

ISSUES

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www.iss.europa.eu

EDITORIAL



Álvaro de Vasconcelos DIRECTOR


AVOIDING CONFRONTATIONAL BIPOLARITY

The war in Georgia has reignited the debate on whether or not a new strategic bipolarity is developing, opposing an authoritarian and expansionist Russia to the democratic Euro-Atlantic community. If this were to be so, should the European Union's strategic priorities be fundamentally redefined, alongside those of NATO? Has this war signalled the end of a world where soft power matters and set the time machine back into a world where only power politics matter? Should Europe discard its goal of integrating Russia through a web of norms, rules and economic interdependence as a late twentieth-century utopia since we have turned back to nineteenth-century power games? Is the European Security Strategy (ESS), adopted in 2003, now suddenly outdated, and thus in need of a broader review than the one that was sought?

The EU strategy is designed to confront international challenges and achieve peace through effective multilateralism. That is to say, the international community must be able to deal with the kinds of crises and conflicts that broke out in the 1990s, such as Bosnia, Kosovo and Rwanda, where using force may prove necessary to protect civilians and stop crimes against humanity. In this sense, it represents the culmination of a reflection that started in 1998 at the Franco-British summit of St. Malo, and subsequently set in motion the European Security

and Defence Policy (ESDP). More broadly, however, strongly asserting, as the ESS does, the validity (and necessity) of seeking multilateral solutions to crisis, including those calling for the use of hard power, is a European answer to the US-led Iraq war, a reminder to the US government that if it was possible to build a large international consensus ensuring multilateral legitimacy to the war in Afghanistan, that was the right course to follow to deal with crises and effectively face global challenges.

The notion that the European Union must engage with Russia and other global players to find the right solutions for a number of international problems is a core element of EU strategy, as bilateral partnerships with aspiring global players are ultimately designed to make multilateralism effective. This goal has not been shattered or diminished by the war in Georgia, a regional war with the same kind of root causes as the conflicts in the Balkans and South Caucasus back in the 1990s, following the break-up of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Russia's excessive use of force and subsequent unilateral recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, although in violation of international law, has not recreated the Cold War in Europe. Nor has it rendered obsolete the EU strategic concept as it stands today, even if it has provided those who think so with fresh arguments.



The European Foreign & Security Policy Institute



EU observers watch Russian troops pull back at the Georgian village of Karaleti

The best option for the EU remains to try to find solutions with Russia, not against Russia, for European crises, including those waiting to happen in the common neighbourhood. The fact that war in Georgia was allowed to happen at all illustrates the limits of relying solely on long-term inclusiveness based on economic interdependence. Where Russia and the other eastern neighbours are concerned, there is a clear need for EU political clout to deter aggressive nationalist behaviour. Political relevance requires the ability to prevent crises from degenerating into conflict rather than to deal with its tragic, unwanted consequences. The crisis in Georgia was not a failure of the ability to predict but of the capacity to prevent, which is what crisis-management is ultimately about. Warning bells had been sounding for some time: it was common knowledge that Georgia did not accept the pro-Russian status quo in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and was set on changing it by whatever means, if necessary by force. It was equally known that Russia was preparing to respond in kind to any military incursion. The EU did not have enough leverage in Tbilisi to stop the crisis beforehand, since European integration was not – is not – a primary concern there. The US administration might have succeeded, but it is obvious no ‘red lines’ were firmly set by the Bush team either with respect to Tbilisi or for that matter to Moscow. Using coercive instruments to deter Moscow did not appear a viable undertaking to the Union any more than it did to the United States. With the agreements of 12 August and 8 September, however, it was the Union that took centre stage in the diplomatic game, first to stop the war and afterwards to assure the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia’s territory beyond the breakaway regions.

This outcome owes much to the French Presidency’s leadership, not least in securing that all EU members and institutions present a united front and delegate the response to the serious crisis to the Union – in spite of the vast differences in how to interpret Moscow’s behaviour and how to deal with it. This is a most significant development that goes to prove that the EU can indeed act decisively if it does so coherently and cohesively, allowing its combined strengths to fully back the right policy options and giving political effectiveness to its ESDP missions such as the civilian monitoring mission in Georgia that was established in accordance with the agreement of 8 September.

