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EU-UN cooperation in military crisis management: the experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006

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Claudia Major

**EU-UN cooperation in military
crisis management:
the experience of EUFOR RD
Congo in 2006**



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This Occasional Paper explores the internal and external effectiveness of EU-UN cooperation in the area of military crisis management (MCM). Since the EU carried out its first autonomous military operation in 2003 in DR Congo, it has increasingly engaged in military crisis management. In this context, the Union seeks cooperation with the UN, as a recognised moral and legal authority in international relations. At the same time, the UN, facing a growing number of increasingly complex crises, seeks material support in order to carry out its tasks.

While both the EU and the UN thus publicly support this cooperation, as witness inter alia the increasing institutionalisation of contacts and cooperation in the field, the output seems rather unsatisfactory. It is this apparent contradiction which this Occasional Paper aims to address, namely the coexistence of the ambiguous results of such cooperation alongside both organisations' insistence on its significance.

The issue is of both political and strategic relevance. EU-UN cooperation in MCM lies at the intersection of several challenging and interconnected developments which are liable to surface very quickly and repeatedly on the EU's agenda. The main challenges can be outlined as follows: the changing character of crisis management operations, which are increasingly becoming more complex and integrated operations; the EU's evolution as an effective security actor, underpinned by the development of credible military capabilities; and the growing focus on Africa in international crisis management. Surprisingly, the issue has been the focus of little attention until now. It is in addressing this topic that this paper seeks to contribute to the current debate.

It does so by looking at the 2006 EU military operation EUFOR RD Congo and its cooperation with the UN mission already in the field, MONUC. First, the paper describes the background context by providing a short overview of the development of the current pattern of EU-UN cooperation in both the political and military realms. In the second part, it moves on to outline the basic parameters of EUFOR RD Congo, namely, the background, setting, evolution and outcome of the operation. Building upon that, the third part of the paper analyses the political, institutional and operational functioning of EU-UN cooperation in three categories: political, strategic and operational planning; cooperation in the field; and support and logistics. The paper explores how the particular settings at the political and organisational levels trickle down to cooperation in the field, and how they affect the ability to jointly achieve the mission objectives. Section four presents an evaluation of the cooperation and analyses the factors which condition both the opportunities and limits of cooperation and which characterise the current complex framework for EU-UN cooperation. It shows that the

complex institutional setting and procedures, the different political agendas and a lack of understanding with regard to the objectives, capacities and the functioning of the partner institution affect the planning and conduct of operations. Friction between the institution's central headquarters and the field level impede both internal and bilateral cooperation. The study concludes with an analysis of both the limits and opportunities of future EU-UN cooperation and puts forward policy recommendations for improvement. The recommendations aim to encourage immediate and medium-term effect at the working/operative level as opposed to structural changes in the political and institutional environment, which are more difficult to achieve.

Introduction – The significance of EU-UN cooperation in military crisis management

In the summer of 2006, the European Union launched a military operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The UN had requested the Union's support in assuring the smooth running of the elections in a country which had been ravaged by war for over a decade. The operation was considered a success in that the elections took place without any major incidents. But it also raised questions: How to cooperate with other international actors, mainly the UN? Is the EU able to handle serious military challenges?

The issue of EU-UN cooperation in military crisis management (MCM) has not been the focus of much attention. This is surprising given that both the EU and the UN have repeatedly stated its relevance and cited previous successful examples, such as within Operation *Artemis* in 2003.¹ In the European Security Strategy (ESS), the EU defines effective multilateralism as one of its strategic objectives, with the UN being a key partner.²

However, the two organisations differ considerably in terms of political agendas, objectives, means and institutional procedures. Moreover, military and civilian officials involved in recent operations consider this cooperation to be rather unsatisfying. While claiming that 'lessons identified' from previous operations have only partly been implemented, they also express their concerns about the insufficient incentives to decision-makers to address these deficiencies.³

The ambiguous results of EU-UN cooperation in MCM alongside the concomitant insistence on its importance raise the question of the effectiveness of such operations. To what extent does EU-UN cooperation in MCM work effectively and yield satisfying results? The central aim of this paper is hence to assess and evaluate the external (result-oriented) and internal (process-oriented) effectiveness of EU-UN cooperation in military crisis management in the context of the most recent example of a completed operation, i.e., EUFOR RD Congo 2006.

The issue is both of political and strategic relevance for the EU. EU-UN cooperation in MCM lies at the intersection of several challenging and interconnected developments which are liable to recur frequently on the EU's agenda:

- The changing character of missions: crisis management operations are increasingly characterised as complex peacekeeping operations, i.e. involving different tasks (civilian-military), and as hybrid missions, i.e. involving different institutional actors. Both require increased cooperation and coordination. But if a growing number of actors potentially enhances a mission's legitimacy, their different agendas and natures risk creating obstacles. Moreover, the quality of coordination in MCM also affects civil-military cooperation.
- The EU-UN relationship: The UN is considered the centrepiece of a norm-based world

¹ Council of the European Union, 'Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management', Council document 12510/03 (Presse 266), New York, 24 September 2003; 'A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy', Brussels, 12 December 2003; Joint statement on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management, Berlin, 7 June 2007, available at: www.eu2007.de.

² European Security Strategy, Part II: 'Strategic Objectives'.

³ Federal Ministry of Defence, contributions to the conference 'Military aspects of UN-EU cooperation in crisis management operations in the light of EUFOR RD Congo', Berlin, 19-21 March 2007; Christian Damay, 'La contribution de l'UE à la sécurité du processus électoral en république démocratique du Congo', *Les cahiers de Mars*, no. 191, 2007, pp. 89-92; Interviews in the French and German Ministries of Defence and the EU Council, October-December 2007, February-April 2008.

order anchored in multilateralism, to which the EU subscribes. The EU recognises the UN's authority to confer political legitimacy and legality and has declared its support for the UN. MCM thus provides a clear test case of the EU's commitment in this regard.

- ▶ **EU 'actorness':** The EU's commitment to MCM is a crucial indicator for the EU's development as a security actor in terms of coherence, effectiveness and legitimacy. This includes the capacity for effective EU-internal decision-making.
- ▶ **Capabilities:** To underpin its strategic 'actorness', the EU has set up military capabilities for crisis management, such as the battle-groups (BG). Their further development and strategic role in EU crisis management concepts depend on the success of their deployments. These could particularly take place in UN-related scenarios.
- ▶ **Regional focus of operations:** Whereas the UN focuses on MCM in Africa, the EU/ESDP was reluctant to engage on this continent. If the EU wants to honour its declared commitment to MCM and EU-UN cooperation, it has to increase its commitment in Africa. In December 2007, the EU and Africa engaged in a strategic partnership, thereby acknowledging their interdependence and underlining their commitment to jointly address regional and global challenges. The EU's concerns touch upon topics as various as African security architecture, peacekeep-

ing, resources-related conflicts, development, and reaching the Millennium Development Goals.

These factors of long-term relevance also have short-term policy implications. In January 2008, after a long-winded and rather unsatisfying force generation process, the EU started deploying a bridging military operation in Chad and the Central African Republic.⁴ In February 2008, a rule-of-law mission to Kosovo was launched. All these examples imply forms of EU-UN cooperation.

Consequently, this study seeks to assess the effectiveness of EU-UN cooperation in view of upcoming operations. It does so by analysing political-institutional and operative aspects of EU-UN cooperation within EUFOR RD Congo in 2006.

This study will first outline the development of EU-UN cooperation and describe its current structures. Section two provides an overview of the basic parameters of EUFOR RD Congo and assesses its external effectiveness. Building upon this, section three analyses the internal effectiveness of EU-UN cooperation in three particular fields, namely political decision-making and planning cooperation in the field and support and logistics. The study closes with an overall evaluation of EU-UN cooperation within EUFOR RDC and proposes policy recommendations for improving EU-UN cooperation.

⁴ Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo), 4 February 2008; Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP on the European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic, 15 October 2007.

The increasing institutionalisation of EU-UN cooperation

The EU is the regional organisation that ‘has gone the furthest in its relationship with the UN.’⁵ After being formalised in 2001, the cooperation gained in substance when the EU assumed operational responsibility in 2003. This led the EU to define its framework of cooperation with the UN in military crisis management in 2004.

1.1 *Complementary partners? Evolution and institutionalisation of an EU-UN framework*

Since the 1990s, the UN has been confronted with the changing and increasingly demanding nature of peacekeeping operations as well as their growing number. Although it has developed into a modern peacekeeping agency, the UN desperately lacks the material support of the international community to effectively carry out its tasks. This mainly concerns reliable military capabilities to ease the UN’s overstretch in terms of both quality and quantity. It particularly applies to high-quality assets, such as transport or communication infrastructure, and to high-readiness units. The UN has hence increasingly sought support from regional actors, mainly the EU.

As for the EU, it was the experience of the Balkan wars which led the Union in 1999 to set up ESDP in order to equip itself with the necessary institutional and material resources for effective crisis management. ESDP is conse-

quently not so much about defence, rather than about enabling the EU to autonomously carry out crisis management operations.

In this context, the EU has explicitly alluded to the role of the UN on several occasions. When setting up military capabilities at the Helsinki summit (1999), the EU recognised the ‘primary responsibility of the UN-Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.’⁶ EU capabilities can therefore be deployed for operations requested by the UN. In terms of financial support, the EU Member States contribute a crucial almost 40% to the UN budget and the special budget for peacekeeping operations.⁷ In the ESS, the Union has explicitly committed itself to effective multilateralism and to supporting the UN.

Hence, at first glance, there is mutual interest in cooperation. The EU can offer financial support and can provide the military capabilities that the UN does not have. In exchange, the UN can provide the EU with the political legitimacy and legal endorsement for its operations. This legitimacy is crucial for many EU Member States: Ireland’s ‘triple lock’ system requires that any military operation be endorsed by a UN mandate, approved by the parliament and agreed within the government. In Germany and the Netherlands, each military deployment needs to be authorised by the parliament.

First institutionalisation since 2001

As a result of this mutual interest, the two organisations have increasingly formalised their cooperation. In 2001, a ‘platform for intensified coop-

⁵ Thierry Tardy, ‘EU-UN cooperation in peacekeeping: a promising relationship in a constrained environment’, in Martin Ortega (ed.), ‘The EU and the UN – Partners in effective multilateralism’, *Chaillot Paper* no. 78, EUISS, Paris, June 2005, pp. 49-68, p. 50.

⁶ Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999, Presidency conclusions, article 24.

⁷ Peter Schmidt, ‘La PESD et l’ONU: un couple parfait?’, in *Politique étrangère*, no. 3, 2005, pp. 613-24, pp. 616-17.

eration' was proposed by the EU Council, which envisaged four dimensions of cooperation:⁸

- EU ministerial-level meetings with the UN Secretary-General.
- Meetings and contacts between the EU High Representative (EU HR) and the External Relations Commissioner and the UN Secretary General (UNSG) and the UN Deputy Secretary-General.
- Political and Security Committee (PSC) meetings with the UN Deputy Secretary-General and Under-Secretaries-General, and other levels and formats as appropriate.
- Contacts of the Council Secretariat and the Commission with the UN Secretariat.

However, these contacts did not lead to very substantial interaction. Thus, in January 2003, task forces were set up to co-ordinate the interaction between the two organisations at the appropriate levels. Consequently, DG EIX dealing with civilian crisis management and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) increasingly cooperated with the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO). The EU Policy Unit defined the Office of the Assistant Secretary General for Europe in the UN Department for Political Affairs (UNDPA) as a counterpart.⁹ This was accompanied by a strengthening of the liaison officers and the establishment of a joint steering committee which meets twice a year.

Further developments since 2003

These contacts concentrated mainly on information exchange. Only when the EU started to assume operational responsibility in 2003, the EU-UN relationship gained more substance. In this regard, two examples in 2003 can be consid-

ered as breakthroughs: the EU takeover of the UN police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the deployment of an EU force in DR Congo (Operation *Artemis*). Both operations considerably relieved the UN. But *Artemis* in particular also boosted the EU's self-confidence. The operation set the standard for a great number of initiatives in ESDP.¹⁰

Immediately after their first experience of military cooperation within *Artemis*, the EU and the UN signed the Joint declaration on UN-EU cooperation in crisis management (September 2003). It affirms that the 'primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security rests with the UN Security Council [...]'¹¹ In parallel, the EU 'reasserts its commitment to contribute to the objectives of the United Nations in crisis management.' Calling for practical steps to further cooperation, the declaration establishes a joint consultative mechanism at working level to examine ways to enhance mutual co-ordination and compatibility in four areas: planning, training, communication and best practices.

