

## CSDP newsletter

POLITIQUE DE SÉCURITÉ ET DE DÉFENSE COMMUNE DE L'UE



EUTM, EUNAVFOR-Atalanta : illustrations de l'engagement de l'UE pour la Somalie

EU Security and Defence and the Lisbon Treaty, new ground for CSDP

Contributing to the response to the Haiti earthquake





# Coup d'œil sur la Politique de sécurité et de défense commune de l'UE

**La Politique de sécurité et de défense commune (PSDC) constitue le volet opérationnel civil et militaire de la Politique étrangère et de sécurité commune (PESC) de l'Union européenne.**

L'Union européenne mène des opérations au titre de sa Politique de sécurité et de défense depuis 2003. Sept ans plus tard, vingt-quatre opérations ont eu lieu ou sont en cours avec un effectif total de près de 20.000 personnes. Il s'agit d'opérations militaires et de missions civiles (maintien de la paix, renforcement de l'Etat de droit, lutte contre la piraterie, aide au désarmement, aide à la réforme de la police et de la justice, réforme du secteur de la sécurité, surveillance des frontières...). Du Tchad aux territoires Palestiniens, de la République Démocratique du Congo à l'Afghanistan, de l'Irak aux Balkans et à l'Asie du Sud-Est, l'Union européenne est devenue un acteur toujours plus actif et reconnu pour assurer la paix et la sécurité internationale. À ce jour, l'UE conduit 14 opérations simultanément : trois opérations militaires et onze missions civiles.

Depuis janvier 2007, l'Union dispose d'un Centre d'opérations (OpsCentre) lui fournissant une nouvelle option pour la planification et la conduite d'opérations. Elle dispose également de forces de réaction rapide, les groupements tactiques (« EU Battlegroups »).

En juin 1999, parallèlement à la nomination de Javier Solana en tant que premier « Haut Représentant pour la PESC » (1999–2009), le Conseil européen réuni à Cologne a placé au cœur du renforcement de la Politique étrangère de l'UE les missions de gestion des crises. Ce même Conseil européen a décidé que « l'Union doit disposer d'une capacité d'action autonome soutenue par des forces militaires crédibles, avoir les moyens de décider d'y recourir et être prête à le faire afin de réagir face aux crises internationales, sans préjudice des actions entreprises par l'OTAN ». C'est sur cette base que des efforts soutenus ont abouti à la mise en place de structures politiques et militaires permanentes (Comité politique et de sécurité, Etat-major militaire et Comité militaire de l'UE) et à l'établissement de capacités civiles et militaires en matière de gestion des crises.

L'Union a également conclu des arrangements relatifs à la consultation et à la participation de pays tiers à la gestion des crises. Elle a en outre défini avec l'OTAN le cadre des relations entre les deux organisations, qui comprend des arrangements permettant à l'Union de recourir aux moyens et capacités de l'OTAN si nécessaire.

Les missions dans lesquelles l'UE peut intervenir incluent aujourd'hui des missions humanitaires et d'évacuation, des missions de conseil et d'assistance en matière militaire, des missions de prévention des conflits et de maintien de la paix, des actions conjointes en matière de désarmement, des missions de forces de combat pour la gestion des crises, y compris les missions de rétablissement de la paix et les opérations de stabilisation à la fin des conflits. Toutes ces missions peuvent contribuer à la lutte contre le terrorisme.

L'entrée en vigueur du traité de Lisbonne en décembre 2009 devrait renforcer la PSDC. La nouvelle Haute Représentante, Catherine Ashton, est en même temps vice-Présidente de la Commission européenne, avec à sa disposition dès la fin de l'année le Service européen pour l'action extérieure. Le traité introduit également la coopération structurée permanente pour les Etats membres dont les capacités militaires peuvent faire face aux missions les plus exigeantes. Cette clause s'ajoute à la nouvelle possibilité de lancer des coopérations renforcées en matière de défense. Il introduit également une clause de solidarité entre les Etats membres (assistance en cas d'attaque terroriste ou de catastrophe naturelle ou d'origine humaine) et une clause d'assistance mutuelle (en cas d'agression armée, les Etats membres se doivent aide et assistance par tous les moyens en leur pouvoir). Par ailleurs, le traité de Lisbonne élargit le spectre des missions PSDC et adapte les mécanismes financiers pour gagner en rapidité. La Politique de sécurité et de défense commune de l'UE peut donc continuer à se développer pour renforcer la paix et la sécurité à l'extérieur de ses frontières.

**Plus d'infos :**

[www.consilium.europa.eu/psdc](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/psdc)

[www.consilium.europa.eu/csdp](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/csdp)

[www.eeas.europa.eu](http://www.eeas.europa.eu)

et sur YouTube, [www.youtube.com/EUSecurityandDefence](http://www.youtube.com/EUSecurityandDefence)

# Editorial

The work that will lead to the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) is making steady progress in this summer 2010. On 26 July 2010, the Council of the EU adopted the decision establishing the European External Action Service based on High Representative Catherine Ashton's initial proposal. "I am delighted that in four short months since I tabled the proposal, we have come so far. We can move forward to build a modern, effective and distinctly European service for the 21st century. The reason is simple: Europe needs to shape up to defend better our interests and values in a world of growing complexity and fundamental power shifts."

Other institutional steps remain, including amendments to the EU staff and financial regulations and an amending budget for 2010 to allow the Service formally to come into being. But work is indeed moving apace towards the establishment of a service which will enable the EU to deliver a more effective foreign policy. The discussions on the establishment of the EEAS, after the negotiations on the Lisbon Treaty, may project the image of an EU which is inward looking, and focusing on its own institutions rather than on the world around it. But this stage is important: if the EU manages to shape its instruments – and the EEAS is a key instrument – in the right way, it will be able to deliver better results and bring more added value to international efforts on peace, security and development.

At the same time the European Union continues to develop its work in the field of crisis management. In this issue, we look at a new mission, EUTM, which is part of the EU's efforts to continue to address the many challenges facing Somalia. The Head of EUTM, Colonel Ricardo Gonzalez Elul, tells the *newsletter* about the challenges he has had to face to launch the mission.

A key mission is EULEX Kosovo. Two years after its launch, it is well established. We look at a crucial part of its activities, in the "EU House" in north Mitrovica.

In addition to EU missions, the EU's structures can offer significant contributions to international crisis response. In the weeks that followed the devastating earthquake in Haiti, a coordinating cell – EUCO – located in the EU Situation Centre tried to facilitate the deployment of assets to alleviate the plight of the Haitian populations.

The backdrop of current EU activities is made of institutional change: we look into what the Lisbon treaty holds for the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and hear from a key player in the change process, Walter Stevens, who chairs the Political and Security Committee. Working closely with HR Catherine Ashton, he manages transition in this key committee. And while there is no longer a rotating presidency as such in the field of foreign affairs, Belgium does bring to the table its long experience and its strong dedication to the CSDP.

The backdrop is also about economic constraints. The dire situation of public finances in Europe following the financial crisis of 2008–2009, as illustrated by the recent sovereign debt crisis, is particularly difficult. This leads André Dumoulin to look at the impact on the defence sector. For him, increased cooperation between EU member states, including in the framework of permanent structured cooperation, should be part of the answer.

A decade after the European Council meeting in Cologne, the EU Common Security and Defence Policy has entered a new stage: President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy, High Representative Catherine Ashton with EU Heads of State or Government on the day of their appointment on 19 November 2009 in Brussels



## Informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government Brussels 19. 11. 2009




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**The views expressed in the newsletter are those of their authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Council of the EU or of Member States.**

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# Names and News

## EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE: HELP STRENGTHENING THE EUROPEAN UNION'S ROLE ON THE WORLD STAGE

Two weeks after the Madrid deal on setting up the European External Action Service (EEAS), a package of recommendations on its organisation and working methods was approved by the European Parliament on 8 July 2010. The Council of the EU adopted the final decision establishing the European External Action Service and setting out its organisation and functioning on 26 July 2010.

On this occasion, High Representative Catherine Ashton said: "I am delighted that in four short months since I tabled the proposal, we have come so far. We can now move forward to build a modern, effective and distinctly European service for the 21st century. The reason is simple: Europe needs to shape up to defend better our interests and values in a world of growing complexity and fundamental power shifts."

The High Representative also highlighted the importance of moving rapidly forward with the amendments to the EU Staff and Financial Regulations, and an amending budget for 2010 to allow formally the Service to come into being by the first anniversary of the Lisbon Treaty.

The Spanish presidency of the Council of the EU (Foreign minister Miguel Moratinos and Secretary of State Lopez Garrido), the High Representative Catherine Ashton, the Commission (Maroš Šefcovic) and the European Parliament representatives (MEPs Brok, Verhofstadt and Gualtieri) met on 21 June 2010 in Madrid. This meeting has been preceded by a number of contacts with the European Parliament between April and June 2010. The parties reached on 21 June political agreement on the proposal for a Council decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service. In addition to the decision, parties reached agreement on the text of two declarations by the High Representative: on political accountability and on the basic structure of the central administration. This political agreement paved the way to the vote of 8 July by the European Parliament.

Contributing to international peace and security is a key objective for the European Union. In order to better achieve this, the Lisbon Treaty lays the basis for greater coherence in the Union's foreign policy. By bringing together its many levers of influence in a more effective manner and pursuing a wide range of goals on the international stage, it will increase the Union's political and economic influence in the world. The Treaty tasks the High Representative to conduct the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy, to chair the Foreign Affairs Council, to fulfil within the Commission the responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union's external relations, and to support and facilitate the cooperation between the Council and Commission in order to ensure consistency between the different areas of external action. In fulfilling her mandate, the High Representative will be assisted by the European External Action Service. The EEAS will help strengthening the European Union on the global stage and enable it to project its interests and values more efficiently.

[www.eeas.europa.eu](http://www.eeas.europa.eu)

## PROJET POUR L'EUROPE À L'HORIZON 2030 – LES DÉFIS À RELEVER ET LES CHANCES À SAISIR

Dans son rapport sur l'avenir de l'UE, remis le 8 mai 2010 au Président du Conseil européen Herman Van Rompuy, le groupe de réflexion présidé par Felipe Gonzalez expose les défis auxquels l'Union européenne est susceptible d'être confrontée à l'horizon 2030, parmi lesquels le défi démographique, la sécurité énergétique et le changement climatique, la sécurité intérieure et extérieure ainsi que les solutions que l'UE peut y apporter.

Dans le chapitre consacré à la sécurité intérieure et extérieure, le rapport rappelle que « [...] Dans ce nouvel ordre mondial, différents centres de puissance coexistent dans un environnement plus instable. [...] Nous devons à présent prendre des mesures énergiques et mettre en oeuvre un nouveau « modèle européen de sécurité ». Plus particulièrement sur la sécurité extérieure, parmi les nombreuses mesures proposées pour renforcer la PSDC, le groupe estime qu'« il est nécessaire de créer un état-major d'opérations européen réellement opérationnel et doté d'un personnel suffisant, estime de planifier, de déployer et de superviser les opérations civiles/militaires à l'étranger ». Les sages rappellent que le traité de Lisbonne a prévu un certain nombre d'instruments importants, notamment la coopération structurée permanente, et que le traité devrait par ailleurs permettre aux Etats membres de surmonter les problèmes liés au financement de la PSDC en demandant la constitution d'une « enveloppe de départ » pour soutenir les missions communes.

Le rapport insiste également sur la nécessité pour l'UE de s'affirmer en tant qu'acteur. Face au risque de démondialisation qui peut devenir réel, le groupe de sages souligne les avantages du multilatéralisme et la nécessité de renforcer la panoplie d'instruments dont dispose l'UE. Il conclut en rappelant que l'Union européenne est plus qu'un marché commun. [...] « l'UE peut prendre la tête de l'action menée par la communauté internationale pour relever les grands défis mondiaux, dont la cohésion sociale, le changement climatique, le développement durable et la paix entre les nations ».



Le Président du Conseil européen, Herman Van Rompuy, avec Felipe Gonzalez (à droite)

## VERS UN MODÈLE EUROPÉEN DE SÉCURITÉ – STRATÉGIE EUROPÉENNE DE SÉCURITÉ ET NOUVELLE STRATÉGIE POUR LA SÉCURITÉ INTÉRIEURE

Deux ans après l'actualisation de la Stratégie européenne de sécurité adoptée en 2003, où l'UE définissait la dimension extérieure de sa sécurité (nouveaux défis, principales menaces, sécurité et développement, multilatéralisme efficace), le Conseil européen de mars 2010 a adopté un nouveau document qui la complète : la Stratégie de sécurité intérieure de l'Union européenne. Les principaux objectifs de cette nouvelle Stratégie sont les suivants :

- faire connaître au grand public les moyens existants de l'UE qui contribuent d'ores-et-déjà à garantir la sécurité et la liberté des citoyens européens, ainsi que la valeur ajoutée qu'offre l'action de l'UE dans l'espace européen de liberté, de justice et de sécurité ;
- s'attaquer aux causes de l'insécurité et pas uniquement à ses conséquences ;
- renforcer la coopération judiciaire et la coopération en matière de répression, de gestion des frontières, de protection civile et de gestion des catastrophes.

La Stratégie établit un modèle européen de sécurité qui inclut notamment des mesures concernant l'application de la loi et la coopération judiciaire ainsi que la gestion des frontières et la protection civile, dans le plein respect des valeurs communes européennes, notamment les Droits fondamentaux. Elle recense les principales menaces et les principaux défis auxquels l'UE fait face, y compris le terrorisme, la criminalité organisée, la cybercriminalité, le trafic de drogues et d'armes, la traite des êtres humains, l'exploitation sexuelle des mineurs et la pédopornographie, la délinquance économique et la corruption, ainsi que la violence chez les jeunes. Les catastrophes d'origine naturelle ou humaine, par exemple les incendies de forêts et les pénuries d'énergie, exigent également une préparation et une réponse transfrontières.