The high level of interdependence across the entire European continent, notably with Russia, gave the Union’s soft power a special role. What is important today is to consolidate the *acquis* and frame an inclusive European order that instead of ignoring Russia binds her to a set of norms and rules governing pan-European relations that have been in the making since the fall of the Berlin Wall almost twenty years ago. This European order must recognise that the continent is now home to two of the ‘poles’ of the international system – the Union and Russia. Accepting Russia’s claim to the status of global player also means it must play by the rules, renouncing the unilateral use of force and by doing so avoiding a relapse of the division of Europe along antagonistic lines. The war in Georgia proves yet again that the unwarranted use of force is no solution either to divisions inside societies or to disputes between states, and that those who think otherwise lose legitimacy and credibility.

A strategic objective for the EU is to work for political convergence and economic integration at continental scale, no longer through concentric circles, as was put forth twenty years ago, but rather through interlocking circles. The first step is to offer a clear perspective of EU membership to the European eastern neighbours, starting with the Ukraine, making it clear that this requires full-fledged democracy and the banishment of extreme nationalism. For Russia, this requires strengthened economic, technological and scientific ties to go hand in hand with strict observance of the pan-European security principles of the OSCE Paris Charter of 1990. Delegitimising power politics is the only basis for a ‘Europe whole and free’ where war will be something of the past, and that again is calling for ‘a new beginning’. Shaped by the same principles as the OSCE Charter, a new beginning could include a continental security agreement between the EU, as such, and Russia, containing stronger commitments on the non-use of force and human rights protection, as a component of the EU–Russia Strategic Partnership, thus in effect making it one of the ‘interlocking circles’ of pan-European security. A satisfactory handling of the remaining aspects of the Georgia crisis, respectful of its integrity and diversity, and mindful of its sovereign European future, is the first test of the ability and willingness of Russia to build that partnership. The success of that partnership will depend also, in good measure, on the ability of the European Union to define not only a common vision of its relations with Russia, but also common policies in critical areas such as energy.

Any league of democracies such as American neo-conservatives have been proposing is dangerously reminiscent of the Cold War. There is no evidence the democratic world is threatened by a sinister alliance of rogue and undemocratic states, and it is wrong to seek an indication of this turn of events in the crisis in Georgia. The interest of the Union lies in the exact opposite direction to the neo-cons’ mantra. It is unquestionably a priority of the European Security Strategy to avoid not only European but also a global bipolarity. Global bipolarity would oblige countries all over the world to take sides, making it impossible to promote concerted action to face global challenges ranging from climate change to food and financial crises, and utterly impossible to protect civilians from violence and conflict and keep international peace. There is no solution for many such questions without Russia or China’s cooperative engagement. They have yet to prove that they are prepared to take their share of the burden, but it is an outcome worth trying to achieve.

EUROPEAN INTERESTS AND STRATEGIC OPTIONS

In 2008 the EUISS organised a series of seminars across Europe on the implementation of the European Security Strategy (ESS). The series, entitled 'European Interests and Strategic Options', concluded with an event in Paris hosted jointly with the French EU presidency.

The ESS, drafted under the guidance of High Representative Javier Solana, aimed to define the security challenges confronting the Union and to provide a common sense of purpose to the EU in shaping the international system. The rationale behind the Union's strategy is to bring together its soft power and its emerging hard power to make multilateralism more effective. The seminar series reviewed the progress made in the five years since the Strategy was adopted, and looked at ongoing challenges.

Despite some differences of opinion, participants in the series broadly agreed on the general relevance of the 2003 Strategy, as a doctrine founded on effective multilateralism as a way of solving global and regional problems. However, changes on the international stage since 2003, including the emergence of new global actors, require new visions and approaches to fine tune the Strategy. The EU needs to learn how to marry its combined power, values and interests in the new global context.

The EU and global governance: rules, power, priorities

Organised jointly with the Istituto Affari Internazionali Rome, 5-6 June 2008

The three workshops of this event dealt with the implementation of the ESS in: security and development; non-proliferation and disarmament; and human rights.