This commitment was reiterated in the ESS in December 2003. Accordingly, 'strengthening the UN, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority'. Moreover, the EU commits to reinforcing its cooperation with the UN to assist countries emerging from conflicts, and to enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis management situations.

Steps towards implementation in 2004

The implementation of these commitments with regard to military crisis management was addressed in 2004 by the European Council.¹² This document remains up until today the basic

⁸ EU General Affairs Council, 2356th Council meeting, Luxembourg, 11-12 June 2001; Presidency Report on ESDP, European Council, 14-15 December 2001, par. 22.

⁹ Alexandra Novosseloff, *EU-UN Partnership in Crisis Management: Developments and Prospects*, International Peace Academy, New York, June 2004.

¹⁰ It served for example as a blueprint for the Battlegroup initiative. See Gustav Lindstrom, 'Enter the EU Battlegroups', *Chaillot Paper* no. 97, EUISS, Paris, February 2007 and Christian Mölling, 'EU-Battlegroups. Stand und Probleme der Umsetzung in Deutschland und für die EU', SWP Diskussionspapier, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, March 2007.

¹¹ Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management, op. cit. in note 1.

¹² Presidency Report on ESDP, Annex II, European Council, 17-18 June 2004.

framework for cooperation. It identifies two main options:

- (1) provision of national military capabilities in the framework of a UN operation, whereby the decision to provide capabilities remains a national responsibility.
- (2) an EU operation in answer to a UN request. This implies the launching and conduct of an EU operation in support of the UN and under the political control and strategic direction of the EU. The EU could conduct these operations as stand-alone operations or take responsibility for a specific component within the structure of a UN mission ('module approach').

In addition, the declaration pays particular attention to rapid response. Two broad categories of rapid response operations in support of the UN have been identified:

- (1) the 'bridging model', which aims at providing the UN with the time to mount a new operation or to reorganise an existing one;
- (2) the 'standby model' in which the EU would provide an 'over-the-horizon reserve' or an 'extraction force' in support of the UN.

In conclusion, the document insists on the necessity for better mutual understanding as a precondition for successful cooperation and calls for the further implementation of the cooperation settings.

Nevertheless, the same 2004 declaration also sets clear limits to EU-UN cooperation. It insists that:

- the EU retains political control and strategic direction of any operation via the PSC.
- Cooperation takes place on a case-by-case

basis, there would be no automatic involvement.

- The EU does not constitute a pool of forces but can only intervene by conducting specific missions, and there would be no earmarked forces or stand-by arrangements.

Current cooperation settings in place

As a result of the formalisation that has taken place over the last few years, the following cooperation structures are now in place:¹³

- the steering committee meets twice a year.
- contacts between the secretariats have been established at different levels, particularly between UNDPKO, UNDP, EU DGE IX, DGE VIII, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) Unit, and the EUMS.
- training standards and modules have been discussed.
- UN personnel have participated in EU training courses.
- Dialogue on planning and EU-UN cooperation has taken place, such as in the EU-UN Exercise Study EST 05 in April 2005.¹⁴

The most recent development in the EU-UN relationship is the joint statement of June 2007.¹⁵ It reaffirms the 'determination to work together in the area of crisis management'. After a review of the achievements of previous years, the document calls for enhancing mutual cooperation and coordination in precise areas, such as senior level political dialogue, coordination and cooperation mechanisms in crises where both are engaged, and systematic lessons learned.

¹³ Thierry Tardy, *op. cit.* in note 5, p. 58.

¹⁴ EU-UN Exercise Study – EST 05, 13-15 April 2005, Statement to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) by H.E. Ambassador J.-M. Hocheit, permanent representative of Luxembourg to the United Nations, on behalf of the European Union, New York, 31 January 2005. Available at: www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/es/article_4291_es.htm.

¹⁵ Joint Statement on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management, Brussels, 7 June 2007. Available at: <http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/EU-UNstatmntoncrsmngmnt.pdf>.

Main stages of the institutionalisation of EU-UN cooperation

YEAR	COOPERATION STEPS	Content
2003	Joint declaration on UN-EU cooperation in Crisis Management	Welcomes EU-UN cooperation in civilian and military crisis management and recognises progress in recent years. Primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security rests with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Calls for further practical steps to enhance cooperation. Establishes joint consultative mechanisms at working level to enhance coordination in the areas of: planning, training, communication, best practice.
2003	European Security Strategy	The EU strives for a world order based on effective multi-lateralism. Commits to strengthen the UN, reinforce the cooperation, and support the UN in crisis management.
2004	EU-UN cooperation in Military Crisis Management Operations. Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration	EU Member States decide to provide military capabilities for UN operations or EU operations under UN mandate (on UN request). Two main categories of operations: ‘bridging model’ and ‘stand-by force’. EU retains political control and strategic direction over operations. EU decides on a case-by-case basis.
2007	Joint statement on UN-EU cooperation in Crisis Management	Reaffirms determination to cooperate in crisis management. Calls to enhance cooperation and coordination in specific areas.

1.2 Inter-institutional settings: preconditions for successful cooperation in the field?

These steps established a formal inter-institutional framework of cooperation. But a detailed assessment reveals that several issues have not been addressed. There are two major shortfalls, namely different interpretations of the current settings and several missing links within the cooperation framework.

The existing declarations fall short of substance for assuring effectiveness in cooperative military crisis management operations. In particular, the 2004 EU document sets clear limits to this cooperation. It does so by codifying for example the political control and strategic direc-

tion of any operation by the PSC and by insisting on a case-by-case decision for deployments.

Likewise, the 2007 statement addresses several points which had already been raised in the 2003 joint EU-UN declaration. The 2007 statement calls for the ‘pursuit of the establishment of specific coordination and cooperation mechanisms for crisis situations’ where both the UN and the EU are engaged, and for ‘systematic EU/UN joint lessons learned exercises.’ By reiterating topics which had already been raised four years earlier, the 2007 statement seems to outline shortcomings which have not yet been efficiently addressed.

Moreover, although cooperation at the political-institutional level has been increasingly institutionalised, the military-operational dimension has received little attention. Several crucial aspects which continuously pose prob-

lems in combined military operations have not been addressed. These are mainly technical standards, communication, planning, logistics and different aspects of interoperability.¹⁶ A particularly thorny topic that has been ignored concerns the exchange of confidential information. The UN does not have a system or procedure to deal with classified information. But operative cooperation is seriously affected by that, as the EU-NATO relationship shows.¹⁷

This ambiguous picture can be partly explained by the changing EU-UN relationship in recent years. The increasing development of autonomous crisis management capabilities led the EU to rethink its relationship with the UN in terms of both the UN's role as legitimising body and the terms of participation in peacekeeping operations. According to the UN, its universal character provides it with a primary role when compared to a regional organisation such as the EU.¹⁸ But while recognising the primacy of the UN, the EU insists upon its political and strategic autonomy.¹⁹ Besides, as one of the biggest financial contributors, the EU is interested in seeing its contribution generating effective outcomes and in shaping the agenda of peacekeeping.

In fact, the EU determines where to intervene and how by referring to a multitude of external and internal factors.²⁰ If EU Member States increasingly participate in UN *mandated* missions, they have almost disappeared from UN-*led* missions.²¹ This preference for carrying out operations through the EU rather than through

the UN settings allows the EU Member States to keep control over their armed forces and the mission objectives. But it restricts UN deployments. While ESDP missions have clearly supported the UN in critical moments, such as with Operation *Artemis*, the EU has made it clear that it will not automatically engage in operations requested by the UN. Ultimately, the EU-UN relationship seems to be determined more by the EU's agenda and willingness to act than by the UN's needs. The overlap between what the UN wants and what the EU is willing to give defines the limits of their cooperation.

This situation is further complicated by the fact that the EU is not a unitary actor. ESDP builds on intergovernmental and unanimous decision-making. Hence, Member States strongly influence both the decision-making within the EU and the outcome of MCM operations in so far as their political will and material commitment are crucial for the success of operations. This is particularly valid at a time when all European countries face serious resource crunches and overstretch of their military capabilities. Recent studies have however shown that the Member States' unwillingness to pledge forces to European operations does not reflect a general reluctance to deploy forces.²² Troops deployed in national operations, such as in Sierra Leone (UK), Chad or Ivory Coast (France) are yet another expression of the Member States' desire to keep control over their armed forces.

¹⁶ Michael Codner, 'Hanging Together: Military Interoperability in an Era of Technical Innovation', RUSI *Whitehall Paper* no. 56, 2000.

¹⁷ It affects formal EU-NATO cooperation but particularly practical cooperation such as in Kosovo and Afghanistan. For the background and current challenges see Stephanie Hofmann and Christopher Reynolds, 'EU-NATO Relations: Time to Thaw the "Frozen Conflict"', SWP Comments 2007/C 12, Berlin, June 2007.

¹⁸ See for example Alexandra Novosseloff, 'La coopération entre l'Organisation des Nations Unies et les institutions européennes de sécurité. Principes et perspectives', in *Annuaire français des relations internationales*, vol. 11, 2001, pp. 594-612.

¹⁹ Presidency Report, on ESDP, op. cit. in note 12.

²⁰ Giovanna Bono, 'Introduction: The role of the EU in External Crisis Management', in *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 11, no. 3, Autumn 2004, pp. 395-403.

²¹ Peter Schmidt, 'La PESD et l'ONU: un couple parfait?', op. cit. in note 7, p. 614; UNDPKO, 'Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations', available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2007/may07_2.pdf; UNDPKO, 'UN Mission's Summary detailed by Country', Month of Report, 31 May 2007, available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2007/may07_3.pdf.

²² Bastian Giegerich and William Wallace, 'Not such a soft power: the external deployment of European forces', *Survival*, vol. 46 no. 2, Summer 2004, pp. 163-82.

EUFOR RD Congo 2006: course and context at a glance

In December 2005, the UN invited the EU to consider the possibility of deploying a military force to DR Congo in order to assist the UN mission MONUC²³ during the election process, planned for summer 2006.²⁴ This request emanated as part of the debate within the UN on the need for reserve forces to reinforce peacekeeping operations during sensitive periods. It was exactly what the UN requested the EU to provide: targeted support at a critical juncture in the transition process, namely the elections.

The resulting operation EUFOR was an autonomous military operation carried out within the framework of ESDP. It followed a UN request and was conducted in full agreement with the Congolese government. The UNSC Resolution 1671 (25 April 2006) provided the EU with a clear mandate in accordance with international law.²⁵

2.1 The background: UN and EU commitment to the Great Lakes Region

Since the early 1990s, the African Great Lakes region²⁶ has been troubled by interlocking civil wars, inter-state conflict and flawed democratic transitions. An estimated 4 million Congolese have died as a result of the conflict, and a high number are still displaced. Concerted efforts of the international community in cooperation with local players led to the Lusaka Accord (1999) and the Pretoria and Sun City agreements (2002), which engaged the region in a transition process. In 1999, the UNSC established a mission, MONUC, to facilitate the implementation of the Lusaka Accord and the subsequent transition process.²⁷ The international support for political aspects of the transition process has been led by the International Committee to Assist the Transition (CIAT).²⁸ The main goal was to reach sustainable conflict solution as a precondition for a transition towards peace, stability and development. An important step in this process was the scheduling of democratic elections for 2006.

With a budget exceeding one billion dollars and approximately 18,380 personnel,²⁹ MONUC is the largest and most expensive mission in the UNDPKO.³⁰ Its mandate can be divided into four phases:

²³ Mission de l'Organisation des Nations unies en République démocratique du Congo = MONUC.

²⁴ Letter from the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations to the presidency of the European Union, 27 December 2005, S/2006/219.

²⁵ UN Resolution 1671 (2006), S/RES/1671, 25 April 2006.

²⁶ The African Great Lakes region is usually defined as comprising the DRC, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania.

²⁷ Security Council Resolution 1279 (1999) on the Establishment of MONUC, S/RES/1279, 30 November 1999.

²⁸ CIAT: Comité international d'Accompagnement de la Transition. It was set up following the signature of the peace agreement in Pretoria in December 2002 to support the democratic transition process in DRC. It is composed of the five permanent Member States of the UNSC (China, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Russia), South Africa, Angola, Belgium, Canada, Gabon, Zambia, the African Union, the EU and MONUC.

²⁹ Figures as of 31 January 2008: 18,385, out of which 16,612 soldiers, 737 military observers, 1,036 police. See: http://www.un.org/french/peace/peace/cu_mission/monuc/monucF.htm.

