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EU cohesion in the UN General Assembly

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by Paul Luif

**EU cohesion in the
UN General Assembly**



The author, a senior member of staff at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs, worked on this paper while at the EU Institute for Security Studies as a Senior Visiting Fellow in February and March of this year.

Contents

| | | |
|----------|---|-----------|
| | Summary | 3 |
| 1 | Introduction | 5 |
| 2 | Groups of countries in the United Nations | 7 |
| 3 | The process of coordination among EU member states in the UN | 9 |
| | 3.1 <i>Basic principles for cooperation among the EU member states in the UN</i> | 9 |
| | 3.2 <i>EU coordination in the General Assembly</i> | 12 |
| | 3.3 <i>EU coordination with regard to the Security Council</i> | 16 |
| 4 | The voting behaviour of EU member states in the UN — technical remarks | 21 |
| | 4.1 <i>Some early studies</i> | 21 |
| | 4.2 <i>The data and method used here</i> | 22 |
| 5 | The voting behaviour of the EU member states and other countries in the UN — results of the analysis | 27 |
| | 5.1 <i>The EU member states and the various issue areas debated in the UN General Assembly</i> | 27 |
| | 5.2 <i>The distance of the candidate countries and other third states from the EU consensus</i> | 37 |
| | 5.3 <i>The distance of EU member states and other countries from the United States</i> | 49 |
| 5 | Conclusions | 51 |
| a | Annexes | 53 |
| | a1 <i>Statistics on recorded votes in the UN General Assembly</i> | 53 |
| | a2 <i>Recorded votes at the 57th UN General Assembly 2002</i> | 57 |

The main subject of this paper is a long-term analysis of the voting behaviour of the European Union (EU) member states in the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN). Data on voting in the General Assembly is readily available, although not always in machine-readable format. Here it is used to give a broad picture of the agreement (or lack thereof) among EU members: to what extent and on what issues, in other words, does the EU ‘speak with one voice’, and which countries belong to the EU ‘mainstream’ and which do not. This said, it has to be kept in mind that the General Assembly can only pass recommendations, not legally binding texts – its political relevance, therefore, is hardly comparable with that of the Security Council.

Since late 1973 all EU members have been represented in the General Assembly, while the European Commission has long enjoyed ‘observer’ status. Therein, the EU members are part of the so-called Western European and Other States Group, which today may coordinate the votes of as many as 30 countries and is regarded as the most cohesive group and a key actor in its own right. Coordination and consultation occur mostly in New York through a heavy agenda of meetings among the representatives of the EU (and candidate) states. Only since early 2001, by contrast, do weekly meetings among those EU members that are on the Security Council and those who are not take place: they are based on Art. 19 TEU provisions and consist mostly of briefings and informal discussions between officials and/or experts. This is mainly due to the reluctance of the European permanent members (Britain and France) to see their status, prerogatives and behaviour affected by constraining EU mechanisms – a reluctance that is also reflected in Art. 19 TEU.

This paper finds that identical votes by the EU states in the UN General Assembly have increased over time, in parallel with the establishment and further development of the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). However, the data show that the degree of consensus and convergence has constantly varied according to issue areas. More specifically:

- ▶ on Middle East questions dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, agreement among EU members is quite high – as it is on human rights matters;*
- ▶ EU member states still disagree on strategic and international security-related issues, such as disarmament in general and nuclear weapons in particular. Disagreement is even larger on ‘decolonisation’ issues, but these have declined in importance over time;*
- ▶ the voting behaviour of Britain and France is different from the EU ‘mainstream’, especially on strategic matters. The ‘neutral/non-aligned’ EU countries, too, form a*

slightly deviating group – the exception being Finland, ever closer to the EU ‘mainstream’ since the late 1990s;

- ▶ *as for the EU candidates, they have quickly adjusted to the EU positions: only Latvia (strategic/security issues) as well as Cyprus and Malta (Middle East issues) still differentiate themselves from the ‘mainstream’ EU. Turkey, too, has moved ever closer to the EU positions, but not as close as the other candidates.*

Finally, the overall ‘gap’ between the EU consensus and the United States has become quite large since 1979, though less so during the Clinton years. This ‘gap’ has been widest on Middle East issues (especially concerning Israel). The EU countries closest to the United States have been Britain and France, especially thanks to resolutions on nuclear weapons and strategic issues, where the three countries have displayed a fairly similar voting behaviour.

Introduction

The United Nations (UN) is once again at the centre of the international political debate. During the crisis that led to the military intervention and occupation of Iraq, the need for an explicit legitimisation by the UN Security Council was discussed at length. The topic of the present study is not a crisis situation with extensive media coverage all over the world. The subject of this paper is a long-term analysis of the voting behaviour of the European Union (EU) member states in the General Assembly, the ‘main deliberative organ’ of the UN.¹

Consultation among the EU member states in New York, at the usual meeting place of the General Assembly, has a long tradition. Since 1973, when the Federal Republic of Germany joined the EU, all EU member states have been members of the UN and thus have a seat in the General Assembly. The situation is different in the Security Council, where only some EU countries are represented, be it as permanent or non-permanent members.

Since the EU as such does not have a legal personality, the European Community (EC), the more economic element of EU cooperation, is an ‘observer’ in the General Assembly.² Nevertheless, the EU is regarded as the most cohesive group and by itself an important actor in the General Assembly. In a formal sense, the EU countries do not represent a distinct regional group in the United Nations. They are part of the so-called Western European and Other States Group.

The focus of this study is a quantitative analysis of the voting behaviour of the EU member states in the UN General Assembly.³ It does not try to explain the politics and policies of the EU countries themselves. A general examination of the role and function of the United Nations in international affairs is also beyond the scope of this inquiry.

Data on voting in the General Assembly of the UN is readily available, although not always in machine-readable format. It has been used in empirical quantitative research in a number of ways. Here it will be used first to give a broad picture of the agreement among the EU member states – to what extent and on what issues does the EU ‘speak with one voice’.⁴

Second, quantitative analysis will be used to show which countries belong to the EU ‘mainstream’ and which cast their votes more ‘individually’. Third, distances from the EU consensus position will be calculated to find out where third countries stand vis-à-vis the EU. In the final section, particular emphasis will be given to analysis of the distance between the EU and the United States.

For the reader without extensive knowledge of the UN system, some background information on the United Nations and the coordination process of the EU in the UN will be given. This information should allow a better understanding of the outcome of the whole process – voting in the General Assembly.

¹ *Basic Facts About the United Nations* (New York: United Nations, 2000), p. 6.

² The term ‘European Union’ (EU) is generally used here for the whole period since the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951-52, although its designation was European Community (EC) before the Maastricht Treaty came into force on 1 November 1993.

³ Earlier comprehensive studies on the EU in the UN are Beate Lindemann, *EG-Staaten und Vereinte Nationen. Die politische Zusammenarbeit der Neun in den UN-Hauptorganen* (Munich-Vienna: R. Oldenbourg, 1978), and Klaus-Dieter Stadler, *Die Europäische Gemeinschaft in den Vereinten Nationen. Die Rolle der EG im Entscheidungsprozeß der UN-Hauptorgane am Beispiel der Generalversammlung* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993).

⁴ See the study by Philip Taylor, *When Europe Speaks with One Voice. The External Relations of the European Community* (London: Aldwych Press, 1979).

Besides using the relevant literature and compiling the empirical data, this study is based on interviews with officials in the General Secretariat of the EU Council and in the European Commission as well as with officials in the foreign ministries of Austria, France and the United Kingdom in the first half of 2003. In February 1999, I had the opportunity to talk with officials from the UN Secretariat, the Liaison Office of the General Secretariat of the EU

Council, the European Commission Delegation and with officials from several permanent missions of EU member states in New York. I wish to thank colleagues at the EU Institute for Security Studies for their valuable comments on my research during my stay in Paris as Senior Visiting Fellow in February/March 2003. The views expressed and the interpretation of the data in this publication are mine alone.

Groups of countries in the United Nations

The Charter of the United Nations does not identify subgroups of UN member states, with the possible exception of the five permanent members of the Security Council. In a 'gentlemen's agreement' of 1946, the United States and the Soviet Union divided the six non-permanent seats in the Security Council among the then 51 UN members in a mixture of geographical and ideological groups: Latin America (2 seats), Asia and Mideast (1), Eastern Europe (1), Western Europe (1) and the Commonwealth (1). The extension of the membership of the Security Council in 1963 from 11 to 15 members (by adding four non-permanent seats) also brought a new division of the non-permanent seats and a realignment of the five regional groups: Africa, Asia (together 5 non-permanent seats), Eastern Europe (1), Latin America and Caribbean (2), Western Europe and others (2).⁵ Besides endorsing states for election to two-year terms as non-permanent members of the Security Council, the regional groups put forward proposals for elections to the UN ECOSOC (Economic and Social Council) and for various other positions in UN organs.⁶ In New York, the regional groups meet about once a month. Their decisions are made by consensus; substantial questions are rarely debated in the groups.⁷

The *Western Europe and Others Group* (WEOG) consists of the present 15 EU member states and all other West European countries (Andorra, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey) as well as Australia,

Canada and New Zealand. There are some peculiarities. Turkey is also member of the Asian States Group, but for elections it is member of WEOG. The United States is an observer in WEOG and participates only in the process of selecting members for elections. Israel was refused membership in the Asian Group and finally became 'temporary' member of WEOG in May 2000 for four years, but only in New York. It has to report every year about its endeavours to become member of the Asian Group.

The *Eastern European Group* consists of countries of the former Eastern bloc, including the successor states of former Yugoslavia. Estonia does not belong to any regional group. Cyprus belongs to the *Asian Group*. If all countries which signed the accession treaties in April 2003 become EU members in May 2004, the EU countries will be divided among three regional groups in the UN. The merger of WEOG with the East European States Group was debated, but has not been decided on; a merger would probably reduce the representation of European states in UN organs.

Besides these regional groups that are relevant mostly for election purposes, with present and future EU member states there exist a few coalitions of states that deal with the important substantive matters of the UN General Assembly. The *Non-Aligned Movement* (NAM) was founded in 1961 by countries mainly of the Third World to avoid involvement in the conflicts between East and West. Today it is the

⁵ Ingo Winkelmann, 'Regionalgruppen', in Helmut Volger (ed.), *Lexikon der Vereinten Nationen* (Munich-Vienna: Oldenbourg, 2000), pp. 435-8; M. J. Peterson, *The General Assembly in World Politics* (Boston-London-Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986), pp. 152-60.

⁶ General Assembly Resolution 33/138 of 19 December 1978 states that 'the various organs of the United Nations should be so constituted as to ensure their representative character'.

⁷ The situation is different in e.g. Geneva, where the regional groups also discuss substantial issues.

political grouping of countries of the South. The economic interests of the Third World are represented by the *Group of 77*, which was founded at the first UN Conference on Trade and Development in 1964. Both groups have more than 100 members; it is thus often fairly difficult to obtain consensus among them.⁸ In the past there have been various attempts to enhance cooperation among the Western countries, but only the *European Union* and the *Nordic*

countries have been significant over a longer time period.⁹ Since the 1990s, JUSCANZ (Japan, United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) has developed as a (loose) forum of cooperation for non-EU 'Western' and like-minded countries in UN bodies. In this group, besides the countries which gave it its name, other countries participate with various intensity, among them Norway, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Russia and South Korea.

⁸ For a detailed analysis of the political groups in the UN see Sally Morphet, 'States Groups at the United Nations and Growth of Member States at the United Nations', in Paul Taylor and A. J. R. Groom (eds.), *The United Nations at the Millennium. The Principle Organs* (London-New York: Continuum, 2000), pp. 224-70.

⁹ Since 1995, three of the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland and Sweden) have been members of the EU. As a result, the relevance of the Nordic cooperation has declined; see Lena Wiklund, 'Nordisk samling i FN', in Bengt Sundelius and Claes Wiklund (eds.), *Norden i sicksack. Tre spårbyten inom nordiskt samarbete* (Stockholm: Santerus, 2000), pp. 253-74.

The process of coordination among EU member states in the United Nations

3.1 Basic principles for cooperation among the EU member states in the UN

In the early years of the United Nations, the Benelux countries regularly held consultations on their policies in the General Assembly. When Italy became a UN member in 1955, the West European countries (the Benelux countries plus France and Italy) significantly increased their cooperation in the UN.¹⁰ Cooperation was also extended to the United Kingdom, and the Western European Union (WEU) was used as a coordination framework.

In 1970, when the EU member states started their foreign policy cooperation in the context of EPC (European Political Cooperation), the Federal Republic of Germany was not yet a member of the United Nations. This seems to have been the reason why there is no reference to UN cooperation in the very first documents of EPC. Only just before the Federal Republic joined the UN, the Annex to the Copenhagen Report of the EPC (23 July 1973) referred to '[placing] within the framework of political cooperation the consultations which used to take place within the WEU before sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, of the Economic and Social Council and of the FAO'.¹¹ On 18 September 1973, the Federal Republic was admitted (together with the German Democratic Republic) to the United Nations. A few months later, in December 1973, the foreign ministers of the EU member states declared in

the 'Document on the European Identity', at point 21:

[The Nine] are also resolved to contribute to international progress, both through their relations with third countries and by adopting common positions wherever possible in international organizations, notably the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies.¹²

The Copenhagen Report also established EPC working groups. On the initiative of the Federal Republic, the Political Committee (group of high officials from member states' foreign ministries) instructed the UN Working Group (CONUN – Coordination Nations Unies) to study the situation of the United Nations and how to improve cooperation among the EU member states in the UN. The concluding 'Dublin Report' (June 1975) stressed the importance of the early coordination of national positions on all UN matters among EU member states except subjects coming under the European Commission's competence.¹³ But there was no comprehensive consensus, and therefore difficulties for the EU's UN policy remained. First, there was no agreement on uniform voting. Nevertheless, it was decided that whenever there was disagreement, at least the casting of opposing votes should be avoided. Second, member states could not agree on an obligation to consult. They were only ready to consult on 'important initiatives'. Finally, France and the United Kingdom rejected any obligation to inform the other EU members on matters concerning the Security

¹⁰ Lindemann, op. cit. in note 3, p. 57.

¹¹ Taken from *European Political Co-operation (EPC)*, 5th edition (Bonn: Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 1988), p. 44.

¹² Ibid., p. 54.

¹³ See Lindemann, op. cit. in note 3, p. 82–5; the Dublin Report was not published.

Council. Since both countries had been permanent members of this most important UN body, they were keen to maintain their privileged role in UN politics. Only since the Iraq-Kuwait crisis (1990-91) has information exchange started between the two permanent members and the rest of the EU countries on Security Council matters.¹⁴

On 11 October 1974, the European Economic Community (EEC) obtained observer status at the UN General Assembly, which has allowed its representatives to participate in the work of the General Assembly and its main committees.¹⁵ A decision by COREPER (made on 12 September 1974) stated that the EU would be represented by a delegate from the Commission and a delegate from the Presidency.¹⁶

At the European Council in Brussels, on 17 July 1975, the heads of states or governments of the EU countries reiterated 'their confidence in the United Nations, the main institution of international cooperation'. The Nine signalled 'their resolve to clear their concertation of all obstacles, so that the Community may come out with all the weight of its responsibilities'. Their aim would be a strengthening of the United Nations.¹⁷

On 23 September 1975, at the 30th Session of the UN General Assembly, the Italian foreign minister (Italy holding the Presidency) made the first statement on behalf of the 'nine Foreign Ministers of the Community' in the general debate.¹⁸ At the next session of the General Assembly, the Dutch foreign minister spoke as 'President of Council of Ministers of the European Community and as president of the Euro-

pean Political Cooperation'.¹⁹ At the 36th Session of the General Assembly in 1981, the representative of the Presidency, the British foreign minister, spoke for the first time 'on behalf of the Community and its member States' – a formula retained up to the 49th General Assembly in 1994, when the German foreign minister for the first time spoke on behalf of the European Union.²⁰

In 1983, in view of the increased EPC cooperation, the Political Committee issued a new report on EU coordination in the UN. It stressed the importance of common actions. The Political Committee demanded intensified and concrete coordination of the entire range of foreign policy questions which were relevant for all EU member states. The member states should consult each other as early as possible and harmonise their positions and actions in the UN.²¹ It seems the Political Committee was caused to issue this report by the friction on EPC matters among member states due to the accession of Greece in 1981.

The *Single European Act*, signed in February 1986 and in force on 1 July 1987, introduced the first legally binding rules for cooperation among the EU member states in the United Nations. Title III, Article 30(7) referred to 'international institutions':

- a. In international institutions and at international conferences which they attend, the High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to adopt common positions on the subjects covered by this Title.
- b. In international institutions and at international conferences in which not all the High

¹⁴ On the initiative of the Italian Presidency (second half of 1990), the Security Council members Belgium, France and the United Kingdom began discussing the Security Council agenda; but no coordination of national positions took place. Stadler, op. cit. in note 3, pp. 69, 70 and 199.

¹⁵ The term 'EEC' was later changed to 'European Community'; the EU does not have a legal personality.

¹⁶ That is, a so-called bicephal (double-headed) representation.

¹⁷ Op. cit. in note 11, p. 94.

¹⁸ UN General Assembly, Provisional Verbatim Records, 2358th Meeting, 23 September 1975, p. 16; the same formula was already used at the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly in 1975.

