

*Chaillot Paper*

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July 2009

n° 117

# EU security and defence

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## Core documents 2008

*Volume IX*

*compiled by Catherine Glière*



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**Institute for Security Studies**  
*European Union*  
*Paris*

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ISSN 1017-7566

ISBN 978-92-9198-141-0

QN-AA-09-117-EN-C

Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in Condé-sur-Noireau (France) by Corlet Imprimeur. Graphic design by Claire Mabilie (Paris).

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# Introduction

2008 was, in several respects, a significant year for the defence and security policy of the European Union.

First, it marked a threefold anniversary: fifteen years ago, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was launched; a decade ago, St. Malo paved the way for the European Security and Defence policy (ESDP); and five years ago, the first EU operations under the ESDP were launched.

The crises that occurred in the course of 2008 as well as the progressive redistribution of power heralding a new multipolar order were challenges and opportunities which revealed the crucial role that the Union can and should play in today's world. At the EUISS annual conference, 'Partnerships for effective multilateralism: Managing global crises', held in Paris in October 2008, the High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, delivered a speech highlighting this multifaceted role with regard to the world financial crisis in particular and its consequences for foreign policy, regional crises and for partnerships with the other global payers.

It was also a notable year because of the increased focus on important environmental challenges, particularly the implications of climate change for international security. For example, Javier Solana, together with the Commission, considers climate change as a 'threat multiplier' that exacerbates or magnifies existing trends, tensions and instabilities.

This and other important conclusions regarding security issues were formulated in the 'Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World', which Javier Solana presented to EU Foreign Affairs ministers in December. The report highlighted the fact that the EU now carries 'greater responsibilities than at any time in its history' in the face of 'increasingly complex threats and challenges'. It also urged the EU and NATO to deepen their strategic partnership and achieve better cooperation in crisis management.

Acting in regions of the world both near and far away, the Union has worked to develop a common vision of threats and how to respond to them, and to find ways for Member States to pool the necessary resources.

The events of August in Georgia demonstrated that the Union was able to react to an international crisis quickly and efficiently. Never was such a significant mission established so quickly. While the conflict between Russians and Georgians was still raging, on 13 August the 27 EU foreign ministers were already planning a European presence on the ground. In a matter of weeks, a number of measures were taken: definition of the planning documents; staff recruitment; provision of the necessary equipment and logistics. Under the French presidency, the EU thus managed to bring the conflict to an end and

deal with its immediate consequences: this constituted a major diplomatic success for the European Union.

In Africa, the EU was involved in the international efforts undertaken to respond to the Darfur crisis and to its regional ramifications; in order to securitise this area of Africa, EUFOR Tchad/RCA started its operation in March 2008, deploying to a particularly remote and inaccessible theatre. In the framework of the EU-Africa partnership defined in December 2007 in Lisbon, an Africa-EU ministerial troika, which included the defence ministers, took place in November in Addis Ababa. The meeting focused on the implementation of the EU-Africa Joint Strategy and of the first Action Plan, based on eight partnerships, including the peace and security partnership.

EUNAVFOR Atalanta, the first EU maritime operation, was launched in December 2008 to respond to the continuing increase in piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Aden Gulf. It is already contributing to the establishment of safer conditions for the ships that use this important maritime route.

Closer to home, the mission EULEX Kosovo, which is to date the Union's largest civilian mission, was launched on 9 December 2008 after months of preparation and in a difficult political context. This EU 'rule of law' mission involves some 1,900 international judges, police officers, prosecutors and customs officials, whose objective is to support the Kosovo authorities by monitoring, mentoring and advising in order to improve the functioning of the legal system and police force and to consolidate the rule of law, while involving local civil society.

The ESDP was further reinforced in 2008 through a whole range of other initiatives and operations, of varying visibility and prominence, which demonstrate the constant progress and relevance of this policy: the SSR mission in Guinea Bissau; the EURO RECAP initiative; the declaration on international security at the end of the French Presidency; improvements regarding capabilities through the work of the European Defence Agency; consolidation of the defence equipment market with the 'defence package'; and, last but not least, the special focus on human rights and particularly children's rights in armed conflict situations.



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# Core documents

## 2008

# General Affairs and External Relations Council

Brussels, 28 January 2008

## MIDDLE EAST

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### Middle East Peace Process – Council conclusions

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘The EU welcomes the start of negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian officials on all outstanding issues, including all final status issues, with a view to concluding a peace agreement before the end of 2008 as agreed in Annapolis last November. The Council reaffirms that this is a crucial opportunity for regional and international partners to support effectively a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East. In this context, the Council calls for a continued broad and constructive involvement by Arab partners, building on the Arab Peace Initiative. The Council urges the parties to implement their Road Map obligations in parallel with their negotiations. The goal remains the establishment of an independent, democratic, contiguous and viable Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza that will unite all Palestinians, living side by side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbours.

The EU considers that settlement building anywhere in the occupied Palestinian Territories is illegal under international law. This includes Israeli settlements in both East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Settlement construction is an obstacle to peace. The EU is therefore deeply concerned by recent settlement activity, particularly the recent tenders issued for new construction in Har Homa. The Road Map is clear that Israel should freeze all settlement activity, including the natural growth of existing settlements, and dismantle all outposts erected since March 2001.

The Council is deeply concerned about recent events in Gaza and the grave disturbances at the border between Gaza and Egypt. It expresses its sympathy for the civilian populations affected by the violence in Gaza and in Southern Israel. It condemns the continued firing of rockets into Israeli territory and all other activities which are contrary to international law and endanger civilians. While recognising Israel’s legitimate right to self-defence, the Council calls for an immediate end to all acts of violence. It reiterates its grave concern at the humanitarian situation in Gaza and calls for the continuous provision of essential goods and services, including fuel and power supplies. The Council calls on Israel to fulfil its obligations to Gaza. The Council reiterates its call on all parties to work urgently for the controlled re-opening of the crossings in and out of Gaza for both humanitarian reasons and commercial flows. In that context, the Council underlines its support for the proposal by the Palestinian Authority to take control of the crossings and supports the Arab League resolution in that respect. The EU will continue to provide humanitarian assistance to the population of Gaza and stands ready to assist in the economic rehabilitation of Gaza. The EU reiterates its call for the immediate release of the Israeli soldier abducted 19 months ago and commends efforts including by partners in the region, to that effect.

The Council commends and supports efforts by the government of Egypt to find a peaceful and orderly solution to the current situation, and expresses the EU readiness to contribute to its implementation in the framework of an agreement involving the Palestinian Authority, Egypt and Israel. The EU is ready to consider resuming its monitoring mission at Rafah under the pro-

visions of the relevant international agreements related to Access and Movement concluded in November 2005.

The EU reaffirms its commitment to remain actively involved in order to support the parties' efforts to keep the negotiation on track, working closely with other members of the Quartet and partners in the region. The EU remains determined to contribute significantly to this effort, as laid down in its Action Strategy: 'State building for Peace in the Middle East', which covers the broad range of its assistance activities. The EU welcomes the agreement reached on the accreditation procedure of EUPOL COPPS, which will allow the EU to support Palestinian Civilian Police in order to further strengthen security and law and order.

The EU welcomes the results of the International Donors' Conference for the Palestinian State last December, namely over 7,4 billion US-\$ in pledges, and calls on all donors to deliver on their pledges in support of efforts to build the future Palestinian State in accordance with the Reform and Development Plan presented by Prime Minister Fayyad. In this context, the EU recalls the utmost importance of the full implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access. The EU is committed to providing substantial financial support for the Palestinian people, and welcomes the work of the Commission to launch a new funding mechanism PEGASE, which will constitute a key channel for EU and other international assistance. The EU continues to support the work of the Quartet Representative, Tony Blair.'

## Lebanon – Council conclusions

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. The Council condemns in the strongest possible terms the terrorist attack perpetrated in Beirut on 25 January, that claimed the lives of Internal Security Forces' Captain Wissam Eid and four others, the bombing of a US diplomatic vehicle in Beirut that killed three people and injured several others on 15 January, and the attack on UNIFIL on 8 January. The Council reiterates its firm denunciation of all terrorist attacks and of all attempts to undermine peace and stability in Lebanon.
2. The Council remains strongly concerned at the continued absence of a Head of State in Lebanon. It regrets that it has not yet been possible to elect a new President, and that the parliamentary session has been postponed yet another time until 11 February.
3. The Council welcomes the unanimous endorsement by the extraordinary session of the Foreign Ministers of the Arab League held on 6 January in Cairo of a plan for the immediate election of the president, the formation of a national unity government and the adoption of a new electoral law. The Council warmly welcomes the mediation efforts by the Secretary General of the Arab League aimed at a rapid solution of the crisis.
4. It calls upon the parties to work responsibly in order to implement without any further delay the plan of the Arab League, as well as to refrain from all actions that could upset public order and the security of the citizens. In this regard, the Council deplores the escalating tension which has led to further loss of lives. Recalling the importance of stability in Lebanon for the whole region, the Council looks forward to the full resumption of the functioning of democratic institutions in Lebanon.
5. The Council reiterates its support to the legitimate and democratic government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and to the Lebanese Armed Forces and their contribution to the stability of the country.

6. The Council recalls previous statements and remains determined to reinforce Lebanon's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, unity and stability, according notably to UNSC Resolutions 1559, 1680, 1701 and 1757. In this respect, the Council looks forward to the start of the work of the Special Tribunal as soon as possible.

7. The Council also condemns the rocket attacks launched against Israel on 8 January.'

## **AFRICA**

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### **Kenya – Council conclusions**

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘1. The Council remains extremely concerned at the continued uncertainty, instability and serious crisis arising from the recent presidential elections in Kenya and is monitoring the situation closely. The Council regrets the loss of life and the serious humanitarian consequences that have ensued after the elections. It condemns the acts of violence that have taken place, for which there can be no impunity, and underlines the need to protect the human rights of all in Kenya. It calls upon all the political leaders in Kenya to act urgently to bring violence to an end and ensure security for all Kenyans by publicly and unequivocally rejecting all forms of violence, restraining their followers and encouraging all concerned, including police and army officials, to exercise maximum restraint. It calls on all political leaders to resort to dialogue immediately and secure a political solution based on democratic principles and to the benefit of the Kenyan people. The Council further calls upon the Kenyan authorities to restore the right of the media to work freely and the right of assembly and to avoid excessive or lethal force against those demonstrating peacefully.

2. The Council recalls that the initial findings of the EU Election Observer Mission and reports from other independent observers, notably from the Commonwealth, the International Republican Institute, the East African Community and a number of domestic observer groups, cast serious doubts on the official results of the presidential elections. The Council calls for all allegations of election irregularities to be urgently and thoroughly investigated through appropriate means and in a way that helps to restore the trust of the Kenyan people in democracy.

3. Building on the commendable efforts of President Kufuor, President of the African Union (AU), the Council welcomes and lends its full support to the ongoing efforts of the Panel of Eminent African Personalities, led by Mr Kofi Annan. The Council is encouraged by the meeting between Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga on 24 January 2008 but urges Kenya's political leaders now to build on this meeting urgently by pursuing their stated commitment to dialogue and to work together for a just and sustainable peace. The EU stands ready to provide any assistance it can to this process.

4. The Council continues to urge all parties to live up to their responsibilities by engaging constructively and fully in this process, working jointly through dialogue on all issues, including electoral and constitutional reform, and to agree a sustainable and consensual political solution to the crisis. The Council believes such a solution should reflect the clear democratic will of the Kenyan people and enable Kenya's politicians to overcome their divisions. The EU expresses its willingness to provide any assistance it can to Kenya to help develop and implement the elements of such a political solution, as requested.

5. Until a legitimate solution is agreed, the EU and its Member States cannot conduct busi-

ness as usual with Kenya. Failure to find a sustainable and consensual political solution would affect donors' engagement with Kenya and EU Kenya relations. Bearing in mind the Lisbon Summit and shared values recently enshrined in the Lisbon Plan of Action, the Council will decide upon its next course of action towards the situation in Kenya, and Kenya's political leaders, on the basis of their engagement with the Eminent Personalities initiative and progress towards the lasting political solution referred to above.

6. The Council reiterates its continued commitment to respond to the humanitarian needs of Kenyans affected, or displaced from their homes, by the recent acts of violence and stands ready to provide further assistance as required. The Council expresses its concern about the difficulties faced by those engaged in humanitarian assistance and economic activities in Kenya and the region.

7. The Council will continue to monitor closely the events in Kenya and support all efforts to ensure democracy, respect for human rights and stability in the country.'

### **Sudan/Chad/Central African Republic – Council conclusions**

The Council discussed the situation in Sudan, Chad and the CAR, in the presence of Jan Eliasson, the UN Secretary-General's special envoy for Darfur. It adopted the following conclusions:

1. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) is the basis for sustainable peace and development throughout Sudan and its implementation must be pursued as a key priority. Therefore the Council welcomes that the parties to the CPA have resumed their cooperation in the Government of National Unity (GNU) and agreed on the full and timely implementation of all the provisions of the CPA. The Council urges the parties to ensure their commitments are honoured, including on still outstanding issues such as the status of Abyei and the formation, training and deployment of the Joint Integrated Units (JIU). It also calls for concrete steps to revitalise and strengthen the Assessment and Evaluation Commission. The Council supports the important role of UNMIS and encourages the parties to take full advantage of its presence and mandate, including its tasks to provide support to reconciliation in all its aspects, emphasising the role of women and civil society, and with regard to the necessary preparation (including the census) for the conduct of the general elections in 2009.

2. The Council welcomes the transfer of authority from AMIS to UNAMID for the operation in Darfur and underlines the need to address the considerable challenges facing the deployment of UNAMID. It calls on the Sudanese authorities, notably the GNU, to lend their full support to the effective establishment of UNAMID, including necessary technical and administrative arrangements for this purpose and to accept all troops deemed necessary by the UN and the AU for successful discharge of its mandate. In this context, the Council deplores the unwillingness of the Sudanese Authorities to accept Sweden's and Norway's contributions to UNAMID. Furthermore, the Council strongly condemns the attack on 7 January by elements of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) on a UNAMID supply convoy and calls on the Government of Sudan (GoS) to fulfil its promises of full cooperation. The Council reiterates its readiness to take necessary measures, notably within a UN-framework, against any party that impedes the establishment of an effective UNAMID force.

3. The Council attaches utmost importance to the continued, unimpeded and safe humanitarian access to the population in Darfur. It urges the GoS to respect its commitment to a

Moratorium on restrictions and obstacles to all humanitarian work in Darfur, as set out in the Joint Communiqué on this matter, and to review issues of concern through established channels (for example the High Level Committee). The Council welcomes the recent announcement of the extension of this Moratorium on restrictions and obstacles to all humanitarian work in Darfur. In this connection, the Council stands ready to consider further measures, notably within a UN-framework, against any party that undermines peace and security in Darfur or the region by committing acts of violence and especially against any party that obstructs humanitarian access.

4. There can be no impunity for the crimes committed in Darfur. The Council calls on the GoS to cooperate unconditionally with the International Criminal Court (ICC) and to surrender the two individuals for whom it issued arrest warrants on 27 April 2007 in relation to alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur.

5. The Council calls on all parties in the Darfur conflict to cease their hostilities and engage in the peace process mediated by the UN and AU Special Envoys. It underlines that the effectiveness of UNAMID will only be guaranteed if an inclusive political agreement between the parties to the conflict in Darfur is reached. The Council therefore recalls its position that any party failing to engage constructively in the peace process is to be considered as an obstacle to peace and that it will promote appropriate further measures against it, notably in the UN framework.

6. The Council is seriously concerned over the deterioration of the security situation in the border region of Sudan and Chad, including the recent attacks by rebel groups from Darfur in eastern Chad as well as the incursions of Chadian armed forces into Sudan. The Council urges the Chadian and the Sudanese governments to abstain from any action that could further destabilise the current situation whilst exercising the utmost restraint and settling differences through dialogue and diplomatic channels. The Council urges the governments of Sudan and Chad to terminate support to armed groups operating in Eastern Chad or Darfur and recalls their responsibility in accordance with their agreements to prevent armed groups from crossing the common border.

7. Deploring the renewed attacks by Chadian rebel groups, the Council stresses the importance and urgency to foster a continuous peace process between the Chadian government and the armed rebel groups. In this perspective the Council welcomes the efforts of regional neighbours, particularly Libya. It also welcomes the progress made in implementing the accord of 13 August 2007 committing the Chadian authorities to work closely with the unarmed political opposition in addressing defined shortfalls notably in view of the legislative elections in 2009. In this context, the Council calls upon the still active armed rebel groups to abandon all attempts of further pursuing military options and instead, pursuing a democratic path. It reminds all parties that an internal political settlement remains the only viable perspective for peace and stability in Chad.

8. The Council launched the military bridging operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA. It authorised the EU operation commander, with immediate effect, to release the activation order in order to execute the deployment of the forces and start the execution of the mission. The Council reaffirms its full commitment to contribute to the implementation of UNSC-Resolution 1778(2007) which authorises the deployment in Chad and Central African Republic of a multi-dimensional presence, including the EU providing the military element of it. In accordance with this Resolution, the EU conducts this military bridging operation for a period of 12

months from the declaration of Initial Operational Capability which is planned to be reached in March 2008. A mid mandate review after 6 months, conducted in conjunction with the UN, will assess the need for a possible UN follow-on capability.

9. In conducting this operation the EU is stepping up its longstanding action in support of efforts to tackle the crisis in Darfur and to address its regional ramifications, notably in Eastern Chad and North-eastern Central African Republic. In this context, EUFOR Tchad/RCA will ensure a high degree of coordination with UNAMID. The deployment of this EU operation has been welcomed by both the governments of Chad and Central African Republic. EUFOR Tchad/RCA will actively work for the improvement of the security situation in Chad and Central African Republic. It will contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly displaced persons and refugees, to facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel and to protecting UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment. It is part of the EU's multi-faceted support to the area, which includes European Commission support to the UN police mission in Chad. The European Commission and Member States will also continue their ongoing development cooperation and humanitarian aid.

10. The Council underlined that the bridging military operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA will be conducted in a neutral, impartial and independent manner. Throughout the mission, EUFOR Tchad/RCA will coordinate closely with the United Nations and cooperate with the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic.

11. Systematic mainstreaming of Human Rights, Gender Issues and Child Protection (in line with UNSC – Resolution 1612 and the Checklist for the Protection of Children affected by Armed Conflict in ESDP Operations) into operational planning and in the execution of the operation is to be ensured by specially designated personnel at all levels.

12. The operation will be commanded from the EU Operations Headquarters (OHQ) in Mont Valerien (Paris) by Lieutenant General Patrick NASH (Ireland); the Force in theatre will be commanded from Abeche (Chad) by Brigadier General Jean-Philippe Ganascia (France). The operation will cooperate closely with the UN mission MINURCAT and with the humanitarian and development organisations present in Chad and CAR.'

## **IRAN**

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At lunch, ministers reviewed the situation regarding the Iranian nuclear issue, notably following the meeting in Berlin on 22 January of the foreign ministers of China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK and the United States as well as the EU High Representative concerning a new UN Security Council Resolution.

(...)

## **EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY**

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### **Launching of EU military operation in Chad and the Central African Republic**

The Council adopted a decision on the launching of a European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic (operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA). [See section 'Sudan/Chad/Central African Republic – Council conclusions'].

The Council also adopted decisions approving the conclusion of agreements with Chad and Cameroon aimed at facilitating the deployment and transit in those countries of EU-led forces involved in the EUFOR Tchad/RCA operation.

### **Training programme in security and defence matters 2008 – 2010**

The Council approved an EU training programme, in the field of European security and defence policy for the years 2008 to 2010 (5538/08).

(...)



# Iran – Summary of the statement to the European Parliament by Javier Solana

Brussels, 30 January 2008

Mr President, Honourable Members of Parliament,

Iran is a key country in the Middle East. It is important in strategic terms, as a regional actor. We would like to have a constructive relationship with Iran. But there are many difficulties.

Iran is also a vibrant society, full of talented people. It has an exceptionally high proportion of women graduates. Persian is one of the major languages of the internet, especially for blogs as young people seek a means of self expression.

The political scene in Iran is of interest: there are elements of democracy there not present in many other Middle Eastern countries, though the election process still leaves much to be desired. For the Majles elections in March for example, 30% of candidates have been disqualified, with those of reformist tendencies suffering most. Nevertheless an imperfect democracy is better than none and it is right that we should engage with Iranian Parliamentarians. I am grateful to the European Parliament for sending a delegation there to meet with colleagues in the Majles.

Members of this Parliament are also right to be concerned about the rule of law and human rights. Iran is almost at the bottom of the world press freedom index. It has increased the number of executions. There are unfortunately numerous reports of torture. Such things are unacceptable and only damage Iran's image as a civilised country.

All of those who campaign for human rights in Iran, for example in the one million signatures campaign for women's rights, deserve our support and admiration. With greater freedom, greater accountability and a more even handed justice, Iran could be one of the most creative and dynamic society's in the Middle East. The European Union had in the past a human rights dialogue with Iran but since 2004 the Iranians have been unwilling to participate.

We have many areas of common interest with Iran that are not fully exploited. The most obvious of these is the energy sector. But there is also more we could do together on drug trafficking and against terrorism.

It would be good if we were able to work better with Iran in the region. But for the moment it is difficult to see Iran as a constructive partner. In almost every area we seem to find ourselves pursuing different, sometimes contradictory policies. We want a two state solution in Palestine. We want Annapolis to work. Iran, by contrast, urged Muslim countries to boycott the Annapolis conference. It is still the only country in the Middle East that does not accept the idea of a two state solution. It is a key supplier of arms to Hamas. The remarks of President Ahmadinejad concerning Israel and his support for holocaust denial are entirely unacceptable. Iran also plays a destabilising factor in Lebanon. It is the most important supplier of weapons to Hezbollah. It has also worked with groups pursuing violence in Iraq.

All of these activities make Iran, from our point of view, a troublesome actor in the Middle East. But it remains one that we need to understand and engage with better. There have been periods of cooperation with Iran, for example in Afghanistan, that have been fruitful and I believe we should continue to seek such opportunities.

The most important subject of concern is the Iranian nuclear program. Were Iran to develop a weapon this could be a cause of radical instability and danger in the Middle East. It would also

be very damaging to the whole non-proliferation system. Even the suspicion that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon can destabilise the Middle East. Our objective is to remove those suspicions. In the end this can be done only through a negotiated solution.

It is welcome that Iran is working with the IAEA to deal with some of the so called Outstanding Issues. The current phase, in which Iran needs to answer questions about a possible weaponisation program, is especially important.

But even if these questions about the past are answered that does not provide transparency about Iran's present activities nor its future intentions. Present transparency requires Iran to ratify and implement the Additional Protocol.

Confidence about its future intentions is more difficult. Supposing Iran did have a weaponisation program in the past, how can we be sure that its present enrichment activity is exclusively civil? It is especially difficult to believe this when we see no sign of Iran signing a contract to build a nuclear power plant (apart from Bushehr for which the Russians supply the fuel). All we hear about is enrichment. When I ask representatives of the Iranian government what they plan to do with the enriched uranium they are producing, I never get an answer.

The fact is that Iran can develop a civil program only with assistance of Europe, the USA, Russia or Japan. None of us have a problem with an Iranian civil program, indeed we are offering to help. But none of us will do so unless we are certain that Iran's intentions are exclusively peaceful.

# Javier Solana – ‘The external energy policy of the European Union’

Brussels, 1 February 2008

## SPEECH AT THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE FRENCH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (IFRI)

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Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am delighted to be here and I want to thank IFRI for the invitation.

Energy questions have shot to the top of the international agenda. It is easy to see why.

Hardly a day goes by without a decision or event highlighting how much energy questions are linked to international politics. This is an important challenge which will stay with us for years to come. But it is also an urgent one. The lead time in energy is long. Our decisions today – or, more often, the absence thereof – greatly influence the options we will have tomorrow.

Let me start by briefly stating the broader context. Or what some call the ‘three hard truths’.

First, growth in demand is accelerating. By 2050 it is expected to double, driven by population and economic growth, especially in Asia. The mere expectation of this surge is already triggering all sorts of behaviour. Hence, the talk about a ‘scramble for energy’ or a ‘dash for gas’.

Second, the days of ‘easy’ oil and gas are over. The molecules are there, but the investment needed to get them out, runs into hundreds of billions of dollars.

Third, climate stresses are increasing too, especially because of higher use of coal. Coal may be attractive for energy security reasons. But unless we make rapid progress on ‘clean coal’, it’s generally bad for climate change.

By 2020, world energy markets will be tighter, leading to more political tensions. In all scenarios the power of resource-holders is set to increase.

What are my conclusions?

First, there are no easy solutions. Especially for a Europe which is increasingly dependent on energy imports. Second, there is no solution. We will have to work on multiple fronts: savings and efficiency, renewables and biofuels; carbon capture, interconnections and storage. Third, there is not just an internal solution. We also need a credible European external energy policy.

Clearly, we do not have one yet. Indeed, we are not always implementing our internal energy policy. We have set ourselves ambitious targets to put this right. In 2006, the European Council endorsed the paper ‘An external energy policy to serve EU energy interests’. But we have to match words with deeds. I sometimes wonder if we are keeping up with the speed and scope of the changes in the international energy landscape.

Big deals are being made every day. In the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Balkans and Asia. From decisions on pipelines, to exploration deals to strategic partnerships among producers. Our future options seem to be narrowing while others move in a determined manner.

In Europe, we have seen real progress on tackling climate change; some progress on the internal energy side; but rather less progress on the external side. Too often, we see mixed messages. And the defence of narrow, national interests at the expense of broader, European interests. It does not have to be this way. It’s time to think and act a bit more as Europeans. And do so with a sense of urgency and discipline.

Beyond this general observation, there are a few specific elements that I want to mention.

The link between energy and foreign policy works in two directions. We talk a lot about how we can use our foreign policy instruments and relationships to secure our energy interests. Call it energy security through foreign policy. In practical terms, this means being more united and disciplined in our energy diplomacy. Promoting sound market principles and investment protection in our neighbourhood and beyond. Developing joint crisis mechanisms and strategic reserves, especially in gas. Above all, it means making progress with diversification in supply and transit routes. I will come back to this later on.

But there is also energy security in foreign policy. Recent academic research has confirmed what many long suspected. Oil and gas rich countries are nine times more likely to suffer from violent conflicts than those which are non-resource rich. Nearly all experience political instability, poor governance and human rights abuses. This is partly because oil and gas revenues often lead to corruption, rent-seeking behaviour and insufficient economic diversification. But also because they shield countries from external pressure, including us, to promote good governance.

I am glad that the European Union and Africa have agreed to step up co-operation to break the cycle of energy, conflicts and human rights abuses. It is essential that resources are developed in a way that benefits the entire population.

For billions of people the daily reality is extreme energy poverty. An estimated 1.6 billion people, 25% of the world's population, do not have access to electricity. Our support for bio-fuels is raising food prices worldwide, making it harder for poor people to afford basic food ingredients. This has serious social and economic consequences – and can threaten political stability.

So, we need a broad perspective, and see the effects of our choices in other areas. We should also go beyond a narrow Western prism. This means thinking about changing the governance system of energy, involving new players. Is there a case for bringing countries like China, India and others into the International Energy Agency? Would that strengthen their legitimacy and hence effectiveness? I think so.

Russia will remain the mainstay of our energy imports. We are right to insist on a genuine partnership based on a simple reality: interdependence. Consumers need to buy but producers need to sell. It is worth recalling that all existing infrastructure in Russia runs West, not East. And in the last two years about half of the existing gas supply contracts have been extended by 25-30 years. Still, there is a justified concern across Europe about Russia seeming more interested in investing in future leverage than in future production. Contrast Gazprom's strategic spending spree abroad with the lack of investment and waste at home.

Russia's energy policy follows a tight script. There is a sense of strategic purpose. There is, in principle, nothing that stops us, the Europeans, from matching their determination with our own discipline. We are, perhaps, unlikely to see big changes in Russia's domestic energy behaviour, including its stance on the Energy Charter. After all, Russians see their strategy as a rational way to maximise rents.

But there are things we can change tomorrow. It is up to us to avoid the kind of fragmented, bilateral negotiations which leave all of us worse off. A more united, and comprehensive approach would enhance our bargaining position.

Perhaps this cannot happen over night. But it's important to get started. For instance by ensuring a better flow of information on bilateral negotiations. And by showing more discipline and loyalty within these bilateral settings to wider European commitments.

We should also stick to our insistence that there has to be reciprocity in terms of investments upstream and downstream. And we can and should be more serious in our diversification strategy. This means making sure that Nabucco actually happens. But it also means developing a broader energy partnership with Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia, including a possible trans-Caspian pipeline. When I travelled in Central Asia, all leaders said they wanted a closer energy relationship with Europe. But they also asked what concrete projects and resources we were willing to commit.

Let me also say a word about climate change, which is connected to energy and geo-political questions, in a variety of ways. Climate change is obviously influenced by the energy choices we make – and vice versa. For example, climate change is creating easier access to the Arctic, including for energy exploration purposes. This opens up new avenues for potential co-operation, but also possible territorial disputes. We are already seeing different countries asserting various claims.

Climate change itself is already having profound consequences for international security. These effects are not just of a humanitarian nature. They include political and security risks that directly affect European interests. In essence, climate change acts as a threat multiplier, worsening existing tensions in countries and regions which are already fragile and conflict-prone. Because of water shortages, loss of arable land, mass migration and new border disputes.

At the next European Council, there will be a report on this very question, prepared together with the Commission. I hope that in the months ahead we can make real progress in addressing this problem, mobilising all levers of EU foreign policy.

There is one other aspect on the interplay between climate change, energy and foreign policy and that is nuclear energy. More and more countries are interested in nuclear power. Russia, India and China are planning the construction of 100 nuclear reactors. Others in the Middle East and elsewhere are moving in the same direction. How we react collectively to this expansion of nuclear power will in part be determined by our non-proliferation policy.

Dear friends, let me end with a word on trust. Both markets and international politics depend on trust. And in energy issues there is an obvious trust deficit. This is clear if you look at the behaviour of producers and consumers; governments and companies; in Europe and outside.

All of us need to think how we can generate greater confidence. This is essential if we want energy markets to function as openly as possible. History suggests that dialogue and politics are essential for generating trust, as are practical projects of co-operation. You need both the theory and the practice.

As for Europe, we now have clear provisions on solidarity in relation to energy integrated in the Lisbon Treaty. This is about time. And it is time to act. One should hope that full implementation of these provisions will alleviate some member-states' concerns.

Solidarity and trust. Dialogue and practical co-operation.

These should be the elements of a credible External Energy Policy for the European Union.

## **EUFOR Tchad/RCA**

**Brussels, 3 February 2008**

The European Union conducted a military bridging operation, EUFOR Tchad/RCA, from 28 January 2008 to 15 March 2009, under the mandate provided by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1778 (of 25 September 2007). This operation, deployed in Eastern Chad and in the North East of the Central African Republic, was conducted under the ESDP, with the agreement of the governments of Chad and the Central African Republic. With this operation, the EU stepped up its longstanding action to tackle the crisis in Darfur, as part of its regional approach to the crisis.

### **EU PRESIDENCY STATEMENT ON THE REPUBLIC OF CHAD**

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The Presidency of the European Union expresses its great concern over the continued attempts of armed groups in Chad to seize power unconstitutionally. The Presidency calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities.

A political settlement of the conflict remains the only viable perspective for peace and stability in Chad. Recalling the accord of 13 August 2007, the Presidency emphasises the urgency of returning to the inclusive political process. The Presidency strongly supports the African Union's call for a peaceful solution.

The Presidency stresses that the European Union remains deeply concerned about the humanitarian and security situation of internally displaced people and refugees for which a multidimensional and international presence remains indispensable. The European Union will continue its close coordination with the United Nations in this regard. The Presidency underlines the European Union's commitment to the achievement of the objectives of the EUFOR Tchad/RCA operation under UNSC Resolution 1778 (2007), and to continue with the deployment when circumstances permit.

Stressing its deep concern over the implications of the current crisis in Chad for regional stability, the Presidency reiterates the EU's full support for the ongoing UN/AU efforts in the region.

### **COMMENTS BY JAVIER SOLANA**

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**Brussels, 4 February 2008**

We took the decision to launch an operation in Chad because we knew very well that Chad is an important country for the stability of the region. Today, as you know, the situation is not yet clear, as far as the situation on the ground is concerned. As far as the political outcome is concerned, we continue to maintain the operation in readiness.

We have halted deployment in the last few days in order to see how the situation evolves on the ground and to have more clarity concerning the political developments. But our intention is to maintain the operation.

These events prove the need for an operation of this nature, not only for Chad but also for relations between Chad and Sudan. The operation is aimed at protecting people, who are displaced, in camps, or in other places in Chad. This is more important than ever.

## BACKGROUND – EU MILITARY OPERATION IN EASTERN CHAD AND NORTH EASTERN CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

January 2008

On 28 January 2008, the EU decided to launch a bridging military operation in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) (operation 'EUFOR Tchad/RCA') in accordance with the mandate set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1778 (2007). This operation comes within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

In deciding to conduct this operation the EU is stepping up its longstanding action in support of efforts to tackle the crisis in Darfur as part of a regional approach to that crisis.

This operation will be conducted with the agreement of the Chadian and Central African governments.

In its resolution 1778 of 25 September 2007, the UN Security Council approved the establishment of a UN Mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT) and authorised the EU to deploy forces in these countries for a period of 12 months from the declaration of Initial Operating Capability.

EUFOR Tchad/RCA will be a bridging operation which will closely coordinate with the multidimensional United Nations presence in the East of Chad and in the North-East of the CAR in order to improve security in those regions. More specifically, the EU operation will have the following objectives:

- To contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons;
- To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations;
- To contribute to protecting UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its staff and UN and associated personnel.

EUFOR Tchad/RCA will be a demanding operation in particular with respect to the situation on the ground, the vast area to be covered and the logistical constraints.

The EU operation will include around 3,700 troops. It is the most multinational military operation conducted in Africa by the EU so far:

- 14 EU Member States will be present in the field (Chad/CAR);
- 21 EU Member States are present at the Operations Headquarters (OHQ).

Lt General Patrick NASH (Ireland) has been appointed EU Operation Commander. Brigadier General Jean-Philippe GANASCIA (France) has been appointed EU Force Commander.

The EU Operational Headquarters (OHQ) is located at Mont Valérien (France).

The EU military operation will have an appropriate mandate allowing the use of armed force if necessary. It will be independent, impartial and neutral.

The budget for the common costs of the EU military operation is EUR 119,6 million.

The establishment of EUFOR TCHAD/RCA forms part of a comprehensive package of enhanced EU commitment to a solution to the crisis in Darfur. All EU instruments – diplomatic, political and financial – will be mobilised in support of this effort. The main components, all interlinked, will comprise:

- increased support for African Union (AU) and UN efforts to revitalise the political process with a view to finding a lasting solution;

- speeding up establishment of UNAMID in Darfur;
- increased mobilisation to finance humanitarian aid, but also to secure humanitarian access.

In this regard, the European Commission intends to implement transitional programmes of recovery and rehabilitation, covering reconciliation-oriented activities, support for the voluntary return of displaced persons and rehabilitation in their places of origin, and support for local governance. In Chad, the EU, through the European Commission, will contribute substantially to the UN programme for the establishment of the UN police force, which will train and equip Chadian police officers as well as deploy them in the refugee and IDP camps in eastern Chad. In north-eastern CAR, rehabilitation and reconstruction activities will be undertaken.

These measures will be continued within the strategic framework of the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF (European Development Fund), which will allocate EUR 299 million to Chad and EUR 137 million to CAR over a five-year period.



# EULEX Kosovo – Council Joint Actions

Brussels, 4 February 2008

Reflecting the paramount importance it attaches to stability in the Western Balkans, the Union decided to deploy a EULEX mission to strengthen the rule of law in Kosovo. It is the largest civilian mission ever launched under the ESDP. The central aim is to assist and support the Kosovo authorities in the rule of law area, specifically in the police, judiciary and customs areas. EULEX works under the general framework of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and has a unified chain of command in Brussels. This mission began operations on 9 December 2008.

## **COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/124/CFSP ON THE EUROPEAN UNION RULE OF LAW MISSION IN KOSOVO, EULEX KOSOVO**

### THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 14 and the third paragraph of Article 25 thereof,

Whereas:

(1) On 10 June 1999, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 (hereinafter Resolution 1244), and within this framework, the United Nations Security Council:

- ▶ ‘Decides that the international civil and security presences are established for an initial period of 12 months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise’ (Paragraph 19),
- ▶ ‘Authorises the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organisations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo ...’ and ‘Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include ... (f) in a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement ... (i) maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo’ (Paragraphs 10 and 11),
- ▶ ‘Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other international organisations to develop a comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilisation of the region affected by the Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation’ (Paragraph 17).

(2) The Kosovo organs, institutions and authorities referred to in this Joint Action are the institutions (hereinafter the Kosovo institutions) created on the basis of Resolution 1244. They include, *inter alia*, the Kosovo Police Service, the judiciary and the associated Ministries of the Interior and of Justice.

(3) There is a need to prevent, on humanitarian grounds, possible outbreaks of violence, acts of persecution and intimidation in Kosovo, taking account, as appropriate, of the responsibility towards populations as referred to in Resolution 1674 by the United Nations Security Council on 28 April 2006.

- (4) On 10 April 2006, the Council adopted Joint Action 2006/304/CFSP on the establishment of an EU Planning Team (EUPT Kosovo) regarding a possible EU crisis management operation in Kosovo in the field of rule of law and possible other areas in Kosovo<sup>(1)</sup>.
- (5) On 11 December 2006, the Council approved the Crisis Management Concept for a possible EU crisis management operation in the field of rule of law and possible other areas in Kosovo.
- (6) Joint Action 2006/304/CFSP lays down that the Head of EUPT Kosovo is, in particular, to act under the direction of the Head of the EU crisis management operation in Kosovo once the latter has been appointed.
- (7) The Brussels European Council of 14 December 2007 underlined the readiness of the EU to play a leading role in strengthening stability in the region in line with its European perspective and in implementing a settlement defining Kosovo's future status. It stated the EU's readiness to assist Kosovo in the path towards sustainable stability, including by means of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission and a contribution to an international civilian office as part of the international presences. The General Affairs and External Relations Council was invited to determine the modalities for the mission and when to launch it. The Secretary-General/High Representative (SG/HR) was requested to prepare the mission in discussion with the responsible authorities in Kosovo and the United Nations. In this regard, the United Nations Secretary-General has stated that the United Nations, with the support of the relevant international organisations, is committed to assisting Kosovo in the path towards sustainable stability. The United Nations Secretary-General also noted the readiness of the EU to play an enhanced role in Kosovo, as reflected in the conclusions of the Brussels European Council on 14 December.
- (8) In parallel with this Joint Action, the Council is adopting a Joint Action appointing an EU Special Representative for Kosovo.
- (9) In accordance with the guidelines of the Nice European Council of 7-9 December 2000, this Joint Action should determine the role of the SG/HR in accordance with Articles 18 and 26 of the Treaty.
- (10) Article 14(1) of the Treaty calls for the indication of financing for the whole period of implementation of the Joint Action. The indication of amounts to be financed by the general budget of the European Union illustrates the will of the political authority and is subject to the availability of commitment appropriations during the respective budget year.
- (11) Considering the scale and nature of the mission established by this Joint Action, specific provisions are required concerning staff recruitment and procurement.
- (12) The command and control structure of the mission should be without prejudice to the contractual responsibilities of the Head of the mission towards the Commission for implementing the mission's budget.
- (13) The watch-keeping capability established within the Council Secretariat should be activated for this mission.
- (14) The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo will be conducted in a situation which may deteriorate and could harm the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as set out in Article 11 of the Treaty,

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(1) OJ L 112, 26.4.2006, p. 19.

## HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

### *Article 1*

#### **The mission**

1. The EU hereby establishes an European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO (hereinafter EULEX KOSOVO).
2. EULEX KOSOVO shall operate in accordance with the Mission Statement set out in Article 2 and shall carry out the tasks as set out in Article 3.

### *Article 2*

#### **Mission Statement**

EULEX KOSOVO shall assist the Kosovo institutions, judicial authorities and law enforcement agencies in their progress towards sustainability and accountability and in further developing and strengthening an independent multi-ethnic justice system and multi-ethnic police and customs service, ensuring that these institutions are free from political interference and adhering to internationally recognised standards and European best practices.

EULEX KOSOVO, in full cooperation with the European Commission Assistance Programmes, shall fulfil its mandate through monitoring, mentoring and advising, while retaining certain executive responsibilities.

### *Article 3*

#### **Tasks**

In order to fulfil the Mission Statement set out in Article 2, EULEX KOSOVO shall:

- (a) monitor, mentor and advise the competent Kosovo institutions on all areas related to the wider rule of law (including a customs service), whilst retaining certain executive responsibilities;
- (b) ensure the maintenance and promotion of the rule of law, public order and security including, as necessary, in consultation with the relevant international civilian authorities in Kosovo, through reversing or annulling operational decisions taken by the competent Kosovo authorities;
- (c) help to ensure that all Kosovo rule of law services, including a customs service, are free from political interference;
- (d) ensure that cases of war crimes, terrorism, organised crime, corruption, inter-ethnic crimes, financial/economic crimes and other serious crimes are properly investigated, prosecuted, adjudicated and enforced, according to the applicable law, including, where appropriate, by international investigators, prosecutors and judges jointly with Kosovo investigators, prosecutors and judges or independently, and by measures including, as appropriate, the creation of cooperation and coordination structures between police and prosecution authorities;
- (e) contribute to strengthening cooperation and coordination throughout the whole judicial process, particularly in the area of organised crime;
- (f) contribute to the fight against corruption, fraud and financial crime;
- (g) contribute to the implementation of the Kosovo Anti-Corruption Strategy and Anti-Corruption Action Plan;

- (h) assume other responsibilities, independently or in support of the competent Kosovo authorities, to ensure the maintenance and promotion of the rule of law, public order and security, in consultation with the relevant Council agencies; and
- (i) ensure that all its activities respect international standards concerning human rights and gender mainstreaming.

## *Article 4*

### **Planning and preparation phase**

1. During the planning and preparation phase of the mission, EUPT Kosovo shall act as the main planning and preparation element for EULEX KOSOVO.

The Head of EUPT Kosovo shall act under the authority of the Head of EULEX KOSOVO (hereinafter the Head of Mission).

- 2. The risk assessment carried out as part of the planning process shall be updated regularly.
- 3. EUPT Kosovo shall be responsible for recruiting and deploying staff and procuring equipment, services and premises intended for EULEX KOSOVO, financed from the EUPT Kosovo budget.
- 4. EUPT Kosovo shall be responsible for drawing up the Operation Plan (OPLAN) and developing technical instruments necessary to execute the mandate of EULEX KOSOVO. The OPLAN shall take into account the risk assessment and shall include a security plan. The Council shall approve the OPLAN.

## *Article 5*

### **Launching and transition period**

- 1. The decision to launch EULEX KOSOVO shall be taken by the Council upon approval of the OPLAN. The operational phase of EULEX KOSOVO shall start upon transfer of authority from the United Nations Mission in Kosovo, UNMIK.
- 2. During the transition period, the Head of Mission may direct EUPT Kosovo to undertake the necessary activities in order for EULEX KOSOVO to be fully operational on the day of transfer of authority.

## *Article 6*

### **Structure of EULEX KOSOVO**

- 1. EULEX KOSOVO shall be a unified ESDP mission across Kosovo.
- 2. EULEX KOSOVO shall establish:
  - (a) its main Headquarters in Pristina;
  - (b) regional and local offices across Kosovo;
  - (c) a Brussels support element; and
  - (d) liaison offices, as required.
- 3. Subject to detailed arrangements in the OPLAN, EULEX KOSOVO shall be structured as follows:
  - (a) the Head of Mission and staff as defined in the OPLAN;
  - (b) a police component, co-located where appropriate with the Kosovo Police Service, including at the border crossing points;
  - (c) a justice component, co-located where appropriate with the relevant Ministries, the Kosovo judiciary, the Kosovo Property Agency, the Kosovo Correctional Service; and (d) a

customs component, co-located where appropriate with the Kosovo Customs Service.

4. Specialised police may be hosted in camps designed to cater for their operational needs.

## *Article 7*

### **Civilian Operation Commander**

1. The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) Director shall be the Civilian Operation Commander for EULEX KOSOVO.
2. The Civilian Operation Commander, under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the overall authority of the SG/HR, shall exercise command and control of EULEX KOSOVO at the strategic level.
3. The Civilian Operation Commander shall ensure proper and effective implementation of the Council's decisions as well as the PSC's decisions, including by issuing instructions at strategic level as required to the Head of Mission and providing him with advice and technical support.
4. All seconded staff shall remain under the full command of the national authorities of the seconding State or EU institution concerned. National authorities shall transfer Operational Control (OPCON) of their personnel, teams and units to the Civilian Operation Commander.
5. The Civilian Operation Commander shall have overall responsibility for ensuring that the EU's duty of care is properly discharged.
6. The Civilian Operation Commander and the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) shall consult each other as required.

## *Article 8*

### **Head of Mission**

1. The Head of Mission shall assume responsibility and exercise command and control of EULEX KOSOVO at theatre level.
2. The Head of Mission shall exercise command and control over personnel, teams and units from contributing States as assigned by the Civilian Operation Commander together with administrative and logistic responsibility including over assets, resources and information placed at the disposal of EULEX KOSOVO. The exercise of such command and control shall be without prejudice to the principle of the independence of the judiciary and the autonomy of prosecution when considering the discharge of judicial duties of EULEX KOSOVO judges and prosecutors.
3. The Head of Mission shall issue instructions to all EULEX KOSOVO staff, including in this case the support element in Brussels, for the effective conduct of EULEX KOSOVO in theatre, assuming its coordination and day-to-day management, and following the instructions at strategic level of the Civilian Operation Commander.
4. Until the expiry of Joint Action 2006/304/CFSP, the Head of Mission shall be supported by EUPT Kosovo established thereby.
5. The Head of Mission shall be responsible for the implementation of the EULEX KOSOVO's budget. For this purpose, the Head of Mission shall sign a contract with the Commission.
6. The Head of Mission shall be responsible for disciplinary control over the staff. For seconded staff, disciplinary action shall be exercised by the national or EU authority concerned.
7. The Head of Mission shall represent EULEX KOSOVO in the operations area and shall ensure appropriate visibility of EULEX KOSOVO.

8. The Head of Mission shall coordinate, as appropriate, with other EU actors on the ground. The Head of Mission shall, without prejudice to the chain of command, receive local political guidance from the EUSR, including with regard to the political aspects of issues related to executive responsibilities.
9. The Head of Mission shall ensure that EULEX KOSOVO works closely and coordinates with the competent Kosovo authorities and with relevant international actors, as appropriate, including NATO/KFOR, UNMIK, OSCE, third States involved in the rule of law in Kosovo and an International Civilian Office.
10. Under the direct responsibility of the Head of Mission, internal legal and financial control functions shall be performed by personnel independent of the staff responsible for the administration of EULEX KOSOVO.

## *Article 9*

### **Staff**

1. The numbers and competence of the EULEX KOSOVO staff shall be consistent with its Mission Statement set out in Article 2, the tasks set out in Article 3 and the structure of EULEX KOSOVO set out in Article 6.
2. EULEX KOSOVO shall consist primarily of staff seconded by Member States or EU institutions. Each Member State or EU institution shall bear the costs related to any of the staff seconded by it, including travel expenses to and from the place of deployment, salaries, medical coverage and allowances other than daily allowances and applicable risks and hardship allowances.
3. EULEX KOSOVO may also recruit, as required, international staff and local staff on a contractual basis.
4. Third States may also, as appropriate, second staff to EULEX KOSOVO. Each seconding third State shall bear the costs related to any of the staff seconded by it, including travel expenses to and from the place of deployment, salaries, medical coverage and allowances. Exceptionally, in duly justified cases, where no qualified applications from Member States are available, nationals from participating third States may be recruited on a contractual basis, as appropriate.
5. All staff shall abide by the mission-specific minimum security operating standards and the mission security plan supporting the EU field security policy. As regards the protection of EU classified information with which they are entrusted in the course of their duties, they shall respect the security principles and minimum standards established by Decision 2001/264/EC<sup>(1)</sup>.

## *Article 10*

### **Status of EULEX KOSOVO and of its staff**

1. The status of EULEX KOSOVO and its staff, including the privileges, immunities and further guarantees necessary for the completion and smooth functioning of EULEX KOSOVO, shall be agreed as appropriate.
2. The State or EU institution having seconded a member of staff shall be responsible for answering any claims linked to the secondment, from or concerning the member of staff. The

(1) OJ L 101, 11.4.2001, p. 1. Decision as last amended by Decision 2007/438/EC (OJ L 164, 26.6.2007, p. 24).

State or EU institution in question shall be responsible for bringing any action against the seconded person.

3. The conditions of employment and the rights and obligations of international and local civilian staff shall be laid down in the contracts between the Head of Mission and the members of staff.

## *Article 11*

### **Chain of command**

1. EULEX KOSOVO shall have a unified chain of command, as a crisis management operation.

2. Under the responsibility of the Council, the PSC shall exercise political control and strategic direction of EULEX KOSOVO.

3. As also laid down in Article 7, the Civilian Operation Commander, under the political control and strategic direction of the PSC and the overall authority of the SG/HR, shall be the commander of EULEX KOSOVO at strategic level and, as such, shall issue the Head of Mission with instructions and provide him with advice and technical support.

4. The Civilian Operation Commander shall report to the Council through the SG/HR.

5. The Head of Mission shall exercise command and control of EULEX KOSOVO at theatre level and shall be directly responsible to the Civilian Operation Commander.

## *Article 12*

### **Political control and strategic direction**

1. The PSC shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council, political control and strategic direction of EULEX KOSOVO.

2. The Council hereby authorises the PSC to take the relevant decisions for this purpose, in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 25 of the Treaty. This authorisation shall include the powers to amend the OPLAN and the chain of command. It shall also include powers to take subsequent decisions regarding the appointment of the Head of Mission.

The Council, on the recommendation of the SG/HR, shall decide on the objectives and termination of EULEX KOSOVO.

3. The PSC shall report to the Council at regular intervals.

4. The PSC shall receive, on a regular basis and as required, reports by the Civilian Operation Commander and the Head of Mission on issues within their areas of responsibility. Planning for specific areas may be reviewed by the PSC on a regular basis.

## *Article 13*

### **Participation of third States**

1. Without prejudice to the decision-making autonomy of the EU and its single institutional framework, third States may be invited to contribute to EULEX KOSOVO provided that they bear the cost of the staff seconded by them, including salaries, allowances and travel expenses to and from the theatre of operation, and to contribute to the running costs of EULEX KOSOVO, as appropriate.

2. Third States making contributions to EULEX KOSOVO shall have the same rights and obligations in terms of day-to-day management of EULEX KOSOVO as Member States taking part in it.

3. The Council hereby authorises the PSC to take the relevant decisions on acceptance or otherwise of the proposed contributions and to establish a Committee of Contributors.
4. Detailed arrangements regarding the participation of third States shall be laid down in an agreement to be concluded in accordance with Article 24 of the Treaty. The SG/HR, assisting the Presidency, may negotiate such arrangements on its behalf. Where the EU and a third State conclude an agreement establishing a framework for the participation of such third State in the EU crisis management operations, the provisions of such agreement shall apply in the context of EULEX KOSOVO.

## *Article 14*

### **Security**

1. The Civilian Operation Commander shall direct the Head of Mission's planning of security measures and ensure their proper and effective implementation for EULEX KOSOVO in accordance with Articles 7 and 11 and in coordination with the Security Office of the General Secretariat of the Council.
2. The Head of Mission shall be responsible for the security of the operation and for ensuring compliance with minimum security requirements applicable to the operation, in line with the policy of the EU on the security of personnel deployed outside the EU in an operational capacity under Title V of the Treaty and its supporting instruments.
3. The Head of Mission shall be assisted by a Senior Mission Security Officer (SMSO), who will report to the Head of Mission and also maintain a close functional relationship with the Security Office mentioned in paragraph 1.
4. The Head of Mission shall appoint Area Security Officers in the regional and local EULEX KOSOVO locations, who, under the authority of the SMSO shall be responsible for the day-to-day management of all security aspects of the respective EULEX KOSOVO elements.
5. EULEX KOSOVO staff shall undergo mandatory security training before or upon taking up their duties, in accordance with the OPLAN. They also receive regular in-theatre refresher training organised by the SMSO and the Area Security Officers.
6. The Head of Mission shall ensure that the numbers of EULEX KOSOVO staff present and of authorised visitors never exceed EULEX KOSOVO's capabilities to ensure their safety and security or to manage their evacuation in an emergency situation.
7. The Head of Mission shall ensure the protection of EU classified information in accordance with Decision 2001/264/EC.

## *Article 15*

### **Watch-keeping**

The watch-keeping capability shall be activated for EULEX KOSOVO.

## *Article 16*

### **Financial arrangements**

1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to a period of 16 months starting from the approval of the OPLAN shall be EUR 205 000 000.
2. All expenditure shall be managed in accordance with the Community rules and procedures applicable to the general budget of the EU, with the exception that any pre-financing shall not remain the property of the Community.



3. Subject to the Commission's approval, the Head of Mission may conclude technical arrangements with EU Member States, participating third States and other international actors deployed in Kosovo regarding the provision of equipment, services and premises to EULEX KOSOVO. Nationals of the countries of the Western Balkans region or of contributing third States shall be allowed to tender for contracts. The position of contract holder of contracts or under arrangements concluded by EUPT Kosovo for EULEX KOSOVO during the planning and preparation phase shall be transferred to EULEX KOSOVO, as appropriate. Assets owned by EUPT Kosovo shall be transferred to EULEX KOSOVO.
4. The Head of Mission shall report fully to, and be supervised by, the Commission on the activities undertaken in the framework of his contract.
5. The financial arrangements shall respect the operational requirements of EULEX KOSOVO, including compatibility of equipment and interoperability of its teams, and shall take into consideration the deployment of staff in regional offices.
6. Expenditure shall be eligible as from the date of approval of the OPLAN.

## *Article 17*

### **Coordination with Community actions**

1. The Council and the Commission shall, each in accordance with its respective powers, ensure consistency between the implementation of this Joint Action and external activities of the Community in accordance with Article 3 of the Treaty. The Council and the Commission shall cooperate to this end.
2. The necessary coordination arrangements shall be put in place in the EULEX KOSOVO area, as appropriate, as well as in Brussels.

## *Article 18*

### **Release of classified information**

1. The SG/HR shall be authorised to release to the United Nations, NATO/KFOR and to other third parties, associated with this Joint Action, EU classified information and documents generated for the purposes of EULEX KOSOVO up to the level of the relevant classification respectively for each of them, in accordance with Decision 2001/264/EC. Local technical arrangements shall be drawn up to facilitate this.
2. In the event of a specific and immediate operational need, the SG/HR shall also be authorised to release to the competent local authorities EU classified information and documents up to the level 'RESTREINT UE' generated for the purposes of EULEX KOSOVO, in accordance with Decision 2001/264/EC. In all other cases, such information and documents shall be released to the competent local authorities in accordance with the procedures appropriate to those authorities' level of cooperation with the EU.
3. The SG/HR shall be authorised to release to the United Nations, NATO/KFOR, to other third parties associated with this Joint Action and to the relevant local authorities, EU non-classified documents related to the deliberations of the Council with regard to EULEX KOSOVO covered by the obligation of professional secrecy pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Council's Rules of Procedure<sup>(1)</sup>.

(1) Decision 2006/683/EC, Euratom of 15 September 2006 adopting the Council's Rules of Procedure (OJ L 285, 16.10.2006, p. 47). Decision as amended by Decision 2007/881/EC (OJ L 346, 29.12.2007, p. 17).

## *Article 19*

### **Review**

The Council shall evaluate, not later than six months after the start of the operational phase, whether EULEX KOSOVO should be extended.

## *Article 20*

### **Entry into force and duration**

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the date of its adoption. It shall expire 28 months from the date of approval of the OPLAN. The budget for the last 12 months before expiry shall be decided upon separately by the Council.

## *Article 21*

### **Publication**

1. This Joint Action shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.
2. The decisions of the PSC pursuant to Article 12(1) regarding the appointment of the Head of Mission shall also be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Brussels, 4 February 2008.

*For the Council*

*The President*

D. Rupel

## FACTSHEET – EULEX KOSOVO

**February 2008**

In the framework of its comprehensive approach towards Kosovo the EU decided to launch, on 16 February 2008, an EU Rule of Law mission in Kosovo (EULEX KOSOVO). The objective of EULEX KOSOVO is to support the Kosovo authorities by monitoring, mentoring and advising on all areas related to the rule of law, in particular in the police, judiciary, customs and correctional services. This means that the mission will assist the Kosovo institutions, judicial authorities and law enforcement agencies in their progress towards sustainability and accountability and in further developing and strengthening an independent multi-ethnic justice system and multi-ethnic police and customs service. The key priorities of the mission are to address immediate concerns regarding protection of minority communities, corruption and the fight against organised crime.

The mission is conceived as a joint effort with local authorities, in line with the local ownership principle, with a view to foster a self sustainable judicial and administrative system in Kosovo, based on the rule of law and European standards. However, EULEX KOSOVO will have some limited correctional powers in the broader field of rule of law, in particular to investigate and prosecute serious and sensitive crimes.

EULEX KOSOVO will only assume its responsibilities after a build-up period foreseen for 120 days after its launch. This means that the United Nations mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) will remain fully in charge until the end of this transition period, when the EU will step in to support the Kosovo authorities in their efforts to create a sustainable rule of law system.

Once it reaches full operational capability the mission will have around 1,900 international police officers, judges, prosecutors and customs officials and approximately 1,100 local staff and will be based in headquarters in Pristina or located throughout the judicial and police system in Kosovo. A contingency of around 300 police and border officials is foreseen but will only be deployed if deemed necessary. Yves de KERMABON (France) has been appointed Head of Mission of EULEX KOSOVO.

The EU Special Representative (EUSR) in Kosovo will provide local political guidance to EULEX KOSOVO Head of Mission, who will report to the Civilian Operations Commander in Brussels. The EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) will exercise, under the responsibility of the Council of the EU, political control and strategic direction of the mission.

The initial mandate is for 2 years but the mission is foreseen to be terminated when the Kosovo authorities have gained enough experience to guarantee that all members of society benefit from the rule of law. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to a period of sixteen months will be EUR 205 million.

## COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/123/CFSP APPOINTING A EUROPEAN UNION SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN KOSOVO

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union and, in particular Articles 14, 18(5) and 23(2) thereof,

Whereas:

- (1) On 10 June 1999 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1244.
- (2) On 15 September 2006, the Council adopted Joint Action 2006/623/CFSP<sup>(1)</sup> on the establishment of a team to contribute to the preparations of the establishment of a possible International Civilian Office in Kosovo, including a European Union Special Representative component (ICO/EUSR Preparation Team).
- (3) On 13/14 December 2007, the European Council underlined that the EU stands ready to play a leading role in strengthening stability in the region and in implementing a settlement defining Kosovo's future status. It stated the EU's readiness to assist Kosovo in the path towards sustainable stability, including by an ESDP mission and a contribution to an International Civilian Office as part of the international presences.
- (4) In parallel with this Joint Action, the Council will adopt a Joint Action on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX KOSOVO).
- (5) The Stabilisation and Association Process is the strategic framework for the EU's policy towards the Western Balkan region, and its instruments apply to Kosovo, including a European partnership, political and technical dialogue under the SAP Tracking Mechanism, and related Community assistance programmes.
- (6) The EUSR's mandate should be implemented in coordination with the Commission in order to ensure consistency with other relevant activities falling within Community competence.
- (7) The Council foresees that the powers and authorities of the EUSR and the powers and authorities of an International Civilian Representative shall be vested in the same person.
- (8) The EUSR will implement his mandate in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could harm the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as set out in Article 11 of the Treaty,

HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

### *Article 1*

#### **Appointment**

Mr Pieter Feith is hereby appointed as European Union Special Representative (EUSR) in Kosovo for the period from the date of adoption of the Joint Action to 28 February 2009.

### *Article 2*

#### **Policy objectives**

The mandate of the EUSR shall be based on the policy objectives of the EU in Kosovo. These include to play a leading role in strengthening stability in the region and in implementing a set-

(1) OJ L 253, 16.9.2006, p. 29. Joint Action as last amended and extended by Joint Action 2007/744/CFSP (OJ L 301, 20.11.2007, p. 27).

tlement defining Kosovo's future status, with the aim of a stable, viable, peaceful, democratic and multi-ethnic Kosovo, contributing to regional cooperation and stability, on the basis of good neighbourly relations; a Kosovo that is committed to the rule of law and to the protection of minorities, and of cultural and religious heritage.

### *Article 3*

#### **Mandate**

In order to achieve the policy objectives of the EU in Kosovo, the mandate of the EUSR shall be to:

- (a) offer the EU's advice and support in the political process;
- (b) promote overall EU political coordination in Kosovo;
- (c) provide local political guidance to the Head of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX KOSOVO), including on the political aspects of issues relating to executive responsibilities;
- (d) ensure consistency and coherence of EU action towards the public. The EUSR spokesperson shall be the main EU point of contact for Kosovo media on Common Foreign and Security Policy/European Security and Defence Policy (CFSP/ESDP) issues. All press and public information activities will be conducted in close and continued coordination with the SG/HR spokesperson/Council Secretariat Press Office;
- (e) until the expiry of Council Joint Action 2006/623/CFSP of 15 September 2006 on the establishment of a EU team to contribute to the preparations of the establishment of a possible international civilian mission in Kosovo, including a European Union Special Representative component (ICM/EUSR Preparation Team), give political guidance and operational direction to the Head of the Preparation Team established thereby, preparing for the EU contribution to an International Civilian Office;
- (f) contribute to the development and consolidation of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Kosovo, including with regard to women and children, in accordance with EU human rights policy and EU guidelines on Human Rights.

### *Article 4*

#### **Implementation of the mandate**

1. The EUSR shall be responsible for the implementation of the mandate acting under the authority and operational direction of the Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR).
2. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) shall maintain a privileged link with the EUSR and shall be the primary point of contact with the Council. The PSC shall provide the EUSR with strategic guidance and political direction within the framework of the mandate.
3. Until the expiry of Joint Action 2006/623/CFSP, the EUSR shall be supported by the Preparation Team established thereby.

### *Article 5*

#### **Financing**

1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the mandate of the EUSR in the period from the date of adoption of this Joint Action to 28 February 2009 shall be EUR 380 000.
2. The expenditure financed by the amount stipulated in paragraph 1 shall be eligible as from the date of adoption of this Joint Action. The expenditure shall be managed in accordance

with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the European Communities with the exception that any pre-financing shall not remain the property of the Community. Nationals of the countries of the Western Balkans region shall be allowed to tender for contracts.

3. The management of the expenditure shall be subject to a contract between the EUSR and the Commission. The EUSR shall be accountable to the Commission for all expenditure.

## *Article 6*

### **Constitution and composition of the team**

1. An EU dedicated staff shall be assigned to assist the EUSR to implement his mandate and contribute to the coherence, visibility and effectiveness of the overall EU action in Kosovo. Within the limits of his mandate and the corresponding financial means made available, the EUSR shall be responsible for constituting his team in consultation with the Presidency, assisted by the SG/HR, and in full association with the Commission. The team shall include expertise on specific policy issues as required by the mandate. The EUSR shall inform the SG/HR, the Presidency and the Commission of the composition of his team.

2. Member States and Institutions of the European Union may propose the secondment of staff to work with the EUSR. The salary of personnel who are seconded by a Member State or an institution of the European Union to the EUSR shall be covered by the Member State or the institution of the European Union concerned, respectively. Experts seconded by Member States to the General Secretariat of the Council may also be posted to the EUSR. International contracted staff shall have the nationality of an EU Member State.

3. All seconded personnel shall remain under the administrative authority of the sending Member State or EU institution and shall carry out their duties and act in the interest of the mission of the EUSR.

## *Article 7*

### **Privileges and immunities of the EUSR and his staff**

The privileges, immunities and further guarantees necessary for the completion and smooth functioning of the mission of the EUSR and the members of his staff shall be agreed as appropriate. Member States and the Commission shall grant all necessary support to such effect.

## *Article 8*

### **Security of classified information**

1. The EUSR and the members of his team shall respect security principles and minimum standards established by Council Decision 2001/264/EC of 19 March 2001 adopting the Council's Security Regulations<sup>(1)</sup>, in particular when managing EU classified information.

2. The SG/HR shall be authorised to release to NATO/KFOR EU classified information and documents up to the level 'CONFIDENTIEL UE' generated for the purposes of the action, in accordance with the Council's security regulations.

3. The SG/HR shall be authorised to release to the UN and the OSCE, in accordance with the operational needs of the EUSR, EU classified information and documents up to the level

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(1) OJ L 101, 11.4.2001, p. 1. Decision as last amended by Decision 2007/438/EC (OJ L 164, 26.6.2007, p. 24).

‘RESTREINT UE’ which are generated for the purposes of the action, in accordance with the Council’s security regulations. Local arrangements shall be drawn up for this purpose.

4. The SG/HR shall be authorised to release to third parties associated with this Joint Action EU non-classified documents related to the deliberations of the Council with regard to the action covered by the obligation of professional secrecy pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Council’s Rules of Procedure<sup>(2)</sup>.

## *Article 9*

### **Access to information and logistical support**

1. Member States, the Commission and the Council Secretariat shall ensure that the EUSR is given access to any relevant information.
2. The Presidency, the Commission and/or Member States, as appropriate, shall provide logistical support in the region.

## *Article 10*

### **Security**

In accordance with the EU’s policy on the security of personnel deployed outside the EU in an operational capacity under Title V of the Treaty, the EUSR shall take all reasonably practicable measures, in conformity with his mandate and the security situation in his geographical area of responsibility, for the security of all personnel under his direct authority, notably by:

- (a) establishing a mission-specific security plan based on guidance from the General Secretariat of the Council, including mission-specific physical, organisational and procedural security measures, governing management of the secure movement of personnel to, and within, the mission area, as well as the management of security incidents and including a mission contingency and evacuation plan;
- (b) ensuring that all personnel deployed outside the EU are covered by high risk insurance as required by the conditions in the mission area;
- (c) ensuring that all members of his team to be deployed outside the EU, including locally contracted personnel, have received appropriate security training before or upon arriving in the mission area, based on the risk ratings assigned to the mission area by the General Secretariat of the Council;
- (d) ensuring that all agreed recommendations made following regular security assessments are implemented and providing the SG/HR, the Council and the Commission with written reports on their implementation and on other security issues within the framework of the mid-term and mandate implementation reports.

## *Article 11*

### **Reporting**

The EUSR shall regularly provide the SG/HR and the PSC with oral and written reports. The EUSR shall also report as necessary to working groups. Regular written reports shall be circulated through the COREU network. Upon recommendation of the SG/HR or the PSC, the EUSR may provide General Affairs and External Relations Council with reports.

(2) Decision 2006/683/EC, Euratom of 15 September 2006 adopting the Council’s Rules of Procedure (OJ L 285, 16.10.2006, p. 47). Decision as last amended by Decision 2007/881/EC (OJ L 346, 29.12.2007, p. 17).

## **Article 12**

### **Coordination**

1. The EUSR shall promote overall EU political coordination. He shall help ensure that all EU instruments in the field are engaged coherently to attain the EU's policy objectives. The activities of the EUSR shall be coordinated with those of the Presidency and the Commission, as well as those of other EUSRs active in the region as appropriate. The EUSR shall provide regular briefings to Member States' missions and Commission's delegations.
2. In the field, close liaison shall be maintained with Presidency, Commission and Member States' Heads of Mission who shall make best efforts to assist the EUSR in the implementation of the mandate. The EUSR shall provide local political guidance to the Head of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX KOSOVO), including on the political aspects of issues relating to executive responsibilities. The EUSR and the Civilian Operation Commander will consult each other as required.
3. The EUSR shall also liaise with relevant local bodies and other international and regional actors in the field.
4. The EUSR, with other EU actors present in the field, shall ensure the dissemination and sharing of information among EU actors in theatre with a view to achieving a high degree of common situation awareness and assessment.

## **Article 13**

### **Review**

The implementation of this Joint Action and its consistency with other contributions from the European Union to the region shall be kept under regular review. The EUSR shall present the SG/HR, the Council and the Commission with a progress report before the end of June 2008 and a comprehensive mandate implementation report by mid-November 2008. These reports shall form a basis for evaluation of this Joint Action in the relevant working groups and by the PSC. In the context of overall priorities for deployment, the SG/HR shall make recommendations to the PSC concerning the Council's decision on renewal, amendment or termination of the mandate.

## **Article 14**

### **Entry into force**

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the day of its adoption.

## **Article 15**

### **Publication**

This Joint Action shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Brussels, 4 February 2008.

*For the Council*

*The President*

D. Rupel



# Javier Solana – ‘Where is Russia going? A new attempt for an all-European security order’

Munich, 10 February 2008

## SUMMARY OF THE ADDRESS BY JAVIER SOLANA AT THE 44<sup>TH</sup> MUNICH CONFERENCE ON SECURITY POLICY

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(...)

**Russia has a long tradition of being a European and world power.** To regain its status as major world power has been the first priority of Russian foreign policy during the Presidency of Vladimir Putin. In many ways, this objective has been achieved. Russia is back. For us, Europe is stronger and more stable with a strong and open Russia reaching out to the world.

**In the meantime the world has changed.** Thankfully, we no longer have a bipolar order dominated by confrontation between two superpowers with Europe as the fault-line. Co-operation has replaced confrontation. There are also new players: China, India, Japan, to name a few. Then there are new global threats: global warming, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism. And regional threats. In Europe, we have to deal with instability that has come out of the end of the Cold War, as discussed in a panel yesterday. We also know that tension and instability outside Europe – in the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere – is a threat to our security in Europe, Russia and the US.

**In short, this is a new world.** With shifting threats, we see shifts in the way to deal with them. There are more actors, and more flexible constellations.

In this new international security architecture, Russia is a key partner. We want to work as much as possible with a Russia that is ready to play its part. Indeed, little of value can be achieved without Russia, and almost nothing against it. Of course, it is not always easy to agree on what to do. But in most cases we manage. The recent agreement in Berlin on a new UNSC resolution on Iran a good example.

**The European Union and Russia are both global actors. But we also share a continent.** It is sometimes easier to be global strategic partners than to be good neighbours. We have some well-known disagreements. From trade disputes to travel restrictions to concerns over whether media and organisations like the British Council can operate in truly free and independent manner. But trade is booming. And co-operation expanding to a wide range of areas. This broad nature of relationship has a stabilising effect.

Nevertheless, we do not have a real strategic convergence yet. Still lingering mistrust here and there. Believe we are at a turning point. To consolidate the new paradigm of co-operation in Europe, I see three priorities.

**First, we need to build on the achievements of our predecessors.** This means maintaining the treaty regimes on which our security and societies are built. For us, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty – both its ceilings and its confidence building measures – remains a cor-

nerstone of European security. Losing it increases the risk of creeping mistrust.

The same goes for the manner in which other treaties and issues, like missile defence, are discussed and ultimately decided upon. As we rightly seek to defend ourselves against new threats, we should be careful that we do not, unintentionally, create new sources of suspicion or tensions amongst us.

The founding treaties of the Council of Europe and the OSCE define what it means to be European. Both organisations have adapted successfully to new circumstances. It is difficult to imagine building a new European security order on a different platform. Respect for the rules of these organisations is indispensable.

**Secondly, we must find more common ground based on the rule of law.** If we want our companies to compete on open markets without generating political disputes, we need common rules and an agreed framework to enforce them. WTO offers a key element of this framework. I look forward to Russia joining.

The emphasis given recently by Russian Deputy PM Medvedev to the rule of law is as significant as it is welcome. I do not want to quote him out of context. But I agree when he says about Russia that ‘if it wants to become a civilised state, first of all we have to become lawful.’ Developing a shared commitment to the rule of law will be a major strategic challenge in the coming years.

This has implications across the board, as in the field of energy. Our interdependence in energy is a fact. A quick look at the map of existing pipelines confirms this. There is a justified concern across Europe about Russia seeming more interested in investing in future leverage than in future production. Contrast Gazprom’s strategic spending spree abroad with the lack of investment at home. So we need a European framework for energy, based on the rule of law and reciprocity.

**Finally, as a third priority, we must match our rhetoric with concrete action.** Resolving the frozen conflicts in Europe is particularly important. If we continue working closely together, we can get a durable settlement to these conflicts. Resolving these conflicts is important per se: enabling these countries to focus on essential political and economic reforms. But it also important for us, for confidence, for our stability and to show we can solve problems. During the Cold War, Europe was the frontline. It was here that military planners envisaged a possible military confrontation.

Now we have the chance to make Europe a continent of stability. A source of hope for more troubled regions of the world. It is in the interest of both the EU and Russia to make this happen. This would not be a minor contribution to world order.

# EU SSR Guinea Bissau – Council Joint Action

Brussels, 12 February 2008

The Council adopted a Joint Action to establish an advice and assistance mission in support of the security sector reform (SSR) in Guinea-Bissau. The mission will be undertaken in partnership with the Guinea-Bissau authorities in order to contribute to creating the conditions for implementation of the National Security Sector Reform Strategy. EU SSR Guinea Bissau will be the first ESDP mission in the field of Security Sector Reform bringing together the three sectors of defence, justice and police.

## **COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/112/CFSP ON THE EUROPEAN UNION MISSION IN SUPPORT OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA-BISSAU (EU SSR GUINEA-BISSAU)**

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### THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 14 and the third subparagraph of Article 25 thereof,

Whereas:

- (1) The promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa and Europe is a key strategic priority of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy adopted by the EU-Africa Summit on 9 December 2007.
- (2) Security sector reform (SSR) in Guinea-Bissau is essential for the stability and sustainable development of that country.
- (3) In November 2006, the Government of Guinea-Bissau presented a National Security Strategy underlining its commitment to implement SSR.
- (4) In this context, the General Secretariat of the Council and the European Commission carried out an initial joint information-gathering mission in May 2007 in Guinea-Bissau, in cooperation with that country's authorities, to develop an overall EU approach to support the national SSR process.
- (5) In order effectively to implement the National Security Strategy, an Action Plan for the Restructuring and Modernisation of the Security and Defence Sectors was presented by the Government of Guinea-Bissau in September 2007, and the institutional framework for the implementation of this Action Plan was established.
- (6) In order to combat the increasing threat posed by organised criminal networks operating in the country, the Government of Guinea-Bissau, with the assistance of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), also announced an Emergency Plan to Fight Drug Trafficking in September 2007.
- (7) A report by the UN Secretary-General of 28 September 2007, whilst commending the Government of Guinea-Bissau for the positive measures taken so far to implement SSR, also underlined the country's inability to combat drug trafficking by itself and called for technical and financial support from regional and international partners.
- (8) On 19 November 2007, the Council considered that a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) action in the field of SSR in Guinea-Bissau would be appropriate, consistent with, and complementary to, European Development Fund and other Community activity.
- (9) Following a second EU fact-finding mission deployed in October 2007, on 10 December

2007 the Council approved the General Concept for potential ESDP action in support of Guinea-Bissau SSR.

(10) In a letter dated 10 January 2008, the Government of Guinea-Bissau invited the EU to deploy a European Union SSR Mission in Guinea-Bissau.

(11) On 12 February 2008, the Council approved a Concept of Operations relating to a mission conducted under the ESDP in support of SSR in Guinea-Bissau, to be known as 'EU SSR GUINEA-BISSAU'.

(12) In its conclusions of 21 November 2006, the Council concluded that SSR in partner countries constitutes one of the core areas for EU action as identified in the European Security Strategy.

(13) Any Third State participation in the mission should be in accordance with the general guidelines defined by the European Council.

(14) The Command and Control Structure of the Mission is without prejudice to the contractual responsibility of the Head of Mission towards the Commission for implementing the budget of the Mission.

(15) The Watch-Keeping Capability established within the Council Secretariat should be activated for this Mission.

(16) The ESDP mission will be conducted in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could harm the objectives of the CFSP as set out in Article 11 of the Treaty,

## HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

### *Article 1*

#### **Mission**

1. The European Union (EU) hereby establishes an EU Mission in support of security sector reform in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, hereinafter referred to as 'EU SSR GUINEABISSAU', or the 'Mission'), comprising a preparatory phase beginning on 26 February 2008 and with an implementation phase beginning no later than 1 May 2008. The duration of the Mission will be up to 12 months from the declaration of initial operational capability.

2. EU SSR GUINEA-BISSAU shall operate in accordance with the mission statement as set out in Article 2.

### *Article 2*

#### **Mission statement**

1. EU SSR GUINEA-BISSAU shall provide local authorities with advice and assistance on SSR in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, in order to contribute to creating the conditions for implementation of the National SSR Strategy, in close cooperation with other EU, international and bilateral actors, and with a view to facilitating subsequent donor engagement.

2. The particular objectives of the mission are:

- ▶ Operationalisation of the National SSR Strategy through assisting in the development of detailed implementation plans for downsizing/restructuring the Armed Forces and security forces.
- ▶ Assistance to the development and articulation of capacitybuilding needs, including training and equipment, facilitating subsequent mobilisation of, and engagement by, donors.

- Assessment of the potential and risk for continued ESDP engagement in the medium term in support of SSR implementation.

### *Article 3*

#### **Structure of the mission**

The mission shall be located in the capital city of Bissau and shall comprise:

- (a) the Head of Mission and Deputy Head of Mission, supported by a Mission Support Cell and a Political Adviser/Public and Press Information Officer (POLAD/PPIO);
- (b) advisors assigned to work with:
  - the Army,
  - the Navy,
  - the Air Force,
 and at the Armed Forces Headquarters level;
- (c) advisors assigned to work with:
  - the Judicial Police,
  - the National Interpol Office,
  - the Prosecution Services, and
  - the Public Order Police including on the establishment of a National Guard;
 and
- (d) an advisor to the Secretariat of the Committee for Technical Coordination (CTC).

### *Article 4*

#### **Civilian Operation Commander**

1. The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) Director shall be the Civilian Operation Commander for EU SSR GUINEA-BISSAU.
2. The Civilian Operation Commander, under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the overall authority of the Secretary-General/High Representative (SG/HR), shall exercise command and control of EU SSR GUINEA-BISSAU at the strategic level.
3. The Civilian Operation Commander shall ensure proper and effective implementation of the Council's decisions as well as the PSC's decisions, including by issuing instructions at strategic level as required to the Head of Mission.
4. All seconded staff shall remain under the full command of the national authorities of the seconding State or EU institution. National authorities shall transfer Operational Control (OPCON) of their personnel, teams and units to the Civilian Operation Commander.
5. The Civilian Operation Commander shall have the overall responsibility for ensuring that the EU's duty of care is properly discharged.

### *Article 5*

#### **Head of Mission**

1. The Head of Mission shall assume responsibility and exercise command and control of the mission at theatre level.
2. The Head of Mission shall exercise OPCON over personnel, teams and units from contributing States as assigned by the Civilian Operation Commander together with administrative and logistic responsibility including over assets, resources and information put at the dis-

posal of the Mission.

3. The Head of Mission shall issue instructions to all mission staff, for the effective conduct of EU SSR GUINEA-BISSAU in theatre, assuming its coordination and day-to-day management, following the instructions at strategic level of the Civilian Operation Commander.

4. The Head of Mission shall be responsible for the implementation of the Mission's budget. For this purpose, the Head of Mission shall sign a contract with the Commission.

5. The Head of Mission shall be responsible for disciplinary control over the staff. For seconded staff, disciplinary action shall be exercised by the national or EU authority concerned.

6. The Head of Mission shall represent EU SSR GUINEA-BISSAU in the operations area and shall ensure appropriate visibility of the Mission.

7. The Head of Mission, assisted by the General Secretariat of the Council, shall draw up the Operational Plan (OPLAN) for the Mission for approval by the Council.

## *Article 6*

### **Staff**

1. EU SSR GUINEA-BISSAU shall consist primarily of staff seconded by Member States or the EU institutions. Each Member State or EU institution shall bear the costs related to any of the staff seconded by it, including travel expenses to and from the place of deployment, salaries, medical coverage and allowances, other than applicable per diems as well as hardship and risk allowances.

2. International civilian staff and local staff shall be recruited on a contractual basis by the Mission if the functions required are not provided by Member States.

3. All staff shall abide by the Mission-specific minimum security operating standards and the Mission Security Plan supporting the EU Field Security Policy. As regards the protection of EU Classified Information with which staff are entrusted in the course of their duties, all staff shall respect the security principles and minimum standards established by Council Decision 2001/264/EC of 19 March 2001 adopting the Council's security regulations<sup>(1)</sup> (hereinafter referred to as the 'Council's security regulations').

## *Article 7*

### **Chain of command**

1. EU SSR GUINEA-BISSAU shall have a unified chain of command as a crisis management operation.

2. Under the responsibility of the Council, the PSC shall exercise political control and strategic direction of EU SSR GUINEA-BISSAU.

3. The Civilian Operation Commander, under the political control and strategic direction of the PSC and the overall authority of the SG/HR, shall be the commander of EU SSR GUINEA-BISSAU at strategic level and, as such, shall issue the Head of Mission with instructions and provide him with advice and technical support. The EU Military Staff Civ-Mil Cell shall be involved in all aspects within its Terms of Reference.

4. The Civilian Operation Commander shall report to the Council through the SG/HR.

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(1) OJ L 101, 11.4.2001, p. 1. Decision as last amended by Decision 2007/438/EC (OJ L 164, 26.6.2007, p. 24).

5. The Head of Mission shall exercise command and control of EU SSR GUINEA-BISSAU at theatre level and shall be directly responsible to the Civilian Operation Commander.

## *Article 8*

### **Political control and strategic direction**

1. The PSC shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council, political control and strategic direction of the Mission. The Council hereby authorises the PSC to take the relevant decisions in accordance with Article 25 of the Treaty. This authorisation shall include the powers to appoint a Head of Mission, upon proposal of the SG/HR, and to amend the Concept of operations (CONOPS) and the OPLAN. The powers of decision with respect to the objectives and termination of the Mission shall remain vested in the Council.
2. The PSC shall report to the Council at regular intervals.
3. The PSC shall receive on a regular basis and as required reports by the Civilian Operation Commander and the Head of Mission on issues within their areas of responsibility.

## *Article 9*

### **Financial arrangements**

1. The financial reference amount to cover expenditure relating to the Mission shall be EUR 5 650 000.
2. All expenditure shall be managed in accordance with the Community rules and procedures applicable to the budget, with the exception that any pre-financing shall not remain the property of the Community. Nationals of third States shall be allowed to tender for contracts.
3. The Head of Mission shall report fully to, and be supervised by, the Commission regarding the activities undertaken in the framework of his contract.
4. The financial arrangements shall respect the operational requirements of the Mission, including compatibility of equipment.
5. The expenditure connected with the Mission shall be eligible as from the entry into force of this Joint Action.

## *Article 10*

### **Participation by third States**

1. Without prejudice to the decision-making autonomy of the EU and its single institutional framework, third States may be invited to contribute to the Mission, provided that they bear the cost of the staff seconded by them, including salaries, all risks insurance cover, daily allowances and travel expenses to and from the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, and that they contribute to the running costs of the Mission, as appropriate.
2. Third States contributing to the Mission shall have the same rights and obligations in terms of day-to-day management of the Mission as Member States.
3. The Council hereby authorises the PSC to take the relevant decisions on acceptance of the contributions proposed and to establish a Committee of Contributors.
4. Detailed arrangements regarding the participation of third States shall be covered by agreements concluded in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 24 of the Treaty. The SG/HR, who shall assist the Presidency, may negotiate such arrangements on the latter's behalf. Where the EU and a third State have concluded an agreement establishing a framework for the third State's participation in EU crisis-management operations, the provisions of that

agreement shall apply in the context of the Mission.