³⁰ See: www.monuc.org.

- ▶ Phase 1 involved forcibly implementing the ceasefire agreement.
- ▶ Phase 2 involved its monitoring and the reporting of any violations.
- ▶ Phase 3, still underway, centres on the DDRRR (disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration) process.
- ▶ Phase 4 includes facilitating the transition towards the organisation of credible elections.

MONUC considerably increased in numbers since its inception in 1999 while also acquiring a more robust mandate.³¹ It started modestly in 1999 with 90 members.³² Faced with an increasing number of violent crises, the UN gradually expanded MONUC up to the current 18,000 troops and placed the mission under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Commanded by General Babacar Gaye, MONUC is mainly based in the east of the country, where the situation is the most volatile.

In addition to MONUC, other UN agencies are involved in humanitarian assistance, economic and social development, health, state and security sector reform. The UN Secretary's General's Special Representative (UNSR), Ambassador William Lacey Swing, is responsible for civilian matters. He closely cooperates with Force Commander Gaye.

Also the EU gives considerable support to the transition process. In terms of diplomatic support, the EU is a member of the CIAT. SG/HR Javier Solana, Development Commissioner Louis Michel and EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the Great Lakes region, Aldo Ajello, played an important role in moving the transition process forward at critical junctures. The EU also offers institutional and technical support. Under the Cotonou Agreement, which encapsulates the

EC's cooperation with DRC since 2002, some 750 million euro has been provided for institution-building, macro-economic support and the fight against poverty. Overall, the EU is the largest donor of official humanitarian aid.³³

Besides, in addition to the military operation *Artemis* (2003), three civilian ESDP missions have been deployed to DRC. From 2005-2007, EUPOL Kinshasa provided a framework and advice for the training of Congolese police forces. Since 2007, it has been followed by EUPOL RD Congo whose main tasks consist in supporting and assisting the Congolese authorities in reforming the security sector with regard to the police and its interaction with the justice sector.³⁴ In addition, EUSEC RD Congo, launched in 2005 and still ongoing, provides advice and assistance to the Congolese authorities in charge of security while ensuring the promotion of policies compatible with human rights and international humanitarian law, democratic standards, principles of good public management, transparency and observance of the rule of law.³⁵

The DRC has increasingly become a showcase for the capacity of the international community to manage the process of reconstruction and nation building from start to finish. Hence the positive response of the EU to the UN request for support in DRC fitted with the broader commitment of the EU and of the international community at large. Supporting the UN, however, was not the only reason that led the EU to deploy EUFOR. The Union also welcomed the operation for internal political purposes. EUFOR afforded an opportunity to show the EU flag and to demonstrate the EU's military capabilities and autonomy by carrying out a mission without recourse to NATO assets (Berlin Plus), as the EU had already done in 2003 (*Artemis*).

³¹ http://www.un.org/french/peace/peace/cu_mission/monuc/monucM.htm, S/RES/1291 (2000) makes MONUC a Chapter VII mission; see also Xavier Zeebroek, *Mais que fait la MONUC ?*, GRIP, Brussels, 4 April 2007.

³² Security Council Resolution 1258, 6 August 1999, welcoming the Ceasefire Agreement and authorising the deployment of UN liaison personnel, S/RES/1258 (1999).

³³ Cornelis Wittebrod, 'Protecting the humanitarian space in Africa', in *The EU's Africa Strategy: What are the lessons of the Congo Mission?*, SDA Discussion Paper, 2007, pp. 24-26, p.24. The Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office has been a major contributor in terms of humanitarian aid over the last decade. In 2006, it had allocated 45 million euro to DRC from the 2006 EU general budget for humanitarian aid. ECHO Decision 2006. See : http://ec.europa.eu/echo/information/decisions/2006_en.htm.

³⁴ EUPOL RD Congo. See: www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=1303&lang=en.

³⁵ EUSEC RD Congo. See: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=909&lang=EN&mode=g.

2.2 EUFOR RD Congo: the operation's parameters and objectives³⁶

Following the December 2005 request, the EU Council approved in March 2006 an option paper to express possible EU support to MONUC and decided to launch the military planning process.³⁷ The Council also took note of the availability of an Operational Headquarters (OHQ) in Potsdam. A few days later, the EU presidency confirmed the principles of EU military support to MONUC.

On 25 April 2006, the UNSC adopted the resolution S/RES/1671 (2006), thereby authorising the EU to deploy forces in DR Congo to support MONUC during the election process. EUFOR RD Congo was deployed under Chapter VII and was charged with the following tasks:

- 'to support MONUC to stabilise a situation, in case MONUC faces serious difficulties in fulfilling its mandate within its existing capabilities.
- to contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence in the areas of its deployment, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo.
- to contribute to airport protection in Kinshasa.
- to ensure the security and freedom of movement of the personnel as well as the protection of the installations of EUFOR Congo.
- to execute operations of limited character in order to extract individuals in danger'.³⁸

Subsequently, on 27 April 2006, the EU Council adopted the Joint Action (JA) 2006/319/CFSP

which formed the EU legal basis of the operation and set out its framework.³⁹ EUFOR was to be conducted in 'full agreement with the authorities of the DRC and in close coordination with them and MONUC'. The JA refers to the tasks outlined in UNSC Resolution 1671; that is, mainly deterrence and evacuation. Lieutenant General Karlheinz Viereck (Germany) was appointed EU Operation Commander (OpCdr). Major General Christian Damay (France) was appointed EU Force Commander (FCdr).

According to the JA, the PSC would exercise the political control and strategic direction of EUFOR. This includes the power to 'amend the planning documents, including the Operation Plan, the Chain of Command and the Rules of Engagement'.⁴⁰ The JA called for close coordination and cooperation with the UN.⁴¹ According to the terms of the JA, the SG/HR, assisted by the EUSR and in close cooperation with the EU Presidency, shall act as 'primary point of contact' with the UN, the authorities of DRC and other relevant actors. The EU OpCdr shall cooperate, in close coordination with the SG/HR, with UNDKPO and MONUC. The EU FCdr shall, in coordination with the EUSR and the heads of mission of EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC RD Congo, maintain close contact with MONUC, local authorities and other international actors. These arrangements were finalised by an exchange of letters between the EU SG/HR Javier Solana and the UNSG Kofi Annan in July 2006.

The EU Council launched the operation on 12 June 2006.⁴² The force was composed of three pillars:

- (1) an advance element deployed in Kinshasa
- (2) an on-call force stationed in Libreville/Gabon
- (3) a strategic reserve in Europe.

³⁶ See also Report of the Council of the EU to the UN, Brussels, 10 January 2007, DG E VIII, 5139/07.

³⁷ Council of the European Union, 'République démocratique du Congo: le Conseil lance la planification en vue d'une opération de l'UE en soutien de la MONUC pendant les processus électoral', 7762/06 (Presse 88), Brussels, 23 March 2006. See also Karlheinz Viereck, 'EUFOR RD Congo. Europe can do it', *Truppendienst* 3/2007, pp. 253-58, p. 254.

³⁸ UN Resolution 1671 (2006), 25 April 2006, p. 3.

³⁹ Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP, 'EU military operation in support of the MONUC during the election process in DR Congo', 8761/06 (Presse 121), Luxembourg, 27 April 2006.

⁴⁰ Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP, article 6.1.

⁴¹ Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP, article 9.

⁴² Council of the European Union, 'EU military operation in support of the MONUC during the election process in RD Congo', 10366/06 (Presse 180), Luxembourg, 12 June 2006.

By keeping an over-the-horizon force in Gabon, EUFOR intended to simultaneously ensure a deterrent capacity while avoiding an unnecessary heavy military presence in Kinshasa.

Pillars one and two involved 2,400 troops drawn from 21 EU Member States plus Turkey. The biggest contributors were France (1,090 troops), Germany (780), Spain (130), Poland (130), Belgium (60) and Sweden (55).⁴³ If one adds the third pillar, the strategic reserve in Europe, EUFOR had overall at its disposal about 4,000 troops, stationed in DRC, Gabon, France and Germany, and Chad-based air support.⁴⁴ The rapid reaction capability within EUFOR was mainly composed of the Spanish Legion's *Grupo Táctico Valenzuela*, while a Polish military police contingent was in charge of protecting the EUFOR headquarters and base. Special forces provided by France (two companies), Sweden (one company) and Portugal (25 troops) further strengthened EUFOR's deterrent, reaction and intervention capabilities.

The chain of command (CoC) set up for this operation comprised three levels. The PSC maintained the overall political guidance and strategic control. At the military strategic level, the German-led OHQ in Potsdam assured the military planning and command of the operation. The FHQ, acting at the operational level, was located in Kinshasa at the N'Dolo airfield.

In terms of geographical scope, EUFOR focused on Kinshasa, but on request it was allowed to intervene in the whole area of DRC. There were, however, particular national provisions restricting the geographical scope of deployment for the different units within EUFOR. The German and the Spanish units were for example restricted to the area of Kinshasa.

The European chain of command



As to the timeframe, EUFOR was deployed for 4 months, 30 July-30 November 2006, starting with the first round of the elections. Overall, including pre-deployment and withdrawal phases, EUFOR was present about 6 months in DRC. It remained in Congo until December, but its intervention capacity was limited to self defence and to assistance to persons in danger.

The question of extending EUFOR's mandate was raised several times. Particularly France and Belgium wished to extend the operation as a precaution against the danger of riots after the withdrawal of EUFOR.⁴⁵ However, although the European authorities in the field (national ambassadors, EUSR, EUFOR, EUPOL, EUSEC, the Commission) agreed that the timing of the withdrawal process was unfortunate, Germany, and parts of the military personnel, insisted on the departure going ahead as originally scheduled. The operation was not extended.⁴⁶

⁴³ Ministère de la Défense, 'Opération EUFOR RD Congo - BENGAL'. See: www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/layout/set/popup/layout/set/popup/layout/set/popup/content/view/full/24657.

⁴⁴ France offered its existing structures in Africa to support EUFOR, see Ministère de la Défense, 'Opération EUFOR RD Congo - BENGAL'.

⁴⁵ Matthias Dembinski, Christian Foerster, *Die EU als Partnerin der Vereinten Nationen bei der Friedenssicherung. Zwischen universalen Normen und partikularen Interessen*, HSK-Report 7/2007, p. 28.

⁴⁶ See also European Parliament, Chairman's report, Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Security and Defence, 'Visit of the ad hoc delegation to Kinshasa (RDC)', Brussels, 6-9 November 2006; 'European Union operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) - reply to the Annual report of the Council', Report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Ignació Cosido Gutiérrez, Assembly of Western European Union, The Interparliamentary European Security and Defence Assembly, Fifty-second session, Doc A/1954, 29 December 2006.

Concerning the financing, EUFOR drew on national contributions and common costs financed via ATHENA.⁴⁷ Common costs relate mainly to headquarters and to command, control, communications and information (C³I) systems. The overall cost of EUFOR was about 100 million euro. The exact sum is difficult to assess as it includes expenditure dealt with by the Member States at the national level which have not yet been comprehensively assessed.

murdered former president Kabila, and vice president Jean Pierre Bemba. After the first round of the presidential elections on 30 July 2006 did not yield a winner, a second round took place on 29 October 2006. As a result, the Congolese Supreme Court of Justice declared Joseph Kabila president of DRC with 58.05% of the votes and rejected the complaint filed by unsuccessful candidate Bemba. Kabila was inaugurated as president on 6 December 2006.

Factsheet EUFOR RD Congo

Code Name	EUFOR RD Congo
Legal basis/Mandate	UN Resolution 1671 (2006), 25 April 2006 EU Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP, 27 April 2006
Task	Support MONUC in its stabilising role; deterrence; protection of civilians; airport protection; evacuation
Scope	Focus on Kinshasa, on request all of DRC; but geographic restrictions to Kinshasa for some units ('national caveats')
Timeframe:	Four months, 30 July 2006 – 30 November 2006 (overall presence five-six months including pre-deployment and withdrawal)
Operations Commander	Karlheinz Viereck (Germany), in Potsdam/Germany
Force Commander	Christian Damay (France), in Kinshasa/DRC
Forces involved	2,400 troops divided into an advance element in Kinshasa and on-call force in Gabon/Libreville, completed by a strategic reserve in Europe 21 contributing states, 18 in DRC (France and Germany as main actors), including third countries (mainly Turkey) ⁴⁸
Cost	Overall approx 100 million euro
Mode of financing	Member States (national) and ATHENA

2.3 The course of the operation

The presidential and parliamentary elections in DR Congo took place simultaneously. The best placed candidates for the presidential elections were outgoing president Joseph Kabila, son of

With some exceptions, EUFOR's activities were concentrated in Kinshasa. Conducted in close cooperation with MONUC as well as EUPOL, EUFOR's activities aimed to assure its visibility and credibility in order to dissuade potential attacks on the electoral process and to

⁴⁷ ATHENA is complementary to the principle of 'costs lie where they fall' which means that individual countries pay for their forces and only 'common' investments are funded by the EU. ATHENA develops a mechanism by using a gross domestic product calculation to cover the common costs of military operations. EU Council Secretariat Factsheet, 'Financing of ESDP operations', Brussels, June 2007, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ATHENA_june_2007.pdf.

