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editorial

## Rebound

Nicole Gnesotto

Director

**D**ecidedly, the Union is surprising. After a gloomy spring of crises and serious divisions among member states, two major advances have brightened the European horizon: the Convention on the Future of Europe, under the chairmanship of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, has successfully met the historical challenge of producing a first draft Constitutional Treaty for a Union of 25; and the European Council of Salonika has, among other achievements, welcomed the main points of the Union's security strategy proposed by Javier Solana. These two events are obviously not comparable in scale, but their coincidence reflects the extraordinary vigour driving the European enterprise forward despite all opposition. On the one hand is an ebullient civil society that wants to adapt the Union's institutions to the new circumstances of a Europe at 25; on the other, a council of heads of state anxious to adapt the Union's foreign policy to the new strategic conditions in the world. Together, these two movements are laying down the institutional and political foundations essential to defining and implementing, at 25, a shared vision of the world and the Union's role in it.

■ Granted, putting this into practice will be a lengthy business. But it is quite possible not to blissfully think that the CFSP now has a glorious future and yet take some satisfaction in the positive aspects. And for two reasons: firstly, despite the Eurosceptics' views, conservatism is neither a European reflex nor Europe's future path: the reforms proposed by the Convention offer the possibility of extracting the Union from the political status quo that has obsessed it for decades. There will doubtless be resistance from some governments at the Intergovernmental Conference, but all issues,

from the most taboo to the most commonplace, have been reopened by the 'Conventionals', including assertive unanimity on foreign and security policy.

■ The second reason is that political divisions between member states over relations with the United States do not necessarily represent the decisive factor in the Union's security policy. There are admittedly deep divisions over America, but their impact needs to be put into perspective, as three examples show. First is the progress made on European defence, including at the height of the Iraq crisis, in particular the launch of Operation Concordia in Macedonia and subsequently Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the convergence of British and French views on ESDP at both the Le Touquet summit and in the Convention, and the consensus among the 15 member states on solidarity in the event of a terrorist attack on one of them. Second is the realignment that took place during debates in the Convention, when the weakness of the two clans divided over America during the Iraq crisis became evident. Most of the 10 future members followed a more or less communautaire line, unlike Britain and Spain who stuck to their very intergovernmental vision of the Union, nearer in that respect to France than to Poland, and the five so-called 'large' members, torn apart by Iraq, found themselves on the same side again facing the so-called 'small' states in defence of the idea of a stable European Council presidency. The third, and certainly the most important example, is the surge of consensus on tackling the new international strategic situation.

■ With an Action Plan to fight against the proliferation of

# Institute Activities

## Transatlantic conference

■ A conference on ‘The EU and the US: Partners in Stability?’, organised by the Institute (Gustav Lindström), was held in Paris on 22-23 April. Attended by officials and academics from both sides of the Atlantic, its main objective was to analyse the state of the transatlantic link following the Iraq war. In addition to the lessons learned from that episode, participants considered the challenges and their possible impact on the partnership. An implicit US message from the conference was the need for a more ‘businesslike’ transatlantic relationship. On the European side, participants noted that a common EU vision would strengthen the relationship.

## Annual conference

■ The Institute’s second Annual Conference, the occasion for Javier Solana to present the EU’s new security concept and speak on ‘CFSP: the state of the Union’, was scheduled to take place in Paris on 30 June.

## Task forces

■ A meeting of the Institute’s European Defence Book Task Force (Jean-Yves Haine) was held on 19 May.

■ The Institute’s Task Force on the Caucasus (Dov Lynch) met on 16 May to discuss ‘Security and Insecurity in the South Caucasus’.

■ A workshop on the ‘ESA Study on Space and Security Policy in Europe’, in collaboration with the Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, was held on 13 May in Paris (Burkard Schmitt).

## Briefings

■ Research fellows briefed Parisian and American university students on 27 and 28 May, and 3 June in Paris.

## Seminars

■ A conference on ‘The enlarged EU and its new neighbours: new security challenges’ (Antonio Missiroli et al.) took place on 5 and 6 June. It dwelt upon the impact of the forthcoming enlargement on the external and proximity policies of the Union and addressed, in particular, the specific challenges of the new neighbourhoods – East, South-East and South of the enlarged EU.