La Commission devrait adopter prochainement une communication sur les mesures concrètes à prendre dans le cadre de cette Stratégie de sécurité intérieure pour l'UE.

[www.consilium.europa.eu/ess](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ess)

### EUFOR TCHAD/RCA: LESSONS LEARNED

The EUFOR TCHAD/RCA lessons learned seminar hosted by the EU Institute for Security Studies on 18 March 2010 facilitated a debate on the EU operation in Chad and in the Central African Republic conducted in 2008–2009.

The discussions resulted in a number of recommendations for the planning, conduct and execution of subsequent EU operations and generated several ideas for the future of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), to build upon existing 'lessons identified' processes, and to share lessons on the comprehensive aspects of EU operations. Debates were open and led to

valuable exchanges of views among representatives from various communities of expertise.

As for EU-UN cooperation, bridging will remain a key concept for joint planning. Structural differences between the two organisations would be addressed by having more systematic joint exercises, training and exchanges.

[www.iss.europa.eu](http://www.iss.europa.eu)

[www.consilium.europa.eu/eufor-tchad-rca](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eufor-tchad-rca)



Handover ceremony in Abeche, 15 March 2009

### AMANI AFRICA – EURORECAMP: PROVIDE AFRICA WITH A CAPABILITY TO DEAL WITH CRISES

'AMANI AFRICA', meaning 'Peace in Africa' in Swahili, is based on an EU proposal (EURORECAMP) to assist the African Union in making the African Standby Force, which is being developed across the continent in order to provide Africa with a capability to deal with crises, operational through training and evaluating the continental decision making process. Procedures have been developed, forces identified and exercises mounted.

The first AMANI AFRICA cycle is now entering its final stages and will culminate into a command post exercise scheduled for 13 to 29 October 2010. This command post exercise will be conducted in Addis Ababa and will deploy an African Union Headquarters, a mission Headquarters and an exercise control element. In total, approximately 150 people, military, police and civilian coming from the continental level (African Union) as well as from the sub regional organisations will participate. Partners will assist the African Union (AU) in the conduct of the exercise. Prior to the exercise, training activities have been scheduled to increase awareness of all participants on procedures, doctrine and scenario used for the exercise.

The objective of the first AMANI AFRICA cycle remains to assist the African Union in the evaluation and training of the continental decision making chain to plan and conduct a Peace Support Operation according to one of the scenarios laid down for deployment of African Standby Forces. It will build on documents already developed during the previous stages of the cycle. Finally, by the end of 2010, the cycle will be concluded with a lessons learned workshop which will help with future orientations. The European Union is at the heart of the cycle, with a dedicated multinational

(Finland, France, UK, Italy...) and multidimensional (military, police and civilian) core planning team, jointly with an AU team responsible for the elaboration and follow up of all AMANI AFRICA related issues. It is worth noting that the exercise will coincide with the meeting of the ministers of defence of the AU, who are planning to visit the ongoing exercise.



The AMANI AFRICA cycle was officially launched on 21 November 2008 at the AU – EU Ministerial Troika in Addis Ababa, within the Joint Africa European Union Strategy. This cycle is one of the action points within the partnership Peace & Security, of which General Pierre-Michel Joana is the “chef de file” on the EU side, and is contributing to the operationalisation of the African peace and security architecture. [www.amaniafricacycle.org](http://www.amaniafricacycle.org)

## TOWARDS A EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE CULTURE: THE INITIATIVE FOR THE EXCHANGE OF YOUNG OFFICERS INSPIRED BY ERASMUS PICKS UP SPEED

On 10 March 2010, two important milestones were reached in the implementation of the European Initiative for the exchange of young officers, inspired by Erasmus, better known as ‘Erasmus militaire’. First of all a standard framework arrangement that Member States can use when they exchange young officers for training was agreed upon by the European Security and Defence College (ESDC). This eases the administrative burden that normally comes when sending military to another country.

Secondly, a credit transfer system was officially put into place which allows Member States to recognise more easily the efforts made by a student when he is on an exchange. This system can best be compared with the European credit transfer and accumulation system (ECTS), that civilian universities use for their exchange programmes. The objective is that young cadets who follow an education in another EU Member State will no longer have to take the same training in their own country.

With these two cornerstones in place, the initiative takes a major step towards its goals: not only increasing the number of exchanges of young cadets so that they are on a par with their civilian counterparts, but making sure that these exchanges are useful for both the cadet and his home Member State. This will strengthen the interoperability of the armed forces and promote a European security and defence culture. Launched in November 2008, this initiative, better known as « Erasmus militaire » aims at creating more and better opportunities for young students of the military training institutes of the Member States to meet and learn together, thus improving their common understanding of the work of the European Union and of each other.

Although military universities can and do actively participate in the Bologna Process (the process of creating the European higher education area, based on cooperation between ministries, higher education institutions, students and staff from 46 countries, with the participation of international organisations)

and in the Commission funded Erasmus programme for their academic exchanges, there was still a lack of significant exchange opportunities in professional training.

The implementation of this initiative was put in the hands of the European Security and Defence College. 27 Member States started work almost immediately. This led to specific exchanges for young students conducted in Portugal and Spain in which several hundred participants were present. Further activities are planned for autumn 2010 in Austria and Greece.

## HIGH REPRESENTATIVE CATHERINE ASHTON WELCOMED THE NEW HANDBOOK ON CSDP

High Representative Catherine Ashton welcomed the new Handbook on CSDP, published for the European Security and Defence College last April. The Handbook on CSDP aims at supporting trainers and trainees of the College in the preparation for and the conduct of the ESDC courses. For course participants, more than 2500 since 2005, it will also serve as a reference book after they have completed the course.

The ESDC is a network College and relies on the contribution of Member States and their national institutes. Following this basic functioning principle, the Handbook on CSDP was prepared together with the Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria. The content of the Handbook mirrors the content of a CSDP Orientation Course, the most popular course provided by the ESDC, targeting in particular “newcomers” in the field of CSDP.

The last ‘CSDP High Level Course’ 2009/2010, ‘Robert Schuman’, concluded successfully with 48 graduates from Member States and EU Institutions. <http://esdc.mil-edu.be>

## EU MISSION SECURITY OFFICERS’ CERTIFICATION PROGRAMME IN SWEDEN

23 Mission Security Officers made their way to Sweden to attend the second Mission Security Officers Certification course (22 – 30 April). With six of the Commission’s Regional Security Officers (which are to move to the European External Action Service) participating on the course, duty-of-care for the safety and security of EU staff in Delegations will be a key responsibility for the European External Action Service.

The scope of the course is wide enough so as to be applicable not only to the roles, functions and responsibilities of the security officer working within a CSDP or EUSR mission, but also to individuals with responsibility for the security in the ‘new’ EU Delegations. In order to assist a Head of Delegation, Head of Mission or EUSR in managing their responsibilities for the safety and security of staff under their command, the course is designed to develop a roster of professionally trained Security Officers operating in line with a single standard security risk management model. The course content included both theoretical lectures by experienced experts and scenario-based security management exercises.

# Names and News

These exercises concentrated around realistic scenarios which could happen in any crisis management mission or EU Delegation abroad. These built on participants' existing 'security DNA' by asking them to apply common security risk management methodologies to the crises they were asked to manage. This in turn helped them

to adopt the common EU field security 'language' which they will need in order to successfully manage the security and safety of staff in high and critical risk areas. Of the 23 participants, 22 passed the course and are now fully certified Mission Security Officers. A further course is programmed for September.

## NOMINATIONS

### EUMC

Since 6 November 2009, General Håkan Syrén who was Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces for more than five years prior to his present posting, is the Chairman of the European Union Military Committee (EUMC). General Syrén took over from General Henri Bentégeat. The EUMC is the highest military body set up within the Council. It directs all EU military activities and provides the High Representative and the Political and Security Committee (PSC) with advice and recommendations on military matters. It is composed of the Chiefs of Defence of the Member States, represented by their permanent Military Representatives. The Chairman, selected by the Chiefs of Defence of the Member States, is appointed by the Council of the EU.

[www.consilium.europa.eu/eumc](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eumc)

### EUMS

On 27 May 2010, Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, presided over a ceremony to mark the change of command of the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) from General David Leakey to General Ton Van Osch. A permanent EU structure since 2001, the EUMS receives taskings from the EU Military Committee. It provides military expertise for the High Representative. Its main operational functions are early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning. As the European Union is conducting its seventh military operation, the EUMS has become a key player in the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy.

[www.consilium.europa.eu/eums](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eums)

### EUNAVFOR-ATALANTA

On 14 June 2010, Major General Buster Howes took over as the new EU operation Commander of operation EUNAVFOR-Atalanta. He succeeded Rear Admiral Peter Hudson who held the position from 3 June 2009.

On 4 June 2010, Rear Admiral Bartolomé Bauzá handed over the responsibility of Deputy Operation Commander EUNAVFOR-Atalanta to Rear Admiral Thomas J. Ernst.

Every four months a new Force Commander is appointed to command the force at sea. On 14 April 2010, Rear Admiral Jan Thörnqvist from Sweden, took office as the new EU Force Commander of EUNAVFOR. He succeeded Rear Admiral Giovanni Gumiero and Commodore Pieter Bindt.

For more on EUNAVFOR-Atalanta see the article on page 23.

[www.consilium.europa.eu/eunavfor-somalia](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eunavfor-somalia)  
[www.eunavfor.eu](http://www.eunavfor.eu)

### EUTM SOMALIA

On 17 February 2010, Colonel Ricardo Gonzalez Elul was appointed as the EU Mission Commander of EUTM Somalia.

For more on EUTM Somalia see the article on page 16.

[www.consilium.europa.eu/eutm-somalia](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eutm-somalia)

### EUFOR ALTHEA

Major General Bernhard Bair took office on 4 December 2009 as the new EU Force Commander of the operation. He succeeded Major General Stefano Castagnotto.

[www.consilium.europa.eu/eufor-althea](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eufor-althea)

[www.euforbih.org](http://www.euforbih.org)

### EUPOL AFGHANISTAN

As of 15 July 2010, Brigadier General Jukka Petri Savolainen took office as the new Head of mission for EUPOL. Chief Superintendent Nigel Thomas was appointed Head of Mission, ad interim, of the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan as from 31 May 2010. He succeeded Mr Kai Vittrup.

[www.consilium.europa.eu/eupol-afghanistan](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eupol-afghanistan)

[www.eupol-afg.eu](http://www.eupol-afg.eu)

### EUJUST LEX IRAQ

On 1 January 2010, Francisco Díaz Alcantud was appointed Head of mission of EUJUST LEX Iraq. He succeeds Stephen White. The EU's integrated rule of law mission in Iraq has been extended from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2012. During this period, the mission will progressively shift its activities and relevant structures to Iraq, focusing on specialised training, while maintaining out-of-country activities.

[www.consilium.europa.eu/eujust-lex](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eujust-lex)

### EU SSR GUINEA BISSAU

On 1 July 2010, Fernando Afonso replaced Juan Esteban Verastegui as the new Head of mission of the European Union mission in support of security sector reform in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR GUINEA-BISSAU). The mission has been extended until 30 September 2010.

[www.consilium.europa.eu/eu-ssr-guinea-bissau](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eu-ssr-guinea-bissau)

### EUPOL COPPS

Henrik Malmquist took office as the Head of the EUPOL COPPS mission on 1 January 2010. He succeeded Paul Robert Kernaghan.

[www.consilium.europa.eu/eupol-copps](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eupol-copps)

[www.eupolcopps.eu](http://www.eupolcopps.eu)



# From ESDP to CSDP: the Lisbon Treaty and the Security and Defence Policy of the European Union

*The Lisbon Treaty has strengthened the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Here is an overview of the innovations.*

## HISTORICAL MILESTONES

The Treaty of Lisbon entered into force on 1 December 2009. It gives the European entities a single legal personality that allows the EU to join international organisations and conventions (such as the Council of Europe and the European Convention on Human Rights). In addition, it includes a series of institutional and conceptual innovations as well as innovations in decision-making that are designed to increase the coherence and capabilities of the EU as a security actor.

These innovations are a logical consequence of the treaty reforms in Maastricht (1992), Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2001) and political agreements such as the French-British Summit in St. Malo (1998). Whereas the former mentioned the "progressive framing of a common Union defence policy", the UK and France overcame their differences about EU cooperation in the field of defence at the meeting in St. Malo in December 1998 and developed a common view that finally paved the way for the establishment of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

Building on that, the European Council of Cologne in June 1999 agreed to develop military capabilities and appropriate decision-making bodies while the European Council of Nice in December 2000 created the organisational structures within the Council (Political and Security Committee, EU Military staff and EU Military Committee) to support the ESDP. In December 2001, the ESDP was declared operational by the European Council in Laeken and only 15 months later, in March 2003, the EU deployed its first military operation to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Since then, the EU has launched a total of 24 civilian and/or military operations worldwide in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy. This rapid evolution and implementation of the ESDP, however, made institutional as well as conceptual adaptation necessary. Consequently, the Treaty of Lisbon includes several substantial innovations in this field. It also relabelled the ESDP as CSDP – the Common Security and Defence Policy.

## INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS

Two other visible institutional innovations are the creation of the posts of a President of the European Council and of a High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

### **President of the European Council**

Assigned by the European Heads of State or Government to Herman Van Rompuy for a term of two and a half years (renewable once), the President of the European Council ensures the external representation of the Union in the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy.

### **High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy**

In addition to being the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, who was appointed by the European Council in November 2009 with the agreement of the President of the Commission for a period of five years, combines two other functions: she is the President of the Foreign Affairs Council and is a Vice-President of the Commission. As such, her post is about ensuring effective inter-institutional coordination, thereby leading to the implementation of more coherent EU external policies.