⁴⁸ Turkey contributed *inter alia* a staff officer in Potsdam and a C-130 H transport plane. In August 2006, the EU reached an agreement with Switzerland on its participation, mainly liaison officers. Report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Ignació Cosido Gutiérrez, Assembly of Western European Union; Doc A/1954, 29 December 2006: Art 117.

reassure the population. Overall, EUFOR did not face serious military challenges. It engaged however in stabilising tasks on three occasions: in August, after the announcement of the results of the first round in the elections; in September when Bemba's TV station was attacked, and in November when the final results were announced.⁴⁹

The incidents with the greatest potential for destabilisation occurred on 20-22 August 2006.⁵⁰ In response to the request from MONUC, EUFOR intervened in cooperation with MONUC when violent confrontations followed the announcement of the results of the first round of the presidential elections. The main intervention took place when vice president and presidential candidate Jean Pierre Bemba's HQ came under attack from elements of the presidential guards. At that moment, Bemba was receiving the members of CIAT, which regroups *inter alia* the ambassadors of the five permanent members of the UNSC.

The concerted intervention of MONUC and EUFOR made it possible to separate the conflict parties and brought the CIAT representatives to safety. About 130 Spanish soldiers participated in the operation, the only effective combat units in Kinshasa at the time.⁵¹ Additional forces were brought in from Gabon.

2.4 The result of the operation – assessing external effectiveness

EUFOR clearly fulfilled its mandate: it successfully supported MONUC in securing the election process in DRC. The operation hence displayed external effectiveness. Moreover, EUFOR did not suffer casualties. Except during the August events, it was not involved in violent incidents.

Already during the operation, EUFOR's deployment was considered a success by the EU and some observers.⁵² According to EU SG/HR Solana, the operation has been 'a success, both in the way it has been conducted and in its contribution to the overall conclusion of the transition in DRC'.⁵³ During the August incidents, EUFOR was able to transform into a military deterrent force and demonstrated the capacity to react rapidly. Overall, in close cooperation with MONUC, EUFOR played a decisive role in limiting the number of incidents and in containing the potential spread of violence at sensitive moments in the election process.

However, other international observers, particularly those who were based in DRC, are more cautious.⁵⁴ While the EU considers EUFOR's role in the August incidents a successful example of quick and efficient intervention, others, such as the International Crisis Group, claimed that 'neither the MONUC nor EU troops in Kinshasa acted quickly enough to prevent the August violence from escalating'.⁵⁵ Moreover, while recognising that EUFOR fulfilled its mandate in terms of assuring the elections, they argue that EUFOR would not have been able to

⁴⁹ For an overview of EUFOR's interventions during the deployment see: 'Les missions d'EUFOR RD Congo' at the French MOD. Available at: www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/layout/set/popup/layout/set/popup/content/view/full/32700. See also Karlheinz Viereck, 'EUFOR RD Congo. Europe can do it', op. cit. in note 37, p. 256; Interviews in the French MOD and the European Council, February 2008.

⁵⁰ See also Report 5139/07 of the Council of the EU to the PSC, Brussels, 10 January 2007, DG E VIII, 5139/07.

⁵¹ An additional 130 Polish military police also stationed in Kinshasa were securing EUFOR facilities.

⁵² UN Security Council, Presentation by Javier Solana, EUHR for CFSP, on the Democratic Republic of Congo/EUFOR, New York, 9 January 2007, S005/07; Summary of remarks by Javier Solana, Informal Meeting of the EU defence ministers. Levi, Finland, 3 October 2006, S273/06; Hans-Georg Erhardt, 'Nichts wie weg? Zum Ende des EU Militäreinsatzes im Kongo', *Hamburger Informationen zur Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik*, 41/2006, December 2006; Security and Defence Agenda, *The EU's Africa Strategy: What are the lessons of the Congo Mission?*, SDA Discussion Paper, Brussels 2007.

⁵³ UN Security Council, Presentation by Javier Solana, EUHR for CFSP, on the Democratic Republic of Congo/EUFOR, op.cit. in note 52.

⁵⁴ Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, 'Lessons learned from the Artemis and EUFOR operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo', in *The EU's Africa Strategy*, op. cit. in note 52, pp. 32-33; International Crisis Group, 'Securing Congo's Elections: Lessons from the Kinshasa Showdown', *Africa Briefing* no. 42, 2 October 2006.

⁵⁵ International Crisis Group, 'Securing Congo's Elections: Lessons from the Kinshasa Showdown', p. 4; see also Espoir pour tous, 'La bataille de Kinshasa : MONUC et EUFOR impuissants ?', 23 August 2006, available at: <http://www.societecivile.cd/node/3032>.

confront bigger military challenges. More importantly, they are critical of the fact that the limited timeframe affected the dissuasive character of the mission.

These comments echo the criticism voiced prior to the operation. European observers called EUFOR an inappropriate 'cosmetic operation', which had more to do with European form than African substance, and more with rhetoric than with relevant action.⁵⁶ From this point of view, EUFOR fitted more with what the EU had to offer than what the DRC and the UN needed. The fact that the operation was geographically restricted to Kinshasa, the timeframe, the troop numbers and the terms of mandate are usually quoted to demonstrate the 'cosmetic character' of EUFOR.

These allegations are certainly valid in that to substantially support the transition process, a larger deployment, with a longer timeframe and a different mandate, would have been necessary. In fact, while EUFOR certainly fulfilled its mission and allowed the EU to gain greater visibility and international recognition, it was less decisive in influencing the long-term political situation in DRC. Seemingly, the newly installed Congolese president was merely awaiting EUFOR's departure to deal with the opposition. In March 2007, shortly after the last European units left, Kabila's Republican Guard attacked

the personnel charged with protecting the residence of unsuccessful candidate and opposition leader Bemba in the very heart of Kinshasa. The clashes reached a much higher intensity than those of August 2006, causing around 300 deaths.⁵⁷ Bemba escaped and MONUC escorted him later on to the airport from which he departed into exile.

Nevertheless, bearing in mind EUFOR's role and mandate, this criticism seems to miss the point. The EU is very committed in DRC, in political, economic, technical, diplomatic and also military terms. These different dimensions of the EU should certainly be brought under a more effective single strategy. But one mission, EUFOR, can neither compensate for this shortcoming nor can it be criticised for not doing so. EUFOR was neither supposed to replace MONUC nor to assure in a long-term perspective the overall transition process in DRC. It was set up to support MONUC at a specific moment in time, with MONUC remaining in charge of the overall situation. The political and symbolic relevance of EUFOR was surely prominent with a view to showing the EU's capacity to intervene militarily for the benefit of international security. But this does not alter the fact that EUFOR indeed fulfilled its mandate as outlined in the UNSC Resolution and the JA and hence clearly successfully carried out its task.

⁵⁶ Jean-Yves Haine and Bastian Giegerich, 'In Congo, a cosmetic EU operation', *International Herald Tribune*, 12 June 2006.

⁵⁷ United Nations Human Rights Office, 'Serious Human Rights violations committed in aftermath of Kinshasa events of March 2006', 7 January 2008. Available at: www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newsID=16401.

The EU-UN cooperation process in the field: assessing internal effectiveness

Although the external effectiveness, that is, the fulfilment of EUFOR's mandate, has been acknowledged, criticisms have been raised regarding the mission's internal effectiveness, that is, effective EU-UN cooperation in the run-up to and during the operation.

Several observers and participants raised concerns regarding the effectiveness of the cooperation framework with the UN, but also regarding EUFOR's general operational parameters.⁵⁸ From their standpoint, EUFOR was lucky not to have had to face serious military challenges. They also point to the personal leadership of the FCdr which enabled the mission to overcome the problems posed by inadequate structures and facilities. Such statements do not paint an encouraging picture for upcoming EU-UN cooperation, for which however both organisations call. Consequently, this chapter investigates how EU-UN cooperation worked in practice, assesses its outcome, and defines shortcomings in the cooperation settings.

The cooperation between the EU/EUFOR and the UN/MONUC will be analysed in three areas. They correspond to the criteria which usually apply to the assessment of cooperation in multilateral military operations:

- Political decision-making and planning process prior to and during the operation.
- Cooperation in the field.
- Support and logistics.

3.1 Overall planning process

The political planning and decision-making processes include the definition of the mandate and of the force to be generated. In this case it involved three groups of actors, namely the UN, the EU and the EU Member States.⁵⁹

These processes were strongly conditioned by the slow intergovernmental procedures in the EU. This was mainly due to the reluctance of the Member States to provide the necessary capabilities and infrastructure. However, the timely use of existing EU-UN consultation mechanisms prior to the UN request would have also made it possible to prepare and hence to ease these procedures.

The political-strategic level

It is interesting to note that the UN request in December 2005 was communicated directly to the EU presidency, thereby bypassing the consultation mechanisms put in place since 2001 precisely to prepare such cooperation.⁶⁰ Although the UN request certainly fitted in with both the long-term commitment of the EU in the Great Lakes region and the Union's engagement in EU-UN cooperation, it was hence greeted with some surprise by the outgoing and incoming EU presidencies.

The UN request was followed by a series of

⁵⁸ Christian Damay, 'La contribution de l'UE à la sécurité du processus électoral en république démocratique du Congo', op. cit. in note 3; Christian Damay, 'Military aspects of UN-EU cooperation in crisis management operations in the light of EUFOR RD Congo', intervention, conference of the Bundesministerium des Verteidigung Berlin, 19-21 March 2007; European Parliament, Chairman's report, Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Security and Defence, Visit of the ad hoc delegation to Kinshasa (DRC), 6-9 November 2006; interview, French and German Ministries of Defence, November 2007-April 2008.

⁵⁹ For the sake of thoroughness it should be added that not all 26, but mainly the bigger Member States and the potential troop contributors, have been involved.

⁶⁰ Both the outgoing British and the incoming Austrian EU presidency are said to have been very surprised by the request, which apparently reached them without previous informal information or consultation. Interviews with EU Council and Permanent Representations in Brussels, December 2007, February 2008.

assessments and EU demands on clarifications regarding the possible mandate for the operation. Delegations from the EU and the UN, at both political and military levels, met several times in Brussels, New York and Kinshasa to discuss various options regarding the deployment. In March 2006, following strong Belgian and French lobbying, the EU Council approved of an option paper to express EU support to MONUC and decided to launch the military-strategic planning process.⁶¹ This option paper had already been drafted in February but the publication had been delayed due to the lengthy decision-making process in the EU and UN.⁶²

This led to a formal agreement which the EU confirmed in a letter to the UNSG dated 28 March 2006. The EU agreed to deploy military capabilities in support of MONUC. The letter clearly stated that the EU's autonomy of decision on the deployment would be a key point in the resolution to be adopted, while also setting out the nature and scope of the European force.

These terms informed the UNSC resolution S/RES/1671 (2006) and the JA 319, both published in April 2006. The coordination process was finalised by an exchange of letters in July 2006 between UNSG Kofi Annan and SG/HR Javier Solana. This agreement outlined some defining characteristics of EUFOR, notably:

- that the major part of EUFOR would be stationed *outside* the theatre of operations.
- that EUFOR would enjoy a large degree of autonomy. EU-led forces would remain all the time under the control and command of EUFOR.
- a technical agreement between EU and UN in view of logistics and intelligence.

Lengthy EU internal and domestic processes

This rather slow inter-organisational decision-making process was further delayed by the time-consuming force generation process in the EU, i.e. Member States being reluctant to provide troops.

Once it was internally agreed that the EU would take over the operation, pressure started mounting on Germany to take a leading role in terms of both providing troops and offering command structures. Particularly France, who strongly advocated an EU deployment, quickly called for Germany to take over responsibilities. Not convinced about the utility of the deployment, the German government, which had only come to power some months earlier, was rather reluctant. It felt unfairly pressured and criticised by what was perceived as a French attempt to make others carry out the tasks France had called for.

