

*Edited by  
Antonio Missiroli*

## **Bigger EU, wider CFSP, stronger ESDP?**

The view from Central Europe

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## En attendant les Barbares

Qu'attendons-nous, rassemblés ainsi sur la place ?

Les Barbares vont arriver aujourd'hui.

Pourquoi un tel marasme au Sénat ? Pourquoi les Sénateurs restent-ils sans légiférer ?

C'est que les Barbares arrivent aujourd'hui. Quelles lois voteraient les Sénateurs ? Quand ils viendront, les Barbares feront la loi.

Pourquoi notre Empereur, levé dès l'aurore siège-t-il sous un dais aux portes de la ville, solennel, et la couronne en tête ?

C'est que les Barbares arrivent aujourd'hui. L'Empereur s'apprête à recevoir leur chef ; il a même fait préparer un parchemin qui lui octroie des appellations honorifiques et des titres.

Pourquoi nos deux consuls et nos préteurs arborent-ils leur rouge toge brodée ? Pourquoi se parent-ils de bracelets d'améthystes et de bagues étincelantes d'émeraudes ? Pourquoi portent-ils leurs cannes précieuses et finement ciselées ?

C'est que les Barbares arrivent aujourd'hui, et ces coûteux objets éblouissent les Barbares. Pourquoi nos habiles rhéteurs ne pérorent-ils pas avec leur coutumière éloquence ?

C'est que les Barbares arrivent aujourd'hui. Eux, ils n'apprécient ni les belles phrases ni les longs discours.

## *Waiting for the Barbarians*

*What are we waiting for, assembled in the forum?*

*The barbarians are to arrive today.*

*Why such inaction in the Senate? Why do the Senators sit and pass no laws?*

*Because the barbarians are to arrive today. What laws can the Senators pass any more? When the barbarians come they will make the laws.*

*Why did our emperor wake up so early, and sits at the greatest gate of the city, on the throne, solemn, wearing the crown?*

*Because the barbarians are to arrive today. And the emperor waits to receive their chief. Indeed he has prepared to give him a scroll. Therein he inscribed many titles and names of honour.*

*Why have our two consuls and the praetors come out today in their red, embroidered togas; why do they wear amethyst-studded bracelets, and rings with brilliant, glittering emeralds; why are they carrying costly canes today, wonderfully carved with silver and gold?*

*Because the barbarians are to arrive today, and such things dazzle the barbarians. Why don't the worthy orators come as always to make their speeches, to have their say?*

*Because the barbarians are to arrive today; and they get bored with eloquence and orations.*

■ ■ ■

Et pourquoi, subitement, cette inquiétude et ce trouble ? Comme les visages sont devenus graves !

Pourquoi les rues et les places se désemplissent-elles si vite, et pourquoi rentrent-ils tous chez eux d'un air sombre ?

C'est que la nuit est tombée, et que les Barbares n'arrivent pas. Et des gens sont venus des frontières, et ils disent qu'il n'y a point de Barbares ...

Et maintenant, que deviendrons-nous sans Barbares ?

Ces gens-là, c'était quand même une solution.

Constantine P. Cavafy (1904)  
Traduit du grec  
par Marguerite Yourcenar et Constantin Dimaras

*Why all of a sudden this unrest and confusion. (How solemn the faces have become).*

*Why are the streets and squares clearing quickly, and all return to their homes, so deep in thought?*

*Because night is here but the barbarians have not come.*

*And some people arrived from the borders, and said that there are no longer any barbarians.*

*And now what shall become of us without any barbarians?*

*Those people were some kind of solution.*

Constantine P. Cavafy (1904)  
translated from the original Greek  
by Rae Dalven

## Introduction

Antonio Missiroli

Last spring, the research team of the then WEU Institute for Security Studies came up with the idea of carrying out a targeted screening of the prevailing (and evolving) views on CFSP and ESDP in the candidate countries. In order to preserve some homogeneity and comparability, the screening would be limited to the ten Central European applicants. In fact, the Mediterranean candidates (Cyprus and Malta, let alone Turkey) pose completely different problems, while the whole exercise was intended to try and assess what CFSP/ESDP means to the part of Europe that was ‘kidnapped’ for almost half a century – according to Milan Kundera’s well-known metaphor from the 1980s – and is now about to ‘return’ where it belongs. In a way, however, the project was also intended to try and assess what such a ‘return’ might mean for CFSP/ESDP, and how the two processes would interact and dovetail.

Accordingly, a grid with five main clusters of questions was handed out to the potential authors in order to structure their contributions, answer a series of topical questions and allow an overall as well as a comparative assessment. The clusters were the following:

### I. Enlargement and CFSP

Your country has already ‘closed’ Chapters 26 (Relex) and 27 (CFSP). What was the original negotiating position? Did the negotiators meet any special problem (and, if so, what)? To what extent had your country already adopted CFSP common positions and *démarches*? Which ones (if any) had not been adopted, and why?

### II. Enlargement and ESDP

How was the launch of ESDP in 1998/99 received in your country? What factors shaped official and unofficial attitudes? Has there been any

discernible evolution of your country’s position on ESDP ever since? If so, in what direction and why?

### III. Enlargement and military crisis management

Did your country ‘contribute’ to the ‘Catalogue of Forces’ exercise and the EU’s Headline Goal? If so, please give details on the units and assets ‘offered’ for EU-led crisis-resolution operations, with special attention to their availability (to NATO too, if pertinent) and to the overall size and structure of your country’s armed forces. What is your country’s ‘record’ so far in international peacekeeping operations?

### IV. Enlargement and defence procurement

Is your country interested in and/or supportive of a more coordinated European defence procurement policy? Is it involved in any such framework (e.g. WEAG)? What are your country’s main priorities in this field (modernisation of armed forces) and acquisition policy? Can you give some examples and illustrate cases of conflict between political and industrial interests and/or European and American suppliers?

### V. Enlargement and European security policy

Please make a final short assessment on your country’s general attitude vis-à-vis the EU as an international/global actor and your country’s likely role and self-perception within an ‘enlarged’ EU. What should be, for instance, the priorities for CFSP, both geographically and politically? Would your country accept (and, if so, on what terms) a more ‘flexible’ CFSP? In other words, what is or may be your country’s attitude vis-à-vis constructive abstention and enhanced cooperation for CFSP/ESDP? What changes and adaptations to the TEU, with respect to

CFSP/ESDP, would your country endorse/oppose in the 2004 Treaty review?

After the terrorist attacks on the United States, however, an additional group of questions was added – **VI. Enlargement after September 11** – in order to address the main reactions to that in the countries under consideration and their reassessment of priorities and goals, with a view to the decisions on the two enlargements that are expected to be taken this autumn in Prague (NATO) and Copenhagen (EU).

The authors are mostly young researchers from the applicant countries who have been involved in the Institute's programmes over the past (and coming) months, including a seminar on *Enlarging Europe: CFSP Perspectives* held in Paris in late May 2001. The new EU Institute will continue to count on them as active interlocutors and partners for its activities. Here they have written in a personal capacity but tried also to

convey a balanced image of the ways in which domestic political and bureaucratic élites, as well as the wider public, see the issues raised by CFSP and ESDP. The country reports are listed in geographical order – from north to south – with a view also to conveying the proximity/similarity of visions and perceptions among neighbours.

The EU Institute is delighted to have 'inherited' the project from its WEU predecessor and to be able to present its results. Needless to say, this Occasional Paper is bound not to be the sole product that the new ISS devotes to enlargement and security, especially in this crucial year.



# Estonia

Andres Kasekamp

## I. Estonia and CFSP

The invitation to Estonia, in 1997, to begin EU accession negotiations with the first wave of applicant countries came as a surprise for nearly everyone. As the only state that was formerly part of the Soviet Union, Estonia had the weakest starting point among fellow applicants included in the first wave and, therefore, adopted a strategy of overcoming this handicap by trying to be the best student in the class. Estonia has met most EU demands quickly and requested very few transitional periods (and no derogation). In a way, Estonia has tried to emulate Finland in building a reputation in Brussels of being a constructive and eager learner. This strategy has largely paid off, with Estonia annually receiving one of the most positive Progress Reports from the Commission and closing chapters at a fast pace.

In the accession negotiations, Chapter 26 (external relations) of the *acquis* was provisionally closed in April 2000. The only contentious issue was Estonia's desire to preserve the conditions of its Free Trade Agreements with Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine. Estonia was forced to withdraw from its initial position – all the more so since the bilateral aspect with the other two Baltic States is no longer a concern as it now appears that they will be joining the EU at the same time as Estonia.

In the same negotiations, Chapter 27 (CFSP) has been one of the simplest to deal with. Here the official position, from the beginning, has been that Estonia is prepared to accept the relevant *acquis* in full. Therefore, unsurprisingly, there were not any obstacles or problems in negotiating and concluding (in April 2000) the CFSP chapter.

Estonia is prepared and able to participate fully in CFSP. The country has no territorial disputes with its neighbours, though a border treaty with Russia (agreed upon in 1999) is still awaiting ratification by the Russian Duma. Nevertheless, the border has been demarcated and Russian and Estonian border guards cooperate smoothly. Estonia supports the non-proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and is a party to the relevant international agreements prohibiting such weapons.

Right from the start of the political dialogue on CFSP, Estonia has adopted practically all EU common positions and *démarches*. The few rare cases in which Estonia has not adopted CFSP common positions have arisen when the EU and United States have held conflicting positions, e.g. on Middle East issues, where Estonia has no well-defined interest. In some of these cases Estonia has preferred not to jeopardise its good relations with the United States. However, as the date of accession has drawn nearer, Estonia has consistently aligned itself with all EU common positions, even when these have been at odds with the US position. A notable recent example is that of the proposed International Criminal Court. Estonia has also participated in several EU joint actions, *inter alia* enforcing sanctions against Yugoslavia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Indonesia and Burma.

## II. Estonia and ESDP

The launch of ESDP did not receive much notice in Estonia. The initiative was met with scepticism as to whether it will ever succeed in transforming itself from an idea on paper into a reality. Estonians have also been concerned that

some EU member states, such as Germany, might seek to offer ESDP to the Baltic States as a substitute for NATO membership. Since ESDP does not provide collective security, the Estonian government believes that it falls short of Estonian security requirements. Opinion polls have consistently shown that a much higher number of Estonians support NATO membership than EU accession. This is largely explained by their desire for security, something Estonians have never enjoyed in their history. The 'hard' security guarantees offered by NATO are much more attractive (and easier for the public to grasp) than the 'soft' ones provided by the EU. This said, adding a security and defence element to the EU can only be seen as a positive development from the Estonian perspective. Therefore, the further development of ESDP is perceived by Estonians as providing added value to EU membership, though not as an alternative to NATO membership.

Estonians are interested in preserving a strong transatlantic link between the United States and its European allies. Tallinn does not support pointless duplications of NATO and EU structures that could create tension between the two organisations. More generally, Estonians would welcome any initiative that improved the ability of Europeans to effectively intervene in resolving international crises in the proximity of EU borders.

As a future EU member state, Estonia has sought from the beginning to be informed and consulted to the highest possible degree on the development of ESDP. Tallinn has generally been happy with the 15+15 format for EU candidate countries and non-EU NATO member states to be consulted on EU-led operations.

The Estonian government has been particularly interested in developing European capabilities not only for military but also for civilian crisis management. In the post-Cold War environment, responding to crises should be multifaceted and aim at a maximum of coordination and coherence between military and civilian approaches and instruments. Estonia has been proactive and constructive on this particular aspect of ESDP, whose priorities and instruments still appear to be in the process of being

formed. Tallinn has tried, for instance, to draw more attention to non-conventional security risks, against which reacting with both military and non-military means might prove necessary: that could apply to ecological or technological disasters, with their social and political implications, such as uncontrolled migration flows. Estonia is also interested in the civilian side of crisis management because there exists less international experience of cooperation and, therefore, the contribution by a small state like Estonia could have a bigger impact.

### *III. Estonia and military crisis management*

For the fulfilment of the Headline Goal-plus, Estonia has pledged one light infantry battalion (available in 2005), one military police unit, one mine-clearance platoon, and two naval vessels. These same forces have been made available to NATO in the framework of the Partnership for Peace programme. They will therefore be put under European command if they are not already involved in other peacekeeping operations led by the UN or NATO. At present there is one Estonian infantry company active in the SFOR in Bosnia, one military police unit in KFOR in Kosovo, and one military observer in the Middle East with UNTSO. Estonian border guards participated in the WEU Multinational Advisory Police Element in Albania (MAPE) and are still involved in the OSCE border observation mission in Georgia. Additionally, Estonian police officers are participating in the UN-led mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

For Estonians, participation in international peacekeeping operations has been and continues to be a source of prestige. It is also worth noting that, proportionately to the overall size of its armed forces, Estonia is one of the leading providers of peacekeepers in the world. It is also an important way of showing that Estonia is not simply a *demandeur* or consumer but also a provider of security – as an active contributor whenever possible.

#### *IV. Estonia and defence procurement*

Estonia does not have an arms industry of its own and, therefore, does not have a well-articulated position on the development of a more coordinated European defence procurement policy. That said, Estonia welcomes any efforts in this direction. Estonia is not a member of any framework, although it interacts with WEAG through the WEU Associate Partners programme. So far, there have been no cases of conflict between political and industrial interests or between European and American suppliers. No problems are foreseen in this area either, at least in the short term.

In line with the criteria for NATO membership, Estonia has increased its defence spending from 1.6 per cent of GDP in 2000 to 1.8 per cent in 2001. With the 2002 budget it will meet the target of 2 per cent. In 2001 defence investments were directed primarily towards the development of air surveillance capabilities and further improvement of the infrastructure, and the main focus of investments until 2003 will remain on construction and improvement of infrastructure. After that, the share of construction will decrease and the share of procurement increase. And, since Estonia is keen on participating in international peace support operations, a significant share of current expenditure on defence is allocated for this purpose.

Two main elements characterise Estonian defence procurement:

- ▶ used equipment that has been made redundant by European and other countries;
- ▶ acquisition of modern equipment that is used in NATO member states or corresponds to NATO standards.

The policy adopted by Tallinn in this domain is that new equipment will be purchased if it relies on up-to-date information technology (such as air surveillance systems, anti-aircraft and anti-tank defences). By contrast, Estonia will settle for donations of less sophisticated

used equipment such as armoured vehicles, artillery pieces, land transport vehicles, and so on.

#### *V. Estonia and European security policy*

As Foreign Minister Toomas-Hendrik Ilves has stated, 'EU membership will alter the scope of Estonian foreign policy. Our perspective on international events will change, our policy will become more global. I believe that full participation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU will make our national foreign policy stronger.'<sup>1</sup>

In other words, Estonia will have a policy for those parts of world – Africa, Asia, South America – for which it does not presently. The (sad) fact is that Estonia will never be able to build up such an extensive network of foreign representations as those that some bigger EU countries have at their disposal. Here CFSP offers a valuable opportunity for cooperation in third countries and for common diplomatic and consular protection.

It is somewhat premature to speculate on the possible changes and adaptations to the TEU (with respect to CFSP/ESDP) that Estonia might endorse or oppose in the 2004 treaty review. The Estonian vision of how it would behave as a member state is still being worked out and, honestly, all energies seem currently to be spent on clearing the final hurdles before accession and getting the support of the majority of the Estonians.

What can be said at this stage is that, in Tallinn's view, CFSP/ESDP should be effective and credible; that it should remain an intergovernmental issue rather than a supranational one; and that, whereas Estonia is not against enhanced cooperation per se, qualified majority voting should not be used to outvote smaller countries.

<sup>1</sup> 'Enlargement and Estonia's identity on the international stage', remarks by Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Estonian Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the International Conference 'Estonia and the European Union', National Library, Tallinn, 5 November 1999.

## *VI. Estonia and enlargement after 11 September*

As mentioned above, Estonia had already drawn the attention of EU partners to the importance of being able to tackle non-conventional risks as well as conventional ones. In the wake of the terrorist attacks against the United States, the urgency of building adequate and coherent EU civilian crisis-management capabilities has increased enormously.

Like the EU, Estonia immediately showed solidarity with the United States. However, Estonians were initially worried that the American focus on Afghanistan might have negative implications for their goal of joining NATO. Specifically, there was concern that Russia's willingness to cooperate with the United States might come at a price – exclusion of the Baltic States from the forthcoming wave of NATO enlargement – and that the Bush administration would basically put the issue on the back burner. Luckily, all these fears have proved unfounded. President Putin's speech in Brussels on 3 October, indicating new flexibility on the issue of NATO's expansion to the Baltic region, marked an important turning point in the debate.

Russia has signalled its willingness to forge a closer relationship with the West, and with NATO in particular. In this context, Russia might also in future be interested in participating in EU-led crisis-management operations in terms of both military and civilian crisis management. Thus, Estonia and Russia could in the future find themselves part of the same process, which will help the former overcome some old fears and test its security cooperation in practice. If so, paradoxically, Estonia's participation in ESDP might also improve Estonian-Russian bilateral relations.

As it now appears that both enlargements (EU and NATO) will turn out to be bigger than expected before 11 September, the jockeying for position and the latent rivalry among the Baltic States has faded away. In fact, while Estonia was the first to be invited to start negotiations with the EU, Lithuania was often tipped as having a better chance to join NATO first. Both countries had tried to shed their 'Baltic' identity in their public relations exercises, with Estonia taking up a Nordic one, Lithuania a Central European one, and Latvia left alone in the middle. Fortunately, the likely simultaneous accession of all three Baltic States to both the EU and NATO allows the harmony of the Baltic trio to be restored.

# Latvia

Atis Lejins

## *I. Latvia and CFSP*

Latvia closed Chapters 26 and 27 of the EU acquis very quickly after it began accession negotiations on 15 February, 2000. In fact, Latvia was ready to adopt EU policy without any requests for derogation or transitional periods. The 2001 regular Report on the candidate countries by the European Commission stated that 'Latvia has continued to align its foreign policy with that of the EU and has participated constructively in the framework of the CFSP.'

With regard to Chapter 26 (External Relations), Latvia became a full member of the WTO in February 1999 and has complied or is harmonising its legislation with that of the EU in this body as well as in the UN, especially with respect to sanctions. There was one specific demand in the original negotiating position adopted by Latvia, i.e. a transitional period for the Baltic Free Trade Agreement (which includes agricultural goods) if Latvia joined the EU before Estonia and Lithuania. The transitional period would continue until all three Baltic States had become EU members. However, the demand was eventually dropped and the chapter signed because first Estonia and then Lithuania distanced themselves from the Latvian position. In any event, at the end of 2001 all three Baltic States had closed more or less the same number of chapters, and it appeared very likely that they would join the EU at the same time.

Nor did Latvia request transitional periods for Chapter 27 (CFSP), since there were no obstacles with regard to national legislation. Border agreements have been concluded with Estonia, Lithuania (they have been signed by Lithuania but not yet ratified by Latvia), and Belarus.

Demarcation of land borders has been completed (except with Belarus, where only the Latvian side has done so). After Riga acquiesced to Russian demands in the dispute with Moscow over portions of territory taken from Soviet Latvia at the end of 1944 (which became an administrative part of Russia during the Soviet era), Latvia and Russia accordingly finalised the border agreement in 1997. Latvia, however, is still waiting for Russia's final approval: Moscow has accepted the agreement, in fact, but still not signed it. The Russian position can be explained as an attempt to influence Latvia's admission to NATO.

## *II. Latvia and ESDP*

Latvia's position is that there is no alternative to NATO, which is a collective defence organisation and plays an uncontested leadership role in crisis management. ESDP applies only to the so-called Petersberg tasks. Along with Estonia and Lithuania, Latvia has a working agreement with the United States, known as the USA-Baltic charter, which includes political, military, and economic cooperation. Latvia supports harmonious NATO-EU relations and opposes creating parallel and competing military structures. Furthermore, the units Latvia will contribute to meet the Headline Goal in 2003 (Catalogue of Forces) are the same ones that it has pledged for NATO operations.

The relevant Latvian ministers have participated in all the EU and candidate states' (15+15) joint meetings of defence and foreign ministers since November 2000. Similarly, the Latvian minister of the interior is regularly involved in the collegial meetings of the same format.

### *III. Latvia and military crisis management*

Latvia has been active in supporting NATO-led peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. With a population of less than 2.5 million it has provided peacekeepers for IFOR/SFOR almost from the outset, first platoon and then company-sized contributions (now attached to the Danish Battalion). The companies are part of BALTBAT (the Baltic Battalion) and serve on a rotational basis of six months. In addition, Latvia sent six observers as part of the Kosovo Verification Mission, and humanitarian aid was sent to refugee camps in Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina during the Kosovo air campaign. From 1999 Latvia began participating in KFOR, with an army medical liaison team stationed in Albania, including two specially equipped trucks attached to the Belgian contingent. Since 2000, a Latvian representative has worked in the OSCE mission in Kosovo and army medical and military police units have participated in KFOR operations with the British brigade. Latvian units are currently involved in the Operation *Joint Guardian*, and Riga has sent soldiers as observers to Skopje for border observation.

In addition to OSCE observer missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Latvia has also contributed to similar OSCE efforts in the northern Caucasus, and the OSCE border monitoring operations in Georgia. Latvia has also participated in the WEU-led MAPE mission in Albania.

As for the Headline Goal, the Latvian contribution to the European Rapid Reaction Force will consist of a battalion to serve on a rotational basis for periods up to six months, an explosive ordnance disposal unit, a MP unit, a field medical unit, two minesweepers from BALTRON (Baltic squadron), and a fast patrol boat. According to Latvian officials, any future increase in the country's contribution to the Helsinki Headline Goal-plus will have to be qualitative in the first instance.

By virtue of its close military cooperation with Estonia and Lithuania in joint military units such as BALTBAT, BALTRON, BALTNET (Baltic air surveillance system) and BALTDEF-

COL (the Baltic Defence College for the training of senior officers) – a cooperation that dates back to the mid-1990s – Latvia appears to be well suited to participation in multinational formations.

### *IV. Latvia and defence procurement*

After the restoration of independence in 1991, Latvia had to start from scratch in setting up autonomous armed forces. No national units existed during the Soviet occupation. Latvia was therefore highly dependent on foreign military aid and training. So far the Latvian army has been equipped mainly by Sweden, the aim being to have four operational infantry battalions operational in the medium term. Military purchases have remained on a very modest scale (mostly ammunition), and several refurbished Soviet-built helicopters for search and rescue missions have been bought from Lithuania. Used minesweepers and patrol boats have been donated by the Nordic countries and Germany.