### **European External Action Service**

According to the Lisbon Treaty, the High Representative will be supported by a European External Action Service (EEAS) consisting of staff that will be recruited from diplomats of Member States, the Council Secretariat and the Commission. The service is expected to be up and running by the end of this year

## CONCEPTUAL INNOVATIONS

### **Enhanced Cooperation and Permanent Structured Cooperation**

The protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation is another potentially profound change in the field of EU Security and Defence Policy. This is in addition to the new enhanced cooperation mechanism, as established by the Treaty of Lisbon, which now covers defence issues, and which enables a group of willing states (at least 9 Member States) to deepen their cooperation in the field of military crisis management once the unanimous approval of the Council has been received.

Permanent Structured Cooperation is a flexible and permanent measure, which, in contrast to enhanced cooperation, does not require a threshold of participants to proceed. According to the Treaty, Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the EU framework. The protocol gives a key role to the European Defence Agency in this new defence mechanism.

### **Solidarity and Mutual Defence Clause**

In addition to that, the Treaty of Lisbon introduces a solidarity and

## De la PESD à la PSDC

Le traité de Lisbonne introduit une série d'innovations qui répondent à l'évolution de la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense (PESD) et renforcent les capacités de l'UE en matière de défense et de sécurité. Il renomme également la PESD en Politique de sécurité et de défense commune (PSDC).

La création du poste d'Haut Représentant de l'Union pour les Affaires étrangères et la Politique de sécurité, qui est également vice-président de la Commission européenne, avec à sa disposition le Service européen pour l'action extérieure (SEAE), permet d'assurer la coordination interinstitutionnelle et la cohérence des politiques extérieures.

Sur le plan conceptuel, le traité introduit la coopération structurée permanente pour les Etats membres dont les capacités militaires peuvent faire face aux missions les plus exigeantes. Cette clause s'ajoute à la nouvelle possibilité de lancer des coopérations renforcées en matière de défense, qui permet à un groupe d'au moins neuf Etats membres d'approfondir leur coopération dans la gestion des crises. Ce traité introduit également une clause de solidarité entre les Etats membres (assistance en cas d'attaque terroriste ou de catastrophe naturelle ou d'origine humaine) et une clause d'assistance mutuelle (en cas d'agression armée, les Etats membres se doivent aide et assistance par tous les moyens en leur pouvoir). Le traité de Lisbonne actualise également le spectre des missions PSDC et donne accès à un fonds de lancement pour financer plus rapidement certaines actions, notamment les activités préparatoires des missions.

The President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, Brussels, 19 November 2009



a mutual assistance clause. The mutual assistance clause obliges all EU Member States to provide aid and assistance by all the means in their power in the event that another Member State were to become a victim of armed aggression. It does not, however, affect the specific character of the security and defence policies of certain EU Member States, their neutrality or their commitments under NATO.

The solidarity clause represents another new legal mechanism of assistance between the EU Member States in the event that one of them were to fall victim to a terrorist attack, a natural or man-made disaster. In such a case, according to the clause, upon request of the affected Member State, the EU will mobilise all the instruments at its disposal to assist it, which may include military resources that are made available by Member States.

### **Update of CSDP Tasks**

Moreover, the Treaty of Lisbon codifies and updates the scope of CSDP tasks. In addition to the traditional range of tasks such as humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and post-conflict stabilisation tasks as well as tasks carried out by combat forces in crisis management (including peacemaking), the Treaty refers to joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks as well as a contribution to the fight

against terrorism, which were already agreed in the European Security Strategy.

### **Financing of CSDP operations**

Expenditure related to the Common Foreign and Security Policy is charged to the Union budget, except for such operating expenditure arising from military operations and cases where the Council unanimously decides otherwise. In September 2003, the Council decided that the European Union should acquire a flexible capacity for managing the financing of common costs of military operations through a permanent mechanism which would also define the scope of such common costs. As a result, the Council of the EU established a special mechanism called 'ATHENA' in February 2004.

The Lisbon Treaty creates new and specific procedures guaranteeing rapid access to appropriations in the Union budget where there is an urgent need to finance initiatives in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and in particular for preparatory activities for CSDP tasks, with a start-up fund.

The Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU has come a long way in ten short years. The Lisbon Treaty offers the potential for more progress. ■



The EU House has increased the EU's footprint in northern Kosovo

## The future has already arrived in the north of Mitrovica

The rationale behind the establishment of the EU House in the north of Mitrovica was linked to the particular situation and actual needs on the ground, rather than to any policy decisions associated with the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the European External Action Service. In reality however, the activities conducted through the EU House in northern Kosovo might very well be seen as a leading indicator for the future of EU external actions around the world.

In a challenging place, where the EU is not always well understood, the idea behind the EU House was to increase the EU's overall footprint in the north. The concept is as simple as it is effective: bring together and promote various activities under one roof, no matter who actually implements them. Instead of a number of diverse and sometimes confusing and overlapping actors with different mandates, only one EU should exist for the public. Moreover, this coherent and consistent EU should deal with issues that are tangible, hands-on and relevant for the population in their daily lives. Therefore, in the north of Kosovo, the focus is on practical and visual actions (see page 14).

So, regardless as to whether we are talking about building a health centre in Zubin Potok municipality or, work on water purification for Leposavic municipality, or strengthening the police and customs presence in order to decrease smuggling in the region, – all these activities are supported by the EU. It does not matter for a member of the public if it is different parts of the EU that implement different activities. For them, what matters is that their quality of life is improving. In the words of the Head of the EULEX mission in Kosovo, Yves de Kermabon: "All the EU presences in Kosovo share the same

**The EU presences in Kosovo share the same values and objectives: promoting stability, security and prosperity for the benefit of all the people in Kosovo, no matter where they live or their ethnic background.**

values and objectives: promoting stability, security and prosperity for the benefit of all the people in Kosovo, no matter where they live or their ethnic backgrounds.

Furthermore, all 27 EU Member States, regardless of their position on Kosovo's status, are strongly committed to the European perspective for the entire Western Balkans. Such a stance is strongly supported by public opinion in both Serbia and Kosovo. Therefore, it is only natural that it also encompasses the rather small and somewhat contentious area of northern Kosovo. The EU House has been welcomed by both Belgrade and Pristina.

Over the last few years, EU Member States have explored ways to improve and enhance the EU's foreign policy. The results are partly seen in the Lisbon Treaty. The treaty offers the opportunity to strengthen the European Union's impact on the international stage and its strategic vision through streamlined decision-making and greater policy coherence and consistency. The EU House in northern Mitrovica is a concrete case in point. ■



Gaining trust: EULEX is more and more perceived as a robust and effective mission to help develop rule of law in Kosovo

## EULEX: challenges and achievements

The mandate for the EU's Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) was renewed for another two years on 8 June 2010 – the perfect time to take stock of EULEX's achievements and the challenges facing the mission. EULEX, the largest civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission ever launched, is not in Kosovo to govern. It is a technical rule of law mission focusing on police, justice and customs although it does have a number of executive powers, particularly in organised and economic crimes, corruption and war crimes. Its main mandate is to monitor, mentor and advise local institutions

In the past two months, EULEX's activities have gathered momentum, a trend reflected in a new public perception of EULEX as a robust and effective institution in pursuing its mandate. A milestone was the EULEX Police Executive Department searches at the Ministry of Transport as well as at the homes of the Minister of Transport and other officials on 28–29 April in connection with several road construction tenders from 2007 to 2009. Investigations are underway.

In the area of war crimes, the Raška case, in relation to which a potential mass grave in Serbia was recently discovered, is another

important achievement for EULEX. The Serbian War Crimes Prosecutor's Office has acknowledged that EULEX's work led to the site being identified.

Such cooperation has been well received in Pristina by the Ministry of Justice, the Kosovo Police and the Working Group on Missing Persons, and is thus a step forward in establishing a much needed communication channel between Belgrade and Pristina. The case will continue to be a major issue over the summer as exhumation at Raška probably will begin during this period.

### MAIN CHALLENGE: POLITICAL WILL TO FOLLOW THROUGH

Other events that have contributed to the mission's robust image include recent arrests in a joint Kosovo Police and EULEX special police units' operation in a major drug-related organised crime case and ongoing joint EULEX Police/EULEX Customs and Kosovo Police checks in the north of Kosovo.

The main challenges ahead will be to demonstrate the political will to follow through with ongoing investigations and legal decisions. This is a coordinated effort

with the local authorities in the lead and there is a strong joint commitment from both parties to continue to work together in the fight against organised crime and corruption.

With regard to the mission's main activity, the monitoring, mentoring and advising of judicial and law enforcement institutions, the latest EULEX Programme Report 2010, which tracks monitoring and progress in such activities, identifies a major challenge.

That challenge is to ensure that the institutional reforms recommended by the report are implemented to bring them up to EU standards. Improvements needed include Kosovo Police management and internal communications in Kosovo Customs. Justice is identified as the area requiring the most improvement.

The report noted several judicial shortcomings. For example, it said that Kosovo's criminal justice system's ability to undertake reforms "remained very fragile and inconsistent."

It added that interference in both criminal and civil proceedings was common, that cooperation between Prosecutors and Kosovo Police and between prosecution offices and



## Enjeux et réalisations

EULEX (mission pour l'État de droit au Kosovo) concentre son activité sur les secteurs de la police, de la justice et des douanes avec pour mandat d'assurer le suivi, l'encadrement et le conseil aux institutions locales. La mission a certains pouvoirs exécutifs pour lutter contre la criminalité organisée et économique, la corruption et les crimes de guerre. Les derniers mois ont apporté une évolution positive dans la perception de la mission. Le 8 juin 2010, son mandat a été étendu pour deux ans, au cours desquels EULEX se focalisera sur la mise en oeuvre des réformes institutionnelles recommandées dans son dernier rapport d'étape. Elle maintiendra aussi son mandat exécutif.

Dans le nord, les progrès dépendront en grande partie des solutions politiques. La priorité portera sur le rétablissement du plein contrôle des douanes. La mission continuera également à travailler sur le retour des juges kosovars d'origine albanaise et serbe.

L'ouverture de la « Maison de l'UE à Mitrovica Nord » a considérablement accru la visibilité de l'UE. Elle permet d'organiser diverses activités pratiques qui sont conduites au nom de l'UE. Dans les deux prochaines années, EULEX continuera à lutter contre la corruption et le crime organisé et à aider les autorités du Kosovo à construire des institutions qui respectent l'Etat de droit.

courts was lacking and that the legislative process also needed greater transparency. All of these aspects are a challenge for EULEX's justice component.

### EU HOUSE IN MITROVICA IS WELL PERCEIVED BY THE POPULATION

Up until now, EULEX has also faced difficulties in the north. But, since the opening of the EU House in north Mitrovica (see the article on page 11) this spring, there has been a considerable increase in EU visibility there, especially as the EU House has been

well received by the population. This summer, the mission plans a new outreach campaign in the north's four municipalities, which will give EULEX's presence a boost.

After months of delays, the mission is also pressing on with its work towards the return of Kosovo-Albanian and Kosovo-Serb judges and prosecutors to the Mitrovica courthouse by allowing justice to be delivered by a single multi-ethnic judiciary.

An ongoing major challenge to reestablishing the rule of law, in terms of customs, in the

north, is the issue of restoration of full customs controls there. Progress in this field very much depends on a political settlement, which is outside the scope of EULEX's mandate.

Clearly, over the next two years, the mission needs to keep up the momentum in following through on its executive responsibilities, especially in battling corruption and organised crime, in order to help the Kosovo authorities build strong rule of law institutions that are free from political interference and meet EU standards.

[www.eulex-kosovo.eu](http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu) ■



Smuggling and organised crime are on the decline due to constant presence of police and customs officers

## EU activities in north Kosovo

The work of the EU brings the region closer to achieving its European perspective.

- Around 230 sustainable employment positions have been created and there has been a total investment of more than 4.6 million euros.
- 1.1 million Euros has been invested in the lead refinery plant in Zvecan where hundreds of tons of used car batteries are being recycled.
- The EU is involved in several ongoing projects e.g. the installation of the Kiosk Market in north Mitrovica, building of the International Wholesale Market, the Business Complex in Zvecan and the development of the Ibar River Bank. It is also building a health centre in Zubin Potok, a water plant for the Mitrovica area and a water purification system in Leposavic.
- All EU Member States, firmly believe that the rule of law needs to be strengthened in order to benefit all communities in Kosovo, including in the north.
- The EU has reopened the courthouse in Mitrovica and 11 verdicts and 65 hearings have already taken place.
- The EU is working hard on bringing local judges and prosecutors back to work.
- The EU has 24 hour presence of police and customs at Gates 1 and 31 in order to fight organised crime, including smuggling. It is estimated that since the EU has been present at Gates 1 and 31 there has been a 60% reduction in smuggling.
- The EU has permanent police officers based in the 4 northern police stations in monitoring functions and additional officers at the gates.
- Since 9 December 2008 the EU has approximately 120 staff present in the north on a daily basis.
- The EU has nominated an informal Facilitator for the north, Michael Giffoni who is currently the Italian Ambassador in Pristina.

EU Special  
Representative  
Pieter Feith



## Effective rule of law fundamental for attracting investment

*The EU Special Representative in Kosovo, Pieter Feith, is playing a leading role in supporting Kosovo authorities to develop a viable, democratic and multi-ethnic Kosovo. As the political envoy of the European Union to Kosovo he promotes overall coordination among the EU presences on the ground, including by providing local political guidance to the Head of the EU rule of law mission, EULEX, and contributes to the development and consolidation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Kosovo.*

Since the beginning of the reinforced EU presence in 2008, Kosovo is increasingly assured of its course towards its European perspective as part of the wider Western Balkans region. With the support of the European Union, Kosovo has made important strides in furthering reconciliation and contributing to overall regional stability.

A key priority for the EU in Kosovo is to establish an effective rule of law system which is fundamental for attracting much needed foreign investment in Kosovo. This is necessary in order to foster socio-economic development which can ultimately lead to better living standards for everyone in Kosovo. In this context, tackling corruption and organized crime is paramount. The recent investigations and searches of high officials and the Kosovo ministry of transport, carried out by EULEX, were an important milestone.

