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Une Constitution sans citoyens ?

Nicole Gnesotto

Directeur

L'Europe a donc un Traité constitutionnel. Les 25 chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement ont finalement accompli cette prouesse de s'entendre – même au rabais – sur ce qui les divise le plus : la répartition des pouvoirs au sein de l'ensemble européen. Mais l'Europe n'a pas d'électeurs : les taux records d'abstention aux élections européennes du 13 juin jettent donc sur cette victoire diplomatique une ombre tout aussi indéniable.

■ Ce paradoxe peut induire deux leçons différentes pour l'avenir du projet européen. Certains concluront de l'abstention électorale qu'il est sage désormais de faire une pause ; qu'après l'euro et l'élargissement, il n'existe plus suffisamment de dynamique politique pour porter un nouveau projet fondateur ; que l'insécurité du monde alliée aux pénalités sociales d'une mondialisation mal régulée conforte au contraire l'attachement des citoyens aux cadres nationaux de protection et de régulation, quelle que soit par ailleurs la réalité du pouvoir de chacun des Etats. Bref, qu'après la fatigue de l'élargissement, il existe désormais une fatigue de l'intégration, et qu'il est une limite à l'agitation européenne au-delà de laquelle les Etats feraient mieux, pour l'instant, de ne pas s'engager. Ainsi se justifie la relative modestie de la Constitution. Dans cette optique, il est plus que probable que les Etats prendront tout le temps nécessaire pour soumettre à ratification le nouveau Traité si difficilement acquis.

■ D'autres concluront au contraire que les élections censurent moins un projet qu'une méthode, c'est-à-dire une construction européenne totalement incompréhensible, trop complexe pour être efficace, trop obscure pour être aimée, trop lointaine surtout pour

susciter ce qui est après tout le fondement de toute démocratie : le sentiment tout simple que voter peut changer les choses. Pour qui a lu un tant soit peu les clauses et dispositions sur lesquelles se sont déchirés depuis deux ans ministres et chefs d'Etat, la perplexité est en effet permise : il est un seuil d'obscurantisme à partir duquel le plus démocratique des compromis diplomatiques négociés entre 25 chefs d'Etat devient aussi le plus improbable des projets politiques soumis au vote des 450 millions de citoyens européens. De même que la crise irakienne avait mis en lumière une fracture majeure entre la rue européenne et la plupart des élites politiques des 25, de même, en 2004, une immense majorité de citoyens européens ne se reconnaît pas dans les circonvolutions institutionnelles que leurs dirigeants appellent désormais le projet européen. Dans cette optique, le nouveau Traité est proche de l'illisible et même le plus tardif des processus de ratification devient une aventure à hauts risques.

■ Changer tout ou geler tout, tel est donc le message des urnes, or telles sont précisément les deux décisions que les dirigeants européens ne peuvent pas prendre. Mais ils ne peuvent non plus s'accommoder d'une telle fracture démocratique, entre l'Union et ses citoyens, à l'heure où d'autres décisions tout aussi importantes, sur d'autres élargissements, sur la Turquie, sur le budget, sont à l'ordre du jour. A défaut de changer les électeurs, il faudra donc changer de pratique européenne : fournir des résultats, expliquer, convaincre, prouver par des réalisations concrètes la pertinence et l'intérêt du projet européen, construire de la légitimité par l'action plutôt que par la disser-

The Institute and the Union

■ **European Security Strategy.** The Institute has now published Javier Solana's document 'A secure Europe in a better world - European Security Strategy', adopted by the European Council in Brussels on 12 December 2003, in six other languages of the Union - Danish, Dutch, Finnish, Greek, Portuguese and Swedish. Copies of these, as well as the English, French, German, Italian and Spanish versions previously published, can be obtained from the Institute, and are available on our website.

■ **Enlargement.** On 22 March the Director and research fellows held a working lunch with the Paris ambassadors of the ten new EU member countries.

■ **EU Open Day.** The Institute, represented by Catherine Glière, had a stand at the Open Day organised by the Council of the EU in Brussels on 1 May, the day of enlargement.

■ **'Green Book' on defence procurement law.** The Institute (Burkard Schmitt) contributed to several brainstorming sessions at the European Commission (DG Internal Market) on the content of the 'Green Book' on defence procurement law to be presented in September 2004.

Seminars

■ **'Russia: quo vadis?'** This seminar, organised at the Institute by Dov Lynch on 5 April, aimed to take a sounding, at the start of Putin's second presidency and on the eve of EU enlargement, of the range of opinion among Russian experts on the state of affairs inside Russia and of the effect of change within Russia in Europe and the world.

