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EDITORIAL



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THE END OF EUROPEAN UNIQUENESS?

With Obama's victory, Europe is losing, its moral uniqueness - and that should be warmly welcomed for providing an opportunity to build a better world, in particular to deal with global challenges and protracted conflicts like in the Middle East, tragically aggravated during the Bush years.

The rejoicing and the sense of hope that swept over Europe after Obama's triumphant bid for the US presidency has since been mitigated by an acute sense of the scale of the problems he needs to confront on the domestic agenda and globally. The enduring financial crisis and the war in Gaza have somewhat watered down expectations. Many analysts insist that expectations have been raised too high, and that we should brace ourselves for severe disappointment as soon as President Obama is required to prove his ability to deal with global challenges and show how far he can distance himself from Bush's legacy, in particular in the Middle East. This is certainly true if we are expecting a sort of 'Superman' Obama to solve the problems of the world overnight. But if we are counting on a radical change of approach to the conduct of international politics, then in my view high expectations are indeed warranted.

The Bush presidency did much to bring American politicians in general into disrepute. But the last thing Europeans should do is to look with cynicism to the Obama presidency. There is no reason to doubt - and every reason to believe - Obama when he says that he shall privilege multilateralism and engagement over unilateralism and isolation, and prefer the power of example over the example of power. This radically changed approach is the natural consequence of the tragic failures of unilateralism, and Europeans should be the first to acknowledge this basic truth. After all, Obama is only confirming that the Europeans were right to oppose Bush's unilateralism, be it his dismissive attitude to climate change initiatives or the contempt in which he held the rule of law in the name of the fight against terror. Obama was as critical of the war in Iraq as many European politicians and the overwhelming majority of European public opinion.

The European approach to world problems matters. It matters crucially to those issues that are known to be at the top of the agenda of the new US President, and European leaders should not shy away from trying to win over the US ally to their views for fear of being seen as preaching to the Americans.

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
THE END OF EUROPEAN UNIQUENESS?

by Álvaro de Vasconcelos

AFTER EUFOR IN CHAD

by Damien Helly

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The European Foreign & Security Policy Institute



Obama speaks at an Inaugural Celebration at the Lincoln Memorial on Sunday, 18 January 2009.

There is no lack of hard facts to show that the European approach is the right approach: looking for multilateral solutions, which means working with and talking to all those concerned and engaging with other powers; defining long-term goals, and designing inclusive, comprehensive strategies to achieve those goals; privileging diplomacy over war; and trying to shape an international system based on norms and rules, where violence is only legitimate and necessary when subordinated to those rules. The European approach is particularly important for one of the main objectives of an Obama presidency: to change the way in which the United States is perceived in the world, in particular in countries with a Muslim majority.

The Bush years were a period when Europe could rightfully claim the moral upper hand and the Union seemed to be the only hope for the world - even if Europe itself is not always consistent with its values as the debate on migration policies shows. Europeans should not be sorry for losing that uniqueness. Not only was its price too high, but its promise could not be fulfilled by Europe alone. Not one of the main issues in EU foreign and security policy priorities, from the Middle East to climate change, has seen a shred of progress. The war is being lost in Afghanistan, and tensions with Iran have not been eased to any satisfactory degree.

Europe has lacked the unity of purpose and the capacity to act that would have made it the decisive solution-broker, with the possible exception of dealing with Russia's Georgia war. But even if it had attempted to use its soft power more decisively, it is unlikely that the European approach and policy aims could succeed on any major global issue if the United States is opposed head-on, as was the

case with Kyoto or the International Criminal Court. Or that Europe alone could have dealt with the crucial Arab-Israeli question.

As the African-American writer Toni Morrison puts it, Obama is 'someone who understands what it will take to help America realize the virtues it fancies about itself, what it desperately needs to become in the world'. This can be nothing but good news for all Europeans who share the same belief not only about America but perhaps also about themselves. And this explains perhaps why Obama was, overwhelmingly, the Europeans' - indeed *the European* - candidate for the White House.