Moreover, in January 2006 France suggested that a battlegroup (BG) be deployed.⁶³ The UN's request coincided with the rotation from a French BG to a Franco-German BG. It was the latter which France suggested deploying. However, this Franco-German BG was bi-national solely to the extent that it comprised a small number of French officers, whereas the main component was German. Deploying this BG would have meant that Germany would have had to bear the responsibility and the costs almost on its own. Moreover, the BG in question was mainly able to carry out evacuation tasks. Thus, it would not have been able to cover the whole range of tasks outlined in the mandate.⁶⁴

Eventually, a call for contributions was launched among the EU Member States. Third countries and accession candidates were also

⁶¹ 'République démocratique du Congo: le Conseil lance la planification en vue d'une opération de l'UE en soutien de la MONUC pendant le processus électoral', op. cit. in note 37.

⁶² Matthias Dembinski and Christian Foerster, op. cit. in note 45; Karlheinz Viereck, op. cit. in note 37, p. 254.

⁶³ The battlegroup (BG) concept was developed following the 2003 *Artemis* operation and was then integrated into the HG 2010. BG are swiftly deployable troops for crisis management operations. Set up in 2005, they reached their full operational capacity in 2007. For further details see Gustav Lindstrom, op. cit. in note 10, and Christian Mölling, op. cit. in note 10.

⁶⁴ Another reason for not deploying the BG is that BG are supposed to be deployed in rapid response operations. But there was no time pressure for EUFOR and hence no need for rapid response.

invited to contribute, which led to the participation of Turkey and Switzerland. A compromise was reached where Germany and France each contributed one third of the troops, with the remaining number being provided by other countries.

Equally problematic was the designation of the OHQ. Only five Member States have indicated the principal disposition of an OHQ for EU-led operations: France, Germany, Greece, Italy and the UK.⁶⁵ The UK referred to its commitment in Afghanistan and in Iraq as grounds for refraining from offering the OHQ. France, who was in charge of Operation *Artemis*, considered itself not well-placed as there was a risk of EUFOR not being perceived as neutral when operating under French command. Also Italy and Greece declined.⁶⁶ Pressured to lead the operation, Germany finally agreed and ensured the provision of the FHQ by France.

In France, which since the beginning had strongly supported the operation, the participation in EUFOR generated neither disagreement in the government nor public debate. Quite the contrary happened in Germany, where heated debates raged about its role in EUFOR.⁶⁷ While historically-related reasons clearly explain this discrepancy, differences in the political systems also account for it. Whereas in Germany each military deployment requires the approval of the parliament, in France the president decides without necessarily engaging in public debates.

In Germany, the government itself was divided. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the armed forces were against the deployment, only the Chancellor and the Minister of cooper-

ation and development supported it. The government eventually approved the deployment on 17 May.⁶⁸ The necessary parliamentary approval was reached on 1 June 2006 after heated public and parliamentary debates.⁶⁹ Altogether, the German decision-making process certainly took a long time to yield a result. But it should be remembered that the postponement of the elections in DRC and the tedious force generation process within the EU also further extended this process.

The parliamentary vote imposed several limitations on the German deployment. First, German troops were only allowed to operate in Kinshasa, whereas most of the other units were allowed to operate throughout the territory of the DRC. Second, Germany insisted on a 4-month timeframe, and made clear that an extension would not be acceptable. Finally, German combat troops were stationed in neighbouring Gabon, which reduced the probability of their deployment. By limiting the mandate, the German government was able to convince a reluctant parliament and public opinion about the deployment.

Thus, delays and hesitations in the early stages of the planning process considerably complicated the run-up to EUFOR RDC. Eventually, the cumbersome European decision-making and force generation process, and the reluctance of EU Member States to support EUFOR in both financial and material terms, risked undermining the declarative and normative commitment of the EU to Africa, UN support and crisis management. This demonstrates that the EU's capacity to act entirely depends on the Member States' commitment. Member

⁶⁵ In addition to the five national OHQ, the EU also disposes since 2007 of an EU Operation Centre or can use NATO capabilities and common assets under the terms of the Berlin Plus agreement. See Council of the EU, 'EU Operations Centre'. Available at: www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=1211&lang=EN&mode=g.

⁶⁶ Denis M. Tull, 'Die Fuehrung und Beteiligung der Bundeswehr an EUFOR RD Congo', in Stefan Meir (ed.), *Auslandseinsatze der Bundeswehr. Leitfragen, Entscheidungsspielraeume und Lehren*, SWP Studie, S 27/September 2007, pp. 68-77: 69-70.

⁶⁷ See for example, 'Streit über Einsatz in Kongo', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung*, 12 March 2006; 'Koalition unter Bedingungen zu Kongo-Einsatz bereit', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 10 March 2006; 'Weitere Bedenken wegen Kongo', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 9 March 2006; Denis M. Tull, op. cit. in note 66; Peter Schmidt, 'Freiwillige vor! Bundeswehreinsatz im Kongo – Zur Dialektik einer Führungsrolle wider Willen', *Internationale Politik*, November 2006, pp. 68-77.

⁶⁸ 'Kabinett stimmt Kongo-Einsatz zu', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 17 May 2006.

⁶⁹ The Bundestag agreed with 440 votes against 135 to deploy 780 soldiers to DRC; Deutscher Bundestag [German Parliament] transcript of the plenary session 16/36, 19 May 2006, and transcript of the plenary session 16/37, June 2006.

States will probably refrain from politically blocking an operation even if they are not convinced of it. But they might be very reluctant in committing themselves financially or materially.⁷⁰ The EU can only commit itself to the extent that the Member States agree to offer political and material support.


Strategic and operative planning

Despite its internal coordination problems, the EU succeeded in channelling its preferences within the set-up of the operation. This was reflected in a rather euro-centric planning process.

The EU officially launched the planning process in March 2006. Once the EU had decided about the command structures and the contributing states, the UN formalised the EU's military engagement in the DRC alongside MONUC, and adopted UNSC resolution 1671 on 25 April 2006. As usually happens, the terms of this mandate for EUFOR RDC were negotiated jointly by the EU and the UN and were agreed prior to the publication of the UNSC Resolution 1671. These negotiations, including the operational planning, involved the troop contributing states, the UNSC, UNDPKO and the EU. Subsequently, on 27 April 2006, the EU adopted the JA 319.

The EUFOR planning process was shorter than outlined in the standard operational procedures (SOPs), and the order of the planning documents differed from the ideally outlined sequence.⁷¹

Sequence of planning documents:



- 1 = Crisis Management Procedures
- 2 = Crisis Management Concept
- 3 = Military Strategic Options
- 4 = Initiating Military Directive
- 5 = Joint Action
- 6 = Concept of Operations
- 7 = Operation Plan

Given that the planning process is always adapted to the precise situation, this deviation from the SOPs is usual practice and not surprising. Worth noticing and particular to EUFOR is however the fact that the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) and the Military Strategic Option (MSO) were replaced by an option paper. The latter, presented by the CivMil Cell, outlined different options for the operation to be deployed. It hence followed by its very nature a different objective than a CMC, and addressed different topics. EU-UN cooperation, a fundamental aspect of the operation, for example, was not addressed.

⁷⁰ Similar considerations apply to EUFOR TCHAD/RCA (2007/08).

⁷¹ Interviews in the French and German MOD, December 2007 and February/April 2008. For details on the planning process see Gustav Lindstrom, *op. cit.* in note 10.

Moreover, in the case of EUFOR, the EU finished the very detailed operational planning process prior to the publication of the UNSC Resolution in April.⁷² This includes the Initiating Military Directive (IMD), which gives the OpCdr specific military guidelines, and the CONOPS/CJSOR. The UN was therefore presented with completed planning documents, that is, the character of EUFOR was defined prior to the UNSC Resolution. This made it possible to accommodate European expectations and constraints, and hence implement a mandate in terms acceptable to the EU and its Member States, be it in terms of tasks, time or autonomy.

Thus, during the overall planning process, EUFOR-MONUC cooperation turned out to be limited. The lack of formal coordination structures frequently gave rise to frustration. Apparently, the UN did not have or did not use the opportunity to influence the EU planning process.

3.2 Cooperation in the field

The cooperation in the field was affected by EUFOR's and MONUC's different interpretations of EUFOR's mandate, and the practical repercussions of EUFOR's setting, particularly its insistence on autonomy. Problems were mainly due to the complexity of the agreed procedures, the different levels of responsibility in the chain of command, the limitations of EUFOR in terms of capacities and tasks, and cooperation in the area of intelligence.

The impact of inadequate institutional settings on cooperation in the field

The extent and areas of EUFOR-MONUC cooperation were outlined in EUFOR's mandate and the exchange of letters between the UNSG and the EU SG/HR in July 2006. However, these agreements only partly provided for efficient cooperation in the field. As much as defining

cooperation structures, they limited the planning and information exchange.

Joint planning was revealed to be very limited due to the lengthy formal procedures, EUFOR's rigid parameters, and the nature of the missions that EUFOR was capable of conducting. EUFOR's intervention could only be envisaged in response to exceptional circumstances beyond MONUC's capacities. It then required a lengthy and complex authorisation process. The coordination measures and the liaison architecture put in place certainly eased these rigid settings but could not overcome them.

Cooperation was further limited by the lack of a formal agreement on the exchange on secure information. EU-UN agreements certainly invited EUFOR and MONUC to share situation assessments, mainly to be able to anticipate a possible request to EUFOR. But the UN does not dispose of a system for handling classified information. The cooperation with EUFOR at the operational and operative levels was seriously limited by such issues.⁷³

The complex internal structure of the EU further amplified these intra-organisational shortcomings. The interoperability within EUFOR itself such as in terms of standards and equipment proved to be challenging. EUFOR was undoubtedly a good quality force. But while the use of NATO standards theoretically avoids problems of interoperability, the practical reality of integrating different national contributions into one operation turned out to be difficult. Besides, EUFOR was limited by having to work with different rules of engagement. Each unit had its national doctrines, practices and instructions which were more or less adapted to the local requirements.

While national caveats certainly make it feasible to assure the participation of the highest possible number of Member States and therefore enable multinational forces to be deployed, they also potentially hamper such a force's capacity to act. Different provisions for each national unit potentially lead to frictions

⁷² Karlheinz Viereck, op. cit. in note 37, p. 255.

⁷³ *Operative* means 'in effect', that is, in operation at the moment without further planning or preparation, referring or reacting to what happens *ad hoc*. *Operational*: refers to a specific operation or the operational level within the chain of command.

among the countries involved, with some feeling that they are more exposed and having to bear greater responsibilities than others. Within EUFOR, particular provisions existed for example for the Belgian, German and Spanish units.

Different chains of command affect cooperation

Besides, the cooperation between EUFOR and MONUC was considerably affected by (1) the different chains of command (CoC) and (2) the allocation of responsibilities to different levels in the respective chains of command of the EU and the UN. This was amplified by the complex nature of the EU CoC.

The MONUC CoC was composed of two levels. FCdr Gaye in DRC had total operational control over his troops and reported directly to UNDPKO. By contrast, EUFOR disposed of a tripartite structure composed of a FHQ in Kinshasa, under FCdr Damay; an OHQ in Potsdam under OpCdr Viereck; and finally the PSC in Brussels which assured political control and strategic direction.


This European CoC certainly assured the political and military control over the operation. But it proved to be very complex and slow.

It also appeared disproportionate in view of the limited number of troops deployed in the theatre. Moreover, the OpCdr, also due to political pressure, sought to exert close military control over the operation at the lower levels of the CoC, which some observers critically called ‘micro-management’.⁷⁴ This resulted in some tension with regard to interaction inside the CoC. Ultimately, this is due to different national military cultures which partly explain the different conceptions of the role the OpCdr and the FCdr respectively should play, or of the degree of subsidiarity attributed to each level of the CoC.

On the other hand, the split of the troop contingent between Kinshasa and Libreville/Gabon raised the question of whether such an important concentration of troops would not have required a post of command in Libreville. The French military structures in place certainly facilitated the deployment in Libreville. But the fact that the French local HQ had concurrent responsibilities for the French government did not please all EU Member States involved.