## *Article 11*

### **Coordination**

1. The Council and the Commission shall each, in accordance with their respective powers, ensure that this Joint Action is consistent with the Community's external activities, in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 3 of the Treaty. The Council and the Commission shall cooperate to this end. Arrangements for the coordination of the EU's activities in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau shall be established in Bissau as well as in Brussels.
2. Without prejudice to the chain of command, the Head of Mission shall also act in close coordination with the Commission delegation to ensure the coherence of EU action in support to SSR in Guinea-Bissau.
3. The Head of Mission shall coordinate closely with the local EU Presidency and other EU Heads of Missions in particular as regards EU participation in the Steering Committee for the implementation of the National Security Strategy.
4. The Head of Mission shall cooperate with the other international actors present in the country, in particular the United Nations, ECOWAS and with the International Contact Group on Guinea-Bissau.

## *Article 12*

### **Release of classified information**

1. The SG/HR shall be authorised to release to third States associated with this Joint Action EU classified information and documents up to the level 'RESTREINT UE' which are generated for the purposes of the operation, in accordance with the Council's security regulations.
2. The SG/HR shall be authorised to release to the United Nations and ECOWAS, in accordance with the operational needs of the operation, EU classified information and documents up to the level 'RESTREINT UE' which are generated for the purposes of the operation, in accordance with the Council's security regulations. Local arrangements shall be drawn up for this purpose.
3. In the event of a specific and immediate operational need, the SG/HR shall also be authorised to release to the host State EU classified information and documents up to the level 'RESTREINT UE' which are generated for the purposes of the operation, in accordance with the Council's security regulations. In all other cases, such information and documents shall be released to the host State in accordance with procedures appropriate to the host State's level of cooperation with the EU.
4. The SG/HR shall be authorised to release to third States associated with this Joint Action EU non-classified documents relating to the deliberations of the Council with regard to the operation and covered by the obligation of professional secrecy pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Council's Rules of Procedure<sup>(1)</sup>.

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(1) Decision 2006/683/EC, Euratom (OJ L 285, 16.10.2006, p. 47). Decision as last amended by Decision 2007/881/EC, Euratom (OJ L 346, 29.12.2007, p. 17).



## *Article 13*

### **Status of EU SSR GUINEA-BISSAU and its staff**

1. The status of EU SSR GUINEA-BISSAU and its staff, including where appropriate the privileges, immunities and any further guarantees necessary for the completion and smooth functioning of the Mission, shall be agreed in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 24 of the Treaty. The SG/HR, who shall assist the Presidency, may negotiate such arrangements on its behalf.
2. The State or EU institution having seconded a member of staff shall be responsible for answering any claims linked to the secondment, from or concerning the member of staff. The State or EU institution in question shall be responsible for bringing any action against the person seconded.

## *Article 14*

### **Security**

1. The Civilian Operation Commander shall direct the Head of Mission's planning of security measures and ensure their proper and effective implementation for EU SSR GUINEA-BISSAU in accordance with Articles 4 and 7, in coordination with the Security Office of the General Secretariat of the Council.
2. The Head of Mission shall be responsible for the security of the operation and for ensuring compliance with minimum security requirements applicable to the operation, in line with the policy of the EU on the security of personnel deployed outside the EU in an operational capacity under Title V of the Treaty on EU and its supporting documents.
3. The Head of Mission shall be assisted by a Mission Security Officer (MSO), who shall report to Head of Mission and also maintain a close functional relationship with the Council Security Office.
4. EU SSR GUINEA-BISSAU staff shall undergo mandatory security training before taking up their duties, in accordance with the OPLAN. They shall also receive regular in-theatre refresher training organised by the MSO.
5. The Head of Mission shall ensure the protection of EU Classified Information in accordance with the Council's Security Regulations.

## *Article 15*

### **Watch-keeping Capability**

The Watch-keeping Capability shall be activated for EU SSR GUINEA-BISSAU.

## *Article 16*

### **Review of the Mission**

A Mission review shall be presented to the PSC six months after the beginning of the implementation phase of the Mission, on the basis of a report by the Head of Mission and the General Secretariat of the Council.

## *Article 17*

### **Entry into force and duration**

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.  
It shall apply until 31 May 2009.

## ***Article 18***

### **Publication**

1. This Joint Action shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.
2. The Decisions of the PSC pursuant to Article 8(1), regarding the appointment of the Head of Mission, shall also be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Brussels, 12 February 2008.

*For the Council*

*The President*

A. Bajuk

## Small arms – Council Joint Action

Brussels, 12 February 2008

### **COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/113/CFSP IN SUPPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT TO ENABLE STATES TO IDENTIFY AND TRACE, IN A TIMELY AND RELIABLE MANNER, ILLICIT SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS (SALW) IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EU STRATEGY TO COMBAT THE ILLICIT ACCUMULATION AND TRAFFICKING OF SALW AND THEIR AMMUNITION**

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#### THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 14 thereof,  
Whereas:

- (1) On 8 December 2005, the United Nations General Assembly adopted an International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) (hereinafter referred to as International Tracing Instrument).
- (2) On 15 and 16 December 2005, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy to combat the illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition (EU SALW Strategy) which calls for supporting the adoption of a legally binding international instrument on the tracing and marking of SALW and ammunition.
- (3) By adopting the International Tracing Instrument, States committed themselves to undertake a number of measures to ensure the adequate marking of and record-keeping for SALW and to strengthen cooperation in tracing illicit SALW. In particular, States were to ensure that they are capable of undertaking traces and responding to tracing requests in accordance with the requirements of the International Tracing Instrument. The instrument declares that States will cooperate, as appropriate, with the United Nations to support its effective implementation.
- (4) On 6 December 2006, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 61/66 on 'The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects' which called upon States to implement the International Tracing Instrument, the implementation of which will be considered during the Biennial Meeting of States in 2008.
- (5) This Joint Action should be implemented in accordance with the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement, concluded by the European Commission with the United Nations.
- (6) In accordance with paragraphs 27, 29 and 30 of the International Tracing Instrument the UN Secretariat (Office of Disarmament Affairs) is seeking financial assistance to support activities which are aimed at promoting the International Tracing Instrument,

#### HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

##### *Article 1*

1. The European Union shall pursue the promotion of the International Tracing Instrument.

2. In order to achieve the objective referred to in paragraph 1, the European Union shall support a project of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (hereinafter referred to as UN-ODA) for the promotion of the International Tracing Instrument in 2008, which includes three regional workshops for better acquainting relevant government officials and others (including SALW points of contact, law enforcement officials, members of national coordinating bodies, and parliamentarians) with the provisions of the International Tracing Instrument.

A description of the project is set out in the Annex.

### *Article 2*

1. The Presidency, assisted by the Secretary-General/High Representative for the CFSP (hereinafter referred to as SG/HR), shall be responsible for the implementation of this Joint Action. The Commission shall be fully associated.

2. The technical implementation of the activities resulting from the EU contribution shall be carried out by the UNODA, which shall perform its tasks under the control of the SG/HR, assisting the Presidency. For this purpose the SG/HR shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the UN-ODA.

3. The Presidency, the SG/HR and the Commission shall keep each other regularly informed of the implementation of this Joint Action, in accordance with their respective competences.

### *Article 3*

1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of this Joint Action shall be EUR 299 825, to be funded from the general budget of the European Union.

2. The expenditure financed by the amount stipulated in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the Community procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the European Union.

3. The Commission shall supervise the proper management of the expenditure referred to in paragraph 2, which shall take the form of a grant. For this purpose, it shall conclude a financing agreement with the UN-ODA. The financing agreement shall stipulate that the UN-ODA is to ensure visibility of the EU contribution, appropriate to its size.

4. The Commission shall endeavour to conclude the financing agreement referred to in paragraph 3 as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Joint Action. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of conclusion of the financing agreements.

### *Article 4*

The Presidency, assisted by the SG/HR, shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Joint Action on the basis of reports prepared by the UN-ODA. These reports shall form the basis for the evaluation carried out by the Council. The Commission shall be fully associated. It shall report on the financial aspects of the implementation of this Joint Action.

### *Article 5*

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the day of its adoption. It shall expire 12 months after the conclusion of the financing agreement referred to in Article 3(3) or 6 months after the date of its adoption if no financing agreement has been concluded within that period.

***Article 6***

This Joint Action shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Brussels, 12 February 2008.

*For the Council*

*The President*

A. Bajuk

## ANNEX – EU CONTRIBUTION TO THE UN PROJECT IN SUPPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRACING INSTRUMENT

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### 1. Introduction

The UN Secretariat (Office of Disarmament Affairs) (hereinafter referred to as UN-ODA), intends to organise in 2008 a series of regional and sub-regional workshops in order to allow relevant government officials and others (including SALW points of contact, law enforcement officials, members of national coordinating bodies, and parliamentarians) to become better acquainted with the provisions of the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), adopted by United Nations General Assembly on 8 December 2005 (hereinafter referred to as International Tracing Instrument).

### 2. Project description

Workshops will have a practical focus and a two-day duration and will provide participants with information aimed at enhancing their understanding of the International Tracing Instrument, its relevance and the capacities, skills and resources that would be needed to ensure its implementation at national level. In addition, the workshops will aim at initiating country-specific needs assessments.

The Conventional Arms Branch (CAB) of the UN-ODA intends to organise and implement the workshops in collaboration with the Office's Regional Disarmament Branch, which includes the three United Nations Regional Disarmament Centres. In addition, UN-ODA will endeavour to work in partnership with interested Governments, relevant regional and/or sub-regional organisations, international organizations and civil society organisations with expertise in the area of marking and tracing SALW, including the Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC), the Groupe de Recherche et d'Information sur la Paix et la Sécurité (GRIP) and the Small Arms Survey (SAS). In close cooperation with Interpol, technical presentations will also be provided with a view to familiarising participants with the technical tools available and to assist law enforcement officials with the identification and tracing of illicit SALW.

#### 2.1. West Africa

Possible venues for the workshop in West Africa are Bamako (Mali), Abuja (Nigeria), Libreville (Gabon), or the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Lomé (Togo). A final decision on the location of the workshop will be taken by the UN-ODA, in coordination with the Presidency, assisted by the SG/HR.

Member States of the sub-regional organisations 'Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS) and the 'Economic Community of Central African States' (ECCAS) will be eligible to take part in<sup>(1)</sup> the workshop:

ECOWAS: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo. ECCAS: Angola,

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(1) UN-ODA will organise a workshop for the North, East and South of Africa in December 2007.

Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tomé and Príncipe.

## **2.2. Asia**

The workshop in Asia is to be held in Seoul, Republic of Korea.

The following countries are eligible to take part in the workshop:

Afghanistan, Australia<sup>(2)</sup>, Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan<sup>(2)</sup>, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam.

## **2.3. Latin America and the Caribbean**

The workshop in Latin America and the Caribbean is to be held in Brazil. A final decision on the location of the workshop will be taken by the UN-ODA, in coordination with the Presidency, assisted by the SG/HR.

The following countries are eligible to take part in the workshop:

Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela.

## **3. Duration**

The total estimated duration of the projects will be 12 months.

## **4. Beneficiaries**

The beneficiaries of the seminars are States in Africa, Asia and Latin America, as indicated above, which according to the UN-ODA need to enhance their understanding of the provisions set up by the International Tracing Instrument, as well as to identify the capacities, skills and resources that would be needed to ensure its implementation at national level.

Potential regional and other technical assistance donors, as well as relevant international regional and sub-regional organisations, will also be invited to attend.

## **5. Implementing entity**

Within the context of its overall responsibility, the UN-ODA will implement the technical activities resulting from the EU contribution, as stipulated in this Joint Action, under the control of the SG/HR, assisting the Presidency.

## **6. Estimated total cost of the project and EU financial contribution**

The project is to be co-financed by the EU and other donors. The EU contribution will cover the participation of representatives from beneficiary States and experts in the workshops,

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(2) The Governments of Australia and Japan will assume the travel expenses of their participants.

excluding UN staff, as well as conference costs. The EU contribution will finance eligible activities for the workshop in Africa as a priority. Expenditure incurred by relevant regional and sub-regional organisations may also be covered, insofar as this is directly related to their participation in activities under the projects. The UN-ODA will be responsible for the overall coordination of contributions made by other donors, which will finance the remaining costs of the project.

The total estimated cost of the project is USD 798 800 to which the EU will contribute EUR 299 825.



# General Affairs and External Relations Council

Brussels, 18 February 2008

(...)

## EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

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### Palestinian territories – EU police mission

The Council adopted a decision allocating EUR 5 million to EUPOL COPPS, the EU's police mission for the Palestinian territories, as from 1 March to 31 December 2008 (5841/08).

The decision implements joint action 2005/797/CFSP.

EUPOL COPPS (EU police co-ordinating office for Palestinian police support) is aimed at facilitating the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements under Palestinian ownership, in accordance with the best international standards.

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## WESTERN BALKANS – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

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The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘The Council condemned recent acts of violence in Belgrade, Mitrovica and other places, in particular against foreign diplomatic missions and urged respective authorities to ensure security and safety of the EU citizens and their property. The Council called on Belgrade and Pristina to respect previous commitments to refrain from any activities or statements which might endanger the security situation.’

### Kosovo – Council conclusions

The Council discussed developments in Kosovo and adopted the following conclusions:

‘On 17 February 2008 the Kosovo Assembly adopted a resolution which declares Kosovo to be independent. The Council takes note that the resolution commits Kosovo to the principles of democracy and equality of all its citizens, the protection of the Serb and other minorities, the protection of the cultural and religious heritage and international supervision. The Council welcomes the continued presence of the international community based on UN Security Council resolution 1244.

The Council notes that Member States will decide, in accordance with national practice and international law, on their relations with Kosovo.

The Council recalls the European Union's longstanding commitment to the stability of the Western Balkans region. The Council reiterates the European Union's readiness to play a leading role in strengthening stability in the region, and recalls the European Union's commitments contained in the conclusions of the European Council of 14 December 2007, as well as the agreement to Joint Actions establishing an ESDP Police and Rule of Law mission and appointing an EU Special Representative in Kosovo. The European Union will continue to

cooperate with the UN, KFOR, OSCE and other international actors in order to preserve stability in the region.

The Council reaffirms its commitment to fully and effectively support the European perspective for the Western Balkans. It asks the Commission to use community instruments to promote economic and political development and to propose to the broader region concrete measures in order to advance in that direction.

The Council reiterates the EU's adherence to the principles of the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, *inter alia* the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity and all UN Security Council resolutions. It underlines its conviction that in view of the conflict of the 1990s and the extended period of international administration under SCR 1244, Kosovo constitutes a *sui generis* case which does not call into question these principles and resolutions.'

(...)

## AFRICA

### Kenya – Council conclusions

The Council discussed the situation in Kenya and adopted the following conclusions:

1. The Council expresses its deep concern that the violence, uncertainty and instability in Kenya continue.

2. The Council reiterates the urgent need for Kenya's leaders to engage seriously and flexibly in order to bring an immediate end to the violence and to ensure security, stability and the protection of human rights for all in Kenya. The Council calls on the Kenyan parties to engage constructively in a genuine spirit of compromise in order to find a legitimate political settlement.

3. The Council strongly supports the efforts by the Panel of Eminent African Personalities, led by Mr. Kofi Annan, and stands ready to provide any further assistance it can to this process. The Council reiterates the necessity for the International Community to stand united behind the dialogue process chaired by Mr. Annan. The Council will monitor this process closely. Individuals who obstruct the dialogue process or who encourage violence will have to face the consequences.

4. The Council welcomes the agreement between the Kenyan parties on 1st February to take immediate steps to end the crisis. It is encouraging that the parties plan to address the long term issues as well as the short term ones. The Council welcomes the intention by the Kenyan parties to establish a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission aimed at bringing about debate and consensus on how Kenya should address the root causes of the crisis.

5. The Council welcomes the response by the United Nations to events in Kenya, both politically and in support of the affected civilian population.

6. The Council welcomes the agreement by all parties to an international investigation into the violence since the elections and calls for further co-operation by the Kenyan authorities with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide of the Secretary General of the UN.

7. The Council reiterates that until a legitimate political settlement is agreed, the EU and its Member States cannot conduct business as usual with Kenya. The Council will continue to closely monitor the situation in Kenya and support all efforts towards ending the violence and ensuring democracy, stability and respect for human rights.'

## Chad – Council conclusions

The Council discussed the situation in Chad and the ongoing deployment of operation EUFOR/Tchad/RCA and adopted the following conclusions:

1. The Council firmly condemns the renewed attacks of armed groups against the government of Chad. The Council calls on all Chadian parties to unconditionally renounce the use of force and engage in a constructive dialogue aimed at finding a peaceful solution to the current situation. The Council supports the initiative taken by the African Union to engage the parties to end fighting and its efforts aimed at seeking a lasting solution to the crisis.

2. The Council expresses its deep concern regarding the regional ramifications of the conflict in Darfur and attempts of overthrowing the Chadian government and fully backs the African Union and the United Nations' call for the respect of the sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity of Chad. In order to de-escalate the current confrontation the Council calls on the governments of Sudan and Chad to immediately stop supporting and equipping armed groups and to improve their relations. It calls on the countries of the region to contribute to good neighbourhood relations and improve their cooperation.

3. The Council notes the decision of the Chadian authorities to declare a state of emergency. It will closely monitor the respect of civil rights and liberties and the fundamental principles of the rule of law in this context and expects them to be fully respected. The Council would like to recall its full support to the 13 August 2007 Political Agreement set up with almost all political parties belonging to the legal opposition. The Council considers this agreement, sponsored by the European Union, as the cornerstone of a broader road map leading to legislative elections in 2009. Therefore, it welcomes the efforts provided by the international community, to which the European Union has contributed, to help implementing this Political Agreement, with regard to the civil and electoral census as well as the promotion of democratic freedom and freedom of speech. The Council calls upon Chadian authorities to keep supporting this process and re-establish confidence with the political parties of the legal opposition and civil society with the aim of strengthening democracy in Chad. The Council calls on all parties to the agreement to renew dialogue and to start working in the framework of the 'follow-up committee' of the agreement. The Council expresses its deep concern over the arrest of members of the unarmed political opposition in Chad, including Mr. Lol Mahamat Choua. The Council calls on President Deby to show restraint and immediately release these detainees.

4. The Council emphasises the urgent need to protect civilians and improve the humanitarian situation in the whole region. The Council reaffirms its full commitment to contribute to the implementation of UNSCR 1778 (2007) which authorises the deployment in Chad and the Central African Republic of a multidimensional presence, the military element of which will be provided by the EU. In accordance with this resolution, the EU conducts this military EU bridging operation for a period of 12 months from the declaration of initial operational capability. The situation on the ground will be constantly assessed by the competent Council bodies and the Operation Commander. In the light of the recent events the need for the deployment of EUFOR Tchad/RCA and MINURCAT to contribute to the required security in Eastern Chad has been underscored. EUFOR's mandate is to contribute to the protection of civilians in danger, particularly displaced persons and refugees, to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel and to contribute to the protection of UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment. In observance of its mandate EUFOR

Tchad/RCA will act in an impartial, neutral and independent manner. Regarding systematic mainstreaming of human rights, gender issues and protection of children in armed conflicts, the Council recalls its conclusions of 28 January 2008. The Council welcomes the contribution of the European Commission to provide financial support to MINURCAT and to deliver humanitarian aid to the people in need, to support the reconciliation process and to contribute to the rehabilitation of conflict-affected areas.

5. The Council strongly condemns the attacks by the Sudanese forces against three villages of Western Darfur that took place on 8 February. The Council is deeply concerned by the information from UNAMID and OCHA on the number of deaths and casualties among the civilians. The Council further condemns the military activities of the rebel movements in Western Darfur. The Council calls upon all the parties to commit to an immediate cessation of hostilities. The consequences of this attack for Eastern Chad, with the arrival of more than 10,000 new refugees near Guereda, underlines the urgent need to upgrade international efforts to secure refugees and IDPs with the deployment of EUFOR and MINURCAT as well as full deployment of UNAMID in Darfur.

6. The Council stresses the importance of the international community acting and pronouncing itself in a coordinated and concerted manner. The deployment of EUFOR Tchad/RCA is a major EU contribution, which together with the UN mission MINURCAT in Chad and Central African Republic and in coordination with the Hybrid AU/UN mission UNAMID in Darfur helps to address the conflict in the region and its effects on the humanitarian situation. In this context, the Council urged the Government of Sudan to facilitate a speedy deployment of UNAMID. Efforts to generate stability and create a proper security environment will be conducive for negotiations. The Council will continue its close cooperation and coordination with all actors involved, in particular with the UN and the AU.'

## **MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS**

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At lunch, ministers discussed developments regarding Middle East peace process, notably on the basis of a briefing by High Representative Javier Solana on his recent visit to Egypt. The Commission informed ministers about the humanitarian situation, particularly in Gaza, and the follow-up to the Paris donors' conference.

## **BURMA/MYANMAR – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

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At lunch, ministers discussed developments in Burma/Myanmar. The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. The European Union remains deeply concerned by the situation in Burma/Myanmar and urges the authorities to take rapid steps to transition to a democratically elected government. The Council notes the authorities' announcement on 9 February of a referendum on a new Constitution in May 2008 and multi-party elections in 2010. It underlines that only a process that involves the full participation of the opposition and ethnic groups will lead to national reconciliation and stability. To this end the EU reiterates its call for the release of all political detainees, including Aung San Suu Kyi, the start of a substantial time-bound dialogue with all political stakeholders, and full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

2. The EU reiterates its full support to the UN Secretary General's good offices mission to

help the transition to democracy in Burma/Myanmar, and calls on the authorities to re-admit UN Special Adviser Professor Ibrahim Gambari as soon as possible and to fully cooperate with him and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar Sergio Pinheiro.

3. The EU commends the work of Special Envoy Piero Fassino in co-ordinating the EU's diplomatic efforts with Asian partners, and reaffirms his role in supporting and promoting the UN mission.

4. The EU continues to support the humanitarian needs of the people of Burma/Myanmar and has recently increased aid to that end.

5. The EU remains determined to assist the people of Burma/Myanmar to achieve stability, prosperity and democracy. The EU stands ready to review, amend or reinforce the measures it has already agreed in the light of developments.'

(...)

## Kosovo – Remarks by Javier Solana

Brussels, 20 February 2008

### SUMMARY OF REMARKS BY JAVIER SOLANA AT JOINT PRESS BRIEFING WITH PRIME MINISTER THAÇI IN PRISTINA

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#### Prime Minister Thaçi:

‘Today’s visit of Mr. Solana in Kosovo, along with his colleagues Mr Peter Feith and Mr Yves de Kermabon, is a visit to a new and independent Kosovo, a Kosovo of stability and peace, with the commitments of Kosovo’s institutions for integration into European and Euroatlantic structures.

Kosovo is a part of the European family. Once again, I expressed the commitments of the Kosovo Government, the country’s institutions and of the people that we have been working with our full capacity for a democratic, unique, indivisible and multi-ethnic Kosovo, the homeland of all its citizens, with the most positive and affirmative rights of minorities, especially the Serbs.

Mr Solana, Kosovo’s institutions have started to implement Ahtisaari’s document. The Government and the Assembly have just finished their meeting. We will continue with our biggest commitment that our new determination and responsibility in new Kosovo is for a close cooperation with the new international mission. A mission that will be advisory, supervisory for the country’s institutions but, in the meantime, I think from now on, Kosovo’s way to the EU and NATO is much shorter.

Thank you Mr Solana for your contribution to stability and peace in Kosovo, a new reality for peace and stability in the region.’

#### High Representative Javier Solana:

‘It’s a pleasure to be back in Pristina to represent the European Union. I’d like to say that the European Union and Kosovo, the Kosovo people, have had good relations in the past, and this is something that is going to continue.

I’d like to say on the joy, the energy that are still in the streets of Kosovo in the last days, I think that an appeal has to be made to the people to transform that joy into constructive and positive energy, to help develop this society into a direction that this society has to develop.

Politically, economically and – very important - culturally, and I am sure – I took note – that the Prime Minister recognizes that, he agrees with that, and I am sure that the commitments that were made about the political development, the cultural development, the minorities, it will be done, and that will be very important for the future.

We are in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, societies of today are different from societies of the past and I think those opportunities have to be taken, by young people, many young people who are here in the society of Kosovo. I would like to say that from our point of view we are going to be very much engaged.

As I said yesterday, the European perspective is there. I would like to say that we are going to put people on the ground. They are going to cooperate with the government in the rule of law,

the police, economic development, and we have also EU citizens who we pay for and who will be on the ground.

I was pleased what you, Prime Minister, said privately and what is now public, as you said to the people, I would like to transmit the sentiment, the joy, that you spread so respectfully on the street in the last days, it has to be converted into positive energy to move society forward. The time is now for a long journey. And I very much hope that it will be a journey that people will appreciate very much.'

**Question:** 'Mr Solana, this is your first visit in an independent Kosovo, did you congratulate the leaders and are you happy with the new flag?'

**Solana:** 'I talked with the Prime Minister on the phone during the weekend and I have said everything that I had to tell him. The flag, I saw it basically today, I saw it in pictures yesterday, I think it's very pretty. I like everything that is in it. I see there is yellow, that there are stars, that there is blue.'

**Question:** 'When will the EU be unified about Kosovo? Will the other countries recognize Kosovo soon?'

**Solana:** 'Let me be very clear about the question. The EU is united, so much united that we put people in this place on behalf of the EU. But different countries have different rhythms and different procedures to take up with new realities in the international community. And that is something that has to be like that. The EU does not recognize countries – the Member States do that and they do it according to their national legislation.'

**Question:** 'Mr Solana, what would it take for Cyprus, Romania to recognize Kosovo?'

**Solana:** 'I cannot speak on behalf of Member States. They know how to do it, they know what the procedures in their own countries are. Once again, the EU collectively, the institutions of the EU, have taken a very important decision, and that is what the EU collectively will do.'

**Question:** 'What do incidents in Mitrovica mean?'

**Thaçi:** 'I want to confirm officially the situation in the north of Mitrovica. Everything is under the control and authority of NATO, Kosovo police and UNMIK authority. No soft incident can lighten the glory of dignified celebrations of Kosovo citizens.'

**Question:** 'Aren't you softening too much the events in the north, when you are using no "soft incidents that happened today"? Two checkpoints went off and the control of the borders has been completely lost. Don't you consider it as a failure of NATO to protect the border crossing of Kosovo and not the check points?'

**Thaçi:** 'Kosovo is unified and indivisible. Kosovo's territory is internationally guaranteed and recognized. Everything is under the control of NATO and under the control of Kosovo's and international civilian control. It is an exaggerating vocabulary of your question, Mr Fatmir (Aliu), because there were not such things over there. There were isolated incidents that will not lighten, under any circumstance, the glory of celebrations and noblesse of Kosovo's citizens. There is no room for fear, panic, but only for calmness, prudence and continuation of our work. KFOR troops are there and everything is under control.'

**Question:** ‘Are you prepared to call on NATO troops to enforce the authority of the EU mission?’

**Solana:** ‘Let me start by saying that the EU mission is about to be deployed, don’t ask the mission to do something that they are not in a position to do. They are going to be deployed in the whole of Kosovo. And, let me say, KFOR is here and KFOR has the same responsibilities and obligations today.’

**Question:** ‘Can EU mission be called an administration, independence not full independence, due to executive powers of ICR, what do you think?’

**Solana:** ‘I don’t have to think anything, I think the Prime Minister has made it very clear today – independence has a face’ (pointing to Thaçi).

## **SUMMARY OF REMARKS BY JAVIER SOLANA AFTER HIS MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT FATMIR SEJDIU AND PRIME MINISTER HASHIM THAÇI IN PRISTINA**

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It’s a pleasure to be back in Pristina to represent the European Union. I’d like to say that the European Union and Kosovo, the Kosovo people, have had good relations in the past and this is something that is going to continue.

I would like to transmit that the sentiment, the joy, that you spread so respectfully on the streets over the last days now has to be converted into positive and constructive energy in order to move the society forward. I am sure that the commitments that were made about the political developments, the cultural development, the respect for minorities and respect for cultural heritage will be kept. It will be very important for the future.

I would like to say that, from our point of view, we are going to be very much engaged. The European perspective is there. The EU collectively, the institutions of the EU, have taken a very important decision and that is what the EU collectively will do. We are going to put people on the ground. They are going to cooperate with the government in the areas of rule of law, the police and economic development.

I would like to say that we are good friends of Kosovo, Kosovo is a friend of the EU and, as we said yesterday, the EU perspective for all the countries of the region is open and we would like to keep cooperating in that direction.



# Informal meeting of the Defence Ministers – Summary of remarks by Javier Solana

Ljubljana, 21-22 February 2008

## OPERATIONS

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### Western Balkans – Operation ALTHEA, Bosnia and Herzegovina

- ▶ This year will be an important one for Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the wider region. The prospect of signing the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) must remain real;
- ▶ We will keep EUFOR under review in the light of the situation on the ground and developments concerning the SAA and the Office of the High Representative (OHR);
- ▶ In the meantime, following its reconfiguration last year, EUFOR is now some 2500 strong, backed up by over-the-horizon reserves. It remains robust and stands ready to respond to any threat to the safe and secure environment that is beyond the capacity of local law enforcement agencies.

### Western Balkans – Operation EULEX KOSOVO

- ▶ The EU has just taken important decisions on Kosovo, which is one of the EU's top foreign policy priorities at this moment. These decisions reflect the EU's dedication to the stability and the progress of the Western Balkans. The EU has acted, on a united basis, to give substance to its commitment to play a leading role in implementing a settlement and in contributing to the international presences in Kosovo;
- ▶ On 18 February, the Council agreed on a common reaction to the Kosovo Assembly's declaration of independence the previous day. This is an important political achievement by the EU and it is confirmation yet again that the EU can handle even the most complex CFSP issues;
- ▶ Following the European Council on 14 December 2007, we have also finalised our internal preparations for our enhanced presence in Kosovo. On 4 February we adopted the Joint Actions for the establishment of a ESDP mission in the field of the rule of law and for the appointment of an EUSR. The Operations Plan for the ESDP mission, EULEX Kosovo, was approved by the Council on 15 February, formally launching the mission. However, its operational phase will only start at the end of the transition period;
- ▶ The main objective of both missions is to safeguard the rule of law and to ensure stability in Kosovo. This is in the interest of all communities, first of all the Serbian community in Kosovo;
- ▶ The EUSR, Pieter Feith, is mandated to support the political process in Kosovo. I visited Kosovo on Tuesday, with Pieter Feith and Yves de Kermabon, Head of the ESDP mission, to convey the messages from Monday's meeting of foreign ministers;
- ▶ EULEX KOSOVO will assist the Kosovo authorities in their progress towards sustainability and accountability and in further developing and strengthening an independent multi-ethnic justice system and a multi-ethnic police and custom service. The mission will implement its mandate through monitoring, mentoring, and advising, while retaining certain executive responsibilities;

## Afrique – Operation EUFOR/TCHAD/RCA

- A la suite des attaques récentes par les forces armées soudanaises ainsi que par les mouvements de rébellion, plus de 10 000 personnes en provenance du Darfour se sont réfugiées dans la région de Guéréda. Ce contexte justifie plus que jamais que l'on déploie rapidement EUFOR et MINURCAT;
- La protection des populations en danger devient tous les jours de plus en plus impérative et nous devons respecter les engagements que nous avons pris devant la communauté internationale;
- En plus des efforts politiques qui doivent rester notre priorité, nous devons déployer EUFOR au plus vite – ce qui est en cours – et atteindre la capacité opérationnelle initiale (IOC) pour la mi-mars, suivie rapidement de la capacité pleine. Par ailleurs, il est impératif que les ressources soient réunies pour que notre engagement couvre effectivement la durée prévue de l'opération.

## Afrique – EUSEC RD CONGO

- Le mandat actuel de l'opération, qui s'achève le 30 juin prochain, porte sur l'assistance à la constitution de la future armée nationale de la République démocratique du Congo;
- Des résultats très concrets ont été obtenus, notamment sur la réforme de la chaîne de paiement qui permet de payer effectivement les soldats;
- Un plan de réforme des armées, auquel EUSEC a coopéré, est soumis aux autorités mais il est évident que la priorité est donnée au règlement de l'instabilité dans les Kivu.

## Afrique – EU SSR Guinea-Bissau

- This month, the Council has established an EU mission in support of the security sector reform in Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau);
- Its overall purpose is to provide advice and assistance to the local authorities on reforming the security sector in Guinea-Bissau, in order to contribute to creating the conditions for the implementation of the national security sector reform strategy, in close cooperation with other EU, international and bilateral actors, and with a view to facilitating subsequent donor engagement.

## CAPACITÉS MILITAIRES

- Dans le domaine de nos capacités militaires, nos efforts doivent tendre vers un but commun: faire en sorte que l'UE dispose effectivement, le moment venu, des capacités militaires dont elle a besoin;
- Sur les Groupements tactiques, je me félicite de l'engagement des Etats membres qui, j'en suis sûr, continueront à se porter volontaires pour les périodes d'alerte.

## PARTNERSHIPS

### Relations with NATO – EUPOL Afghanistan

- ▶ EUPOL Afghanistan is firmly established in Kabul and is deploying in the provinces;
- ▶ The focus so far has been on stabilising the Headquarters. We currently have deployment in the North and West, and the EUPOL footprint will now start to spread across the country in the next days and we should be deployed across the country by March 2008. The deployment of these police officers under EUPOL command will enable a more coherent and coordinated approach of the international community's efforts on police reform in Afghanistan, which truly is one of the added values of EUPOL;
- ▶ EUPOL is already fully involved together with its Afghan and international counterparts in the definition of a national policing plan; EUPOL has played a leading role in ensuring that the architecture is in place in Kabul to take this work forward;
- ▶ Concerning NATO/ISAF support to EUPOL, it is important in such a dangerous environment for a civilian mission to be able to count on solid cooperation with NATO.

### Relations with the United Nations

- ▶ Our general discussion on operations is proof of the reality of our cooperation with the UN, both in Africa and in the Balkans;
- ▶ Co-operation with the UN in crisis management is excellent. But we will not rest on our laurels. Our two organisations are committed to further strengthening this relationship in particular at the operational level;
- ▶ That is why the Secretariat produced an Analysis of Lessons from Operation EUFOR RD Congo, and worked with DPKO to identify best practice and optimise the effectiveness and quality of future co-operation. This led to a number of practical measures that were used extensively during the planning of EUFOR Tchad/RCA. We continue to pursue this track.

### Relations avec l'Union africaine

- ▶ Le renforcement des capacités africaines dans le domaine de la prévention, de la gestion et de la résolution des conflits constitue un axe d'efforts majeurs de l'UE et s'inscrit au cœur du partenariat stratégique UA/UE;
- ▶ Le plan d'action pour renforcer les capacités africaines, adopté en décembre dernier à Lisbonne a fait l'objet de discussions avec l'UA, en particulier sur la mise en œuvre d'EURO-RECAMP et le soutien de l'UE aux centres de formation africains;
- ▶ Enfin, j'ai nommé le Général Joana pour coordonner toutes ces questions au sein du Secrétariat en collaboration étroite avec la Commission européenne et assurer un contact permanent avec les Etats membres, mais aussi avec les partenaires Africains et les autres acteurs internationaux. Il travaillera également en étroite liaison avec notre nouveau représentant auprès de l'UA, Koen Vervaeke, à Addis Abeba, qui entretient un dialogue permanent avec l'ensemble des structures de l'UA sur l'ensemble de ces aspects. Ces deux nominations témoignent de l'approfondissement de notre partenariat avec l'Union africaine.

## EU-NATO – Joint press briefing by Javier Solana and Jaap De Hoop Scheffer

Brussels, 25 February 2008

Javier Solana and Jaap De Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General, met bilaterally on 25 February to discuss the situation in Kosovo and in Afghanistan. The meeting took place in the margins of the PSC-NAC meeting to discuss Bosnia and Herzegovina.

### Javier Solana

‘Let me once again publicly welcome the Secretary General of NATO, my dear friend Jaap, to this building once again.

We had a very good and long meeting, fundamentally about Kosovo. The two of us and our two teams followed and analysed together the situation and the cooperation between NATO and the European Union, today and in the future as long as our missions are deployed on the ground.

We are concerned and we would like to share our hope that everybody acts responsibly in the coming period of time, so that the cooperation between international actors on the ground can be constructive and positive for the stability of the region. That has always been the aim of NATO and the aim of the European Union as you know very well, and I think this was very well explained last Monday by the ministers of foreign affairs of the European Union and at the end of the week by the ministers of defence. So the cooperation is solid and we are going to continue to work in that direction.

We commented also on the situation in Belgrade. I would like to say very clearly that for us a good and solid relationship with Belgrade is fundamental. Belgrade has an offer to negotiate with the European Union the manner in which this relation can be deeper, namely through the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) and through other mechanisms that can be put forward. And it is important for that that the situation calms down and that everybody acts responsibly.

Let me say that the two of us and our teams have also spoken about Afghanistan. We have discussed the situation in Afghanistan and how the cooperation between NATO and the European Union can be done in an effective manner now that we have the mission practically deployed on the ground.

Afghanistan is for NATO and for us a very important theatre and we are going to continue working very closely.

We held later on in the morning a formal meeting with NATO on Bosnia and Herzegovina. As you know, in Bosnia-Herzegovina there is a force of the European Union, under the Berlin Plus arrangement, and we do practically monthly a review of the situation. There are two agreements which I think are important.

On EUFOR, the forces which are deployed, we do not want to take any decision today about the drawing down of the force. We want to wait until we analyse in detail the situation in the region before taking such a decision. The force is acting very well and the cooperation is therefore very strong.

The second thing we are going to discuss in the coming days is the future of the OHR – the office of the international representative. Again we are going to see how the situation evolves in the region, and in particular how the reform of the police is moving forward in Bosnia and

Herzegovina. You know that we have initialled the SAA with Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it has not been signed and will not be until the process of reform finishes, in particular the police reforms.

In any case the relationship is very solid and very good. The Commander of the force was also in Ljubljana at the end of last week, he reported to the ministers of defence of the European Union, something which we also discussed today.

Thank you very much!

### **Jaap De Hoop Scheffer**

‘Thanks for the hospitality, Javier.

It is good to have the opportunity from time to time, apart from frequent telephone calls, to have a fundamental and serious bilateral meeting, and this was what we had this morning.

I can to a great extent echo Dr Solana’s words on Kosovo, where KFOR is present as you know on the basis of Resolution 1244. KFOR will stay there, KFOR has the role to secure Kosovo and to protect all citizens of Kosovo, wherever they are across Kosovo, minority and majority alike. We also see the European Union coming in, as well as a third important partner in Kosovo, which is UNMIK. It was good that we had the opportunity to go into some depth and some length, Dr Solana and I, to discuss Kosovo because by definition NATO-EU cooperation in Kosovo is of great importance although the two organisations each have their own responsibilities.

The same is true for Afghanistan. You might know that I took all 26 NATO ambassadors to Afghanistan last week. We spoke at length and had a briefing about the EU police mission in Afghanistan, which is coming very well off the ground. As you know, in Afghanistan, we – NATO – should do more in training the Afghan national army. We are lagging behind there, that is one of the holes I would like to see filled. We are happy that the European Union police mission, under the able leadership of Mr Scholz, is coming off the ground. They are training the trainers and I think we have the arrangements in place to be all together there as well, given the fact that also a number of NATO allies are very much involved in this police training. Afghanistan was the second important topic.

Point number three, and that relates to the NATO Bucharest Summit. The meeting devoted to Bosnia and Herzegovina is of course also related to a discussion in NATO. Apart from the state of play, Bosnia and Herzegovina having the Partnership for Peace, and EUFOR and NATO having a Headquarters in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I drew the circle a bit wider. You know that at the Bucharest Summit there are three nations having Membership Action Plans, knocking on NATO’s door, but you also know that the allies want to look at the region in a more general way in the run- up to Bucharest and during Bucharest. So what was also discussed was the possibility of invitations, mark my words, the possibility of invitations, we are not there yet, and how NATO is going to relate to the region in general, including the NATO relationship with Serbia. I hope that in the region, and more specifically – I end where I started – in Kosovo, we could do without unhelpful rhetoric coming from certain places. But this is important in the framework of the NATO relationship with the region as a whole. And let me stop here.’

### **Question**

‘As you know Russia’s Dmitri Medvedev is in Belgrade today for a trip aimed at reinforcing ties between Moscow and Belgrade. What concrete steps can the EU and NATO take at this stage to go about repairing the relationship with Serbia and strengthening ties in the coming weeks?’

**Javier Solana**

‘Well, as I said in my first intervention, our wish is to have a fluid relation with Serbia. Elections took place in Serbia and we would very much like, as we offered not long ago, the possibility of getting closer to the EU. That continues to be our aim. We think that a stable Balkans will not be possible without Serbia having a stable and solid relationship with the European Union. Anything that can be done we will do. But, as I said before, it is important that the other party is also ready.’

**Jaap De Hoop Scheffer**

‘Let me add that the same goes of course for NATO. We have a Partnership for Peace relationship.’

I talked about unhelpful rhetoric but Serbia is a very important player in the region. I can understand frustrations in Serbia, but let’s look ahead, please. I am open, as NATO Secretary General, with the allies, to see how we can use to the maximum extent possible the fact that we have a Partnership for Peace relationship with Serbia.’

**Question**

‘Mr Solana, if you state that Kosovo is a unique case, why in that case couldn’t Serbia be a unique case in European integration, in the means that you could offer something more than to other countries in the European integration?’

And, Mr Scheffer, you spoke about rhetoric being useless but what about cooperation on the ground this week with Serbia army on northern part of Kosovo and all Kosovo as well?’

**Javier Solana**

‘You know very well what is the scheme that we have for all the countries in the Balkans, which is the scheme that is well defined through the Stabilisation and Association Process. I do not think that we have to get out of that channel but I can tell you that the speed we need to travel through that channel may be different, it does not need to be the same for everybody. I think I say enough for it to be understood really what is on offer.’

**Jaap De Hoop Scheffer**

‘Let me say to you that the relationship between KFOR and the Serbian armed forces is an excellent relationship. I have great respect for the Serbian Chief of Defence, General Ponos. There is also much direct communication in Kosovo between KFOR in Pristina and everywhere else and the Serbian armed forces. So I think that cooperation and communication is as good as it could be and as good as it should be. I am of course also in frequent touch, like my friend Javier Solana, with our interlocutors in Serbia.’

**Question**

‘How worried are you about the partition of Kosovo? And, particularly to the High Representative, what kind of signal are you sending with the withdrawal of EU staff from Mitrovica?’

**Solana**

‘We are not worried. We have to follow in detail the situation and produce the analysis, in particular with UNMIK. As you know UNMIK has responsibility as the international presence for

the moment. We are preparing to deploy, but the responsibility is still with UNMIK, which is there. And with KFOR, which is there. I would like to say that for us, our mission, as was agreed by the Member States of the Union, is a mission that will cover the whole territory of Kosovo. No other thing can be said.'

**Jaap De Hoop Scheffer**

'And so it is KFOR. KFOR is covering the whole territory of Kosovo. The relevance for KFOR is that we have Kosovo Police Force, we have UNMIK and we have KFOR. KFOR is not a police force, as you know. And so I can echo the Secretary-General's words.'

## European Defence Agency – Conference ‘Commercialising logistics?’

Brussels, 27 February 2008

More than 200 representatives of governments, armed forces, EU institutions and industry attended a conference organised by the European Defence Agency on 27 February in Brussels. They debated practical measures to encourage greater private sector involvement and explored the challenges and constraints in supporting multinational operations in remote and varied location. An increased role for the commercial sector in providing logistical support for EU crisis-management operations could help fill critical gaps, provide better value for money and free military personnel for front-line duty.

### OPENING ADDRESS BY JAVIER SOLANA

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This is the third annual conference of the EDA. I know expectations for this annual conference are high, given the impact of its two predecessors.

The EDA conference in February 2006 focused on Defence Research and Technology. This was the starting point for elaborating the first European R&T Joint Investment Programme. It was launched before the end of the same year. The Joint Investment Programme, focusing on technologies in support of force protection, is now up and running. It provides an excellent example of how we invest more effectively if we invest more together.

A year ago, the Conference’s theme was the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base. Only three months later, in May 2007, Ministers of Defence approved the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base Strategy. It describes the future defence industrial landscape in Europe that we should aim for. Work is underway to give more substance to the strategy through a series of activities, including the listing of the key industrial capacities Europe should retain or develop.

So, with successful EDA Conferences in the past two years let us address how the Agency and its participating Member States can tackle another vital issue, namely logistics. What are the problems? Why do we face continuing shortcomings in logistic support to modern military operations?

Current and future crisis management operations set complex demands. Firstly, they differ in size and duration. Most importantly, they take place at great distances from the home territory of the countries providing the troops. In most cases adversaries are unknown. Threats are often asymmetric. Sometimes the terrain is inaccessible, in other cases there is hardly any infrastructure at all. In some cases operations take place in deserts, in others in tropical forests. Clearly, this sets higher demands for logistics. Secondly, we operate in multinational coalitions, with different countries providing different contributions.

But while the armed forces of our Member States increasingly operate side-by-side, the larger part of their equipment is not interoperable. Naturally, this has a direct impact on logistics. In all military operations there are as many logistical chains as there are national flags. And these national logistical chains run from the area where the troops are deployed to the home country. The result is duplication and waste of money. We need to change this situation fundamentally. And doing so requires a broad approach.

What we need is more standardisation and interoperability of our armed forces. In turn, this



requires early harmonisation of military requirements, joint R&T when we need new technologies and collaborative armaments programmes. This is precisely the work agenda of the EDA.

If we are successful in increasing standardisation and interoperability we will create tremendous potential for organising logistics on a multinational basis, thereby saving costs and personnel. Of course, this broader solution will not be realised overnight. We also have to look at improving logistics in the near future.

This brings me to the theme of today’s Conference, namely how Third Party Logistic Support can help.

The first remark I would like to make is that we are not starting from scratch. There is already a lot of experience. Support from contractors to military operations is not new. Over the last decade it has increased in scale and tempo, reflecting a wider trend of outsourcing government activities. Just an example: between 1994 and 2002, the Pentagon has signed more than 3,000 such contracts with private companies, with an estimated value of more than 300 billion dollar. Also, Third Party Logistics is a recognised concept in the civilian world. If you type ‘Third Party Logistics’ in Google, you get 682,000 hits! Many commercial companies operate globally in providing logistics. And the military can learn a good deal from the civilian world.

Why would we want to further increase Third Party Logistic Support for the military? There are several reasons:

First, ESDP is about peacekeeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian operations. Logistics are a prerequisite for carrying out these missions. Using commercial support services can help to release military personnel which are badly needed for operations in the field.

Second, there is the argument of cost-effectiveness. Practical experience and studies have shown that outsourcing can save money while enhancing overall logistics performance. Crucially, cost-savings will increase when logistic support is organised on a multinational basis. For some logistics this is easy to do. Fuel is a good example. All national contingents need it. If you buy it collectively, you can get a better deal with the contractor.

Finally, Third Party Logistics can, sometimes, compensate for the absence of support assets of the Member States. The lack of such assets has increased in the past decade as many armed forces had to transform from static to more mobile structures. This required new investment which often led to shortfalls, in particular in logistic and technical support.

Taken together, these are good reasons to look at commercialising military logistics. But we also have to recognise there are limits. Combat tasks cannot be outsourced. Operating with civilian contractors in areas of high security risk raises other issues, of a political nature but also legal and ethical character. Under what legal framework do they work and to whom are they accountable? Therefore, we should focus on the potential but not forget the limits. And when we discuss the scope for improving logistics, we should keep in mind some urgent operational needs.

Let me mention just one example. In all on-going military operations – be it in Afghanistan or Chad – there is shortage of helicopters, in particular transport versions. We have to investigate all types of solutions, including outsourcing. Recently, the Agency launched several activities to increase the availability of helicopters for ESDP operations. In the short-term Third Party Logistic Support might contribute to overcome logistic obstacles to helicopter deployability.

I encourage you to discuss this further today, with a focus on producing quick results. They are badly needed. Naturally, we cannot have a sensible discussion on the merits of commercialising logistics without involving the suppliers in the debate. I am happy that industry is repre-

sented here today. I call on your help as well. A close dialogue between consumers and suppliers is needed if we are to ensure that services are delivered timely and effectively in an environment where the military have to deploy and react rapidly to emerging crises.

Twenty-six centuries ago, Sun Tzu already understood the important of logistics when he wrote that 'the line between disorder and order lies in logistics'. Today, you have an opportunity to bring more order by improving logistical support for the military operating in crises areas in Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere.

I wish you all a successful EDA Conference. I am certain it will, once more, be the start of fruitful activities in the months to come.

## EDA CONFERENCE SEES BENEFITS FROM GREATER USE OF COMMERCIAL LOGISTICS TO SUPPORT EU MILITARY OPERATIONS

(...)

Commercial support for military logistics is not a new concept and the practice has grown over the past decade, especially in areas such as ‘life support’ – accommodation and catering – as well as fuel supply, construction and strategic transport by sea and air.

The conference was told that governments must now consider outsourcing capabilities in the area of operations traditionally considered to be purely military, like transport and utility helicopters, which are in short supply.

‘In my mind the question is not if industry shall be part of the logistics support for these operations or not, but how industry best can be a partner to the EU in this effort,’ Åke Svensson, President of the AeroSpace & Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) told the conference. ‘I see great opportunities for our industry to contribute to EU efforts in crisis-management operations.’

Solana pointed out that although European armed forces increasingly operate more and more side-by-side, the greater part of their equipment was still not interoperable. As a result, in all military operations there were as many logistical chains as there were national flags, resulting in duplication and wasted money.

The conference heard that common standards, which would address the minimum common understanding of the basic requirements, were needed to make contracted logistical services acceptable from the outset to the various national contingents participating in an operation.

Greater use of the commercial sector would require new structures in both the armed forces and companies, to ensure appropriate control and coordination between military staff and civilian contractors. This transformation will require the military to acquire commercial management skills and to think about commercial relationships.

General Henri Bentégeat, Chairman of the EU Military Committee, pointed out many of the limitations of outsourcing logistics but said the possibility should not be dismissed.

‘We do it all the time and we are now contracting in Chad and Central Africa. Why? Mainly because the transformation of European forces to make them more deployable and sustainable has not been completed yet. And because Member States never commit enough logistics assets to our operations,’ he told the conference.

Other topics raised during the panel discussions included the limits to what civilian operators can and should do in support of military operations; how to ensure commercial support was available within the required timelines for operations; the fact that contracts, even when written with the best of intentions, cannot cover every possible contingency in advance; and security of contracted personnel and formulas for sharing risks over the contractors’ equipment.

‘The EDA’s third annual conference has once again raised a number of important questions in an area of critical importance for European defence and delivered some possible answers,’ said EDA Chief Executive Alexander Weis. ‘As with the previous conferences on R&T and the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, the Agency will follow up today’s debates and work with Member States to turn good ideas into concrete actions,’ he added.

# Javier Solana – ‘Europe in the World: The Next Steps’

Oxford, 28 February 2008

## ADDRESS – CYRIL FOSTER LECTURE

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Dear Chancellor, dear Chris  
 Excellencies,  
 Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me begin by thanking the two groups that have invited me to come back to a city and university I admire: the managers of the Cyril Foster Fund and the European Studies Centre of St Antony's College.

It is a special honour to give this year's Cyril Foster lecture. Cyril Foster, I understand, was a special character. A retired owner of a shop selling sweets, who lived and died in a caravan. He left the remains of his estate to this University, stating that his money be used to promote peace with an annual lecture. This speech had to focus on 'the elimination of war and better understanding of the nations of the world.'

The commitment of ordinary people like Cyril Foster to international peace offers an important message to those involved in daily diplomacy. Our responsibility is not just to defend the national interest but to put this in the context of wider international interests. Gorbachev used the phrase 'all-human values'. This may sound foreign to use. But I know what he was talking about.

Since we are gathered in the Examination Schools, I am conscious I had better try to answer the exam questions that have been set. Why should the European Union play a global role? What have we learned in recent years? And what are the next steps?

\* \* \*

In science, as in politics, one has to make the case. It cannot be assumed. So what is the case for a credible European Union foreign policy? Broadly speaking, I see two logics:

First, and perhaps most familiar, is the logic of effectiveness. It has become a cliché to say that the world around us is changing fast. Trite, perhaps, but no less true. Complexity and uncertainty are core features of the international landscape. The boundaries of national and international politics are blurring. Old templates do not enable us to make sense of today's new threats, new issues and new powers. Meanwhile, many of the old problems from the rubble of past empires endure.

In addition, power is shifting away. Both within political systems where markets, NGOs, media and individuals are increasingly powerful. But also between political systems: from the West to East, from North to South.

It is clear, or it should be, that in the face of these broad trends, national cards have only limited reach. These days, if you want to solve problems, you must bring together broad constellations of international actors. This applies to all governments around the world. But especially to Europe: a group of medium-sized countries that have had out-sized influence on the world. And whose power base, in relative demographic and economic terms, is eroding.

These days politics, like business, is increasingly taking place on a continental or even global

scale. It is interesting that sometimes our publics and companies seem ahead of governments in realising this. So the first reason has to do with the changes in the world around us. Effectiveness requires us to group together.

\* \* \*

On top of the external rationale, there is also an internal, specific European one. For a credible European foreign policy should also be seen as the logical extension of the origins of the European project. With six words, the French poet Paul Valéry captured the European condition in 1945: ‘We hope vaguely, we dread precisely’.

It was only after Europe had experienced the horrors of the 20th century that people were ready to try a radical new idea: peace through openness; integration based on strong institutions and laws; a paradigm change whereby the strength of one’s neighbour was no longer seen as a threat but as an asset.

European integration, together with NATO, has been essential for this fantastic success. No one under 60 has experienced a general European war. Historically speaking, this is not the ‘normal’ condition for our continent. Then there is enlargement, through which we have expanded the zone of peace, stability and law. In the European Union we practice system change: it is voluntary, peaceful and extraordinarily successful. From the original six to 27 member-states today. More than 500 million people living under a Community of law.

**Yes**, all this has required a sharing of powers. Some people believe that sharing power means there is less of it when you share it. On the contrary, there is more. Michael Heseltine once expressed this point with a good phrase: ‘A man alone in the desert is sovereign. He is also powerless.’ By being members of the European Union, countries regain the capacity to address problems that, on their own, they would have no hope of solving. In other words, the rationale for European integration extends far beyond ‘no more war’. Although that remains a success we should not belittle.

So the twin logics are: **First** effectiveness driven by external forces. And **second**, extending the internal success of the European project. From peace on our continent to promoting peace in the world.

In addition, the internal and external logics are linked. For the nature of the integration project has influenced the kind of foreign policy we are trying to shape. Internally, it has been all about taming the passion of states and spreading the rule of law. To make power lawful and the law powerful. That is the way we started and succeeded inside Europe. And that is how we try to operate outside.

Domestically, people are more free if they live under the rule of law than if they live in anarchy. So rules make people free and secure.

In the same way, states have more control over their destiny if they can establish a framework of rules and operate together. All this explains our support for strong institutions and rules. From the UN to the WTO to the African Union or the OSCE. But also on specific issues: from human rights, to non-proliferation, to climate change.

Mind you, all this is not some naïve do-goodism. We know that all of us, including the strongest, benefit from having a system of rules. And we know that rules need to be enforced. Above all, we know that promoting peace, law and institutions, requires taking risks. Politically and with people on the ground.

That is precisely what we have done. Since 2003 we have deployed 18 operations on three continents. From classic peace-keeping, to border monitoring, to security sector, police or judi-

cial reform. In recent years, around 10 000 people have been deployed in EU operations. These operations are mostly small in size. But conceptually they are quite sophisticated. Mixing military with civilian instruments; in support of a political strategy.

This is what we try to do in Chad, where we will protect refugees. We do not pretend that this is the answer to the Darfur crisis. It is sad but probably true that we cannot deal with Darfur directly. But we are doing our best to deal with the effects. We do so in close operation with the UN. And alongside our military engagement we offer aid and other forms of assistance.

Moreover, having people on the ground is changing the way outsiders see us. Slowly, people outside Europe are beginning to see that Europeans are not only people who talk or give money. But who are also willing to take risks and have people on the ground. Besides, deploying people is also changing our own mental maps. We no longer see ourselves as something like the World Bank. We are becoming a political actor with interests to defend and values to promote.

All this is leading to a more serious and more strategically rounded mindset. But, if you like, it remains more influenced by Kant than Hobbes. Because of our attachment to democracy and the rule of law.

\* \* \*

This brings me to the second part of the exam question: what have we learned in recent years in the area of foreign policy? Einstein once said that politics is much more difficult than physics. This is even more true of foreign policy. There are no quick fixes. But the trend is clear: year by year we are getting better – even if there are fluctuations in the trend.

What are the key ingredients for success? I see six important elements.

1. A desire to change things and a willingness to take some risks.

Whenever we discuss our response to a crisis, there are always voices in favour of the status quo. Or those who say that ‘now is not the time’ to take action. But little of value is achieved in political life by standing aside. And I am glad that we have taken some risks. For some of the EU’s greatest successes in recent years – take for example our operation in Aceh in Indonesia – were far from obvious at the beginning.

In Aceh we helped to end the longest running civil war in the largest Muslim country in the world. With people on the ground, we helped to ensure that the peace agreement between the government of Indonesia and the Aceh rebels was implemented – on time. For the future, we need to draw inspiration from this.

2. Invest in international and regional partnerships.

Our operational impact is growing. But of course there are limits. The world is too complex and its problems too great for the EU to address alone. This is true even in our immediate neighbourhood like the Balkans. We have been most successful when we have worked with others. Major players like the US and Russia. But also organisations such as the UN, the African Union or ASEAN.

I know that this type of co-operation is not easy. But the benefits are clear. As is the strategic aim of building up regional capacities. The Middle East is an interesting case. I am convinced that the weakness of regional co-operation in the Middle East is both a result of but also a reason for that region limping from crisis to crisis.

3. There is no simple sequencing of military first, civilians later.

Integrated solutions are needed, drawing on both civil and military instruments, from day one. That is what we learned, the hard way, in the Balkans. We are now trying to apply these lessons

learned in Africa and Afghanistan. We also know that, ultimately, there are only political solutions. Crisis management is about creating the space for politics to work.

In a way, the same is true for development aid. Over the years, countries like Pakistan or Kenya have received quite a lot of aid. But the current instabilities underline that aid alone, without functioning politics, cannot transform a country.

We should be modest and not oversell our strengths. But probably no organisation is better placed than the European Union to work on the nexus of security and development. Of course we should practice what we preach. And ensure that 'coherence' is not an empty slogan.

4. Be prepared to commit for the long-term.

Countries often fall back into the conflict-poverty cycle if the underlying political dynamics do not change. It is a bit like heart patients relapsing after heart surgery, if they do not change their lifestyles.

Collectively, the international community is not doing as well as it should to prevent these reversions. Haïti, Somalia and East Timor highlight the need to stay the course after the initial intervention. It takes time before any transition becomes self-sustaining. This is a real challenge for the wider international community – but no less for the European Union.

5. The institutions in Brussels should be properly aligned. But what really matters is what member states do.

In foreign policy, it is member-states who have the legitimacy and resources that count. What we are doing in Brussels is at the service of the member states. And our job is to add value. It is not easy keeping 27 countries, each with their own histories and habits, marching in lock-step. But when we do, the results are impressive. When we don't, divisions are high.

6. The world may be shrinking but remember that foreigners are different.

What do I mean? As we know, the opening sentence of the 'Go Between' is 'the past is a foreign country. They do things differently there'. But, the present is also a foreign country where many do things differently.

They are different in terms of assumptions and ways of operating. Even in our hyper-modern and globalised world, the weight of culture, history and identity is enormous. People are more connected. But they are not automatically more alike. What we consider normal, acceptable or desirable may look very different to people half way round the globe. The so-called 'cartoon crisis' brought this out. If we want to solve problems, we have to understand the mindset of others. Better not to forget this.

\* \* \*

What about the third part of the exam question, the 'next steps'? If we are serious about a more effective European foreign policy, there are many things we have to do. Let me mention just three.

**Firstly**, we need more capabilities for crisis management. Plus we need a greater willingness to use the ones we have. It is striking that, after we have agreed together to deploy missions in Afghanistan or Chad or elsewhere, the force generation takes longer than it should. By being smarter in how we spend on defence, we can get more usable equipment and capabilities.

In similar vein, we should expand the number of rapidly deployable and adequately trained civilians. Sometimes mobilising civilians is even harder than military, since they do not wait in barracks to be called to duty.

**Secondly**, when we agree by consensus on what to do, we need greater efficiency in translating that into effective action on the ground. The Lisbon Treaty will help very much. It is right

that consensus remains required for decision-making in foreign policy. But once we have taken decisions, we should be able to implement them faster and more effectively.

**Thirdly**, and most difficult: we need to think differently about foreign policy as such. Foreign policy these days should not be just about diplomats, soldiers and development workers. And about how we can bring these 'tribes' better together – although doing so is necessary.

Modern foreign policy should be broader and involve wider sets of people. From those working on energy and climate change to migration and asylum to international economics. Perhaps I could make the same point somewhat differently. If the European Union gets its act together on energy, climate change and migration, we will have created big building blocks for a foreign policy fit for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

\* \* \*

Let me close with a word on the role of the UK in all this. My basic message should be no surprise: Europe needs Britain. A credible European foreign policy without the UK is simply not possible. Europe needs your contribution in terms of ideas, resources and relationships, including with the US. Your organisational capacity, your global mindset and your armed forces.

We know that the euro and the Schengen zone of passport-free travel can and do work without the UK. Better though for me that the UK would be in. But the same is not true in foreign and defence policy. Here the UK has a decisive contribution to make. It can and should help to lead this project.

But the converse is also true: Britain needs Europe. The world I described is also your world. The choice between trying to shape the world or be shaped by it is also your choice. It is of course up to the people and leaders of Britain to make that choice. Not once, but day after day.

I am certain of the benefits to Britain, Europe and the wider world of you making the right choice. And I am confident that you will.

Thank you very much.



## Iran – Statement

New York, 3 March 2008

### **STATEMENT BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF CHINA, FRANCE, GERMANY, RUSSIA, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES WITH SUPPORT OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION**

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Today the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1803, reflecting the international community's ongoing serious concerns about the proliferation risks of the Iranian nuclear programme. This is the third time that the UN Security Council has sent a strong message of international resolve to Iran by adopting a sanctions resolution under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations on Iran's nuclear programme. We deplore Iran's continued failure to comply with its UN Security Council and IAEA Board requirements, in particular by expanding its enrichment-related activities. We note the progress made in implementing the IAEA-Iran Work Plan and the IAEA's serious concerns about the 'alleged studies,' which are critical to an assessment of a possible military dimension to Iran's nuclear programme. We call upon Iran to heed the requirements of UN Security Council and the IAEA, including the suspension of its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.

We remain committed to an early negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and we reaffirm our commitment to a dual-track approach. We reconfirm the proposals we presented to Iran in June 2006 and are prepared to further develop them. Our proposals will offer substantial opportunities for political, security and economic benefits to Iran and to the region. We urge Iran to take this opportunity to engage with us all and to find a negotiated way forward. We reiterate our recognition of Iran's right to develop, research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with its NPT obligations. We reconfirm that once the confidence of the international community in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme is restored it will be treated in the same manner as that of any Non-Nuclear Weapon State party to the NPT. We remain ready to negotiate future arrangements, modalities and timing in this respect once the conditions for negotiations have been established.

This will require further diplomatic efforts and innovative approaches. To that end we have asked Dr. Javier Solana, the European Union's High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, to meet with Dr. Saeed Jalili, Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, and to address the interests and concerns of both sides in a manner which can gradually create the conditions for the opening of negotiations.

## Middle East Peace Process – Javier Solana

Ramallah, 4 March 2008

Javier Solana visited Israel and the Palestinian Territories on 3 and 4 March during a tour of the Middle East aimed at supporting the efforts to get the Annapolis peace process back on track after the latest violence in southern Israel and Gaza. While he was in Ramallah, Mr. Solana visited the headquarters of the EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS).

### REMARKS TO THE PRESS BY JAVIER SOLANA DURING HIS VISIT TO RAMALLAH

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I am delighted to be here and to see the excellent work being done by our people on the ground in the EUPOL COPPS team. It is a vital aspect of our efforts to support the peace process. Our EUBAM Rafah mission is standing by, ready to resume its role of helping monitor the border crossing if we are asked.

I am here in the region to see how we can get the peace process back on track following the violence in southern Israel and Gaza. I have met President Abbas and Prime Fayyad and Ahmed Qurei here this morning and I had discussions with President Peres, Prime Minister Olmert, Foreign Minister Livni and Defence Minister Barak in Israel. I am now going on to Lebanon and to Egypt.

We are trying to see how we can find a solution to the complex situation and to resume dialogue and put an end to the violence. The violence must stop and the peace talks must resume. The Annapolis peace process must continue.

## EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council twelfth meeting

Brussels, 11 March 2008

At the twelfth EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council today, the EU welcomed the progress made in EU-Ukraine relations over the last year and called on the Ukrainian leadership to stabilise the country's political situation and continue on the path of ambitious political and economic reforms. The EU reiterated its commitment to support Ukraine's reform efforts.

The EU commended the conduct of the parliamentary elections of 30 September 2007, characterised by a lively campaign and genuine political competition, and the establishment of a new government in the end of 2007. The EU recalled the key importance of constitutional reform, establishing a viable system of proper checks and balances between the main state organs and an independent Constitutional Court, as a necessary basis for political stability. Ukraine was encouraged to make use of the advice of the Venice Commission in its efforts to obtain a sustainable and well balanced Constitution.

The Cooperation Council confirmed the extension of the Action Plan for a period of maximum one year as a key tool for Ukraine's reform process, and took note of the joint evaluation report on the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan, including additional specific actions for 2008.

The Cooperation Council welcomed the substantive progress achieved in the first six rounds of negotiations on a new Enhanced Agreement and reconfirmed the strong commitment of both parties to the negotiations. The Cooperation Council also welcomed the start of negotiations on a deep and comprehensive Free Trade Area as a core element of the New Enhanced Agreement on 18 February. The EU congratulated Ukraine on the finalisation of the WTO accession process in Geneva and encouraged it to complete the internal ratification process quickly.

The Cooperation Council highlighted the importance of further strengthening of EU-Ukraine relations through concrete co-operation, focusing on key sectors including energy, transport, environment and health. The Cooperation Council welcomed the entry into force of the EC-Ukraine Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements and emphasised the importance of their full implementation.

The Cooperation Council welcomed strengthened cooperation in the area of foreign and security policy, in particular in the regional context. The EU expressed its appreciation for Ukraine's cooperation on the Transnistria settlement, including through the EUBAM, and for the fact that Ukraine continues to align itself with most EU declarations. The Cooperation Council welcomed the recent ratification of the EU-Ukraine Agreement on the Participation of Ukraine in EU-led crisis management operations by the Ukrainian Parliament.

The EU was represented by Mr Rupel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovenia, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, Mr Mingarelli, Deputy Director General for the European Neighbourhood Policy and relations with Eastern Europe, and Mr Sellal, Permanent Representative of France to the EU. Prime Minister Tymoshenko led the Ukrainian delegation.

## European Council

Brussels, 13-14 March 2008

### PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS

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(...)

#### Climate change and energy

17. Last year the EU made firm and ambitious commitments on climate and energy policy; now, in 2008, the challenge is to deliver. In December of last year the Bali Climate Conference made an important breakthrough and launched an inclusive international negotiating process set out in full in the Bali roadmap. The EU is committed to maintaining international leadership on climate change and energy, and to keeping up the momentum of negotiations on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol, in particular at the next Conference of the Parties in Poznań. The objective is to secure an ambitious, global and comprehensive post-2012 agreement on climate change at Copenhagen in 2009 consistent with the EU's 2°C objective. By delivering on all the targets set by the Spring 2007 European Council, the EU will make a major contribution to this objective. A key challenge will be to ensure that this transition to a safe and sustainable low-carbon economy is handled in a way that is consistent with EU sustainable development, competitiveness, security of supply, food security, sound and sustainable public finance and economic and social cohesion. The EU proposes to contribute to an accelerated and concerted high-level effort in support of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Bali Action Plan, to develop a coherent and consistent architecture for a post-2012 agreement that ensures scaled-up finance and investment flows for both mitigation and adaptation. Taking into account that energy and climate is an integral part of the Lisbon Strategy it will also contribute positively to broader growth and jobs objectives.

18. The ambitious package of proposals proposed by the Commission to implement the conclusions of the Spring 2007 European Council provides a good starting point and basis for agreement. The European Council invites the Commission to continue to support Member States' efforts to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases through comprehensive and ambitious Community policies and measures. Comprehensive deliberations by the Council, working closely with the European Parliament, should result in an agreement on these proposals as a coherent package before the end of 2008 and consequently allow for their adoption within the current legislative term, at the latest early in 2009. In so doing, the Council should bear in mind the importance of maintaining the overall balance across the package as a whole and should base its work on the principles of transparency, economic efficiency and cost-effectiveness, and fairness and solidarity in the distribution of effort between Member States. It should also take into account Member States' different starting points, circumstances and potentials as well as achievements accomplished, and respect the need for sustainable economic growth across the Community with all sectors contributing. A cost-effective and flexible way should be followed as well when developing market-based instruments to reach energy and climate policy objectives, so as to avoid excessive costs for Member States. Stepping up to the more ambitious 30% reduction target as part of a global and comprehensive agreement needs to be built in explicitly

and in a balanced, transparent and equitable way, taking into account work under the Kyoto Protocol first commitment period.

19. The European Council recognises that in a global context of competitive markets the risk of carbon leakage is a concern in certain sectors, such as energy intensive industries, particularly exposed to international competition that needs to be analysed and addressed urgently in the new ETS Directive, so that if international negotiations fail appropriate measures can be taken. An international agreement remains the best way of addressing this issue.

20. The European Council underlines that the EU ETS forms an essential part of an integrated climate and energy policy and recognises the importance of a single EU-wide ETS cap and an emissions reduction trajectory. The revised Directive should enhance the cost-effectiveness of the necessary emission reductions, enable the EU ETS to link to other mandatory emissions trading systems capping absolute emissions, and strengthen the use of flexibility mechanisms resulting from projects implemented in third countries. The European Council also underlines the need for flexibility in achieving national non-ETS and renewable targets in line with the Action Plan adopted by the European Council in March 2007, and stresses the importance of effective national support schemes for renewable energies and an effective flexibility mechanism based on guarantees of origin as suggested by the Commission, and stresses the need for Community and Member States' energy policy to increase energy efficiency and security of supply as key elements for achieving the EU's integrated climate and energy policy and sustainable economic development.

21. The European Council recalls that the objective of proposing a regulatory framework on carbon capture and storage (CCS) is to ensure that this novel technology is deployed in an environmentally safe way, which will be demonstrated through projects, as agreed in Spring 2007.

22. In meeting the ambitious target for the use of biofuels it is essential to develop and fulfil effective sustainability criteria, which could in the future also be considered for the use of other forms of biomass for energy in line with the conclusions of the Spring 2007 European Council, and ensure the commercial availability of second generation biofuels.

23. It is necessary to achieve greater synergies between climate change and biodiversity policies as a way of securing co-benefits, in particular by strengthening mutually supportive activities and measures with regard to climate-change mitigation and adaptation and to the production, consumption of and trade in biofuels. The European Council encourages Member States and the Commission to strengthen efforts aimed at halting biodiversity loss by 2010 and beyond. The 9<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Parties to the CBD in May 2008 in Bonn and the full implementation of the NATURA 2000 network are essential steps towards achieving this objective.

24. An effective, fully-functioning and interconnected internal energy market is an essential condition for a secure, sustainable and competitive supply of energy in Europe. The European Council therefore urges the Council to build on recent progress on the third internal market package for gas and electricity in order to reach political agreement by June 2008, taking full account of the Spring 2007 European Council conclusions. It invites the Commission to take account of the situation and needs of small or isolated energy markets in further developing these policies.

25. The European Council recalls the importance it attaches to enhancing the energy security of the EU and its Member States. Whereas action on climate change and energy, the internal energy market and new technologies all contribute to this objective, work must also be vigorously pursued on further developing the external dimension of the 2007-2009 Energy Policy for

Europe. The European Council welcomes the progress achieved in this regard, as set out in the state of play report submitted to the Council (6778/08), and will undertake a more comprehensive assessment of progress on implementation and further action needed in the light of the next Strategic Energy Review, to be presented in November 2008 and endorsed by the Spring 2009 European Council, and which will serve as the basis for the new Energy Action Plan from 2010 onwards to be adopted by the Spring 2010 European Council. This Strategic Energy Review will focus in particular on security of supply, including regarding interconnectors, and external energy policy. The European Council attaches particular importance to the EU and its Member States speaking with a common voice on energy issues with third parties.

26. The European Council welcomes the joint report from the High Representative and the Commission on the impact of climate change on international security. It underlines the importance of this issue, and invites the Council to examine the paper and to submit recommendations on appropriate follow-up action, in particular on how to intensify cooperation with third countries and regions regarding the impact of climate change on international security by December 2008 at the latest.

27. The transition to a safe and sustainable low carbon economy will have an impact on numerous policies and on the economic and daily life of citizens. Coherent policies exploiting the synergies relating to Energy and Climate Change are also needed in the other three priority areas of the Lisbon Strategy as well as in other EU policy areas, including:

- developing coherent R&D and innovation policies at the European and national levels;
- unlocking the business potential of eco-industries and developing a sustainable industrial policy and sustainable and globally competitive lead markets, while taking into account the impact of Energy and Climate Change measures on competitiveness;
- promoting a sustainable transport system which allows Member States, in the framework of EU policies, to take the necessary measures to combat climate change effectively;
- considering a review of the Energy Taxation Directive to bring it more closely into line with the EU's Energy and Climate Change objectives;
- improving energy and resource efficiency in all sectors;
- informing the consumer about the efficient use of energy in order to tackle social impacts and opportunities of Energy and Climate Change.

The European Council also invites the Commission, in bringing forward its legislative proposals on VAT rates, due in the summer of 2008, and working with the Member States, to examine areas where economic instruments, including VAT rates, can have a role to play to increase the use of energy-efficient goods and energy-saving materials.

28. The European Council emphasises the need for sustained investment in research and development and an active take-up of new technologies in energy, as outlined recently in the European Strategic Energy Technology Plan put forward by the Commission.

29. The European Council recognises that addressing energy and climate change is also a matter of shaping values and changing citizens' behaviour. It therefore urges national governments and European institutions to set an example by making substantial progress towards reducing energy use in their buildings and car fleets.

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## **ANNEX I – STATEMENT ON ‘BARCELONA PROCESS: UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN’**

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The European Council approved the principle of a Union for the Mediterranean which will include the Member States of the EU and the non-EU Mediterranean coastal states. It invited the Commission to present to the Council the necessary proposals for defining the modalities of what will be called ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ with a view to the Summit which will take place in Paris on 13 July 2008.

## CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY – PAPER FROM THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL

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Brussels, 14 March 2008

### I. INTRODUCTION

The risks posed by climate change are real and its impacts are already taking place. The UN estimates that all but one of its emergency appeals for humanitarian aid in 2007 were climate related. In 2007 the UN Security Council held its first debate on climate change and its implications for international security. The European Council has drawn attention to the impact of climate change on international security and in June 2007 invited the High Representative and the European Commission to present a joint report to the European Council in Spring 2008.

The science of climate change is now better understood. The findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change demonstrate that even if by 2050 emissions would be reduced to below half of 1990 levels, a temperature rise of up to 2°C above pre-industrial levels will be difficult to avoid. Such a temperature increase will pose serious security risks that would increase if warming continues. Unmitigated climate change beyond 2°C will lead to unprecedented security scenarios as it is likely to trigger a number of tipping points that would lead to further accelerated, irreversible and largely unpredictable climate changes. Investment in mitigation to avoid such scenarios, as well as ways to adapt to the unavoidable should go hand in hand with addressing the international security threats created by climate change; both should be viewed as part of preventive security policy.

Climate change is best viewed as a threat multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability. The core challenge is that climate change threatens to overburden states and regions which are already fragile and conflict prone. It is important to recognise that the risks are not just of a humanitarian nature; they also include political and security risks that directly affect European interests. Moreover, in line with the concept of human security, it is clear that many issues related to the impact of climate change on international security are interlinked requiring comprehensive policy responses. For example, the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals would be at considerable risk because climate change, if unmitigated, may well wipe out years of development efforts.

This report focuses on the impact of climate change on international security and considers the impact of these international security consequences for Europe's own security, and how the EU should respond.

The EU is in a unique position to respond to the impacts of climate change on international security, given its leading role in development, global climate policy and the wide array of tools and instruments at its disposal. Moreover, the security challenge plays to Europe's strengths, with its comprehensive approach to conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction, and as a key proponent of effective multilateralism.

The European Security Strategy recognised the link between global warming and competition for natural resources while the Communication 'Europe in the World' highlighted the effects of globalisation on external relations.



The report considers how the full range of EU instruments, including Community and CFSP/ESDP action, can be used alongside mitigation and adaptation policies to address the security risks. It also considers the implications for the intensification of political dialogue with third countries. A post-2012 agreement has to be developed by the end of 2009 and all levers of EU foreign relations must work towards this end.

The report concludes that it is in Europe's self interest to address the security implications of climate change with a series of measures: at the level of the EU, in bilateral relations and at the multilateral level, in mutually supportive ways.

Although this report addresses the impact of climate change on international security, the EU's response will be conditioned by the impact of climate change on Europe itself. Climate change will heavily affect Europe's natural environment and nearly all sections of society and the economy.

## II. THREATS

The effects of climate change are being felt now: temperatures are rising, icecaps and glaciers are melting and extreme weather events are becoming more frequent and more intense. The following section outlines some of the forms of conflicts driven by climate change which may occur in different regions of the world.

### **i) Conflict over resources**

Reduction of arable land, widespread shortage of water, diminishing food and fish stocks, increased flooding and prolonged droughts are already happening in many parts of the world. Climate change will alter rainfall patterns and further reduce available freshwater by as much as 20 to 30% in certain regions. A drop in agricultural productivity will lead to, or worsen, food-insecurity in least developed countries and an unsustainable increase in food prices across the board. Water shortage in particular has the potential to cause civil unrest and to lead to significant economic losses, even in robust economies. The consequences will be even more intense in areas under strong demographic pressure. The overall effect is that climate change will fuel existing conflicts over depleting resources, especially where access to those resources is politicised.

### **ii) Economic damage and risk to coastal cities and critical infrastructure**

It has been estimated that a business as usual scenario in dealing with climate change could cost the world economy up to 20% of global GDP per year, whereas the cost of effective concerted action can be limited to 1%. Coastal zones are the home of about one fifth of the world's population, a number set to rise in the years ahead. Mega-cities, with their supporting infrastructure, such as port facilities and oil refineries, are often located by the sea or in river deltas. Sea-level rise and the increase in the frequency and intensity of natural disasters pose a serious threat to these regions and their economic prospects. The East coasts of China and India as well as the Caribbean region and Central America would be particularly affected. An increase in disasters and humanitarian crises will lead to immense pressure on the resources of donor countries, including capacities for emergency relief operations.

### **iii) Loss of territory and border disputes**

Scientists project major changes to the landmass during this century. Receding coastlines and

submergence of large areas could result in loss of territory, including entire countries such as small island states. More disputes over land and maritime borders and other territorial rights are likely. There might be a need to revisit existing rules of international law, particularly the Law of the Sea, as regards the resolution of territorial and border disputes. A further dimension of competition for energy resources lies in potential conflict over resources in Polar regions which will become exploitable as a consequence of global warming. Desertification could trigger a vicious circle of degradation, migration and conflicts over territory and borders that threatens the political stability of countries and regions.

#### **iv) Environmentally-induced migration**

Those parts of the populations that already suffer from poor health conditions, unemployment or social exclusion are rendered more vulnerable to the effects of climate change, which could amplify or trigger migration within and between countries. The UN predicts that there will be millions of 'environmental' migrants by 2020 with climate change as one of the major drivers of this phenomenon. Some countries that are extremely vulnerable to climate change are already calling for international recognition of such environmentally-induced migration. Such migration may increase conflicts in transit and destination areas. Europe must expect substantially increased migratory pressure.

#### **v) Situations of fragility and radicalization**

Climate change may significantly increase instability in weak or failing states by over-stretching the already limited capacity of governments to respond effectively to the challenges they face. The inability of a government to meet the needs of its population as a whole or to provide protection in the face of climate change-induced hardship could trigger frustration, lead to tensions between different ethnic and religious groups within countries and to political radicalisation. This could destabilise countries and even entire regions.

#### **vi) Tension over energy supply**

One of the most significant potential conflicts over resources arises from intensified competition over access to, and control over, energy resources. That in itself is, and will continue to be, a cause of instability. However, because much of the world's hydrocarbon reserves are in regions vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and because many oil and gas producing states already face significant social economic and demographic challenges, instability is likely to increase. This has the potential to feed back into greater energy insecurity and greater competition for resources. A possible wider use of nuclear energy for power generation might raise new concerns about proliferation, in the context of a non-proliferation regime that is already under pressure. As previously inaccessible regions open up due to the effects of climate change, the scramble for resources will intensify.

#### **vii) Pressure on international governance**

The multilateral system is at risk if the international community fails to address the threats outlined above. Climate change impacts will fuel the politics of resentment between those most responsible for climate change and those most affected by it. Impacts of climate mitigation policies (or policy failures) will thus drive political tension nationally and internationally. The potential rift not only divides North and South but there will also be a South – South dimension

particularly as the Chinese and Indian share of global emissions rises. The already burdened international security architecture will be put under increasing pressure.

### III. GEOGRAPHICAL EXAMPLES

In many regions, climate change is fuelling one or more of the threats identified above. The following sections illustrate how climate change is multiplying existing pressures in various regions around the world. Since the EU's neighbours include some of the most vulnerable regions to climate change, e.g. North Africa and the Middle East, migratory pressure at the European Union's borders and political instability and conflicts could increase in the future. This could also have a significant impact on Europe's energy supply routes.

#### 1. Africa:

Africa is one of the continents most vulnerable to climate change because of multiple stresses and low adaptive capacity. In North Africa and the Sahel, increasing drought, water scarcity and land overuse will degrade soils and could lead to a loss of 75% of arable, rain-fed land. The Nile Delta could be at risk from both sea-level rise and salinisation in agricultural areas while 12 to 15% of arable land could be lost through sea-level rise in this century with 5 million people affected by 2050. Already today, climate change is having a major impact on the conflict in and around Darfur.

In the Horn of Africa reduced rainfall and increasing temperatures will have a significant negative impact on a region highly vulnerable to conflict. In southern Africa, droughts are contributing to poor harvests, leading to food insecurity in several areas with millions of people expected to face food shortages. Migration in this region, but also migration from other regions through Northern Africa to reach Europe (transit migration) is likely to intensify. In Africa, and elsewhere, climate change is expected to have a negative effect on health, in particular due to the spread of vector-borne diseases further aggravating tensions.

#### 2. Middle East:

Water systems in the Middle East are already under intense stress. Roughly two-thirds of the Arab world depends on sources outside their borders for water. The Jordan and Yarmuk rivers are expected to see considerable reduction in their flows affecting Israel, the Palestinian territories and Jordan. Existing tensions over access to water are almost certain to intensify in this region leading to further political instability with detrimental implications for Europe's energy security and other interests. Water supply in Israel might fall by 60% over this century. Consequently, a significant drop in crop yields is projected for an area that is already largely arid or semi-arid. Significant decreases are expected to hit Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia and thus affect stability in a vitally strategic region for Europe.

#### 3. South Asia:

Sea-level rise may threaten the habitat of millions of people as 40% of Asia's population (almost 2 billion) lives within 60km from the coastline. Water stress and loss of agricultural productivity will make it difficult for Asia to feed its growing population who will additionally be exposed to an increase of infectious diseases. Changes in the monsoon rains and decrease of melt water from the Himalayas will affect more than 1 billion people. Conflicts over remaining resources

and unmanaged migration will lead to instability in a region that is an important economic partner of Europe with factors of production and distribution concentrated along vulnerable coastlines.

#### **4. Central Asia:**

Central Asia is another region severely affected by climate change. An increasing shortage of water, which is both a key resource for agriculture and a strategic resource for electricity generation, is already noticeable. The glaciers in Tajikistan lost a third of their area in the second half of the 20th century alone, while Kyrgyzstan has lost over a 1000 glaciers in the last four decades. There is thus considerable additional potential for conflict in a region whose strategic, political and economic developments as well as increasing trans-regional challenges impact directly or indirectly on EU interests.

