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## Les cinq prochaines années

Nicole Gnesotto

Directeur

Lancée en 1999 au Conseil européen de Cologne, la PESD est sans conteste l'une des plus rapides « success stories » de l'Union européenne. Lorsque Javier Solana prit ses fonctions il y a cinq ans, personne n'aurait osé parier que l'Union aurait bientôt des responsabilités directes en matière de gestion de crises, un état-major, des opérations placées sous sa responsabilité, une agence de l'armement, une clause de solidarité en cas d'attaque terroriste et, surtout, une vision commune des menaces et des réponses adéquates, autrement dit une stratégie de sécurité véritablement européenne. Or ce sont désormais des réalités.

■ Ni les différences de culture stratégique entre les 25, ni leurs divergences sur les stratégies américaines, ni leur différentiel de capacités ou d'ambition européenne n'ont empêché qu'en matière de sécurité et de défense, l'Union trouve assez de consensus entre ses membres pour construire petit à petit les moyens d'une véritable influence internationale. Entre la première opération en Bosnie (530 policiers en janvier 2003) et la reprise programmée, fin 2004, de l'opération SFOR de l'OTAN en Bosnie (7000 hommes), la montée en responsabilité de l'Union est spectaculaire. Les opinions européennes n'ont d'ailleurs cessé d'affirmer leur soutien à ce projet. Quant à la Constitution, elle lui donnera un nouvel élan qualitatif, avec la création d'un poste de Ministre des Affaires étrangères dont Javier Solana sera la première incarnation.

■ Le lecteur trouvera dans la dernière publication de l'Institut, La politique de sécurité et de défense de l'Union – les cinq premières années (1999-2004), le bilan le plus complet à ce jour des réalisations, des enjeux et des difficultés – car elles existent ! – de cette première étape de l'action politique de l'Union.

De nombreuses pistes pour l'avenir sont également proposées par l'équipe de l'Institut. Les cinq prochaines années seront en effet très différentes de celles qui ont présidé à l'entrée en scène internationale de l'Union, plus difficiles, plus chaotiques, sans doute plus dangereuses. Le monde dans lequel l'Union va devoir inscrire son action et continuer de prospérer ne sera pas ce long fleuve tranquille que la fin de la guerre froide et l'essor de la mondialisation avaient laissé espérer. En dépit des inconnues qui s'amoncellent sur l'environnement international, quelques tendances lourdes émergent, qui seront décisives pour l'avenir de la politique extérieure de l'Union. Quatre d'entre elles seront déterminantes :

- ▶ La montée en puissance des questions de sécurité dans l'agenda international et dans les préoccupations des opinions européennes. Parce que le niveau de violence internationale est en croissance régulière, le retour du politique dans la gestion de la mondialisation sera de même inévitable.
- ▶ L'interaction croissante des enjeux économiques et stratégiques, qu'il s'agisse de la lutte antiterroriste ou de la stabilité des prix du pétrole : la nécessité d'une approche « intégrée » de la politique étrangère n'en deviendra que plus urgente.
- ▶ La détérioration du Sud : c'est dans la vaste zone comprise entre le Moyen-Orient et les marges de l'Asie que les turbulences sont



# Institute Activities

## Annual conference



■ For the third consecutive year, Javier Solana High Representative for

CFSP, opened the Institute's **Annual Conference**, held in Paris on Friday, 10 September. His speech focused on recent developments in European security policy and made an assessment of CFSP and ESDP five years after Cologne. The Institute's latest book, *EU Security and Defence Policy - The first five years (1999-2004)*, was launched on this occasion. Attending the conference for the first time, four high-level officials, Gijs de Vries (Terrorism), Annalisa Giannella (Non-proliferation), Jean-Paul Perruche (EU Military Staff) and Nick Witney (European Defence Agency) focused in the afternoon on the foreseeable challenges of the next five years.

## ESDP – five years

■ The Institute has published English, French and German versions of *EU Security and Defence Policy – The first five years (1999-2004)*, edited by Nicole Gnesotto with a preface by Javier Solana and contributions by Martti Ahtisaari, Michel Barnier, Carl Bildt, Elmar Brok and Norbert Gresch, Robert Cooper, Judy Dempsey, Lamberto Dini, Jean-Louis Gergorin and Jean Bétermier, Philip H. Gordon, Jean-Yves Haine, Gustav Lindstrom, Antonio Missioli, Alberto Navarro, Martin Ortega, Fernando Riccardi, Alexander Rondos, Burkard Schmitt, Rainer Schuwirth, Theo Sommer and Laurent Zecchini. Italian and Spanish versions will shortly be published. Copies can be obtained from the Institute, and the text is available on our website.