¹⁹ UN General Assembly, Official Records, Thirty-First Session, 7th Plenary Meeting, 28 September 1976, p. 76; Stadler, op. cit. in note 3, p. 76.

²⁰ UN General Assembly, Official Records, Thirty-Sixth Session, 8th Plenary Meeting, 22 September 1981, p. 106; and UN General Assembly, Official Records, Forty-Ninth Session, 6th Plenary Meeting, 27 September 1994, p. 15.

²¹ The 1983 decision was not published; see Stadler, op. cit. in note 3, p. 81.

Contracting Parties participate, those who do participate shall take full account of positions agreed in European Political Cooperation.

Although the wording of these two subparagraphs was quite guarded, it gave guidelines as to the two circumstances in which EU member states could find themselves. When all EU countries were members of the international organisation, they would have to 'endeavour' to speak with one voice. In those institutions where only a subgroup of the EU states were members, they should take 'full account' of the EPC positions.

Article J.2(3) of the *Maastricht Treaty* (signed February 1992, in force 1 November 1993) introduced the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as the 'second pillar' of the three-pillar EU edifice. Concerning international organisations, it used slightly stronger language. The member states should 'coordinate' their action; they should 'uphold' the common positions, including in cases where not all members participate:

Member States shall coordinate their action in international organizations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such fora.

In international organizations and at international conferences where not all Member States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the common positions.

In Article J.5(4), the EU Treaty introduced more detailed rules for international organisations of which not all EU member states were members. Members represented in such an organisation had the duty to inform the other EU countries:

Without prejudice to Article J.2(3) and Article J.3(4) [about joint actions], Member States represented in international organizations or international conferences where not all the Member States participate shall keep the latter informed of any matter of common interest.

Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

The second subparagraph explicitly mentioned the EU states sitting in the UN Security Council. They had to 'concert' — among themselves; coordination with the EU countries which were not members of the Security Council was not called for. The permanent members of the Security Council (France and the United Kingdom) had to defend the 'positions and interests' of the Union, but the provisions of the UN Charter would take precedence.²²

A policy document on *European Union Coordination in the United Nations Framework* which was adopted by the EU foreign ministers at the General Affairs Council on 10 April 1995, brought a non-binding 'code of conduct' for EU coordination with a number of elements, among them the following rules:

- ▶ member states should try to start drawing up common positions as well as drafting Presidency statements and resolutions as early as possible. In accordance with the importance of the topic, this preparation should take place through COREU messages,²³ in Brussels or in New York;
- ▶ members should identify sufficiently early on those key questions where detailed agreement should be sought among the EU countries, and distinguish them from less important issues. For the latter, the Presidency could be granted more leeway in contacts and negotiations with third countries;
- ▶ for preparing EU statements, resolutions or contacts with third countries, the Presidency could, in accordance with the other EU

²² This could be regarded as an implementation of Article 103 of the UN Charter: 'In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.'

²³ COREU (Correspondance européenne) is the formerly telex network, now e-mail network, which connects the foreign ministries of the member states (and their permanent representations in Brussels), the European Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council.

members, delegate some of its tasks to the 'Troika' as well as to other member states;

- ▶ EU states should abide by EU 'discipline'. In particular, each EU country should begin appropriate consultations before it launches a national initiative or co-sponsors texts with third countries.²⁴

The *Amsterdam Treaty* (signed October 1997, in force 1 May 1999) brought several new elements to the CFSP, in particular the position of the High Representative, but in UN matters it only consolidated the rules in one place, now Article 19 TEU:

1. Member States shall coordinate their action in international organizations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such fora.

In international organizations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the common positions.

2. Without prejudice to paragraph 1 and Article 14(3) [on Joint Actions], Member States represented in international organizations or international conferences where not all the Member States participate shall keep the latter informed of any matter of common interest.

Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

The *Treaty of Nice* (signed February 2001, in force 1 February 2003) did not change Article 19 TEU. However, it introduced the legal basis for some institutional innovations in the CFSP, especially the Political and Security Committee

(PSC). It should 'monitor the international situation' in the areas covered by the CFSP and contribute to the 'definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own initiative' (Article 25 TEU).

The draft *EU Constitution* of June 2003 maintains the intergovernmental features of the CFSP. It introduces a 'Minister for Foreign Affairs' who will chair the Foreign Affairs Council. The rules concerning the UN coordination of the EU member states remain the same, with a few exceptions. The (new) Minister for Foreign Affairs 'shall organize the coordination' in international organisations and the Minister shall also be kept informed when only some EU states are members of the organisation. The EU countries in the UN Security Council shall again 'concert' and the responsibilities of the Security Council members under the provisions of the UN Charter are mentioned, but without explicit reference to the Permanent Members (Article III-201). An item of the draft Constitution which could have spillover effects for the whole CFSP is Article I-6 on the 'legal personality' of the EU. As already mentioned, the EC (which has been part of the first pillar of the EU) has been the observer in the UN, not the EU itself. If the EU is able to act as EU, the incentives for 'speaking with one voice' will be enhanced.

3.2 EU coordination in the General Assembly

The General Assembly of the United Nations is one of the six principle organs of the UN. It is the place where the 'sovereign equality' of states (Article 2(1) UN Charter) is most visible. With the admission of Switzerland and Timor-Leste in September 2002, 191 states (and only states) are members of the General Assembly, each state having one vote. The (regular) sessions of the

²⁴ COREU PAR 483/95. The first three points are from Part II of this policy document which deals directly with the EU coordination in UN organisations. The fourth point is from Part III, on the coordination at international conferences. The policy document has not been published; however, Winkelmann gives a comprehensive description of its content: see Ingo Winkelmann, 'Europäische und mitgliedstaatliche Interessenvertretung in den Vereinten Nationen', in *Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht*, vol. 60, no. 2 (2000), pp. 413-45, here pp. 418-21.

General Assembly usually start on the third Tuesday in September in New York.²⁵ The first important agenda item is the ‘general debate’, when the heads of state or government (or foreign ministers) of most UN members come to New York and make statements in the General Assembly. The meetings of the Assembly are then held until the Christmas holidays. The following year meetings are held if necessary, until the next General Assembly session begins. The General Assembly can deal with any matter of international affairs. Article 12 of the UN Charter stipulates that the General Assembly should not make any recommendations on a dispute or situation as long as these are discussed in the Security Council. In practice, the General Assembly deals with such matters as well.²⁶ Six Main Committees of the General Assembly prepare the debates in the Plenary. They give a good indication of the principal topics debated each year in the General Assembly:

First – Disarmament and International Security Committee

Second – Economic and Financial Committee

Third – Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee

Fourth – Special Political and Decolonisation Committee

Fifth – Administrative and Budgetary Committee

Sixth – Legal Committee

Looked at historically, the General Assembly has gone through various stages of importance for world politics. As the East-West conflict paralysed the functioning of the Security Council, the General Assembly gained prominence in international relations as from the late 1940s. After two decades there was a period of stagnation (1965 to the early 1980s). Since then, many observers have seen the UN General Assembly as

being ‘in decline’. It has been less and less able to satisfy its members. The Third World countries have become disillusioned. The United States has even become hostile.²⁷

The General Assembly can only pass recommendations, not legally binding texts.²⁸ This ‘irrelevance’ of the General Assembly makes its decision-making processes part of ‘low politics’. It is mainly the task of the specialists and diplomatic ‘technicians’ in New York to negotiate and find solutions for the issues on the agenda. Member states’ capitals are seldom involved in the decision-making. Therefore, the voting in the UN General Assembly can be considered a ‘routine’ presentation of the interests of its members.

Coordination among the EU countries at the United Nations in New York is regarded as part of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Although there are economic topics which belong (partly) to the supranational first pillar of the EU, all topics at the General Assembly (and the Security Council) are dealt with using the CFSP method. The European Commission takes part in all aspects of this coordination process, but it does not have the exclusive right of initiative as in first-pillar procedures. One can compare its position to that of a member state. The primary role for managing the coordination process rests with the semi-annually rotating Presidency; decisions are made by unanimity.

The Commission established an information office in New York in 1964 which became the EU Commission Delegation to the United Nations in 1974. According to Article 302 TEU (before the Amsterdam Treaty a similar Article (229) was in the EEC Treaty), the Commission shall ‘ensure the maintenance of all appropriate relations with the organs of the United Nations and of its specialised agencies’. The

²⁵ The 57th Session of the General Assembly started on 10 September 2002, which was actually the second Tuesday of September.

²⁶ Under the ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution adopted by the General Assembly in November 1950, the Assembly may take action if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of its permanent members, fails to act where there appears to be a threat to international peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. See *Basic Facts*, op. cit. in note 1, p. 6.

²⁷ Marie-Claude Smouts, ‘The General Assembly: Grandeur and Decadence’, in op. cit. in note 8, pp. 21–60, here p. 46.

²⁸ Exceptions of this non-binding nature of decisions are the designation of the states and other entities to participate in the General Assembly, the UN budget and the election of members to various organs of the UN.

general role of the Commission Delegation in New York is to reinforce the coordination of common EU policy and approaches in the United Nations, including helping to prepare EU statements and the adoption of EU positions on draft resolutions and other texts.²⁹

The Council's Liaison Office in New York was created in July 1994 (in the context of the Maastricht Treaty). It provides information, reports and analyses on United Nations activities to the High Representative for the CFSP and to the General Secretariat of the Council in Brussels. In New York, it assists the Presidency and the member states in the day-to-day running of EU coordination.³⁰

In meetings at the UN where the EU is present, its delegation sits behind three nameplates – Commission, Presidency and Council – a sign of the complexity of the EU and confusing in particular for third countries. If the planned EU Constitution were to provide the EU with legal personality, the Commission Delegation would probably fuse with the Council's Liaison Office to form a single EU Delegation.³¹

Coordination among the EU countries for the upcoming General Assembly starts in the first half of the year when the Presidency prepares a framework text which is sent by COREU to the member states for comment and complement. Up to the late 1990s, this text was a rather lengthy 'Memorandum', in effect an extensive outline of the whole CFSP *acquis*.³² The idea behind the Memorandum was to supplement the statement of the EU Presidency at the 'general debate' of the General Assembly. The questionable usefulness of such a lengthy Memorandum compelled the EU to produce just a much shorter 'Priorities Paper'. After the text of this Paper is established through the COREU procedure, the Council working group on the UN,

CONUN, debates the text and tries to establish a consensus. The Paper is then sent to the PSC, which discusses it and finalises the text if necessary; the Council then formally approves it. On 22 July 2002, the General Affairs and External Relations Council approved (without debate) the EU 'Priorities Paper' for the 57th General Assembly. The main priorities included the following subject matters:

- the role of the UN and implementation of the Millennium Declaration (strong commitment of the EU to multilateralism);
- combating terrorism and the central role of the UN in this;
- the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms as essential elements of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (including abolition of the death penalty, human rights of children and women, fight against racism);
- commitment to international law and justice, support for the International Criminal Court;
- humanitarian issues, a key concern for the EU, the largest global donor in humanitarian aid (closer cooperation between peacekeeping, peace-building and the humanitarian response);
- conflict prevention, one of the main objectives of the EU's external relations, and peacekeeping, as the EU is developing its own crisis management capability;
- international peace and security, including the situation in Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans, the Mediterranean region, India and Pakistan, Afghanistan and East Timor;
- disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;

²⁹ Description of European Commission Delegation's work in New York, DELNY01-001EN, 19 September 2002, *European Union @ United Nations*, <http://europa-eu-un.org/article.asp?id=458>.

³⁰ See the information on the *European Union @ United Nations*; <http://europa-eu-un.org/article.asp?id=1933>.

³¹ In anticipation of this fusion, the Commission and Council representations plan to move into shared offices with 'European Union' on the door; see Claire Hewitt, 'The EU at the UN: propagating a model of good governance', in: *Commission en direct*, weekly internal newspaper of the European Commission, no. 284 (6–12 June 2003), p. 5.

³² The Memorandum of the Luxembourg Presidency for the General Assembly in 1997 had 68 pages; its condensed version on EU priorities had seven pages.

- ▶ sustainable development, in particular the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg) as an opportunity to redirect globalisation towards sustainable development and poverty reduction;
- ▶ World Summit on the Information Society;
- ▶ the eradication of infectious diseases and pandemics, in particular the fight against HIV/AIDS;
- ▶ strengthening the UN system, including by improving UN finances.³³

This list shows the typical result of the consensus procedure of the EU's CFSP: each member state tries to include its preferences in such a paper. The 'priorities' become a list of the many problems the world community has to face. None the less, some of the points in the list clearly show disagreement with e.g. the United States: commitment to multilateralism, abolition of the death penalty, support for the International Criminal Court.

The preparation of the 'Priorities Paper' is only the beginning of intensive EU coordination on common statements, joint positions on resolutions and negotiations with third countries during the General Assembly. This is done mostly in New York; special, important matters are also discussed in Brussels, in the working groups of the Council. In-depth exchanges on matters concerning e.g. the General Assembly's First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) often take place in Brussels in two Council working groups, CODUN (Global Disarmament and Arms Control) and CONOP (Non-Proliferation).

Questions concerning the coordination process in New York can also be part of daily bilateral e-mail exchanges between the foreign ministries and through the COREU network. But speed, flexibility and a division of labour compel the EU to do most of the coordination process in New York.³⁴

In the second half of each year, during the main part of the General Assembly session, there are about 600 meetings of EU representatives in New York (EU member states, Commission Delegation, Liaison Office of the EU Council). They are held at three levels: UN ambassadors of EU member states, deputy chiefs of mission and experts. Between September and December, several meetings take place each day, usually before the UN bodies meet. Although the 'silence procedure' (a statement is regarded as accepted unless a member raises an objection to it before a specified deadline) by e-mail or COREU is increasingly used, it is a 'fairly demanding and time-consuming coordination mechanism'.³⁵

Each Presidency puts together a 'Report' after the autumn meetings of each General Assembly which gives an overview of this hard and arduous work in New York.³⁶ In the second half of 2001, the Belgian Presidency made 26 statements in the General Assembly on behalf of the EU and 61 statements in the Main Committees.³⁷ The formula by which the common statements are introduced also shows the extent of the support for this statement:

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe associated with the

³³ 'EU Priorities for the 57th General Assembly', approved by the 2447th EU Council Meeting, General Affairs and External Relations, Brussels, 22 July 2002, available at <http://europa-eu-un.org/articleslist.asp?section=47>; this Priorities Paper is some 14 pages long. This list of subject matters is taken (with additions) from press release 10945/02 (Presse 210) of the 2447th Council Meeting.

³⁴ So Winkelmann, *op. cit.* in note 24, p. 419.

³⁵ These are the words of Ernst Sucharipa, 'Die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (GASP) der Europäischen Union im Rahmen der Vereinten Nationen', in: Jochen Abr. Frowein, Klaus Scharioth, Ingo Winkelmann and Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds.), *Verhandlungen für den Frieden/Negotiating for Peace* (Heidelberg: Springer for Liber Amicorum Tono Eitel, 2003), pp. 773-97, here p. 786. Ambassador Sucharipa was head of the Austrian Permanent Mission to the United Nations during Austria's EU Presidency in the second half of 1998.

³⁶ See 'Rapport de la Présidence belge de l'Union européenne' (New York, juillet-décembre 2001), Mission Permanente de la Belgique auprès des Nations Unies, mimeo, New York, and 'Report of the Danish Presidency of the European Union' (New York, July-December 2002), Permanent Mission of Denmark to the United Nations, New York, mimeo.

³⁷ 'Rapport de la Présidence belge', *op. cit.* in note 36, p. 7; the Report of the Danish Presidency, *op. cit.* in note 36, p. 1, states that altogether '145 formal interventions were delivered on behalf of the European Union'.

European Union – Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia – and the associated countries Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, as well as the European Free Trade Area country of the European Economic Area, Iceland, all align themselves with this statement.³⁸

Thus, the EU coordination procedure most of the time includes not only the present member states of the EU, but also the Central and East European countries and other associated states as well as the EFTA countries. In general, only after the EU countries have reached a (provisional) consensus do they ask these states to support the statement. Usually the Presidency (often in the Troika format) or under the responsibility of the Presidency other EU member states consult with these and other third countries. It can happen that the representatives of the EU's partner countries get the text of the joint EU statement just minutes before a meeting starts. They then have to decide immediately if they want to align themselves with the statement. Reaching a consensus among the 15 EU member states is already quite difficult; in addition, time constraints limit the possibility for inputs from third countries.

The fact that usually some 30 countries support the common position makes the EU a fairly important player in the UN General Assembly. In spite of their strong position, the behaviour of the EU states in the General Assembly is mostly *reactive* towards initiatives and drafts of resolutions by other (groups of) countries; most initiatives taken in the UN General Assembly come from Third World countries, the NAM or the G-77. Relatively seldom does the EU put forward its own proposals. The Belgian Presidency

reported on EU initiatives during the 56th General Assembly in the following fields:

- security of UN staff carrying out humanitarian actions;
- implementation of the recommendations of the Millennium Declaration;
- support for anti-personnel mines actions;
- global partnerships (concerning the private sector in UN actions);
- resolution on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency;
- the right of the child;
- human rights in Iran, Iraq, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo.³⁹

All these initiatives concern draft resolutions which have a long history (see the list of the 'Priorities Paper' for the 57th General Assembly above). Proactive, new impulses by the EU are rare.⁴⁰

The output of the EU coordination process of greatest interest here is the attempts by EU member states to cast identical votes in the Plenary of the General Assembly – they will be analysed below to show how far the EU countries have succeeded to 'speak with one voice' in the UN General Assembly. But before that, a few words are necessary on EU coordination concerning the UN Security Council.