#### **5. Latin America and the Caribbean:**

In drier areas of Latin America climate change will lead to salinisation and desertification of agricultural land and to decreasing productivity of important crops and livestock. This will have adverse consequences for food security. Sea-level rise is projected to cause increased risk of flooding in low-lying areas. Increases in sea surface temperature due to climate change are projected to have adverse effects on coral reefs, and cause shifts in the location of fish stocks. Latin American and Caribbean countries are already subject to the detrimental effects, including many extreme events, associated with the El Niño cycle. Changes in rainfall patterns and the disappearance of glaciers are projected to significantly affect water availability for human consumption, agriculture and energy generation, for example in the Andes region. Countries in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico are already increasingly affected by major hurricanes. This will be further exacerbated by climate change and result in social and political tensions in a region with often weak governance structures.

#### **6. The Arctic:**

The rapid melting of the polar ice caps, in particular, the Arctic, is opening up new waterways and international trade routes. In addition, the increased accessibility of the enormous hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic region is changing the geo-strategic dynamics of the region with potential consequences for international stability and European security interests. The resulting new strategic interests are illustrated by the recent planting of the Russian flag under the North Pole. There is an increasing need to address the growing debate over territorial claims and access to new trade routes by different countries which challenge Europe's ability to effectively secure its trade and resource interests in the region and may put pressure on its relations with key partners.

## **IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

The impact of climate change on international security is not a problem of the future but already of today and one which will stay with us. Even if progress is made in reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases, weather patterns have already changed, global temperatures have already risen and, above all, climate change is already being felt around the globe.

The active role of the EU in the international climate change negotiations is vital and must

continue. The EU has demonstrated leadership both in international negotiations, in particular by advocating the 2°C target, and with its far-reaching decisions on domestic climate and energy policies. Yet, the EU cannot act alone. In a changing international political landscape, major emitters and emerging economies will also have to be engaged and commit to an ambitious global climate agreement under the UN framework.

In the EU's response, special consideration needs to be given to the US, China and India and what the implications mean for the EU's long term relations with Russia. The recommendations below should be complemented by further studies and followed up by coherent EU action plans, aiming at addressing the different dimensions of the responses required to address the impact of climate change on international security in a comprehensive and effective manner. The upcoming examination of the implementation of the European Security Strategy, and as appropriate proposals to complement it, should take account of the security dimension of climate change.

### **Enhancing capacities at the EU level**

A first step to address the impact of climate change on international security should be to build up knowledge and assess the EU's own capacities, followed by an improvement in the prevention of, and preparedness for early responses to, disasters and conflicts. Financial implications for such responses should be identified and also be considered in the EU's budget review.

Possible actions that could be developed include:

- ▶ Intensify EU capacities for research, analysis, monitoring and early warning and Watch Lists including the Institute for Security Studies, the EU Satellite Centre (EUSC), the EU Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN), the EU Network of Energy Correspondents (NESCO), the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security and Joint Research Centres. Monitoring and early warning needs to include in particular situations of state fragility and political radicalisation, tensions over resources and energy supplies, environmental and socio-economic stresses, threats to critical infrastructures and economic assets, border disputes, impact on human rights and potential migratory movements.
- ▶ Further build up EU and Member State planning and capabilities including civil protection and the use of crisis management and disaster response instruments (civil and military) to contribute to the response to the security risks posed by climate change.
- ▶ Commission further work to look, region-by-region, in more detail at what the security implications are likely to be and how they will affect EU interests.

### **EU multilateral leadership to promote global climate security**

Climate change is a key element of international relations and will be increasingly so in the coming years, including its security dimension. If recognised, it can even become a positive driver for improving and reforming global governance. As it is a global problem, the EU is advocating a multilateral response. Building on the successful Bali conference in Dec 2007 the EU needs to continue and strengthen its leadership towards an ambitious post-2012 agreement in 2009, including both mitigation and adaptation action by all countries as a key contribution to addressing climate security.

Possible actions that could be developed include:

- ▶ Focus attention on the security risks related to climate change in the multilateral arena; in particular within the UN Security Council, the G8 as well as the UN specialised bodies

(among others by addressing a possible need to strengthen certain rules of international law, including the Law of the Sea).

- ▶ Enhance international cooperation on the detection and monitoring of the security threats related to climate change, and on prevention, preparedness, mitigation and response capacities. Promote the development of regional security scenarios for different levels of climate change and their implications for international security.
- ▶ Consider environmentally-triggered additional migratory stress in the further development of a comprehensive European migration policy, in liaison with all relevant international bodies.

#### **Cooperation with third countries**

Climate change calls for revisiting and reinforcing EU cooperation and political dialogue instruments, giving more attention to the impact of climate change on security. This could lead to greater prioritisation and enhanced support for climate change mitigation and adaptation, good governance, natural resource management, technology transfer, trans-boundary environmental cooperation (inter alia water and land), institutional strengthening and capacity building for crisis management.

Possible actions that could be developed include:

- ▶ Further integrate adaptation and resilience to climate change into EU regional strategies (for example Northern Dimension, European Neighbourhood Policy, EU-Africa Strategy, Barcelona Process, Black Sea Synergy, EU-Central Asia Strategy, Middle East action plan). Special attention should be given to the most vulnerable regions and potential climate security hot spots. The Global Climate Change Alliance between the EU and the most vulnerable developing countries should be built upon.
- ▶ Develop an EU Arctic policy based on the evolving geo-strategy of the Arctic region, taking into account i.a. access to resources and the opening of new trade routes.
- ▶ Examine the security implications of climate change in dialogue with third countries.

## EUFOR TCHAD/RCA – Press Release

N'Djamena, 17 March 2008

### COMMUNIQUÉ DE PRESSE – CONFÉRENCE DE PRESSE À L'OCCASION DE LA DÉCLARATION DE LA CAPACITÉ OPÉRATIONNELLE INITIALE DE LA FORCE

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La Force européenne (EUFOR Tchad/RCA) se déploie actuellement dans l'est du Tchad alors que le détachement multinational de Birao (République Centrafricaine) est d'ores et déjà sous commandement de la Force.

Les moyens et unités à présent disponibles ont permis de déclarer officiellement que l'EUFOR Tchad/RCA a atteint sa Capacité Opérationnelle Initiale.

Cette déclaration constitue une étape importante puisqu'elle marque le début effectif des douze mois du mandat de la Force.

A cette occasion, le général Jean-Philippe Ganascia, commandant la Force, fera un point de situation à l'intention des media.

La résolution 1778, votée le 25 septembre 2007 par le Conseil de Sécurité de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, autorise l'Union européenne à déployer, pour une durée d'un an à compter du moment auquel l'Union européenne déclarera sa capacité opérationnelle initiale en consultation avec le Secrétaire général, une opération dénommée « opération de l'Union européenne ».

Dans le cadre du renforcement de l'action qu'elle mène de longue date en soutien des efforts visant à faire face à la crise du Darfour, l'Union européenne conduit une opération militaire dans l'est du Tchad et le nord-est de la République Centrafricaine, inscrite dans une action multidimensionnelle de la communauté internationale dans l'ensemble de la région.

La Force de l'Union européenne, dénommée EUFOR Tchad/RCA, est autorisée à prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires, dans la limite de ses capacités et dans sa zone d'opérations dans l'est du Tchad et le nord-est de la République centrafricaine, pour s'acquitter des tâches suivantes :

- ▶ Contribuer à la protection des civils en danger, en particulier les réfugiés et les personnes déplacées ;
- ▶ Faciliter l'acheminement de l'aide humanitaire et la libre circulation du personnel humanitaire en contribuant à améliorer la sécurité dans la zone d'opérations ;
- ▶ Contribuer à la protection du personnel, des locaux, des installations et du matériel des Nations Unies et à assurer la sécurité et la liberté de circulation de son personnel, du personnel des Nations Unies et du personnel associé.

## Joint UK-France Declaration

London, 27 March 2008

(...)

Our international institutions are critical to safeguarding global security, but they lack the capabilities they need in key areas. In relation to tackling conflict, we will go further in improving international capacity for stabilisation and post-conflict recovery.

Together we will:

- Develop stronger international capacity through the UN and EU to deal with every stage in the conflict cycle, from the threat of conflict through peacekeeping, to stabilisation and post-conflict reconstruction;
  - We will each commit qualified civilians, to be available for stabilisation under the EU's Civilian Headline Goal 2010 targets, in advance of the reports for the November Council. We look to others to make similar commitments;
  - We will back our commitment to the EU goal with a joint UK-FR conference on using expeditionary civilian missions to boost the rule of law in regions affected by conflict including sharing best practice on stabilisation force generation;

We call for 2008 to be the year for EU civilian missions to make decisive impact on conflict: Afghanistan, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Kosovo, with reports back to the Council in December;

We recognise the particular issues in Africa. Together we will:

- Develop our cooperation to secure Africa's peace and security through training, technical and financial support to the African Union's African Standby Force (ASF) for peace keeping operations. In close cooperation with our European partners we will work together to support African exercises to support the ASF in the framework of the Euro-RECAMP programme as well as security sector reform in Africa in close cooperation with our European partners.
- Work with the G8 and other members of the international community to contribute to the funding of African-led peace support operations.
- Take steps towards the establishment of a predictable and sustainable funding mechanism, building on the experience of the African Peace Facility and EU and AU Member States' bilateral contributions.
- Work together to reinforce support by the UN for peace-keeping operations undertaken by the AU or under its authority, within the framework of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

(...)

### **2. United Kingdom and France will act and cooperate to strengthen the stability of the world bilaterally and within international institutions (EU, NATO, UN...)**

The UK and France will strengthen their co-operation on Foreign and Security Policy. The Foreign Ministers of our two countries will jointly take this commitment forward.

## FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL CRISES

Together we:

- Reaffirm our determination to work for stabilisation and peace in the Balkans. We agreed to



make further efforts, together with our European partners, particularly within mission EULEX, to help the authorities of Kosovo establish the rule of law, thereby allowing all communities to live in peace and security. We recalled our wish to see Serbia progress towards her European future and will help Belgrade work in this direction.

- ▶ We strongly condemn recent attacks in West Darfur by Government of Sudan and rebel forces, including indiscriminate attacks against civilians, which are in direct violation of UN Security Council resolutions. There can be no military solution to the crisis in Darfur. We endorse the call by the UN High Commission for Human Rights on the Government of Sudan to stop aerial attacks and use of armed militia groups in the conduct of military operations, and on rebel groups to stop deliberate attacks targeting civilians and to refrain from involving civilians in conflict including as human shields. The UK and France will work to reinvigorate the peace process in Darfur, in the context of the UNSCR 1769, supporting the efforts of the UN and AU co-mediators. We call on the Government of Sudan and the rebels to engage in a negotiating process. We will take joint measures to facilitate the earliest deployment of UNAMID in Darfur and call on the Government of Sudan to fully cooperate with UNAMID in this regard. The UK and France will consider joint action against parties committing atrocities on the ground, and those who hamper the peace process or deployment of UNAMID.

We will drive forward the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which put an end to the war between North and South Sudan, supporting especially the preparation of the 2009 elections which will be decisive for the future of Sudan. On the regional level, we will act in favour of the normalization of the relations between Sudan and Chad without which there can be no sustainable stability in Chad, nor peace in Darfur. We call on Sudan and Chad to abide by the agreements they signed, notably the agreement signed in Dakar, and to implement effective follow-up mechanisms. The two countries recall their full support for the EU operation in Eastern Chad.

- ▶ Remain concerned about the ongoing humanitarian, political and economic situation in Zimbabwe and conditions on the ground, which may endanger the holding of free and fair Parliamentary and Presidential elections.
- ▶ Emphasize that a just and lasting peace in the Middle-East will only be possible with the creation of a modern, independent and democratic Palestinian State. We strongly condemn the recent terrorist attacks. A solution can only be reached by negotiation. We remain committed to the political process that was initiated in Annapolis last year and urge the parties to achieve progress on the ground. The parties need to end settlement activity and take steps to improve security. We welcome the achievements of the Paris Donors' Conference and look forward to the upcoming donor co-ordination meeting to be held in London in May. We support all efforts to end violence. We are deeply concerned by the deteriorating of the humanitarian situation in Gaza, and we ask for the opening of the crossings and stand ready through EUBAM to provide any assistance deemed necessary.
- ▶ The ongoing political crisis in Lebanon also remains a serious concern. We underlined our continued support for the Government of Lebanon and for the Arab League's efforts to help achieve a solution. We called for the election of consensus President in Lebanon as soon as possible.
- ▶ Afghanistan is a strategic challenge. With the support of the Afghan government, we are determined to stay with our Allies as long as necessary to ensure stability of the country. We will continue to work on rebuilding Afghanistan as a top priority, with the objective of enabling the

Afghan population and institutions to take responsibility of the future of their country. And together we will continue to promote effective governance and rule of law. We will renew our efforts to tackle the scourge of the narcotics industry, which funds the insurgency, fuels corruption and criminality and undermines the prospects for development for the people of Afghanistan. France and UK call on all partners to join their effort for the success of the Support Conference to be held in Paris in June.

- ▶ We are united in our determination to resolve the Iranian proliferation challenge: we welcome the very broad support for UNSCR 1803; call on Iran to comply fully; urge early, full implementation of the sanctions it imposes, and call on our EU partners to establish additional measures in support of our shared objectives: Iran must realise that the cost of continuing to defy its international obligations will only grow. We reaffirm our continuing readiness to positively engage with Iran on the basis of E3+3 ambitious proposals.
- ▶ Continue to work together in the UN Security Council, the EU and with partners in the region to encourage democratic transition and respect for human rights in Burma. Our immediate priorities are to support the UN Secretary General's good offices mission, and to focus on the deep flaws in the regime's proposals for a referendum and new constitution, with a view to making the political process genuinely inclusive and credible. We stand ready to respond positively to political evolution in Burma or increase pressure on the regime if it continues to ignore the international community's demands.
- ▶ Welcome the power-sharing agreement in Kenya brokered by Kofi Annan. It provides the roadmap to end the political crisis and to achieve essential reforms needed to restore Kenya to the path of prosperity, democracy and stability. The UK and France will continue to work closely together within the framework of the EU and with other international partners to support the full implementation of the agreement.

## DEFENCE AND SECURITY

As permanent members of the UN Security Council, we are fully determined to work closely together to maintain international peace and security worldwide and resolve international crises.

We face the same security challenges. Our strategic and security interests are closely inter-linked. We cannot imagine a situation in which the vital interests of one of us, but not the other, are under threat. We cannot imagine a situation in which the vital interests of either of our two nations, France and the United Kingdom, could be threatened without the vital interests of the other also being threatened.

Our Armed Forces work hand in hand. We intend to further intensify our bilateral defence cooperation in all aspects and to seek synergies between our industrial, R&D and market policies.

Ten years after Saint Malo, which launched European Security and Defence Policy, we stress our continuing common determination to play a leading role in defence and security, both in Europe and within the Atlantic Alliance, and in close cooperation with our partners and Allies.

We call on all our European partners to take decisive steps to strengthen European military and civilian crisis management capabilities during the French presidency of the EU.

Together, we will:

- ▶ Counter the threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, their means of delivery, equipments and materials worldwide and related terrorist risks.

Our commitment applies equally to state and non-state actors. We will resist any attempt to weaken the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is a cornerstone of international security. We will also work together towards the establishment of an IAEA-led system of nuclear fuel assurances to reduce the proliferation risks.

- Support international efforts to control conventional weapons, in particular an early start to negotiations on an Arms Trade Treaty and the early achievement of international agreements banning cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilian populations.
- Cooperate closely on counter terrorism through a wide range of actions, from threat analysis to technical and operational cooperation. We will work together to combat nuclear terrorism by screening traffic including that passing through the Channel Tunnel. We will put a new emphasis on developing concerted responses to the development of violent extremism in our societies, including radicalisation and recruitment and terrorist propaganda, including through the internet. We have asked our officials to organise a seminar to share experience and best practice. We have also agreed to work together to develop proposals for the June European Council on how EU counter-radicalisation efforts might be deepened, for example by devoting more EU spending to counter radicalisation work. We reaffirm in all this our commitment to respect in full the rule of law and human rights.
- Remain committed to the close cooperation of our intelligence and security services to counter common threats, particularly from terrorism, whilst recognising that intelligence and national security remain each State's sole responsibility.
- Foster our bilateral dialogue on nuclear deterrence.
- Work together to prepare our two countries to emerging challenges such as cyber-security, space security and missile threat.
- Work together to face organised crime and fight narcotics trafficking.
- Cooperate to develop European military capabilities, available to both the EU and NATO, in particular in the fields of:
  - Carrier Group operations: by facilitating the generation of a combined maritime strike capability when required for national, EU-led or NATO operations. This capability could be expanded to other European countries able and willing to make a contribution.
  - A 400M: France and the UK will pursue a common approach to in service support for interoperability and through life cycle costs optimisation, including common configuration management with other A400M nations; our aim is to cover the requirements of both France and the UK in a single joint contract.
  - Helicopters: by addressing critical shortfalls in capability which constrain the deployment of helicopters in operations. Support will be given to initiatives such as pilot operational and advanced training courses, upgrading aircraft and establishment of a trust fund that could improve the availability of helicopters to our European partners and NATO allies. Other nations are invited to contribute to this effort. We support both the EDA and NATO's role in addressing European helicopter capability shortfalls.
- Contribute to current initiatives and work to modernise NATO, in particular to streamline its organisation, reform its defence planning, improve its capability for expeditionary operations and encourage burden-sharing.
- Work to strengthen EU/NATO cooperation and interaction, in particular the ability to operate together in the same theatre.

- Give a new impetus to our bilateral industrial defence cooperation, which contributes to reinforcing European and Allied capabilities:
  - by increasing our joint R&D effort with each of us providing 50M per year for common projects;
  - by reviewing in a systematic fashion possible cooperation between our respective capability programmes;
  - by establishing measures to facilitate transfers between our two countries and between companies;
  - by pursuing a joint industrial strategy for complex weapons working towards future concepts and technologies for common programmes such as SCALP / Stormshadow, anti-ship missiles and combat missiles and making more effective use of our respective industrial capabilities and skills to deliver our military requirements for weapons, particularly where these are common;
  - by ensuring that both countries possess the appropriate processes under which information can be exchanged freely and effectively between us and the respective complex weapons companies;
  - by ensuring better opportunity for small and medium size companies in armament projects, through a range of measures;
  - by signing an agreement to encourage cross-investments in the defence sector and remove any potential obstacles ;
  - by agreeing to exchange classified data to facilitate defence cooperation ;
  - by supporting implementation of High Level Working Group recommendations in accordance with future national decisions on resources.

## Javier Solana – ‘La diplomatie européenne en Méditerranée’

March/April 2008

**L’Union européenne ne peut se contenter de voir la Méditerranée comme un simple voisin. La Méditerranée fait partie de l’Union européenne. Sept Etats membres bordent ses eaux.**

Bien entendu, au-delà de ces sept pays existent d’autres Etats membres de natures différentes et variées. Mais si certains sont perçus comme appartenant à la région des Balkans en termes géostratégiques, ils n’en possèdent pas moins une dimension méditerranéenne. L’Albanie est l’un d’eux. Pour cette raison, elle a accédé en novembre dernier au partenariat euro-méditerranéen, ou processus de Barcelone. D’autres distinctions peuvent être faites : Etats arabes/ Etats non arabes, comme la Turquie et Israël ; ou bien encore Afrique du Nord/ Proche-Orient. Mais quelle que soit la classification retenue, la région est d’une importance vitale pour l’Union européenne. Les raisons en sont multiples.

### Voisinage signifie coexistence

Les individus s’accordent à dire qu’il est de bonne politique d’entretenir avec leurs voisins immédiats des relations sereines. Il est en effet raisonnable de penser qu’une bonne entente avec son voisin est la meilleure recette pour avoir une vie tranquille. Cette certitude se retrouve dans le domaine de la géopolitique. Nous avons, nous Européens, un intérêt direct à voir nos voisins vivre dans un environnement de stabilité et de prospérité. Nous voulons sincèrement qu’ils connaissent la paix et le succès économique qui sont aujourd’hui la marque de nos vies quotidiennes. Reconnaissons toutefois que notre ambition ne puise pas seulement dans l’altruisme. Nos intérêts sont en jeu.

### Une géographie partagée signifie des défis communs

Le phénomène migratoire est l’un de ces défis communs. La compréhension que nous avons des migrations a considérablement évolué en quelques années. Il n’y a pas si longtemps, l’Afrique du Nord était un lieu d’où partaient des migrants à la recherche d’une meilleure vie en Europe. Aujourd’hui, les pays du Maghreb sont devenus à leur tour des pays cibles ou des pays de transit pour d’autres populations en quête elles aussi d’une amélioration de leurs conditions de vie. Une autre question clé est celle de l’énergie. Certains de nos voisins méditerranéens sont des fournisseurs d’énergie. Nous en sommes les destinataires. Il y a là une inversion des rôles habituels. Cette question en appelle d’autres liées à la sécurité énergétique, au réchauffement climatique et à l’environnement en général.

### Une région qui connaît des troubles

La situation dans la région impose d’être réaliste. La Méditerranée connaît des conflits anciens et durs. Le conflit israélo-arabe est le plus connu. Mais les difficiles relations entre le Liban et la Syrie ne doivent pas être perçus comme un effet secondaire d’une crise plus large. La question

du Sahara occidental fait moins la une de la presse mais elle n'a pas encore trouvé sa solution. Si l'on dépasse le strict cadre méditerranéen, la liste des conflits s'allonge.

## La politique de l'Union européenne

A eux seuls, les conflits de la région justifient et expliquent que l'Europe se soit depuis longtemps intéressée à la Méditerranée. Historiquement, la Méditerranée a nourri notre politique étrangère depuis l'origine de la création européenne. Le traité de Rome renfermait déjà un protocole qui offrait au Maroc et à la Tunisie, nouvellement indépendants, une relation économique spéciale. Ces relations Nord-Sud se sont développées au rythme de la création européenne. Elles ont culminé avec la déclaration de Barcelone qui a été adoptée les 27 et 28 novembre 1995. On se souviendra que j'ai eu le privilège de présider cet important événement en ma qualité de président du Conseil de l'Union européenne.

Le « processus de Barcelone » est né de deux circonstances dont on s'accorde à penser qu'elles ont défini les années 1990. D'un côté, la guerre froide a disparu, conduisant à un ambitieux élargissement de l'Union européenne ; de l'autre, la situation paraissait s'améliorer au Proche-Orient grâce aux accords d'Oslo. L'atmosphère ainsi créée a été propice au lancement d'une vaste initiative multilatérale dont les ambitions politiques et économiques étaient uniques. Le processus de Barcelone s'est développé pour devenir aujourd'hui un instrument de qualité de notre relation avec nos partenaires les plus proches. Certes, des voix critiques se font entendre, notamment à propos de notre ambition de créer à l'horizon 2010 une vaste zone de libre-échange.

Cet objectif est peut-être ambitieux, mais il faut garder à l'esprit que de médiocres aspirations conduisent à de médiocres résultats. Quoi qu'il en soit, j'ai toujours senti que l'un des plus grands succès du Partenariat euro-méditerranéen était sa capacité à offrir un forum, un réseau d'échanges et de rencontres à tous les niveaux. Des jeunes, des artistes, des politiciens, des étudiants, des journalistes... se rencontrent dans le cadre de ce partenariat. C'est une dimension essentielle de la relation Nord-Sud qui s'inscrit dans le cadre intergouvernemental ou dans des institutions satellites comme la fondation Anna Lindh pour le Dialogue interculturel, le réseau universitaire EUROMESCO ou l'Assemblée parlementaire euro-méditerranéenne. Toute évaluation de ces structures doit prendre en considération le fait que se trouvent réunis autour d'une même table des Etats distincts qui discutent de questions aussi fondamentales que la gestion de l'eau, les migrations ou l'éducation. Cet apport, on le doit au partenariat euro-méditerranéen. On ne peut le sous-estimer.

Le processus de Barcelone a aussi eu le mérite d'enrichir la politique extérieure de certains Etats membres de l'Union européenne. Des pays d'Europe, que leur géographie ne prédisposait pas à se sentir directement concernés par les questions méditerranéennes, s'investissent aujourd'hui considérablement dans le développement de ce partenariat. C'est l'un des succès et l'un des atouts du processus de Barcelone.

Ces dernières années, le partenariat Euro-Med a été complété par la politique européenne de Voisinage. Cette politique est le fruit d'une démarche qui vise à consolider et à rehausser les relations de l'Europe avec les Etats qui bordent ses frontières. Et même si l'Est de l'Europe est concerné, le Sud n'est pas délaissé pour autant. La politique de Voisinage n'ambitionne pas de se substituer au processus de Barcelone. Elle se construit sur les résultats en introduisant une dimension bilatérale qui sert parfois mieux les relations dans certains domaines. Cette disposi-

tion ajoute une utile flexibilité à l’Europe puisqu’elle lui permet d’avancer à des rythmes différents avec ceux de ses Etats voisins qui le souhaitent.

L’Europe évolue aussi dans d’autres dimensions. Le 5+5 et le Forum méditerranéen en sont deux exemples. La nouvelle Assemblée parlementaire de la Méditerranée en est une autre.

## Acteurs extérieurs

L’intérêt pour la Méditerranée ne saurait être limité à ceux qui vivent dans son environnement immédiat. Cette donnée existe depuis longtemps. Les Etats-Unis et la Russie ont marqué leur propre intérêt pour la région. Dans un avenir proche, on peut s’attendre à ce que d’autres pays manifestent leur souhait de jouer un plus grand rôle dans cette zone géographique. À considérer les développements en Afrique ou en Asie, notamment en Chine et en Inde, on peut raisonnablement penser que des pays voudront jusqu’à un certain point faire partie de l’équation méditerranéenne.

L’Europe doit se préparer à cette éventualité. Elle doit intégrer cette dimension dans sa stratégie en refusant de la considérer comme un élément de menace, mais plutôt comme une occasion à ne pas manquer et à maîtriser. Une réaction négative consisterait, par exemple, à y déceler une perte d’influence historique. Telle ne devrait pas être notre réaction. Notre préoccupation devra être de comprendre si cette nouvelle donnée peut profiter à l’ensemble des pays de la Méditerranée. Notre souci sera de préserver les références de qualité que nous avons fixées pour la région. Notre ambition sera de convaincre nos partenaires régionaux de défendre ces références et les modèles que nous avons adoptés ensemble. L’acquis défendu par tous ne doit pas être réduit, voire dilapidé.

## Vision

Notre intérêt pour la Méditerranée nous conduit inévitablement à nous intéresser à ce qui se passe au-delà de sa stricte géographie. Notre vision s’étend au conflit israélo-arabe et à notre relation avec le monde arabe. Elle concerne aussi la sécurité énergétique, les migrations, le réchauffement climatique, le terrorisme et d’innombrables questions socio-économiques comme l’agriculture et la pêche.

Le conflit israélo-arabe figure au premier rang de nos priorités. L’Europe est membre du Quartet. L’Europe est le plus gros donateur d’aides aux Palestiniens. Nul ne peut remettre en cause ces réalités qui concernent l’Union européenne et ses Etats membres.

Nos ambitions ne sont pas modestes. Nous œuvrons pour qu’un Etat palestinien viable soit créé, pour qu’une coexistence pacifique s’installe entre Israël et ses voisins arabes et pour que le Moyen-Orient soit débarrassé de ses armes de destruction massive. Dans notre relation avec l’Iran, nous recherchons des arrangements qui nous permettent d’éviter la peur et l’instabilité. Nous le faisons avec tout le respect que l’on doit à cet important pays de la région. Nous voulons que le Liban reprenne la voie du dialogue et retrouve la prospérité. Quant à l’Irak, nous sommes convaincus que le pays dispose des moyens humains et économiques nécessaires pour retrouver un rôle à sa mesure au sein de la communauté internationale.

Avec tous nos voisins, nous cherchons à renforcer notre dialogue. Nous aimerions leur faire passer le message que notre propre paix n’a pas été obtenue aisément et que, nous aussi, nous avons connu de difficiles phases de transition. Notre obligation commune est de nous com-

prendre au-delà de nos différences historiques, culturelles ou religieuses. Nous ne pouvons, ni les uns ni les autres, permettre que se développent des mouvements radicaux. Nous ne pouvons accepter que des « causes célèbres » soient élaborées sur la base d'incompréhension ou de mauvaises perceptions.

Les réformes sont fondamentales. Qui dit « réforme » dit « évolution ». Qui dit « évolution » dit « renforcement » et « consolidation ». Se tromper fait partie de la vie des sociétés. Nous devons tirer des leçons de nos erreurs parce qu'elles sont de nature à consolider l'avenir de nos peuples. Nous-mêmes sommes passés alternativement par ces phases d'erreur et de réussite. Pour cette raison., nous avons l'obligation d'approcher nos partenaires avec humilité.

Notre partenariat n'est pas exempt de dilemme. Cela ne doit pas nous empêcher de réfléchir et d'agir. Devons-nous fixer des conditions à nos investissements ? Devons-nous nous y refuser parce que nos partenaires pourraient aller chercher ailleurs une coopération qui serait dépourvue de conditions ? Nos positions sont-elles si durablement assurées qu'elles nous autorisent à faire l'économie de ces réflexions ? Telles sont quelques-unes des problématiques qui alimentent nos réflexions.

Nous devons prendre soin de ne pas apparaître comme des donneurs de leçons. C'est un reproche qui nous est souvent fait. Il n'est pas toujours injustifié. Mais il est fondamental que nous puissions faire passer nos messages, que nous restions fidèles à notre éthique, que nous continuions à croire en la démocratie, les droits de l'Homme, l'état de droit et en toutes les autres valeurs qui font que notre système continue d'apporter à nos concitoyens la justice et la vie prospère qu'ils sont en droit d'exiger de leurs dirigeants. Au-delà, il revient aux autres, à nos voisins notamment, de dire s'ils veulent adopter ces principes et, éventuellement, de définir la manière de les transformer en actes. Pour ce qui nous concerne, nous continuerons à dire notre préoccupation chaque fois que ces principes seront ignorés.

La politique de Voisinage n'est pas exempte de certaines conditionnalités. Mais elle ne les impose pas. Chaque Etat peut les accepter ou les refuser. C'est l'une de nos vertus que de laisser libre choix entre une approche bilatérale et une approche multilatérale.

## Conclusions

La Méditerranée est prompte à nous tendre une image d'étendue d'eau, d'histoires croisées et de riches cultures. Pour ceux qui sont impliqués dans le monde de la politique, cette image idyllique se double d'une autre image où se retrouvent conflits et discordes régionaux.

L'Union européenne est toujours disposée à traiter les causes de ces situations, qu'il s'agisse de la pauvreté qui génère analphabétisme, migrations illégales et problèmes de santé, ou qu'il s'agisse des conséquences des changements qui affectent une région plus rapidement qu'ailleurs.

En définitive, on ne peut que vouloir le bien de son peuple. En ces temps de cynisme généralisé, on ne peut se permettre le luxe de cesser d'espérer et de rêver à un avenir qui apporterait de meilleures perspectives à cette région troublée, à notre région.

*Diplomatie 31*



## Anti-personnel mines – Declaration by the Presidency

Brussels, 4 April 2008

### **DECLARATION BY THE PRESIDENCY ON BEHALF OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ON THE OCCASION OF THE INTERNATIONAL DAY FOR MINE AWARENESS AND ASSISTANCE IN MINE ACTION ON 4 APRIL 2008**

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On the occasion of the International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action proclaimed by the United Nations the European Union welcomes the significant progress made in the fight against the suffering caused by anti-personnel mines.

The European Union, nonetheless, expresses its deep concern about the tremendous humanitarian and development challenges still posed by anti-personnel mines and unexploded ordnance. These devices continue to kill people and constitute an obstacle to the return of refugees and other displaced persons, humanitarian aid operations, reconstruction and economic development, as well as the restoration of normal social conditions, and have serious and lasting social and economic effects on the populations of mine-affected countries.

The European Union is aware of the potential of mine action as a peace and confidence-building measure in post-conflict situations among parties concerned. The European Union urges that where appropriate, all relevant multilateral, regional and national programmes and bodies should include, in addition to specialised mine action programmes, mine action activities in their humanitarian, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development assistance activities, bearing in mind the need to ensure national and local ownership, sustainability and capacity-building.

Over the last ten years, the European Union and its Member States have consistently provided major political, financial and scientific support to mine action worldwide, totalling nearly EUR 1.5 billion and constituting almost a half of the world's financial assistance to mine action in this period. The European Union has been integrating mine action into long-term socioeconomic development programmes with a view to improving its response to national priorities and enhancing local ownership. The Union's overall goal is a world free of anti-personnel mines without any new anti-personnel mine victims and where better care is provided for the victims of these weapons. This is an ambitious target, but it can be achieved if all states demonstrate the necessary determination and unite their efforts towards this end.

The European Union appeals to countries which have not yet acceded to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, which embodies both humanitarian and disarmament objectives, to do so as soon as possible, and join in the efforts to permanently eliminate anti-personnel landmines. The EU also calls upon countries which have not yet ratified the CCW or its relevant protocols to do so as soon as possible.

## European Parliament – Address by Javier Solana to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

Brussels, 8 April 2008

### INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

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‘Mr. President thank you for inviting me again. I will try as always to be brief.

Let me start by saying that this year 2008 will be a important year for us. I hope that the ratification of the Treaty will allow us to move on in the field of foreign and security policy, in a much more coherent manner, in co-operation with the Parliament, and to see how we can move forward, as I think we have an obligation to do, and with high expectations, not only among our own citizens but also in the world at large.

Let me say a few things about the most important matters on the international agenda today.

I will start by talking about the Western Balkans. This is the most important topic on the agenda. I would like to comment on the situation in Kosovo, after the unilateral declaration of independence, the reaction of Serbia, and the deployment of the European mission on the ground.

11 May is a very important date. As you know, elections have been called in Serbia and for the first time presidential, parliamentary and municipal elections will be held together. I underline in particular the municipal elections because it is the first time that municipal elections will take place and we have to see how this is handled by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in the northern part of Kosovo, that is the part of Kosovo north of the River Iber, where the situation is still not completely stabilised.

We have to see how we can go from here to the elections on the 11<sup>th</sup> of May in trying to see if the response of the Serbian people is the one that we would like to see, namely a majority vote for the pro-European forces in Serbia. We want Serbia to be a close cooperative partner of the European Union and to come closer to the European Union and I would like every thing that can be done on our side up to the 10<sup>th</sup> of May to be done. We have to do the utmost to take measures, if possible, that would send a very clear signal to the Serbian people that we care about them.

Firstly, there is the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. There are still difficulties but I think every effort should be made to finalise it by the 11<sup>th</sup> of May. Secondly, as you know, the Commission is continuing to work very constructively – Commissioner Rehn is making a substantive effort – to see if something can be done on the visa issue. These are two of the most important issues that we have to consider before the elections on the 11<sup>th</sup> of May. I would like to see an agreement on them in the Council and all the help from the European Parliament would be very welcome.

The decision to deploy the EULEX mission in Kosovo was taken by all 27 Member States and we very much hope to see it deployed at the pace agreed in the mission’s operational plan. Small problems are still emerging, in particular as regards relations with UNMIK and the definition of roles, as some changes have taken place on the ground, particularly north of the river, and some adjustments have to be made in our relations with the UN.

As you know, UNMIK is still deployed across Kosovo, in particular in the northern part, and

with responsibilities on the crossing line, at the river. You will remember the tensions at the two most important gates on the border, gate number 1 and gate number 31, the two main crossing points between Serbia proper and the northern part of Kosovo. We hope very much that the cooperation between the EU and UNMIK will continue.

I had a good meeting with the UN Secretary General in the margins of the meeting in Bucharest last Thursday and Friday. We will maintain that relationship to see if EULEX can be fully deployed and if UNMIK has the mandate and capacity to perform all its duties while it remains there.

As you know, Kosovo's new constitution was presented to the Parliament yesterday and will be approved on the 15th of June. So between the 11th of May and the 15th of June we have to be very attentive to see how the situation evolves.

I would like to stress once again that we must make every effort to reach out to the Serbian people and to continue telling them clearly, not only with words but also with deeds, that we want them to be part of the European family. In Bucharest, we also met the Serbian Foreign Minister and continued the conversation of the previous Saturday at the Gymnich over breakfast in Ljubljana.

Let me now move on to the second big issue that we have which is Afghanistan.

There was a very important meeting on Afghanistan in Bucharest last Thursday. President Karzai was there as were the most important donors from the international community – not only from the European Union but also from many other countries that are not members of the European Union or NATO: Australia, New Zealand, Japan and many others. In addition to the commitment to keep on helping the government of Afghanistan we also secured a set of benchmarks to assess progress and we agreed that the meeting on Afghanistan in Paris in June will be a political conference as well as a pledging conference. I think that was a good idea and, as you know, new pledges and new commitments were made in Bucharest, at the economic and political levels and also on forces on the ground.

Let me also say that we, collectively as Europeans, are maintaining our ESDP police mission. It is now deployed across almost the whole of Afghanistan. We have agreements for the majority of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). We still have two that are not finalised – with the United States and with Turkey – but on the rest we are working very hard. By the end of the spring we will be fully deployed and we are already present across the country.

Let me remind you that the objective of the mission is not to train the police but to train the trainers, to organise a system, a police concept, that really is long lasting and benefits the people of Afghanistan. This cannot be done overnight. It will take time and it will require the tenacity of the Member States of the European Union in order to continue to produce results in the very difficult field of security-sector reform with the police.

Now let me move on to the Middle East. The last time I was with you – in the plenary session – it was a very bad week, with violence in Gaza, and I had the opportunity to explain to you what was going on, what we were doing in cooperation with the Egyptians to restore calm in Gaza and in the zone in general.

Since then, the situation has calmed down but the issues have not been resolved. A solution has not been found for the Rafah crossing point or for the other two crossing points. But, politically, I think an important meeting took place yesterday. For the first time there was a meeting between Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas together with Foreign Minister Livni and Abu Ala, the Palestinian negotiator. I do think that we still have a chance to move the process to

a settlement before the end of 2008. I don't want to sound too optimistic, I want to sound realistic at this point in time, and hope that still we have a chance to move the process forward.

The situation is not resolved as far as Gaza is concerned but I think it is more relaxed than it was and I believe and very much hope that with all our efforts, including with our Egyptian friends, we can have a period of calm in Gaza which could also help move forward the bilateral negotiations which, as you know, have been stuck. I will be going to the region again soon and I look forward to reporting back to you on the progress there.

The 2<sup>nd</sup> of May is an important date as the Ad-hoc Liaison Committee and the Quartet will meet in London. I will be very happy to return around the middle of May and give you my impression of how we approach the summer period. I think we have still a window of opportunity until, let us say, the end the summer but if we are not able to move the process forward in a dynamic manner by then maybe we will have to begin to think that the possibility of an agreement in 2008 will be farther away from our hopes.

Let me say a word about Lebanon. As you know, the Arab League Summit was held last Sunday. It was not a summit that we can call a success. It was not a failure either, but I think it was a failure as far as Lebanon is concerned. The president has still not been elected and the situation continues to be very difficult. We must make every effort on our side to continue to push for the presidential election in Lebanon to be held. It has been postponed for the 17<sup>th</sup> time. This cannot continue and I would very much like your support on that situation also.

A few words about Africa. Deployment of our ESDP mission in Chad continues as normal. We already have 1 500 people on the ground and before the rainy season the full 3 700 will be deployed. The situation at this point is satisfactory for the mission. There have been no big problems on the ground and we are continuing to make the contribution the UN asked us for.

Zimbabwe is a very important issue on our agenda. Today is important because the court should reach a decision concerning the election results. I spoke yesterday to the Foreign Minister of Tanzania, currently the chair of the African Union. The situation is of great concern to the African Union whose leaders, particularly the President of the African Union, have not been able to contact President Mugabe. All the efforts to do so have failed. On Saturday I met President Mbeki who, as you know, has played a very important role and today I will meet the designated Chairman of the African Union for the first time for a working lunch and Zimbabwe will be one of the most important issues that we will discuss, as well as Chad and Sudan. So we have to watch carefully how the situation evolves, particularly over the next few hours.

In conclusion, let me say a word on the paper on the security implications of climate change that I presented, with the Commission, to the European Council. It is a very important issue on which I hope we will continue to work in close contact with the Parliament. It relates to the lack of resources, not only oil, but also – crucially – gas and water, to the use of land for food production and to food prices. You saw at the weekend and last week a lot of problems in many countries, poor countries, arising because of the prices of agricultural products. All these issues are fundamental. We have to look at them in a comprehensive manner and see how can we help to resolve them. The same can be said about large-scale migration as a consequence of climate change. This is an issue that is of great concern to the people and the leaders of the EU.

These are to my mind the hottest issues facing us today. As far as Tibet is concerned, as you know an important statement was made in Ljubljana at the Gymnich meeting by the foreign ministers and I know that you having a big debate on it. I hope very much that the EU's demands will be heeded by the Chinese authorities. We have to continue the pressure. There will be a

human rights dialogue meeting with China on the 15th of May. Let us see how we can also put those issues on the table and how we can also find solutions moving in the right direction.

Before I finish let me tell you about the NATO summit meeting in Bucharest last week. I think that, seen together with the meeting at the weekend in Sochi between President Bush and President Putin, it gives us grounds for, if not optimism, a sense of constructive realism on the big strategic issues that are important for us as well as for NATO. With the difficulties that we may be facing in 2009 and 2010 when all the major agreements on disarmament will come up for renewal it will be important for the EU and its citizens to have the possibility of avoiding a vacuum between now and then. So, I very much hope that our efforts to that end will bear fruit and will allow us to enter the period 2009-2010 with the feeling that the very important agreements that were reached in 1999, 2000 and 2001 with President Yeltsin will be maintained and that we will not be moving into a vacuum where these major agreements, which have been the fundamental pillars of our strategic security, are concerned.

## Summary of answers to questions

### WESTERN BALKANS

On the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia name issue, Mr Solana said the UN Secretary-General's envoy was in the lead on finding a solution to the problem and he hoped that it would be settled in the near future. As far as the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's relations with the EU were concerned, it was one of the most advanced countries in the region, he said. It was a candidate country, the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) was already implemented and 'we expect a potential good result will take place before the end of the year.' He added that the government might decide to call elections, following the disappointment at the Bucharest meeting, but he hoped that any decision on this would not be made as a result of frustration.

In exchanges on the conditions for signing the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Serbia, Mr Solana appealed to everyone to focus on how best to help the Serbian people move forward and draw closer to the EU and to show flexibility in order to achieve this. 'I would very much prefer, on the 10<sup>th</sup> of May, to go to sleep with my conscience relaxed that all the efforts that were in our hands have been made.' We want Serbia to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), he said.

On the subject of Kosovo's status, the High Representative underlined that the operational decision of the EU to deploy a rule-of-law mission to Kosovo was a collective, unanimous decision. The Member States had agreed that they would decide on a national basis, at their own pace, on the issue of recognising Kosovo's declaration of independence. He hoped that the situation would be resolved over time and that all the Balkan countries would draw closer to the EU, stabilising the whole region.

Bosnia and Herzegovina was top of our agenda, said Mr Solana. The SAA had been initialled some months ago but its signature depended on the finalisation of the police reform which was long overdue. We were, he said, only 'inches away' and he hoped the difficulties could be overcome very soon.

### AFRICA

Mr Solana said that since last Saturday he had been following the situation in Zimbabwe extremely closely. He underlined the role of President M'beki of South Africa in the interna-

tional efforts to broker a solution and stressed the very grave concern of the African Union leaders. The question of whether a second round of the presidential election would be held was very important and he would discuss the situation with Jean Ping, the designated chairman of the African Union Commission, at lunch.

#### TURKEY

Asked in the first round of questions for his views on the case in the Turkish Supreme Court against the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Turkey's president and prime minister, Mr Solana said that a ruling declaring the party illegal would cause a constitutional crisis in Turkey, with serious consequences. 'If the court determines the illegality of a party like the AKP, that won democratic elections recognised by us and of which the president and the prime minister are members, we would be in a serious situation from a constitutional point of view.' He hoped that the Court would reach a reasonable decision and said that failure to do so would be a severe blow for Turkey and for its relations with the EU.

#### TIBET and the OLYMPIC GAMES

Mr Solana called for dialogue and for a political solution to the problem of Tibet: 'The important thing is that the Tibet question is solved, and that it is solved in a solid manner, that there is a dialogue, that there is a political solution and that human rights are respected, as we have always defended in our relations with China, where we also defend the territorial integrity of China.'

On the question of whether or not to boycott the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games in Beijing, Mr Solana cautioned against mixing sport and politics. He stated his personal interest in the Olympic Games, as a member of the Olympic family and having been responsible for organising the Barcelona Olympics in 1992. He said he would like to be in Beijing but he assured the MEPs that if the EU decided to boycott the ceremony he would respect its position.

#### AFGHANISTAN

Asked about the EU's state-building role in Afghanistan, Mr Solana said that the meeting in Bucharest, attended by President Karzai and the most important donor countries, had been very serious and constructive, with frank discussions and important decisions, including the agreement to hold a 'political pledging meeting' in Paris. He announced that he would visit Kabul and Islamabad the week after next. The EU's 'military and political theatres' in the region and cooperation over the Pakistan-Afghanistan border were very important. The EU's relationship with the new government of Pakistan was a high priority.

#### MIDDLE EAST

The EU's engagement in Iraq continued to grow, Mr Solana stressed, the EU's rule-of-law mission – EUJUST LEX – was doing an excellent job and the EU must help as much as possible with the forthcoming municipal elections in Iraq. Mr Solana said he would be meeting Prime Minister Maliki and hoped to visit Iraq in the near future.

On Iran, the only new development since the High Representative had last reported to the European Parliament was the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1803 (with just one abstention) on Iran's nuclear programme. The international community remained united and the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany would

meet again soon, during the 90-day period preceding implementation of the Resolution.

Mr Solana assured the committee that the EU mission to monitor the border between Gaza and Egypt at Rafah was still in the region, ready to deploy immediately if called upon: 'We have not left.' An agreement that built on the 2005 Agreement on Access and Movement was under discussion and a new '2005 Plus' agreement, that included Egypt as a signatory, was essential as the role of Egypt was very important.

#### EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY AND RELATIONS WITH NATO

Mr Solana hoped very much that ratification of the Lisbon Treaty would help speed the development of the ESDP. The development of a new strategic concept by NATO would also, he thought, enable the two organisations to move forward in the area of security, developing complementary roles.

The US President's statement on the ESDP and the French President's statement on NATO at the NATO Summit in Bucharest were very important, said Mr Solana. He looked forward to deeper cooperation with NATO and to the EU being able to develop its own capabilities in security and defence policy. He hoped that preparatory work would be done on this in the second half of this year.

On the EU's relations with NATO, the High Representative emphasized that cooperation within the 'Berlin Plus' framework for EU operations using NATO assets, such as the very successful operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, worked very smoothly. Where relations outside the 'Berlin Plus' arrangements were concerned, there were problems of interpretation by some NATO countries, which made aspects of practical cooperation on the ground difficult in some cases, for example in Afghanistan and in Kosovo. This was a matter that must be resolved, said Mr Solana.

#### STRATEGIC ISSUES

Several MEPS asked about non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Mr Solana said disarmament would be at the core of important debates coming up both within and beyond the EU in 2009 and 2010. The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and crucial US-Russia agreements on disarmament were coming up for renewal and it was vital, Mr Solana said, to continue to fight proliferation and to achieve a deep consensus among the international community. He hoped that it would be possible to move in the field of disarmament.

## Iraq EUJUST LEX – Council Joint Action

Brussels, 14 April 2008

### **COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/304/CFSP AMENDING AND EXTENDING JOINT ACTION 2005/190/CFSP ON THE EUROPEAN UNION INTEGRATED RULE OF LAW MISSION FOR IRAQ, EUJUST LEX**

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THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 14 thereof,  
Whereas:

- (1) On 7 March 2005, the Council adopted Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP on the European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq, EUJUST LEX<sup>(1)</sup>.
- (2) On 22 November 2007, the Council adopted Joint Action 2007/760/CFSP<sup>(2)</sup> amending and extending Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP until 30 April 2008.
- (3) Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP should be further extended until 30 June 2008.
- (4) The financial reference amount of EUR 10 million provided for in Council Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP was supplemented by EUR 11,2 million in Council Joint Action 2006/708/CFSP<sup>(3)</sup>, which should also cover the expenditure to be incurred during the remaining period of the Mission,

HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

#### ***Article 1***

Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP is hereby amended as follows:

1. Article 11(1) shall be replaced by the following:  
'1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the mission for the period 7 March 2005 to 30 June 2008 shall be EUR 21,2 million.';
2. the second subparagraph of Article 14 shall be replaced by the following:  
'It shall expire on 30 June 2008.'

#### ***Article 2***

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

#### ***Article 3***

This Joint Action shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Luxembourg, 14 April 2008.

*For the Council*

*The President*

I. Jarc

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(1) OJ L 62, 9.3.2005, p. 37.

(2) OJ L 305, 23.11.2007, p. 58.

(3) OJ L 291, 21.10.2006, p. 43.



# Weapons of Mass Destruction – Council Joint Action

Brussels, 14 April 2008

## **COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/314/CFSP ON SUPPORT FOR IAEA ACTIVITIES IN THE AREAS OF NUCLEAR SECURITY AND VERIFICATION AND IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU STRATEGY AGAINST PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (CORRIGENDUM)**

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THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 14 thereof,  
Whereas:

- (1) On 12 December 2003, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Chapter III of which contains a list of measures to combat such proliferation and which need to be taken both within the EU and in third countries.
- (2) The EU is actively implementing this Strategy and is giving effect to the measures listed in Chapter III thereof, in particular through releasing financial resources to support specific projects conducted by multilateral institutions, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
- (3) On 17 November 2003 the Council adopted Common Position 2003/805/CFSP on the universalisation and reinforcement of multilateral agreements in the field of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery.<sup>(1)</sup> That Common Position calls, inter alia, for the promotion of the conclusion of IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols and commits the EU to work towards making the Additional Protocol and comprehensive safeguards agreements the standard for the IAEA verification system.
- (4) On 17 May 2004, the Council adopted Joint Action 2004/495/CFSP on support for IAEA activities under its Nuclear Security Programme and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.<sup>(2)</sup>
- (5) On 18 July 2005, the Council adopted Joint Action 2005/574/CFSP on support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.<sup>(3)</sup>
- (6) On 12 June 2006, the Council adopted Joint Action 2006/418/CFSP on support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.<sup>(4)</sup>
- (7) The strengthening of the control of high-activity radioactive sources in accordance with the G-8 statement and Action Plan on securing radioactive sources, adopted at the 2003 Evian Summit, remains an important objective for the EU, which will be pursued through outreach to third countries.

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(1) OJ L 302, 20.11.2003, p. 34.

(2) OJ L 182, 19.5.2004, p. 46.

(3) OJ L 193, 23.7.2005, p. 44.

(4) OJ L 165, 17.6.2006, p. 20.

(8) In July 2005, States Parties and the European Atomic Energy Community agreed by consensus to amend the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) with a view to expanding its scope to encompass nuclear material and facilities in peaceful domestic use and storage, as well as in transport, and to oblige States Parties to make violations subject to criminal sanctions.

(9) In September 2005, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention) was opened for signature. Upon its entry into force, it will require States Parties to enact legislation to criminalise these offences.

(10) The IAEA pursues the same objectives as set out in Recitals (3) to (9). This is done through the implementation of its Nuclear Security Plan which is financed entirely through voluntary contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund.

(11) The EU has contributed to this fund through Joint Action 2004/495/CFSP, as well as through Joint Actions 2005/574/CFSP and 2006/418/CFSP which are currently implemented by the IAEA and which are geared towards the Central Asian Region, the Mediterranean Region and Africa respectively.

(12) In order to help address the specific challenges in the field of nuclear security and non-proliferation in Asian countries, due in particular to the growing number of nuclear applications in the region, inter alia in the field of medicine, agriculture and water, as well as nuclear research, this Joint Action should specifically support IAEA activities in South-East Asia. This should take into account the increasing role of Asia as a partner to the EU in the field of security. Particular emphasis should be given to the strengthening of nuclear safety and security in non-energy nuclear applications in eligible countries,

## HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

### *Article 1*

1. For the purposes of giving immediate and practical implementation to certain elements of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the EU shall support the IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification in order to further the following objectives:

- achieving progress towards the universalisation of international non-proliferation and nuclear security instruments, including comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol,
- enhancing the protection of proliferation-sensitive materials and equipment and the relevant technology, providing legislative and regulatory assistance in the area of nuclear security and safeguards,
- strengthening the detection of and response to illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials.

2. The projects of the IAEA, corresponding to measures of the EU Strategy, are the projects which aim at:

- strengthening national legislative and regulatory infrastructures for the implementation of relevant international instruments in the areas of nuclear security and verification, including comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol,
- assisting States in strengthening the security and control of nuclear and other radioactive materials,

- strengthening States' capabilities for detection and response to illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials.

These projects shall be carried out in countries needing assistance in these areas after an initial assessment carried out by an expert team.

A detailed description of the projects is set out in the Annex.

### *Article 2*

1. The Presidency, assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council/High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (SG/HR), shall be responsible for the implementation of this Joint Action. The Commission shall be fully associated.
2. The projects referred to in Article 1(2) shall be carried out by the IAEA. It shall perform this task under the control of the SG/HR, assisting the Presidency. For this purpose, the SG/HR shall enter into the necessary arrangements with IAEA.
3. The Presidency, the SG/HR and the Commission shall keep each other regularly informed about the projects, in conformity with their respective competences.

### *Article 3*

1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2) shall be EUR 7 703 000, to be funded from the general budget of the European Communities.
2. The expenditure financed by the amount stipulated in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the European Community procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the European Communities.
3. The Commission shall supervise the proper management of the expenditure referred to in paragraph 2, which shall take the form of a grant. For this purpose, it shall conclude a financing agreement with the IAEA. The financing agreement shall stipulate that the IAEA is to ensure visibility of the EU contribution, appropriate to its size.
4. The Commission shall endeavour to conclude the financing agreement referred to in paragraph 3 as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Joint Action. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of conclusion of the financing agreement.

### *Article 4*

The Presidency, assisted by the SG/HR, shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Joint Action on the basis of regular reports prepared by the IAEA. These reports shall form the basis for the evaluation by the Council. The Commission shall be fully associated. It shall provide information on the financial aspects of the implementation of this Joint Action.

### *Article 5*

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the day of its adoption.

It shall expire 24 months after the date of the conclusion of the financing agreement between the Commission and the IAEA or after 12 months if no financing agreement has been concluded before that date.

**Article 6**

This Joint Action shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Luxembourg, 14 April 2008.

For the Council

The President

I. Jarc

## ANNEX – EU SUPPORT FOR IAEA ACTIVITIES IN THE AREAS OF NUCLEAR SECURITY AND VERIFICATION AND IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU STRATEGY AGAINST PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

### 1. Description

The number of terrorist incidents in EU Member States and elsewhere over recent years has shown no sign of diminishing. The international community has recognised in various forums that the risk of successful acts of nuclear terrorism involving nuclear or other radioactive material remains high. In addition, recent reports of illicit trafficking, also involving particularly sensitive nuclear material, have underscored the continuing risk that terrorists could acquire such materials.

The international community has reacted strongly to these threats and has taken several initiatives aimed at preventing nuclear or other radioactive material from falling into the hands of criminals and terrorists. Particular attention was drawn to the situation in Asia by the Seminar on Strengthening Nuclear Security in Asian Countries, which took place in Tokyo in November 2006, which called on the IAEA to enhance its cooperation with States in the region to ensure that acceptable levels of security are applied to all nuclear and other radioactive material under national jurisdictions and according to effective national systems and functions. Added impetus to international efforts was given through the launch in July 2006 of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

IAEA verification remains an indispensable tool for building confidence among States with regard to nuclear nonproliferation undertakings, and for advancing the peaceful use of nuclear material.

Recent international developments have resulted in a new and strengthened set of international legal instruments that are relevant for nuclear security and verification: in July 2005, States Parties adopted the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was opened for signature in September 2005; and in April 2004, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540(2004), dealing with weapons of mass destruction and non-State actors. UN Security Council Resolution 1373(2001) calls for all States to become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

Over 80 States have made a political commitment to implement the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources<sup>(1)</sup>. In addition, in 2005 the General Conference and the Board of Governors of the IAEA have adopted several resolutions and decisions to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system<sup>(2)</sup>.

(1) GOV/2003/49-GC(47)/9. Also the document: 'Measures to Strengthen International Cooperation in Nuclear, Radiation, Transport Safety and Waste Management: *Promoting Effective and Sustainable National Regulatory Infrastructure for the Control of Radiation Sources*' (GOV/2004/52-GC(48)/15) includes parts that are relevant to the IAEA-EU cooperation under the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. These activities are also reflected in 'Activities Supporting Nuclear Security' in the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan for 2006-2009.

(2) In September 2005, the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) decided that in order to strengthen the safeguards system, the so-called 'small quantities protocol' (SQP) to NPT safeguards agreements should remain part of the Agency's safeguards system, subject to modifications in the standard text and the change in the SQP criteria; the 2005 IAEA General Conference adopted a resolution in which it noted, inter alia, that, in the case of a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement supplemented by an additional protocol in force, these measures represent the enhanced verification standard for that State.

States' implementation of these international instruments may be significantly facilitated, in part, by assistance provided through the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan for 2006-2009, which was approved by the Board of Governors of the IAEA in September 2005<sup>(3)</sup>. This is a continuation to the 2003-2005 Plan of Activities to protect against nuclear terrorism<sup>(4)</sup>. The Nuclear Security Plan includes three activity areas: (1) Needs assessment, analysis and coordination; (2) Prevention; and (3) Detection and response. It also includes a part referred to as 'Activities Supporting Nuclear Security', which comprises activities originally identified for their safety and safeguards objectives but which are also recognised for their important contributions to nuclear security.

International Safeguards, as implemented by the IAEA, represent key means of verifying the compliance by States with their specific non-proliferation commitments and obligations. It is of utmost importance that the required national legislation for the implementation of a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and, if applicable, an additional protocol, is in place<sup>(1)</sup>. The implementation requires that each State party to such agreements maintain an effective State System for Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC). In September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors requested that the IAEA Secretariat assist States for which comprehensive safeguards agreements had small quantities protocols attached, including non-members of the Agency, through available resources, in the establishment and maintenance of such SSACs.

The Nuclear Security Plan 2006-2009 pursues similar objectives to some elements of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. These provide a comprehensive approach to nuclear security including the regulatory controls, accountability and protection of nuclear and other radioactive materials in use, storage and transport, 'from cradle to grave', in the short term as well as in the long term. However, should the protection fail, backup measures must be established to detect theft or attempts to smuggle the material across international borders and to respond to malicious acts involving nuclear or other radioactive materials, should they occur.

The IAEA is about to complete implementation of Council Joint Action 2004/495/CFSP of 17 May 2004 on support for IAEA activities under its Nuclear Security Programme and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. In addition, the IAEA is in the process of implementing Council Joint Action 2005/574/CFSP of 18 July 2005 on support of IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, as well as Council Joint Action 2006/418/CFSP of 12 June 2006, on support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

With the associated contributions of the EU, the IAEA has initiated major activities to support the efforts of recipient States in the Caucasus, Central Asia, south-eastern Europe and the Balkans, the Mediterranean region in the Middle East, and Africa to strengthen nuclear security and the implementation of international safeguards in these countries.

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(3) GOV/2005/50-GC(49)/17.

(4) GOV/2002/10.

(1) See the Agency's Plan of Action to Promote the Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, as published by the IAEA.

Support for these efforts continues to be in high demand in IAEA Member States as well as in States that are not members of the IAEA. Countries eligible to receive support are: in south-eastern Europe: Turkey, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Republic of Moldova, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; in the Central Asia region: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan; in the Caucasus region: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia; in the Mediterranean region in the Middle East: Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syrian Arab Republic; and in Africa<sup>(2)</sup>: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe; in the South-East Asia region: Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam.

Work will continue in south-eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Caucasus, in the Mediterranean region in the Middle East, and in Africa on the basis of the existing Joint Actions and an update of the needs evaluations carried out as part of those Joint Actions. This Joint Action will focus on South-East Asia. The final selection of the additional countries in the South-East Asia region to receive support will be made on the basis of the needs evaluation phase, which will comprise evaluation of existing information in headquarters supplemented by assessment missions where required. The support activities for each project will be focused on those countries that are in most need of support in each project area.

For the purpose of the needs evaluations, a team of recognised experts will assess the present status of nuclear security system already in place in these countries and give recommendations on improvements. The recommendations will constitute a platform for the definition of subsequent assistance, covering present status and need for improvement as regards prevention, detection of and response to malicious acts involving nuclear and other radioactive materials, including those in non-nuclear use, and of nuclear facilities. Priorities will be set in identifying the countries for each project that would be covered by the budget made available through EU support. The development of human resources will be implemented as part of the established training programme of the IAEA, which, to a large extent, is based on a regional approach. The participation of experts from as many eligible countries as possible will be supported, subject to available financial resources. Subsequently, projects will be implemented in the selected countries in three fields:

### 1. *Legislative and Regulatory Assistance*

The legal foundation for nuclear security comprises, in large part, international instruments and recognized principles (treaties, conventions, agreements, norms, IAEA standards, codes of conduct and guidance documents, and recommendations) that are implemented by national authorities to control nuclear material and other radioactive sources. This broad range of norms (many developed under IAEA auspices) provides a framework for using nuclear material,

(2) Up to 20 to 25 countries in Africa are foreseen to receive support for nuclear security upgrades under different projects. Additional countries may be involved in regional training events.

other radioactive substances or their related facilities safely and securely – both those with large nuclear programmes and those conducting only limited nuclear activities.

The existence of proper national legislation, and regulatory control infrastructure, is a precondition for a successful nuclear security regime. National implementing legislation should provide a framework of principles and general provisions that enables authorised governmental entities to exercise the necessary regulatory functions and that regulates the conduct of any person engaged in regulated activities. In many States such legislation is inadequate and the regulatory infrastructure is not in place or is inadequate. Such gaps, combined with inefficient regulatory control infrastructures result in a weakness of the global security regime. The aim should therefore be to strengthen or establish adequate national legislative and regulatory frameworks, and the effective application of relevant measures.

Radioactive materials are often used in non-nuclear applications, e.g. in medical or industrial use. Some of these sources are highly radioactive and belong to categories 1 to 3 as defined in the IAEA document ‘Categorisation of Radioactive Sources’. These sources, if not adequately under regulatory control and protected, may fall into the wrong hands and be used in malicious activities. The regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety and security of radioactive sources must be effective and must function adequately in accordance with international standards, the guidelines of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the associated import/export guidance, and with best practices.

The conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols with the IAEA is an effective measure that promotes stringent national and international control over nuclear material and related technologies. It is important that national implementing legislation clearly identify the nuclear activities, installations, facilities and material to which safeguards will be applied. In addition, States that have concluded an additional protocol need to ensure that their national implementing legislation has been enhanced to enable the State concerned to comply with the additional obligations under the additional protocol. In particular, the State’s domestic legislation should be revised to expand the responsibilities and powers of the regulatory body designated for the purposes of implementing and applying the safeguards agreements concluded.

States also accept obligations to meet international norms related to nuclear security when becoming parties to the CPPNM by ratifying the Amendment to the CPPNM, and when becoming a party to the Nuclear Terrorism Convention. In addition, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540(2004) also obliges all States to establish domestic controls including the establishment of appropriate controls over materials related to nuclear weapons.

States’ undertakings included in the aforementioned international instruments in the field of nuclear security have resulted in a juxtaposition of commitments related to the security of nuclear material and facilities and other radioactive sources. These commitments include measures for the establishment of a regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety and security of radioactive sources; accountancy and control measures; physical protection measures; import and export controls and the criminalisation of unlawful acts.

## *2. Strengthening the Security and Control of Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials*

The materials used or stored at nuclear facilities and locations must be adequately accounted for and protected in order to prevent theft or sabotage. An effective regulatory system should identify those elements requiring implementation at the level of the State and of the operator respectively.



It is also of vital importance that powerful and vulnerable sources in non-nuclear applications are physically protected against malicious acts when used or stored, and when no longer required, that they be dismantled and stored, or disposed of as radioactive waste, in a safe and secure location.

All States with comprehensive safeguards agreements are required to establish and maintain state systems of accounting for and control of all nuclear material (SSACs) subject to safeguards. However, IAEA estimates that such systems are lacking or inadequate in many States that are party to such agreements. This situation is particularly widespread among the 120 States or so that do not operate any nuclear facilities.

### *3. Strengthening of States' Capabilities for Detection and Response to Illicit Trafficking*

Illicit trafficking relates to the unauthorised receipt, provision, use, transfer or disposal of nuclear material and other radioactive materials, whether intentional or unintentional and with or without crossing international borders.

A terrorist-made, crude nuclear explosive device or a radiological dispersal device cannot be constructed without the material having been acquired as a result of illicit trafficking. In addition, sensitive equipment and technology to produce sensitive material for or to construct a crude nuclear explosive device may also have been acquired via illicit trafficking. It may be assumed that cross-border movement of material or technology is necessary for the material to reach its end destination. To combat illicit trafficking, States thus require the necessary regulatory systems to be in place, as well as technical systems (including user-friendly instruments) and available procedures and information at border stations for detecting attempts to smuggle radioactive materials (including fissile, radioactive materials) or unauthorised trade in sensitive equipment and technology.

Effective measures must also be in place to respond to such acts and also to seizures of any radioactive materials.

Law enforcement staff (customs, police, etc.) is frequently not trained in the use of detection equipment, and thus the sensitive equipment and technology may be unfamiliar. Training of these officers is therefore critical to the success of any measures put in place for detection of illicit trafficking. Different training should be offered to staff of different categories, both in using detection instruments and in understanding the reading of the instruments in order to be able to decide on follow-up activities.

Support in this area is in great demand as a result of increased awareness of the threat involved and of the availability of equipment and methodology for improved border-monitoring capability.

## **2. Objectives**

Overall objective: To strengthen nuclear security in selected countries.

### *2.1. Evaluation Phase: Financing International Nuclear Security Missions*

Evaluation will be carried out by the IAEA to identify needs to strengthen nuclear security in each of those countries mentioned in point 1, in which such evaluation has not been completed. For the other identified countries, the evaluation carried out earlier will be updated. The evaluation will cover, as appropriate, physical protection and security of nuclear and non-nuclear applications, established measures to combat illicit trafficking as well as the necessary legal and

regulatory infrastructure. The results of the overall evaluation will be used as a basis for selecting the countries in which the projects will be implemented.

The projects outlined above will:

- evaluate, in each country, the status of physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive materials, and the protection of any nuclear or research installation or location in which these materials are used or stored. Identify a subset of facilities and locations containing these materials to be selected for subsequent upgrading and support,
- evaluate, in each country, any needs with respect to the upgrading of the security of radioactive sources. Identify any weaknesses and shortcoming against international standards and the Code of Conduct requiring improvement of regulatory infrastructure, and identify the need to provide additional protection of powerful, vulnerable sources. The specific equipment needed to provide protection would also be determined as a result of the evaluation,
- evaluate, in each country, the current status of the capability to combat illicit trafficking and identify needs for the required improvements,
- evaluate, in each country, the status of the SSAC and identify needs for the required improvements.

## *2.2. Implementation of specific actions defined as priorities as a result of the evaluation phase*

### Project 1 . Legislative and Regulatory Assistance

Project purpose:

- to strengthen national legislative and regulatory infrastructures related to nuclear and other radioactive material taking into account relevant international instruments and recognised principles in the nuclear security field and existing synergies with national systems of radiation safety,
- to strengthen national legislative frameworks for the implementation of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols concluded between States and the Agency,
- to strengthen the national regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety and security of radioactive sources.

Project results:

- development and adoption of comprehensive, coherent and effective legislation at the national level, thereby contributing to a harmonised, strengthened and more universal system of nuclear security,
- development and adoption (in national languages) of national legislation necessary to enable States to comply with their obligations under Agency Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols,
- establishment/upgrading of the national regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety and security of radioactive sources through the provision of advisory services, equipment and training, in accordance with international standards, the guidelines of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and best practices.

### Project 2 . Strengthening the Security and Control of Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

Project purpose:

- to strengthen physical protection of nuclear facilities and of nuclear and other radioactive

materials in nuclear applications in the selected countries,

- to strengthen the control and physical protection of radioactive materials in non-nuclear applications in the selected countries,
- to strengthen SSACs for the implementation of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, including in States with ‘small quantities protocols’.

Project results:

- physical protection of nuclear materials and other radioactive materials at selected nuclear facilities and locations upgraded,
- vulnerable sources in non-nuclear applications protected or, as appropriate, dismantled and transferred to safe and secure storage in the selected countries,
- national regulatory infrastructure for physical protection improved through expert assistance,
- establishment and maintenance of effective SSACs capable of implementing safeguards agreements and additional protocols, including in States with ‘small quantities protocols’,
- staff training provided in the countries eligible to receive support.

Project 3. Strengthening of States’ Capabilities for Detection and Response to Illicit Trafficking

Project purpose:

- to strengthen the States’ capacities for detection of and response to illicit trafficking in the selected countries.

Project results:

- enhanced information collected and evaluated on illicit nuclear trafficking, from open sources and from States’ Points of Contact, to improve the knowledge about and circumstances of illicit nuclear trafficking. This information will also facilitate the prioritisation of the various activities undertaken to combat illicit trafficking,
- national frameworks established through expert assistance, to combat illicit trafficking and to improve the national coordination of control cross-border movements of radioactive materials, sensitive nuclear equipment and technology in the selected countries,
- border-monitoring equipment upgraded at selected border crossings,
- training provided for law enforcement staff in countries eligible to receive support.

### 3. Duration

The evaluation will be performed within a period of three months after the entry into force of the contribution agreement between the Commission and the IAEA. The three projects will be performed in parallel during the 21 subsequent months. The total estimated duration for the implementation of this Joint Action is 24 months.

### 4. Beneficiaries

The beneficiaries are the countries where the assessment and the subsequent projects will be implemented. Their authorities will be helped to understand where there are weak points and receive support to bring solutions and increase security. The final choice of the beneficiaries and

the needs to be addressed in the selected countries shall be made in consultation between the implementing entity and the Presidency, assisted by the SG/HR in close consultation with Member States and the Commission in the framework of the competent Council working group. These decisions shall be based, where appropriate, on proposals made by the implementing entity in accordance with Article 2(1) of this Joint Action.

## **5. Implementing Entity**

The IAEA will be entrusted with the implementation of the projects. The international nuclear security missions will be performed following the standard mode of operation for missions of the IAEA, which will be carried out by IAEA and Member States' experts. The implementation of the three projects will be done directly by the IAEA staff and/or by selected experts or contractors from IAEA Member States. In the case of contractors, the procurement of any goods, works or services by the IAEA in the context of this Joint Action shall be carried out in accordance with the applicable rules and procedures of the IAEA.

## **6. Third Party Participants**

The projects will be financed 100 % by this Joint Action. Experts from IAEA Member States may be considered as third party participants. They will work under the standard rules of operation for IAEA experts.

## **7. Specific Conditions for Contracting and Procurement**

In some cases, to improve the security arrangements for nuclear and other radioactive materials, e.g. radioactive sources, originally supplied by the Russian Federation, contracts for procurement of goods, works and services could be offered to providers in the Russian Federation, which are familiar with the Russian technology.'

# Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union

Brussels, 15 April 2008

## TITLE V – GENERAL PROVISIONS ON THE UNION’S EXTERNAL ACTION AND SPECIFIC PROVISIONS ON THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

### CHAPTER 1 – GENERAL PROVISIONS ON THE UNION’S EXTERNAL ACTION

#### *Article 21*

1. The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.

The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.

2. The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to:

- (a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity;
- (b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law;
- (c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders;
- (d) foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty;
- (e) encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade;
- (f) help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development;
- (g) assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters; and
- (h) promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance.

3. The Union shall respect the principles and pursue the objectives set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 in the development and implementation of the different areas of the Union’s external action covered by this Title and by Part Five of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and of the external aspects of its other policies.

The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies. The Council and the Commission, assisted by the High

Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall ensure that consistency and shall cooperate to that effect.

### *Article 22*

1. On the basis of the principles and objectives set out in Article 21, the European Council shall identify the strategic interests and objectives of the Union.

Decisions of the European Council on the strategic interests and objectives of the Union shall relate to the common foreign and security policy and to other areas of the external action of the Union. Such decisions may concern the relations of the Union with a specific country or region or may be thematic in approach. They shall define their duration, and the means to be made available by the Union and the Member States.

The European Council shall act unanimously on a recommendation from the Council, adopted by the latter under the arrangements laid down for each area. Decisions of the European Council shall be implemented in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Treaties.

2. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, for the area of common foreign and security policy, and the Commission, for other areas of external action, may submit joint proposals to the Council.

## CHAPTER 2 – SPECIFIC PROVISIONS ON THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

### SECTION 1 COMMON PROVISIONS

#### *Article 23*

The Union's action on the international scene, pursuant to this Chapter, shall be guided by the principles, shall pursue the objectives of, and be conducted in accordance with, the general provisions laid down in Chapter 1.

#### *Article 24*

**(ex Article 11 TEU)**

1. The Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence.

The common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and procedures. It shall be defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded. The common foreign and security policy shall be put into effect by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and by Member States, in accordance with the Treaties. The specific role of the European Parliament and of the Commission in this area is defined by the Treaties. The Court of Justice of the European Union shall not have jurisdiction with respect to these provisions, with the exception of its jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Article 40 of this Treaty and to review the legality of certain decisions as provided for by the second paragraph of Article 275 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

2. Within the framework of the principles and objectives of its external action, the Union

shall conduct, define and implement a common foreign and security policy, based on the development of mutual political solidarity among Member States, the identification of questions of general interest and the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of convergence of Member States' actions.

3. The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union's action in this area.

The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.

The Council and the High Representative shall ensure compliance with these principles.

## ***Article 25***

**(ex Article 12 TEU)**

The Union shall conduct the common foreign and security policy by:

- (a) defining the general guidelines;
- (b) adopting decisions defining:
  - (i) actions to be undertaken by the Union;
  - (ii) positions to be taken by the Union;
  - (iii) arrangements for the implementation of the decisions referred to in points (i) and (ii);
 and by
- (c) strengthening systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy.

## ***Article 26***

**(ex Article 13 TEU)**

1. The European Council shall identify the Union's strategic interests, determine the objectives of and define general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, including for matters with defence implications. It shall adopt the necessary decisions.

If international developments so require, the President of the European Council shall convene an extraordinary meeting of the European Council in order to define the strategic lines of the Union's policy in the face of such developments.

2. The Council shall frame the common foreign and security policy and take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing it on the basis of the general guidelines and strategic lines defined by the European Council.

The Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union.

3. The common foreign and security policy shall be put into effect by the High Representative and by the Member States, using national and Union resources.

## ***Article 27***

1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who shall chair the Foreign Affairs Council, shall contribute through his proposals towards the preparation of the common foreign and security policy and shall ensure implementation of the decisions adopted by the European Council and the Council.

2. The High Representative shall represent the Union for matters relating to the common

foreign and security policy. He shall conduct political dialogue with third parties on the Union's behalf and shall express the Union's position in international organisations and at international conferences.

3. In fulfilling his mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States. The organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service shall be established by a decision of the Council. The Council shall act on a proposal from the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission.

### *Article 28*

**(ex Article 14 TEU)**

1. Where the international situation requires operational action by the Union, the Council shall adopt the necessary decisions. They shall lay down their objectives, scope, the means to be made available to the Union, if necessary their duration, and the conditions for their implementation.

If there is a change in circumstances having a substantial effect on a question subject to such a decision, the Council shall review the principles and objectives of that decision and take the necessary decisions.

2. Decisions referred to in paragraph 1 shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity.

3. Whenever there is any plan to adopt a national position or take national action pursuant to a decision as referred to in paragraph 1, information shall be provided by the Member State concerned in time to allow, if necessary, for prior consultations within the Council. The obligation to provide prior information shall not apply to measures which are merely a national transposition of Council decisions.

4. In cases of imperative need arising from changes in the situation and failing a review of the Council decision as referred to in paragraph 1, Member States may take the necessary measures as a matter of urgency having regard to the general objectives of that decision. The Member State concerned shall inform the Council immediately of any such measures.

5. Should there be any major difficulties in implementing a decision as referred to in this Article, a Member State shall refer them to the Council which shall discuss them and seek appropriate solutions. Such solutions shall not run counter to the objectives of the decision referred to in paragraph 1 or impair its effectiveness.

### *Article 29*

**(ex Article 15 TEU)**

The Council shall adopt decisions which shall define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature. Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the Union positions.

### *Article 30*

**(ex Article 22 TEU)**

1. Any Member State, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security



Policy, or the High Representative with the Commission's support, may refer any question relating to the common foreign and security policy to the Council and may submit to it initiatives or proposals as appropriate.

2. In cases requiring a rapid decision, the High Representative, of his own motion, or at the request of a Member State, shall convene an extraordinary Council meeting within 48 hours or, in an emergency, within a shorter period.

### *Article 31*

**(ex Article 23 TEU)**

1. Decisions under this Chapter shall be taken by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where this Chapter provides otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded.

When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration under the present subparagraph. In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity, the Member State concerned shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision and the other Member States shall respect its position. If the members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represent at least one third of the Member States comprising at least one third of the population of the Union, the decision shall not be adopted.

2. By derogation from the provisions of paragraph 1, the Council shall act by qualified majority:

- when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position on the basis of a decision of the European Council relating to the Union's strategic interests and objectives, as referred to in Article 22(1),
- when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position, on a proposal which the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has presented following a specific request from the European Council, made on its own initiative or that of the High Representative,
- when adopting any decision implementing a decision defining a Union action or position,
- when appointing a special representative in accordance with Article 33.

If a member of the Council declares that, for vital and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken. The High Representative will, in close consultation with the Member State involved, search for a solution acceptable to it. If he does not succeed, the Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council for a decision by unanimity.

3. The European Council may unanimously adopt a decision stipulating that the Council shall act by a qualified majority in cases other than those referred to in paragraph 2.

4. Paragraphs 2 and 3 shall not apply to decisions having military or defence implications.

5. For procedural questions, the Council shall act by a majority of its members.

### *Article 32*

**(ex Article 16 TEU)**

Member States shall consult one another within the European Council and the Council on any

matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to determine a common approach. Before undertaking any action on the international scene or entering into any commitment which could affect the Union's interests, each Member State shall consult the others within the European Council or the Council. Member States shall ensure, through the convergence of their actions, that the Union is able to assert its interests and values on the international scene. Member States shall show mutual solidarity.

When the European Council or the Council has defined a common approach of the Union within the meaning of the first paragraph, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Member States shall coordinate their activities within the Council.

The diplomatic missions of the Member States and the Union delegations in third countries and at international organisations shall cooperate and shall contribute to formulating and implementing the common approach.

### *Article 33*

**(ex Article 18 TEU)**

The Council may, on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, appoint a special representative with a mandate in relation to particular policy issues. The special representative shall carry out his mandate under the authority of the High Representative.

### *Article 34*

**(ex Article 19 TEU)**

1. Member States shall coordinate their action in international organisations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the Union's positions in such forums. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall organise this coordination.

In international organisations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the Union's positions.

2. In accordance with Article 24(3), Member States represented in international organisations or international conferences where not all the Member States participate shall keep the other Member States and the High Representative informed of any matter of common interest. Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other Member States and the High Representative fully informed. Member States which are members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, defend the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

When the Union has defined a position on a subject which is on the United Nations Security Council agenda, those Member States which sit on the Security Council shall request that the High Representative be invited to present the Union's position.

### *Article 35*

**(ex Article 20 TEU)**

The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the Union delegations in third countries and international conferences, and their representations to international organisa-

tions, shall cooperate in ensuring that decisions defining Union positions and actions adopted pursuant to this Chapter are complied with and implemented.

They shall step up cooperation by exchanging information and carrying out joint assessments.

They shall contribute to the implementation of the right of citizens of the Union to protection in the territory of third countries as referred to in Article 20(2)(c) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and of the measures adopted pursuant to Article 23 of that Treaty.

### *Article 36*

**(ex Article 21 TEU)**

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall regularly consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy and inform it of how those policies evolve. He shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration. Special representatives may be involved in briefing the European Parliament.

The European Parliament may ask questions of the Council or make recommendations to it and to the High Representative. Twice a year it shall hold a debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy, including the common security and defence policy.

### *Article 37*

**(ex Article 24 TEU)**

The Union may conclude agreements with one or more States or international organisations in areas covered by this Chapter.

### *Article 38*

**(ex Article 25 TEU)**

Without prejudice to Article 240 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, a Political and Security Committee shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or on its own initiative. It shall also monitor the implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative.

Within the scope of this Chapter, the Political and Security Committee shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council and of the High Representative, the political control and strategic direction of the crisis management operations referred to in Article 43.

The Council may authorise the Committee, for the purpose and for the duration of a crisis management operation, as determined by the Council, to take the relevant decisions concerning the political control and strategic direction of the operation.

### *Article 39*

In accordance with Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and by way of derogation from paragraph 2 thereof, the Council shall adopt a decision laying down the rules relating to the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Member States when carrying out activities which fall within the scope of this Chapter, and

the rules relating to the free movement of such data. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to the control of independent authorities.

### *Article 40*

**(ex Article 47 TEU)**

The implementation of the common foreign and security policy shall not affect the application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union competences referred to in Articles 3 to 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Similarly, the implementation of the policies listed in those Articles shall not affect the application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union competences under this Chapter.

### *Article 41*

**(ex Article 28 TEU)**

1. Administrative expenditure to which the implementation of this Chapter gives rise for the institutions shall be charged to the Union budget.

2. Operating expenditure to which the implementation of this Chapter gives rise shall also be charged to the Union budget, except for such expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications and cases where the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise.

In cases where expenditure is not charged to the Union budget, it shall be charged to the Member States in accordance with the gross national product scale, unless the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise. As for expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications, Member States whose representatives in the Council have made a formal declaration under Article 31(1), second subparagraph, shall not be obliged to contribute to the financing thereof.

3. The Council shall adopt a decision establishing the specific procedures for guaranteeing rapid access to appropriations in the Union budget for urgent financing of initiatives in the framework of the common foreign and security policy, and in particular for preparatory activities for the tasks referred to in Article 42(1) and Article 43. It shall act after consulting the European Parliament.

Preparatory activities for the tasks referred to in Article 42(1) and Article 43 which are not charged to the Union budget shall be financed by a start-up fund made up of Member States' contributions.

The Council shall adopt by a qualified majority, on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, decisions establishing:

- (a) the procedures for setting up and financing the start-up fund, in particular the amounts allocated to the fund;
- (b) the procedures for administering the start-up fund;
- (c) the financial control procedures.

When the task planned in accordance with Article 42(1) and Article 43 cannot be charged to the Union budget, the Council shall authorise the High Representative to use the fund. The High Representative shall report to the Council on the implementation of this remit.

## SECTION 2 – PROVISIONS ON THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

### *Article 42*

**(ex Article 17 TEU)**

1. The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.

2. The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

The policy of the Union in accordance with this Section shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.

3. Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute to the objectives defined by the Council. Those Member States which together establish multinational forces may also make them available to the common security and defence policy.

Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities. The Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (hereinafter referred to as ‘the European Defence Agency’) shall identify operational requirements, shall promote measures to satisfy those requirements, shall contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, shall participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and shall assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities.

4. Decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from a Member State. The High Representative may propose the use of both national resources and Union instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate.

5. The Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of Member States in order to protect the Union’s values and serve its interests. The execution of such a task shall be governed by Article 44.

6. Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework. Such cooperation shall be governed by Article 46. It shall not affect the provisions of Article 43.

7. If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power,

in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.

Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.

