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La PESC en antidote

Nicole Gnesotto

Directeur

Alors que la crise européenne s'installe dans la durée, c'est au tour des Etats-Unis de connaître une crise similaire, de gouvernance et de confiance, qui fait de Katrina, selon la très juste formule de Karl Kaiser, un phénomène géopolitique de première ampleur. Les relations transatlantiques s'améliorent donc sur fond d'affaiblissement parallèle des deux acteurs qui les soutiennent, l'Union et les Etats-Unis. Nul doute que la politique étrangère américaine intégrera progressivement les effets de la nouvelle donne politique aux Etats-Unis. Mais qu'en est-il de la politique étrangère européenne ?

Personne ne songerait à nier les effets négatifs de la crise constitutionnelle traversée depuis mai dernier par l'ensemble de l'Union : crise d'autant plus sérieuse qu'elle se double de divergences profondes sur les dotations budgétaires de l'Union et les perspectives d'adhésion de la Turquie. Des deux ambiguïtés constructives de l'Union depuis cinquante ans – sur la finalité politique et sur les limites géographiques du projet européen – aucune ne devrait désormais pouvoir survivre. Et parce qu'elle n'est pas une politique séparée de l'ensemble de la dynamique européenne, parce que les outils prévus par la Constitution ne peuvent être mis en œuvre, la PESC ne peut pas ignorer les turbulences politiques désormais à l'œuvre entre les Vingt-Cinq.

Pour autant, nombreux sont les arguments qui font de la politique étrangère le domaine le moins touché par la crise et peut-être celui grâce auquel certaines sorties de crise peuvent commencer à être envisagées. Chacun sait d'une part que les « non » français et néerlandais ont été essentiellement portés par des arguments et des perceptions de nature économique, en aucun cas par une

remise en cause de l'Union comme acteur international. Tous les sondages confirment à l'inverse que les opinions européennes ont dans l'ensemble de très fortes attentes à l'égard du rôle international de l'UE. Il en est de même des attentes des partenaires extérieurs : on notera ainsi, aux Etats-Unis par exemple, y compris dans les cercles les plus conservateurs, bien peu de ricanements ou de satisfaction à l'égard de la crise européenne, mais énormément d'attentes et de volonté de renforcer, là où c'est possible, un réel partenariat de sécurité entre l'Amérique et l'Union. S'agissant de la PESC d'autre part, nombre de ses réalisations ont été décidées et mises en œuvre de façon consensuelle entre les Etats, sans le préalable d'un cadre juridique formel : rien n'empêche cette méthode de rester créatrice pour le développement à venir de la politique européenne de défense. Surtout, le monde est toujours là, les crises sont là, la violence internationale ignore superbement les aléas institutionnels européens, et l'Union reste engagée, voire de plus en plus sollicitée pour répondre à ces défis. Dans les Balkans, à l'égard de l'Iran, vis-à-vis du conflit israélo-palestinien, il n'existe pas d'alternative nationale à l'engagement collectif de l'Union.

Autrement dit, à ceux qui s'interrogent sur la pertinence de l'échelon européen dans la gestion de la sécurité internationale, il importe de rappeler l'un des fondements de la stratégie de sécurité adoptée par les chefs d'Etat il y a à peine deux ans : dans ce monde globalisé qui est le nôtre, aucun problème n'est à la mesure d'un seul. Mais c'est précisément parce qu'elle est nécessaire que la politique étrangère commune de l'Union doit

Institute Activities

The Institute and the Union

- On 4 July, the Director, Nicole Gnesotto, took part in the meeting of the European Security Research Advisory Board set up by the Commission in Brussels. On the same day, she had talks with the European Commission's Internal Market Directorate General and took part in the meeting organised by the Secretariat of the Council on the revision of the Joint Action.
- On 19 July, the Director took part in the meeting of the Governing Board of the Institute in Brussels.
- On 27 September, the Board of the Institute met in Paris with the Director and the research team.

Brainstorming meeting

- Following the rejection of the EU constitutional treaty in France and Netherlands, and concerned with the uncertainty around the EU's future, the Institute held an extraordinary brainstorming meeting on 7 July in Paris entitled 'The EU in trouble: what is to be done?' (Antonio Missiroli, Marcin Zaborowski). The seminar, divided into three panels (EU foreign policy, enlargement and institutional implications of the crisis), focused explicitly on those dimensions of the crisis that could affect the EU's ability to develop into a foreign policy actor.

