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Institute

European Union

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Union européenne

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Un bilan

Nicole Gnesotto

Directeur

Lorsque j'ai pris mes fonctions en 2002, l'Union était triomphante (lancement de l'euro, négociations du grand élargissement) et la PESC balbutiante. A la veille de mon départ cinq ans plus tard, le bilan est totalement inversé : l'Union traverse une crise majeure (de confiance, de projet, d'institutions, d'identité), mais la PESC est florissante et rares sont les crises extérieures dans lesquelles Javier Solana n'est pas sollicité.

Du côté américain, un renversement similaire s'est opéré. En 2002, l'administration Bush pouvait croire et faire croire qu'elle dominait le monde et l'agenda international. Cinq ans plus tard, l'échec de la diplomatie américaine est sévère, sa puissance militaire empêtrée en Irak et son leadership délégitimé aux yeux d'une bonne partie de l'opinion internationale.

Il n'existe certes aucun lien de cause à effet entre ces différentes évolutions : mais le contraste est si frappant qu'il donne à réfléchir, sur la fragilité de la puissance, la réversibilité des politiques, la permanente accélération de l'histoire. Pour ce qui concerne l'Union européenne, je m'en tiendrai à ces deux réflexions.

1) S'il existe, le moteur de la dynamique européenne est aujourd'hui à l'extérieur de l'Union. Le paradoxe est en effet frappant : il y a cinquante ans, c'est l'objectif de paix, de réconciliation et de liberté du continent lui-même qui porta la dynamique d'intégration européenne. C'est tout le contraire désormais. La réconciliation du continent s'est traduite par un élargissement historique de l'Union, mais celui-ci est devenu l'une des pommes de discorde majeure entre Européens : la compatibilité entre élargissement et approfondissement se révèle de facto une idée fautive. Quant

à la liberté, c'est en son nom que de nombreux Etats tentent de détricoter une intégration et une solidarité européennes jugées gênantes pour leur stratégie nationale à l'égard de la mondialisation. A l'inverse, ce sont les défis de la paix et de la sécurité à l'extérieur de l'Europe qui apparaissent les seuls capables de relancer aujourd'hui une dynamique européenne : la sécurité internationale, et d'abord celle du monde arabo-musulman, n'est plus en effet à la mesure d'aucun Etat membre, pas même des Etats-Unis. Surtout, l'énergie, l'environnement, les grandes pandémies, le terrorisme international, l'immigration, chacun de ces défis globaux appelle une réponse collective des Européens. Que la PESC y puise un surcroît de légitimité me paraît évident. Que cette politique étrangère de plus en plus commune soit en retour capable de recréer une dynamique de solidarité intérieure est moins certain, mais c'est un pari qui mérite au moins d'être tenté.

2) La crise européenne n'est donc pas une crise de la PESC. Jamais l'Union n'a été aussi demandée, ni aussi active dans les crises extérieures. De la part de nombreux pays, en Afrique, au Moyen-Orient, en Europe, de la part des institutions de sécurité comme l'ONU et même l'OTAN, la demande de médiation, d'intervention, de visions européennes est un phénomène croissant. De la part des opinions publiques, le potentiel d'attente à l'égard d'une approche spécifiquement européenne de la sécurité internationale est également spectaculaire. Que cette demande soit aussi le résultat d'une certaine faillite du leadership américain ne change rien au constat. Elle augmente même la responsabilité collective des

Institute Activities

The Institute and the Union

■ **The German Presidency** — On 29 January, the Institute organised, in collaboration with the German Presidency, a seminar entitled 'ESDP: from Cologne to Berlin and beyond. Operations - Institutions - Capabilities' in Berlin (Giovanni Grevi). The aim was to take stock of the achievements accomplished since the launch of ESDP, and define the challenges and priorities for the coming years. Over 130 senior national and European officials, as well as prominent experts, gathered for a rich and productive exchange. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Javier Solana and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer delivered three major policy speeches at the opening session. The closing session included interventions from General Henri Bentégeat, Helga Schmid and Michael Schaefer. Giovanni Grevi, Daniel Keohane and Gustav Lindstrom produced an extensive report of the proceedings.