Latvia does not plan to purchase fighter aircraft but next year, in a joint purchase bid with Estonia, it will make its first major military acquisition of modern radar equipment from Lockheed Martin in order to upgrade its contribution to the existing BALTNET. In fact, a well functioning air surveillance system covering the Baltic States and which will eventually be connected to NATO's European civil and military air control system will significantly enhance air safety in Europe.

### *V. Latvia and European security policy*

Latvia's record and policy, as described above, clearly show that Latvia is consistent with furthering stability and security in Europe. Latvia's full membership of the EU and NATO will further enhance the consolidation of the European 'security space'. Latvia's Parliament has always strongly supported the country's participation in NATO-led peacekeeping operations. It has

backed every request from the government to send Latvian troops and observers to crisis areas. There is no reason to think that this might change if and when the EU calls upon Latvia to participate in 'Petersberg' operations. This does not mean that, as a future member of the Union, Latvia may not avail itself of the constructive abstention clause with respect to e.g. Belarus, a neighbouring country with which Latvia (like Lithuania and Poland) has to cooperate closely in guarding the border against illegal immigration and cross-border crime.

Latvia may have an advantage in peacekeeping in the Balkans and the Caucasus, as it has never been aggressive towards its neighbours and it has used peaceful means even to regain independence. In addition, today it is able to boast a successful transition from communism to democracy, with a functioning market economy and fast economic growth.

## *VI. Latvia and enlargement after 11 September*

In response to the 11 September attacks on the United States, Latvia immediately started working on an Action Plan to combat international terrorism at the highest level that was adopted by the Government on 16 October.

The attack has not slowed down NATO enlargement. Latvia feels that, along with

Estonia and Lithuania, it may be invited to join NATO at the Prague summit in November 2002. Only a week before the terrorist attack, during his visit to Helsinki on 2 September, Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged that joining NATO was the Baltic States' own choice. After 11 September, however, there was apprehension in Riga that, through the new upgraded NATO-Russia Council, Moscow might get some sort of veto in NATO, which could adversely affect Latvia's security interests. This 'new threat' was allayed when the decision on the new Council was deferred until next May in Reykjavik and it became clear that NATO would not relinquish control over its policy. Latvia's position has always been that membership of NATO and the EU will increase its prospects of improving relations with Russia. The meeting between the Latvian President Vaira Vike-Freiburga and Putin at Innsbruck, in February 2001, was an attempt on the part of Latvia to establish a direct dialogue with Russia at the highest level.

Having closed 23 chapters in its accession negotiations with the EU at the end of 2001, and after obtaining several key transitional periods and derogation, Latvia feels confident that it will be able to close all chapters by the end of 2002 and to be in the first group of candidates to join the EU in 2004 – which is probably also when it may officially become a member of NATO.

## Lithuania

Gediminas Vitkus

### *I. Lithuania and CFSP*

Even before the beginning of the official EU accession negotiations in February 2000, Lithuania was already an active participant in the multilateral political dialogue with the EU in the field of CFSP. With respect to EU statements and declarations, Lithuania has regularly aligned its positions with those of the Union when requested to do so. According to the European Integration Department of the Lithuanian MFA, until 2001 Lithuania aligned itself with 611 EU statements, *démarches* and common positions through the Council's Secretariat in Brussels as well as in the framework of the United Nations (its agencies included) and of the OSCE. Only in 10 cases did Lithuania decide not to do so, and most of those concern the group of EU statements concerning the OSCE missions in Latvia and Estonia and referring to the status of Russian minorities. On that Vilnius had different positions from the EU,<sup>1</sup> but the issue is unlikely now to influence Lithuania's foreseeable behaviour on CFSP after accession.

Lithuania and the EU provisionally closed Chapter 27 (CFSP) almost at the beginning of the negotiations, namely on 25 May 2000. The reason for that was that in the original negotiating position on the CFSP chapter Vilnius had not requested any transitional periods or derogation. Special attention was given only to the links between Chapter 27 and other chapters, especially those encompassing restrictive measures and sanctions: yet no problems have arisen in the implementation of so-called negative measures either. After signing the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel

Mines and on their Destruction (i.e. the Ottawa Convention) in 1999, Lithuania conformed to the CFSP *acquis* in that domain. Vilnius also accepted the obligation to implement the CFSP *acquis* in the field of diplomatic and consular protection, and will be ready to provide assistance to all EU citizens from the date of accession. The necessary administrative decision-making and implementation structures – including the positions of Political Director and European Correspondent – are in place. The secure communication system between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Secretariat-General of the EU Council is also in operation. Negotiations on Chapter 26 (External Relations) started in May 2000. The main points at issue were two transitional periods requested by Vilnius:

- a transitional period for the Free Trade Agreement between the Republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia on agricultural products. Such transitional period was required if any of the signatories became an EU member later than the others, which would establish a trade regime with that country different from that of the FTA;
- a five-year transitional period for the Free Trade Agreement between Lithuania and Ukraine in order to preserve the preferential trade regime.

On 5 October 2000, however, Lithuania – after taking into consideration the remarks made in the relevant EU Common Position, Estonia's decision to denounce the agreement between the three Baltic States from the date of accession, and changes in the EU policy vis-à-vis Ukraine – withdrew its request for transitional measures. As a result, negotiations on Chapter 26 were provisionally closed on the following 24 October.

<sup>1</sup> Interview with Tomas Gulbinas, Counsellor of the Department of Multilateral Relations of the Lithuanian MFA on 10 January, 2002.



## II. Lithuania and ESDP

Since the launch of ESDP in 1998/99, the Lithuanian position underwent a certain evolution, notably from reserved support to a fairly explicit positive attitude. Of course, no doubt was ever expressed officially by Lithuanian representatives: the authorities always stressed that they were following the development of the ESDP with great attention and that they accepted it as a logical follow-up to the deepening of economic and political integration. At the 15+15 meeting of foreign and defence ministers in May 2001, the Lithuanian Foreign Minister, Antanas Valionis, diplomatically stated that 'the results achieved in ESDP make us sure that we will join a European Union capable of successfully handling crisis management operations of different nature.'<sup>2</sup>

At the same time, however, it was possible to detect a certain amount of 'unofficial' mistrust and a lukewarm attitude, generated in part by the still relatively undefined nature of the whole initiative. Some confusion emerged, too, when disagreement came to the fore between European leaders and the new US administration led by George W. Bush during 2001, fuelling fears that ESDP might one day undermine the existing European security architecture based on transatlantic cooperation, NATO and the US presence in Europe. The speculative assumption that the further development of the ESDP might mean the Americans leaving Europe and Russia having more influence was probably the main factor that created a rather ambivalent attitude towards the initiative. For instance, the government programme for 2001-04 found it necessary to maintain quite firmly that Lithuania's participation in the structures of CFSP and ESDP should proceed 'with full awareness that the strengthening of ESDP and the establishment of European crisis management forces will contribute to the reinforcement of

transatlantic relations, which represent the basis of European security.'<sup>3</sup>

After 11 September doubts and ambivalence seem to have disappeared. According to the Lithuanian Minister of National Defence, Linas Linkevičius, 'the year 2001 with its dramatic and tragic events once again proved to all of us that Europe must be able to cope with the various types of threats on our continent and all over the world... This also proved that the development of a European Security and Defence Policy has to have an inclusive character. We view this development as reinforcing the transatlantic partnership and we urge the EU to use already existing NATO planning mechanisms. We note, in particular, that the implementation of the Headline Goal does not mean creation of a military structure duplicating, or competing with, that of NATO.'<sup>4</sup>

## III. Lithuania and military crisis management

At the EU Capabilities Commitment Conference on 21 November 2000, Lithuania declared strong and clear support for the Headline Goal and announced its 'voluntary contribution' to the pool of EU forces. Vilnius offered three motorised battalions, two naval vessels, one helicopter and two military cargo aircraft, along with small engineer and military medical support units. Two of the three motorised battalions are already participating in multinational/subregional units as the Lithuanian components of the joint battalion for international peacekeeping (BALTBAT) and of the Lithuanian-Polish battalion (LITPOLBAT), formed for joint training, exercises and future participation in international peace support operations. In addition, Vilnius offered to the EU – with immediate effect – use of two of its national training areas. In the spring of 2001, during bila-

<sup>2</sup> Speech of the Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Antanas Valionis at the EU+15 Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers Meeting, Brussels, 15 May 2001.

<sup>3</sup> Programme of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania for 2001-2004. Available online: [http://www.urm.lt/data/2/EF8475732\\_vyriaus-e.htm](http://www.urm.lt/data/2/EF8475732_vyriaus-e.htm), 11 January 2002.

<sup>4</sup> Intervention by the Lithuanian Minister of National Defence Linas Linkevičius at the EU Capabilities Improvement Conference, Brussels, 20 November 2001.

teral talks with the EU, the Lithuanian experts changed the category of naval vessels declared for the EU pool of forces from *Grisha III* type frigate to *Lindau* class minehunters. Finally, at the Capabilities Improvement Conference in the following November, Lithuania offered one additional helicopter.

If asked to contribute individually to NATO or EU-led peace operations, Lithuania would consider deployment of one company-size infantry unit for short-term deployment (6 months), or one platoon-size infantry unit for long-term deployment (12 months), or one combat engineer platoon, or one medical section as a land component (readiness category: 30 days), or one aircraft (14 days), or helicopters (30 days) as an air asset, or one naval asset (14 days) from the Lithuanian list. The fact is that the contribution can come from one service only at any one given time. Finally, like many other countries, Lithuania has made available to the EU the same operational assets that had already been identified within the PFP Planning and Review Process.

The units in question have already been widely involved in current peace support operations. Elements of the Lithuanian component of BALTBAT (41 personnel from 20 October 1998 to 15 March 1999; 147 from 15 March 1999 to 13 October 1999; 19 from 13 October 1999 to 20 March 2000) participated in NATO's SFOR operation in Bosnia within the Danish Battalion/ Nordic-Polish Brigade. Elements of the Lithuanian component of LITPOLBAT (30 personnel from March 2001 to March 2002, on a six-month rotation basis) are still participating in NATO-led KFOR operation within the Polish Battalion. The military medical team of 10 persons (including doctors, paramedics, drivers and an interpreter) participated in the NATO-led humanitarian aid Operation *Allied Harbour* in Albania, from March to September 1999, within the Czech Military Hospital. Finally, the Lithuanian Air Force Aircraft An-26, with seven crew and maintenance personnel, is

supporting KFOR/SFOR tasks (April 2001-February 2002).<sup>5</sup>

#### *IV. Lithuania and defence procurement*

In general, as a future EU member, Lithuania is interested in supporting a common European defence procurement policy and in contributing to joint acquisition procedures. For the moment, however, Lithuania is not a member of WEAO or WEAG, much as it would like to join such programmes as Euclid, Thales, and Socrates as soon as possible. Currently, the main Lithuanian centres for research and technologies participate in NATO's Science for Peace Programme, NIAG, and CNAD, as well as the EU's Framework, Eureka, Esprit, Peco and Copernicus projects and the Tempus, Copernicus, and Cost programmes.

The key priorities for the modernisation of Lithuania's armed forces are reflected in the six main procurement plans for the period 2001-04.

The plan foresees procurement of:

- short-range air defence systems;
- medium-range anti-tank systems;
- tactical communications equipment;
- transport and
- logistical support for the Readiness Brigade and, finally,
- medium-range radar for the airspace surveillance system.

As a rule, the Lithuanian National Defence System provides centralised procurement. The acquisition policy of the Lithuanian armed forces is based on the criteria of transparency and competition, as described in the 1999 law on public procurement.<sup>6</sup> It requires open international tenders and competition for goods and services when certain price thresholds are exceeded. This approach foresees detailed procedures and penalties, while outlining long-term development plans and costs evaluation for the procurement of weapons systems and equipment.

<sup>5</sup> Information obtained from the Public Relations Office of the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence.

<sup>6</sup> Law on Public Procurement of the Republic of Lithuania (No.VIII-1210, 3 June 1999). Available online: <http://www3.lrs.lt/c-bin/eng/preps2?Condition1=32534&Condition2=>, 11 January 2002.

In order to manage defence resources and reorganise defence research and support technologies, the Ministry of National Defence prepared a 2001-03 R&D programme. Over 13 Lithuanian enterprises have produced equipment for the Lithuanian armed forces as well. Still in 2001 the Ministry of National Defence, which is allowed to spend 22 per cent of the defence budget on procurement, negotiated two major purchases from European and American suppliers:

► On 7 December, the National Defence Ministry signed a contract with EADS concerning the purchase and delivery of a Medium-Range Radar System. The total value of the contract is LTL75.1 million (= \$US18,775 million). Between the end of 2002 and the beginning of 2004, therefore, Vilnius will receive mobile radar systems that will help identify and monitor sea and air movements, and to analyse and process the relevant data.

► On 17 December, a bilateral agreement between Lithuania and the United States concerning the procurement of a modern Medium Range Anti-Tank weapon system was signed too. The Javelin system to be acquired by the Lithuanian Armed Forces is being procured at a cost of LTL38.5 million (= \$9,625 million).<sup>7</sup> The *Javelin* system may be used for firing purposes from a vehicle or by a rifleman. It may also be used in built areas and is therefore a weapon system that is ideal for urban combat conditions.

So far therefore – and partially also thanks to such a well-balanced policy – cases of open conflict between political and industrial interest, on the one hand, or between European and American suppliers, on the other, have not occurred.

## *V. Lithuania and European security policy*

Lithuania's 'geohistorical' experience explains the special importance that security and defence issues have for the country. The famous

Lithuanian geographer Kazys Pakstas (1893-1960) noted once that 'Switzerland could be characterised as a country of high mountains, Italy is famous as a country of fine arts, and everybody knows Finland as a country of lakes – but the most exclusive feature of Lithuania is the fact that this country lies in an extremely unsafe place for a small nation.' Therefore, since the withdrawal of Soviet troops in the summer of 1993, Vilnius has been working systematically to make sure that the nightmare of 1940 is never repeated. Lithuania is working very hard to prepare itself adequately for NATO and EU membership, and to become part of the West and a respectable member of the international community.

From the Lithuanian point of view, any initiative that could strengthen the Union's security and its defence capabilities is generally welcome. As a future EU member, Lithuania would not see any political problem in sharing collective defence obligations with its partners. Of course, as European security policy is primarily aimed at 'Petersberg'-type operations, Vilnius will continue to strive for NATO membership. New opportunities for cooperation that might open up within ESDP, however, are equally essential. The Union's ambition to become a more substantial and more visible actor on the world stage is also welcome. It is obvious that the voice of small countries like Lithuania will have a different echo if they are part and parcel of CFSP. This is particularly true for relations with Russia. In fact, Russia has always been a difficult partner for everyone in Central and Eastern Europe; it will be much easier to do business with Moscow as part of a large and influential European family rather than on a bilateral basis.

Finally, the most recent development in the official Lithuanian position on the future of the EU was reflected in the address by Foreign Minister Valionis to the Seimas (Parliament) on Lithuania's EU membership negotiations, on 19 December 2001. On that occasion, he presented the main principles that, in his opinion, Lithuania should stick to in the forthcoming

<sup>7</sup> More important events for Lithuanian National Defence in 2001. Available online: <http://www.kam.lt/en/main.php?cat=ekstra&sub=001>, 11 January 2002.

debates:

- ▶ first, without a successful enlargement there could be no successful future for the EU;
- ▶ second, the development of the EU should evolutionary, not revolutionary;
- ▶ therefore, the reform of EU institutions should be gradual. Further development of the 'community' method is in Lithuania's interest, as it lays down equal rules for all partners. Strong institutions guarantee a better protection of the interests of smaller states;
- ▶ fourth, the present provisions on closer cooperation are sufficient. Closer cooperation must be an instrument for integration and not for exclusion or isolation;
- ▶ finally, the principle of solidarity should also be maintained within the enlarged EU. For example, there should not be different regional policies, one for current and another for new members. We have to be very careful in assessing any proposal to 're-nationalisate' existing common policies.<sup>8</sup>

## *VI. Lithuania and enlargement after 11 September*

Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus was an eyewitness of those terrible events. On 11 September, he was on a state visit to the United States and meeting with US officials in Washington when the Pentagon was attacked. Of course, all that has sharpened the Lithuanian public's general feeling that the world has become less safe now. However, 11 September also triggered speculation that the terrorist attack may eventually generate positive scenarios for the enlargement of both NATO and the EU. To a certain extent, such speculation has also affected Lithuanian public opinion. A poll

conducted in September showed that 36.6 per cent of respondents believed that the terrorist actions in the United States would hasten Lithuania's entry into NATO. Another 27.1 per cent thought Lithuanian NATO membership would be postponed for the same reason, while only 19.9 per cent were convinced that current events would play no role (and 16.4 per cent declined to answer).<sup>9</sup>

This rather pessimistic opinion can be explained by at least two factors. First of all, the terrorist attack has created a paradoxical situation for it has shown that small countries with rather limited capabilities (like Lithuania) are a relatively safer place than the United States. Secondly, since 11 September clear signs of a new American/Western rapprochement with Russia have emerged. Much as the rapprochement per se is a positive development, nobody in the Baltic States wants to go back Yalta-type arrangements, with the West and Russia speaking over the heads of the Central Europeans. These fears have never spread too wide though, while the percentage of Lithuanians in favour of joining NATO has risen to 63.1 per cent (in May 2001 it was 45.5).

As seen from Vilnius, the dynamics of enlargement – of both the EU and NATO – appears to have become faster, bigger and more coordinated than ever before. 11 September has also – in the light of the supportive reaction of EU members – done away with doubts and ambivalence about the (non)inclusive nature of ESDP. On top of that, when the Lithuanian President went back to Washington in January 2002 to complete the visit abruptly interrupted on 11 September, the US President not only encouraged Lithuania to continue the reforms necessary for NATO membership, but also referred to Lithuania as the leading candidate country.

<sup>8</sup> Address by Antanas Valionis, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania, Discussion in the Seimas about Lithuania's EU Membership Negotiations on 19 December 2001, Vilnius. Available online: <http://www.euro.lt/showitems.php?TopMenuID=41&MenuItemID=58&ItemID=1287&LangID=2>, 11 January 2002.

<sup>9</sup> *Newsfile Lithuania*, 17-23 September 2001, Information and Culture Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Issue 33 (674). Available online: [http://www.urm.lt/data/15/EF82614650\\_nf674.html](http://www.urm.lt/data/15/EF82614650_nf674.html), 23 01 2002.

## Poland

Rafal Trzaskowski

### *I. Poland and CFSP*

Poland was included in the first wave of candidate countries (the so-called Luxembourg group), which started accession negotiations with the EU on 31 March 1998. In its negotiating position, Poland did not request any transitional periods or derogation in either CFSP or the external relations chapter, declaring that it would be ready to implement the *acquis* in both areas on the day of accession. Since neither of the chapters proved to be controversial in the Polish case, both of them were already provisionally closed – external relations in November 1999 and CFSP in April 2000.<sup>1</sup>

Regarding external relations, the Polish government pledged that it would renounce all treaties as well as bilateral and multilateral agreements to the extent necessary to remove any possible differences with the *acquis*. The Polish negotiators informed the EU that the country was ready to assume all preferential European Community trade commitments. Warsaw made it clear from the outset that it wanted to maintain and foster economic relations with its important partners from outside the Union (especially with CEFTA and ex-Soviet countries). However, it was ready to do so only in a way that would not contradict the EU's trade policy. Poland also declared that it would be prepared to coordinate its actions and positions with the European Union in WTO and OECD in the pre-accession period, including the adoption of common positions vis-à-vis third countries.

Regarding CFSP, Poland has declared its full support for the EU's political goals. Even though Warsaw may prioritise its interests in a

different way, Polish foreign policy diverges very rarely, if ever, from the position of the Union. Poland regularly aligns its standpoint with the most important *démarches* of the Union, and it also supports many of its crucial common positions. The reasons for the occasional non-alignment are in many cases commonplace. There is no official, uniform and unambiguous set of criteria on the basis of which the Associated Countries are invited to join the CFSP declarations. Sometimes such invitation is issued, sometimes it is not, and quite often the decision to ask the Associated Countries to support the EU seems to be completely arbitrary. It can happen that the deadline for alignment is set within hours, putting too much strain on the Polish decision-making structures. In most of the other cases, the reasons for divergence are of a purely legal or technical nature. For example, in April 1999 Poland did not join the EU declaration on land mines because it had not ratified the Ottawa Convention on the issue. The Polish government also has problems with meeting short deadlines that the EU sets for aligning with the imposition of sanctions. Sanctions can be implemented by EU member states directly and almost immediately through the relevant EU regulations. In Poland, by contrast, such sanctions do not automatically form part of Polish law: they are implemented through resolutions of the Council of Ministers (or even administrative decisions), and that takes considerable time. Moreover, in certain cases, the government cannot impose given measures that necessitate a modification of Polish law. Such changes can be introduced only by the Parliament.

<sup>1</sup> The CFSP chapter was concluded with a certain delay due to internal EU problems (Cyprus).

Very rarely has the non-alignment to CFSP resulted from political reasons. A case in point was the crisis with Belarus (in 1998 EU diplomats were asked to leave their embassies there), when Poland did not support the EU declaration because, as the current chair of OSCE, it did not want to alienate the Belarussian government. Poland only abstained, however, after consultation with the EU.

## II. Poland and ESDP

Poland supports the development of ESDP. According to the official Polish Security Strategy,<sup>2</sup> the future participation in EU security structures will be as important for Poland as its membership of NATO. It is very important to note, however, that the Polish position on ESDP has undergone considerable evolution. At the beginning it was characterised by mistrust fuelled by fears that ESDP could in the future undermine NATO, which, for the majority of Poles, is seen as the only force able to guarantee security on the European continent. Moreover, the Poles were afraid that if Europeans chose to neglect US positions, this could simultaneously allow Russia to gain more influence over European security, which was anathema to Polish decision-makers in the first half of the 1990s.

Once Europe's ambitions were clarified, they were met in Warsaw with much greater understanding. Ever since, Poland has voiced its genuine support for ESDP. However, the Polish attitude towards the whole concept is characterised, even today, by a certain ambivalence. The Polish political élite is still not at all certain where the European defence path will actually lead, and shows a lack of understanding for the full implications of ESDP, which is quite often perceived along the lines of the ESDI concept (where the stress is on strengthening the European pillar of NATO, not on creating an autonomous security entity). It should also be pointed out that, as the Polish political class tends to focus on 'hard' security guarantees and

its grasp of the importance of 'soft' security measures is limited, so is its interest in a strong European defence capability.