Transatlantic Conference

- Responding to the need for an appraisal of EU-US co-operation, the Institute held a conference entitled 'New Bush - New EU - New Issues' which took place on 8 July in Paris (Marcin Zaborowski). This conference, attended by European experts and members of the EU and US administrations, focused on four key issues: multilateralism, Russia, Asia and the overlap of interests and agendas between the EU and US. The keynote speech was delivered by H.E. Mr. John Bruton, head of the delegation of the European Commission to the United States.

Institute publications

Chaillot Papers

- *No. 83: Disasters, Diseases, Disruptions: a new D-drive for the EU*, by Stefan Elbe, Urs Luterbacher, Antonio Missiroli, Bengt Sundelius and Marco Zupi; edited by Antonio Missiroli (September).
- *No. 82: EU-US burdensharing: who does what?*, by Gustav Lindstrom (September).
- *No. 81: The question of Serbia*, by Judy Batt (August).
- *No. 80: Promoting security sector governance in the EU's neighbourhood*, by Heiner Hänggi and Fred Tanner (July).
- *No. 79: Looking into Iraq*, by Martin van Bruinessen, Jean-François Daguzan, Andrzej Kapizewski, Walter Posch and Álvaro de Vasconcelos; edited by Walter Posch (July).

Forthcoming

- *Book: Transatlantic Book: A challenging partnership*, edited by Marcin Zaborowski.
- *Chaillot Paper: Terrorism and political violence*, by Paul Wilkinson.
- *Chaillot Paper: The Belarus impasse*, edited by Dov Lynch.
- *Chaillot Paper: The OSCE in crisis*, by Pal Dunay.
- *Chaillot Paper: EU approach to civilian crisis management*, edited by Agnieszka Nowak.
- *Occasional Paper: Policing peace: the European gendarmerie force*, by Claudio Catalano.
- *Occasional Paper: The EU and Moldova: settling conflicts in the neighbourhood*, by Nicu Popescu.

Institute staff

- Giovanni Grevi (Italian) joined the research team as a research fellow at the beginning of August; he is working on the future of ESDP, civilian crisis management and institutional aspects of CFSP/ESDP.
- Pierre-Antoine Braud (French) joined the Institute as a research fellow at the end of August; his areas of research are African studies and EU policy towards Africa.
- Gearóid Cronin (Irish) joined the Institute as English-language editor in August.
- Anthony Hervey, English-language editor and editor-in-chief of the *Newsletter*, retired in July after fifteen years at the Institute.

External publications

Antonio Missiroli

- 'Between EU and US: The Enlarged Union, Security and the Use of Force', in Esther Brimmer and Stefan Frohlich (eds.), *The Strategic Implications of EU Enlargement* (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2005).
- 'Changements et continuités de la politique italienne', in Patrice Buffotot (dir.), *La défense en Europe* (Paris: La Documentation française, 2005).

Walter Posch

- 'Iran and the Shia of Iraq', in: *Krakowskie Studia Miedzynarodowe* (Krakow International Studies), 2005/2.
- 'Islamist Neo-Cons Take Power in Iran', in *Occasional Paper 3* (Ljubljana: Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005).
- 'La dynamique de la renaissance Chiite en Irak', *Géostratégiques* no.7, avril 2005, S. 153-175.
- 'Turkey and the EU: Strategic implications' (with Borut Grgic), in *Insight Turkey*, vol. 7, no.1, pp. 8-12.
- 'Mühsame Suche nach Souveränität', *Die Furche*, 27 January 2005 (Austrian Weekly).
- 'Der Islam in Europa: zwischen Terrorangst und sozialer Misere', in *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, 1/2005.

Burkard Schmitt

- 'Towards a European Defence Equipment Market', in *EuroFuture*, Summer 2005.

Marcin Zaborowski

- 'Old Europe, New Europe and the Transatlantic Security Agenda', with Kerry Longhurst (eds.) (London: Routledge, August 2005).
- 'Westernising the East: External Influences in the *Post-Communist Transitions*', Special Issue of *Journal of Communist and Transition Studies*, Spring 2005.
- 'Germany and the Eastern Enlargement of the EU: A Self-Interested Idealist?', in Helen Sjursen, *Justifying Enlargement* (London: Routledge, 2005).