3.3 EU coordination with regard to the Security Council

In contrast to the General Assembly premised on the sovereign equality of states, the Security Council privileges a small group of UN members. It has 15 members, five of them permanent and endowed with a 'veto' power.⁴¹ Ten Security Council members are elected for a two-year

³⁸ Address by the Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller on behalf of the European Union, dealing with the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), Official Records, United Nations General Assembly, fifty-seventh session, 10th plenary meeting, 16 October 2002, A/57/PV.10, p. 18.

³⁹ 'Rapport de la Présidence belge', op. cit. in note 36, pp. 7, 17 and 18.

⁴⁰ See the evaluation by Ernst Sucharipa, op. cit. in note 35, p. 777. The Danish report on the 57th General Assembly does not explicitly list EU initiatives.

⁴¹ Article 27 UN Charter speaks of 'an affirmative vote' of nine members of the Security Council necessary to make a decision, including all five permanent members. In practice, abstentions by permanent members do not hinder the passing of a decision. See Bruno Simma, Stefan Brunner and Hans-Peter Kaul, 'Article 27', in: Bruno Simma (ed.), *The Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary, Volume 1*, 2nd edition (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2002), pp. 476–523, here pp. 493–9.

period (immediate re-election is not allowed), selected on a geographical basis (see above). Since the end of the Cold War, the Security Council has once more gained in status and importance in world politics. This was particularly evident in the first half of the 1990s, when the Security Council managed 18 peacekeeping operations involving up to 77,000 troops (data for 1995).⁴² But the (negative) experiences in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina led to a reduction of the Security Council's actions. Still, the Security Council is the UN body that can make binding decisions, in particular under Chapter VII of the Charter.

The Security Council has developed into a kind of international 'conference' with various kinds of meetings taking place almost daily. One can distinguish between, first, the 'formal public meetings', which are held in the (through media reporting, well-known) hall of the Security Council. There the formal decisions are made and the members explain their positions to the public; but it is not the place where the members negotiate. Second, the 'informal consultations of the whole' convene in the consultation room beside the hall. Here political deliberations and negotiations take place. The meetings are not public and have (despite its designation) a fairly organised structure with a fixed agenda, a list of speakers and simultaneous interpretation. UN members that are not members of the Security Council cannot participate in these informal consultations. Third, other informal meetings and discussions have a variety of formats, like informal discussions of a subgroup of Security Council members, meetings of drafting groups on expert level or ad hoc working groups.⁴³

The working method of the Security Council is also characterised by the existence of several groups:

- the five permanent members, the 'P5';
- subgroups of the P5, like the 'P2' (United States and United Kingdom) or the 'P3' (United States, United Kingdom and France);
- the non-aligned members;
- the non-non-aligned members, those non-permanent members which do not belong to the Non-Aligned Movement.⁴⁴

The non-aligned members of the Security Council 'caucus' and try to reach common positions; frequently their unity proves to be unstable. China often supports positions close to the non-aligned.⁴⁵

The EU countries that are members of the Security Council (be it as permanent or as elected members) see themselves primarily as states which represent their national interests.⁴⁶ Other EU members of the Security Council maintain that they have to act 'on behalf' of *all* UN members (see Article 24 UN Charter) and not only for the interests of the EU countries.⁴⁷

These attitudes help to explain the difficulties with regard to coordination among the EU member states in the Security Council. For a long time in particular the Permanent Members, France and the United Kingdom, refused any cooperation with the other EU countries. They saw their refusal justified by the TEU (see above). Exceptions were the weekly meetings of the EU head of missions in New York, where each Friday the British and French ambassadors would answer questions by their colleagues on the activities in the Security Council. As many meetings of the Security Council are informal and not open to the public, the ambassadors often did not know what questions to ask their British and French colleagues.

In recent years, the EU members of the Security Council have taken the demands of

⁴² Hans-Peter Kaul, 'Arbeitsweise und informelle Verfahren des Sicherheitsrats. Beobachtungen eines Unterhändlers', in *Vereinte Nationen*, vol. 46, no. 1, February 1998, pp. 6-13, here p. 7.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 10/11.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁴⁶ This was explicitly stated in an interview at the Foreign Office, June 2003.

⁴⁷ Interview with an official in the French Foreign Ministry, February 2003.

Article 19 TEU more seriously. Article 19 (see text on p. 12 above) stipulates:

1. that the EU members of the Security Council discuss among themselves their positions on the topics of the agenda ('concert');
2. that these members inform the other EU countries on the debates and negotiations in the Security Council.

These obligations were virtually ignored for several years. Yet since January 2001, Security Council coordinators or experts from the permanent missions of the EU member states meet weekly in New York for so-called 'Article 19 briefings'. Their main tasks consists in a broad 'debriefing' on Security Council matters for the other EU member states. It thus extends and augments the daily briefings of the other EU member states after the informal meetings of the Security Council by France and the United Kingdom. The Article 19 Group was established on the initiative of France and Spain in the early days of the Swedish Presidency and has led to a real improvement in the flow of information concerning past events in the Security Council.⁴⁸

The heads of the UN departments in the foreign ministries of France and the United Kingdom as well as Germany and Spain (non-permanent members of the Security Council in 2003/4) tried in 2002 to agree on a number of points to improve the coordination among themselves.

1. More coordination meetings among the four in New York were planned to find areas where EU-4 initiatives could bring added value to the UN Security Council. Several issue areas (topics) were considered: Kosovo, Cyprus, Africa, counter-terrorism.
2. In the course of the discussions there was also the suggestion that the missions of the four countries in New York should inform each other about the instructions they got from their capitals before the discussions take place in the UN Security Council.⁴⁹

When the final meeting took place in Madrid in December 2002, the escalating dispute on Iraq made agreement among the EU-4 impossible. — an indicator of how quickly cooperation and coordination on CFSP matters among EU countries can vanish during times of crisis.

There are several ways in which the EU can make the common positions of the CFSP more visible in the Security Council. In formal public meetings, non-members of the Security Council can participate. Here the Presidency can present the positions of the EU. This possibility is utilised about 20 times during a Presidency. On rare occasions even the High Representative for the CFSP has made a presentation.⁵⁰

The permanent members Britain and France have always resisted any a priori coordination with the other EU members on Security Council matters. But they have now accepted an interpretation of Article 19 TEU where the EU member states would make 'forward-looking' debates. The question would be about the agenda of the Security Council the following week: 'Does anyone have an idea for the upcoming agenda of the Security Council?' In fact, the United Kingdom and France have not (yet) got any really relevant feedback on this question from the other 13 EU member states.⁵¹

The structural differences between the permanent members, the non-permanent members and the other EU member states will not be easily overcome. Permanent member status is for France and the United Kingdom an important element of being a 'great power'. In the Security Council, they have 'primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security' (Article 24 UN Charter). Compared with the two permanent members, the non-permanent members have much less experience with the Security Council decision-making procedures. But as members of the Security Council they can participate in the very frequent informal meetings and thus have a large information lead over the other EU countries.

⁴⁸ Sucharipa, *op. cit.* in note 35.

⁴⁹ The United Kingdom opposes that procedure, because it would go beyond Article 19 TEU. In addition, there was the danger that the EU position would become rather bland; interview at the Foreign Office, June 2003.

⁵¹ Interview at the Foreign Office, June 2003.

The problems of coordination and harmonisation of the positions of EU member states in the Security Council cannot be resolved easily. Too much prestige and power is at stake. Solutions like a single (or additional) seat for the EU in the Security Council can only be part of a comprehensive reform of the Security Council itself. But endeavours to reform the Security Council have been going on since the 1970s and have failed so far.

The rest of this paper will concentrate on the quantitative voting behaviour of the EU member states and other countries in the UN General Assembly. Here the positions of all EU countries can be analysed and compared. In addition, voting behaviour can be used as an indicator of the development of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The voting behaviour of EU member states in the United Nations — technical remarks

4.1 *Some early studies*

In an early study of the voting behaviour of EU member states, Leon Hurwitz looked at voting in the General Assembly for the years 1948–1973. The votes of the countries that were to create the future European Communities displayed a relatively high voting cohesion. In 1950, all five countries ((West) Germany joined the EC only in 1973) voted the same way in all roll call (= recorded) votes.⁵² After the creation of the EEC in 1957, the voting cohesion of the five member states was at first quite high but soon declined.⁵³ According to the data of Leon Hurwitz, Gaullist France started to vote differently from its partners, weakening cohesion. In an outlook on the new member states of the impending enlargement in 1973, Hurwitz saw that the United Kingdom had different voting behaviour from (the new members) Denmark and Ireland; but Britain's distance from France was relatively small.

Already in the 1950s and 1960s, the voting pattern of the (then five) EU member states had a characteristic pattern. According to Hurwitz, on two issues EU voting cohesion was clearly above average in the UN General Assembly: human rights and the Palestine/Israel-Arab dispute. In the fields of self-determination, decolonisation, trusteeships and South Africa,

cohesion was only slightly above average, in disarmament/arms control matters, cohesion was slightly below average.⁵⁴

Klaus-Dieter Stadler looked at the voting behaviour of EU member states in the UN General Assembly between 1974 and 1991. He found that the EU countries attained the highest level of consensus during these years in 1975, when the EU member states voted identically in 65.3 per cent of all recorded votes on (whole) resolutions.⁵⁵ This relatively high degree of consensus among the EU countries was never again attained during the later years of Stadler's analysis; in 1991 the EU states voted together in 50.0 per cent of the recorded votes on (whole) resolutions. Stadler noted the special role of France and the United Kingdom as permanent members of the UN Security Council. In general, they adopted a middle position between the EU core countries and Greece and Ireland. France and the United Kingdom pursued special interests in security and disarmament questions as well as decolonisation issues.⁵⁶

In the late 1970s, the EU member states reached rather high levels of consensus on questions relating to international security and disarmament. But this degree of agreement was drastically reduced in the early 1980s, on the one hand by the increased tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, on the other

⁵² See Leon Hurwitz, 'The EEC in the United Nations: The Voting Behavior of Eight Countries, 1948–1973', in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 13, no. 3, March 1975, pp. 224–43, here Figure I on p. 235.

⁵³ Over time, the voting cohesion rose, fell and then rose again between 1957 and 1972. Since Hurwitz uses a different indicator for voting cohesion, I do not give any quantitative data from his article, to avoid possible confusion.

⁵⁴ Op. cit. in note 52, Table III on p. 234. I take the categories from this table. They are similar, but obviously not identical to the categories I will use later in this study.

⁵⁵ See Stadler, op. cit. in note 3, Table 3.1.3 on p. 170. In his calculations Stadler used only votes on whole resolutions, not separate votes on parts of resolutions as will be done in the calculations below. In using *all* votes, one mostly gets slightly lower percentages than in the tables of Stadler. See also Lindemann, op. cit. in note 3, table on p. 143.

⁵⁶ Stadler, op. cit. in note 3, p. 198.

hand through the membership of Greece, which joined the EU in 1981.⁵⁷ Stadler notes that in economic and financial matters the EU countries were, in contrast to other issue areas, quite proactive. They were the principle negotiating partner of the Group of 77, the grouping of Third World countries. In no other field of debate in the General Assembly did the EU member states display greater agreement. This high rate of consensus was helped by the fact that many of the resolutions on international economic and financial matters were passed without a vote.⁵⁸ Stadler discerned an 'above-average' consensus on Middle East questions (Palestine-Israel). But at the same time he remarked that the independent role of the EU vis-à-vis the United States in this issue area in the General Assembly was not reflected in the 'real world' outside the United Nations.⁵⁹

In a mathematically sophisticated study of the voting behaviour in the UN General Assembly in the years 1991 to 1993, Soo Yeon Kim and Bruce Russett tried to identify the major issue dimensions and the voting alignments (the major voting groups) with the help of factor analysis.⁶⁰ Through this inductive method they found three major factors (three major issue dimensions) which accounted for most of the variation in voting patterns in the three General Assembly sessions.⁶¹ The first factor accounted for just over half (50.5 per cent) of all variance in voting. The authors called this factor 'self-determination and disarmament', and identified three sub-issues related to this dimension: 'colonialism and neo-colonialism', 'disarmament'

and 'Palestine'. The second factor had high loadings on 'human rights' issues, concerning Iraq, Iran and Sudan; it accounted for 10.8 per cent of the variance in voting. The rather small 'Middle East' factor explained 6.7 per cent of the variance. Without any predetermined concept, the authors extracted several issue dimensions through factor analysis. A reading of the resolutions passed in the General Assembly makes these results quite obvious and similar issue areas will be used in the analysis below.⁶²

4.2 *The data and method used here*

Data on voting in the Plenary of the General Assembly of the UN is readily available, although not always in machine-readable format. One could take all resolutions and decisions in the General Assembly and calculate the voting behaviour, but this would artificially increase the extent of agreement among member states because each year many resolutions and decisions are accepted by consensus, without a 'recorded vote' in the General Assembly. Only some 20 to 30 per cent of the resolutions each year are passed by a 'recorded vote', where each member state votes openly with 'yes', 'no' or 'abstaining' (or is 'absent' from the vote). This voting behaviour is then published, nowadays including on the Internet.⁶³

The published records only give the results of votes on resolutions passed, but resolutions put to a vote could also be rejected by a majority.

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 229/230; the consensus in international security matters reached a peak in 1979, when the EU states voted identically in 63.6 per cent of the recorded votes on (whole) resolutions; in 1983, the figure was only 18.7 per cent; Table 3.2.8 on p. 228.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 280. This 'harmonious' situation in this area of the UN General Assembly is the main reason why economic and financial issues are not analysed in more detail here.

⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 301, 302.

⁶⁰ Soo Yeon Kim and Bruce Russett, 'The New Politics of Voting Alignments in the General Assembly', in Bruce Russett (ed.), *The Once and Future Security Council* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1997), pp. 29–57.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 33.

⁶² The results concerning the clusters among the states in the General Assembly were less remarkable. The authors found a large group of states, almost exclusively from the Non-Aligned Movement. The second, third and fourth clusters included most European and other Western states, the fifth and final cluster consisted of Malta, Republic of Korea and Turkey. Ibid., p. 39.

⁶³ There are several ways to get to the recorded vote on UN resolutions. One way is to use the UNBisnet site (<http://unbisnet.un.org/webpac-bin/wgbroker?new+-access+top.vote>).

Sometimes parts of resolutions are voted on: e.g. separate votes on some words, whole preambular paragraphs or operative paragraphs. It can happen that before a resolution is passed by consensus, parts of it are passed by recorded votes. Then there are also recorded votes on motions in the General Assembly, for instance a motion not to vote on a resolution. Finally, each year a few decisions are passed by recorded votes.⁶⁴ The data on these recorded votes are not easily available. One has to read through the verbatim records of all the sessions of the General Assembly to find them. The voting behaviour of each state analysed has then to be typed into a database to permit a computerised analysis.⁶⁵ Because of these difficulties, the data described here are usually excluded from the quantitative analyses of UN voting behaviour.⁶⁶

The separate votes are included here because they provide a 'qualitative' element to the analysis. The wordings of resolutions which have been particularly controversial and have thus been the subject of several recorded votings can generally be considered of greater importance than resolutions passed by one recorded vote only. At the 51st General Assembly, about 23 per cent of all recorded votes were votes on parts of resolutions, etc. At the 54th General Assembly, the share was 30 per cent, and at the 57th General Assembly (until 31 December 2002), it was 33 per cent. The details are given in List 1 (Annex I).

Table 13 (Annex I) shows the amount of recorded votes that have been collected and analysed here. The data starts from the 34th

General Assembly in 1979; between 1979 and 1989, only every second year has been examined.⁶⁷ During the 'Second Cold War' in the 1980s the number of recorded votes was quite high, reaching a peak in 1985 with 203 recorded votes. After the end of the East-West conflict, the disputed votes declined sharply in the UN General Assembly. In the 1990s and 2000s, they were mostly slightly below or above 100.⁶⁸

In Table 13 the number of votes are given for several issue areas which are regularly debated in the General Assembly. Middle East questions (concerning Israel, Palestinian territories and adjacent countries like the Lebanon and Syria) have played a prominent part in the discussions in the General Assembly, almost from its beginning. Another topic hotly debated and voted on in the Assembly has been international security. Here the General Assembly has regularly dealt with various aspects of nuclear weapons and their proliferation, with other proliferation questions, disarmament problems and questions concerning anti-personnel mines, small arms, dual-use goods, etc. Questions of Middle East security have been included in the Middle East category.

Still debated, but of little importance compared with the 1950s and 1960s are a few decolonisation questions (non-self-governing territories, right of self-determination). The resolutions on the 'economic, commercial and financial embargo' imposed by the United States on Cuba (e.g. Resolution 57/011) have been included in this category as well. Recorded votes on human rights have significantly

⁶⁴ Decisions are on similar subjects as resolutions, only a 'decision' has less political weight than a 'resolution'. One should not forget that both, resolutions and decisions, are only recommendations and have no binding force.

