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editorial

Rebuilding

Nicole Gnesotto

Director

Could it be that Europeans, like Americans, believe that from now on 'the mission determines the coalition, and not the other way round'? That was the new American strategic dogma established as transatlantic doctrine by Donald Rumsfeld after the 11 September attacks. It is also the key to understanding the current breakdown in European solidarity: the operation in Iraq has shattered the collective Euro-American alliance and led to the emergence of two coalitions, the one for and the other against American strategy. To put it another way, because of Iraq the Europeans, possibly more rapidly than America's leaders had wished, have suddenly left the Cold War system.

■ Three elements lay behind the Atlantic solidarity that existed in Europe up until last month: a threat that was so collective and undeniable that it unified; an almost automatic reflex of alignment with American policy; and a project for European integration founded on Franco-German reconciliation that developed under the umbrella of NATO's military monopoly. Having already been shaken during the 1990s, these three pillars have now disappeared: the urgency and priority of threats have become the subject of disagreement; the idea of rejecting American strategy is no longer taboo; and the Union, following the consummate success of Copenhagen on the reconciliation of the peoples of Europe, has now run out of political projects. Hence the upsetting of traditional reflexes: the most Atlanticist countries, like Germany and Turkey, are openly dissociating themselves from Washington; the most European, for instance Italy and Spain, are aligning themselves with America regardless of their European instincts; the European public are taking to the streets to demonstrate against the American strategy of war on Iraq; both Britain and France are becoming illustrative of this sudden transition from a reassuring but bygone Atlantic system to a new Euro-American order that is worrying because it has to be rebuilt from scratch.

■ Because rebuilding has to happen, and quickly. And with all the more seriousness and imagination since Euro-American and Euro-European solidarity are no longer instinctive and automatic when crises and threats are perceived differently on either side. There will surely be other crises after Iraq, as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will be our common lot in future. There will not necessarily be a repetition of the divisions caused by Iraq in every future crisis, but while Iraq is not a precedent, neither can it be considered an exception proving the rule of European political solidarity. If there is one certainty about the Iraq affair, it is that Europeans are deeply divided over how the world is to be managed in future.

■ For the Union, there are still a few possible ways forward. First, political priorities have to be re-established. European defence has of course been one of the major *acquis* of the last four years, but the finest armed forces in the world serve little purpose if there is no common view on the crises in which they are to be used. In other words, what the EU has to look at seriously is foreign policy more than military arrangements or capabilities. Next is a readiness to look at the world as it is: one lesson of the Iraq crisis is the urgent need to find a common mechanism for sharing information and analyses on threats that could affect the interests and security of Europe as a whole. Common analysis of the risks is of course no guarantee that there will be consensus on the policies to be adopted, but it is a prior condition for the adoption of any individual or collective position taken by states. The third urgent requirement is to set priorities: the Balkans, Iran, North Korea – and above all the fight against proliferation in general – will clearly be other crucial tests of European political cohesion. It would be as well to get to grips with these issues now, if only to identify

Institute Activities

Seminars

■ The Institute is closely following the Iraqi crisis and its implications for both the transatlantic relationship and the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. A number of reports and *Occasional Papers* have been produced (see our webpage 'Headline: the Iraqi crisis') and meetings held. 'CFSP confronting Iraq' (Antonio Missiroli and Martin Ortega) was the title of a seminar held on 3 March, at which senior analysts and officials discussed the reasons why Iraq is a divisive issue and looked at the implications of the crisis for the EU's foreign, security and defence policies, and for transatlantic relations.

Task forces

■ Meetings of the Institute's **European Defence Book Task Force** (Jean-Yves Haine), were held on 28 January and 31 March.

■ The Institute's **Task Force on South-Eastern Europe** (Dimitrios Triantaphyllou) met on 7 March to discuss 'The transition from a reduced US commitment'.

■ A European Space Agency study on 'Space and Security Policy in Europe' was discussed at a workshop (Burkard Schmitt), in collaboration with the Istituto Affari Internazionali, 7 February.

On-line/http

All of the Institute's publications and reports on seminars can be accessed on the Institute's website:

www.iss-eu.org

Institute publications

Chaillot Papers

■ **No. 58: Terrorism, proliferation: a European threat assessment**, by Harald Müller (March).