Obviously, as a new member of the Atlantic Alliance, Poland is eager to prove its credentials, but at the same time it does not want to be perceived by Europeans as a US Trojan horse. Warsaw would thus back all of the initiatives aimed at strengthening ESDP as long as they do not lead to the creation of a collective defence mechanism and full emancipation from the Alliance. Whenever, in official declarations, Poland voices its acceptance of ESDP, it is always accompanied by statements declaring that the EU should never strive to substitute for NATO.

The Polish military élite, for its part, is not overtly enthusiastic about ESDP, though not for ideological reasons. The Polish military is quite often doubtful about Europe's ability to muster enough political will to develop fully effective, independent operational capabilities. It should also be pointed out that NATO membership has already produced certain important 'socialisation' effects, whereas Polish officials in both the MOD and MFA still feel quite detached from active EU policy-making.

Support for ESDP has not prevented Poland from voicing its dissatisfaction with the degree of involvement offered by the EU. As the MFA document concerning Poland's attitude towards ESDP puts it, 'consultation and dialogue will not substitute cooperation'. Warsaw tends to treat institutional issues very seriously, sometimes losing sight of the strategic *raison d'être* of the whole concept. Poland expected greater participation of the non-EU NATO members in ESDP decision-making. The general feeling is that associate status in WEU was more satisfactory for Poland than the status now proposed in the realm of ESDP. The non-EU NATO members were especially disappointed when the EU decided in Helsinki that, as regards operations not having recourse to NATO assets, their position was to be equal to all the other countries willing to participate in European-led operations. Poland also thought

<sup>2</sup> Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (adopted by the Government on 4 January 2000), MOD website - [www.mon.gov.pl/bezpieczenstwo/1\\_1\\_1.html](http://www.mon.gov.pl/bezpieczenstwo/1_1_1.html).

that after a decision to embark on a given operation, consultation should be at 15+6 and on an equal footing. At the EU Feira summit, Poland even submitted its own proposals aimed at greater participation in the ESDP decision-making and planning through regular and wide-ranging cooperation in the 15+6 format.<sup>3</sup> Poland, as a future EU member, generally expects to have at least some influence on the definition of the PSC's agenda, as well as more transparency and openness in the workings of the new EU security organs.

### *III. Poland and military crisis management*

In 2000 Poland embarked on a path of radical restructuring of its military. The Programme of Restructuring and Technical Modernisation of Polish Armed Forces in the years 2001-06<sup>4</sup> assumes a continuation of the process of scaling down of the Polish military. Such a reduction is indispensable in order to secure the funds needed to finance the upgrading of a 'crucial number of military units to an average European standard'.<sup>5</sup> The goal of the Programme is to aim at least at full interoperability of troops dealing with crisis management, as it would be unrealistic to expect the territorial defence units to become compatible with NATO in the near future.

At the Capabilities Commitment Conference in November 2000, Poland declared its contribution to the 'Catalogue of Forces' exercise and the EU's Headline Goal. Warsaw declared that it would be ready to contribute one framework brigade, one airborne search and rescue group, one navy support group and a section of military police. These forces will be earmarked for participation in either NATO or EU missions, under the so-called 'double-hatted' formula. Initially,

Poland did not want to specify the exact number of troops committed, in order to maintain a certain flexibility. Warsaw simply had the ambition of providing the European Rapid Reaction Force with the biggest contingent from Eastern Europe. In May 2001, former Defence Minister Komorowski declared that for European-led missions Poland would probably set aside the 21st Brigade of Highland Riflemen, composed of 1,500 to 2,500 soldiers. At the same time, Poland proposed the inclusion of a Ukrainian battalion (750 men) in the brigade. Tightening cooperation with its eastern neighbours is one of the Polish government's strategic priorities.<sup>6</sup> More recently, the new Polish government clarified what it meant by a 'framework' brigade. The Deputy Defence Minister, Janusz Zemke, declared that Poland was ready to commit the 18th Rapid Reaction Battalion and the 7th Air Cavalry Battalion (a total of 1,300 soldiers) to the EU Headline Goal.

What are the implications for ESDP of the characteristics of the Polish Armed Forces? Financial constraints and strategic considerations have created a Polish military that is much better suited to non-Article 5 missions. Therefore, all of the units interoperable with their European counterparts will be most valuable for the European Rapid Reaction Force. Poland has a solid tradition of peacekeeping, and its performance has always been very highly appreciated by its partners. The peacekeeping experience of Polish troops has been put to good use in both international and European contexts. So far, when it comes to the missions in former Yugoslavia, Poland has always been amongst the staunchest allies of the European States involved, convincing them that it could always be relied on.

Even though Poland's attitude towards ESDP is not devoid of doubts and reservations, once Polish troops are engaged, their loyalty

<sup>3</sup> 'Initial Proposals for Practical Development of Feira Decisions Concerning the EU Co-operation with non-EU European Allies'. Polish MFA website - [www.msz.gov.pl/english/unia/position\\_18082k-ang.html](http://www.msz.gov.pl/english/unia/position_18082k-ang.html).

<sup>4</sup> Published by the Polish MOD in March 2001, passed as a bill by the Polish Parliament in May 2001.

<sup>5</sup> The Programme of Restructuring and Technical Modernisation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland 2001-2006. Polish MOD website - [www.mon.gov.pl](http://www.mon.gov.pl).

<sup>6</sup> *Europan News Service*, 15 May 2000. [euro.pap.com.pl](http://euro.pap.com.pl).

would be unquestionable. There can be no doubt about either the commitment or the value of the forces that Poland will earmark for EU missions. However, here optimism must end. Obviously, the biggest problems that the Polish military face are financial in nature.<sup>7</sup> Poland has problems even in fulfilling the NATO goals, namely providing at least two brigades for a single NATO mission. Therefore, it should not be expected that the country would be ready, and indeed capable, of committing troops solely for the purposes of Art. 17-type operations. Unfortunately, in the future it might be problematic for Poland to meet the stipulated financial 'convergence criteria' for ESDP.

#### *IV. Poland and defence procurement*

Without upgrading equipment, which is one of the most important priorities of the Programme for the Restructuring of the Polish Military, it will not be possible for Warsaw to meet even the declared NATO objectives. Equipment is purchased through standardised public procurement procedures that (along with other criteria characterising civil-military relations, such as civilian control of the Ministry of Defence, legislative supervision and publicly known defence policy) are to prove the democratic and fully Westernised character of the Polish military. At least two important tender procedures have already taken place: one (in 1999) for howitzers, and the other resulting in the purchase of the Spanish CASA C-295 aircraft in 2001, which will provide the Polish military with strategic medium-lift capability. The tender for an attack helicopter worth around €1 billion – for which initially US Bell Textron, Italy's Agusta and the Franco-German Eurocopter competed – was called off because of lack of fun-

ding. Consequently, a new, much more modest tender procedure was initiated for an upgrade (avionics, communications and missile system) of the Soviet Mi-24 helicopter that is currently in use in the Polish Air Force. Other tenders, to follow in the near future, will be concerned with upgrading T-72 tanks (and maybe obtaining new tanks)<sup>8</sup>, new anti-tank missiles and new ships (especially corvettes and frigates).

The Polish government is currently facing the most important tender for a multirole fighter (MRF) which is of absolutely fundamental importance for the future of the Polish military. Without the modernisation of its Air Force, Poland will not be able to meet the NATO requirements to contribute at least two fighter squadrons to the Alliance Reaction Forces. Moreover, the tender for MRF is perceived as an acid test of Poland's ability to meet high Western standards in the field of public procurement.

There are three contenders in the procurement bid for the MRF:<sup>9</sup> European consortium BAE Systems (Swedish Saab/British Aerospace) with the *Gripen*, American Lockheed Martin with F-16, and French Dassault with the *Mirage* 2000-5. The bids made by Lockheed and BAE Systems are the most serious, and the conditions offered by BAE Systems seem to be the best suited to the Polish needs. However, it is not at all certain that the MRF will be chosen solely on the basis of the technical merits of the given proposals put forward, since political considerations may weigh quite heavily in the final outcome.

On the one hand, Poland wants to prove to the Americans that it is the most reliable ally; on the other, it does not want to be regarded by the European as an American proxy. Both Americans and Europeans have engaged in aggressive lobbying: European politicians have indirectly hinted at a link between the MRF deal and Poland's efforts to prove its European credentials – a statement that should not be unde-

<sup>7</sup> Poland achieves a roughly comparable level of defence expenditure to its European partners, i.e. close to 2 per cent of GDP. Unfortunately, along with the severe budgetary crisis that Poland is currently undergoing and the radical slow-down of economic growth (to 2 or cent of GDP) it may be increasingly difficult to keep up with declared commitments.

<sup>8</sup> The German Bundeswehr submitted a free offer of *Leopard* 2 main battle tanks.

<sup>9</sup> Estimated worth of the procurement is between €2 and 3.5 billion.



reestimated in the context of the accession negotiations which are currently under way. However, European lobbying efforts cannot be compared to a full-blown diplomatic campaign launched by the Americans, who have even gone as far as to conduct high-level political meetings with a leading theme 'F-16 for Poland'.<sup>10</sup>

It goes without saying that the most important part of the deal is connected with the famous 'offset package'. The so-called Offset Bill, passed by the Polish Parliament in September 1999, clearly states that the equivalent of any armaments deal of a value higher than €5 million has to be invested in the Polish economy, half of it directly in the defence industry. The sum of €2-3 billion (the approximate value of the MRF contract) would have a significant impact on the Polish economy. Poland cannot afford to waste its potential and it should make the best use of the investment.

During the communist era Poland had a dynamic defence industry. During the transition, many of the defence industry companies went bankrupt as the export market progressively shrunk. Most of the others, which still exist, have serious problems in sustaining the pressure of the free market, as they are equipped with obsolete machinery. Their only chance of survival is heavy investment in infrastructure. There are companies in Poland that have potential – such as WSK Rzeszów, which produces jet-engines for Pratt and Whitney, PZL Mielec (the only factory with the capacity to build new aircraft),<sup>11</sup> Mesco (ammunition), and Swidnik, which produces helicopter parts for Agusta and Eurocopter. However, they are in great need of foreign investment.

In 2000 Poland became a member of Western European Armaments Group. This opened up the possibility for the national defence industry to participate in programmes concerning

research and development in defence technology. However, in reality, practical cooperation in that field is very limited. As a top Foreign Ministry official put it: 'The process of lowering the production costs results from the consolidation of European defence industries. Today we can clearly see the formation of a division into producers and buyers. A permanent allocation to the group of buyers may hamper our ability to become in the future a constructive participant of ESDP.'<sup>12</sup> To become an interesting partner in that field, Poland will need to modernise its industry. However, without large investment that will be quite difficult. With the strengthening of the ESDP, European defence industries will undergo further consolidation. European initiatives in the field of defence are expected to go in the direction of joint planning and joint acquisition policy. Therefore, if Poland is to be a serious partner in the European enterprise it must be fully involved in such initiatives as WEAG. Two conditions have to be met: the Polish industry must be in a position to offer some added value to its partners, and the members of the EU have to be seriously interested in such cooperation.

## *V. Poland and European security policy*

Poland supports the development of cooperation and the deepening of integration in the field of European security as long and in so far as it does not duplicate NATO. Poland has the ambition of being a constructive member of the EU, contributing to the further strengthening of its foreign and security policies, as these have a stabilising influence on Poland's immediate environment. Polish specialists ask themselves, however, whether Poland, having limited capa-

<sup>10</sup> Madeleine Albright and her successor Colin Powell vocally presented the American arguments in bilateral contacts with the members of the Polish government.

<sup>11</sup> BAE Systems already placed in Mielec the working package worth over €100 million. Mielec is now producing parts for *Airbus*, wings for Regional Jet Avro and tails for *Gripen*.

<sup>12</sup> Roman Kuzniar, the director of the Planning and Strategy Department of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in his presentation on the future of European security at the Conference 'The Perspectives of European Security' organised in Warsaw on 21 September 2000 by the Euro-Atlantic Association and Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

bilities in the field, will be able to influence the future development of European security policy to the extent it would like to. Having said that, the current Polish attitude towards the future development of European security policy can be generally described as superficial. The vast majority of the Polish political élite still have problems in projecting Poland as a future constructive EU member.

The security issues in the EU context are not a subject of debate within Poland and, when they are addressed, they are discussed within a comprehensive security context, where Polish élites are primarily focused on defending the country's status as a non-EU NATO member. The majority of the political élite do not fully recognise the political potential of ESDP and the positive consequences it might have in the longer run. Not much consideration is given to the role that Europe should play globally in the future, with the notable exception of the EU's future Eastern policy. The quality of Polish reflection on the future of Europe has been slowly improving only in the last months, along with the beginning of the debate on EU institutional reform, which is organised by the President's office, NGOs and think tanks. However, most of the current discussions do not concern the future of European security policy.

Unfortunately, the Polish position on the future of Europe is generally defensive in its character. The attitude towards enhanced cooperation in the realm of CSFP is a very good case in point. Polish thinking in this respect is dominated by the fear of being marginalised – if decisions on who can join the closer cooperation in the security field were to be made dependent on the fulfilment of 'convergence criteria'. Moreover, Polish experts are convinced that if defence were never to be a subject of enhanced cooperation, it would never develop along the lines of collective defence, which would be unacceptable for Poland. Therefore, Poland is wholly satisfied with the present provisions and the constructive abstention mechanism, which allows countries that are not interested in a given action or geographical priority to abstain from participating.

Although the Polish position on the future of European security has not been developed very much yet, once in the Union Poland would not become a force that hampered European ambitions in the field. In short, Warsaw is ready to take its responsibilities seriously, to contribute to the development of ESDP and sometimes even to punch above its weight. Poland has no general problem in getting involved in actions aimed at peacekeeping, even if that were to mean out-of-area operations. Poland shares most of the EU's foreign policy priorities, although it will aim at revamping the EU's Eastern policy by giving it much more muscle. All Polish political parties stress that close cooperation with Eastern neighbours constitutes one of the most vital Polish interests. Therefore, Poland will be actively involved in shaping EU policy towards Russia, Ukraine and other ex-Soviet republics, contributing its own vast experience in the field and providing its Eastern partners with a good example of successful transition.

## *VI. Poland and enlargement after 11 September*

After the terrorist attack on the United States in September 2001, Poland supported fully the EU position concerning a coordinated fight against terrorism (recently in the declaration signed after the Gent summit). Poland was also fully in favour of evoking Article 5 within NATO. The Polish government believes that the terrorist attack on New York and Washington will have a beneficial effect on the EU enlargement. According to the Polish position, since enlargement will strengthen stability on the Continent, the tragic events in the United States should have the effect of speeding up the whole process.

In the Polish case, support for the anti-terrorist coalition was manifested in practical terms: in November 2001 Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski organised a conference, including most of the countries from Central and Eastern Europe, in which all of the participants declared their strong commitment to the fight against terrorism.

Immediately after the terrorist attack, Warsaw pledged additional forces for deployment in the Balkans, in order to relieve American and British troops which might be needed elsewhere. In October 2001, just after the United States started its action in Afghanistan, former Polish Minister of Defence Bronislaw Komorowski declared that, if the United States were to ask for any direct military support for fighting the Taliban, Poland was ready to send 'Grom', its best special unit. At the end of the year 2001, the new Polish government declared that it was ready to send troops to Afghanistan

or any other place if the United States requested such support. It seems that there might be a greater need for Polish anti-biological and anti-chemical weapons units or for logistical or engineering support than for special forces, especially since the ground operation in Afghanistan itself is virtually over. Poland is ready to provide such troops, although the United States is unlikely to request more than just a symbolical Polish presence (not exceeding 100 soldiers). Anyhow, in January 2002, the Polish contingent was put on a state of permanent alert in case the anti-terrorist campaign continued.

## Czech Republic

Radek Khol

### *I. The Czech Republic and CFSP*

The Czech Republic has already closed Chapters 26 and 27 of the EU accession negotiations: neither presented major problems. The initial negotiating position in Chapter 26 (External Relations) envisaged a possible transitional period for the customs union with Slovakia. Later on, however, such a measure was considered unnecessary, as Slovakia may join the EU either together with the Czech Republic or soon afterwards. It was also understood that the EU is not particularly keen on transitional periods in this area. Otherwise, all necessary institutional infrastructure for the implementation and enforcement of EC legislation in this area is or will be in place and operational by the date of the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU. Continuing screening did not bring any clash over Czech commercial policy, sanction regimes, and so on.

The Czech Republic is prepared and able to participate fully and actively in CFSP, as there is no conflict with its national legislation. There are no territorial disputes between the Czech Republic and any EU member or between Prague and other neighbouring Associated Countries. The Czech Republic supports the non-proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and is a signatory to all relevant international agreements. It has introduced and exercises strict control concerning dual-use items and technologies and is a member of the major existing export control regimes.

Due to its own historical experience, the Czech Republic is highly interested in enhancing stability on the Continent and fulfilling the other political objectives of CFSP as articulated in the Treaties. The Czech Republic has participated in a number of peacekeeping and peace

support operations, namely in the NATO-led IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, KFOR in Kosovo and Operation *Essential Harvest* in Macedonia – which demonstrates both its interest in the region and capacity to contribute to similar activities under the EU flag.

Whenever invited to join CFSP common positions and *démarches* it does so, which has been made even easier since the introduction of the Associated Countries Network (ACN) in December 1999. In only two instances did the Czech Republic not join a specific EU position, namely in an overly positive assessment of UNIDO activities in 1999 and, earlier on, regarding elections in the Baltic States. It is worth noting, however, that the EU does not invite candidate countries to join *all* its positions. Exceptions may apply to EU positions concerning other candidates but, interestingly, also concerning the Middle East and former Soviet Union (until 2000 Yugoslavia was also included in this ‘no-go’ group).

The consultation process, the communication of EU plans and policy, and the resulting involvement of the Czech Republic (as well as of other candidates) were significantly improved during the 2001 Swedish presidency, with reference also to the political dialogue with third countries. Good examples of cooperation already existed in several international organisations, such as the UN and OSCE.

### *II. The Czech Republic and ESDP*

The initial reaction of the Czech Republic to the emergence of ESDP was to wait cautiously for a clear outline of the project to emerge while stressing the need not to undermine NATO as an effective security institution. Initially, the EU

and its military efforts were perceived as a supplement to existing NATO capabilities in crisis-management operations. This pragmatic approach, focused on better European capabilities, was combined with two basic conditions for Czech support: transparent and strong cooperative relations between the EU and NATO, and appropriate forms of participation for non-EU European allies (including the Czech Republic). Gradually, it became clear that Czech expectations were perhaps unrealistic and that the EU would try and play a basically autonomous role (in its decisions and, at least in appearance, structures) vis-à-vis NATO. This reality is now understood, if not wholeheartedly welcomed. Nevertheless, the example of EU-NATO cooperation in Macedonia shows that the two ambitions can be harmonised. A strong interest in keeping the EU-NATO link vital is therefore a constant priority of Czech policy, and is likely to remain so even after Czech entry into the EU.

As for the issue of participation of 'third countries' in ESDP, Czech policy has also evolved. The initially strong position, which preferred a complete transfer of the model practised in WEU through Associate Membership, was later modified in favour of a substantive 15+6 format. Although there is continuing interest in the original WEU format, the Czechs can now see that it has serious limitations from the EU viewpoint. Also, the tangible perspective of EU membership (or at least the conclusion of negotiations) moderates certain objections. From the Czech standpoint, however, the relevance of the 15+6 format should be strengthened in both formal and substantive points. The Accession Agreement which is expected to be signed at the end of 2002 or the beginning of 2003 could secure for the Czech Republic an observer position, similar to the country's experience with participation in NATO activities before it gained formal membership. In the meantime, the 15+6 format could be improved, for example through a timely distribution of the agenda and all the relevant documents and the distribution of minutes and conclusions of COPS meeting through the ACN. Also better access for Czech diplomats to EU buildings on a regular rather than case-by-case basis would improve the

atmosphere and move it somewhat away from the present exclusive 'club mentality' (the model adopted by NATO in SHAPE through the Partnership Coordination Cell is often considered as best practice). Better information-sharing about COPS meetings would be welcomed by Czech officials in both Brussels and Prague. Czech policy also supports the openness of this process as a preparation for dealing with those candidate countries that may join NATO before the EU and thus find themselves in the same position as the Czech Republic today.

This optimistic approach, combined with the qualifications mentioned above, is now shared by most political parties and is advocated especially by the Czech MFA. Czech MOD officials are more reserved, preferring clear decision-making structures *à la* NATO, as little duplication as possible and joint defence planning. One political force that is still very sceptical of the ESDP rationale, and its current and potential future shape, is the right-wing ODS, the party of former Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus. Its members often criticise the practical steps taken by the EU and their alleged negative impact on the transatlantic link and the future of NATO, including the prospects of a continuing US presence in Europe.

### *III. The Czech Republic and military crisis management*

The Czech Republic declared its contribution to the Helsinki Headline Goal on the second day of the CCC in November 2000. It consists of a mechanised infantry battalion, a special forces company, a helicopter unit, a field hospital or medical battalion, a chemical protection company, and a centre for humanitarian and rescue operations. These units are fully professional and also represent a portion of the Czech units assigned to the NATO Rapid Reaction Forces integrated in the ARRC. As a general principle, these units are 'double-hatted' for NATO as well as EU operations. In addition, some of these units can also be used for peacekeeping missions under UN command. The total size of the Czech contribution is over 1,000 men, with long-term

rotation ensured for the mechanised infantry battalion. All other declared forces are of specialised nature and their participation in an operation can presently be sustained for only six months.

Given the allied status of the Czech Republic, these units have priority for NATO tasks or NATO-led peace support operations. Their size, too, reflects the level of interoperability of the Czech armed forces and the economic capacity of the country to afford several simultaneous military deployments abroad. The recently initiated reform of the Czech armed forces set targets for long-term participation of a maximum of 1,000 men in peace operations, including those of the EU, and a short-term deployment of 250 men in a less demanding role (humanitarian or search and rescue operations). The proportion of Czech units available for operations outside the national territory and in non-Article 5 tasks will grow to the desired level of 5,000 men out of an expected overall size of 34-36,000 persons for the Czech armed forces.

For the moment, however, the deployment of Czech military units for EU missions is slightly more complicated than in the case of NATO or UN operations. Czech laws require the prior approval of the Czech parliament for any mission with a duration of over 60 days, if carried out by an international organisation of which the Czech Republic is not a full member. Until accession to the EU, in other words, parliamentary approval will be a precondition for any military contribution to ESDP operations.

