

ISSUES

26

JULY 2008

Quarterly published by the **EU Institute for Security Studies**
43 avenue du Président Wilson - 75775 Paris cedex 16 - France
Phone + 33 (0) 1 56 89 19 30 • Fax + 33 (0) 1 56 89 19 31

Editing / Layout : Daniel Keohane / Hanno Ranck

EDITORIAL



Álvaro de Vasconcelos DIRECTOR

A BETTER AND STRONGER EUROPE

Following Ireland's 'No' to the Lisbon Treaty, echoing the French and Dutch voters' rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, the EU needs to consider carefully how to win back citizens' support and thus overcome the fears that are crippling its ability to shape world politics.

'More Europe,' not less, and a 'better Europe', is needed to deliver what citizens expect from the Union and dispel their anxieties, whipped up by populist demagoguery on the 'evils' of globalisation, free markets and open borders. A new US administration will shortly be defining a new course for US foreign policy and putting its stamp on world affairs. It is high time that Europe follows suit and gets its act together on external action. Even without the instruments provided for in the Lisbon Treaty, meant to significantly improve the EU's capacity to act decisively on a global scale, the combined efforts of the Union and its Member States can go a long way in that direction.

The Union needs to reconcile its citizens with the central idea of integration – that of an open Europe, one that is both open to the world and open internally because diversity is its hallmark. Because 'Europe' has become such a large part of their daily lives, Europeans increasingly look to the EU for answers as demonstrated by

the 'hot issues' that have dominated referenda debates. Because the world has indeed gone largely global, however, the EU will not be able to meet such expectations unless its ability to shape world governance is bolstered. It would be foolish to think that any single EU country, even resorting to special alliances with other major powers, could decisively influence the price of food or energy or tackle the environment and climate change should its fellow EU members pursue a different course of action. The Union must act as a united whole in order to manage relations with the United States and to involve established and aspiring world powers like China, India and Russia in a system of global governance that fairly distributes both globalisation's benefits and burdens.

Presenting a united front is not enough, however, for the EU to be globally effective. This crucially requires that adopted policies are fully consistent with its stated principles and values, and thus do not weaken but rather reinforce the EU's legitimacy in the judgment of its citizens and in the eyes of the world. This is vital across the board and nowhere more so than in such policy areas as migration, enlargement and security. Immigration has become a highly politicised issue, one that looms large in political campaigns often verging on naked populism, and fear of migration has become a prominent


CONTENTS

A BETTER AND STRONGER EUROPE
by Álvaro de Vasconcelos

L'UNION POUR LA MÉDITERRANÉE ET LES ACQUIS CIVILS DE BARCELONE
par Abdallah Saaf

GREAT EXPECTATIONS: AMERICA AND EUROPE AFTER BUSH
by Marcin Zaborowski

www.iss.europa.eu



The European Foreign & Security Policy Institute



Angela Merkel, Jean Claude Juncker, and Nicolas Sarkozy at the European Council summit after Irish voters rejected the Lisbon treaty

feature of the domestic political landscape in several EU countries. Yet, as a recent study prepared by eminent specialists for the French government demonstrates, migration is an international public good that makes a net contribution to world wealth, whose benefits are felt in countries of origin and host countries alike. If European politicians insist on dealing with immigration as a security challenge rather than as an economic opportunity, it is highly probable that in national referenda voters will tend to reject one of the four market freedoms that lie at the heart of the European single market: the free movement of labour. That will hurt would-be non-European migrants first. How long will it take, however, before the same kind of rejection starts undermining the very foundations of the European single market?

Policies based on the exclusion of migrants are detrimental to EU interests as they go against the founding values, clearly spelled out in the treaties, on which the EU has been built. This damages the EU's legitimacy as it erodes the support of large swathes of European public opinion. How many millions of European voters are not themselves the product of recent waves of immigration?