### *Article 43*

1. The tasks referred to in Article 42(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.

2. The Council shall adopt decisions relating to the tasks referred to in paragraph 1, defining their objectives and scope and the general conditions for their implementation. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, acting under the authority of the Council and in close and constant contact with the Political and Security Committee, shall ensure coordination of the civilian and military aspects of such tasks.

### *Article 44*

1. Within the framework of the decisions adopted in accordance with Article 43, the Council may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task. Those Member States, in association with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall agree among themselves on the management of the task.

2. Member States participating in the task shall keep the Council regularly informed of its progress on their own initiative or at the request of another Member State. Those States shall inform the Council immediately should the completion of the task entail major consequences or require amendment of the objective, scope and conditions determined for the task in the decisions referred to in paragraph 1. In such cases, the Council shall adopt the necessary decisions.

### *Article 45*

1. The European Defence Agency referred to in Article 42(3), subject to the authority of the Council, shall have as its task to:

- (a) contribute to identifying the Member States' military capability objectives and evaluating observance of the capability commitments given by the Member States;
- (b) promote harmonisation of operational needs and adoption of effective, compatible procurement methods;
- (c) propose multilateral projects to fulfil the objectives in terms of military capabilities, ensure coordination of the programmes implemented by the Member States and management of specific cooperation programmes;
- (d) support defence technology research, and coordinate and plan joint research activities and the study of technical solutions meeting future operational needs;

- (e) contribute to identifying and, if necessary, implementing any useful measure for strengthening the industrial and technological base of the defence sector and for improving the effectiveness of military expenditure.
2. The European Defence Agency shall be open to all Member States wishing to be part of it. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall adopt a decision defining the Agency's statute, seat and operational rules. That decision should take account of the level of effective participation in the Agency's activities. Specific groups shall be set up within the Agency bringing together Member States engaged in joint projects. The Agency shall carry out its tasks in liaison with the Commission where necessary.

### *Article 46*

1. Those Member States which wish to participate in the permanent structured cooperation referred to in Article 42(6), which fulfil the criteria and have made the commitments on military capabilities set out in the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, shall notify their intention to the Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

2. Within three months following the notification referred to in paragraph 1 the Council shall adopt a decision establishing permanent structured cooperation and determining the list of participating Member States. The Council shall act by a qualified majority after consulting the High Representative.

3. Any Member State which, at a later stage, wishes to participate in the permanent structured cooperation shall notify its intention to the Council and to the High Representative.

The Council shall adopt a decision confirming the participation of the Member State concerned which fulfils the criteria and makes the commitments referred to in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation. The Council shall act by a qualified majority after consulting the High Representative. Only members of the Council representing the participating Member States shall take part in the vote.

A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

4. If a participating Member State no longer fulfils the criteria or is no longer able to meet the commitments referred to in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, the Council may adopt a decision suspending the participation of the Member State concerned.

The Council shall act by a qualified majority. Only members of the Council representing the participating Member States, with the exception of the Member State in question, shall take part in the vote.

A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

5. Any participating Member State which wishes to withdraw from permanent structured cooperation shall notify its intention to the Council, which shall take note that the Member State in question has ceased to participate.

6. The decisions and recommendations of the Council within the framework of permanent structured cooperation, other than those provided for in paragraphs 2 to 5, shall be adopted by unanimity. For the purposes of this paragraph, unanimity shall be constituted by the votes of the representatives of the participating Member States only.

## EUPOL Afghanistan – Factsheet

Brussels, 21 April 2008

When Javier Solana met Mr. Hamid Karzai, President of Afghanistan, and other high officials on Monday 21 April 2008, he confirmed that ‘the European Union will continue to help the people of Afghanistan in the long term’. In Kabul, Mr Solana visited the headquarters of the European Union Police Mission to Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan), which is designed to help the Afghan Ministry of Interior develop an effective police force throughout the country. The success of the mission can be seen in its deployment throughout Afghanistan.

### EU POLICE MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN)

In the framework of its comprehensive approach towards Afghanistan, the EU is conducting an EU Police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN).

The mission, launched in June 2007, aims at contributing to the establishment of sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements under Afghan ownership and in accordance with international standards.

More particularly, the mission monitors, mentors and advises at the level of the Afghan Ministry of Interior and other central Afghan administrations, regions and provinces.

EUPOL AFGHANISTAN builds on the efforts of the GPPO (German Police Project Office) and other international actors in the field of police and the rule of law. It brings together individual national efforts under an EU hat, taking due account of the relevant Community activities. Its activities cover the whole of Afghanistan.

EUPOL AFGHANISTAN consists of some 230 personnel, mainly police, law enforcement and justice experts deployed at central (Kabul), regional (the regional police commands) and provincial levels (deployment in provinces, through the Provincial Reconstruction Teams – PRTs). EUPOL has deployed police officers throughout the country.

### Activities

EUPOL AFGHANISTAN focuses on the Afghan National Police (ANP) vision and strategy and institutional development of the Ministry of Interior (MoI) – including the linkages with the wider rule of law sector –, on a strategy for criminal investigation, on the development of a national training strategy and on border management. The mission has been actively working with partners in rationalising the support that they offer the MoI and ANP to ensure a co-ordinated effort. A comprehensive Action Plan articulating the key areas that will significantly contribute to police reform has been prepared. In concert with partners and the Ministry of Interior EUPOL is refining the process to ensure a joint plan for MoI support under the auspices of the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB), as recommended by the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board of the Afghan Compact.

Linked to this process the IPCB Secretariat has facilitated a ‘Vision’ for the future of Afghan Police that will in time lead to the development of a Policing Plan for Afghanistan. Additionally EUPOL is working towards the consolidation of activities across the criminal justice sector, including efforts to support the legislative and operational reform of criminal investigations, prosecutions and police – prosecutor cooperation.



The mission is established for a period of at least 3 years. It is headed by Brigadier General Jürgen Scholz (Germany) who was appointed on 16 October 2007. It has a budget of EUR 43.6 million for the period until September 2008. The EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) has the political control and the strategic direction of the mission.

## The EU and Afghanistan

EUPOL AFGHANISTAN is part of the overall EU commitment to Afghanistan and of a coordinated EU approach that includes local political guidance provided by the EU Special Representative, Francesc Vendrell, and a reconstruction effort managed notably through the European Commission delegation in Kabul.

In the period 2002-2006, the EU, as the second largest donor, contributed collectively EUR 3.7 billion (EC budget and EU member states) in aid to Afghanistan, amounting to one third of the aid provided by the international community. Of this amount, over EUR 1.1 billion has been contributed through the EC budget.

The EU's new assistance strategy for 2007-2010 foresees EC funding of at least EUR 610 million for Afghanistan with focus on governance (support to the Afghan budget through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, police, justice, border management), public health and agriculture/rural development. At the July 2007 Rome Conference on Afghanistan, the EC confirmed a commitment of EUR 200 million for the rule of law sector for that period. In this context, the EC has launched a programme of reform of Afghanistan's justice institutions dovetailing with EUPOL AFGHANISTAN.

The EU – European Community and EU member states – is a significant contributor to the Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA). The EU will continue support for the Afghan National Police through the LOTFA. To date, the EC alone has channelled since 2002 more than EUR 160 million into LOTFA for police salaries, thus making it the single largest donor. In order to strengthen the governance and reconstruction efforts in the provinces, the European Community has also allocated over EUR 10 million with the aim of supporting projects carried out through PRTs with European participation in different parts of the country.

EU member states have played leading coordinating roles in particular sectors such as police, justice and counter-narcotics, and have made large contributions to security, including through current provision of nearly half the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), amounting to over 22,000 troops (25 EU member states are deploying troops to ISAF), and participation in PRTs.

EUPOL AFGHANISTAN is set in the wider context of the international community's effort to support the Afghans in taking responsibility for law and order. The EU will continue to support the role of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) in coordinating donors' civilian efforts and will, together with UNAMA, ISAF, the US and other key actors, including the international financial institutions, work towards effective cooperation and coordination within the international community and with the Government of Afghanistan.

## Iraq – EU Declaration

Brussels, 22 April 2008

### EU DECLARATION ON THE EXPANDED MEETING OF THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES OF IRAQ

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The EU welcomes the holding of the Expanded Ministerial of the Neighbouring Countries of Iraq, which took place in Kuwait on 22 April and would like to thank the Government of Kuwait for hosting this important event.

The EU reaffirms its strong support for the Neighbouring countries process and underlines the mutual benefits of continuing dialogue and co-operation between Iraq, its neighbours and the International Community. Constructive engagement of Iraq's neighbours and partners in the region remains essential to achieve peace and stability in Iraq and in the region as a whole. The expanded Neighbouring countries process offers an excellent forum for regional dialogue and co-operation. The EU reiterates its clear commitment to contribute to the success of this process. We encourage the three working groups on refugees, security co-operation and energy to make further progress on technical cooperation.

The EU urges all partners in the region to contribute to the political stabilisation and reconstruction of Iraq by implementing commitments made during the neighbours' process and other mechanisms such as International Compact with Iraq and the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI); and through advancing discussions on the provision of debt relief.

Therefore, we welcome the decision by Bahrain to reopen its Embassy in Baghdad and we encourage those neighbours who have not already done so to take advantage of the improved security situation and commit to sending Ambassadors to Baghdad and opening diplomatic missions to facilitate direct bilateral diplomatic relations. The international community, and in particular the States in the region, have a responsibility to support and promote the difficult process of national reconciliation and stabilization in Iraq, and to prevent outside interference that could undermine this process. We urge them to use their influence to promote support for the statement released by the Iraqi Political Council for National Security on 6 April.

The EU reaffirms its support for a secure, stable, democratic, prosperous and unified Iraq and reiterates its commitment to the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Iraq. The EU reaffirms its support for the legitimate, democratically elected Government of Prime Minister al-Maliki and the democratically elected institutions of Iraq. Any aid to groups that attack Iraq and coalition forces and undermine the security and stabilisation of Iraq is wholly unacceptable. We encourage further efforts by Iraq and its neighbours to prevent the transit of foreign fighters and arms to and from Iraq.

The EU underlines its support for the central role of UN/UNAMI in Iraq and encourages continued close cooperation between UNAMI and the Iraqi authorities on the implementation of UNSCR 1770.

The Candidate Countries Turkey, Croatia\* and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\*, the Countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, and the EFTA countries Iceland,

Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia align themselves with this declaration.

\* Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

# 17<sup>th</sup> Japan-EU Summit

Tokyo, 23 April 2008

## JOINT PRESS STATEMENT

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1. Mr Yasuo Fukuda, Prime Minister of Japan, and Mr Janez Janša, Prime Minister of Slovenia, in his capacity as President of the European Council, and Mr José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, met in Tokyo on 23 April 2008 for the 17<sup>th</sup> Summit between Japan and the European Union (EU).
2. Summit leaders are determined to further promote the Japan-EU strategic partnership, based upon the longstanding cooperation and shared fundamental values and principles, such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights, good governance and a market-based economy. Reiterating also the importance of the Action Plan for Japan-EU Cooperation adopted in 2001 as the basis of the current fruitful dialogue and cooperation between both sides, they tasked the Action Plan Steering Group to ensure effective and satisfactory implementation of the Action Plan.

### I. Assuming Global Responsibility

3. Summit leaders, fully assuming their responsibility to deal with global challenges, reaffirmed their willingness that Japan and the EU continue to play leading roles, for instance, in addressing climate change, in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) with special reference to the development of Africa, as well as in maintaining international peace and security. Japan and the EU emphasised that close synergies exist between the climate change and development agendas, and action in each of these areas should be mutually reinforcing.

(...)

6. Japan and the EU welcomed the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali which launched a process aiming to establish an effective and comprehensive post-2012 framework under the UN by the end of 2009, responding to the findings of the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and that delay in reducing emissions significantly constrains opportunities to achieve lower stabilisation levels and increases the risks of more severe climate change impacts. Japan and the EU will aim to ensure that the forthcoming G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit will contribute towards this end. Both will work together to achieve a fair and flexible framework in which major economies participate substantially.

Summit leaders share the view that setting mid-term quantified national emissions reduction targets is an essential element of such a framework. The bottom up approach proposed by Japan is useful to identify the technically possible mitigation potential based on aggregated sectoral reduction amounts. Combined with an approach taking into account the costs of the technical mitigation potentials and the financial capability of countries, this is a constructive contribution to setting cost-efficient, fair and equitable targets. Japan and the EU stress that a highly ambitious and binding international approach is required to deal with the scale and urgency of the climate change challenge of promoting a low carbon, high growth global economy.

7. Japan and the EU shared the view on the urgency to achieve a peaking out of emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs). Leaders recalled positions expressed by Japan and the EU on the appropriate length of the period to be considered in this respect. In this context, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments by Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG) noted the usefulness of the ranges referred to in the contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC and that this report indicates that global emissions of GHGs need to peak in the next 10 to 15 years and be reduced to very low levels, well below half of levels in 2000 by the middle of the twenty-first century in order to stabilize their concentrations in the atmosphere at the lowest levels assessed by the IPCC to date in its scenarios.

(...)

12. Both sides considered energy efficiency improvement to be the most cost-effective means of addressing energy security and climate change mitigation in the short-term and committed to further enhance international cooperation in this field. In preparation of the upcoming G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit, Japan and the EU expressed their strong support for the International Partnership for Cooperation on Energy Efficiency (IPEEC), which they have been developing together with the US and other countries, to be an open, broad and inclusive partnership of the nations seeking to maximise the benefits of energy efficiency. Japan and the EU emphasize the need of strengthening energy security including through enhanced dialogue and cooperation between producing and consuming countries and the need of greater use of sustainable energy options such as renewable energy sources, enhanced oil recovery, clean coal and carbon capture and storage. Both will also work closely within the UN, including the IMO and ICAO, in order to achieve an effective reduction of GHGs emissions from international shipping and aviation, taking account of Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Kyoto Protocol.

(...)

## II. Promoting Peace and Security

17. Summit leaders exchanged views on a number of issues of common concern. They underlined the usefulness of strategic dialogues between Japan and the EU in building common views on East Asia and Central Asia, in the light of, among others, the still existing security concerns. Summit leaders, reaffirming their willingness to enhance existing political dialogues, shared their intention to strengthen their operational cooperation to be more action-oriented and promote international peace and stability. Japan stressed the view that the issue of arms embargo deserves careful consideration in the light of the regional security environment.

18. On East Asia and its emerging regional architecture, the EU welcomed efforts to strengthen open and transparent regional co-operation based upon universally recognised values and global rules, and expressed appreciation of Japan's constructive and active role in this respect. Japan welcomed the EU's constructive contributions to the regional political architecture in Asia-Pacific. Recognising that the East Asia Summit (EAS) is a forum with ASEAN as the driving force working in close partnership with its other participants, Japan welcomed the EU's continued interest in being engaged in the EAS process and its intention to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). Recognising the growing role of China in the world economy and in international relations, Japan and the EU stressed the importance of working with China as responsible and constructive partners in the international community.

19. Summit leaders acknowledged the important role of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) as a platform for dialogue, cooperation and policy development between the two regions. They looked forward to ASEM 7 which will be held in China on 24-25 October 2008.
20. Japan and the EU will continue their close cooperation on assistance to Afghanistan in the fields of rural development, police and judicial reforms as well as Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG). Japan expressed appreciation for the activities of the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL Afghanistan). Japan and the EU underlined the importance of the international community maximising its collective input on Afghanistan and committing to do all it can in support of the Afghan government's efforts to achieve peace and stability for its people.
21. Japan and the EU, sharing serious concerns over the Iranian nuclear issue, renewed their commitment to the ongoing efforts in the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UN Security Council to resolve it and confirmed their determination to work for a peaceful and diplomatic resolution to this issue. Japan and the EU also underscored the importance of stability in the Middle East region.
22. On the Middle East Peace Process, Japan and the EU reiterated their support for the political process launched at Annapolis, recalling that only a negotiated solution can bring peace and security to the Middle East. They expressed strong support for the ongoing bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. The goal remains the establishment of an independent, democratic and viable Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza that will unite all Palestinians, living side by side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbours. Japan and the EU called on the Parties to implement their Road Map obligations in parallel with the negotiations. They recalled that a just and lasting peace can only be achieved through a comprehensive approach.
23. Regarding North Korea, Japan and the EU will continue to cooperate in denuclearising the Korean Peninsula, on the basis of the agreement at the Six-Party Talks, eliminating the threat posed by missiles and addressing the human rights concerns including the abduction issue.
24. Summit leaders expressed their expectations that Myanmar embark on a peaceful transition to a legitimate, civilian government. Summit leaders took note of the announcement by the Government of Myanmar of a Constitutional referendum in May 2008 by secret vote and of multi-party elections in 2010. Summit leaders encouraged Myanmar to immediately engage all stakeholders in an inclusive dialogue, in order to better address the political, structural and economic problems facing the country. Such a dialogue requires the immediate release of political detainees. Both sides commended the UN Special Envoy Mr Gambari for his valuable work and stressed their commitment to continue to support his efforts.
25. On Sri Lanka, Japan and the EU will continue to monitor closely the human rights situation. They welcomed ongoing efforts toward a political solution of the ethnic conflict, including the local government election held in Batticaloa in March and the work of the All Party Representative Committee. Japan and the EU stressed the importance of encouraging the Government of Sri Lanka to make further efforts to this end.
26. Reaffirming the importance of fostering the stability and prosperity in Central Asia, Japan and the EU will co-ordinate closely on efforts to enhance border management capacity in the region. Summit leaders also reaffirmed the usefulness of political dialogues with the countries of the region, of supporting reform and democratisation, and of exploring the possibilities of cooperation in such areas as water management, health, human resources development including education, human rights, democracy, the rule of law and environment.

27. Reiterating the importance of peacebuilding, especially in Africa, Japan and the EU will cooperate in enhancing Africa's peacekeeping capabilities and also work together to promote sustainable peace throughout the continent. They will support the multidimensional presence in Chad and the Central African Republic consisting of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), the EU Force in Chad and Central African Republic (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA) as well as the Chadian Integrated Security Detachment, which are contributing to the security in those countries and are also expected to enhance stability in Darfur, Sudan.

28. Japan and the EU reaffirmed their intention to cooperate in the area of human security by promoting this concept in the General Assembly of the United Nations and other international fora, and to pursue dialogue on human security.

(...)

# 13<sup>th</sup> ECOWAS-EU Ministerial Troika Meeting

Luxembourg, 28 April 2008

## FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ

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(...)

### A. PEACE AND SECURITY

3. Both parties exchanged view on the peace security situation of the region. They expressed their concern on cross-border threats to peace and security such as trafficking in drugs, human beings and small arms. The EU welcomed the progress and efforts made by ECOWAS in its conflict prevention, mediation and peace keeping policies. This will enable ECOWAS inter alia to react to regional crisis, consolidate democracies in the region and provide support for post conflict recovery.

#### Côte d'Ivoire

4. ECOWAS and the EU reviewed the status of the implementation of the Ouagadougou political agreement signed in 2007. ECOWAS briefed the EU on the political situation in Côte d'Ivoire. The parties welcomed President Blaise Compaoré's continued engagement for a peaceful resolution of the crisis.

5. EU and ECOWAS noted the efforts of the authorities in terms of disarmament and demobilisation of the militias and encouraged the authorities to proceed towards effective demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of the armed forces especially in the North of the country which are essential elements in the peace process. Both Parties encouraged the authorities to take further steps towards resolving the difficulties and welcomed the ongoing efforts on restructuring and refounding of the armed forces.

6. ECOWAS and the EU welcomed the setting of the date of 30 November 2008 for the presidential elections and urged Ivorian political actors to cooperate in order to ensure transparent elections in line with international standards. Both parties reiterated the importance of the voter registration and certification exercise and emphasized the need to achieve reliable electoral lists. The parties also considered how to further assist the election process in a manner reflecting the needs of the country.

#### Guinea

7. ECOWAS and the EU welcomed the continued efforts of the government of Prime Minister Kouyaté to improve democratic process in the country. Although the political, social and economic situation remains fragile, ECOWAS and the EU encouraged all Parties to pursue the overall positive steps towards stabilisation of the country. The EU informed ECOWAS on the status of the article 96 process. The EU also expressed its appreciation for the mediation role that ECOWAS is playing in promoting political dialogue and reforms in Guinea and invited ECOWAS to pursue the joint approach vis à vis Guinea especially in the fields of human rights issues and good governance.



8. Following the adoption of new electoral laws and the setting-up of the Independent National Electoral Commission, the EU and ECOWAS underscored the need for setting a firm date for the legislative elections. They also reiterated their willingness to take part in the observation of these elections. The EU underlined the need to receive an official invitation from the Guinean government and the confirmation of the date in order to initiate the preparatory work for the electoral observation missions.

9. ECOWAS and the EU encouraged the authorities of Guinea to continue improving economic governance to redress public finances. In that regard, they welcomed the adoption of The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility programme of the International Monetary Fund in December 2007. ECOWAS and the EU also encouraged donors to follow up on their promises to support the emergency programme and the 2007-2010 Poverty Reduction Strategy.

### **Guinea Bissau**

10. ECOWAS and the EU welcomed the increased focus of the Government of Guinea Bissau in implementing its ambitious reform programme. Both parties recognised that the international community has increased its support and expressed hope that these efforts would contribute in an effective way to the ongoing reforms. ECOWAS and the EU furthermore welcomed the announcement of the date for legislative elections to be held on 16 November 2008 and reiterated their readiness to observe them. For the EU an invitation from the authorities would need to be received sufficiently in time to start the appropriate preparations.

11. The parties stressed that drug trafficking constitutes a threat to sub-regional security and the credibility of Guinea Bissau, and encouraged the Government to continue strengthening its efforts to combat it. They welcomed the support of the international community to the implementation of the National Action Plan to Fight Drug Trafficking and existing plans to improve the justice and penitentiary systems.

12. Both parties commended the Government of Guinea Bissau for finalising the Action Plan for the implementation of the National Security Strategy. ECOWAS commended the comprehensive approach of EU support towards SSR in Guinea-Bissau and in particular the forthcoming launching of the ESDP mission. ECOWAS welcomed as well the action under the Instrument for Stability financed by the European Commission.

13. The parties stressed the importance of improving public finances management and welcomed the increased cooperation of the World Bank, the IMF as well as UEOMA and ECOWAS efforts. ECOWAS and the EU will continue to cooperate both on the ground and within the framework of the International Contact Group on Guinea Bissau.

### **Sahel (Security Situation in Northern Niger/Northern Mali)**

14. ECOWAS and the EU reiterated their concern about the deteriorating security situation in the Northern parts of Mali and Niger and its adverse consequences on the security of the neighbouring countries. They condemned the use of landmines which constitute a great danger to the civilian population and an obstacle to the security and development of the areas concerned. Both Parties agreed to continue to share their analysis of the situation and welcomed the initiatives of the two countries to rally support by ECOWAS and the international community to solve the issue.

15. ECOWAS and the EU reaffirmed their commitment to respect the Bamako Declaration on Democracy and Good Governance which condemns, among others, violence as a political alternative.

16. ECOWAS and the EU reaffirmed their support for the Governments of Niger and Mali in their actions to preserve the peace and territorial integrity of their respective countries. Both sides emphasized the importance of regional cooperation to ensure security, peace and development in the Sahel region. In this context, the organisation of regional conferences addressing both security and development aspects was strongly supported by ECOWAS and the EU.

(...)

# General Affairs Council

Luxembourg, 29 April 2008

## WESTERN BALKANS – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council discussed the situation in the Western Balkans, with particular focus on Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and adopted the following conclusions:

### ‘SERBIA

The Council welcomes the signature of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) and of the Interim Agreement with Serbia as an important step on the country's path towards the EU. It looked forward to intensifying cooperation with Serbia through the comprehensive framework offered by these agreements and the other mechanisms of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

The Council recalled articles 2, 4 and 133 of the SAA and articles 1 and 54 of the Interim Agreement and stated that full cooperation with the ICTY, including all possible efforts to arrest and transfer indictees, is an essential element of these Agreements.

Accordingly, Ministers agreed to submit the SAA to their parliaments for ratification and the Community decided to implement the Interim Agreement as soon as the Council decides that Serbia fully cooperates with the ICTY.

The Council and the Commission will regularly monitor that Serbia continues to fully cooperate with the ICTY. The EU and its Member States will assist Serbia in this respect.

### BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

The Council welcomed the conclusion of the first phase of the police reform by the recent adoption of the two police laws. The Council recalled that agreement on police reform in line with the EU's three principles is one of the necessary conditions for further progress towards the conclusion of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA).

The Council acknowledged BiH's progress on all the four conditions for the signing of the SAA as set out in the Council conclusions of 12 December 2005. While Bosnia and Herzegovina will need to undertake further efforts to address reforms, the Council expressed its readiness to sign the SAA. Technical preparations are underway.

The Council highlighted the importance of the future SAA as the essential framework of the relations between EU and BiH, as well as an important element to ensure stability and strengthen dialogue within BiH. Therefore it encouraged all the political forces of BiH to unite their efforts to pursue with strong determination its reform agenda including the priorities set out in the European Partnership.

Recalling its Conclusion of 10 March 2008, the Council called on the European Commission to launch a visa dialogue with BiH as soon as possible.

## COMMISSION COMMUNICATION ON WESTERN BALKANS

The Council welcomed the Commission's Communication: 'Western Balkans: enhancing the European perspective' as a basis for the discussions held at the informal EU Foreign Ministers Meeting (Gymnich) and the EU-Western Balkans Forum in Brdo on 29 March 2008.

Progress achieved in the recent years through the Stabilisation and Association Process must be sustained and made irreversible. The European perspective needs to be tangible and more visible to the people across the Western Balkans.

To this end, the Council welcomed the launch of the dialogue on visa liberalisation and looked forward to discuss roadmaps for all the countries in the region. It welcomed the Commission's intention to further increase the number of scholarships granted to students from the Western Balkans to study in the EU, initiative to step up support to civil society and to enhance coordination with international financial institutions and with bilateral donors in order to support socio-economic development in the region. It expressed support to the proposed enhanced cooperation on disaster prevention, preparedness and response in the region and called for further participation of the Western Balkans in Community programmes and agencies, as well as for the development of the Regional School of Public Administration (ReSPA) into a fully fledged school as of early 2009.

The Council is committed to support the full implementation of these measures. The Council also invited other Council formations to take the work forward in the fields such as transport and energy, as set out in the Communication.'

## ZIMBABWE – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

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The Council discussed the situation in Zimbabwe and adopted the following conclusions:

1. The Council closely follows the situation in Zimbabwe after the elections on 29 March and expresses its deep concern over the delay in announcing the result of the presidential elections as well as over acts of intimidation, human rights abuses, and violence.
2. The EU considers unacceptable and unjustifiable that four weeks after the people of Zimbabwe exercised their fundamental democratic right, no results of the Presidential elections have yet been published. The EU calls for the results of the Presidential elections to be released immediately and to be a genuine reflection of the free and democratic will of the Zimbabwean people, as the delay raises serious concerns about the credibility of the process.
3. The EU condemns the post-election violence and intimidation against Zimbabweans and calls for its immediate end. The EU considers that these serious incidents appear to be targeted and politically motivated attacks against supporters of democratic change. The EU also underlines that recent arrests have demonstrated that the Government of Zimbabwe is not committed to allowing the Electoral Commission in Zimbabwe to function as an independent institution.
4. The EU notes that respect for freedom of assembly and of the media, as well as an atmosphere free from intimidation and violence, are crucial to the holding of free and fair elections, and calls for the electoral process to be completed in a context which respects these principles.
5. The countries in the region, Southern African Development Community and the African Union have a crucial role and a responsibility to continue their engagement to resolve the current crisis in Zimbabwe. The EU shares the concern of the SADC about the situation and reiterates full support for its efforts to resolve the current crisis. In this context, the Council com-

mends the holding of the extraordinary Summit in Lusaka.

6. The Council remains concerned about the possible effects on the stability of the region as a consequence of the ongoing events and therefore calls upon SADC to engage with renewed determination with the Zimbabwean authorities to implement the outcome of the Lusaka Summit including the decision to remain actively involved till the end of the electoral process.

7. The EU welcomes the statement by African Union Commission President Konaré reiterating the AU's willingness to work in concert with all the parties concerned, SADC, and the international community to ensure the successful completion of the electoral process in Zimbabwe.

8. The EU recalls that it does not supply or sell arms, related materials or equipment which could be used for internal repression in Zimbabwe. It encourages others to exercise similar restraint at this time by introducing a de facto moratorium on all such sales and welcomes actions which have already been taken in this respect.

9. The EU will continue to closely monitor the situation and to explore further options for increasing pressure on those who direct and engage in state-sponsored violence and intimidation in the post-election period.

10. The Council recalls its continued commitment to the people of Zimbabwe and emphasises that the EU remains the most important donor to Zimbabwe. The EU also wishes to confirm its willingness to continue to make use of any opportunity provided to engage in the dialogue with a democratically elected Government of Zimbabwe and, as soon as conditions allow, to begin working towards the resumption of full cooperation.'

## **MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS**

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Ministers discussed the Middle East peace process in preparation of the upcoming meeting of Quartet principals and ministerial conference of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee to be held on 2 May in London.

## **IRAQ**

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The Council had an exchange of views on Iraq with a view to preparing for the review conference of the International Compact with Iraq, which takes place on 29 May in Stockholm.

## **PAKISTAN – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

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The Council discussed the situation in Pakistan and adopted the following conclusions:

1. The Council welcomes recent progress made in the democratic process in Pakistan. The elections of 18 February 2008, generally seen as competitive and having achieved increased public confidence, provided both Pakistan and the EU with new opportunities to improve and deepen the existing relationship. The Council welcomes the transition to new governments at federal and provincial levels and the initial steps taken to restore judicial independence.

2. The EU fully supports the Government of Pakistan in countering terrorism, insurgency and violent opponents of a peaceful and democratic society. The Council recognises the sacrifices made by the Pakistani population and security forces in the struggle against a radical minority, out to disrupt progress and opposed to moderation. The Council calls upon the

Government of Pakistan to address underlying causes of radicalisation, through a coherent approach that includes democratisation, socio-economic development, education and inter-cultural dialogue.

3. The Council underlines the EU's commitment to continuing support for the people and government of Pakistan. The Council welcomes the EU's dialogue with Pakistan and reiterates its wish to strengthen EU-Pakistan relations further, in full respect of international law and UN Security Council Resolutions. Particular focus will be given to economic development and trade, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, human rights, migration, education, inter-cultural issues and regional cooperation as well as issues of wider international importance.

4. At the heart of the EU's cooperation with Pakistan is enhancing long-term development, including in the fields of rural development and education. The EU will look for ways to expand its support for education, including adult literacy and vocational training. The European Commission, which has substantially increased financial assistance to Pakistan over the 2007-10 period, will continue with the regular dialogue under the 2004 Cooperation Agreement.

5. Based on the recommendations of the EU Election Observation Mission, the EU will approach the Pakistani authorities to explore jointly ways to support strengthening of democratic institutions, the electoral framework with particular focus on institution building, legislative reform and voter participation. Progress in that sector is essential to the security and long term stability of Pakistan. The Council reiterates the importance of enhanced EU assistance to and dialogue on the rule of law.

6. One of the EU's main priorities is the promotion of human rights, paying special attention to women's and children's rights. The bi-annual exchange on human rights between EU Heads of Mission in Islamabad and the Government of Pakistan underlines this commitment.

7. The Council reaffirms its support for broad and substantial cooperation between Pakistan and its neighbours. In this respect, the EU fully endorses initiatives aimed at fostering better cross-border ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan, including in the framework of the G8, through the Ankara Process, and the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan. The Council also reiterates its support for the continuation of the composite dialogue between Pakistan and India. The EU further recognises the value of supporting opportunities for strengthening regional trade integration through SAARC/SAFTA. The EU will continue to explore ways to enhance trade with Pakistan and trade within South Asia.

8. The Council underlines its commitment to work together with Pakistan on non-proliferation and disarmament of Weapons of Mass Destruction in international forums. Support from Pakistan for the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to begin negotiations on a Fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) would be a strong signal in that respect. The Council stresses the importance of Pakistan's cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency in order to have more information on outstanding issues related to the Iranian nuclear programme.

9. The Council will regularly review EU policy towards Pakistan.'

## **BURMA/MYANMAR – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

The Council discussed the situation in Burma/Myanmar and adopted the following conclusions:

'1. The European Union continues to be deeply concerned by the situation in Burma/Myanmar and again urges the authorities to take rapid steps for transition to a legitimate, civilian government and for national reconciliation.

2. The Council notes the report by UN Special Adviser on Myanmar, Ibrahim Gambari, on the absence of any immediate, tangible results of his recent visit to Burma/Myanmar. The EU reiterates its full support for the Good Offices Mission of the UN Secretary General and calls on partners, in particular the neighbours of Burma/Myanmar, to do likewise.
3. The Council commends the work of EU Special Envoy Piero Fassino in support of UN efforts and in coordinating with Asian partners. The EU will intensify its close consultations with ASEAN members and other neighbours of Burma/Myanmar, including those that are represented in the UN Security Council.
4. The Council remains convinced that only a process that involves the full participation of all stakeholders in the country, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and ethnic groups, will lead to national reconciliation and stability. Thus the Council believes the draft constitution, referendum and elections, as currently conceived, will not address the many problems facing Burma/Myanmar.
5. The Council calls on the authorities to allow a free and open debate by all political actors on the constitution prior to the referendum on 10 May, and to rescind the laws prohibiting criticism of the National Convention and the referendum. The EU calls on the authorities to guarantee that the referendum will be free and fair as well as to invite international monitoring. The Council urges the authorities to ensure the political process is transparent, and to give the people of Burma/Myanmar clarity about the future political process and the 2010 elections.
6. The Council expresses concern that the draft constitution would foresee restrictions on the eligibility for high political office, allow the military to suspend the constitution at will as well as fail to accommodate the country's ethnic diversity.
7. The Council reiterates its call for the immediate release of all political prisoners, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and deplores the intensified intimidation and violence in the run-up to the referendum. The Council reiterates its call for the authorities to cooperate fully with the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, and implement his recommendations.
8. The Council notes today's adoption of the Common Position, renewing for a further twelve months restrictive measures targeted against those responsible for human rights abuses and lack of development in Burma/Myanmar. Recalling the Council Conclusions of 15 October 2007, the Council reiterates its readiness to review or amend these measures or to introduce further restrictive measures in light of developments on the ground.
9. The Council recalls that as part of its restrictive measures against Burma/Myanmar the sales, supply, transfer or export of arms and related material of all types are prohibited. The Council would like to encourage the international community to adopt similar measures.
10. The EU recalls its unwavering, strong commitment to the welfare of the people of Burma/Myanmar. The EU and its Member States provide substantial assistance to their country. The EU continues to stand ready to respond positively to genuine progress towards democracy by engaging with Burma/Myanmar in its development and by finding new areas of cooperation.'

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The Council adopted a common position renewing restrictive measures against Burma/Myanmar until 30 April 2009 and updating the lists of persons and enterprises subject to those measures (8391/08).

The new lists take account of changes in the government, the security forces, the State Peace

and Development Council and the administration in Burma/Myanmar, as well as in the personal situations of the individuals concerned. It includes other persons associated with the regime in Burma/Myanmar who are deemed responsible for acts of repression, and additional enterprises that are owned or controlled by the regime or by persons associated with the regime.

The restrictive measures, first adopted in 1996, were replaced by new measures under common position 2006/318/CFSP, adopted by the Council in April 2006. They consist of a visa ban and a freezing of assets of members of the military regime and other individuals, groups and undertakings that are impeding Burma/Myanmar's transition to democracy. They also include a ban on making financial loans or credits available to, and on acquiring or extending a participation in, Burmese state-owned enterprises.

Following the repression of peaceful protesters in autumn 2007 and continuing human rights violations by the Burmese authorities, the Council adopted in November 2007 additional measures targeted at the sources of the regime's revenue, such as the logging, timber and mining industries.

(...)



## Quartet Statement

London, 2 May 2008

Representatives of the Quartet – U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, High Representative for European Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, European Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner, and Slovenian Foreign Minister Dimitrij Rupel – met today in London to discuss the situation in the Middle East. They were joined by Quartet Representative Tony Blair.

The Quartet expressed its strong support for ongoing Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and encouraged the parties to make every effort to realize the shared goal of an agreement on the establishment of a Palestinian state by the end of 2008. Commending the parties for their continuous and intensive negotiations, the Quartet emphasized the urgent need for progress and called on the international community to remain constructively engaged in support of negotiations with the goal of the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza and an end to the conflict.

The Quartet emphasized the importance of visible progress on the ground to build confidence and create an atmosphere supportive of negotiations. The Quartet welcomed concrete steps by both sides in the wake of the trilateral meeting between Secretary of State Rice, Prime Minister Fayyad and Defense Minister Barak, and stressed the urgent need for rapid and continued implementation of these and previous commitments to improve conditions on the ground. While taking note of some positive steps, including the removal of some roadblocks and an outpost by Israel, and improved security performance by the Palestinian Authority, the Quartet noted that much more remained to be done to improve the situation on the ground in order to change the conditions of life in the West Bank and to keep the political process on track.

In this context, the Quartet expressed its support for Quartet Representative Tony Blair, and underscored the urgent need for progress and close donor coordination. It also expressed its strong backing for the planned Bethlehem Conference on Private Sector Investment in May as well as the parties' agreement to improve security and economic conditions in Jenin, which can offer a model for important progress on the ground.

Noting the particular importance of justice sector reform, the Quartet looked forward to the meeting that will take place in Berlin in June to promote and coordinate donor assistance in this area.

The Quartet called upon both sides to fulfill their obligations under the Roadmap. It also called on both sides to refrain from any steps that undermine confidence or could prejudice the outcome of negotiations. In this context, the Quartet expressed its deep concern at continuing settlement activity and called on Israel to freeze all settlement activity including natural growth, and to dismantle outposts erected since March 2001. It called on the Palestinian Authority to fulfill its commitments to fight terrorism and to accelerate steps to rebuild and refocus its security apparatus. It urged Israel and the PA to increase cooperation in that respect and to facilitate the delivery of security assistance to the Palestinian Authority.

The Quartet condemned continuing rocket attacks from Gaza on southern Israel, including against Sderot and Ashkelon, as well as the terrorist attacks at a seminary in Jerusalem on March 6. The Quartet also expressed deep concern at Palestinian civilian casualties, including

the recent death of a mother and four of her children in Gaza. It called for an end to all violence and terror and urged all parties to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of affected civilians in accordance with international law.

Noting its deep concern over humanitarian conditions in Gaza, the Quartet called for continued emergency and humanitarian assistance and the provision of essential services to Gaza without obstruction. The Quartet expressed its continuing concern over the closure of major Gaza crossing points given the impact on the Palestinian economy and daily life. The Quartet condemned the terrorist attack on Nahal Oz fuel terminal on April 9, and noted that such attacks on the Gaza crossings interfere with the supply of essential services and undermine the interests of the Palestinian people. Principals strongly encouraged Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and Egypt to work together to formulate a new approach on Gaza that would provide security to all Gazans, end all acts of terror, provide for the controlled and sustained opening of the Gaza crossings for humanitarian reasons and commercial flows, support the legitimate Palestinian Authority government, and work towards conditions that would permit implementation of the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access.

Looking forward to a productive meeting of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, the Quartet encouraged all parties to do their part to support Palestinian institutional capacity building and economic development. The Quartet called for all donors to follow through on pledges made at the December 2007 Paris Donors' Conference. Underlining the crucial role of Arab states in support of the peace process, and the importance of the Arab League peace initiative, the Quartet encouraged the Arab states to fulfill both their political and financial roles in support of the Annapolis process.

The Quartet also discussed the proposal for an international meeting in Moscow to lend continued support to the parties in their negotiations and efforts on the ground.

The Quartet authorized its envoys to continue to work to facilitate the achievement of all of these goals.

The Quartet reaffirmed its commitment to a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace in the Middle East based on UNSCRs 242, 338, 1397 and 1515.

## Iran – Statement on Iran’s Nuclear Programme

2 May 2008

The UK Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, gave the following statement on Iran’s Nuclear programme after the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Russia, the US State Secretary, the Vice Foreign Minister of China and the EU High Representative.

We’ve just had a positive and productive meeting of five foreign ministers and the vice-foreign minister from China to talk about the next steps in our approach to the grave problem that we see in respect of Iran’s nuclear programme.

Firstly, we are united in our belief that the threat posed by this enrichment programme to stability is very serious and it’s one that we want to address directly.

Secondly, we are united in our determination to pursue a twin-track strategy. Last month, at our instigation the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1803 setting out a range of sanctions, the third set of sanctions against Iran.

But we’ve always been clear that should be accompanied by an offer to Iran showing the benefits of engagement and cooperation with the international community.

And our meeting today has been dedicated towards taking the offer that we made in June 2006, reviewing it and updating it, and I’m glad to say that we’ve got agreement on an offer that will be made to the government of Iran.

Thirdly, we will be transmitting that offer – we won’t be revealing details except to the government of Iran – and we very much hope that they will recognise the seriousness and the sincerity with which we’ve approached this issue and that they will respond in a timely manner to the suggestions that we are making.

Iran says that it wants to play a constructive role. We believe that the rights that it seeks need to be accompanied by a clear set of responsibilities and it’s in the spirit of seeking to fulfil both rights and responsibilities that we are making the new approach to Iran on the basis of today’s meeting.

## EUBAM Rafah – Council Joint Action

Brussels, 19 May 2008

### COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/379/CFSP AMENDING JOINT ACTION 2005/889/CFSP ON ESTABLISHING A EUROPEAN UNION BORDER ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR THE RAFAH CROSSING POINT (EUBAM RAFAH)

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THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 14 thereof,  
Whereas:

- (1) On 25 November 2005, the Council adopted Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP on establishing a European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah)<sup>(1)</sup>.
- (2) The mandate of that Mission was extended until 24 May 2008 by Council Joint Action 2007/359/CFSP<sup>(2)</sup>.
- (3) Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP should be further extended until 24 November 2008.
- (4) The financial reference amount provided to cover the expenditure related to the Mission for the period from 25 May 2007 until 24 May 2008 should also cover the expenditure to be incurred during the remaining period of the Mission,

HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

#### *Article 1*

Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP is hereby amended as follows:

1. the second subparagraph of Article 13(1) shall be replaced by the following:  
‘The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the mission for the period from 25 May 2007 to 24 November 2008 shall be EUR 7 000 000.’;
2. the second subparagraph of Article 16 shall be replaced by the following:  
‘It shall expire on 24 November 2008.’.

#### *Article 2*

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

#### *Article 3*

This Joint Action shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Brussels, 19 May 2008.

*For the Council*

*The President*

I. Jarc

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(1) OJ L 327, 14.12.2005, p. 28. Joint Action as last amended by Joint Action 2007/807/CFSP (OJ L 323, 8.12.2007, p. 53).

(2) OJ L 133, 25.5.2007, p. 51.

# Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean

Brussels, 20 May 2008

## COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL

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1. All of the EU's Mediterranean partners have close historical and cultural links with Europe. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has provided a means to address many strategic regional questions relating to security, environmental protection, the management of maritime resources, economic relations through trade in goods, services and investment, energy supplies (producing and transit countries), transport, migratory flows (origin and transit), regulatory convergence, cultural and religious diversity and mutual understanding. However, the centrality of the Mediterranean for Europe, the importance of our links, the depth of our cultural and historical relations and the urgency of the strategic common challenges we face, needs to be revisited and given greater political prominence.
2. The European Council of 13/14 March 2008 approved the principle of a Union for the Mediterranean and invited the Commission to present proposals defining the modalities of what will be called 'Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean'.
3. The Commission has made an analysis of the achievements of the Barcelona process and its contribution to dialogue, peace, stability and prosperity in this region, shared by the EU and some of its closest partners. They have also taken into account the shortcomings and difficulties in this process of multilateral co-operation which the EU has pursued since 1995. This Communication takes these factors into account and sets out the Commission's proposals for developing the 'Barcelona process: Union for the Mediterranean'.
4. The Commission has consulted with all partners involved in the European Union and the Mediterranean, in order to gain a clearer picture of their priorities and to see how best to channel a new political and practical impetus into the process.

### Over a decade of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation

5. The Mediterranean region is an area of vital strategic importance to the European Union in both political and economic terms. The Barcelona Process has been the central instrument for Euro-Mediterranean relations since 1995. Representing a partnership of 39 governments and over 700 million people, it has provided a framework for continued engagement and development.
6. The Barcelona Process is the only forum within which all Mediterranean partners exchange views and engage in constructive dialogue, and political dialogue is a regular item on the agenda of the Euro-Mediterranean ministers' and senior officials' meetings. It represents a strong commitment to regional stability and democracy through regional cooperation and integration, and aims to build on that consensus to pursue the path to political and socio-economic reform and modernisation. However, the persistence of the conflict in the Middle East has challenged and stretched the Partnership to the limit of its abilities to preserve the channels of dialogue among all partners.

7. The partnership has also overseen efforts to strengthen democracy and political pluralism by the expansion of participation in political life and continues to promote the embracing of all human rights and freedoms. However, the aim of advancing and reforms and engaging more decisively in the process of strengthening governance and participatory democracy, has been tempered by global and regional events.
8. A very positive feature of the last decade has been the way in which dialogues with different political and economic agents -civil society, including women's organisations and the media - have become more central to the process.
9. The various cooperation agreements and programmes in the field of education and training have contributed to capacity building in the countries concerned and represent a major tool to develop human capital and promote cultural and societal values in the region. The Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between cultures, as the unique institution financed by all partners, illustrates the common commitment to establish dialogue and promoting mutual understanding on cultural issues and recognises the essential role of intercultural dialogue to promote peaceful coexistence.
10. The EU remains the main partner of Mediterranean countries both in trade of goods and services. Significant progress has been made towards the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area by 2010. Progressive free trade with the EU has favoured exports and investment, but services, and to a lesser extent agriculture, accounting for two-thirds of the GDP, are only now being included in the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area. Slow but steady advances have been made in South-South economic integration which remains below potential. There have been improvements in macro-economic stability, inflation down significantly over 10 years, while human development indicators show improvements in health conditions and overall life expectancy.
11. However, it is also true that further and faster reforms are needed if the EU's Mediterranean partners are to reap the potential benefits of globalisation and free trade with the EU and regional integration. Economic reforms, gradual free trade of industrial products with the EU, and improvements in economic governance, have not been enough to attract the domestic and foreign investment needed to boost standards of living in the region. Growth has been good but insufficient. Reforms have been encouraging but short of initial expectations. Free trade with the EU has favoured exports and investment. The combined effect of these shortcomings has been a slower than expected process. As a consequence of the insufficient growth and continued demographic expansion the prosperity gap between the EU and most Mediterranean countries has increased and there has been no real economic convergence. The formula of trade plus investment plus cooperation is as pertinent as it was in 1995. While there is more that the EU can do to promote trade, investment and co-operation in the region, the greatest need is for the countries of the region to take up these opportunities as part of their domestic economic policies.
12. In sum, the Partnership has witnessed a strong promotion of multilateral and bilateral relations, but now needs a qualitative and quantitative change, to spur investment and employment creation and optimise the use of human resources.
13. A number of shortcomings need to be addressed if the Partnership is to become the multilateral support to jointly agreed policies in political, security, economic, social, educational and cultural cooperation. There is a need to reassert in political terms the central importance of the Mediterranean on the political agenda of all participants. There is mutual concern about

the perceived lack of co-ownership by Mediterranean partners. Another area to be addressed is the lack of institutional balance between the weight of the EU on one side, and the Mediterranean partners on the other. An additional deficit of the Barcelona Process has been its weak visibility and the perception by citizens that little is done to tackle their daily problems and their real needs. More engagement and new catalysts are now needed to transform the objectives of the Barcelona Declaration into tangible realities.

## Scope and main objectives

14. The challenge of a new initiative is to enhance multilateral relations, increase co-ownership of the process and make it more visible to citizens. Now is the time to inject further momentum into the Barcelona Process.

15. It should build on and reinforce the successful elements of the existing Barcelona Process. Thus the Barcelona Declaration, its goals and its cooperation areas remain valid and its “three chapters of cooperation” (Political Dialogue, Economic Cooperation and Free Trade, and Human, Social and Cultural Dialogue) will continue to constitute the backbone of Euro-Mediterranean relations. The 5-year work programme adopted by the 2005 Barcelona Summit (including the fourth chapter of cooperation on ‘Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security’ introduced at that stage), the 2008 annual work programme adopted by Foreign Affairs Ministers in Lisbon in November 2007 and the conclusions of the sector ministerial meetings will remain in force.

16. Following the views expressed by most EU Member States and Mediterranean Partners, the Commission considers that the current structures of the Barcelona Process, and in particular the Euro-Mediterranean Senior officials meetings, the Euro-Mediterranean Committee meetings and the experts’ meetings should be preserved and reinforced where possible. Political and economic dialogues are a major feature of the multilateral dimension of Euro-Mediterranean relations and should continue to operate.

17. The ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ will be a multilateral partnership. By focusing on regional and trans-national projects it should increase the potential for regional integration and cohesion. It will encompass all EU Member States and the European Commission, together with the other members and observers of the Barcelona Process (Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Palestinian Authority, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey and Albania), and the other Mediterranean coastal states (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Monaco).

18. It will be complementary to EU bilateral relations with these countries which will continue under existing policy frameworks such as the European Neighbourhood Policy, and, in the case of Mauritania, the African, Caribbean, Pacific framework. It will also be complementary to the regional dimension of the EU enlargement policy, which includes the accession negotiations and the pre-accession process. It will also be coherent and complementary with the EU- Africa Strategy.

19. This new initiative will give a new impulse to the Barcelona Process in at least three very important ways:

- by upgrading the political level of the EU’s relationship with its Mediterranean partners;
- by providing more co-ownership to our multilateral relations; and
- by making these relations more concrete and visible through additional regional and sub-

regional projects, relevant for the citizens of the region.  
All dimensions of the process will be open to all participants on an equal footing.

### Upgrading of relations

20. A clear signal of the intention to upgrade the relationship will be the proposed decision to hold biennial summits of Heads of Government. The first Summit, due to take place in Paris on 13 July 2008 under the incoming French Presidency, should take the formal decision to launch 'Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean', and establish its structure, functioning and main goals. The conclusions of the summit should also include a political declaration, and possibly a short list of concrete regional projects to be set in motion. The conclusions should be adopted by consensus.

21. Subsequent summits will follow this format by adopting a political declaration, endorsing a broad two-year work programme for the 'Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean' and agreeing on a number of concrete regional projects. Foreign Affairs Ministerial meetings will also take place between summits to review progress in the implementation of the summit conclusions and prepare the next summit meetings.

22. In principle the summit meetings should take place alternately in the EU and in Mediterranean partner countries. Countries hosting summit or ministerial meetings of the 'Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean' should invite all countries which are parties to the initiative.

23. The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) has reaffirmed itself as the Parliamentary dimension of the Barcelona Process providing a framework of debate, open dialogue and free exchange of views. It gives impetus to the Partnership by adopting resolutions and recommendations. The role of the Euro-Mediterranean Assembly will be the legitimate parliamentary representation of a Union for the Mediterranean. The Commission strongly supports the strengthening of the role of the EMPA in relations with Mediterranean partners.

### Increase co-ownership

24. During the consultations and contacts held by the Commission it has become clear that all countries agree on the need to build a stronger partnership that should come through greater co-ownership of the different processes. Two proposals have received overall support from partners: the establishment of a co-presidency and the setting-up of a joint secretariat.

### Co-Presidency

25. Establishing a co-presidency will increase and improve the balance and the joint ownership of our cooperation. They will be the co-presidents of the Partnership as a whole. One of the co-presidents will be from the EU, and the other from the Mediterranean partner countries.

26. The establishment of a co-presidency from the EU side must be compatible with the provisions on the external representation of the European Union in the Treaty of the European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community. For the first Summit, the rotating EU Presidency will hold the Presidency from the EU side. From the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Presidency on the EU side will correspond to the President of the European



Council and the President of the Commission (at the level of Heads of State and Government), and the High Representative / Vice President of the Commission, at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

27. Given the complex regional environment, the selection of the co-president from the Mediterranean partner countries will require consensus. The co-presidency from the Mediterranean side should be chosen for a period of two years. The country assuming the co-presidency on the Mediterranean Partner side may host the summit of the 'Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean'.

## Institutional governance and Secretariat

28. Another key instrument for enhancing co-ownership and promoting a more balanced partnership will be an improved system of institutional governance and the creation of a new secretariat. In order to make the 'Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean' more visible and relevant, it should have a strong project focus.

29. Improved institutional governance: A reinforced and more balanced and enhanced governance will be attained by setting-up a committee of specifically appointed representatives from all Member States, Mediterranean Partners and the Commission. They will constitute a Brussels based committee to be called 'Joint Permanent Committee' composed of permanent representatives from the respective missions in Brussels.

30. The Joint Permanent Committee:

- would be steered by the representatives of the co-presidencies;
- would prepare the meetings of the Senior Officials and Euro-Mediterranean Committee meetings and ensure the appropriate follow up;
- would assist the co-presidencies in the preparation of the Summits and Foreign Affairs and thematic Ministerial meetings;
- may act as well as a mechanism to react rapidly if a crisis situation arises in the region that requires the consultation of Euro-Mediterranean partners;
- membership and co-presidencies of the Permanent Committee will be the same as the Senior Officials / Euro-Mediterranean Committee meetings;
- the setting-up of a Permanent Euro-Mediterranean Committee that would meet regularly could lead to less frequent Senior Officials / Euro-Mediterranean Committee meetings.

31. The Secretariat: In the light of the different views expressed, the Commission has concluded that the Secretariat of the 'Barcelona process: Union for the Mediterranean' should be asked to perform the role of making proposals for joint initiatives to be decided by the political bodies and to ensure the necessary follow-up of project-related decisions taken by the Heads of State and Government.

32. The Secretariat could have a separate legal personality with an autonomous status. Detailed modalities will be submitted for approval by the Euro Mediterranean Foreign Affairs Ministers in November 2008.

- **Tasks:** The Secretariat should gather project initiatives (from various sources such as sector ministerial meetings, national or regional authorities, regional groupings, private sector, civil society), examine them, and suggest projects to the Euro-Mediterranean Committee that will act as a clearing house. Once the projects are accepted by the Euro-Mediterranean Committee they will be submitted for approval, through the Foreign Affairs Ministers con-

ferences, to the Summit. If endorsed, the Summit will instruct the Secretariat to give the necessary follow-up in terms of initiating the promotion of the projects, and the search for partners for their implementation. The funding and implementation of projects will be pursued on a case-by-case basis by the various interested partners and according to their own procedures. The secretariat will report to the Euromed Committee.

- Composition:** The Secretariat will be composed of officials seconded from participants in the Process. The objective is to achieve a sufficiently higher level of involvement of Mediterranean partners to increase co-ownership and participation. There will be one General Secretary from one side and a Deputy Secretary General from the other side to be selected by consensus. The Secretary General will appoint the staff of the Secretariat on the basis of competence and geographical balance. The organisation of the secretariat and the composition of the staff will be approved by the Euro-Mediterranean Committee.
- Funding:** The seconded officials will be funded by their respective administrations. The running costs of the Secretariat (support staff, equipment etc) will be funded on an equal basis by the EU and the Mediterranean partners.
- The headquarters** will be decided by consensus. The host country will provide the premises for the Secretariat free of charge.

## Projects

33. The project dimension should be at the heart of the 'Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean'. The programmes developed under this initiative should have a strong potential to promote regional cohesion and economic integration, and to develop infrastructural interconnections. They should constitute visible and relevant projects for the citizens of the region.

34. The selection process will take into account:

- the regional, sub-regional and trans-national character of proposed projects, including the possibility of cooperation among a limited number of countries;
- their size, relevance and interest for all Partners;
- their potential to promote balanced and sustainable development, regional integration, cohesion and interconnections;
- their financial feasibility including the maximisation of private sector financing and participation; and
- their maturity or degree of preparedness to be rapidly launched.

35. A number of project proposals adapted to the needs of the region and meeting the criteria outlined above should be ready to be examined at the Summit planned to take place on 13 July. The Commission has identified 4 such projects that it considers to be highly relevant to promote growth, employment, increased regional cohesion and sustainability for the Mediterranean. These projects are attached in Annex I to the present Communication and submitted to the consideration of partners.

36. The priorities set out in the Regional Indicative Programme will continue to apply and any potential EC contribution to the new regional projects in Annex I will not be financed at the expense of the existing bilateral allocations under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument or the Pre-accession Instrument (or in the case of Mauritania the European Development Fund).

## Funding

37. The EU and its Member States already provide significant funding in the Mediterranean region (see Annex II for details). To bring added value to existing arrangements, the “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean” should be designed to mobilise additional funding for the region, mainly through regional projects. Its added value will very much depend on its capacity to attract more financial resources for regional projects.

38. While there can be no prior earmarking of EU funds, certain projects which fit with the objectives of EU regional programmes can be considered for funding. Insofar as funding from the EU budget is concerned, the normal selection and procedural rules will continue to apply.

39. The Commission believes that additional funding for regional projects and activities should come mainly from the following sources:

- Private sector participation;
- Bilateral cooperation from EU MS;
- Contributions from Mediterranean partners;
- International financial institutions, regional banks and other bilateral funds;
- the Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership Facility (FEMIP) was created in 2002 as a tool to foster private sector development in the Mediterranean region to facilitate a higher economic growth. FEMIP combined EIB loans with EU-budget resources to provide technical assistance, risk capital and interest rate subsidies. The Facility was reinforced in 2005, after a review.
- The ENPI (aprox. € 50 million per year already programmed for the period 2007-2010), the Neighbourhood Investment Facility and the cross-border cooperation instrument within the ENPI, as well as the other instruments applicable to the countries covered by the initiative.

## Conclusions and next steps

40. The Commission invites the European Council at its meeting in June 2008 to discuss and endorse the proposals contained in this Communication. They can then become the agreed position of the EU to be put to the inaugural meeting of the ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ planned for 13 July 2008 in Paris. The Commission will fully involve the European Parliament and the EMPA in the ongoing discussions on this new initiative.

(...)

## External Relations Council

Brussels, 26-27 May 2008

(...)

### GEORGIA – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

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The Council discussed the situation in Georgia and adopted the following conclusions:

1. The Council examined the situation in Georgia following the parliamentary elections held on 21 May 2008 which were an important test for democracy. The Council congratulated the people of Georgia on the peaceful conduct of the elections, welcomed the efforts made by Georgian authorities since the last elections and urged them to take all necessary steps to address the shortcomings and problems identified by the OSCE-led International Election Observation Mission.

2. The Council stressed the need for constructive dialogue between the government and the opposition to agree on the way forward. It emphasised the importance of stability in Georgia and in the region and urged all parties concerned to respect the rule of law and to use only democratic and peaceful means in seeking to resolve political differences.

3. The Council reiterated the European Union's serious concern about the recent series of events that have raised tensions between Georgia and the Russian Federation. In this context, the Council reaffirmed its full commitment to the principles of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognised borders, as most recently reaffirmed in the UNSC Resolution 1808 of 15 April 2008. The Council recalled the Presidency Declarations on behalf of the EU of 18 April 2008 and 2 May 2008. It underlined that it is essential now to reduce the risk of further escalation and take steps towards normalisation of relations. The Council emphasised that all parties should tone down public rhetoric and abstain from provocations and implementation of decisions that undermine the above principles.

4. The Council expressed its support for the UNOMIG investigation into the shooting down of a Georgian unmanned aircraft and looked forward to discussing its results as soon as possible. The Council believes that UNOMIG should be reinforced, as recommended in the UN Secretary General's report S/2007/588 of 4 October 2007 and supported in UNSC Resolution 1781 of 15 October 2007.

5. The Council reconfirmed its support for international efforts aimed at a peaceful settlement of the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts, especially the efforts by the UN, the Group of Friends of the UN Secretary-General and the OSCE. The Council welcomed the peace initiative on Abkhazia put forward by the Georgian President, as well as the recent direct talks by the parties, hoping that they will contribute to a constructive dialogue on the issue. The Council affirmed that the EU stands ready to contribute to all these efforts and called on the parties to continue these talks on a higher level in order to reach peaceful and sustainable solutions. The Council underlined the importance of the work of the European Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus and recalled that the EUSR for the South Caucasus and the European Commission will continue to implement confidence-building measures in support of resolving the conflicts.

6. The Council looked forward to strengthening EU-Georgia relations through active con-

tinuation of EU-Georgia political dialogue and implementation of the ENP Action Plan. The Council welcomed the establishment of the EU-Georgia Subcommittee on Justice, Freedom and Security and the results of its first meeting on 30 April 2008. The Council took note of the Georgian wish for visa facilitation, and looks forward to continuing result-oriented work in the area of mobility. The EU is considering means of strengthening economic cooperation with Georgia and, if the necessary conditions are met, the possibility of a deep and comprehensive Free Trade Agreement.

7. The Council will continue to follow closely the situation in Georgia and will revert to it as appropriate.'

## **AFRICA**

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### **Somalia – Council conclusions**

The Council discussed the situation in Somalia and adopted the following conclusions:

1. The Council is seriously concerned over the security situation in Somalia and its negative humanitarian and human rights consequences. The Council reaffirms its commitment to a comprehensive approach to a lasting settlement of the Somali crisis, covering its political, security and humanitarian aspects. It reiterates that the only way to restore the situation is through a political process ultimately inclusive of all concerned Somali stakeholders that renounce violence in the interest of the people of Somalia. The Council commends those committed to dialogue in search of common ground.

2. The Transitional Federal Charter provides the only credible framework for an inclusive consultative process and broad-based ownership in shaping the future of Somalia through a permanent Constitution. The Council calls on all parties to engage in a constructive dialogue in shaping the future constitution of Somalia, to be the subject of a popular referendum in 2009, leading to elections.

3. The Council welcomes the continued efforts by the Prime Minister Nur "Adde" Hassan Hussein and his Cabinet, under the leadership of President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, and supported by the Transitional Federal Parliament, to advance the political process. To that end, it welcomes the outcome of the meeting held in Djibouti from 10-15 May 2008 under the auspices of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG) Ould-Abdallah and urges all the parties to comply with the engagement to continue further discussions on 31 May and to put aside their differences, facilitate unhindered humanitarian access and the delivery of assistance to the people with immediate effect. The Council also welcomes the ongoing dialogue between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and local leaders in Mogadishu.

4. The Council is deeply troubled by the extremely serious humanitarian situation in Somalia, due to the combined effects of drought and violence. The Council calls on all parties to comply fully with international humanitarian law and its principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence. The Council welcomes the intention expressed by the TFG to create a focal point for the humanitarian crisis as well as the commitment by the TFG to facilitate unimpeded humanitarian access to those in need, and calls on all other concerned parties to do the same, in the interest of protecting the lives of innocent civilians disproportionately victimised in the present fighting.

5. The Council urges that all violations of international humanitarian law and human rights

be officially denounced and investigated. The Council supports the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, including the Independent Expert for Somalia, and encourages them to undertake an independent fact-finding and assessment mission to Somalia to address the human rights situation. This would be a welcome first step towards the creation of a mechanism to investigate systematic human rights abuses by all parties. The EU is ready to increase its support in the field of human rights, notably for capacity building within public institutions and services.

6. The Council commends the work of the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), currently acting in Somalia on behalf of the international community. The Council commends the commitment of Uganda and Burundi to AMISOM and calls on all African Troup-Contributing Countries and other potential regional partners to provide the units required for the full deployment of AMISOM. The Council welcomes international efforts to enhance financial, logistical and technical support to AMISOM. The Council recalls the readiness of the EU and its Member States to continue to increase their support to AMISOM, *inter alia* by identifying substantial new financial support. The EU will continue to work, with the AU Commission and other partners, towards mechanisms that will facilitate the receipt and management of contributions for AMISOM and other future peace support missions.

7. The Council welcomes the unanimous adoption on 15 May of UN Security Council Resolution 1814 and emphasises the EU's full support for all its provisions. The Council welcomes the commitment of the UN to continue contingency planning for the possible deployment of a UN Mission to succeed AMISOM and welcomes its willingness to consider taking over from AMISOM at an appropriate time, subject to progress in the political process and improvement in the security situation on the ground. The Council fully supports the integrated and comprehensive approach aligning the political, security and programmatic work of the UN. The EU stands ready to expand its support in this field, including support for the ongoing reconciliation process, in view of achieving the political agreement which is necessary for effective mobilisation of the UN force, and for an agreed comprehensive security sector reform programme.

8. The EU remains firmly behind the initiatives of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and is ready to provide political, financial and technical support to facilitate a process of dialogue and consultations with key constituencies, fully supports his leadership role, *inter alia* in facilitating improved multi-faceted coordination of international support for peace, security and development in Somalia. The Council welcomes the reinvigorated role of the International Contact Group on Somalia under the leadership of the SRSG and stays committed to participation in this mechanism, including at field level.

9. The Council expresses its concern over the upsurge of piracy attacks off the Somali coast, which affect humanitarian efforts, international maritime traffic in the region and contribute to continued violations of the UN arms embargo. The Council greatly appreciates the commitment of the UN Security Council to addressing the problem of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast and looks forward to the early adoption of a Security Council resolution to that effect.

10. The Council commends the sequenced initiatives of some EU Member States to provide protection to World Food Programme vessels and welcomes the provisions of paragraph 11 of UN Security Council Resolution 1814 in this regard. The Council stresses the need for wider participation by the international community in these escorts in order to secure the delivery of humanitarian aid to Somali populations.'

(...)

## MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. The EU reaffirms its commitment to support the parties in the ongoing negotiations on all outstanding issues, including all final status issues, with a view to concluding a peace agreement before the end of 2008 as agreed in Annapolis last November. These negotiations must urgently press ahead. In this context, the EU also welcomes the recent meetings of the Quartet principals including with Arab foreign ministers and of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee of 2 May in London. The EU re-emphasizes the continued and constructive involvement of Arab partners and the importance of the Arab Peace Initiative as a major element in moving the Middle East Peace Process forward. The Council recalls that peace in the Middle East requires a comprehensive solution and in this regard welcomes the announcement that Syria and Israel have agreed to initiate peace negotiations under the auspices of Turkey.
2. The EU underlines the urgent need for swift and tangible results on the ground in order to sustain Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Action from both sides to implement their Roadmap obligations in parallel to the negotiations is vital in order to retain the confidence and support of the Israeli and Palestinian populations, the region and the wider international community.
3. The EU is deeply concerned by recent accelerated settlement expansion. The EU reiterates that settlement building anywhere in the occupied Palestinian Territories, including East Jerusalem, is illegal under international law. Settlement activity prejudices the outcome of final status negotiations and threatens the viability of an agreed two-state solution. It reiterates its call on Israel to freeze all settlement activity including natural growth, and to dismantle outposts erected since March 2001.
4. The EU condemns the continued firing of rockets from Gaza on southern Israel including the recent attack in Ashkelon and all other activities which are contrary to international law and endanger civilians. While recognising Israel's legitimate right to self-defence, the EU calls for an immediate end to all acts of violence. The EU urges all parties to ensure the protection of affected civilians in accordance with international law. The EU continues to support Egyptian efforts to bring about a cessation of violence and a solution that will allow for the reopening of all crossings.
5. The EU calls for the progressive removal of Israeli restrictions on movement and access in order to improve the situation on the ground and living conditions in the West Bank and revitalise the Palestinian economy. The EU welcomes as a step in the right direction the decision to remove a limited number of roadblocks but underlines the fact that much more remains to be done.
6. The EU remains deeply concerned about the unsustainable humanitarian situation in Gaza. It reiterates its call on all parties to work urgently for the controlled reopening of the crossings in and out of Gaza for both humanitarian reasons and commercial flows. In this context, it calls on Israel to fulfil its obligations regarding the uninterrupted provision of fuel and electricity supplies, as well as that of all other humanitarian assistance. It condemns the attacks from Gaza against the crossing points and terminals and their negative consequences on the delivery of humanitarian aid and fuel. It reiterates its readiness to resume its border assistance mission at the Rafah crossing point as soon as conditions allow under the provisions of the relevant international agreements related to Access and Movement concluded in November 2005.
7. The EU remains committed to assisting Palestinian state-building efforts across a broad

range of areas. It welcomes the Palestinian Authority's efforts to develop an effective and reformed security sector and encourages ongoing efforts towards the fulfilment of its Roadmap obligations in this field. In this regard, the Council expresses its full support to the international conference in support of Palestinian civil security and the rule of law to be hosted by Germany on 24 June 2008. It has decided to expand the EUPOL COPPS mission to support the criminal justice sector namely in the fields of the judiciary and the penitentiary, in cooperation with international partners. It welcomes the recent package of measures agreed by the Quartet Representative with the Israeli and Palestinian authorities, aimed at enhancing both economic activity and the capacity of Palestinian Authority security forces, by improving their ability to operate freely. It emphasises the importance of early implementation of these measures. The Council also welcomes the success of the recent Palestinian Investment Conference in Bethlehem in taking forward the economic development agenda.

8. The EU underlines the need to deliver on pledges made at the International Donor's Conference for the Palestinian State in Paris last December. In this context, it highlights the importance of keeping the institutions of the Palestinian Authority running in the second half of 2008, for which additional budget support is urgently needed. As the largest contributor of financial assistance to the PA, the EU calls on other donors to increase their budget support to the PA, with due regard for equitable burden sharing.'

## **LEBANON – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

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Minister discussed the situation in Lebanon. The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1 The Council welcomes the agreement reached in Doha on 21 May that has opened the path towards a full resumption of the functioning of all democratic institutions of the state of Lebanon. The Council welcomes the election of Michel Sleiman as President of Lebanon and looks forward to the full implementation of the Doha agreement based on the Arab initiative and on the principles enshrined in the Lebanese constitution and the Taif Accord.

2. The Council congratulates the parties concerned for their constructive approach and their will to engage in dialogue. It commends the efforts of the Arab League, in particular of the Committee of Foreign Ministers, under the leadership of the Emir of the State of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr al-Thani, and Secretary-General Amr Moussa, during both the mediation mission in Beirut and the negotiations in Doha, in ending the recent acts of serious violence and in helping the Lebanese leaders reach an agreement.

3. The Council reaffirms its solidarity with the people of Lebanon and its full support to the government and other democratic institutions. It also commends the Lebanese Armed Forces and their contribution to the stability of the country. It deplores the recent acts of violence in which over 70 people lost their lives and 250 were wounded. The Council reiterates its firm denunciation of all attempts aimed at undermining peace and stability in Lebanon, in particular through the use of force and in this regard it welcomes the agreement reached by the parties in Doha to ban the use of weapons and violence as a means to settle disputes, irrespective of their nature and under any circumstances.

4. The Council recalls its commitment to the full implementation of UNSC Resolutions 1559, 1680, 1701 and 1757 and in this respect looks forward to the start of work of the Special Tribunal. The Council also recalls previous statements and remains determined to reinforce



Lebanon's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, unity and stability.

5. The Council welcomes the holding of the International Donor Conference on the reconstruction and recovery of Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp and its surrounding area, which will take place in Vienna on 23 June 2008.'

## **IRAQ – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

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The Council discussed the situation in Iraq and adopted the following conclusions:

1. The EU reaffirms its support to a secure, stable, democratic, prosperous and unified Iraq and reiterates its commitment to the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Iraq, where human rights are respected. It underlines its support for the central role of UN/UNAMI in Iraq and strongly encourages continued close cooperation between UNAMI and the Iraqi authorities on the implementation of UNSCR 1770.

2. The Council welcomes the visit to Brussels by Prime Minister Maliki and members of his government on 16-17 April and the opportunity to enhance the EU's political engagement with Iraq.

3. The Council welcomes the Expanded Ministerial Conference of the Neighbouring Countries of Iraq in Kuwait on 22 April 2008 and underlines the importance of dialogue and cooperation between Iraq, its neighbours and regional partners. Constructive engagement of Iraq's neighbours and partners in the region remains essential to achieve peace and stability in Iraq and in the region as a whole. The Council encourages all neighbours and partners in the region to live up to the commitments made in the Final Communiqué of the Kuwait meeting and to strengthen their representation in Baghdad. The EU stands ready to support the neighbouring countries process and to provide its expertise where participants deem this helpful.

4. The Council also looks forward to the First Annual Review Conference of the International Compact with Iraq (ICI) in Stockholm, Sweden, on 29 May 2008. An EU Member State hosting the Annual Review Conference is a reflection of the EU's commitment to its partnership with Iraq. The Council urges strong Iraqi leadership and ownership in the implementation of the ICI, Iraqi sector wide inclusiveness and broad involvement of the international community including Iraq's neighbours and partners in the region. It also commends the progress made so far on economic aspects of the ICI, the passage of the Justice and Reconciliation, Amnesty, Provincial Powers Laws and the budget.

It encourages the Government of Iraq to make further progress in the political process and in national reconciliation. The EU will continue to develop a close cooperation and partnership with Iraq in accordance with the priorities indicated in the ICI and will do its utmost to assist Iraq in the implementation of the ICI together with the international community.

5. The Council underlines the importance of national reconciliation and welcomes initiatives of all parties to meet this end, including the 15-point statement issued by the Iraqi Political Committee for National Security. The EU encourages all parties to strengthen work in this area, consolidating the rule of law and national reconciliation.

6. The Council welcomes political agreement to hold provincial elections before the end of 2008 and strongly encourages the Government of Iraq and the Council of Representatives to adopt the necessary legislation and provide the funding in support of those elections. It also strongly encourages agreement on the hydrocarbon law as another important contribution towards national reconciliation. It expresses strong hope that the Constitutional Review

Committee will be able to contribute to resolving outstanding issues. It welcomes the commitment of Iraq's political leaders to a government of national unity leading to further progress on the legislative and reform programme. It commends efforts made by the UN and others in solving issues related to the disputed internal boundaries.

7. The Council recalls that further improvements in the security situation in Iraq are central to the Government of Iraq's efforts to build a stable and prosperous state. It condemns all acts of terrorism in all its forms in Iraq and calls for the immediate cessation of all such acts. It supports the Iraqi Government's increasing efforts in combating terrorism and sectarian violence and to disarm militia forces.

8. The Council expresses concern about the displaced Iraqis inside Iraq and Iraqi refugees in neighbouring countries, in particular in Jordan and Syria. It recalls the obligation of the Government of Iraq and the international community, as expressed at the Expanded Neighbours Ministerial Conferences, to protect and assist displaced Iraqis inside Iraq and in neighbouring countries by addressing their immediate and foreseeable needs and ensure their safety. It strongly encourages the Iraqi Government to use its resources to help neighbouring countries to cope with the additional burden of refugees.

9. The Council expresses concern about the human rights situation in Iraq, and supports the work of the UNAMI in this field. The Council reiterates that it is essential for the Government of Iraq to protect and promote the human rights of all Iraqis, paying special attention to vulnerable groups such as children, women and persons belonging to religious and ethnic minorities. Increased respect for human rights is essential to achieve reconciliation between Iraq's communities and sustain improvements in the security situation. The promotion and protection of human rights in Iraq will also greatly benefit from strengthening of the rule of law in general, including by ensuring the neutrality and inclusiveness of the Iraqi judiciary and security forces. The Council calls upon the Iraqi Government to suspend the practice of the death penalty as a step towards abolition.

10. The Council recalls its strong commitment to Iraq as reflected in the priorities set out by the GAERC on 19-20 November 2007 for future assistance to Iraq. Taking into account the EUR 829 million already committed by the European Community in reconstruction and humanitarian support since 2003, the additional substantial contributions from EU Member States, and the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq, the EU:

- commits to provide further assistance to basic services and to strengthen Iraqi institutions and capacities to unlock Iraq's own resources;
- welcomes the substantial progress on the negotiations on the Trade and Cooperation Agreement and states its determination to conclude negotiations as soon as possible, thereby establishing the first contractual relationship between the EU and Iraq;
- aims to enhance energy cooperation in the mutual interest of the EU and Iraq;
- notes the significant diplomatic EU presence in Baghdad, including the EC Delegation, and – expresses intentions for further strengthening the EU presence;
- looks forward to enhancing the current political dialogue at ministerial and senior official level with Iraq, including through regular meetings, and building on the mutual desire to take such a dialogue forward;
- underlines the importance of establishing a system of rule of law and a culture respecting human rights, welcomes the Commission's programme supporting the rule of law and justice sector and stresses the important role that the EUJUST LEX has played to this end;

- underlines its readiness to consider ways to build on the significant contribution of EUJUST LEX when its mandate comes to an end;
- will explore possibilities to provide further expert assistance to the secretariat of the International Compact;
- accepts the invitation to the EU, including the Commission, to participate in the three Expanded Neighbouring Countries of Iraq working groups on refugees, energy and security cooperation and coordination;
- commits to provide further contributions to help alleviate the humanitarian situation of displaced Iraqis inside Iraq and Iraqi refugees in neighbouring countries in particular in Jordan and Syria;
- welcomes support from the Community budget provided already for the preparations for local elections scheduled to be held before the end of the year.’

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## **AFGHANISTAN – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

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On Afghanistan, the Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. Looking ahead to the International Conference in Support of Afghanistan, to be held in Paris on 12 June 2008, and recalling Conclusions on Afghanistan of the European Council in December 2006 and successive GAERC Conclusions since February 2007, the Council underlines the EU’s continued commitment to long-term support for the people and Government of Afghanistan. The central objective of the EU in Afghanistan is to support the Government in establishing a sustainable and functioning state providing security, respecting the rule of law and human rights, and fostering development.
2. The Council welcomes the important progress made through combined efforts by the Government and people of Afghanistan and the international community, most notably in building political institutions, health and education.
3. The Council, nevertheless, notes the remaining challenges, especially in the areas of development and governance, and the underlying factors, notably corruption and a lack of security – with narcotics being linked to both – which continue to undermine the functioning of the Government of Afghanistan. The Government and the international community need to address this through the Afghanistan Compact.
4. The Council, therefore, welcomes the opportunity to assess progress in Afghanistan at the Paris Conference and wishes to focus on the following areas.
5. The Council calls on the Government of Afghanistan to take greater responsibility for reconstruction and development. The Council therefore thinks that as much assistance as possible should be directed in support of the Government through multi-donor trust funds or budgetary support, with due attention to absorption capacity.
6. The Council underlines that increased ownership should be paired with accountability. Urgent progress in meeting the benchmarks of the Afghanistan Compact is needed, notably:
  - a) implementation of a strategy to tackle corruption at all levels, in recruiting competent and credible professionals to public service on the basis of merit, and establishing a more effective, accountable and transparent administration at all levels of Government; this includes ensuring proper functioning of an independent mechanism for senior appointments as agreed in the Compact;

- b) strengthening resources and authority of sub-national government structures building upon successful national programmes and through the Independent Directorate for Local Governance;
  - c) implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy, under the leadership of the Government of Afghanistan, including implementation of an effective rural livelihoods strategy.
7. Furthermore, together with the international community the EU will provide full support to the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and the implementation of priorities set out therein, in line with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.
8. The Council further underlines the importance of a unified approach by the international community in pursuing common goals, in full coordination with the Government of Afghanistan and with coherence between the military and civilian dimensions. In this context, the Council calls for strengthening UNAMA's capacity, including by lending support to efforts aimed at widening its presence throughout the country, notably in the South and West. The Council supports an enhanced role of the UN Secretary General Special Representative Kai Eide in coordinating efforts of the international community and stresses the synergy in objectives between UNAMA, EU and ISAF.
9. The Council recalls that promotion of respect for human rights, including freedom of the media, and gender equality is a fundamental responsibility of the Afghan Government, which should fully support the functioning of its relevant institutions and the implementation of its international obligations in the field of human rights. Full support should also be given to the abolition of the death penalty in Afghanistan. As a first step a de facto moratorium on the death penalty should be re-established.
10. The Council stresses the importance of the democratic process in Afghanistan, especially in light of the Presidential elections in 2009 and the parliamentary elections in 2010. The EU stands ready to support preparations for the elections. The Council also stresses the importance of well-defined, Afghan-led political outreach.
11. Security and rule of law remain key challenges to progress in Afghanistan. A lack of security in parts of the country is compounded by weak judicial and law enforcement institutions. The Council stresses the importance of the Community programmes to support Afghanistan in promoting rule of law through support to the reform of the Justice Sector. The EU underscores the need for a coherent approach to the rule of law sector, in particular the interface between Community justice reform programmes and activities in the police sector.
12. The Council reiterates its determination to contribute significantly to police reform through the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan), respecting Afghan ownership and working in close cooperation with other international actors, in particular the USA. EUPOL Afghanistan has made progress in implementing its mandate and is now deployed throughout the country; full deployment is planned for June 2008. In this context, the Council would also like to welcome the contributions of third countries to EUPOL Afghanistan.
13. Given the size of the task, the EU is committed to substantially increase its efforts through EUPOL Afghanistan, with the aim of doubling the original number of experts working in the mission. Such an increase of the mission size would provide an important additional capacity on the key police reform issues. Due to the challenging operational environment, thorough preparation, timely planning, prior full operational capability and continued contribution of high-calibre staff are essential.

14. The Council recognises the importance of the International Police Coordination Board's work on a unified, integrated vision of the Afghan police, which should be given the highest priority.

15. The Council considers good relations with neighbouring countries to be key to achieving stability in Afghanistan, especially given the multidimensional character of issues such as narcotics. The Council therefore continues to support efforts aimed at improving relations between Afghanistan and its neighbours, and at full integration of the country into regional structures.'

## **CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICT**

Following a presentation by the presidency, the Council commended the study made on children affected by armed conflict. The Council approved the general review of the implementation of the checklist for the integration of the protection of children affected by armed conflict into ESDP operations, and emphasised the aim of further enhancing its implementation on the ground.

On the basis of an extensive survey of existing practices in the mission areas, the revised checklist includes substantive improvements, particularly on the elaboration of the definition of child protection; specific training on children affected by armed conflict; monitoring and reporting; improving visibility and awareness; the possibility of having specific expertise on the ground; and enhancing expert communication between missions/operations and Brussels.

## **EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

The Council adopted the following overall conclusions on ESDP (9841/08):

### *1. ESDP Missions and Operations*

#### **Western Balkans**

##### **Operation ALTHEA**

1. The Council reiterated that the EU remained actively committed to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), including through Operation ALTHEA, and that, as part of the EU's overall engagement in the country, the EU-led military presence would remain there for as long as necessary. The Council welcomed the positive contribution of the force to the safe and secure environment in BiH. The security situation remains stable and the EU-led force (EUFOR) continues to provide reassurance, and remains ready to respond to possible security challenges throughout the country.

2. The Council further welcomed the continued contribution of EUFOR, together with other forms of EU engagement, to international efforts to support reform of the security sector in BiH.

3. Following the successful reconfiguration of Operation ALTHEA in BiH in 2007 EUFOR numbers some 2500 troops on the ground, backed up by over-the-horizon reserves. Its operational focus remains the maintenance of a safe and secure environment and the transfer of Joint Military Affairs (JMA) tasks to relevant national authorities. Elements of the European Gendarmerie Force have successfully participated in the Integrated Police Unit of EUFOR since November 2007.

4. Coherence of EU action in BiH – involving all EU actors including the Commission and EU Heads of Mission – remains a priority. The EU Force Commander, the EUSR and the Head of EUPM continue to consult each other regularly prior to taking action. EUFOR has also maintained a close working relationship, including on operational matters, with other international actors. In respect of Operation ALTHEA, cooperation with NATO has continued to work smoothly and efficiently.

#### **EUPM BiH**

5. The Council welcomes the adoption of the police reform laws and supports the efforts of EUPM in aiding BiH authorities in the implementation of those laws. The Council notes the progress made by BiH authorities in tackling the most serious forms of criminality, with the operational assistance of EUPM. The Council welcomes the efforts of EUPM to improve the coordination of the police and the judiciary in BiH with the aim to establish an effective criminal justice system and to adopt a country-wide coordinated approach to the fight against organised crime.

#### **EULEX KOSOVO**

6. In line with the conclusions of European Council of 14 December 2007, which underlined the readiness of the EU to play a leading role in strengthening the stability in the region, Council welcomes the preparations for the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX KOSOVO), including the on-going deployment of the mission staff. The Council commends the work of the European Union Planning Team for Kosovo (EUPT), whose mandate was extended until 14 June 2008.

### **Middle East**

#### **EUBAM Rafah**

7. The Council reiterates the EU commitment and readiness to redeploy to the Rafah crossing point as soon as conditions allow it. Ever since the closure of the Crossing Point, EUBAM Rafah has continued to maintain operational capability. The Council decided to extend the mandate of the mission for a further 6 months until 24 November 2008.