⁶⁵ For the 56th and 57th General Assembly, I gratefully acknowledge the assistance in this task by Linda Lucinio and Tom Dolby, interns at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris.

⁶⁶ See, e.g. the analysis by Miguel Marín-Bosch, *Votes in the UN General Assembly* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998) (= *Nijhoff Law Specials*, vol. 35); the statistics in the reports of the EU Presidencies (see op. cit. in note 36) and the table in Sucharipa (op. cit. in note 35, p. 796) do not include votes on parts of resolutions etc. as well.

⁶⁷ Coding of data as well as data analysis always entails an error probability; this cannot be excluded in the study presented here. The important thing is that these (practically unavoidable) errors do not distort the substance of the analysis.

⁶⁸ Data for the years 1979, 1981 and 1983 were taken from Hanna Newcombe, Joyce Litster, Ruth Klaassen, Michael Klaassen and Allison McNaught, *Nations on Record: United Nations General Assembly Roll-Call Votes (1978–1983), Second Supplement* (Dundas: Peace Research Institute, 1986). Data from 1985 on are from the annual press releases of the UN on Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly, supplemented by the Provisional Verbatim Records and the Official Records of the UN General Assembly. A warning to the reader: the sheer size of the data, the coding and calculating as well as the practice of corrigenda used by the UN Secretariat all can lead to (hopefully only minor) errors in the resulting graphs and tables.

increased recently, in particular in 2002. The votes include general problems like '[g]lobalisation and its impact on the full enjoyment of all human rights' (Resolution 57/205), but also specific issues like '[e]xtrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions' (Resolution 57/214) as well as the human rights situation in several countries, such as Sudan and Iraq. Here again, votes dealing with human rights issues in the Middle East have been included in the latter category. Questions of racism and racial discrimination have been included in the decolonisation category. But where resolutions have dealt explicitly with human rights (like Resolution 57/196 on the '[u]se of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination'), the resolution has been put in the human rights category. The categorisation of resolutions can never be perfect, but it should help in finding general trends in various issue areas voted on in the UN General Assembly.⁶⁹

After the votes have been selected, the positions of various countries and groups of countries (the EU member states, the candidate countries and other third countries) towards each other can be calculated. Countries or groups of countries can be in complete agreement, when they all vote the same way, or in partial (dis-)agreement, when one of them votes yes (or no) and the other abstains, or in complete disagreement, when one votes yes and the other no. The difficult part for arriving at a quantitative index is to 'measure' the partial agreement. It lies somewhere between full agreement and complete disagreement – but where exactly? For most researchers it seemed reasonable to credit a

partial agreement with half the weight of a complete agreement. This procedure will be used here in calculating the distance between (groups of) states.⁷⁰

In mathematical terms, for each full disagreement between pairs of countries (or groups of countries), a value of 1 is given; each partial disagreement is allocated a value of 0.5, full agreement 0. These values are added for all the votes under consideration. At the same time, the 'maximum' disagreement for each pair of countries is calculated. This would be the value when both countries vote as differently as possible in each recorded vote. The actual value calculated is compared with the 'maximum' value possible. How high the actual value is in comparison with the 'maximum' value possible is given in percentages in the tables that will be discussed here. This means that the *maximum distance* a country (or a group of countries) can have from another country is always 100, the *minimum distance* is always 0, independently of how many votes are analysed. So one can make a comparison over time and over issue areas, although there will nearly always be different amounts of votes studied. To remind the reader that these calculations are based on various assumptions, only the whole numbers are given for this 'distance index'.⁷¹

There is one additional problem when calculating the 'distance' between countries. Sometimes countries are 'absent', they do not cast a vote. Some researchers simply throw out all (pairs of) votes that include a country which is absent. This would make the analysis presented here tremendously complicated. Since there are relatively few instances of 'absenteeism' with the

⁶⁹ Many analyses of the UN General Assembly voting use similar categories. See, e.g. 'U.S. Department of State, Voting Practices in the United Nations 2002' (www.state.gov/p/io/conrpt/vtgprac/), p. 3: 'Those resolutions on which recorded votes were taken continued primarily to address arms control, the Middle East, and human rights.' The factor analysis by Yeon Kim and Bruce Russett, op. cit. in note 60, extracted similar categories from the recorded votes.

⁷⁰ One exception are the calculations by Thomas J. Volgy, Derrick V. Frazier and Robert Stewart Ingersoll, 'Preference Similarities and Group Hegemony: G-7 Voting Cohesion in the UN General Assembly', in *Journal of International Relations and Development*, vol. 6, no. 1, 2003, pp. 51–70, here p. 56: 'Abstentions are coded as a "no" vote, based on the assumption that abstentions have increasingly come to reflect a softer way of disagreeing with the majority direction in the Assembly'.

⁷¹ For further details see Paul Luif, *On the Road to Brussels: The Political Dimension of Austria's, Finland's and Sweden's Accession to the European Union* (Vienna: Braumüller, 1995) (= *Laxenburg Papers*, no. 11), pp. 282–4.

countries analysed here, the distances for 'absent' are calculated as for 'abstaining'. The country is regarded as not knowing how to vote, it is 'in-between' a pro and a contra vote; it is therefore regarded as a 'partial disagreement' if confronted with a 'yes' or 'no' vote and given a value of 0.5. We have here an instance where quantitative analysis works with possibly problematic assumptions. A small precaution has been taken though: if a country is absent in more than a third of the recorded votes analysed, no

distance will be calculated (notified by 'n/a' in the tables). The prolonged absence of a country does not allow any clear distance index to be given.⁷² A special case for the EU is the UN General Assembly in 1996. In the voting at this General Assembly, the Greek representatives were absent most of the time. Thus, only 14 EU countries have been used in calculating the different indices, and for 1996 Greece was completely eliminated from the computations.⁷³

⁷² Yeon Kim and Bruce Russett, *op. cit.* in note 60, p. 32, use a 30 per cent threshold.

⁷³ The reason for this prolonged absence seems to have been a protracted strike by Greek diplomats in December 1996; see Georgios Kostakos and Dimitris Bourantonis, 'Testing CFSP at the UN. EU Voting at the General Assembly 1990-1997', in *Peace and Security*, vol. 31, June 1999, pp. 19-26, here p. 24.

The voting behaviour of the EU member states and other countries in the United Nations — results of the analysis

5.1. The EU member states and the various issue areas debated in the UN General Assembly

5.1.1. Consensus among the EU member states

Before the ‘distance’ between states and groups of states is analysed, a straightforward measure will be used to present the amount of consensus among the EU member states in the UN General Assembly. Graph 1 shows how often EU member states voted identically in relation to all recorded votes. The solid line in Graph 1 shows that in 1979 the EU states voted identically in almost 60 per cent of all recorded votes. The consensus then declined quite steeply, reaching a low of 27 per cent in 1983. One reason for that decline could be the new ‘Cold War’ of the early 1980s; but the bigger impact came most probably from the new Pasok government in Greece which had its own foreign policy agenda, without regard to the other EU states.⁷⁴ But as Greece slowly adjusted to the mainstream of the EU, the EU consensus increased again. Since the early 1990s, after the end of the Cold War and in connection with the introduction of the CFSP by the Maastricht Treaty, the consensus among


EU member states had steadily grown until 1998. After a decline in 1999 and 2000, the consensus votes have increased again, reaching about 75.5 per cent of the recorded votes in the General Assembly in 2002.⁷⁵

In Graph 1, there are two dotted lines for two different issue areas which have been important topics for resolutions in the General Assembly, as well as for the EU cohesion. Since the Venice Declaration from 1980, the EU has attempted to speak with one voice on Middle East affairs, concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Graph 1 demonstrates that the EU consensus has practically always been above average in this field. In 2001, the full consensus on Middle East issues of the previous years crumbled; in 4 out of 25 recorded votes, the EU countries cast divergent votes. France was absent in two of these four votes and later informed the UN Secretariat that it had intended to vote with the other EU states. Therefore, Graph 1 somewhat exaggerates disagreement among the EU countries on Middle East affairs for 2001. The opposite is true for security matters. Here the cohesion of the EU member states has been below average — no surprise since the EU includes two nuclear powers, France and the United Kingdom. Other EU countries, like the Netherlands, Ireland and Sweden have been strong supporters of disarmament and rather critical of nuclear arms.

⁷⁴ A proof for this claim will be found in Table 1.

⁷⁵ These data are very similar to the results of the EU cohesion for recorded votes (on whole resolutions only) from 1977 to 2001, which Ernst Sucharipa provides (op. cit. in note 35, table on p. 796); in Sucharipa’s table the cohesion for 1979 is 59.8 per cent (for Graph 1 the figure is 58.9 per cent, see also Table 14 in Annex I), the lowest point is in 1983 with 30.6 per cent (27.1 per cent) and the highest point is reached in 1998 with 85.0 per cent (82.1 per cent). Sucharipa’s table is based on a compilation by the Finnish EU Presidency and own calculations for 2000 and 2001. As will be shown below, there were several dubious ‘absent’ votes by EU states in 2002; in correcting these ‘mistakes’, the cohesion of the EU countries would have been somewhat higher than 75.5 per cent in 2002. See also the cautionary remarks and the results of Kostakos and Bourantonis, op. cit. in note 73, p. 22.

Graph 1




Notes: * 1996 EU without Greece; ** until 31 December 2002. This graph is a partial rendition of Table 14 (Annex 1).

Graph 2 repeats the data from 1995 on, but includes two additional issue areas: human rights and decolonisation. In the human rights field the consensus among EU member states has always been clearly above the EU average, whereas in matters of decolonisation, the EU countries have been rather divided. One has to add that decolonisation questions are of minor importance in General Assembly voting, whereas the importance of human rights issues has increased over time; see Table 13 (Annex I). Graph 2 shows that during the 56th General Assembly of 2001, which took place right after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, EU voting behaviour on security and Middle East affairs had changed slightly. However, voting on human rights and decolonisation matters did not change.

In May 2004, the biggest enlargement in the history of the EU will take place. Will the level of consensus on CFSP matters among the then probably 25 member states be maintained or will the share of consensus votes decline? As was to be expected, in 1995 cohesion among the 25 countries of the (possible) future EU was much smaller than that among the 15 EU member states; the 15 voted identically in 70 per cent of the recorded votes, whereas the 25 showed a consensus in only 40 per cent of the votes (see Graph 3). This rather big difference has diminished over time, without completely disappearing. In 2002, the difference was only about 13 percentage points, a consensus of 75.5 per cent versus a consensus of 62.3 per cent.

Graph 2

EU consensus in human rights and decolonisation matters
(Percentages of recorded votes)



Notes:


* 1996 EU without Greece;

** until 31 December 2002.

This graph is a partial rendition of Table 14 (Annex 1).

Graph 3

Consensus among 15 EU members compared with (assumed) 25 EU members



Notes: * 1996 EU without Greece; ** until 31 December 2002.

5.1.2. Distance from the EU majority

The three graphs just presented give the overall picture of EU cohesion. But which EU countries contributed to the cohesion and which EU member states ‘thwart’ unanimity? The case of Greece has already been mentioned. To explore the voting behaviour of the EU member states, a ‘distance’ measure is introduced here (see above for details on its calculation) – the distance from EU majority behaviour. Each vote in the UN General Assembly is checked for a clear, *absolute majority* opinion among the EU member states. If at least 8 countries of the 15 EU member states vote the same way, this identical voting behaviour is used as ‘pivot’ and the distances of all member states are calculated from there. It can happen that no clear (absolute) majority

exists, when e.g. 7 states voted ‘for’ a resolution, 5 ‘abstained’ and 3 states voted ‘against’. The voting records of these votes are disregarded and no distance is calculated.⁷⁶ The distances from the majority position are calculated for all EU member states and added, the maximum possible distance is set to 100, the minimum distance (always voting with the majority) is set to 0.

Table 1 gives the distance indices from the EU majority for all recorded votes. In 1979, the distances of each of the EU member states from the majority were relatively small, France showing the highest distance with an index number of 13. But the EU countries had rather disparate voting behaviour, only Belgium and Luxembourg voting almost always with the majority. The future member states (indicated by a grey shade in the cells of Table 1) all had a greater

⁷⁶ The (absolute) majority is always calculated from the current number of member states; when there were 12 EU member states, the (absolute) majority would be 7, with 10 member states 6, etc. For most of the recorded votes, a majority position of EU member state could be discerned. Historically, the lowest point was reached in 1983, when only in 92.3 per cent of votes did an absolute majority among EU countries exist. Since 1996, there has been an EU majority position in all recorded votes.

distance from the EU majority than the EU countries themselves. In 1981, Greece had joined the EU and adjusted its voting behaviour a bit to the EU ‘mainstream’ but it was still at a greater distance from the EU majority than any other EU country, thus reducing EU cohesion. In 1983, Greece noticeably moved away from the EU majority. As already mentioned, the change to a Pasok government seems to be the causal factor for this change, since all other EU member states maintained their distances with the exception of Ireland and partly the United Kingdom. In the following years Greece moved slowly closer to the EU ‘mainstream’ (the other countries maintaining more or less their positions); the overall cohesion of the EU increased, as one can see in Graph 1. Spain, and even more so Portugal, adjusted their voting behaviour to the EU majority even before they became members of the EU in 1986. Ireland, the only ‘neutral’ member of the EU at that time, moved away from the EU majority during the 1980s. One can suppose that this move was caused by the renewed Cold War (this is probably corroborated in Table 3, which deals with external security). In 1989, one can clearly identify a ‘core’ group of countries, almost always voting with the majority: five of the six original members (France being the exception) plus Portugal.

In the early 1990s, the more ‘peripheral’ countries, in particular Denmark, Ireland and Spain, reduced their distances from the EU majority. In 1994, only two EU countries clearly stood out any longer, France and the United Kingdom. When the three other ‘neutrals’, Austria, Finland and Sweden, joined the EU in 1995, they had already adjusted their voting behaviour noticeably to the EU ‘mainstream’. Thus, cohesion among the now 15 EU member states did not decrease, in fact, it rose until 1998, as Graph 1 shows. In 1999 and 2000, France moved slightly away from the EU ‘mainstream’, causing

a reduction in EU cohesion. Its move back towards the majority in 2001 and 2002 contributed to the slight increase in cohesion, although Austria, Germany, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden to some extent increased their distances in 2001 and/or in 2002. The countries which had an distance index value above average (i.e. above 3) in 2002 were France, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom. France and the United Kingdom still vote differently from the rest. In 2001 and 2002 Ireland had a noticeably divergent position; its fellow ‘neutrals’ Austria and Sweden, but not Finland, had a slightly deviating voting behaviour as well.

Annex II gives a detailed listing of all recorded votes at the 57th UN General Assembly in 2002. Annex II gives first the 80 votes where the EU member states voted identically and then lists the 26 votes where their voting behaviour diverged. In the latter list several problematic cases appear, in particular concerning ‘absent’ voting behaviour. These could result from technical and/or human ‘mistakes’ (perhaps not pushing the right button at the appropriate moment) and need some technical explanation. In the votes on Resolutions 57/56 and 57/57, all EU countries as well as the United States abstained, except for Germany, which was absent.⁷⁷ In these two cases, there was no identical voting behaviour of the EU states (thus reducing the percentage for EU cohesion) but the difference between Germany and the (large) majority of member states was 0, since abstaining and absence have the same ‘value’. These two votes were also not counted among the votes where the EU and the United States voted identically. Denmark was absent at the vote on Resolution 57/63, but this did not influence the calculations, since there was only a majority (and not the rest) of EU member states abstaining.

⁷⁷ See UN General Assembly, Official Records, A/57/PV.57, pp. 5, 6; no correction was published on these votes, at least not on the Website of the General Assembly (www.un.org/ga/57/pv.html).

Table 1

Distance from the EU *majority*: all votes
(Maximum distance from the EU majority = 100, minimum = 0)

| | 1979 | 1981 | 1983 | 1985 | 1987 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 * | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 ** |
|--------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|--------|------|------|------|------|------|---------|
| Austria | 17 | 15 | 26 | 27 | 19 | 23 | 22 | 11 | 6 | 8 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| Finland | 21 | 18 | 25 | 27 | 21 | 21 | 18 | 7 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Sweden | 20 | 14 | 21 | 25 | 21 | 22 | 21 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 5 | 1 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 4 |
| Spain | 26 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 10 | 7 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| Portugal | 17 | 14 | 12 | 6 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| Greece | 28 | 20 | 35 | 32 | 24 | 22 | 15 | 12 | 8 | 8 | 2 | 4 | n/a | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Ireland | 10 | 11 | 18 | 17 | 15 | 17 | 17 | 10 | 5 | 7 | 5 | 2 | 6 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 |
| Denmark | 9 | 14 | 13 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 |
| UK | 9 | 9 | 12 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 15 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 10 | 13 | 7 | 7 | 10 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 8 |
| France | 13 | 8 | 8 | 11 | 7 | 8 | 14 | 7 | 6 | 9 | 12 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 10 | 13 | 13 | 9 | 8 |
| Italy | 8 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| Germany (FR) | 5 | 5 | 7 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Netherlands | 9 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Luxembourg | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Belgium | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |

Notes: * 1996 EU without Greece; ** until 31 December 2002; n/a: absent in more than one third of the votes.