The same applies to EU expansion, which is unquestionably its greatest contribution so far to world peace and democracy. To call into question the decision to start accession negotiations with Turkey without any reasonable justification, other than an unspoken one based on culturalistic notions of identity, namely that it fails to qualify as a member of a 'Christian club', undermines the political foundations of

European integration and the key principle of unity within diversity. It would be hardly surprising if, as a result, enlargement came to be seen by voters (possibly even in retrospect) as a threat rather than as a positive development for their future.

To shut out the Turks, or indeed would-be migrants, on the basis of prejudice, is deeply damaging to the diversity that contributes so much to the EU's power of attraction, and is an integral part of the EU's world influence. It is equally damaging to the EU's foreign policy as a whole in most regions of the world.

In order to survive as a 'force for good' both internally and externally, one that its citizens will not fail to support, the EU needs to be more coherent and more cohesive in addressing today's global challenges. This is what institutional reform and the current debate on the European Security Strategy (ESS) seek to achieve. Lack of coherence refers not so much to differences between Member States or inter-institutional rivalries but to inconsistency between stated principles and policy options. This is highlighted in the fight against terrorism. Emergency measures that weaken our democracies and are used as an alibi by authoritarian regimes should be decisively rejected.

The EU will continue to be called upon to protect civilians under threat in troubled parts of the world. This is consistent with the UN principle of the 'responsibility to protect' that is implicitly, but not explicitly, endorsed in the ESS when it commits the EU to intervene against major violations of international law. European

defence cannot be neglected if the EU wants to shape the future course of world events. When intervening in a crisis, especially if the military is involved, the EU must be seen to strictly reflect the delegitimation of power politics that lies at its heart. Otherwise, legitimacy will be compromised and popular support will decline. It should be noted that, in spite of its culture of neutrality, Ireland's current military presence in Chad as part of the EU operation was not an issue in the 'no' campaign (even if neutrality was). This is because defending human rights commands strong public support and the EU operation is seen as guided by humanitarian objectives: protecting refugees from Darfur.

Making the EU a coherent and effective global world actor is the next step that needs to be taken in order to ensure public support and reconcile European citizens with their Union. It should not be difficult to muster the support of European citizens for such an endeavour, if only a clear case is made for the tangible benefits of upholding European ideals. Sceptics will dismiss the rallying potential of European ideals as pure utopia. But then what does the entire Union, including democratic peace and the pooling of sovereignty between states that had been at war for centuries, amount to if not a form of utopia achieved? Why not, then, an 'open Europe', a strong Europe that can be a powerful actor on the global stage? It is high time for the proponents of the European ideal to make their voices heard, and to reclaim the European discourse from those who would settle instead, against the Union's citizens best interests, for an inward-looking, introverted Europe, doomed to powerlessness in the face of globalisation.

MIDDLE EAST SECURITY AND WMD NON-PROLIFERATION/DISARMAMENT

On 19-20 June, the EUISS hosted close to 100 officials and academics from Europe and the Middle East, in collaboration with the office of HR Solana's Personal Representative on Non-Proliferation. Participants discussed proliferation challenges in the Middle East and possible frameworks in which to develop Euro-Mediterranean co-operation against proliferation. Speakers included Annalisa Giannella, Ahmed Maher El-Sayed, Wael Al-Assad, Rogelio Pflirter, Ephraim Asculai, Dominique Ristori and Mohammed Benaissa.

THE EU AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: RULES, POWER, AND PRIORITIES

On 5-6 June, the EUISS, in cooperation with the Istituto Affari Internazionali, held the first seminar in the series on 'European Interests and Strategic Options' in Rome, to debate the implementation and updating of the European Security Strategy. This seminar addressed 'The EU and global governance: rules, power, and priorities'. Prominent speakers, including Giuliano Amato and Robert Cooper amongst others, debated how to enhance the EU contribution to multilateral solutions to complex challenges. The record of the EU in three important domains of external action, namely security and development, non-proliferation and human rights was subject to more specific scrutiny in three separate working groups.