Briefings

- On 30 September, Nicole Gnesotto and the research team briefed Iraqi diplomats and officers from the Geneva Centre for Security Policy.

...

s'adapter très vite aux circonstances issues de la crise de confiance européenne. Il faut donc inverser la formule de Jean Monnet : en l'absence d'institutions, l'urgence est de consolider les politiques, de donner la priorité à l'action concrète, d'engranger des résultats, et de revenir ensuite, à partir de ces acquis, aux questions institutionnelles. Ce que Javier Solana a appelé, lors de la conférence annuelle de l'Institut, « la légitimation par l'action », peut dès lors se décliner sur les priorités suivantes :

- ▶ Répondre aux attentes citoyennes et à la légitimité civile dont bénéficie l'Union sur la scène internationale. Les Européens s'interrogent de toute évidence sur le rôle et la pertinence de l'Union dans une économie mondialisée ; ils n'ont aucun état d'âme en revanche sur la nécessité d'un acteur européen influent et respecté. Satisfaire cette demande d'Europe est un impératif pour l'action extérieure de l'Union : c'est vrai pour l'ensemble des catastrophes naturelles qui nivellent riches et pauvres dans les mêmes tragédies. Mais c'est également vrai pour la promotion d'une certaine vision européenne de la résolution des conflits, d'une certaine pratique globale, ni purement civile ni seulement militaire, de l'intervention et de l'influence dans les crises extérieures.
- ▶ Fonder l'avenir sur l'efficacité d'opérations concrètes. La PESD est à cet égard exemplaire. Elle a dès l'origine assis sa crédibilité sur des opérations collectives, elle s'est développée sur la base des expériences acquises, elle a alors nourri la démarche globale de l'Union européenne et suscité les aménagements institutionnels nécessaires. Sans l'opération Artemis en République démocratique du Congo en juillet 2003, la relation entre

l'Union et l'Afrique n'aurait pas pris la dimension globale qu'on lui connaît aujourd'hui, au travers notamment du partenariat développé avec l'Union africaine. Sans l'expérience acquise dans les missions de police en ex-Yougoslavie, de justice en Géorgie, de secours humanitaire lors du tsunami, la dimension civile de la PESD n'aurait pas non plus connu les développements que l'on connaît aujourd'hui. Et ainsi de suite. La récente mission de contrôle du cessez-le-feu à Aceh, en Indonésie, pour modeste qu'elle soit à ce stade, peut de la même façon nourrir l'espoir de voir se développer, à partir de cet engagement concret, une politique globale et plus cohérente de l'Union à l'égard du Sud-Est asiatique, puis de l'Asie toute entière.

- ▶ Prouver, à l'intérieur, les bénéfices de l'action investie à l'extérieur. Les citoyens sont en effet en droit d'attendre, en matière de PESC comme dans d'autres domaines, un certain retour sur investissement. Si l'Union parvient à montrer que la prospérité intérieure est aussi fonction du niveau de stabilité qu'elle est capable d'assurer à l'extérieur ; si elle arrive à convaincre les citoyens que leur sécurité physique, contre le terrorisme, dépend aussi du niveau d'engagement collectif de l'Union dans les conflits qui nourrissent la folie terroriste, alors la PESC sera un outil formidable pour consolider l'adhésion des citoyens au projet européen.

Tel est paradoxalement le défi nouveau de la politique étrangère européenne : montrer que l'action internationale de l'Union peut avoir une influence positive sur la dynamique intérieure de l'Europe, sur les perceptions des citoyens, sur leur ambition surtout de faire et de réussir ensemble. ■

Research awards

Visiting Fellows

In September, five visiting fellows started work at the Institute on various topics:

- Vladimir Bilcik (Slovak), 'The Visegrad Four in the EU's new periphery: the case of Ukraine'.
- Angel Pascual Ramsay (Spanish), 'The role of business corporations in the new EU security architecture: the need for public/private partnerships'.
- Bastien Nivet (French), 'Security by proxy? The EU and (sub-)regional organizations: the case of ECOWAS'.
- Sarah Reichel (German), 'The potential role of NGOs in civilian ESDP operations'.
- Nicola Casarini (Italian), 'The European Union's strategy towards China'.