■ **No. 57: From Laeken to Copenhagen. European defence: core documents, Vol. III**, compiled by Jean-Yves Haine (February).

Occasional Papers

■ **No. 43: La question du Cachemire. Après le 11 septembre et la nouvelle donne au Jammu et Cachemire**, by Christophe Jaffrelot and Jasmine Zérinini-Brotel (March).

■ **No. 42: L'Union en action: la mission de police en Bosnie**, by Agnieszka Nowak, a former visiting fellow (January).

■ **No. 41: La Bulgarie et la Roumanie dans le Pacte de stabilité**, by Ralitzia Dimtcheva, a former visiting fellow (January).

Forthcoming

■ **Chaillot Paper: European armaments cooperation: core documents**, compiled by Burkard Schmitt.

■ **Chaillot Paper: The European Union and CTR. EU cooperative threat reduction activities in Russia**, by Kathrin Höhl, Harald Müller and Annette Schaper; edited by Burkard Schmitt.

■ **Chaillot Paper: Russia faces Europe**, by Dov Lynch.

■ **Occasional Paper: The Galileo satellite system and its security implications**, by Gustav Lindström with Giovanni Gasparini, a former visiting fellow.

Reprints

■ Reprinted copies of *Chaillot Papers 47 and 51 (European defence: core documents Vols. I and II)* are available on request.

Briefings

■ Research fellows briefed American and Parisian university students on 21 and 24 February respectively, in Paris.

Institute staff

■ **Judy Batt** (British), currently Jean Monnet Chair in the European Integration of South-East Europe and Senior Lecturer in Central and East European Politics, CREES, University of Birmingham, is to join the Institute as a research fellow in May.

External publications

Nicole Gnesotto

— 'New World, New ESDP: A Comment on Deighton', in J. H. H. Weiler, Iain Begg and John Peterson (eds.), *Integrating in an expanding European Union: Reassessing the Fundamentals* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003).

Dov Lynch

— 'Post-Imperial Peacekeeping: Russia in the CIS', Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, *IFS Info*, April 2003.

Antonio Missiroli

— 'L'Unione fa la Forza: l'evoluzione della Pesd', in Giuseppe Vacca (ed.), *L'unità dell'Europa - rapporto 2003 sull'integrazione europea* (Bologna: Edizioni Dedalo, March 2003).

— 'Ploughshares into swords? Euros for European Defence', in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. VIII, no. 1, pp. 5-33.

— 'EU enlargement and CFSP/ESDP', in *European Integration*, vol. XXV, no. 1, pp. 1-16.

— 'Giochi di guerra? Calcio, Europa, integrazione', in *Italianieuropei*, 1/2003.

— 'Enlargement(s) and European Security', in *Security Dialogue*, vol. 33, no. 4, December 2002.

Martin Ortega

— 'Uma posição comum da União', *O Mundo em Português*, February 2003.

Burkard Schmitt

— 'European Union' (ed.), in *Protecting against the Spread of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons* (Washington, DC: CSIS, January 2003).

Dimitrios Triantaphyllou

— 'Prospects for South Eastern European Security', in Theodor Winkler, Predrag Simic et al. (eds.), *European Integration and The Balkans* (Belgrade: CSES and DCAF, 2002).

Research awards

Senior visiting fellows

-Paul Luif, a senior member of staff at the Austria voting habits in UN bodies that will form the basis

Visiting fellows

During the period January to March the following studies

-Rosa Balfour (Italian), whose research topic was

-Rafael Bueno (Spanish), 'North Korea's danger

-Thomas Gomart (French), 'The dilemmas of EU

Associate research fellow

The Institute has started a programme whose aim with the Institute until the end of this year, is Kl

The United Nations must be given a chance

The days between 24 February (when Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States submitted to the UNSC a draft resolution to authorise a collective war on Iraq) and 20 March (when the United Kingdom and the United States launched a military intervention in Iraq, with logistical and political support from some other states) will be remembered as a crucial moment in history. Indeed, the very existence of the Security Council, the only body entitled to maintain peace and stability globally, was put at stake. Had events unfolded in a different manner, perhaps today the days of this body would be numbered. And yet, is that not the case today?

