

Quarterly published by the EU Institute for Security Studies
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editorial

Attention, danger !

Nicole Gnesotto

Directeur

On avait accusé les électeurs du « non » d'obscurantisme. Les dirigeants font pire, aggravant par le haut la crise que les électeurs d'en bas ont ouverte au sein de l'Union. Du côté des opinions, le message dominant est que rien ne va plus. Maintenant que la mondialisation économique rompt l'habitude d'une croissance collective, les citoyens se réapproprient la chose européenne, exigent que l'on revoie la copie, demandent des comptes. Que ce qui a été accompli depuis 50 ans ait été un formidable succès, nul n'en doute. Que les mêmes logiques soient encore adaptées aux défis actuels, une majorité ne le croit plus : elle préfère la crise totale à la poursuite indéfinie du système, et là réside sans doute l'extraordinaire contagion du non tant redoutée par les responsables européens. Le gel des ratifications est à ce titre une mesure conservatoire, mais incapable à elle seule de créer des jours meilleurs.

■ Du côté des chefs d'Etat, le message est que rien ne compte plus. Ni la solidarité collective, ni le partage des sacrifices et des bénéfices, ni la crédibilité extérieure du projet européen. Historique, le sommet de juin 2005 le restera pour l'étalage des égoïsmes nationaux les plus étriqués. Etrange leçon donnée à des citoyens déjà sceptiques ! Le problème, c'est que l'on ne voit pas à qui profite le crime. Ni aux nouveaux membres, premières victimes de la panne budgétaire de l'Union ; ni au projet d'Europe politique, lequel suppose un principe de solidarité collective transcendant les nations ; ni au libre jeu du marché et du libéralisme économique, qui ont toutes les raisons de s'alarmer des relents protectionnistes désormais libérés.

■ Comment répondre ? En matière de gestion des crises extérieures, les leçons engrangées en Afrique et dans les Balkans sont simples : rien ne peut réussir dans la durée sans appropriation collective, par

les populations concernées, des solutions proposées. On voit mal pourquoi il en serait autrement pour l'Union. Cette ré-appropriation populaire de l'Europe ne se fera sans doute ni en quelques mois, ni par d'étroits marchandages budgétaires, encore moins par des bricolages institutionnels pour sauver deux ou trois bouts du Traité ou de nouveaux projets de grand marché transatlantique. Les pistes suivantes méritent au moins considération.

— Motiver les classes d'âge du futur : que 60% des moins de 25 ans aient voté non en France (et il n'y a pas dans ce pays une telle proportion d'illettrés !) mérite une profonde réflexion. Ni la recherche, ni l'innovation technologique, ni la formation supérieure, sans parler des grands projets scientifiques, ne font partie des priorités européennes. Est-ce normal, quand on prétend vouloir adapter l'Europe aux défis du futur ?

— Partager pour protéger : en termes de solidarité entre riches et pauvres, les fonds structurels étaient une idée de génie. Mais leur logique purement géographique semble désormais insuffisante face aux effets d'un marché mondialisé. Pourquoi le budget communautaire ne financerait-il pas, tout autant que de grands travaux, un fonds européen d'accompagnement social de la modernisation économique ?

— Identifier les évidences de la construction européenne qui, désormais, ne le sont plus : la structure du budget ? L'exclusion des politiques sociales ? Le rythme et les critères présidant à l'élargissement ? Les acquis communautaires, dont on vient de réaliser qu'ils ne sont justement pas acquis au niveau des « actionnaires-citoyens » de l'Union ?

Institute Activities

The Institute and the Union

- Judy Batt received Michael Sahlin, EU Special Representative for FYROM, to discuss current developments in the Balkans and the EU's role, on 1 March.
- The Institute was present at the EU's Open Day in Brussels on 30 April, where Catherine Glière, Noëlle Tomas and Bertrand Oudart publicised the Institute's work and publications.
- On 24 May the Director, Nicole Gnesotto, was invited by the Luxembourg EU presidency to discuss with the PSC the future of the Institute in light of the forthcoming review of the Institute's founding Joint Action.