So far, the Czech armed forces have not participated in any multinational formations, except the ARRC structures. This has changed with the recent signature of an agreement establishing the joint Czech-Polish-Slovak brigade for international peacekeeping operations, and may also affect a potential deployment of the unit in peace support operations under NATO, UN or EU command. In addition, starting in 2002, another similar unit will be deployed within KFOR, namely a joint Czech-Slovak infantry battalion. The results of this cooperation may influence future joint deployment plans for peacekeeping operations by both states.

#### *IV. The Czech Republic and defence procurement*

Czech policy supports more structured European defence procurement policy if the EU can better coordinate current European efforts and stimulate further specialisation of defence industries across Europe. In November 2000 it became a full member of WEAG, which is seen as helpful, but only as a secondary structure for defence cooperation, if compared with such NATO structures as CNAD (Conference of National Armaments Directors).

The most expensive and also the most controversial procurement item in the ongoing modernisation of the Czech military is the current government's plan to buy 24 or 36 supersonic aircraft as the future backbone of the Czech Air Force. This should be combined with the domestically developed subsonic multipurpose jet fighter L-159 *Alca*, produced at Aero Vodochody, which is majority-owned by Boeing. For this and other reasons, there is strong interest in Prague in supporting trends that would help the transatlantic character of defence industries: this could also prevent clashes between European and American suppliers. The financial sources for the project, however, are still unclear and there is no cross-party support yet for the procurement plan and some of its key parts. The crucial factor will be the financing of the project, given the recent negative experience with the procurement of 72 L-159's, which (due to a poor contract that lacked insurance against a significant exchange rate drop) cost the MOD almost twice as much as expected and represented a serious financial drain for all military investment projects. A potentially different approach can be seen in the current bidding competition for the supersonic aircraft, for which the Czech government required a substantial offset programme (up to the value of 150 per cent of the contract) to be included in the contract applications for an expected sum that could amount to Kc100 billion (\$3 billion). This condition may be an advantage for European suppliers, who have a positive attitude towards offset programmes, experience in

it and better conditions for realising it. The bidding competition, however, was seriously undermined when all but one company stepped down for an alleged lack of transparency. US firms also complained that there was strong high-level lobbying in favour of a European supplier (also combining political considerations of future EU membership) which created unfair conditions. The remaining bidder is BAE Systems with its JAS 39 *Gripen*. If chosen, the latter would bring a combination of European and US arms industries to the Czech Air Force for many years to come.

### *V. The Czech Republic and European security policy*

The Czech position inside the enlarged EU in the field of CFSP will most likely support measures leading to its effectiveness while improving its 'common' features. Prague's approach can be quite flexible, since most foreseeable CFSP issues do not touch upon vital interests or areas that are sensitive for the Czech Republic. Geographically, Czech activism may be higher in Eastern Europe, including the CIS and Russia, the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean, down to the Caucasus. Given that the Czechs have no legacy of colonial or long-term presence in territories outside the greater European area, presenting and communicating CFSP actions in distant territories (and potential Czech direct participation in them, or at least support of them by other means) may prove challenging at times. It would be definitely easier with areas where at least limited Czech interests are at stake.

The Czech Republic's profile is unlikely to be that of a troublemaker blocking EU actions. Prague may rather use the 'constructive abstention' clause in cases where advocating a substantial use of Czech resources would be difficult for the Czech public. Flexible and effective structures can be seen as more important than strict formal representation as long as a certain influence is maintained and the overall cohesion of the EU action is not undermined. There might also be Czech support for a more rational,

simpler structure even at the expense of a certain duplication of NATO structures and capabilities, which now seems inevitable. By contrast, there might be more hesitation on the wider application of QMV in CFSP decisions with military implications and on the possible transformation of ESDP into a supranational rather than intergovernmental EU activity. Yet Czech support for strengthening certain community tools available for the civilian dimension of CFSP/ESDP, such as emergency funds for humanitarian aid and conflict prevention, is likely.

Speculation on the Czech attitude towards future revisions of the TEU is quite premature. One thing that can, however, be said concerns the possible inclusion of Art. 5-type commitments in the TEU. The Czech Republic already participates in NATO and therefore in principle does not have any psychological problems with sharing collective defence obligations. In conclusion, not only Czech diplomats but also a majority of the Czech political élite share the vision of a stronger EU in the international arena, which requires the entire spectrum of political, economic, financial and also security/military tools. Even the more sceptical views of the ODS are likely to be moderated by its coalition partners, if it finds itself in charge of putting together a new government after the parliamentary elections due in June 2002.

### *VI. The Czech Republic and enlargement after 11 September*

In the wake of the terrorist attacks, the Czech political élite and the wider public shared an initial reaction of shock and solidarity with the Americans. Several weeks afterwards, however, the focus of the Czech public debate shifted in a way that very much reflected other complicated and topical issues (policy towards the EU included). In fact, a rather heated debate opposed the defenders of 'pure' capitalism and Western civilisation on the one hand, and the critics of globalisation (or the negative side of the market economy) on the other. In somewhat overzealous

lous fashion, the debate then moved to a discussion of the general roots of terrorism, the concrete motives for the attacks on the United States, the measures to be taken in response to them, and the long-term improvement of the conditions that breed the phenomenon.

As a member of NATO, the Czech Republic immediately gave its full support to the United States and the activation of Art. 5. Prague also offered various means for the international anti-terrorism campaign, *inter alia* an NBC protection company, a special services unit, a field hospital and a transport aircraft. At the same time, it declared a state of security alert for its internal security forces, from military to police and intelligence services. One aspect of the special measures adopted in the Czech Republic was a visible upgrading of protection around the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty building in the heart of Prague.

The attacks on the United States also partially changed the perception of security among the Czech public, demonstrating the general

vulnerability to asymmetric threats and the usefulness of professional, well-equipped and well-trained military forces. At the same time, as a member of the Western world, the Czech Republic saw itself as a potential target of similar attacks. An effective defence against them, however, is considered possible only through international cooperation.

Finally, there has been no serious linkage between the current security situation and the expected NATO/EU enlargements. So far these are considered as two separate agendas which do not necessarily impinge upon each other. The only concern openly expressed has been about the increasing role of Russia and the potential concessions to be made by the West on NATO enlargement in exchange for Russian support for the anti-terrorism campaign.



# Slovakia

Vladimir Bilcik

## *I. Slovakia and CFSP*

In preparation for EU membership, CFSP has played a formative role in shaping the boundaries and the focus of Slovakia's foreign and security policies. Slovakia, as an Associated Country, has taken an active part in the forms of cooperation within the CFSP framework. It has consistently aligned itself with the declarations, *démarches*, common positions and joint actions of the EU. Clear exceptions have been specific *démarches* or common positions adopted in direct relation to one or more fellow candidate countries. In certain cases – e.g. during the Kosovo conflict – Slovakia has imposed sanctions adopted by the Union vis-à-vis third countries. Cooperation and coordination of positions (whenever possible) take place in international forums and inside multilateral organisations such as the United Nations. The CFSP framework has encouraged good-neighbourly relations, especially between Slovakia and Hungary. It has also emphasised adhesion to and compliance with non-proliferation and export controls regimes.

Formally, the negotiations on CFSP have posed very few problems to Slovakia. The explanation for that lies, in part, with the limits of CFSP itself as an essentially intergovernmental policy. Compliance with CFSP provisions does not demand extra financial or institutional resources on the Slovak side, and the character of cooperation in this area does not require major changes to domestic legislation. The CFSP domain may indeed become sensitive – with possible future implications for national sovereignty – but this has not been an issue in Slovakia thus far. On the whole, the CFSP chap-

ter has been among the easiest parts of the accession and negotiation process. Slovakia was able to close it provisionally (along with the chapter on External Relations) at the beginning of the process, and Bratislava expects to be ready to participate fully in the formulation, adoption and implementation of all CFSP instruments upon its accession.

## *II. Slovakia and ESDP*

ESDP has added a completely new dimension to second-pillar issues. Whereas CFSP has so far been largely an exercise in political and bureaucratic integration, the development of ESDP encompasses a wider range of functional and operational tasks. The fact that ESDP is no longer just about political, economic and legislative integration, however, seems not to have been fully understood in Slovakia. To the extent that it exists, the domestic debate on ESDP has largely reflected more general uncertainties over the policy's future role inside the EU. It has most visibly focused on the relations between NATO and the EU, and it has also addressed the question of the country's participation in the present and future developments of ESDP.

Official statements about ESDP have tended to be rather reserved and general. Slovakia has been 'monitoring the developments related to the European Security and Defence Policy in connection with the building of autonomous decision-making capacities and, where NATO as a whole will not be engaged, supports possible EU-led peacekeeping operations.'<sup>1</sup> On the whole, although it has given political backing to ESDP, Slovakia seems to lack an operational

<sup>1</sup> The quote originates from the Slovak official negotiating position on the CFSP chapter.

structure that could help both understand the policy process (and its problems) and outline a more constructive contribution to the current debate. Instead, some confusion persists. Much as the domestic debate has been vague and ESDP as such has received a general welcome by the governing political parties, it is worth noting that it was the Slovak National Party (SNP – right-wing nationalists) that openly endorsed the idea of autonomous European defence capabilities. Its motivation was simple: it was not NATO and it did not involve the Americans.

In a broader sense, the SNP's simplistic attitude is a side effect of the relative lack of clarity of the official policy. At the policy-making level, ESDP is still perceived only as a part of the EU agenda and not necessarily viewed, instead, as a part of a wider security and defence policy agenda. The Slovak MFA European Correspondent handles the ESDP matters virtually alone. Policy is limited to the established institutional structures in the CFSP context, and the primary concern rests with the existing modalities of dialogue and cooperation with the EU. A broader strategic vision, including wider security matters and issues of planning and coordination, is lacking. Although the EU itself remains unclear about some aspects of ESDP, current Slovak arrangements contrast sharply with institutional and policy-making structures in EU member States, where the new policy is handled more comprehensively.

ESDP touches upon and in some ways competes with other security and defence priorities and initiatives that shaped Slovakia's foreign policy goals throughout the 1990s. These include, first and foremost, a desire to join NATO, motivated by the collective defence guarantees that are not covered by ESDP. In its official statement(s) Slovakia understands ESDP as 'a complementary process to the system of collective defence of the North Atlantic Alliance'.<sup>2</sup> Despite the varying degrees of domestic elite and public consensus, NATO membership has been the top security policy priority in Slovakia. The country was not invited to join the Alliance

at the NATO Madrid summit in 1997 principally because of unstable and questionable domestic political developments under the coalition government led by Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar (1994-98). The present coalition government, led by Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda since late 1998, hopes that an invitation to join the Alliance will be issued at the NATO Prague summit scheduled for November 2002. For Slovakia, therefore, membership of the Alliance represents a more urgent priority than membership of the EU. Paradoxically, while most EU member states and NATO allies are principally concerned with the ESDP and crisis-management operations, Slovakia is focusing most of its energies on gaining admission to an alliance for collective defence. From the viewpoint of the current Slovak governing elite, the endurance of the transatlantic link is of crucial importance.

Finally, although Slovakia is going to become a fully-fledged participant in ESDP upon enlargement, the present modalities of participation of candidate countries as laid down in Feira and Nice are not seen as adequate. The current structures imply both a certain degree of exclusion and a certain lack of access to decision-shaping for the applicants. For the sake of comparison, Slovakia is included in NATO's Planning and Review Process (PARP) that operates under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. Furthermore, Slovakia's participation in the Membership Action Plan (MAP), which represents a more advanced version of the PfP, entails a good degree of joint defence planning with the Alliance.<sup>3</sup> Presently, EU member States 'invite' and 'welcome' additional contributions of forces by candidate states, while the PfP programme explicitly calls for a contribution of forces. As the example of the Kosovo crisis demonstrated, a common inclusive framework for both members and non-members of NATO was an important factor in preventing any spillover of violence onto neighbouring states.

<sup>2</sup> *Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic*, approved by the Council of the Slovak Republic on 27 March 2001.

<sup>3</sup> F. Heisbourg et al., 'European defence: making it work', *Chaillot Paper 42* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, September 2000).

Although participation of candidate countries in NATO (or WEU) structures never implied actual involvement in the decision-making process, it has certainly allowed a comparatively greater involvement in the preparation of decisions. The current modality of political participation in ESDP, with regular ministerial meetings of EU members and candidates, is somewhat reminiscent of the Union's Structured Dialogue initiated by the German Presidency in 1994.<sup>4</sup> Devised and implemented at the start of the enlargement process, the Structured Dialogue soon proved both ineffective and insufficient in giving a voice to the applicants and addressing their concerns. Whilst ESDP is an evolving policy area, it should be in the EU's interest to include the soon-to-be partners under a more encompassing umbrella of partnership. Moreover, experience with NATO's operational structures seems to suggest that, for the applicants, ESDP should have a definite Euro-Atlantic dimension. From the Slovak standpoint, one of the preconditions for active inclusion in ESDP is NATO's involvement and a satisfactory agreement between the EU and NATO on strategy, assets and capabilities, and structures of consultation.

### *III. Slovakia and military crisis management*

At the Capabilities Commitment Conference held in November 2000, Slovakia – like other candidate states – pledged its contribution to the 'Catalogue of Forces' exercise and the EU's Headline Goal. The pledge included the following forces and equipment:<sup>5</sup>

#### **MILITARY CAPABILITIES**

- ▶ One mechanised company (including support elements);
- ▶ Four Mi-17 transport helicopters (available by the end of 2002);

- ▶ One engineering mine-clearance unit (currently operating within KFOR);
- ▶ One military police unit (available by the end of 2001);
- ▶ One multi-purpose field hospital with surgery capabilities (available by the end of 2003).

#### **CIVILIAN CAPABILITIES**

- ▶ One detection group for chemical and radioactive substances
- ▶ One mobile laboratory;
- ▶ Emergency re-deployable capacity for long-term accommodation of up to 400 persons in tents in the event of humanitarian disasters (including service personnel).

As the details of the pledge indicate, the commitment exists on paper: in reality, it is questionable if and to what extent Slovakia can sustain and finance the contributions it has pledged. Realistically, the numbers are likely to be smaller. Slovakia already has some forces that are serving in various peacekeeping missions. In 1999, for instance, approximately 150 Slovak Army members participated in UN operations<sup>6</sup> and other peace support operations. Of these, 40 participated in KFOR and 8 in SFOR. From the Slovak standpoint, additional available inter-operable forces are likely to be limited and expensive to support over a long period of time. At the same time, while EU expectations of bigger defence and military contributions should remain modest, Slovakia's peacekeeping record so far solidly places the country in the position of being a reliable participant in future crisis-management operations.

### *IV. Slovakia and defence procurement*

Slovakia – like other candidates for EU and NATO membership – is undergoing a wide-ranging reform of its armed forces. On 30 October

<sup>4</sup> B. Lippert and P. Becker, 'Structured Dialogue Revisited: the EU's Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. III (1998), no. 3.

<sup>5</sup> Based on the official information from the Slovak MFA.

<sup>6</sup> V. Bilcik et al., 'Foreign and Defense Policy of the Slovak Republic', in G. Meseznikov et al. (eds.), *Slovakia 2000. A Global Report on the State of the Society* (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2001), p. 257.

2001, at the meeting of the NATO Strengthened Political Committee (SPC), the Deputy Minister for Defence Jozef Pivarci presented *The Slovak Republic's Defence Reform Long Term Plan – SR Force 2010*. The general aim of the reform is to make the armed forces slimmer, more flexible and – most importantly – fully professional. Thus far Slovakia has not come across major conflicts or tensions between US and European bidders in the context of the modernisation of its military equipment. Due to their potential political sensitivity, such conflicts are highly unlikely before the decision on enlargement to be taken during the NATO Prague summit in the autumn of 2002. Slovakia cooperates with WEAG in Panel I, where a Slovak representative attends plenary sessions. More generally, Slovakia is supportive of a more coordinated European defence procurement policy.<sup>7</sup>

On the whole, although the issues of defence procurement and arms modernisation represent important medium- and long-term goals, Slovakia is primarily concerned with its political participation in the development of defence policy in Europe. In a recent speech, MOD State Secretary Rastislav Kacer maintained that political reasons prevailed over military ones in Slovakia's motivation to enter NATO: 'considering the number of planes the Alliance has, the issue of 18 or 23 jet fighters for the Slovak Army is not interesting. NATO membership is a question of consensual responsibility for maintaining of and pushing for joint values. It is a more difficult path than the one of non-participation, but it offers more prospects.' According to Kacer, membership in the Alliance is of vital importance for the country, as remaining out would also mean no membership of the EU. Slovakia would welcome it if the European Union took a positive and unambiguous stance towards NATO enlargement too. In this sense, Slovakia would also welcome better coordination between NATO and EU policies.<sup>8</sup>

## *V. Slovakia and European security policy*

Over the past ten years Slovak foreign policy priorities have encompassed mainly NATO and EU membership as well as the development of such forms of subregional cooperation as the Visegrad group. Clear and comprehensive policy towards the East has been largely lacking – except for the general aim of distinguishing oneself from it, of not being part of it any longer. Intellectual, political, economic and financial resources have been used almost exclusively to get closer and closer to Western institutions and structures. Although transatlantic and European integration are going to remain central priorities for some time to come, precisely accession to the EU may soon place the country in a better position gradually to shift the focus of relations with its Eastern neighbours. In helping to formulate a more comprehensive and multifaceted EU Eastern policy, Slovakia can add new value to future specific initiatives. Its comparative advantage stems from common historical ties and geographic and linguistic proximity, as well as the shared experience of post-Communist transition. Actually, accession per se will immediately confront Slovakia with a double challenge, namely, how to combine an effective Eastern strategy with compliance with EU trading rules, visa regimes and border controls.

There are limits, however, to the policy initiatives that small states like Slovakia can take. Furthermore, in an enlarged Union consensus on policy will be generally more difficult to achieve. It has been so even among candidate states, as the example of the Visegrad group's relations with Ukraine illustrates. During February and March 2000 the Czech Republic and Slovakia decided to introduce visas for Ukrainians from 28 June 2000. Poland and Hungary instead remained committed to imple-

<sup>7</sup> Interview with a representative of the Mission of the Slovak Republic to NATO, 4 November 2001.

<sup>8</sup> Lecture by Rastislav Kacer, State Secretary of the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, the Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, 15 November 2001.

menting their visa regimes in relation to Ukraine at the latest possible date.<sup>9</sup>

The future success of ESDP will largely depend on the coherence, flexibility and readiness of an enlarged EU in taking action effectively. Currently and for the years to come, Slovak domestic stability per se contributes to the stability of the EU neighbourhood and wider European space. Bratislava is likely to be a committed small contributor to peacekeeping operations. In the institutional and practical context of decision-making and -shaping – especially if Slovakia manages to get an invitation to join NATO in 2002 – EU enlargement is likely to enhance the Euro-Atlantic dimension of ESDP even more visibly. Besides, Slovakia has also consistently favoured moves towards the harmonisation of asylum policy and more open police cooperation.

## *VI. Slovakia and enlargement after 11 September*

Although it is still too early to evaluate fully the impact of the events of 11 September 2001, from the Slovak standpoint there could be – alongside several concerns – also some positive effects. In a broad sense, Slovakia – as a candidate country for NATO membership – is closely monitoring the consequences of the attacks against the US for the nature and structure of the North Atlantic Alliance. Recent developments in NATO's relations with Russia and US-Russian cooperation in the war against terrorism should not affect Slovakia's bid to join the Alliance, though in some respects the new situation could influence the decision on NATO enlargement to other candidate countries, especially the Baltic states. The better state of relations between Russia and the West has created potentially

favourable conditions for NATO's enlargement to a larger group of countries. At the same time, the threat of terrorist attacks, combined with new US military commitments in Asia, gives additional reasons for an enhanced EU capacity in security matters and for more EU cohesion and action in cases of regional instability in Europe. EU enlargement as a policy tool that fosters stable developments in the European 'neighbourhood' and helps extend the Union's framework of rules and norms to the candidate states should become an increasingly urgent priority for the Fifteen.

On the strictly domestic front, the events of 11 September 2001 have brought together the main players in Slovak politics. Since the attacks on the United States there has been a broad verbal consensus between the current government and the main opposition party (the Movement for Democratic Slovakia, led by Meciar) on the actions undertaken by the United States, NATO and the EU in the fight against terrorism. The attitudes have been different from what they were during the Kosovo crisis in 1999, when Meciar and his Movement openly criticised the air campaign against Yugoslavia. At the same time, unlike then (when public support for Slovakia's membership in NATO dropped to some 35 per cent), the US military action in Afghanistan has not affected that variable: more than 50 per cent of the Slovak population currently supports the country's entry into the Alliance.<sup>10</sup>

Membership of NATO and EU remains the most important Slovak foreign policy priority. International events since 11 September 2001 have not altered this fact: if anything, they have provided more reasons for achieving full membership of both NATO and the European Union at the earliest possible date.

<sup>9</sup> A. Duleba, 'Ukraine, Central Europe and Slovakia's Foreign Policy', *Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs*, vol. 1 (2000), no. 2, p. 86.

<sup>10</sup> By contrast, public support for EU membership has hardly fluctuated. It has been fairly stable over the past four years and is currently around 70 per cent.

## Hungary

Erzsébet Nagyne Rózsa

### *I. Hungary and CFSP*

As one of the first Central European countries to sign an Association Agreement with the EU in December 1991, and then a member of the so-called Luxembourg group of candidates, Hungary has been among the front runners of Eastern enlargement. During the accession talks that started in late March 1998, both the EU and Hungary aimed to close swiftly those chapters that did not present any major problem. External relations and CFSP were among them.