Obama's victory should therefore not be seen as the irremediable loss of a forever elusive European leading role, but rather as a window of opportunity for the EU to advance its international agenda. Europe needs to spell out its vision of what is best done together and what is not, and to spell out no less clearly what are its real concerns about Obama's expected options. Some European concerns are worth being taken into consideration by the new American administration. This is certainly the case with the scepticism that has met candidate Obama's stance on Afghanistan, which seems to rely on a military surge as a way out. It would be ill-advised to take this as mere unwillingness to commit European forces in greater numbers; there is the need for the clarification of the strategic objectives in Afghanistan. But some European states' concerns in relation to Obama's willingness to engage with Iran are misplaced - indeed, the European Union has been advocating this approach all along.

All things considered, rebuilding Euro-American relations should not start or pri-

marily be predicated on security or even Afghanistan. This is why it would not be a good idea for the first visit of President Obama to Europe to be to the NATO Summit in April, where the agenda will be dominated by hard security issues and enlargement. Rather, a meeting to deal with global challenges, including the Middle East crisis, in a bilateral framework should be called as soon as possible.

There is a vast number of diplomatic initiatives and global issues where common efforts are no less urgent and perhaps even more necessary. This is certainly also the case with the financial crisis, and its links with the energy, environment and food crises. President Obama has distanced himself from the previous administration's last-minute efforts at taking the lead in these matters, which call for perhaps a more radical and certainly a fresh start. There is also the need to take advantage of the 'Obama effect' on Arab public opinion to force the implementation of the two-states solution to the Israel-Palestinian question, which will only be possible by involving all Palestinian movements, including Hamas. This task has just become more urgent and difficult with the war in Gaza.

The nature and the magnitude of the agenda suggests more vividly than before that NATO is but one and not the most important institutional framework for Euro-American cooperation. Bilateral relations must take precedence. It should be just as clear by now to both American and European leaders that the world has changed a lot in the last eight years, and that there is no going back to the nineties when US benign hegemony was happily supported by Europe. The day has come for a change of paradigm in Euro-American relations.

The engagement of the United States is a pre-condition to the success of the European project for global governance. But it does not suffice. The so-called 'West' is no longer alone in the world of today. Western hegemony, however benign or well-intentioned, is as doomed as US hegemony has proven to be. The engagement of new global players like China, India, Brazil, and a more assertive Russia, is crucial to the solution of most of the problems at the top of the US world agenda. But for this to happen it should also be clear that a new Euro-American *entente* in no way signifies a rekindled 'West against the Rest'. A truly multilateral, all-inclusive world order must be the common goal of all self-respecting nations, and there is much that Europe and the US president can do to bring it about. And, yes, we can!

PARTNERSHIPS FOR EFFECTIVE MULTI-LATERALISM: MANAGING GLOBAL CRISES

The Institute's 2008 Annual Conference, held in Paris on 30-31 October, built on the previous year's event which looked at how Europe can engage the new global players for effective multilateralism. In 2008, the focus moved to how multilateral efforts can tackle global crises, particularly in the light of the year's Russia-Georgia conflict and the financial crisis.

Five major conclusions, addressing current challenges, arose from the conference:

- There is an opportunity to reinvigorate the transatlantic agenda with the new US administration, formulating common proposals rather than reacting to US-led initiatives, including on how to deal with Afghanistan and Pakistan.
- The EU needs to maintain fluid relations with Russia despite some differences, including making efforts to understand Russian security concerns.
- The EU should push for long-term solutions to the unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
- The EU and US need to be willing to make concessions to upgrade the position of the new global players in the present international system, starting with the financial institutions.
- The EU can contribute to the development of rules and mechanisms of global governance by sharing its integration experience and supporting the efforts of emerging powers.



EU High Representative Javier Solana in his opening address:

"Regarding the policy response, the crisis has demonstrated - once more - the need for stronger global institutions. With goodwill and creativity a lot can and has been achieved. Through ad-hoc crisis management among political leaders, central bankers and others. But if we are honest we must admit that the existing architecture is not up to the task - neither in Europe, nor globally."

Robert Hutchings, on effective global multilateral governance:

"I think what is needed is to seize the 'Bretton Woods moment' to take advantage of the growing awareness that the global international architecture is badly outmoded and needs urgent attention to be fixed. The new global order needs to cover not only trade and finance, but also security, energy, environment and governance. These constitute the new global strategic agenda."

Radha Kumar, on human security:

"There is a fundamental disagreement between what we can loosely call the 'Western and non-Western worlds' over the methods and means used to protect human security when it comes to ethnic and political rights, and especially when it comes to humanitarian intervention ... a large part of this disagreement could be resolved through the multilateral use of a good cop-bad cop strategy (so long as both agree on the endgame).