## Seminars

■ A joint conference 'New security challenges and EU responses' was held by the Institute (Antonio Missioli) and the Latvian Institute of International Affairs, in Riga on 17-18 September, the second to be organised by the EUISS with a new EU member country.

## Seminars

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■ On 27 September a seminar 'Turkey and/in the EU: the security dimension' (Antonio Missioli, Walter Posch) was held at the Institute. The primary aim of the seminar, which was attended by a number of Turkish officials and experts, was to examine the possible implications of Turkish membership (or non-membership) for the Union's security policy.

## Task Forces

■ The Institute's Balkans Task Force (Judy Batt) met in Paris on 2 July for a meeting on 'Kosovo: what prospects for final status?'. The meeting was organised in four sessions: assessment of the domestic constraints and possibilities in Serbia and Kosovo; the ramifications of the Kosovo issue in the W Balkans neighbourhood; the scope for consensus on resolving 'final status'; and the role and future responsibilities of the EU in Kosovo. Participants clearly arrived ready for a focused and purposeful debate: discussion was intense, extremely well informed and productive.

■ The Institute's European Defence Book Task Force (Jean-Yves Haine) organised a seminar in Brussels on 15 September to present and discuss the main conclusions of its report *European defence. A proposal for a White Paper* with experts and journalists.

## Institute publications

### Book

In June the Institute published *European defence. A proposal for a White Paper*, a report by an Institute task force (Jean-Yves Haine) that included André Dumoulin, Jan Foghelin, Nicole Gnesotto, François Heisbourg, William Hopkinson, Marc Otte, Tomas Ries, Lothar Rühl, Stefano Silvestri, Hans-Bernhard Weisserth and Rob de Wijk.

### Chaillot Papers

■ *No. 69: Protecting the European homeland: the CBR dimension*, by Gustav Lindstrom (July).

### Occasional Papers

■ *No. 54: EU enlargement and armaments. Defence industries and markets of the Visegrad countries*, by Timo Behr and Albane Siwiecki; edited by Burkard Schmitt (September).

## Institute publications

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### Forthcoming

■ *Chaillot Paper: The Western Balkans: moving on*, by Franz-Lothar Altmann, Judy Batt, Misha Glenny, Gerald Knaus and Marcus Cox, Stefan Lehne, Jacques Rupnik, Ivan Vejvoda and Romana Vlahutin; edited by Judy Batt.

■ *Chaillot Paper: Défense européenne: la quête d'une cohérence*, by Philippe de Schouttheete.

## External publications

### Nicole Gnesotto

– 'Crisis y perspectivas transatlánticas', in *Anuario internacional CIDOB 2003*, Edición 2004, Fundacio CIDOB, pp. 189-93.

### Gustav Lindstrom

– 'The Fight Against Terrorism and Civil Liberties: A Zero Sum Game?', in *Les Dossiers de L'Abécédaire Parlementaire - Challenges for Europe's Security and Defence in the 21st Century*, Assembly of the Western European Union, No. 18, 2nd Trimester 2004.

### Dov Lynch

– 'Moldova and Transnistria', in 'Security Sector Reform and Transparency Building: Needs and Options for Ukraine and Moldova', *Harmonie Paper* no. 17 (Groningen: The Centre for European Security Studies, 2004), pp. 111-12.  
– 'Security Sector Governance in the South Caucasus: Towards an EU Strategy', in Anja H. Ebnother and Gustav Gustenau (eds.), *Security Sector Governance in the South Caucasus: Challenges and Visions* (Vienna and Geneva: National Defence Academy, Austrian Federal Ministry of Defence and Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, February 2004), pp. 34-56.

### Antonio Missioli

– 'Lo Strategic Concept europeo nel contesto della Presidenza italiana dell'UE', *Osservatorio Strategico*, maggio 2004.  
– 'Enlarging CFSP/ESDP', in H.J. Giessmann (ed.), *Security Handbook 2004 - The Twin Enlargement of NATO and the EU* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2004).  
– 'Enlarging ESDP/ESDP: The Central Europeans between the EU and NATO', in A. Maurer, K.-O. Lang and E. Whitlock (eds.), *New Stimulus or Integration Backlash? EU Enlargement and Transatlantic Relations* (Berlin: SWP, July 2004).  
– 'Financing ESDP - The Operational Dimension', in H.-G. Ehrhart and B. Schmitt (eds.), *Die Sicherheitspolitik der EU im Werden*. (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2004).

### Martin Ortega

'La Estrategia Europea de Seguridad', in *Monografías del CESEDEN* (Madrid), no. 71.

