

Quarterly published by the EU Institute for Security Studies
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Institute

European Union

for Security

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Union européenne

editorial

La PESC, entre l'Iran et la Constitution

Nicole Gnesotto

Directeur

A force de sombrer dans la morosité européenne ambiante, on n'en oublierait presque de regarder simplement la réalité : or l'Union européenne vient de marquer un point capital dans la stabilisation de l'une des crises les plus graves du moment, celle qui oppose depuis trois ans l'Iran et la communauté internationale sur l'avenir de la non-prolifération nucléaire. Le revirement de la politique américaine, acceptant le principe d'un dialogue direct avec Téhéran après plus de 25 ans de rupture diplomatique, est une victoire majeure de la détermination et de la stratégie des Européens. La perspective d'un retour de l'Iran à un espace de négociation, après presque un an de rupture et de provocations de toutes sortes, est de nouveau ouverte. Lorsque Javier Solana s'est rendu à Téhéran le 6 juin dernier, il agissait non seulement au titre de ses fonctions au sein du Conseil de l'Union, mais aussi sous mandat de l'ensemble des membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies et de l'AIEA.

Certes, une extrême prudence s'impose quant à l'issue finale de cette nouvelle dynamique du dossier iranien. Si les cartes ont été redistribuées, rien n'autorise à conclure que la partie est désormais facile et le jeu forcément gagnant. Mais l'étape qui vient d'être franchie n'en est pas moins décisive et mérite que l'on s'y arrête. Puisque les chefs d'Etat ont prolongé jusqu'à 2009 la période de réflexion pour relancer la dynamique européenne, autant réfléchir à partir d'exemples concrets. Or un certain nombre de leçons peuvent d'ores et déjà être tirées de la crise iranienne : les premières concernent l'Union elle-même et l'avenir de son rôle

international. Les secondes concernent la contribution des Européens à l'émergence d'un système politique international adapté aux réalités du XXI^{ème} siècle.

S'agissant de la politique étrangère et de sécurité de l'Union, l'affaire iranienne renforce d'une part une évidence : l'unité et la détermination paient. Unis, les Européens ont un vrai pouvoir d'influence, en particulier sur leur partenaire américain. Divisés, comme ils le furent durant l'affaire irakienne, ils ne comptent tout simplement pas. Dans un monde appelé à devenir de facto multipolaire, avec l'émergence programmée de la Chine, de l'Inde, et d'autres, renforcer ce pouvoir d'influence sur chacun des pôles de puissance mondiale devrait être la seule ambition politique de l'Union. La deuxième évidence concerne, d'autre part, le rôle incontournable des Etats membres dans la crédibilité internationale de l'Union. Parce que la mondialisation n'est pas un long fleuve tranquille vers le commerce et la paix universels, parce que les quatre cinquièmes de la planète fonctionnent encore sur un mode traditionnel de rapports de force et d'intérêts, l'implication directe des Etats membres, avec tous leurs pouvoirs d'influence, d'incitation ou de coercition, reste une condition majeure de l'efficacité extérieure de l'Union. Tous les débats en cours sur l'avenir de la PESC, toutes les querelles institutionnelles sur les mérites respectifs du Conseil ou de la Commission en la matière, ne pourront éluder cette contrainte majeure. Le Traité constitutionnel avait vu juste, qui voulait inscrire le futur Ministre des Affaires

Institute Activities

The Institute and the Union

■ **The Presidency** — On 27 April, in cooperation with the Austrian Presidency, Nicole Gnesotto and Marcin Zaborowski organised a restricted seminar on China for the PSC Ambassadors in Brussels. The purpose of this session was to foster the development of independent European security thinking on the international implications of China's rise – undoubtedly a major geopolitical phenomenon in recent years. The session addressed the three following themes: China's foreign policy and its position in East Asia; modernisation of the People's Liberation Army (PLA); and China's energy policy and its geopolitical consequences.