Chapter 26 (External Relations) was provisionally concluded on 5 October 2000. Although in some special cases (trade imports) a transitional period was requested, on the whole Hungary is ready and able to terminate all those obligations that are inconsistent with the *acquis*. As of 1 January 2001, free trade between Hungary and the European Union has been in place. External relations altogether have been brought within the competence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Hungary provisionally concluded Chapter 27 (CFSP) on 6 April 2000. During the screening process and the negotiations no problems arose, nor were any expected. The result of the screening in the case of Hungary was positive, since the country shares the basic values, objectives and principles underpinning CFSP, and is prepared and able to participate fully and actively in it. Since Hungary's foreign policy is mostly harmonised with CFSP, Budapest did not request any derogation or transitional period on any issue belonging to the scope of this chapter. Hungary participates in the implementation of CFSP as an Associated Country and considers

the possibility to align itself with the joint actions, common positions and statements of the European Union as an important part of preparation for membership. Since 1995, when the EU started to invite the associated states to align themselves with such actions, positions and statements, Budapest has done so in all cases. During the screening it became obvious that Hungary found acceptable even those declarations and documents that it had not been invited to join earlier. There were no EU regulations/prescriptions in the modalities of cooperation vis-à-vis third countries or within international organisations that could cause trouble. Hungarian foreign policy structures have been shown to be capable of carrying out the tasks originating from CFSP, although some minor technical changes will have to be implemented before accession. Budapest reported the need to carry out 'structural changes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs enabling it to fully participate in the formulation and implementation of CFSP [the establishment of a Political Director's post]. The technical capacity for electronic communication of the Ministry will also be stepped up.'<sup>1</sup> Meanwhile, technical facilities have improved, whereas the post of Political Director has not yet been established: for now at least, the EU accepts the present MFA structure as long as it is always the same person who represents the country at the Political Directors' meetings

Due to historical experience, the changed environment – three of its neighbours no longer exist as they were (the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, the latter after a series of civil wars) – and the country's unique situation (there are Hungarian national minori-

<sup>1</sup> 'Negotiation Position of the Government of the Republic of Hungary on Chapter 27, 8 September 1998', in P. Dunay, Boxes: *Why CFSP and CESDP Do Not Matter Much to EU Candidate Countries*; see note 4, p. 9.

ties in a number of neighbouring countries), stability in Central Europe and in Europe at large is of vital importance to Hungary. It has therefore participated in a number of peacekeeping and peace support operations, in NATO-led IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, KFOR in Kosovo and Operation *Essential Harvest* in Macedonia, manifesting its interest and capacity to contribute to these and similar EU actions. Budapest also plays an active role in CFSP cooperation within different international organisations (such as the UN and the OSCE) and between foreign missions accredited in third countries.

Hungary has no territorial disputes with any of its neighbours, but the question of minorities beyond its borders has caused some concern with regard to the Schengen regulations, especially in the case of Romania, where approximately two million ethnic Hungarians live. With Romania on its way to being removed from the list of visa-bound states, and with neighbouring countries negotiating their accession to the EU as well (some of them may even join at the same time as Hungary), the problem is perceived to be of a transitory character.<sup>2</sup> However, it will remain one with respect to Ukraine and Yugoslavia, where the number of ethnic Hungarians is much lower, but so also is the likelihood of EU membership.

Budapest supports the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and is a party to all the treaties prohibiting such weapons. Hungary was the country whose accession triggered the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Hungary is a member of all the international export control regimes (Zangger Committee, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Arrangement) and has introduced into national legislation all the relevant export control lists. The combination of these lists and the upgrading of the combined list have been

carried out according to EU regulations, aiming for conformity from the outset. Therefore, no difficulty in switching over to the community regime is expected.

## II. Hungary and ESDP

Ever since the launching of the ESDP in 1998-99, it has been a firm belief among Hungarian authorities that, firstly, there is and should be no contradiction between NATO obligations and support for the development of a European defence capability, even less so as the United States has seemed to back the idea and to be willing to reduce its military forces in Europe; secondly, NATO and the US presence are a precondition for Hungary's security.

The EU's military efforts have been seen as a supplement to existing NATO capabilities as 'European security might face challenges that do not directly affect the interests of the United States',<sup>3</sup> especially in crisis management. As a result, participation in it has been considered a priority for Hungary, as the potential critical spots in Europe are located mostly in areas very close to or in the immediate neighbourhood of the country.<sup>4</sup> Crisis management, therefore, has been and is especially important for Hungary: the civil war that went on for years in former Yugoslavia posed manifold concerns and threats, from having ethnic Hungarian minorities in Serbia to being exposed to the danger of a possible spillover and to waves of refugees (not only ethnic Hungarians, but also Serbs). In the recent establishment of the European Rapid Reaction Force, however, Hungary has expressed its firm support but also stressed the necessity not to undermine NATO. In this respect, there has been no difference between official and unofficial attitudes, and the public has not been interested in this issue at all. Ever since, there has been no perceivable evolution in the

<sup>2</sup> 'It seems as if the monster of Schengen was less frightening than a year ago.' János Martonyi, opening press conference on 3 January 2001. <http://www.mfa.gov.hu/Szovivoi/2001/Martonyij/0103mjvkvk.html>.

<sup>3</sup> János Martonyi in *Financial Times*, <http://www.kum.hu/Szovivoi/2001/Martonyij/mjftcikk.htm>. Interview with the Head of the Defence Policy Dept. in the Ministry of Defence (October 2000): 'ESDP is the Petersberg Tasks, is it not?'

<sup>4</sup> Csaba Körösi: *Biztonságpolitika az ezredfordulón* (Security policy on the turn of the millennium), *TLI Policy Papers*, no. 22, 2001, p. 11.

Hungarian position. Therefore EU-NATO cooperation in Macedonia was most welcome, since it proved for Hungary and others that NATO and the EU can cooperate well.

As a consequence, the second precondition for NATO member Hungary was the establishment of some form of appropriate participation for non-EU European allies in the shaping of the future European military decision-making. 'Hungary was not unhappy with the Feira decisions, which were a minimum for 15+6 cooperation. The objectives must be to make EU-NATO cooperation effective and to make contributions of the 6 effective. This required parliamentary approval and hence information proving that the 6 were involved in decision-making. Many of the 6 were geographically close to the crisis regions, thus their involvement might be needed anyway.'<sup>5</sup> During the period prior to its accession, Budapest would like to see 15+6 meetings on a ministerial level as well as quasi-permanent consultation on crises and an information flow at the level of experts. At the same time, Hungary participates in the dialogue between the 6 non-EU European NATO members.

### III. Hungary and military crisis management

Participating in peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions is not new to the Hungarian military. There have been several missions across the world where Hungarian forces participated or are still participating, albeit in limited numbers. Hungarians have served in a number of UN missions: UNIKOM (Iraq-Kuwait – 6 observers), UNIFICYP (Cyprus – 121 armed peacekeepers), UNOMIG (Georgia – 8 military observers), MINURSO (Western Sahara – 6 military observers), UNMIK (Kosovo – 1 mediator between UN and KFOR), altogether 142 persons. In the OSCE missions in Georgia one military observer, in Bosnia-Herzegovina 2

military observers, on the Georgian-Chechen border 2 military observers (one of whom died recently in a helicopter crash), in Nagorno-Karabakh one military observer, on the Sinai Peninsula 41 armed peacekeepers. In KFOR, 308 Hungarian soldiers provide protection for military bases (the British Headquarters) and, in SFOR, the 200 military technical personnel's main task is to build bridges. As regards peacekeeping in the Balkans, planning has started in the Defence Staff for possible bigger and more varied Hungarian participation. Although such planning is at an early stage as yet, it foresees the restructuring of the units already operating in the Balkans and will most probably aim at a smaller unit performing exclusively such military tasks as reconnaissance.<sup>6</sup> An approximately 50-strong unit participated in Macedonia in the collection of arms (they have already returned to Hungary). Sending a smaller ground force unit to Macedonia to perform NATO-led tasks is also on the agenda.

At the 21 November 2000 Capabilities Conference, the Hungarian Minister for Defence offered a 350-strong force including an air defence unit equipped with *Mistral* missiles and a mechanised infantry battalion. According to the statements made by the Prime Minister, these units (or parts of them) will be offered to both NATO and the EU: he maintained in fact that 'Hungary will not participate in any decision that would create duplicated capacities and thus would put such burdens on the Hungarian Army, which we cannot meet at the moment.'<sup>7</sup>

Budapest puts the reinforcement of its national capabilities, required to carry out Petersberg-type missions, in the context of the ongoing reform of the armed forces. Military reform, i.e. the modernisation and restructuring of the Hungarian armed forces, started in 1999, when at the same time Hungary joined NATO, the Kosovo crisis erupted and it became impossible to finance adequately the Hungarian defence sector from the funds then allocated in

<sup>5</sup> János Martonyi at a breakfast meeting hosted by the Norwegian Foreign Minister Jagland with the participation of the foreign ministers of the 6 non-EU European NATO countries and High Representative Javier Solana, New York, 14 September 2000.

<sup>6</sup> 'Magyar felderítő alakulat a Balkánra?' (Hungarian reconnaissance unit to the Balkans?) in *Népszabadság*, 30 October 2001, p. 1.

<sup>7</sup> A miniszterelnök a feladatszabó értekezleten /The Prime Minister at the Task Assigning Conference of the Hungarian Defence Forces/, 1 March 2001, <http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk.php?cikk=717>.



the budget. The modernisation of the army took two main directions. First, the Hungarian Defence Forces were (re-)integrated into the Ministry of Defence and the command structure was changed, so that the number of headquarters was reduced and the personnel were relocated to different units. Secondly, the size of peacetime personnel in the Ministry of Defence was cut down from 63,000 to a maximum of 45,000 (the actual figures would amount to 42,900 in accordance with the resolution passed by the Hungarian Parliament in June 2000).<sup>8</sup> These changes were for the most part made in 2000, and completely by June 2001. According to the estimates of the Ministry of Defence, wartime personnel strength will be approximately 50 to 60 per cent higher than the authorised peacetime personnel strength of the Hungarian Defence Forces.<sup>9</sup> While the conscript system cannot be fully eliminated for the time being, in the long run the Hungarian armed forces may well be transformed into an even smaller professional rapid reaction force. Recruiting troops to participate in peacekeeping missions in the Balkans has been relatively well received by the public, in part because those missions provided a safe and morally acceptable living for many. More recently, however, a targeted and well organised campaign has taken place in the media with the explicit aim of recruiting qualified personnel for a future professional army.

#### *IV. Hungary and defence procurement*

The modernisation of the armed forces has made the upgrading of military equipment equally unavoidable. The debate on defence procurement has been driven by two essential ele-

ments: the limits of the country's financial resources and the determination that any new purchase be based on Western technology. In accordance with the obligations taken on entering NATO, and thanks to the relatively good development of the economy, the defence budget has been increased to 1.81 per cent of GDP (from the previous 1.61). However, in the foreseen ten-year cycle of transformation of the defence forces, the beginning of the acquisition of new equipment has been set for the second phase only (until 2006), leaving the bulk of its modernisation for the third phase (2007-10).

Between 2000 and 2001 it became apparent that there was one major exception where the acquisition of new equipment could not be further delayed: a resolution of Parliament ruled that 'the structure of the Air Force must be modernised in a way that allows the entire air defence system to operate as a part of NATO's integrated air defence system, and aviation units must be capable to assist pursuing operations required by collective defence.'<sup>10</sup> A first decision had to be made on whether to upgrade the MiG-29 aircraft currently in service or to replace them by modern Western aircraft. It was soon decided that although Hungary was 'to keep equipment originating from a former period temporarily and due to lack of finances... these (planes) are not the final solution.'<sup>11</sup> Accordingly, the modernisation of MiG-29s was gradually abandoned and it was decided that Western planes would be leased instead. The relevant decision-making process was heavily weighed down by domestic and foreign policy considerations. Five bids were made to the Hungarian government: F-16s were offered by the United States, Belgium, Turkey and Israel, while Sweden proposed the Gripen. The decision was made by the National Security Cabinet and, in spite of a diffi-

<sup>8</sup> 62/2000 (VI.21. OGY határozat a fegyveres erők részletes bontású létszámáról szóló 124/1997 (XII.18.) határozat módosításáról /Resolution 62/2000 (21 June) of the Parliament on modification of Resolution 124/1997 (18 December) of the Parliament regarding the detailed personnel strength of the armed forces. (Officers: 8,600, warrant officers and NCOs: 10,230, contract soldiers: 6,700, conscripts: 12,610, students from higher educational institutions: 1,200, civilians: 4,010.)

<sup>9</sup> Transformation of the Hungarian Defence Forces, p. 4. <http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk.php?cikk=582>.

<sup>10</sup> 61/2000 (VI.21.) OGY határozat a Magyar Honvédség hosszú távú átalakításának irányairól /Resolution 61/2000 (21 June) of the Parliament on the long-term transformation of the Hungarian Defence Forces/, point 4b

<sup>11</sup> A miniszterelnök a feladatszabó értekezleten /The Prime Minister at the Task Assigning Conference of the Hungarian Defence Forces/, 1 March 2001, <http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk.php?cikk=717>.

cult internal debate, the Swedish proposal was accepted on 10 September 2001. That proposal had an important plus, namely that the amount of the lease would be reinvested in the Hungarian economy. There are still some terms of the contract to be negotiated – the framework agreement was signed by the Hungarian Defence Minister and his Swedish counterpart in December 2001 – as regards especially the exact price of the lease and the date of delivery, which the Hungarian government would like to be as early as 2004. The Swedish party undertakes to train pilots and technical staff as well. Interestingly, during the negotiations between the two parties, which were taking longer than expected, the newly-appointed US Ambassador to Budapest handed in a new American proposal to the Minister of Defence, noting that ‘had the Hungarian government made the decision after 11 September, probably another decision would have been made.’<sup>12</sup>

It should be added, however, that after all a decision was made in the National Security Cabinet on the modernisation of the MiG-29s, which without upgrading could not be kept in service after the summer of 2002. Of 27 MiG-29s, 14 will be upgraded at a cost of HUF5 billion, the rest are in such poor condition that upgrading them would be too expensive.

### *V. Hungary and European security policy*

Budapest supports the further extension of NATO both on the basis of its national interests and out of moral considerations. Hungary supports its neighbours in the Euro-Atlantic integration process (in the Alliance and the Union alike) on the understanding that the security of Hungary can be fully guaranteed only if its neighbours are integrated into the EU and NATO as well. It is the firm belief of the Hungarian government that the accession of

those states in its area that are well prepared for membership will strengthen its security environment.

So far, the enlargement process has had a stabilising effect in Central Europe, where Hungary itself is perceived and conceived by the Government as a state that has a stabilising influence over the entire region. The Hungarian minorities abroad play an important role in this process: they are seen as a bridge, an essential link between a Hungary that is already in NATO and at the doorstep of the EU, and its neighbours who are following in line. ‘The ethnic Hungarian minorities and their political organisations in all the neighbouring countries support those forces that had initiated the reform process, and which are interested in the strengthening of the Euro-Atlantic and the European integration process, and are successful in such support. These common interests make the cooperation of Hungary with its neighbours relatively easy and successful... The most important element of the Hungarian strategy is to unite the Hungarians in a practically and economically increasingly integrated Europe.’<sup>13</sup>

As security is understood in a broad sense (including the economic dimension, especially in the case of the EU) by Hungarian political élites, the further extension of enlargement would have an important economic side-effect for the region, namely that successful regional cooperative frameworks (e.g. Visegrad) should not be scrapped but could simply be brought into the EU.

### *VI. Hungary and enlargement after 11 September*

The transatlantic debate between Europe and the United States on ESDP seems outdated after 11 September. While ESDP was being implemented further, European states rushed to support the United States and immediately joined

<sup>12</sup> ‘Új amerikai ajánlat F-16-osokra’ (New American proposal for F-16s) *Népszabadság*, 25 October 2001, p. 1.

<sup>13</sup> János Martonyi, in his opening press conference on 3 January 2001. <http://www.mfa.gov.hu/Szovivoi/2001/Martonyij/0103mjev.html>.

the US-led coalition. The centre of decision-making and action is again, and remains, the United States, thus vindicating Hungarian foreign policy-makers who feel justified in their declarations on the importance of the American presence in Europe.

NATO's Article 5 was invoked, yet it is not NATO where decisions have been made and military actions carried out. NATO is not even the place for partial consultations. 11 September could have an impact on the future development of the Alliance in such aspects as defence planning, strategic doctrines or the geographic scope of NATO operations. It is in Hungary's best interests, however, that NATO sticks to its basic functions and remains a relevant defence against any attack and firmly relies on its set of values. NATO should also play a relevant role in peace-support operations and regional conflict management.

No one knows as yet how 11 September will affect EU and NATO enlargement. It is worth noting, however, that the two decisions will be made approximately at the same time and by almost the same actors. While the accession criteria cannot be circumvented, the main lesson of the conflict in Afghanistan is that no region that could become a source of instability should be neglected.<sup>14</sup> Keeping the enlargement process open meets the Hungarian foreign policy aim to have as many of its neighbours integrated into Western organisations as possible. This would help ease the tension between those who are in and those who are (temporarily) left out. As regards Hungary's accession to the EU, Budapest is sticking to its original schedule: the country will be ready to close the accession negotiations in the year 2002.

It is clear that Hungary will never have a role to play in Afghanistan, except maybe for peace-keeping activities: the country's importance will depend on its usefulness. Hungary should start to specialise on functions that are lacking in peacekeeping operations, as for instance the construction of bridges, which it has already done in Bosnia-Herzegovina.<sup>15</sup>

When ESDP was conceived, both military and non-military elements were taken into consideration. The number of peacekeeping missions is probably going to increase, while conflict prevention and non-military tasks will be further emphasised. The strengthening of CFSP and European capabilities is endorsed by Hungary, provided (once again) it does not weaken NATO's defence role.

Furthermore, it is in Hungary's interests that Russia be closely linked to Europe. A European security system should involve Russia in the long run, but perhaps not too soon. The American/Western-Russian rapprochement after 11 September, in fact, might bring about a situation familiar to that of the states of Central Europe from the NATO accession negotiations period, namely that the West and Russia speak 'over our heads'.

Finally, the official Hungarian position is that the use of WMD is not yet within the power of terrorist organisations.<sup>16</sup> Non-proliferation regimes should be strengthened. Hungary has always been active on non-proliferation for all WMD categories, but especially in the domain of the prohibition of biological weapons: Ambassador Tibor Tóth has chaired the ad hoc Group on the Protocol to the BWC for the past six years.

<sup>14</sup> Csaba Körösi, Deputy State Secretary, MFA, in his lecture at the Foreign Policy Association on 24 October 2001.

<sup>15</sup> Hungary used to be a major producer of pontoon bridges in the Warsaw Treaty Organisation until 1998, and its engineering units for assembling them are still proficient.

<sup>16</sup> Csaba Körösi, Deputy State Secretary, MFA, in his lecture at Foreign Policy Association on 24 October 2001.

## Slovenia

Ivan Hostnik

### *I. Slovenia and CFSP*

Accession to the EU is a major priority and undoubtedly a major challenge for Slovenia. It is also a historic opportunity: in fact, by harmonising its legislation with the *acquis communautaire*, Slovenia is accelerating the process of strengthening its economy and improving its competitive position. Actual negotiations began in March 1998. Slovenia has set itself the goal of being internally prepared for the assumption of obligations deriving from membership by the end of 2002. The signature of the accession agreement is expected at the same date. By 2004, Slovenia hopes to be a member of both the EU and NATO.

Slovenia accepted the *acquis* in the CFSP chapter without requesting any transitional periods. Slovenian legislation allows integration into the second pillar and is fully in compliance with the *acquis*, including the field of diplomatic and consular protection, cooperation with third countries and international institutions, implementation of negative measures, and the signature of international contracts and treaties. The only problem related to this chapter could be the introduction into Slovenian legislation of a system allowing prompt implementation of broader EU measures (e.g. enforcement or abolition of sanctions against third countries). This is still lacking at the moment.

As an EU Associated Country, Slovenia already actively participates in the formulation of CFSP. Within the framework of the enhanced political dialogue conducted by the EU with candidates, Slovenian officials attend the twice-yearly meetings of Political Directors and European Correspondents. Ljubljana, however, proposes that the Associated Countries should start to take a more active part in the formula-

tion of EU common positions and joint actions. Since 1999 Slovenia has been connected to the telecommunications Associated Countries Network (ACN) that links the Associated Countries to the Secretariat-General of the EU Council, thus making it easier for the country to join the *démarches*, positions, declarations and joint actions of the Union. Thanks to the ACN, every Associated Country can also inform other states in the network on its foreign policy activities.

Good-neighbourly relations are crucial for stability and security. Slovenia has made considerable progress in forging good bilateral relations. None of its neighbours poses a military threat, although a few unsettled issues in the area may have an impact on economic and political stability. Of Slovenia's neighbours, Hungary has already become a full member of NATO, and relations are very good also in so far as respective national minorities across the border are concerned. Some issues have remained unresolved with Croatia since the dissolution of Yugoslavia, but the two countries have a strong interest in cooperating closely. Relations with Austria and Italy are good, although they are sometimes troubled by domestic pressure on the other side of Slovenia's border.

### *II. Slovenia and ESDP*

Slovenia attaches great importance to ESDP and follows its development with interest. In Ljubljana's view, participation in ESDP does not mean that the role of NATO will be diminished, since the Union and the Alliance are seen as complementary. Of course, Slovenia remains committed to the transatlantic security component as embodied by NATO.

Slovenia is not entering the new EU mechanisms unprepared, for it is already involved in many security forums. It is an active participant in NATO's Partnership for Peace programme and in the operations set up by the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, and Kosovo. In June 2001, Ljubljana concluded its participation in the UNFICYP mission in Cyprus.

Slovenian officials attend the regular sessions of the enhanced political dialogue with the EU in the 15+15 format. Ljubljana particularly welcomed the decisions taken at Feira and Nice regarding the involvement of third (and especially associated) countries in crisis management.

Slovenia wishes to contribute actively to building a new European security and defence identity. From the Slovenian perspective, the interaction between the EU and NATO and the preservation of the Euro-Atlantic connection are the key issues related to the development of ESDP. The shaping of the security and defence policy of the European Union is perceived as a complementary process to the system of collective defence of the Atlantic Alliance. If the EU wants to ensure operational autonomy and act independently in a given crisis, i.e. without the active assistance of the United States, a certain degree of duplication of means and capabilities will be necessary, especially in the fields of strategic intelligence, advanced communications, tactical surveillance and reconnaissance, strategic and tactical lift and logistics.

It was also of particular importance to Ljubljana that the European Council in Nice adopted a document on mechanisms of cooperation of the Fifteen with the other European NATO members and with the candidates for EU membership, thus enabling them to participate actively in EU crisis-management operations. As a small country, however, Slovenia can contribute much more to the civilian side of crisis management than with substantial military means.

### *III. Slovenia and military crisis management*

Slovenia participated in the Capabilities Commitment Conference held in Brussels in November 2000. On that occasion, Slovenia made its 'voluntary contribution' to the catalogue of forces for the so-called Headline-Goal-plus. Ljubljana offered an infantry company, a military police squad, a transport helicopter/air force unit, the ROLE 1 medical unit and officers, and NCOs for work in headquarters. These capabilities have already been tested in various NATO and UN-led peace support operations.