Feng Zhongping, on China and multilateral global governance:

"The most noticeable change in China's foreign policy is probably the acceptance of multilateralism in dealing with both regional and global issues. One could argue that China has not become, like the Europeans, a wholehearted supporter of multilateralism. The truth, however, is that China has become more and more willing to work with international institutions and has become more active than before in many issues concerning the third world."

Dmitri Trenin, on reforming the international system:

"New systems historically do not emerge from thinking at universities or even from think tanks, they emerge from crises, they emerge from wars. This is a good time right now to fashion a new or a modernised system of institutions, as people are preparing for the G20 'new Bretton Woods' summit in Washington DC. This is precisely what history tells us - this is the way forward. I believe we can expect more international multilateral action where people have more common interests, more common values and that's at this point the world of international global finance and economy."

Towards a European defence market

Chaillot Paper n° 113 – 11/2008

Erkki Aalto, Daniel Keohane (editor), Christian Mölling, Sophie de Vaucorbeil

The European Commission is currently proposing new procurement and trade directives aimed at streamlining defence market legislation. The proposed directives would open up the defence market, improve European cooperation on armaments and lead to a more competitive European defence industry.

Negotiating the final status of Kosovo

Chaillot Paper n°114 – 12/2008

Marc Weller

The international administration of the Kosovo crisis generated the very result that the organised international community had most wanted to avoid: independence for Kosovo. This paper looks at how and why this happened.

The EU, NATO and European Defence – A slow train coming

Occasional Paper n°74 – 12/2008

Asle Toje

This paper is devoted to the proposals on European defence under discussion during the 2008 French EU Presidency. The paper examines specific initiatives for a stronger, more unitary European security structure.

Scanning the future:

American and European perspectives

Policy Brief n°4 – 12/2008

Giovanni Grevi

This brief reviews the recent US National Intelligence report on global trends in 2025, which predicts a more multipolar and heterogenous world, characterised by non-state actors and rising powers with different priorities such as China, India and Russia.

European perspectives on the new American foreign policy agenda

Report n°4 – 01/2009

Edited by Álvaro de Vasconcelos and Marcin Zaborowski

This collaborative effort of the EUISS research team highlights what it considers to be the major political event of 2009: the election of President Obama and the impact that the change in the American administration will have on the world. It covers the priority areas for US-EU cooperation: global governance, climate change, disarmament and non-proliferation, Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and transatlantic relations.

International Herald Tribune**2 November 2008****Sarkozy's Mediterranean plan slow to get moving**

Álvaro de Vasconcelos, director of the [European Union Institute for Security Studies](#), an EU-financed foreign policy research institute, said that differentiated the Barcelona Process Union for the Mediterranean from European efforts to spread its influence beyond its eastern borders. "Most European governments," de Vasconcelos said, "still consider stability is the foremost objective when dealing with countries to the south. That is as opposed to the east, where they equate democracy with stability. This makes it more difficult to sustain the process of reform."

Polskie Radio Online**5 November 2008****Amerykanski sen Obamy**

Analitycy przestrzegają przed zbyt wielkimi oczekiwaniami. Zdaniem Marcina Zaborowskiego z unijnego [Instytutu Studiów nad Bezpieczeństwem](#) w Paryżu znaczących zmian w prowadzonej polityce nie należy oczekiwać. - Polityka Obamy nie będzie jakos radykalnie inna, ale my będziemy inaczej ją postrzegać, bo jest większa wola po stronie Europy - tłumaczy Marcin Zaborowski.

Canada.com**6 November 2008****Europe's Obama mania could mean more support for Afghan mission**

Marcin Zaborowski, of the Paris-based [European Union Institute for Security Studies](#), said a seismic shift in public attitudes has occurred. Americans have demonstrated in Tuesday's vote "that the United States is perhaps the most progressive nation in the western hemisphere, against predictions in Europe, and that's going to change the way the U.S. is being viewed."

Gazeta Wyborcza**20 November 2008****Sikorski apeluje o jedność NATO w polityce wobec Rosji**

Naszym celem nie powinno być izolowanie lub ignorowanie Rosji. Nie jest jednak realną alternatywą ustępowanie i akceptowanie rosyjskich roszczeń - powiedział szef polskiej dyplomacji podczas czwartkowego panelu będącego częścią konferencji na temat stosunków transatlantyckich, zorganizowanej przez [Institute for Security Studies i Unie Europejskiej](#).

