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## Terrorism and enlargement: a clash of dynamics

Nicole Gnesotto

Director

One year on, the only thing that is systematic about the international system is its disorder. The United States, shaken to the core by the terrorist attacks and the fraud perpetrated by leaders of globalised companies, is relentlessly pursuing its course down the path of unilateralism. International regulators are powerless faced with the anonymity of the new breed of international terrorist troublemakers and weakened by America's instinctive mistrust of international organisations – a mistrust in which a number of countries take quiet satisfaction. And to sum up the state of transatlantic relations, there is now an unprecedented culture gap between Europeans and Americans on every international topic bar none, even if on both sides efforts are being made to keep up appearances and maintain some semblance of transatlantic harmony.

■ It is against that background that the European Union will have to negotiate one of the major turning points in its history: an imminent enlargement to take in up to thirteen new member countries. The tension of adapting to both the consequences of 11 September and EU enlargement is extreme. On the one hand, in international relations, the 11 September attacks have reinforced a political, security and military logic based on violence and the response to violence, one in which the role of states and national sovereignty is again becoming predominant, since it is a question of security and therefore a matter of life or death for millions of citizens. On the other, enlargement is both the fruit and the symbol of a world in which violence has given way to democratic negotiation, the principle and the aim are shared prosperity and nations limit their demands in the greater interests of collective solidarity. On the one hand there is a security imperative based on states' indi-

vidual responsibilities; on the other, an objective of peace and reconciliation founded on the integration of societies. On the one hand there is a world in which America has given 'sovereignist' ideologies a new importance that they had lost; on the other, a world where shared sovereignty is at once the rule and the condition for joint success.

■ These two sets of considerations, the one focusing on security and national sovereignty and the other on civil society and integration, are poles apart and are presenting all the Union's member states with conflicting imperatives. Going ahead with enlargement almost automatically implies a certain form of European introversion in which priority is given to economic and budgetary issues, institutional demands and the working out of a new, more coherent form of European governance. Conversely, adapting to violent situations in the outside world presupposes a certain extraversion, a willingness to take risks and the subordination of sectional interests to a more general internal and external security imperative. Reconciling the two amounts to taking an impossible yet unavoidable gamble.

■ By virtue of its traditions, culture and institutional heritage, the Union is more suited to taking up the challenge of enlargement than that of international security, quite simply because it is more familiar with implementing norms and managing diversity in peacetime than with the employment of force and risk-taking in periods of crisis. However, certain EU countries have also traditionally maintained, or have built up, a culture and capability of intervention in external conflicts. It would not be offensive to either the Union's institutions or the

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# Institute Activities

## Annual Conference and inauguration

The first Annual Conference of the EUISS took place in Paris on 1 July. At the same time the Institute was officially inaugurated by Javier Solana and His Excellency Hans Henrik Bruun on behalf of the EU presidency. The Conference included:

- a speech by the High Representative *Javier Solana* on 'CFSP and the state of the Union', which will be a regular feature of future Annual Conferences;
- a round-table discussion, chaired by *Quentin Peel* (foreign affairs editor of the Financial Times), on 'The Convention and the future of CFSP', with *Carl Bildt* (former Swedish prime minister), *Elmar Brok* (Chairman of the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee), *Jacques Delors* (former president of the European Commission) and *Bronislaw Geremek* (former Polish minister for foreign affairs).

The Conference was attended by over a hundred diplomats, directors of institutes, security specialists and officials from both EU member states and candidate countries.

## Transatlantic conference

■ A conference on 'Transatlantic relations and the new security environment', organised by the ISS (Julian Lindley-French) in collaboration with the Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos, was held in Madrid on 8 June. The need for flexibility, renovation and reform of the transatlantic relationship was the key message. Javier Solana gave an address at the opening dinner on the state of transatlantic relations. Richard Haass, Director of Policy Planning at the State Department, said that effective cooperation was needed, not just in the war against terror but also on transnational issues, to deal with the unwelcome consequences of globalisation. Iraq would be a test case of that new relationship. Phil Gordon of the Brookings Institution said that whilst there were not many differences between Europeans and Americans over the threat posed by Iraq, there were marked disagreements over how to deal with Saddam Hussein.