### Burkard Schmitt

– 'European land armaments: time for political will', in *Military Technology*, vol. XXVIII, issue 6, 2004.  
– (with Antonio Missioli), 'More Euros for ESDP: What Convergence, What Criteria?', in Karl von Wogau (ed.), *The Path to European Defence* (Antwerp: Maklu, 2004).

## Protecting Europe

**The terrorist attacks in Madrid** on 11 March 2004 provided a grim reminder of the threats facing Europe. They reinforced the EU Security Strategy's assertion that 'internal and external aspect of security are indissolubly linked'. The attacks also underscored the need for Europe to reinforce its internal security. With open borders and the free movement of goods, services, people and capital, it is critical that the EU adequately protect its roughly 450 million citizens. There are a number of reasons why the EU needs to act now.

■ First, we are facing a new type of terrorism. Terrorism today is a global phenomenon, characterised by independently operating cells worldwide. These loosely associated groups or networks take advantage of the benefits provided by globalisation and new technologies to carry out their attacks. They are willing to inflict mass casualties and use asymmetric means to put pressure on governments. Europe's experience with domestic terrorism has made it more vigilant, but handling international terrorism requires renewed efforts.

■ Second, non-state actors are pushing the envelope with respect to the acts they are willing to commit to achieve their goals – the events in Beslan are a recent reminder. Certain groups have openly expressed their willingness to use weapons of mass destruction if they were to have access to them. The threat of chemical, biological, radiological or even nuclear attacks is more realistic today than in the past. A number of small-scale plots have been uncovered in Europe. In February 2002, the Italian authorities apparently thwarted a plot by al-Qaeda to poison Rome's water supply with cyanide-based chemicals. In January 2004, French anti-terrorist police detained five people in Lyons – two of them admitted plans to

attack specific targets in France using ricin and botulinum bacteria. In April 2004, British anti-terrorist agents foiled a plot involving the use of the corrosive substance osmium tetroxide. While the impact of these attacks might have been limited – with the exception of the possible attempt to poison Rome's water supply – one can only imagine the psychological effects arising from such an attack.

■ Third, our societies are increasingly interconnected and vulnerable to aggression against our critical infrastructures – the virtual and physical systems and assets which ensure the proper functioning of society. Examples include the telecommunications, energy, transportation, public health, emergency service and food sectors. With the advent of globalisation, these infrastructures are increasingly interdependent and rely on information technologies for proper functioning. As a result, they are susceptible to attacks by outsiders who may use electronic means to wreak havoc. From afar, attackers can target the Achilles heels of critical infrastructures and their industrial control systems. The recent blackouts across Europe (Italy, Britain and Denmark/Sweden) provide a hint of the types of effects that could result if the failure of one critical infrastructure brings down others due to a malicious attack.

■ Fortunately, important steps have been taken to protect Europe. For example, in the aftermath of the Madrid attacks, the European Council adopted a declaration on combating terrorism. One of its main provisions is the political commitment expressed by member states to act jointly against terrorist acts, 'in the spirit of the Solidarity Clause contained in Article 42 of the draft Constitution for Europe'. The European Council also established the post of Counter-Terrorism Coordinator – currently held by Mr Gijs de Vries – to

facilitate a comprehensive approach against terrorism. Member states were likewise urged to fully implement regulations concerning issues such as the European Arrest Warrant, joint investigative teams, money laundering, and police and judicial cooperation.

■ While the EU is moving in the right direction, these efforts must be carried out in a purposeful, consistent and transparent manner. Collaboration is critical, among policy-makers, among institutions, and between business and government. European policy-makers at all levels need to limit the 'stovepipe' effect, where one actor is unaware of or unable to affect the actions of other key players. For the EU, this means limiting the barriers raised by the EU's three pillars. Only with adequate cross-pillar cooperation can we properly address the global nature of today's threats. Within individual EU member states, new efforts are needed to ensure that terrorism-related EU legislation is transposed into national law in a timely manner. Several framework decisions, such as those concerning the European Arrest Warrant and joint investigation teams, are still not applicable in all EU member states.

■ Finally, the EU must increase its preparedness. Steps are needed to ensure adequate response in the event of a large-scale incident. Since the results of an attack could affect more than one member state, it is important that solidarity commitments are properly operationalised through adequate interoperable resources. Information must be shared across borders, and large-scale exercises must be organised to test plans, procedures and equipment. To date, the EU has only carried out one such exercise in response to a large-scale terrorist event – EURATOX 2002. Now is the time for more action. ■

*Gustav Lindstrom*

### Research awards

*During the period April to June the following studied at the Institute as a visiting fellow:*  
- Bülent Aras (Turkish), whose research topic was 'The EU and Caspian security in the aftermath of the Iraq war'.