■ **The Council and Commission** — On 16 March, a seminar entitled 'GMES: the security dimension' was organised by the Institute in cooperation with the Council (DG E VIII), the Commission, the EU Military Staff, the Satellite Center and the European Defence Agency (Gustav Lindstrom) in Paris. Over 100 experts and EU officials attended this seminar whose main purpose was to study the security applications and implications of GMES.

■ **The Council** — On 23 March, Nicole Gnesotto and the Research Team met with Marek Grela, Director, Transatlantic Relations, Latin America, United Nations, Human Rights, Counter-terrorism, to discuss the future of US-EU relations.

■ **European Security and Defence College** — On 4 February and 11 March, Gustav Lindstrom served as faculty member during the ESDP High Level Course (Module 4 and Module 5), organised by the ESDC in Madrid and Brussels respectively.

On 8 February and 20-21 March, Gustav Lindstrom participated in meetings of the Executive Academic Board of the

The Institute and the Union

continued

ESDC in Madrid and Brussels respectively.

On 28 March, Gustav Lindstrom attended the ESCD Steering Committee Meeting held in Brussels.

Seminars

■ On 12 January, the Institute held a seminar in Paris entitled 'Reforming the Union: questions, options and visions' (Giovanni Grevi). The purpose of the seminar was to assess how EU reform is relevant to the Union's global role and, conversely, how the external challenges of the Union affect the path and priorities of reform. It was attended by EU senior officials and directors of institutes.

■ On 19 January, the Institute organised a conference in Paris entitled 'Iran: Between Co-operation and Confrontation' with Iranian participants (Walter Posch). The main aim was to get a clearer view of Iranian foreign policy, in particular concerning Iran's regional role and EU-Iranian relations.

■ On 26 March, the Institute organised a brainstorming session in Paris on 'Lebanon and the road to regional stability' (Martin Ortega). The aim was to examine the current political situation in Lebanon, following the crisis management arrangement of last summer. European countries participating in UNIFIL explained their peacekeeping experience there. Experts, diplomats, military officers and EU officials analysed the current European contribution to stability in Lebanon and explored how this contribution can be projected to the future.

Task Force

On 26 January in Paris, the Institute held a Task Force on the Balkans: 'Year of Decision - The Western Balkans in 2007' (Judy Batt). It was attended by thirty-seven participants, officials and experts from EU member states. The aim was to exchange information and perspectives among member states on the questions of Kosovo, Serbia's EU perspective, and the wider implications for the Western Balkans region.

Brainstorming

On 23 February, the Institute held a brainstorming meeting entitled 'Albanian Nationalism' (Judy Batt) with EU experts with a view to publishing a Chaillot Paper on this topic in Autumn 2007.

Institute publications

Chaillot Papers

- **No 98: EU security and defence — Core documents 2006**, compiled by Catherine Glière/ *Sécurité et défense de l'UE — Textes fondamentaux 2006*, Volume VII, réunis par Catherine Glière (March / mars).
- **No 97: Enter the EU Battlegroups**, by Gustav Lindstrom (February).
- **No 96: Monitoring a region in crisis: the European Union in West Africa**, by Marie V. Gibert (January).

Occasional Papers

- **No 66: Beyond international trusteeship: EU peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina**, by Stefano Recchia (February).

Other

- **The European Union Institute for Security Studies — 2002-2006: five years for the EU / L'Institut d'Etudes de Sécurité de l'Union européenne — 2002-2006: cinq années pour l'Union** (January).