Such steps are unprecedented in Kosovo. Additionally positive is the firm commitment of Kosovo authorities to want to be in the lead in the fight against corruption at all levels. This is indeed a very important development and in line with the EU principle of local ownership that aims to see local institutions spearheading reforms and progress. The EUSR in Kosovo has been supporting these efforts on crime and corruption as well as in other rule of law areas falling within the mandate of EULEX through political guidance to Kosovo authorities and in close coordination with the Head of the EULEX mission.

The Kosovo authorities have demonstrated their commitment to bring forward the decentralization process which resulted in positive results, in terms of Serb participation, in the local elections held in November last year. Kosovo Serbs in the new municipalities

are now discovering the benefits of full participation in Kosovo's political life, and are starting the work of improving their living conditions. There is reason to be optimistic that this positive example of improved governance and municipal services will trigger the interest of Serbs living in northern Kosovo. The implementation of decentralized governance is bringing Kosovo closer to European integration and regional reconciliation.

In line with its European perspective as part of the Western Balkans region, an opportunity presents itself for Kosovo to strengthen its ties with regional states at all levels in order to realize sustainable socio-economic development and increased prosperity for all the communities in Kosovo. The Sarajevo Conference in June this year, where Kosovo participated alongside all partners of the Western Balkans region was a very positive event for the region as a whole. The EU will continue to guide Kosovo authorities to actively participate in regional initiatives and in particular to engage in direct contacts with Belgrade.

The EU is well underway to become Kosovo's main international partner, even more so with the streamlining of the EU presence in Kosovo under the arrangements of the External Action Service. The future more visible, more coherent and efficient representation of the EU in Kosovo will bring additional momentum for Kosovo's reform efforts to reach European standards. The EU in Kosovo will continue to be a strong partner to the local authorities in the development and consolidation of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Kosovo, the development of a sustainable rule of law system and in its overall efforts to advance on its European path.



L'objectif d'EUTM est de former une unité d'élite des forces de sécurité somaliennes

## Dossier

# EUTM Somalie : reflet de l'engagement de l'UE pour la Somalie

C'est à Bihanga, à l'Est de l'Ouganda, à sept heures de route de la capitale Kampala, qu'a démarré début mai 2010 la première mission de formation militaire de l'Union européenne. L'objectif est de former en un an l'unité d'élite des forces de sécurité somaliennes. « Nous allons ainsi former 2000 hommes, lors de deux sessions successives de six mois chacune, jusqu'à 2011, en étroite coopération avec l'Ouganda et l'Union Africaine et avec le soutien des Américains », explique le colonel espagnol Ricardo Gonzalez Elul, chef de la mission EUTM Somalia. Cette unité sera « la colonne vertébrale des forces armées somaliennes, pour permettre au gouvernement fédéral de transition de mieux assurer le contrôle de la capitale, Mogadiscio, et de lutter contre la piraterie » ajoute-t-il.

Le programme de formation porte aussi sur le droit international humanitaire, les Droits de l'Homme et le droit des réfugiés ainsi que sur la protection des populations civiles, y compris sur la protection des femmes et des enfants. « C'est une contribution notable de l'Union européenne pour restaurer la paix et l'ordre en Somalie » précise le chef de la délégation de l'UE en Ouganda, Vincent de

Visscher. « La Somalie est un État fragile, confronté au problème du terrorisme. C'est non seulement important pour l'UE mais aussi pour la région de l'Afrique de l'Est d'avoir des bases solides de la stabilité en Somalie. »

### DES RECRUES VENANT DE L'ENSEMBLE DU TERRITOIRE DE LA SOMALIE

Les recrues proviennent de l'ensemble du territoire de la Somalie : de Mogadiscio, la capitale, mais aussi du nord du pays, du Puntland ou du Somaliland. Elles ont été sélectionnées sur la base de critères définis par les Européens par le gouvernement fédéral de transition somalien (GFT). Parmi ces critères, l'attention du gouvernement somalien porte notamment sur la diversité clanique, la condition physique, sur l'âge (avoir plus de 18 ans), le niveau d'aptitude intellectuelle ou encore l'absence de violation des Droits de l'Homme. Le passé de chacun des « élèves » est ensuite scruté. « Les bad guys seront exclus immédiatement du processus » explique le chef de la mission, le colonel Elul. Les recrues sont ensuite acheminées par des avions affrétés par le Département d'État américain, puis prises en charge à

leur arrivée à Entebbe par les forces armées ougandaises Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF).

A leur arrivée, les Somaliens sont, en effet, insérés dans le processus d'incorporation spécifique à l'UPDF. Leur paquetage comprenant uniformes, vêtements, chaussures ou bottes, sacs – leur a été remis. Au terme de cette période d'organisation de quelques jours, la formation peut commencer. Les Somaliens ne sont pas armés en permanence. Ils utilisent des fusils d'entraînement, qui sont consignés, après chaque exercice, dans l'armurerie, sous la garde du camp. Les Etats-Unis assurent par ailleurs le paiement des salaires des recrues somaliennes.

### L'OUGANDA ET L'UE TRAVAILLENT ENSEMBLE POUR UNE FORMATION OPTIMALE DES SOMALIENS

Le programme de la formation a été soigneusement mis au point par l'Ouganda et l'Union européenne. Il est ajusté, en temps réel sur place, à Bihanga. Européens et Ougandais se voient ainsi tous les jours pour préciser ensemble le planning des formations et les questions pratiques.





## The European Union and Somalia

The European Union is building up a comprehensive engagement in Somalia, with a view to responding to the priority needs of the Somali people and stabilising Somalia. The largest donor in Somalia, the EU works closely with its international partners. Collective endeavour is key to success in Somalia.

Through its political engagement, the EU supports the implementation of the Djibouti Peace Agreement and is a key contributor to the diplomatic efforts deployed by the international community. The EU supports the Transitional Federal Institutions that have the responsibility to lead the transition. The EU continues to engage with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), led by President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and supports its efforts to improve the living conditions of the population, including in the field of security and delivery of basic services. The EU supports the principles laid down in the Djibouti Peace Agreement, including the spirit of reconciliation and the search for an inclusive process in Somalia. A critical objective is to deliver a new constitution adopted by referendum and to have democratically elected institutions by the end of the transitional period in 2011.

Restoring the rule of law through support of Somali-owned governance and security sector initiatives is another EU objective. On governance and security, there are 23 projects ongoing in 2010 amounting to 52 million euro. The EU pledged 12 million euro from the European

Development Fund (EDF) to the Somali police force through the UNDP Rule of Law programme, making the total amount of EU support through this channel 43 million euro. The EU has also been supporting the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) since its start. The African Union has received EU support through bilateral contributions from Member States, 5 million euro from the EU Instrument for stability to support the planning capacity, as well as 95 million euro from the EDF-funded African Peace Facility (APF) to cover mission costs such as peacekeeper's per diems, salaries, running costs of offices, communication and medical costs.

On the military side, the EU also launched two CSDP operations: EUNAVFOR-Atalanta and EUTM Somalia. Other actions are being considered, including building up of maritime capacities.

The EU also provides assistance to the Somali people, particularly the most vulnerable groups, and aids in the reconstruction of the country. The European Commission and the Member States have committed 215.4 million euro for development aid through the EDF for the period 2008 to 2013. On education, there are 13 projects ongoing amounting to 36 million euro, on economic growth, 25 projects ongoing amounting to 48 million euro. Particularly on non focal sectors, 17 projects worth 27 million euro in health, water and sanitation and operational support are ongoing in 2010.



Le camp de Bihanga, ici en construction, accueille les recrues somaliennes

On peut vraiment parler de formation combinée, tant les modules sont imbriqués, comme le confirme d'ailleurs le chef adjoint de la mission, le colonel Philippe Bouillaud. « Nous nous spécialisons sur la formation des jeunes cadres, officiers et sous-officiers ainsi que des spécialistes. En parallèle, les Ougandais vont continuer à donner aux jeunes recrues une formation de base. Et, au fur et à mesure de cette formation de six mois, nous allons mixer nos efforts de façon à pouvoir, à la fin du stage, constituer des unités complètes. »

Du côté de l'Union européenne, une dizaine d'équipes de formation ont été constituées pour former l'encadrement : trois équipes espagnoles, dont une avec les Grecs, deux équipes françaises et quatre équipes binationales : une belgo-luxembourgeoise, une germano-hongroise, une irlandomaltaise, une suédo-finnoise. Quant aux modules de formation spécialisés, ils sont généralement pris en charge par une équipe d'un État membre : la formation des officiers par les Français, l'action anti-engins explosifs artisanaux (IED) et l'évacuation médicale (MEDEVAC) par les Italiens, les communications par les Allemands, le combat en zone urbaine (Fighting in Built-Up Areas ou FIBUA) par les Portugais.

### UNE MAJORITÉ D'ETATS MEMBRES PARTICIPENT À LA MISSION

Avant l'arrivée des Somaliens, l'Union européenne a dû aménager le site de Bihanga qui n'était pas conçu pour accueillir autant d'élèves et de formateurs

en même temps. Les Européens ont donc fait d'abord du génie civil, pour bâtir un camp leur permettant d'avoir des structures de commandement, de soins et de vie, les formateurs restant logés sous tente. Le camp ougandais a aussi subi des transformations, notamment la construction de dortoirs supplémentaires pour accueillir tous les stagiaires somaliens et des installations d'entraînements (notamment pour les combats urbains). Enfin, une petite piste d'atterrissage a été construite en bordure du camp afin de pouvoir faire face à d'éventuelles évacuations médicales ou des approvisionnements d'urgence.

Une quinzaine d'Etats membres de l'Union européenne participent à la mission : l'Espagne, la France, l'Italie, le Portugal, l'Allemagne, la Belgique, l'Irlande, la Finlande, la Hongrie, la Suède, Malte, la Grèce, le Royaume-Uni, le Luxembourg et Chypre. Le Quartier général de la mission – doté de 25 personnes – est installé à Kampala. Une cellule de liaison est également basée à Nairobi auprès des Nations Unies et de la Mission de l'Union africaine en Somalie (AMISOM) où siègent de nombreux responsables politiques somaliens. Une cellule de soutien est également établie à Bruxelles, chargée d'assurer la liaison avec les autorités politiques des Etats membres, les ambassadeurs des 27, ainsi que la direction gestion des crises et planification (CMPD) et l'Etat-Major de l'UE, structures placées sous l'autorité de la Haute représentante de l'UE pour les Affaires étrangères et la Politique de sécurité, Catherine Ashton.

### POUR LE CHEF D'ETAT-MAJOR DE L'ARMÉE DE TERRE OUGANDAISE, EUTM ILLUSTRE AUSSI L'ENGAGEMENT POLITIQUE DE L'UE

Pour le général Edward Katumba Wamala, commandant des forces terrestres ougandaises, cette formation mixte est une excellente contribution. « Sur le terrain à Mogadiscio, nous avons pu constater combien l'armée somalienne souffrait de sérieux manques : au niveau médical, des communications, dans la lutte contre les IED par exemple. Ce que l'équipe de l'Union européenne nous apporte, c'est toute cette expertise. Nous allons ainsi pouvoir faire l'entraînement d'une unité complète ». Mais –ajoute-t-il – cette mission a une signification plus large, « plus politique ». « Le message est clair : le problème somalien est un problème qui concerne chacun d'entre nous et doit être résolu par tous. Ce n'est pas seulement à l'Ouganda ou au Burundi (qui fournissent l'essentiel des forces de l'AMISOM) de le résoudre, ou à l'Union africaine seule, c'est plus large. Chacun peut et doit contribuer à la stabilité de la Somalie. Car la stabilité de la Somalie est une part de la stabilité de nos propres pays ». Et d'ajouter : « Nous ne pouvons fermer les yeux. Si nous faisons cela, notre comportement est incompréhensible. C'est comme quand vous vous êtes au soleil. Ce n'est pas en fermant les yeux que vous n'êtes pas exposés. Plus nous aidons la Somalie, moins nous aurons à souffrir de l'instabilité. »

Pour plus d'informations sur EUTM Somalie : [www.consilium.europa.eu/eutm-somalie](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eutm-somalie)

Et pour plus d'informations sur l'AMISOM : [www.africa-union.org](http://www.africa-union.org)



La Haute Représentante de l'UE, Catherine Ashton, avec le commandant de la mission, le Colonel Elul, en visite dans la région en mai 2010





## EUTM Somalia: contributing to the stability of Somalia

The European Union began its first ever military training mission in May 2010 in Bihanga, Uganda. In total, 15 EU Member States are sending personnel to give special training in a range of areas for two periods of six months to create a unit of elite Somali security forces. Working closely with Uganda and the African Union, the EU also has support from the US as it seeks to train 2,000 Somalis. The EU has put together the training programme with Uganda. Officials from the EU and Uganda meet on a daily basis to work out detailed planning for the training and to deal with practical issues. The EU works with trainees with a higher rank while the Ugandans will focus on giving young recruits basic training. Over the course of a six-month training period, the EU and Uganda will then combine their efforts to create complete units.

The EU sets up around nine or ten training teams, some of which are made up of personnel from one Member States and others from two Member States. The specialised training modules include countering Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), communications and Fighting in Built-Up Areas (FIBUA). The recruits for the training come from all over Somalia and have been selected on the basis of criteria laid down by the EU and by the TFG. The trainee forces are not permanently armed and have to hand back their training weapons after each training exercise. The ultimate aim of the mission is to provide the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) with well-trained local security forces to help them keep control of the capital of Somalia, Mogadishu, and to contribute to the TFG as a functioning government serving the Somali citizens.