For the United States, the war was chiefly justified in self-defence against possible future attacks. Many Europeans who support the war tend to minimise this aspect; however, for the Americans it is the capital argument. US Congress joint resolution of 10 October 2002 (adopted, therefore, one month before Resolution 1441) authorised President Bush to use force against Iraq, first to 'defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq', and second to ensure the respect of UNSC resolutions. Nevertheless, the UN Charter clearly indicates that self-defence may not be based on speculation. Indeed, although possible terrorist attacks against the United States (or other countries) with WMD are a matter of serious concern, they might have diverse origins, apart from Iraq.

On 17 March, President Bush said: 'Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict.' During the forty-eight hours ultimatum given by President Bush, a UNSC meeting showed that

the chief UN weapons inspector, as well as a majority of the Security Council members, favoured giving more time to inspections in order to verify Iraq's disarmament. Plausibly, Iraqi WMD could have been checked and destroyed (as *Al-Samoud* missiles were when the war started) in some months' time. However, the United States chose to wage a war because it was pursuing other goals in addition to Iraqi disarmament. A whole range of other motives have been offered by the US administration: not only self-defence but also regime change, 'unfinished business', democratisation, repression of an 'axis of evil', etc.

From 24 February to 20 March, China, France, Germany, Russia and Syria stated publicly that they did not support the draft resolution aimed at transforming the inspections regime into an authorisation to employ force. Two days after the outbreak of hostilities, Chile and Mexico, two other Security Council members, declared that they believed that inspections should have continued. Therefore, it seems obvious that the draft resolution was not put to a vote owing to a lack of the necessary nine affirmative votes. Reliable reports and some public declarations from the proponents of the draft resolution suggest that, had the draft rallied those nine votes, it would have been put to a vote, even if one or several vetoes would most probably have prevented its adoption. At that moment, the vetoes would have perhaps been dismissed as 'unreasonable' by the proponents of the draft resolution, and the UN Charter would have been declared obsolete.

The Security Council will have another opportunity to fulfil its role once hostilities are over. It could then discuss an

agreed framework to coordinate the reconstruction of Iraq. Those discussions would be a good opportunity to mend fences between allies. However, the organisation of postwar Iraq might also prove a divisive issue if the previous positions were maintained.

At the end of March, when this article was written, there were two different visions of the Security Council's role in postwar Iraq. Although there seemed to be general agreement that the military administration should be undertaken by American and British forces, there were opposing views as far as the political and economic dimensions were concerned. The United States appeared to maintain that, taking into account that it had taken the initiative and borne most of the war effort, it should also take the lead in Iraq's 'democratisation process' and economic reconstruction. For their part, most of the European allies favoured a multilateral approach to the postwar phase. This would notably include a decision by the Security Council to ensure collective action to support the establishment of a democratic government in Iraq.

It is evident that the involvement of the Security Council in Iraq's reconstruction would have clear advantages. It would allow the international community's participation in the postwar process. It would offer a good opportunity to discuss the situation in the Middle East as a whole. Finally, the expertise of the United Nations and some other institutions and individual states in state-building would be utilised. Despite these and other advantages, one cannot know in advance whether postwar Iraq will be organised in a multilateral way or not. ■

Martin Ortega

ian Institute for International Affairs, worked at the Institute during February and March on 'The EU in the UN', a study of member states' past sis of a *Chaillot Paper*.

ed at the Institute as visiting fellows:

is 'The political and security dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership';

'ous game: options for the EU';

iro-Russian cooperation'.

m is to form a network of external experts on areas not covered by its own researchers. The first 'associate research fellow', who will collaborate aus Becher, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. His area of expertise is security aspects of space.

Will North Korea follow Iraq?

In its *National Security Strategy* (NSS) published in September 2002, the Bush administration maintains that the United States reserves the right to act pre-emptively to 'stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends'. With Iraq currently in the limelight, this begs the question whether or not North Korea will follow next.

From a literal interpretation of the Bush doctrine, North Korea clearly fits the bill for a pre-emptive strike. Pyongyang has recently reactivated its nuclear programme, expelled UN nuclear inspectors and withdrawn from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It may only be a question of time before it starts its reprocessor near the Yongbyon nuclear reactor, opening the door for the extraction of weapons-grade plutonium from the reactor's spent fuel rods. Some analysts and intelligence communities claim that North Korea already has at least one nuclear device.