Forthcoming

- **Cahier de Chaillot: Sécurité et développement de l'Afrique: une nouvelle approche pour l'UE**, by Charles Goerens.
- **Chaillot Paper: Building the future - The EU's role in global governance**, by Martin Ortega.
- **Chaillot Paper: Gender mainstreaming**, by Johanna Valenius.
- **Chaillot Paper: Regional cooperation in the Western Balkans**, by Milica Djilas.
- **Cahier de Chaillot: Gestions de crises en RD-Congo**, by Pierre-Antoine Braud.
- **Chaillot Paper on the EU Special Representatives**, by Giovanni Grevi.
- **Petit manuel de la PESD**, by Gustav Lindstrom.

Missions on the ground

On 17-23 January Judy Batt was in Belgrade to cover the general election on 21 January.

Handing over from one Director ...



On 1 May, **Nicole Gnesotto** will leave the Institute, having completed her five-year mandate. She was appointed as the first Director of the EUISS on 1 January 2002. As a previous Director of the WEU Institute for Security Studies, she oversaw the smooth transformation of the Institute into an EU agency. Under her leadership, the Institute has become the only European think tank devoted to the security and defence policy of the European Union and its publications, in particular the *Chaillot Papers*, are now regarded as authoritative sources of reference in European strategic thinking. All the staff at the Institute offer her their very best wishes and wish her every success for the future.


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Álvaro de Vasconcelos has been appointed the new Director of the Institute from 1 May 2007. Born in Porto, Portugal, in 1944, he has headed the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (IEEI), of which he is a co-founder, since 1981. Over the past ten years, he has been much involved in the coordination of EuroMeSCo, the 50-member strong Euro-Mediterranean network of foreign and security policy research centres which constitutes the main confidence-building measure and provider of expertise in the first chapter of the Barcelona Process. He is a regular columnist in the Portuguese and international press.

Institute Staff

Daniel Keohane (Irish) joined the Institute in January as a Research Fellow. His research areas are: ESDP, counter-terrorism and defence industry issues.



Sabine Fischer (German) joined the Institute in February as a Research Fellow. She works on Russia's domestic and foreign policy and on EU policy in the post-Soviet space.

Briefings

- On 13 February, Nicole Gnesotto and Giovanni Grevi gave a briefing at the Fondation pour l'Innovation politique on the book *The New Global Puzzle: What World for the EU in 2025?* at the round table entitled 'Les défis du monde en 2025', in Paris.
- On 15 March, Giovanni Grevi gave a briefing to the Civilian Headline Goal Workshop 'Lessons learned from the CHG 2008 process', in Brussels.
- On 20 March, Nicole Gnesotto and Giovanni Grevi gave a presentation on *The New Global Puzzle: What World for the EU in 2025?* at CEPII (Centre d'Etudes prospectives et d'Informations internationales) in Paris.
- On 23 March, the Director and the Research Team gave a briefing to students from the Institute for the International Education of Students of Freiburg (European Security Policy).

- On 28 March, Nicole Gnesotto presented the book *The New Global Puzzle: What World for the EU in 2025?* at the Institut Aspen France during the Rencontres Futurbulences (Paris).
- On 29 March, Pierre-Antoine Braud briefed fifty students from the University of Antwerp on issues related to Africa and EU policy towards Africa (Paris).
- On 30 March, Daniel Keohane briefed twenty delegates from the German Ministry of Defence Staff Course on ESDP.

Public Relations — From 28 February to 1 March, the Institute was present at the stand of the Council at the Brussels Bookfair.

Time to talk

When the US and Iran sat face to face in Baghdad last March, this did not signify the start of bilateral negotiations. Rather, international diplomacy was refocusing on what has become the centre of regional insecurity in the world: Iraq. The meeting did of course not happen out of the blue. In a sense, it was a direct continuation of several meetings held by states neighbouring Iraq that commenced immediately after the US intervention in Iraq four years ago. These meetings have always functioned as a consultation mechanism and have also been good for confidence-building. Needless to say, the EU supported this process and on some occasions even participated as an observer. Two elements, however, were missing: American involvement and Iraqi ownership. Whatever the long-term results of this meeting will be, the Iraqi government's position is now strengthened in the region and *vis-à-vis* the US due to its successful insistence on American and Iranian participation.