Another case was more problematic, the vote on Resolution 57/97 (below page 74), where Belgium was absent, but later informed the UN Secretariat that ‘it had intended to vote in favour’.⁷⁸ This vote again was not counted among the EU consensus vote and the distance value for Belgium was set here to 0.5, although one could argue that the intention of Belgium should have set the distance to 0. On Resolution 57/133, Portugal was absent, whereas all other EU countries abstained. Again, this resolution was not counted among the consensus resolutions and the distance of Portugal to the EU majority was 0. Portugal was also absent from the two previous votes, but here France and the United Kingdom abstained, whereas the other EU member states voted for the resolutions; these two resolutions were thus not in any way part of the consensus. All EU countries voted against Decision 57/525, but Portugal was absent, so there was no EU unanimity. The Netherlands abstained on the vote for Resolution 57/139 and later informed the UN Secretariat that ‘it had intended to vote in favour’ (like all other EU countries).⁷⁹ Here, the distance was set to 0.5 but one could argue that the intention to vote in favour should set the distance to 0. On Resolution 57/141, the Netherlands was absent, and therefore ‘ruined’ the EU consensus, since all other EU states voted for the resolution.

After this technical explanation concerning in particular the ‘absence’ of EU member states, Table 2 gives the distance of EU member states

from EU majority behaviour in Middle East affairs. As could be expected from Graph 1, the distances between the EU majority and each member state are rather small. Only Greece and Spain had fairly distinct voting behaviour on Middle East issues until 1993. Since then, the distance index value for all EU member states has been almost always 0. In 2002, the only exception was Belgium, with a value of 3. This concerns the previously mentioned absence of Belgium from the vote on Resolution 57/97, when all other EU countries voted in favour; Belgium later declared that it too had intended to vote in favour.

Table 3 shows a rather different picture for security matters. Here one notices a distinctive ‘core’ of EU countries which almost always vote with the EU majority or, to put it in another way, often constitute the EU majority. Since 1979, the founding members, except for France, have been part of this core group. They were later joined by Denmark, Greece, Portugal and Spain. Among the ‘neutral’ countries, Finland is closest to this core, whereas Ireland has often been rather distant from it. But the most characteristic feature of Table 3 is the particular position of France and the United Kingdom. Since the mid-1990s, they have been further away from the EU majority than any other EU country. In six votes on nuclear weapons issues in 2002, France and the United Kingdom voted differently from the other EU member states, and together with the United States (see Annex II).

⁷⁸ UN General Assembly, Official Records, A/57/PV.57, p. 29.

⁷⁹ UN General Assembly, Official Records, A/57/PV.73, p. 24.

Table 2

Distance from the EU majority: Middle East questions
(Maximum distance from the EU majority = 100, minimum = 0)

| | 1979 | 1981 | 1983 | 1985 | 1987 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | |
|--------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|---|
| Austria | 7 | 11 | 17 | 16 | 12 | 7 | 9 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Finland | 6 | 4 | 10 | 13 | 8 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Sweden | 6 | 4 | 10 | 15 | 9 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Spain | 35 | 44 | 28 | 22 | 19 | 12 | 15 | 12 | 11 | 13 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Portugal | 24 | 33 | 18 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Greece | 35 | 44 | 35 | 31 | 25 | 24 | 16 | 12 | 11 | 13 | 3 | 3 | n/a | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Ireland | 2 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Denmark | 4 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| UK | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| France | 11 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Italy | 2 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Germany (FR) | 2 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Netherlands | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Luxembourg | 2 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Belgium | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |

Notes: * 1996 EU without Greece; ** until 31 December 2002; n/a: absent from more than one third of the votes.

Table 3

Distance from the EU *majority*: security, disarmament
(Maximum distance from the EU majority = 100, minimum = 0)

| | 1979 | 1981 | 1983 | 1985 | 1987 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 |
|--------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Austria | 13 | 34 | 47 | 39 | 39 | 42 | 33 | 26 | 6 | 12 | 10 | 2 | 10 | 8 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 4 |
| Finland | 25 | 50 | 54 | 44 | 38 | 39 | 29 | 15 | 6 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| Sweden | 15 | 32 | 46 | 41 | 39 | 41 | 35 | 18 | 6 | 12 | 8 | 2 | 11 | 8 | 4 | 8 | 5 | 7 | 8 |
| Spain | 10 | 8 | 19 | 14 | 11 | 13 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| Portugal | 5 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 12 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Greece | 8 | 28 | 48 | 43 | 34 | 31 | 12 | 15 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 2 | n/a | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Ireland | 13 | 30 | 46 | 34 | 34 | 37 | 29 | 24 | 9 | 12 | 7 | 2 | 11 | 10 | 4 | 9 | 6 | 9 | 10 |
| Denmark | 3 | 18 | 28 | 16 | 23 | 21 | 17 | 9 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| UK | 10 | 10 | 13 | 9 | 15 | 14 | 31 | 18 | 32 | 18 | 17 | 13 | 8 | 6 | 13 | 14 | 11 | 13 | 15 |
| France | 15 | 6 | 8 | 18 | 25 | 18 | 37 | 18 | 9 | 12 | 18 | 10 | 10 | 7 | 14 | 24 | 23 | 14 | 15 |
| Italy | 3 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 1 |
| Germany (FR) | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| Netherlands | 3 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Luxembourg | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Belgium | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Notes: * 1996 EU without Greece; ** until 31 December 2002; n/a: absent from more than one third of the votes.

A similar configuration gives the relatively few votes on decolonisation issues in the UN General Assembly. Table 4 shows that France and in particular the United Kingdom (both former colonial powers) have a rather consistent and relatively large distance from the other EU member states.

For human rights questions, the differences among the EU countries will be insignificant (see Graph 2). As one can see in Table 5, except for Greece in 1995, the distances are rather small, France and the United Kingdom have no distinct position at all.

Table 4

Distance from the EU majority: decolonisation
(Maximum distance from the EU majority = 100, minimum = 0)

| | 1995 | 1996 * | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 ** |
|--------------|------|-----------|------|------|------|------|------|------------|
| Austria | 15 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 5 |
| Finland | 0 | 6 | 11 | 6 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 |
| Sweden | 15 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 5 |
| Spain | 15 | 6 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 6 | 5 |
| Portugal | 15 | 6 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 6 | n/a |
| Greece | 15 | n/a | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| Ireland | 15 | 6 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 6 | 5 |
| Denmark | 15 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 5 |
| UK | 46 | 24 | 32 | 38 | 40 | 39 | 28 | 25 |
| France | 15 | 12 | 26 | 25 | 27 | 22 | 22 | 15 |
| Italy | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Germany (FR) | 8 | 0 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 0 | 0 |
| Netherlands | 8 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 0 | 5 |
| Luxembourg | 0 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 5 |
| Belgium | 8 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 0 | 0 |

Notes: * 1996 EU without Greece; ** until 31 December 2002; n/a: absent from more than one third of the votes.

Table 5

Distance from the EU *majority*: human rights
(Maximum distance from the EU majority = 100, minimum = 0)

| | 1995 | 1996 * | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 ** |
|--------------|------|-----------|------|------|------|------|------|------------|
| Austria | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 |
| Finland | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Sweden | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Spain | 5 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 5 |
| Portugal | 0 | 0 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 5 |
| Greece | 14 | n/a | 4 | 6 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 5 |
| Ireland | 5 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 2 |
| Denmark | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| UK | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| France | 5 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 |
| Italy | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 |
| Germany (FR) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Netherlands | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Luxembourg | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Belgium | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Notes: * 1996 EU without Greece; ** until 31 December 2002; n/a: absent from more than one third of the votes.

5.2. The distance of the candidate countries and other third states from the EU consensus

The data which will be presented now deal with the distance of non-EU countries from the EU. The 'pivot' in this section will be the consensus position of the EU countries. As mentioned above, these countries voted identically only in e.g. some 75 per cent of all recorded votes in the UN General Assembly in 2002, the nadir being the General Assembly in 1983 with 27 per cent of

consensus votes (see Graph 1). To take into account this selective use of recorded votes in the UN General Assembly, the next section will use the voting behaviour of the United States and calculate the distance of the EU countries and other states from the United States in 2002.

Graph 3 indicated that the countries that will most probably join the EU in May 2004 have moved close to the EU positions in the UN General Assembly. Table 6a gives the distance indices for the 13 countries that have finished their accession negotiations with the EU already (ten countries in all), are in the process of negotiating with the EU (Bulgaria, Romania) or have

candidate status but are not yet negotiating with the EU on accession (Turkey).⁸⁰ The data for the countries which used to be part of the Soviet bloc have a clear profile: until the end of the Cold War, they voted identically, like the Soviet Union (see Table 6b below), with the exception of Romania. All were rather distant from the EU. In 1989, Hungary changed its voting behaviour, the other countries followed in 1990 and drastically altered their votes, moving close to the EU consensus. With few variations, they all (including the new states) maintained a close position vis-à-vis the EU until 2002. In that year, only Latvia was a small distance from the EU consensus.⁸¹

The data for Malta, Cyprus and Turkey in Table 6a have a completely different structure. During the Cold War, these three countries were not as distant from the EU consensus as the Soviet bloc countries. But they did not move closer to the EU as did the formerly Soviet allies in the early 1990s. Malta in fact reduced its distance in the early 1990s, but between 1996 and 1998 it moved away from the EU consensus, although it had applied for EU membership in 1990. The reason for this 'backlash' seems to be the Labour Party government, which opposed EU membership at that time. Cyprus maintained its distant position from the EU for quite some time even after it had submitted its membership application in 1990. Only since the late 1990s has it noticeably reduced the distance to the EU consensus. Compared with Cyprus,

Turkey used to be closer to the EU most of the time but since 1999 its distance from the EU has been greater than that of Cyprus.

Table 6b gives the data for a rather diverse group of countries. A look at the non-EU WEOG countries in the table shows that Australia, Canada, Japan and Norway all have voted very similarly to the EU consensus; there has been practically no change over time. Croatia, a future EU candidate country, has moved towards the EU consensus. The difference in voting behaviour between Israel and the EU consensus has been quite large, except for 1979. The countries of the Third World have kept a rather great distance from the EU consensus, in particular Egypt and India, whereas the two Latin American countries, Brazil and Mexico, as well as Nigeria, are a little closer to the EU consensus. China, a permanent member of the Security Council, has voted quite differently from the EU in the UN General Assembly. The Soviet Union, which in 1979 and in the early 1980s was very far from the EU consensus, moved closer to the EU in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Russia as its successor state has maintained this relatively close position; in the 2000s, the distance increased slightly. The distance between the EU consensus and the United States was small in 1979, but during the 'Second Cold War' this distance increased; it did not diminish immediately after the end of the Cold War. Only during the Clinton administration did it decrease somewhat, to rise again from 2000 on.

⁸⁰ Croatia, which has already applied for EU membership, is included in the following table.

⁸¹ In at least two cases, Latvia tried to maintain a 'middle' position between the EU consensus and the United States; see Annex II.

Table 6a

Distance of candidate countries from the EU consensus: all votes
(Maximum distance from the EU consensus = 100, minimum = 0)

| | 1979 | 1981 | 1983 | 1985 | 1987 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 |
|------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Bulgaria | 69 | 46 | 42 | 56 | 33 | 32 | 6 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Czechosl./Cz. R. | 69 | 47 | 42 | 56 | 34 | 34 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Estonia | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 6 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| Hungary | 69 | 47 | 44 | 55 | 34 | 19 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 |
| Latvia | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 5 | 3 | 6 | 6 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 3 |
| Lithuania | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 3 | 3 | 7 | 6 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 |
| Poland | 66 | 45 | 41 | 56 | 34 | 29 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Romania | 42 | 33 | 24 | 36 | 34 | 31 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Slovakia | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 7 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Slovenia | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 11 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Malta | 36 | 21 | 11 | 29 | 15 | 9 | 9 | 11 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 16 | 14 | 8 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 |
| Cyprus | 41 | 26 | 13 | 37 | 32 | 29 | 24 | 24 | 26 | 23 | 21 | 23 | 7 | 11 | 11 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 3 |
| Turkey | 29 | 18 | 11 | 21 | 17 | 14 | 12 | 8 | 11 | 10 | 9 | 7 | 15 | 17 | 10 | 16 | 9 | 12 | 9 |

Table 6b

Distance of selected third countries from the EU consensus: all votes
(Maximum distance from the EU consensus = 100, minimum = 0)

| | 1979 | 1981 | 1983 | 1985 | 1987 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 |
|-------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Australia | 9 | 3 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 13 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 3 |
| Brazil | 42 | 27 | 19 | 33 | 30 | 29 | 26 | 21 | 23 | 24 | 19 | 30 | 22 | 22 | 21 | 26 | 21 | 21 | 13 |
| Canada | 6 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 1 |
| China | 41 | 27 | 14 | 36 | 31 | 34 | 28 | 30 | 33 | 42 | 38 | 47 | 33 | 37 | 34 | 42 | 35 | 34 | 40 |
| Croatia | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | n/a | n/a | 8 | 9 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 12 | 3 | 3 | 1 |
| Egypt | 38 | 25 | 12 | 36 | 30 | 34 | 24 | 28 | 24 | 33 | 29 | 38 | 27 | 33 | 31 | 39 | 39 | 36 | 40 |
| India | 45 | 29 | 19 | 45 | 37 | 38 | 29 | 29 | 28 | 37 | 40 | 53 | 44 | 47 | 44 | 48 | 40 | 44 | 38 |
| Israel | 22 | 38 | 46 | 35 | 31 | 37 | 46 | 45 | 47 | 30 | 28 | 35 | 40 | 40 | 46 | 39 | 50 | 45 | 48 |
| Japan | 14 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 |
| Mexico | 39 | 27 | 12 | 38 | 28 | 28 | 27 | 26 | 24 | 24 | 27 | 28 | 22 | 27 | 30 | 34 | 27 | 29 | 17 |
| Nigeria | n/d | n/d | n/d | n/d | n/d | n/d | 26 | 29 | 28 | 29 | 25 | 44 | 31 | 37 | 24 | 31 | 29 | 29 | 27 |
| Norway | 4 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| USSR/Russia | 70 | 47 | 41 | 56 | 35 | 33 | 23 | 18 | 14 | 13 | 18 | 16 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 24 | 19 | 20 | 25 |
| USA | 17 | 35 | 39 | 40 | 43 | 52 | 46 | 39 | 47 | 34 | 31 | 27 | 35 | 31 | 37 | 34 | 45 | 43 | 52 |

Notes: * 1996 EU without Greece; ** until 31 December 2002; n/a: absent from more than one third of the votes; n/d: no data calculated.

As with the data on EU member states, various issue areas will now be analysed. First, the distance between the EU consensus and third countries concerning Middle East questions will be presented. Table 7a repeats for the ex-Communist countries the picture presented in the previous table: they were rather distant from the EU consensus during the Cold War (except in 1983) and then quickly moved towards the EU consensus. On the other hand, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey are still at a distinct distance from the EU consensus on Middle East issues.

Table 7b explains to a large degree the distance of the United States (and Israel) from the EU consensus: on Middle East questions, most of the time the United States votes opposite the EU countries. The distance increased over time and reached an index value of 86 in 2002. Israel and the EU consensus represent almost perfectly contrary positions. On the other hand, the WEOG countries of Table 7b (and Croatia) are very close to the EU consensus. Since 1996, Russia's voting behaviour has been very similar to the EU consensus as well. Even the Third World countries show a relatively small distance from the EU member states.

Table 8a gives the distance indexes for the candidate countries on security and disarmament questions which are debated in the UN General Assembly. As expected, the former communist countries changed their behaviour in 1990; except perhaps for Bulgaria, which altered its voting behaviour comprehensively a year later. Again, Malta and Cyprus display rather erratic distance indexes; in 2002 they are in com-

plete agreement with the EU consensus, whereas on Middle East issues they showed a noticeable distance (Table 7a). Turkey has been quite close to the EU consensus since 1979, again in marked contrast to Middle East questions. This significant divergence in voting has most probably been influenced by Turkey's NATO membership (see also the behaviour of Norway below).

Croatia among the selected third countries shown in Table 8b is fairly close to the EU consensus, as are Australia and Canada; except in 1983, Norway has always voted with the EU consensus. Since 1993, Japan has distanced itself slightly from the EU consensus on security issues, in contrast to Middle East questions. The Third World countries have voted rather differently from the EU consensus, in particular India, which in 2002 had the biggest distance from the EU consensus of all countries listed in Table 8b. Even more so than Japan, Israel has increased its distance from the EU consensus since 1993. On security issues, China has been more detached from the EU consensus than on Middle East questions. Russia has moved relatively close to the EU position. The distance between the United States and the EU consensus has changed considerably over time: the biggest gap was in 1987, the smallest distance was during the second part of the Clinton administration. In 2001 and 2002, the distance increased considerably. Still, compared with Middle East questions (Table 7b), the distances between the EU consensus and the United States have been much smaller regarding external security matters.⁸²

⁸² A reason for this is that on security issues France and the United Kingdom tend to vote with the United States, and against the EU majority. Therefore, the consensus votes of the EU often include those cases where France and the United Kingdom as well as the United States vote together.