■ **'Options for the Greater Middle East'** was the title of a seminar held on 3 May at the Institute (Martin Ortega). Attended by officials, diplomats and academics, the aim was to analyse the current situation in the Middle East and assess the various Western initiatives taken in the region.

Seminars

continued

■ A seminar 'Facing terrorism: European perspectives and strategies' (Gustav Lindstrom and Burkard Schmitt) was held in Paris on 7 May. Attended by officials and academics, it covered an examination of the threat since 9/11 and what had been done to meet it, what Europe could do in the future and the consequences for CFSP and ESDP.

■ A conference held jointly by the Institute (Antonio Missiroli) and the Czech Institute of International Relations, in Prague on 14-15 May, entitled 'CFSP and ESDP after enlargement', was the first to be organised by the EUISS with a new EU member country.

■ The 2004 Transatlantic Conference 'The EU and the US: redefining the partnership' (Gustav Lindstrom) held at the Institute on 4 June, focused on the security agendas of the US and EU, visions for the Middle East and trends in the transatlantic partnership. It was attended by nearly a hundred representatives of government, international organisations, policy institutes and academia. The event was also reported by several news outlets, including the *International Herald Tribune*, *El Pais* and the *Financial Times*.

Institute publications

Book

European defence. A proposal for a White Paper, is a report by an Institute task force (Jean-Yves Haine) that included André Dumoulin, Jan Foghelin, Nicole Gnesotto, François Heisbourg, William Hopkinson, Marc Otte, Tomas Ries, Lothar Rühl, Stefano Silvestri, Hans-Bernhard Weissert and Rob de Wijk (May).

Occasional Papers

■ **No. 53: *Europe's next shore: the Black Sea region after EU enlargement***, by Mustafa Aydin (June).

■ **No. 52: *Rethinking the Euro-Mediterranean political and security dialogue***, by Rosa Balfour (May).

■ **No. 51: *Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of the European Union***, by Fernanda Faria (April).

■ **Rapport d'activité 2003**, a report of the Institute's activities in 2003, was published in June.

■ Extracts from *Chaillot Paper 68, One year on: lessons from Iraq*, appeared, in Italian, in *Aspenia*, no. 24, 2004.

Institute publications

continued

Forthcoming

■ ***Five years of European defence***, edited by N. Gnesotto, with contributions by M. Ahtisaari, M. Barnier, C. Bildt, E. Brok and N. Gresch, R. Cooper, J. Dempsey, L. Dini, J-L. Gergorin and J. Bétermier, P.H. Gordon, J-Y. Haine, G. Lindstrom, A. Missiroli, A. Navarro, M. Ortega, F. Riccardi, A. Rondos, B. Schmitt, R. Schuwirth, T. Sommer and L. Zecchini, and a preface by Javier Solana.

■ ***Chaillot Paper 69: Protecting the European homeland: the CBR dimension***, by Gustav Lindstrom.

■ ***Occasional Paper: The impact of EU enlargement on the armaments sector***, by Burkard Schmitt.

External publications

Nicole Gnesotto

– 'Europe et Etats-Unis. Visions du monde, visions de l'autre', *Commentaire*, no. 105, printemps 2004.

Jean-Yves Haine

– 'Idealism and Power: The EU Security Strategy', *Current History*, no. 105, March 2004.

– 'The Union Inaugural Address', in Jess Pilegaard (ed.), *The Politics of European Security* (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2004)

Dov Lynch

– 'Moldavie. Laboratoire de la nouvelle stratégie européenne', *Le Courrier des pays de l'Est*, no. 1042, March-April 2004.

– *Engaging Eurasia's Separatist States* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2004).

Antonio Missiroli

– 'Dopo Berlusconi: la presidenza italiana e l'Europa', *Italianieuropei*, 1/2004.

– (Co-rapporteur), 'PESD', dans Bruno Racine et al., *Perspectives de la coopération renforcée dans l'UE* (Paris: La Documentation française, 2004).

Burkard Schmitt

– 'A proposed armaments, research and capabilities agency', *CNES Magazine*, no. 21, January 2004, p. 28.

– 'Vers l'Agence européenne d'Armement, de Recherche et de Capacités', *Défense*, no. 109, janvier-février 2004.