■ It goes without saying that discussing Iraq will not solve outstanding problems between Iran and the US, Iran and the international community and Iran and its Arab neighbours. Yet focusing on Iraq should pave the way for constructive policies in dealing with the Islamic Republic. Times have changed: Tehran is currently relatively weakened whereas the position of the US seems to have been relatively strengthened. Washington would never have engaged in talks with Tehran as a supplicant.

■ Politically, it is the nuclear issue that in the end limits most of Tehran's room for manoeuvre. Contrary to the expectations of sceptics, international relations have worked, as Tehran was not able to divide the international community over its nuclear programme. Tehran faces a EU3+3 (or P5+1) position which is as marked by patience as it is by the resolve to bring Iran back to the negotiating table on pain of sanctions. And the international community has not needed to press for fully-fledged sanctions; incremental steps alone are already working as they put the Iranian economy under tangible pressure.

■ But regionally, too, Iran's position is less strong than it was previously. Initially Tehran successfully accrued advantages and promotion in its regional status thanks to American foreign policy, which destroyed the Taliban and the Baathist regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. But it was following the free elections held in Iraq in 2005 and in the Palestinian Authority in 2006 that the perceptions of Iranian power changed. Needless to say, elections were the only means of bringing Tehran's allies, who in both cases were victorious, to power. But then Arab diplomacy intervened in order to simultaneously limit Iran's high profile in the region and put the brakes on the American policy of democratisation – without, of course, expressing any overt criticism of the US. It was successful in both endeavours and the international community's positive perception of elections in the Middle East gave way to fears of a 'Shiite crescent'. The ill-timed execution of Saddam Hussein diminished Iran's prestige in the eyes of the 'Arab Street' and Muslim public opinion – Muslims in other countries tend to view the Iranians as 'heretic' Persians rather than as champions of Islam. And, finally, the Saudi-sponsored Mecca Agreement has wooed Hamas away from Iran (which has in any case never been its main financial sponsor) and brought it back into the Sunni-Arab fold. Ever since, the leaders of authoritarian Sunni regimes have been hailed as moderate Arabs – not a bad deal for the nations that gave birth to Al Qaida and its associated networks.

■ Iran's weakness is America's strength. Bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan and faced with Iranian defiance, the US were for a while relatively weakened against Iran. However, the US have turned the tables on Iran by embracing a multilateral approach, thus putting the ball back into Iran's court. In May 2006 Condoleezza Rice offered direct talks on condition that Iran stop its enrichment activities – something Iran must do anyway according to a UNSC resolution. Furthermore, America's sheer military power and the fact that the Bush Administration remains unwilling to rule out the

option of a military strike against Iran also puts the US in a strong position *vis-à-vis* Tehran. This is not to say that a military option would be justified, let alone a wise decision. But the fact that Tehran is getting increasingly nervous about this possibility highlights the obvious truth that, even weakened, the US are still much stronger than Iran – at least militarily.

■ But resolve against Iran is only meaningful when it is linked to the will for serious engagement. This is precisely the attitude that has been demonstrated by the EU with regard to the nuclear issue: it has stood firm on its international commitments and at the same time offered the Iranians a set of positive incentives, categorically ruling out any means other than diplomacy for the resolution of the Iranian crisis. That being said, at the end of the day the vital issue is whether Iran suspends enrichment and negotiates with the EU3+3 or not. For the EU, because it cannot forego its consensual position of the last four years; for the US, because this is the minimum requirement for the Administration to officially engage in talks with Iran; and for Iran because, domestically and perhaps also regionally, a cessation of enrichment activities before negotiation would be seen as humiliation.