The table below shows the number of personnel of the Slovenian Army participating in various peace support operations as of 2000.

#### Slovenian Army personnel in PSO (2000)

<i>current number</i>			
<b>operation</b>	<b>UN</b>	<b>NATO/PfP</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
UNFICYP	29		29
UNTSO	2		2
UNMIK	1		1
SFOR-AF		41	41
SFOR-MP		26	26
SFOR-ME		12	12
KFOR		6	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>117</b>

*Source: General Staff of the Slovenian Army, G-7 (international cooperation), April 2000*

The forces that Slovenia has committed to the Headline Goal-plus are not the only contribution that the country would like to make. The country is also involved in setting up multinational units with neighbouring countries – most notably the Italo-Slovenia-Hungarian Land Force (MLF) – and in organising joint border patrolling with Italy and Germany.

Besides, Ljubljana is interested in taking an active part in the civilian aspects of crisis management and conflict prevention proper. This is particularly true for South-Eastern Europe, where Slovenia advocates pacific solutions to interethnic conflicts: while supporting the integrity of Macedonia, for instance, Slovenia is also the biggest single foreign investor in Bosnia-

Herzegovina. Furthermore, in the first half of 2001 it co-chaired Working Table 1 of the Stability Pact, dealing inter alia with the establishment of the International Centre for Inter-Ethnic Relations and the Protection of Minorities. Slovenia is also active in some other subregional activities (Trilateral Cooperation, Adriatic-Ionian Initiative and Alpe Adria). Another regional programme, the International Trust Fund for Demining (ITF), was launched jointly by Slovenia and the United States in 1995: although technically available to the entire Balkans, it has actually focused mainly on Bosnia, and with some success.

#### *IV. Slovenia and defence procurement*

Since it is not a member of either the EU or NATO, Slovenia is not directly involved in European defence procurement policy. Nor is the country a member of WEAG, although it is very interested in becoming one and intends to apply for membership as soon as possible. Ljubljana is well aware of how useful functional cooperation is for a small country, since it has partner-nation status within NATO's PfP and participates in those of the Alliance's Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) activities that are open to partners. At this year's CNAD meeting Slovenia was also given the opportunity to introduce its defence industry, which is rather small at present and capable of producing much less than before the disintegration of former Yugoslavia. It expects better times with EU and NATO membership. On the whole, Slovenia strongly supports a more coordinated European defence procurement policy.

In terms of future acquisitions, Slovenia will have to continue to finance the Swiss-built aircraft already purchased, Bell helicopters and *Cougar* transport helicopters, while it is considering an advanced air control radar system. A short-lived domestic discussion about whether to buy F-16s or other similar combat aircraft appears to have decided against this option, in view of Slovenia's limited budgetary means and

geography. Other major acquisition projects in near future lie in the areas of tactical telecommunication systems, logistic vehicles and integrated air defence systems.

Ljubljana is currently in a process of fast reorganisation and modernisation of its armed forces. The Slovenian Army is being set up and refurbished through the acquisition of weapon systems and equipment that are available on the foreign market. The domestic defence industry is involved especially in the (partially licensed) development and production of the Light Wheeled Armoured Vehicle (VALUK) and of some items of the XXI Century *Warrior* equipment. Almost 90 per cent of the new equipment, however, is acquired abroad. If and when possible, according to the tender procedures, Slovenia aims at a kind of trade-off/balance between American and European suppliers. As a rule, the government also requires contract applicants to offer a substantial offset programme: actually, offsets are understood as one of the most important instruments for stimulating cooperation between domestic and foreign defence industries.

#### *V. Slovenia and European security policy*

Slovenia is a small European country that, in order to provide its citizens a safe and stable geopolitical framework, has given priority to membership of multilateral (security) structures. As a consequence, it believes that its position will be better if the EU grows stronger. The EU will be stronger if it is more united. Ljubljana therefore supports further European integration, 'ever closer union'. The necessary flexibility is ensured by enhanced cooperation, which should remain within the framework of the provisions of the Nice Treaty.

Slovenian officials are pleased with the results of the EU's Laeken summit. The resolutions are in line with expectations, although what is most important is that the ten candidates (including Slovenia) that may conclude negotiations by the end of this year have been named individually. For Slovenia it is also

important that the enlargement roadmap adopted in Nice remain unchanged. The European Commission must therefore draft the negotiating standpoints for the chapters on agriculture, regional policy and budget on the basis of the EU's existing budget, which was agreed at the Berlin summit in 1999.

Slovenia has welcomed the possibility for candidate countries to participate in the debate about the future of the enlarged EU. Slovenia also hopes that alternative solutions adopted by the Convention will only be formed upon consensus among EU members and candidate countries alike. For Ljubljana it is important that in an enlarged EU its national interests be best fulfilled and protected. It is also worth underlining that the prospect of eventual membership of the EU has already had a positive influence per se on the overall security of Slovenia and its citizens.

## *VI. Slovenia and enlargement after 11 September*

According to opinion polls, the events of 11 September are seen as unlikely to slow down or speed up the EU enlargement process significantly. The political pressure for enlargement as

a means of stabilising countries to the East has been increased, but new requirements for membership are being added as well.

The process of NATO enlargement also gained momentum when the fight against terrorism was placed at the top of the foreign and defence policy agendas of all European countries and the United States. What happened was, in a way, logical, but it would probably not have happened had it not been for the terrorist attacks. Solidarity between East and West was declared, particularly with Russia and some Muslim countries. These changes may have an influence on NATO too, although they are unlikely to alter its nature and mission.

Slovenia is well aware of the problem of international terrorism. The day after the brutal attacks on the United States, the Republic's National Security Council decided that Slovenia would support and actively contribute to international counter-terrorism efforts with all its available resources. It also tasked all the relevant authorities with a further strengthening of the activities that guarantee domestic security. Ljubljana is also following the Action Plan of the European Union and is implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1373, which represents the main basis for the current international action against terrorism.

## Romania

Daniel Calin

### *I. Romania and CFSP*

Accession negotiations with Romania were officially launched on 15 February 2000. Among the five chapters opened, there were also Chapter 26 (External Relations) and Chapter 27 (CFSP). The negotiations on both were provisionally closed during the Accession Conference Romania – EU on 14 June 2000.

In its position paper, Romania declared itself ready to accept the *acquis* under Chapter 26 and to implement it by 2007. Romania's statement was that at the date of accession it would ensure that all its agreements and treaties (in particular trade, economic and technical cooperation and investment accords) complied with the obligations of membership. The EU welcomed Romania's statement to encourage the development of economic relations between the EU and the Republic of Moldova, in the framework of the Common Commercial Policy, after Romania's accession. The conclusion was that this chapter did not require further negotiations.

In the same context, Romania declared its acceptance of the existing *acquis* in the CFSP area and did not require any transitional period or derogation. The necessary structures for its implementation are in place, while Romania's foreign and security policy is based on the same principle and has the same orientation as the policy pursued by the EU. Romania will be ready to apply the existing *acquis* at the moment of accession. Due to the peculiarities of the CFSP *acquis*, the screening process earmarked four different domestic aspects to be tackled in order to comply fully with EU standards: the system of restrictive measures vis-à-vis the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) during the Milosevic regime; Afghanistan; the embargo on arms and military equipment against Ethiopia and Eritrea; and the visa restriction regime for

persons involved in the military junta in Burma/Myanmar. Romania aligned itself with all the *démarches*, common positions and joint actions in the four above-mentioned areas for which it was invited to do so. Bucharest also declared its readiness to examine the further development of the *acquis* and on a regular basis to inform the Accession Conference and the Association Council on the progress made in its adoption and implementation.

Relations with neighbouring countries are normal. Relations with FRY have taken a normal path now. As for those with Hungary, the bilateral difficulties created by the Status Law (promoted last year by the Hungarian Government in order to offer a special status to Hungarian minorities in such neighbouring countries as Romania and Slovakia) were overtaken by the signature of a memorandum between the two respective prime ministers. In addition, there are ongoing negotiations with Ukraine on the 'Treaty on the State border regime' and the 'Agreement on delimitation [of] the maritime zones between Romania and Ukraine', as well as with Bulgaria on a similar agreement. In spite of the Romanian proposals, there has been no response so far from the Ukrainian side. There were no new developments in the negotiations with Bulgaria in 2001 either.

In the future, Romania will continue to develop an active policy of good-neighbourliness – making use *inter alia* of the problem-solving potential of bi- or trilateral cooperative frameworks – with the goal of bringing stability to the region. Last year the Romanian Chairmanship of OSCE, together with the main international actors in Skopje (especially the EU and NATO), was deeply involved in the management of the crisis in Macedonia and the conclusion of a sound settlement along the principles laid down in the Ohrid Agreements.



At the EU summit in Laeken, in December 2001, Romania was not mentioned among the first 'wave' of countries expected to be able to take part in the European Parliament elections in 2004 as EU members. That decision was in line with the realistic objective set by the Romanian government, i.e. to open negotiations on all chapters in 2002 with the aim of being in a position to join the Union by 2007.

## *II. Romania and ESDP*

Although Romania has had the highest level of popular support for European and Euro-Atlantic integration among the candidates (80 per cent for the EU and 85 per cent for NATO, according to the latest opinion polls, including the Eurobarometer of November 2001), ESDP did not attract much public attention when it was launched. This could be explained by a lack of information and by the fact that NATO enlargement was much more fashionable at that time. At the political level, however, ESDP was dealt with as an important development in the process of the EU asserting its identity on the international scene.

The European and Euro-Atlantic integration processes are essential national objectives of Romanian foreign policy. Consequently, Bucharest considers the political and military integration into the EU and NATO as complementary, contributing to the modernisation of Romanian society. Yet the opposition parties (especially the far right party, 'Great Romania') consider this dual-track approach as counter-productive and against the national interest.

Romania welcomed the decisions adopted by the European Councils in Cologne and Helsinki. It has expressed its willingness and strong interest in actively participating in the arrangements for cooperation with third countries and becoming a fully-fledged participant in ESDP once it joins the EU. At the same time, Romania has been against unnecessary duplication with NATO, decoupling of Euro-Atlantic security and structures, and discrimination vis-à-vis European allies involved in the development of ESDP. In Romania's view, much as the

EU and NATO should act as complementary organisations in the field of crisis management, they should remain different in nature, at least in the medium term. NATO remains the cornerstone of European security and the fundament of collective defence in the Euro Atlantic area. The development and implementation of ESDP should build on the principles approved at the North Atlantic Council in Berlin (1996). The process of development and implementation of ESDP should aim at strengthening the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO and preserving the transatlantic link as a prerequisite for an effective security architecture. The development of cooperation between the EU and NATO has to be fully consistent with the principle of autonomous decision-making capacity. The creation of the ERRF has to be put in place in accordance with the NATO concept of 'separable, but not separate' forces.

At the operational level, ESDP should draw on the experience acquired within the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the development of an evaluation mechanism should build on the achievements of its Planning and Review Process (PARP).

Initially, Romania insisted on the transfer of the WEU *acquis* to the EU's ESDP. It soon became apparent, however, that ESDP was designed especially for the EU member states and that the third countries should be content to be associated with this process. Yet the Romanian perception of the Feira and Nice deliberations was that the EU pays more attention to the 15+6 format than to the 15+15 one. That is why Romania will promote a non-discriminatory approach towards all the 15 countries virtually associated to ESDP, starting with the Union's military exercises policy.

## *III. Romania and military crisis management*

At the Military Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels (November 2000), Romania made its offer of additional forces for the ERRF. That offer was in line with the forces

made available for WEU and consisted of land and maritime forces (about 1,000 military personnel and four vessels). During the Capability Improvement Conference in Brussels (November 2001), Romania made a new, significantly increased offer in order to enhance its contribution to the achievement of the Helsinki Headline Goal-plus. The new offer also included forces with some experience in peace support operations (PSO). All these forces are ready to meet the interoperability requirements for the execution of EU-led missions. The Supreme Council of National Defence decided that these forces should be the same as those made available for NATO-led PSO. This approach was based on the financial and logistical capabilities requested for training and sustaining such forces in a theatre of operations, and on the criteria set by the EU bodies. The offer includes:

- ▶ *land forces*: 5 infantry battalions and 1 infantry company, 1 paratroop company, 1 mountain troops company, 1 military police company, 1 engineer company, 1 mine-clearance detachment, 1 reconnaissance platoon, 1 transport platoon;

- ▶ *maritime forces*: 6 maritime and river vessels (of which 2 rescue tugs, 1 minesweeper and a frigate);

- ▶ *air forces*: 4 MiG-21 Lancer combat aircraft and 1 C-130B cargo aircraft.

The Romanian offer amounts to approximately 3,700 military personnel, probably the most important contribution from all the candidate countries (bar Turkey) All these forces meet the EU's requirements (ready to be deployed in full within 30 days, sustainable for 1 year and available from 2001). Moreover, at the CIC, Romania announced its readiness to contribute 75 police officers to the European Police Headline Goal.

Meanwhile, the Romanian MOD has planned a more compact, higher performance, more efficient and flexible force structure, compatible with NATO standards, to be operational by the end of 2003. It will include 112,000 military personnel (18,000 officers, 40,000 NCOs and warrant officers, 22,300 contract-enlisted sergeants and 31,500 conscripts) and 28,000 civilians. In the planning blueprint, Romania's basic secu-

rity and defence interests were considered, joining NATO being a wish, not an end in itself. As a Membership Action Plan (MAP) country, the process of reforming and restructuring the Romanian armed forces benefits from politically agreed financial support, so that the defence budget will be maintained at a level of at least 2 per cent of GDP. It was 1.9 per cent in 2001, and will be around 2.4 per cent in 2002, with a simultaneous growth of GDP and defence expenditure. The budget for 2001 allocated: 57 per cent of expenditure for personnel, 33 per cent for equipment (including foreign credit reimbursement) and around 10 per cent for operation and maintenance, infrastructure and other expenses. The goal is to reach NATO standards: 40 per cent personnel costs, 35-40 per cent equipment acquisition, 20-25 per cent operation and maintenance.

Since 1991 Bucharest has been actively involved in a large number of PSOs, gaining a significant experience in the field: 9 UN operations, 3 NATO-led peace support operations and 4 missions under the OSCE umbrella. They include Angola (UNAVEM III and MONUA); Albania (ALBA); Bosnia-Herzegovina (IFOR, SFOR I and II); Kosovo (KFOR); Afghanistan (ISAF); Iraq-Kuwait (UNIKOM); Congo (MONUC); Ethiopia-Eritrea (UNMEE); and OSCE missions in Georgia, FYROM and Kosovo. More than 6,500 Romanian military personnel have already been involved. Presently, Romania's main efforts are directed to its participation in SFOR (120 military personnel), KFOR (210) and ISAF (48 and a C-130B transport aircraft).

Currently, Romania is also taking part in the following regional politico-military cooperative initiatives: Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE)/South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG); Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR); Romanian-Hungarian Joint Peacekeeping Battalion; Multinational Engineer Battalion between Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine (Tisa Battalion); and Multinational Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations (SHIRBRIG). Furthermore, negotiations are taking place for the establishing of

the Central European Nations Cooperation in Peace Support (CENCOOP).

#### *IV. Romania and defence procurement*

Romania considers that European cooperation in the field of defence industry plays an essential role in improving the EU's military capabilities. Bucharest is also keen on participating in WEAG: negotiations are in hand in order to conclude a memorandum of understanding between Romania and WEAG, allowing the participation in the programmes launched through the EUROFINDER mechanism.

Romania's current and projected inventory of CFE-accountable equipment is below the established ceilings. Actually, during the Communist regime Romania had an important and well-developed defence industry sector. Romanian arms exports were directed to various conflict areas in the world. After 1989, the traditional arms export markets went lost once and for all and domestic demand, too, shrank because of the lack of resources. As a consequence, the defence industry has undergone major restructuring. At the beginning of the 1990s there were approximately 130,000 employees in the sector: presently they amount to only 60,000 (according to some sources, the real figure is 45,000). The restructuring process was limited to downsizing personnel and various compensatory measures. Since 2001, it has been managed by the Ministry of Industry and Resources along with the MOD. According to official sources, in 2002 a further 26,500 employees may have to be laid off, while recovery programmes and other protection measures are envisaged. The government committed itself not to close any of the existing defence factories but either to convert them to civilian production or transform them into modern military equipment producers.

In the past, several scandals have exploded in defence procurement policy. Probably the most famous is that related to the privatisation of IAR Brasov, once the pride of the Romanian defence industry. According to the initial contract, the

acquisition by Romania of 96 attack helicopters (close to the figure allowed by CFE Treaty and at a cost far exceeding the defence budget) was a condition set by Bell Helicopters for taking over the firm. One of the arguments used by the former government to support the takeover was based on the fact that it would have enhanced Romania's chances of NATO membership. In the end, after a long and controversial public debate, the Government had to abandon its position. Meanwhile, there have been negotiations with the European group Eurocopter, but nothing concrete has happened so far.

According to the declared priorities and to the financial resources allocated for the defence sector, the restructuring process of the armed forces was to be undertaken in two stages. *In the first stage* (2000-03), the process includes resizing the armed forces and establishing the new force structure; the professionalisation of the personnel; the modernisation and standardisation of training practices. During this stage, only acquisition programmes whose funding is ensured will be implemented, all others being rescheduled. Still, while the new structures are put in place, the partial modernisation of certain operational components will be carried out. *In the second stage* (2004-07), progress towards the planned operational capability will continue and major procurement programmes aimed at the modernisation of the Romanian forces with support equipment and protection of the combat equipment typical of the twenty-first century battlefield will be concluded. In other words, no major procurement programme will begin before 2004.

#### *V. Romania and European security policy*

Romania's view of the role of an enlarged EU is to have a Union with a more coherent and defined vision vis-à-vis the main international actors, i.e. the United States, Russia, and China. In the medium term, CFSP should function on an intergovernmental basis, especially as a consequence of the development and implementation of ESDP. The European Commis-

sion, however, should be increasingly involved in this field. The EU is a regional power, but in many areas it acts as a global one. In Bucharest's eyes, the place of Europe in the international system could be defined as follows: the most faithful allies of the United States, Russia's anchor within the community of democratic and free societies, and a powerful global actor in the field of trade and finance (via the euro). In the longer term, the emergence of ESDP could constitute the necessary incentive to transform the EU into a global actor and fully assert its identity on the international scene. The Union should stick to its traditional way of promoting its values, i.e. through preventive actions. The EU seems to benefit from the advantage that there is no dominant country inside it. On the contrary, the member states, especially the small and medium-sized ones, should focus on the areas of foreign policy where they have experience and interests. With enlargement, these CFSP features are set to become stronger.

Geographically, for Romania, the priorities of CFSP should be the Balkans, the CIS and Russia, probably the Caucasus. Romania deems it necessary to pay more attention, during the next IGC, to the definition of the geographical limits of the EU. This would contribute to the definition of a strategic approach to its eastern neighbours, i.e. the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus.

In the foreseeable future, the constructive abstention clause represents for the EU perhaps the only possible way to function on a normal basis in an intergovernmental area such as CFSP/ESDP. As for the application of enhanced cooperation to CFSP/ESDP, Romania has supported the idea from the beginning and suggested using the ESDP concept as an avant-garde of enlargement (there have been proposals to extend the Association Agreement to the defence sector). The QMV procedure, by contrast, should not be used as a means to ignore or marginalise small and medium-sized countries. Finally, given the progress that has been and will be made in the CFSP/ESDP, Bucharest will probably support the establishment of a Council of Ministers of Defence on the model of the General Affairs Council.

Romania is in favour of the review of the Treaties and backs the idea of a European Constitution or a Constitutional Treaty on the Union. The role of the European Parliament should become more important and it should also be given some authority over defence expenditure as related to Art. 17 TEU-type operations. A Committee of National Parliaments, on the model of the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, could also be set up. There would be two possible options: *a minimal one*, with the Committee having only a consultative role (thus also solving the problem of the future of the WEU Parliamentary Assembly); and *a maximal one*, with it receiving some competencies and a right of co-decision with the present European Parliament.

The future of the EU-NATO relationship depends, in a decisive way, on the finalisation of the arrangements allowing the Union access to NATO assets and capabilities. Romania supports the EU's efforts in this domain as well as the prospect of harmonising the two organisations' exercise policy, along the pattern of past WEU-NATO relations. The efforts of the EU in the field of ESDP should not – at least in the medium term – lead to the creation of a European Army.

## VI. Romania and enlargement after 11 September

After the tragic events of September 2001, Romania became aware that security is indivisible and that ignoring aggression may mean inviting aggression. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, the whole world was united against a common enemy – terrorism. As a consequence, Romania has immediately declared itself a *de facto* NATO member and acted accordingly. A concrete step was to offer NATO forces free access to all land, maritime and air facilities identified in this context. Furthermore, Romania announced its contribution to ISAF.

Although the initial general reaction was one of shock and solidarity with the United States, a few weeks later Romania found itself once again

immersed in its economic and social problems. It also became obvious that the country is not seen as a potential target for similar attacks. Yet Bucharest considers that the impact of 11 September has been directly felt by South-Eastern Europe as a region. First, because it is still an area with a very high potential for conflict. Second, because terrorists have been active within its borders. Third, because a shift in political attention away from here might have unpredictable consequences, at a time when unfinished business still requires the involvement of the international community. And fourth, because further disintegration in this region could have a disruptive effect on the necessary coordination efforts of the anti-terrorist campaign. That is why the US decision to stick to its commitments in the Balkans was well received in Romania.

In the new circumstances, some countries of South-Eastern Europe decided to launch a new initiative on 'Counterproliferation, Border Security and Counterterrorism'. Romania

intends to play an active role in it. By assuming the chairmanship of SEDM Coordination Committee (SEDM-CC) and Political-Military Steering Committee (PMSC)/MPFSEE in 2001 and of SEEGROUP, as well as the Co-Presidency of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe Working Table III in 2002, Bucharest will bring its contribution to the coordination process among the various cooperative initiatives in the region. In this endeavour, it will most certainly take stock of the experience gained while chairing the OSCE in 2001.

Finally, Romania does not see any immediate linkage between the enlargement of the EU, that of NATO and the present security situation. Although the NATO-Russia relationship has taken a new and positive path and put the Baltic States altogether in a better position than before, Romania has important assets and there is still a good chance that it will be invited to join NATO.