## Task forces

■ On 13 May, a first meeting of the Institute's **European Defence Book Task Force** (Julian Lindley-French), was held in Paris. The Task Force was charged with assessing the ESDP in order both to enhance the process of European defence in light of the security environment post-11 September and to communicate European defence to a broad European audience.

## Institute publications

### Chaillot Papers

- *N° 52: Terms of engagement: The paradox of American power and the transatlantic dilemma post-11 September*, by Julian Lindley-French (May).
- *N° 53: Enlargement and European defence after 11 September*, by Jiri Sedivy, Pal Dunay and Jacek Saryusz-Wolski; edited by Antonio Missiroli (June).
- *N° 54: The United States: the empire of force or the force of empire?*, by Pierre Hassner (September).

### Occasional Papers

- *N° 35: L'ONU au Kosovo: leçons de la première MINUK*, by Eric Chevallier (May).
- *N° 36: Optimiser le processus de Barcelone*, by Dorothee Schmid, a former Institute visiting fellow (July).
- *N° 37: From candidate to member state: Poland and the future of the EU*, by Rafal Trzaskowski, a former visiting fellow (September).

### Forthcoming

- *Chaillot Paper N°55: The EU as a cooperative security provider: model and reality*, by Hans-Georg Erhart.
- *Chaillot Paper N°56: Terrorism and Europe*, by Thérèse Delpech.
- *Occasional Paper N°38: Strengthening Cooperative Threat Reduction with Russia: what role for the European Union?*, edited by Burkard Schmitt.

## Institute staff

**Three new researchers have joined the ISS:**

- **Dov Lynch** (Irish), former lecturer in War Studies at King's College, London;
- **Martin Ortega** (Spanish), former director of INCIPE in Madrid;
- **Gustav Lindström** (Swedish), former student at RAND Corporation;
- **Maartje Rutten** has left the Institute on termination of her contract for an appointment at Forum Europe, Brussels.

## External publications

### Nicole Gnesotto

– 'Demilitarization in Europe, Depoliticization in the US', *Internationale Politik, Transatlantic Edition: 9/11 – One Year Later*, 3/2002, Vol. 3.

### Julian Lindley-French

– 'Can Europe Defend Itself?', *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 24:215-222, 2002.  
– 'Combined and Joint? The Development of a Security and Operational Doctrine for the European Union', in Erich Reiter et al. (eds.) *Europas ferne Streitmacht* (Hamburg, 2002).

### Antonio Missiroli

– 'Zwischen Konfliktverhütung und Krisenmanagement – ESVP nach dem 11 September', *Internationale Politik*, 7/2002, Vol. 57.  
– 'More euros for military capabilities' (with Burkard Schmitt) *European Voice*, 27/6/2002.  
– 'Coherence, effectiveness and flexibility for CFSP/ESDP', in Erich Reiter et al. (eds.), *Europas ferne Streitmacht* (Hamburg, 2002).

### Burkard Schmitt

– 'Essential for NATO's Future: Defence Spending', *NATO's Nations and Partners for Peace*, 1/2002.  
– 'L'industrie de défense en Europe', *Annuaire français de Relations internationales* 2002, vol. III.

### Dimitrios Triantaphyllou

– 'Y a-t-il une "question albanaise"?' *Le Courrier des Pays de l'Est*, no. 1023, 3/2002.

## Research awards

### Visiting fellows

*During the period April to July the following studied at the Institute as visiting fellows:*

- **Ralitzia Dimtcheva** (Bulgarian), whose research topic was 'The Stability Pact and the prospects for Bulgarian and Romanian membership of Euro-Atlantic structures';
- **Roberto Francia** (Italian), who worked on 'The prospects of European foreign policy towards Colombia';
- **Giovanni Gasparini** (Italian), 'European security and space: the Galileo project';
- **Seid Turkovic** (Bosnian), 'The development of a strategic concept for European security and defence';
- **Katia Vlachos-Dengler** (Greek), 'Getting there: strategic mobility and the ESDP'.