Associate Research Fellow

— Agnieszka Nowak spent five months (February to June) at the Institute where she carried out a study on EU civilian crisis management capabilities. Her research will be published later this year as a multi-author *Chaillot Paper* under her direction.

What Turkey for what Union?

Groucho Marx famously stated that he would never join a club that would accept him as a member. Today, the Turkish leadership might be well advised to take the same approach to the European Union (EU). Membership for the sake of it should not be the objective. Accession will only succeed when the Union is confident enough to welcome Turkey among its members. As far as Europe is concerned, the inclusion of this pivotal neighbour in the Union should not be a decision taken by default. Many regard the accession of Turkey as the final blow to European political integration: this need not be the case. Accepting Turkey must be a positive choice for a stronger, more dynamic and outward-looking Union. Such a decision cannot be taken now, but it should not be ruled out. Negotiations should start on time in order not to poison the relationship irretrievably. But this much should be clear from the start: Turkey will join the Union if and when both parties are ready for each other, according to the spirit and the letter of the Copenhagen criteria.

■ Were Turkey to join a Union in a state of lingering crisis and soul-searching, undermined by a lack of consensus on key policy priorities, the gains would be questionable. Were a weak and disheartened Europe to take Turkey on board, many of the features that have made the 'European way' attractive across the world might well swiftly fade. The public debate around the start of the accession negotiations on 3 October has developed along parallel paths. Sadly, there seems to be little scope for reconciling the strategic rationale of EU expansion towards a key geopolitical area with the political goal of a more cohesive Union.

■ Supporters of accession claim that Turkey is a strategic player across the Middle East. The admission of a powerful Muslim country into the European community of peace and

prosperity would send a resounding message to the Islamic world that coexistence is possible, and prevent religious or ethnic extremism from gaining more ground in Turkey. In short, a win-win situation.

■ Conservatives argue that the cultural cohesion of Europe, essential for EU political integration, would be disrupted by the accession of a country that did not share the defining 'European' experiences of the Renaissance, Humanism, The Enlightenment and, of course, Christianity. This is a legitimate but contentious argument. After all, the very purpose of European integration has been to put the past behind us and build a shared future on the bedrock of common values. Furthermore, Europe is today an ethnically and culturally very diverse continent anyway.

■ A more solid objection comes from those who fear that further enlargement extended to a populous country, with demanding social and economic requirements and a strong sense of national pride, could undermine the deepening of integration. This argument deserves very careful consideration: for too long, the question of striking the right balance between enlarging and deepening has been postponed. The latest attempt to confront it, with the drafting of a Constitutional Treaty for a Europe of 25, and soon 27, has run into the sand. But, if a workable recipe is to be found, the question needs to be put in the right terms: there is no inescapable contradiction between deepening and enlarging. A more constructive approach would consist of regarding these two 'poles' of the debate on Europe as mutually reinforcing, so as not to turn a potentially win-win situation into a zero-sum game.

■ Two risks, however, must be averted. We cannot push ahead with negotiations as if the problems of the faltering political cohesion of the Union and the

very shallow popular support for Turkey's accession did not exist. On the other hand, we must not hold the negotiations hostage to the Union's lack of institutional, political and economic reform. Inaction is not a good reason to deny Turkey membership. Strategic imperatives and the aspiration to strengthen the political and economic governance of the Union before expanding further are not incompatible. On the contrary, the strategic influence of a looser, fractious Union would be tenuous and episodic at best, whereas the external appeal of a more homogeneous but introverted and defensive Union would decline.

■ The EU should seize the opportunity of the debate over Turkey's accession in order to undertake a serious reflection on its own state and *raison d'être*. In fact, these fundamental questions – Turkey's entry and the nature of the Union – are two sides of the same coin: by addressing the former, one really faces the latter. By facing up to the challenge of fully integrating Turkey over the long term, the Union is forced to take a much needed look in the mirror. The outlook may not be particularly encouraging just now, but it would be wrong to rule out Turkey's eventual accession because of current difficulties.