Secretary-General of the Italian MFA Giampiero Massolo

A common approach to the Neighbourhood

Organised jointly with the European Centre Natolin Natolin, 27-28 June 2008

This seminar took stock of the European Neighbourhood Policy and identified views from the neighbours. Four working groups addressed the themes of: democracy and good governance; unresolved conflicts; energy security; and borders.



Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski (left)

All seminar reports are available on the Institute's website: www.iss.europa.eu

The EU's approach to international security

Organised jointly with the Finnish Institute of International Affairs and the Swedish Institute of International Affairs Helsinki, 18-19 September 2008

The focus of this event was ESDP. Working sessions were held on: the security challenges facing the EU; improving ESDP tools, capabilities, and financing; and coherent use of different policy instruments, notably for crisis management.



Carl Bildt, Álvaro de Vasconcelos, Alex Stubb

Which strategy for the European Union's security interests?

Organised jointly with the French Presidency of the EU Paris, 2-3 October 2008

This final seminar brought together the threads of the earlier events, and identified lessons learned, political orientations and implementation priorities. It also included a discussion on the two recent French defence-related white papers.



Nick Witney, Claude-France Arnould, Carlo Magrassi

Bush's legacy and America's next foreign policy

Chaillot Paper n° 111 – 09/2008

Marcin Zaborowski

The EUISS's transatlantic researcher looks back at US foreign policy over the last 8 years. He argues that regardless of whether Obama or McCain wins the upcoming presidential election, it will be difficult to meet the high European expectations for a new era. The paper focuses on US relations with Iraq, Iran and China, as well as touching on Europe and Russia.

EU-UN cooperation in military crisis management: the experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006

Occasional Paper n°72 – 09/2008

Claudia Major

Since its first autonomous military operation in the Congo in 2003, the EU has increased its role in military crisis management around the world. This paper looks at the often disappointing results of EU-UN cooperation, using the example of the EU's later operation in the Congo in 2006. Analysing the limits and institutional constraints to effective cooperation, the paper presents recommendations that can be enacted at the working level in future collaboration.

L'Union et les armes légères et de petit calibre (ALPC)

Policy Brief n°3 – 09/2008

Damien Helly

By prioritising prevention, the EU could maximise the use of its resources and build the capacity of governments and societies to combat the flow of small arms and light weapons.

EU security and defence: Core documents 2007

Chaillot Paper n°112 – 10/2008

Compiled by Catherine Glière

A compilation of official EU documents related to security and defence, including statements, decisions, actions, etc by the relevant EU structures. Available in English and in French.

Education and training for European defence equipment programmes

ISS Report n°2 – 10/2008

Sophie de Vaucorbeil & Daniel Keohane

This report looks at some of the problems in existing education and training programmes, and presents recommendations to help develop mutual understanding in the European armaments community.

All publications are available on the ISS website.

France24.com

20 July 2008

ICC case against Sudan's al-Bashir stirs controversy

... Damien Helly, Sub-Saharan Africa specialist at the [EU Institute for Security Studies \(EUISS\)](#), is adamant that the Court can wield significant influence. "We must not underestimate the impact this arrest warrant could have if it is finally issued," he argues, pointing to the examples of the former Yugoslavia's Milosevic and Liberia's Taylor. "In those cases, the consequences were tangible. The indictments entailed either negotiations for the culprits' exile, regime changes through popular revolt, or conflict management through diplomacy." According to Helly, "if an arrest warrant is issued against al-Bashir, the Sudanese leader could be outlawed by the international community. International pressure could limit his room for manoeuvre, at least outside his country. This is where the Court comes in handy."

International Herald Tribune

14 August 2008

EU wants to firm up Russia-Georgia peace deal

EU diplomats hope international political pressure will lead Russia to pull its troops back to South Ossetia and Abkhazia and respect the other points of the agreement: no use of force; a definitive cessation of hostilities; free access for humanitarian aid and talks on a long-term security solution in the disputed territories, as well as a return of Georgian troops to their barracks. "Political incentives are needed to make sure that there is political will on both sides to respect the text of the cease fire," said Damien Helly, an expert in crisis management at the [EU's Institute for Security Studies](#) in Paris.