Deutsche Welle**24 November 2008****Conflictul din Georgia va determina Moldova sa accepte o solutie ruseasca la conflictul transnistrean**

Sabine Fischer, Research Fellow la [Institutul pentru Studii de Securitate](#) de la Paris, descrie harta geopolitica si geostrategica in care va activa noul Parlament al Romaniei. Unde vor trebui alesi sa aiba grija? Doamna Fischer este de parere ca Uniunea Europeana a stabilizat Estul continentului prin transformările democratice pe care le-a determinat in statele regiunii, dar pe de alta parte a intrat intr-un spatiu considerat de Rusia sfera sa de influenta.

Der Standard**26 November 2008****Iran zeigt Verständnis für die Lage der Iraker**

Gudrun Harrer sprach mit dem Sicherheitsexperten Walter Posch. STANDARD: Teheran hat heftig gegen das US-irakische Sicherheitsabkommen agitiert, wie steht es jetzt dazu? Posch: Allem Anschein nach sind die Iraner zwar nicht besonders glücklich über das Abkommen, fürchteten aber, dass mehr Obstruktion von ihrer Seite nur die Position der irakischen Regierung den USA gegenüber schwächen würde...

Chicago Tribune**27 November 2008****Can tide be turned on Iran?**

"Bush, in his last year, was doing things very different from his rhetoric of a few years ago," said Walter Posch, a senior fellow at the [European Union Institute for Security Studies](#). "Now with Obama, the whole political environment has changed. When Obama said he was willing to talk without preconditions, that put the ball in the Iranian court."

Rzeczpospolita**29 November 2008****NATO nie drgnie na Wschód**

Przeciwnicy ustępstw na rzecz Gruzji i Ukrainy mogą się na to nie zgodzić. - To kwestia reguł. Skoro raz ustalono, że MAP jest potrzebny, to dlaczego robić wyjątki dla krajów, które nie spełniają warunków. A po drugie to plan odchodzącej administracji amerykańskiej. Dlaczego Europa Zachodnia miałaby się na to zgodzić - mówi "Rz" Marcin Zaborowski, ekspert [Instytutu Studiów Strategicznych](#) (ISS) w Paryżu.

Euractiv.com**4 December 2008****EU and NATO keep Eastern countries at bay**

Dr. Sabine Fischer of the Paris-based [Institute for Security Studies](#) told EurActiv that EaP goes beyond ENP in several respects: It presents itself explicitly as a political message of EU solidarity ...; it suggests that the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements

be replaced by Association Agreements (following the Ukrainian model); it suggests the establishment of a new instrument, the 'Comprehensive Institution-Building Programme' (CIB), on a bilateral track; ... it also provides clear and detailed suggestions as to how to deepen the energy cooperation with the Eastern ENP countries ...; lastly, and possibly most importantly, it calls for fresh funding to be allocated to new initiatives.

The Irish Times**6 December 2008****Opt-out of European security pact would exclude State from defence talks and missions**

"Every single ESDP mission has been mandated by the UN, which desperately needs the type of well-trained and well-equipped peacekeepers capable of rapidly deploying to secure an area," says Daniel Keohane, analyst at the [European Institute for Security Studies](#). "It is often more efficient for the UN to subcontract out its peacekeeping missions to the EU. We have seen this model in Chad where 3,600 troops are deployed."

Wirtschafts Woche**12 January 2009****Westintegration der Ukraine gebremst**

Als Waffe ist das russische Gas unterdessen nur bedingt einsetzbar, sagt Ukraine-Expertin Sabine Fischer vom Pariser [Institut für Sicherheitsstudien](#). Gazprom ist schließlich ein marktwirtschaftlich geführter Konzern mit Börsennotierung, und jeder Tag, an dem kein Gas durch die Leitungen fließt, kostet das Unternehmen Millionen.

Forbes.com**14 January 2009****Gaza Backlash Hits European Firms**

All of this is likely to be more of a "controlled explosion" than a real tide of outrage that could harm foreign businesses in Iran, according to Walter Posch, of the [European Union's Institute for Security Studies](#). He said that it was a way for the Iranian regime to fulfil its anti-Zionist credentials without actually resorting to action, and that the Basij hardliners were in the minority when it came to railing against consumerism and private ownership.