■ A seminar entitled ‘Towards a European Non-proliferation Strategy’ (Gustav Lindström and Burkard Schmitt), at which missile technology, nuclear, biological and chemical proliferation were assessed, was held in Paris on 23 May.

■ *Chaillot Papers* based on both seminars will be published in the autumn.

## Institute publications

### Chaillot Papers

■ *No. 61: EU cooperative threat reduction activities in Russia*, by Kathrin Höhl, Harald Müller and Annette Schaper; edited by Burkard Schmitt (June).

■ *No. 60: Russia faces Europe*, by Dov Lynch (May).

■ *No. 59: European armaments cooperation: core documents*, compiled by Burkard Schmitt (April).

### Occasional Papers

■ *No. 45: Euros for ESDP: financing EU operations*, by Antonio Missiroli (June).

■ *No. 44: The Galileo satellite system and its security implications*, by Gustav Lindström with Giovanni Gasparini (April).

### Forthcoming

■ *Chaillot Paper: The EU and the crisis in the Middle East*, by Muriel Asseburg, Dominique Moïsi, Gerd Nonneman and Stefano Silvestri; edited by Martin Ortega.

■ *Chaillot Paper* on armaments cooperation, by Burkard Schmitt.

■ *Occasional Paper: EU-Russian security dimensions*, by Hiski Haukkala, Thomas Gomart and Anaïs Marin, edited by Dov Lynch.

### Reprints

■ Reprinted copies of *Chaillot Papers* 47 and 51 (European defence: core documents Vols. I and II) are still available.

## External publications

### Judy Batt

– Stephen White, Judy Batt and Paul G. Lewis (eds.), *Developments in Central and East European Politics 3* (London: Palgrave, 2003).

### Antonio Missiroli

– ‘La PESC fra Comunita’, politiche nazionali e Alleanza Atlantica’, in Sonia Lucarelli (ed.), *La Polis europea. L’Unione oltre l’euro* (Trieste: Asterios, 2003), pp. 273-98.

– ‘Piu’ euro per la sicurezza europea’, *Il Mulino*, 3, 2003, pp. 531-6.

– (with Burkard Schmitt), ‘Mehr Euro für die europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (ESVP): Was für eine Konvergenz, was für Kriterien?’ in Karl von Wogau (ed.), *Auf dem Weg zur Europäischen Verteidigung - Gemeinsam sind wir sicher* (Freiburg: Herder, 2003), pp.394-408.

– ‘On Old and New Similarities: Italy and the Berlin Republic’, in Dieter Dettke (ed.), *The Spirit of the Berlin Republic* (New York/Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003), pp.194-203.

– ‘PESC/PESD: coerenza, flessibilità, efficacia’, in Rosa Balfour and Ettore Greco (eds.), *Il ruolo internazionale dell’Unione Europea* (Rome: CeMISS, 2003).

## Research awards

### Visiting fellows

During the period April to June the following studied at the Institute as visiting fellows:

-Sibylle Bauer (German), whose research topic was ‘The Europeanisation of the naval shipbuilding industry’;

-Taras Kuzio (British), ‘The influence of domestic factors in Ukrainian foreign policy’;

-Teodora Mosoiu (Romanian), ‘EU policy in the Balkans’;

-Erzsebet Rozsa (Hungarian), ‘The enlargement of the EU, and the Middle East’;

-Olivia Rutazibwa (Belgian), ‘The EU in Africa: rethinking human rights and EU’s foreign policy’;

-Bjorn Müller Wille (German/Swedish), ‘Shaping an EU intelligence policy’.

## Institute staff

■ Judy Batt (British), formerly Jean Monnet Chair in the European Integration of South East Europe and Senior Lecturer in Central and East European Politics, CREES, University of Birmingham, joined the Institute as a research fellow in May.

## Half full

If measured against the questions raised in the Laeken Declaration of December 2001, the answers offered by the Convention on the Future of Europe cannot be considered satisfactory. However, Laeken is not the only benchmark for assessing the Convention's achievements. In fact, the new body was set up also in order to give some extra momentum to the continuing reform process of EU institutions by (a) involving the European citizens more directly and (b) countering, or just softening, the mutually paralysing effects of intergovernmental conference (IGC) negotiations, as shown in Amsterdam and Nice.