Compared to that, MONUC’s CoC was shorter and the competences were assigned differently. The FCdr enjoyed more strategic and operational competences. In fact, MONUC’s FHQ incorporated the responsibili-

The different levels of responsibility in the EUFOR and MONUC chain of command



⁷⁴ Interviews with French and German personnel involved in EUFOR, December 2007, February and April 2008.

ties of both, EUFOR's OHQ and FHQ. Thus, in terms of hierarchy and responsibility MONUC FCdr Gaye was at the same level in the CoC as EUFOR OpCdr Viereck. But geographically, and with regard to action in the field, he was closer to EUFOR FCdr Damay.

Particularly at the early stage, this different distribution of responsibilities impeded both communication and coordinated decision-making between EUFOR and MONUC. To address these problems, both FCdrs established close cooperation. In terms of hierarchy however, EUFOR FCdr Damay often had to revert to the OHQ Potsdam for approval.

The complex procedures for committing EUFOR in support of MONUC further amplified the cooperation problems rooted in the CoC. With the exception of emergency cases, the commitment of EUFOR was to be obtained through a formal request by the UNSG to the EU SG/HR. The lengthy and complex nature of this process was revealed during the command post exercise MUZURRI in July 2006. It was set up to test procedures between MONUC FHQ, UNDPKO, EU OHQ, EU FHQ and the EU PSC for requesting the military engagement of EUFOR for stabilisation tasks. The result was disastrous. The EU's answer arrived at MONUC FHQ 24 hours after the request. The call had to go up the UN line of command and then down the EU line of command. Furthermore, it was revealed that if the point of application had not been Kinshasa, it would have taken up to 72 hours before EUFOR would have been engaged at full capacity.⁷⁵

Moreover, MONUC's and EUFOR's understanding of the environment in which they operated differed considerably. Whereas for MONUC the political dimension was predominant, EUFOR obeyed a military logic. The respective roles of the two FHQs reflect this difference. MONUC's FCdr Gaye worked permanently with UNSR W. L. Swing. By contrast, EUFOR was certainly in contact with the other EU missions, EU ambassadors and the EUSR

Ajello. But there was no direct political counterpart comparable to UNSR Swing for EUFOR.

In view of these impediments, the two FCdrs engaged in a pragmatic search for a solution to establish efficient coordination. Beyond their personal cooperation, this mainly concerned the setting up of *ad hoc* arrangements which strengthened the existing ill-adapted liaison structures. Daily interaction was conducted by liaison officers at FHQ level. EUFOR liaison officers were permanently attached to the HQ in Kinshasa and to the Western Brigade HQ of MONUC. There was temporary exchange of liaison officers during joint missions. Besides, both chiefs of staff met on a weekly basis for follow-up and assessment of the operative situation. In their communication policies, both MONUC and EUFOR aimed at being mutually appreciative of one another's efforts and at showing consistency in their actions. The success of these measures was demonstrated during the August incidents when FCdrs Damay and Gaye jointly led the operation.

Different aspects of cooperation in the field: issues of hierarchy and autonomy, PsyOps and intelligence

Different conceptions of hierarchy and autonomy between the forces further affected EU-UN cooperation. According to UNSC resolution 1671 and the EU-JA 319, EUFOR's task was to support MONUC in stabilising the situation, to contribute to the protection of civilians, including extraction, and secure the airport. EUFOR was to be in the third rank of deterrence, behind the Congolese Forces (police and army) and MONUC. It was not to act as a substitute for MONUC, nor to operate in areas where MONUC already had sufficient resources. Neither was EUFOR to be deployed as a substitute for the Congolese armed forces. EUFOR was supposed to intervene at the request of MONUC in emergency situations, but retained autonomous decision-making for the effective deployment of its troops.⁷⁶

⁷⁵ Presentations during the conference: 'Military aspects of UN-EU cooperation in crisis management operations in the light of EUFOR RD Congo', Federal Ministry of Defence, Berlin, 19-21 March 2007.

⁷⁶ Paragraph 9, UN Resolution 1671 (2006), S/RES/1671, 25 April 2006.

In spite of these clear provisions, EUFOR and MONUC interpreted their implementation differently. MONUC was naturally inclined to consider EUFOR as a subordinate unit. EUFOR was considered a dissuasive reserve, which, in case of emergency, should be able to reinforce the rapid reaction capabilities of MONUC. This hierarchical conception clashed with EUFOR's strong will to preserve the autonomy of decision-making and action, as set out in both the JA 319 and the UNSC Resolution.

But not only did MONUC's conception of hierarchy not match EUFOR's idea of autonomy. There was also a gap between the needs expressed by MONUC and the capabilities provided by EUFOR in terms of its mandate.

MONUC expected from EUFOR specific capabilities which it lacked itself, mainly intelligence, rapid reaction, extraction of people in danger, but also training of the Congolese army and crowd control. The latter was actually one of the main challenges that MONUC faced, particularly in a city as large as Kinshasa with some 6 million inhabitants.

However, both the mandate and the resources made available to EUFOR allowed for only partial fulfilment of these expectations. EUFOR was able to provide intelligence and rapid reaction. But training and crowd control was not part of EUFOR's mandate.

Cooperation was smoother in the area of intelligence, where EUFOR clearly offered an added value to MONUC. EUFOR shared niche capabilities unavailable to the UN which helped MONUC carry out its mission.

EUFOR had electronic observation and intelligence-gathering capabilities, including four B-Hunter Drones (UAV) at its disposal. They offered useful results for both EUFOR and MONUC, particularly during the August riots, in that they allowed round-the-clock tracking of troops and materials.

However, the UAVs were vulnerable, as demonstrated by the fact that one of them was

Gap between the needs expressed by MONUC and the capabilities provided by EUFOR:

UN expected	EU provided
Immediate reaction capability	LIMITED
Crowd control	NONE (not in the mandate)
Congolese army training	NONE (not in the mandate)
Intelligence	LIMITED (lack of agreement on the exchange of secure information)

shot down by light weapons during their first flights. Consequently, their flight altitude had to be increased, which affected the quality of the data gathered. A second drone was lost due to a technical failure.⁷⁷

Additional support consisted of customised analysis of satellite imagery provided by the EU Satellite Centre.⁷⁸ Overall, EUFOR's intelligence gathering process and information dissemination to MONUC worked properly during the whole operation. Intelligence provided by the UAVs was a valued asset for surveillance and anticipation of movements and concentration of troops for both EUFOR and MONUC.⁷⁹

The letters exchanged between UNSG and EU SG/HR in July 2006 included a technical agreement inviting both EUFOR and MONUC to share situation assessment in order to be able to anticipate a possible request to EUFOR. MONUC and EUFOR also exchanged operational documents, such as daily and weekly situation reports. However, less analysis was shared given the sensitivity of such issues and the lack of an agreement on the exchange of classified information. Consequently, one worrying prob-

⁷⁷ 'Drohne der EU stürzt auf Armenviertel', *die tageszeitung*, 31 July 2006; Wahlen verlaufen bisher friedlich', *Focus*, 30 July 2006.

⁷⁸ Frank Asbeck, 'The EU Satellite Centre in support of EU operations in the DRC', in *ESDP Newsletter*, Issue no. 3, January 2007, p. 12.

⁷⁹ Karlheinz Viereck, op. cit. in note 37, p. 256.

lem turned out to be that the two forces partly generated independent threat assessments, which created a difference over precisely when deterrent action was necessary.⁸⁰

Another example of fruitful cooperation between EUFOR and MONUC was in the area of public perception and image. Here EUFOR benefited from MONUC's experience on the ground and its understanding of the situation in Kinshasa/DRC.

Initially, both EUFOR's neutrality and its military capability were questioned. Considering EUFOR a small force in numbers with a limited mandate, the local population quickly tried to ridicule EUFOR by nicknaming it 'EU-Faible' ('faible' meaning 'weak' in French as opposed to 'fort', meaning 'strong').⁸¹ Besides, the local population suspected EUFOR of partiality and support for the outgoing President Kabila. EUFOR had thus to go through a process of legitimising its presence and building up a deterrent image. FCdr Gaye, very familiar with the situation in the field, quickly put forward recommendations for EUFOR to improve its image. There were mainly:

- to restrict reconnaissance missions in sensitive areas (mainly in Kinshasa).
- to stop tactical air reconnaissance over Kinshasa. Low altitude flights over the residence of Jean Pierre Bemba were interpreted, by the local population, as a sign of partiality.
- to encourage EUFOR to make more use of public communication and PsyOps.

Subsequently, EUFOR engaged in a focussed media campaign to explain its presence, to clarify its role compared to MONUC, to build up a

deterrent image, and to develop a specific identity for EUFOR.⁸² EUFOR published its own journal, *La Paillote*, which was distributed for free. *La Paillote* was a great success in DRC and helped to channel information.⁸³ This was flanked by civil-military actions to improve EUFOR's image and win over hearts and minds, such as supporting local hospitals.⁸⁴ But it was particularly the intervention in the August events which allowed EUFOR to convince the local population of both its force and impartiality. By quickly engaging with combat units in protection of the opposition candidate, EUFOR gained the recognition of the local population.

3.3 Support and logistics

Although often neglected, the realm of support and logistics is essential for the success of a mission. It entails tasks as various as assuring living and working accommodation; communications & IT; medical support; movement control; surface transport; air transport; water & food; fuel; office equipment & furniture; general services; janitorial work; waste disposal etc.⁸⁵

EUFOR-MONUC's problematic relationship in logistics

The area of logistics differed from the other fields analysed in that EUFOR encountered here the greatest limitation to its autonomy. According to the technical agreement between the EU and the UN, MONUC was responsible for providing logistics. There was thus no European lead nation for logistics.

⁸⁰ Richard Gowan, 'EUFOR RD Congo, UNIFIL and future European support to the UN', in *The EU's Africa Strategy: What are the lessons of the Congo Mission?*, SDA Discussion Paper, Brussels 2007, pp. 29-31, p. 30; interviews with the French MOD, April 2008.

⁸¹ Interviews with personnel involved in the Electoral Observation Mission and the French Ministry of Defence, October-December 2007.

⁸² Babacar Gaye, intervention, conference of the German Federal Ministry of Defence, 'Military aspects of UN-EU cooperation in crisis management operations in the light of EUFOR RD Congo', Berlin, 19-21 March 2007; see also Karlheinz Viereck, op. cit. in note 37, p. 255.

⁸³ There was competition between French and German units about who had primary responsibility for the journal. This led *inter alia* to the incorrect wording of the title (the correct French is 'Paillote'). 'The Bundeswehr Psyops Task Force: Mission beendet, ein Rückblick auf den Congo', available at: www.opinfo.bundeswehr.de; interviews in the French Ministry of Defence and EU Council.

⁸⁴ See for example, Etat-major des armées, 'Eufor RD Congo: les actions civilo-militaires', 9 octobre 2006. Available at: www.defense.gouv.fr.

⁸⁵ Interviews with the French Ministry of Defence. See also William G. Pagonis, and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank, *Moving mountains – Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War*, Harvard Business School Press, Harvard, 1992.

It became quickly evident that the significant differences between the logistical practices and systems led to coordination problems and possible competition for scarce resources. This was echoed by unsolved issues of responsibility and levels of interactions: it was not clearly defined who talks to whom, at what level and when. One of EUFOR's reactions was to individually buy the goods on the spot market, which in turn led to a considerable increase in price. These institutional shortfalls were partly amplified by the fact that the EU only informed the UN about its demands at a very late stage.

Nevertheless, thanks to its presence in the whole DRC, MONUC was able to facilitate EUFOR deployments outside Kinshasa. This included providing petroleum during force projection exercises to the point of application, depots and transit camps and support to reconnaissance missions.

Nonetheless, overall, the outsourcing often failed to meet the EU demands. Pointing out delays and the quality of the proposed products, EUFOR questioned MONUC's capacity to provide real-life support to the advanced party in Kinshasa under the conditions required by EUFOR. Eventually, logistics turned out to be one weak point of the operation.

Shortfalls in airlift and movement capabilities

These difficulties also apply to the realm of airlift. For airlift between Europe, Gabon and Kinshasa,

the EU drew upon the SALIS (Strategic Airlift Interim Solution).⁸⁶ Flights between Europe and Africa were coordinated by the Strategic Airlift Coordination Centre in Eindhoven, Netherlands, in liaison with the EUFOR OHQ. Logistical support and the transport of troops from Gabon to the DRC and within were provided where necessary 'on the spot' by tactical airlift capabilities based in Libreville and Kinshasa.⁸⁷

According to a report from the Assembly of the Western European Union, EUFOR was two aircraft short of the capabilities requested during the planning phase.⁸⁸ Nevertheless, these limited air capabilities would only have been a problem if EUFOR had had to deploy beyond Kinshasa. It was hence agreed during the planning process that in the event of MONUC making such a request, there could only be one deployment outside Kinshasa at a time.