Eurasian.net

3 September 2008

The Georgian-Russian Conflict: A Test for the European Union

But positions within the EU may be consolidating, argues one analyst in Paris. "It is the first time that member states ever agree on the necessity of the deployment of a European Security and Defense Policy mission. This is really something new," commented Sabine Fischer, an analyst from the [European Union Institute for Security Studies](#). Solana has announced the deployment of an EU observer mission to be discussed by EU foreign ministers on September 15. ... While some American analysts have cautioned that Moscow will view any EU response as more talk than action, Fischer assesses the steps positively, "The

fact that the EU presidency negotiated the ceasefire and the fact that the EU is able to call an emergency meeting within a few weeks and really play an important role in processes on the ground is not a bad record for the time being," she said.

Focus.de

8 September 2008

Sarkozy vermittelt im Kaukasus-Konflikt

„Es ist sehr gut, dass Sarkozy nach Beginn der Krise so schnell reagiert hat“, sagt Sabine Fischer, Russland-Expertin vom [Europäischen Forschungsinstitut für Sicherheitsfragen \(EUISS\)](#) in Paris. „Aber der von ihm ausgehandelte Pakt birgt Probleme, insbesondere lässt er Moskau Interpretationsspielraum.“ Etwa der Verbleib von russischen Sicherheitskräften in der georgischen Grenzregion zur Wahrung der Stabilität. Für Medwedew sind die Truppen „Friedenssoldaten“, deren Verbleib nicht gegen den Deal verstößt. Auch die Erwähnung der Souveränität Georgiens fehlt in dem Vertrag.

International Herald Tribune/AP

8 September 2008

Sarkozy: unlikely diplomat in Russia-Georgia fight

"It's very good that the French presidency reacted so quickly," said Sabine Fischer, an expert on Russia at the [EU's Institute for Security Studies](#) in Paris. But the ceasefire deal has problems, she added: "It gave the Russian side room for interpretation ... this is what Sarkozy has been criticized for."

Middle East Online

12 September 2008

Rethinking the West and Iran

The Islamic Republic of Iran can - and should --become a partner of the West rather than its adversary. Since the present Western policy of threats and sanctions has failed, the only way forward must be comprehensive negotiations with Tehran, leading to a partnership between equals. These are the bold opinions of Christoph Bertram, a prominent German commentator on security and defence matters. His carefully-argued booklet, recently published by the [European Union's Institute for Security Studies](#), is the first to break spectacularly with the over-heated view - largely propagated by American and Israeli hard-liners - that Iran poses a danger to the entire world.

De Standard

21 September 2008

Austausch von Terror-Expertise

Der Iranist und Turkologe Walter Posch im STANDARD-Interview über Pakistan als end-

gültigen Teil des Schlachtfelds des „Kriegs gegen den Terror“. Pakistan ist endgültig Teil des Schlachtfelds des „Kriegs gegen den Terror“. Frequenz und Vehemenz der Anschläge, die Al-Kaida zugerechnet werden, nehmen zu. Gudrun Harrer befragte dazu den Experten Walter Posch. Der österreichische Iranist und Turkologe Walter Posch (42) arbeitet am [Institut für Sicherheitsstudien der EU \(ISSEU\)](#) in Paris. Zu seinen Forschungsschwerpunkten zählt die Sicherheitspolitik im Mittleren Osten.

The European Voice

25 September 2008

France seeks consensus on military capabilities

Diplomats say that the case for strengthening the military aspects of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – a priority of the French presidency – is now stronger than ever, because experiences in Chad and in Afghanistan have highlighted logistical failings and difficulties with communications as well as shortfalls in transport capabilities (especially a lack of helicopters). "Chad has given new urgency to these needs," said Daniel Keohane, a defence analyst at the Paris-based [European Union Institute for Security Studies](#). "The problem is not a lack of ideas or plans, but implementing them." France's focus on concrete projects is therefore appropriate, he added.

Dziennik

1 October 2008

Fiasko unijnej misji w Gruzji

Większość z ponad 300 uczestników misji - cywilnych obserwatorów i ich wsparcia, jest w Gruzji już od kilku dni. Zostali rozlokowani w czterech gruzińskich miastach - Tbilisi, Gori, Zugdidi i Poti. "Być może rzeczywiście zaistniały jakieś problemy logistyczne, ale nie można wykluczyć, że Rosjanie próbują grać na zwłokę" - mówi w rozmowie z [DZIENNIKIEM](#) Sabine Fischer z paryskiego [Instytutu Badań Strategicznych UE](#).