■ **Political and Security Committee** — As part of the cooperation of the Institute with the EDA on the ESDP Long-Term Vision, Nicole Gnesotto went to Brussels on 27 April to present the report of the Institute to the PSC Ambassadors.

■ **European Security and Defence College (ESDC)** — On 15 May, Nicole Gnesotto and Gustav Lindstrom took part in the ESDC Executive Academic Board meeting organised in Brussels under the chairmanship of the EUISS Director. On 8 June, Gustav Lindstrom chaired the ESDC EAB meeting. On 9 June, he gave a presentation on ESDP training activities within the Networking Conference on Training in the field of ESDP. On 23 June, Nicole Gnesotto attended the Steering Committee of the College in Brussels.

■ **ESDP Long-Term Vision** — On 13 June Nicole Gnesotto and Giovanni Grevi took part in the seminar entitled 'Europe's Long-Term Vision of the Defence environment in 2025: sharp or fuzzy?' organised by the Security & Defence Agenda (SDA) and the European Defence Agency (EDA) in Brussels. On 29 June, Nicole Gnesotto participated in

The Institute and the Union

continued

the Long-Term Vision Grand Seminar organised by the EDA in Brussels, where she presented the findings of the Global Context Study produced by the Institute.

■ **Gender issues** — On 10 May, Judy Batt met with the HR/SG's Personal Representative for Human Rights in the area of CFSP, Michael Matthiessen, and with Nicole Rechinger and Johanna Gardmark (Secretariat General of the Council) to discuss the project 'Gender mainstreaming in ESDP missions'.

■ **Information meeting on ESDP** — On 21 June, Giovanni Grevi went to Brussels where he participated in a meeting entitled 'Communicating ESDP' organised by the Secretary General of the EU Council. On that occasion, he presented the activities of the Institute and its contribution to building a European security culture.

■ **Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention** — The EUISS is assisting Ms. Annalisa Giannella, Personal Representative on non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, with the implementation of an EU Joint Action on the BTWC. Between 20 and 23 June, Gustav Lindstrom participated in the first regional seminar in support of the Joint Action organised in Nairobi (Kenya). The EUISS will host a conference on the BTWC Review Conference in September 2006.

Seminars

■ On 3 April, the Institute organised a seminar on 'Israel-Palestine: the Dispute at a Crossroads' (Martin Ortega). Its purpose was to analyse the new political environment following elections in Israel and the Palestinian territories, and reflect on possible courses of action for the European Union as an external actor.

■ On 7 April, the Institute organised a seminar on 'Conflict & Post-Conflict Management in Africa' (Pierre-Antoine Braud) which helped review standard

Seminars

continued

political and economic formulae in implementing peace and identify the contexts in which the EU is developing its crisis management instruments.

■ On 19 May, the Institute jointly organised a conference in Natolin (Poland) on 'The EU as a Global Power' with the European Centre Natolin



Robert Cooper, Anna Fotyga, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Nicole Gnesotto

(Marcin Zaborowski). The conference aimed at debating the future of EU foreign policy and fostering two-way (old and new member states) strategic thinking inside the EU. It attracted high-level participants both from Poland and other member states, including Poland's Minister for Foreign Affairs Anna Fotyga, Director General for External Relations Robert Cooper, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the European Parliament Elmar Brok and Georgia's Deputy Minister for Euro-Atlantic Affairs Tamar Beruchashvili.

■ On 29 May, the Institute organised a seminar entitled 'Global Governance: the European Union's Contribution' (Martin Ortega). The purpose was to reflect on the prospects and difficulties of global governance and to analyse the actual and potential roles of the European Union in global governance.

Seminars in cooperation

■ On 10 May, Nicole Gnesotto and Giovanni Grevi took part in the seminar 'European Security Round Table' organised by the EUISS, The Kangaroo Group and Copura at the initiative of Karl von Wogau, MEP, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Defence in the European Parliament in Brussels.