In the last few weeks, North Korea has stepped up its actions, conducting several missile launch tests, and intercepted a US Air Force reconnaissance plane in international airspace. The aim of these provocations is to force the United States to the negotiating table for bilateral talks.

But, with the exception of the deployment of bombers to the region, the US response has been limited. Downplaying the crisis, the United States is looking for a multilateral solution that involves the UN and North Korea's neighbours in the region. Above all, it does not want to 'reward' North Korean behaviour and agree to direct talks that would most likely centre on aid

packages and a non-aggression treaty in return for a renewed moratorium on its nuclear programme. Such a move could open the door to future blackmail.

The multilateral dimension of the US approach reached its high point when it actively strove to push the matter to the Security Council in late January 2002. Given the recent decision not to pursue a second resolution through the UN Security Council in the case of Iraq, it remains to be seen if this option remains on track — especially given Chinese and Russian reticence regarding this particular route.

While puzzling, the stark contrast between US strategies towards Iraq and North Korea can be traced to five principal factors. First, Saddam Hussein has shown that he is willing to use his weapons of mass destruction — even on his own people. Also, unlike North Korea, Iraq has attacked its neighbours. Thus, Iraq is regarded as the more troublesome of the two.

Second, an attack on North Korea would probably mean a war on the Korean peninsula. With over 8,000 artillery pieces and almost one million North Korean troops along the demilitarised zone, South Korea represents an easy target. Likewise, these weapons would pose great risk to the 37,000 American soldiers stationed along the DMZ as well as to key regional allies such as Japan (with about 40,000 US troops). The unpredictable nature of Kim Jong Il and potential reactions by regional players (particularly China) reinforce such preoccupations.

Third, there is a feeling among US decision-makers that North Korea can be nudged to take certain steps in the 'right' direction through non-military means. For example,

it is believed that economic pressure could be used as leverage to encourage Kim Jong Il to freeze the country's nuclear programme before any negotiations can take place.

Fourth, with a US-led war under way in Iraq, unilateral options are limited. From a military perspective, the US doctrinal requirement of being able to conduct two major operations simultaneously is hampered by limited air- and sealift capabilities. There are simply not enough capabilities to pursue more than one major deployment at a time.

Finally, the United States is working under the assumption that North Korea may already have at least one nuclear device. It is therefore handled with care (but this sends a strong signal to other would-be proliferators: once you attain nuclear weapons you are 'safe').

For these reasons, it is likely that North Korea will be approached multilaterally for the time being.

But the options available to the Security Council are not clear. An initial option might be to present a resolution calling for North Korea to return to the NPT, refreeze the Yongbyon reactor, and dismantle its uranium enrichment programme. Should this prove ineffective, officials have the option of imposing sanctions. This will be a critical stage, since Russia and China have voiced objections to UN sanctions. They argue such a move would be confrontational. North Korea itself has stated that it would be treated as an act of war. Before reaching that stage, it will be vital that allies agree on how the international community can force a country to comply. ■

Gustav Lindström

editorial ... continued from front page

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possible divergences from US policy and therefore risks of fresh European divisions, since a fourth condition is essential: discussion, among Europeans, of America. Not to condemn or, on the contrary, to adopt a priori US positions, but because it would be quite surrealist for the Europeans, who are so ready to talk about anything and everything, to refrain from looking together at the essential question — the profound changes that have taken place in the most powerful country in the world.

■ *These various steps carry absolutely no guarantee that a European foreign policy will emerge, but at least they offer the possibility that certain issues will be resolved. At this time of acute crisis, institutional arrangements are scarcely likely to produce solutions.*

There is certainly no doubt that a Union of 25 will have to be based on the principle of differentiation; but the way differences are accommodated must remain an open question. Neither reactive alliances that exclude this or that country, nor selective clubs of democracies, in either the Union or NATO, can today bring about reconciliation. For the moment it would be better to consider the virtues of pragmatism, deciding priorities, working seriously and progressing together where possible. Especially where bases for Franco-British cooperation, essential in the light of future challenges, can still be found. There is of course no reason not to think that the Rubicon of a definitive division of Europe will soon be crossed, but neither is there any proof that the moment has arrived. ■