Table 7a

Distance of candidate countries from the EU consensus: Middle East questions
(Maximum distance from the EU consensus = 100, minimum = 0)

| | 1979 | 1981 | 1983 | 1985 | 1987 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 * | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 ** |
|------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|--------|------|------|------|------|------|---------|
| Bulgaria | 63 | 22 | 3 | 32 | 19 | 13 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Czechosl./Cz. R. | 63 | 26 | 5 | 32 | 21 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Estonia | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 8 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 6 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 |
| Hungary | 63 | 26 | 5 | 30 | 21 | 8 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 |
| Latvia | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 8 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Lithuania | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 2 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 3 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 |
| Poland | 53 | 26 | 5 | 30 | 23 | 10 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Romania | 35 | 19 | 0 | 15 | 26 | 10 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Slovakia | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Slovenia | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | n/a | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Malta | 33 | 11 | 3 | 19 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 6 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 10 | 12 | 9 | 10 | 9 | 11 | 14 |
| Cyprus | 30 | 15 | 0 | 17 | 17 | 10 | 17 | 17 | 18 | 14 | 12 | 9 | 7 | 10 | 7 | 10 | 9 | 11 | 14 |
| Turkey | 30 | 4 | 3 | 13 | 17 | 8 | 12 | 10 | 16 | 14 | 15 | 12 | 12 | 14 | 9 | 10 | 9 | 11 | 14 |

Table 7b

Distance of selected third countries from the EU consensus: Middle East questions
(Maximum distance from the EU consensus = 100, minimum = 0)

| | 1979 | 1981 | 1983 | 1985 | 1987 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 * | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 ** |
|-------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|--------|------|------|------|------|------|---------|
| Australia | 3 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 0 |
| Brazil | 25 | 11 | 10 | 13 | 15 | 8 | 14 | 13 | 14 | 11 | 9 | 12 | 12 | 10 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 8 | 11 |
| Canada | 8 | 0 | 8 | 4 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 0 |
| China | 48 | 11 | 3 | 17 | 21 | 13 | 19 | 21 | 18 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 10 | 12 | 16 | 13 | 14 | 11 | 14 |
| Croatia | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | n/a | n/a | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Egypt | 30 | 11 | 0 | 17 | 17 | 8 | 14 | 19 | 18 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 10 | 14 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 11 | 14 |
| India | 30 | 15 | 3 | 21 | 21 | 10 | 19 | 21 | 16 | 14 | 12 | 18 | 17 | 21 | 19 | 15 | 20 | 18 | 19 |
| Israel | 45 | 70 | 90 | 74 | 72 | 88 | 81 | 79 | 92 | 86 | 76 | 91 | 93 | 93 | 98 | 97 | 98 | 97 | 97 |
| Japan | 18 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mexico | 25 | 19 | 0 | 19 | 15 | 8 | 17 | 17 | 14 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 7 | 10 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 11 | 14 |
| Nigeria | n/d | n/d | n/d | n/d | n/d | n/d | 17 | 19 | 22 | 21 | 18 | 18 | 12 | 17 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 11 | 14 |
| Norway | 0 | 0 | 8 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| USSR/Russia | 63 | 26 | 5 | 32 | 23 | 13 | 19 | 25 | 27 | 21 | 24 | 27 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 3 | 8 |
| USA | 20 | 44 | 65 | 51 | 53 | 68 | 60 | 58 | 73 | 71 | 73 | 79 | 79 | 79 | 86 | 87 | 86 | 82 | 86 |

Notes: * 1996 EU without Greece; ** until 31 December 2002; n/a: absent from more than one third of the votes; n/d: no data calculated.

Table 8a

Distance of the candidate countries from the EU consensus: security, disarmament
(Maximum distance from the EU consensus = 100, minimum = 0)

| | 1979 | 1981 | 1983 | 1985 | 1987 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 |
|------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Bulgaria | 62 | 59 | 78 | 48 | 18 | 12 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 0 |
| Czechosl./Cz. R. | 62 | 59 | 78 | 48 | 18 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Estonia | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0 | 8 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 |
| Hungary | 62 | 59 | 78 | 48 | 18 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 2 |
| Latvia | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 11 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 6 | 5 |
| Lithuania | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 11 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 |
| Poland | 62 | 59 | 78 | 48 | 18 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Romania | 24 | 41 | 39 | 24 | 18 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Slovakia | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 11 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Slovenia | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Malta | 24 | 29 | 11 | 24 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 14 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Cyprus | 24 | 35 | 33 | 36 | 32 | 16 | 9 | 40 | 38 | 32 | 25 | 32 | 8 | 11 | 13 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 0 |
| Turkey | 5 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 4 | 7 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 2 |

Table 8b

Distance of selected third countries from the EU consensus: security, disarmament
(Maximum distance from the EU consensus = 100, minimum = 0)

| | 1979 | 1981 | 1983 | 1985 | 1987 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 |
|-------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Australia | 0 | 0 | 6 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 10 | 24 | 10 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Brazil | 29 | 35 | 28 | 32 | 41 | 20 | 27 | 40 | 38 | 42 | 25 | 42 | 24 | 23 | 30 | 26 | 21 | 18 | 11 |
| Canada | 5 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| China | 19 | 6 | 22 | 24 | 23 | 16 | 9 | 40 | 31 | 32 | 40 | 48 | 32 | 34 | 38 | 34 | 41 | 31 | 30 |
| Croatia | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | n/a | 11 | 10 | 11 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Egypt | 24 | 24 | 22 | 28 | 32 | 24 | 18 | 40 | 31 | 32 | 40 | 46 | 26 | 36 | 39 | 40 | 56 | 39 | 32 |
| India | 19 | 35 | 56 | 52 | 45 | 36 | 27 | 50 | 54 | 53 | 53 | 64 | 54 | 54 | 54 | 55 | 47 | 49 | 43 |
| Israel | 10 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 13 | 24 | 16 | 16 | 21 | 26 | 18 | 22 | 25 |
| Japan | 0 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 3 | 10 | 8 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 12 | 8 | 7 |
| Mexico | 19 | 29 | 28 | 32 | 32 | 12 | 18 | 40 | 31 | 42 | 43 | 39 | 28 | 36 | 41 | 38 | 35 | 32 | 23 |
| Nigeria | n/d | n/d | n/d | n/d | n/d | n/d | 18 | 40 | 31 | 37 | 23 | 42 | 28 | 32 | 34 | 30 | 29 | 27 | 18 |
| Norway | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| USSR/Russia | 62 | 59 | 67 | 48 | 18 | 12 | 9 | 20 | 0 | 11 | 5 | 15 | 10 | 14 | 15 | 11 | 12 | 14 | 11 |
| USA | 14 | 24 | 11 | 28 | 50 | 44 | 45 | 10 | 15 | 21 | 20 | 10 | 12 | 4 | 7 | 6 | 9 | 22 | 23 |

Notes: * 1996 EU without Greece; ** until 31 December 2002; n/a: absent from more than one third of the votes; n/d: no data calculated.

In the few votes on decolonisation issues (Table 9a), the candidate countries have not been as close to the EU consensus as on other issues, but in 2001 and 2002 they were more or less in line with the EU. Malta and Cyprus again have a peculiar voting behaviour; in 2002 they were further away from the EU consensus than Turkey.

The other third countries in Table 9b are at fairly large distances from the EU countries, the exceptions being Croatia and the WEOG states. In 2002, Israel and the United States had the greatest distances; in contrast, Russia was rather close to the EU consensus.

Table 9a

**Distance of candidate countries from the
EU consensus: decolonisation**
(Maximum distance from the EU consensus = 100, minimum = 0)

| | 1995 | 1996* | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 ** |
|----------------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|---------|
| Bulgaria | 0 | 0 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Czech Republic | 8 | 6 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 5 |
| Estonia | 8 | 12 | 16 | 13 | 13 | 11 | 6 | 5 |
| Hungary | 8 | 0 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 0 | 0 |
| Latvia | 8 | 6 | 16 | 13 | 13 | 17 | 6 | 5 |
| Lithuania | 8 | 6 | 21 | 13 | 7 | 11 | 0 | 0 |
| Poland | 8 | 12 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 5 |
| Romania | 8 | 12 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 |
| Slovakia | 8 | 6 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 5 |
| Slovenia | 8 | 6 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Malta | 23 | 41 | 42 | 6 | 0 | 6 | 6 | 5 |
| Cyprus | 54 | 18 | 21 | 19 | 13 | 11 | 17 | 15 |
| Turkey | 15 | 6 | 16 | 13 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 0 |

Table 9b

Distance of selected third countries from the EU *consensus*: decolonisation
(Maximum distance from the EU consensus = 100, minimum = 0)

| | 1995 | 1996* | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 ** |
|-----------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|---------|
| Australia | 20 | 8 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 22 | 13 | 20 |
| Brazil | 100 | 58 | 75 | 63 | 71 | 56 | 75 | 20 |
| Canada | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 0 | 10 |
| China | 100 | 67 | 75 | 75 | 71 | 56 | 75 | 20 |
| Croatia | n/a | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Egypt | 62 | 53 | 47 | 38 | 33 | 33 | 44 | 30 |
| India | 54 | 53 | 47 | 38 | 33 | 33 | 44 | 30 |
| Israel | 0 | 25 | 25 | 38 | 29 | 44 | 25 | 80 |
| Japan | 23 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 11 | 5 |
| Mexico | 100 | 67 | 75 | 75 | 71 | 56 | 75 | 20 |
| Nigeria | 100 | 58 | 75 | 75 | 71 | 56 | 75 | 20 |
| Norway | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Russia | 8 | 29 | 32 | 31 | 13 | 17 | 28 | 5 |
| USA | 54 | 41 | 53 | 63 | 60 | 67 | 67 | 70 |

Notes: * 1996 EU without Greece; ** until 31 December 2002; n/a: absent from more than one third of the votes.

On human rights issues, the candidate countries are close to the EU consensus, but mostly without voting in a completely identical manner (Table 10a). Only Estonia and Hungary had complete agreement with the EU in 2002. Malta and Cyprus, which voted differently from the EU consensus between 1996 and 1998, have moved closer to the EU position recently. Turkey has been relatively far away from the EU consensus. In 2002, it came somewhat nearer to the EU consensus, parallel to the Third World countries, but in contrast to e.g. the United States, as Table 10b shows.

Table 10b shows that Croatia and the WEOG states are again close to the EU in votes on human rights in the UN General Assembly. The Third World countries, however, were far removed from the EU consensus, but in 2002 Brazil and Mexico, as well as China, came closer to the EU. On human rights, Russia has always had higher distance values from the EU consensus than the United States, yet in 2001 and 2002 the United States and the EU moved markedly away from each other. Israel has been in an in-between position for most years, but in 2002 it had the biggest distance from the EU consensus among all countries shown in Table 10b.

Table 10a

Distance of candidate countries from the EU *consensus*: human rights
(Maximum distance from the EU consensus = 100, minimum = 0)

| | 1995 | 1996 * | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 ** |
|----------------|------|-----------|------|------|------|------|------|------------|
| Bulgaria | 5 | 9 | 7 | 6 | 3 | 8 | 4 | 3 |
| Czech Republic | 5 | 4 | 7 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Estonia | 5 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 0 |
| Hungary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Latvia | 5 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 |
| Lithuania | 5 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 2 |
| Poland | 5 | 9 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Romania | 9 | 9 | 11 | 6 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 5 |
| Slovakia | 9 | 9 | 7 | 6 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 5 |
| Slovenia | 5 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 2 |
| Malta | 5 | 30 | 18 | 22 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 5 |
| Cyprus | 9 | 13 | 14 | 22 | 6 | 8 | 8 | 5 |
| Turkey | 9 | 35 | 36 | 28 | 25 | 28 | 27 | 17 |

Table 10b

Distance of selected third countries from the EU *consensus*: human rights
(Maximum distance from the EU consensus = 100, minimum = 0)

| | 1995 | 1996 * | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 ** |
|-----------|------|-----------|------|------|------|------|------|------------|
| Australia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 6 |
| Brazil | 100 | 58 | 75 | 63 | 71 | 56 | 75 | 20 |
| Canada | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 0 | 10 |
| China | 100 | 67 | 75 | 75 | 71 | 56 | 75 | 20 |
| Croatia | n/a | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Egypt | 45 | 57 | 54 | 56 | 50 | 72 | 69 | 69 |
| India | 86 | 83 | 79 | 83 | 66 | 76 | 73 | 52 |
| Israel | 0 | 25 | 25 | 38 | 29 | 44 | 25 | 80 |
| Japan | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 7 |
| Mexico | 100 | 67 | 75 | 75 | 71 | 56 | 75 | 20 |
| Nigeria | 100 | 76 | 76 | 56 | 34 | 61 | 54 | 44 |
| Norway | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Russia | 23 | 48 | 43 | 50 | 50 | 60 | 58 | 56 |
| USA | 0 | 13 | 11 | 11 | 19 | 12 | 23 | 41 |

Notes: * 1996 EU without Greece; ** until 31 December 2002; n/a: absent from more than one third of the votes.

5.3 *The distance of EU member states and other countries from the United States*

In several of the tables just discussed, only a few votes were used to calculate the distance indexes. Table 14 (Annex I) shows that in decolonisation matters in 45.5 per cent of the recorded votes EU member states had identical voting behaviour. Table 13 reveals that as few as 11 recorded votes in the Plenary of the General Assembly dealt with decolonisation issues. Therefore, only 5 votes were used to calculate the distance indexes in Tables 9a and 9b for 2002. This problem, albeit in a less extreme form, is inherent in all the tables using the EU consensus as a 'pivot'. The last two tables presented here use the United States' voting behaviour as pivot and thus take into its index calculation all votes recorded for 2002.

Using the United States as 'pivot' has an additional advantage, in the sense that it gives another perspective. Table 11 shows the calculations of the distance index between each EU country and the United States at the 57th General Assembly in 2002 (recorded votes until 31 December 2002). The EU country closest to the United States is, not surprisingly, the United Kingdom. Still, with an index value of 45, the United Kingdom is relatively far from the US position. A little more surprising, in view of the turmoil over Iraq, is the position of France, which is the EU country second closest to the United States. Table 11 immediately shows the reason for that: in international security matters, the United States, the United Kingdom and France are quite close to each other, compared with other EU member states. The same holds true for decolonisation matters.

On Middle East questions, the United States is very far from the positions of all EU member states, as already indicated in Table 7b. Security and human rights issues find the United States and the EU member states in somewhat closer positions. The EU country with the largest distance from the EU consensus is Ireland, followed by Sweden and Austria — three of the four EU neutral/non-aligned. The reason for that gap can be seen in their positions on international security matters.

Looking at a few other countries, it is no surprise that Israel has by far the smallest distance from the United States (Table 12). All other countries have a distance of more than 50 index points. China, India, Mexico, Nigeria and also Russia have remarkably large distances from the United States. Once again, the WEOG countries and the EU candidate states are closer to the United States, in particular on security and human rights matters.

The results of Tables 11 and 12 can be directly compared with computations done by the US State Department in its annual reports to the Congress on voting practices at the United Nations.⁸³

The Report for 2002 starts also from the 106 recorded votes in the 57th UN General Assembly (September–December 2002).⁸⁴ According to these calculations, the United Kingdom has the highest voting coincidence percentage with the United States (57.1 per cent) among the EU countries, followed by France (56.0 per cent). The country with the lowest voting coincidence with the United States is again Ireland (44.7 per cent), followed by Sweden (46.1), Austria (46.8), Finland (48.0) and Greece (48.1).⁸⁵

⁸³ Op. cit. in note 69.

⁸⁴ But it uses for its calculation only the 'yes' and 'no' votes of the United States and ignores all abstentions or absences (90 votes for 2002). It takes all identical (yes/yes or no/no) votes and opposite (yes/no or no/yes) votes. Voting coincidence percentages are derived by dividing the number of identical votes by the total of identical and opposite votes; op. cit. in note 69, p. 57.

⁸⁵ Op. cit. in note 69, p. 72.

Table 11

Distance of EU member states from the United States,
57th UN General Assembly (until 31 December 2002)
(Maximum distance from the USA = 100, minimum = 0)

| | All topics | Middle East | Security etc. | Decolo-nisation | Human rights |
|-------------|------------|-------------|---------------|-----------------|--------------|
| Austria | 55 | 83 | 42 | 75 | 39 |
| Belgium | 53 | 80 | 38 | 70 | 39 |
| Denmark | 54 | 83 | 38 | 75 | 39 |
| Finland | 54 | 83 | 41 | 70 | 39 |
| France | 46 | 83 | 22 | 55 | 39 |
| Germany | 53 | 83 | 35 | 70 | 40 |
| Greece | 54 | 83 | 38 | 75 | 40 |
| Ireland | 57 | 83 | 45 | 75 | 40 |
| Italy | 53 | 83 | 36 | 70 | 39 |
| Luxembourg | 54 | 83 | 38 | 75 | 39 |
| Netherlands | 53 | 83 | 38 | 65 | 37 |
| Portugal | 53 | 83 | 38 | n/a | 40 |
| Spain | 53 | 83 | 35 | 75 | 40 |
| Sweden | 56 | 83 | 43 | 75 | 39 |
| UK | 45 | 83 | 22 | 45 | 39 |

Note: n/a: absent from more than one third of the votes.