Task Force

■ On 30 June, the EUISS organised a Task Force entitled 'Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo – the State of Play' (Judy Batt). Discussion focussed on Montenegro after the independence referendum and relations with Serbia; domestic developments in Serbian politics especially in the light of the possibility of parliamentary elections in the autumn; and the prospects for a viable settlement of Kosovo's 'final status' this year.

Missions on the ground

■ From 29 March to 4 April, Judy Batt and Johanna Valenius (Associate Research Fellow) went to Bosnia to conduct interviews in connection with the project 'Gender mainstreaming in ESDP missions'. From 21 to 24 May, Judy Batt was in Podgorica to carry out a study on 'The 21 May referendum on independence in Montenegro'; and from 24-27 May, she was in Belgrade to gauge Serbian reactions to the referendum result. On 29 May, she went to Brussels to discuss her findings with Ambassador Lajcak.

■ From 7 to 10 June, Pierre-Antoine Braud went to Dakar where he took part in the fourth Colloque euro-africain, 'La nouvelle stratégie africaine de l'UE face aux réalités du continent'. From 22 June to the beginning of July, he was in DR Congo to carry out a field mission in the context of forthcoming national elections and Eufor DRC deployment.

External publications

Nicole Gnesotto

- 'L'Union européenne et ses capacités', in *Défense & Sécurité Internationale* (DSI), 14 avril 2006.

Judy Batt

- 'Kosovo and the Question of Serbia' in *Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs*, vol.VI, no.2 (Autumn 2005, distributed March 2006).

- 'Cross-border minorities and European integration in Southeastern Europe: the Hungarians and Serbs compared' in J. McGarry and M. Keating (eds.) *European Integration and the Nationalities Question* (Routledge, London, 2006).

Institute publications

Chaillot Papers

■ *No. 90: Civilian crisis management: the EU way* by Catriona Gourlay, Damien Helly, Isabelle Ioannides, Radek Khol, Agnieszka Nowak and Pedro Serrano; edited by Agnieszka Nowak (June).

■ *No. 89: Iranian challenges* by Katajuna Amirpur, William O. Beeman, Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Fred Halliday, Bernard Hourcade, Andrzej Kapiszewski, Walter Posch and Johannes Reissner; edited by Walter Posch (May).

■ *No. 88: The OSCE in crisis* by Pál Dunay (April).

ESDP Newsletter

■ The second issue of the ESDP newsletter, published by the Council in cooperation with the Institute as a co-editor, contains articles on a wide range of ESDP topics, from the new mission in Congo (DRC) to ESDP Training.

Other

■ *Rapport d'activité 2005*, a report of the EUISS's activities in 2005, was published in May.

Forthcoming

■ *Book: Looking towards the future*, edited by Nicole Gnesotto and Giovanni Grevi.

■ *Chaillot Paper: Turkey's foreign policy options in turbulent times*, by Kemal Kirisçi.

■ *Chaillot Paper: EU stakes in Central Asia*, by Anna Matveeva.

■ *Chaillot Paper: The future of multilateralism and global principles*, by Martin Ortega.

■ *Chaillot Paper: The EU and the transition in RDC*, by Pierre-Antoine Braud.

Institute staff

■ On 28 April, Burkard Schmitt, Senior Research Fellow and Deputy Director, left the Institute to take a new job in the European Commission (DG Internal Market).

Research awards

Senior Research Fellows

– Professor Alexander Nikitin (Russian) worked at the Institute from 2 to 19 May on the project mandated by the 'Roadmap for the Common Space of External Security' entitled 'Sharing Russia/EU Peace Support Experience', managed at the EUISS by Dov Lynch.

Associate Research Fellows

– Stéphane Delory (French) returned to the Institute on 2 May and was joined by Vincent Vicard (French) on 10 May to work on the follow-up to the EDA Project on ESDP Long-Term Vision.