## Bulgaria

Radoslava Stefanova

### *I. Bulgaria and CFSP*

Since 10 December 1999, Bulgaria has opened negotiations on 23 chapters, having deposited official positions on 26. It is about to deposit the remaining three positions soon. To date, 13 chapters have been preliminarily closed. Negotiations on Chapters 26 and 27 were among those that presented least problems: both were officially opened for negotiation in May 2000 and closed in November 2000 and June 2000 respectively. Bulgarian foreign and security policy is enshrined predominantly in the 1991 Constitution, more specifically in its Articles 5, 24, 85, 98, 100, 106, 49 and 158, which constitute the legal norms to be examined in relation to CFSP. All three of the EU Commission's Progress Reports since 1999 have underlined the compliance of Bulgarian legislation with the CFSP *acquis*, and both Brussels and Sofia expect that Bulgaria will be fully able to adopt the entire CFSP *acquis* at the time of accession. Due to the normative scope of the legislation linked CFSP, Bulgaria's negotiating position was the only one submitted for discussion and approval to Parliament, which adopted it unanimously on 26 May 2000.

Since 1994, i.e. even before filing its official application for EU membership (in late 1995), Bulgaria has been invited to join various EU common positions and *démarches*. It has done so consistently, including support for negative measures against third countries/areas (Former Yugoslavia) that had significant economic repercussions. The Bulgarian side puts particular emphasis on its support for the EU's Code of

Conduct on arms exports, as well as on the general lack of requests for derogation or transitional periods on both sides.

In its relationship with third countries, Bulgaria stresses its role in promoting regional cooperation and stabilisation in South-Eastern Europe, where it is part of virtually all subregional and multilateral initiatives and bodies, supporting and joining all important missions and projects. Officials at the Foreign Ministry emphasise the important stabilisation and pacification role Sofia has played during the prolonged Balkan crises, which is likely to reinforce the Union's ability to cope with similar crises in the future, once the country becomes a fully-fledged EU member.<sup>1</sup> Bulgaria also underlines its excellent relations with all its neighbours, a fact not to be taken for granted in what is still quite a turbulent region.

As for the other provisions covered in Chapter 27, Bulgaria has put in place all relevant legislation for the safeguard of foreign diplomats and consular relations in general. It has also concluded the technical preparation for the installation of U3 mail common communication system and considers itself ready for full participation in the Courtsey system.

In the field of control of foreign trade in armaments and dual-use items and technologies, Bulgaria is also harmonising its legal system in accordance with the update and review of the relevant EU *acquis*. The Parliament is currently discussing amendments to the existing law on Control of Foreign Trade Activity of Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, likely to be adopted by the end of November. The

<sup>1</sup> Private interviews with officials from the European Integration Directorate, MFA, Sofia, November 2001. Unless otherwise indicated, all the quoted statements and reported data in this paper are taken from *RFE/RL Newswire* (2001-02).

new bill should bring Bulgarian legislation in line with the EU Council Regulation 1334/22.06.2000 as well as incorporating an updated list of banned items in accordance with the Wassenaar Arrangement. A list of countries and organisations to which exports are to be restricted was adopted by the Government on 9 April 2000. In other words, there is no reason to think that there will be problems with the country's ability and willingness to adopt fully all CFSP decisions at the time of accession – whenever that happens.

## *II. Bulgaria and ESDP*

According to a recent statement by the new Bulgarian Foreign Minister, Solomon Passy, 'Bulgaria welcomes and supports the emerging ESDP as a policy to reinforce the Union's contribution to peace and stability on the continent. Our support stems from Bulgaria's strategic goals – EU and NATO membership. We share the view that being able to deliver on an effective security and defence policy is essential for the EU credibility.'<sup>2</sup> In addition, Passy underlined that EU's increased crisis management capabilities under ESDP were 'a vital element in our common coalition against terrorism'.

It should be noted, however, that Bulgaria's current foreign minister has a personal pro-NATO background, having been for almost 10 years the president of Bulgaria's Atlantic Club. As a result, his vision certainly has a strong Atlantic orientation (similar to that of the three Central European NATO non-EU members), favouring a limited development of an autonomous European defence capability but with an emphasis on placing all EU activities within a NATO framework. In fact, Passy stresses that he sees the aim of ESDP as 'the creation of "value added" to the existing NATO potential [while] collective defence has to remain NATO's function.' By and large, however, it is fair to say that

ESDP's linkage with NATO was also advocated by the Kostov government.<sup>3</sup> If the current attitude in Bulgarian foreign policy-making circles persists until accession, Bulgaria is very likely to side with the more pro-US group of EU members.

## *III. Bulgaria and military crisis management*

Following the Capabilities Commitment Conference of November 2000, on 19 April 2001 Bulgaria officially declared its willingness to contribute to the EU's Rapid Reaction Force with one mechanised battalion, one engineering battalion, one radioactive and chemical reconnaissance brigade, two Mi-17 cargo helicopters, four military Mi-24 helicopters, a sea-based rocket launcher to be used in the Black Sea, and two liaison officers for employment in the framework of CIMIC. Bulgaria also advocates convening a Capabilities Improvement Conference and a first Police Conference in 15+15 format. It is now considering also a possible further contribution to the Headline Goal through specific commitments for civilian crisis management.

More generally, Sofia supports the Union's overall approach to both the military and civilian dimensions of conflict prevention and crisis management, and has repeatedly stated its willingness to contribute to future EU military operations and to participate in its industrial definition and development. Bulgaria views its leading role in the setting up, in 1998, of the multinational peacekeeping force in South-Eastern Europe (SEEBRIG), headquartered in Plovdiv, as evidence of its engagement and ability to contribute to such arrangements. Building on the fact that SEEBRIG was declared operational in May 2001, at the 6th South-East European Defence Ministers meeting held in Antalya last December, US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld proposed that the SEEBRIG

<sup>2</sup> Speech delivered during Passy's visit to Brussels for a meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the EU and the candidate countries, 20 November 2001.

<sup>3</sup> Private interviews with officials from the European Integration Directorate, MFA, Sofia, November 2001.

replace some of the SFOR troops in Bosnia (which he suggested should be downsized by 60 per cent by the end of 2002). Bulgarian Defence Minister Nicolai Svinarov, however, replied that Sofia was against involving its forces in neighbouring countries, even for peacekeeping missions.<sup>4</sup>

Bulgaria has participated in international peacekeeping missions since 1992, having contributed with military forces to missions in Cambodia, Angola, Croatia, and Tajikistan. Current commitments include a transport brigade and a sequence of nine military engineering detachments of 30 men each to SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1997; a sequence of three 40-men military engineering detachments and 48 police observers to the UNMIK mission in Kosovo as well as the running of a 2,000-bed military hospital in the Radusha refugee camp in FYROM. In addition, Bulgaria has committed troops and a decontamination shower facility to the British-led ISAF in Afghanistan, to be deployed by mid-February.

Bulgarian armed forces currently number around 65,000, divided between infantry and artillery troops, the Air Force and the Navy – a number still too high in terms of both military efficiency and defence spending, despite the efforts of the Kostov government to reduce it over recent years. While significant progress has been achieved in pushing through some of the toughest reforms (such as lay-offs and early retirement of officers), further efforts are needed to bring the Army in line with NATO requirements. The new Defence Minister, Nikolai Svinarov, recently announced a radical restructuring of the Army, code-named Plan 2004, which envisages a reduction of 20,000 men by 2004 and the formation of small, more mobile units. Part of Plan 2004 is also the decommissioning of 800 tanks, 500 armoured vehicles, 40 radar stations, and 27 naval units. With regard to weaponry upgrading in accordance with NATO standards, Svinarov does not expect

resources to be available before 2003.<sup>5</sup> However, he pledged that the Army's communications system would be compatible with that of NATO members in time for the 2002 Prague summit. In terms of strategy, Svinarov called for the revision of both the National Security Concept and the official military doctrine, although he considered the reforms already undertaken in 2001 with the purpose of streamlining the armed forces and initiating the structural reforms of Plan 2004 a success. This has also been confirmed by General Jeremy Mackenzie, a former deputy SACEUR and now a consultant on military reform, who has given a positive overall assessment of Svinarov's Plan 2004. Plan 2004 still has to be approved by the Council of Ministers. Currently the defence budget is 3 per cent of GDP.

#### *IV. Bulgaria and defence procurement*

Since the Kostov government, Bulgaria has sought membership of the WEAG group, and hopes to achieve it soon. While supporting a more coordinated European procurement policy, however, the Kostov administration's procurement preferences seemed to lie with the United States (in so far as they are financially affordable): relations with European suppliers have begun to be explored only recently, although already in 1999 the Government in Sofia signed a contract with Marconi for the improvement of the army's communications system.<sup>6</sup>

The most pressing procurement problem concerns the Air Force, which has two squadrons of MiG-29s consisting of 21 planes in total, only three of which are airworthy due to the lack of spare parts. The problem stems from Russia's refusal to pay back half of its \$100 billion debt to Bulgaria in spare MiG parts or, more generally, to make them available in any marke-

<sup>4</sup> In fact, the SEEBRIG's rationale has been that the peacekeepers would be deployed in regions other than South-East Europe.

<sup>5</sup> Interview with Agence France Presse, 26 November 2001 as quoted in *RFE/RL Newslines* vol. 5, no. 223, Part II, November 2001.

<sup>6</sup> Private interviews with a former Ministry of Defence official, Sofia, November 2001.



table way. However, Russia has recently agreed to repay its debt in the form of other military supplies, such as nuclear fuel. Throughout 2000 there were repeated leaks to the media (never denied by the then Defence Minister Boiko Noev) that Bulgaria was negotiating the acquisition of F-16s, which further exasperated Moscow. Sofia did indeed acquire 6 US Bell helicopters, while it is not clear whether and how the new government intends to pursue the purchase of F-16s.

On 12 December 2001 the new Defence Minister Nikolai Svinarov officially announced an international tender for the upgrading of the MiG-29s to bring them in line with NATO standards. The tender is estimated to be worth some \$300 million. The bidders are required to repair the planes at Bulgaria's aviation repair plant Georgi Benkovski and to be licensed by Mikoyan, Russia's chief construction bureau. Accordingly, five foreign companies have already expressed interest, among them the Russian MiG and an unspecified Israeli company. Like his predecessor, Svinarov has also speculated on the possibility of selling the MiGs after their upgrading in order to finance the purchase of Western-made military aircraft, although he has not ruled out retaining some of the MiGs once they are sufficiently modernised to meet NATO standards.

Another procurement aspect prompted notably by Bulgaria's NATO membership aspirations has been the dismantlement of the country's Soviet-made SS-23 medium-range missiles and their replacement with more modern items. Again, the United States is being considered as the main possible supplier, as it is also pledging considerable financial assistance in both the dismantlement of the SS-23s and the delivery of more up-to-date US missiles to boost Bulgaria's position for the 2002 Prague NATO summit. On 18 December 2001 the Bulgarian Parliament approved the SS-23s dismantlement timetable, whereby the SS-23s are to be destroyed by 30

October 2002. As agreed with the US State Department, the destruction of the SS-23s will be carried out by an American company specialised in the destruction of *Scud* missiles.

## *V. Bulgaria and European security policy*

Most of Bulgaria's progress in the area of enlargement and CFSP had to do with the government led by Ivan Kostov until June 2001. The new government of Simeon Saxecoburggotski<sup>7</sup> that took over last July started out on a vague foreign policy platform, but it has recently reaffirmed Bulgaria's aspirations to EU and NATO membership. Several months after taking office the new Foreign Minister, Solomon Passy, pledged to deliver by early 2002 an 'Acceleration Strategy' for Bulgaria's EU accession, which the previous administration expected would occur in 2006. The delivery of the new strategy by the new government was also prompted by a number of remarks made by EU diplomats in the run-up to the Laeken Euro-pean Council.

Sofia's relatively late start in pursuing EU and NATO membership and in implementing the necessary and required reforms accounts for the ever more resolute approach taken by the present and past governments. Even the former Communist Party, whose leader was recently elected President, seems to be committed to these same foreign policy priorities. Despite the slowly rising but still relatively low standard of living, public support for Euro-Atlantic institutions is among the highest among candidate states.

One of the reasons why it is unlikely that Bulgaria's general attitude towards the security dimension of the EU will change significantly in the future is that the obstacles to membership are mostly of an economic nature, which makes the prospect for membership rather speculative. In the CFSP/ESDP field Bulgaria is likely to

<sup>7</sup> For purposes of clarity, it should be noted that while the Premier's royal relatives throughout Europe are usually known under their dynasty's name, Saxe Coburg-Gotha, when Simeon took up Bulgarian citizenship in the early 1990s his passport was issued using the Bulgarianised version of his original family name, Saxecoburggotski. This is the name under which he registered to run for the general elections, and this is the name that he now uses as Prime Minister.

become a constructive member of the Union, duly assuming and fulfilling its obligations in terms of crisis management or relevant foreign policy initiatives. It is still quite realistic to expect that stability in South-Eastern Europe and close ties with the United States and NATO would be Bulgaria's foreign policy priorities at the time of membership. Aware of the many structural limitations that may take Bulgaria into very long transitional periods, the government has hinted that it favours increased flexibility for CFSP as well as use of the constructive abstention clause, while also supporting enhanced cooperation in principle. Given the substantial convergence between Bulgaria's foreign policy and that of the EU, it is unlikely that the country would seek any significant change to the TEU in the field of CFSP/ESDP, even if it might be very interested in the proceedings of the 2004 IGC in other key areas, such as the social or the economic ones.

## *VI. Bulgaria and enlargement after 11 September*

The domestic debate on the new meaning of security and its preservation in the Balkans in the wake of the terrorist attack on the United States was far from one-dimensional. To start with, Premier Saksoburggotski's first declaration was ambivalent and stirred up controversy in the press. In fact, he declared that since Bulgaria was far away from what was happening, the country should not worry about adopting specific measures.<sup>8</sup> By contrast, Foreign Minister Passy said that NATO's Art. 5 should be applied in response to the terrorist attacks, and that he considered Bulgaria bound by that article even if the country was not a member of the Alliance. Defence Minister Svinarov stated that Bulgaria would be ready to make available to the United States both air corridors and support troops and equipment. On 13 September the Parliament approved a declaration of

condemnation of the terrorist attacks, adopting after some discussion a formula whereby 'the United States has a leading role in the development of democracy'.

On 13 September some newspapers published articles critical of the United States and the role of NATO, questioning the security offered to the Balkans by the EU. The political analyst Ivan Krastev told the daily *Dnevnik* on 12 September that NATO was losing credibility, and that it was to be expected that South-Eastern Europe would fade away from the US political agenda. As a result, the European Union – *volens nolens* – would have to take up the task of guaranteeing security in the Balkans much more comprehensively, a task for which it still had to prove its readiness. Also the daily *Kapital* was worried about the EU's not being able or willing to take up peacemaking in the Balkans in the wake of 11 September.

After the controversy had abated somewhat, however, the Government decided to make some concrete moves which would prop up Bulgaria's credibility as an ally and strengthen the country's chances for membership of the EU and NATO. In mid-October the Government submitted to Parliament a proposal to waive Bulgaria's reservation on the European Convention on terrorism that the country signed in 1998. The reservation has to do with the right to refuse extradition of a terrorist offender requested by another country if it is considered that the offence had political motivations. On this occasion, Justice Minister Anton Stankov argued that 'in the context of the events of September 11, we cannot make any reservation for terrorist activities. Terrorism has entered a new era, so global and so overreaching, that it has to be fought at all levels.'<sup>9</sup> And in his recent visit to Brussels, Foreign Minister Passy once again made the link that Bulgaria perceives between the strengthening of the CFSP through enlargement and a more effective countering of international terrorism explicit.

On 14 November the Parliament in Sofia

<sup>8</sup> *Notizie Est*, no. 470, [www.ecn.org](http://www.ecn.org).

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.government.bg/Priorities/ForeignPolicy/2001-10-18/367.html>.

ratified a deal signed with the United States that allows US forces to transit through or stay in the country as part of Operation *Enduring Freedom*. The deal also allows the use of Bulgarian airspace for overflights and the storage of military equipment for the duration of the whole campaign against international terrorism. On 23 November six USAF KC-135 *Stratotanker* aircraft serviced by 200 ground personnel arrived in Burgas: the operation was terminated on 27 December 2001. During their visit to Brussels in mid-November Passy and Svinarov also made an offer of similar logistical support to the British troops leading the ISAF force in Afghanistan.

Finally, as far as EU enlargement proper is concerned, on 19 November French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine suggested that all 12 candidates (the ten Central Europeans plus Malta and Cyprus) should be taken in as members together, thus emphasising the political dimension of enlargement.<sup>10</sup> On 6 December the French Minister for European Affairs, Pierre Moscovici, said that ‘Bulgaria should not be left out of the [EU] accession talks’, and that he supported ‘the idea that the European enlargement project must be looked at from a political perspective and that there must be no dividing lines among the [candidate] countries.’ Neither French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin nor President Jacques Chirac dissociated themselves from these statements, which seem to reflect a

concerted policy adopted by France with regard to enlargement in general. Highly encouraged by these statements, and clearly in anticipation of the Laeken summit, on 11 December 2001 the Bulgarian Foreign Minister Passy declared that Bulgaria had decided that 2003 was the expected date for closing the accession negotiations with a view to joining the EU in 2004 – a decision that reportedly had been taken several months previously, but that the Premier refused to confirm at the Laeken summit. By contrast, Enlargement Commissioner Günther Verheugen repeatedly said that Bulgaria’s attempt to join the EU with the other candidates was a ‘Harry Potter’ approach, and that it was advisable ‘not to create expectations [among Bulgarians] that are too high and cannot be met, because that could lead to disappointment.’ The Laeken Council’s decision, in fact, confirmed the fact that Bulgaria and Romania would probably be left out of the ‘Big Bang’ enlargement expected to take place in 2004. On 19 December, however, the Bulgarian parliament approved the Accelerated Strategy with an overwhelming majority, building also on remarkable public support for a fast track to accession. While the Strategy has triggered sceptical reactions by European officials, the Danish Parliament’s European Affairs Committee suggested that Bulgaria’s accession – by virtue of the progress made so far – could be separated from Romania’s.

<sup>10</sup> Védrine’s statement was immediately welcomed by Passy as ‘visionary’, in line with Jean Monnet’s thinking. The Belgian presidency, however, followed by Enlargement Commissioner Günther Verheugen, expressed strong doubts as to the plausibility of Védrine’s claims.

## Conclusions

Antonio Missiroli

The enlargement of the European Union is a security policy in itself. It is a security policy by other means, so to speak, and a security policy in its own right. By other means, because extending the Union's norms, rules, opportunities and constraints to the applicants makes instability and conflict in the region much less likely, although such adjustment may entail elements of risk. And it is a security policy in its own right, too, because the entrants bring in interests and skills that broaden the scope of the common external policies.<sup>1</sup> This was the case with the first enlargement of the European Community, with the British (and partially also Danish) outreach overseas and gradual Anglo-Irish *détente* via Brussels. All the more so with the Southern enlargements of the 1980s, which paved the way for the successful completion of post-authoritarian transitions, a significant reinforcement of the Community's presence in the Mediterranean basin and an equally significant extension of European influence in the Americas. Finally, the 1995 enlargement of the recently created EU brought more stability to the Baltic 'rim' and strengthened the Union's drive to cooperate with the UN and the OSCE. It marginally altered the internal balance between allied and non-allied member states, but it also favoured – albeit indirectly, as a sort of compensation for those EU members who felt penalised

by the Central and Northern 'drift' of the Union – the launch of the Barcelona process.

The current enlargement, however, is nothing like the previous ones. It is fundamentally different in size, scope, and character. And it is likely to change quite radically the institutions, the policies, even the nature of the Union.<sup>2</sup> To what extent and exactly how will it affect the way in which the EU projects itself externally? In other words, what CFSP and ESDP will the enlarged Union end up with? Needless to say, answering such questions always entails a strong element of guesswork. In fact, actual membership per se may alter the expectations, the priorities and, ultimately, the behaviour of the former applicants. To a certain extent, the fact that membership is closer now than it was a few years ago has *already* altered their attitude and influenced their foreign policy decisions. Moreover, in a Union of more than 20 members, alliances and coalitions may easily shift according to the contingencies and the issues at stake. What can be assessed at this stage, therefore, is only what priorities, preferences, general attitudes and specific interests the current applicants will bring into the present Union of Fifteen. What will happen from day one after accession is bound to remain a guessing game.

In this respect, much as nuances persist among the ten Central European<sup>3</sup> candidates

<sup>1</sup> See my introduction to A. Missiroli (ed.), 'Coherence for European Security Policy: Debates – Cases – Assessments', *Occasional Paper 27* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, May 2001), especially pp. 6-7. On enlargement as 'risk management', see P. Cecchini, E. Jones and J. Lorentzen, 'Europe and the Concept of Enlargement', *Survival*, vol. XLIII (2001), no. 1, pp. 155-65.

<sup>2</sup> For an overview see G. Avery and F. Cameron, *The Enlargement of the European Union* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998). On the specific procedures and the use of 'conditionality' see K. E. Smith, *The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1999). See also F. Draus, 'Un élargissement pas comme les autres. Réflexion sur les spécificités des pays candidats d'Europe centrale et orientale', *Etudes et recherches* 11 (Paris: Notre Europe, 2000). For the significantly different issues raised by the two Mediterranean candidates (Cyprus and Malta) see M. Maresceau and E. Lannon (eds.), *The EU's Enlargement and Mediterranean Strategies: A Comparative Analysis* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001).

(due also to their different historical experience, geopolitical position, sheer size, and available re-sources), some discernible common features emerge from the contributions collected in this *Occasional Paper*.

### ■ CFSP and ESDP

First, the negotiations on the CFSP-related chapters (26 and 27) of the *acquis* went rather smoothly and came to a quick end for all. The only issues that stirred up some controversy – be it through requests for transitional periods (26) or through non-alignment with CFSP common positions or *démarches* (27) – were those that involved relations with fellow applicants and/or neighbours. As long as the enlargement process appeared to proceed in different gears for the two main groups invited to the negotiating table – the Luxembourg Six (1997) and the Helsinki Six (1999) – the most advanced candidates were afraid of dismantling bilateral or subregional arrangements that had proved effective in improving relations and security at all levels. However, once it became clear recently that almost all ten countries under consideration might accede to the Union at roughly the same time, that worry disappeared. Similar fears were aired with respect to such countries as Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, Belarus. In so far as they are still on the table, they will be dealt with either in the final round of negotiations on the individual Accession Treaties or in the broader EU framework after enlargement.