#### **EUPOL COPPS**

8. EUPOL COPPS has continued its efforts in support of the Palestinian Civil Police. The mission supports the implementation of the Palestinian Civil Police Development Plan, including through the training of Palestinian police and facilitating and coordinating the provision of equipment in close cooperation with European Community activities. The Council also agreed to expand EUPOL COPPS' activities in the area of the criminal justice system, including the judiciary, the prosecutors as well as penitentiary service.

#### **EUJUST LEX**

9. The EU has been contributing towards strengthening the rule of law in Iraq and promoting human rights through its Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX), by providing training courses and work experience secondments in EU Member States for senior Iraqi police, judicial and penitentiary personnel. The Council welcomes the continuation of

EUJUST LEX's work in partnership with the Iraqi authorities and international bodies until 30 June 2009.

## Africa

### **EUFOR Tchad/RCA**

10. The Council recalled the urgent need to protect civilians and improve the humanitarian situation in the whole region. The Council reaffirmed its full commitment to contribute to the implementation of UNSCR 1778 (2007) which authorises the deployment in the Republic of Chad and the Central African Republic of a multidimensional presence, the military element of which is provided by the EU. In accordance with this resolution, the EU is conducting the military bridging operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA for a period of 12 months from the declaration of initial operational capability (IOC) on 15 March 2008. The Full Operational Capability (FOC) is expected to be achieved before the end of June 2008; the deployment of EUFOR has been progressing on schedule. EUFOR's mandate is to contribute to the protection of civilians in danger, particularly displaced persons and refugees, to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel and to contribute to the protection of UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment. In observance of its mandate EUFOR Tchad/RCA will act in an impartial, neutral and independent manner. The Council looks forward to the mid-term review and report foreseen in UNSCR 1778(2007) which will report arrangements for following up EUFOR Tchad/RCA after the one-year period for which it has been authorised by the UN Security Council. The Council stressed the need for a timely start of preparatory work in this respect.

11. Negotiations with some Third states that have shown willingness to contribute to the operation are ongoing. Agreements with Russia and Albania, which have made a formal offer, are under negotiation or about to be concluded. Non-EU European NATO members and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU have been regularly informed about the development of the operation.

12. The deployment of EUFOR Tchad/RCA is a major EU contribution to the international efforts, which, together with UN mission MINURCAT in the Republic of Chad and the Central African Republic and in coordination with the Hybrid AU/UN mission UNAMID in Darfur, helps to address conflict in the region and its devastating effects on the humanitarian situation. In this context, the Council urged the Government of Sudan to facilitate a speedy deployment of UNAMID. The EU will continue its close cooperation and coordination with all actors involved, in particular with the UN and the AU.

13. EUFOR is part of the EU's multi-faceted support to the area. The EC and Member States continue their ongoing development cooperation and humanitarian aid. The EU will continue to support a process of inclusive national dialogue, in order to promote the necessary conditions for the holding of free and transparent elections.

14. Given the cross-border involvement of armed groups the Council called on the governments of Sudan and Chad to improve their relations and to immediately stop supporting and equipping these groups. It called on the countries of the region to contribute to good neighbourhood relations and improve their cooperation. In this context, the Council welcomed the Dakar Agreement of 13 March, brokered by the Senegalese President Wade, and signed by the Presidents of Chad and Sudan to effectively end their disputes; noting particularly the built-in

implementation mechanism with regular high-level meetings between government representatives from not only Chad and Sudan, but also Libya, Congo-Brazzaville, Senegal, Gabon and Eritrea. Continued pressure on the parties concerned by the international community will be crucial for sustainable successful implementation.

#### **EUSEC RD Congo**

15. The Council supported current efforts aiming at the re-launching of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process, as part of the overall effort to restore stability in the DRC. Deploring the continued violence exerted against women in the East, the Council expressed its support for a stronger involvement of MONUC in this regard to address robustly exactions by armed groups. The Council expressed its concern at the rise in the recruitment of child soldiers to armed groups in the Eastern DRC and underlined the need for all actors in the field to address this problem as a priority.

16. Security Sector Reform (SSR) remains necessary to reach a sustainable stability in the Democratic Republic of Congo. To that end, the continued work and close coordination between the ESDP missions (EUSEC RD Congo and EUPOL RD Congo) and Community activities are of great importance. Further stabilisation of the DRC is one of the most important factors for peace in the whole Great Lakes region. Concerning the reform of the defence sector, the Council underlined its willingness to continue its support, via the mission EUSEC RD Congo, to sustainable reforms which are respectful of key principles of good governance and human rights.

17. The Council underlined practical activities undertaken by EUSEC, including the continuation of the biometric census of the Armed Forces personnel as well as the chain-of-payments project which has achieved real progress, notably the better delivery of increased salaries to the military. A gradual transfer of responsibilities to the Congolese administration is now an objective to be achieved by June 2009.

18. The Council underlined the importance of the full implementation by all parties of their commitments taken at the Goma Conference and in the Nairobi Communiqué. The current peace process represents a chance for a lasting stability enabling the Government to focus on long-term reforms. Of crucial importance is a developed dialogue with the Congolese people and authorities to promote a better national ownership of the reform process. Coordinated support from the EU Member States will contribute to a successful outcome. The Council commended the efforts of the EUSR for the African Great Lakes Region in providing essential support to the Congolese parties in keeping the Goma process firmly on track, as well as his support to follow-on of the Nairobi Communiqué. In this regard, the Council recalled that the mission EUSEC RD Congo has provided support to the EUSR for the African Great Lakes Region in his effort aiming at keeping these processes on track.

#### **EUPOL RD Congo**

19. The Council welcomes the achievements of EUPOL RD Congo in support of the reform of the Congolese police and the latter's interaction with justice, especially the operationalisation of the coordinating mechanism through the CSRP (Comité de Suivi de réforme de la Police). The Council also expresses its appreciation for the mission's contribution to EU overall efforts intended to bolster the Security Sector Reform (SSR) process in DRC, and takes note of the ongoing preparatory work to extend EUPOL RD Congo for another year, including with a limited deployment in Eastern DRC, in support to the stabilization process.



**EUSSR Guinea Bissau**

20. The Council notes the deployment of an advance team to Guinea-Bissau to launch EU SSR GUINEA BISSAU by the month of June. The Council underlines the comprehensive character of the mission, having tasks with police, judicial and military components contributing to security sector reform. EU SSR GUINEA BISSAU will provide advice and assistance to the local authorities on reform of the security sector in Guinea-Bissau in order to contribute to creating the conditions for implementation of the National Security Strategy in close cooperation with other EU, international and bilateral actors, and with a view to facilitating there through subsequent donor engagement.

**Asia****EUPOL AFGHANISTAN**

21. The Council commends the progress achieved by EUPOL AFGHANISTAN in the implementation of its mandate and in its deployment throughout the country. The mission has supported, in close coordination with its key international partners, the Afghan Government's efforts in reforming and strengthening its police and more broadly the rule of law sector in Afghanistan.

22. With respect to the EUPOL AFGHANISTAN the Council recalls the Council Conclusions on Afghanistan adopted on 26 May 2008.

***II. Capabilities*****Civilian Capabilities**

23. As civilian crisis management continues to grow, the further development and consolidation of underlying civilian capabilities becomes all the more important. The Council notes that implementation of the new Civilian Headline Goal 2010 started with work on a new common pilot illustrative scenario supportive of both civilian and military ESDP capability development processes, taking into account relevant capabilities available to the European Community. The Council stresses that, in the further development of the capability planning process under CHG 2010, special attention must continue to be dedicated to synergies between civilian and military ESDP and between ESDP and European Community activities.

24. Council noted that the work has begun on the development of a systematic approach regarding the human resources with a view to put in place a clear framework that would help to recruit and have in place the most qualified staff, so as to achieve optimal success in the area of civilian crisis management.

**Military Capabilities**

25. The Council welcomed the continued progress made in the EU military capabilities development process.

26. The Council noted that in accordance with the recommendations of Progress Catalogue 2007, based on the Initial Orientation findings, additional information was compiled and analysed against Capability Shortfalls in order to derive the First Prioritisation for addressing capability shortfalls.

27. The Council encouraged Member States to undertake the appropriate actions in order to address the identified capability shortfalls, in particular in the areas of force protection, deployability and information superiority, including through good use of opportunities for cooperation aiming at improving the EU's capability to act and the European Defence Agency to continue being actively involved in capability development, in close cooperation with the EU Military Committee.

28. The Council welcomed progress made in the elaboration of the Capability Development Plan (CDP), which participating Member States are elaborating through the European Defence Agency and the EUMC in active and efficient cooperation. The Council encouraged Member States to use the CDP, of which the first tranche of the actionable conclusions will be presented at the EDA Steering Board in July, as a tool to orientate their efforts to further improve their military capabilities.

29. The Council agreed to terminate the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP). The Council looked forward to being informed on the follow-up of the issues highlighted by the former ECAP project groups on Special Operations Forces, Headquarters, and Air and Missile Defence in their final reports.

30. The Council noted the work on Information Exchange Requirements (IER) aimed at identifying operational requirements for exchanging information between all entities, both civilian and military, that may interact in support of ESDP operations. This work includes the development of vignettes covering military and civilian operations, as defined in the revised Global Overview and Roadmap noted by the PSC in December 2007. The Council looked forward to further Steps in accordance with the IER Methodology.

31. The Council noted that the work on IER is undertaken in close coordination with the work undertaken on the ESDP Network Enabled Capabilities.

#### **Rapid Response**

32. The Council noted that work has started on the revision of the EU Military Rapid Response Concept and looked forward to further work on this revision, which shall be concluded in 2008. The Council welcomed the progress made in the implementation of the Maritime Rapid Response and Air Rapid Response Concepts agreed in November and December 2007 respectively. This includes the first Maritime Rapid Response Information Conference (MarRRIC) held in April 2008, where Member States reviewed the assets and capabilities they have declared for the second semester of 2008 and their indicative declarations for the first semester 2009. In view of the next MarRRIC scheduled for October 2008, Member States are invited to provide further indications to the EUMS.

33. The Council welcomed the outcomes of the Battlegroup Coordination Conference (BGCC) on 24 April, where Member States have committed in detail the required BG packages until the second Semester in 2009 and have committed packages until the first Semester in 2011. The Council strongly encouraged volunteering Member States to make new offers at next BGCC in October 2008 in order to fill in particular the vacant slot in the second semester of 2010. The Council looked forward to a Generic Preparation Guide, which Member States may use on a voluntary basis in order to facilitate their BG preparatory activities.

#### **EUMS Organisation Development**

34. The Council welcomed work conducted in order to implement the SG/HR report on the

EU Military Staff's ability to conduct military planning at the strategic level for EU-led operations, as requested by the Council in May 2007, following the Wiesbaden Ministerial Conference. This resulted in a provisional restructuring of the EUMS and a limited revision of its Terms of Reference and organisation, aimed at enhancing the military ability to conduct early planning at strategic level in order to better inform and accelerate the Member States decision making process. The Council recalled that it will revert to this issue as soon as practicable during the course of 2008, including the need for any additional personnel, on the basis of an evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of the implementation of the measures and actions in responding to the Council request to the SG/HR.

35. The Council welcomed the declaration made in March of the Initial Operational Capability of the EU Watchkeeping Capability which monitors ESDP operations.

### European Defence Agency

36. The Council noted the report by the Head of the Agency on its activities and welcomed the achievements.

37. The Council welcomed the progress made in developing and implementing the long-term strategies:

- a) Preparation, in close cooperation with the EU Military Committee and the EU Military Staff, of the Capability Development Plan (CDP) in view of delivering its initial version at the Steering Board in Capabilities Directors' formation in July this year with the first tranche of Actionable Conclusions. Good progress has been achieved in the four strands of the CDP. The two strands under the responsibility of the EUMC, strand A (which provides the EUMC guidance on the first prioritisation of identified shortfalls) and strand D (which provides lessons identified from EU and non-EU led military operations) were completed and forwarded to EDA for follow-up work on CDP. Regarding the two strands under the Agency's lead, work has progressed towards the identification of the potential capability trends and characteristics up to 2025 and beyond, and participating Member States have accelerated the inputting of potential collaborative projects into the CDP Projects and Initiatives Database with their national projects, programmes and initiatives across all capability lines of development.
- b) Implementation of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) strategy with, notably, some progress on the identification of key industrial technologies to be developed or preserved in Europe (it was agreed by the Steering Board in National Armament Directors (NAD) formation that work would focus initially on Future Air Systems), and the establishment of Security of Supply Points of Contacts/National Representatives.
- c) Development of a European Defence Research and Technology Strategy, with progress on the definition of key technologies and on a number of new tools to manage Research and Technology (R&T) activities and to improve the generation of opt-in R&T projects under EDA's umbrella.
- d) Development of a European Armaments strategy meant to describe the translation process between a capability need and a cooperative armaments programme. This strategy will be delivered for approval by the ministerial Steering Board in November 2008.

38. The Council encouraged EDA to continue with advertising its potential added value in

specific ad hoc cooperative projects and programmes with a view to enhancing and improving European cooperation. The results deriving from the CDP will assist participating Member States to achieve a more coherent and coordinated capability development effort. In this respect, the EDA is encouraged to launch concrete projects and programmes.

39. The Council also welcomed the results achieved on policies and specific projects and initiatives:

- a) Positive assessment of the overall implementation of the Regime on defence procurement, indicating that in general subscribing Member States have adapted their procurement practices to the provisions of the Code of Conduct (CoC). The Council underlined the need to increase the awareness of the CoC, and the importance of ensuring higher value cross-border awards and of encouraging cross-border biddings. The Council welcomed the decision of Bulgaria to join the Regime on 23 April 2008, which brought the number of subscribing Member States to 25. The Council also welcomed the Steering Board's approval of Norway's participation in the Regime.
- b) Successful implementation of the first Agency Defence R&T Joint Investment Programme, in the area of Force Protection, with contracted projects launched and further calls for projects under way.
- c) Approval by the Steering Board in Defence Minister's formation of a new Defence R&T Joint Investment Programme, in the area of Innovative Concepts and Emerging Technologies.
- d) Initiation of activities to improve the availability of helicopters for ESDP operations: investigating the potential for cooperation of participating Member States who operate the same types of helicopters, to create upgrade and/or support programmes to enhance deployability; and investigating the opportunities for participating Member States to share training and maintenance facilities for existing and new helicopters.
- e) Preparatory work in view of implementing the roadmap to fly UAVs in regulated airspace, including with the approval of four priority areas where the EUR 6 m earmarked revenue agreed in November 2007 could be used.
- f) Progress on the drafting of the NEC Concept, to be discussed by the Steering Board in Capabilities Directors' formation (July 2008), after which the SG/HR will decide on further handling, for consideration of the Council bodies, including the PSC.
- g) Establishment of a Project Team to study viable business and operational models for the development of a European Air Transport Fleet and their implementation modalities.
- h) Adoption of Rules and Procedures for ad hoc projects and programmes for mutual use of governments test facilities and cooperative test and evaluation, which will increase transparency and interdependencies in Europe in this area.

40. The Council welcomed the Agency's efforts to seek synergies between military and civilian activities, in consultation and coordination with the European Commission (in relation to its research activities), especially in the areas of SDR, UAV and Maritime Surveillance.'

The conclusions also cover conflict prevention, strategic partnerships, security and development, human rights, training and exercises. The full text of the conclusions is in document 9841/08.

(...)

# Meeting of the Defence Ministers

Brussels, 26 May 2008

## SUMMARY OF REMARKS BY JAVIER SOLANA

### EU OPERATIONS

#### Bosnia and Herzegovina: EUFOR Althea

- ▶ I welcome the progress made on police reform as it paved the way for the signature of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) at the June GAERC meeting;
- ▶ The transition from the Office of High Representative (OHR) to a reinforced EU Special Representative (EUSR) will eventually take place. This will show that the EU's engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to evolve; a review will be required in due time of the overall EU presence;

#### EUFOR Tchad/RCA

- ▶ L'opération EUFOR Tchad/RCA est déjà active et le déploiement est en train de se finaliser. Lors de ma récente visite sur le terrain, j'ai pu constater le travail admirable qui a déjà été accompli et je remercie le général Nash, commandant de l'opération, le général Ganascia, commandant de force, et tous les contributeurs de leur engagement;
- ▶ Grâce à la présence d'EUFOR, mais aussi au travail de sécurisation des autorités tchadiennes, la situation se stabilise même si elle demeure fragile. La confiance revient petit à petit et les Tchadiens de l'Est retrouvent l'espoir;
- ▶ Un mouvement de retour des déplacés s'esquisse par endroits. Il faut l'accompagner, notamment dans le domaine de la reconstruction;
- ▶ La coopération avec les gouvernements tchadien et centrafricain est très bonne, nous devons la poursuivre;
- ▶ Il nous faut maintenant nous concentrer sur la revue de mi-mandat qui précisera les contours de « l'après-EUFOR ». Une mission conjointe d'estimation UE-NU sera menée fin juin. Le rapport que je ferai sur cette base sera soumis à l'approbation du Conseil. Ces travaux nourriront le débat qui aura lieu mi-septembre au Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies;
- ▶ Pour ce qui concerne les pays tiers, nous sommes sur le point de finaliser les offres de transport aérien tactique de la Russie et de l'Ukraine, contributions qui seraient très importantes tant politiquement que sur le plan opérationnel;
- ▶ Enfin, au niveau régional, nous devons tout mettre en oeuvre pour oeuvrer à la normalisation des relations entre le Tchad et le Soudan, il en va de la stabilité de l'ensemble de la sous-région. J'en ai fait part au Président Déby qui m'a assuré de son engagement dans ce sens.

#### EUSSR Guinea Bissau

- ▶ I welcome the very good start made by the EU Security Sector Reform (EUSSR) mission in Guinea Bissau, which should reach full operational capacity in mid-June;

- ▶ Elections in Guinea Bissau (scheduled for 16 November) will be an important event for the country and for us. Towards the end of 2008, depending on the commitment of the new government and on the progress reflected in the mid-term review of the mission, we will need to reflect on our further ESDP engagement there;
- ▶ This mission is an excellent example of EU coordination but cooperation with other actors, in particular the UN, is also an important dimension.

### **EUSEC RD Congo**

- ▶ I would underline both the importance of helping the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to reform its army and the difficulties in achieving quick and visible progress; not least because the security challenges in the east tend to monopolise the government's attention;
- ▶ However, if the country is to find the way to stability and prosperity, it needs to have a functioning security sector and an accountable army capable of delivering protection to its citizens;
- ▶ The security situation in the Eet has shown some improvement in the wake of the recent peace efforts, in particular the Nairobi/Goma peace processes. But that is fragile, and it is crucial that EU and international efforts continue.

### **CAPACITÉS**

#### **Capacités militaires**

- ▶ Nous devons aborder de manière ouverte et pragmatique, pour aller de l'avant, un certain nombre de questions;
- ▶ Sur les Groupements tactiques (Battlegroups), je me félicite des engagements confirmés et des nouvelles offres faites par les Etats membres le 24 avril dernier, lors de la dernière conférence sur les capacités. Nous pourrions par ailleurs réfléchir à une mise en œuvre flexible des Groupements tactiques répondant aux besoins réels;
- ▶ Sur la solidarité financière, les opérations sont décidées par l'ensemble des Etats membres, mais les coûts reposent surtout sur ceux qui fournissent déjà troupes et moyens. Cette situation n'est pas soutenable dans la durée;
- ▶ Il est nécessaire de réaliser des progrès concrets sur le développement de capacités, notamment à court et moyen terme. L'initiative franco-britannique sur les hélicoptères est très positive et représente un potentiel important, précisément parce que l'engagement des Etats membres est essentiel. J'encourage le développement de projets et programmes de coopération entre Etats membres au sein de l'Agence européenne de défense (AED);
- ▶ Concernant le Plan de développement des capacités, le soutien et l'engagement réel des Etats membres sur les premières conclusions, qui seront présentées au Comité directeur de l'Agence européenne de défense (AED) le 8 juillet, sont nécessaires. A partir de ces conclusions vous pourrez décider de lancer des actions concrètes;
- ▶ Nous devons trouver des réponses à toutes ces questions si nous voulons tenir nos engagements et répondre aux attentes croissantes envers l'UE, acteur global.

## European Defence Agency (EDA)

- ▶ We have a good record on strategies and policies; it is now time to move from common goals to concrete implementation. Strategies are useful, but they will really add value if they are taken into account in your ministries' day-to-day life and in your defence planning. They must be used to generate projects;
- ▶ We are increasingly seeing the benefits of the Agency's efforts. More transparency, more coordination and more cooperation. We see it in areas such as defence procurement, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and information and communication;
- ▶ But we need to deliver more concrete results. I have high hopes that the second half of the year will keep us busy with collaborative projects and programmes. A lot is expected from the Capability Development Plan – with your planners' and national armaments directors' direct engagement. And the collaboration maturing amongst some may lead to inclusion under the EDA umbrella;
- ▶ Let us keep up the momentum. As the need for European cooperation increases more than ever we need the Agency to continue to make a difference.

## PARTNERSHIPS

### EU-UN, EU-NATO, Kosovo and Afghanistan

#### *General*

- ▶ There is good cooperation with the UN at all levels and on the ground. Lessons learned from EUFOR/RDC resulted in practical measures that were put to good use in EUFOR Tchad/RCA;
- ▶ Last year's Joint Statement on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management has led to a series of recommendations which the two organisations are progressively putting into place. These will further improve cooperation at headquarters level and in the field;
- ▶ On EU-NATO relations, the Berlin Plus arrangements work very well for operation ALTHEA in BiH;
- ▶ We hold regular meetings with the NATO Secretary-General to discuss all issues of mutual interest;

#### *Afghanistan*

- ▶ I welcome the appointment of Fernando Gentilini as senior civilian NATO representative and I am continuing to work with Kai Eide. I hope for increased cooperation under the UN's leading role;
- ▶ On our relationship with NATO, we all agree, given the security conditions in Afghanistan, that it is important for EUPOL Afghanistan to count on ISAF support;

#### *Kosovo*

- ▶ Our cooperation with UN, NATO, the OSCE and local authorities is crucial. There is a need for clarity regarding their positions and strategy during the transition period. For the time being, UNMIK and KFOR have an important responsibility in maintaining public order and ensuring a safe and secure environment;

- ▶ A sound formal basis for EULEX and KFOR cooperation in the field is the key to success;
- ▶ Our contingency planning, including on the issue of the transfer of authority from UNMIK, is ongoing: we will have operational assessments in the event of changes in the political and strategic context.

## **EU DEFENCE MINISTERS PLEDGE TO ADDRESS HELICOPTER SHORTAGES FOR CRISIS OPERATIONS**

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European defence ministers today issued a declaration of their determination to improve the operational availability of helicopters, noting that shortfalls in helicopter availability constrained EU and other international crisis management operations.

A ministerial meeting of the Steering Board of the European Defence Agency noted that important work was underway in the Agency to mitigate the problem of helicopter availability through initiatives such as enhanced crew training, fleet technical upgrades and logistic improvements, but more needed to be done.

‘We all know that helicopters are a key military enabler, which can often make the difference in the success or failure of crisis management missions,’ said Head of the Agency Javier Solana, who chaired the meeting.

‘Despite large numbers in European inventories, there remains a shortage of helicopters that can actually be deployed on operations. This is true in all operations theatres.’ he added.

The ministers’ declaration welcomed a joint initiative on the subject announced by France and the United Kingdom at their summit on 27 March. They pledged to work through the Agency on the issue and encouraged the European defence industry to contribute to this effort.

The Steering Board heard a progress report on the development of a common overall strategy in Defence R&T. A first list of 22 technology priorities has been established and Ministers invited the Agency to foster new collaborations in accordance with those priorities.

On other matters, ministers discussed preparatory work on establishing a European Satellite Communication (SATCOM) Procurement Cell, intended to harmonise military requirements and aggregate the growing defence demand for third-party SATCOM capacity through a single European point. Such a Procurement Cell could start operations in 2010.

France, Poland, the Netherlands, the U.K. and Luxemburg will take the lead in this project to demonstrate that pooling requirements and orders will lead to better offers by providers.

The Steering Board also reviewed progress on implementing the strategy for the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (DTIB), which was endorsed a year ago. They noted that it was well on track, thanks to further development of the European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM), considerable steps towards achieving mutual confidence in security of supply and work on identifying key technologies and to foster co-operation amongst Member States.

They confirmed that work on identifying key industrial capabilities should start with Future Air Systems (FAS), with an emphasis on supply chain weaknesses, and asked the Agency to continue dialogue with industry on dependencies on non-EU sources of supply, particularly in this sector.

‘Today’s meeting has shown that, across a range of areas, we are moving from theory to practice,’ said EDA Chief Executive Alexander Weis. ‘Our strategies are crucial as they define a common vision of what the Agency will deliver for the benefit of its Member States and how it will do so. Our objective is now to translate these strategies into real activities and outputs.’



## ANNEX

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### Draft Defence Ministers' Declaration of Intent on Helicopter Availability (Steering Board, 26 May 2008)

We, the EDA Steering Board in Defence Ministers' formation:

- 1) Recognising the importance of addressing the critical operational shortfalls in helicopter availability which constrains international crisis management operations,
- 2) Noting the important work underway in the European Defence Agency to mitigate the problem of helicopter availability through initiatives in the area, notably through enhanced crew training, fleet technical upgrades and logistic improvements,
- 3) Noting the Agency's efforts to ensure coherence with other ongoing activities,
- 4) Acknowledging the valuable contribution of France and the United Kingdom to invigorating this work through their Joint Summit declaration of 27<sup>th</sup> March and their subsequent measures of practical support,
- 5) Recalling the importance of collective EU action on military capabilities for an enduring solution to the problem of helicopter availability and the undertaking of a cooperative effort,  
 Declare our full determination to improve the operational availability of helicopters and commit, wherever possible, to work with the Agency in this regard, and;  
 Strongly encourage the European Defence Industry to contribute to this effort to increase the availability of helicopters.

### EDA AGREES ON NORWAY'S PARTICIPATION IN REGIME ON DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

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European Union Defence Ministers agreed today to allow non-EU member Norway to participate in the Regime on Defence Procurement, under which governments and industry voluntarily commit to more open cross-border competition for defence equipment contracts.

The decision was taken at a ministerial Steering Board meeting of the European Defence Agency (EDA), to which all EU members except Denmark belong. The EDA administers the Regime and operates the Electronic Bulletin Board (EBB) portal on which contracting opportunities are advertised.

'We are delighted that Norway will be participating in the Regime, which will help our efforts to open the European Defence Equipment Market and further strengthen our Defence Technological and Industrial Base,' said Head of the Agency Javier Solana, who chaired the meeting.

Norway has an Administrative Arrangement for cooperation with the EDA. Although not a member of the EU, it participates in its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in many ways, contributing troops to ESDP operations and forming part of the EU Nordic Battle Group.

'It is a privilege for Norway, as the first country outside the European Union, to be able to participate in the Regime on Defence Procurement and its Code of Conduct, fostering transparent and integrated defence markets,' said Norwegian Defence Minister Anne-Grete Strom-Erichsen.

‘By committing ourselves to the level playing field of the Regime, and on the basis of our relatively high defence expenditure and competitive defence industry, I am sure that the development of the European Defence Equipment Market will benefit from our participation,’ she added.

The non-legally binding Regime has been in effect since 1 July 2006 and has two main parts: a Code of Conduct for government procurement contracts, which requires equal treatment for companies from all countries subscribing to the regime according to clear and transparent criteria; and a Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain, under which the defence industry applies the same principles to sub-contracting opportunities. That part of the EBB portal was implemented in March 2007.

The Norwegian Defence and Security Industries Association (FSi), representing the country’s defence industry, has endorsed the Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain and will work with companies to ensure that it is implemented.

The Steering Board also welcomed a report on the operation of the Regime and noted that the overall assessment was positive. Governments have so far published more than 260 contract opportunities based on open competition, worth more than €10 billion.

Although only in its early stages, the supply chain code had seen 12 different companies posting 30 formal sub-contracting notices on EBB2, and 13 more companies had advertised a further 123 potential opportunities.

The Steering Board asked the Agency to continue monitoring the implementation of the Regime, particularly to see whether high value contracts would be awarded across borders by governments and suggested possible improvements in a number of areas which might lead to an increase in cross-border bidding.

‘The decision by Norway to participate in the Regime, following a similar decision by Bulgaria last month, shows the strength of commitment to the concept,’ said EDA Chief Executive Alexander Weis. ‘A cultural change towards transparency and publication for cross-border competition is being achieved.’

# Annual Review Conference on the International Compact with Iraq

Stockholm, 29 May 2008

## SUMMARY OF REMARKS BY JAVIER SOLANA

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I should like to thank Sweden for hosting today's conference and also thank the two co-chairs: Prime Minister Maliki and UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.

One year after the compact much progress has been made but more work still has to be done.

The EU is committed to Iraq for the long-term. More progress is still needed within the area of security. Real dialogue and reconciliation between all groups is necessary.

You have a partner in us. We are talking about a new beginning. Progress is needed with preparations for the elections this autumn and progress is needed with the hydrocarbon law.

More work is also needed with the establishment of the rule of law. The EU is helping you with that through its rule of law programme and rule of law mission, EUJUST LEX. And we have just extended our mission again. To date we have already trained over 1,500 senior judges, prosecutors and prison officials.

Since 2003 the EU has already committed 830 million euro to Iraq in reconstruction and humanitarian support. This comes on top of the substantial contributions from individual Member States.

Our Compact is about commitments on both sides and you know that you have our full commitment. You can count on our support.

## DECLARATION BY THE PRESIDENCY

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The EU welcomes the Annual Review Conference of the International Compact with Iraq in Stockholm, Sweden on 29 May 2008. An EU member state hosting this event strongly manifests the EU's support to the partnership with the Government of Iraq and to the principles of the International Compact with Iraq and underlines the EU's clear commitment to contribute to the political and economic reconstruction of Iraq.

The EU reaffirms the goal shared with the Government of Iraq of a secure, stable, democratic, prosperous and unified Iraq where human rights are respected and reiterates its commitment to the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Iraq.

The EU recalls its support for the International Compact with Iraq and welcomes the Annual Review Report (May 2007 – May 2008) entitled 'A New Beginning', which reflects the progress made since the launch of the ICI and indicates how the Government of Iraq intends to ensure further progress in the implementation of the Compact. The broad involvement of the international community, including Iraq's neighbours is vital for further achievement of the agreed bench marks and promotion of sustainable development.

The EU supports the Government of Iraq's proposed mutual priority areas for 2008-9, in addition to national reconciliation and further consolidation of the economy and the security situation, as being human development, human rights, reconstruction and anticorruption. The EU is concerned about the human rights situation in Iraq, including that of vulnerable groups such as children, women, religious and ethnic minorities, and welcomes the expressed

commitment by the Government of Iraq to improve the situation throughout the country. Increased respect for human rights is essential to achieve reconciliation between Iraq's communities and sustain improvements in the security situation.

The EU recalls the obligation of the Government of Iraq and the international community to protect and assist displaced Iraqis inside Iraq and in neighboring countries. It supports the stated commitment of the Government of Iraq to cooperate with host countries and the international community to address the needs of displaced Iraqis and help in their return or resettlement.

It commends the progress made so far on economic aspects of the ICI and welcomes the Government's 6-point proposal entitled 'Partnership for Development'. It notes the progress on the political and legislative agenda including the passage of a number of laws such as the Justice and Reconciliation, Amnesty, Provincial Powers Laws and the budget and it calls upon the Government of Iraq to ensure a swift implementation of these laws, while it strongly encourages the Government of Iraq to make further progress in the political process and on national reconciliation and other important legislative challenges as the Hydrocarbon Law. The EU will continue to develop a close co-operation and partnership with Iraq in accordance with the priorities indicated in the ICI and will do its utmost to assist Iraq in the implementation of the ICI together with others of the international community. The EU recalls that further improvements in the security situation in Iraq are key to the Government of Iraq's efforts to build a stable and prosperous state. It condemns all acts of terrorism in all its forms in Iraq and calls for the immediate cessation of all such acts. It supports the Iraqi Government's increasing efforts in combating terrorism and sectarian violence and to disarm militia forces.

The EU encourages the Government of Iraq to continue the review and the strengthening of the Compact architecture, including the Secretariat, with the aim of aligning planning procedures and the work of the thematic working groups to the priorities identified in the Compact. The EU underlines the importance of strong Iraqi leadership and ownership in the implementation of the ICI, Iraqi sector wide inclusiveness and broad involvement of the international community including Iraq's neighbours and partners in the region. It fully agrees with the principle of Iraq co-financing of new development programmes in order to ensure ownership. The EU stands ready to offer its expertise for the political process and economic reconstruction wherever the Government of Iraq deems this helpful.

The EU underlines its strong support to the central role of the UN in Iraq as formulated in the UNSCR 1770, and its role of co-chair of the International Compact, and will continue its close cooperation with UNAMI and the Iraqi authorities in supporting the implementation of the resolution.

Taking into account the €829 million already committed by the European Community in reconstruction and humanitarian support since 2003, the additional substantial contributions from EU Member States, and the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq, the EU is ready to support the further implementation of the ICI by contributing to the Partnership for Development in accordance with Iraqi priorities. The EU:

- ▶ commits to provide further assistance to basic services and to strengthen Iraqi institutions and capacities to unlock Iraq's own resources;
- ▶ welcomes the substantial progress on the negotiations on the Trade and Cooperation Agreement and states its determination to conclude negotiations as soon as possible, thereby establishing the first contractual relationship between the EU and Iraq;

- ▶ aims to enhance energy co-operation in the mutual interest of the EU and Iraq;
- ▶ notes the significant diplomatic EU presence in Baghdad, including the EC Delegation, and expresses intentions for further strengthening the EU presence;
- ▶ looks forward to enhancing the current political dialogue at ministerial and senior official level with Iraq, including through regular meetings, and building on the mutual desire to take such a dialogue forward;
- ▶ underlines the importance of establishing a system of rule of law and a culture respecting human rights and will continue providing assistance in this area through the Commission's programme and the EUJUST LEX;
- ▶ underlines its readiness to consider ways to build on the significant contribution of EUJUST LEX when its mandate comes to an end;
- ▶ will explore possibilities to provide further expert assistance to the secretariat of the International Compact;
- ▶ accepts the invitation to the EU, including the Commission, to participate in the three Expanded Neighbouring Countries of Iraq working groups on refugees, energy and security cooperation and coordination;
- ▶ commits to provide further contributions to help alleviate the humanitarian situation of displaced Iraqis inside Iraq and Iraqi refugees in neighbouring countries in particular in Jordan and Syria;
- ▶ will continue support to the preparations for local elections scheduled to be held before the end of the year through funding provided already.

## **BACKGROUND – EU RULE OF LAW MISSION FOR IRAQ**

**April 2008**

- ▶ The EU is conducting an Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq – 'EUJUST LEX' – since July 2005 following a decision by the EU Council on 21 February 2005. EUJUST LEX falls under the scope of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).
- ▶ EUJUST LEX consists of integrated training in the fields of leadership, criminal investigation and a range of specialised subjects for senior officials from the judiciary, the police and the penitentiary in order to promote an integrated criminal justice system in Iraq. It also coordinates 'work experience secondments' for Iraqi criminal justice professionals to work alongside their EU counterparts.
- ▶ EUJUST LEX is meeting its training objectives beyond expectations: to date 1450 judges, investigating magistrates, judicial investigators, senior police and penitentiary officials participated in over 60 integrated and single disciplinary training courses in 18 EU Member States. Nearly all EU Member States are currently involved in offering training or support to the Mission in its training programme for Iraqis.
- ▶ All training interventions take place within the EU. The mission has a liaison office in Baghdad and a coordination office in Brussels. The arrangements for this mission are determined in close partnership with the Iraqi authorities and complement other international efforts in Iraq.
- ▶ Welcoming the mission's achievements, the Council extended EUJUST LEX for a period of 18 months on 12 June 2006 until 31 December 2007, in response to Iraqi needs and

requests, and again on 25 September 2007 for a further 18 month-period taking operations up to June 2009.

- ▶ EUJUST LEX continues to offer integrated and single disciplinary courses as well as ‘work experience secondments’ (WES) that meet the specific needs of the Iraqi criminal justice sector in respect to establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights. Through evaluating past training interventions, the mission continues to facilitate highly practical courses and WES while aiming to achieve gender balance and geographical representation in each training intervention.
- ▶ Stephen White has been the Head of the EUJUST LEX Mission since its establishment in March 2005.
- ▶ An amount of EUR 21.2 million from the EU budget is allocated to cover the common costs of the mission for from March 2005 through June 2008. In addition, EU Member States continue providing training interventions, trainers and nationally seconded experts to EUJUST LEX.

# Javier Solana – Address to the European Parliament

Brussels, 4 June 2008

## EDITED SUMMARY OF JAVIER SOLANA'S INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

Mr President, Honourable Members,

Thank you for inviting me to this important debate on the EU's foreign, security and defence policy here in the plenary of the EP.

However, before going into the substance, let me from the outset condemn the outrageous terrorist attack against Danish Embassy in Islamabad on Monday. I express my condolences to the Danish and the Pakistanis and the families of dead and injured. Let us remember them. I was in Islamabad not long ago and I would like to report on that trip if time allows.

Now, I would also like to thank the two rapporteurs, Mr Saruysz-Wolski and Mr Kuhne, for their reports. There are many excellent points in these reports on how we can strengthen the EU's overall impact around the world, in line with our values and interests. I congratulate them and assure them and all of you that I will take as many of their points into consideration as possible because I think they are very constructive and very positive.

This is a very important session and I would like to address some of the issues which are in both reports and to talk about those issues that are more pertinent on the international affairs agenda, to see how we can contribute to the resolution of the problems of today.

Let me now say some words about the Treaty of Lisbon, which has been referred to by the rapporteurs. In both reports there are many references to the Treaty of Lisbon, and it is clear why. Those reports ask for efficiency, and the main point of the Treaty is to make the EU work more efficiently and effectively, especially in foreign and security policy. I am convinced that the Treaty will solve many of the problems identified in particular in Mr Kuhne's report.

The first priority is to get the Lisbon Treaty ratified. We all have to work in that direction in the days ahead. The Slovenian Presidency was mandated by the December European Council to take forward the work on preparing for the smooth entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.

The work has been guided by a few basic principles that we share. The starting point for all these discussions is the Treaty itself. It has to be respected in full. Secondly, the overall aim is that the Treaty enters into force, as previously agreed, on 1 January 2009 – if things go smoothly.

A large number of the aspects of the Treaty's implementation are of direct interest to you, to the European Parliament, including in foreign and security policy. Both the Presidency and the Commission and myself have had the opportunity during this semester to discuss many of these issues with some of you and these contacts will certainly continue. I would like to guarantee to you that I will continue to do so until the day the Treaty enters into force. It is vital for the three main institutions to work together if we are to ensure the smooth implementation of the Treaty.

Let me say a word about the European External Action Service (EEAS), As you know, I have a mandate, as High Representative in Office, under Declaration 15 of the Treaty, to carry out preparatory work with the Commission and Member States. I am doing that. I am implementing that mandate with the clear objective of having the decision establishing the EEAS adopted as soon as possible after the entry into force of the Treaty.

As regards the European Security Strategy (ESS), under the mandate of the European

Council from last December I am asked to produce another report by December 2008. The ESS has proved very useful and has served us well in the past four years, as is recognised by the rapporteur, and I thank you for that. It is a document that is short but at the same time readable and therefore I think that it has complied with its purpose.

I think that this strategy reflects our values, it reflects our principles. The task from the European Council last December is not about changing the text, but about looking at where to improve it and, if appropriate, complement it. It is important to reflect on the international developments since it was written in 2003. Things have taken place in this period of time. They are probably not fundamental enough to change the content of the strategy but lessons have been learned and debates have taken place in Parliament and in the institutions. The input from the Parliament, also through the report by Mr Kuhne, is very valuable and most welcome.

I will report orally to the European Council in two weeks' time. I will get some feedback on Member States' thinking and your contribution and your comments today are very important. Then there will be further discussion at the informal meeting of foreign ministers, the Gymnich, in September and we will continue talking about these issues here in Parliament. The final report will be submitted to the European Council in December.

I think the timing very important. December 2008 will be the fifth anniversary of the ESS. Hopefully by then the Lisbon Treaty will be ratified, thereby improving the coherence of our action. On the key threats, those identified in 2003 were the right ones. I think we can agree on that. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, organised crime, regional conflicts. They are still as relevant today. We have been very active in fighting them but we must continue.

The ESS was based on an analysis of the major global challenges as they stood in 2003. But today some of them are more relevant than others of five years ago and we also have new ones. Climate change and its effects on international security, and energy security were not contemplated in the strategy. The same applies to migration, illegal migration in particular, and information security. We have to take account of these developments.

Let me say a word about the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). It has been a success. It is an important, visible part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Over the past five years, we have deployed more than 15 missions – in fact 17. We now have 14 of them – civilian and military – currently deployed on three continents: Europe, Africa and the Middle East and Asia. This fact is recognized in the reports and I appreciate that.

Mr Kuhne's report also highlights some of the challenges and shortfalls we face in the ESDP. And rightly so. We are working on it. We are taking into account lessons learned from previous missions, we are adapting our structures – both on the civilian and on the military side. We are trying to make it more civilian-military – i.e. with a comprehensive approach.

Good progress was made at the Council meeting last week with the foreign and defence ministers, when we took a key decision on helicopters, one area where the international community is having difficulties with regard to crisis management operations. Political will and financing are important.

Let me say a few words about the situation in the world today, the hot spots and the things we are trying to resolve. Let me start with the Western Balkans. What happened at the elections on Sunday in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is something that should make us think. However, since the last time we spoke, two important things have taken place in Serbia. The Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) has been signed and elections have taken place. I think the result of the election has something to do with our behaviour and let us hope



that we can have a government in Serbia that will look to its European perspective.

Let me say a word about Kosovo. In Kosovo, as you know, by 15 June the global package of laws, including the constitution that was promised from the day of Kosovo's independence, will be in place. By that time we would like to have EULEX moving in the right direction. Deployment has begun. We are in permanent contact with the Secretary General of the United Nations to see how that can be done.

It is more than natural to say a word or two about Georgia. I am leaving tomorrow for Tbilisi and I will also be visiting the territory of Abkhazia. It is very important that we also visit Abkhazia to try to establish direct contact between the two sides, in the framework of the 'Group of Friends of the Secretary General' for the moment, and to see whether another format can be put in place.

I should also like to report to you on the situation in Lebanon, where important events have recently taken place. Together with the President of Parliament, I had the privilege to be there on that Sunday. General Suleiman is now President after 18 months of instability. I hope that the decision that was reached in Doha in Qatar will allow Lebanon to evolve towards peace and to an election in 2009. Mr Siniora was reappointed prime minister. He is a dignified man, a man we should respect. Let us hope that our help and coherence in our actions in the months to come will help further the process, because, at the moment, it is still not complete.

I also want to convey to you that I will be going to Tehran. I have not been there since June 2006. Since then I have had many meetings with the leaders of Tehran. However, I have decided, with the six countries involved in the negotiations, to return there and meet the leaders. I will take an upgraded offer compared to the one that we presented in 2006. I do not expect miracles but I think it is important for us to keep extending a hand and to make it clear that we have a dual track approach, with negotiations to solve the basic issues, in particular the nuclear issue, but at the same time, to continue using what the Security Council has to offer.

## EU-US Summit – Declaration

Brdo, 10 June 2008

### 2008 EU-US SUMMIT DECLARATION

We, the leaders of the European Union and the United States of America, met today in Brdo, Slovenia to further strengthen our strategic partnership. We view this Summit, and the fact that it is being hosted by Slovenia in its role as Presidency of the Council of the EU, as symbolic of our endeavour to realise a free, democratic and united Europe. The process of unifying Europe is one of the outstanding historical legacies of our partnership over the past half century.

The strategic partnership between the EU and the U.S. is firmly anchored in our common values and increasingly serves as a platform from which we can act in partnership to meet the most serious global challenges and to advance our shared values, freedom and prosperity around the globe. We seek a world based on international law, democracy, the rule of law and human rights, and strengthened by broad and sustainable market-based economic growth. The bond between the EU and the U.S. has proven its resilience through times of difficulty, and we continue to demonstrate global leadership and effective transatlantic cooperation in the face of the most pressing challenges of our day:

- ▶ Promoting international peace, stability, democracy, human rights, international criminal justice, the rule of law and good governance;
- ▶ Working together in conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction;
- ▶ Fighting the scourge of terrorism while protecting the fundamental freedoms on which our democratic societies are built;
- ▶ Encouraging the world's fast-growing economic powers to assume their responsibilities in the global rules-based system;
- ▶ Fostering an open, competitive and innovative transatlantic economy, through free movement of goods, persons, services and capital, while working together towards a prompt, balanced and ambitious agreement in the WTO Doha Round that creates new market access and strengthens growth in both developed and developing nations;
- ▶ Combating climate change, promoting energy security and efficiency, helping developing nations lift themselves out of poverty, and fighting the most crippling infectious diseases.

An effective response to these challenges requires transatlantic unity of purpose and effective multilateral approaches. We stand stronger when we stand together especially in meeting new global challenges.

### Global Security, Peace, Human Rights and Democracy

In this decisive year for the **Western Balkans**, we underline the importance of the European and transatlantic perspective as an essential element in promoting stability and economic progress for the whole region. We welcome the commitment of the EU to extend membership to all the countries of the Western Balkans, as soon as necessary conditions are met. We also welcome NATO's recent decisions to extend its membership into the Western Balkans.

We welcome progress made by **Croatia, Serbia, Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina** and **Montenegro** in the processes of EU and NATO

integration. We welcome the signature of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement and of the EU Interim Agreement with Serbia as a confirmation of its commitment to a European perspective and an important step on the country's path towards the EU. We welcome the commitment of all political forces in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to remain united behind the national consensus to actively pursue Euro-Atlantic integration. We welcome the forthcoming signature of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina and urge the Bosnian leaders to remain committed to a sustainable reform process.

We will continue to support the stability and security of **Kosovo** and its regional integration, and will assist Kosovo in its economic and institutional development. We note that the Kosovo authorities are committed to the objective of a stable, democratic and multi-ethnic society. We commend NATO's contributions to Kosovo as well as those of the OSCE. We will cooperate on completing a smooth transition from UNMIK to EULEX responsibility for the rule of law and its full deployment throughout all of Kosovo, which is essential for the stability of Kosovo. The EU welcomes U.S. participation in the EULEX mission.

We welcome the recent steps forward towards **Peace in the Middle East**, and will pursue complementary efforts to support the Parties' efforts to reach a political agreement by the end of 2008, as foreseen at the Annapolis Conference. We are determined to support the subsequent implementation of that agreement, and call again on Israel and the Palestinians to implement their Roadmap obligations in full. The EU and the U.S. are doing important work in the area of Palestinian capacity-building to pave the way for a future democratic Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbours. We underline the importance of continued broad and constructive involvement by Arab partners and commend the Arab League's Peace Initiative and its goal of promoting a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. We call on donors, especially those in the region to follow through on and, if possible increase, their pledges and deliver assistance to the Palestinian Authority.

We welcome the election of Michel Suleiman as President of **Lebanon**. We look forward to the full implementation of the Doha agreement and a full resumption of the functioning of all democratic institutions of the state of Lebanon. We reaffirm our joint commitment to the sovereignty and independence of Lebanon, and our support for its government. We call on all concerned parties, including Syria, to comply with UN Security Council 1559, 1701, 1757, and other relevant resolutions, including full cooperation with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. We reject the use of violence as a means to achieve political ends, and we reiterate our support for the extension of the full authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout Lebanese territory.

We expect **Iran** to comply with its international obligations concerning its nuclear activities, including the full and verifiable suspension of enrichment and full cooperation with the IAEA. Iran must fully restore confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme through implementation of the Additional Protocol. Iran must provide to the IAEA full disclosure of any weapons-related work and allow the IAEA to verify that any such work has ceased. We affirm the dual track strategy on this issue which was reinforced by the incentives package and reiterate our belief that a mutually satisfactory, negotiated solution remains open to Iran. At the same time, we will fully and effectively implement UN Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803 and other pertinent resolutions and we are ready to supplement those sanctions with additional measures. We will continue to work together, including through the Financial

Action Task Force, to take steps to ensure Iranian banks cannot abuse the international banking system to support proliferation and terrorism. We call upon the Government of Iran to cooperate in the fight against terrorism. We reiterate our concern about Iran's regional policies, especially its continued support for terrorist organisations, and call on Iran to play a responsible and constructive role in the region. We also underline our continued concern about the deterioration of the human rights situation in Iran, especially those of human rights defenders, women and minorities.

We welcome the meetings of the Neighbouring Countries of **Iraq** and of the International Compact with Iraq, and acknowledge the value and importance of these ongoing processes, which remain essential to achieve security and prosperity in Iraq and in the region as a whole. We encourage the countries in the region to increase engagement with Iraq by opening diplomatic missions in Baghdad, exchanging senior-level visits, and making progress on bilateral debt negotiations. We welcome the more extensive role played by the UN/UNAMI in Iraq in line with UNSCR 1770. We will continue to work jointly in support of the Government of Iraq's efforts to hold provincial elections as part of its efforts towards national reconciliation and in promoting peace, stability, and security for the benefit of all Iraqis. We encourage all political actors in Iraq to do their utmost to bring an end to violence. We will work with Iraq to hasten its ability to join the WTO. The EU's substantial assistance in Iraq, including more high-level contacts with the Iraqi government, is complemented by negotiating an EU/Iraq Trade and Cooperation Agreement for which we look forward to a rapid conclusion.

We share a long-term commitment towards the stabilisation and development of a democratic **Afghanistan**. We appreciate NATO's work in leading the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, and will work closely to ensure the success of the mission of UN Special Representative Kai Eide. We are enhancing our strategic cooperation on assisting Afghanistan, including expanding the size and scope of our justice and police reform assistance and counternarcotics efforts. We look forward to reaffirming our long-term commitment to Afghanistan's development at the 12 June Paris Support Conference. We call on the Afghan Government to further invigorate its efforts to improve governance and human rights, including media freedom, and fight corruption, drug production, and drug trafficking, and we call on our international partners to maintain their generosity.

We welcome the recent progress made in **Pakistan** towards a lasting democratic transition. We are committed to supporting the new democratically elected government in tackling the many challenges it faces, not least the threat from violent extremism.

We stand ready to work together with **Russia** on major regional and global issues of mutual concern as we recognise the important and constructive role that Russia should play on the international stage. We encourage Russia to meet its international commitments on human rights and democratic development, including in the Council of Europe and the OSCE. We also encourage Russia's engagement in a productive and transparent dialogue aiming at beneficial cooperation, in order to promote democratic values and freedoms.

We offer our deepest condolences to the people of **China** for the earthquake victims in Sichuan. Recognising China's growing role as an engaged member of the international community, we will continue our constructive engagement and will encourage China to assume a greater role in helping to tackle issues of global concern, such as the international financial and trading system, climate change, sustainable development and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We also encourage greater regional integration as a means for promoting

prosperity and stability in East Asia. We are concerned about the recent unrest in Tibet and urge all sides to refrain from further violence. We welcome China's recent decision to hold talks with the Dalai Lama's representatives. We encourage both parties to move forward with a substantive, constructive and results-oriented dialogue at an early date. We urge China to take substantive steps to allow its citizens to enjoy internationally recognized human rights. We encourage China to address its poor human rights record.

We offer our deepest condolences and reiterate our concern for the **Burmese** victims of Cyclone Nargis and our commitment to assist them as they recover from this tragedy. We call on the Burmese authorities to meet their commitments to grant access to foreign aid workers to the cyclone affected areas. We confirm our intention to continue our substantial humanitarian aid to the people affected by the disaster, in particular through the combined efforts of the UN, ASEAN, international and local agencies, and NGOs. Separately, we remain deeply concerned at continued repression in Burma/Myanmar as well as the lack of progress toward national reconciliation and a credible transition to legitimate civilian government. We reiterate our support to the Good Offices Mission of the UN Secretary General, and will continue to pressure the Burmese authorities, including implementing targeted sanctions, to embark on an inclusive dialogue with all stakeholders in the country, including Aung San Suu Kyi and other democratic and ethnic minority representatives. We are deeply troubled by the Burmese regime's extension of Aung San Suu Kyi's house arrest on 27 May and call upon the regime to release her and all political prisoners.

We commend the continued efforts of **Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova** to meet European standards, we welcome their aspirations and we commit to help these countries achieve their reform goals as soon as possible. We note that NATO leaders sent a clear message in Bucharest that Georgia and Ukraine will become members of NATO. We are ready to work with all appropriate parties to promote resolution of the conflicts in the region. We reiterate our commitment to the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognised borders, and call on all parties, in particular on Russia, to support these principles. We welcome the Georgian President's recent peace initiatives on Abkhazia, as well as the recent direct talks between the parties, hoping that they will contribute to a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

In **Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan** we will continue to promote democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. With regard to Belarus, we will continue to hold Belarusian officials responsible for human rights abuses. We call on the Belarusian authorities to release unconditionally and immediately all remaining political prisoners. We condemn the use of coercive measures taken against diplomatic missions in Belarus.

We will continue to act together in order to stabilise **Sudan, Somalia and the Great Lakes region of Africa**. We will coordinate our efforts to support African Union capacity-building including financial accountability and the development of the African Standby Force. We note the EU commitment to maintain its peacekeeping efforts in eastern Chad in line with commitments and deadlines contained in UNSCR 1778 and commit to work together to increase pressure on Darfur rebels and the Government of Sudan, including through the implementation of sanctions with the goal of accelerating the deployment of the UN/African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur and promoting the peace process mediated by the UN and AU Special Envoys and in full compliance with UNSCR 1593 and UNSCR 1769. We will continue to support the

full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement as the bedrock of long-term stability and the way forward for democracy in Sudan.

We call on the government of **Zimbabwe** immediately to cease the state-sponsored violence and intimidation against its people that has occurred since the 29 March presidential and parliamentary elections and which is so hostile to the tenets of democracy and human rights, and we strongly back the efforts of African leaders to bring about an expeditious resolution to this crisis. We urge the United Nations Secretary-General to send a team immediately to monitor human rights and to deter further abuses. The announced second round of presidential elections on 27 June presents the opportunity for the Zimbabwean people to express freely and democratically their will, opening the way for delivering political stability to the country. A free and fair presidential run-off is critical to the resolution of the ongoing crisis.

We will continue to work together and in collaboration with partners in **Latin America** and **the Caribbean**, to spread the benefits of democracy in the Western Hemisphere; to promote economic opportunity and social development; to uphold democratic institutions and human rights; and to enhance security. We encourage democratic processes in the countries of the region consistent with the Inter-American Democratic Charter. We welcome Cuba's signing of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and urge the government to ratify the Covenant and demonstrate its commitment by unconditionally releasing all political prisoners. We will work together to support human rights, democratic values and an active civil society and the continued exercise of freedom of expression throughout the region. We condemn the taking of hostages in any circumstances whatsoever and call on illegal armed groups to release all hostages.

We will continue acting jointly bilaterally and multilaterally to promote **democracy, safeguard peace** and **human rights** and in this regard encourage all governments to promote and protect their citizens' human rights. We have co-sponsored a Declaration in the United Nations General Assembly to highlight the plight of prisoners of conscience throughout the world in honour of the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We will continue to work cooperatively to promote democratic governance around the world and are prepared to encourage multilateral initiatives such as the Community of Democracies.

We are committed to support effective multilateralism, based on a stronger and more efficient **United Nations**. We will work to strengthen the United Nations so that it can better fulfil the goals and objectives set forth in its mandate with transparency and accountability. We will work together to ensure that the multilateral system takes action to protect the freedoms of individuals, and will hold all regimes that fail to protect the human rights of their people accountable. We will support in the UN more effective peacekeeping, disarmament, and delivery of development assistance, and food assistance.

We recognise the need for further cooperation to tackle **international terrorism**, particularly through an active role for the U.S., the EU and Member States in multilateral counter-terrorism efforts at the UN. We stand ready to work for an effective implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. We will continue to work together to reach international consensus towards an agreement on a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism that enhances global efforts to combat terrorism and strengthens the existing international legal framework for counter-terrorism. We call for full implementation of UNSC counter-terrorism Resolutions 1267, 1373 and 1540 and support the work of the respective UNSC Committees. We will redouble our efforts to ensure that the UNSCR 1267 Consolidated List

accurately reflects facts on the ground, including through proposals of new listings. We agreed to expand our cooperation on counterterrorism finance including preventing misuses of charities and bulk cash smuggling to finance terrorism, and increase information sharing.

We will seek to deepen our ties in our common fight against terrorism. We will ensure that efforts to combat terrorism comply with our obligations under **international law**, in particular international human rights law, refugee law and humanitarian law. We will take steps to ensure that members of designated terrorist groups do not misuse the law. We agree that the fight against international terrorism raises important legal questions. We have continued and deepened our dialogue on international law principles, relevant to our common fight against terrorism. Our dialogue contributes to a better mutual understanding of our respective legal frameworks and helps us work together more effectively.

We look forward to the imminent ratification and entry into force of the **EU-U.S. Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements**, which are important tools for enhancing fully judicial cooperation and for better tackling organised crime and terrorist offences.

We will work together to combat the global threats posed by **transnational organised crime, grand scale corruption, and terrorism**. We recognise that transnational criminal syndicates, high level corruption, and terrorist networks destabilise societies by undermining the rule of law and impeding efforts to promote freedom and democracy. We look forward to strengthening international cooperation and working jointly to provide capacity to combat these global threats. We also call for full implementation of the UN Convention Against Corruption, the UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime and its complementary protocols, as well as other UN instruments and resolutions to fight organised crime, corruption, and terrorism.

We recognise that the fight against **transnational crime and terrorism** requires the ability to share personal data for law enforcement purposes while fully protecting the fundamental rights and civil liberties of our citizens, in particular their privacy and personal data protection, by maintaining necessary standards of personal data protection. Our ongoing discussions within the High Level Contact Group (HLCG) on EU and U.S. frameworks for the protection of personal data have allowed us to identify a number of significant commonalities in our approaches based upon our shared values. The best way to ensure these interests are met is through a binding international agreement that addresses all the issues identified in the HLCG report. Our challenge moving forward will be to translate insights into greater collaboration in all aspects of law enforcement cooperation.

We will continue to work together to strengthen and universalise relevant **disarmament and non-proliferation** treaties and regimes. We agree to continue and further develop our cooperation in promoting strict implementation of and compliance with relevant treaties, agreements and commitments on non-proliferation. We will cooperate as appropriate in programmes aiming at raising awareness and at improving national capacity to prevent and counter the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat, including by combating the financing of proliferation and the threat of nuclear terrorism. We will continue our joint efforts to better coordinate multilateral capacity building and third country assistance on non-proliferation, in particular drawing on our joint support for United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 and the decision by the Security Council to extend the important work of this universal effort through UNSCRs 1673 (2006) and 1810 (2008).

We call for geographical expansion of the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. We will address together the challenges posed by noncompliance with regimes restricting the use or proliferation of WMD, and continue our productive dialogue on verification and compliance, established at the 2005 Summit, with a view to identifying opportunities for joint initiatives. We will continue to develop our cooperation in combating nuclear terrorism, in particular through the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in which all EU Member States are partners.

We recognise the need for further cooperation on preventing and fighting **international piracy**, especially in the framework of the UN.

The security challenges we face call for enhanced cooperation on **crisis management**. We recognise that modern crisis management requires a comprehensive approach. We can improve our response to crises through close collaboration on all aspects of crisis management, consistent with and building upon cooperation with the UN, other nations, NATO, and other multilateral organisations as appropriate, with a particular view to enhancing transatlantic cooperation in civilian aspects of crisis management and conflict prevention through our agreed Work Plan. We recognise the contribution that a strong EU role in crisis management can bring to the world and support closer EU-NATO relations to better address a wide range of issues of common interest relating to crisis management.

We will support and work together actively in a spirit of mutual respect and cooperation to advance **international criminal justice** and accountability for war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.

Recognising the serious threat presented by cocaine production and trafficking, we endorse intensified cooperation on intelligence sharing and interdiction in this field, and we commit in particular to facilitate an exchange of information and a coordination of assistance efforts to address **drug trafficking** from Latin America, especially to West Africa.

(...)



# Iran – Proposal from the Group of Six

Teheran, 14 June 2008

Accompanied by the political directors of the French, British, German, Russian and Chinese foreign ministries, Javier Solana travelled to Tehran on 14 June, and made a ‘revised offer’ to the Iranian authorities on behalf of the group of six world powers (China, the United States, France, Great Britain, Russia and Germany). In line with their policy of trying to engage Iran in negotiations on the one hand and, on the other, resorting to sanctions in the absence of any response from Iran, the Six decided to demonstrate once more their willingness to negotiate by presenting Iran with a new offer of cooperation based on the offer they had previously made in 2006. The offer was ambitious, and set out concrete proposals regarding civil nuclear energy, political and security issues and economic and technological cooperation. The Group of Six called again on Iran to seize this opportunity and to suspend its nuclear activities in order to allow negotiations to begin.

## PROPOSAL TO IRAN BY CHINA, FRANCE, GERMANY, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

### Possible Areas of Cooperation with Iran

In order to seek a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution of the Iranian nuclear issue consistent with relevant UN Security Council resolutions and building further upon the proposal presented to Iran in June 2006, which remains on the table, the elements below are proposed as topics for negotiations between China, France, Germany, Iran, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, joined by the High Representative of the European Union, as long as Iran verifiably suspends its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, pursuant to OP 15 and OP 19(a) of UNSCR 1803. In the perspective of such negotiations, we also expect Iran to heed the requirements of the UNSC and the IAEA. For their part, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union High Representative state their readiness:

- to recognize Iran’s right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with its NPT obligations;
- to treat Iran’s nuclear programme in the same manner as that of any Non-nuclear Weapon State Party to the NPT once international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme is restored.

### Nuclear Energy

- Reaffirmation of Iran’s right to nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes in conformity with its obligations under the NPT.
- Provision of technological and financial assistance necessary for Iran’s peaceful use of nuclear energy, support for the resumption of technical cooperation projects in Iran by the IAEA.
- Support for construction of LWR based on state-of-the-art technology.
- Support for R&D in nuclear energy as international confidence is gradually restored.
- Provision of legally binding nuclear fuel supply guarantees.
- Cooperation with regard to management of spent fuel and radioactive waste.

## Political

- ▶ Improving the six countries' and the EU's relations with Iran and building up mutual trust.
- ▶ Encouragement of direct contact and dialogue with Iran.
- ▶ Support Iran in playing an important and constructive role in international affairs.
- ▶ Promotion of dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation, regional security and stabilisation issues.
- ▶ Work with Iran and others in the region to encourage confidence-building measures and regional security.
- ▶ Establishment of appropriate consultation and co-operation mechanisms.
- ▶ Support for a conference on regional security issues.
- ▶ Reaffirmation that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery.
- ▶ Reaffirmation of the obligation under the UN Charter to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.
- ▶ Cooperation on Afghanistan, including on intensified cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking, support for programmes on the return of Afghan refugees to Afghanistan; cooperation on reconstruction of Afghanistan; cooperation on guarding the Iran-Afghan border.

## Economic

Steps towards the normalization of trade and economic relations, such as improving Iran's access to the international economy, markets and capital through practical support for full integration into international structures, including the World Trade Organization, and to create the framework for increased direct investment in Iran and trade with Iran.

## Energy Partnership

Steps towards the normalization of cooperation with Iran in the area of energy: establishment of a long-term and wide-ranging strategic energy partnership between Iran and the European Union and other willing partners, with concrete and practical applications/measures.

## Agriculture

- ▶ Support for agricultural development in Iran.
- ▶ Facilitation of Iran's complete self-sufficiency in food through cooperation in modern technology.

## Environment, Infrastructure

- ▶ Civilian Projects in the field of environmental protection, infrastructure, science and technology, and high-tech:
  - Development of transport infrastructure, including international transport corridors.

- Support for modernisation of Iran’s telecommunication infrastructure, including by possible removal of relevant export restrictions.

### Civil Aviation

- Civil aviation cooperation, including the possible removal of restrictions on manufacturers exporting aircraft to Iran:
  - enabling Iran to renew its civil aviation fleet;
  - assisting Iran to ensure that Iranian aircraft meet international safety standards.

### Economic, social and human development/humanitarian issues

- Provide, as necessary, assistance to Iran’s economic and social development and humanitarian need.
- Cooperation/technical support in education in areas of benefit to Iran:
  - Supporting Iranians to take courses, placements or degrees in areas such as civil engineering, agriculture and environmental studies;
  - Supporting partnerships between Higher Education Institutions e.g. public health, rural livelihoods, joint scientific projects, public administration, history and philosophy.
- Cooperation in the field of development of effective emergency response capabilities (e.g. seismology, earth quake research, disaster control etc.).
- Cooperation within the framework of a ‘dialogue among civilizations’.

### Implementation mechanism

- Constitution of joint monitoring groups for the implementation of a future agreement.

## **ANNEXE – LETTER FROM E3+3 TO HR MANUCHEHR MOTTAKI, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN**

**12 June 2008**

Sir,

Iran is one of the oldest civilisations in the world. Its people are justifiably proud of their history, culture and heritage. It sits at a geographical crossroads. It has vast natural resources and great economic potential, which its people should be reaping to the full.

But in recent years, Iran’s relationship with the international community has been overshadowed by growing tension and mistrust, since there remains a lack of confidence in Iran’s nuclear programme. We have supported the IAEA’s efforts to address this with Iran but successive IAEA reports have concluded that it is not able to provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. Two years ago, the IAEA referred the matter to the UN Security Council, which has now passed four Resolutions calling on Iran to comply with its obligations.

We, the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, joined this endeavour by the European Union High Representative

for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, are convinced that it is possible to change the present state of affairs. We hope that Iran's leaders share the same ambition.

In June 2006, we set out an ambitious proposal for a broad-based negotiation. We offered to work with Iran on a modern nuclear energy programme, with a guaranteed fuel supply. We were also prepared to discuss political and economic issues, as well as issues regarding regional security. These proposals were carefully considered and designed to address Iran's essential interests and those of the international community.

Today, bearing in mind the provisions of UN Security Council resolution 1803, we restate our offer to address constructively these important concerns and interests.

Our proposals are attached to this letter. Iran is, of course, free to suggest its own proposals. Formal negotiations can start as soon as Iran's enrichment-related and reprocessing activities are suspended. We want to be clear that we recognise Iran's rights under the international treaties to which it is a signatory. We fully understand the importance of a guaranteed fuel supply for a civil nuclear programme. We have supported the Bushehr facility. But with rights come responsibilities, in particular to restore the confidence of the international community in Iran's programme. We are ready to work with Iran in order to find a way to address Iran's needs and the international community's concerns, and reiterate that once the confidence of the international community in the exclusively peaceful nature of your nuclear programme is restored, it will be treated in the same manner as that of any Non-Nuclear Weapon State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

We ask you to consider this letter and our proposals carefully and hope for an early response. The proposals we have made offer substantial opportunities for political, security and economic benefits to Iran and the region. There is a sovereign choice for Iran to make. We hope that you will respond positively: this will increase stability and enhance prosperity for all our people.

c.c:

Saeed Jalili

Secretary of the National Security Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran

HR Mr Yang Jiechi

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China

HE Dr Bernard Kouchner

Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the French Republic

HE Dr Frank-Walter Steinmeier

Deputy Federal Chancellor and Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany

HE Mr Serei Viktorovich Lavrov

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

HE Mr David Miliband

Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

HE Dr Condoleezza Rice

Secretary of State of the United States of America

HE Dr Javier Solana

High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy  
Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union

# Georgia/South Ossetia – Council Joint Action

Brussels, 16 June 2008

## COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/450/CFSP REGARDING A FURTHER CONTRIBUTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO THE CONFLICT SETTLEMENT PROCESS IN GEORGIA/SOUTH OSSETIA

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### THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union and in particular Article 14 thereof,  
Whereas:

- (1) On 27 June 2006, the Council adopted Joint Action 2006/439/CFSP regarding a further contribution of the European Union to the conflict settlement process in Georgia/South Ossetia<sup>(1)</sup>, which was extended by Joint Action 2007/484/CFSP<sup>(2)</sup> until 31 December 2007.
- (2) The EU's assistance under Joint Action 2006/439/CFSP has reinforced the effectiveness of its role, as well as that of the OSCE, in the settlement of the conflict in Georgia/South Ossetia. In particular, the EU's contribution to the OSCE mission to Georgia has been effective in ensuring the functioning of permanent secretariats for the Georgian and the South Ossetian representatives, under the aegis of the OSCE, and in facilitating meetings within the framework of the Joint Control Commission (hereinafter referred to as 'JCC') which is the main forum of the conflict settlement process.
- (3) The OSCE has appealed for follow-up assistance from the EU, and the EU has agreed to offer further financial assistance to the conflict settlement process. This financial assistance should focus on support for JCC meetings, for Steering Committee meetings on an economic rehabilitation programme and a related newsletter, for a confidence-building workshop and for a meeting of representatives of the law enforcement bodies.
- (4) The assistance to be provided by the EU under this Joint Action is complementary to the work of the European Union Special Representative (hereinafter referred to as 'EUSR') for the South Caucasus appointed by Joint Action 2008/132/CFSP<sup>(3)</sup>, whose mandate is, *inter alia*, to contribute to the prevention of conflicts, to assist in conflict resolution and to intensify the European Union's dialogue with the main interested actors concerning the region,

### HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

#### *Article 1*

1. The European Union shall contribute to strengthening the conflict settlement process in South Ossetia.
2. For this purpose, the European Union shall provide a contribution to the OSCE to finance meetings of the JCC and other mechanisms within the JCC framework.
3. The European Union shall provide a contribution to the OSCE to finance Steering Committee meetings on an economic rehabilitation programme, the Economic Rehabilitation

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(1) OJ L 174, 28.6.2006, p. 9.

(2) OJ L 181, 11.7.2007, p. 14.

(3) OJ L 43, 19.2.2008, p. 30.

Programme Newsletter, a confidence-building workshop and a meeting of the representatives of the law enforcement bodies.

4. As part of the EU's support for a series of confidencebuilding measures in Georgia, the European Union shall also provide a contribution to host an informal JCC meeting in Brussels or in the capital city of the Member State exercising the Council Presidency.

### *Article 2*

The Presidency, assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council/High Representative for the CFSP, shall be responsible for the implementation of this Joint Action, with a view to the fulfilment of its objectives as set out in Article 1.

### *Article 3*

1. Disbursement of financial aid provided under this Joint Action shall be conditional upon the holding of regular meetings of the JCC and the other mechanisms in the JCC framework, as well as the holding of Steering Committee meetings on an economic rehabilitation programme and the issuing of a newsletter on the programme, a confidencebuilding workshop, a meeting of the representatives of the law enforcement bodies, as well as an informal JCC meeting in Brussels or in the capital city of the Member State exercising the Council Presidency, within 12 months of the starting date of the financing agreement to be concluded between the Commission and the OSCE mission to Georgia. Both the Georgian and South Ossetian sides should make demonstrable efforts to achieve real political progress towards a lasting and peaceful settlement of their differences.

2. The Commission shall be entrusted with the task of controlling and evaluating the implementation of the EU's financial contribution, in particular with regard to the conditions set out in paragraph 1. To that end, the Commission shall conclude a financing agreement with the OSCE mission to Georgia on the use of the EU contribution, which shall take the form of a grant. The Commission shall also ensure the correct use of the grant for the purposes set out in Article 1(2), (3) and (4).

3. The OSCE mission to Georgia shall be responsible for reimbursing mission expenses, for the organisation of conferences under the aegis of the JCC, and for the correct purchase and handing over of equipment. The financing agreement shall stipulate that the OSCE mission to Georgia shall ensure visibility of the EU contribution to the project and that it shall provide the Commission with quarterly reports on its implementation.

4. The Commission, in close cooperation with the EUSR for South Caucasus, shall liaise closely with the OSCE mission to Georgia in order to monitor and evaluate the impact of the EU contribution.

5. The Commission shall report in writing on the implementation of this Joint Action to the Council, under the responsibility of the Presidency, assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council/High Representative for the CFSP. This report shall in particular be based on quarterly reports to be provided by the OSCE mission to Georgia, as stipulated in paragraph 3.

### *Article 4*

1. The total financial reference amount for the EU contribution referred to in Article 1(2), (3) and (4) shall be EUR 223 000.

2. The management of the expenditure financed by the amount specified in paragraph 1

shall be subject to the European Community procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the European Union.

### ***Article 5***

1. This Joint Action shall enter into force on the day of its adoption.  
It shall apply until 16 June 2009.
2. This Joint Action shall be reviewed 10 months after its entry into force. To that end, the EUSR for the South Caucasus, in association with the Commission, shall assess the need for further support to the settlement process in Georgia/South Ossetia and make recommendations to the Council, as appropriate.

### ***Article 6***

This Joint Action shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Luxembourg, 16 June 2008.

*For the Council*

*The President*

D. Rupel

## Javier Solana – Remarks at EUROSATORY exhibition

Paris, 17 June 2008

During his visit to the EUROSATORY international defence exhibition on 17 June, Javier Solana met with representatives of the defence sector. His remarks are reproduced below.

« C'est pour moi un vrai plaisir de rencontrer les acteurs des industries de défense européennes du secteur terrestre. Je ne suis pas ici pour vous faire un long discours. Plusieurs de mes collaborateurs sont en effet déjà parmi vous et interviendront devant vous cette semaine. Je suis d'abord ici pour vous rencontrer et vous écouter. Aussi me permettrez-vous d'être bref et de me limiter à quelques observations.

Depuis 2003, l'Europe a considérablement développé ses outils de prévention et de gestion de crises. Plus d'une vingtaine d'opérations civiles et militaires lancées depuis 2003 sur trois continents. Près de 10 000 hommes en opérations cette année, du Tchad au Kosovo, du Proche-Orient à l'Afghanistan. C'est considérable.

Est-ce satisfaisant ? Oui. Est-ce suffisant ? Non.

Comment mieux peser sur les évolutions actuelles ? Comment mieux faire face aux menaces ? Très simplement en nous dotant des capacités nécessaires. Le monde évolue. Et vite. Il ouvre des perspectives inédites, mais il apporte aussi son lot de crises et de menaces multiformes. Contenir les crises lorsqu'on n'a pas pu les juguler à temps et prévenir à la source les menaces extérieures qui peuvent avoir un impact direct sur notre sécurité intérieure. Voici résumée en quelques mots la Stratégie européenne de Sécurité adoptée en 2003.

Sous l'impulsion de la Présidence française de l'Union européenne, ce document va être cette année revu à la lumière des évolutions des cinq dernières années. Et c'est sur cette base que les Européens vont pouvoir mieux définir les moyens militaires et civils dont ils ont besoin pour mieux faire face aux menaces qui pèsent sur leur sécurité. Cette semaine, je ferai part aux chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement des vingt-sept de mes premières recommandations.

Je ne vous surprendrai pas en vous livrant ici l'une de mes toutes premières recommandations : il n'y a pas de PESD crédible sans capacités militaires disponibles et adéquates, et sans une base industrielle et technologique européenne, autonome, solide et compétitive. Sans vous Messieurs, pas de marché d'équipements. Pas de base de défense, pas de capacités. Et donc pas d'opérations de gestion de crise. Il est en effet évident pour tous ici que l'industrie de défense joue un rôle déterminant dans l'équipement des forces armées en soutien de la PESD.

Le développement d'un vrai marché européen de défense est bien sûr tout aussi crucial. Une industrie européenne rationalisée et un marché compétitif européen : ce sont là des clefs essentielles. Pour satisfaire cet objectif, l'effort doit être collectif. Les capacités militaires de l'Union européenne sont en effet d'abord celles de ses Etats membres. Mais chacun doit jouer son rôle : gouvernements nationaux, institutions européennes et industriels. En bonne intelligence, il nous appartient d'identifier ensemble les contraintes, de fixer les priorités, de définir les besoins et d'engager les efforts financiers qu'ils justifient, de la recherche jusqu'à l'emploi des capacités développées.

Je suis heureux de constater que c'est cet esprit de coopération qui domine aujourd'hui. Les lacunes communes constatées par l'Union européenne et l'OTAN montrent qu'il n'y a pas d'autres voies. Et c'est d'ailleurs le sens de la dernière initiative franco-britannique sur les héli-



coptères. Et c'est en agissant dans cet esprit de synergie que nous avancerons dans trois des directions tracées dans le Livre blanc français sur la défense et la sécurité :

- ▶ la définition commune des besoins militaires des Européens
- ▶ le développement de l'action de l'Agence européenne de défense
- ▶ la mise en place de règles communes pour le marché des équipements de défense.

L'Europe n'est pas une option parmi d'autres. Elle est l'unique horizon à la hauteur de nos ambitions politiques et stratégiques. Nous n'avons tout simplement pas d'autre choix que celui de l'Europe. Et c'est ensemble que nous pouvons réussir à l'assumer. »

## MILEX 08 – Third EU military exercise

Brussels, 17 June 2008

The European Union (EU) will conduct its third military exercise (MILEX 08)<sup>1</sup> from 19 to 27 June 2008 in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

MILEX 08 is a Command Post Exercise (CPX) and will focus on key military aspects of crisis management. No troops will be deployed. During the conduct of the exercise, the EU Operation Headquarters (OHQ) in Rome will be activated for the first time.

The exercise will focus on the interaction between the EU Operation Headquarters (OHQ) in Rome and the EU Force Headquarters (FHQ) in Valencia supported by experts from the EUMS, in the context of an autonomous EU-led military operation<sup>2</sup>.

MILEX 08 will be based on the ALISIA scenario, which is being used for EU exercises in the time-frame from 2007 to 2011. This scenario depicts the situation regarding two fictitious countries, Rhodania and Relinesia, in which one of them identifies its need to have access to the sea and tries to achieve this goal through military force. This ignites a violent conflict between Relinesia and Rhodania which results in a UN resolution which mandates the EU, in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN, to restore peace through the separation of parties by force and the establishment of a demilitarised zone in the border area between Rhodania and Relinesia.

MILEX 08 will be coordinated in Brussels under the direction of the EU Military Committee supported by the EU Military Staff, and under the guidance of the EU's Political and Security Committee.

The exercise will be conducted in Rome (EU OHQ) and in Valencia (EU FHQ). Some 340 'players' and supporting personnel are expected to take part. The exercise represents a major step forward for the EU through the first full activation of the EU OHQ in Rome.

The Council decision to schedule the exercise is carried out under the operational authority of the EU High Representative Javier Solana. The Director General of the EUMS, Lieutenant General David Leakey, is responsible for preparing its implementation.

The appointed commanders for the exercise are Major General Tommaso Ferro (OpCdr) and Brigadier General José Antonio Bautís (FCdr).

Representatives of NATO staff, the UN, the OSCE, as well as the non-EU European NATO Members and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU, Canada, Russia, Ukraine, the United States and the Mediterranean Partners, will be invited to information briefings about the exercise.

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1. In May 2002, the EU conducted its first Crisis Management Exercise (CME 02) in the framework of the ESDP. In November 2003, the EU and NATO conducted a joint Crisis Management Exercise (CME/CMX 03). A third Crisis Management Exercise (CME 04) was conducted by the EU in May 2004. The first Military Exercise (MILEX 05) was conducted in November 2005 and the second MILEX 07 incl. the first activation of the EU OpsCentre was conducted in June 2007.

2. Without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities.

# European Council

Brussels, 19-20 June 2008

## PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS

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### LISBON TREATY

1. The European Council took note of the preparatory work carried out in line with its December 2007 conclusions.
2. The European Council noted the outcome of the referendum in Ireland on the Lisbon Treaty and took stock of the situation on the basis of an initial assessment provided by the Taoiseach Brian Cowen.
3. The European Council agreed that more time was needed to analyse the situation. It noted that the Irish government will actively consult, both internally and with the other Member States, in order to suggest a common way forward.
4. Recalling that the purpose of the Lisbon Treaty is to help an enlarged Union to act more effectively and more democratically, the European Council noted that the parliaments in 19 Member States have ratified the Treaty and that the ratification process continues in other countries<sup>1</sup>.
5. The European Council agreed to Ireland's suggestion to come back to this issue at its meeting of 15 October 2008 in order to consider the way forward. It underlined the importance in the meantime of continuing to deliver concrete results in the various policy areas of concern to the citizens.

### FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE

6. Strengthening the EU as an area of freedom, security and justice is a key priority for citizens. The European Council calls on the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission to make every effort to ensure the rapid adoption of important legislative proposals still pending in this field before the end of the year or, as appropriate, before the end of the current legislature.
7. Last December the European Council underlined the need for a renewed political commitment for the purpose of developing a comprehensive European migration policy. Since then, important progress has been achieved, in particular on the development of an integrated border management strategy and the enhancement of cooperation with third countries. Efforts in this area should be strengthened in the coming months, in order to increase the efficiency and coherence of migration policies. In this context the European Council welcomes the presentation by the Commission of its Communication 'A common immigration policy for Europe: principles, actions and tools' and looks forward to the forthcoming proposal of a pact on immigration and asylum by the incoming French Presidency.
8. The European Council emphasises the interlinkages between migration, employment and development as well as the importance of combating the major pull factors of illegal migra-

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1. The European Council noted that the Czech Republic cannot complete their ratification process until the Constitutional Court delivers its positive opinion on the accordance of the Lisbon Treaty with the Czech constitutional order.

tion. It calls on the Council to intensify work with a view to adopting the proposals on the admission of third country nationals for the purpose of highly qualified employment, on sanctions against employers of illegal immigrants, and on a single application procedure and a common set of rights for third country nationals.

9. The European Council welcomes the conclusions of the Council of April 2008 on practical cooperation in the field of asylum and the Commission Communication 'Policy Plan on asylum, an integrated approach to protection across the EU'. It underlines the need to continue with progress on the future Common European Asylum System with a view to its realisation by 2010.

10. The European Council underlines the importance of continuing work on the further development of the integrated border management strategy, including addressing particular pressures faced by some Member States and promoting a fair sharing of responsibilities. Rapid progress is needed on the future development of FRONTEX, including through the enhancement of operational coordination. Modern technologies must be harnessed to improve the management of external borders. The Commission is invited to present proposals for an entry/exit and registered traveller system by the beginning of 2010. The European Council looks forward to the forthcoming studies and possible legislative proposals on an electronic system for travel authorisation and on the creation of a European Border Surveillance System. The European Council invites the Commission to step up efforts on these issues and to rapidly report back on progress achieved and further possible steps, with a view to the development and implementation of the overall strategy as soon as possible.

11. The European Council reiterates the need for an effective return and readmission policy. It welcomes the progress made on the proposal on common standards in this area and underlines the importance of enhancing cooperation on readmission with third countries, including through the implementation of obligations under existing instruments, and consequently stresses the need to conclude readmission agreements urgently with all major countries of origin and transit.

12. Endorsing the Council's conclusions of 16 June on enhancing the Global Approach to Migration, the European Council underlines the importance of continuing the dialogue, partnership and cooperation with third countries on migration issues in a geographically balanced manner. The Global Approach needs to be further developed, in particular through the development of concrete instruments such as migration missions, cooperation platforms, mobility partnerships and migration profiles. In this respect, the European Council welcomes the launching of Pilot Mobility Partnerships with Cape Verde and the Republic of Moldova and looks forward to the opening of the dialogue on such Partnerships with Georgia and Senegal. The Commission is invited to evaluate the Pilot Mobility Partnerships and report on the results by no later than June 2009.

13. Noting the important progress achieved over recent months in implementing the Union's Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the European Council stresses that efforts to fight terrorism must be stepped up, while fully respecting the rule of law and human rights. In this context the European Council welcomes the new impetus given to the implementation of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy by the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator with his recent report and recommendations. It invites the Commission to continue its work on the prevention of radicalisation and recruitment for terrorism as soon as possible. In its cooperation with third countries the Union should usefully contribute to the prevention of recruitment for terrorism, particularly through the delivery of technical assistance in the fields of education, human rights, rule of law,

civil society and governance. The Commission is invited to focus efforts in particular on countries in the North African region and the Sahel, as well as countries in the South Asia region.