Seminars

- On 8 April the Institute (Judy Batt), in collaboration with the G17 Institute, organised a seminar entitled 'The EU's Security Agenda and the Western Balkans' in Belgrade. Designed to introduce Serbian and Montenegrin policy-makers, academics and journalists to ESDP, it was the first of its kind to be held in the USM capital.
- A seminar on 'The Crescent of Crisis', organised by the Institute (Martin Ortega), Brookings Institution, the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, King's College London and Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik was held in Paris on 19 April.
- The Institute co-sponsored the 'Conference on Democracy and Global Islam' held at UC Berkeley, California on 22 April (Walter Posch).
- On 10 May, at the request of the EU's Political and Security Committee, the Institute (Martin Ortega) organised a seminar in Paris on 'ESDP and the Mediterranean'. The aim was to take stock of the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue and to look at ways in which it could be intensified for the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona process.
- A seminar on 'Iranian Challenges' (Walter Posch) held at the Institute on 20 May looked at Iran's regional and strategic interests, its internal challenges, its nuclear policy and EU-Iranian relations.
- The Institute supported a seminar in Bratislava on 20 May on 'Assessing Developments in the Western Balkans: Problems of Today, Ideas for the Future' organised by the Slovak Foreign Policy Association.

Seminars

continued

- The Institute hosted the **Second Plenary Meeting of the Arab Reform Initiative**, organised by the Al-Ahram Centre, Cairo, together with Henry Siegman of the US/Middle East Project, Council on Foreign Relations, in Paris, on 26-27 May (Walter Posch).

Task Forces

- The Institute's Task Force on the Balkans (Judy Batt), invited officials and experts from EU member states and the United States to Paris on 30 May to compare views on 'Kosovo and Beyond', prior to the international community's discussions on the province's future status.

Missions on the ground

- Judy Batt had interviews in Belgrade on 1-10 April with politicians, policy advisers and experts on Serbian policies for Kosovo and European integration.
- Dov Lynch helped to facilitate the second round of the Georgia-Ossetia Dialogue, 7-10 June, which included high-level officials from both sides of the conflict and civil society activists.

Institute publications

Book

- A report by an EUISS Task Force, *Defence procurement in the European Union. The current debate*, by Burkard Schmitt as Chairman and Rapporteur, was published in May.

Chaillot Papers

- *No. 78: The European Union and the United Nations. Partners in effective multilateralism*, by Sven Biscop, Francesco Francioni, Kennedy Graham with Tânia Felício, Jeffrey Laurenti, Martin Ortega and Thierry Tardy; edited by Martin Ortega, with a foreword by Jean-Marie Guéhenno (June).
- *No. 77: Effective non-proliferation. The European Union and the 2005 NPT Review Conference*, by Darryl Howlett & John Simpson, Harald Müller and Bruno Terrais; edited by Burkard Schmitt (May).

Occasional Papers

- *No. 59: L'évolution stratégique du Japon: un enjeu pour l'Union*, by Régine Serra (Juin).
- *No. 58: L'Union et l'Afrique subsaharienne: quel Partenariat?*, by Roland Sourd (Mai).
- *No. 57: The democratic legitimacy of European Security and Defence Policy*, by Wolfgang Wagner (April).

Institute publications

continued

Forthcoming

- *Chaillot Paper: Promoting security sector governance in the European Union neighbourhood*, by Heiner Hänggi and Fred Tanner.
- *Chaillot Paper: Looking into Iraq*, by Martin van Bruinessen, Jean-François Daguzan, Andrzej Kapiszewski, Walter Posch and Álvaro de Vasconcelos; edited by Walter Posch.
- *Chaillot Paper: Disasters, diseases, disruptions: a new D-drive for the EU*, by Stefan Elbe, Urs Luterbacher, Antonio Missiroli, Bengt Sundelius and Marco Zupi; edited by Antonio Missiroli.
- *Chaillot Paper: The Belarus impasse*, by Alexandra Goujon, Przemyslaw Zurawski vel Grajewski, Dov Lynch, Clelia Rontoyanni, Vitaly Silitsky and Dmitri Trenin; edited by Dov Lynch.
- *Chaillot Paper: Burden-sharing between the EU and the US*, by Gustav Lindstrom.
- *Chaillot Paper: The question of Serbia*, by Judy Batt.
- *Occasional Paper: Policing peace: the European Gendarmerie Force*, by Claudio Catalano.

Institute staff

Giovanni Grevi (Italian), currently at the European Policy Centre, Brussels, joins the research team in August. Antonio Missiroli left the Institute at the end of June. He is now Chief Policy Analyst at the European Policy Centre. Marcin Zaborowski (Polish), formerly head of the transatlantic programme at the Centre for International Relations, Warsaw, joined the Institute in May as a research fellow.