Table 12

Distance of selected states from the United States,
57th UN General Assembly (until 31 December 2002)
(Maximum distance from the USA = 100, minimum = 0)

| | All topics | Middle East | Security etc. | Decolo-nisation | Human rights |
|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------|-----------------|--------------|
| Australia | 51 | 80 | 39 | 70 | 32 |
| Canada | 53 | 80 | 42 | 70 | 35 |
| China | 78 | 95 | 67 | 100 | 77 |
| Czech Republic | 54 | 83 | 38 | 75 | 39 |
| Hungary | 53 | 83 | 36 | 70 | 39 |
| India | 71 | 93 | 62 | 100 | 68 |
| Israel | 19 | 10 | 20 | 5 | 26 |
| Japan | 54 | 83 | 48 | 75 | 32 |
| Latvia | 53 | 83 | 36 | 65 | 42 |
| Lithuania | 54 | 83 | 38 | 70 | 40 |
| Mexico | 73 | 95 | 67 | 100 | 60 |
| Nigeria | 74 | 95 | 65 | 100 | 68 |
| Poland | 53 | 83 | 36 | 75 | 37 |
| Romania | 54 | 83 | 38 | 70 | 40 |
| Russia | 64 | 85 | 36 | 75 | 73 |

Conclusions

The results of this study of the voting behaviour are relevant for the analysis of the EU as an actor in international politics. The increase of identical votes by the EU states in the UN General Assembly happened in parallel with the establishment and further development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Since the CFSP is based on consensus among the EU countries, the growing agreement could indicate a greater potential for common actions. However, the data show that the amount of consensus has varied according to issue areas, and this has remained so over a long period of time:

- ▶ on Middle East questions dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, agreement among EU member states is quite high; on human rights matters there is a broad consensus as well;
- ▶ EU member states still disagree on questions of international security, such as disarmament in general and nuclear weapons in particular; disagreement is even larger on decolonisation issues, but these questions declined in importance in the General Assembly.

Since the mid-1990s, the voting behaviour of EU members has coalesced into a more or less characteristic structure:

- ▶ the voting behaviour of France and the United Kingdom is different from the EU 'mainstream'; this divergence from the other EU countries is especially visible in security matters, being *inter alia* related to the particular status of France and the United Kingdom as nuclear powers and as permanent mem-

bers of the Security Council;

- ▶ the 'neutral/non-aligned' EU countries form a second, also slightly 'deviating' group; the exception being Finland, which has voted since the late 1990s with the EU 'mainstream'.

The voting behaviour of non-EU countries has varying degrees of 'distance' from the consensus position of the EU. Concerning the candidate countries, in view of the impending enlargement to the East, the effects will be modest:

- ▶ after the end of the Cold War, the candidate countries (including Croatia) quickly adjusted to the EU positions; only Latvia (security issues) as well as Cyprus and Malta (particularly on Middle East questions) still have identifiable distances to the EU consensus;
- ▶ the share of consensus votes of an enlarged EU with 25 member states will most probably decrease, compared to an EU with 15 members, albeit not dramatically;
- ▶ Turkey's position has never been very far from the EU consensus, particularly on security issues, but its voting behaviour has not converged with the EU consensus as has the voting of the other candidate countries.

The distances of other third countries from the EU have remained by and large stable over the whole period analysed (1979–2002). With the exception of the Soviet Union/Russia, the end of the Cold War had little effect on the distances from the EU consensus:

- ▶ the 'Western' countries analysed here (Australia, Canada, Japan and Norway) have had only marginal disagreement with the EU consensus;
 - ▶ among the Third World countries, Egypt and India have been rather distant from the EU (in particular on human rights questions), whereas Nigeria has been a little closer to the EU consensus; Brazil and Mexico moved somewhat nearer to the EU in the 2000s;
 - ▶ vis-à-vis the EU China has a similar position to Egypt and India;
 - ▶ the Soviet Union was far removed from the EU in 1979, since 1987 it has moved closer to the EU, about the same time when the United States increased its distance from the EU consensus; Russia has reduced the distance even more, in particular on Middle East questions, but there is still a big disparity between the EU and Russia over human rights issues.
- The analysis has paid special attention to the distance between the EU and the United States:
- ▶ after 1979, the overall 'gap' between the EU consensus and the United States became quite large; it decreased from 1993 but increased again after 1999;
 - ▶ the EU and the United States (and Israel) are very far apart on Middle East questions;
 - ▶ during the years of the Clinton administration, the EU consensus and the United States were rather close on security and human rights matters, but since 2000 the distances have increased considerably;
 - ▶ when calculating the distances between the United States and each of the EU member states, the EU countries closest to the United States are the United Kingdom and France; the reason for that proximity is the resolutions on nuclear weapons, where the three

countries have fairly similar voting behaviour.

By and large, the European Union is in a rather strong position in the General Assembly, since the EU speaks on behalf of 30 and more countries. Its position somewhere between the countries of the Third World and the only superpower, the United States, makes it an important interlocutor for most members of the General Assembly.

But can the EU really use this influence? The coordination process among the EU member states is very cumbersome and time-consuming. It sometimes seems that reaching a consensus is more highly valued than proactively influencing the General Assembly. When the EU countries have finally reached agreement on important matters, negotiations on this position with third countries often become impossible, since no EU state is eager to split the (hard-won) consensus. In addition, the attainment of consensus has to be distinguished from achieving substantial agreements which would be capable of producing a truly collective policy. This could only happen if there were no differences in the individual EU member states' preferences.⁸⁶

Voting in the General Assembly is only a part of the EU members' United Nations policies. The General Assembly can only make recommendations, not binding decisions like the Security Council. Therefore, the search for consensus among EU member states in the Assembly will on the whole be less demanding than making binding decisions on the important matters of world politics. Increasing cohesion among the EU member states in the UN General Assembly is thus a necessary but not a sufficient step in attaining an efficient and effective EU Common Foreign and Security Policy.

⁸⁶ See the discussion of this problem in Costanza Musu, 'European Foreign Policy: A Collective Policy of a Policy of "Converging Parallels"?' in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. 8, no. 1, Spring 2003, pp. 35-49.

Annex 1

Statistics on recorded votes in the UN General Assembly

51st General Assembly 1996/97: Recorded votes on 74 resolutions passed, in addition, 22 recorded votes on rejected resolutions, parts of resolutions, on decisions and motions; in total 96 recorded votes.

52nd General Assembly 1997/98: Recorded votes on 69 resolutions passed, in addition, 21 recorded votes on rejected resolutions, parts of resolutions, on decisions and motions; in total 90 recorded votes.

53rd General Assembly 1998/99: Recorded votes on 61 resolutions (1 in 1999) passed, in addition, 23 recorded votes on rejected resolutions, parts of resolutions, on decisions and motions; in total 84 recorded votes.

54th General Assembly 1999/2000: Recorded votes on 69 resolutions (1 in 2000) passed, in addition, 30 recorded votes on rejected resolutions, parts of resolutions, on decisions and motions; in total 99 recorded votes.

55th General Assembly 2000/01: Recorded votes on 66 resolutions (1 in 2001) passed, in addition, 17 recorded votes on rejected resolutions, parts of resolutions, on decisions and motions; in total 83 recorded votes.

56th General Assembly 2001/2002: Recorded votes on 67 resolutions (2 in 2001) passed, in addition, 21 recorded votes on rejected resolutions, parts of resolutions, on decisions and motions; in total 88 recorded votes.

57th General Assembly 2002/2003 (data until December 31, 2002): Recorded votes on 72 resolutions passed, in addition, 34 recorded votes on rejected resolutions, parts of resolutions, on decisions and motions; in total 106 recorded votes.

Table 13

Number of recorded votes in the UN General Assembly
(Total and according to topic)

| | 1979 | 1981 | 1983 | 1985 | 1987 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 |
|------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Number of all recorded votes | 163 | 151 | 170 | 203 | 177 | 143 | 103 | 89 | 88 | 77 | 92 | 97 | 96 | 90 | 84 | 99 | 83 | 88 | 106 |
| Middle East | 31 | 35 | 43 | 51 | 44 | 37 | 31 | 34 | 34 | 20 | 22 | 21 | 24 | 25 | 24 | 22 | 25 | 25 | 22 |
| Security, etc. | 23 | 32 | 53 | 54 | 41 | 45 | 32 | 20 | 20 | 22 | 43 | 47 | 42 | 39 | 42 | 41 | 34 | 38 | 39 |
| Decolonisation | | | | | | | | | | | | 8 | 10 | 11 | 9 | 8 | 10 | 11 | 11 |
| Human rights | | | | | | | | | | | | 11 | 13 | 16 | 10 | 18 | 13 | 14 | 31 |

Notes: * 1996 EU without Greece; ** until 31 December 2002; no data calculated for decolonisation and human rights between 1979 and 1994.

Table 14

Percentages of recorded votes in the UN General Assembly with EU consensus
(Total and according to topic)

| | 1979 | 1981 | 1983 | 1985 | 1987 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 |
|----------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| All Votes | 58.9 | 42.4 | 27.1 | 37.4 | 47.5 | 45.5 | 41.8 | 52.8 | 61.4 | 59.7 | 65.1 | 70.1 | 75.0 | 80.0 | 82.1 | 76.8 | 72.3 | 73.9 | 75.5 |
| Middle East | 74.2 | 40.0 | 46.5 | 51.0 | 56.8 | 56.8 | 71.0 | 76.5 | 82.4 | 80.0 | 86.4 | 90.5 | 95.8 | 92.0 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 84.0 | 95.5 |
| Security etc. | 56.5 | 34.4 | 20.8 | 27.8 | 31.7 | 31.1 | 18.8 | 25.0 | 35.0 | 50.0 | 53.5 | 70.2 | 66.7 | 76.9 | 76.2 | 61.0 | 52.9 | 68.4 | 59.0 |
| Decolonisation | | | | | | | | | | | | 37.5 | 70.0 | 45.5 | 55.6 | 50.0 | 50.0 | 45.5 | 45.5 |
| Human rights | | | | | | | | | | | | 72.7 | 92.3 | 87.5 | 90.0 | 88.9 | 92.3 | 92.9 | 90.3 |

Notes: * 1996 EU without Greece; ** until 31 December 2002; no data calculated for decolonisation and human rights between 1979 and 1994.

Annex 2

Recorded votes at the 57th UN General Assembly 2002: voting behaviour of EU member states, the candidate countries and the United States (votes until 31 December 2002 included)

1. EU consensus votes for all recorded votes (80 cases)
 - 1.1. EU consensus identical with the votes of the United States
 - 1.2. EU consensus different from the votes of the United States
 2. Recorded votes without a consensus among EU member states (26 cases)
 3. Recorded votes of the EU member states different from the EU majority
 4. Recorded votes of the 13 candidate countries different from the EU consensus
- (a = amendment, i = inserted, op = operative paragraph, p = paragraph, pp = preambular paragraph, w = words)

1. EU CONSENSUS VOTES FOR ALL RECORDED VOTES (80 CASES)

1.1. EU consensus identical with the votes of the United States (33 cases)

Resolution 57/9:

Topic: Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency

EU (consensus) and USA for

Resolution 57/9-pp3:

EU (consensus) and USA for

Resolution 57/9-pp12:

EU (consensus) and USA for

Resolution 57/9-op5:

EU (consensus) and USA for

Motion

Topic: No action shall be taken on the amendment contained in document A/57/L.17 (Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency) concerning weapons inspections in Iraq

EU (consensus) and USA for

Resolution 57/54:

Topic: Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament

EU (consensus) and USA against

Resolution 57/66:

Topic: National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual use of goods and technology

EU (consensus) and USA for

Resolution 57/66-pp2w:

EU (consensus) and USA for

Resolution 57/75:

Topic: Transparency in armaments

EU (consensus) and USA for

Resolution 57/75-op4b:

EU (consensus) and USA for

Resolution 57/75-op6:

EU (consensus) and USA for

Resolution 57/77:

Topic: Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels

EU (consensus) and USA for

Resolution 57/84:

Topic: Reducing nuclear danger
EU (consensus) and USA against

Resolution 57/94:

Topic: Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons
EU (consensus) and USA against

Resolution 57/120:

Topic: Offers by Member States of grants and scholarships for higher education, including vocational training, for Palestine refugees
EU (consensus) and USA for

Resolution 57/205:

Topic: Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of all human rights
EU (consensus) and USA against

Resolution 57/213:

Topic: Promotion of a democratic and equitable international order
EU (consensus) and USA against

Resolution 57/214:

Topic: Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions
EU (consensus) and USA for

Resolution 57/214-pp3:

EU (consensus) and USA for

Resolution 57/214-op6:

EU (consensus) and USA for

Resolution 57/214-op12:

EU (consensus) and USA for

Resolution 57/216:

Topic: Promotion of the right of peoples to peace
EU (consensus) and USA against

Resolution 57/217:

Topic: Respect for the purposes and principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations to achieve international cooperation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms and in solving international problems of a humanitarian character
EU (consensus) and USA against

Resolution 57/222:

Topic: Human rights and unilateral coercive measures
EU (consensus) and USA against

Resolution 57/230:

Topic: Situation of human rights in the Sudan
EU (consensus) and USA for

Resolution 57/232:

Topic: Human rights situation in Iraq

EU (consensus) and USA for

Resolution 57/232-op4abe:

EU (consensus) and USA for

Resolution 57/232-op4b:

EU (consensus) and USA for

Resolution 57/232-op4e:

EU (consensus) and USA for

Resolution 57/232-op4f:

EU (consensus) and USA for

Resolution 57/233:

Topic: Situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
EU (consensus) and USA for

Resolution 57/298:

Topic: Cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
EU (consensus) and USA for

Resolution 57/298-a:

EU (consensus) and USA abstaining

1.2. EU consensus different from the votes of the United States (47 cases)

Resolution 57/5:

Topic: Elimination of unilateral extraterritorial coercive economic measures as a means of political and economic compulsion
EU (consensus) for and USA against

Resolution 57/9-op10:

Topic: Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency
EU (consensus) for and USA against

Resolution 57/11:

Topic: Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba
EU (consensus) for and USA against

Resolution 57/49:

Topic: Cooperation between the UN and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
EU (consensus) for and USA against

Resolution 57/62:

Topic: Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol
EU (consensus) for and USA abstaining

Resolution 57/71:

Topic: Missiles
EU (consensus) abstaining and USA against

Resolution 57/74:

Topic: Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction
EU (consensus) for and USA abstaining

Resolution 57/79-op10:

Topic: Nuclear disarmament
EU (consensus) for and USA abstaining

Resolution 57/97-pp6:

Topic: The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East
EU (consensus) for and USA abstaining

Resolution 57/100:

Topic: Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
EU (consensus) for and USA against

Resolution 57/107:

Topic: Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People
EU (consensus) abstaining and USA against

Resolution 57/108:

Topic: Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat
EU (consensus) abstaining and USA against

Resolution 57/109:

Topic: Special information programme on the question of Palestine of the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat
EU (consensus) for and USA against

Resolution 57/110:

Topic: Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine
EU (consensus) for and USA against

Resolution 57/111:

Topic: Jerusalem
EU (consensus) for and USA against

Resolution 57/112:

Topic: The Syrian Golan
EU (consensus) abstaining and USA against

Resolution 57/117:

Topic: Assistance to Palestinian refugees
EU (consensus) for and USA abstaining

Resolution 57/119:

Topic: Persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 and subsequent hostilities
EU (consensus) for and USA against

Resolution 57/121:

Topic: Operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
EU (consensus) for and USA against

Resolution 57/122:

Topic: Palestine refugees' properties and their revenues
EU (consensus) for and USA against

Resolution 57/123:

Topic: University of Jerusalem 'Al-Quds' for Palestine refugees
EU (consensus) for and USA against

Resolution 57/124:

Topic: Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories
EU (consensus) abstaining and USA against

Resolution 57/125:

Topic: Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the other occupied Arab territories
EU (consensus) for and USA against

Resolution 57/126:

Topic: Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan
EU (consensus) for and USA against

Resolution 57/127:

Topic: Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem
EU (consensus) for and USA against

Resolution 57/128:

Topic: Occupied Syrian Golan
EU (consensus) for and USA abstaining

Resolution 57/156:

Topic: Cooperation between the United Nations and the Council of Europe

EU (consensus) for and USA abstaining

Resolution 57/156-op4:

EU (consensus) for and USA abstaining

Resolution 57/156-op6:

EU (consensus) for and USA against

Resolution 57/156-op12:

EU (consensus) for and USA against

Resolution 57/188:

Topic: Situation of and assistance to Palestinian children

EU (consensus) abstaining and USA against

Resolution 57/189-op1 (the whole resolution was adopted by consensus):

Topic: The girl child

EU (consensus) for and USA against

Resolution 57/190:

Topic: Rights of the child

EU (consensus) for and USA against

Resolution 57/194-op10 (the whole resolution was adopted by consensus):

Topic: International convention on racial discrimination

EU (consensus) for and USA against

Resolution 57/195:

Topic: The fight against racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance and the comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action

EU (consensus) for and USA against

Resolution 57/198:

Topic: The right of the Palestinian people to self-determination

EU (consensus) for and USA against

Resolution 57/199:

Topic: Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

EU (consensus) for and USA against

Resolution 57/214-pp7op3:

Topic: Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions

EU (consensus) for and USA against

Resolution 57/214-op11:

EU (consensus) for and USA against

Resolution 57/214-op18:

EU (consensus) for and USA against

Resolution 57/214-op22:

EU (consensus) for and USA against

Resolution 57/215-pp7 (the whole resolution was adopted by consensus):

Topic: Involuntary disappearances

EU (consensus) for and USA against

Resolution 57/223:

Topic: The Right to Development

EU (consensus) abstaining and USA against

Resolution 57/226:

Topic: The right to food

EU (consensus) for and USA against

Resolution 57/227:

Topic: Respect for the right to universal freedom of travel and the vital importance of family reunification
EU (consensus) abstaining and USA against

Resolution 57/233-p1i:

Topic: Situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
EU (consensus) for and USA against

Resolution 57/269:

Topic: Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources
EU (consensus) for and USA against

2. RECORDED VOTES *WITHOUT A CONSENSUS* AMONG EU MEMBER STATES (26 CASES)

Resolution 57/56:

Topic: Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
[all EU countries abstaining, except Germany absent; USA abstaining]

Resolution 57/57:

Topic: Prevention of an arms race in outer space
[all EU countries abstaining, except Germany absent; USA abstaining]

Resolution 57/58:

Topic: Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons
[Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden for; France, UK against; Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain abstaining; USA against]

Resolution 57/59:

Topic: Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda
[Austria, Ireland, Sweden for; France, UK against; Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain abstaining; USA against]

Resolution 57/63:

Topic: Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation
[Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, UK against; Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden abstaining; Denmark absent; USA against]

Resolution 57/64:

Topic: Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control
[all EU countries for, except France, UK abstaining; USA abstaining]

Resolution 57/65:

Topic: Relationship between disarmament and development
[all EU countries for, except France, UK abstaining; USA against]

Resolution 57/73:

Topic: Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas
[all EU countries for, except France, UK against; Spain abstaining; USA against]

Resolution 57/73-op3w:

[all EU countries for, except France, UK abstaining; USA abstaining]

Resolution 57/73-op3:

[all EU countries for, except France, UK abstaining; USA abstaining]

Resolution 57/78:

Topic: A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons
[all EU countries for, except Ireland, Sweden abstaining; USA against]

Resolution 57/79:

Topic: Nuclear disarmament

[all EU countries against, except Ireland, Sweden abstaining; USA against]

Resolution 57/85:

Topic: Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 'Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons'

[Ireland, Sweden for; Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK against; Austria, Finland abstaining; USA against]

Resolution 57/85-op1:

[all EU countries for, except France against; UK abstaining; USA against]

Resolution 57/97:

Topic: The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East

[all EU countries for, except Belgium absent; USA against; subsequently the delegation of Belgium informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour (A/57/PV.57, p. 29)]

Resolution 57/131:

Topic: Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73e of the Charter of the United Nations

[all EU countries for, except France, UK abstaining; Portugal absent; USA abstaining]

Resolution 57/132:

Topic: Economic and other activities which affect the interests of the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories

[all EU countries for, except France, UK abstaining; Portugal absent; USA against]

Resolution 57/133:

Topic: Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations

[all EU countries abstaining, except Portugal absent; USA abstaining]

Resolution 57/139:

Topic: Dissemination of information on decolonisation

[all EU countries for, except UK against; France, Netherlands abstaining; USA against; subsequently the delegation of the Netherlands informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour (A/57/PV.73, p. 24)]

Resolution 57/140:

Topic: Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

[Austria, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden for; UK against; Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal abstaining; USA against]

Resolution 57/141:

Topic: Oceans and law of the sea

[all EU countries for, Netherlands absent; USA for]

Resolution 57/175:

Topic: Future operations of the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women

[Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain for; Netherlands against; Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Sweden, United Kingdom abstaining; USA against]

Resolution 57/196:

Topic: Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination

[Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, UK against; Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain abstaining; USA against]

Resolution 57/228:

Topic: Khmer Rouge trials

[Austria, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain for; Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, UK abstaining; USA for]

Decision 57/515:

Topic: UN conference on nuclear dangers and nuclear disarmament

[Ireland for; France, UK against; Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden abstaining; USA against]

Decision 57/525[RTF bookmark start:]portugalabsenteuagainst[RTF bookmark end:]portugalabsenteuagainst:

Topic: The military activities of colonial powers

[all EU countries against, except Portugal absent; USA against]

3. RECORDED VOTES OF THE EU MEMBER STATES DIFFERING FROM THE EU MAJORITY

Austria (6 cases)
 Belgium (1 case)
 Denmark (2 cases)
 Finland (2 cases)
 France (14 cases)
 Germany (4 cases)
 Greece (4 cases)
 Ireland (8 cases)
 Italy (3 cases)
 Luxembourg (1 case)
 Netherlands (3 cases)
 Portugal (8 cases)
 Spain (6 cases)
 Sweden (6 cases)
 United Kingdom (14 cases)

Austria (6 cases)

Resolution 57/58:

Topic: Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons

EU (majority) abstaining and Austria for

USA against

Resolution 57/59:

Topic: Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda

EU (majority) abstaining and Austria for

USA against

Resolution 57/85:

Topic: Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 'Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons'

EU (majority) against and Austria abstaining

USA against

Resolution 57/140:

Topic: Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

EU (majority) abstaining and Austria for

USA against

Resolution 57/196:

Topic: Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination

EU (majority) against and Austria abstaining

USA against

Resolution 57/228:

Topic: Khmer Rouge trials

EU (majority) abstaining and Austria for

USA for

Belgium (1 case)

Resolution 57/97:

Topic: The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East

EU (majority) for and Belgium absent

[Subsequently the delegation of Belgium informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour (A/57/PV.57, p. 29); it voted for Resolution 57/97-pp6]

USA against

Denmark (2 cases)

Resolution 57/63:

Topic: Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation

EU (majority) abstaining and Denmark absent

USA against

Resolution 57/140:

Topic: Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

EU (majority) abstaining and Denmark for

USA against

Finland (2 cases)

Resolution 57/58:

Topic: Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons

EU (majority) abstaining and Finland for

USA against

Resolution 57/85:

Topic: Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 'Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons'

EU (majority) against and Finland abstaining

USA against

France (14 cases)

Resolution 57/58:

Topic: Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons

EU (majority) abstaining and France against

USA against

Resolution 57/59:

Topic: Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda

EU (majority) abstaining and France against

USA against

Resolution 57/64:

Topic: Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control

EU (majority) for and France abstaining

USA abstaining

Resolution 57/65:

Topic: Relationship between disarmament and development

EU (majority) for and France abstaining

USA against

Resolution 57/73:

Topic: Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas

EU (majority) for and France against

USA against

Resolution 57/73-op3w:

EU (majority) for and France abstaining

USA abstaining

Resolution 57/73-op3:

EU (majority) for and France abstaining

USA abstaining

Resolution 57/85-op1:

Topic: Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 'Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons'

EU (majority) for and France against

USA against

Resolution 57/131:

Topic: Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73e of the Charter of the United Nations

EU (majority) for and France abstaining

USA abstaining

Resolution 57/132:

Topic: Economic and other activities which affect the interests of the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories

EU (majority) for and France abstaining

USA against

Resolution 57/139:

Topic: Dissemination of information on decolonisation

EU (majority) for and France abstaining

USA against

Resolution 57/196:

Topic: Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination

EU (majority) against and France abstaining

USA against

Resolution 57/228:

Topic: Khmer Rouge trials

EU (majority) abstaining and France for

USA for

Decision 57/515:

Topic: UN conference on nuclear dangers and nuclear disarmament

EU (majority) abstaining and France against

USA against

Germany (4 cases)

Resolution 57/56:

Topic: Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

EU (majority) abstaining and Germany absent

USA abstaining

Resolution 57/57:

Topic: Prevention of an arms race in outer space

EU (majority) for and Germany absent

USA abstaining

Resolution 57/63:

Topic: Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation

EU (majority) abstaining and Germany against

USA against

Resolution 57/196:

Topic: Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination

EU (majority) against and Germany abstaining

USA against

Greece (4 cases)

Resolution 57/140:

Topic: Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

EU (majority) abstaining and Greece for

USA against

Resolution 57/175:

Topic: Future operations of the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women

EU (majority) abstaining and Greece for

USA against

Resolution 57/196:

Topic: Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination

EU (majority) against and Greece abstaining

USA against

Resolution 57/228:

Topic: Khmer Rouge trials

EU (majority) abstaining and Greece for

USA for

Ireland (8 cases)

Resolution 57/58:

Topic: Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons

EU (majority) abstaining and Ireland for

USA against

Resolution 57/59:

Topic: Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda

EU (majority) abstaining and Ireland for

USA against

Resolution 57/78:

Topic: A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons

EU (majority) for and Ireland abstaining

USA against

Resolution 57/79:

Topic: Nuclear disarmament

EU (majority) against and Ireland abstaining

USA against

Resolution 57/85:

Topic: Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 'Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons'

EU (majority) against and Ireland for

USA against

Resolution 57/140:

Topic: Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

EU (majority) abstaining and Ireland for

USA against

Resolution 57/196:

Topic: Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination

EU (majority) against and Ireland abstaining

USA against

Decision 57/515:

Topic: UN conference on nuclear dangers and nuclear disarmament

EU (majority) abstaining and Ireland for

USA against

Italy (3 cases)

Resolution 57/63:

Topic: Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation

EU (majority) abstaining and Italy against

USA against

Resolution 57/175:

Topic: Future operations of the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women

EU (majority) abstaining and Italy for

USA against

Resolution 57/228:

Topic: Khmer Rouge trials

EU (majority) abstaining and Italy for

USA for

Luxembourg (1 case)

Resolution 57/140:

Topic: Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

EU (majority) abstaining and Luxembourg for

USA against

Netherlands (3 cases)

Resolution 57/139:

Topic: Dissemination of information on decolonisation

EU (majority) for and Netherlands abstaining

[Subsequently the delegation of the Netherlands informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour (A/57/PV.73, p. 24)]

USA against

Resolution 57/141:

Topic: Oceans and law of the sea

EU (majority) for and Netherlands absent

USA for

Resolution 57/175:

Topic: Future operations of the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women
EU (majority) abstaining and Netherlands against
USA against

Portugal (8 cases)

Resolution 57/63:

Topic: Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation
EU (majority) abstaining and Portugal against
USA against

Resolution 57/131:

Topic: Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73e of the Charter of the United Nations
EU (majority) for and Portugal absent
USA abstaining

Resolution 57/132:

Topic: Economic and other activities which affect the interests of the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories
EU (majority) for and Portugal absent
USA against

Resolution 57/133:

Topic: Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations
EU (majority) abstaining and Portugal absent
USA abstaining

Resolution 57/175:

Topic: Future operations of the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women
EU (majority) abstaining and Portugal for
USA against

Resolution 57/196:

Topic: Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination
EU (majority) against and Portugal abstaining
USA against

Resolution 57/228:

Topic: Khmer Rouge trials
EU (majority) abstaining and Portugal for
USA for

Decision 57/525:

Topic: The military activities of colonial powers
EU (majority) against and Portugal absent
USA against

Spain (6 cases)

Resolution 57/63:

Topic: Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation
EU (majority) abstaining and Spain against
USA against

Resolution 57/73:

Topic: Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas

EU (majority) for and Spain abstaining

USA against

Resolution 57/140:

Topic: Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

EU (majority) abstaining and Spain for

USA against

Resolution 57/175:

Topic: Future operations of the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women

EU (majority) abstaining and Spain for

USA against

Resolution 57/196:

Topic: Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination

EU (majority) against and Spain abstaining

USA against

Resolution 57/228:

Topic: Khmer Rouge trials

EU (majority) abstaining and Spain for

USA for

Sweden (6 cases)

Resolution 57/58:

Topic: Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons

EU (majority) abstaining and Sweden for

USA against

Resolution 57/59:

Topic: Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda

EU (majority) abstaining and Sweden for

USA against

Resolution 57/78:

Topic: A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons

EU (majority) for and Sweden abstaining

USA against

Resolution 57/79:

Topic: Nuclear disarmament

EU (majority) against and Sweden abstaining

USA against

Resolution 57/85:

Topic: Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 'Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons'

EU (majority) against and Sweden for

USA against

Resolution 57/140:

Topic: Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

EU (majority) abstaining and Sweden for

USA against

United Kingdom (14 cases)

Resolution 57/58:

Topic: Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons

EU (majority) abstaining and UK against

USA against

Resolution 57/59:

Topic: Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda

EU (majority) abstaining and UK against

USA against

Resolution 57/63:

Topic: Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation

EU (majority) abstaining and UK against

USA against

Resolution 57/64:

Topic: Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control

EU (majority) for and UK abstaining

USA abstaining

Resolution 57/65:

Topic: Relationship between disarmament and development

EU (majority) for and UK abstaining

USA against

Resolution 57/73:

Topic: Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas

EU (majority) for and UK against

USA against

Resolution 57/73-op3w:

EU (majority) for and UK abstaining

USA abstaining

Resolution 57/73-op3:

EU (majority) for and UK abstaining

USA abstaining

Resolution 57/85-op1:

Topic: Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 'Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons'

EU (majority) for and UK abstaining

USA against

Resolution 57/131:

Topic: Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73e of the Charter of the United Nations

EU (majority) for and UK abstaining

USA abstaining

Resolution 57/132:

Topic: Economic and other activities which affect the interests of the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories

EU (majority) for and UK abstaining

USA against

Resolution 57/139:

Topic: Dissemination of information on decolonisation

EU (majority) for and UK against

USA against

Resolution 57/140:

Topic: Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

EU (majority) abstaining and UK against

USA against

Decision 57/515:

Topic: UN conference on nuclear dangers and nuclear disarmament

EU (majority) abstaining and UK against

USA against

4. RECORDED VOTES OF THE 12 CANDIDATE COUNTRIES DIFFERING FROM THE EU CONSENSUS

Cyprus (5 cases)

Hungary (1 case)

Latvia (4 cases)

Malta (5 cases)

Romania (2 cases)

Turkey (13 cases)

Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia always voted with the EU consensus.

Cyprus (5 cases)

Resolution 57/107:

Topic: Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People

EU (consensus) abstaining and Cyprus for

USA against

Resolution 57/108:

Topic: Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat

EU (consensus) abstaining and Cyprus for

USA against

Resolution 57/112:

Topic: The Syrian Golan

EU (consensus) abstaining and Cyprus for

USA against

Resolution 57/124:

Topic: Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

EU (consensus) abstaining and Cyprus for

USA against

Resolution 57/188:

Topic: Situation of and assistance to Palestinian children

EU (consensus) abstaining and Cyprus for

USA against

Hungary (1 case)

Resolution 57/74:

Topic: Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

EU (consensus) for and Hungary absent

USA abstaining

Latvia (4 cases)

Resolution 57/5:

Topic: Elimination of unilateral extraterritorial coercive economic measures as a means of political and economic compulsion

EU (consensus) for and Latvia abstaining

USA against

Resolution 57/49:

Topic: Cooperation between the UN and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

EU (consensus) for and Latvia absent

USA against

Resolution 57/94:

Topic: Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

EU (consensus) against and Latvia absent

USA against

Resolution 57/217:

Topic: Respect for the purposes and principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations to achieve international cooperation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms and in solving international problems of a humanitarian character

EU (consensus) against and Latvia abstaining

USA against

Malta (5 cases)

Resolution 57/107:

Topic: Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People

EU (consensus) abstaining and Malta for

USA against

Resolution 57/108:

Topic: Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat

EU (consensus) abstaining and Malta for

USA against

Resolution 57/112:

Topic: The Syrian Golan

EU (consensus) abstaining and Malta for

USA against

Resolution 57/124:

Topic: Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

EU (consensus) abstaining and Malta for

USA against

Resolution 57/188:

Topic: Situation of and assistance to Palestinian children

EU (consensus) abstaining and Malta for

USA against

Romania (2 cases)

Resolution 57/298:

Topic: Cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

EU (consensus) for and Romania absent

USA for

Resolution 57/298-a:

EU (consensus) abstaining and Romania absent

USA abstaining

Turkey (13 cases)

Resolution 57/107:

Topic: Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People

EU (consensus) abstaining and Turkey for

USA against

Resolution 57/108:

Topic: Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat

EU (consensus) abstaining and Turkey for

USA against

Resolution 57/112:

Topic: The Syrian Golan

EU (consensus) abstaining and Turkey for

USA against

Resolution 57/124:

Topic: Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories

EU (consensus) abstaining and Turkey for

USA against

Resolution 57/188:

Topic: Situation of and assistance to Palestinian children

EU (consensus) abstaining and Turkey for

USA against

Resolution 57/205:

Topic: Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of all human rights

EU (consensus) against and Turkey abstaining

USA against

Resolution 57/214-op6:

Topic: Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions

EU (consensus) for and Turkey abstaining

USA for

Resolution 57/214-op11:

EU (consensus) for and Turkey abstaining

USA against

Resolution 57/214-op12:

EU (consensus) for and Turkey abstaining

USA for

Resolution 57/227:

Topic: Respect for the right to universal freedom of travel and the vital importance of family reunification

EU (consensus) abstaining and Turkey for

USA against

Resolution 57/230:

Topic: Situation of human rights in the Sudan

EU (consensus) for and Turkey absent

USA for

Resolution 57/233-p1i:

Topic: Situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

EU (consensus) for and Turkey abstaining

USA against

Resolution 57/298-a:

Topic: Cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

EU (consensus) abstaining and Turkey for

USA abstaining

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