Pierre Levy, Robert Cooper and Giuliano Amato

EUROPEAN SECURITY CULTURE

On 29-30 May 2008, the EUISS co-organised a conference in Vilnius together with the Slovenian EU Presidency, the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Institute of International Relations and Political Science at Vilnius University. The event brought together policy-makers and academics to discuss the main features of European security identity, the relationship between foreign policy and security from a European perspective and security perceptions from EU neighbouring and partner countries. Speakers included Gérard Araud, Petras Vaitiekunas, Milan Jazbec, Aurelia Bouchez, Jan Joel Andersson, Andrew Michta, Arkady Moshes, Abdallah Saaf, Richard Wright and Helga Schmid.

THE EU AND THE PREVENTION OF MASS VIOLENCE

This select roundtable took place on 28 May and gathered diplomats and experts for a discussion around theories and practices of genocide prevention developed in Dr David Hamburg's book 'Preventing Genocide'. The conceptual dimensions of mass violence prevention were explored in view of current European practices of prevention, followed by background reflection on lessons learned by international organisations and their difficulty to act when a crisis is ongoing. The proposal to create a European centre for genocide prevention was also discussed.



Narcis Serra and Álvaro de Vasconcelos

US-EU REGIONAL DIALOGUE ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF 'MAPPING THE GLOBAL FUTURE'

On 7 May, the EUISS held a joint event with the Atlantic Council of the United States to discuss the National Intelligence Council report on 'Mapping the Global Future' and the EUISS publication *The New Global Puzzle: What World for the EU in 2025?* The debate focused on two regional issues – the challenge posed by the rise of Asia and relations with the Islamic world – and some horizontal questions, such as energy security and climate change. Speakers included Rafael Bardaji, Banning Garrett, François Godement, Marek Grela, Robert Hutchings, Frederick Kempe, Jamie Shea, Philip Stephens, Pawel Swieboda and Bruno Tertrais.

EU-LATIN AMERICA MILITARY COOPERATION: WORKING TOGETHER FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

On 21-22 April, the EUISS hosted around 60 national diplomats, international officials and academics from Latin America and Europe to debate on 'EU-Latin America military cooperation'. The event was co-organised with the European Forum of Forte Copacabana and the Mercosur chair of Sciences Po. Participants discussed avenues for joint work, such as industrial cooperation, peacekeeping in Haiti and Africa, the fight against organised crime, and the role of emerging global players such as Brazil and China. Speakers included Luiz Carlos Da Costa, Ruth Diamint, Bruno Gallard, Marco Aurelio Garcia, Michel Miraillet, Nicolas Pascual de la Parte, General Jean-Paul Perruche, Gabriel Gaspar Tápia and Burkard Schmitt.

RETHINKING IRAN: FROM CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION

by Christoph Bertram

Chailot Paper n° 110 – 08/2008
(forthcoming)

Christoph Bertram sets out the need for the international community to devise an alternative strategy to the confrontational one that has dominated relations with Iran in recent years. The West should forge a new relationship with Iran, and offer cooperation, *détente* and even partnership as the basis for addressing nuclear concerns.

2007 : LES ENJEUX DES ÉLECTIONS

LÉGISLATIVES EN ALGÉRIE ET AU MAROC

Luis Martinez

Occasional Paper n° 71 – 06/2008

Les élections législatives tenues en 2007 en Algérie ont démontré que les électeurs algériens ont tourné la page de la guerre civile et attendent du régime la mise en place d'un agenda politique permettant à leur pays d'installer la démocratie. Au Maroc, la bonne organisation des élections témoigne d'une véritable évolution dans ce sens; mais des progrès doivent encore être faits pour que le Maroc devienne le modèle de transition démocratique tant recherché dans la région.

UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN – BUILDING ON THE BARCELONA ACQUIS

Roberto Aliboni, George Joffe, Erwan Lannon, Azzam Mahjoub, Abdallah Saaf, Álvaro de Vasconcelos

ISS Report n° 01 – 02/2008

The project of a Union for the Mediterranean has relaunched the debate on Euro-Mediterranean relations in a broader context. One of the pre-conditions for the success of this new Mediterranean initiative is to consolidate and reinforce the Barcelona *acquis*.