Research awards

Visiting Fellows

During the period April to June the following studied at the Institute as visiting fellows:

- Sara Kutchesfahani (British), whose research topic was 'Diplomacy vs. threats: what is the best way to deal with Iran?'
- John O'Brennan (Irish), 'EU capacity-building and compliance strategies in the Western Balkans'.
- Kestutis Paulauskas (Lithuanian), 'The Baltic States after double enlargement'.
- Nicu Popescu (Moldovan), 'Conflict resolution and European neighbourhood policy'.

NPT breakdown

After four weeks of diplomatic arm-wrestling, the 2005 Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in New York ended on 27 May in failure. The final document adopted by the 153 delegations listed conference officials and how many meetings were held, but did not contain a single decision or recommendation on any important issue.

■ It is true that the 1980 and 1990 NPT Conferences also failed to achieve substantive agreements, and the nuclear non-proliferation regime with the NPT at its core nevertheless survived. However, this time failure comes at a particularly bad moment: since the last Review Conference, in 2000, North Korea has withdrawn from the Treaty and declared that it possesses nuclear bombs; Libya has acknowledged that it worked for years on a clandestine nuclear weapons programme; undeclared uranium enrichment activities have been discovered in Iran, and A. Q. Khan's nuclear trafficking network has revealed the weakness of the regime vis-à-vis non-state actors. All this has plunged the NPT into a deep crisis of both compliance and confidence.

■ This situation made it particularly important to send a strong political signal in support of the Treaty and adapt the regime to the challenges of the 21st century. Given the diversity of interests among states parties, it was clear from the outset that this would be achievable only on the basis of a bargain involving all three pillars of the NPT: non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy. Consequently, there was a long list of items to be addressed, ranging from the implementation of the Additional Protocol as the new verification standard, the future of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and the entry

into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the management of sensitive fuel cycle activities.

■ However, instead of using their four weeks to tackle these challenges and debate practical steps for implementing the Treaty's commitments, delegations spent 15 out of 20 conference days on purely procedural battles. During the little time that was left for discussing substance, a few important states obstructed all initiatives which they found incompatible with their national priorities: the US blocked any reference to the disarmament commitments made by the nuclear powers at the 1995 and 2000 NPT conferences; Iran blocked proposals to limit access to the nuclear fuel cycle by non-nuclear states; Egypt blocked a resolution on the universalisation of the NPT because of Western tolerance vis-à-vis Israel's nuclear activities. At the end, an unholy alliance of states with diametrically opposed interests made any trade-off between non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use impossible. As a result, none of the pressing issues was tackled, and the conference became, as one observer put it, 'one of the most shameful exhibitions of cynical time-wasting seen outside the Geneva Conference on Disarmament'.

■ This outcome is a severe setback for the NPT regime in general, and the European Union's non-proliferation strategy in particular. The way in which a small minority hijacked the conference and substantive opportunities were 'squandered by procedural brinkmanship' (Ambassador Meyer of Canada), shows how difficult it is to make multilateralism effective if a few key actors refuse to play the game. This was particularly regrettable, since the EU came to New York with a

Common Position which many considered a good basis for a substantive Final Document. Presenting 43 recommendations covering all three NPT pillars, the EU sent a clear message that the Treaty must be defended in its integrity. At the same time, the Common Position demonstrated that a compromise between Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Weapons States is possible. However, bad timing greatly reduced the Union's influence: if the Common Position had been adopted weeks rather than days before the conference, the EU could have already used the run-up phase to test the ground for broader compromises. Once the conference had started, however, there was not even enough time to discuss the EU proposals.

■ In particular the way the Review Conference failed was so discouraging that many delegations and observers left New York deeply frustrated and pessimistic. At least in the short term, it will indeed be difficult to revitalise the NPT. Kofi Annan proposed using the UN summit in September as an opportunity to break the nuclear deadlock. However, it is hard to imagine that a meeting of more than 170 heads of state and government with a wide-ranging agenda is the appropriate framework in which to achieve this objective. Specific non-proliferation issues will certainly be dealt with in specialised forums, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. However, the next opportunity to discuss the NPT as a whole will not come before 2007, when the first PrepCom meeting for the 2010 Review Conference will take place. In other words, the world will have to live for at least several years with a weakened NPT regime that risks eroding even further.

Burkard Schmitt

Briefings

The research team briefed students from the Institute for International Education of Students, Freiburg, on 4 April, and members of the Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale (IHEDN) on 6 April. A group from the American University, Washington DC visited the Institute on 23 May.