Defense News

2 October 2008

EU Ministers Pledge Capabilities

A project to create a European Security and Defense College for officers also won support. EU foreign relations chief Javier Solana told EU ministers Oct. 2 he supported the college, which would foster a better understanding of a "European crisis-management framework" and interoperability. "This will help definitely create a culture of European security," said Walter Posch, senior research fellow at the [European Union Institute for Security Studies](#).



AFGHANISTAN – A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE

In April 2007, Afghanistan became the newest addition to the eight-member South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Speaking on the occasion, President Hamid Karzai stressed the benefits that SAARC could bring to his country, in terms of human development as well as technology, and the benefits that Afghanistan, as a transit route for energy, goods and services, could bring to the region. One year later, at SAARC's Columbo summit in August, he focused almost entirely on the terrorist threat from Pakistan.

President Karzai's speech was made in the aftermath of the suicide attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul, in which more than 60 people were killed. Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency, ISI, was accused by the Afghan and Indian authorities of being behind the bombing, a claim that US intelligence officials have backed. Over the past two years, as India-Afghanistan ties have grown in strength, so have Pakistani fears of being squeezed by its two neighbours. As a result, the Kabul blasts have raised the spectre of a new Great Game in the region, in which India-Pakistan rivalry could worsen the already deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan, and feed a nascent Great Powers rivalry between the US and Europe on one side and Russia on the other, with China as a third entrant.

The latter fear is probably alarmist. A new Great Game is unlikely; what is more probable is dangerous misperception amongst and between Great and regional powers. Such misperception is already evident in Pakistan where security hawks predict an all-out military confrontation with the US in which the frontline troops will be the Taliban and allied militant groups. In this view the next 3 months are decisive – while US attention is focused on the transition to a new administration, there is a window of opportunity to strengthen militant infrastructure for the confrontation that looms.

Alongside, the hawks warn, the US will seek India as an ally in its confrontation, so that Pakistan can be squeezed on its eastern as well as western borders. There is little doubt that strategic competition between India and Pakistan will substantially contribute to increasing violence in Afghanistan, as well as in Pakistan and India. But is India-Pakistan rivalry inevitable?

Not necessarily. Pakistani Prime Minister Gilani's response to President Karzai's speech was telling. Instead of indulging in furious counter-allegations against India, as he did in New York in July, he stressed that combating terrorism had to be a joint effort by the SAARC countries. At the same time, he promised Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that he would institute an enquiry into the Kabul attack. In Sep-

and President Zardari in October, may help improve this context. As far as South Asia is concerned there are two major countries involved with Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. It has always made sense that the two separate peace processes – between India and Pakistan and between Pakistan and Afghanistan – should coincide. Working in parallel, each could strengthen the other. But this has been the most difficult



Copyright: Gurinder Osani/AP/SIPA

SAARC Summit: Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai and Pakistan's Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani

tember, Pakistan's new President, Asif Ali Zardari, invited President Karzai to be the only dignitary at his swearing-in. And in October, the Indian and Pakistani leaders agreed to revitalise the Joint Counter-Terrorism Mechanism they set up in 2006.

These may be straws in the wind, or they may be straws to merely clutch at. It is not clear whether the Pakistani army supports the government's gestures, and it remains the dominant power in the country. But it is also dependent on outside support, and a coherent as well as coordinated international strategy could exert considerable leverage over it. Thus far the escalating conflict in the borderland of Afghanistan and Pakistan has obscured the peace initiatives promised by the two governments, even though the regional government of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province, led by the Awami National Party, is ideally positioned to revive the Peace *Jirga* (tribal council).

The restart of an India-Pakistan peace process, announced by Prime Minister Singh

goal to achieve. The two peace processes have thus far been on a seesaw: when one is up, the other is down. Could this be a moment to bring them in sync?