PARTNERSHIPS FOR EFFECTIVE MULTILATERALISM: EU RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL, CHINA, INDIA AND RUSSIA

Ummu Salma Bava, Feng Zhongping, Sabine Fischer, Marco Aurélio Garcia, François Godement, Giovanni Grevi, Dmitri Trenin, Alfredo Valladão, Álvaro de Vasconcelos and Christian Wagner
Chailot Paper n° 109 – 05/2008

The tension between interdependence and power politics will shape the future of the international system. This *Chailot Paper* addresses the strategic partnerships that the EU seeks to set up with four important actors, whose ascent is changing traditional patterns of power and governance.

DEFENSE NEWS

23 June 2008

French Generals Fire Back at Defense Cuts

French President Nicolas Sarkozy confirmed June 17 controversial plans to slash 54,000 defense jobs as he outlined a planned overhaul of the armed forces and doctrine in a much-awaited white paper on defense and national security... The white paper recommended rejoining NATO's integrated military planning and urged a greater planning and operational capability for the European Union, including a 60,000-strong intervention force deployable for a year in an overseas theater. Daniel Keohane, research fellow at the [EU Institute for Security Studies](#) here, said the white paper set ambitious goals for Europe, particularly in the light of Ireland's "no" vote in the referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. The treaty's proposed permanent structured cooperation would have made the work of the European Defence Agency easier, he said.

NEW YORK TIMES

20 June 2008

Europe Plays Down Setback in U.S. Tanker Bid

Seeking to avoid a new trans-Atlantic trade clash, the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company and European politicians played down on Thursday a report that might jeopardize a \$35 billion United States military contract awarded to EADS in partnership with Northrop Grumman. Daniel Keohane, a research fellow at the [European Union Institute for Security Studies](#) in Paris, said the case was of enormous significance to trans-Atlantic military trade in an era where the aerospace supply chain is increasingly global. Selling military equipment to the United States has long been difficult for European companies, who cite legislative hurdles like the Buy American Act, passed by Congress in 1933, which allows procurement preferences for domestically produced goods.

DER STANDARD

20 June 2008

"Deutliche Warnung" an Teheran

Es sind nicht die erste israelischen Angriffsübungen. Aber das Getöse wird lauter: Kürzlich drohte Israels Vizepremier Shaul Mofaz mit einem Angriff, sollte der Iran sein Atomprogramm nicht einstellen. Und israelische Exmilitärs sagen inzwischen offen, es gehe nur mehr um das Wann und nicht um das Ob. Dennoch: "Ein israelischer Angriff steht nicht unmittelbar bevor", sagt Walter Posch vom

[EU Institut für Sicherheitsstudien](#) in Paris im Standard-Gespräch. Aber wozu dann das Getöse? Posch meint, dass die Drohungen aus Israel Teil einer neuen Strategie sind: Die Übungen Israels seien im Zusammenhang mit dem neuesten Angebot der fünf UNO-Vetomächte plus Deutschland an den Iran zu sehen. Neben wirtschaftlichen Anreizen wurden Teheran von den sechs Staaten Sicherheitsgarantien in Aussicht gestellt, so es seine Atomanreicherung stoppt. Neben diesen Angeboten mache es aber auch Sinn, Stärke gegenüber Teheran zu demonstrieren, sagt Posch. Diese Rolle habe Israel übernommen. Weil die Gefährdung der USA durch eine iranische Bombe sich öffentlich nicht mehr verkaufen lasse, soll zudem künftig generell stärker die Bedrohung Israels in den Vordergrund gerückt werden.

INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE

11 June 2008

Deadlock in Kosovo risks Balkan instability

Russia, displeased that some European countries and the United States recognized Kosovo's independence, is blocking those arrangements. Its main objection, officially, is that Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia without a green light from the UN Security Council and without support from Serbia. But analysts say the Russian objections are based on the Kremlin's ambiguity toward a stronger EU. "The Kosovo issue shows just how ambiguous Russia's attitude towards a stronger EU actually is," said Sabine Fischer, a Russia expert at the [EU's Institute for Security Studies](#) in Paris. "It wants a stronger EU as a counterweight to the U.S., but it is not willing to have that stronger Europe at the expense of Moscow having no veto over what the EU does. That is why it wants the EU mission in Kosovo under some kind of UN umbrella." The EU, however, does not want to be subservient to the UN. In Kosovo the ethnic Albanians want an end to the UN's presence this Sunday, since it symbolizes their lack of independence.