On-line/http

All of the Institute's publications and reports on seminars can be accessed on the Institute's website:

www.iss-eu.org

How the US views the European crisis

The failure of the EU constitution in the referendums in France and the Netherlands has met with three types of responses in America: disappointment, satisfaction and ignorance. Most of the Americans who care about European affairs have not welcomed the failure. This view has also apparently prevailed in the White House. In the months following the re-election of President Bush, Washington's attitude towards the EU improved, with the President making several pronouncements in support of European integration, albeit stopping short of explicitly endorsing the constitution, although an early draft of the President's address during his February tour of Europe included a direct endorsement of it. Whilst the relevant phrases were eventually removed from the President's speech, this was due to Washington's weariness of being perceived as meddling in the EU's internal affairs.

■ Washington's largely positive view of the constitution has been motivated by a number of cultural and strategic considerations. A number of opinion polls have consistently shown that Americans generally support a stronger and more globally responsible EU. It has also been a prevailing view amongst the majority of the US's foreign policy elite, both Democrat and Republican, that a stronger EU would be more open and more free-market oriented, and that as such it would constitute a useful partner in addressing global security issues. Much of this view relies on the assumption that an integrated Europe would be willing and capable of releasing the US from some of its international responsibilities, be it in the Balkans, Afghanistan or Iraq.

■ Consequently, the current European crisis is largely seen in the US as having negative implications for transatlantic burden-sharing and the promotion of stability in areas vital to US interests. In particular, the US is concerned about the likely slow-down of EU enlargement to Turkey and the decreasing chances of providing Ukraine and Moldova with a clear prospect of membership in the foreseeable future. Many in the US also expect that a Europe in crisis is likely to turn introvert and selfish.

■ However, the small but vocal minority of experts who see the failure of the constitution as conducive to US interests contradict the above views. For example, the influential Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute have argued against the US's endorsement of the constitution. Whilst there are some subtle differences in the views expressed by these two think tanks, they have both argued that the constitution would have produced an EU that was likely to counterbalance rather than cooperate with the US. The Heritage Foundation has long argued against the US's support for European integration and in favour of Washington embarking on a policy of dividing Europeans. The conservative agenda pursued by the AEI is subtler. For example, David Frum of the AEI argues that the emergence of a strong Europe would be desirable from the US's point of view as long as the European project was limited to economic integration. However, he sees the constitution as being weak in promoting economic liberalisation but strong on advancing political centralism, the latter being undesirable from his point of view.

■ Both the Heritage Foundation and the AEI have objected particularly to those parts of the constitution that strengthen the EU's external role. They argue that, if the document entered into force, transatlantic relations would suffer and anti-Americanism would be promoted by Brussels as a way of creating a common European identity.

■ The third type of reaction from Washington has been indifference and oblivion, which has probably been most widespread among foreign policy circles. Many Americans have simply had no knowledge and no views on the constitution. In fact, it has not been uncommon that even the US officials who work in Europe have no appreciation of the likely implications of the constitution for the EU's external role and transatlantic cooperation.

■ The endorsement of the constitution by the majority of those Americans who have had an opinion on the matter, Washington's discreet support and the limited appeal of the anti-constitution minority are undoubtedly good news for transatlantic relations. However, the fact that most Americans have held no view on the constitution should be a cause for concern. It is not unlikely, for example, that should the ratification crisis continue, the views of the current conservative minority may become more acceptable to mainstream opinion as offering simple and clear answers to what many Americans may come to see as 'this European mess'. There is therefore no room for complacency and it is clear that much work remains to be done to strengthen the effectiveness of the EU's public diplomacy across the Atlantic.

Marcin Zaborowski

editorial ... continued from front page

— Clarifier les limites. Le projet européen souffre depuis longtemps d'une double ambiguïté : géographique (quelles frontières ?) et politiques (quelle intégration ?), les deux incertitudes se renforçant l'une l'autre dans un sentiment d'incompréhension et de rejet croissant. Or l'identité européenne mourra si elle est définie par la seule extension géographique des règles du marché unique. Ce n'est pas faire insulte aux pays candidats à l'Union que de vouloir empêcher que ne s'effondre la maison dans laquelle ils aspirent à entrer. Ce n'est pas

agir en fauteurs de troubles à l'extérieur de l'Union que de vouloir d'abord éteindre le feu qui progresse à l'intérieur.

D'autant que la solidarité transatlantique pourrait trouver ici une occasion nouvelle de se manifester : stabiliser les pourtours de l'Europe, pacifier les Balkans, aider à la démocratisation progressive des voisins, est de l'intérêt commun des Etats-Unis et de l'Union. Ne serait-ce que sur le plan financier, pourquoi ne pas en partager le fardeau ?