■ This is the time to engage in a frank, democratic debate across the Member States on what the Union is, what the Union does, and how far it should expand. As far as the accession of Turkey is concerned, the prerequisite for this to happen is that negotiations start on 3 October. Their conclusion, however, will be subject not only to the fulfilment of enlargement conditionality by Turkey, but also to the achievement of adequate political, economic and institutional reform within the Union. ■

Troubled waters

The United Nations' 60th anniversary summit in New York had some positive results: it reaffirmed international principles and development goals, and established a peace-building commission. However, the summit was not a success with regard to some crucial issues, in particular the reform of the UN Security Council. The summit declaration mentions protection of the environment, the new role of regional organisations in crisis management and peacekeeping, and the reinforcement of the UN's human and financial resources, but does not ensure concrete measures to advance on those fronts.

■ The summit made the global governance gap more visible. In our globalised and interdependent world, we do not have adequate global institutions. Today the trend is to return to the nation state as the protagonist of international relations, and therefore promote bilateral and *ad hoc* solutions to international problems to the detriment of multilateral bodies and regimes. But the main task of individual governments is to advance the interests of their own citizens, not to look after collective interests. When governments decide to cooperate, some global challenges can be tackled; if they choose not to cooperate, those challenges continue to fester. More than ever, the endless series of national speeches delivered at the UN left us with the image of the incongruent pieces of a puzzle that do not fit together.

■ In contrast, global threats seem to be forming a perverse constellation. Fundamentalism, wars and protracted conflicts are fuelling terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Extreme inequality and diseases lead to failing states, illegal immigration and organised crime. In addition, a new generation of threats, including scarcity of resources, the possibility of

oil crises and global warming, is gaining momentum. The Iraqi conundrum is perhaps the central star in this ominous constellation.

■ Faced with this undesirable situation, nation states are unable to give satisfactory responses. American global leadership is faltering, partly due to dubious management of the 'global war on terror', partly due to a genuine lack of interest in Washington. The Eurosceptic members of the EU favour individual responses, while the pro-European members fail to deliver the leadership required to tackle pressing challenges. In other parts of the world, emerging powers are, understandably enough, seeking to take advantage of this state of affairs.

■ The EU members are not using the potential of the European Union to the full. Despite their commitment to effective multilateralism and common action, they are creating and re-creating various groupings with countries from all regions in order to discuss UN reform. One would have expected that the 25 EU member states would have dealt with UN reform, and more specifically that of the Security Council, between themselves at the highest political level before discussing this issue outside the Union.

■ We urgently need a common European blueprint for the United Nations, its purposes and tasks, in the 21st Century, which can then be shared and negotiated with the EU's partners and friends. Agreement amongst the EU members on this vital issue might trigger global consensus, whereas disagreement within the EU announces troubled waters ahead.

■ The stalemate in the EU following the French and Dutch referendums should not cloud the fact that European citizens are calling for a more determined EU foreign and security policy. According to the *Transatlantic Trends 2005* opinion poll, seventy per cent of Europeans (interviewed in nine

key countries) want the EU to become a 'superpower' like the United States. Forty-seven per cent of Americans support an EU superpower - and eighty per cent of those are in favour even if the EU would not always agree with US policies. A majority of sixty per cent of Europeans (including 62 % of French and 64 % of German respondents) support a single EU seat on the UN Security Council.

■ In times of danger, bold initiatives are needed. The current lack of global vision leaves us perplexed - and worried. One of the main tasks of experts in security matters is to warn political leaders about impending risks. Many alarm signals can be heard, and yet nobody seems to want to pay attention. It's rather as though the night watch in a big transatlantic liner had seen icebergs looming on the horizon. But the first class passengers are dancing too merrily to pay any heed to the signals, while the third class passengers are too busy trying to emulate their first class counterparts. And the ship sails on ... ■

Martin Ortega

Chaillot Paper

June 2005

n° 78

The European Union and the United Nations

Partners in effective multilateralism

Sven Biscop, Francesco Francioni, Kennedy Graham with Tânia Felício, Jeffrey Laurenti and Thierry Tardy

Foreword by Jean-Marie Guéhenno
Edited by Martin Ortega



Fourth Annual Conference of the Institute

For the fourth consecutive year, Javier Solana, High Representative for the CFSP, opened the Institute's Annual Conference, held in Paris on Monday, 26 September. Advocating 'legitimation through action', he insisted on the impact of the CFSP on the European project: the EU's increased involvement in the international arena can indeed have a positive influence on its internal dynamics. During the round table held in the afternoon with Carl Bildt, Elmar Brok and Jacques Delors, the need for the EU to focus on efficiency and to demonstrate the extent to which it can be a force for good was also highlighted. Almost 200 European participants attended the conference, which has become the annual rendez-vous of the European strategic community.