## Briefings

Members of the Institute's research team gave briefings to visitors from the US War College and the American University, Washington, DC.

## US: the new Leviathan?

**American actions** in the extended wake of 11 September are increasingly perplexing Europeans, the Administration's spurning of the International Criminal Court (ICC) being only the latest in a string of disagreements that have beset transatlantic relations over recent months. Indeed, the sight of an American administration threatening not just to withdraw from UN peace-keeping missions but to veto them unless its forces are exempted from the court's jurisdiction has perplexed even the closest of America's allies, not least because the US had defined the mission and method of the court. Clearly, the ICC was not the actual cause of Washington's irritation. Rather, it was the nature of what constitutes legitimate constraint upon a superpower with global responsibilities.

American thinking about international organisations these days goes something like this. The US *is* the force for good in the world, therefore constraint upon the US is bad. International organisations, by definition, constrain their members. International organisations, therefore, are bad. The power, status and values of Imperial Britain at the end of the nineteenth century suggested to London that *Pax Britannica* should be served by the 'Doctrine of the Free Hand': what was good for Britain was good for the world. History soon consigned such hubris to the dustbin of time where it belonged, partly (and not without a certain irony) as a result of America's appearance as a world power in the late 1890s.

Britain rejected multilateralism in favour of hegemonic stability because power and opportunity came together in such a way as to convince the British that they were naturally endowed with virtue. Of course, the British simply did not have the power to realise such a vision but could it be that the America of the twenty-first century does? It is a tempting and, from a European per-

spective at least, a compelling and dangerous prospect for both America and its friends. Make no mistake, the world is a better place for American leadership. What would the world of today look like had Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union won the great systemic struggles of the twentieth century? America *is* the force for good in the world. However, Lord Acton's old adage still stands: if power corrupts, absolute power corrupts absolutely, and there have been signs of late that power might just be going to America's head.

In that context, its rejection of the ICC seems not so much a repudiation of an instrument of international law, but of international law itself. It is as though the United States, dissatisfied with the performance of international organisations, now wants to replace them – America the new Leviathan, benign master of all it surveys, constrained by none, drawing its legitimacy by right of power. It is a dangerous twist of the American dream that Americans must resist, however seductive it might appear. Bending the Wilsonian principle by replacing the court of world opinion with American opinion would deny the inspirational America, to which so much of the world looks, for mighty America, in which effectiveness replaces legitimacy as a basis for American action.

Not surprisingly, Europeans have a few problems with that. How far can we diverge over the method of global security governance before such divergence changes the very ends upon which Europeans and Americans are supposed to agree? The essence of Europe is that no one state can be allowed to lead or to withdraw. It is a place in which the Doctrine of the Free Hand has been replaced by the Doctrine of the Tied Hand (some would say the Doctrine of No Hands). Somewhere between these two extremes must

surely lie a more effective model for security governance.

Here is the bottom line. Europeans do not really expect the US to be multilateral, since American power and politics preclude that. Unilateralism is, after all, the deal by which the essentially isolationist American people permit the American elite to engage with the world. What matters is the nature of unilateralism – broad or narrow. If it is narrow, and calculated solely on a strict interpretation of the American interest American 'leadership' in global security governance will be undermined. If it is broad, open to the counsel of others before definitive American action is taken, then effectiveness will be reinforced by legitimacy. Indeed, it is difficult to see how American policy can be effective unless it is also legitimate.

That is why America so desperately needs Europe. Europeans live for treaties and institutions, a 'weakness' that is also a strength, constraint and restraint being the very fonts of legitimacy. Therefore, if America is seen to listen to Europe from time to time it will also ensure that America itself is heard elsewhere with less prejudice but Europe too must support its counsel with the capacity to act. As Henry Kissinger states, 'power without legitimacy tempts tests of strength; legitimacy without power tempts empty posturing.'