On-line/http

All of the Institute's publications and reports on seminars can be accessed on the Institute's website:

www.iss-eu.org

A new impetus for ESDP

Among the clouds of abstention, apathy and doubts about the European integration project, the area of security and defence has seen indisputable progress in the last couple of years. The year 2003 witnessed a crucial agreement on EU-NATO relations, the EU's first police missions in the Balkans and first autonomous military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Most importantly, a European Security Strategy document was endorsed last December. All of this would have been unthinkable just five years ago. Yet, the capabilities aspect of ESDP is still lagging behind. The original objective set at Helsinki – up to 600,000 troops deployable within 60 days – has not been met. This postponement is damaging, since demands for security are increasing, both internally, as the Madrid bombings demonstrated, and externally, as crises deepen in Sudan or Congo. The recent flare-up in Kosovo suggests that stability in the Balkans, too, is still tentative. Moreover, with the recent enlargement, remote theatres like Moldova or the Caucasus have become Europe's direct neighbourhood.

■ **Lessons learnt so far.** Several problems plagued the Helsinki Headline Goal. First, it was merely a quantitative target designed after the Bosnian experience, and therefore ill-suited to today's new strategic imperatives. Second, it was just a catalogue of forces, only ten per cent of which were actually rapidly deployable. Third, if deficiencies were identified, there were no real incentives to remedy them. Briefly put, efforts on capabilities have to shift from the quantitative to the qualitative. Several recent developments took this necessity into account.

■ First, building on the success of Operation *Artemis* in RDC, EU defence ministers have endorsed the concept of 'battle groups'. Battle groups of 1,500 troops, including support elements, represent a more flexible force package capable of higher-intensity operations. Deployable within 15 days, they will be fully manned, equipped and trained, and have sufficient strategic lift assets. The aim is to establish 2-3 battle groups by next year, and 7-9 by 2007.

■ Second, it was decided to establish a European Defence Agency to 'support the Member States in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management'. The Agency will thus promote equipment collaborations, research and technology projects and procurement. All this should bring invaluable synergies and economies of scale to the way Europeans spend scarce resources on defence. In particular, the Agency should be able to coordinate efforts to fill the gaps identified by the European Capabilities Action Plan. In order to have a real impact, the Agency must be properly funded.

■ Third, the principle of permanent structured cooperation for defence is now recognized by the EU Constitution. The criteria governing this cooperation are stringent, at least on paper: among other things, member states must have an adequate level of defence expenditure, take concrete measures to enhance the availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability of their armed forces and commit resources to address shortfalls identified by the ECAP mechanism. The real novelty lies in the encouragement to coordinate the identification of military needs, to specialise national defence and to pool capabilities. Given the weakness

of defence budgets and the chronic under-investment in R&T, collective procurement and multinational forces are obvious solutions. If implemented, permanent structured cooperation could offer a precious framework in which to change the dynamics of European defence.

■ **More Europe, not less.** Europe has developed a comprehensive approach to security, from police missions to crisis management. Fulfilling the less demanding aspects of peacekeeping operations, like the future Bosnia mission, cannot slow down the necessary transformation of European forces. In a report published by the Institute, an independent task force of security and defence experts has recommended ways to achieve a more capable Europe.¹

■ Noting that its capacity for autonomous action is currently severely limited by deficiencies in deployability and sustainability, and following the objectives spelled out by the European Security Strategy, the task force has recommended, *inter alia*, that 50 per cent of European forces must become deployable, that EU projection capability should be enlarged with new force packaging, that a permanent force headquarters and a mobile deployable operation headquarters should be set up, and that a European fund and a European concept for force transformation should be envisaged. The overall aim is to better allocate and coordinate scarce resources. To achieve that, more Europe, not less, is needed. To act now is to be prepared for the future. The credibility of the Union as an international security actor is at stake. ■

Jean-Yves Haine

¹ *European Defence. A proposal for a White Paper*, Report of an Independent Task Force (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, May 2004).

Research awards

During the period April to June the following studied at the Institute as visiting fellows:

- Elena Dimitrova-Jileva (Bulgarian), whose research topic was Reconciling security and the free movement of people in Europe;
- Roland Sourd (French), Conflict prevention in sub-Saharan Africa;
- Marcin Zaborowski (Polish), CFSP and ESDP after enlargement.

Briefings

On 20 April the Institute hosted a discussion for a group from the Swedish organisation People and Defence.

The research team gave a briefing on assessing international crisis management to European participants in the course on Democratisation and Good Governance, funded by the Commission, at the Ecole Nationale d'Administration, on 28 April.

Support to other institutes

The Institute partially sponsored and contributed to a seminar in Dakar on 3-4 June on Euro-African crisis prevention and management organised by the Centre de Réflexion Europe-Afrique pour la Prévention des conflits et des crises internationales.