## Quelques étapes qui ont conduit au lancement d'EUTM

- **23 avril 2009**, lors d'une conférence internationale à Bruxelles, l'Union européenne et la Communauté internationale s'engagent à aider la Somalie : 213 millions de dollars US dont la moitié provient de l'UE et de ses Etats membres ;
- **26 mai 2009**, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies adopte la résolution 1872 qui appelle les Etats à « offrir une assistance technique pour la formation et l'équipement des forces de sécurité somaliennes » ;
- **Fin mai 2009**, le Haut représentant de l'UE pour la politique étrangère, Javier Solana, écrit aux Etats membres pour rappeler l'urgence d'une action européenne ;
- **27 juillet 2009**, le Conseil de l'UE appelle à « renforcer la participation de l'UE aux efforts déployés en faveur de la paix et du développement en Somalie » et « étudier les possibilités qui s'offrent à l'UE pour contribuer aux efforts de la communauté internationale, notamment dans le domaine de la sécurité » ;
- **17 novembre 2009**, le Conseil de l'UE approuve le concept de gestion de crise sur « une éventuelle mission PESD visant à contribuer à la formation des forces de sécurité du Gouvernement fédéral de transition (GFT) somalien » et demande que des « travaux de planification complémentaires soient menés » ;
- **5 janvier 2010**, le ministre de la défense ougandais salue l'initiative de l'UE quant à une mission de soutien aux forces de sécurité somaliennes et invite l'UE à participer aux efforts de formation des forces de sécurité du gouvernement fédéral de transition qui se déroulent en Ouganda ;
- **20 janvier 2010**, l'UE propose formellement au gouvernement somalien de contribuer à la formation des forces de sécurité somaliennes ;
- **25 janvier 2010**, le Conseil des ministres des Affaires étrangères de l'UE décide de « mettre sur pied une mission militaire pour contribuer à la formation des forces de sécurité somaliennes en Ouganda ». Parallèlement, arrivent en Ouganda, les premières équipes chargées de la planification et de l'installation de la mission ;
- **7 avril 2010**, l'UE donne officiellement son feu vert au lancement de la mission de formation militaire dénommée « EUTM Somalia » ;
- **5 mai 2010**, la pleine capacité opérationnelle de la mission (Full operational capability) est déclarée, les formations peuvent commencer.

## Interview

Colonel Ricardo Gonzalez Elul, Mission Commander of EUTM Somalia, about the training mission



### HOW WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE THE START OF THE MISSION?

The mission was launched on schedule. From the European Union point of view, there was no delay at all. There have certainly been some delays in some infrastructure works within the EU Camp in Bihanga, due mainly to weather conditions and the unavailability of certain specific materials in the local market. Although they represented some slight inconveniences, these delays haven't, in any way, jeopardized the declaration of the EUTM Somalia Full Operational Capability (FOC). The delay in the reception of some Somali soldiers was mainly due to the situation on the ground in Somalia. When you put in place a new procedure, with the intervention of different actors, in the framework of an unstable situation, there are always circumstances that can slow down the process. We have learned a lot already and have slightly modified the whole process, clarifying roles and responsibilities. We are confident that this will bear results for the second intake.

### CAN YOU DESCRIBE THE CHALLENGES YOU ARE FACING?

The first challenge is to work in a new and quite different environment. We are all Europeans, and we tend to think according to European standards. We are working in Africa, where some standards are slightly different. Take for example the concept of time. We are used to thinking of time in terms of the clock and calendar. We like to work within deadlines and we like to stick to them. After some time working here, you realise there

is a different sense of time and you have to start taking this into account when making your plans.


The second main challenge is to train people from very different backgrounds. A number of them have already received some kind of basic military training, either from one of the African nations involved or from a European nation. Others have received no previous training at all. Some of them have had experience on the ground, some of them not. When they are transferred to the EU trainers, you need to do a thorough assessment on the trainees' backgrounds and try to achieve a balance. The final results of the specialised training modules which we are responsible for will depend on this balancing work. Without doubt, the EU has gathered together an extraordinary group of very experienced soldiers that are able to face all these challenges. They are very experienced not only in the subject areas covered by the EU training modules, but also in how to train both the Ugandan trainers and the Somali trainees. The second purpose of the training we are providing is to 'train the trainers'. We expect that, at the end of the EU Mission, the Ugandan Defense Forces, on behalf of the African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM), will be able to conduct the training programs themselves. I have no doubt but that the final output will achieve all expectations.

### EUTM TAKES PLACE IN UGANDA. WHY NOT IN MOGADISHU ITSELF?

EUTM is one more of several training efforts that are taking place by different countries and organizations. In this specific case, we

Colonel Elul at the Bihanga camp: "The EUTM is part of the comprehensive action conducted by the EU in the Horn of Africa to deal with the Somali crisis."





EUTM is one more of several training efforts that are taking place by different countries and organisations

complement the training provided by the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF). They are in charge of the basic training while the EU Mission takes the responsibility for the specialized one. The UPDF, being quite aware of the situation on the ground, as AMISOM main contributor, identified some areas in which they lack the expertise needed for certain specialized training. The EUTM Somalia training modules for Non-Commissioned officers, Junior Officers, Communications, Fighting in Built-Up Areas and Combat Life Saver follow the needs expressed by the UPDF. The training provided by the UPDF takes place in Uganda, therefore it is natural that the EU mission which complements that of the UPDF should take place in Uganda also.

#### HOW DO YOU COORDINATE WITH THE UPDF AND AMISOM?

We are in close and continuous contact with both organizations. Regarding the UPDF, I personally have a direct line with General Wamala, Chief of the Ugandan Land Forces and, on a daily basis, they have a Liaison Officer specifically dedicated to the Mission. Apart from that, there are frequent functional contacts that take place on a case by case basis. Regarding AMISOM, we have a Liaison Office located in Nairobi that is in permanent contact with AMISOM HQ there.

#### CAN WE SAY THAT EUTM CHARACTERIZES THE EU COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TOWARDS SOMALIA?

EUTM Somalia is part of the comprehensive action conducted by the EU in the Horn of Africa to deal with the Somali crisis, which has political, security and humanitarian aspects. The EU and its Member States continue to help stabilize Somalia by providing support to vital and priority areas such as the security sector. In this framework, the EU is supporting the AMISOM financially, in terms of planning and capacity building, in order to increase the efficiency of the Somali Security Sector. EUTM Somalia is the EU response to some specialized gaps AMISOM identified while training the Somali Army. Therefore we can say it is the contribution

to the strengthening of the security sector in the framework of the comprehensive effort the EU is developing towards Somalia.

#### WHAT IS THE BIGGEST DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THIS MISSION AND OTHER OPERATIONS YOU HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN?

Every mission is different. There are no two similar missions. Each one has its own characteristics and peculiarities. In all of them the environment is one main factor. The environment of EUTM Somalia, both physical and human is totally new for most of EUTM Somalia personnel. The fact that this is a military training mission (non-executive) is also something very new. We are not performing patrols nor escorting humanitarian aid nor providing a safe and secure environment and so on and so forth. We are just training in a positive, permissive, favorable environment with almost no concern apart from those directly derived from the task and the general ones about security – which remains a Host Nation primary responsibility –, logistics, etc.


#### WHAT ARE YOUR PERSONAL FEELINGS ABOUT EUTM?

I think that, at the end of this 12 month mission, EUTM Somalia will have provided two assets:

- A group of up to 2,000 well-trained Somali soldiers, organized up to platoon level that, properly led, could form the spine of a larger Army that could enable the Transitional Federal Government to regain full control of Somalia.
- UPDF soldiers capable of providing the same level of specialized training that EUTM Somalia trainers have performed.

Apart from that, the EU will have shown the African Union, that is to say Africa and indeed beyond that the EU is really committed to finding a comprehensive lasting solution to the problems of Somalia. ■

Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah of Mauritania has been UN Special Representative for Somalia since September 2007. On 9 June 2010, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed Augustine P. Mahiga of the United Republic of Tanzania from July 2010 as successor



## Interview

### AHMEDOU OULD-ABDALLAH, AS THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR SOMALIA AND THE HEAD OF THE UNITED NATIONS POLITICAL OFFICE FOR SOMALIA (UNPOS), WHAT WAS YOUR ROLE?

My basic role, and that of the UNPOS office is to advance peace and reconciliation in Somalia. During my three years in office, I have been working on making progress in the political process particularly through the Djibouti Peace Agreement signed in August 2008 which resulted in an expanded Parliament and more inclusive Government. The Agreement, the first of its kind on Somalia not originating from a specific regional state, is fully backed by the United Nations, the African Union, the League of Arab States, the Organization of Islamic Conference, and the European Union. It was also witnessed by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, with IGAD actively supporting its implementation.

To date, significant progress has been made with respect to the Constitution, of which a first draft is due to be presented by 1 July 2010, to coincide with the 50th anniversary of the country's independence.

I have also been working with other international partners to support the training and retention of the security forces. My role also includes coordinating all the activities of the UN in Somalia and to mobilise resources

### HOW OPTIMISTIC ARE YOU THAT YOU CAN ACHIEVE THE GOAL OF RESTORING PEACE IN SOMALIA?

I am always optimistic about the future of Somalia. It would be difficult to carry out this role otherwise. I believe that the people of Somalia, after 20 years of fighting, are yearning for peace. I think this is particularly true of the displaced and refugees

who long to return home. There is a small minority who want the fighting to continue because they profit from it but they will not win in the long run and will be brought to justice. The international community, in particular, the European Union, has a very important role to play both in the political and security areas and the training program currently underway in Uganda for 2000 Somali troops is very much welcome.

### SECRETARY-GENERAL BAN KI-MOON TOLD AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOMALIA, HELD IN ISTANBUL FROM 21 TO 23 MAY, THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST ACT QUICKLY TO END THE CRISIS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA NATION OR THE VIOLENCE MAY EXPAND TO THE COUNTRY'S NEIGHBOURS AND BEYOND. WHAT ARE THE MAIN RESULTS OF THE ISTANBUL CONFERENCE?

This was an extremely important conference which was co-convened by the UN Secretary General and the government of Turkey. One of the most interesting aspects of the conference was the bringing together of the Somali business community with key members of the international business community. This allowed the businessmen and women to make important contacts and for the international community to hear about the progress and opportunities in Somalia.

As proposed in the Istanbul Declaration, issued at the end of the conference, a task force has been set up to devise a mechanism to bring together development partners and agencies to respond to Somalia's critical needs pending the stabilisation of the country. This task force, which was chaired by the SRSG and included the African Development Bank, Islamic Development Bank, World Bank France, Norway, Turkey, the UK and US among others discussed the way forward and ways of working with the Somali private sector. ■

## United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS)

The Secretary-General established the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) on 15 April 1995, to help him advance the cause of peace and reconciliation through contacts with Somali leaders, civic organizations and the States and organizations concerned. In view of the difficult security situation inside Somalia, UNPOS has been working from Nairobi, Kenya. The Head of the office is the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Somalia, who closely monitors the situation in and relating to Somalia and assists the Secretary-General provide periodic briefings and written reports to the Security Council every four months.

[www.unpos.unmissions.org](http://www.unpos.unmissions.org)

## Commandants pour EUNAVFOR

Un nouveau commandant d'opération pour EUNAVFOR-Atalanta a pris ses fonctions, le 14 juin. Le général britannique Buster Howes a ainsi succédé au contre-amiral Peter Hudson. Issu du corps des Royal Marines, Buster Howes a servi sur plusieurs terrains difficiles (Irlande du Nord, Irak et Afghanistan). Il a comme adjoint le contre-amiral allemand Thomas Josef Ernst, spécialiste de la surveillance aérienne et ancien pilote de patrouilleur maritime.

Sur zone, jusqu'à la mi-août, c'est le contre-amiral suédois Jan Thörnqvist qui assure le commandement de la force à bord du HMS Carlskrona. Il sera relayé à la mi-août par le Français Philippe Coindreau à bord de la frégate De Grasse.



# EUNAVFOR-Atalanta : 18 mois et un bilan appréciable pour l'« opération soeur » d'EUTM

Les ministres des Affaires étrangères de l'Union européenne ont décidé, le 14 juin 2010, de prolonger pour deux ans supplémentaires l'opération européenne anti-piraterie « EUNAVFOR-Atalanta », déployée au large de la Somalie depuis décembre 2008. Ils ont également approuvé le principe de l'extension, à l'automne, de sa zone d'opération vers l'Est, en direction de l'Inde, et vers le Sud. Une extension rendue nécessaire pour s'adapter au champ d'action des pirates. Depuis un an, une dizaine d'attaques et six détournements de navires ont eu lieu hors de la zone couverte par EUNAVFOR.

Après 18 mois de présence dans le Golfe d'Aden et l'Océan indien, l'opération navale de l'UE a, en effet, affirmé sa présence. Les forces européennes ont ainsi assuré l'accompagnement de 73 bateaux du Programme alimentaire mondial (PAM), permettant ainsi d'acheminer vers la Somalie plus de 400.000 tonnes d'aide alimentaire, sans encombre. Ceci a permis de nourrir chaque jour environ 1,6 millions de Somaliens. Un résultat notable par rapport à la situation qui prévalait avant le lancement de l'opération de l'UE, qui avait vu le PAM obligé d'interrompre ses livraisons, faute d'escorte.

EUNAVFOR a également assuré l'accompagnement de 52 navires approvisionnant la mission de l'Union africaine en Somalie (AMISOM). Ces deux missions mobilisent, environ 30% des forces d'EUNAVFOR-Atalanta. Aucun de ces navires n'a été capturé par les pirates.

Dans le Golfe d'Aden, les navires européens continuent d'assurer la surveillance du corridor international de transit des navires marchands (IRTC). Ce qui a permis de limiter au minimum les attaques réussies. Seuls trois navires ont ainsi été détournés par les pirates depuis juin 2009 dans le corridor. Dans le bassin somalien, trop vaste pour pratiquer une surveillance aussi étroite, la politique continue de dissuasion active a permis de désarmer environ 70 groupes de pirates et d'éviter entre 15 et 20 prises supplémentaires.