Thus, the choice comes down to Hobbes or Locke: a Hobbesian Leviathan bound by nothing other than its own sense of purpose or a rational Lockean 'Leviathan' (with apologies to Locke) reflective of the democracy it is duty-bound to protect. It was Churchill who once said that America eventually makes the right choice after all other options have been exhausted. So make that choice, America. ■

Julian Lindley-French

## US: going nuclear?

**It has become commonplace** to say that the events of 11 September have changed international affairs dramatically. With regard to nuclear affairs, this is also partly the case. The terrorist attacks themselves had no direct nuclear implications, but they gave new impetus to ongoing change in the nuclear landscape.

On the positive side, 11 September has greatly strengthened the awareness of the urgent need to fight proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to prevent terrorists from acquiring or developing WMD and WMD-related materials. This led, in June 2002, to the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Within this framework, the G8 countries committed themselves to raising up to \$20 billion over the next ten years for the financing of collaborative projects with Russia on non-proliferation, disarmament and nuclear safety. Given the persistent risks that stem from Russian WMD-related installations and stockpiles, this commitment is without doubt vital and a major success – provided that the partners keep their promises and find the necessary financial resources.

However, the G8 Global Partnership could not conceal profound divergence over the way to fight proliferation that persists – and it is getting worse. In this respect at least, 11 September has been both a catalyst and a boost for developments that were under way before that tragic day. The US tendency to concentrate the ‘war on terror’ on the so-called ‘axis of evil’ has revived and intensified the debate about rogue states and the way in which to deal with them. This, in turn, has a nuclear dimension.

In particular, the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review was initiated before 11 September but it nevertheless reveals that

the United States will draw up contingency plans for using nuclear weapons against Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya and Syria, because they ‘all have long-standing hostility towards the US and its security partners, [...] sponsor or harbour terrorists, and have active WMD and missile programs’. Calling for a new force posture able to deter and respond to any and all emerging threats, the NPR suggests combining the deployment of missile defences with a mixture of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, together with a so-called ‘hedge policy’, all of this designed to enhance flexibility in offensive and defensive capabilities. According to the NPR, the United States should maintain the capacity to reverse reductions of deployed warheads, develop and deploy a Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system, and continue to examine the possibility of developing low-yield nuclear warheads for use against hardened and deeply buried targets.

The US search for greater flexibility was also reflected in the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) signed with Russia in May 2002. Only three pages long, the treaty significantly scales back oversized nuclear stockpiles but does not mandate *permanent* reductions. It contains no requirement to destroy withdrawn warheads, and allows both sides to return to any force level they desire after 10 years and to pull out with 90 days’ notice at any time. Moreover, the United States is now able to develop its nuclear force without detailed treaty limitations, and there is no link between strategic reductions and constraints on missile defences.

Both the 2002 NPR and SORT indicate a strong will to increase the ability to respond militarily, on the one hand, and to avoid clear and binding obligations, on the other. In pursuit of

greater American freedom of action, Washington is reinventing arms control, basing it on implicit trust (instead of treaties and verification), turning its back on irreversible arms reductions, seeking to develop new, more usable nuclear weapons and targeting non-nuclear weapon states. All of this is fundamentally incompatible with both the spirit and the letter of the NPT; it could therefore not only contribute to the ongoing undermining of the current regime but devalue arms control itself, thereby leading to even greater risks of proliferation – which is surely not the intention. The same is true for the envisaged combination of missile defences, on the one hand, and a mixture of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, on the other. What some consider an indispensable part of maintaining an effective deterrent could be interpreted by others as an attempt to increase the chances of a successful pre-emptive attack, which could provoke destabilising reactions on the part of potential opponents.

All of this shows that there is a major shift in US nuclear policy that runs against the European preference for binding and verifiable multilateral arms control and non-proliferation arrangements. In consequence, nuclear issues like BMD, the role of nuclear weapons, or the future of disarmament and non-proliferation, will probably become yet more transatlantic bones of contention, even if a possible attack against Iraq would not imply the use of WMD. The problem is, once again, the absence of a systematic and comprehensive debate among EU members on these issues. Without such a debate, however, there will be neither a common European position nor an open and fruitful transatlantic dialogue about the best way to achieve effective security. ■

## Russia: anchoring in troubled seas

The year following 11 September witnessed Russian movement on a wide front. Agreement was reached with the United States on the reduction of strategic nuclear warheads. Russia joined a new NATO-Russia Council. In Russia's backyard, US and European forces have been deployed in Central Asia, and the United States has launched a programme to develop Georgia's armed forces. These changes seem to mark a shift in Russian policy away from a previous pursuit of 'multipolarity', in which it was assumed that Russia was one of the world's 'poles', towards one that seeks its inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic 'pole'. In the flurry, however, the origins of Russian shifts have been obscured. It is worth recalling that they reside not so much in September 2001 as in 1999. 11 September was an accelerator, not a turning point.