– Johanna Valenius (Finnish) left the Institute on 31 May after working with Judy Batt on the project 'Gender mainstreaming'.

Visiting Fellows

– Gheorghe Teodor Ciascai (Romanian) was at the EUISS from 3 April to 30 June to work on 'Entre les Balkans occidentaux et le voisinage de l'Union – l'approche de la Roumanie sur la PESC'.

– Marie Gibert (French) worked at the EUISS from 3 April to 30 June on 'Monitoring a region in crisis: the EU in West Africa'.

– Srdjan Gligorijevic (the first Visiting Fellow from Serbia at the EUISS) worked at the Institute from 3 April to 30 June on 'The Western Balkans – a CFSP/ESDP partner – Proposal for a step ahead'.

– Daniel Möckli (Swiss) worked at the EUISS from 3 April to 30 June on 'Towards a European strategy for the Middle East: dilemmas and policy options'.

– Stefano Recchia (Italian) arrived at the EUISS on 15 May to work on 'Beyond neotrusteeship: EU peacebuilding in Bosnia'.

– Irene Bernabeu Esteban (Spanish) arrived at the EUISS on 15 June to work on 'Security sector reform in the Mediterranean'.

– Christian Mölling left the Institute on 13 April.

The EU's 'soft power' at work in the Balkans

The Montenegrin referendum of 21 May was a major success for the EU. Skilful, patient and determined deployment of the EU's 'soft power' brought remarkable results: the EU's efforts overcame acute political polarisation among key players and brokered acceptable rules of the game, which stimulated exceptionally high voter turnout on the day. The EU's commitment was matched by other international organisations, which provided intensive monitoring of the referendum process, and the Montenegrin authorities rose to the challenge. Both the campaign and the voting took place in a peaceful, orderly way. Thus was produced a result whose legitimacy is not open to serious challenge.

■ This offers dramatic proof that political behaviour in the Balkans can change, provided the EU is committed and closely engaged. The 'EU perspective' has shown it can work in the Balkans, as it did for Central Europe. It was the desire of key players in Montenegro to prove their 'European' credentials that ultimately made agreement on the rules of the game possible, and induced them to shift away from 'zero-sum' politics and the inflamed rhetoric of mistrust and ill-will. The experience has been a learning process for all sides, and the 'European factor' has shown its potential to help overcome deep political polarisation.

■ This was a success for EU enlargement, too. The EU drew upon valuable new assets from new member states, especially Slovakia, which provided superb diplomats with deep local knowledge and linguistic capacities

that were crucial to the effectiveness of the mission. As Slovaks, they were trusted by all sides. Ambassador Lajcak's frequently robust and forthright messages could not easily be dismissed by



Source: Government of the Republic of Montenegro – PR Bureau

the parties as expressions of 'Great Power arrogance'.

■ The final result is good for the EU too. A convincing majority – 55.5 per cent – voted in favour of independence (the EU had required a qualified majority of 55 per cent as a minimum for independence). The fact that turnout was so high – at 86.5 per cent – shows that both pro- and anti-independence sides were made to work hard to reach out win and more voters than their respective parties had ever won before. They had to reach out beyond their established camps of convinced supporters, and to persuade the some 25 per cent of voters who were undecided at the start of the campaign.

■ The EU should now move swiftly to capitalise on this success as a 'turning point' in its Balkans strategy. One key item of 'unfinished business' has been removed from the 2006 agenda in the Western Balkans. Now, the Montenegrin government can no longer blame

the State Union for defects in its performance. And Serbia will have one less reason to avoid confronting its key challenges: Kosovo and cooperation with the ICTY.