These shortfalls amplified the constraints EUFOR already faced due to the lengthy process and complexity of projecting troops. There was an estimated 72 hours to engage at full capacity if the point of application was not Kinshasa. The different terms of use of the tactical air transport as well as the distance between Libreville and Kinshasa made logistics cumbersome. The time needed to deploy the over-the-horizon force from Gabon to Kinshasa (2 hour flight from Libreville to Kinshasa) restricted EUFOR's capacity to act. Eventually, EUFOR was lucky that it did not face a situation where it needed to deploy its over-the-horizon force rapidly, and beyond Kinshasa.

⁸⁶ SALIS was set up in June 2004 by 15 European NATO member states and has been operational since March 2006. Resources have been pooled to charter special aircrafts to gain the capability to quickly transport heavy equipment by air. Russian and Ukrainian Antonov aircraft are used as an interim solution to meet shortfalls in European strategic airlift capabilities, pending deliveries of Airbus A400M, expected to start in 2010. See: www.nato.int/issues/strategic-lift-air/index.html.

⁸⁷ Report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Ignació Cosido Gutiérrez, op. cit. in note 46.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

Evaluation of EUFOR-MONUC cooperation

The analysis presented in this paper reveals an ambiguous picture. On the one hand, EUFOR clearly fulfilled its mandate and hence displayed external effectiveness. On the other hand, the internal effectiveness of the cooperation between EUFOR and MONUC turned out to be limited. The following section first sums up the challenges of EUFOR-MONUC cooperation. The deficiencies in terms of the internal effectiveness ultimately did not compromise EUFOR's external effectiveness, that is, the overall successful outcome of the operation. But it affected its smooth running and could have affected its overall result. The second part analyses how EUFOR and MONUC sought to overcome these shortcomings in view of assuring effective cooperation on the ground.

4.1 Summary: the challenges of cooperation between EUFOR and MONUC

The cooperation between EUFOR and MONUC suffered from both inadequate cooperation mechanisms and coordination problems within the EU and the UN.

On the one hand, the lack of an agreement on information exchange, the complex procedures for committing EUFOR in support of MONUC, the failures in the areas of logistics and a lack of communication in the run-up to and during the operation seriously affected the cooperation between EUFOR and MONUC. In the field, EU and UN heads of mission and FCdrs eventually had to collaborate across institutional lines. In addition, the insistence on EUFOR's autonomy certainly ensured that the operation remained

under the control of the EU. But it also led to the partly unnecessary duplication of assets, such as medical structures and facilities.

On the other hand, the impact of the EU Member States potentially affected EUFOR's capacity to act, also with regard to interaction with MONUC. Behind the EU are the Member States, whose role is considerable in the intergovernmentally-organised ESDP. Using the full capacity of EUFOR was limited by the fact that 21 participating countries also wished to participate in the decision-making. EUFOR was a small force which displayed a high degree of diversity and was constrained by a number of national caveats.

Nevertheless, it is worth asking what EUFOR-MONUC cooperation can actually be legitimately criticised for. EUFOR suffered from the caveats that any multinational force faces, be it in terms of geographical restrictions or different rules of engagement. These intra-European problems were however amplified by particular cooperation mechanisms with the UN.

The cumbersome set-up of the mission was also reflected in the area of command. At the political-strategic level, 26 PSC ambassadors, EU SG/HR Solana, the chairman of the EUMC and DGE VIII were involved. Both OHQ and FHQ were comparatively big in numbers when compared to the number of troops. The EU FHQ, which commanded about 2,400 troops, had more staff than the MONUC FHQ which commanded about 18,000 troops. According to EUFOR personnel, the number of (European and national) advisors both in Potsdam and Kinshasa was particularly high for an operation of such size. This perceived problem of proportions is the expression of the political logic EUFOR followed, rather than an operative one.⁸⁹ Ultimately, this shows that EUFOR-MONUC cooperation faced a dou-

⁸⁹ Referring to this political logic, other observers are more cautious about criticising this apparently high number. If the EU aims to have political, legal and gender etc advisors, they claim, then this obviously increases the number.

ble challenge of interoperability and cooperation: on the one hand, the internal EU cooperation and the interoperability of the different European entities within EUFOR, and on the other hand the complexity of the cooperation procedures between EUFOR and MONUC, and the EU and the UN.

Model of EU-UN cooperation framework

The above analysis yields a model of EU-UN cooperation which shows the involved structures, actors and processes. It helps to understand the multifaceted relationship between the EU and the UN at the different levels and its complex cooperation patterns. The basic structure of EU-UN cooperation consists of three groups of actors: the EU, the UN and the EU Member States. These actors are again divided into an HQ/strategic political and a field level. Relevant processes run

- between the actors (horizontally/inter-organisational)
- between the different levels (vertically/intra-organisational).

The two institutions are connected via the joint area of operation. In the case of EUFOR-MONUC, the primary task was to ensure the smooth running of the elections. The internal


effectiveness of cooperation, namely efficient EU-UN cooperation, and the external effectiveness, namely attaining the mission’s objective, depend on the overall performance delivered by all three actors when addressing the security problem in the joint area of operation.

4.2 Why EUFOR and MONUC cooperation still worked

The two FCdrs very quickly acknowledged the above-outlined constraints. Recognising that close coordination and common perceptions were key to the success of the operation, Christian Damay and Babacar Gaye jointly engaged in a pragmatic search for a solution. Besides, EUFOR benefited from a relatively favourable environment.

Personal leadership and joint efforts lead to pragmatic solutions on the ground

Cooperation between MONUC and EUFOR was enhanced by close contacts between the two FCdrs and between the two FHQs and the UNSR W. L. Swing. This was favoured by the geographical proximity of the FHQs, personal contacts,



the appointment of liaison officers and, after the August riots, the setting up (on the initiative of MONUC) of a joint working group destined to define and implement confidence-building measures between the local conflicting parties in order to solve the crisis.

Mutual confidence and understanding between the FCdrs as well as their strong personal commitment were key in bridging differences and establishing a common approach on operational issues. That Damay and Gaye knew each other from having both attended the French elite military academy St-Cyr was certainly beneficial for their mutual cooperation and understanding, as was the fact that a significant position in Gaye's HQ was French staffed. FCdr Damay might have generally felt more comfortable in interacting with a familiar and 'French socialised' counterpart (FCdr Gaye) with whom he shared a similar understanding of the military settings and procedures, of the subsidiarity within the CoC, and the particularities of the local settings.⁹⁰

The August events demonstrated that there was room for flexibility and that the forces supported each other in times of crisis. FCdrs Gaye and Damay led the engagement together and gained credibility in the eyes of the local populations. According to FCdr Damay, the cooperation with MONUC functioned well.⁹¹ But as he and other personnel involved recognised, this was mainly due to personal commitment and joint efforts.

FCdr Damay played a constructive role for the EU on the ground with regard to both, handling the cooperation with MONUC and adapting the force to the situation in Kinshasa. He was supported by an FHQ which was almost entirely French-staffed. His preference for lightly armoured patrols, with berets rather than helmets, gun muzzles kept down and mostly French-speaking soldiers so as to facilitate interaction with the local population contributed to the positive reputation EUFOR eventually enjoyed.

In addition to interpersonal relations and the personal commitment of the FCdrs, it was daily coordination and communication through liaison structures which were at the heart of solutions in the field. Every national or multilateral deployment usually enjoys enough room for manoeuvre to set up *ad hoc* structures. In this particular case the *ad hoc* structures remedied shortfalls in essential areas, such as communication.

These patterns of informal and *ad hoc* cooperation can also be observed with regard to the cooperation between EUFOR and other EU missions, for example the EU Electoral Observation Mission (EU EOM). When the EUFOR advance team arrived in Kinshasa, they admitted that they were ill-prepared and sought advice from EOM, which was already in place. During the mission itself, the exchange continued. But all this took place informally.⁹²

Thus, EUFOR revealed an interesting phenomenon: acting on the basis of *ad hoc* measures and arrangements on the ground, the two FCdrs acted as a corrective to the institutional shortcomings. They were directly confronted with the problems and deficiencies of cooperation at both the political-institutional and the practical field levels. One solution was to interpret the given frameworks rather loosely. By doing so, they managed to turn the limited degree of institutionalisation into freedom of manoeuvre to improve the settings, mainly by having recourse to *ad hoc* solutions.

As effective as these informal *ad hoc* structures and personal leadership were, they were not however sufficient in themselves to overcome the deficiencies posed by the limitations of capabilities and the overall mandate of EUFOR. They did not address the underlying causes of the deficiencies and therefore did not provide the basis to solve the overall challenges of EU-UN cooperation with a view to upcoming operations.

⁹⁰ Interviews in Brussels, Paris and Lille, December 2007 and February/April 2008.

⁹¹ Christian Damay, 'La contribution de l'UE à la sécurité du processus électoral en république démocratique du Congo', op. cit. in note 3.

⁹² Interviews with personnel involved in EUFOR and EU EOM.

Favourable conditions of the operation

Independently from these joint efforts, EUFOR also profited from an overall favourable environment.

Once it had dispelled doubts about its strength and impartiality, EUFOR operated in a mostly friendly environment. The Congolese population showed an enormous interest in the elections and strongly supported them, which facilitated EUFOR's task.

EUFOR also profited from an overall positive evolution of the security situation. Eventually, the security challenges were concentrated in

Kinshasa. This considerably simplified EUFOR's mission.

In the light of the difficult force generation process, the limited mandate and the criticism raised prior to EUFOR's deployment about its potential incapacity, there was a certain relief in European and national circles once the operation was successfully concluded. Military personnel involved in the operation insisted that besides good planning, relative stability and the overall performance of the troops, a 'certain amount of luck' allowed for the positive outcome of the operation.⁹³

⁹³ Interviews with military personnel involved in EUFOR, October 2007-April 2008.

Lessons identified and lessons learned? Policy recommendations for future cooperation

What lessons can therefore be identified from this analysis for future EU-UN cooperation? In the case of EUFOR, the deficiencies in terms of the internal efficiency did not ultimately compromise the external efficiency, that is, the overall evident successful outcome of the operation. But it affected its smooth running and could have damaged the external efficiency at sensitive moments, such as during the August incidents. In view of avoiding such problems for upcoming operations and improving cooperation, the internal efficiency needs to be enhanced.

So far, there has been very little public assessment of the operation and the cooperation between the EU and the UN. As required by the EU-UN agreement, SG/HR Solana presented the results of EUFOR to the UN in January 2007.⁹⁴ He presented a globally positive assessment and announced that a 'lessons learned review' was under way. This review was published by the Council in March 2007. However, approximately 90% of the content has not been declassified. The document thus does not offer any publicly accessible analysis.⁹⁵ As for the UN; it has not yet provided any official review, as it did for example for *Artemis*.⁹⁶

With regard to 'lessons identified', EUFOR's deployment can only provide a limited test case of the EU's ability to autonomously deploy a military operation at long distance and short notice. It was not an example of a long- distance

deployment, as it relied on French structures, mainly in Gabon. Neither was it an example of timely logistics, as it relied on MONUC for that. Nor was it an example of rapid deployment. The Member States had enough time to set up the force. It was not a blueprint for a stand-alone operation either since EUFOR cooperated with MONUC which was already present in the field. Finally, EUFOR did not constitute an example of dealing alone with serious military challenges as MONUC carried out most of these interventions. The EU has not yet demonstrated its ability to tackle these challenges.

How can the cooperation between the EU and the UN be improved? Several recommendations exist already.⁹⁷ The fact that they have been reiterated over and over again shows the extent to which innovation runs up against established procedures which are resistant to change. Hence, before developing suggestions, and in order to ensure their applicability, the limits and opportunities for such changes need to be defined. Put differently: what can be suggested and can reasonably be expected to have a chance of being implemented?

Three main challenges have to be acknowledged. First, the analysis illustrates the fact that EU-UN cooperation comprises not two but at least three sets of actors: the UN, the EU and the EU Member States. In order to enhance EU-UN cooperation, the EU should seek to improve its internal processes. The same applies to the UN.

⁹⁴ UN Security Council, Presentation by Javier Solana, EUHR for CFSP, on the Democratic Republic of Congo/EUFOR, New York, 9 January 2007, S005/07.

⁹⁵ Council of the European Union/DGE VIII/EUMS, 'Analysis of Lessons from Operation EUFOR RD Congo', Brussels, 22 March 2007, 7633/07. Brussels-based observers, however, defend the particular nature of the document. Stating that it is classified information, and given the absence of a security agreement between the EU and the UN, hence the bulk of the document cannot be made accessible.