For Russia, the 'moment of truth' occurred in 1999. Internally, Russia's economy was recovering from the financial collapse of August 1998. Armed Chechen groups had invaded Dagestan, raising the prospect of the further collapse of the North Caucasus. Externally, Operation *Allied Force* confirmed Russia's worst fears about NATO, by undermining the UN, sidelining the OSCE and using force in the name of the controversial concept of 'limited sovereignty'. Renewed conflict in Chechnya left Russia isolated in Europe. A new US administration looked on Russia not so much as a partner as a problem to be managed. Upon becoming President, therefore, Vladimir Putin inherited a buffeted state that was weak internally and isolated externally.

Putin drew several conclusions from this panoply of failure. First, the rules of the international game created during the Cold War were disappearing, and new ones were being written *with-*

*out* Russia's involvement. Second, the pursuit of multipolarity by Yevgeny Primakov had left Russia in a no-man's land with little influence over international developments. Putin established as his primary task the revitalisation of the Russian state, an objective requiring a predictable and friendly international environment. Putin intuitively perceived the dangerous link between internal and external trends: Russia's vicious circle of domestic weakness and foreign isolation had to be broken.

In foreign policy, Putin launched what might be called a *strategy of anchoring*. Russia's President concluded that, in this troubled sea of world affairs and at the start of the twenty-first century, Russia could not sail alone. In fact, far from sailing at all, Russia had best take shelter. In Putin's view, the only port available lay within the Euro-Atlantic community. In 2000-01, changes in policy were hesitant but positive. Full relations were restored with NATO in February 2000. Welcoming feelers were put out to the new US administration. Officially, Russia still rejected further NATO enlargement and protested against national missile defence. In private, however, the noises were different, more subdued, more accommodating. In the region of the former Soviet Union, Russia worked with France and the United States for a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh question. Relations with the EU, and especially views on ESDP, improved greatly after the Paris summit of October 2000.

11 September offered Putin an opportunity to accelerate the anchoring process. Put more bluntly, the attacks *required* Russia to do so. Putin grasped indeed that neutrality in the new 'war' could only mean isolation and further rough sailing.

Russian differences with the West have not gone away; simply, Putin has decided that they are best resolved

inside the tent. Externally, Russia may be more willing to accept the inevitable, whether on NATO enlargement or the stationing of 'foreign' troops in the former Soviet Union. However, Putin's choice does not mean a less prickly Russia. Flexibility on Russia's objective of restoring its control in Chechnya cannot be expected. The Russian military continues to place pressure on Georgia to clear its Pankisi Gorge of Chechen 'terrorists.' And, of course, Russian ties with Iran and Iraq have only deepened over the summer. What does all this mean for the EU? The EU is an anchor in Putin's policy – and an important one economically – but it is of minor importance in security terms. For now at least, from Moscow's perspective, the EU adds little in itself to Russia's security agenda except as insurance as a future option. All the while since 11 September, Russian eyes, half fascinated and half fearful with the dramatic US turn towards unilateralism, have been fixed on Washington: half fearful of the meaning of this surge of American power for Russia, but half fascinated also with the opportunities this opens for Russia to pursue more openly, even more unilaterally, its own interests. ■

Dov Lynch

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# Middle East: the crux of the matter

In the last two years or so, the situation in the Middle East has been quickly evolving from instability to war, while neither the local actors nor the United States, individual European countries or the European Union have been able to react to prevent it. Many new factors shaping the region are making it more dangerous.