■ Iran's negative attitude towards the offer made by the EU (and later the EU3/3) can easily be understood against the background of the poisoned US-Iranian relationship and the increasingly bellicose talk in Washington about military action against the Islamic Republic and regime change. This is where the Iraqi conference comes in, as both sides are interested in stabilising Iraq. There have even been precedents for American-Iranian cooperation without formal agreement, as happened when Iranian cooperation was needed to end the civil war in Kurdistan or over Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002. It is time to repeat that exercise in good faith and to create some measure of trust. In the meantime, the EU has kept the door open for a negotiated solution, and will continue to do so.■

An endgame in Kosovo

After several months of predictably fruitless ‘negotiations’ between Serbia and the Kosovar Albanians, and a delay caused by parliamentary elections in Serbia, Martti Ahtisaari, the UN Special Envoy for Kosovo, released the text of his proposed solution for the future status of the province that has been under UN administration since 1999. A round of ‘further consultations’ with the parties was held in early March, then on 15 March the finalised text was submitted to the UN. It is now expected that the UN Security Council will consider the proposal and take action in April. However, much uncertainty surrounds the next steps.

■ Ahtisaari proposes a form of internationally-supervised independence for Kosovo. Kosovo will be self-governing, but its constitution will contain some binding provisions, laid down by the international community, that the Kosovo parliament will not be able to change. These will include clear guarantees for the protection of the non-Albanian communities, especially the Serbs, which amount to a substantial self-governing autonomy in vital fields such as education, health provision, the selection of local police chiefs, and the protection of historic monuments and churches. Serbian communities will have the right to maintain freely their links with each other and with Belgrade. For some years to come, the implementation of these provisions will be supervised by the international presence on the ground – a new International Civilian Office (ICO), with EU-led missions to oversee policing and the operation of the courts, and a continuing NATO military presence. The head of the ICO will have some significant powers: for example, to veto laws passed by the Kosovo parliament and to remove from positions of power any persons whose actions are found to be contravening the terms of the international settlement of Kosovo’s status.

■ Serbia long ago made clear that it is not ready to accept such a settlement. But the immediate concern is whether Russia will use its power of veto in the Security Council to block a new Resolution to replace UNSCR 1244, which regulated the situation after NATO’s intervention in 1999 and established the UN Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Russian representatives have maintained a studied ambiguity on this, voicing the apprehension that Kosovo might set a precedent for other secessionist regions such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia or Transdniestria. Yet Russia already effectively controls these, and anyway the circumstances are completely different from Kosovo. So it seems likely that this is a pretext for other Russian aims, connected with the trend towards reasserting Russia’s international status. Some hard bargaining is ahead in the coming weeks if the US and the EU are to get the quick resolution they seek on Kosovo.

■ For the EU, a new UNSC resolution is essential to give a clear mandate for the EU’s future expanded role as lead actor in the new ICO and the major ESDP missions, committing over 1,000 personnel. Delay in passing the resolution is risky and damaging. There is a real danger of UNMIK drawing down prematurely: key personnel are already leaving the mission, and its authority is weakening daily. In the transition, the role of KFOR will be pivotal in maintaining stability. The next few weeks and months will be a time of great risk for the stability of the region: ‘getting it wrong’ over Kosovo could jeopardise the enormous resources and effort expended in the region in recent years. The EU is now facing the lead responsibility, and unity is the key condition for its effective engagement.

■ Although the primary focus of attention now is on how to reach the settlement, the EU also needs to focus on the challenges of implementing a

settlement that possibly neither side has agreed to fully – or at all.

■ What could go wrong? If there is prolonged delay, or worse still, no UNSC resolution, then the Kosovar Albanians cannot be prevented from declaring independence. This would provoke the Serbian minority concentrated in Mitrovica in the north-east corner of Kosovo to declare independence and/or reunion with Serbia in turn. Preparations for this are said to be underway among former Serbian military and security personnel. What, realistically, could KFOR do to avert UNMIK’s ejection from the north? Then angry Albanians would retaliate, first of all from across the Ibar river which divides north from south Mitrovica, and then also possibly against the vulnerable scattered Serbian enclaves elsewhere. And, no doubt, the international presence would soon become a target of radical Albanians, such as the ‘Self-Determination’ movement, which rejects the Ahtisaari settlement and advocates immediate, unconditional independence. What incentive would Kosovar Albanian political leaders have to hold back KLA veterans, if they see the international community unable to prevent partition? Even in the best of circumstances, it has to be admitted that it will not be easy to implement the complex structures of decentralisation, designed largely to win over the Serbian minority communities against considerable Albanian reluctance.