⁹⁶ 'Operation Artemis: the Lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force', Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, United Nations, October 2004. See: <http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpps/Library/Artemis.pdf>.

⁹⁷ See Ibid.; Alexandra Novosseloff, *EU-UN Partnership in Crisis Management: Developments and Prospects*, op. cit in note 9, pp. 15-16, .

Intra-organisational questions need to be solved in order to improve the inter-organisational cooperation.

Second, the structural differences between the EU and the UN are deeply entrenched and display a remarkable inertia. More importantly, the two entities exhibit a high degree of structural, organisational and cultural divergence. This will not change in the near future. As the analysis has revealed, the operational level suffers precisely from the disconnect between the institutional and political levels, which trickles down to the field level. Not only is substantial structural change rather unlikely. It would also require long-term political agreement which will not be easy to reach.

Third, multinational deployments display by definition a high degree of heterogeneity. The degree of intra-European and EU-UN interoperability will always be lower than that of a purely national force. The problems revealed in EUFOR-MONUC cooperation are typical for hybrid and multinational missions. It has to be recognised that this heterogeneity can certainly be eased but not overcome.

These limitations have to be recognised as a starting point for further efforts to improve EU-UN cooperation. Hence, this paper concentrates on suggesting modifications which can be achieved without necessarily initiating long-winded political debates and without engaging in fundamental structural change on which agreement and means to assure implementation are difficult to find. The recommendations aim at the working/operative level to show immediate and medium-term effect as opposed to long-term evolution of the political institutional context.

1. Improve coordination in planning – enhance mutual understanding

The EU and UN do not conduct joint operations. This will not change in the near future. But this does not necessarily hinder joint planning. The analysis revealed that coordination at the planning level at the earliest stage is essential. If during the strategic planning the partners agree on a clear distribution of tasks,

the chances for the success of the operation increase. In addition, and independently from a precise operation, the EU and UN could engage in joint contingency planning. This will foster the development of a common or at least coordinated planning culture and enhance mutual understanding of the ‘ways of doing things’. A better and common understanding of political, strategic and operational goals and of how the partner plans, i.e. which means, capabilities and processes are assumed or expected, will ease cooperation in times of crises. On the EU side, coherent planning can be further enhanced by designating as early as possible the OHQ or at least personnel which will be involved in the whole planning cycle.

2. Make credible commitments

The EU tends to commit itself to the UN before having assured the material support for military crisis management operations. This gives rise to frustration on both sides, within the EU and the UN. The struggle to set up EUFOR CHAD/RCA, including its downsizing, exemplifies such practice. While acknowledging the moral considerations which drove the EU commitment, such behaviour potentially damages not only the EU’s credibility. It also generates frustration within the EU Member States and potentially increases their reluctance to commit to such operations. Besides, it leads to irritation if it is felt that the EU’s engagement is driven by the national agendas of certain Member States. On the UN side, such behaviour generates disappointment. Recognising what the EU can realistically offer, and assuring the material and political support prior to any commitment, would enhance both the credibility of the EU and hence of the UN, and the chances for successful cooperation.

3. Increase EU-interoperability and EU-UN compatibility

It is not likely that a European army will exist in the foreseeable future. EU deployments are thus classical multinational deployments with their usual limitations and caveats. But what

degree of multinationality is compatible with military efficiency? While respecting the national strategic cultures, the interoperability of standards and equipments within a European force has to be enhanced. It could also allow for better cooperation with the UN. This concerns the standardisation of material and of the rules of engagement, but also of daily routines. Nonetheless, where interoperability is too difficult to reach, maintaining autonomy might be the only way to avert conflict. However, in this case, both the EU and the UN have to assure communication on their activities to achieve real-time situation awareness. A prior training period for the troops of all contributing states would enable numerous problems of interoperability to be tackled and hence avoid difficulties in the field.

4. Improve command structure

The complex European CoC risks assuring political control on the costs of military effectiveness. The political level should acknowledge that a military operation comprises an element of uncertainty and is only partly controllable. While recognising the political primacy and respecting the military hierarchy of the CoC, the principle of subsidiarity between the different command levels should be considered. The competences of the FCdr need to be better defined to offer him more room for manoeuvre to adapt to the situation in the field. In view of easing EU-UN cooperation, the two FHQs (EU and UN) could be located in the same place.

Moreover, as long as a European OHQ does not exist, the EU should strive to improve its CoC. In view of benefiting from the experiences gained and improving the process of designation of command structures and the cooperation within the command structures, the EU could set up a pool of personnel and assure joint training programmes. Composed of general staff which share operational experience, such a pool would facilitate inter- and intra-organisational coordination. This could also contribute to the build-up of a European strategic culture as called for in the ESS.

5. A common understanding in logistics

Recognising that, in the logistics domain, the concepts and procedures of either organisation are not likely to change, a common understanding needs to be reached. Generally, the EU and the UN should assure better prior information exchange, particularly early advice on the force capabilities and needs. Properly coordinated fact-finding missions are essential. This would make it possible to predict the general and accommodation needs of the force and to develop a comprehensive list of support requirements.

6. Unity of effort instead of unity of command

Recognising that unity of command is in practice not achievable (and possibly not sought for), the EU and the UN should concentrate on unity of effort. Communication is essential to ensure cooperation particularly in view of the operative autonomy of the partners. The probability that an agreement on handling classified information will be signed in the near future is very low. Hence, in order to assure cooperation from the planning stage onwards, the EU and the UN should make further use of liaison structures at an early stage.

The UN should detach an officer to the OHQ of the incoming EU force to provide detailed information regarding the area of operations and the UN force in place. This would assist the EU force in planning and deployment. Complementary to this, and following the existing liaison officers scheme between the EUMS and UNDPKO, the EU should detach officers to the UN force in place since the planning stage. There should be an exchange of liaison officers at the OHQ/strategic level and at the FHQ/operational level once the forces are identified.

Applying the concept of effect-based operations and comprehensive approaches can contribute to achieving unity of effort. This would imply including political and economic aspects in the planning process, but also taking into account information gathered from various actors on the ground.

7. Unity of goals rather than debate on tools and new concepts

All these recommendations show that the basic problem consists in a lack of mutual understanding, deeply anchored structural patterns and potentially a lack of will to overcome them. Resolving these differences by trying to forcibly harmonise the systems does not seem a very auspicious approach. The most sensible approach to ensure efficient cooperation is to bridge these differences. Raising awareness and increasing the understanding of the partner and their way of doing things, but also recognising mutual dependence, is key to building bridges and hence improving cooperation.

The EU and the UN should above all concentrate on discussing goals and procedures rather than specific tools (such as the Battlegroups). Besides, there is not necessarily a need for new grand strategies, which often are the easy way

out of difficult implementation. The lessons identified have to be implemented rather than new concepts developed. The EU and the UN should more frequently carry out common lessons identified exercises and engage in cooperation on best practices, mutual training and learning processes. As undesirable as they are, painful practical experiences in the field might trigger this process.

Not addressing the outlined shortcomings puts EU-UN cooperation at risk, and hence also calls into question the UN's and the EU's capacities, credibility and international responsibility. Cooperation in military crisis management lies at the intersection of several upcoming challenges which are high on the EU's and UN's agenda. The costs of inadequate cooperation or of a poor EU-UN relationship could be high and their effects would be felt beyond the two organisations.

Annexes

Timeline of the EUFOR RD Congo operation

2005	
12 December	The European Council confirms that the EU is determined to support the Congolese people in the transition process towards a democratic government. No mention of military support.
27 December	The UN invites the EU to consider the possibility of deploying a military force to the DR Congo to assist MONUC during the election process (letter by UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno).
2006	
January	Franco-German government meeting.
14 March	Franco-German summit in Berlin. President Chirac and Chancellor Merkel both argue for a EU military operation in DR Congo.
23 March	Council approves option paper for possible UN support to MONUC.
28 March	Letter by foreign minister of Austria on behalf of the European Council to the UNSG stating support to deploy EU military capabilities in support of MONUC.
25 April	UNSC Resolution no. 1671 (2006) authorising an EU operation in DR Congo.
27 April	Joint Action of the Council 2006/319/CFSP defines the organisational structure of EUFOR, the OHQ in Potsdam, and nominates OpCdr Karlheinz Viereck and FCdr Christian Damay.
1 May	The first round of the elections in DR Congo is postponed from 18 June to 30 July.
17 May	The German government approves the deployment of 780 troops (500 soldiers and 280 logistical and medical support personnel).
24 May	The operation planning and rules of engagement approved by the European Council.
1 June	The German Bundestag agrees on the deployment of 780 soldiers for EUFOR.
12 June	EU foreign ministers adopt the decision to launch the operation.
30 July	Start of EUFOR DR Congo.
30 July	First round of the elections.
20 August	Incidents just prior to the announcement of the provisional election result.
21 August	The independent electoral commission announces the results of the election and a necessary second round. Intervention of EUFOR Congo at the request of MONUC when Vice President Bemba's HQ is attacked. Incidents continue.
22 August	Third day of violent incidents in Kinshasa. EUFOR reinforces its troops in Kinshasa, some of the Gabon-stationed troops arrive in Kinshasa. EUFOR intervenes in the protection of European and US diplomats.
22 August	Presidential candidates Bemba and Kabila sign an agreement to withdraw their troops from the centre of Kinshasa after two days of confrontations.

4 September	The EU Commission makes available an additional 16 million euro to finalise the election process in DRC, thereby acceding to the request of the UNSG. This brings the Commission's contribution to 165 million euro.
12/13 September	SG/HR Solana visits Kinshasa.
18 September	Riots following a fire at Bemba's TV station.
22 September	First session of the newly formed parliament, elected on 30 July in parallel to the presidential elections.
25 September	German Defence Minister Jung argues against the extension of EUFOR Congo, estimating that the situation in Congo will be relatively quiet after the second round. Force Commander Damay contradicts this assessment, judging the situation instable. France, Spain and Belgium do not rule out an extension. The International Crisis Group explicitly calls for it.
3 October	SG/HR Solana announces that the EU does not envisage extending the mission beyond 30 November.
10 October	EUFOR is increased by troops from Gabon to reach 1,500 in Kinshasa.
29 October	Second round of the presidential elections,
11 November	Violent confrontations in Kinshasa,
15 November	Provisional elections results put outgoing President Kabila in the lead with 58% against 42% for Bemba, with a turnout of over 65%.
17 November	General Bentégeat, head of EUMC, declares that EUFOR will retain a capacity for action after the end of the mandate (30 November) in DR Congo, but will not be able to intervene to support the UN because it lacks rules of engagement.
18 November	Vice President Bemba questions the provisional results at the Supreme Court of Justice.
21 November	Incidents around the Supreme Court of Justice opposing Bemba and Kabila supporters.
27 November	Supreme Court of Justice declares Kabila President of DRC, with 58.05%. It rejects the complaints filed by Bemba. Severe fighting in the East, opposing the army and the UN against dissident soldiers.
30 November	End of EUFOR RD Congo.
6 December	Joseph Kabila is inaugurated as president of DRC.
2007	
March	Confrontations in Kinshasa between troops from Kabila and unsuccessful presidential candidate Bemba. Bemba leaves the country.

Abbreviations

BG	Battlegroup
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIAT	Comité international d'Accompagnement de la Transition/International Committee to Assist the Transition
CJSOR	Combined Joint Statement of Requirements
CMC	Crisis Management Concept
CoC	Chain of Command
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
DG	Directorate General
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EOM	Electoral Observation Mission
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EUFOR	European Union Force
EU HR	EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy
EUMC	EU Military Committee
EUMS	EU Military Staff
EUSEC	EU Security Sector Reform mission
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
FCdr	Force Commander
FHQ	Force Headquarters
IMD	Initiating Military Directive
IT	Information Technology
JA	Joint Action
MCM	Military Crisis Management
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MONUC	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations unies en République démocratique du Congo/Mission of the United Nations in the Democratic Republic of Congo
OHQ	Operational Headquarters
OpCdr	Operations Commander
PSC	Political and Security Committee
PsyOps	Psychological Operations
RDC	République démocratique du Congo
SALIS	Strategic Airlift Interim Solution

SG/HR	Secretary General/High Representative
SOPs	Standard Operational Procedures
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UN	United Nations
UNDPA	United Nations Department for Political Affairs
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSG	United Nations Secretary General
UNSR	United Nations Special Representative

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