14. Access to relevant information by the competent authorities of the Member States and EU agencies is a necessity for efficient prevention of terrorism and serious crime. The European Council therefore stresses the need for a coordinated and coherent approach to the implementation of the principle of availability, aiming for effective use of information technology and information networks. Agreement has been reached on the integration of the provisions on exchange of information in the Prüm Treaty into the Union's legal framework, but further initiatives to enhance the exchange of information should be examined, taking due account of the protection of personal data.

15. In March 2008, the enlargement of the Schengen area by 9 Member States was finalised with the abolition of controls at internal air borders. This contributes to a higher level of mobility without affecting the security of EU citizens. The European Council welcomes the entry into force of the Schengen association agreement with Switzerland and the signature of the Protocol with Liechtenstein. It urges the Member States and the Commission to work closely together and to allocate sufficient resources to ensure that SIS II becomes operational in September 2009. It invites the Commission to present possible solutions for the long-term management of large-scale IT systems in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice.

16. The European Council welcomes an initiative to progressively establish a uniform EU E-justice portal by the end of 2009.

17. Recalling the European Council conclusions of June 2007 on the overall agreement on the Framework Decision on combating certain forms of racism and xenophobia, the European Council welcomes the first European hearing on crimes committed by totalitarian regimes and acknowledges the need to continue the process.

18. The European Council welcomes the agreement reached on the Directive on the protection of the environment through criminal law and the progress made with regard to the Directive against ship source pollution. The European Council reiterates the importance of achieving a high level of environmental protection throughout the EU. It also welcomes the rapid adoption of the framework decision for enhancing procedural rights in trials in the absence of the person, thus strengthening the procedural guarantees in this area.

19. Efforts to enhance judicial cooperation in civil law matters, including family law, need to continue, considering the positive impact such cooperation can have on citizens in their everyday lives. Important legal acts concerning mediation in civil and commercial matters, the law applicable to contractual obligations and parental responsibility and the protection of children have been adopted; nevertheless, further work is needed. The European Council therefore calls for the Regulation on maintenance obligations to be adopted before the end of 2008 and for a political solution concerning the Regulation on jurisdiction and applicable law in matrimonial matters to be found promptly. The Commission is invited to submit its proposal on succession and wills before the end of 2008.

20. The European Council underlines the need to rapidly follow up on the project to establish a common frame of reference for European contract law.

21. The roles of Eurojust and Europol need to be strengthened, and the cooperation between these two agencies enhanced, with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious cross-border crime. The European Council stresses the importance of the agreement reached at the April 2008 Council on the Decision on establishing Europol and calls for its swift formal adoption in

line with the timetable agreed in June 2007. The European Council calls on the Council to rapidly conclude its work with a view to formally adopting before the end of 2008 the draft Council Decision on strengthening Eurojust.

22. The European Council emphasises the need to strengthen cooperation with third countries and international organisations (especially the Hague Conference on Private International Law, the Council of Europe and the United Nations).

23. The European Council strongly supports the aim of having all EU Member States participating as quickly as possible in the U.S. Visa Waiver Programme in order to ensure full reciprocal visa-free travel and equal treatment for all EU citizens as is already the case for U.S. citizens entering the territory of the Member States.

24. The European Council welcomes ongoing efforts to reinforce the Union's disaster management capacities and stresses the need for a coordinated approach to managing disasters. It invites the Council, the Commission and Member States to take this work forward rapidly.

(...)

## WESTERN BALKANS

(...)

56. The European Council underlines that further steps by the **former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia** in its progress towards the EU are possible by the end of this year, provided that the conditions set out in the December 2005 European Council conclusions, the Copenhagen political criteria and the key priorities of the February 2008 accession partnership are met. In this context the European Council takes note of the conclusions of the GAERC of 16 June 2008. Maintaining good neighbourly relations, including a negotiated and mutually acceptable solution on the name issue, remains essential. The EU welcomes **Albania's** commitment to ensure the conditions for free, fair and democratic elections which must take place in 2009. Further efforts with regard to institutional capacities in public administration, the fight against corruption and organised crime as well as in the judiciary will be of similar importance. The European Council takes note of the progress **Montenegro** has made and encourages the country to further focus on building administrative capacity, pursuing the fight against corruption and organised crime, consolidating the institutions as well as reforms of the judiciary in accordance with the Constitution. To reach the next stage in their respective relations with the EU, Albania and Montenegro must also establish a convincing track record of successful SAA implementation. The European Council welcomes the recent signature of the SAA with **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, which constitutes an important step in that country's European course. Bosnia and Herzegovina must continue with the implementation of the reform process without delay, particularly with a view to fulfilling the objectives and conditions for the transition from the Office of the High Representative to the European Union Special Representative. The European Council looks forward to a new Government in Belgrade with a clear European agenda to push forward with necessary reforms. Building on the recent signature of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU, **Serbia** can accelerate its progress towards the EU, including candidate status, as soon as all necessary conditions are met in accordance with the GAERC conclusions of 29 April 2008. Recalling the European Council's conclusions of December 2007 and the GAERC conclusions of 18 February 2008 the European Union remains committed to playing a leading role in ensuring the stability of **Kosovo**, also through

EULEX Kosovo, EUSR and its contribution to an international civilian office as part of the international presences. The EU welcomes the UNSG's report on UNMIK and, as is described in his report, his intention to reconfigure the international civil presence in Kosovo.

This would facilitate the deployment of EULEX KOSOVO throughout Kosovo and allow for an enhanced operational role of the EU in the area of rule of law. The European Council also welcomes Kosovo commitment to the principles of democracy and equality of all its citizens, the protection of the Serb and other minorities, the protection of religious and cultural heritage as well as international presence. The European Council expresses its support to the forthcoming Donors' Conference and encourages bilateral and multilateral donors to pledge assistance. The EU recalls its willingness to assist the economic and political development of Kosovo through a clear European perspective, in line with the European perspective of the region.

## EXTERNAL RELATIONS

(...)

### Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean

65. The Mediterranean region is an area of vital strategic importance to the European Union in political, economic and social terms. The Barcelona Process has been the central instrument for Euro-Mediterranean relations since 1995 and has allowed the strong promotion of multi-lateral and bilateral cooperation. Building on and reinforcing previous successes, the 'Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean' will inject further momentum into the Union's relations with the Mediterranean. It will complement ongoing bilateral relations which will continue within existing policy frameworks.

66. The European Council welcomes the Commission's Communication of 20 May 2008 and, in particular, the proposals to add an enhanced political and institutional dimension to the EU's relations with Mediterranean partners through a new political impetus, notably by holding biennial summits, and to reinforce the shared ownership of the Partnership through the establishment of a co-presidency with due regard for the relevant provisions of the Treaties.

67. On this basis, the EU will conduct the necessary consultations with all Euro-Mediterranean partners with a view to preparing a joint declaration to be adopted at the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean on 13 July 2008.

(...)

## PRESIDENCY REPORT ON ESDP

1. In line with the mandate defined by the European Council in December 2007, the Presidency hereby submits this report on ESDP.

2. In presenting this report, the Presidency has noted that Denmark has drawn attention to Protocol No 5 on the position of Denmark, which is annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty.

### *I. Operational Activities*

#### **Western Balkans**

3. In line with the conclusions of European Council of 14 December 2007, which underlined

the readiness of the EU to play a leading role in strengthening the stability in the region and following the Council adoption of Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP on 4 February 2008, and subsequent planning documents (Concept of Operations also on 4 February and Operational Plan on 16 February), the **EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo**, EULEX KOSOVO was established for 28 months, until 15 June 2010. On 7 February 2008, Yves de Kermabon was appointed as Head of the EULEX Kosovo mission. In parallel, on 4 February, Peter Feith was appointed as EU Special Representative for Kosovo. The personnel selection process is being finalised, while the deployment is ongoing. Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States have formally indicated that they will contribute to EULEX Kosovo. The PSC established the Committee of Contributors on 22 April 2008, which first convened on 26 May 2008.

4. Following the successful reconfiguration of **Operation ALTHEA** in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in 2007 the EU-led force (EUFOR) numbers some 2500 troops on the ground, backed up by over-the-horizon reserves. Its operational focus remains the maintenance of a safe and secure environment and the transfer of Joint Military Affairs (JMA) tasks to relevant national authorities. The Council welcomed the successful participation of elements of the European Gendarmerie Force in the Integrated Police Unit of EUFOR since November 2007.

5. The Council reviewed Operation ALTHEA on 16 June and approved the Secretary General/High Representative's recommendations on the operation in the light of the advice received from relevant Council bodies. The Council reiterated that the EU remained actively committed to BiH, including through Operation ALTHEA, and that, as part of the EU's overall engagement in the country, the EU-led military presence would remain there for as long as necessary. The Council welcomed recent political developments in BiH, and noted that further developments in the country would need to be reflected in the EU's overall engagement. The Council noted that the security situation remained stable, welcomed the positive contribution of the operation to the safe and secure environment in BiH, and added that EUFOR continued to provide reassurance and remained ready to respond to possible security challenges throughout the country.

6. Coherence of overall EU action, including in support of further progress on reforms, in BiH – involving all EU actors including the Commission and EU Heads of Mission – remains a priority. The EU Force Commander, the EUSR and the Head of EUPM continue to consult each other regularly prior to taking action. EUFOR has also maintained a close working relationship, including on operational matters, with other international actors. In respect of Operation ALTHEA, cooperation with NATO continues to work smoothly and efficiently.

7. The **EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM)** has promoted and intensively supported the reform of the BiH law enforcement agencies. The adoption of the two police reform laws on 16 April is considered a major step forward and allowed for the signature of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA).

8. The implementation of this legislation will allow EUPM, the mandate of which has been extended for another two years until 31 December 2009, to focus on concrete capacity building at state level while promoting simultaneously a bottom-up approach for the country-wide harmonisation of all laws pertaining to law enforcement agencies and police officials.

9. Against these institutional developments, BiH law enforcement agencies and, in particular, SIPA have made substantial progress in developing sustainable policing arrangements for the targeting of organised crime networks and bringing to justice key figures allegedly involved in serious criminal offences.

10. Coordination among law enforcement agencies and an effective cooperation with the



judiciary still require a close monitoring by EUPM to cement the good practice and the achievements monitored in key cases.

11. Through its various instruments, including ESDP, the EU has contributed to security sector reform in BiH.

12. EUPM has, with support of the Presidency, organised a seminar on Police Reform in BiH - Security Sector Reform and the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) held in Sarajevo in June 2008. The outcome and lessons identified will contribute to the formulation of strategies to strengthen the rule of law and enable further progress towards European integration, to be promoted both by ESDP and Community Instruments.

### **Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus**

13. The mandate of the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus was extended until 28 February 2009, prolonging also the activities of the **EUSR Border Support Team in Georgia**. The team continues its work on assisting the implementation of the border reform in line with the EU-Georgia ENP Action Plan Priority Area 4. The Border Management Strategy of Georgia was endorsed by the President of Georgia on 4 February 2008. The team is assisting in drawing up the Implementation Action Plan of the approved strategy. The team promotes cooperation between Border Police and Revenue Service (Customs) in drafting joint procedures for cooperation and co-ordination in accordance with the European Concept for Integrated Border Management.

14. Additionally, the team continues assisting Georgian Border Police in the implementation of approved Standard Operating Procedures in the field. A new task for the team is to establish relevant contacts in the conflict regions 0150 South Ossetia and Abkhazia 0150 thereby enabling the team to contribute to confidence-building and to assess border-related issues in those regions. The task will be carried out once agreed with the Georgian Government and all parties concerned.

15. The Border Team of the EUSR for the Republic of Moldova continued its activities in contributing to enhancement of cooperation at the common border between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, with a particular focus on the Transnistrian section. The activities of the Border Team have been prolonged until 28 February 2009, following the extension of the mandate of the EUSR for the Republic of Moldova.

16. The work of the **Border Team of the EUSR for the Republic of Moldova** took place in close collaboration with the **EU Border Assistance Mission to the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine)**, which is a European Commission activity, staffed to a large extent by seconded experts from EU Member States. EUBAM promotes co-ordinated action of and assists the governments of the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine in areas involving border, customs and fiscal matters, including through monitoring activities.

17. The Memorandum of Understanding between the European Commission and the Governments of the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine establishing EUBAM was extended for an additional period of 24 months until 30 November 2009. The Head of EUBAM is also carrying out the function of Senior Political Advisor to the EUSR for the Republic of Moldova.

### **Middle East**

18. The EU's **Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX)** is aiming at strengthening the rule of law in Iraq and promoting human rights through providing training courses

and work-experience secondments in EU member states for senior Iraqi police, judicial and penitentiary personnel in management and criminal investigation.

19. The mission continues to provide training to Iraqi judges, prosecutors, senior members of the police force and senior penitentiary personnel. As of 16 May, the mission has provided training to a total of 1483 Iraqi personnel through 62 courses and 12 work experience secondments. During the first half of 2008, the mission facilitated with the help of Member States 11 training courses and one work experience secondment, with a total of approximately 200 participants.

20. EUJUST LEX continues to work to ensure Iraqi ownership and works closely with Iraqi interlocutors in order to make sure that it delivers training which corresponds to Iraqi needs.

21. The **EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories** (EUPOL COPPS) is assisting the Palestinian Civilian Police (PCP) in establishing sustainable and effective policing arrangements under Palestinian ownership in accordance with best international standards.

22. On 24 December 2007, by signing an exchange of letters with the SG/HR, the Israeli government granted diplomatic accreditation to the mission. In January 2008, the EU has approved contributions from two non-EU members, Canada and Norway, who seconded a total of three officers to the mission in the first half of the year. Following the EU Action Plan from November 2007, the mission is now planning an expansion of its Rule of Law section to undertake additional tasks in building capacity of the penal and criminal justice systems and the Prosecutor's office. A Civilian Response Team was deployed to the occupied Palestinian Territories to participate in the joint Commission-Council Secretariat FFM which was conducted from 25 May to 6 June in order to assess the needs and scope of the aid in the broader rule of law area in the occupied Palestinian Territories.

23. The **EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point** (EUBAM Rafah) provided its last third-party presence at the Rafah Crossing point (RCP) on 9 June 2007. After the closure of the Rafah Crossing Point on 14 June 2007, as a consequence of the takeover of Gaza by Hamas, the mission suspended its operations, while preserving its operational ability to redeploy at short notice.

24. The Council has reiterated its commitment to the EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah), to the Agreements concluded and to the region, in particular the Gaza population. It has underlined the importance of the implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access by all parties. The EU remains committed in its readiness to redeploy to the Rafah crossing point as soon as conditions allow it and has extended the mandate of the mission until 24 November 2008.

## **Africa**

25. In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1778 (2007), which approved the deployment in Chad and the Central African Republic of a multidimensional presence and authorised the EU to provide its military element, the EU launched on 28 January 2008 the bridging military operation in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic (**EUFOR Tchad/RCA**).

26. This operation is being carried out in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy, for a period of one year from the date that its initial operational capability was declared, on 15 March 2008. The Full Operational Capability (FOC) is expected to be achieved before the end of June 2008 and the situation on the ground is being constantly assessed by the competent Council bodies and the Operation Commander. The Council looked forward to the

mid-term review and report foreseen in UNSCR 1778(2007) which will report arrangements for following up EUFOR Tchad/RCA after the one-year period for which it has been authorised by the UN Security Council. The Council stressed the need for a timely start of preparatory work by the EU and the UN in this respect.

27. Negotiations with some third States that have shown willingness to contribute to the operation are ongoing. The PSC has accepted formal offers by Russia and Albania to participate in the operation. Non-EU European NATO members and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU have been regularly informed about the development of the operation.

28. The deployment of EUFOR Tchad/RCA is a concrete expression of the EU's comprehensive commitment to actively work for the improvement of the security situation in the region, in particular in Eastern Chad and North-Eastern Central African Republic, by contributing to the protection of refugees and IDPs, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance, helping to create the conditions for displaced people to return to their places of origin voluntarily, with the support of the Commission's Programme d'Accompagnement à la Stabilisation de l'Est du Tchad, as well as contributing to ensure MINURCAT's security and freedom to operate. In observance of its mandate, EUFOR Tchad/RCA will continue to act in an impartial, neutral and independent manner. The deployment has been welcomed by the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic.

29. Furthermore, the conduct of operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA is supplemented by continuous EU activities on a political level to foster inter-Chadian and regional dialogue in implementing the 13 August 2007 Agreement and the implementation of the 13 March 2008 Dakar Agreement between the Governments of Chad and Sudan, as well as by Community programmes.

30. The Council also welcomed the Commission's decision to assist in the financing of strengthening electoral capacity in Chad, including a census, in advance of the scheduled 2009 legislative elections. On the longer term, the 10th EDF's National Indicative Programme for Chad seeks to build on MINURCAT in reforming the justice sector to address the Chadian difficulties in the long-term, in addition to supporting good governance, SSR and development of Chadian infrastructure.

### **Democratic Republic of Congo**

31. The two ESDP missions, together with the European Community activities, have maintained their support to the Security Sector Reform (SSR) process in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) through the provision of expertise and technical assistance to the different domains (Police, Justice and Defence).

32. The Nairobi and Goma Peace processes have provided renewed impetus for stabilisation of the East of the Democratic Republic of Congo, supported by the efforts of the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the African Great Lakes and European Community activity. In the security domain, further support may be required from the international community.

33. **EUSECRD Congo** continued its work and efforts in the field of SSR and DDR in line with the mandate which expires on 30 June 2008. As regards the renovation of the military administration, the mission has continued the biometric census of the Armed Forces personnel. The chain-of-payments project has achieved real progress, notably the better delivery of increased salaries to the military. A gradual transfer of responsibilities to the Congolese administration is now a rational objective by June 2009.

34. The Congolese Government adopted in February 2008 a new Army model. This decision

represents a key step that will need international support for its implementation. After a joint mission to the DR Congo by the EUSR, Presidency and Secretariat, the SG/HR in April 2008 proposed to the government a provision of advice and technical assistance for the definition of modalities for the organisation of a Rapid Reaction Force.

35. The security situation in the East of the country has experienced some improvements in the wake of the signatures of the Nairobi communiqué and the Goma engagement acts for the Kivu provinces. Those recent achievements are still fragile as demonstrated by the continued violation of human rights by armed groups. Nevertheless, they represent the beginning of a process that could lead to a lasting peace. In this regard, the mission EUSEC RD Congo has provided support to the EUSR for the African Great Lakes Region in his efforts aiming at maintaining on track these processes.

36. Since **EUPOL RD Congo** started on 1 July 2007, important milestones have been achieved in the policing field: the operationalisation of the Comité Mixte de Réforme de la Police (CSRP) long with its working groups allowing to move forward the police reform. The mission has also continued to facilitate the linkage between the police and justice realms through its justice interface and its expertise provided to the justice reform process.

37. EUPOL RD Congo has continued to work in close cooperation with all international partners and close coordination with the Delegation of the European Commission as well as with the other ESDP mission, EUSEC RD Congo, especially through their joint capacities (Security/Human Rights-Children in Armed Conflict/Gender/Press and Public Information).

38. EUPOL RD Congo's mandate has been extended for another year, until 30 June 2009, with a view to consolidate the mission's achievements in support of the Congolese police reform process and its interaction with justice within the broader framework of Security Sector Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The extended mission will comprise the deployment of a limited number of experts to the cities of Goma and Bukavu in order to assist on the strategic level in the linkages and harmonisation between the police-related activities in the Eastern DRC and the reform process of the Congolese police, as well as to deliver assistance and expertise to the police and to the Gender and Human Rights/Children and armed conflict aspects of the stabilisation process in Eastern DRC.

39. Following Council adoption of the Joint Action on 12 February 2008, and the subsequent approval of planning documents (Concept of Operations on 12 February and Operational Plan on 5 June, the **EU mission in support of security sector reform in Guinea Bissau** was launched on 16 June 2008 and will last until end of May 2009. On 4 March General Juan Esteban Verástegui was appointed as head of EUSSR Guinea Bissau.

40. The strategic objective is to obtain a self-sustaining security sector capable of responding to society's security needs, including the fight against organised crime, compatible with democratic norms and principles of good governance, contributing to stability and lasting development in Guinea Bissau.

41. The mission provides advice and assistance on reform of the security sector (SSR) in Guinea Bissau to the local authorities in order to contribute to creating the conditions for implementation of the National SSR Strategy, in close cooperation with other EU, international and bilateral actors, and with a view to facilitating there through subsequent donor engagement. The mission will have a comprehensive character, having tasks with police, judicial and military components contributing to security sector reform.

42. Successful implementation of SSR in Guinea Bissau will depend on the commitment of

funds and resources by the international community and the commitment of the local authorities to promote SSR implementation.

### Asia

43. Since its launch in June 2007, the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan, **EUPOL Afghanistan** has further developed its action in Afghanistan in support to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), providing advice to the GIROA on the reform of the Afghan National Police (ANP) and mentoring and monitoring Afghan authorities. The strategic objective of the mission is to contribute to the establishment under Afghan ownership of sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements that will ensure appropriate interaction with the wider criminal justice system and in accordance with international standards, within the framework of the rule of law and respect for human rights.

44. The mission has now overcome the logistics challenges it faced during its build-up phase. EUPOL has made progress in implementing its mandate and is now deployed throughout the country: full deployment is planned for the end of the reporting period (June 2008). In addition to its staff based in EUPOL HQ, its mentors and advisers working with their Afghan counterparts in Kabul in central Afghan administrations, the mission is now deployed to most of the Afghan territory (in the Northern, Western and Southern regions), with EUPOL staff accommodated in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (9 PRTs, covering 13 Afghan provinces). Outside Kabul, the rehatting and/or deployment of these personnel under EUPOL Afghanistan has further increased the mission's added value in terms of coordination of the International Community (IC) reform efforts in Afghanistan. There was substantial progress achieved by EUPOL Afghanistan in the implementation of its mandate and in its deployment throughout the country.

45. The mission has been actively working with partners in rationalising the support that they offer to the Afghan Ministry of Interior and ANP to ensure a co-ordinated effort. The International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) and its Secretariat (partly manned with EUPOL Afghanistan staff) are now up and running, thus supporting the work of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) on the Afghan Compact. In this framework, the mission has been particularly involved in the development of a joint plan for MoI support, as well as the development of an integrated vision for the ANP, addressing requirements of law enforcement. The mission has also closely co-ordinated with the US on the development of a proposal for the reform of the MoI. Additionally EUPOL Afghanistan, in close cooperation with the EC delegation, has continued working towards the consolidation of activities across the criminal justice sector, including efforts to support the legislative and operational reform of criminal investigations, prosecutions and police-prosecutor cooperation. The mission has also been advising the Afghan authorities on the development of a Training Strategy for the ANP as well as on border management.

46. Given the size of the task, the EU is committed to substantially increase its efforts through EUPOL Afghanistan, with the aim of doubling the original number of experts working in the mission. Such an increase of the mission size would provide an important additional capacity on the key police reform issues. Due to the challenging operational environment, thorough preparation, timely planning, prior full operational capability and continued contribution of high-calibre staff are essential.

## *II. Planning and conduct of civilian missions and military operations*

47. The **Directorate for Civilian Crisis Management (DGE IX)** is responsible for political, strategic and horizontal issues of civilian crisis management, including policy and planning of civilian ESDP missions at the strategic level (in particular the Crisis Management Concept). It initiates the mainstreaming of new policy into operations, and is responsible for lessons learned/best practices/evaluation, relations with Third States and International Organisations, concepts, training and the capability development process. The service has gone through a reorganisation in recent months with the creation of two units (Horizontal issues; Operational issues), additional posts and it has acquired new expertise.

48. New arrangements continue to be implemented for command and control (C2) of EU civilian operations in crisis management as agreed by Council in June 2007. The acting Director of the **Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC)** stepped down after six months in February 2008 to take on new responsibilities. On May 1 2008, Kees Klompenhouwer, CPCC Director/Civilian Operations Commander was appointed to exercise C2 at the strategic level for the planning and conduct of all civilian crisis management operations under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee and under the overall authority of the SG/HR. CPCC's start-up recruitment drive is now complete. Internal standard operating procedures are in place.

49. Work continues in terms of strengthening command and control structures, enhancing duty of care and defining relations with other partners in the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, in particular the Watchkeeping Capability which, as 15 April, is progressively taking over under the CivOpCdr's functional authority the reception, view and transmission of information from and to civilian ESDP missions.

50. In the reporting period, two new missions were planned and launched (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau; EULEX Kosovo) and another (support to AMIS) closed down.

51. In the context of the conduct of civilian missions and in the line with the European Security Strategy which stated that better coordination between external action and justice and Home Affairs policies is crucial in particular in the fight against organized crime, progress was made on possible cooperation mechanisms between civilian ESDP Missions and Europol as regards the mutual exchange of information.

52. Work was conducted in order to implement the SG/HR report on the EU Military Staff's ability to conduct military planning at the strategic level for EU-led operations, as requested by the Council in May 2007, following the Wiesbaden Ministerial Conference. This resulted in a provisional restructuring of the EUMS and a limited revision of its Terms of Reference and organisation, aimed at enhancing the military ability to conduct early planning at strategic level in order to better inform and accelerate the Member States' decision-making process. A first evaluation report on the effectiveness and efficiency of the implementation of the agreed measures and actions will be provided in November 2008.

53. The **EU Watchkeeping Capability (WKC)**, as part of the Operations Directorate of the EU Military Staff has reached Initial Operating Capability by 17 March. It started initially with nine watchkeepers, an additional three have been selected and arrived by summer. Currently the WKC monitors the two military ESDP operations and five civilian missions. Two WKC exercises were held in order to test WKC/CPCC/SITCEN procedures and interaction. After completion of the training of the additional three watchkeepers and assumption

of watchkeeping responsibilities for all civilian missions the WKC will reach FOC by the end of August 2008.

### *III. Lessons Identified/Lessons Learned*

54. The **Process started on the establishment of** an architecture for evaluation, lessons and best practices of civilian ESDP missions that will provide a coherent framework for evaluation from this point onwards with a view to continuous learning and improvement. Civilian ESDP lessons to date were reviewed as well and a set of action plans for their implementation agreed. PSC will monitor the implementation of the plans within the next 6 months.

55. The **EU civilian-military supporting action to the African Union Mission in the Darfur region of Sudan (AMIS II)** was terminated on 31 December 2007 and its Civilian Component, the EU Police Team, was reduced to a 6-member Liquidation Team whose task was to proceed to the closure of the mission and the preparation of the Final Report. This closure process was completed by 30 April 2008 and the Final Report for the Civilian Component was presented to PSC by the Head of the Police Team on 15 April 2008. PSC noted lessons from the EU supporting action to AMIS II. The implementation of the lessons will be monitored by the PSC.

56. A number of recommendations are being prepared in view of the lessons learned process after the termination of the **EU Civilian-Military Supporting Action to the African Union Mission in the Darfur Region of Sudan (AMIS)** on 31 December 2007. The aim is to further consolidate these lessons and consider them in the planning of subsequent/possible civilian/military supporting actions or missions.

### *IV. Capabilities*

#### **(a) Development of Civilian Capabilities**

57. The Political and Security Committee agreed an implementation plan for the **new Civilian Headline Goal 2010** that was established by the Council on 19 November 2007. In line with this implementation plan, the EU has launched a capability planning process to assess required civilian ESDP capabilities and survey their availability. In this process, special attention is dedicated to possible synergies between civilian and military ESDP and between ESDP and European Community action and to enhance the visibility of this process.

58. The first step in the implementation was the establishment of a new common pilot illustrative scenario supportive of both civilian and military ESDP capability development processes, taking into account relevant capabilities available to the European Community. On this basis, EU capabilities (understood as personnel, equipment and concepts) necessary for a possible civilian ESDP mission are to be identified, taking account of all resources available to the EU and possible synergies between them.

59. The **development of the Civilian Capability Management Tool**, which started under the CHG 2008, was carried forward. This tool consists of interlinked software applications serving two main functions, i.e. supporting the civilian capability development process and supporting ESDP mission planning and preparation, notably the identification and raising of Human Resources. The development work is conducted in close cooperation with the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). The first leg of this system is expected to reach operational status by June 2008.

60. The implementation of the **Civilian Response Team (CRT)** process continued through the Call for nominations with the aim of strengthening the pool with 30 more experts, reaching the agreed overall target of 100 experts and, in particular, reinforcing the pool in the field of mission support. The nominations process is ongoing and new members of the pool will be trained in the autumn of 2008. This training was financed by the European Commission. Furthermore, the European Commission continued to provide procurement training and started to provide financial training for CRT pool members as well as other MS experts.

61. The CPCC has made tangible progress in its internal **build-up of mission** support by acquiring resources both in terms of numbers and know-how. The strengthened capacity of CPCC has led to a deeper reflection on the need to make the current civilian crisis management more efficient and more professional. Further work is ongoing to make ESDP missions' internal administration more efficient and professional, and to strengthen the overall systemic oversight to ensure that (a) the planning and conduct of civilian ESDP missions works efficiently, (b) in a professional manner and that (c) timely action can be taken to correct/improve when necessary. Part of this work is being undertaken in full cooperation with Directorate-General RELEX of the European Commission, according to the respective competences.

62. A joint working paper of the Council Secretariat and the European Commission containing an action plan to be gradually implemented in a number of thematic areas (concepts, finance, procurement, general support services and human resources) was presented to Member States. The action plan aims at improving the rapid and efficient deployment and conduct of ESDP civilian missions and presents a number of steps to be jointly undertaken by the Secretariat and the Commission. These include, inter alia, an agreement to develop a handbook for use of civilian ESDP mission administrations, a logistics framework, the improvement of recruitment procedures in general as well as streamlining and standardising of administrative procedures within missions. The implementation of the work programme will be closely monitored by the relevant Council bodies. A workshop was held in June to launch the work of the three task groups in the areas of human resources requirements, force generation and deployment.

63. The concept of **Preparatory Measures and Preparatory Teams** in the context of the Preparatory Measures budget line within the CFSP budget was further developed in order to make the Preparatory Measures budget line operational; the aim is to facilitate significantly the preparation of future civilian ESDP missions by making funds rapidly available notably for procurement of key equipment and early deployment of administrative personnel.

64. The ability of the EU to ensure immediate deployment can be optimized by relying on an extensive catalogue of existing contracts at the disposal of the missions, and pre-established partnerships with suppliers. In this regard, work has been undertaken in the area of procurement concerning the elaboration and conclusion of framework contracts: the contracts for armoured vehicles and soft-skin off-road vehicles have been recently concluded, the procedure for the soft-skin city vehicles has been launched and is on-going, the launch of a specific procedure for Communications and Information Systems equipment and services is expected to take place very soon. In the near future, work is expected to continue with a view to the conclusion of contracts for the provision of services related to health, medevac and high risk insurances. A tender on strategic transport is also planned to be launched in the near future.

65. On the issue of **human resources**, the implementation of the new regime for ESDP missions' international contracted staff was revised through the new Commission



Communication on CFSP Special Advisers, and related implementation tools. The new remuneration regime for international contracted staff improves the attractiveness of ESDP missions as employers and thus helps improve the availability of essential mission support personnel, for the posts not already covered by seconded personnel.

66. The effort to give more awareness to Calls for Contributions for ESDP operation is still ongoing, with the creation of web links in different agencies and cross-links among the missions themselves.

### **(b) Development of Military Capabilities**

67. Within the context of the Headline Goal (HLG) 2010 and as recommended by the Progress Catalogue 2007 (PC07), the EU Military Committee (EUMC) conducted an analysis resulting in a **First Prioritisation of capability shortfalls**, which was approved by the EUMC on 30 April 2008. The analysis was based on PC07, including its Initial Orientation, and additional available information.

68. The First Prioritisation refines the Initial Orientation findings in PC07 by associating a higher or lower importance to identified capability shortfalls within the Critical, Intermediate and Minor groups respectively. This EUMC prioritisation of the capability shortfalls for the short to-mid term in the context of the HLG 2010 informs the capability development process and provides an EUMC guidance for addressing the identified shortfalls, in particular in the areas of force protection, deployability and information superiority. Within the Critical group, capability shortfalls related to Computer Network Operations, establishing and operating from austere bases and locations, Inter Theatre Transport, Vertical Lift, Air-to-Air Refuelling, and Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance Collection were given higher importance.

69. Progress was made in the **Capability Development Plan (CDP)**, which participating Member States are elaborating through the European Defence Agency and the EUMC in active and efficient cooperation. Besides those Strands, which fall under the responsibility of the EUMC, Strands A and D, the EUMC played a collaborative role in Strand B, which aims at identifying possible trends in future ESDP military capability needs beyond the Headline Goal 2010.

70. Member States were encouraged to use the CDP, of which a first tranche of actionable conclusions will be presented at the EDA Steering Board in July, as a tool to orientate their efforts to further improve their military capabilities.

71. A Compilation of the **Headline Goal (HLG) 2010 process Lessons Identified** was elaborated as a basis for further work, including analysing these lessons and drawing conclusions, and for possible refinements of the HLG process.

72. On 18 April 2008 the PSC noted the Final Reports of the three remaining Project Groups of the **European Capability Action Plan (ECAP)**. Following PSC's recommendation, the Council agreed on 26 May to terminate the ECAP. The issues raised by the former Project Groups, namely the processing of Special Operations Forces Concept deliverables, the EU Headquarters manning mechanism and an Air and Missile Defence CONOPS, will be further elaborated by the EUMS, drawing upon Member States expertise as required. The EUMC will keep the PSC informed about these issues.

73. On 15 January 2008, the PSC sought advice from CIVCOM on the proposal to utilise the same **Information Gathering (IG) Tool** for the civilian and the military capability development processes. The full context of IG for the EU is under development. Additionally, the PSC

endorsed the requirement to contact NATO, to determine whether NATO is willing to share an IG Tool that satisfies both EU and NATO requirements.

74. On 10 March 2008, the EUMC agreed the **Framework for EU Military Conceptual Documents**. It describes how the EUMC manages this framework and its content.

75. The **EU Military Rapid Response Concept** provides a basis for the conduct of EU-led military operations requiring a rapid response. Following a Tri-Presidency (Germany, Portugal, Slovenia) initiative, a mandate and methodology for conducting a review of this concept was agreed by the EUMC on 20 December 2007. An initial meeting was held on 15 April 2008, at which Member States agreed to hold two workshops on this issue, with the first workshop on 29 and 30 May 2008.

76. Since 1 January 2007, two **Battlegroups (BG)** have been on standby at any given time. At the Battlegroup Co-ordination Conference (BGCC) on 24 April 2008, Member States have committed in detail the required BG packages until the second Semester in 2009 and have committed BG packages until the first Semester in 2011. They were invited to make new voluntary offers at next Conference in October 2008 in order to fill in particular the vacant slot in second semester of 2010. The next BGCC will be held on 16 October 2008.

77. Work was conducted on possible ways to improve standardisation in support of MS-led BG preparatory activities. According to a methodology set in January 2008, two workshops were organised to elaborate a Generic Training Guide and a Generic Evaluation and Certification Guide. These documents will be merged in a single BG Generic Preparation Guide, to be presented to the EUMC in July 2008 and used by Member States on a voluntary basis.

78. In response to an EU Chiefs of Defence task in November 2007, the EUMS produced a Food For Thought paper on the realities associated with meeting the agreed EU BG related decision and deployment timelines. This paper initiated two workstrands: the incorporation of the early activation of EU Operation and Force Headquarters into ongoing work on the Headquarters manning mechanism, and the compression of the timelines for Operational Planning documents in support of the EU BG Concept.

79. The **EU Maritime Rapid Response** and **Air Rapid Response** Concepts were agreed by the EUMC on 15 November 2007 and 21 December 2007. They both foresee the implementation of a Maritime or Air Rapid Response Mechanism focused on force generation and supported by a Database, updated through bi-annual Maritime or Air Rapid Response Information Conferences and Member States' own initiatives.

80. The Maritime Rapid Response Database was populated in April 2008 by Member States offers for the second semester 2008. It was reviewed during the first Maritime Rapid Response Information Conference (MarRRIC) which took place on 25 April 2008. The next MarRRIC will be held on 15 October 2008.

81. As a next step in the Air Rapid Response area it is foreseen to develop the Air Rapid Response database and to conduct the first Air Rapid Response Information Conference (AirRRIC). A Table Top Exercise conducted by the EUMS is planned to validate the concept.

82. A further step would be to develop the EUFOR Deployment Operating Base implementing doctrine and to validate it. National exercises such as BAPEX 08 to be conducted by France on 3-5 December 2008 will inform this reflection.

### **(c) European Defence Agency (EDA)**

83. The Head of the Agency's report highlighted good progress on developing and imple-

menting long-term strategies, and on generating and maturing specific cooperative initiatives.

84. The Agency made substantial progress in developing and implementing the long-term strategies:

- a) The initial version of the Capability Development Plan (CDP), established in close consultation with the EUMC and the EUMS, should be delivered at the Steering Board in Capabilities Directors' formation in July this year, with the first tranche of Actionable Conclusions. Good progress has been achieved in the four strands of the CDP. In particular, work has progressed towards the identification of the potential capability trends and characteristics up to 2025 and beyond, and participating Member States have accelerated the inputting of potential collaborative projects into the dedicated Database with their national inputs.
- b) The implementation of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base strategy is well on track with, notably, some progress on Security of Supply and on the identification of key industrial technologies to be developed or preserved in Europe (with agreement to start work on Future Air Systems).
- c) The development of a European Defence Research and Technology Strategy is under way, with progress on the definition of key technologies and on a number of new tools to manage Research and Technology (R&T) activities and to improve the generation of opt-in R&T projects under EDA's umbrella.
- d) Work has continued on the development of a European Armaments strategy meant to describe the translation process between a capability need and a cooperative armaments programme.

85. Furthermore, the Agency started with advertising its potential added value in specific ad hoc cooperative projects and programmes with a view to enhancing and improving European cooperation.

86. The Agency also continued to implement policies and specific projects and initiatives, in particular:

- a) Positive assessment of the overall implementation of the Regime on defence procurement, indicating that in general subscribing Member States have adapted their procurement practices to the provisions of the Code of Conduct. Bulgaria decided to join the Regime on defence procurement on 23 April. Furthermore, the Steering Board approved on 26 May Norway's participation in the Regime.
- b) Successful implementation of the first Agency's Defence R&T Joint Investment Programme, in the area of Force Protection, with contracted projects launched and further calls for projects under way.
- c) Approval by the Steering Board in Defence Minister's formation of a new Defence R&T Joint Investment Programme, in the area of Innovative Concepts and Emerging Technologies.
- d) Initiation of activities to improve the availability of helicopters for ESDP operations, in the areas of training, upgrades and logistics.
- e) Preparatory work in view of implementing the roadmap to fly Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in regulated airspace.
- f) Progress on the drafting of the Network Enabled Capability Concept, to be discussed by the Steering Board in Capabilities Directors' formation (July 2008), after which the SG/HR will decide on further handling, for consideration of the Council bodies, including the PSC.
- g) Establishment of a Project Team to study viable business and operational models for the development of a European Air Transport Fleet and their implementation modalities.

## *V. Civil-Military Coordination*

87. The Council noted further progress in the work on Information Exchange Requirements (IER) aimed at identifying operational requirements for exchanging information between all entities, both civilian and military, that may interact in support of ESDP operations. This work includes the development of vignettes covering military and civilian operations, as defined in the revised Global Overview and Roadmap noted by the PSC in December 2007. The Council looked forward to further Steps in accordance with the IER Methodology.

88. The Council noted that the work on IER is undertaken in close coordination with the work undertaken on the ESDP Network Enabled Capabilities.

## *VI. EU Satellite Centre (EUSC)*

89. The **EU Satellite Centre** continued to provide products and services in support of ESDP related activities. This covered support for EU operations and missions, contingency planning, as well as periodical monitoring tasks. In particular, the support to EUFOR Tchad/RCA, has led to a successful cooperation between the Operation Headquarters (OHQ) in Mont Valérien and the EUSC. The close cooperation with the UN has been pursued. The EUSC has taken an active role in the framework of the European initiative of Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES).

## *VII. EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)*

90. The **EU Institute for Security Studies** continued its work with regard to research, debate and analysis on security issues. The Institute formed a focal point for academic exchange, networking and monitoring of the European security agenda as well as a policy-orientated think tank supplying European policy-makers with analysis, advice and suggestions. The Institute has organised a series of seminars, for example regarding Russia on 18 January 2008, the Mediterranean Union Initiative and the Barcelona Process on 7 March 2008, on the Western Balkans on 17 March, on Iran on 11 April, on Iraq on 14 April and on EU-Latin America military cooperation on 21 and 22 April. It co-hosted a high-level seminar in Rabat with the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation on ESDP on 14 March 2008.

## *VIII. ESDP and Space*

91. The work on the actions identified in the Initial Road Map for the 'European Space Policy: ESDP and Space' has continued within the framework set by the European Space Policy.

92. In the framework of GMES, the General Council Secretariat has continued, together with the European Commission, the reflection on the identification of end-user communities for future security applications and on specific generic requirements to fulfil security missions.

## *IX. Security and Development*

93. The adoption by the Council in November 2007 of Conclusions on the nexus between security and development was the start of an important and ambitious process. The

Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council, in close cooperation with the Member States, have initiated work to take the implementation of the Conclusions forward.

94. Initial actions identified in the Conclusions are increasingly put into practice (joint fact-finding missions, cross-pillar cooperation in the planning and preparation of ESDP operations, etc.).

95. Preparations for the future Action Plan on Security and Development are ongoing. The Conclusions confirmed that the Action Plan should be informed by lessons learned from past and current experiences in a few specific countries where ESDP missions and operations and/or CFSP, Community and bilateral Member States activities are being planned, conducted or have come to an end. These countries have been identified, and the Council welcomed the Commission's initiative to launch a study to draw lessons from current and past experiences in the countries.

96. The nexus between Security and Development is also taken duly into account in the framework of the implementation of the EU-Africa Partnership.

97. The Presidency has promoted work on specific dimensions of the Security and Development nexus. Studies on Children Affected by Armed Conflict, and Women and Armed Conflict, both with particular reference to development policy, have been discussed by relevant Council Working Parties.

## *X. Security Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration*

98. The Council welcomed the willingness of the United Nations to play an enhanced role in supporting Security Sector Reform (SSR). The report prepared last January by the Secretary-General exemplifies the potential for cooperation between the UN and its partners, including the European Union. The development of a holistic and coherent United Nations approach to security sector reform, in support of national actors, will help forge universally agreed policies and guidelines. The Council recalled its operational support for security sector reform through ESDP missions to partners outside the European Union. In this context, the EU stands ready to act as an important partner to a United Nations approach to security sector reform, including disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR).

## *XI. Human Rights Issues, Gender Issues and Protection of Children Affected by Armed Conflict (CAAC)*

99. The declassified version of the Handbook on Mainstreaming Human Rights and Gender Issues into the ESDP is being published as a result of the Tri-Presidency (Germany, Portugal, Slovenia) continued efforts. It will enhance visibility and awareness of these issues within the civil society, NGOs, international organizations and target audiences on the ground.

### **Human Rights**

100. Human Rights issues, including Children Affected by Armed Conflict (CAAC) and Gender issues continued to be systematically included in the planning and conduct of all ESDP missions and operations, and subsequently evaluated in the lessons learned process. Closer cooperation on these issues with EU Special Representatives (EUSRs), whose mandates contain specific provisions to address Human Rights issues, CAAC and Gender issues, is much welcomed.

## **Gender**

101. The importance of Gender mainstreaming has continued to be emphasized, as well as the reinforcement of efforts in the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and relevant EU documents, particularly with a view to achieving more concrete progress in this field on the ground. In this regard, the study conducted during this Presidency on Enhancing the EU response to women and armed conflict was a substantial contribution.

102. Several ESDP missions now have gender expertise in their missions. In the EUFOR Tchad/RCA operation, the gender adviser appointed to the Operational Headquarters is, inter alia, conducting gender training and has proposed a comprehensive structure for monitoring and reporting. The planned EULEX Kosovo mission will have a Human Rights and Gender Unit not only ensuring compliance of EULEX Kosovo policies and decisions with Human Rights and Gender standards but also constituting an entry point for all third parties complaints related to alleged breaches of the code of conduct against third parties. EUSEC RD Congo and EUPOL RD Congo share a gender adviser, as well as a Human Rights/Children and Armed Conflicts expert, and the gender adviser in EUPOL Afghanistan provides advice to the Afghan authorities on gender policy in the Afghan National Police. Finally, gender mainstreaming is subsequently being evaluated in the lessons learned processes.

## **Children Affected by Armed Conflict (CAAC)**

103. With regard to CAAC issues and the further implementation of UNSCR 1612, the study commissioned by the Presidency on this subject, as well as the review based on the Questionnaire and the concrete amendments to the Council document Checklist for the Integration of the Protection of Children affected by Armed Conflict into ESDP Operations, has particularly emphasized the aim to further enhance its implementation on the ground.

104. The revised Checklist points to needed improvements in the field of training, monitoring and reporting, public visibility and local awareness. Explicitly defining the concept of child protection, emphasizing the need for direct exchange of information and putting additional focus on the CAAC issues in the field, it is aimed at further improving the implementation of the Checklist among actors involved in ESDP missions/operations.

105. Within the wider framework of the activities undertaken by the Presidency on children affected by armed conflict, the Centre for European Perspective (CEP), in cooperation with the European Commission and the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) organized a conference 'Increasing the impact on the ground – NGO and EU collaboration in the thematic area of children affected by armed conflict'. The conference aimed to gather representatives of NGOs, EU Member States, EU institutions and International Organizations with a proven expertise on the issue to look into how enhanced collaboration at all levels between the different EU institutions as well as between the institutions and NGOs can lead to more impact on the ground for children affected by armed conflict.

## ***XII. Conflict Prevention***

106. The European Union continued its efforts in the area of conflict prevention, including implementation of the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, adopted by the European Council in Göteborg in June 2001 and taking into account the European Security Strategy of December 2003. It also reflects the spirit of the Progress Report of the UN Secretary

General on Prevention of Armed Conflicts published in August 2006 and the Recommendations of the EU Annual Report on conflict prevention adopted by the European Council in June 2007. 107. Throughout the reporting period, conflict prevention continued to be a key EU objective. Efforts were pursued to improve culture of conflict prevention, further strengthen conflict sensitivity and conflict prevention approach, develop the necessary capabilities and capacities and enhance coherence between the EU's various external policy instruments as well as cooperation between the EU institutions and the Member States.

108. The annual report on EU activities in the framework of conflict prevention, including implementation of the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts recommended that the European Union 'examine possible ways of taking account of Member States' relevant activities in the field of conflict prevention'. To this end, a questionnaire aimed at assisting this process and contributing to a broad overview of Member States' activities and capabilities in this area has been adopted by the PSC on 10 October, 2007 and it was sent to the Member States. The results of the questionnaire were analysed, discussed and endorsed during a CivCom working group meeting in April 2008 which concluded that conflict prevention has made considerable progress but must be further enhanced in several sectors such as preparedness and adequate response to crisis situations. The findings of this assessment which was undertaken to present an overall view on conflict prevention, will be reflected in this year's conflict prevention report.

109. A **workshop on conflict prevention and climate change**, held on 24 and 25 April 2008 in Brussels, was the first in the new two-year programme on conflict prevention in practice. It was organised by the Madariaga European Foundation and the Folke Bernadotte Academy with the support of the Presidency, and in cooperation with the Council of the European Union, the European Commission and the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office. The workshop addressed the main security risks as well as the role of climate change as a cause or an exacerbating factor of conflict, and tried to indicate possible early warning strategies. Actors from different sectors and nations discussed how to improve the cooperation and partnership in conflict prevention. The workshop brought together senior representatives of major international and regional organizations and agencies as well as other key players in conflict prevention.

### *XIII. Visibility of the ESDP*

110. Enhancing visibility of the ESDP remains one of the priorities of the EU. While our activities in the field of crisis management are growing and the EU is taking on increasing responsibility for the stabilization and peaceful development of regions affected by conflicts around the world, there is a clear need to continue to effectively communicate our goals and aims to the broader public, decision makers and major stake holders.

111. The EU continued to develop a clear and coherent information and communications strategy in the field of ESDP. Special attention was given to public outreach campaigns on the launch of the crisis management operations in Kosovo, Chad and Guinea Bissau and to the successful conduct of already ongoing operations, especially in Afghanistan. The information activities have been closely co-ordinated with public information activities in Brussels (Council Secretariat and relevant European Commission Services). Public diplomacy and ESDP was also discussed by Security Policy Directors at the meeting hosted by the Presidency in April 2008.

#### *XIV. Cooperation with Non-Governmental Organisations*

112. To enhance the dialogue between NGOs and the members of Council preparatory bodies, the Presidency regularly invited **NGO representatives** to give briefings to members of the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management in accordance with the Recommendations for Enhancing Cooperation with NGOs and CSOs. Particular care was taken to ensure that NGO input as appropriate was given during the early stages of the planning phase for civilian ESDP missions.

113. With a view to reviewing the document 'Enhancing Cooperation with NGOs and CSOs in the framework of EU civilian crisis management and conflict prevention' during this Presidency, a survey was undertaken with all Heads of Mission and EUSRs to investigate their current and past relations with NGOs and CSOs.

114. On the basis of the survey the review of the above mentioned document has been carried out. This Review outlines a number of areas where EU cooperation with NGOs/CSOs should be taken forward.

115. A Civil Society Conference with EULEX KOSOVO was organised in May by the Council General Secretariat in cooperation with the Presidency and EULEX KOSOVO and prepared in association with the European Peace Building Liaison Office (EPLO). The conference presented the objectives of EULEX KOSOVO to participating NGOs/CSOs, focussing on issues such as human rights, gender and accountability. The conference also explored how all actors can contribute to the strengthening of Rule of Law in Kosovo.

#### *XV. EU Training relevant to ESDP*

116. In January 2008, the Council approved the EU Training Programme in ESDP for the years 2008-2010. It includes the training activities of the European Security and Defence College and of other EU training actors, including those training activities of Member States that are open to participation of other nationals. The programme is kept available and regularly updated on the web page of the Council (ESDC web page).

117. Training activities in the field of ESDP of the various EU actors conducted in the previous year have been thoroughly evaluated in the **Comprehensive Annual Report on ESDP and ESDP-related Training (CART 2008)** and steps identified to further improve training activities have been approved by the Council. The possibility of a more systematic set-up of the annual EU Training Programme, a better management and coordination of some training activities provided at EU-level and possibilities to close the gap between training, recruitment and deployment in the field of civilian crisis management are some of the important conclusions agreed by the Council.

118. The **European Security and Defence College (ESDC)** successfully concluded its third ESDP High Level Course with the 5th and final module on 11 April 2008 in Ljubljana. Other modules were held in Brussels, Lisbon, Prague/Brno and Tartu. The course certificate was awarded to 61 course participants. Hosted by the Slovenian Presidency, for the first time, about 60 former course participants of the ESDP High Level Courses convened in Ljubljana for an ESDC Alumni Seminar from 10 to 12 April 2008.

Furthermore, three ESDP Orientation Courses have been conducted successfully, one in February 2008 in Palermo hosted by CASD/Rome, a second in May 2008 in Brussels hosted by



the Netherlands Defence College and a third one beginning of June 2008 in Brussels hosted by the Slovenian Presidency. Two of these courses were open to participation of third states and international organisations.

119. As regards the ESDC training activities, measures have been agreed by the ESDC Steering Committee to improve the quality and quantity of the ESDC courses. Firstly, a more conceptual and modular approach to future ESDC training activities will allow to address a wider range of audiences and to respond to new developments and demands arising from forthcoming missions and operations by offering a wider range of strategic-level courses. Secondly, the establishment and running of the Internet-based Advanced Distance Learning (IDL) System, including the development of training material for training relevant to ESDP, is now pursued with priority and will be tested in an experimental phase in the context of the next ESDP High Level Course 2008/2009, Module 1 in Summer and early Autumn 2008. The provision of a real IDL capacity, which could have wider benefits also for the national Institutes, will be subject to the necessary resources to be made available.

120. In February 2008, the PSC had a debate on the activities and perspectives of the ESDC based on the Article 13 Report of the ESDC Steering Committee where Member States expressed their general support to ESDC and its activities and recommended to Council a revision of the Joint Action establishing the ESDC taking into account the conclusions of this report. The revised Joint Action will be submitted to the Council for agreement on 23 June 2008.

121. As regards the future perspectives of the ESDC, the Council will revert to the issue in November 2008 on the basis of a detailed study including an agreed training need analysis.

122. Following the initiative to share Member States' training facilities on a voluntary basis, subsequently, the EUMS took this initiative forward. Member States provided their offers of available national training facilities, which were placed on a Catalogue on a Council website. After a first assessment, the EU shared training facilities catalogue is considered to be a useful tool on which the EUMS is currently working for improvement.

123. All on-going ESDP missions have continued with their regular training activities in the area of civilian crisis management. The **EUPT Kosovo** Training Team in particular has organized a regular three days in-mission induction training for all EULEX Kosovo personnel upon deployment, while Member States are responsible for pre-mission mission specific training of their personnel. This induction training plays a crucial role in ensuring common approach and vision amongst the mission staff.

124. Concerning training and evaluation, EULEX Kosovo is for the first time exercising a concept of best practices, which includes both training and evaluation as one of the quality assurance tools for the mission management as part of the Head of Mission's office. This concept will be further developed at the EU level as part of conceptual and capabilities development for the future ESDP civilian missions.

125. The Council Secretariat continued the practice of key mission personnel induction training organised in Brussels. For the EU SSR mission in Guinea-Bissau this training was successfully organised in several stages and included a special module on Security Sector Reform.

126. The European Commission financed two actions under the Instrument for Stability. The first project is designed to consolidate and to complete the work undertaken in the past years by the EC Project on training for civilian aspects of crisis management. The second project deals with the operational training of police experts to be deployed in international missions, aiming at training 600 experts in two sessions (one in June and the other in November 2008) in St.

Astier, France, and is undertaken by the French Gendarmerie. CivCom was invited by the project and travelled to observe the practical exercises on 18/19 June.

## *XVI. Exercises*

127. The Council approved the EU Exercise Programme 2009-2013 on 26 May 2008, thus defining the five year rolling programme of EU exercises and exercise-related activities.

128. The Council welcomed the successful conduct of the EU Military Exercise 2008 (MILEX 08). This third EU military exercise took place from 19-27 June 2008. It focused mainly on the interaction between the EU Operation Headquarters in Rome, provided by Italy and the EU Force Headquarters in Valencia, provided by Spain.

129. The Council underlined the importance of continued preparatory work for the EU crisis management exercise to be conducted from 29 September to 10 October 2008 (CME 08). This will provide an opportunity to undertake for the first time operational planning in parallel for a military operation and a reconfigured civilian ESDP mission engaged in the same theatre. The EU OHQ for this exercise will be at Mont Valérien (France), which also has responsibility for the operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA. The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability will be participating in an EU crisis management exercise for the first time.

130. Preparatory work was undertaken for the fourth EU Military Exercise to be held in 2009, i.e. MILEX 09, focusing on military aspects of crisis management at the military strategic and operational level for an envisaged EU-led crisis management operation, including maritime component, without recourse to NATO common assets and capabilities. The EU OHQ for this exercise will be provided by Greece and is located in Larissa. In addition, the EU FHQ will be in Naples and is provided by Italy.

131. The Council recalled the importance it attaches, in accordance with the EU exercise policy, to the planning and conduct of regular crisis management exercises, including together with NATO and with the participation of all EU Member States.

## *XVII. Cooperation with International Organisations, Mediterranean Partners and Third States*

### **Cooperation with International Organisations**

#### **EU-UN**

132. EU-UN cooperation continues to be an important component of ESDP. In June 2007 the EU and UN agreed a Joint Statement on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management, which builds on the 2003 Joint UN-EU Declaration. The Joint Statement is being progressively implemented through a series of concrete recommendations approved by the PSC, inter alia in the fields of reinforced dialogue (including regular consultation between senior UN officials and the PSC), SSR, African peace-keeping capabilities, and the multidimensional aspects of peace-keeping.

133. Close cooperation between the EU and the UN in crisis management has continued, in particular on: Chad, where the two Secretaries-General have established an Arrangement on cooperation between EUFOR Tchad/RCA and the UN mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) dealing in particular with mutual support; the DRC, where EUSEC/RDC and EUPOL/RDC have continued to cooperate successfully with MONUC; and Kosovo, where an ESDP civilian mission is planned to take over a number of the tasks hitherto performed by UNMIK.

## EU-NATO

134. Coordination and cooperation efforts between the SG/HR and NATO SG and cooperation on the ground between the EU and NATO with regard to theatres where the two organizations are engaged, in particular Kosovo and Afghanistan, have continued. EU-NATO coordination, including on strategic level, needs to be further strengthened, in order to enhance the overall effectiveness of the efforts of the two organisations and further develop their strategic partnership in crisis management, whilst respecting the decision making autonomy of each organisation.

135. Aspects of EU-NATO cooperation and the need for a pragmatic approach were also discussed by Ministers in February 2008 in Brdo (Slovenia) and in May 2008 in Brussels, particularly regarding in-theatre cooperation in Kosovo and Afghanistan and the need for solid arrangements.

136. Regarding operation ALTHEA, EU-NATO cooperation in the context of the 'Berlin Plus' arrangements has continued to work smoothly and efficiently both in Brussels and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As for the continued dialogue between EU and NATO, PSC and NAC have exchanged information on Operation ALTHEA and NATO HQ Sarajevo. Regular meetings have also taken place between the SG/HR and the NATO SG as well as between EU and NATO staffs.

137. Cooperation has been facilitated through the permanent EU Cell at SHAPE and the NATO permanent liaison team at the EU Military Staff in accordance with their Terms of Reference.

138. The Council reaffirmed the need for continued cooperation between EU and NATO on issues of military capability development. The EU-NATO Capability Group continued to provide a forum for exchanging information on the development of military capabilities in the EU and NATO where requirements overlap. All Member States were informed of these issues. The Council welcomed the document 'Considérations sur le groupe UE-OTAN des capacités militaires' which was made available to NATO on the basis of transparency and reciprocity and noted that the participation of all EU Member States to the Group would further facilitate the exchange of information between the two organisations in the domain of military capabilities. As a result preparatory work in the appropriate EU working parties was reinforced and information on a number of new relevant capability related issues of interest to both the EU and NATO could be exchanged with, on the EU side, a strong participation from EDA experts. The EU-NATO Capability Group had an initial exchange of views on the need to improve the availability of European helicopters. Discussion will continue based on further work, respectively in the EU, including the EDA for the benefit of all its participating Member States, and in NATO.

## EU-AU and Sub-Regional Organisations and Strengthening African Capabilities

139. In the framework of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy adopted in December 2007 during the EU/Africa Lisbon Summit, and its first Action Plan (2008-2010), the implementation of the peace and security partnership has started.

140. The new EU delegation to the AU in Addis Ababa was set up on the ground in January 2008. This delegation is in the process of being staffed with political, military and civilian expertise. The European Union Special Representative/Head of delegation to the African Union, Koen Vervaeke, will inter alia. offer advice and provide support to the building up of the African Union's crisis management capabilities.

141. The SG/HR Special Advisor for the African Peacekeeping Capabilities, Pierre-Michel Joana, was appointed on 3 March 2008 with the main objective to assist the SG/HR in promoting and implementing the EU involvement to support the building of African Peacekeeping Capabilities, in the ESDP framework and in reference to the Joint EU/Africa Strategy. Activities

will be co-ordinated with international actors, inter alia the United Nations, NATO, the United States, Canada, China, Brasil and Japan.

142. According to the Action Plan with proposals for the implementation of the EU concept for Strengthening African Capabilities of May 2007, EURO RECAMP will be a two-year programme of strategic-level training activities to be provided to African partners, culminating in a Command Post Exercise (CPX). EURO RECAMP has been designated by the African Union (AU) as the vehicle to support the training and operationalisation of the African Standby Force by 2010 and will cover both the military and civilian components of crisis management. In January, discussions were held in Addis Ababa with the African Union and the framework nation to prepare the main elements of the EURO RECAMP cycle: timing, scenario, activities and financial issues.

143. In April, the Council General Secretariat and the Commission presented a joint paper to the PSC on EU support to African Training Centres. This project has the objective to draw up, together with the Commission of the African Union, a preliminary study of support for African training centres in the area of peace and security. The result should be a programme of activities setting out priorities, support measures, benchmarks, a timetable and arrangements for implementation, including EU funding foreseen under the Peace Facility (10th EDF). Support provided under this programme will cover the military and civilian aspects of crisis management in a balanced manner. Contacts have been held with EU Member States, other donors and international organisations to identify support activities by relevant actors.

#### **EU-OSCE**

144. The Presidency supported by the Finnish OSCE Chairmanship addressed issues for common cooperation at various levels and occasions. The EU-OSCE Ministerial Troika in Luxembourg on 28 April 2008 discussed e.g. EU-OSCE cooperation on EULEX Kosovo, the future of OMIK, electoral issues in the Southern Caucasus, conflict resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Moldova (Transnistria) and gave an outlook on a possible EU-OSCE engagement on border issues in Afghanistan.

145. The EU-OSCE staff-to-staff discussions on 13 June 2008 further deepened discussions on specific technical issues and bring cooperation to a higher level of understanding thus strengthening coherence in the light of avoiding overlap and of fostering a seamless partnership in the field.

#### **Cooperation with Mediterranean Partners**

146. Dialogue between the EU and Mediterranean Partners continued to be pursued with a view to strengthening cooperation in the field of security and defence. The Euro-Mediterranean Senior Officials Meeting devoted to ESDP is scheduled for 23 June. Information meetings continued to be organised by the Secretariat for the benefit of Mediterranean Partners, including on ESDP operations and missions, as well as on the EU support to the development of the African capabilities. Some Mediterranean Partners continued to participate in ESDP operations and missions, as well as in the ESDP Orientation Courses under the aegis of the European Security and Defence College. The EU Institute for Security Studies (ISS) launched a series of seminars, together with the Mediterranean partners, with a view to deepen Euro-Mediterranean dialogue in the field of security and defence. The first such seminar was held on 14 March 2008 in Rabat in Morocco and focused on dialogue between the EU and its Mediterranean partners on ESDP.

## **Cooperation with Third States**

147. The EU continued the close cooperation in ESDP crisis management with the non-EU European NATO members and countries which are candidates for accession to the EU, Canada, Russia, Ukraine and other third states. Non-EU European NATO members and countries which are candidates for accession to the EU met regularly with the PSC and the EUMC regarding the development of EU military operations and attended information meetings with the EUMS. Participants from the Third States, including from Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Japan, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Norway, Australia, Indonesia and the US attended the ESDP Orientation Courses on 18-22 February 2008 in Palermo organised by CASD (Rome) and on 2-6 June 2008 in Brussels organised by Slovenian MoD.

148. Several Third States continued to contribute to ESDP military operation EUFOR Althea in BiH (Albania, Argentina, Chile, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Switzerland, Turkey). Non-EU European NATO Members, countries which are candidates for accession to the EU, Albania, Russia, Switzerland and Ukraine were kept informed on the operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA. At this stage, Albania and Russia made formal offers of contribution to this operation.

### **(a) Russia**

149. In the framework of the Road Map for the Common Space on External Security, the EU and Russia made an important step forward on cooperation in crisis management. A close dialogue was held on the operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA, including through a visit of the Council Secretariat and OHQ delegation to Moscow. On 15 May PSC accepted a formal offer from Russia to contribute to this operation with a helicopter capability. Furthermore Russia indicated its readiness to negotiate a framework agreement in the area of crisis management.

### **(b) Ukraine**

150. The EU and Ukraine continued building a close relationship and enhancing cooperation in foreign and security policy, including in crisis management. In line with the list of proposed activities in the field of ESDP between the EU and Ukraine in 2008, good contacts were pursued between the Ukrainian Chief of Defence and the Chairman of the EU Military Committee and a seminar on the Battlegroup concept, involving Ukrainian and EUMS experts, was scheduled for 10 June 2008. Further to its ratification by the Ukraine, the Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine establishing a framework for the participation of Ukraine in the European Union crisis management operations entered into force on 1 May 2008. Cooperation in crisis management continued to be discussed in the context of the negotiation of the new Enhanced Agreement.

### **(c) United States of America**

151. Dialogue and potential cooperation with the US across the full spectrum of crisis management has been further enhanced following joint EU-US agreement on a Work Plan in March 2008 which sets out a range of technical areas for cooperation. Expert-level contacts have already been initiated, facilitated by the US/EU security agreement allowing a greater exchange of information. This activity complements ongoing dialogue with the US on specific operations (EUSSR Guinea Bissau) and ESDP-related issues, including African peacekeeping capacity-building.

## *XVIII. Mandate for the Incoming Presidency*

152. On the basis of this report and taking into account the European Security Strategy<sup>1</sup>, the future Presidency, assisted by the Secretary-General/High Representative (SG/HR) and in association with the Commission, is asked to continue work on developing the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and in particular to:

- prepare decisions on current and future operations and missions, whether civilian or military, and to ensure their effective implementation;
- complete implementation of the guidelines for command and control of civilian operations;
- consolidate the European Union's capabilities for planning and conducting operations, and in particular to continue, on the basis of the report and recommendations of the SG/HR adopted by the General Affairs and External Relations Council in November 2007, the work on implementing the recommendations to remedy the shortcomings noted in the European Union Military Staff's ability to conduct planning at strategic level for EU-led operations, and invite the SG/HR to present an initial evaluation of the implementation of these recommendations in November 2008;
- continue to develop civilian capabilities in the framework of the Civilian Headline Goal 2010 and ensure follow-up to the initiatives for the enhanced effectiveness of civilian crisis management, particularly with a view to the Ministerial Conference on improving civilian capabilities in November 2008;
- continue implementation of an effective architecture for lessons learned, evaluation and best practices for civilian missions;
- continue the work on developing military capabilities in the context of the Headline Goal 2010 and, to that end, encourage the European Defence Agency (EDA), in close cooperation with the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), to set in train work on the Capability Development Plan, which should lead to initial operational conclusions in July, while pursuing its further development;
- support the work of the EDA, in particular the development and implementation of the strategies already adopted (European defence technological and industrial base; European defence research and technology strategy, European armaments strategy) as well as the implementation of specific projects and programmes;
- enhance the European strategic air transport capability, developing a European air transport fleet concept and improving the deployability of helicopters in the framework of the EDA;
- strengthen the role of the European Union Satellite Centre;
- as regards civil-military coordination, pursue in particular the work aimed at identifying requirements for exchanging information. In particular, this work will make a useful contribution to developing a concept for European Union network enabled capabilities;
- carry out a review of the Athena financing mechanism;
- develop training relevant to the ESDP, comprising a civilian dimension as well as a military

1. In the light of all developments which have taken place since 2003, in particular the experience drawn from ESDP missions, implementation of the European Security Strategy will, in accordance with the mandate of the European Council of December 2007, be examined by the SG/HR, in full association with the Commission and in close cooperation with the Member States, with a view to proposing elements on how to improve the implementation and, as appropriate, elements to complement it, for adoption by the European Council in December 2008.

one, taking into account the activities of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC), national activities and Community instruments; finalise, by November 2008, a report on the prospects for the ESDC, including a detailed analysis of training requirements;

- ▶ develop exchanges of officers in the context of their initial training;
- ▶ take forward work on the ESDP's contribution in the areas of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR), notably by enhancing the European Union's expertise in this area;
- ▶ continue to implement the European Union exercise programme, including successful conduct of the CME 08 exercise, and the start of planning for the CME 09 crisis management exercise and for the MILEX 09 military exercise;
- ▶ continue to promote consultation and cooperation with the United Nations on the basis of the Joint Statement on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management;
- ▶ strengthen the EU-NATO strategic partnership in crisis management; guarantee practical and effective coordination where the two organisations are engaged in the same theatre, particularly in Kosovo and Afghanistan; ensure coherent development of military capabilities where requirements overlap, including by exchanging information within the EU-NATO Capability Group; continue to implement the existing framework for cooperation between the European Union and NATO;
- ▶ continue to strengthen the strategic partnership between the European Union and Africa in the area of African conflict prevention, management and resolution capabilities on the basis of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy adopted in December 2007; in particular, continue to support the setting-up of the African standby force, particularly in the framework of the EURO RECAMP programme;
- ▶ maintain the European Union's commitment in the Western Balkans in the framework of existing and future activities;
- ▶ maintain close cooperation and dialogue on crisis management issues with other key partners, in particular the OSCE, the States which are candidates for accession, the non-EU European NATO members, Canada, the United States, Russia, Switzerland, Ukraine and the Mediterranean countries;
- ▶ contribute to the implementation of the European conflict prevention programme;
- ▶ continue to encourage effective implementation of the relevant provisions regarding human rights and gender equality in the context of the crisis management activities conducted under the ESDP, including the provisions of UN Security Council resolutions 1612 and 1325; special attention will be devoted to the issue of children affected by armed conflicts;
- ▶ animate the dialogue and exchange of information with NGOs and civil society, in line with the review of the recommendations on cooperation with NGOs and civil society in the framework of civilian crisis management and conflict prevention;
- ▶ enhance communication about the ESDP on the basis of the existing framework and discussions held hitherto, particularly with a view to enhancing the visibility of ESDP activities.

# European Security and Defence College – Council Joint Action

Brussels, 23 June 2008

## COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/550/CFSP ESTABLISHING A EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE COLLEGE (ESDC) AND REPEALING JOINT ACTION 2005/575/CFSP

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THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 14 thereof,  
Whereas:

- (1) On 18 July 2005, the Council adopted Joint Action 2005/575/CFSP establishing a European Security and Defence College<sup>(1)</sup>.
- (2) On 21 December 2007, pursuant to Article 13 of that Joint Action, the Steering Committee presented a report on the activities and perspectives of the ESDC with a view to a revision of the Joint Action.
- (3) On 18 March 2008, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) recommended that the Council amend the Joint Action in the light of that report.
- (4) For the sake of clarity, a new consolidated version of the Joint Action should be adopted,

HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

### *Article 1*

#### **Establishment**

1. A European Security and Defence College (ESDC) is hereby established.
2. The ESDC shall be organised as a network between the institutes, colleges, academies, universities and institutions within the European Union (EU) dealing with security and defence policy issues and the European Union Institute for Security Studies (hereinafter referred to as 'institutes').
3. It shall establish close links with the EU institutions and relevant EU agencies.

### *Article 2*

#### **Mission**

The ESDC shall provide training in the field of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) at the strategic level in order to develop and promote a common understanding of ESDP among civilian and military personnel, and to identify and disseminate, through its training activities, best practice in relation to various ESDP issues.

### *Article 3*

#### **Objectives**

The objectives of ESDC shall be the following:

- (a) to further enhance the European security culture within ESDP;

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(1) OJ L 194, 26.7.2005, p. 15.



- (b) to promote a better understanding of ESDP as an essential part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP);
- (c) to provide EU instances with knowledgeable personnel able to work efficiently on all ESDP matters;
- (d) to provide Member States' administrations and staff with knowledgeable personnel familiar with EU policies, institutions and procedures; and
- (e) to help promote professional relations and contacts among training participants. Where appropriate, attention should be paid to consistency with Community activities.

## *Article 4*

### **Tasks of the ESDC**

1. The main tasks of the ESDC are in accordance with its mission and objectives to organise and conduct training activities in the field of ESDP.
2. ESDC training activities shall include:
  - (a) the ESDP High Level Course;
  - (b) the ESDP Orientation Course; and
  - (c) ESDP courses for specialised audiences or with specific focus, as decided by the Steering Committee referred to in Article 6.  
Other training activities shall be undertaken, as decided by the Steering Committee.
3. In addition, the ESDC shall in particular:
  - (a) support the relations to be established between the institutes engaged in the network;
  - (b) install and run an Internet-Based Advanced Distance Learning (IDL) System to support the ESDC training activities;
  - (c) develop and produce training material for EU training in ESDP also drawing on already existing relevant material;
  - (d) establish an alumni network between former training participants;
  - (e) support exchange programmes in the field of ESDP between the Member States' training institutes;
  - (f) provide contributions to the annual EU training programme in ESDP; and
  - (g) organise and conduct an annual networking conference bringing together relevant civilian and military actors involved in EU training in ESDP.
4. The ESDC shall have the necessary legal capacity in particular to enter into contracts and administrative arrangements and to hold a bank account. Any liability which may arise from contracts concluded by the ESDC shall be covered by the contributing States and other contributors as referred to in Article 11(5). In no case may the Council, its Secretary-General or the General Secretariat of the Council be held liable in respect of services provided by staff of the General Secretariat in connection with the activities of the ESDC.
5. The ESDC training activities shall be conducted through the institutes forming the ESDC network or other actors of a Member State hosting the training activity.
6. As part of the ESDC network, the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EU ISS) shall support the ESDC training activities, in particular through EU ISS publications and by providing lectures given by EU ISS researchers as well as by making available its website within and for the Internet-Based Advanced Distance Learning (IDL) System.

## *Article 5*

### **Organisation**

1. The following bodies shall be set up under the ESDC:
  - (a) a Steering Committee which shall be responsible for the overall coordination and direction of the training activities of the ESDC;
  - (b) an Executive Academic Board which shall ensure the quality and coherence of the training activities; and
  - (c) a permanent Secretariat for the ESDC (hereinafter referred to as the 'Secretariat') which shall in particular assist the Steering Committee and the Executive Academic Board.
2. The Steering Committee, the Executive Academic Board and the Secretariat shall carry out the tasks set out in Articles 6, 7 and 8 respectively.

## *Article 6*

### **Steering Committee**

1. The Steering Committee composed of one representative appointed by each Member State, shall be the decision-making body of the ESDC. Each member of the Committee may be represented or accompanied by an alternate. Letters of appointment, duly authorised by the Member State, shall be directed to the Secretary-General/High Representative (SG/HR). Representatives from acceding States may attend its meetings as active observers.
2. Members of the Steering Committee may be accompanied by experts.
3. The Committee shall be chaired by the representative of the Member State holding the Council Presidency and shall meet at least twice a year. The Chairman of the Steering Committee shall be empowered to represent the ESDC in particular for the purpose of concluding contracts as referred to in Article 4(4).
4. The Chairperson of the Executive Academic Board, representatives of the SG/HR and of the Commission shall be invited to attend the meetings of the Committee.
5. The tasks of the Committee shall be to:
  - (a) establish the annual academic programme of the ESDC, drawing on the ESDC training concept;
  - (b) provide overall guidance to the work of the Executive Academic Board;
  - (c) adopt and keep under regular review the ESDC training concept reflecting the agreed ESDP training requirements;
  - (d) select the Member State(s) hosting the ESDC training activities and the institutes conducting them;
  - (e) develop and agree the outline curricula for all ESDC training activities;
  - (f) adopt evaluation reports and a general annual report on ESDC training activities, to be forwarded to the relevant Council bodies; and
  - (g) appoint the Chairperson of the Executive Academic Board for a period of at least two academic years.
6. The Committee shall adopt its Rules of Procedure.
7. Decisions of the Committee shall be taken by qualified majority. The votes of the Member States shall be weighted in accordance with Article 205(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community. For their adoption, decisions shall require the number of votes provided in the third subparagraph of Article 23(2) of the Treaty on European Union.

## *Article 7*

### **The Executive Academic Board**

1. The Executive Academic Board shall be composed of senior representatives from those institutes which are actively engaged in the ESDC activities. Where there are several representatives from one Member State, they shall together form a single delegation.
2. The Chairperson of the Board shall be appointed by the Steering Committee among the members of the Board.
3. Representatives from the SG/HR and of the Commission shall be invited to attend the meetings of the Board. Academic experts and senior officials from national and European institutions may be invited to attend its meetings.
4. The tasks of the Board shall be to:
  - (a) provide academic advice and recommendations to the Steering Committee;
  - (b) implement, through the institutes forming the ESDC network, the agreed annual academic programme;
  - (c) oversee the Internet-Based Advanced Distanced Learning (IDL) System;
  - (d) develop detailed curricula for all ESDC training activities building on the agreed outline curricula;
  - (e) ensure general coordination of ESDC training activities among all institutes;
  - (f) review standards of the training activities undertaken in the previous academic year;
  - (g) submit to the Steering Committee proposals for training activities in the next academic year;
  - (h) ensure a systematic evaluation of all ESDC training activities; and
  - (i) contribute to the draft general annual report on ESDC activities.
5. To fulfil its tasks, the Board may meet in different project orientated configurations. The Board shall draw up the rules and arrangements governing the creation and functioning of these configurations to be agreed by the Steering Committee.
6. The Rules of Procedure of the Board shall be adopted by the Steering Committee.

## *Article 8*

### **The Secretariat**

1. The General Secretariat of the Council shall act as the Secretariat of the ESDC. Staff shall be provided by the General Secretariat of the Council, Member States and the institutes forming the ESDC network.
2. The Secretariat shall assist the Steering Committee and the Executive Academic Board, carry out administrative and conceptual work in support of their activities, and provide support for the organisation of the ESDC training activities.
3. The Secretariat shall in particular:
  - (a) be responsible for the administration and coordination of the ESDC's work and training programme; and
  - (b) be the main point of contact for the institutes and other bodies engaged in the college network as well as for external entities and the public.

A staff member of the Secretariat shall act as Head of the ESDC and could also act as director of the ESDP High Level Course.
4. The Secretariat shall closely cooperate with the Commission.
 

Each institute forming the ESDC network shall designate a point of contact with the

Secretariat to deal with the organizational and administrative issues connected with the organisation of the ESDC training activities.

### *Article 9*

#### **Participation in the ESDC training activities**

1. All ESDC training activities shall be open to participation by nationals of all Member States and acceding States. The organising and conducting institutes shall ensure that this principle applies without any exception.

The ESDC training activities shall in principle be open to participation of nationals of candidate countries and, as appropriate, of third States.

2. Participants shall be civilian and military personnel dealing with strategic aspects in the field of ESDP.

Representatives of, inter alia, international organisations, nongovernmental organisations, academic institutions and the media, as well as members of the business community, may be invited to participate in ESDC training activities.

3. A certificate signed by the SG/HR shall be awarded to a participant who has completed an ESDC course. The modalities of the certificate shall be decided by the Steering Committee.

The certificate shall be recognised by the Member States and by the EU institutions.

### *Article 10*

#### **Cooperation**

The ESDC shall cooperate with and draw on the expertise of international organisations and other relevant actors, such as national training institutes of third States.

### *Article 11*

#### **Financing**

1. Each Member State, EU institution, EU agency and institute forming the ESDC network shall bear all costs related to its participation in ESDC, including salaries, allowances, travel and subsistence expenses and costs related to organisational and administrative support of the ESDC training activities.

2. Member States and the institutes forming the ESDC network shall each bear the costs related to the personnel they provide to the Secretariat, including salaries, allowances and travel and subsistence expenses and accommodation expenses when on mission.

3. The General Secretariat of the Council shall bear all costs arising from and related to its tasks as set out in Article 8, including the personnel it provides.

4. Each participant in ESDC training activities shall bear all costs related to his/her participation.

5. For financing specific activities, in particular the development, setting up and running of information system networks or applications for the ESDC, as referred to in Article 4(3), voluntary contributions by Member States and institutes forming the ESDC network shall be managed by the General Secretariat of the Council as earmarked revenue.

6. Practical arrangements for the contributions referred to in paragraph 5 shall be decided by the Steering Committee.

## *Article 12*

### **Security regulations**

The Council's security regulations set out in Council Decision 2001/264/EC of 19 March 2001 adopting the Council's security regulations<sup>(1)</sup> shall apply to the ESDC activities.

## *Article 13*

### **Review**

This Joint Action shall be reviewed and revised as appropriate in the light of a study on the future perspectives of the ESDC and their possible implications. The study shall also address aspects such as the Secretariat, staff capacities, running of the IDL system, conference facilities, financial arrangements, management and coordination of ESDP training at EU level, and the civil-military balance within the ESDC network, to be prepared by the General Secretariat of the Council and presented by the Presidency to the Council by November 2008.

In addition this Joint Action shall be reviewed and revised as appropriate no later than 31 December 2011.

## *Article 14*

### **Repeal**

Council Joint Action 2005/575/CFSP is hereby repealed.

## *Article 15*

### **Entry into force**

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the day of its adoption.

## *Article 16*

### **Publication**

This Joint Action shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Luxembourg, 23 June 2008.

*For the Council*

*The President*

I. Jarc

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(1) OJ L 101, 11.4.2001, p. 1. Decision as last amended by Decision 2007/438/EC (OJ L 164, 26.6.2007, p. 24).

## Iraq EUJUST LEX – Council Joint Action

Brussels, 23 June 2008

### COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/480/CFSP AMENDING AND EXTENDING JOINT ACTION 2005/190/CFSP ON THE EUROPEAN UNION INTEGRATED RULE OF LAW MISSION FOR IRAQ, EUJUST LEX

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THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 14 thereof,  
Whereas:

- (1) On 7 March 2005, the Council adopted Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP on the European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq, EUJUST LEX<sup>(1)</sup>.
- (2) On 14 April 2008, the Council adopted Joint Action 2008/304/CFSP amending and extending Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP until 30 June 2008.
- (3) Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP should be further extended until 30 June 2009.
- (4) A new financial reference amount should be provided in order to cover expenditure related to the Mission for the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009.
- (5) The mandate of the Mission is being carried out in a security context that is liable to deteriorate and to undermine the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as defined in Article 11 of the Treaty,

HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

#### *Article 1*

Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP is hereby amended as follows:

1. The following subparagraph shall be added to Article 11(1):  
'The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the Mission for the period 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009 shall be EUR 7,2 million.';
2. In Article 14 the second subparagraph shall be replaced by the following:  
'It shall expire on 30 June 2009.'

#### *Article 2*

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

#### *Article 3*

This Joint Action shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Luxembourg, 23 June 2008.

*For the Council*

*The President*

I. Jarc

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(1) OJ L 62, 9.3.2005, p. 37. Joint Action as last amended by Joint Action 2008/304/CFSP (OJ L 105, 15.4.2008, p. 10).

# EUPOL RD Congo – Council Joint Action

Brussels, 23 June 2008

## COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/485/CFSP AMENDING AND EXTENDING JOINT ACTION 2007/405/CFSP ON THE EUROPEAN UNION POLICE MISSION UNDERTAKEN IN THE FRAMEWORK OF REFORM OF THE SECURITY SECTOR (SSR) AND ITS INTERFACE WITH THE SYSTEM OF JUSTICE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (EUPOL RD CONGO)

### THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 14 thereof,  
Whereas:

- (1) On 12 June 2007 the Council adopted Joint Action 2007/405/CFSP<sup>(1)</sup> for an initial period ending on 30 June 2008.
- (2) Following consultation with the Congolese authorities and other parties concerned, it appears necessary to extend the mission for one year.
- (3) The tasks of EUPOL RD Congo should also include the provision of assistance to the *Police Nationale Congolaise* in the areas of Border Police and the Audit Police Service. Furthermore, the mission should contribute to the police, gender, human rights and children and armed conflict aspects of the stabilisation process in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and facilitate the linkage and harmonisation of those efforts with the national process of police reform. That should be achieved in particular by providing support for two programmes that have been devised in order to implement the agreements signed in Goma on 23 January 2008 by the government of the DRC and various armed groups operating in the Kivus, namely the *Programme Amani* and the *Plan de Stabilisation de l'Est*, both of which include police components.
- (4) In this connection, EUPOL RD Congo should also be deployed in the eastern part of the DRC taking particular account of security issues, gender-based violence, children in armed conflicts and international coordination.
- (5) A new financial reference amount should be provided in order to cover the expenditure relating to the mission for the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009.
- (6) The mandate of the mission is being carried out in a security context that is liable to deteriorate and to undermine the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as defined in Article 11 of the Treaty,

### HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

#### *Article 1*

Joint Action 2007/405/CFSP is hereby amended as follows:

1. in Article 2(1) the following indent shall be added:

(1) OJ L 151, 13.6.2007, p. 46. Joint Action as amended by Joint Action 2008/38/CFSP (OJ L 9, 12.1.2008, p. 18).

‘- contribute to the police as well as to the gender, human rights and children and armed conflict aspects of the peace process in the eastern DRC and especially to its linkage to the reform process of the PNC.’;

2. Article 3 shall be replaced by the following:

**‘Article 3**

**Structure of the mission and deployment zone**

1. The mission shall have headquarters (HQ) in Kinshasa consisting of:

- (a) the Head of Mission;
- (b) a team of police advisers at strategic level;
- (c) a team of police advisers at operational level;
- (d) a team of legal advisers at strategic and operational level;
- (e) administrative support.