It now seems fair to say that the Convention has not been greatly successful in its opening up to civil society: interest in its debates and proceedings has been highest among a limited group of activists and experts, but quite modest on the European street. Conversely, the Convention has been reasonably successful in its reforming effort. It could probably have gone further if it had decided to be less consensual internally. By doing so, however, it would have weakened the legitimacy of its end result, thus opening the door to substantial revisions by the ensuing IGC. To a certain extent, the Praesidium has managed – especially since some acting EU foreign ministers joined the ranks of the ‘Conventionals’ – to merge or blur the two formats, thus transforming the Convention into a sort of pre-IGC and occasionally playing the one off against the other. As a result, the outcome is not entirely satisfactory for anyone (which may not be a bad thing after all) but can hardly be called into question now – bar a few marginal adjustments – by the very ministers who have just subscribed to it.

The area in which all this is most evident is notably the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). First, lack-

ing consensus on a more ambitious reform, the future creation of a double-hatted EU ‘Minister for Foreign Affairs’ bodes well for the necessary coherence of the Union's external action: while the institutional set-up is bound to remain fuzzy, intra-EU turf battles and bureaucratic bottlenecks are expected to be reduced to the physiological level, while visibility, speed and effectiveness are likely to increase. Furthermore, this is one reform that could be foregone already next year by appointing one and the same person as both High Representative and Commissioner for External Relations: while he would not yet be endowed with all the powers enshrined in the new Constitutional Treaty, it will once again be difficult for the other actors to oppose his strengthening having accepted it in the Convention. Similarly, the broader definition of the old ‘Petersberg tasks’ (Art. III-205) and the inclusion of an explicit solidarity clause (Art. III-226) are bound to widen the scope of common policies in this and other fields.

By contrast, the convoluted Art. III-196 on decision-making – as released right before Thessaloniki – displays all the roadblocks that still slow down or impair CFSP. One can count up to four different modalities for taking ‘European decisions’, none of which is entirely clear but for the primacy of the unanimity rule (that includes qualified abstention), from which only few predetermined derogations are envisaged (and further limited, in turn, by the possible claim of ‘vital and stated reasons of national policy’). True, CFSP is not primarily about legislation, for which majority voting is indispensable. In its domain, consensus increases legitimacy, and action cannot be imposed on reluctant member states. The Conventionals, however, could have gone further in limiting the crude veto right of individual

member states, especially in an enlarged EU, for instance by making ‘super’-qualified majority voting as now defined in Art. I-24 – at least 2/3 of member states + 3/5 (4/5 in an earlier version) of the overall population – the general rule ‘unless the Council decides otherwise’ and/or specifying eventual derogations. This would de facto preserve the right of member states to block certain decisions but also force them to build minimal alliances to do so. It is worth noting that, even for ‘matters having military or defence implications’, the reaffirmed unanimity rule is then dispensed with in Art. III-207 (the armament agency) and, potentially, also in Art. III-208 (‘structured’ cooperation based on ‘high’ military capabilities).

Finally, taken together, Arts. III-206/209 and III-226 entail at least five potentially different formats and scenarios for flexibility, that is, for policy arrangements including only some, not necessarily all member states. On the one hand, this creates confusion. On the other, it keeps the door open to various, competing and even opposite developments. Paradoxically, therefore, those articles meet the key requirement of a Constitutional Treaty worthy of the name, namely the provision of ‘enabling’ rather than restrictive clauses. And this may well turn out to be the main achievement of the Convention in the CFSP domain. ■

*Antonio Missiroli*

**On-line/http**

All of the Institute's publications and reports on seminars can be accessed on the Institute's website:

[www.iss-eu.org](http://www.iss-eu.org)

# European strategy – first steps

For the first time in its history the European Union has set about drawing up a common strategic concept. This is a major event. From necessity during the Cold War and then from a lack of consensus, the Union left strategic thinking to the United States and member states. That has changed for two reasons: divided, Europe is powerless, and an enlarged Europe cannot afford to shirk its responsibilities.