Environ 20 navires et avions prennent part à l'opération européenne, impliquant environ 1800 personnes. Une dizaine d'Etats membres de l'UE contribuent ainsi régulièrement (Belgique, Espagne, France, Allemagne, Luxembourg, Pays-Bas, Grèce, Italie, Suède et Portugal). Et une dizaine d'autres complètent le dispositif ou envoient des personnels au quartier général de l'opération, situé à Northwood au Royaume-Uni. Quatre Etats non-membres de l'UE ont choisi également de participer à l'opération EUNAVFOR et y ont envoyé ou s'approprient à y envoyer des moyens (Norvège, Croatie, Monténégro et Ukraine).

Pour assurer la coordination au quotidien, les Européens ont mis au point un dispositif sécurisé (appelé « Mercury ») qu'ils partagent avec les autres forces multinationales (CTF 151, OTAN) ou nationales (Russie, Inde, Chine...) présentes sur zone. Ce système, simple et pratique, permet à toutes les forces actives d'avoir immédiatement les renseignements nécessaires sur les positions de chacun et d'échanger des informations. Tous les mois, les principaux commandants d'opérations se rencontrent à Bahrein au sein du mécanisme « SHADE » (Shared Awareness and Deconfliction). Des rencontres qui permettent d'échanger les pratiques optimales, de tenir des discussions informelles et d'harmoniser certaines activités de pays et d'organisations participant aux différentes opérations militaires de lutte contre la piraterie dans la région.

L'Union européenne a aussi signé des accords de transfert des pirates avec deux pays bordant l'Océan indien, le Kenya et les Seychelles. Des négociations ont été entamées avec d'autres pays de la région.

**Plus d'informations sur EUNAVFOR-Atalanta :**  
[www.consilium.europa.eu/eunavfor-somalia](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eunavfor-somalia)  
[www.eunavfor.eu](http://www.eunavfor.eu)



The EU's response was fast. The first ECHO experts arrived in Haiti only 14 hours after the earthquake

## Crisis response to the Haiti earthquake – an EU SITCEN perspective

The Brussels-based EU Situation Centre (EU SITCEN) monitors and assesses international events 24 hours a day, seven days a week. With the Lisbon Treaty having just come into force and no European External Action Service in place, the devastating 2010 Haiti earthquake was a big challenge. Among the various EU players involved, how was SITCEN able to help?

The EU SITCEN Duty Officer received the first news alert about the Haiti earthquake at 23.01 CET (Central European Time) on 12 January 2010. Following procedures, he called the SITCEN Crisis Response Manager (an experienced SITCEN official who was on stand-by), who made the assessment that the catastrophic earthquake could also be politically significant for the EU.

The EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), Catherine Ashton, was alerted about what had happened shortly after midnight. In order to speed up the response time, the EU SITCEN management decided to keep the HR and other decision-makers regularly updated about the latest developments. The Duty

Officer also contacted the Commissions' Monitoring Information Centre (MIC) and the DG RELEX Crisis Room to ensure that they were also aware of the event.

As is normal with any significant crisis, EU SITCEN stepped up its collection, processing and reporting efforts with regard to the situation in Haiti, mainly using open source intelligence. The EU SITCEN also activated its web-based information-sharing tools, both for general crisis information and for consular information. On these web sites, information such as situation reports and other documents from a variety of sources were published, ensuring an up-to-date flow of information.

### EU SITCEN STAFF DEPLOYED TO HAITI

It soon became clear that the information flows covering the situation on the ground were not adequate, not least because of the damage done to the local infrastructure and the losses suffered by the EU (the EU Head of Delegation was rapidly evacuated by medical services, the Chargé d'Affaires was killed, several staff were injured and the EU Delegation building itself was

seriously damaged). With the agreement of the High Representative, two EU SITCEN personnel were despatched to Haiti to gather information, (with a focus on non-humanitarian issues) and to help the EU Presidency deal with consular issues.

When the EU SITCEN team arrived on 18 January, the situation on the ground was chaotic. Hundreds of thousands of people were dead or injured, and residences and public buildings had collapsed or were severely damaged. Communication systems, air, land, and sea transport facilities, hospitals, and electrical networks had been damaged by the earthquake. General confusion as to who was in charge, air traffic congestion and problems with the prioritisation of flights further complicated relief work in the early stages.

An improvised EU SITCEN corner was speedily set up in an office located in the logistics base of the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) outside Haiti's capital Port-au-Prince. The MINUSTAH HQ had been totally destroyed by the earthquake. The EU SITCEN team's primary task was to support the Spanish EU Presidency, which



was coordinating the evacuation of all EU citizens, providing them with information from Brussels, including via the SITCEN's web-based information-sharing tools.

The team also took part in all the meetings which the EU Presidency and the EU Delegation were invited to. Tasks were adapted to the new UN coordination structures and the team took part in the various coordination meetings with all the UN actors on the ground, both on a strategic and operational level. Additionally, the team established contact with all other EU entities deployed in theatre (the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO) and MIC), with a view to ensuring that all of them had a common information picture.

When the EU SITCEN team arrived in Haiti, the communication network was almost completely out of action. There was no land line, mobile phones did not work (only SMS messages did) and there was limited internet access. Satellite phone was the only means of voice communication available for the first ten days. As the local internet network was fragile, the EU SITCEN team deployed its own satellite antenna and benefited from Spanish embassy support, allowing the team to report in real time to EU SITCEN in Brussels.

The team was assisted by its Travelling Communicator, who set up a communication centre to ensure that minimum security standards were in place for personnel, equipment and documentation. He also

permanently managed the information flow to and from Brussels.

### BRUSSELS COORDINATION: EUCO HAITI CREATED

Back in Brussels, there was a lot of discussion about how far military assets could contribute to the relief effort, with many Member States considering dispatching military forces in addition to their rapid and immediate dispatch of civil protection assets. At about this moment, the United Nations made a detailed request for police units to join MINUSTAH and to assist it with its security role and for military units (mainly in the field of logistics and mobility) to assist the relief effort.

In order to assist with the non-humanitarian aspects of the relief effort (civil protection and humanitarian assistance being coordinated by MIC and ECHO) the Foreign Affairs Council agreed on 25 January to the High Representative's proposal to set up a light crisis coordination cell in Brussels, called EUCO Haiti. The purpose of EUCO Haiti was to "facilitate the coordination of EU response in the military and security domains, complementing existing arrangements for information exchange."

Directly under the authority of the High Representative, SITCEN, which had already been made responsible for summarising information, was sitting alongside the other CSDP services and offered a 24/7 capability, provided a readily available and

appropriate home for EUCO Haiti. The cell was manned by military and police experts from the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and the Civil Conduct and Planning Capability (CPCC) and by SITCEN staff. Later on, the cell was strengthened by staff from the European Gendarmerie Force.

EUCO Haiti collected information from the UN on its precise needs and from the Member States on their offers before trying to match them. It was also looking out for opportunities for synergies between Member States' offers, including in the field of transport. The cell also focused on situation awareness, information-sharing and the information flow between actors in the field and the headquarters in Brussels and elsewhere in Europe. EUCO Haiti was in permanent contact with the deployed EU SITCEN staff in Haiti, working closely with each other, and with other bodies, in particular the MIC.

### HUMANITARIAN DISASTER OFTEN HAS POLITICAL, SECURITY, POLICE AND CONSULAR ELEMENTS

The way in which the Haiti crisis developed was a reminder that a humanitarian disaster often has political, security, police and consular elements. It was also the first time that crisis response and crisis management measures had taken place under the Lisbon Treaty and under the leadership of the new HR. Although new procedures in line with the Lisbon Treaty were not yet in place, the spirit of the Lisbon Treaty was in evidence. ■

## Facts about the EU Situation Centre (EU SITCEN)

The EU SITCEN monitors and assesses international events 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Focus lies on sensitive geographical areas, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The information and evaluations provided by EU SITCEN are of a civilian and military nature, covering all aspects of EU crisis management.

The EU SITCEN's five main functions are to:

- monitor situations and events,
- issue early warning,
- provide crisis response facilities (Crisis Task Forces),
- produce situation and risk assessments,
- act as operational contact for the High Representative.

The EU SITCEN is also the EU focal point for Situation Centres/Crisis Cells in Member States and in international organisations (UN, OSCE, NATO etc.), as well as in relevant third countries.

The EU SITCEN acquired its analysis and assessment functions in 2002. It has three units: the Operations Unit, the Analysis Unit and the Consular Affairs Unit.

The EU SITCEN is currently part of the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, under the authority of Catherine Ashton, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

The EU SITCEN will be transferred to the European External Action Service (EEAS) when it is established.

Environ un million d'Haïtiens ont perdu leur domicile à cause du séisme du 12 janvier 2010



## EUCO Haïti et la réponse du SITCEN

L'activité et le déploiement rapide du personnel du SITCEN ont permis à l'UE de disposer d'informations précises en provenance du terrain, et ce en temps réel. C'est en son sein qu'a été créée la cellule de coordination pour Haïti (EUCO Haïti). Parmi ses tâches, cette cellule était en charge de recueillir les différentes informations venant des Nations unies sur les premiers besoins et, parallèlement, sur ce que les Etats membres étaient en mesure de fournir pour y répondre. L'idée pour EUCO Haïti étant de faire coïncider ces besoins et les aides à apporter de la manière la plus coordonnée possible, par exemple en matière de transport.

Depuis 2002, le SITCEN assure le suivi et l'analyse continus des événements internationaux. Il fournit une alerte précoce au Haut représentant de l'UE et aux autres structures de gestion de crises. Il fournit les éléments de réponse aux crises (équipes spéciales) et sert de contact opérationnel au Haut Représentant. Son action est concentrée sur les régions sensibles, le terrorisme et la prolifération des armes de destruction massive. Le SITCEN est aussi un point de contact de l'UE pour les centres de situation nationaux, les organisations internationales (ONU, OSCE, OTAN) et certains pays non membres de l'UE.

Avec l'entrée en vigueur du traité de Lisbonne, le SITCEN va être intégré au Service européen pour l'action extérieure. Il est placé sous l'autorité directe du Haut Représentant.

## The EU's response to the Haiti earthquake

The earthquake in Haiti was a major humanitarian disaster. Besides killing more than 200 000 people, it left some 300 000 injured and one million homeless. It provoked the almost complete disruption of the country and the State.

The EU responded from day one. It was a swift, large-scale and comprehensive response. A process to learn the lessons of the EU's reaction is underway in order to improve consistency, coherence and co-ordination to better cope with such complex disasters that might happen in the future.

The following are some of the main elements of the EU's quick response to the earthquake in Haiti:

- The EU allocated 3 million euro in fast track humanitarian funds within 24 hours.
- The first ECHO humanitarian expert arrived in Port-au-Prince only 14 hours after the earthquake. The EU Civil Protection Mechanism was activated on the same day of the earthquake and a first team of the Civil Protection Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) was deployed on the next day. A team from the EU Situation Centre was dispatched in the following days
- and the Belgian and Luxembourg Search and Rescue Teams were among the first to arrive in theatre.
- An extraordinary session of the Foreign Affairs Council was convened six days after the earthquake. High Representative Ashton was in regular contact with the Haitian authorities and leaders from the international community including US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.
- At the New York Donors Conference on Haiti, on 31 March 2010, the EU's joint combined pledge was 1, 234 billion euro. The EU humanitarian assistance now stands at 460 million euro.
- EU Member States made available over 2 000 troops, providing robust military relief assets, including maritime, air and engineering forces.
- 260 Gendarmerie officers from France, Italy and Spain were deployed to reinforce the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). A coordination cell, EUCO Haiti, was established in the EU SITCEN in Brussels to assist in the coordination of military assets (see the article page 24).

# EDA – AZOR 2010 :

## le plus grand exercice européen d'hélicoptères jamais réalisé



Plus de quarante hélicoptères et sept cent personnes ont participé au premier exercice multinational de l'Agence européenne de défense (AED) conduit du 9 au 24 juin 2010 en Espagne dans le cadre du programme d'entraînement des pilotes d'hélicoptères (HTP). Plusieurs équipages des huit Etats membres participants (Autriche, Belgique, Slovénie, République tchèque, Suède, Royaume-Uni, Italie et Espagne en tant que pays hôte) ont pu s'entraîner sur les tactiques d'opérations dans des milieux chauds, poussiéreux et montagneux ainsi que tester quelques procédures.

A part l'entraînement pour un pré-déploiement intensif, l'exercice a aussi donné aux équipages participants une possibilité unique d'échanger leurs expériences et leurs meilleures pratiques sur des opérations qui se déroulent souvent dans des conditions difficiles et souvent méconnues. « Actuellement, la qualification d'un pilote varie d'un Etat à un autre. Pour les uns, un pilote qualifié est celui qui peut poser et soulever la machine, pour d'autres, pour obtenir cette qualification, il faut remplir des critères prédéfinis. Notre objectif est d'aboutir à une situation où tout le monde sait quels sont les standards d'un pilote qualifié » a expliqué le lieutenant-colonel Andy Gray, responsable du projet d'hélicoptères au sein de l'AED.

L'objectif du programme est d'organiser deux exercices réels par an, l'un portant sur l'entraînement tactique, le deuxième sur l'interopérabilité entre les équipages. A cela, il convient d'ajouter des cours d'anglais opérationnels pour faciliter la communication des personnels déployés. L'AED pourrait jouer ainsi le rôle de coordonateur entre les besoins d'entraînement identifiés par les différents Etats participants et les offres d'entraînement proposées. Elle veillerait également au retour d'expériences de chaque exercice conduit, avec l'objectif ultime de rapprocher les standards d'entraînement et ceux des procédures. Cela conduirait naturellement au renforcement de la confiance et de l'interopérabilité entre les troupes déployées et par là même, à la diminution du risque encouru par les soldats. « Il s'agit de diminuer les risques pour les individus qui vont servir dans les opérations » a estimé le directeur adjoint de l'AED aux opérations, Adam Sowa. « Avec plus d'entraînement, moins de facteurs seront laissés au hasard. C'est pour cela que nous sommes ici » a souligné Carme Chacòn, la ministre espagnole de la défense qui s'est rendue sur le site de San Gregorio près de Saragosse le 17 juin afin de participer à la journée de démonstration organisée au cours de l'exercice.