THE IRISH TIMES

16 May 2008

Neutrality undermined or peacekeeping enhanced?

Critics of Lisbon claim it significantly boosts the union's role in the security and defence area by forcing states to sign up to common European defence and to increase their military spending.... "The Lisbon Treaty does not mean the 'death of Irish neutrality', no more than previous EU treaties did. All decisions on Ireland's

policy of military neutrality will remain solely in the hands of the Irish Government," says Daniel Keohane of the think tank, the [European Union Institute for Security Studies](#). "The Lisbon Treaty does not change the fact that under Irish law the Irish Defence Forces cannot participate in an EU peacekeeping mission unless it has a UN mandate and both the Government and the Dáil have approved the deployment."

RADIO FRANCE INTERNATIONAL

10 May 2008

"The internal political crisis, short term emergency for internally displaced persons and refugees and the spill-over from the conflict in Darfur are three dimensions to be taken into consideration in Eastern Chad. France has tried to play a constructive role through the EU in addressing the humanitarian crisis by pushing for a European operation aimed at protecting civilians. However this aspect is de-linked from the internal political crisis and the difficulty is to find a common position amongst European member states on how to reach a more stable political situation in Chad, in addition to the EU commitment to assist the 13 August 2007 agreement towards reconciliation" said Damien Helly from the [European Union Institute for Security Studies](#).

PÚBLICO

20 March 2008

Três perguntas a Álvaro de Vasconcelos, director do Instituto de Estudos de Segurança da União Europeia (Paris). O multilateralismo dos EUA e o soft power europeu não vão resolver todos os problemas do mundo.

É possível um novo consenso na União Europeia sobre a melhor forma de lidar com crises internacionais desta natureza e desta envergadura e sobre a relação transatlântica? Os estados-membros continuam com posições diferentes, não tanto directamente em relação aos Estados Unidos, mas em relação a outras potências, como a Rússia, em questões como o alargamento da NATO ou a defesa antimísseis. É indispensável definir uma perspectiva europeia em relação à NATO, o que se tornará talvez mais fácil com a prevista plena integração da França nas estruturas militares da Aliança. O consenso só pode ser construído à volta dos princípios e valores em que se fundamenta a integração europeia. fracasso do unilateralismo armado no Iraque dá argumentos fortes aos que preconizam um multilateralismo eficaz, ou seja, capaz de encontrar soluções comuns para os problemas globais.

L'UNION POUR LA MÉDITERRANÉE ET LES ACQUIS CIVILS DE BARCELONE

L'Institut d'Etudes de Sécurité de l'UE a présenté un rapport intitulé « Union for the Mediterranean. Building on the Barcelona acquis » le 18 juin 2008 à Bruxelles devant une assistance de diplomates et d'experts concernés par les enjeux euro-méditerranéens actuels, notamment par le projet d'Union pour la Méditerranée.

Dans cette démarche, outre les acquis institutionnels et l'impact économique du partenariat, il importe de ne pas faire table rase de l'expérience passée, de prendre en considération les acquis de plus d'une décennie de mise en œuvre du processus de Barcelone, de quelques années déjà de politique de voisinage. Parmi les acquis les plus importants, il importe de considérer que tout ne se réduit pas, dans ce qui s'est fait et se fait à des relations interétatiques, intergouvernementales, formelles, institutionnelles. L'impression prévaut que, sur bien des sujets, des dynamiques ont été enclenchées, qui ont marqué des progrès, ce qui constitue en soi l'ébauche d'une culture euro-méditerranéenne.