The lessons of the Iraq crisis have been taken to heart. Just as the conflicts in former Yugoslavia were followed by the St-Malo and Helsinki accords, so the Iraq crisis has produced a common awareness among Europe's leaders of the need for strategic thinking on international security issues. Throughout the latter episode, the Union's attitude was essentially reactive: if it had set out its own definition of 'material breach' of Resolution 1441, specified the conditions under which force might be used and laid down a precise timetable for action, it would have been able to foresee events, strengthen its position in Washington and appear credible. Lacking a common strategy, it played no part as it was divided over these questions.

Alongside this admission of powerlessness there is a reality that must be recognised: a Europe of 450 million people cannot turn its back on the world around it. Unlike the young American republic, which could, sheltered by the surrounding oceans, adopt a policy of benevolent neutrality, Europe has no such geographical advantage. The natural crossroads of many civilisations, the enlarged Europe will extend to the borders of the Russian and Arab-Muslim worlds. This enlargement will bring closer its members but also their surrounding problems: the Mediterranean, Middle East, Caucasus and Russia, from now on the Union's

immediate neighbours, will call for sustained attention and constant activity. The opening premise of the document drawn up by Javier Solana, *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, is recognition that '... the European Union is, like it or not, a global actor; it should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security'.

Assuming its global responsibilities is the ambitious aim of a European strategic concept whose broad lines are sketched out in this document. The difficulties involved in its production were considerable: reaching an agreement sufficiently broad to include widely varying strategic traditions but precise enough to become a motor of international action; maintaining credibility in the eyes of the major international actors, above all the United States; and addressing the new threats without renouncing the Union's particular *acquis* and identity. In that respect the document is undoubtedly a success.

This outline common strategy is based on three pillars: extending the security zone around Europe by developing the instruments for stabilisation that were used in the Balkans to the benefit of Eastern neighbours such as Ukraine and Moldova, but also in the Mediterranean, which involves resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; establishing effective multilateralism on the basis of the UN, the fundamental framework of international relations, while reaffirming the need to become involved in a preventive way and act when the rules are infringed; finally, responding to the global threats of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and organised crime by recognising that the traditional form of defence is a thing of the past following the fall of the Berlin Wall, and that the first line of defence now lies abroad.

Effective multilateralism and pre-emptive engagement are by nature elusive concepts, but several realities are recognised by the Union. First, Europe is at peace, not at war. Next, if the European analysis of the threats of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is similar to that of Washington, the ways Europe addresses them are different. In its view, the fight against these threats cannot be limited to military force alone: while not excluding it, the Union intends to take a broader approach, combining the political and the economic. Regarding terrorism, there will be no effective solution that is not global. While the Union recognises that bad governance is a major source of instability, it advocates the extension of good governance rather than regime change. The message for Washington is therefore nuanced: from a similar analysis of the threats associated with terrorism stems a more diversified strategy, one that better reflects the European identity. Based on the principles of international law, this approach also implies an obligation to punish offenders. Lastly, this duty implies greater responsibility for Europe, based on more active, consistent and capable involvement. It calls for diplomatic cohesion and synergy in the field of strategic and military intelligence, and it presupposes that an effort to improve European capabilities will continue.

Those with a fondness for simplistic comparisons will stress the new balance between Mars and Venus, the mix of Hobbes and Kant, the marriage of 'soft' and 'hard' power. Yet these comparisons will be misleading, because the Union is not a nation-state. That is what gives this strategic concept its special characteristic and its great merit. Its significance will be measured by its ability to deal with upheavals in the world. ■

Jean-Yves Haine

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*weapons of mass destruction and a draft strategic concept, the Union is gradually acquiring its specific strategic identity, something unthinkable scarcely a year ago. There is no doubt that this evolution is a direct result of the crisis over Iraq: by getting to grips with these two questions, the Europeans have sought not only to reconcile their differences but also to make good the damage done to the transatlantic relationship. Given just how deep the divisions over America's decision to use force in Iraq were, the outcome was far from certain. And yet the divisions have not reappeared. Not only have the 15 arrived at a common position on WMD proliferation,*

*a common strategy to meet this challenge and a common analysis of how risks and threats to security might evolve: in so doing they have also confirmed the Union's specificity on strategic issues and reaffirmed the basic principles of their international action, their attachment to effective multilateralism and their vision of an international order governed by rules negotiated collectively, including when resort to force is necessary. Which is proof that this assertion of the Union's new 'strategic personality' may also be a useful preliminary to the development of transatlantic harmony. ■*