■ If the price of a UN resolution with Russian assent is ambiguity on the terms of Kosovo’s ‘independence’, this could also open up space for divergence between the US and the EU, and among EU member states, in particular over the question of international recognition of Kosovo. Even if Russia can finally be brought on board, the key challenge of sustaining EU unity will remain. ■

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Européens dans l'édification progressive, avec les Etats-Unis et les autres pôles de puissance mondiale, d'une nouvelle gouvernance internationale adaptée à la mondialisation. Si l'Union ne relève pas ce défi de la gouvernance mondiale, qui, en effet, le fera ? Et avec quelle légitimité ?

Autant dire que l'Institut a devant lui un boulevard de questions à déchiffrer, d'idées à explorer et à soumettre au débat. L'équipe y est tout simplement formidable. Ensemble, nous avons participé à une aventure passionnante, difficile parfois, mais dont l'observation in situ a constitué pour chacun de nous une expérience unique : la lente montée en puissance de l'Union européenne. Toutes fonctions et toutes nationalités confondues, cette première génération de l'Institut a

accompli un travail monumental. Quant à nos lecteurs fidèles, qui ont été autant de partenaires de l'Institut depuis sa création, qu'ils soient ici remerciés. A en croire l'essor de notre liste d'envoi depuis cinq ans, la communauté stratégique européenne n'a cessé de s'agrandir, de se renouveler aussi, tout en partageant des préoccupations, des valeurs, des principes, bref, une culture de sécurité de plus en plus commune que les publications de l'Institut ont cherché systématiquement à promouvoir, bien au-delà des frontières de l'Union. C'est maintenant au tour d'Álvaro de Vasconcelos, le nouveau directeur de l'Institut, de reprendre le flambeau. Je sais qu'il le portera haut. ■

New Institute publications



On-line

All the Institute's publications and reports on seminars, can be accessed on the Institute's website:

<http://www.iss.europa.eu>

External publications

Giovanni Grevi

– 'The institutional framework of External Action' and 'Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy', in: G. Amato, H. Bribosia and B. De Witte, *Genèse et destinée de la Constitution européenne – Genesis and destiny of the European Constitution* (Brussels: Bruylant, 2007).

Sabine Fischer

– Ed. with Heiko Pleines and Hans-Henning Schröder, *Movements, Migrants, Marginalisation: Challenges of political and societal participation in Eastern Europe and the Enlarged EU* (Stuttgart: Ibidem Publishers, 2007).
– 'Die EU im post-sowjetischen Raum – politische Konflikte und wissenschaftliche Fragestellungen', in: *Integration* 01/07, February 2007, pp. 60-67.
– 'Die russische Politik gegenüber der Ukraine und Weißrussland', in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 8-9/2007, 19 February 2007, pp. 16-23.
– 'The EU and Russia. Conflicts and Potentials of a Difficult Partnership', *SWP Research Paper* 1/2007, January 2007.

Martin Ortega

– 'L'usage de la force par l'Union européenne', in: Bernard Adam (ed.), *Europe: puissance tranquille?* (Brussels: GRIP, 2006).

Marcin Zaborowski

– (with Kerry Longhurst) 'The European Union as a Security Policy Actor. The View from Poland', in: Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (ed.), *The Future of the European Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after Enlargement* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006), pp. 55-66.
– 'Commentary: The bottom line is that Europe and America both want a stable China', in *Europe's World*, Spring 2007, pp. 9-13.
– (with Kerry Longhurst), *The New Atlanticist - Poland's Foreign and Security Policy Priorities* (Chatham House/Blackwell Publishing, 2007).