First, the bilateral links between some Arab countries and the United States have weakened. Americans have noted that the worst terrorists come from the best allies, which means that the old differentiation between 'nice' and 'rogue' states is too simplistic. Popular discontent in some Arab countries (towards both their governments and Western policies) has led to a transnational terrorist network that is the current enemy.

Second, the United States has a new adversary that cannot be identified with a flag or a territory and employs new methods. Bearing in mind the unequivocal defeat of conventional Iraqi forces in 1991, the rapid occupation of Afghanistan and the awful effectiveness of the 11 September attacks, those who want to hurt the West have surely learnt that the most preferable option for them is not to attempt to overthrow a government and attain power in a state (which would make them vulnerable), but to explore the many possibilities offered by terrorism.

Third, following the wreckage of the peace process, Ariel Sharon's Israel has decided to play an assertive role in the region that is far from the cooperative posture it maintained in the 1990s. The idea of the 'new Middle East', in which Israel would have had a central

position and would have been, for instance, a regional leader in IT and services, has been abruptly replaced with an 'old Middle East' dominated by a déjà vu confrontation between Israel and the rest. In this context, one cannot expect that Israel will not respond if Iraq attacks its territory, as was the case in 1991.

Fourth, the Iraqi government has transformed itself into a cancer for the region, but the doctors do not wholly agree on the right therapy. Indeed, it would be a hard task to attack Iraq, occupy its territory and assure state-building at a reasonable cost for both the Iraqi population and the international community. The question is, can we heal Iraq without affecting the unstable balance in the region?

Also, the use of nuclear weapons and other WMD is now more probable than ever in the Middle East. In addition to the terrorist threat, many states are pondering the nuclear option. Israel sees it as a defensive tool. Some factions in Iran believe it is a way of counterbalancing Israel. In Pakistan, the overriding theme is the nuclear arms race and the balance of terror with India. And in the mind of the Iraqi tyrant, the name of the game is presumably not deterrence but sheer destruction.

Finally, the fact that Pakistan was (and still is) a key actor in the Afghanistan campaign establishes a new link between the Indian subcontinent conundrum and the Middle East puzzle. The terrorist network that had its safe haven in Afghanistan has probably expanded its influence eastwards. Thus, part of the price for keeping stability in Afghanistan appears to be

instability on the Indian-Pakistani border, and that is a high price to pay.

Faced with a dangerous situation, governments in the region are not capable of finding responses, trapped as they are between their own interpretation of regional disputes and their poor economic and democratic record. The United States is the leading external power, but its policies in the region, which are mainly based on maintenance of the status quo, were designed in the 1970s, the 1960s or even earlier, and do not take into account the numerous transformations that are taking place. Without any doubt, terrorism must be tackled, and there may be no other option but to overthrow Saddam Hussein by force, but these two moves do not imply a new strategy for the wider chessboard. The Europeans, for their part, by and large follow America's leadership, because they are not capable of defining an innovative approach towards the whole region.

Therefore, although a new policy for the Middle East is badly needed, we have chosen continuity. And yet the present situation is having a negative impact in the West, because of the impending terrorist threat, the risks associated with local war and the tensions it introduces into the transatlantic relationship. On several occasions in the last thirty years the Middle East has exported trouble to the West: the oil shock and Palestinian terrorism in the 1970s, the Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s, and lately the 11 September attacks. Now it seems that we are passively waiting for a new outbreak of violence, which will hit us head-on. ■

Martin Ortega

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principle of political equality of all Union member states to suggest that those countries have a special responsibility to lead the enlarged Union into a world where international prosperity and security are closely linked. It would merely be an appeal to basic common sense.

■ Unless it can meet the dual challenge of enlargement and security, the Union could be risking a worst-case scenario in which a cleavage emerges similar to that which in NATO now divides the

United States and its European allies. And, in the foreseeable future, that could be accompanied by the worst possible form of Europe: a large free-trade area that is envied but not protected, rich but vulnerable to all the uncertainties of globalisation, with here and there some instances of political cooperation and, depending on the country, nurturing two illusions: on the one hand that of traditional transatlantic security and on the other the illusion of renewed importance of national cards in world affairs. ■