### Briefings

On 8 September a group of Dutch journalists were briefed on ESDP, at the Institute.

### On-line/http

All of the Institute's publications and reports on seminars can be accessed on the Institute's website:

[www.iss-eu.org](http://www.iss-eu.org)



## Talking Turkey

**T**urkey's long-standing relationship with the EU has from time to time been overshadowed by crises. However, there has never been a total breakdown in relations, and Turkey's bid for eventual EU membership has remained alive, if not always well. Now that the time for decisions has come, however, most political analysts expect a positive answer from the EU and the opening of formal accession negotiations some time in 2005.

■ A positive vote could almost be a guarantee of the irreversibility of Turkey's reforms and would boost both economic development and further democratisation, and have an extraordinary impact in further stabilising the country. It would also be seen as clear support for the Western- and democratically minded segments of Turkish society, and strengthen the developing civil society and the pro-reform forces in the élites, the administration and the population.

■ Further, it would affect the way in which the EU is perceived throughout the Islamic world, where the EU's handling of Muslim Turkey's membership application is closely followed. Most certainly, it would help to dispel the image of the EU as nothing more than a 'Christian club' or even hostile towards Islam in general.

■ A 'yes' vote – despite popular reservations in the EU over Turkey's membership – would be positive because otherwise the general frustration in Turkey might in due course lead to a standstill or at least a watering-down of the necessary and painful Turkish

reform process, with possible negative consequences for Turkey's foreign policy.

■ In foreign policy, Turkey has been able to ease tensions with most of its neighbours in the last few years. In some cases real rapprochement has been achieved, as with Syria, after Damascus broke with the PKK, Greece and Bulgaria. In each case, relations have been demotionalised and are now constructive. There are of course still problems to solve, like the disputes with Greece in the Aegean Sea, the question of Cyprus, which has reached deadlock for the time being, and relations with Armenia. In the latter case the border still remains closed but direct dialogue has begun that is more or less decoupled from historical tragedies and the Azerbaijani-Armenian dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh. Needless to say, further progress on these issues will also depend on whether negotiations with the EU start and proceed smoothly, acting as a restraining factor on Turkey's foreign and security policy.

■ Turkey's relations with Central Asia and Iran are other examples of this positive trend in Turkish foreign policy. Regarding the Central Asian republics, enthusiastic expectations have given way to a realistic assessment of Turkey's own policy capabilities and economic potential. As a result Turkey can claim a visible presence and friendly relations with all countries of the region. In the case of Iran, relations are now less tense. At the same time Turkey is able to continue good relations, including security cooperation, with Israel. Hence, the

Turkish government has not hesitated to criticise both Israeli politics and the Palestinian use of suicide attacks. For the time being Turkey is not playing a significant role in the Middle East conflict but its credibility in Israel and Islamic countries will be a valuable asset in the future.

■ In the short term, however, the biggest challenge for Turkey is undoubtedly Iraq, more precisely developments in Northern Iraq. Here, Turkish and American interests meet but do not converge on certain issues like the future of the PKK's remaining splinter groups or the degree of Kurdish autonomy. Turkey and the United States would like to see a united, democratic and secular Iraq. However, Turkey's main concerns are attempts to achieve Kurdish independence in Iraq and its possible repercussions on Turkey's own Kurdish minority. Yet a military intervention such as happened a decade ago is very unlikely due to Turkey's self-restraint and international disapproval. Ankara is nowadays more willing to heed objections from the international community. This has become possible since civilian and military hardliners no longer dominate Turkish foreign policy. The erosion of their power is a result of the general transformation of Turkish domestic and foreign policy, which was in part initiated and is pushed forward by Turkey's EU membership bid.

■ Although one should be realistic about the timeframe for its admission, one has to recognise that policy reforms in Turkey have been remarkable.■

Walter Posch

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*les plus imprévisibles, les plus rapides et les plus déterminantes pour la prospérité et la sécurité de l'Union.*

■ *La relativité et l'ambivalence de la puissance américaine : parce que le fossé ne cesse de grandir entre la vision que les Etats-Unis ont du monde et la perception que le monde a de la politique américaine, parce que leur incomparable puissance cohabite avec des éléments de faillite tout*

*aussi évidents, c'est le rôle même des Etats-Unis dans le système international qui devient un facteur d'incertitude supplémentaire.*

■ *C'est dans ce monde-là que l'Union devra vivre et prouver que sa vision stratégique et son action internationale peuvent avoir une réelle valeur ajoutée dans la pacification des crises. L'enjeu vaut bien une nouvelle Constitution.*■