Tout d'abord, il convient de constater que, derrière les travaux gouvernementaux, se profile le rôle des sociétés civiles. Cette force est elle-même dotée d'espaces marqués d'une vitalité notoire, comme la Plateforme civile Euromed. Des institutions communes telles que l'Assemblée parlementaire euro-méditerranéenne et la Fondation pour le Dialogue des Cultures sont également très importantes. Tout repose sur des enveloppes budgétaires plus ou moins significatives, un suivi politique, des rencontres à différents niveaux, des instruments de dialogue, mais aussi des interactions souvent enrichissantes. Les rapports entre sociétés civiles ont créé des relations entre des centaines d'ONG dans la région et entre des militances associatives de différentes sensibilités.

En outre, un travail de socialisation relativement profond a été effectué : après la mise en œuvre du processus de Barcelone, un rapprochement relatif notoire des deux côtés a eu lieu, s'agissant aussi bien des diplomates, des administrations que des acteurs politiques et des sociétés civiles. La perspective d'une Méditerranée zone de libre échange (MEFTA) ne se limite donc pas à un acte de nature commerciale, mais est une sorte de projet de contrat social entre les Etats et les populations concernées de la région – une tentative de type volontariste avec la définition d'objectifs communs spécifiques.

Par ailleurs, les dimensions politiques ont agi dans ce sens. La formation d'une culture fondée sur la règle de droit, la diffusion des valeurs démocratiques, du respect des droits humains et des libertés fondamentales (expression, association, pensée, conscience, religion, droits de la femme, lutte contre les discriminations de race, de nationalité, de langue, de religion, de sexe, etc.).

une question de sécurité. Cette problématique semble néanmoins avoir évolué. Elle semblait inciter à traiter les immigrés comme acteurs à part entière de la coopération euro-méditerranéenne, et à mettre en valeur leurs rôles potentiels de facilitateurs dans les domaines de l'investissement, de l'internationalisation, des transferts de l'expérience et des savoir-faire.



Jose Manuel Barroso, Hosni Mubarak, Nicolas Sarkozy au Sommet pour la Méditerranée

Un grand effort a été fait pour permettre l'établissement de relations entre les citoyens des deux côtés, les amener à vivre les uns à côté des autres au-delà leurs différences, à faire prévaloir l'idée d'unité dans la diversité.

Cette relation de « people to people » peut-être considérée comme l'un des acquis majeurs de Barcelone. Il a en tout cas permis l'intégration des sociétés civiles dans le partenariat euro-méditerranéen.

Le rapport montre l'importance d'un exemple comme celui de la relation aux organisations islamistes. Il est clair que, dans quelques cas patents, la marginalisation des islamistes et de leurs mouvances dans la société civile a contribué paradoxalement à marginaliser les secteurs démocratiques non islamistes. Bien des faits et des phénomènes enregistrés dans les pays du Sud s'expliquent par le fait que ces derniers ont eu tendance à considérer Barcelone comme un dispositif de préservation du statu quo. Or, grâce au contexte qu'il a créé, beaucoup de choses ont évolué.

Notons aussi que, dans le contexte actuel, où l'on a tendance à percevoir l'autre de plus en plus comme une complication, et de moins en moins comme une opportunité, l'immigration est davantage définie comme

En dépit de nombreuses difficultés, les préoccupations euro-méditerranéennes de la période passée semblent avoir davantage encouragé à mettre fin aux attitudes xénophobes et à tenter de réhabiliter, de promouvoir et d'impulser la dimension humaine de la migration.

Le thème du « clash des civilisations » constitue un autre domaine où, dans une perspective de « civilianisation », on a vu se mettre à l'œuvre les outils d'un travail patient d'intégration dans la diversité. La crise des caricatures en a constitué le révélateur et l'expression. Un des grands enseignements de cet épisode pourrait bien être d'avoir démontré qu'il est inutile de traiter les civilisations comme des acteurs majeurs des relations internationales d'aujourd'hui, et qu'il est nécessaire de dépasser les postures culturalistes, en évitant de se reporter systématiquement à la spécificité culturelle des acteurs. Il atteste du grand intérêt qu'il y a à faire prévaloir la dimension politique des contradictions de cette nature, le rôle des gouvernements, des partis politiques, du rôle de la société civile, du secteur privé.

Ces acquis civils fort précieux ne sauraient être ignorés alors que la région semble sur le point d'entamer une nouvelle expérience.