Financial support was also given to the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy's 2004 Halki International Seminar, held on 16-21 June.

The Institute contributed to the seminar organised in Madrid by INCIPE (Madrid), CIDOB (Barcelona) and IEEA (Spanish Ministry of Defence) on the European Security Strategy, on 9 June.

Region-building in the Middle East

While various summits in June have introduced several plans to promote political reform and cooperation in the 'broader' Middle East, none of them is likely to change the desperate situation of that region. Without any doubt, these plans, which clearly follow the spirit of the EU's Barcelona process initiated in 1995, are steps in the right direction. However, they are not enough. They amount to giving aspirin and applying small plasters to someone who has suffered from a heart attack. The Middle East's afflictions are so complex and serious that they need another kind of treatment.

In spring 2003 President George W. Bush applied shock therapy to Iraq, but this therapy did not work as expected. The current political transition, endorsed by UNSC Resolution 1546, has certainly raised new hopes. Yet, the fact of the matter is that the bad security situation in the country might still make the completion of that transition very difficult. The wishful prospect of Iraq's new democracy expanding across the region has not worked either; for instance, the war in Iraq has led to neither more democracy nor more stability in Saudi Arabia, and terrorism is growing.

President Bush's shock therapy for the region has not worked because it is grounded on old Hobbesian methods. The assumption that forceful regime change would have prompted a friendly regime in Baghdad, which would have accepted an American military presence in Iraq, ignored basic twentieth century principles such as self-determination and democracy. The use of armed force – necessary as it is on some occasions –

cannot be utilised today to impose a regional order while disregarding international legitimacy.

The Middle East needs a wholly different approach, inspired in the Kantian tradition of international relations. The circle of violence there must be stopped and replaced by a region-building process that ushers in a more positive atmosphere. Many deem this idea a senseless dream, which is understandable because old realist thinking cannot explain such schemes – and neither can it explain the European Union or the role of human rights in international relations. What is less understandable, though, is that many of those Hobbesian experts accepted the senseless idea of a democratic domino effect in the Middle East in the wake of a military intervention in Iraq.

Region-building is perhaps the most powerful, yet the most underestimated, feature of international politics in the last half century. This long-term therapy is the only possible solution to the Middle East's numerous problems; however, its implementation raises many thorny issues.

■ First, none of the previous experiments in region-building can be imported as such to the Middle East. However, we can draw lessons that are applicable to the region from all of them: the Marshall Plan, European economic integration, CSCE-OSCE, the 1991 Madrid Conference, NATO's Partnership for Peace, the Barcelona process and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe.

■ Second, region-building in the Middle East is such a huge undertaking that neither the United States nor the European Union can attempt it on its own. It goes

without saying that local actors alone are unable to halt perverse historical dynamics. Therefore, the appropriate synergy between the three interlocutors must be found. The current vicious circle of violence must be transformed into a virtuous triangle.

■ Third, the profound transatlantic understanding needed to design an ambitious plan for the region is not conceivable in the current political circumstances. Following the November US presidential elections, irrespective of the result, a window of opportunity to discuss Middle East issues in depth will open.

■ Fourth, isolated treatment of specific conflicts and situations in the Middle East (Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iraq's reconstruction, Iran's nuclear ambitions, political transitions, etc.) is no longer possible. We need to tackle all problems simultaneously in order to reach consequential agreements through strategic horse-trading. An international conference is perhaps the best way to start.

■ Finally, region-building in the Middle East will be a long-term process that must be based on a new balance of interests. An historic agreement that takes into account territorial, political, energy, economic and nuclear issues must be reached.

In the coming months the options will be clear: either we continue to attempt to manage periodical crises, which weaken both Europe and the United States, or we launch an ambitious regional plan that promotes peace in the region and reinforces both transatlantic allies' positions. ■

Martin Ortega

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tation institutionnelle. Y compris dans la sphère de l'action internationale : c'est sur ce thème de la sécurité et du rôle politique global de l'Union que les attentes des citoyens européens sont en effet – dans tous les sondages d'opinion – les plus constantes et les plus marquées. Or le monde a rarement été aussi chaotique et aussi dangereux, les nations aussi insuffisantes, l'Amérique aussi impuis-

sante et empêtrée, l'extrémisme aussi florissant – y compris au contact même de l'Union comme l'ont montré aussi les élections en Serbie. Si, dans ce monde-là, l'Union échoue également à prouver concrètement sa valeur ajoutée, alors le meilleur aura définitivement été derrière nous. ■