■ The focus is now again on Serbia. President Tadic was prompt to recognize the referendum result and extend a Serbian hand of friendship to Montenegro. But Prime Minister Kostunica adopted the posture of a sulky 'abandoned lover', reluctant to recognise Montenegro and hold talks on winding up the State Union. But the intention was more one of 'punishing' Montenegro than any sinister attempt to destabilise it. Meanwhile, as legal successor to the Union, Serbia is getting on with the practical business of taking over the portfolios of Defence and Foreign Affairs – around which furious political infighting has predictably erupted. Elections are in the air, and expected this autumn.

■ Serbia's divided democrats expect the EU to help them face down the looming threat of the Radical Party, still led by indicted war criminal Vojislav Seselj, and still propagating ethnic hatred. Yet the Radicals expect the support of nearly 40 per cent – making it far the most popular party in Serbia. But many voters will abstain. They are tired of the ineffectual and rancorous bickering of the democratic parties. Of course, the EU should do what it can to help Serbia – isolating Serbia is not part of its plan, as debate at the June European Council showed. But the EU cannot do the Serbian democrats' work for them.

Dialogue with Iran: the EU way out of the impasse

From the mid-1990s onwards, the EU followed a unique policy approach in order to engage the Islamic Republic of Iran. Recognising the country's geostrategic position and its importance as an energy supplier, EU countries embraced a policy of dialogue. As seen from an EU perspective, the critical and the comprehensive dialogues were less a success in terms of ushering in dramatic improvements than in terms of the way in which they led to a gradual shift in the behaviour of the Iranians. As seen from an Iranian perspective, the dialogue format was a means to engage with the Europeans on topics of mutual concern. At the same time, the Iranians welcomed the EU's choice of dialogue as a positive development, since in their historic experience Iranian relations with the West have been mostly one-sided exercises with the 'imperialists' imposing their will upon the 'oppressed' Iranian nation. In the end, the EU and Iran envisioned negotiating a generous Trade and Cooperation Agreement, which was directly linked to success in the political and the human rights dialogue.


■ During that period, the EU was criticised for engaging in dialogue with Iran. Many commentators overseas accused the EU of trading off human rights and democracy for the sake of economic interests. These critics generally overlook the fact that Iran is in the EU's vicinity, and may, after the possible accession of Turkey, even become a neighbour. They also tend to forget that the US policy of dual containment of Iraq and Iran was a disaster and that US-Iranian interaction was overshadowed by scandals.

■ The Iranians, however, changed the

circumstances of negotiations with the EU when secret nuclear activities were disclosed in 2002. By autumn 2003 there was a tense standoff between Iran and the West. The EU prevented it from developing into a fully-fledged crisis by an initiative of the 'Big Three' (France, Germany and Great Britain) foreign ministers, supported and coordinated with Javier Solana.

This initiative became known as the E3/EU format. A major step was achieved when in November 2004 the Iranians and the E3/EU signed the Paris Agreement and Iran suspended its nuclear activities. By then the EU was clearly linking future prospects for EU-Iranian relations to Iran's willingness to maintain the suspension. Then and now, only suspension was seen as the final proof of Iran's good intentions. Whereas the Iranians feared that continued suspension would result in them being forced to abandon their right to enrichment.

■ Throughout 2005 these differences became more and more marked. Ominously, Iran stressed the voluntary nature of the suspension on many occasions. Then in August 2005 Iran brusquely rejected an European offer and terminated the suspension. From then on the nuclear issue determined EU-Iranian relations whereas any other format of discussion lay dormant. Over autumn and winter 2005 the Iranian side aggravated the situation with the new president's remarks on Israel



and the resumption of other nuclear activities. Finally, in January, Iran's nuclear dossier was reported to the UNSC. And, as a consequence, the E3/EU format changed to the E3+3 or UN Permanent 5+1 (Germany) format, which further involves EU member states in the international efforts to resolve the crisis.