EUObserver.com**15 January 2009****MEPs back opening of market in defence goods**

Daniel Keohane, an expert on defence industry issues with the Paris-based [Institute for Security Studies](#), told the EUobserver that the new directive would "place more of an onus on member states to explain if and why a competition is closed."

A NEW DEPARTURE: GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND EU-US POLICIES AFTER THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS

The EU Washington Forum (EUWF) is an annual event of the EUISS organised with the support of the European Commission. The 2008 event was an official launch of the EUWF and it featured interventions from numerous high-level personalities including EUHR Javier Solana, the Polish and Spanish Ministers of Foreign Affairs Radoslaw Sikorski and Miguel Angel Moratinos, Senator for Nebraska Chuck Hagel, and the Head of the EU Commission Delegation in Washington John Bruton.



Held two weeks after the election of Barack Obama, the event focused on the implications of this for US foreign policy, global governance and transatlantic relations.

EU-US relations after the American elections

The change in Washington has created a new opportunity for transatlantic relations that, despite an improvement in his second term, remained poisoned throughout Bush's presidency because of the war in Iraq. It was argued at the EUWF that the enthusiasm the Europeans have shown for Barack Obama and a boosted moral appeal of the US may translate into a greater support in Europe for the incoming administration's foreign policy.

However, it was also argued that Barack Obama will disappoint some expectations in Europe. For example, it is unlikely (not least because of the role of Congress) that the US will revise its climate change policy in time for the Copenhagen summit, due in December 2009. While Obama will probably honour his electoral position and withdraw combat troops

from Iraq within 16 months and not later than 2011 no meaningful change of position is likely to emerge on the Arab-Israeli conflict, although Obama is more likely to throw America's diplomatic weight behind promoting the peace process. On Russia, Obama may decide to suspend the missile defence project promoted by the Bush administration, which would delight Moscow and some EU member states but disappoint the others. However, like his predecessor, Obama will support the further expansion of NATO to Georgia and Ukraine.

It is largely expected that once in office Obama will come to Europe to ask for support, not least in Afghanistan. It was argued that the incoming administration will assess its relations with other powers by dividing them between those that offer help and support and those who do not. According to this perspective a European reaction to this initial request from Obama may come to determine the atmosphere in transatlantic relations during his first term. However, this view was challenged as suggesting that the incoming president would treat the EU instrumentally and not as a partner.

Some American speakers argued that Obama's team will soon start downplaying the importance of Afghanistan for the incoming administration's national security agenda and that Iran rather than Afghanistan may prove to be the biggest challenge in the first years of Obama's presidency.



Foreign Ministers Radoslaw Sikorski and Miguel Angel Moratinos

In the run-up to the elections Barack Obama argued in favour of America's full diplomatic engagement with Iran. Some American participants argued that the President-elect should not rush into negotiating with Tehran as the success of such an exercise may prove illusive at the expense of the President's credibility. It was argued that while the US should join the European diplomatic effort *vis-à-vis* Iran, this should not initially occur at the senior

State Department level. Still, the US could take some bold initiatives to signal a forthcoming attitude towards Tehran, such as opening of the US diplomatic section in Tehran, clarification of US intentions, and refutation of the regime-change policy. It was also argued that a removal of the threat of US military intervention would be actually likely to weaken the existing conservative regime in Tehran.



John Bruton, Álvaro de Vasconcelos and Chuck Hagel

Recalibrating global governance

During the Bush presidency the international system evolved towards multipolarity. With the emergence of China and India as major powers, and the resurgence of Russia, the US and the EU can no longer dominate global governance even when they fully agree.

There was an agreement at the EUWF that this new reality must be reflected in the multilateral institutions that remain shaped by the realities of the post-Second World War order. It was argued that the G20 initiative assembled by President Bush in response to the global economic crisis should become a permanent fixture and its membership should provide the model for the reform of global international institutions. It is perhaps the last chance, it was argued, to draw the new powers into the liberal order; otherwise, they might exercise their influence outside the existing institutions and contribute to the spread of instability.