Plus grand exercice d'hélicoptères organisé depuis la fin de la deuxième guerre mondiale, AZOR 2010 a rassemblé 43 appareils de onze types différents. Le rythme des manœuvres

a été très soutenu, avec plus de 1350 heures au total passées dans l'air par les équipages participants. L'entraînement a été conduit de jour comme de nuit pour assurer tout le spectre des situations rencontrées dans les conditions d'un déploiement réel. « Nous n'avons pas mélangé les équipages. Nous leurs donnions des paramètres différents pour chaque manœuvre, comme l'atterrissage, avec différentes difficultés ou itinéraires » a précisé le colonel José Carbonnel, le commandant d'AZOR 2010. Ensuite, après chaque exercice « nous procédions aux briefings » a-t-il précisé. Les échanges s'effectuaient dans quatre domaines : procédures tactiques et techniques, aspects médicaux, effet « brownout » et maintenance.

La zone de manœuvre comprenait trois sites d'entraînements appartenant aux forces aéromobiles de l'armée espagnole. La base principale de l'exercice était située à Agoncillo offrant six secteurs d'entraînements dans des montagnes de moyenne altitude. Deux bases d'opérations avancées ont offert des possibilités d'entraînements tactiques dans le désert (San Gregorio) et en haute montagne (Santa Cilia).

La planification de l'exercice a été conçue pour répondre aux demandes d'entraînements individuels des pays participants. La Slovénie a, en trois semaines, certifié les capacités de trois équipages pour des opérations d'atterrissage dans le désert et vols de nuit en montagne. « Nos pilotes savent comment effectuer les vols de nuit dans les hautes montagnes » mais « ce qui est important est de parler aux autres Etats pour trouver des procédures communes » a expliqué l'un des capitaines de l'équipe slovène. La Suède a entraîné trois équipages d'hélicoptères Super Pumas pour un prochain déploiement sur le théâtre afghan. Trois autres équipages suédois, qui feront prochainement partie d'un groupement tactique (Battlegroup) de l'UE, ont bénéficié de l'exercice pour s'entraîner dans des conditions qui n'existent pas dans leur pays.

En septembre, l'AED organisera un séminaire sur les leçons apprises de cet exercice ainsi que de son prédécesseur, un exercice d'hélicoptères multinational qui s'était tenu à Gap en mars 2009, durant la présidence française de l'UE. Un nombre d'autres pays participants à l'AED ont déjà exprimé leur intention d'accueillir les exercices suivants. Le Luxembourg décidé de financer le prochain cours de langue anglaise associé au programme. Comme l'exercice tenu à Gap en 2009, AZOR 2010 a été entièrement financé par le Luxembourg.

## Comment

# CSDP outlook for the second half of 2010

On 1 July 2010, Belgium took on the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, for the twelfth time in its history. In Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) matters however, the role of the Presidency has been fundamentally altered since the Treaty of Lisbon came into force on 1 December 2009. And there are other ways in which CSDP in particular is affected by the Lisbon Treaty. So what are, from the Belgian point of view, some of the main driving factors affecting the Common Security and Defence Policy over the next period?

### ACTORS AND INSTRUMENTS

The first driver is the swift and complete implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. The Treaty of course has an impact first of all on the CSDP actors: the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, will act as a kind of Minister for Foreign Affairs with competences extending into the areas of Defence and Development. For example, the High Representative is also the Head of the European Defence Agency.

The High Representative will be supported by a newly created structure, the European External Action Service (EEAS). As the set up of the EEAS is complex, involving parts of Council, the Commission and Member States, the supporting structures to execute the common foreign affairs and security policy are not operational yet.

In the interim, Belgium stands ready to support the High Representative and her services, and sees its role under the "High Representative's leadership" as one of assisting, suggesting and facilitating. Although the transitional phase is likely to continue in the second half of this semester, Belgium aims for a full transition to the new structures during the second half of 2010.

A second driver, also linked to the Lisbon Treaty, is the comprehensive approach. The European Union disposes of many instruments and resources, the new Treaty provides the EU with incentives to bring these elements together to increase the Union's global role. The EEAS will be at the heart of this comprehensive approach. A special emphasis should be put on operationalising and putting into practice this approach in the field.

The civilian-military approach in crisis management could be considered as a sub-item of this aim towards comprehensiveness: the civilian-military approach is a unique feature of the EU that should be further developed. It is Europe's "unique selling proposition".

Finally, a third driver is the decreasing neatness of the distinction between internal and external security. Increasingly it is becoming difficult to separate the two. The new Treaty contains a mutual assistance clause and also a solidarity clause. While the first clause is applicable immediately, implementing the latter will bring to the fore the increasing linkages between

internal and external security. In addition, security and defence are not self-contained: CSDP is not only an integral part of Common Foreign and Security Policy but also interacts closely with domestic policy domains.

External security can have a direct impact on internal security and vice versa. This interaction should be further explored, debated and explained to the public. There are also links between security and development and between climate change and security.



### THE OUTLOOK FOR THE COMING MONTHS

With the first driver in mind, Belgium is fully dedicated to supporting the High Representative in conducting Common Security and Defence Policy. The work programme has been elaborated, coordinated and adjusted in support of and in close understanding with the High Representative and her services.

What are the highlights of that programme? First of all there is of course the work with regard to civilian missions and military operations. EU missions and operations are crucial instruments of CSDP and the most visible expression of the European Union's ambitions as a global actor. Despite the momentous progress and the successful conduct of numerous operations in the past decade, serious challenges lie ahead.

In general, the context and performance of all missions requires continuous attention, Force generation is also a constant challenge. In the second half of 2010, formal decisions need to be taken on the renewal of the mandate of several missions (EUMM Georgia, EUPOL DRC, EUSEC DRC, EUPOL COPPS, EUFOR Althea and EUNAVFOR-Atalanta). Other missions remain high on the political agenda.

The extent to which the European Union will be able to act more decisively greatly depends on the military and civilian capabilities. One of the new instruments in the Treaty of Lisbon is permanent structured cooperation (PESCO). This framework provides opportunities for EU Member States to better cooperate in the domain of capability development. There is a conviction that more synergies can be attained through permanent structured cooperation.

It should lead to operational advantages, and mitigate the current duplications. The intent is to move towards a common political view and understanding before discussions start in a later phase on the modalities and technical criteria. A seminar



Belgian Frigate Louise-Marie is part of the EUNAVFOR-Atalanta operation

early in July will try to stimulate the thoughts in that direction. Also in the capability field, the way ahead about the civilian and military Headline Goal 2010 needs to be debated as they will “expire” this year. It is an excellent opportunity to explore the coherence and synergies between the two processes.

Training, either civilian or military, is another important strand that is essential to the successful conduct of missions and operations. The challenges lie at all levels, from the strategic down to the pre-deployment tactical training. Lessons from missions and operations give us signals that the time has come for adapting the training policy and concept following the operational experience of the past years. A seminar on training will look at the challenges to be addressed.

In the domain of partnerships, in addition to relations between the European Union and the United Nations, EU-NATO relations will continue to be a main point of attention, with a particular stress on concrete measures to increase the mutual cooperation. The approach is capability-oriented, with a substantial input for the EU-NATO Capability Group. Progress is also needed in other areas, such as effective EU-NATO security arrangements in missions.

The relations with Africa and especially with the African Union (AU) are one of the other priorities. EU and AU need to meet and continue to work together at the politico-military level. Members of the EUMC are invited to visit Uganda and Addis Ababa, combining a visit to the EU training mission of Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia) with a visit to the Headquarters of the AU.

Finally, Operation EUNAVFOR-Atalanta has opened many doors for cooperation with a number of strategic partners active in the Somali basin and the Gulf of Aden. We should find ways to build and develop this cooperation.

In conclusion, the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty as well as the day to day work on missions and operations, capability development and partnerships are central axes for the coming months. Belgium sees its role as one of fully supporting the High Representative in achieving these tasks.

Walter Stevens  
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## Essay

André Dumoulin

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# Crise financière et économie de défense : quelle solution ?

L'Allemagne vient de décider de couper dans les dépenses de l'Etat avec un plan sur quatre ans, impliquant, entre autres, une réduction des effectifs et probablement des équipements. En France, les armées vont devoir économiser 5 milliards d'euros en trois ans. En Belgique, le plan de restructuration poursuit son objectif difficile de rééquilibrer les dépenses alors que ce pays est, après la Slovaquie, celui qui consacre le plus faible pourcentage de ses dépenses de défense au renouvellement de son matériel militaire. Et n'oublions pas la Grèce qui, au vu de sa situation économique intérieure, va être dans l'obligation de revoir ses dépenses militaires.

L'OTAN travaille sur une réduction de ses structures pour des motifs budgétaires et politiques. Quant à l'Union européenne, elle veut installer, dès 2011, la surveillance préventive des budgets nationaux. Les déficits publics sont dans le collimateur de Bruxelles. L'objectif général est bien la nouvelle gouvernance budgétaire. Les programmations militaires pluriannuelles, les planifications en matière d'équipements, les politiques de restructuration des forces et autre « Transformation » vont être particulièrement déstabilisées par la crise économique-financière.

Bref, les lignes bougent et vite. La difficulté principale est que la crise économique-financière actuelle – sorte de « surprise stratégique » – va avoir des effets importants sur les budgets de la défense (qui sont déjà souvent pris comme variable d'ajustement). Le premier risque majeur, si la crise devait s'aggraver, pourrait voir apparaître un affaiblissement général de la crédibilité

européenne via le repli national, le décrochage technologique et capacitaire, la remise en cause du modèle des forces et l'impossibilité pour l'UE de faire autre chose que de la Soft Security. Le second risque serait que les audaces inscrites au traité de Lisbonne ne se concrétisent pas, rendant impossible une symétrisation entre l'Agence européenne de défense (qu'il faut booster) et les multiples agences de l'OTAN (qu'il faut réformer et rationaliser), avant de les mettre « en contact ». Déjà, la littérature s'interroge sur l'avenir et la crédibilité de la Politique de Sécurité et de Défense Commune (PSDC)<sup>2</sup> de l'UE, dès lors que certains Etats jouent dans le

**« La difficulté principale est que la crise économique-financière actuelle – sorte de « surprise stratégique » va avoir des effets importants sur les budgets de la défense. »**

relationnel bilatéral privilégié, se méfient de l'Agence européenne de défense (AED) ou privilégient l'Alliance atlantique. Mais les débats ne sont plus idéologiques ou théologiques comme dans les années 1990. Ils sont principalement budgétaires. Les soucis d'argent existent dans toutes les capitales et renvoient à la gestion des mégastuctures otaniennes autant qu'au gaspillage des organes sécuritaires

européens ne disposant pas de grand quartier général civilo-militaire permanent.

On perçoit combien les prochains mois seront ceux des débats concernant la contraction du format des organisations et des structures hiérarchiques, engageant aussi des tensions autour des localisations de postes et d'effectifs. On imagine également la difficulté à clarifier le dossier de déploiement anti-missile durant cette cure d'austérité dont on imagine difficilement la sortie.

Cette réalité économique aura inévitablement des effets sur les effectifs mais aussi et surtout sur l'ampleur de la présence civilo-militaire en missions extérieures. La renationalisation des politiques de défense sera la principale menace à la solidarité et au partage des tâches, des risques et des missions.

Mais une fenêtre d'opportunité pourrait également s'ouvrir ... par défaut. La profondeur de la crise va imposer aux décideurs politiques, militaires et économiques de rechercher de nouvelles synergies sous peine de voir s'effiloche ce qui a été construit depuis plus de dix ans dans le champ européen à travers la PESD. Les problèmes budgétaires peuvent donc être « une chance », peut-être la dernière. Cela doit inciter à lancer de nouvelles synergies, mutualisations, coopérations renforcées de manière dynamique et audacieuse dans le champ de la sécurité-défense. Certes, cela impose une convergence des besoins, mais déjà nous pouvons constater que les lacunes et objectifs

## The financial crisis and defence savings: what can be done?

Member States like Germany, France, Belgium and Greece are all looking to cut their military expenditure in the light of the economic and financial crisis, which could lead to the EU being unable to do anything other than soft security. There is also a danger that innovations in the Lisbon Treaty do not see the light of day or that cooperation between the European Defence Agency and NATO does not go as far as it could.

Rather than renationalising defence spending or working in small groups, the key to getting out of the crisis lies in Permanent Structured Cooperation (PSC), which is set out in the Treaty of Lisbon. "Small" countries stand to benefit from economies of scale while countries such as France, Germany and the UK would see their credibility as major players strengthened. Mutual trust as well as shared and well thought out initiatives are of key importance here.

1 Cet article n'engage pas l'institution de rattachement

2 Appelée Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense (PESD) jusqu'à l'entrée en vigueur du traité de Lisbonne le 1er décembre 2009.

« Toute mesure de protection de la monnaie européenne < impose > en quelque sorte une maturation collective en matière de sécurité ».

capacitaires sont du même ordre à l'UE et à l'OTAN. L'urgence est là au vu des contraintes budgétaires. Rappelons-nous que les convergences monétaires (soutien à l'euro et politique économique commune) et militaires (mutualisation) au niveau européen participent du même processus de construction de tout Etat moderne. L'un ne va pas sans l'autre. Toute mesure de protection de la monnaie européenne « impose » en quelque sorte une maturation collective en matière de sécurité.