2. The mission shall have a permanent presence in Goma and Bukavu, in the eastern part of the DRC, so as to deliver assistance and expertise to the stabilisation process in the eastern DRC.

3. The operational breakdown of tasks shall be as follows:

- (a) experts forming an integral part of the various working parties on police reform, and advisers assigned to the key organisational and decision-making posts of the CSRP planned by the Congolese authorities;
- (b) experts assigned to the PNC, particularly in key posts, and assigned to mentor the criminal police and the police responsible for the maintenance of law and order;
- (c) justice interface in the field of criminal law in order to add to activities in the police field an interface with criminal justice and follow up important aspects of the reform of criminal justice, including in the case of military criminal law;
- (d) expertise aimed at contributing to the horizontal aspects of SSR;
- (e) experts assigned to the PNC, particularly in key posts, and assigned to mentor the Border Police and Audit Police Service;
- (f) experts assigned to the police as well as to the gender, human rights and children and armed conflict aspects of the stabilisation process in the east, and its linkage to the national police reform process.

4. The deployment zone shall be Kinshasa, Goma and Bukavu. Given the geographical implications of the mission throughout the territory of the DRC, as a result of the mission statement, movement of experts and their presence in other locations in the provinces could prove necessary, on the instructions of the Head of Mission or of any person so authorised by the Head of Mission and taking due account of the security situation.’;

3. Article 9(1) shall be replaced by the following:

‘1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure relating to the mission for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008 shall be EUR 5 500 000. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure relating to the mission for the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009 shall be EUR 6 920 000.’;

4. Article 15 shall be deleted;

5. the second subparagraph of Article 16 shall be replaced by the following:

‘It shall apply until 30 June 2009.’



***Article 2***

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

***Article 3***

This Joint Action shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Luxembourg, 23 June 2008.

*For the Council*

*The President*

I. Jarc

## Middle East Peace Process – Berlin Conference

Berlin, 24 June 2008

### SUMMARY OF REMARKS BY JAVIER SOLANA IN SUPPORT OF PALESTINIAN CIVIL SECURITY AND RULE OF LAW

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I would like to thank the German government for taking the initiative of this conference and for its hospitality today. I want to congratulate Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister Steinmeier for their commitment to the success of this event. I wish to commend the Palestinian government and Prime Minister Fayyad in particular for huge accomplishments after one year in office.

This Conference confirms European readiness to take significant responsibilities in Palestinian rule of law and security sector reform. Today's gathering is especially important because we are talking about building a state and creating its institution. The two pillars of our action are: Palestinian ownership and partnership with the EU.

Respect for and enforcement of the rule of law and public order are an essential and indispensable foundation for a viable state, indeed of a viable society. It is an enabler for freedom of movement of people and goods. Without this prerequisite no sustainable economic growth and development are possible.

As rule of law means security and personal safety for all citizens, our aim is to ensure the security of the Palestinian people, under the motto of president Abbas, of 'one law, one authority, one gun'. We are interested in creating security forces accountable to the law, not to a faction nor a party. We want police forces that serve the community. This is in the best security interests of Israel. The security of Israel will derive from a secure and violence-free Palestinian society.

Therefore, it is in Israel's interest to see capable Palestinian security services emerge as quickly as possible. We need better cooperation between Israel and Palestine on security matters. Although progress has already been achieved, more remains to be done. For example, the violent events of today in the West Bank are not positive, they might affect the trust that has been built up.

Since 2005, the EU has been assisting in the rebuilding and development of Palestinian police, through the provision of equipment, training and mentoring of Palestinian police officers. We are not alone in this endeavour. Cooperation with the US government and the US security coordinator, General Dayton, in particular has been a real success and will continue.

Other donors have contributed greatly and I want to pay special homage to those countries who have worked with EU partners in the framework of EUPOL COPPS. A coherent and sustained approach amongst donors is an indispensable ingredient for success, in particular for the follow-up to Berlin.

This conference is working on the fundamentals needed for the creation of a Palestinian state which is a vital component of the two-states solution needed for peace in the Middle East.

## QUARTET STATEMENT

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Representatives of the Quartet – U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, High Representative for European Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, European Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner, and Slovenian Foreign Minister Dimitrij Rupel – met today in Berlin to discuss the situation in the Middle East. They were joined by Quartet Representative Tony Blair.

The Quartet reaffirmed its support for ongoing Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and stressed the urgent need for tangible progress towards the shared goal of an agreement by the end of 2008 on the establishment of an independent and viable Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, and an end to the conflict. The Quartet expressed its commitment to support the parties in taking and implementing the difficult decisions required in order to achieve these outcomes.

The Quartet underscored the urgent need for more visible progress on the ground in order to build confidence and support progress in the negotiations launched at Annapolis. Israel's removal of some significant West Bank checkpoints and the opening of a number of Palestinian police stations in Area B represent good steps. Greater efforts are required now to project a new reality, including through further urgent steps to improve access and movement. Likewise, Palestinian security performance has improved, including recent efforts in Jenin. Continued Palestinian efforts to fight terrorism and to implement a more comprehensive security strategy are necessary for sustainable long-term improvement. The Quartet urged the parties to build upon these efforts, fulfilling all of their obligations under the Roadmap and refraining from any steps that undermine confidence or could prejudice the outcome of negotiations. In particular, the Quartet reiterated its deep concern at continuing settlement activity and called on Israel to freeze all settlement activity including natural growth, and to dismantle outposts erected since March 2001.

The Quartet voiced its support for the outcomes of the 'Berlin Conference in Support of Palestinian Civil Security and the Rule of Law.' With its focus on the Palestinian police and justice sector the conference provided a timely forum to re-focus and direct international support efforts towards two key sectors of Palestinian state-building. The Quartet called for speedy implementation of projects agreed and robust donor support in order to build the capacity of the Palestinian police and justice sector. The Quartet urged Israeli-Palestinian cooperation in that respect, and emphasized the importance of unobstructed delivery of security assistance to the Palestinian Authority.

Noting the dire budget situation facing the Palestinian Authority, the Quartet urged all donors who have not fulfilled their pledges, especially the key regional partners, to fulfill their pledges from the December 2007 Paris donors' conference and to urgently provide budgetary support to meet the requirements of the Palestinian Authority government. It looked to the next AHLC meeting on September 22 to take stock of progress.

Recalling the centrality of economic development and institutional reform to the success of a future Palestinian state, the Quartet reaffirmed its support for Quartet Representative Tony Blair's efforts, and congratulated the Palestinian Authority on the success of the May 21-23 Palestine Investment Conference in Bethlehem. Commending the close cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority on this initiative, the Quartet encouraged similar coopera-

tion to break ground on short and medium term projects and to make progress in private sector activities that will create jobs for Palestinians and help change the conditions of life. The Quartet underscored the importance of uninterrupted transfers of Palestinian tax and customs revenues to the Palestinian Authority.

The Quartet noted that a lasting solution to the situation in Gaza can only be achieved through peaceful means. The Quartet expressed its continuing support for Egyptian efforts to restore calm to Gaza and southern Israel and welcomed the period of calm that began on June 19. The Quartet urged that the calm be respected in full and expressed the hope that it would endure, and lead to improved security for Palestinians and Israelis alike, and a return to normal civilian life in Gaza. In this respect, the Quartet looked forward to increased humanitarian and commercial flows through the Gaza crossings under the management of the Palestinian Authority, consistent with the November 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access, and welcomed the European Union's offer to resume its monitoring mission at the Rafah crossing point. The Quartet expressed its strong support for the steady and sufficient supplies of fuel to Gaza and for the immediate resumption of stalled UN and other donor projects there. It further tasked the Quartet Representative to develop and promote implementation of measures, in coordination with Israel and the Palestinian Authority, to improve conditions in Gaza, as a matter of urgency.

The Quartet welcomed the May 21 announcement by Syria, Israel and Turkey that indirect talks have been launched, with Turkey's facilitation, aimed at achieving peace in accordance with the Madrid terms of reference, and hopes that progress is made in this direction.

The Quartet principals looked forward to meeting again in September at the United Nations General Assembly. On that occasion the Quartet will consider, after further consultations with the parties, the timing and agenda of an international meeting in Moscow to lend support to the process launched in Annapolis. Quartet Principals will also continue their dialogue with members of the Arab League Follow-Up Committee.

The Quartet reaffirmed its commitment to a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace in the Middle East based on UNSCRs 242, 338, 1397 and 1515.

## **BACKGROUND – EU POLICE MISSION FOR THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES (EUPOL COPPS)**

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**Brussels, June 2008**

The EU has been at the forefront of efforts for peace in the Middle East. Amongst its immediate priorities the EU aims to further strengthen law and order, and in this context, EUPOL COPPS is an important element in the improvement of security in the Palestinian territories. EUPOL COPPS, which started on 1 January 2006 builds on the work of the EU Co-ordination Office for Palestinian Police Support, established earlier within the office of the EU Special Representative for the Middle East peace process. The initiative followed the expression by EU leaders in June 2004 of their readiness to support the Palestinian Authority in taking responsibility for law and order, and in particular, in improving its civil police and law enforcement capacity.

## Mandate and objectives

The aim of the mission is to contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements under Palestinian ownership in accordance with the best international standards, in co-operation with the EU institution building programmes conducted by the European Commission as well as other international efforts in the wider context of security sector including criminal justice reform.

## Mission achievements

By improving the Palestinian Civil Police's law enforcement capacity, EUPOL COPPS is a key channel for the efforts of the EU and the wider international community to support the Palestinian Authority in taking responsibility for law and order.

The main achievements of the mission include:

- ▶ providing support to the Palestinian Civil Police for immediate operational priorities and longer-term transformational change as described in the Palestinian Civil Police Development Programme;
- ▶ advising and closely mentoring the Palestinian Civil Police, and specifically senior officials at District and Headquarters level; and
- ▶ co-ordinating and facilitating financial assistance, whether from EU countries or other international donors, to the Palestinian Civil Police.

Projects have included providing training and equipment to the Palestinian Civil Police.

The Council of the European Union has agreed to expand EUPOL COPPS' activities in the area of the criminal justice system. The expansion of the mission to cover the wider rule of law area is currently under examination by the Council.

*'EUPOL COPPS is an expression of the EU's continued readiness to support the Palestinian Authority in complying with its Roadmap obligations, in particular with regard to 'security' and 'institution building' (...). Furthermore, the support of the EU to the Palestinian Civil Police aims at increasing the safety and security of the Palestinian population and at serving the domestic agenda of the Palestinian Authority in reinforcing the rule of law.'* (Council Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP of 14 November 2005 on the European Union)

## Conference on Disarmament – Statement by Javier Solana

Geneva, 25 June 2008

### STATEMENT BY JAVIER SOLANA BEFORE THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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Madam President,  
Mr. Secretary-General,  
Excellencies,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am delighted to have the opportunity to speak to you this morning about an issue that is of great importance. Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are enormous challenges for the international community. The key question is: will the UN disarmament and arms control architecture live up to our hopes and expectations?

This Conference on Disarmament is a key part of the architecture. It has a long and distinguished history. We should not forget that it was here, in Geneva, that crucial treaties were negotiated. Among them, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Conventions and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. These achievements should act as source of inspiration.

But, if truth be told, the last ten years have been a 'lost decade'. When the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon spoke to you at the opening of the 2008 session, he made clear that he was deeply troubled by the lack of progress. I fully share his view. It is puzzling that during an entire decade and despite enormous efforts, there is still no agreement even on the question of how to address the issues and in which order.

My core message to you today is that it is time to start working. The world cannot afford this on-going stalemate. The EU, for its part, will do whatever it can to revitalise this Conference on Disarmament. Of course, multilateral arms control treaties can also be negotiated outside the established international framework. Sometimes with great success. Take the treaty banning antipersonnel mines. But these efforts are no substitute for the necessary strengthening of comprehensive international agreements on weapons of mass destruction and other arms. That is your responsibility.

Everyone knows that the Conference on Disarmament is the only place to forge a credible plan shared by Nuclear Weapon States and Non-Nuclear Weapon States alike. Everyone also knows that thinking on nuclear disarmament has evolved a lot recently. For instance, in the US, Henry Kissinger, together with George Schultz, William Perry, and Sam Nunn have called for practical measures to reach the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

The two candidates in the United States Presidential elections have stated their openness to new thinking on nuclear issues, both in terms of numbers of warheads and posture. In Europe, Prime Minister Brown and President Sarkozy, amongst others, have called for the immediate start of negotiations on a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes. This brings me back to this forum.

A work plan is on your table. It would allow you to start negotiations, without preconditions, on a multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. For the European Union, launching these negotiations is urgent and important.

But of course the work plan also allow you to engage in substantive discussions – not just an exchange of views – on three other issues, which are of no lesser importance:

- ▶ nuclear disarmament per se;
- ▶ the prevention of an arms race in outer space; and
- ▶ negative security assurances.

It would also allow the Conference on Disarmament to continue working on all other issues on the agenda. The proposed work programme has been discussed for years. It is a compromise, with concessions from all sides.

As Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said: ‘It would not deprive any Member State of the ability to assert its national position in the subsequent phases of work’. The European Union fully believes that this plan gives us a realistic basis to get the Conference on Disarmament back to negotiations. We have carefully listened to the difficulties that a few countries have with the proposal and we remain open to discuss any specific security concerns. But we have found no argument that would justify a prolonged hibernation in the Conference on Disarmament.

What we need now is to get started, both with the negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and the other parts of the work plan. I am here today to call personally on all countries to join the emerging consensus.

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Allow me to address a few other issues high on the non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. I would like to underline that the European Union is ready to work on all three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy. As many of you know, I have spoken publicly about the need to make progress with multilateral fuel cycle arrangements.

For the overall system, the NPT Review Conference in 2010 presents us with a unique opportunity. As EU, we are determined to ensure a success. But the NPT can only fulfil its role if we are confident about the compliance by all states with their obligations under the treaty.

As this Conference knows, serious proliferation cases have arisen in recent years. The European Union has been actively engaged, with others, to ensure full compliance with the NPT, in full co-operation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. Of course, when we talk about strengthening the non-proliferation/disarmament system, we also need to look at other instruments.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is fundamental. As I said earlier on, its negotiation was one of the Conference on Disarmament’s great successes. But we need to create a new momentum so that it enters into force. The EU calls on all states, particularly those needed for its entry into force, to sign and ratify the treaty without delay.

This conference also deals with the prevention of an arms race in outer space. You have heard Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov present the Russian viewpoint, and a draft proposal for a treaty. Preventing an arms race in outer space is certainly of great importance. Without doubt, this issue needs to be addressed. However, the time might not be ripe yet politically, to aim for a treaty.

As an intermediate step, the EU is working on an instrument that could take the form of a Code of Conduct which would help build transparency and confidence. It will be presented to you later this year. We look forward to discussing this idea with you.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Of course there are many other aspects to non-proliferation and disarmament. But this morning I wanted to focus on the essential which is to end the impasse and get started on the basis of a balanced work plan. This Conference on Disarmament must meet the expectations that people have. It is in our shared interest to make real progress on both our non-proliferation and disarmament objectives.

Thank you very much.



# EUSEC RD Congo – Council Joint Action

Brussels, 26 June 2008

## COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/491/CFSP AMENDING AND EXTENDING COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2007/406/CFSP ON THE EUROPEAN UNION MISSION TO PROVIDE ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE FOR SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (EUSEC RD CONGO)

### THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 14 thereof,  
Whereas:

- (1) Since 2 May 2005 the European Union has conducted a mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), (EUSEC RD Congo). The mission's current mandate is specified by Joint Action 2007/406/CFSP<sup>(1)</sup> and ends on 30 June 2008.
- (2) The mission's mandate should be extended for a period of 12 months from 1 July 2008.
- (3) The support provided by the European Union to the Congolese authorities in the sphere of security sector reform in the DRC could henceforth also involve focusing on drawing up the arrangements for the organization of the future Rapid Reaction Force specified by the Government of the DRC as part of the overall plan for reforming the army. Particular emphasis should be placed on the 'human resources' function.
- (4) The statements of commitment signed in Goma on 23 January 2008 by the Government of the DRC and armed groups operating in the Kivus began a process of pacification of the Kivus. This process receives back-up from the international community, including the European Union by way of the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the African Great Lakes Region. The EUSEC RD Congo mission should play a part in the efforts made by the EUSR in the work being done to implement the statements of commitment for the Kivus.
- (5) A new financial reference amount should be provided to cover expenditure relating to the mission for the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009.
- (6) The current security situation in the DRC could deteriorate, producing potentially serious consequences for the process of democratic reform, the rule of law and security at international and regional level. Sustained commitment by the EU in terms of political effort and resources will help to establish stability in the region.
- (7) Joint Action 2007/406/CFSP should be amended accordingly,

### HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

#### *Article 1*

Joint Action 2007/406/CFSP is hereby amended as follows:

1. In Article 2, points (a) to (e) shall be replaced by the following:

(1) OJ L 151, 13.6.2007, p. 52.

- ‘(a) providing advice and assistance to the Congolese authorities in their work to integrate, restructure and rebuild the Congolese army, particularly by:
- contributing to the development of various national plans and policies, including work on horizontal issues which cover all the areas involved in the reform of the security sector in the DRC,
  - providing support for the committees and bodies involved in that work, and contributing to the definition of the priorities and practical needs of the Congolese,
  - contributing, *inter alia* by supplying expertise in the selection, training and education of staff and the assessment of infrastructure and equipment requirements, to the drawing up of the arrangements for the organisation and gradual establishment of the Rapid Reaction Force as part of the overall plan for reforming the army with due respect for the principles of human rights, international humanitarian law, gender issues and children affected by armed conflicts;
- (b) running and bringing to completion the technical assistance project on the modernisation of the chain of payments of the Ministry of Defence of the DRC, hereinafter referred to as the “chain of payments project”, so as to carry out the tasks specified in the General Concept for the project;
- (c) on the basis of the chain of payments project, providing support for the human resources function and for the development of a general human resources policy;
- (d) identifying and contributing to the development of various projects and options that the European Union or its Member States may decide to support relating to the reform of the security sector;
- (e) supervising specific projects financed or initiated by the Member States in pursuit of the objectives of the mission and overseeing their implementation, in coordination with the Commission;
- (f) providing support for the EUSR, as and when necessary, in the context of the work carried out by the committees for the process of pacification of the Kivus;
- and
- (g) contributing to ensuring that all efforts made as regards SSR are consistent.’;
2. In Article 3(a), the second indent shall be replaced by the following:
- ‘- a support cell, and’;
3. In the second indent of Article 3(c), the words ‘a mobile team’ shall be replaced by ‘mobile teams’;
4. Article 5 shall be amended as follows:
- (a) Paragraph 1 shall be replaced by:
- ‘1. The Head of Mission shall assume day to day management of the mission and shall be responsible for staff and disciplinary matters.’;
- (b) the first sentence of paragraph 2 shall be replaced by:
- ‘2. In implementing the mission statement as set out in Article 2(e), the Head of Mission shall be authorised to have recourse to financial contributions from the Member States.’;
5. Article 9(1) shall be replaced by the following:
- ‘1. The financial reference amount to cover expenditure relating to the mission for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008 shall be EUR 9 700 000. The financial reference amount to cover expenditure relating to the mission for the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009 shall be EUR 8 450 000.’;

6. Article 15 is hereby deleted;
7. In Article 16, the second paragraph shall be replaced by the following:  
'It shall apply until 30 June 2009.'

### ***Article 2***

This Joint Action shall enter into force on 1 July 2008.

### ***Article 3***

This Joint Action shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Brussels, 26 June 2008.

*For the Council*

*The President*

D. Rupel

## North Korea – Six Party Talks

Brussels, 30 June 2008

### DECLARATION BY THE PRESIDENCY ON BEHALF OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ON THE SIX-PARTY TALKS PROCESS

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The EU welcomes the latest presentation by the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea of its nuclear programmes to the Chinese government, as Chair of the Six-Party Talks, as a significant step forward in the denuclearisation process.

The EU reiterates its full support for the conclusion of the second phase of the denuclearisation process through the cooperation of all six parties.

## Javier Solana – ‘Une Europe qui s’engage sur le terrain’

June 2008

The creation of an effective intervention force, one that will reflect the EU’s commitment to peacekeeping and maintaining stability in crisis zones, is the new ambition of the Union’s security policy. Javier Solana explained the key issues and the objectives of this common defence policy.

Mais l’UE ne se limite pas à être présente dans les enceintes politiques. Elle n’hésite pas non plus à s’engager sur le terrain. Nous avons pour le moment pas moins de 11 opérations en cours, qui ont pour objectif de contribuer à la paix et à la stabilisation de zones en proie à des crises importantes. Depuis la première mission lancée en 2003, dans le cadre de la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense, nous avons déjà déployé quelque vingt opérations. Ces missions utilisent les instruments classiques du rétablissement de la paix, mais incluent aussi la formation de policiers, la réforme du secteur de la sécurité ou la gestion des frontières. De la Bosnie au Kosovo, dans les Balkans, en passant par le Tchad et la République centrafricaine, en Afrique, ou les Territoires palestiniens et l’Irak, au Moyen-Orient, notre présence sur le terrain est importante pour aider et protéger les populations les plus démunies et vulnérables.

En même temps, cette présence et cet engagement ont renforcé notre influence politique, qui est aujourd’hui réelle. L’UE n’est plus un simple bailleur de fonds, mais un partenaire respecté et apprécié sur la scène internationale.

### L’UE est un des premiers financiers de la paix dans le monde, mais comment lui conférer un rôle à la hauteur de son engagement ?

**Javier Solana :** Depuis longtemps, l’Union européenne est un acteur de premier plan sur la scène internationale principalement grâce à sa politique commerciale et à ses programmes d’aide au développement. Mais aujourd’hui, l’UE est aussi devenue un acteur politique de premier plan. Notre diplomatie est active et sollicitée aux quatre coins du monde. Quelques exemples seulement : en Indonésie, à Aceh, nous avons contribué à la mise en œuvre d’un accord de paix entre le gouvernement indonésien et le mouvement de libération GAM. Nous sommes membres du Quartet pour le processus de paix au Moyen-Orient aux côtés des Nations unies, de la Russie et des Etats-Unis. En ce qui concerne le dossier nucléaire iranien, c’est au nom des cinq membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies, plus l’Allemagne, que je mène les contacts avec les négociateurs iraniens.

Cela illustre bien, me semble-t-il, qu’aujourd’hui l’Union européenne compte sur la scène internationale, ce qui aurait été impensable il y a quelques années à peine.

### La présidence française a inscrit dans ses priorités la relance d’une Europe de la défense. Quelles sont les erreurs à éviter pour atteindre l’objectif fixé ?

**Javier Solana :** La PESD est déjà l’une des politiques les plus dynamiques de l’Union, et de celles qui bénéficient du plus grand soutien des citoyens européens. Il faut trouver le bon niveau d’ambition pour développer encore davantage ses moyens d’actions, en rassemblant les Etats membres autour de cet objectif.

Il est désormais clair pour tous les partenaires de l'UE, comme le président Bush l'a dit récemment à Bucarest, qu'une Union européenne forte, y compris dans le domaine de la sécurité, est nécessaire pour garantir la sécurité dans le monde.

### **Comment redynamiser les équipements militaires européens sachant que 20% d'entre eux sont d'origine américaine ?**

**Javier Solana** : Il est évident que si l'UE veut être à la hauteur des ambitions énoncées dans la Stratégie européenne de sécurité, mais aussi des attentes de la communauté internationale auxquelles je me référais à l'instant, elle doit se doter des capacités militaires nécessaires à la conduite des différentes opérations de gestion de crises dans le cadre de la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense. En quelques années, nous avons réalisé des progrès considérables en la matière, même s'il reste encore beaucoup à faire. Si nous voulons améliorer nos capacités et, en même temps, renforcer le secteur européen de la défense, il n'y a qu'une solution : nous devons penser européen et dépasser les frontières nationales. Nous devons résoudre le problème de la fragmentation du côté de la demande en identifiant davantage d'exigences communes parmi les Etats membres. Nous devons aussi résoudre le problème de la fragmentation du côté de l'offre en encourageant la réalisation de projets multinationaux et une collaboration renforcée, au lieu de perpétuer un système favorisant une approche en solitaire par les grands groupes nationaux. Si nous sommes capables d'agir de manière moins dispersée, notre industrie de la défense n'en sera que plus compétitive sur les marchés mondiaux et l'Europe dépendra moins des fournisseurs extérieurs pour les technologies critiques qu'elle se doit de préserver ou de développer.

### **Pourquoi n'arrive-t-on pas à créer un marché européen des industries de défense alors que l'Europe dispose d'une Agence européenne de l'armement ?**

**Javier Solana** : Grâce à l'Agence européenne de défense (EDA), nous avons déjà beaucoup progressé sur la voie de la création d'un marché européen des industries de la défense, notamment grâce au code de conduite en matière de marchés.

Même si ce dernier n'est pas contraignant, les États membres se sont engagés à soumettre les offres de marchés publics aux entreprises des autres États membres et à traiter toutes les soumissions sur un pied d'égalité.

Plus de 260 marchés pour une valeur de plus de 10 milliards d'euros ont été annoncés à ce jour et 16 marchés transfrontaliers ont été octroyés. Un code similaire a été élaboré pour que les mêmes principes s'appliquent tout le long de la chaîne de l'offre afin que les petites entreprises puissent elles aussi profiter de nouvelles possibilités de sous-traitance. Beaucoup reste à faire, mais les premiers pas sont encourageants.

*France-Europe... six mois pour convaincre*

# Middle East Peace Process – Remarks by Javier Solana

Brussels, 2 July 2008

## SUMMARY OF REMARKS BY JAVIER SOLANA AT THE EUROPEAN SOCIALIST PARTY CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AT THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

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First of all, I would like to thank the Parliamentary Group of the Socialist Party for convening this conference, which is very timely. And let me also welcome two people in particular: Ami Ayalon, Minister in the Prime Minister's Office in the Government of Israel, and Ahmed Soboh, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Palestinian Authority. They are both good friends, we have spent many hours together, and it is good that they return. When they are called to come here and discuss important issues, they never miss the opportunity.

Let us see if today we do what we have to do: converge and translate our words into constructive action in order to get peace in reality. This meeting takes place a few days after a very important conference that took place in Berlin on Palestinian civil security and rule of law, which proves our engagement to tackle the difficult problems related to the two-state solution. This requires the creation of a Palestinian state, and for this we need to do our utmost to help the Palestinians on nation building. I think the meeting in Berlin was very important from that point of view, because it brought together the co-operation, the pledge and the co-ordination among different actors to get help.

Today's meeting also takes place at a very important moment: Six months have passed since Annapolis, and with them half of the time we have set ourselves to see the finalisation of an agreement between Israelis and Palestinians.

I would like to spell some of the most important points of the current state of the situation.

First: The bilateral negotiations continue in a discrete manner. We don't know exactly what are the achievements of this bilateral track, but we sense some progress. I don't think we have to be too optimistic, but we have in front of us some space and time to translate the agreement into reality. I think the EU has to continue accompanying this problem in the manner it has done so far: politically, economically and supporting institution building. And we have to recognise we have accompanied the process with a tremendous amount of energy and friendship.

Second: At this point in time, we have a problem of leadership in Israel and we may be in a more difficult political situation by the end of September. We have to be aware of this issue and see how we can deal with that.

Third: I would like to say very clearly that the realities on the ground have to change. I don't think they have changed sufficiently during this recent period of time. On access and movement much more has to be done to allow the life of Palestinian people to be better. Let me also say very clearly that the settlements have to stop. And I think it will be impossible, or very difficult at least, to have successful negotiations on a 'final status', while the 'final status' is being changed prior to the negotiations through the changes on the ground.

Fourth: about the present situation in Gaza. It is still very difficult but something may be moving. I would like to thank the efforts of Egypt, the Arab League and other countries that are contributing to an intra-Palestinian reconciliation. That will not be done in 24 hours, but it is very important and we have to do our utmost in that direction.

Fifth: on the comprehensive character of the process. The Israeli-Palestinian track is fundamental, but it is not the only one. I am glad to see that at least proximity talks have taken place, under the auspices of Turkey, between Israel and Syria. This brings me also to the Lebanese track. The agreement in Doha has cleared the way for an agreement to elect a President and I hope the Government will be established soon. But at the same time I think the question of the Shab'a Farms has to be addressed and this is very important. The Secretary General of the UN will make a report and I would like to see a constructive attitude by Israel and Syria following this. I think the Euromed Summit in Paris on July 13th may also bring the possibility to have meetings in different geometries and see how we can move this issue forward.

Regarding the calendar we have ahead of us: After the last meeting of the 'Quartet' in Berlin on June 24<sup>th</sup> we have to move in action until the last part of September. By then we will also have an important event in New York, the General Assembly, which will be an important moment to take stock and see how we can move towards the end of the year. And finally we also took the decision in the 'Quartet' to have another meeting 'Annapolis-type' in Moscow later on this year.

These are the challenges that we have in front of us and we will continue to be engaged as much as we can. But I would like very much that my two friends Ami Ayalo and Ahmed Soboh try to keep talking together and moving together. Time is short, let's use it properly. And be sure that what we can do from the EU and from this group of the European Parliament we will do.



# EU-NATO relation – Speech by Javier Solana

Paris, 7 July 2008

## DISCOURS DE JAVIER SOLANA A LA SESSION D'OUVERTURE DU SEMINAIRE RELATIF A LA RELATION UE-OTAN

« Merci Bernard,

C'est un plaisir de me trouver aujourd'hui à tes côtés, à Paris, avec Jaap. Nul besoin de dire combien je suis heureux de tes propositions que j'appuie naturellement. Je serai bref.

### 1. Je me limiterai d'abord à trois propos liminaires sur l'Union européenne.

► D'abord, sur le chemin parcouru par les Européens.

Les progrès sont considérables. Et il est impossible, je crois, de faire machine arrière quels que soient les accidents de parcours. Autrement dit, nul ne conteste les compétences développées par l'Union européenne en matière de gestion de crise. A l'intérieur de l'Union européenne, tous les Etats membres, malgré des contraintes fortes, ont pris part ou prennent part à des opérations, militaires ou civiles : 18 Etats membres engagés au Tchad et 27 au Kosovo.

► L'Europe va continuer d'être sollicitée de manière croissante.

En amont, pour prévenir les crises. En aval, pour rétablir la paix et reconstruire. De l'Afghanistan à l'Irak; de la Palestine au Caucase. Parallèlement, les défis de l'extérieur évoluent. Les menaces identifiées en 2003 demeurent.

Mais il faut également faire face à des questions qui ont pris de l'ampleur :

- l'énergie, bien sûr avec le problème des infrastructures et des approvisionnements, de leur sécurité ;
- le changement climatique et son impact sur le prix des aliments, sur la sécurité des personnes qu'il touche directement, son impact sur les mouvements migratoires.
- L'Europe n'a d'autre choix que de devenir un acteur global. Ce qui signifie concrètement, en matière de gestion de crise, qu'elle doit continuer de développer ses outils civils et militaires ainsi que ses structures de planification et de conduite des opérations.

Et ce, afin de mieux travailler avec les partenaires à Washington, à New York et, bien sûr, à l'OTAN.

### 2. Ceci m'amène à la relation avec l'OTAN.

► Sur la coopération entre les deux organisations.

Fort heureusement, la page des débats théologiques se tourne. Bucarest a confirmé une évolution amorcée en 2003. Au quotidien avec le Secrétaire Général, mon ami Jaap, nous avons établi une relation flexible et pragmatique qui nous permet de discuter des sujets d'intérêt commun, et notamment des opérations lancées sur des théâtres communs. Et dans cet esprit, je considère positivement l'idée proposée par Bernard d'un groupe de haut niveau.

► Coopérer est une chose. Le faire plus efficacement sera possible si on développe la complémentarité entre les deux organisations sur des théâtres où elles sont engagées ensemble.

L'OTAN agit militairement sur certains théâtres. L'UE peut agir avec elle, mais aussi de façon

autonome, en bonne intelligence avec les mêmes alliés, sur des théâtres, au Tchad ou en Palestine par exemple, où il serait difficile de concevoir une opération de l'OTAN.

Il faut ajouter que nous vivons aussi une situation nouvelle sur nos théâtres d'engagement. La situation est tout à fait nouvelle par rapport à ce que nous avons à l'esprit quand « Berlin plus » a été négocié. On ne demande plus que l'UE agisse quand l'OTAN en tant que telle n'est pas engagée, mais plutôt de faire converger nos actions.

Les deux organisations sont-elles en mesure d'être plus efficaces ensemble ? Oui, je le pense et nous faisons tous les efforts nécessaires. L'argument de la compétition stratégique entre les deux organisations n'est pas selon moi un argument. Il risque de nous faire passer à côté de l'essentiel : comment renforcer la complémentarité entre l'UE et l'OTAN ? Il est impératif de régler cette question. Permettez-moi de vous livrer quelques réflexions.

### 3. Our primary framework for EU/NATO cooperation is 'Berlin plus'.

Let me indulge in a little history. I went to Ankara to finalise the scope of application of the 'Berlin plus' agreement in 2002 with Mr Erdogan, immediately following the election victory of his party. 'Berlin plus' was developed for one operation, in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2003. The political situation in Ankara at that time facilitated the signing of such an agreement, but it was for a specific purpose. We have used 'Berlin plus' for EU military operations where the EU has needed to use NATO means and capabilities. The cooperation has been excellent, EUFOR-ALTHEA in Bosnia Herzegovina is an example.

But European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has evolved significantly since that time, and we are in a new situation. The EU and NATO operate side by side in different missions, towards the same common purpose in the same theatre, Kosovo and Afghanistan. Interaction at the operational level is essential. 'Berlin plus' does not cover this situation and is not an appropriate framework. It does not ensure the security and coherence of our actions and will not ensure our success in those theatres. What we need is more flexibility, for example through the ability to have technical arrangements when and where we need them.

However, what we also need is flexibility and pragmatism. Jaap and I recognise this and agree. The political situation is the barrier however and "Berlin plus" is not enough. We need more to facilitate our actions. We need to find solutions and quickly. As the security challenges we face become more complex, so our flexibility must increase, not only to be able to interact at the operational level with NATO, but also with the UN, the IMF, the World Bank and development organisations in the same theatre. Our actions in Afghanistan are an example of how important this is.

### 4. With scarce resources we have to develop the right capabilities to meet our challenges, we must be cost-effective in doing so and ensure that the result is greater flexibility for cooperation.

The European Security Strategy sets the scene and is the strategic framework for the development of EU military and civilian capabilities. We must ensure that we have adequate and appropriate capabilities to address the security challenges we face.

The EU value-added is in our flexibility to use both civilian and military capabilities in crisis management, from intelligence-driven crisis prevention actions, to Security Sector Reform

(SSR), to police reform and military action.

Cooperation between EU and NATO is paramount in all contexts, but it is most acute on the last of these elements: military action.

The EU and NATO are fishing from the same pool of resources in terms of personnel and capabilities. Our mutual challenge is to ensure that we spend our limited resources on the most appropriate capabilities for facing the difficult challenges of today.

► The centre of gravity of the EU's work on developing military capabilities is the European Defence Agency (EDA). Guided by identified shortfalls and gaps in capabilities the EDA links research, technology and industry to policy.

It provides a forum for greater cooperation by, for example, facilitating the bilateral French/UK initiative on the improvement of the availability of deployable helicopters and crew which will be available for both NATO or EU military actions.

The EDA uses existing applicable NATO standards and concepts and works within the existing EU-NATO cooperation framework, for example in the EU-NATO Capability Group, where EU Member States and NATO can together build a detailed picture of respective capability development efforts to generate more flexible, interoperable and deployable capabilities.

But we have much further to go. I am sure that during this semester of the French presidency we will continue advancing.

We are extending efforts on both sides to avoid duplication of work and to foster coherence. Our strategic challenges demand vision, coherence and cooperation. Our political and technical framework must respond.

I promised to be short so I will finish here and hand over directly to Jaap.

Thank you.'

## European Defence Agency – Capability Development Plan

Brussels, 8 July 2008

### EU GOVERNMENTS ENDORSE CAPABILITY PLAN FOR FUTURE MILITARY NEEDS, PLEDGE JOINT EFFORTS

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European Union governments today endorsed a Capability Development Plan (CDP) defining the future military needs and priorities of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and agreed to use it to guide future national defence investment decisions and to seek opportunities to collaborate so as to address their short-to-longer-term military requirements coherently.

The CDP, developed over the past 18 months by the European Defence Agency, its 26 participating Member States (pMS), the EU Military Committee and the EU Council General Secretariat, contains a significant body of analysis from which conclusions and an initial tranche of practical proposals for action have been derived. It was presented to a meeting of the EDA's Steering Board, made up of directors of capability planning from the 26 pMS.

'The CDP provides the picture all Member States need to take into account when planning future capability development agendas and finding the right balance between ambition and resources. Linking theory to practice is a job for everyone,' said Javier Solana, Head of the Agency.

'It is quite clear, however, that the CDP is not a supranational military equipment or capability plan which aims to replace national defence plans and programmes. It should support, not replace national decision-making,' he added.

The CDP is an attempt to address the well-documented fragmentation in demand for European military capabilities, caused in part by a lack of coordinated military requirements and comprehensive priorities. It builds on the EDA's Long-Term Vision report, published in 2006.

Among its principal conclusions are the importance of intelligence and information-sharing during operations in complex environments; the need for flexible and agile responses to unpredictable threats; the requirement to coordinate military and civilian activities in crisis management operations; and the challenge of recruiting talented and well-qualified personnel for the armed forces.

As part of the effort, Member States contributed to a database of the national programmes and priorities, which has initially revealed a large number of different areas where more than one country was working on similar ideas. The meeting agreed with the Agency's proposals for how the appropriate collaboration could be encouraged in each of these areas.

The Steering Board agreed on 12 topics for specific action, such as countermeasures against improvised explosive devices, computer network defence and medical support, and asked the Agency to prepare a detailed way forward for each set of priorities.

'A capability-driven Agency means: investing in and delivering those capabilities which the CDP has listed as the needs for tomorrow, both in the short and the longer term,' said EDA Chief Executive Alexander Weis.

Separately, the Steering Board also reviewed progress on existing initiatives designed to address capability needs whose importance was underlined by the CDP.

► To improve the availability of helicopters for EU operations, the meeting agreed to a series

of measures on helicopter training, which would allow cooperation between Member States and increase the operational availability of aircrew, and on upgrading existing aircraft.

- ▶ The Steering Board considered a report on Network-Enabled Capabilities – the use of information technology to link all actors in an operation together so that information can be reliably shared – and agreed that the Agency should fund a study on how the NEC concept could be implemented. The NEC concept described in the report lays particular stress on the potential such technologies to support a unified effort of civilian and military entities involved in operations.
- ▶ Protection against sea mines, maritime surveillance, biological agent detection and combating terrorist bombs were among the force protection issues discussed as areas where the Agency is developing significant capabilities to enhance the operational effectiveness of European military forces.
- ▶ Following an EDA conference this year on the role of third-party commercial support for logistics, the Steering Board agreed to set up a trial of a European Support Platform for connecting industry with planners and commanders to provide help to meet the logistics requirements of EU operations.

## **ANNEXE – LIST OF TOPICS FOR SPECIFIC ACTION**

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Initial tranche of 12 selected actions

1. Counter man portable air defence systems
2. Computer network operations
3. Mine counter-measures in littoral sea areas
4. Comprehensive approach – military implications
5. Military human intelligence and cultural / language training
6. Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance architecture
7. Medical support
8. Chemical, biological radiological and nuclear defence
9. Third party logistic support
10. Counter-improvised explosive device (c-ied)
11. Increased availability of helicopters
12. Network enabled capability

## Iran – Nuclear issue

Brussels and Geneva, 11 and 19 July 2008

### DECLARATION BY THE PRESIDENCY ON BEHALF OF THE EU ON THE IRANIAN MISSILE TESTS

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Brussels, 11 July 2008

The European Union voices its concern at the fact that Iran tested short- and medium-range missiles on 9, and then again on 10 July. Such missile tests can only heighten the concern of the international community at a time when Iran has still not implemented Security Council Resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747 and 1803, and, in particular, has not suspended its sensitive nuclear activities.

The EU would urge Iran finally to respond to the demands of the entire international community, as expressed in the Security Council Resolutions, so as to reach a negotiated solution to the nuclear issue.

The Candidate Countries Croatia\* and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\*, the Countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, align themselves with this declaration.

\* Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

### SUMMARY OF REMARKS BY JAVIER SOLANA AFTER THE MEETING WITH SAEED JALILI, SECRETARY OF THE IRANIAN SUPREME NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR ISSUE

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Geneva, 19 July 2008

Let me first thank the Swiss Government for offering to facilitate this meeting and hosting these talks. We have had a full-day of constructive and productive work based on the generous and comprehensive offer which I presented in Teheran on 14 June 2008, five weeks ago today, as well as on the way forward. I want to thank Dr Jalili for the talks today.

Nevertheless, I must say that we have not yet received a clear answer. We did not get a 'yes' or a 'no'. Now, we expect to have that clear answer and to have it in about two weeks time.

I hope very much that after the exchange of views today, Dr Jalili will go back to Iran and convey our discussions to the leadership in order to see if we can get that positive answer. They have presented a long paper, on modalities, which is not the reply to the question we had posed.

We are offering to refrain from any new action in the United Nations Security Council; and in return we expect Iran to refrain from any new nuclear activity. In particular, not to increase the number of centrifuges. An answer for this is required.

We hope very much that the Iranian people will understand the opportunity that our proposal opens for them and that we are offering cooperation and to avoid confrontation.

# Paris Summit for the Mediterranean – Joint Declaration

Paris, 13 July 2008

Euro-Mediterranean Heads of States and Government meeting in Paris on 13 July 2008, inspired by the shared political will to revitalise efforts to transform the Mediterranean into an area of peace, democracy, cooperation and prosperity, agree to adopt the following joint declaration:

The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, building on the Barcelona Declaration and its objectives of achieving peace, stability and security, as well as the acquis of the Barcelona Process, is a multilateral partnership with a view to increasing the potential for regional integration and cohesion. Heads of State and Government also reassert the central importance of the Mediterranean on the political agenda of all countries. They stress the need for better co-ownership by all participants and for more relevance and visibility for the citizens.

They share the conviction that this initiative can play an important role in addressing common challenges facing the Euro-Mediterranean region, such as economic and social development; world food security crisis; degradation of the environment, including climate change and desertification, with the view of promoting sustainable development; energy; migration; terrorism and extremism; as well as promoting dialogue between cultures.

It will encompass all EU Member States and the European Commission, together with the other States (members and observers) of the Barcelona Process. The Arab League shall be invited to the meetings of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, in pursuance of its participation in the Barcelona Process. Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean welcomes Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Monaco and Montenegro which have accepted the acquis of the Barcelona Process.

## A strategic ambition for the Mediterranean

1. Europe and the Mediterranean countries are bound by history, geography and culture. More importantly, they are united by a common ambition: to build together a future of peace, democracy, prosperity and human, social and cultural understanding. To achieve these common objectives participants agree to continue with renewed dynamism the quest for peace and cooperation, to explore their joint problems and transform these good intentions into actions in a renewed partnership for progress.

2. Heads of State and Government underline the important role played by the Barcelona Process since 1995. The Barcelona Process has been the central instrument for Euro-Mediterranean relations. Representing a partnership of 39 governments and over 700 million people, it has provided a framework for continued engagement and development. The Barcelona Process is the only forum within which all Euro-Mediterranean partners exchange views and engage in constructive dialogue. It represents a strong commitment to peace, democracy, regional stability and security through regional cooperation and integration. The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean aims to build on that consensus to pursue cooperation, political and socio-economic reform and modernisation on the basis of equality and mutual respect for each other's sovereignty.

3. Heads of State and Government underscore the importance of the active participation of civil society, local and regional authorities and the private sector in the implementation of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean.

4. To take advantage of the opportunities offered by an enhanced framework of multilateral cooperation, Heads of State and Government decide to launch a reinforced partnership – The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean.

5. This initiative is also the expression of a common aspiration to achieve peace as well as regional security according to the Barcelona Declaration of 1995, which, inter alia, promotes regional security by acting in favour of nuclear, chemical and biological non-proliferation through adherence to and compliance with a combination of international and regional non-proliferation regimes and arms control and disarmament agreements such as NPT, CWC, BWC, CTBT and/or regional arrangements such as weapons-free zones, including their verification regimes, as well as by fulfilling in good faith their commitments under arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation conventions.

The parties shall pursue a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems. Furthermore the parties will consider practical steps to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as excessive accumulation of conventional arms; refrain from developing military capacity beyond their legitimate defence requirements, at the same time reaffirming their resolve to achieve the same degree of security and mutual confidence with the lowest possible levels of troops and weaponry and adherence to CCW; promote conditions likely to develop good-neighbourly relations among themselves and support processes aimed at stability, security, prosperity and regional and subregional cooperation; consider any confidence and security-building measures that could be taken between the parties with a view to the creation of an ‘area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean’, including the long term possibility of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean pact to that end.

6. It shows the determination to favour human resource development and employment in line with the Millennium Development Goals, including alleviating poverty. Heads of State and Government underline their commitment to strengthen democracy and political pluralism by the expansion of participation in political life and the embracing of all human rights and fundamental freedoms. They also affirm their ambition to build a common future based on the full respect of democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms, as enshrined in international human rights law, such as the promotion of economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights, strengthening the role of women in society, the respect of minorities, the fight against racism and xenophobia and the advancement of cultural dialogue and mutual understanding.

7. Heads of State and Government reaffirm their support for the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, as referred to in the Lisbon Euromed Ministerial Meeting (November 2007) and according to the Annapolis process. They recall that peace in the Middle East requires a comprehensive solution and in this regard welcome the announcement that Syria and Israel have initiated indirect peace talks under the auspices of Turkey, in accordance with the Madrid conference terms of reference for peace.

8. Heads of State and Government reiterate their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and their determination to eradicate it and to combat its sponsors and they



reaffirm their commitment to fully implement the Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism in order to enhance the security of all citizens within a framework that ensures respect of the rule of law and human rights, particularly through more effective counter-terrorism policies and deeper co-operation to dismantle all terrorist activities, to protect potential targets and to manage the consequences of attacks. They emphasise the need to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations without qualification, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes. They also reiterate the complete rejection of attempts to associate any religion or culture with terrorism and confirm their commitment to do their utmost effort with a view to resolving conflict, ending occupation, confronting oppression, reducing poverty, promoting human rights and good governance, improving intercultural understanding and ensuring respect for all religions and beliefs. Such actions serve directly the interests of the people of the Euro-Med region and work against the interests of the terrorists and the networks.

### Scope and main objectives

9. Heads of State and Government agree that the challenge of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean is to enhance multilateral relations, increase co-ownership of the process, set governance on the basis of equal footing and translate it into concrete projects, more visible to citizens. Now is the time to inject a new and continuing momentum into the Barcelona Process. More engagement and new catalysts are now needed to translate the objectives of the Barcelona Declaration into tangible results.

10. The Euro-Mediterranean partnership continues to be an inclusive process driven in all its aspects by the principle of consensus, for which the modalities in terms of projects will be decided by the next Foreign Affairs Ministerial meeting in November 2008.

11. The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean will build on the acquis and reinforce the achievements and successful elements of the Barcelona Process. The Barcelona Declaration, its goals and its cooperation areas remain valid and its three chapters of cooperation (Political Dialogue, Economic Cooperation and Free Trade, and Human, Social and Cultural Dialogue) will continue to remain central in Euro-Mediterranean relations. The Five-Year Work Programme adopted by the 10<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Euro-Mediterranean Summit held in Barcelona in 2005 (including the fourth chapter of cooperation on 'Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security' introduced at that stage) and the conclusions of all ministerial meetings will remain in force. Heads of State and Government acknowledge the progress and economic benefits of the creation of a deep Free Trade Area in the Euromed region by 2010 and beyond, and the strengthening of regional economic integration in all its dimensions. They support the main lines of the Euromed Trade Roadmap till 2010 and beyond, and, in particular, to study the establishment of a smooth, efficient and business-friendly trade facilitation mechanism which would bring further transparency and trade and investment opportunities.

12. Heads of State and Government underline that the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean aims to achieve a future of peace and shared prosperity in the entire region by implementing projects that will enhance the flow of exchanges among the people of the whole region. In this regard they acknowledge the human and cultural dimension of this initiative. They underline the commitment to facilitate legal movement of individuals. They stress that promoting orderly managed legal migration in the interest of all parties concerned, fighting illegal migra-

tion and fostering links between migration and development are issues of common interest which should be addressed through a comprehensive, balanced and integrated approach.

13. The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean will be complementary to EU bilateral relations with these countries<sup>1</sup> which will continue under existing policy frameworks such as the Association Agreements, the European Neighbourhood Policy action plans, and, in the case of Mauritania, the African Caribbean Pacific framework. It will also be coherent and complementary with the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. While complementing activities concerning its regional dimension, the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean will be independent from the EU enlargement policy, accession negotiations and the pre-accession process.

14. The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean gives a new impulse to the Barcelona Process in at least three very important ways:

- by upgrading the political level of the EU's relationship with its Mediterranean partners;
- by providing for further co-ownership to our multilateral relations; and
- by making these relations more concrete and visible through additional regional and sub-regional projects, relevant for the citizens of the region.

### Upgrading of relations

15. Heads of State and Government agree to hold biennial summits. The summits should result in a political declaration and a short list of concrete regional projects to be set in motion. The conclusions should endorse a broad two-year work programme for the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean. Annual Foreign Affairs Ministerial meetings will review progress in the implementation of the summit conclusions and prepare the next summit meetings and, if necessary, approve new projects.

16. The summit meetings should take place alternately in the EU and in Mediterranean partner countries. The host country should be selected by consensus. All countries party to the initiative will be invited to Summits, Ministerials and other plenary meetings of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean.

17. The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly will be the legitimate parliamentary expression of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean. Heads of State and Government strongly support the strengthening of the role of the EMPA in its relations with Mediterranean partners.

18. The Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures as a Euro-Mediterranean institution will contribute in an effective manner to the cultural dimension of the initiative in cooperation with the UN Alliance of Civilizations.

### Increased co-ownership and institutional governance

19. Heads of State and Government agree on the creation of a co-presidency and also decide that a joint secretariat will be established. Participation in the co-presidencies and the secretariat will be open to all members of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean.

1. The countries concerned are: Algeria; Egypt; Israel; Jordan; Lebanon; Mauritania; Monaco; Morocco; Palestinian Authority; Syria; Tunisia. Croatia and Turkey, negotiating candidate countries to the EU. Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro, potential candidates to the EU. Libya, invited by the Presidency since the Euromed Stuttgart ministerial meeting of 1999.

20. The current structures of the Barcelona Process should be preserved and adapted when new modalities are approved by the Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Affairs Ministers.

### Co-Presidency

21. Heads of State and Government establish a co-presidency in order to improve the balance and the joint ownership of their cooperation. One of the co-presidents will be from the EU and the other from the Mediterranean partner countries. The co-presidency shall apply to Summits, all Ministerial meetings, Senior Officials meetings, the Joint Permanent Committee and, when possible, experts/ad hoc meetings within the initiative.

22. The establishment of a co-presidency

- ▶ from the EU side must be compatible with the external representation of the European Union in accordance with the Treaty provisions in force;
- ▶ from the Mediterranean side, the co-president must be chosen by consensus for a non-renewable period of two years.

### Institutional governance and Secretariat

23. Heads of State and Government agree to establish new institutional structures which will contribute to achieving the political goals of this initiative, especially reinforcing co-ownership, upgrading the political level of EU-Mediterranean relations and achieving visibility through projects.

24. They agree that a joint **Secretariat** for the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean will be established, with a key role within the institutional architecture. The Secretariat will give a new impulse to this process in terms of identification, follow-up, promotion of the projects and the search for partners. The funding and implementation of projects will be pursued on a case by case basis. The Secretariat will work in operational liaison with all structures of the process, including by preparing working documents for the decision-making bodies. The Secretariat would have a separate legal personality with an autonomous status.

25. The mandate of the Secretariat is of a technical nature while the political mandate related to all aspects of the initiative remains the responsibility of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Senior Officials.

26. The **Joint Permanent Committee** based in Brussels will assist and prepare the meetings of the Senior Officials and ensure the appropriate follow-up; it may also act as a mechanism to react rapidly if an exceptional situation arises in the region that requires the consultation of Euro-Mediterranean partners.

27. The **Senior Officials** will continue to convene regularly in order to prepare the Ministerial meetings, including projects to be endorsed, take stock of and evaluate the progress of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean in all its components and submit the annual work programme to Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

28. **Details of the mandate** of the new institutional structure, the functioning of the co-presidency, as well as the composition, seat and funding of the Secretariat will be decided on the basis of consensus by the Foreign Affairs Ministers in November 2008, taking into account thorough discussions and proposals submitted by all partners.

## Projects

29. The project selection process will be in conformity with the Barcelona Declaration objectives notably achieving peace, security and stability. The partners will set up a favourable environment for the implementation of projects taking into account the regional, sub-regional and trans-national character of proposed projects as well as their size, relevance and interest for the parties involved, in line with the scope and main objectives of the initiative. The potential to promote balanced and sustainable development, regional and sub-regional integration, cohesion and interconnections will be considered and their financial feasibility including the maximization of private sector financing and participation will be sought. Senior Officials will prepare the criteria for the selection of projects to be approved by Foreign Ministers.

30. Heads of State and Government underscore the potential offered by the reinforced cooperation through the principle of variable geometry projects in line with the scope and main aims of the initiative. Such an approach will enable member countries with affinities, shared objectives and complementarities to give momentum to the process and reach the goals of the Barcelona Declaration.

## Funding

31. The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean will mobilise additional funding for the region, mainly through regional and subregional projects. Its capacity to attract more financial resources for regional projects, with a high degree of donor coordination, will constitute its added value mainly through the following sources, inter alia: private sector participation; contributions from the EU budget and all partners; contributions from other countries, international financial institutions and regional entities; the Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership Facility (FEMIP); the ENPI Euro-Med envelope, the Neighbourhood Investment Facility and the cross-border cooperation instrument within the ENPI, as well as the other instruments applicable to the countries covered by the initiative, for which the usual selection and procedural rules will continue to apply.

## Concluding points

32. The Participants stress that the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean is an historic opportunity to revitalise the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Process and upgrade it to a new level. The ultimate success of the initiative also rests in the hands of citizens, civil society and the active involvement of the private sector.

33. Heads of State and Government invite Ministers of Foreign Affairs to finalise, during their next meeting in November, the modalities for the institutional set-up of the initiative. The new structures for the initiative should be fully operational before the end of 2008. All participating countries and the European Commission will work in close coordination to achieve this objective.

(...)

# Weapons of Mass Destruction – Council Joint Action

Brussels, 15 July 2008

## **COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/588/CFSP OF ON SUPPORT FOR ACTIVITIES OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY ORGANISATION (CTBTO) IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN ITS MONITORING AND VERIFICATION CAPABILITIES AND IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU STRATEGY AGAINST PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION**

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 14 thereof,  
Whereas:

- (1) On 12 December 2003, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Chapter III of which contains a list of measures that need to be taken both within the European Union and in third countries to combat such proliferation.
- (2) The EU is actively implementing this Strategy and is giving effect to the measures listed in Chapter III thereof, in particular through releasing financial resources to support specific projects conducted by multilateral institutions, such as the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO).
- (3) On 17 November 2003, the Council adopted Common Position 2003/805/CFSP<sup>(1)</sup> on the universalisation and reinforcement of multilateral agreements in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery. That Common Position calls, *inter alia*, for the promotion of the signature and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).
- (4) The States Signatories to the CTBT have decided to establish a Preparatory Commission, endowed with legal capacity, for the purpose of carrying out the effective implementation of the CTBT, pending the establishment of the CTBTO.
- (5) The early entry into force and universalisation of the CTBT and the strengthening of the monitoring and verification system of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO are important objectives of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. In this connection, the nuclear test carried out by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in October 2006 further underlined the importance of the early entry-into force of the CTBT and the need for an accelerated building-up and strengthening of the CTBTO monitoring and verification system.
- (6) The Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO is engaged in identifying how its verification system could best be strengthened, including through the development of noble gas monitoring capacity and efforts aimed at fully involving States Signatories in the implementation of the verification regime. The Preparatory Commission should therefore be entrusted with the technical implementation of this Joint Action.

(1) OJ L 302, 20.11.2003, p. 34.

(7) In the light of the above, the Council adopted Joint Action 2006/243/CFSP<sup>(2)</sup> and thereafter Joint Action 2007/468/CFSP<sup>(3)</sup> on support for activities of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO in the area of training and setting up, as well as strengthening the capacities of its monitoring and verification system, and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. This EU support should be continued,

## HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

### *Article 1*

1. For the purposes of ensuring the continuous and practical implementation of certain elements of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the EU shall support the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBTO) in order to further the following objectives:

- (a) strengthening the capabilities of the CTBTO monitoring and verification system, including in the field of radio-nuclide detection;
  - (b) strengthening the capacity of the States Signatories of the CTBT to fulfil their verification responsibilities under the CTBT and to enable them to benefit fully from participation in the CTBT regime.
2. The projects to be supported by the EU shall have the following specific objectives:
- (a) continuing support for the development by the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO of capacity in the area of noble gas monitoring and verification for the detection and identification of possible nuclear explosions;
  - (b) providing technical assistance to African countries aimed at fully integrating States Signatories into the CTBTO monitoring and verification system.

These projects shall be carried out for the benefit of all States Signatories to the CTBT.

A detailed description of the projects is set out in the Annex.

### *Article 2*

1. The Presidency, assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council/High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (SG/HR), shall be responsible for the implementation of this Joint Action. The Commission shall be fully associated.
2. The technical implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2) shall be carried out by the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO. It shall perform this task under the control of the SG/HR, assisting the Presidency. For this purpose, the SG/HR shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO.
3. The Presidency, the SG/HR and the Commission shall keep each other regularly informed about the projects, in conformity with their respective competences.

### *Article 3*

1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2) shall be EUR 2 316 000.

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(2) OJ L 88, 25.3.2006, p. 68.

(3) OJ L 176, 6.7.2007, p. 31.

2. The expenditure financed by the amount stipulated in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the European Communities.
3. The Commission shall supervise the proper management of the expenditure referred to in paragraph 2, which shall take the form of a grant. For this purpose, it shall conclude a financing agreement with the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO. The financing agreement shall stipulate that the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO is to ensure visibility of the EU contribution, appropriate to its size.
4. The Commission shall endeavour to conclude the financing agreement referred to in paragraph 3 as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Joint Action. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of conclusion of the financing agreement.

#### *Article 4*

The Presidency, assisted by the SG/HR, shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Joint Action on the basis of regular reports prepared by the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO. These reports shall form the basis for the evaluation by the Council. The Commission shall be fully associated. It shall provide information on the financial aspects of the implementation of this Joint Action.

#### *Article 5*

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the day of its adoption.

It shall expire 18 months after the date of the conclusion of the financing agreement between the Commission and the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO or after six months if no financing agreement has been concluded before that date.

#### *Article 6*

This Joint Action shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Brussels, 15 July 2008.

*For the Council*

*The President*

M. Barnier

## Kosovo – Intervention by Javier Solana

Brussels, 18 July 2008

### SUMMARY OF INTERVENTION OF JAVIER SOLANA BEFORE THE MEETING OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS ACTIVE ON THE GROUND IN KOSOVO (EU, NATO, UN, OSCE)

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C'est pour moi un vrai plaisir que d'être ici, au Palais d'Egmont avec nos collègues de l'OTAN, de l'OSCE et des Nations unies. Nous avons aujourd'hui l'opportunité de discuter ensemble et de manière pragmatique du Kosovo. Je m'en félicite.

Depuis le 15 février, le sens des responsabilités des uns et des autres a prévalu. Aujourd'hui on observe une relative stabilité au Kosovo. Les forces pro-européennes ont remporté les élections en Serbie où un nouveau gouvernement a été formé. La Serbie a également depuis lors signé un Accord de Stabilisation et d'Association avec l'Union européenne.

Parallèlement le Secrétaire général des Nations unies a pris la décision de reconfigurer, et donc de mieux ajuster, la présence internationale. Aussi maintenant il appartient à ceux autour de cette table de tout mettre en œuvre pour poursuivre sur cette dynamique positive. Les résultats obtenus depuis février nous encouragent. Ils démontrent que nous pouvons relever ces défis et accomplir ensemble notre mission. Pour cela, nous devons rester mobilisés et continuer de nous engager. Notre objectif commun au Kosovo reste de garantir la stabilité des Balkans. Le dernier rapport du Secrétaire général des Nations unies le rappelle à tous et définit le cadre de l'action de chacun.

Ainsi pour la mission EULEX, il fixe son cadre d'opération sous l'autorité de la résolution 1244. En clair, EULEX opérera sous l'autorité globale des Nations unies et je veillerai à fournir tous les rapports nécessaires à leur Secrétaire général. Je tiens ici à saluer personnellement les efforts de Ban Ki Moon et sa contribution déterminante. Ensemble nous réussissons à trouver les bonnes solutions pour tous. Nos équipes y travaillent chaque jour.

Depuis le début, des progrès significatifs ont été accomplis sur le terrain grâce à l'étroite collaboration de la MINUK et de l'OTAN. C'est dans ce même esprit et dans le cadre que j'évoquais à l'instant que la mission européenne se déploie actuellement. L'objectif est de voir EULEX pleinement opérationnel à l'automne.

As of 16 June, the EULEX Head of Mission Yves de Kermabon has been deployed in Pristina. He has been working very hard with his team to build up EULEX towards its full operational capability. Additional deployment has taken place. There are now around 400 staff with EULEX. For each individual area, until EULEX can deploy, it is our understanding that UNMIK will remain in charge. We do not therefore expect any security gap.

With UNMIK real progress has been made on the ground. We are grateful to the US in assisting EULEX.

With NATO complementarity is a defining feature in the Kosovo theatre: While KFOR will remain responsible for providing a safe and secure environment in Kosovo, the EU has a key role to play by contributing to the reinforcement of the Rule of Law.



# Javier Solana – National parliaments of the EU Member States

Paris, 21 July 2008

## CONFÉRENCE DES PRÉSIDENTS DES COMMISSIONS DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES DES PARLEMENTS NATIONAUX DES ÉTATS MEMBRES DE L'UE – RÉSUMÉ DE L'INTERVENTION DE JAVIER SOLANA

Messieurs les Présidents, Mesdames, Messieurs, chers amis,

Permettez-moi tout d'abord de rendre ici hommage à mon ami, Bronislaw Geremek. C'était un homme de bien. C'était un grand Européen. Il va nous manquer à tous.

Chers amis, c'est avec grand plaisir que je vous retrouve à Paris.

Vous savez l'importance de nos réunions pour moi. Nos discussions alimentent ma réflexion. Elles orientent mon action.

Depuis notre dernière réunion, en Slovaquie, en mars, beaucoup d'évènements se sont succédé, en Europe et dans le monde.

L'un de ces évènements est bien sûr le referendum irlandais. Le Président Nicolas Sarkozy est aujourd'hui à Dublin. Les autres processus de ratification du Traité de Lisbonne avancent. Il faut nous donner du temps. Nous ferons le point, lors du Conseil européen en octobre.

Je préfère aujourd'hui me focaliser sur les grands dossiers internationaux, géographiques et stratégiques.

Je commencerai par le Moyen-Orient au sens large.

Depuis 2001, une ceinture de crises s'est développée de Kaboul à Gaza. Mais depuis l'accord signé à Doha sur le Liban en mai dernier, on observe sur cette même ceinture une certaine déflation des tensions. Avec deux nuances de taille que sont la question afghane d'une part, et la question iranienne d'autre part. Je vais y revenir. Mais je vous avance qu'il y a quelques signes d'espoir.

Je parle de déflation des tensions parce que, en quelques mois, on a vu :

- l'élection d'un nouveau Président libanais et la formation d'un gouvernement d'unité nationale ;
- l'engagement de discussions indirectes entre Israël et la Syrie ;
- des échanges de prisonniers entre Israël et le Hezbollah libanais ;
- la poursuite, des négociations entre le Président de l'Autorité palestinienne et la direction israélienne ;
- les accords menés par la diplomatie égyptienne sur Gaza ont déjà eu un impact positif. Les discussions se poursuivent. L'Union européenne se tient prête à reprendre sa mission à la frontière entre l'Égypte et Gaza. La conférence de Berlin a également montré l'engagement européen pour la formation de la police palestinienne en Cisjordanie.

Le Sommet de Paris pour la Méditerranée a mis en lumière cette nouvelle tendance de fond. Je pense que la préparation du Sommet durant ces douze derniers mois a même favorisé cette évolution et que le succès des 13 et 14 juillet l'a consolidée.

Il faut maintenant pousser plus loin : les tensions sont moins aiguës, mais les problèmes de fond demeurent.

Le processus de paix entre Israéliens et Palestiniens reste le nœud gordien. Il faut donc y travailler sans relâche et mettre à profit tous les contacts entre les parties et avec les parties. Je me rendrai donc encore dans la région en septembre. La période de temps qui nous mènent jusqu'à

l'Assemblée générale des Nations unies s'annonce très importante.

Dans ce contexte la question iranienne est fondamentale. Comme vous le savez, j'ai rencontré ce week-end à Genève le négociateur iranien, le Secrétaire général du Conseil de sécurité nationale, Saeed Jalili. Les discussions ont été longues et complexes. Si la volonté de discuter malgré tout est là, nous n'avons pas encore reçu la réponse iranienne claire que l'on attendait après les propositions que j'ai présentées à Téhéran il y a cinq semaines. J'ai demandé à ce que la partie iranienne nous la remette dans un délai de deux semaines.

Un mot sur l'Afghanistan. Les enjeux sont énormes. Les difficultés aussi logiquement. Ils requièrent une vraie mobilisation. Les Européens sont impliqués très directement sur le terrain. L'Union en tant que telle aussi naturellement avec le déploiement d'une mission de police. Le doublement de ces effectifs est prévu pour les prochains mois. C'est là un volet opérationnel indispensable. Il appuie nos efforts dans le dialogue politique développé avec le Président Karzai, mais aussi avec le Pakistan voisin, acteur-clef dans la question afghane.

Quelques mots seulement sur la Russie. J'étais en Sibérie pour le dernier Sommet entre l'Union européenne et la Russie fin juin. Le nouveau Président que j'ai rencontré veut insuffler un nouveau style. Il a confirmé la volonté russe de développer un vrai partenariat franc et direct avec l'Europe. Et nous allons y travailler ensemble. Nous sommes maintenant en pleine négociation du nouvel accord entre l'Union européenne et la Russie qui a été lancé lors du Sommet.

Le Kosovo devient un sujet moins épineux. Nous avançons dans la bonne direction. Avec Ban Ki Moon et l'accord des membres du Conseil de Sécurité, nous définissons les règles de la reconfiguration de l'UNMIK et de la montée en puissance de la mission « État de droit » de l'Union européenne. Cette mission EULEX devrait ainsi atteindre sa pleine capacité à l'automne et être en mesure de remplir pleinement son mandat, notamment en matière de lutte contre le crime organisé.

Sur la Serbie, je veux aussi vous rappeler que, après la signature de l'accord d'Association avec l'Union européenne, les élections ont eu lieu et permis la mise en place d'un gouvernement pro-européen. Le Président Boris Tadic et l'exécutif serbe ont la volonté de faire avancer les relations avec l'Europe.

Permettez-moi quelques mots sur l'Afrique. Comme vous le savez, la force militaire européenne déployée au Tchad avec la contribution de 18 États membres poursuit son action. En aide aux populations civiles, aux personnes déplacées ainsi qu'aux réfugiés du Darfour. Et chacun se félicite du rôle stabilisateur qu'elle joue, en dépit là encore d'une équation régionale très délicate. Je remercie les gouvernements des pays que vous représentez pour l'engagement généreux de vos forces armées.

Quelques mots sur le Zimbabwe où aujourd'hui à Harare se déroulent des événements très importants. On attend avec grand intérêt la signature d'un accord-cadre entre le Président et le leader de l'opposition, sous la médiation du Président sud-africain Thabo Mbeki. La solution pour ce pays devrait être un partage du pouvoir qui reflète le résultat des dernières élections législatives. Nous y travaillons encore une fois avec tous nos partenaires africains. L'Union a la volonté de continuer à faire pression sur Mugabe.

Ladies and gentlemen,

On the horizontal agenda, many issues have become more prominent recently, calling for more active and substantive action at the European level. I want to focus particularly on the European

Union Security Strategy and non proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

No doubt the review of the European Security Strategy will incorporate some of the new issues which have become more prominent in the international agenda such as all the questions related to energy and climate change.

In a way climate change is *the* test case for effective multilateralism. Europe has shown leadership by adopting the 20/20 by 2020 targets. We are right to try to catalyse a global deal in Copenhagen, with binding targets on deep emission cuts and serious investments in technologies. At the same time, we need to prepare for the inevitable. All the evidence suggests that climate change will have increasing political and security consequences.

As ever, governance is the key variable. Where governments are strong, they will cope. Where they are weak, climate change will push them over the edge.

We have begun to take action, on the basis of the paper I presented together with the Commission at the March European Council.

This is a huge agenda. In the coming period, we should focus on developing our analysis and early warning systems ; on helping the most vulnerable regions and countries to strengthen their resilience and on boosting our crisis response capacities.

On non-proliferation, the European Union has been very active promoting adherence to, and implementation of, the various non-proliferation treaties. I have already mentioned my recent contacts with the Iranian negotiator, where again Europe is playing a unique role.

We should, however, be conscious of the broader context, namely that the overall non-proliferation regime is under pressure.

This calls for an active and creative European strategy in the run-up to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review conference of 2010, including by making real progress on multilateral fuel cycle arrangements.

We also need to end the stalemate in the UN Conference on Disarmament and start negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty, among other issues. This was my clear message when I spoke to the CD last month.

In this context, the new thinking of both candidates in the US Presidential elections on nuclear disarmament is as significant as it is welcome.

Finally, a word on crisis management. We have made tremendous progress on developing a distinctive European way of doing crisis management.

It is worth repeating that to date we have seen 19 operations on three continents. From Chad to Afghanistan, from Kosovo to the Caucasus. Protecting the vulnerable, taking risks for peace.

And the demand for European engagement continues to grow. It is up to us to ensure that supply meets demand.

The French Presidency has put forward an ambitious agenda laying out some of the next steps we ought to take on European Security Defence Policy. A big part relates to civilian and military capability development – and rightly so. Another relates to ensuring that we have the right structures to plan and conduct the integrated missions that are needed.

My message today is as simple as it is urgent. In a world of global threats, we need to offer global solutions. But there is no serious role for Europe without the member-states being fully involved.

We will only be able to protect our interests and advance our values if everybody backs this project. By giving political input and support, by harnessing aid and assistance programmes and by sending the ‘best and brightest’ to work both in Brussels and on our missions.

Thank you very much.

## North Korea – Six Party Talks

Brussels, 22 July 2008

### DECLARATION BY THE PRESIDENCY ON BEHALF OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ON THE SIX-PARTY TALKS

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The European Union expresses its satisfaction with the results of the most recent Six-Party talks which took place in Beijing from 10 to 12 July 2008, and hopes that those talks will continue with the aim of achieving the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of the whole of North Korea's nuclear programme, in accordance with the objectives of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718. It welcomes the progress made towards resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, via the diplomatic efforts deployed.

The Candidate Countries Turkey, Croatia\* and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\*, the Countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Armenia and Georgia align themselves with this declaration.

\* Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

### ANNEXE – PRESS COMMUNIQUE OF THE HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING OF THE SIXTH ROUND OF THE SIX-PARTY TALKS

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Beijing, 12 July 2008

The Heads of Delegation Meeting of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing among the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States of America from 10 to 12 July 2008.

Mr. Wu Dawei, vice minister of foreign affairs of the PRC; Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, vice minister of foreign affairs of the DPRK; Mr. Saiki Akitaka, director-general for Asian and Oceanian affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Mr. Kim Sook, special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Mr. Alexei Borodavkin, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the Russian Federation; and Mr. Christopher R. Hill, assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs of the State Department of the United States attended the talks as heads of their respective delegations.

Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the meeting.

The parties spoke highly of the positive progress made in the second-phase actions for the implementation of the Joint Statement and agreed unanimously that the progress contributes to peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The parties reached important consensus on the full and balanced implementation of the second-phase actions.

I. In accordance with the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks adopted on 19 September 2005, the six parties agreed to establish a verification mechanism within the Six-Party Talks framework to verify the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The verification mechanism consists of experts of the six parties and is responsible to the Working Group on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The verification measures of the verification mechanism include visits to facilities, review of documents, interviews with technical personnel and other measures unanimously agreed upon among the six parties.

When necessary, the verification mechanism can welcome the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to provide consultancy and assistance for relevant verification.

The specific plans and implementation of the verification will be decided by the Working Group on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in line with the principle of consensus.

II. The six parties agreed to establish a monitoring mechanism within the Six-Party Talks framework.

The monitoring mechanism consists of the heads of delegation of the six parties.

The mission of the monitoring mechanism is to ensure that all parties honor and fulfill their respective commitments made within the Six-Party Talks framework, including non-proliferation and economic and energy assistance to the DPRK.

The monitoring mechanism will carry out its responsibilities in ways considered effective by the six parties.

The heads of delegation of the six parties can authorize appropriate officials to carry out their responsibilities.

III. The Parties formulated a timetable for economic and energy assistance along with disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities.

Disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities by the DPRK and the remaining heavy fuel oil (HFO) and non-HFO assistance to the DPRK by other parties will be fully implemented in parallel.

All parties will work to complete their HFO and non-HFO assistance to the DPRK by the end of October 2008.

The United States and Russia will work to complete the provision of their remaining share of HFO assistance to the DPRK by the end of October 2008.

China and the ROK will work to sign with the DPRK binding agreements for the provision of their remaining share of non-HFO assistance by the end of August 2008.

Japan expressed its willingness to take part in the economic and energy assistance to the DPRK as soon as possible when the environment is in place.

The DPRK will work to complete the disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities by the end of October 2008.

IV. The Parties agreed to continue with their discussions on the ‘Guiding Principles of Peace and Security in Northeast Asia’.

V. The Parties reiterated that the Six-Party Ministerial Meeting will be held in Beijing at an appropriate time.

VI. The Parties had a preliminary exchange of views on the third-phase actions for the implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005. The Parties agreed to continue to advance the Six-Party Talks progress in a comprehensive manner and work together for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

## General Affairs and External Relations Council

Brussels, 22 to 29 July 2008

(...)

### **CHAD/CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

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At lunch, Ministers briefly discussed the EUFOR Chad/RCA military operation, and adopted the following conclusions:

1. The Council recalls its conclusions of 16 June 2008, underlining the key contribution made by operation EUFOR Chad/RCA, MINURCAT and UNAMID to bringing security to the region and thus to the efforts to consolidate peace and reconciliation, and to improving the humanitarian situation. In accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1778 (2007), the European Union is conducting the EUFOR Chad/RCA military bridging operation for twelve months starting from the day on which the initial operational capability was achieved, namely 15 March 2008.
2. The Council notes that approximately 3 200 men are now deployed on the ground. Battalions South and Centre are fully operational. Battalion North is currently being deployed. The Council welcomes the signature of the participation agreement with Albania on 13 July. The Council wishes an ad hoc participation agreement to be concluded with Russia rapidly so that Russia's contributions can be deployed as soon as possible. Negotiations with other third countries are under way.
3. Since the declaration of Initial Operating Capability on 15 March 2008, EUFOR Chad/RCA has played a key role in bringing security to the areas where it is present, in particular during the attacks in mid-June by rebel movements in the Goz Beïda region. Thus, by protecting refugees, displaced persons and humanitarian staff, operation EUFOR Chad/RCA has acted in accordance with its mandate. EUFOR Chad/RCA will continue to act in a way that is impartial, neutral and independent.
4. The Council notes the quality of the relations established between the European force and the humanitarian actors on the ground, and notes that pragmatic solutions have been found in accordance with EUFOR's mandate, to meet the security needs whilst taking into account the *modi operandi* of each party. The systematic integration of human rights issues and the protection of women and children in armed conflicts into the conduct of the operation, in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1612, will continue.
5. Highlighting the excellent coordination established between operation EUFOR Chad/RCA and the United Nations, the Council wishes MINURCAT to be deployed as swiftly as possible. MINURCAT's role is central in responding effectively to the non-military threats of banditry and crime.
6. Operation EUFOR Chad/RCA forms part of the multidimensional support provided to the region by the European Union. The Council notes with satisfaction the consistency between the European force's action, the cooperation and development measures taken by the European Community on the ground, and the provision of humanitarian aid. In particular, the Council welcomes the fact that the Commission, by means of its accompanying programme for stabilisation, is backing up the assistance given to rehabilitation and reconstruction in eastern Chad.

Furthermore, the European Union will continue to support the inter-Chadian dialogue process by following up the agreement of 13 August 2007 and by participating as an observer in the meetings of the contact group under the Dakar Agreement.

7. The Council notes the smooth conduct of the joint European Union – United Nations evaluation mission in Chad and in CAR from 18 to 24 June. The Union’s report on operation EUFOR/Chad halfway through its mandate is currently being examined by the relevant Council bodies.

8. The Council notes that the need, underlined by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1778, to create conditions in eastern Chad and in the northeast of CAR which are favourable to the voluntary, secure and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons, and to the reconstruction and the economic and social development of these areas, should be maintained beyond the end of EUFOR’s mandate on 15 March 2009. Bearing this in mind, the Council urges that from now on, after duly consulting the Chadian and Central African authorities, all steps be taken to ensure that arrangements for following up the EU’s operation are put in place, with the possible inclusion of a United Nations operation, in accordance with Article 10 of Resolution 1778.’

## **SOMALIA – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

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The Council briefly discussed the situation in Somalia, and adopted the following conclusions:

‘1. The Council considers that the international community must remain engaged in supporting the implementation of the agreement concluded in Djibouti on 9 June 2008. It here welcomes the African Union’s commitment, at its last summit, in Sharm-el-Sheik, to increase its support for Somalia’s efforts to restore peace in the country. The Council reaffirms its concern at the humanitarian situation and at the difficulties in getting aid through to the population, in particular to refugees and displaced people. It points out that strengthening the African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is a crucial first step in improving security on the ground and helping to improve the humanitarian situation.

2. The Council supports the United Nations and in particular the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative; they have an important part to play in assisting the peace process. It is anxious to keep up the momentum required for a lasting political solution in Somalia. The strengthening of the transitional federal institutions and of the national police forces are vital for the implementation of the Djibouti agreement and for the establishment of real authority throughout the country.

3. With reference to its conclusions of 26 May and 16 June 2008, the Council reaffirms its commitment to a comprehensive approach for a lasting settlement of the Somali crisis, covering its political, security and humanitarian aspects.

4. The Council is taking an interest in the options being considered for stepping up European Union action in Somalia, including support for implementation of the Djibouti agreement.

5. The Council again points to its concern at the acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia. In accordance with its conclusions of 26 May and 16 June 2008, it is keen that work under way on options for a European Union contribution to implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1816 should be rounded off as soon as possible.’

(...)

# 1<sup>st</sup> EU-South Africa Summit – Joint Statement

Bordeaux, 25 July 2008

## **JOINT STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT OF SOUTH AFRICA THABO MBEKI, PRESIDENT OF FRANCE NICOLAS SARKOZY, AS PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND COMMISSION PRESIDENT JOSÉ MANUEL BARROSO ON THE OCCASION OF THE FIRST EU-SOUTH AFRICA SUMMIT IN BORDEAUX, ON 25 JULY 2008**

Presidents Mbeki, Sarkozy and Barroso met today and agreed to issue the following joint statement:

### **SA-EU Strategic Partnership:**

(...)

### **Regional/security issues:**

Both sides welcomed the adoption of the Joint EU-Africa Strategy at the Second EU-Africa Summit held in Lisbon, on 9 and 10 December 2007, and expressed their determination to work towards its full implementation. In this context, the meeting welcomed the intention of South Africa and the EU to work towards increased cooperation between the EU and the AU to promote peace and security on the African continent as an essential condition for development. In this regard, the Presidents noted with satisfaction the progress made in the broader Great Lakes region and committed to further cooperate to enhance the prospect for durable peace in Burundi.

The Presidents also welcomed the adoption by the EU of the EU Agenda for Action on the MDGs.

The Presidents exchanged views on the current situation in Zimbabwe. They expressed their concern at the prevailing situation and its negative impact on the sub-region. In light of the negative reports by SADC, the AU and the Pan-African Parliament observers on the run-off election held on 27 June 2008, they further stressed the need to create an environment conducive for democracy.

The EU recalled its view that a transitional Government should be established, respecting fully the will of the Zimbabwean people as expressed on 29 March 2008, which resulted in MDC and M. Tsvangirai leading the presidential poll, with a view to the organization of early free, fair and democratic elections. It recalled the GAERC Conclusions of 22 July 2008 expressing its readiness to take further measures in the absence of new positive developments in the coming weeks.

South Africa stressed the need for all to respect the right of the Zimbabwean people to determine their future free of outside interference and that the most urgent task now is to assist the leadership of Zimbabwe across the political divide to negotiate an agreement that will help Zimbabwe solve its challenges.

The Presidents welcomed the commitment by President Mbeki to facilitate the negotiation process between the parties, with a view to reaching an early and successful outcome. The Presidents welcomed the signing of a memorandum of understanding in Harare on 21 July 2008, which is in line with the AU Summit Resolution of Sharm el-Sheik of 1 July 2008, as a first



step towards an agreement between the parties that would reflect the will of the Zimbabwean people. Consistent with the undertakings made in the MOU, the Presidents called for an immediate end to the violence, and the lifting of all restrictions to the distribution of humanitarian aid. They called on the Zimbabwean parties to act with urgency and cooperate in good faith towards the successful conclusion of the negotiations.

Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to the stability and integrity of Sudan.

The Presidents underlined the need for all Parties to commence with an inclusive political process to find lasting peace in Darfur and welcomed the recent appointment of Mr Bassole as United Nations /African Union Facilitator for the Darfur Peace process.

The Presidents called for the speedy deployment of the United Nations/ African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) to end the suffering of the people of Darfur and of women and children in particular. The Presidents condemned the recent attacks on peacekeepers where seven were killed and twenty two wounded.

The Presidents expressed their support for the progress made in terms of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), particularly the ratification of the Electoral Law, which paves the way for the holding of general elections scheduled to take place in July 2009. They further expressed their support for the agreement by the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) on the 'Roadmap for Return of IDPs and Implementation of Abyei Protocol' to finding a lasting solution to the resolution of the Abyei border dispute.

As regards the International Criminal Court, the Presidents emphasised the importance of putting an end to impunity in Darfur.

Taking into account the regional dimension of the Darfur crisis and with regard to Eastern Chad and CAR, Presidents noted that EUFOR Chad/CAR is an important EU contribution to improve in particular the security for refugees and IDPs.

The meeting also discussed the question of migration with the aim to promote mutual understanding and cooperation on the matter. Both sides recognise the multidimensional challenges of migration and the need to cooperate on addressing these challenges. Both sides agreed that migration requires a global approach and welcomed the idea to establish a structured dialogue, covering issues such as legal and illegal migration, including admission rules and respecting dignity and rights of migrants, capacity building as well as the linkages between migration and development.

The meeting also discussed a number of international crises in particular the Middle East peace process, where both sides recognised the positive role played by the other side. Both sides expressed their support for the post-Annapolis negotiations between the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships. Both sides welcomed other constructive contributions, in particular the Arab League Peace Initiative. They further urged the Israeli and Palestinian negotiating teams to achieve the goal of establishing a viable Palestinian state, existing side by side in peace with Israel within internationally recognised borders, before the end of 2008, as declared at the Annapolis Middle East Peace Meeting.

(...)