■ According to most commentators, the EU's position became closer to that of the US. But in reality the EU's position has never changed. It remains firmly committed to the idea of a dialogue with Iran and to the principle that Iran has to stop enrichment activities in order to create confidence in its peaceful intentions. What have changed are the positions of Iran and the USA. The Iranians abandoned their constructive stance by rejecting the EU's August 2005 offer and resuming enrichment-related activities (and of course the brinkmanship of its president). And the US's position has changed from aggressive regime-change rhetoric to evaluating the possibility of direct talks with Iran.

■ This is encouraging, but one should not forget that 'grand bargains' between the US and Iran have been tried in previous times and have led nowhere. Besides, those groups in the USA who are in favour of regime change in Iran are far from being uninfluential. Hence the risk of military confrontation is not over yet. Needless to say, an Iranian suspension could instigate a new, positive dynamic. The EU has enabled the Iranians and the Americans to enter into direct talks. But the EU's responsibility does not end here; it must actively encourage both sides to engage in good faith in a real dialogue, in order to find a way out of the current impasse.

Walter Posch

Book

Transatlantic book 2006: Friends again? EU-US relations after the crisis

Nicole Gnesotto, James Dobbins, Federico Romero, David Frum, William Wallace, Ronald D. Asmus, István Gyarmati, Walter B. Slocombe, Gilles Andréani, Philip H. Gordon, Werner Weidenfeld, Felix Neugart, Geoffrey Kemp, Dov Lynch, Fiona Hill, Baudoïn Bollaert, Joseph Quinlan, Marcin Zaborowski.
Edited by Marcin Zaborowski



Chaillot Papers

- n°90 **Civilian crisis management the EU way**
edited by Agnieszka Nowak, June
- n°89 **Iranian challenges**
edited by Walter Posch, May
- n°88 **The OSCE in crisis**
Pál Dunay, April
- n°87 **EU security and defence – Core documents 2005 / Sécurité et défense de l'UE – Textes fondamentaux 2005**
Volume VI, March/mars
- n°86 **Why Georgia matters**
Dov Lynch, February

Occasional Papers

- n°63 **Security by proxy? The EU and (sub-)regional organisations: the case of ECOWAS**
Bastien Nivet, March
- n°62 **The Baltics: from nation states to member states**
Kestutis Paulauskas, February

editorial ... continued from front page

étrangères/Vice-président de la Commission sous l'autorité du Conseil de l'Union.

S'agissant du système international lui-même, les Européens n'ont pas à ce stade élaboré de propositions formelles pour aider à la construction d'un ordre politique plus adapté à la mondialisation que ne l'est le dés-ordre actuel. Ils ont certes affirmé, depuis 2003, des principes directeurs pour leur action internationale (multilatéralisme efficace, prévention des conflits, partenariats, cohérence et complémentarité des moyens d'action) sans pour autant les traduire en vision politique de ce que devrait être le système international de demain. Seuls aujourd'hui les Etats-Unis et la Chine véhiculent de tels concepts. Le modèle chinois repose sur un mélange de mondialisation économique et de realpolitik très traditionnelle. La vision américaine du monde repose quant à elle sur un double concept de promotion de la démocratie comme facteur de stabilité d'une part et, d'autre part, d'alliance des démocraties

contre toutes sortes de menaces (qu'il s'agisse de la Chine, du terrorisme international, de l'islamisme radical, ou de tout autre perturbateur futur). L'on peut certes partager cette vision d'un ordre international construit sur une nouvelle forme de bipolarité entre les démocraties et le reste du monde. Mais l'on peut aussi s'interroger sur son adéquation avec les intérêts, les principes, et la pratique même de l'Union à l'égard des crises internationales. La gestion européenne du dossier iranien ne permet pas, en tout cas, de valider une telle vision manichéenne du monde. Il serait peut-être temps que les Européens de l'Union, à partir de leur approche commune de l'Iran, du Monténégro, du Kosovo, du conflit israélo-palestinien, mais aussi des enseignements de leurs divergences passées sur l'Irak, décident d'explicitier leur propre vision de l'ordre international à venir.