That depends. What is wanted is rapid action for not only the Afghan-Pakistan Peace *Jirga* but also simultaneous peace *jirgas* in Pakistan's tribal areas – combined with a joint NATO-US-Pakistan counter-terrorism strategy that targets militant infrastructure as well as key leaders, instead of civilians. There is little doubt that the Pakistani political parties will commit to such a strategy, and the Afghanistan political parties can be prodded to do so. Within South Asia there is widespread support, and the restoration of the India-Pakistan peace process could provide a face-saver for the Pakistan army. But the countries with leverage over the army are the US, China and Saudi Arabia, followed by the EU and the Gulf countries. If they can get Pakistani army backing for, and adherence to, the India-Pakistan and Afghanistan-Pakistan peace processes, then there is a ray of light ahead.



10 YEARS AFTER ST. MALO

The tenth anniversary of the Franco-British St. Malo accord falls on 4 December 2008. That agreement paved the political path for EU governments to launch the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) at the Cologne European Council summit in June 1999. The St. Malo document said that the European Union 'must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises'. Has ESDP met those expectations over the last decade? The answer is both yes and no.

In its initial years, the main geographic focus for potential ESDP activity was the western Balkans, and EU governments placed much emphasis on developing European military forces. For instance, the 'Helsinki headline goals' agreed by EU governments in December 1999, included the aim of having some 60,000 soldiers available for EU military operations. Those emphases were understandable. The European experience of depending militarily on the US in Bosnia – which was repeated in the Kosovo war that occurred between the St. Malo and Cologne summits – greatly influenced EU governments. For many Member States developing an effective working relationship with NATO was also crucial, and it took three years to reach agreement with NATO (known as 'Berlin plus'), so that the EU could use Alliance military assets if required.

It was not until 2003 that ESDP moved from plans to policy, when the EU carried out its first peacekeeping operation (with NATO's help) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The same year, the geographic focus of ESDP moved beyond the Balkans, and the Union completed its first autonomous operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Since 2003, demand for EU action has grown considerably, and on average the Union has undertaken four new ESDP missions each year, such as the current monitoring mission in Georgia and the upcoming naval operation off Somalia. Plus these operations have varied greatly in their tasks, using and sometimes mixing both civil and military resources.

Despite all this impressive progress over the last decade, delegates at a recent EUISS seminar in Helsinki identified at least three key shortfalls facing the future

of ESDP. First, EU governments need to be clearer about their ambitions for the defence policy part of ESDP. The French white paper on defence, published earlier this year, suggests that the EU should be able to carry out two or three military operations simultaneously, along with several civil operations in separate places. The EU is already doing this – Member States are currently carrying out 12 ESDP operations, two of which are military. The key question, therefore, is not the number of operations, but their size, intensity and robustness. The Balkan question asked of Europe in the 1990s still stands: should

Third, EU governments still lack adequate military and civil resources, and existing capacities are already over-stretched due to NATO and UN commitments. The gaps in military equipment have been well documented, and there is no lack of EU plans or ideas for how to fill these shortfalls. The 1999 Helsinki headline goals are still valid in principle – the recent French defence white paper suggests the EU should gradually create a 60,000 strong intervention force – but they have not yet been met in practice. Member States have very different military capacities, but they should speed up their

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Jacques Chirac, Tony Blair and Lionel Jospin in St. Malo

the EU be able to carry out a large military intervention in another country to enforce peace, by stopping a civil war or genocide?

Second, Member States should beef up the EU's existing planning capacity for operations (a tiny 60 civilians and 8 military compared with 3,000 military planners at NATO). Currently, the EU relies on national or NATO headquarters for military operations. However, EU missions have used both civil and military personnel, sometimes combining both, and joint planning is crucial for such multifaceted operations. NATO or national military headquarters cannot devise a comprehensive approach with access to both military and civilian means, whereas a strengthened EU planning structure could combine civil and military planning more effectively.

implementation of existing equipment-generation plans by specialising in particular skills and sharing some strategic assets.

Some commentators have suggested that France and the UK should agree a second St. Malo accord, to re-invigorate the debate on ESDP ambitions and capacities. This is because they are the major military powers in Europe, and ESDP cannot succeed without their support. But EU politics has changed greatly over the last ten years, not least because twelve countries have joined the Union since 1998, and a new Franco-British agreement might not be enough to guarantee results. If they still wish to fulfil the aims of the 1998 St. Malo accord, all EU Member States should re-commit to developing both their ambitions and capacities for ESDP.