Concrètement, il nous faut atteindre une taille critique par le partage capacitaire et les spécialisations. Sans de fortes mutualisations et niches capacitaires, l'édifice s'écroulera, quand bien même Britanniques et Français se jugent les plus pertinents en matière d'équipements, de budget militaire et de réputation opérationnelle. Paris et Londres sont déjà entraînés dans la spirale des économies forcées. Et même si ces deux Etats souhaitent renforcer davantage encore leurs synergies bilatérales, la défense européenne ne peut se faire à deux, si la politique étrangère s'organise à Vingt-Sept. C'est tout le débat sur la confiance

entre partenaires et entre alliés, mis aussi des efforts partagés et bien pensés.

La clef fondamentale pour s'en sortir par le haut ne passe évidemment pas par la renationalisation ou les petits directoires. Elle doit venir du lancement urgent de la coopération structurée permanente (CSP) inscrite dans le traité de Lisbonne. La volonté politique doit exister pour ce faire, dépassant les méfiances nationales, sortant de l'inclusif utopique autant que de l'élitisme ostracisant.

Les « petits » pays à niches n'auront aucune difficulté à être convaincus des économies d'échelle que peuvent amener mutualisation et convergence capacitaire, tout en exprimant au profit de tous leurs compétences spécifiques.

L'objectif, au final, est de programmer « ensemble » et « malin » parce qu'au-delà des ambitions nationales et des spécificités géographiques et historiques, nous sommes « dans le même navire ». Quant à l'intégration culturelle militaire (Collège européen de sécurité et de défense et « Erasmus militaire ») et aux convergences et coopérations industrielles, elles vont aussi devoir consolider leurs synergies, organiser les regroupements, renforcer les partages d'expérience, soutenir et protéger les coopérations. Il n'est d'ailleurs pas impossible que ce soient les industriels de défense qui donnent le ton et la direction ; pragmatisme, protection des acquis, survie et crédibilité obligent.

Dans cet espace géopolitique européen où s'organise sous nos yeux, certes parfois

« Reste à déterminer si les décideurs ont la volonté politique de se risquer à faire confiance au partenaire par le partage d'une certaine souveraineté pluridimensionnelle. C'est cela une véritable communauté de défense et de destin. »

Quant aux Français, aux Allemands et aux Britanniques ou pour le triangle de Weimar, cette CSP doit renforcer leur crédibilité d'acteur majeur, leur volonté de garder la maîtrise du processus ou leur souhait que cette coopération s'organise en synergie avec leurs autres coopérations bilatérales des plus pragmatiques. Il ne s'agit plus de tergiverser mais de construire davantage d'intégration politique européenne.

difficilement, la complémentarité apaisée entre la PSDC et une OTAN rénovée, les politiques de défense nationales n'auront de pertinence et d'avenir que si elles se « marient ». Reste à déterminer si les décideurs ont la volonté politique de se risquer à faire confiance au partenaire par le partage d'une certaine souveraineté pluridimensionnelle. C'est cela une véritable communauté de défense et de destin.

8 junio 2010

Repetidamente en la historia de nuestra nación, los americanos han afrontado momentos de transición y le han sabido dar forma. Este debe ser uno de esos momentos". Con esta frase arrancaba la Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional estadounidense presentada el pasado 27 de mayo ante el Congreso. Coherente con la política que hemos observado en estos 16 meses de mandato – diálogo, compromiso internacional, no proliferación nuclear y desarme – la fuerza del documento estriba en su posicionamiento. La estrategia rompe claramente con la de su predecesor y ofrece una concepción amplia de lo que significa para el presidente la seguridad nacional. [...]

Mantiene la idea de servicio a una misión histórica: la de asumir la importante labor de Estados Unidos para garantizar la seguridad global. Pero se distancia notoriamente en la forma y el fondo de como la entendían sus predecesores en la Casa Blanca. Obama declara que la era de la hegemonía estadounidense ha terminado. En un mundo con diferentes focos de poder e intereses diversos, los desafíos globales necesitan de la cooperación.

El enfoque en seguridad amplía sus miras y propone las tres D: diplomacia, defensa y desarrollo, como partes indisolubles de un todo. La dimensión militar de las intervenciones en el extranjero pierde su papel privilegiado y da cabida a la prevención de conflictos, a las operaciones de mantenimiento de paz y a la estabilización. En la lucha antiterrorista, se abandona la visión predominantemente militar que subyacía en la guerra contra el terror y abraza una visión que centra el foco en el papel de los servicios de inteligencia. Por primera vez, se menciona con precisión a las personas susceptibles de representar una amenaza para la seguridad estadounidense. Estados Unidos no está en una guerra global contra el terrorismo o una religión, sino en una "guerra con una red específica, Al Qaeda, y sus terroristas aliados". En esa guerra son singularmente necesarios los recursos de información. [...]

Entre los expertos internacionales, esta visión no cuenta con un respaldo unánime. Las dos críticas principales –la falta de claridad en su estrategia y el menor énfasis en el poder clásico– hacen referencia a la pérdida de influencia, poder y liderazgo de Estados Unidos. Reflejan posiciones que no saben ver que la naturaleza actual de los conflictos armados no responde ya a la lógica clásica de victoria o derrota militar. La guerra de Afganistán y el complejo entramado que representa la situación en Irak han puesto de relieve la importancia de un enfoque comprensivo. La acción militar no puede contemplarse como única variable de éxito. Una estrategia de éxito debe servir de medios civiles, modelo que ha preconizado, por cierto, la Unión Europea. Estamos ante una nueva política con miras de largo plazo, que afecta a los Estados y a las sociedades. La senda que se debe seguir pasa por la paciencia y la tenacidad estratégica, que son las virtudes del futuro. No es factible percibir cambios de la noche a la mañana, pero al final los resultados cosechados serán mejores y más duraderos.

Este modo de ver el mundo está en sintonía con el multilateralismo efectivo que defiende la Unión Europea. Reconoce el valor de la política de alianzas, otorga mayor relevancia a la dimensión civil frente a la militar, recalca el valor del diálogo y la necesidad de reforzar las instituciones internacionales para poder hacer frente a las amenazas y desafíos comunes, como son el cambio climático, los conflictos armados, las pandemias o los crímenes transnacionales. Por ello, representa una buena noticia para la Unión Europea. No solo brinda una oportunidad para estrechar los lazos transatlánticos, sino que constituye un paso en firme hacia la solución a los retos y desafíos del siglo XXI. Y nos prepara mejor para el mundo de mañana.

8 April 2010

The European Union on Thursday launched a new military mission to train some 2,000 Somali soldiers in Uganda in mine awareness and urban combat. The mission to Uganda is designed to support Somali security forces, struggling to control Islamist militants in Mogadishu.

"This mission is intending to train up to 2000 Somali guys in two consecutive intakes of 1000 each, and so the mission will last more or less 13 or 14 months, because each intake will last six months," said the EU's mission commander Colonel Gonzales Elul. The EU's mission is part of a wider international strategy to turn Somalia into a viable state, and one which can take charge of its own security.

#### Local co-operation

In order to tackle the militant mindset, trainers on the ground are to consult local teachers and elders for insight and cultural tips. And there will also be lessons in human rights for trainee Somali soldiers. "We will have within the headquarter structure, a gender adviser and a legal adviser that will provide some lessons to the trainees, concerning the human rights and gender issues, along with the international law for armed conflicts, so this is a very comprehensive programme," said Colonel Elul. African Union forces have already begun training Somali soldiers, in a bid to help the embattled transitional federal government take control. Until now, Somali security forces have only been able to control small areas of the capital Mogadishu.

#### The art of modern warfare

One problem is how to train Somali soldiers to fight in built-up areas. "Right now they are fighting in a disorganized way and we will try and provide the Somali transitional federal government with a set of tools that they can use more efficiently for fighting in Mogadishu," Elul said. The soldiers will also get training in communications, and medical treatment, as well as mine awareness. And strong incentives have reportedly been set up to stop EU-trained soldiers from defecting to the other side. With fears of foreign militants penetrating Somalia mounting, there are also serious concerns about the smuggling of arms by sea.

#### Providing a solid base to tackle piracy

The EU's Operation Atalanta forms part of the international effort to tackle piracy off the Somali coast – its principal goal is to protect food aid vessels from attacks. EU officials recently warned Somali pirates were becoming bolder about attacking ships in waters further away from their usual patch. But the EU also insists its presence in the Gulf of Aden has acted as a strong deterrent.

Didier Lenoir, who heads up the EU's Crisis Management unit for Somalia, says the very presence of EU ships in the region means there is more information on smuggling routes. But he also stressed the need to strengthen Somalia itself to have any hope of tackling piracy and smuggling in the long term. "The way to prevent smuggling in Somalia is to make sure the legitimate authorities of Somalia and therefore our answer is to make sure that the TFG (transitional federal government) is in a position to deliver this type of control, thus idea of providing more training and resources," he said. As pirates, smugglers and militants become seemingly bolder in the region; the EU says it is determined to help Somalia tackle the problem. And officials in Brussels see this military training mission as a very concrete step.





## KOSOVO CENTRAL BANK CHIEF ARRESTED IN CORRUPTION PROBE

28 July 2010

Kosovo police have arrested the territory's central bank governor Hashim Rexhepi in an anti-corruption investigation. The EU's rule of law mission (Eulex) said the probe concerned suspected bribes, tax evasion, influence-peddling and money laundering. Eulex said Mr Rexhepi was among four suspects whose homes were searched. The Kosovo police also searched the Central Bank of Kosovo and a private company.

The EU has some 1,900 law enforcement officials deployed across Kosovo to strengthen law and order, in the Eulex mission launched in December 2008. They have the power to take on cases that the local judiciary and police find difficult to handle.

On Thursday UN judges in The Hague ruled that Kosovo's declaration of secession from Serbia in 2008 was not illegal.

Friday's operation in Pristina follows other high-profile searches by Eulex and Kosovan police.

In April, the offices of Kosovo's Transport Minister, Fatmir Limaj, were raided as part of a probe into the construction of a major highway. Earlier this month, four companies suspected of fraud over the issuing of a mobile phone licence were also searched.

Kosovo is at a critical stage in its attempts for wider recognition as an independent state, the BBC's Balkans correspondent Mark Lowen reports.

To achieve that international recognition Pristina knows it has to present itself as a more functional government, able to combat the corruption and organised crime that have flourished in Kosovo since the war of the 1990s, our correspondent says.

# Le Monde

## ACCORD SUR LES CONTOURS DU FUTUR SERVICE DIPLOMATIQUE DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE

Jean-Pierre Stooßants avec Jean-Jacques Bozonnet

Mercredi 23 juin 2010

Le service pour l'action extérieure dirigé par Mme Ashton comptera 40% de diplomates nationaux

Un accord entre la Commission, le Conseil et le Parlement européens a été conclu lundi 21 juin, à Madrid. Il devrait permettre la mise en place du futur service européen pour l'action extérieure (SEAE), l'outil diplomatique de l'Union. Le compromis devrait permettre d'organiser et de faire fonctionner cette structure créée par le traité de Lisbonne et appelée à regrouper jusqu'à 7000 fonctionnaires, dont quelque 4 500 diplomates à Bruxelles et dans les 135 délégations de l'UE dans le monde.

Catherine Ashton, Haute Représentante pour les affaires étrangères, s'est réjouie de ce dénouement, après des mois de négociations très ardues qui ont, à plusieurs reprises, failli capoter. La Britannique estime que les Vingt-Sept pourront bientôt se doter d'« un outil adapté au XXI siècle ». [...]

A Madrid, elle a reçu l'appui de la présidence tournante espagnole, qui s'achève le 30 juin. La Haute Représentante a trouvé un terrain d'entente, après plusieurs heures de discussions, avec les représentants du Parlement. « Ce qui a été approuvé n'a plus rien à voir avec le texte initial. On pourra créer un service ambitieux, efficace, le plus proche possible de la démarche communautaire et non pas intergouvernementale », explique au Monde le libéral Guy Verhofstadt, l'un des rapporteurs du Parlement.

Avec le conservateur allemand Elmar Brok, l'ex-premier ministre belge a mené une guerre d'usure. Forts de leur nouveau pouvoir de codécision pour le règlement financier et le statut du personnel du SEAE, les eurodéputés ont élargi progressivement leur champ d'action. Ils ont pesé sur les décisions concernant toute l'organisation et le fonctionnement du SEAE.

MM. Brok et Verhofstadt voulaient empêcher les Etats de s'arroger des compétences communautaires ou d'éviter un véritable contrôle du Parlement. Il y a quelques semaines, Mme Ashton, dont le projet avait déjà été approuvé par la Commission et le Conseil, avait proposé aux eurodéputés de nouvelles garanties. Elles ont facilité l'accord conclu à Madrid. [...]

L'équilibre entre les diplomates nationaux et les fonctionnaires européens au sein du nouvel ensemble était un autre sujet de débats. Les premiers redoutaient d'être désavantagés, en vertu du principe « premier arrivé, premier servi » qui aurait bénéficié au personnel du Conseil et de la Commission, déjà en poste à Bruxelles. Les députés craignaient pour leur part une mainmise des capitales, illustrée par les rivalités entre les Etats pour l'obtention des postes-clés du service diplomatique.

Le compromis prévoit 60% de fonctionnaires européens et 40% de diplomates nationaux. Ces derniers pourraient rester dans le service au-delà d'un délai de dix ans « afin de renforcer leur loyauté à l'UE », selon M. Verhofstadt.

Par ailleurs, Paris, Berlin et Varsovie se partageront les postes-clés du secrétariat général, avec le Français Pierre Vimont, actuel ambassadeur à Washington, dans le rôle de numéro 1. Une dernière demande du Parlement devrait être satisfaite avec le maintien du budget de l'aide au développement dans le giron de la Commission, ce qui instaure une codécision de fait.

L'espoir de Mme Ashton est désormais de disposer en octobre d'un accord général, politique, budgétaire et statutaire, afin de pouvoir faire fonctionner le « bras diplomatique » de l'Union.



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
Chaque semaine la e-newsletter pour en savoir plus sur l'actualité de la PSDC.

## Overview of the missions and operations of the European Union July 2010

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**Military operations: ongoing operations/completed operations**

**"Strengths take into account international and local staff"**



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