GREAT EXPECTATIONS: AMERICA AND EUROPE AFTER BUSH

European expectations for post-Bush America are high. Like much of the rest of the world, Europeans are gripped by Obama-mania. Even if he is not preferred by most, European views on a possible win by John McCain are generally positive too. Most Europeans cannot wait to see the back of George W. Bush, and they expect transatlantic co-operation can only improve with his successor. American expectations about future co-operation with Europe are also considerable. After securing his nomination, John McCain travelled to Europe, and Barack Obama has followed suit. Both McCain and Obama have made efforts to reach out to the Europeans to secure their co-operation on a range of issues, including Afghanistan, Iran and climate change.

Are transatlantic relations really likely to improve after eight tense and unhappy years? The short answer is yes. President Bush never really cared or showed much interest in Europe. His foreign policy was ostentatiously unilateral. Both Obama and to a larger extent McCain (who unlike Obama has mentioned the EU) speak with respect about Europe. Both candidates refer to multilateralism, although Obama is probably more genuine in this – or at least his understanding of multilateralism is closer to that of Europeans. Both want to enter into new and stronger arms control agreements with Russia. And both candidates are 'greener' than Bush – they do not deny that climate change is happening, and both favour introducing compulsory caps on greenhouse emissions.

As for the Europeans, there has already been a considerable rapprochement with the US, prompted by last year's election of President Sarkozy in France. Transatlantic understanding on Iran is deeper than ever before, European contributions to ISAF in Afghanistan have modestly increased and EU-NATO relations could be significantly revitalised should France fully re-join NATO's integrated military command, which seems likely.

There are grounds for optimism, but Europeans and Americans should not have great expectations. For example, those Europeans who expect that America's policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict would change will be disappointed. Few expected that McCain would be more sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, but Obama's mixed heritage, the fact that his father was Mus-

lim and his middle name is Hussein, made some believe that he would pursue a more balanced approach.

Recently Obama proved them wrong in his speech to the powerful pro-Israeli AIPEC group, which he delivered only a few hours after winning his nomination. In the speech the Democratic nominee declared that 'Jerusalem will remain the capital of Israel' and that it 'must remain undivided'. He also stressed that 'Israel's identity as a Jewish state must be preserved', implicitly dismissing the Palestinian 'right of return' (he later qualified this statement).

peans will do more to share the burden in Afghanistan and maybe even in Iraq. This is also unlikely to happen. Both operations are unpopular in Europe, and defence establishments are concerned about overstretching their meagre resources.

What can be done to develop a positive momentum in transatlantic relations after the elections? Two things: first, it is important to reassess expectations in a more realistic manner. The next president will be more EU-friendly and more of a multilateralist. If Obama wins, US policy in Iraq is likely to change and this would have impli-

Copyright: Steven Senne/AP/SIPA



John McCain and Barack Obama.

Some Europeans believe that America's position on Iran will also change, just by talking directly to Tehran. This, again, is unlikely. McCain made it clear that he would rather bomb Iran than talk to its leaders. Obama has taken the opposite position and even offered unconditional negotiations with the Iranians. But he has never ruled out the use of force and stressed in his AIPEC speech: 'I will do everything in my power to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon; everything in my power; everything'. So, there is almost no difference between the candidates regarding harsher sanctions against Tehran, including secondary sanctions that Europeans oppose.

The Americans are also set for some disappointments. Many in Washington expect that with a new administration, the Euro-

peans for the US presence in Afghanistan. But, no matter who wins many US policies would remain the same, including in the Middle East and East Asia. Americans too need to realise the limitations on Europe's involvement in Afghanistan. It is difficult to maintain, let alone increase, investment in a war that has been hugely unpopular for years.

Second, Europeans and Americans should be more open about their differences, and about the challenges that lie ahead. Some Europeans think it is better to avoid mentioning Afghanistan or Iraq in discussions with Americans. This is because the US expects too much and Europe does not have much to offer. Even so, relations with the US will not improve just because some Europeans pretend that these issues do not exist.