On the whole, however, it is arguable that enlarging the CFSP *acquis* has hardly raised any problems, thanks to its primarily declaratory

nature, the limited domestic adjustments it has required, and the substantial lack of budgetary burdens: ‘conditionality’ has not played any significant role.<sup>4</sup> The good news, therefore, is that the process of legal adaptation and policy convergence is already well advanced here. The possibly less good news is that the real negotiations between old and new partners over what the Commission officials in charge call ‘the future us’ have not taken place at all on foreign policy and will probably take place elsewhere: on agriculture, structural funds, justice and home affairs, taxation.

As for *ESDP*, all applicants from Central Europe reacted late and defensively to its launch in 1999. On the one hand, they hardly understood its rationale and, above all, feared that it could undermine NATO’s internal cohesion and, more generally, drive the Americans out of Europe. On the other hand, some of the applicants suspected that involvement in *ESDP* might come as an alternative to NATO membership or, worse, as a consolation prize for not being admitted into the Alliance – which instead was (and remains) their main security policy goal. By contrast, for those candidates who were already fully-fledged NATO members, the key issue was notably the establishment of a clearly defined relationship with the Alliance whereby all relevant decisions would be taken at 15+6 (EU members plus other European allies). In many ways, and with varying emphasis, Warsaw, Prague and Budapest considered *ESDP* acceptable only as *ESDI* within (or under the supervision of) NATO. Over time, however, such attitudes have evolved towards a warmer acceptance of the *ESDP* blueprint as eventually spelt out in Nice – on condition that its implementation

<sup>3</sup> The notion of ‘Central Europe’ as applied to the countries considered in this paper is still controversial. In fact, they amount to what during the Cold War was called ‘Eastern’ and later on ‘East-Central’ or ‘Central-Eastern’ Europe. WEU adopted it officially in the mid-1990s but the EU has not, preferring not to label the candidates geographically. Even among the ten, the scope of the term varies considerably – all the more so when it hints at past historical experiences (e.g. *Mittleuropa*). ‘Central or Middle Europe’, however, covers quite well the old German idea of a *Zwischeneuropa* lying between Western Europe proper (Germany included) and Russia. For a broader discussion see J. Rupnik, *The Other Europe* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988); G. Schöpflin and N. Wood (eds.), *In Search of Central Europe* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989); J. Le Rider, *La Mittleuropa* (Paris: PUF, 1994); S. Medvedev, ‘“Zwischeneuropa”: Historic Experiences, National Views and Strategic Alternatives’, *UPI Working Papers* 6, Helsinki, 1998; K. Henderson (ed.), *Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union* (London: UCL Press, 1999); C. Lord (ed.), *Central Europe: Core or Periphery?* (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School Press, 2000).

<sup>4</sup> The applicants’ attitude is well analysed in P. Dunay, ‘Boxes: Why CFSP and CESDP Do Not Matter Much to EU Candidate Countries’, *RSC Policy Papers* 01/5 (S. Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute, 2001).

turns into a positive-sum (rather than zero-sum) game between the Union and the Alliance.

### ■ Crisis management and defence procurement

In spite of their relatively short record of freedom of action (and, for some, independence) on the international scene, over the past few years all ten Central European applicants have been increasingly engaged in *peacekeeping operations*, mostly – but not exclusively – in the Western Balkans. As a rule, they have done so as modular components of bigger multinational units and under foreign command. Much as their contributions have been limited in absolute numbers and restricted in their functions, they have proved the willingness and ability of the applicants to participate and perform in Art. 17 TEU-type operations. As a result, in late November 2000 the candidates committed forces and capabilities to the so-called ‘Headline Goal-plus’. Modest as they are, therefore, the ‘voluntary contributions’ by EU applicants<sup>5</sup> display a remarkable degree of political goodwill. What is worth noting is not only the fact – quite normal also among current EU members – that all the forces earmarked for the HG-plus are ‘double-hatted’ (i.e. answerable to both NATO and the EU), but also that in most candidate countries participation in NATO-led or EU-led missions is seen as a driving factor towards some sort of *role specialisation*. Such specialisation, of course, is about making virtue out of necessity: financial, technical and human resources are scarce and have to be concentrated and focused on viable objectives – all the more so since all the countries

under consideration are in the process of overhauling and modernising their military forces. Nevertheless, functional role specialisation (military as well as civilian) is a path that could also soon prove necessary for current EU members.<sup>6</sup>

Finally, similar constraints (and opportunities) apply also to the ten candidates’ defence *procurement policy* proper. While most countries are still substituting or upgrading old equipment from the Soviet era, the need to become more interoperable with NATO allies and, in the future, EU partners is putting additional pressure on public budgets and decision-makers.<sup>7</sup> What is worth noting here, too, is that some evolution has occurred throughout Central Europe. Whilst in the late 1990s tenders were almost systematically won by American firms (partly as a side effect of the candidates’ willingness to gain Washington’s support in their bids for NATO membership), lately officials seem to have adopted a more balanced attitude. As a result, European companies have more chances now, for reasons that are linked in part to the prospect of EU membership but in part also to the more credible offset programmes they may be able to offer. Procurement policy, in other words, remains largely driven by political considerations (the two enlargements) but takes increasingly into account the added value of domestic job creation in *high-tech* sectors that may prove crucial in the future.

### ■ European security in the twenty-first century

At the present stage, the main issue for most Central European candidates still seems to be

<sup>5</sup> There are no official figures available on the ‘voluntary contributions’ to the ‘HG-plus’. Those given in this *Occasional Paper* were collected individually country by country, although they convey a reliable overall picture. To be added are those offered by Norway (approx. 3,500 men plus support elements) and Turkey (an infantry brigade, two air squadrons and two transport aircraft, one amphibious infantry battalion plus seven ships and one submarine); see A. Missiroli, ‘Sicherheitspolitische Kooperation zwischen EU und NATO: Der türkische Verdruss über die ESVP’, *Integration*, vol. XXIV (2001), no. 4, pp. 340-55. At the Capability Improvement Conference of November 2001, six of the 15 non-EU countries further increased their initial pledge to the ERRF.

<sup>6</sup> See the discussion paper recently delivered by King’s College Centre for Defence Studies, *Making Sense of the Helsinki Headline Goal*, London, November 2001.

<sup>7</sup> For a comprehensive overview see H. J. Giessmann and G. E. Gustenau (eds.), *Security Handbook 2001 – Security and Military in Central and Eastern Europe* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2001).

that of *participation*. This is apparent at different levels. They want to be adequately consulted and involved in decision-shaping via the official formats envisaged since Nice and also more informal ones. They also want to be considered partners-in-the-making and therefore listened to as prospective subjects, rather than objects, of common foreign policy. This is particularly true of the process of institutional reform (the Convention, followed by another Treaty review) to be completed in 2004 – i.e. the target date for the accession of the first new entrants – yet it could also be extended to CFSP and ESDP at large.<sup>8</sup> Prospectively, participation also means being on an equal footing with the current members in an enlarged Union in which decision-making may become increasingly (even exponentially) complicated. This may help explain the apparently strange dichotomy that is discernible across all ten applicants, namely between their latent opposition to more majority voting and extended ‘enhanced cooperation’ in CFSP/ESDP (which may render them less relevant or even marginal in decision-making) and their openness vis-à-vis the use of ‘constructive abstention’ (which would instead preserve their formal status, but without confronting them with responsibilities that may challenge their resources or internal cohesion). More generally, they all seem to realise that a more effective Union will be in their best interests yet hesitate in the face of the possible institutional implications – just another attitude that is present also among the current EU members, with the crucial difference that most of the Central European candidates have (re)gained their full

national sovereignty only lately and, therefore, may feel particularly uncomfortable with the prospect of ‘pooling’ it right away.

Another important issue is the *scope and outreach* of CFSP/ESDP. For historical as well as geographical reasons, none of the countries under consideration has overseas interests or extensions, let alone a colonial past. Unlike previous enlargements, therefore, the forthcoming one will not entail a significant widening of the horizons of the Union’s external policies. However, all current applicants will have a strong interest in the formulation of those external policies of the enlarged Union that might affect their immediate vicinity. After all, most of them will become the new external frontier (if not the ultimate *limes*) of the EU: the permeability and safety of the Eastern borders and all common ‘direct neighbourhood’ policies<sup>9</sup> will become their vital interests and will presumably shape their behaviour on second-pillar and other issues. The fate of national minorities, cross-border trade and visa regulations, energy and environmental issues, Balkan stability, relations with Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and, of course, Russia will be cases in point – as they have already been, albeit marginally and indirectly, in the accession negotiations. In this sense, the applicants’ impact on CFSP and ESDP will be geographically limited but intensely focused. For further evidence one only has to look at the speech made by Czech President Vaclav Havel in Bratislava last May, in which he was plainly so keen on drawing lines vis-à-vis Russia,<sup>10</sup> or to the suspicious reactions in most Central European countries to the rapproche-

<sup>8</sup> The main precedents in these domains are those of Spain and Portugal in 1985-86 – both attended the proceedings of the Intergovernmental Conference that led to the Single European Act (albeit without voting rights), which occurred a few months after the end of their accession negotiations and before their actual entry – and of Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway in 1994. All four countries had already finalised their Accession Treaties and were expected to join the Union from 1 January 1995. In anticipation of that, they were invited to participate in CFSP activities from the spring of 1994, namely *before* the ratification referendums of the following months. Norway, therefore, was a partner in CFSP for a few months although it has in the end not become a full EU member: in November 1994, in fact, the ‘No’ to accession was to prevail (as it had already done in 1972).

<sup>9</sup> On all these issues see G. Amato and J. Batt (eds.), *The Long-Term Implications of EU Enlargement: The Nature of the New Border*, EUI, Florence, 1999; H. Grabbe, ‘The Sharp Edges of Europe: Security Implications of Extending EU Border Policies Eastwards’, *Occasional Paper 13* (Paris, Institute for Security Studies of WEU, March 2000); H. Grabbe, ‘The Sharp Edges of Europe: Extending Schengen Eastwards’, *International Affairs*, vol. LXXVI (2000), no. 3, pp. 519-36; J. Batt and K. Wolczuk, ‘Keep an Eye on the East’, *Financial Times*, 23 February 2001; J. Monar, ‘The JHA Dimension of EU Enlargement’, *The International Spectator*, vol. XXXVI (2001), no. 3, pp. 37-46; and the papers presented at the joint CEPS-Batory Foundation Conference on ‘New European Borders and Security Cooperation: Promoting Trust in an Enlarged European Union’, Brussels, 6-7 July 2001.

ment between Washington and Moscow in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September. Yet again, this may not necessarily mean that there will be a sort of Central European 'bloc' on, say, relations with Russia (or Belarus). Countries like Slovakia or Bulgaria have different historical and cultural sensitivities from the Baltic States or Poland, while geographical proximity and cross-border trade or minority issues may condition the approach to Russia, Ukraine or former Yugoslavia in several and diverse ways.

Last but not least, NATO *and transatlantic relations*. Needless to say, all ten candidates from Central Europe are pushing for a clear understanding between the Alliance and the Union: whether NATO members or just applicants, they do not want to be forced to choose between Washington and Brussels on security matters. It is therefore to be expected that they will welcome the finalisation by the EU and NATO of the tentative deal that was negotiated with Turkey last December.<sup>11</sup> Their markedly 'Atlanticist' orientation – as is also abundantly clear from opinion polls – will add next to nothing to the spectrum of existing positions among the current EU members. After accession, however, it may tip the internal balance of the Union in that direction, although – as already hinted – actual membership may change the perception of national interests and shape new loyalties, especially if the EU is to take up more direct responsibilities in the Western Balkans. Besides, seven out of the ten Central European applicants are also candidates to join NATO, and their chances have increased lately. Once in, the pressure to join gone and the realities of membership apparent, their attitude may shift towards a more balanced assessment of priorities and goals, as has partially happened with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic since 1999. In other words, there may not be a

Central European 'bloc' on CFSP/ESDP either.

That said, it is worth noting that the terrorist actions of 11 September have had a tangible impact on the applicants' perception of security and vulnerability but have hardly altered their perception of NATO's role. By contrast, among the current EU and NATO members (especially the most 'Atlanticist' ones) the sudden activation of Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty, followed by its modest implementation, is still sending shock waves and raising fundamental questions over the nature and future of the Alliance.<sup>12</sup> How credible are its traditional security guarantees now? Will it become, if anything, a sort of planning and C3 agency (and 'deterrent of last resort', so to speak) for EU-led or joint operations? There has been no trace of such questions, so far, in Central Europe.

### ■ The two enlargements

In the early 1990s, the general expectation was that 'Europe' would eventually be reunited under the joint aegis of the Union and the Alliance. The process would have taken some time, perhaps, due *inter alia* to the fundamentally different entry requirements of the two organisations, but it would have been completed – Russia permitting – in a decade or so. In 1997, however, the two enlargement processes seemed to take divergent paths: a relatively quick but selective enlargement of the Alliance was followed by a slower and still only planned (though almost equally selective) enlargement of the Union.<sup>13</sup> For the former, the driving factors were of a quintessentially geopolitical nature, for the latter of a typically functional/administrative character. Yet the fact that NATO and the Americans did 'deliver' – while the EU and the Europeans did not – still plays a

<sup>10</sup> See [http://www.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/2001/1105\\_uk.html](http://www.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/2001/1105_uk.html)

<sup>11</sup> See A. Missiroli, 'EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP', *Security Dialogue*, vol. XXXIII (2002), no. 1, pp. 9-26.

<sup>12</sup> See for instance L. Freedman, 'The Transformation of NATO', *Financial Times*, 6 August 2001; W. Hopkinson, 'Enlargement: a new NATO', *Chaillot Paper* 49 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, 2001); A. Forster and W. Wallace, 'What is NATO for?', *Survival*, vol. XLIII (2001), no. 4, pp. 107-22; R. de Wijk, 'Perpetual Partners', *Atlantisch Perspectief*, vol. XXV (2001), no. 4, pp. 4-9.



role in the perceptions of the Central European public. As a result, the Alliance is still more popular than the Union among both allied and non-allied applicants, although it must be said that the domestic costs and administrative hurdles of preparing for NATO membership have been (and still are) disproportionately lower than those of preparing for the EU.

More recently, however, the two processes appeared to have become more similar. The expansion of the Alliance started following more stringent functional criteria (as laid down in the Membership Action Plan), partly as a consequence of the technical problems caused in particular by the limited preparedness of the Czech Republic and Hungary.<sup>14</sup> By contrast, the Union started thinking strategically and weighing the geopolitical and security implications of successive waves of entrants.<sup>15</sup> Both processes seemed also to have lost some momentum, due perhaps in some measure to the lukewarm support they were finding in Western public opinion. On top of that, the candidates for NATO enlargement went further than those for the EU, thus potentially increasing the geographical (and functional) mismatch between the two organisations: indeed, the NATO Washington Communiqué of April 1999 – issued in the middle of Operation *Allied Force* in Kosovo – listed Albania and Macedonia alongside the seven Central Europeans.

11 September has changed all that because it has shown dramatically the importance of stabilising the peripheries of Western ‘homelands’ and forging wide coalitions against new potential threats posed by non-state actors. What has changed, however, is not the similarity of the two processes but only their pace. It looks

increasingly likely, in fact, that the summits in Prague (NATO, November 2002) and Copenhagen (EU, December 2002) will issue invitations and set accession dates for a much higher number of Central European candidates than would have been imaginable only a few months ago: up to five for the Alliance (Slovenia, Slovakia and the Baltic States), up to eight/ten for the Union (the same five and the three NATO allies, plus Malta and Cyprus). If so, in a couple of years NATO will count 24 members and the EU 25, 19 of which will be in common. In organisational terms, the most obvious benefit would be the return to a situation of almost overlapping memberships – lost since the mid-1990s – but on a larger scale than ever before. The most obvious cost would be the increasing complexity of consensual decision-making within each organisation. The two Western ‘security communities’ would cover almost the whole continent but would be internally ever less manageable – a situation that does not seem to worry the current applicants but may become a serious problem for all later on. A strategic gain, in other words, might be offset by a functional loss.

For the scope of this paper, however, the main implication of a double ‘Big Bang’ in late 2002 could be – as things stand now – that Bulgaria and Romania would probably remain out of both the Alliance and the Union, at least for some time. In fact, it is not unlikely that after such a robust intake of new members the EU would wait some time before reopening its doors. If adequately prepared and presented, such a gap may not create major difficulties. If not, it may generate a domestic backlash in either country (or both) and end up drawing a dangerous dividing line on the South-Eastern

<sup>13</sup> Among the few studies that have tried to compare the two dynamics see S. Croft et al., *The Enlargement of Europe* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999); M. A. Smith and G. Timmins, *Building a Bigger Europe: EU and NATO Enlargement in Comparative Perspective* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000); A. Hyde-Price, ‘The Antinomies of European Security: Dual Enlargement and the Reshaping of the European Order’, *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. XXI (2000), no. 3, pp. 139-67.

<sup>14</sup> See especially the study by T. S. Szayna, *NATO Enlargement 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping* (Santa Monica-Arlington: RAND, 2001). For a Western European viewpoint see F. Pflügler, ‘An Atlantic Anchor for all of Europe’, *International Herald Tribune*, 5 December 2000. For a Central European perspective see the excellent analysis by J. Sedivy, ‘The Puzzle of NATO Enlargement’, *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. XXII (2001), no. 2, pp. 1-26.

<sup>15</sup> Curiously enough, the case for a more coordinated and parallel expansion of the two organisations was first made by the father of the geopolitical approach, namely Zbigniew Brzezinski (‘NATO and the EU Need to Grow Together’, *International Herald Tribune*, 17 May 2001).

'rim' of the enlarged Union, which also happens to be the most unstable. While eight out of the current ten Central European applicants would at last become subjects, the other two would risk remaining objects of CFSP/ESDP (and probably also waiting in the antechamber of NATO) and sliding off 'Central Europe' proper.

At root, such time and policy gap has much to do with the different pace and depth of democratic transition in Bulgaria and Romania: it started later, from a more backward point of departure, with less momentum and more reservations. The legacy of the Communist past is heavier and more durable there, and the two political systems look more volatile and unstable than the others.<sup>16</sup> For the Union (and the Alliance), finding the right mix of encouragement and support, on the one hand, and conditionality and rigour, on the other, will be a crucial challenge, hovering as it will between a 'direct neighbourhood' and a classical integration policy. In a way, what happens with Bulgaria and Romania is going to be crucial for the Western Balkans as well – from Croatia (which may soon join the two countries on the waiting list) to all the remaining former Yugoslav Republics (plus Albania) – and will set an important precedent for the further expansion of both the Union and the Alliance.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the EU and the NATO that the Central European candidates may soon end up joining will proba-

bly be very different organisations from the ones that they set out to join a decade earlier. Over the past years, in fact, both have become moving targets. The Union has acquired a much more ambitious foreign and security policy – including a specifically defence dimension – and is gradually becoming a single-currency area: in fact, diplomacies, armies and currencies (however 'pooled') are quintessential features of sovereignty, well beyond the constraints and opportunities of a protected free-trade area and a single market. For its part, the Alliance has first gone to (limited) war in Kosovo, then has refrained from making serious use of its Art. 5 guarantees, which have long been seen as its main *raison d'être*. Instead of serving two distinct and separate (albeit mutually compatible and even reinforcing) purposes – economic prosperity vs. hard security – the EU and NATO increasingly cover the same tasks in the same geographical area, and CFSP/ESDP lies exactly at the functional juncture of the two organisations. This is why there is ample scope for cooperation, of course, but also for a fundamental redefinition of their respective goals and roles – across Western and Central Europe as much as across the Atlantic.

<sup>16</sup> In the light of the academic literature on 'transitology', Romania and Bulgaria (let alone most of the Balkan States that have not applied for EU membership) are still in the phase of 'transition' to democracy, whereas the other eight are already in the phase of 'consolidation' (with a remaining question mark for Slovakia, due to Vladimir Meciar's persisting political role). See J. J. Linz and A. Stepan (eds.), *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore-London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); K. von Beyme, *Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe* (Basingstoke-London: Macmillan, 1996); K. Müller, 'Countries in Transition: Entwicklungspfade der osteuropäischen Transformation', *Osteuropa*, vol. LI (2001), no. 10, pp. 1146-67.

## Annexes

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## Abbreviations

15+6	the Fifteen (EU member countries) plus six non-EU European NATO member countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland and Turkey)
15+15	the 15+6 plus nine other EU candidate countries : Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia <i>(there are 13 applicants for EU membership: the nine above plus the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Turkey)</i>
ACN	Associated Countries Network
ARRC	Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps
BALTBAT	Baltic Battalion
BLACKSEAFOR	Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Force
CCC	Capabilities Commitment Conference
CEFTA	Central European Free Trade Agreement
CENCOOP	Central European Nations Cooperation in Peace Support
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIC	Capability Improvement Conference
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CNAD	Conference of National Armaments Directors
EADS	European Aeronautic, Defence and Space Company
ERRF	European Rapid Reaction Force
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EUCLID	European Cooperative Long-term Initiative for Defence
EUROFINDER	a procedure allowing industry to make proposals for R&D projects for inclusion in the EUCLID programme
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HUF	Hungarian forint (currency)
IFOR	Implementation Force (Bosnia)
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISS	EU Institute for Security Studies
Kc	Czech koruna (currency)
KFOR	Kosovo peace implementation Force
LITPOLBAT	Lithuanian-Polish Battalion
LTL	Lithuanian litas (currency)
MAP	Membership Action Plan

MAPE	(WEU) Multinational Advisory Police Element
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MLF	(Italo-Slovenian-Hungarian) Multinational Land Force
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MONUA	UN Observation Mission in Angola
MONUC	UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MP	Military Police
MPFSEE	Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe
MRF	Multi-Role Fighter
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NIAG	NATO Industrial Advisory Group
ODS	Civic Democratic Party
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PARP	Planning and Review Process
PSC	Political and Security Committee
PSO	Peace Support Operations
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
R&D	Research and Development
RELEX	External Relations
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SEDM	South-East European Defence Ministerial
SEEBRIG	South-Eastern Europe Brigade
SEEGROUP	South-East Europe Security Cooperation Steering Group
SFOR	Stabilisation Force (Bosnia)
SHIRBRIG	Multinational Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations
TEU	Treaty on European Union
UN	United Nations
UNAVEM	UN Angola Verification Mission
UNFICYP	UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNIDO	UN Industrial Development Organisation
UNIKOM	UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
UNMEE	UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIK	UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNTSO	UN Truce Supervision Organisation in Palestine
WEAG	Western European Armaments Group
WEAO	Western European Armaments Organisation
WEU	Western European Union
WTO	World Trade Organisation



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