Address by Javier Solana, High Representative for the CFSP (extracts)

« (...) Je vais même plus loin: je suis personnellement convaincu que la **Politique étrangère et de Sécurité commune (PESC)** a son rôle à jouer dans la reconquête des opinions publiques en faveur du projet européen.

L'action internationale de l'Union peut maintenant avoir une influence positive sur la dynamique intérieure de l'Europe, sur les perceptions des citoyens, sur leur ambition de construire ensemble, sur leurs inquiétudes également. C'est ce que j'appellerai la légitimation par l'action. Même quand le débat d'idées nous sépare, la poursuite de nos intérêts, l'affirmation de nos valeurs nous rassemble.

Pourquoi? Le simple bon sens impose à lui seul deux réponses directement liées aux débats actuels:

- oui, la croissance et la prospérité de l'Union sont aussi fonction de la stabilité que l'Union est capable d'assurer à sa périphérie et plus loin, si besoin avec ses partenaires;
- oui, la sécurité intérieure des citoyens est directement liée au niveau d'engagement de l'Union. Engagement dans la règlement de conflits qui nourrissent la folie terroriste ou tout autre type de menaces. Mais aussi engagement pour lutter contre la pauvreté ou les nouvelles pandémies, protéger l'environnement.

Au-delà, le potentiel d'entraînement de la PESC tient également aux acquis indubitables de ces dernières années. Or ces acquis, personne ne songe à les remettre en cause.



L'Union dispose maintenant de structures et de procédures permettant de préparer et de mettre en œuvre des décisions en temps réel. A

force d'opérations et de missions, les Européens ont acquis des réflexes et une expérience solides. Sans l'expérience des missions en ex-Yougoslavie, en Géorgie, au Proche-Orient (je songe à la mission EU COPPS - European Union Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support - en Palestine), la dimension civile de la Politique européenne de Sécurité et de Défense (PESD) n'aurait pas les développements que l'on connaît. Le succès des premières

opérations militaires, autonomes comme *Artemis* en 2003, ou en liaison avec l'OTAN comme en Bosnie, ouvrent la voie à de nouvelles opérations toujours plus ambitieuses. Aujourd'hui la mission à Aceh ouvre la perspective à une politique nouvelle en Asie. Et ainsi de suite.

Deuxième acquis: une capacité de gestion de crise unique. Ni purement civile, ni purement militaire, mais simplement globale. Tout n'est pas encore parfait. Mais là encore sachons agir avec pragmatisme.

Troisième acquis: une doctrine. Ni plus, ni moins. C'est-à-dire une certaine vision du monde fondée sur des intérêts communs et la volonté de les défendre, en bonne intelligence avec chacun de nos partenaires. Tel est le sens de la Stratégie de sécurité mise au point en 2003 (...).

« *Sommes-nous à nouveau en crise? Permettez-moi de ne pas rentrer dans le rang. De ne pas céder à l'autodénigrement.* »



“(...) When approaching the **Kosovo** conundrum, we should base our strategy on three fundamental points. First, it is impossible to solve the Kosovo question without considering the implications for the whole region. We need a comprehensive approach so that all the pieces of the puzzle do fit together - regionally and beyond.

The second point is that this will not be cheap. Our engagement will continue to require substantial European resources: money, people and especially an expanded commitment in the area of security: in Bosnia, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and, increasingly, in Kosovo.

The third point to make is that our Balkans strategy rests on a fundamental promise. Provided the countries of the region advance on the path of internal reform and regional reconciliation, we said that we would assist them to their ultimate destination: entry into the Union. That was the commitment we made in Thessaloniki. Croatia is now close to a major leap forward in this respect, but we need the rest of the region to follow suit. Both with respect to Kosovo and in its own right, we need to ensure that Belgrade advances on the European track. The same is true for former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania and Bosnia - despite the stalemate there over police reform.

Maintaining the European membership perspective is the only way we will have real leverage over local leaders so that they take the tough decisions that are needed. It is the only way to achieve the stabilisation and integration of this region, in which we have such an enormous political and moral stake (...).

On-line

The full text of the High Representative's speech to the EUISS Annual Conference, together with all the Institute's publications and reports on seminars, can be accessed on the Institute's website:

<http://www.iss-eu.org>