However, some of the speakers also argued that the strategy of sharing the responsibility with the new powers has failed. The non-liberal powers, China and Russia, are simply not interested in having a larger share in the system that was put in place by the western powers. In the meantime, western - especially European - influence in the existing multilateral institutions has been shrinking. According to this perspective, the liberal powers should do more to find common positions and learn to lobby together in the context of international institutions.

A full report of this event, including coverage of the working groups on the Arab-Israeli conflict, unresolved conflicts and the Georgia crisis, and non-proliferation and disarmament, will be available shortly on the EUISS website.



AFTER EUFOR IN CHAD

It is still too early to draw conclusions on the success of EUFOR CHAD/RCA, the EU's military bridging operation in Eastern Chad launched last March to support a UN military mission deployed there. To start with, the operation is not yet finished (EUFOR's mandate ends on 15 March this year). Then, it is unclear what level of security is acceptable in such a volatile and heterogeneous area and it is so far almost impossible to quantify the impact that EUFOR has had.

With EU states rejecting any military presence in the Democratic Republic of Congo in support of the UN mission there when it hit crisis-point late last year, the success of the mission in Chad is important not just for the tasks it was sent to do, but for the reputation of EU military operations as a whole and their future in Africa.

As a bridging operation, EUFOR's success will depend largely on the quality of its hand-over to the second MINURCAT (United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad) and the latter's future performance, at least in its first year. There is currently a very serious risk of a security gap between EUFOR's departure and MINURCAT II's full deployment. Civilians, assistance providers, UN staff and the Chadian special police will still need to be protected after mid-March. To do so, the follow-on force has to be able to perform immediately and efficiently, requiring a smooth hand-over from EUFOR, competent troops and strong rules of engagement.

Several administrative measures required to ensure the smooth hand-over from EUFOR to MINURCAT are slowly underway. MINURCAT has been liaising with EUFOR at all levels and in all sectors for several months and a structural working relationship is developing. Yet, debates and disagreements about the future UN force and its mandate continue. A UN Security Council resolution is still expected but so far no consensus has been found on the composition, mandate and budget of the force. Chadian authorities show limited commitment to creating a favourable environment for the continuation of a strong international presence in the East.

One of EUFOR's significant achievements in financial and logistical terms has been its construction of several military camps

in Eastern Chad that can host a force of 3,000. This contribution in kind is undeniable; but it remains to be seen how Chad will authorise the UN to benefit from it.

MINURCAT II may well not be ready to take over properly from EUFOR on 15 March and even to deploy fully by the end of 2009. A gap in the transition from EUFOR to MINURCAT II would not only jeopardise EUFOR's success but lead to security deterioration on the ground. With unpredictable behaviour from neighbouring Sudan, where President Al-Bashir may well be indicted by the International Criminal Court, the regional situation remains highly fragile.

In practical terms, this means reinforcement of the current EUFOR set-up with a transitional re-hatting phase lasting for at least 6 months. This measure, however, is only one part of the solution. The EU needs to send a clear message to the international community by encouraging non-European or other European contributing countries not yet engaged in Chad to contribute to MINURCAT II in order to adequately fill the gap created by the departure of some European troops.

The strong internationalisation of Eastern Chad would prevent serious threats against civilians and humanitarian workers, contain the potential local impact of

Copyright: EUFOR Tchad/RCA



A logistical convoy in Chad, June 2008.

To avoid such a security vacuum, reassure civilians and the humanitarian community and ensure that the ESDP record will not be tarnished by a poor UN performance in Chad, the EU must act with one voice.

It is in the EU's interest to push politically at all levels, in Brussels as well as in New York, for a strong MINURCAT II. This would consist of a robust, well-trained, disciplined and mobile UN military quick-reaction force with strong air assets and solid logistical back-up, mixed with well-qualified and experienced police or gendarmerie-type staff tackling crime and public disorder with the day-to-day support of Chadian central and local authorities.

the Chadian-Sudanese proxy war, and provide an environment conducive to further policing work and future security-sector reform initiatives. This containment of security factors would give space for swifter and deeper national and regional political and peace processes where the EU could play a stronger role. Both the UN and the EU would be praised for their joint efficient management of the crisis, their diplomatic efforts and their contribution to a more stable environment.

An any less robust option for MINURCAT II would probably lead to, at best, the containment of the current situation and, at worst, the further deterioration of security in the East and in the wider region.