## Georgia – Conflict with Russia

13 August-13 October 2009

On the night of 7-8 August 2008, Georgia launched an artillery attack on South Ossetia. Within twenty four hours, the armoured divisions of the 58<sup>th</sup> army of the Russian Federation, stationed in the autonomous republic of North Ossetia, arrived in the area. Straightaway, the European Union expressed its grave concern about the violent clashes taking place on Georgian territory. It demanded an immediate ceasefire and the swift resumption of negotiations aimed at finding a political solution to the crisis, in which the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia would be respected. On 8 September 2008, in Moscow, the European Union received an undertaking from Mr. Dmitri Medvedev that there would be a complete withdrawal of Russian forces from the areas adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The EUMM mission, whose deployment was decided on 15 September, was launched on 1 October 2008 to monitor this withdrawal, which was officially confirmed by Javier Solana on 10 October. The Union thus managed to bring an end to the conflict and deal with its immediate effects: this constituted the first major diplomatic success of the European Union.

### GENERAL AFFAIRS AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS COUNCIL – EXTRAORDINARY MEETING

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Brussels, 13 August 2008

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘1. The Council recalls that the Union had expressed its grave concern at recent developments in Georgia, and the open conflict that has broken out between Russia and Georgia. Military action of this kind is not a solution. This war has caused the loss of many human lives, inflicted suffering on the population, resulted in substantial material damage and further increased the number of displaced persons and refugees.

A peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict in Georgia must be based on full respect for the principles of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity recognised by international law and UN Security Council resolutions.

2. In this context, the absolute priority is to stop the suffering and bring the fighting to an end. In this respect the Council welcomes the agreement subscribed to by the parties yesterday on the basis of the mediation efforts carried out by the Union.

The principles to which the parties have subscribed are as follows:

(1) Not to resort to force;

(2) To end hostilities definitively;

(3) To provide free access for humanitarian aid;

(4) Georgian military forces will have to withdraw to their usual bases;

(5) Russian military forces will have to withdraw to the lines held prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Pending an international mechanism, Russian peace-keeping forces will implement additional security measures;

(6) Opening of international talks on the security and stability arrangements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The Council calls on the parties to honour all these commitments, beginning with an effective ceasefire, and to ensure that they are implemented effectively and in good faith both on

the ground and in the relevant fora. The international mechanism should be set up rapidly.

3. The Council emphasises the Union's commitment to contribute actively to effective implementation of these principles. They will be embodied in a UN Security Council resolution as soon as possible.

Rapid reinforcement of the OSCE's observer capabilities on the ground is crucial. The Union will take action to this effect at the OSCE. The Council urges the parties not to obstruct the observers' activities.

The Council also considers that the European Union must be prepared to commit itself, including on the ground, to support every effort, including those of the UN and the OSCE, with a view to a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict in Georgia. It asks the Secretary General/High Representative, in liaison with the Commission, to prepare proposals on the matter with a view to the informal meeting in Avignon on 5 and 6 September.

4. The Council stresses the humanitarian emergency and the Union's resolve to provide vital assistance to the population. An outline has been given of initial measures undertaken, both by the Commission and by the Member States. The Council requests the Commission, in liaison with the Presidency, to continue to coordinate European assistance and to encourage pooling arrangements designed to enhance its effectiveness and relevance.

It is essential that all parties undertake to respect international humanitarian law and to facilitate the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all the population groups affected, without discrimination.

In addition, in view of the destruction caused by the conflict, the Council emphasises the need to identify reconstruction requirements as of now and to prepare to make a significant contribution to meeting those requirements at Union level. It invites the Commission to report back to it on this matter before its next meeting.'

## **EXTRAORDINARY EUROPEAN COUNCIL – PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS**

**Brussels, 1 September 2008**

1. The European Council is gravely concerned by the open conflict which has broken out in Georgia, by the resulting violence and by the disproportionate reaction of Russia. This conflict has led to great suffering on both sides. Military action of this kind is not a solution and is not acceptable. The European Council deplores the loss of human life, the suffering inflicted on the population, the number of displaced persons and refugees, and the considerable material damage.

2. The European Council strongly condemns Russia's unilateral decision to recognise the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. That decision is unacceptable and the European Council calls on other States not to recognise this proclaimed independence and asks the Commission to examine the practical consequences to be drawn. It recalls that a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict in Georgia must be based on full respect for the principles of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity recognised by international law, the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and United Nations Security Council resolutions.

3. The European Council emphasises that all European States have the right freely to determine their foreign policy and their alliances, while respecting international law and the principles of good neighbourliness and peaceful cooperation. It is also legitimate for the security

interests of each to be taken into account, so long as the fundamental principles of respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and the independence of States are respected.

4. The European Council is pleased that the six-point agreement achieved on 12 August on the basis of the European Union's mediation efforts has led to a ceasefire, improved delivery of humanitarian aid to the victims, and a substantial withdrawal of Russian military forces. The implementation of that plan has to be complete. The European Council calls on the parties to continue the full implementation in good faith of the agreement they have signed. The military forces which have not yet withdrawn to the lines held prior to the outbreak of hostilities must do so without delay. Besides the provision of assistance to the victims, the urgent issue at the moment is to finalise the international monitoring mechanism, in which the Union is prepared to participate, and which is provided for in point 5 of the agreement, so as to replace the Russian additional security measures in the zone adjacent to South Ossetia. It is also a matter of urgency to begin the international talks provided for in point 6 of the agreement concerning the security and stability arrangements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

5. The European Union is ready to commit itself, including through a presence on the ground, to support every effort to secure a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict in Georgia. To that end, the Member States of the European Union are making a significant contribution to strengthening the OSCE observer mission in South Ossetia, by sending observers and by making substantial material and financial contributions. The European Union has also decided on the immediate dispatch of a fact-finding mission with the task of helping to gather information and defining the modalities for an increased European Union commitment on the ground, under the European Security and Defence Policy. The European Council invites the relevant Council bodies to conclude all the necessary preparatory work in order that a possible decision to commit such an observer mission can be taken by the Council by 15 September 2008, depending on how the situation develops, and in close coordination with the OSCE and the United Nations. To this end the European Council requests the President of the Council and the SG/HR to undertake all the necessary contacts and work.

6. The European Union has already supplied emergency aid. It is prepared to supply aid for reconstruction in Georgia, including the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It is ready to support confidence building measures and the development of regional cooperation. It also decides to step up its relations with Georgia, including visa facilitation measures and the possible establishment of a full and comprehensive free trade area as soon as the conditions are met. It will take the initiative of convening an international conference shortly to assist reconstruction in Georgia and requests the Council and the Commission to start preparations for this conference.

7. The European Council notes with concern the impact which the current crisis is having on the whole of the region. The European Union considers that it is more necessary than ever to support regional cooperation and step up its relations with its eastern neighbours, in particular through its neighbourhood policy, the development of the 'Black Sea Synergy' initiative and an 'Eastern Partnership' which the European Council wishes to adopt in March 2009; to this end it invites the Commission to submit proposals in December 2008. In this context the European Council stresses the importance of the forthcoming summit between the European Union and Ukraine on 9 September.

8. The European Council decides to appoint a European Union Special Representative for the crisis in Georgia and asks the Council to make the necessary arrangements.

9. Recent events illustrate the need for Europe to intensify its efforts with regard to the secu-

rity of energy supplies. The European Council invites the Council, in cooperation with the Commission, to examine initiatives to be taken to this end, in particular as regards diversification of energy sources and supply routes.

10. With the crisis in Georgia, relations between the EU and Russia have reached a crossroads. The European Council considers that given the interdependence between the European Union and Russia, and the global problems they are facing, there is no desirable alternative to a strong relationship, based on cooperation, trust and dialogue, respect for the rule of law and the principles recognised by the United Nations Charter and by the OSCE. It was for this reason that we launched negotiations for a new framework agreement between the Union and Russia last July.

11. We call on Russia to join with us in making this fundamental choice in favour of mutual interest, understanding and cooperation. We are convinced that it is in Russia's own interest not to isolate itself from Europe. For its part, the European Union has shown itself willing to engage in partnership and cooperation, in keeping with the principles and values on which it is based. We expect Russia to behave in a responsible manner, honouring all its commitments. The Union will remain vigilant; the European Council requests the Council, with the Commission, to conduct a careful in depth examination of the situation and of the various aspects of EU-Russia relations; this evaluation must begin now and continue in the run up to the forthcoming summit scheduled to take place in Nice on 14 November 2008. The European Council gives a mandate to its President to continue discussions with a view to the full application of the six-point agreement. To that end, the President of the European Council will go to Moscow on 8 September, accompanied by the President of the Commission and the High Representative. Until troops have withdrawn to the positions held prior to 7 August, meetings on the negotiation of the Partnership Agreement will be postponed.

## **SUMMARY OF REMARKS BY JAVIER SOLANA TO THE PRESS**

**Brussels, 1 September 2008**

‘The situation today is clear. Georgia is a country whose territorial integrity has been breached and there is tremendous damage on the ground as concerns people, property, etc and it is our obligation to help. We want to help the people in Georgia. We have also already made very clear statements on the recognition issue – we are against.

On the relations with Georgia, I think that three things are important; the political support, the economic support – as you know we are trying to do the utmost – and then our presence on the ground. As you know, we already have an exploratory mission deployed in Georgia with around 40 people on the ground.

We would like to have an ESDP mission deployed soon and I think that by the next Council, on the 15 September, we will have the decisions finalised. That is what I am looking for and this is what I am seeking at this point in time.

We prepare for an observer mission, a verification mission, in order to see how the plans that have already been approved and signed by the parties are implemented. This is very important. There is a lot to do and the EU is ready, in coordination with the OSCE, to verify that the 6-point agreement is complied with’.

*[See also European Parliament – Address by Javier Solana, 10 September 2009, p. 313-4 in this Chaillot Paper].*

**EXTERNAL RELATIONS COUNCIL – GEORGIA – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS****Brussels, 15 September 2008**

(...)

1. The Council welcomes the agreement on implementing the plan of 12 August, which was recorded in Moscow and Tbilisi on 8 September as a result of mediation by the European Union. That agreement should lead initially to Russian forces being completely withdrawn from the zones adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia to the lines held prior to the outbreak of hostilities, within 10 days of the deployment in those zones of the international mechanisms, including at least 200 observers from the European Union, which should take place by 1 October 2008 at the latest.

2. With reference to the Council conclusions of 1 September, the Council calls on all parties to fully implement this agreement, as well as the agreement of 12 August, and to do so in an effective manner and in good faith within the time limits that have been set, including the withdrawal of all Russian forces and the return of Georgia's military forces to their bases.

3. The Council recalls that the European Union is ready to play a full role in the resolution of this crisis, including on the ground and in future international discussions and the preparations for them, and in supporting efforts towards a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict in Georgia. The Council recalls that a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict in Georgia must be based on full respect for the principles of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity recognised by international law, the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and United Nations Security Council resolutions. In this context, the Council deplores any action that runs contrary to a solution based on these principles.

4. The Council supports the idea of an independent international inquiry into the conflict in Georgia.

5. The Council has decided to appoint Mr Pierre Morel as the Special Representative of the European Union for the crisis in Georgia.

6. In accordance with the conclusions of the Extraordinary European Council meeting on 1 September, the Council has decided to send an independent civilian observer mission to Georgia, under the European Security and Defence Policy, which will be deployed by 1 October in accordance with the arrangements set out in the agreement of 8 September, in close coordination with the OSCE and the United Nations and in addition to the international mechanisms of UNOMIG and the OSCE. The Council notes with satisfaction the contributions announced by the Member States with a view to deploying at least 200 observers by 1 October.

7. The Council invites the Commission to actively and swiftly prepare for the donors' conference to help with the reconstruction and recovery of the Georgian economy and with the return of displaced persons, and to hold it next month in Brussels in the light of an overall assessment of needs. The Council has taken note of the Commission proposal to mobilise financial aid for Georgia which could be of the order of EUR 500 million for the period 2008-2010 and which must be consistent with the financial perspective. The Council also invites the Member States to prepare a significant contribution for the conference in terms of financial support. It welcomes the Commission's commitment regarding the strengthening of the EU-Georgia relationship, in particular by expediting the preparatory work on the facilitation of visas and on readmission, as well as on free trade.'

**JOINT ACTION 2008/736/CFSP ON THE EUROPEAN UNION  
MONITORING MISSION IN GEORGIA, EUMM GEORGIA (AS AMENDED BY  
JOINT ACTION 2008/759/CFSP OF 25 SEPTEMBER 2008))**

**Brussels, 15 September 2008**

**THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,**

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 14 and the third paragraph of Article 25 thereof,

Whereas:

- (1) On 1 September 2008, the European Council expressed its grave concern at the open conflict which had broken out in Georgia, and expressed the readiness of the European Union (EU) to commit itself to support every effort to secure a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict.
- (2) The European Council recalled that a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict in Georgia must be based on full respect for the principles of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity recognised by international law, the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and United Nations Security Council resolutions.
- (3) The six-point Agreement achieved on 12 August 2008 on the basis of the EU's mediation efforts, as supplemented by the Agreement reached on 8 September 2008 for its implementation, remains the basis for the stabilisation process.
- (4) The European Council also recalled on 1 September 2008 that the appointment in December 2003 of an EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus was a further step in the deepening of relations with Georgia and the other two countries of the region (Armenia and Azerbaijan). The European Council decided that, in addition, an EUSR for the crisis in Georgia should be appointed.
- (5) On 2 September 2008, an exploratory mission was deployed to Georgia and began operating in view of gathering relevant information and preparing a possible civilian European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) Mission. This should take full regard of and act in complementarity with the mandates of the existing presences of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the United Nations in Georgia.
- (6) On 3 September 2008, the Council approved a preparatory measure for a possible future ESDP Mission in Georgia.
- (7) In a letter dated 11 September 2008, the Government of Georgia invited the EU to deploy an ESDP civilian monitoring mission in Georgia.
- (8) Any third State's participation in the Mission should be in accordance with the general guidelines defined by the European Council.
- (9) The command and control structure of the Mission should be without prejudice to the contractual responsibility of the Head of Mission towards the Commission for implementing the budget of the Mission.
- (10) The Watch-Keeping Capability established within the General Secretariat of the Council should be activated for this Mission.
- (11) The ESDP Mission will be conducted in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could harm the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as set out in Article 11 of the Treaty,

## HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

### *Article 1*

#### **The Mission**

1. The European Union (EU) hereby establishes a European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, hereinafter referred to as 'EUMM Georgia'. EUMM Georgia shall be deployed in phases, with deployment beginning in September 2008 and the operational phase beginning no later than 1 October 2008.
2. EUMM Georgia shall operate in accordance with the mission statement as set out in Article 2 and shall carry out the tasks as set out in Article 3.

### *Article 2*

#### **Mission statement**

1. EUMM Georgia shall provide civilian monitoring of Parties' actions, including full compliance with the six-point Agreement and subsequent implementing measures throughout Georgia, working in close coordination with partners, particularly the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and consistent with other EU activity, in order to contribute to stabilisation, normalisation and confidence building whilst also contributing to informing European policy in support of a durable political solution for Georgia.
2. The particular objectives of the Mission shall be:
  - (a) to contribute to long-term stability throughout Georgia and the surrounding region;
  - (b) in the short term, the stabilisation of the situation with a reduced risk of a resumption of hostilities, in full compliance with the six-point Agreement and the subsequent implementing measures.

### *Article 3*

#### **Mission tasks**

In order to achieve the Mission, the tasks of EUMM Georgia shall be to:

1. **Stabilisation:**

Monitor, analyse and report on the situation pertaining to the stabilisation process, centred on full compliance with the six-point Agreement, including troop withdrawals, and on freedom of movement and actions by spoilers, as well as on violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.
2. **Normalisation:**

Monitor, analyse and report on the situation pertaining to the normalisation process of civil governance, focusing on rule of law, effective law enforcement structures and adequate public order. The Mission will also monitor the security of transport links, energy infrastructures and utilities, as well as the political and security aspects of the return of internally displaced persons and refugees.
3. **Confidence building:**

Contribute to the reduction of tensions through liaison, facilitation of contacts between parties and other confidence building measures.
4. **Contribute to informing European policy and to future EU engagement.**



## *Article 4*

### **Structure of the Mission**

1. EUMM Georgia shall be structured as follows:
  - (a) Headquarters (HQ). The HQ shall consist of the Office of the Head of Mission and the HQ Staff, providing all necessary functions of command and control and mission support. The HQ shall be located in Tbilisi.
  - (b) Field Offices. Geographically distributed Field Offices shall conduct monitoring tasks and provide necessary functions of mission support.
  - (c) Support Element. The Support Element shall be located within the General Secretariat of the Council in Brussels.
2. As an initial enabling capability, monitoring teams of pre-equipped components provided by the Member States shall be established within EUMM Georgia.
3. The above elements shall be subject to further detailed arrangements in the Operation Plan (OPLAN).

## *Article 5*

### **Civilian Operation Commander**

1. The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) Director shall be the Civilian Operation Commander for EUMM Georgia.
2. The Civilian Operation Commander, under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the overall authority of the Secretary-General/High Representative (SG/HR), shall exercise command and control of EUMM Georgia at the strategic level.
3. The Civilian Operation Commander shall ensure proper and effective implementation of the Council's decisions as well as the PSC's decisions, including by issuing instructions at the strategic level as required to the Head of Mission and providing him with advice and technical support.
4. All seconded staff shall remain under the full command of the national authorities of the seconding State or EU institution concerned. National authorities shall transfer Operational Control (OPCON) of their personnel, teams and units to the Civilian Operation Commander.
5. The Civilian Operation Commander shall have overall responsibility for ensuring that the EU's duty of care is properly discharged.
6. The Civilian Operation Commander and the EU Special Representative (EUSR) shall consult each other as required.

## *Article 6*

### **Head of Mission**

1. The Head of Mission shall assume responsibility for and exercise command and control of the Mission at theatre level.
2. The Head of Mission shall exercise command and control over personnel, teams and units from contributing States as assigned by the Civilian Operation Commander together with administrative and logistic responsibility including over assets, resources and information placed at the disposal of the Mission.
3. The Head of Mission shall issue instructions to all Mission staff, including in this case the support element in Brussels, for the effective conduct of EUMM Georgia in theatre, assuming

its coordination and day-to-day management, and following the instructions at the strategic level of the Civilian Operation Commander.

4. The Head of Mission shall be responsible for the implementation of the Mission's budget. For this purpose, the Head of Mission shall sign a contract with the Commission.

5. The Head of Mission shall be responsible for disciplinary control over the staff. For seconded staff, disciplinary action shall be exercised by the national or EU authority concerned.

6. The Head of Mission shall represent EUMM Georgia in the operations area and shall ensure appropriate visibility of the Mission.

7. The Head of Mission shall coordinate, as appropriate, with other EU actors on the ground. The Head of Mission shall, without prejudice to the chain of command, receive local political guidance from the EUSR.

8. The Head of Mission shall draw up the OPLAN for the Mission so that it may be submitted for approval by the Council. The Head of Mission shall be assisted in this task by the General Secretariat of the Council.

## *Article 7*

### **Staff**

1. EUMM Georgia shall consist primarily of staff seconded by Member States or EU institutions. Each Member State or EU institution shall bear the costs related to any of the staff seconded by it, including travel expenses to and from the place of deployment, salaries, medical coverage and allowances other than applicable daily allowances, as well as hardship and risk allowances.

2. International civilian staff and local staff shall be recruited on a contractual basis by the Mission if the functions required are not provided by personnel seconded by Member States.

Exceptionally, in duly justified cases, where no qualified applications from Member States are available, nationals from participating third States may be recruited on a contractual basis, as appropriate.

3. All staff shall abide by the Mission-specific minimum security operating standards and the Mission security plan supporting the EU field security policy. As regards the protection of EU classified information with which staff are entrusted in the course of their duties, all staff shall respect the security principles and minimum standards established by the Council's Security Regulations<sup>(1)</sup>.

## *Article 8*

### **Status of Mission and staff**

1. The status of the Mission and its staff, including where appropriate the privileges, immunities and further guarantees necessary for the completion and smooth functioning of the Mission, shall be agreed in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 24 of the Treaty. The SG/HR, assisting the Presidency, may negotiate such an agreement on its behalf.

2. The State or EU institution having seconded a member of staff shall be responsible for answering any claims linked to the secondment, from or concerning the member of staff. The State or EU institution in question shall be responsible for bringing any action against the seconded person.

(1) Council Decision 2001/264/EC of 19 March 2001 adopting the Council's security regulations (OJ L 101, 11.4.2001, p. 1).

3. The conditions of employment and the rights and obligations of international and local civilian staff shall be laid down in the contracts between the Head of Mission and the members of staff.

## *Article 9*

### **Chain of command**

1. EUMM Georgia shall have a unified chain of command, as a crisis management operation.
2. Under the responsibility of the Council, the PSC shall exercise political control and strategic direction of EUMM Georgia.
3. The Civilian Operation Commander, under the political control and strategic direction of the PSC and the overall authority of the SG/HR, shall be the commander of EUMM Georgia at the strategic level and, as such, shall issue the Head of Mission with instructions and provide him with advice and technical support.
4. The Civilian Operation Commander shall report to the Council through the SG/HR.
5. The Head of Mission shall exercise command and control of EUMM Georgia at theatre level and shall be directly responsible to the Civilian Operation Commander.

## *Article 10*

### **Political control and strategic direction**

1. The PSC shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council, political control and strategic direction of the Mission. The Council hereby authorises the PSC to take the relevant decisions in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 25 of the Treaty. This authorisation shall include the powers to appoint a Head of Mission, upon a proposal of the SG/HR, and to amend the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and the OPLAN. The powers of decision with respect to the objectives and termination of the Mission shall remain vested in the Council.
2. The PSC shall report to the Council at regular intervals.
3. The PSC shall receive, on a regular basis and as required, reports by the Civilian Operation Commander and the Head of Mission on issues within their areas of responsibility.

## *Article 11*

### **Participation of third States**

1. Without prejudice to the decision-making autonomy of the EU and its single institutional framework, third States may be invited to contribute to the Mission, provided that they bear the cost of the staff seconded by them, including salaries, all risk insurance cover, daily subsistence allowances and travel expenses to and from Georgia, and that they contribute to the running costs of the Mission, as appropriate.
2. Third States contributing to the Mission shall have the same rights and obligations in terms of day-to-day management of the Mission as EU Member States.
3. The Council hereby authorises the PSC to take the relevant decisions on acceptance of the proposed contributions and to establish a Committee of Contributors.
4. Detailed arrangements regarding the participation of third States shall be covered by agreements concluded in accordance with Article 24 of the Treaty. The SG/HR, assisting the Presidency, may negotiate such agreements on its behalf. Where the EU and a third State conclude an agreement establishing a framework for the participation of that third State in EU crisis-management operations, the provisions of that agreement shall apply in the context of the Mission.

## *Article 12*

### **Security**

1. The Civilian Operation Commander shall direct the Head of Mission's planning of security measures and ensure their proper and effective implementation for EUMM Georgia in accordance with Articles 5 and 9, in coordination with the Council Security Office.
2. The Head of Mission shall be responsible for the security of the Mission and for ensuring compliance with minimum security requirements applicable to the Mission, in line with the policy of the EU on the security of personnel deployed outside the EU in an operational capacity under Title V of the Treaty, and its supporting instruments.
3. The Head of Mission shall be assisted by a Mission Security Officer (MSO), who shall report to the Head of Mission and also maintain a close functional relationship with the Council Security Office.
4. EUMM Georgia staff shall undergo mandatory security training before taking up their duties, in accordance with the OPLAN. They shall also receive regular in-theatre refresher training organised by the MSO.
5. The Head of Mission shall ensure the protection of EU classified information in accordance with the Council's Security Regulations.

## *Article 13*

### **Watch-keeping Capability**

The Watch-keeping Capability shall be activated for EUMM Georgia.

## *Article 14*

### **Financial arrangements**

1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the Mission shall be EUR 35 000 000.
2. All expenditure shall be managed in accordance with the Community rules and procedures applicable to the general budget of the EU. Subject to the Commission's approval, the Head of Mission may conclude technical arrangements with EU Member States, participating third States, and other international actors regarding the provision of equipment, services and premises to EUMM Georgia. Nationals of third States shall be allowed to tender for contracts.
3. The Head of Mission shall report fully to, and be supervised by, the Commission regarding the activities undertaken in the framework of his contract.
4. The financial arrangements shall respect the operational requirements of the Mission including compatibility of equipment and interoperability of its teams.
5. The expenditure connected with the Mission shall be eligible as of the date of entry into force of this Joint Action.

## *Article 15*

### **Coordination**

1. Without prejudice to the chain of command, the Head of Mission shall act in close coordination with the Commission delegation to ensure the consistency of EU action in support of Georgia.
2. The Head of Mission shall coordinate closely with the local EU Presidency and other EU Heads of Missions.

3. The Head of Mission shall cooperate with the other international actors present in the country, in particular the UN and the OSCE.

## *Article 16*

### **Release of classified information**

1. The SG/HR shall be authorised to release to the third States associated with this Joint Action, as appropriate and in accordance with the needs of the Mission, EU classified information and documents up to ‘CONFIDENTIEL UE’ level generated for the purposes of the Mission, in accordance with the Council’s Security Regulations.

2. The SG/HR shall also be authorised to release to the UN and OSCE, in accordance with the operational needs of the Mission, EU classified information and documents up to ‘RESTREINT UE’ level which are generated for the purposes of the Mission, in accordance with the Council’s Security Regulations. Local arrangements shall be drawn up for this purpose.

3. In the event of a specific and immediate operational need, the SG/HR shall also be authorised to release to the host State any EU classified information and documents up to ‘RESTREINT UE’ level which are generated for the purposes of the Mission, in accordance with the Council’s Security Regulations. In all other cases, such information and documents shall be released to the host State in accordance with the appropriate procedures for cooperation by the host State with the EU.

4. The SG/HR shall be authorised to release to the third States associated with this Joint Action any EU non-classified documents connected with the deliberations of the Council relating to the Mission and covered by the obligation of professional secrecy pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Council’s Rules of Procedure<sup>(1)</sup>.

## *Article 17*

### **Review of the Mission**

A Mission review shall be presented to the PSC six months after the beginning of the Mission, on the basis of a report by the Head of Mission and the General Secretariat of the Council.

## *Article 18*

### **Entry into force and duration**

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the date of its adoption and its duration shall be for a period of 12 months.

## *Article 19*

### **Publication**

1. This Joint Action shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

2. Decisions of the PSC pursuant to Article 10(1) regarding the appointment of the Head of Mission shall also be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Brussels, 15 September 2008.

*For the Council*

*The President*

B. Kouchner

(1) Council Decision 2006/683/EC, Euratom of 15 September 2006 adopting the Council’s Rules of Procedure (OJ L 285, 16.10.2006, p. 47).

## **ADDRESS BY JAVIER SOLANA AT THE EUROPEAN UNION MONITORING MISSION (EUMM) HEADQUARTERS IN GEORGIA**

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**Tbilisi, 30 September 2008**

It gives me great pleasure to be here today, the day our mission becomes operational in Georgia. Tomorrow is the 1<sup>st</sup> of October. On the 8<sup>th</sup> of September we took the commitment and we will start the EU Monitoring Mission tomorrow.

I want to start by thanking people. I thank the government of Georgia for inviting the mission and cooperating in building up this mission rapidly and efficiently. I thank the preparatory team, the people who worked hard during the last weeks. I want to thank the European Commission and EU Special Representative Peter Semneby for providing logistic and political support for the mission's preparation.

In line with the EU's commitment made on the 8<sup>th</sup> of September, we today have 200 EU monitors deployed on the ground. With support staff, the total deployment is more than 300 persons.

For the EU, to be in Georgia is a great responsibility and it is a great honor. We will work with the people of Georgia and this will bring us closer. EU personnel will know better the people of Georgia and the people of Georgia will know better the people of the EU. Thus we will reach a deeper and more profound relationship.

The EU is here in Georgia to work for the stability of the country. Our engagement is serious. Therefore, we will also organize a conference of support for Georgia.

EUMM is an unarmed civilian mission, and its role is to monitor the situation on the ground in order to ensure that there is no return to violence, that people can return in peace to their homes and that normal life can resume.

By engaging with the local population, the EU monitors will bring a sense of security to the people whose lives have been affected by this tragic conflict. And they will also bring here the spirit of the EU to share it with the Georgians.

This has been the fastest deployment that the EU has ever undertaken. EU Member States made a tremendous effort for you to be here in this short period of time. The EU has shown its capacity to act with determination and speed.

The EU is here today because we committed to be here on the 8<sup>th</sup> of September. We now look forward to all parties fulfilling their commitments as much as the EU did.

## **EXTERNAL RELATIONS COUNCIL – GEORGIA/RUSSIA – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

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**Brussels, 13 October 2009**

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘1. The Council notes with satisfaction that, following the deployment by the European Union, under the Security and Defence Policy, of an independent civilian observer mission in Georgia, comprising more than 200 observers, Russian troops have withdrawn from the zones adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia as an essential additional step in the implementation of the agreements of 12 August and 8 September, which were concluded with the mediation of

the European Union. With reference to the conclusions of the European Council of 1 September and its own conclusions of 15 September, the Council calls on the parties to continue to implement their commitments, including with regard to the role of UNOMIG and OSCE observers. It notes with satisfaction UN Security Council Resolution 1839, which has extended the UNOMIG mandate by four months.

2. The Council reaffirms the willingness of the European Union to take an active part, in particular through its Special Representative for the crisis in Georgia, in the international discussions provided for in the agreements of 12 August and 8 September, which are set to commence on 15 October under the auspices of the EU, the UN and the OSCE. These discussions must focus on all the remaining problems, in particular that concerning arrangements for stability and security in the region and the urgent question of displaced persons, including the question of the upper Kodori valley and the Akhlagori region. In this context, the Council reiterates its support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia.

3. The Council thanks the Commission for convening the high-level conference of donors in Brussels on 22 October, with the aim, in particular, of assisting displaced persons and restarting the Georgian economy. The European Union will contribute substantially via the contributions of the Community and those of the Member States, based on an overall needs assessment carried out by the World Bank in cooperation with the European Commission and other institutions. To strengthen relations between the European Union and Georgia, the Council is preparing to begin negotiations with Georgia in the near future on visa facilitation and readmission, and invites the Commission to continue preparatory work on the possible establishment of a deep and comprehensive free trade area, as soon as conditions permit.’

(...)

# EU-Ukraine Summit

Paris, 9 September 2008

(...)

## II. GEORGIA

The European Union and Ukraine are gravely concerned by the open conflict which has broken out in Georgia, by the resulting violence and by the disproportionate reaction of Russia. Military action of this kind is not a solution and is not acceptable. We deplore the loss of human life, the suffering inflicted on the population, the number of displaced persons and refugees, and the considerable material damage.

The European Union and Ukraine recall that a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict in Georgia must be based on full respect for the principles of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity recognised by international law, the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and United Nations Security Council resolutions.

The European Union and Ukraine emphasise that all European States have the right freely to determine their foreign policy and their alliances, while respecting international law and the principles of good neighbourliness and peaceful cooperation. They are concerned by the impact which the current crisis is having on the whole of the region and affirm their common desire to participate actively in the strengthening of regional cooperation.

The European Union and Ukraine undertake to contribute actively to the full implementation of the six-point agreement signed by the parties to the conflict, to the lasting restoration of peace in Georgia and to the humanitarian, economic and social rehabilitation of the areas affected by the hostilities.

## III. DEEPENING EU-UKRAINE COOPERATION

### Action Plan – New Joint Instrument

The leaders of Ukraine and the EU welcomed the closer cooperation achieved in the past year, notably through the **EU-Ukraine Action Plan**, and looked forward to a further deepening of the relationship in the future. They confirm their commitment to implementing the Action Plan, including the additional measures agreed at the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council in March 2008, and recalled the decision to develop a new practical instrument to replace the Action Plan in March 2009.

### Foreign and Security Policy

While discussing **foreign policy and security issues** the Parties reiterated full and whole-hearted commitment to strict adherence to and respect of internationally recognized principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as inviolability of borders. They expressed their satisfaction with the development of cooperation between Ukraine and EU in this field, leading to ever closer political convergence.



Further convergence in positions on regional and international issues within the existing framework on political consultations, Ukraine's alignment with EU statements and positions, as well as Ukraine's participation in EU efforts on crisis management were particularly emphasized. The Parties recognized a new horizon for practical cooperation in the given field, which has been opened by entrance into force of the Framework Agreement on Ukraine's participation in EU led operations on crisis management.

The Summit welcomed the establishment and encouraged further development of regular dialogue between the military bodies, namely the EU Military Committee and the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The Parties expressed their intention to explore the potential for developing military and technical cooperation. Ukraine and the European Defence Agency will establish close contacts to discuss military capability issues.

### **Cooperation in the Energy Sphere**

The Parties reaffirmed their joint strategic interest in energy co-operation and reconfirmed that the energy security needs of the EU and Ukraine are intrinsically linked. The Parties welcomed the commitment of Ukraine to progress in the reforms of the gas sector and to establish efficient financial mechanisms for the modernisation of the gas transit system of Ukraine. In this context, the Parties welcome the forthcoming conference on the gas transportation system of Ukraine.

They also welcomed the significant progress achieved in implementing the priorities of the EU-Ukraine Memorandum of Understanding on co-operation in the field of energy of 1 December 2005, as reflected in the 3rd progress report presented to the Summit. They agreed to continue co-operation with the aim of advancing Ukrainian energy sector reform and of ensuring safe, reliable and transparent energy transit through Ukraine. The leaders welcomed progress made on Ukraine's integration into the EU's energy system, in particular the imminent start of negotiations regarding Ukraine's accession to the Energy Community Treaty and the preparatory studies concerning the synchronous interconnection of the Ukrainian electricity network with that of the Union for the Coordination of the Transmission of Electricity. They also welcomed the continuing good progress on nuclear safety cooperation.

### **Justice, Liberty and Security**

The leaders of Ukraine and the EU discussed the implementation of agreements on facilitation of issuance of visas and readmission. The leaders underlined the need for full and effective implementation of the visa facilitation and readmission agreements by the authorities of EU Member States and Ukraine, acknowledging that Ukraine has exempted EU citizens from the visa obligation. Ukraine emphasised the importance of improving visa issuance procedures.

The leaders of Ukraine and the EU encouraged the maximum use of possibilities offered by Community legislation on local border traffic. They underlined the benefits of agreements on local border traffic and encouraged intensified co-operation aimed at the prompt entry into force of the relevant agreements of Ukraine with EU neighbouring countries, in full respect of the EC Local Border Traffic Regulation, in order to foster people-to-people contacts and economic development in the local border areas.

The leaders encouraged Ukraine and neighbouring EU Member States to examine possibilities for the introduction of joint border controls at the border crossing points on common bor-

ders, as an effective instrument of facilitating cross-border movement and trade, while respecting security requirements and relevant legislation.

With a view to launching a dialogue on the establishment of a visa-free regime for short stay travel between the EU and Ukraine as a long-term perspective, the leaders encouraged the experts to start this dialogue as soon as possible this year.

Specific attention would be paid to issues such as document security, illegal migration including readmission, public order and security, and external relations.

(...)

### **Republic of Moldova/Transnistria**

The Parties expressed their strong interest in resuming the negotiations in the '5+2' format with the view to speeding the process of the conflict settlement. They expressed particular satisfaction with the on-going positive cooperation with the EU Border Assistance Mission at the Ukrainian-Moldovan border. The EU welcomed progress achieved so far in the demarcation of the Ukrainian/Moldovan state border, and reiterated its readiness to support this process.

# European Parliament – Address by Javier Solana

Brussels, 10 September 2008

## ADDRESS BY JAVIER SOLANA TO THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

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### Introductory statement

‘It is good to be back in the European Parliament. I am looking forward to exchanging views with you on a number of issues and events.

But before we start, allow me to point out that one important Member is missing from the room, Bronislaw **Geremek**. He was a good friend, a great European and an active member of this Committee. I miss him.

I want to start directly with the dramatic events in Georgia. I know you have been briefed by the Presidency both in this Committee and in Plenary after the special General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting and the European Council on 1 September. The very timely European Council mandated President Sarkozy to continue the discussions with Russia and Georgia with a view to the full implementation of the Six-Point Plan.

Since then, much has happened. We have had an informal meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers in Avignon on Friday and Saturday, a visit to Moscow and Tbilisi with President Sarkozy and President Barroso on Monday and an EU-Ukraine Summit yesterday in Paris. I would very much like to report on them to today.

I am just back from these meetings and I think it would be useful to spend some time this morning explaining to you where we stand on these issues: **Georgia, Russia and Ukraine**.

On **Georgia**, I can report good progress. After four hours of tough negotiations in Moscow on Monday, we obtained four clear commitments from President Medvedev.

First, by 10 October, there will be no Russian soldiers on Georgian territory outside Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In their place, international observers – including 200 from the EU – will be deployed by 1 October and Russian troops will leave within ten from that date.

Secondly, even before that, by 15 September, the Russians will remove their check points on the axis from Poti to Senaki, freeing Georgia’s main transport route.

Thirdly, while Russian troops will stay inside Abkhazia and South Ossetia, we obtained two key commitments from President Medvedev. They are the following: the OSCE observers will be able to go back inside South Ossetia and the UN observers will stay inside Abkhazia. The Russian forces – and this is very important – will withdraw to their positions held prior to the conflict, and that is the agreement we had at the European Council and this has been achieved – and not just behind the administrative borders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Fourthly, the launch of international discussions on 15 October in Geneva, to talk about security and stability in the region. This for us includes access for international observers and the return of refugees and displaced persons, both from this conflict and from the 1990s. Launching these international discussions is essential in order to continue to hold Russia accountable for the steps it has taken and the commitments it has now made.

Let me highlight that we obtained Russia’s and Georgia’s agreement to the deployment of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission on the ground. As a result, from

1 October, 200 EU observers will monitor the implementation of the six-point plan, in particular the most important point, namely the withdrawal of Russian troops from the areas bordering South Ossetia and Abkhazia. We will also monitor the political, rule-of-law and human rights situation.

Let me say that the meeting in Moscow was long, more than four hours of tough discussions but I think constructive in the end. We also went to Tbilisi and spent some hours with President Saakashvili. He was pleased to see what had been achieved. We said again, to him personally, what the European Council had agreed on the 1 September. He was very pleased to hear that and it was a good meeting. I will be in touch with him as we will have to have some communication in order to deploy the mission and do the preparatory work.

We will start our deployment to the areas bordering South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but our clear ambition is to be able to deploy our monitors throughout the territory of Georgia. This is why we want to make quick progress, and have set ourselves very short deadlines. Needless to say, all the crisis management bodies in the Council are working full speed to reach our objective of deploying the mission by 1 October.

In one month, a decisive response by the European Union has managed to stop a dangerous conflict and obtain the withdrawal of both sides to the positions they held before the conflict broke out. A clear international framework is in place to ensure the non-use of force, the definitive end to hostilities and resumption of dialogue and diplomacy as the way to solve the crisis.

I would like to pay tribute to President Sarkozy whose strong reaction and leadership have shown what the EU can do when it is united in determination and in action. The extraordinary European Council on 1 September sent a strong and clear message and we can already see the results. Not everything has been done but a very important part of what has to be done has been agreed and done.

The way the European Union – all its institutions, including the European Parliament – has handled this crisis should be an encouragement to all of us – to all of you – who want to see the European Union as a force for good, for peace, for action, in our neighbourhood and in the world. Normally when we meet in this format we highlight our shortcomings; this time I challenge you to say that we have to recognise that an important decision has been taken and even more importantly, actions have also been taken. As I said, much hard work remains ahead of us, with Russia, with Georgia and with our international partners. But we will do it and I think all the institutions of the EU will do it.

Let me repeat once again, we strongly disagree with **Russia** over the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. We have strongly condemned Russia's recognition, which has now led to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Sukhumi and Tskhinvali.

All these concerns will be raised in the international discussions in Geneva next month. I already mentioned that the issues of observer access and the return of refugees would also be discussed.

In this context, I would of course like to thank you, the Parliament, for your crucial support, as expressed in your resolution of 3 September on Georgia.

Let me say that yesterday, as you can imagine, this was also an important topic to discuss with President Yushchenko of **Ukraine** at the Summit. It was a very good meeting and I think President Yushchenko was very pleased. The meeting was very long, very direct and very frank. We listened to the President, his analysis of the situation and his point of view. He listened to our report of the trip and how we perceive the situation. And I really got the impression, knowing

President Yuschchenko as I have done for many years, that he really felt it was a very important moment for him and his country. I think that the support lent by the EU yesterday by agreeing to negotiate the Association Agreement, and by recognising and supporting the territorial integrity of Ukraine, was greatly appreciated by him and, as I said, it was a very important meeting. The agreement to negotiate the Association Agreement and the clear statement that Ukraine is a European country, sent a clear signal to him and his country of our intention to build stronger and closer ties. This closes no doors for the development of our relations – it even opens new avenues for the future. We also agreed to launch a visa dialogue with the perspective, in time, of a visa-free regime.

Let me also mention that this work in the month of August has also led us to emphasise the need to give more support to our eastern neighbourhood policy. I think the idea of the Eastern Partnership has grown already and we will continue in that direction.

Let me also say two or three things on that. First on **Moldova**. As you know, Moldova is another important element for our eastern policy. We are very much engaged in having a 5+2 mechanism in place, at the right point in time, to find a solution to the conflict. Let me say that on Monday, an important meeting was held in Vienna of the 3+2, that means the 5 that are in the context of the negotiations minus the two parties. And there it was agreed that we would see how, in the near future, a meeting in the 5+2 format, that means with the presence of the two parties, can take place. That is the format in which a solution can be found.

Let me also say that as far as **Belarus** is concerned, I had the opportunity of talking to the minister for foreign affairs on the Sunday after the release of all political prisoners in Belarus had taken place and we hope also for improvements in the conduct of the parliamentary elections next week. If so, we will respond in kind.

Going a little bit further, you remember that **Armenia** is also one of the conflict places in the region. I think that the events in Georgia also made the Armenians think about their situation and the meeting that took place between President Gül of Turkey and the President of Armenia is another important step in the direction of trying to find solutions to the problems that have been unresolved for too long.

A word about **Russia**. I think that the meetings in recent days have shown that whenever we have an approach in which the EU is united and in which we engage in a hard-headed manner it produces results. But it is true, as the European Council said, that we have to review our relationship with Russia and I hope very much that between now and when the Summit is due to take place in November in Paris we will be able to analyse our relationship. The European Council made that very clear and we will have to keep on working in that direction.

Before I finish, two words on the **Balkans**. The summer has also been busy on that front. As you know, we had a good debate, a good discussion, with the UN, with the Secretary General and his team, in order to get the technical arrangements in place for the deployment of our ESDP mission in **Kosovo** (EULEX), the transfer from UNMIK to EULEX. It is working and I can now say that EULEX deployment is on track after that agreement.

Regarding **Serbia**, you know President Tadic was in Brussels last week. You know we talked to him very frankly and congratulated him on the results the government has achieved and we hope very much that the interim agreement can be implemented soon. I hope that by the next General Affairs Council we can take such a decision. The process of ratifying the Stabilisation and Association Agreement in Serbia was completed this Monday and I hope very much that we will be able to keep up the momentum.

Let me move on as time is short. I would like to tell you that I will be going to the **Middle East** tomorrow. We had an important discussion on the Middle East at the Gymnich meeting, in Avignon, last Friday and Saturday. I think it is important that we take advantage of what are probably the last days left in the calendar if we want to achieve something from the agreements reached in Annapolis. I will be going to New York soon for over a week, where we will have an important series of meetings on the Middle East. We will have a meeting of the Quartet, and the Quartet plus the Arabs, and other meetings in other formats, with both sides present. I think it is very important that we Europeans try to analyse the situation after the General Assembly in New York and see how to go from then until the end of the year and until the new American Administration is fully operational. It is important to try and ensure that what has been achieved in the way of negotiations up until then is not lost and that we can continue to move on from the beginning of 2009. It will be an important responsibility for us to keep up the momentum.

I will be talking with President Abbas. In Israel, as you know, there is a great deal of political activity as the Kadima primaries are taking place in a few days and a new political situation will probably emerge. We have to take all of that into consideration. I think that the European Union must commit itself to the comprehensive nature of the process. The Syrian track still has the potential to move, or continue to move, and we have to maintain the dynamic.

Another positive development is the new relationship between Syria and Lebanon, the visit by President Suleiman, the elected president of Lebanon, to Syria and the recognition of the bilateral relationship, the exchange of ambassadors. These are promising signs. So, there are important things to tackle from now until the end of the year and I hope that we will have the opportunity to talk to everyone in due course so that we have the full engagement of the parties.

Let me say a few more words, on **Sudan** and **Chad** and on **Afghanistan** and Pakistan. On Sudan and Chad, at the end of July, I sent the mid-term review to the UN Secretary-General stressing two very important points: firstly the need for a follow-on force from EUFOR at the end of the mandate and secondly that the UN Security Council needs to take a decision very rapidly so that the whole operation can finish by the fixed time, that is 15 March 2009. After talking to members of the Security Council I hope that in the UN General Assembly ministerial week it will be possible to get that UNSC Resolution on Chad.

On **Afghanistan**, the summer has not been a good one. There have been setbacks, including the tragic loss of life of many Europeans and other soldiers serving in ISAF. Drug production has remained high. We have appointed a new EU Special Representative who has started in Kabul after Mr Vendrell's mandate ended. We have to maintain the line started at the Paris conference but, as you know. We have to pay very close attention to Afghanistan. If you put that together with the situation in **Pakistan**, you can be sure that those issues will be very high on our agenda in the coming period of time. This is going to be something we have to tackle and we have to talk about in this committee, probably in the near future.

Let me stop there and respond to your questions. I think it is fair to say that this period of time is an important one for the EU. In the coming weeks and months we must pay close attention to all these problems and I hope we will do it together. I look forward to our relationship at this important time. And now, as I said, I am happy to answer any questions, thank you very much.

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## SUMMARY OF ANSWERS BY MR SOLANA TO QUESTIONS FROM THE FLOOR

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### GEORGIA

Asked by MEPs about the EU mission to be deployed in Georgia, Mr SOLANA explained that it would be a 200-strong civilian observation mission, with the intention of deploying throughout the whole of Georgia. The aim was to start deploying on 1 October and to operate in close cooperation with the existing UN and OSCE missions on the ground.

Asked about the appointment of a new EU Special Representative for Georgia, Mr SOLANA said that Peter SEMNEBY, the EUSR for the South Caucasus, was doing a very good job, and working 24 hours a day, on the ground, in Georgia. A decision on a new EUSR for Georgia was expected at the next General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting, on 15 September.

### RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

Questioned by MEPs about what the EU could do if the agreement with Russia (of 8 September) was not respected, Mr SOLANA pointed to the conclusions of the European Council of 1 September and said that the meetings on the negotiation of the Partnership Agreement with Russia were suspended until Russian troops withdrew to the positions they held prior to 7 August. Mr SOLANA added that it was in the EU's interests to have such an agreement, but not at any price, and that it was also in Russia's interest.

### UKRAINE

To questions about strengthening the EU's relations with Ukraine, Mr SOLANA replied that one of the most important elements was Ukraine's internal political stability, underlining that that was a domestic issue in which the EU could not interfere. At the EU-Ukraine summit of 9 September, the decision to start negotiating an Association Agreement with Ukraine was an important step for that country.

### MOLDOVA

Concerning the Moldova and Transnistria issue, Mr SOLANA said that the EU was calling for the resumption of the settlement talks in the established '5+2' format, in view of the results of the '3+2' consultative meeting held in Vienna on 8 September between the international mediators (Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE) and observers (the European Union and United States).

### REGIONAL APPROACH to the CAUCASUS

In October, an international conference on the stability of the region would be convened, with the presence of EU Member States. Mr SOLANA stressed the need to engage Turkey on the issue and to widen the talks to other regional players. He said that the EU had supported the idea of a regional platform, launched by Prime Minister ERDOGAN, from the outset and would participate constructively. This Turkish initiative could, Mr SOLANA said, also be useful in creating

a positive atmosphere in the efforts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. He added that the question of the security of the Black Sea needed to be considered.

## **AFGHANISTAN**

In response to questions concerning the strategy for Afghanistan, Mr SOLANA said it did not need to be changed abruptly. However, he added that the EU needed to follow the situation closely, especially in the run-up to the 2009 presidential and parliamentary elections in Afghanistan. A new EUSR for Afghanistan, Mr. SEQUI, was appointed the 24 July.

## **MIDDLE EAST**

Mr Solana told MEPs that he could not say when a decision would be taken on an EU Association Agreement with Syria but there might be one after the UN General Assembly week. He was pleased with Turkey's mediation role between Syria and Israel.

## **KOSOVO**

Mr. SOLANA reiterated that Kosovo was a very different issue from South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In Kosovo, there was a UN administration for several years and there had been several rounds of negotiations, including the six-month troika process. During these talks, there were in-depth discussions and they were held in the spirit of compromise, with no military action.



# General Affairs and External Relations Council

Brussels, 15 September 2008

(...)

## SOMALIA – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

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The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. The Council remains gravely concerned at the situation in Somalia and off its coasts. With reference to its conclusions of 26 May, 16 June and 22 July 2008, the Council reaffirms its commitment to a comprehensive approach to a lasting settlement of the Somali crisis, covering its political, security and humanitarian aspects.
2. The Council welcomes the official signing by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) in Djibouti on 19 August 2008 of the peace agreement initialled by the two sides on 9 June 2008. It confirms its interest in providing European Union support for the agreement's implementation. It calls on all parties to join the political process in order to allow a swift return to peace, security, stability and development in Somalia. The Council also welcomes the efforts made by the TFG and the ARS to relaunch the political process under the aegis of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General.
3. The Council reaffirms its willingness to continue the European Union's engagement in Somalia, in particular by increased support for the capacity of the Somali police to combat abuses and serious human rights violations and enable the TFG to participate in implementing the Djibouti agreement as regards security. The Council would point to the substantial support given to AMISOM by the EU and its Member States and is prepared to help continue to provide such support. The Council welcomes the presidential statement from the United Nations Security Council on 5 September 2008.
4. The Council deplores the continuing deterioration in the humanitarian situation in Somalia and expresses its concern at the difficulties in reaching the civilian population and at the security conditions which affect the work of humanitarian agencies. It reaffirms the EU's determination to continue its efforts in this area.
5. The Council also reaffirms its serious concern at the acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast and deplores in particular their recent resurgence. As regards the European Union's contribution to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1816 on combating piracy off the Somali coast and to the protection, under Resolutions 1814 and 1816, of vessels chartered by the World Food Programme (WFP) and bound for Somalia, the Council has decided to establish, in the next few days, a coordination unit in Brussels with the task of supporting the surveillance and protection activities carried out by some Member States off the Somali coast. To that end, it has approved a plan for implementing this military coordination action (EU NAVCO).
6. In this context, the Council has also approved a strategic military option for a possible European Union naval operation. The Council would like to see the current planning work press ahead.'

## GEORGIA – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

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1. The Council welcomes the agreement on implementing the plan of 12 August, which was recorded in Moscow and Tbilisi on 8 September as a result of mediation by the European Union. That agreement should lead initially to Russian forces being completely withdrawn from the zones adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia to the lines held prior to the outbreak of hostilities, within 10 days of the deployment in those zones of the international mechanisms, including at least 200 observers from the European Union, which should take place by 1 October 2008 at the latest.
2. With reference to the Council conclusions of 1 September, the Council calls on all parties to fully implement this agreement, as well as the agreement of 12 August, and to do so in an effective manner and in good faith within the time limits that have been set, including the withdrawal of all Russian forces and the return of Georgia's military forces to their bases.
3. The Council recalls that the European Union is ready to play a full role in the resolution of this crisis, including on the ground and in future international discussions and the preparations for them, and in supporting efforts towards a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict in Georgia. The Council recalls that a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict in Georgia must be based on full respect for the principles of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity recognised by international law, the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and United Nations Security Council resolutions. In this context, the Council deplores any action that runs contrary to a solution based on these principles.
4. The Council supports the idea of an independent international inquiry into the conflict in Georgia.
5. The Council has decided to appoint Mr Pierre Morel as the Special Representative of the European Union for the crisis in Georgia.
6. In accordance with the conclusions of the Extraordinary European Council meeting on 1 September, the Council has decided to send an independent civilian observer mission to Georgia, under the European Security and Defence Policy, which will be deployed by 1 October in accordance with the arrangements set out in the agreement of 8 September, in close coordination with the OSCE and the United Nations and in addition to the international mechanisms of UNOMIG and the OSCE. The Council notes with satisfaction the contributions announced by the Member States with a view to deploying at least 200 observers by 1 October.
7. The Council invites the Commission to actively and swiftly prepare for the donors' conference to help with the reconstruction and recovery of the Georgian economy and with the return of displaced persons, and to hold it next month in Brussels in the light of an overall assessment of needs. The Council has taken note of the Commission proposal to mobilise financial aid for Georgia which could be of the order of EUR 500 million for the period 2008-2010 and which must be consistent with the financial perspective. The Council also invites the Member States to prepare a significant contribution for the conference in terms of financial support. It welcomes the Commission's commitment regarding the strengthening of the EU-Georgia relationship, in particular by expediting the preparatory work on the facilitation of visas and on readmission, as well as on free trade.'

# 10<sup>th</sup> Africa-EU Ministerial Troika Meeting

Brussels, 16 September 2008

## COMMUNIQUÉ

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### 1. Implementation of the Joint Strategy/First Action Plan

#### *Stocktaking of progress, endorsement of the implementation architecture, involvement of external partners and way forward*

Both sides debriefed each other about the consultations conducted since the Lisbon Summit on each continent to define the necessary institutional set up needed to carry out an efficient and speedy implementation of the Africa-EU Joint Strategy and its first Action Plan. The EU side emphasised the recent reform of its Council structures tasked with the follow up of the Africa-EU dialogue and stressed the aid effectiveness and division of labour oriented character of the arrangement made for the implementation of the Joint Strategy. Ministers underlined the necessity to involve key stakeholders in the implementation process, including EU Member States and African countries, African Regional Economic Communities, the Pan African and the European Parliaments, local authorities, and non-state actors from continents including civil societies, the private sector and the academic communities. Ministers also emphasised the important role played by the African chefs de file as well as by the AU Permanent Mission to the EU and the EU Delegation to the AU in the further deepening the partnership.

Ministers welcomed the progress report presenting the details of these political and institutional arrangements and adopted its recommendations. They particularly emphasised the need to make speedy progress on the implementation of the eight Africa-EU partnerships and urged all parties to finalise any remaining technical discussions regarding the implementation of the institutional set up. They called upon African and European experts to start the meetings of the informal Joint Experts Groups as soon as possible with a view to achieving together tangible results in time for the next Ministerial Troika which will take place on 20/21 November 2008 in Africa. Ministers requested that efforts be made to allocate funds in order to foster the implementation of the first Action Plan. They also invited the joint AU-EU Task Force and the next meeting of Commissioners of the EC and the AUC to contribute further to the collective efforts to implement the Joint Strategy and its Action Plan.

### 2. Update on current issues

#### *a. Situations in Africa*

##### **Sudan/Chad**

Ministers expressed great concern about the continued degradation of the situation in Darfur. They called on all parties to respect their commitment to the cease-fire with a view to create conditions for a re-launch of the political process. They welcomed the recent nomination of Mr. Djibril Bassolé as AU and UN chief negotiator for Darfur. They underlined the importance of accelerating the deployment of UNAMID which has to be able to fully implement its mandate to protect civilians. They recalled that there could not be a re-establishment of a lasting peace in

Darfur without a strong commitment of all to fight impunity in close cooperation with the international community.

The African side informed on the content of the communiqué of the 142nd meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council held on 21 July 2008 including its demarche to the UN Security Council on its implementation. The European side took note of this information. Both sides agreed to work closely together to ensure continued progress in the peace process in Sudan.

Ministers expressed concern about the situation between Chad and Sudan, which affect the whole region. They agreed on the urgent need to intensify efforts to resolve the crisis through diplomatic means, including the expeditious implementation of the Dakar Agreement of March 2008. In this respect, Ministers welcomed the efforts made by the AU, especially the visit of Chairperson Jean Ping and Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra to Chad and the Sudan, in May 2008, and the planned dispatch to the two countries of a fact finding mission, as decided by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) at its meeting held in Sharm el sheikh, Egypt, on 29 June 2008. They further welcomed the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Ministers acknowledged that the presence of EUFOR Chad/RCA in Eastern Chad and Northern Central African Republic (CAR) is an important EU contribution to the efforts aimed at improving the security of refugees and internally displaced persons. Both sides expressed hope that the presence of EUFOR, together with that of MINURCAT and UNAMID, will facilitate the efforts being deployed towards the promotion of lasting peace and stability in the region.

### **Somalia**

The Ministers deplored the continuation of violence and of the humanitarian crisis on the Somalian territory. They reiterated their support to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). They welcomed the agreement signed on 9 June 2008 in Djibouti between the TFG and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia under the aegis of the Special Representative of the UNSG, Mr. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah and with the support of the AU. They called on the different armed groups to renounce violence and to join the political process. They marked their commitment to continue the deployment of AMISOM and called for a reinforced support of the international community for the African Union's efforts in Somalia, notably in the UN framework. They also welcomed the roadmap for the implementation of the understanding reached in Addis Ababa among the leadership of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI) signed on 26 August 2008 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The Ministers expressed their concern about the increasing acts of piracy along the coast of Somalia and welcomed the European Union's commitment to contribute to fighting the phenomenon.

Finally, Ministers shared concerns about the delay encountered in the full deployment of the authorised strength of AMISOM. The European Union took note of the African Union's concerns regarding the necessity for the United Nations to deploy an international peace keeping force. In this regard the Ministers highlighted the UN responsibility for international peace and security and its important role in support of the ongoing process in Somalia.

### **Zimbabwe**

The Ministers welcomed the agreement of 11 September 2008 in Harare on a government of national unity. They paid tribute to President Mbeki for his mediation efforts on behalf of SADC and with the support of the AU. The restoring of a stable political, economic and social

situation in Zimbabwe is a priority as well as delivery of humanitarian aid. As the first donor in Zimbabwe, the EU intends to remain engaged in support of the people of Zimbabwe.

The Ministers agreed to follow closely the implementation of the agreement and wish its success. They recalled the importance which they attach to the well-functioning of the government of national unity.

### **Mauritania**

Ministers strongly condemned the coup d'état which took place in Mauritania on 6 August 2008 and the actions taken by the junta, including the creation of a 'High State Council' and the establishment of a new government.

Ministers urged the return to constitutional order and the re-establishment of the institutions which the people of Mauritania chose democratically during the legislative and presidential elections of November 2006 and March 2007, respectively. The Ministers supported opening of consultations under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement.

The EU side expressed its firm support to the measures taken by the AU in response to the coup d'état, including the suspension of Mauritania's participation in the activities of the African Union and the timely efforts deployed in order to resolve the crisis rapidly. The African side expressed its sincere appreciation to the EU for the strong support rendered to the AU.

Ministers agreed that the AU and the EU would continue to closely coordinate their activities to mobilise the support of the international community in order to return Mauritania to legality and respect the will of the people of Mauritania.

Ministers reiterated the determination of the AU and the EU to make every effort to end the crisis rapidly through the release of the democratically elected president, M. Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi, and his Prime Minister, M. Yahya Ould Ahmed Waghf, as well as the restoration of democratic institutions created after the elections of November 2006 and March 2007.

## ***b. Situations in Europe***

### **Georgia**

The EU representatives stated their concern following the conflict that took place in Georgia and of the unilateral decision of the Russian Federation to recognise the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. They underlined that a peaceful and lasting solution of the conflicts in Georgia had to be based on the full respect of the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity recognized by international law. The AU representatives took note of the concern.

The EU representatives informed the AU representatives of the initiatives taken by the EU Presidency to reach an end of the hostilities and to prepare a negotiated and lasting peaceful settlement of the issue. The African Union and the European Union called on the parties to engage in a dialogue on building together peace and stability in that region.

### **Kosovo**

The EU side provided a briefing on recent developments in Kosovo stressing that the EU continues to consider Kosovo as a *sui generis* case which does not create a precedent for other areas.

(...)

## Iran – Presidency declaration

Brussels, 18 September 2008

### **DECLARATION BY THE PRESIDENCY ON BEHALF OF THE EUROPEAN UNION FOLLOWING THE REPORT ISSUED BY THE IAEA DIRECTOR GENERAL REGARDING IRAN'S NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES**

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The European Union thanks the IAEA Director General and his team for the report of 15 September which shows the efforts made by the Agency to shed light on Iran's nuclear activities.

The European Union regrets that Iran is refusing to suspend its sensitive nuclear activities, in contravention of Security Council and IAEA Board of Governors resolutions, and is not providing the IAEA with the cooperation which the IAEA has requested in order to answer the outstanding questions listed in its reports.

The European Union shares the IAEA Director General's 'serious concern' as Iran fails to answer questions on possible activities relating to the design and manufacture of nuclear weapons.

The EU calls on Iran to comply with UNSC resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747 and 1803 and, in particular, to suspend its sensitive activities to allow for the opening of negotiations. It reaffirms its support for the proposals put to Iran by the EU Secretary General/High Representative in June 2006 and further developed in the revised offer put to Iran on 14 June 2008. It remains committed to finding a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear question without delay and reaffirms its firm commitment to the two-track approach.

The Candidate Countries Turkey, Croatia\* and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\*, the Countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Albania and Montenegro, and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova align themselves with this declaration.

\* Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

## EU-Asia Forum on the security challenges – Speech by Javier Solana

Paris, 18 September 2008

### DISCOURS DE JAVIER SOLANA À LA SESSION D'OUVERTURE DU FORUM UE-ASIE CENTRALE SUR LES ENJEUX DE SECURITE

Monsieur le Ministre, cher Bernard (Kouchner),  
Mesdames et Messieurs les Ministres et Représentants,  
Grâce à la Présidence française, que je remercie, nous nous rencontrons pour la première fois dans ce cadre original – à Vingt-sept plus Cinq – ouvert à toutes les institutions intéressées par l'Asie centrale.

C'est l'aboutissement d'un travail méthodique de rapprochement engagé depuis plusieurs années qui s'est amplifié il y a un an et demi avec l'élaboration de la Stratégie pour un nouveau partenariat entre l'Union européenne et l'Asie centrale.

Notre premier but, aujourd'hui, c'est de mieux se connaître et se comprendre : nous voulons confirmer l'engagement de l'Union européenne en Asie centrale et renforcer notre dialogue politique sur la question qui commande tout le reste, à savoir la sécurité, dans toutes ses dimensions, telles qu'elles se présentent en Asie centrale.

À nous de faire le point, d'identifier ensemble les grandes priorités. Tel est le but de la déclaration que nous allons adopter aujourd'hui. Nos échanges de vue tout au long de cette journée nous permettront ainsi de mieux travailler ensemble demain.

Il y a dans la Stratégie de l'Union européenne une formulation tout à fait remarquable, celle de notre sixième priorité : « les menaces et les défis communs ». L'expression peut sembler audacieuse, car elle couvre deux vastes régions séparées par mille, ou six mille kilomètres selon la façon dont nous calculons les distances. Et pourtant, c'est bien le cas, comme vont le souligner nos travaux d'aujourd'hui sur la lutte contre les trafics, la prévention du terrorisme et de la prolifération ou le renforcement de la sécurité environnementale et énergétique, car les menaces et défis nous concernent tous en Europe et en Asie centrale.

L'ordre du jour de notre rencontre fait ainsi ressortir la diversité des enjeux de sécurité dans le monde d'aujourd'hui. La confrontation proprement militaire n'a pas disparu, de même que les attaques que subissent chaque jour nos soldats dans leur mission de stabilisation de l'Afghanistan. Mais sachons aussi mesurer que la prise en main du trafic de l'héroïne afghane par les grands réseaux criminels internationaux frappe également nos sociétés de la façon la plus directe.

Le constat que nous nous trouvons face à des menaces communes appelle une conclusion simple : agissons ensemble pour répondre à ces menaces. C'est pourquoi j'aimerais proposer le principe de la Sécurité Coopérative pour nos actions futures.

Nous devons toutefois constater dans le même temps la rapidité des transformations qui modifient notre environnement de sécurité. Je ne citerai qu'un exemple, celui de l'Iran. De même, en quelques années, l'évolution sur le terrain des ressources centre-asiatiques en eau est venue confirmer ma thèse sur les changements climatiques, qui peuvent devenir rapidement des amplificateurs de tension. Travaillons ensemble pour prévenir ces risques.

Les risques se sont certes diversifiés, mais les voisinages de l'Asie centrale sont bien là, et pour

chacun d'eux, l'Europe est engagée : en Afghanistan, que j'ai évoqué ; avec l'Iran, qui doit enfin écouter les appels de la société internationale ; ou encore dans le Caucase, où le conflit géorgien affecte toute la zone caspienne.

L'Union européenne n'en apprécie que plus la stabilité de l'Asie centrale, qui repose, au bout du compte, sur une coopération durable entre toutes les parties prenantes. Tel est le sens du principe de Sécurité Coopérative que nous proposons pour nos actions futures.

Il y a du bon travail à faire pour tous les partenaires intéressés par l'Asie centrale. L'Union européenne est prête à s'engager sur cette voie.

Merci.



## EU NAVCO – Council Joint Action

Brussels, 19 September 2008

### **COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/749/CFSP ON THE EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY COORDINATION ACTION IN SUPPORT OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1816 (2008) (EU NAVCO)**

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#### THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 14, the third paragraph of Article 25, and Article 28(3) thereof,

Whereas:

(1) In resolution 1816 (2008) on the situation in Somalia, adopted on 2 June 2008, the UN Security Council expressed its concern at the threat that acts of piracy and armed robbery against vessels pose to the prompt, safe and effective delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia, the safety of commercial maritime routes and international navigation. The UN Security Council encouraged, in particular, States interested in the use of commercial maritime routes off the coast of Somalia to increase and coordinate their efforts to deter acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea in cooperation with the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG).

It authorised, for a period of six months from the date of the resolution, States cooperating with the TFG for which advance notification had been provided by the TFG to the UN Secretary-General to enter the territorial waters of Somalia and to use, in a manner consistent with relevant international law, all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea. The UN Security Council further called upon States to coordinate with other participating States their actions taken pursuant to the above provisions.

(2) In its conclusions of 26 May 2008 the Council expressed its concern at the upsurge of piracy attacks off the Somali coast, which affect humanitarian efforts and international maritime traffic in the region and contribute to continued violations of the UN arms embargo. The Council also commended the sequenced initiatives of some EU Member States to provide protection to World Food Programme vessels. It stressed the need for wider participation by the international community in these escorts in order to secure the delivery of humanitarian aid to Somali populations.

(3) On 16 June 2008 the Council requested the Council General Secretariat and the Commission to study possible options for implementing all the commitments contained in its conclusions of 26 May 2008, as well as for how best to contribute to the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1816 (2008).

(4) On 5 August 2008 the Council approved a crisis management concept for EU action to contribute to the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1816 (2008).

(5) The Political and Security Committee (PSC) should exercise political control of the EU military coordination action in support of UN Security Council resolution 1816 (2008), provide it with strategic direction and take the relevant decisions in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 25 of the EU Treaty.

(6) Under Article 28(3) of the EU Treaty, the operating expenditure arising from this Joint Action, which has military or defence implications, should be charged to the Member States.

Notwithstanding the fact that expenditure arising from an EU military coordination action such as that envisaged by this Joint Action is not provided for under Council Decision 2007/384/CFSP of 14 May 2007 establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications (Athena)<sup>(1)</sup>, the expenditure arising from this coordination action should, in this specific case and by way of exception, be managed in accordance with that Decision.

(7) The financial reference amount for the common costs of the EU military coordination action constitutes the best current estimate and is without prejudice to the final figures that are to be included in a budget to be approved in accordance with the rules laid down in Decision 2007/384/CFSP.

(8) In accordance with Article 6 of the Protocol on the position of Denmark annexed to the EU Treaty and to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Denmark does not participate in the elaboration and implementation of decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. Denmark is not participating in the implementation of this Joint Action and is therefore not participating in the financing of the EU military coordination action,

## HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

### *Article 1*

#### **Objective**

The European Union shall conduct a military coordination action in support of UN Security Council resolution 1816 (2008), named EU NAVCO.

### *Article 2*

#### **Mandate**

1. In pursuit of the objective laid down in Article 1, the aim of the EU military coordination action shall be to support the activities of Member States deploying military assets in theatre, with a view to facilitating the availability and operational action of those assets, in particular by setting up a coordination cell in Brussels, hereinafter referred to as the 'EU Coordination Cell'.
2. In fulfilment of this mandate, the EU Coordination Cell shall perform the tasks set out in the implementation plan approved by the Council.

### *Article 3*

Appointment of the Head of the EU Coordination Cell Captain Andrés A. BREIJO CLAÚR is hereby appointed Head of the EU Coordination Cell.

### *Article 4*

#### **Establishment of the EU Coordination Cell**

The EU Coordination Cell shall be located in Brussels.

### *Article 5*

#### **Implementation plan and launching of the EU military coordination action**

1. The implementation plan for EU NAVCO is hereby approved.

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(1) OJ L 152, 13.6.2007, p. 14.

2. The EU military coordination action shall be launched on the date of adoption of this Joint Action by the Council.

## *Article 6*

### **Political control and strategic direction**

1. Under the responsibility of the Council, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) shall exercise the political control and strategic direction of the EU military coordination action. The Council hereby authorises the PSC to take the relevant decisions in accordance with Article 25 of the EU Treaty. This authorisation shall include powers to amend the implementation plan. It shall also include the powers to take further decisions on the appointment of the Head of the EU Coordination Cell. The powers of decision with respect to the objectives and termination of the EU military coordination action shall remain vested in the Council, assisted by the Secretary-General/High Representative.
2. The PSC shall report to the Council at regular intervals.
3. The PSC shall receive reports from the Head of the EU Coordination Cell regarding the conduct of the EU military coordination action at regular intervals. The PSC may invite the Head of the EU Coordination Cell to its meetings, as appropriate.

## *Article 7*

### **Military direction**

1. The EU Military Committee (EUMC) shall monitor the proper execution of the EU military coordination action conducted under the responsibility of the Head of the EU Coordination Cell.
2. The EUMC shall receive reports from the Head of the EU Coordination Cell at regular intervals. The PSC may invite the Head of the EU Coordination Cell to its meetings, as appropriate.
3. The Chairman of the EUMC shall act as the primary point of contact with the Head of the EU Coordination Cell.

## *Article 8*

### **Coherence of the EU response**

1. The Presidency, the Secretary-General/High Representative, the Head of the EU Coordination Cell, and the Member States deploying military assets in theatre shall ensure close coordination of their respective activities with regard to the implementation of this Joint Action.
2. The Member States shall in particular be invited to provide the EU Coordination Cell with any relevant information on their operational activities in theatre and on the current situation in the area, including exchanges of information with merchant vessels.

## *Article 9*

### **Relations with the United Nations, the African Union, the International Maritime Organisation and other actors**

1. The Secretary-General/High Representative, assisted by the European Union Special Representative to the African Union, shall, in close coordination with the Presidency and in liaison with the Head of the EU Coordination Cell, act as the primary point of contact with the United Nations and the African Union.

2. At operational level the Head of the EU Coordination Cell shall act as the point of contact with, in particular, ship-owners' organisations, the relevant departments of the UN Secretariat, the World Food Programme and the International Maritime Organisation, and with Combined Task Force 150 within the framework of Operation Enduring Freedom.

## *Article 10*

### **Support of third States**

1. The PSC may authorise on a case-by-case basis the Head of the EU Coordination Cell to provide, under the same conditions as those laid down for the Member States, the coordination of action undertaken by third States implementing UN Security Council resolution 1816 (2008) which have requested such coordination.
2. To that end, the Head of the EU Coordination Cell shall be authorised to enter into administrative and technical arrangements with those States' competent authorities.

## *Article 11*

### **Liability**

1. The Member State which has seconded staff to the EU Coordination Cell shall be responsible for answering any claims linked to the secondment, whether from or concerning a staff member. The Member State in question shall be responsible for bringing any action against the seconded staff member.
2. Member States shall be responsible for answering any claims from third parties arising from naval operations conducted by vessels flying their flags in connection with those States' participation in implementing UN Security Council resolution 1816 (2008).

## *Article 12*

### **Financial arrangements**

1. The following common costs of the EU military coordination action shall be charged to the Member States in accordance with the gross national income scale:
  - communications,
  - transport/travel,
  - administration.
2. The financing of those common costs shall be administered by Athena.
3. The financial reference amount for the common costs of the EU military coordination action shall be EUR 60 000. The percentage of the reference amount referred to in Article 33(3) of 2007/384/CFSP shall be 30 %.

## *Article 13*

### **Release of information to the United Nations and other third parties**

1. The Secretary General/High Representative is hereby authorised to release to the United Nations and to other third parties associated with this Joint Action EU classified information and documents generated for the purposes of the EU military coordination action up to the level of classification relevant for each of them and in accordance with the Council security regulations<sup>(1)</sup>.
2. The Secretary General/High Representative is hereby authorised to release to the United

(1) Council Decision 2001/264/EC of 19 March 2001 adopting the Council's security regulations (OJ L 101, 11.4.2001, p. 1)

Nations and to other third parties, associated with this Joint Action, EU non-classified documents relating to the Council's deliberations on the military coordination action which are covered by the obligation of professional secrecy pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Council's Rules of Procedure<sup>(2)</sup>.

### **Article 14**

#### **Entry into force and termination**

1. This Joint Action shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
2. The EU military coordination action shall terminate on a date to be decided by the Council and shall be reassessed at the end of the period of validity of UN Security Council resolution 1816 (2008).
3. This Joint Action shall be repealed on the date on which the EU Coordination Cell closes and without prejudice to the relevant provisions of Decision 2007/384/CFSP.

### **Article 15**

#### **Publication**

1. This Joint Action shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.
2. The PSC's decisions on the subsequent appointment of the Head of the EU Coordination Cell shall likewise be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Brussels, 19 September 2008.

*For the Council*

*The President*

B. Kouchner

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(2) Council Decision 2004/338/EC, Euratom of 22 March 2004 adopting the Council's Rules of Procedure (OJ L 106, 15.4.2004, p. 22).

## EUFOR TCHAD – Comments by Javier Solana

New York, 24 September 2008

Since March, EU troops were deployed in eastern Chad and in the northeast of the Central African Republic (CAR), within the framework of the operation EUFOR Chad/CAR. The aim of this operation, which was closely coordinated with the United Nations, was to improve security by facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid and help ensure the protection of UN personnel and facilities. On 24 September, Javier Solana gave an address in which he provided the Security Council with an overview of this operation halfway through its mandate.

### INTERVENTION DE JAVIER SOLANA À L'OCCASION DU DÉBAT SUR EUFOR TCHAD/RCA AU CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ DES NATIONS UNIES

Monsieur le Président,

En conformité avec le mandat reçu de ce Conseil, l'opération EUFOR Tchad/RCA est déployée depuis six mois. Aujourd'hui, plus de 3.300 soldats sont sur le terrain.

Pendant cette période, EUFOR a déployé une force puissante et mobile sur un théâtre loin de l'Europe et d'accès difficile. EUFOR a patrouillé une zone particulièrement étendue. EUFOR a mis en œuvre, au profit des organisations humanitaires, des mesures de protection, qui ont de toute évidence amélioré l'accès humanitaire. EUFOR a apporté son soutien au déploiement en cours de la MINURCAT. La coopération entre EUFOR et la MINURCAT est exemplaire. Nous nous en félicitons.

Tout cela s'est fait avec la coopération entière des autorités du Tchad et de la République centrafricaine, et en toute transparence avec tous les pays de la région.

La présence d'EUFOR a contribué à stabiliser l'est du Tchad et le nord de la République centrafricaine. Les humanitaires nous le disent, les réfugiés nous le disent, les déplacés nous le disent. Un mouvement de retour est d'ailleurs en cours. C'est certainement encourageant.

La présence d'EUFOR a contribué à apaiser les tensions régionales. C'est fondamental, car ce qui se passe au Tchad et en République centrafricaine est lié à ce qui se passe dans le Darfour, et inversement. Les efforts politiques en cours entre le Tchad et le Soudan vont dans le bon sens.

Ces efforts doivent être poursuivis et consolidés. La situation est, pour l'instant, calme. Mais elle reste fragile. EUFOR partira, comme annoncé, le 15 mars 2009. Notre souci est d'éviter un vide sécuritaire à cette date.

Pour ces raisons, à l'occasion de l'examen à mi-mandat qui nous réunit aujourd'hui, je crois qu'il est fondamental d'insister sur trois aspects :

- ▶ Premièrement, l'impérieuse nécessité d'une relève appropriée d'EUFOR par les Nations unies, à la date du 15 mars 2009.
- ▶ Deuxièmement, l'importance, pour cette relève, de couvrir à la fois le Tchad et la République centrafricaine, les deux situations étant géopolitiquement liées.
- ▶ Troisièmement, la nécessité d'une décision rapide du Conseil de sécurité, ce qui permettra de lancer la planification des Nations unies dans les temps.

Nous mettrons tout en œuvre pour assister les Nations unies dans tous les domaines, et faire ainsi de cette transition une réussite.

Cette relève, et je voudrais terminer sur ce point, ne constituera pas pour autant la fin de l'engagement de l'Union européenne dans la région :

- ▶ l'Union européenne continuera à être un acteur actif sur le dossier du Darfour, qui permettra, nous l'espérons, à terme, aux réfugiés de rentrer chez eux;
- ▶ l'Union européenne contribuera au financement :
  - du Détachement tchadien Intégré de Sécurité qui a été, et qui continuera à être entraîné par la MINURCAT ;
  - du programme de reconstruction sociale et économique de l'est du Tchad, qui, avec la sécurité, facilitera le retour des déplacés chez eux.

Je vous remercie de votre attention.

## **BACKGROUND – OPERATION MILITAIRE DE L'UE AU TCHAD ET EN REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE EUFOR TCHAD/RCA**

**Brussels, September 2008**

### **Toile de fond de l'opération**

L'opération EUFOR Tchad/RCA a atteint sa Capacité opérationnelle initiale le 15 mars 2008. La Capacité opérationnelle finale a été atteinte mi-septembre 2008.

C'est le 28 janvier 2008 que l'Union européenne a décidé de lancer cette opération militaire de transition dans l'Est du Tchad et dans le Nord-Est de la République centrafricaine, conformément au mandat figurant dans la résolution 1778 (2007). Cette opération s'inscrit dans le cadre de la Politique européenne de Sécurité et de Défense (PESD).

En menant une telle opération, l'UE renforce l'action qu'elle mène de longue date visant à faire face à la crise du Darfour, dans le cadre d'une approche régionale de cette crise.

Cette opération est conduite avec l'accord des gouvernements tchadiens et centrafricains.

Dans sa résolution 1778 (2007) du 25 septembre 2007, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies a approuvé la mise en place d'une mission des Nations unies en République centrafricaine et au Tchad (MINURCAT) et a autorisé l'Union européenne à déployer ses forces, pour une durée d'un an à partir du moment où celle-ci aura déclaré sa capacité opérationnelle initiale.

### **Mandat et objectifs**

EUFOR Tchad/RCA est une opération militaire de transition, étroitement coordonnée avec la présence multidimensionnelle des Nations Unies dans l'Est du Tchad et dans le Nord-Est de la République centrafricaine, afin d'améliorer la sécurité dans ces régions. La mission de l'UE a plus particulièrement les objectifs suivants :

- ▶ contribuer à la protection des civils en danger, en particulier les réfugiés et les personnes déplacées,
- ▶ faciliter l'acheminement de l'aide humanitaire et la libre circulation du personnel humanitaire en contribuant à améliorer la sécurité dans la zone d'opérations,
- ▶ contribuer à la protection du personnel, des locaux, des installations et du matériel des Nations unies et assurer la sécurité et la liberté de circulation de son propre personnel, du personnel des Nations unies et du personnel associé.

## Paramètres de l'opération

Au regard de la situation sur le terrain, de l'immensité de la zone couverte et des difficultés logistiques, cette opération constitue un vrai défi pour l'UE.

Lorsqu'elle sera pleinement déployée, l'opération de l'UE comptera environ 3.700 hommes. Fin avril, quelque 2.380 personnels étaient déjà déployés sur le théâtre d'opération.

Avec 14 Etats membres présents sur le terrain, 18 sur le théâtre et 24 au quartier général opérationnel (OHQ), situé au Mont Valérien (France), EUFOR TCHAD/RCA est l'opération la plus multinationale jamais envoyée en Afrique par l'UE.

Le Général de Corps d'armée Patrick NASH (Irlandais) est le commandant de l'opération de l'UE, et le Général de Brigade Jean-Philippe GANASCIA (Français), le commandant de la force de l'UE.

Le déploiement comprend un quartier général de force arrière à N'Djaména, un quartier général de force à Abéché et trois bataillons stationnés respectivement dans les régions de l'est tchadien d'Iriba (nord), de Forchana (centre) et de Goz Beïda (sud), ainsi qu'un détachement à Birao (République centrafricaine).

EUFOR Tchad/RCA dispose d'un mandat approprié lui permettant l'usage de la force armée si nécessaire. Elle est indépendante, impartiale et neutre.

## Une approche globale de l'UE

La mise en place d'EUFOR Tchad/RCA s'inscrit dans le cadre d'un ensemble de mesures visant à renforcer l'engagement de l'UE en soutien d'une solution à la crise au Darfour. Tous les instruments de l'Union européenne – diplomatiques, politiques et financiers – sont mobilisés pour soutenir ces efforts. Les principaux éléments, tous liés, comprennent :

- un soutien accru aux efforts de l'Union africaine (UA) et de l'ONU pour relancer le processus politique en vue d'une solution durable,
- l'accélération de la mise en place de l'opération hybride UA/ONU au Darfour (UNAMID),
- une mobilisation accrue afin d'assurer le financement de l'aide humanitaire ainsi que l'accès humanitaire.

À cet égard, l'Union européenne, à travers la Commission européenne, soutiendra la mission de police des Nations Unies qui aura pour tâche d'aider au maintien de l'ordre dans les camps de réfugiés et s'agissant des concentrations de personnes déplacées aux alentours près de la frontière du Darfour.

La Communauté européenne financera également, de façon substantielle, la réhabilitation et la reconstruction de zones de retour pour les personnes déplacées, notamment par des actions de reconstruction, de médiation et de renforcement des capacités administratives, nécessaires pour améliorer la sécurité dans les zones couvertes par la mission UE/ONU.

Ces différentes actions seront prolongées grâce aux fonds du 10<sup>ème</sup> Fonds européen de Développement (FED), avec EUR 299 millions pour le Tchad et EUR 137 millions pour la République centrafricaine pour la période 2008-2013.



## Middle East Peace Process – Quartet Statement

New York, 26 September 2008

Representatives of the Quartet – U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union Javier Solana, European Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner and French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner – met today in New York to discuss the situation in the Middle East. They were joined by Quartet Representative Tony Blair.

The Quartet reaffirmed its support for the bilateral and comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and commended the parties for their serious and continuous efforts since the Annapolis Conference. The Quartet recognized that a meaningful and results-oriented process is underway and called upon the parties to continue to make every effort to conclude an agreement before the end of 2008. It noted the significance of this process and the importance of confidentiality in order to preserve its integrity. The Quartet underlined its commitment to the irreversibility of the negotiations; to the creation of an independent, democratic and viable Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, living in peace and security alongside Israel; and to an end to the conflict. The Quartet expressed its desire to see the continuation of the solid negotiating structure, involving substantive discussions on all issues, including core issues without exception, in order to ensure the fulfilment of the Annapolis goals. The Quartet reiterated its previous call for all Palestinians to commit themselves to non-violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations. Restoring Palestinian unity based on the PLO commitments would be an important factor in this process.

The Quartet emphasized the need for a renewed focus on improvements in the situation on the ground and stated that visible and tangible progress must accompany the negotiations. The Quartet commended the Palestinian Authority for the encouraging results of its efforts to reform the security sector, to confront militias and terrorism, and to enforce the Rule of law in areas subject to its security control. The Quartet commended recent measures by the Israeli government to lift restrictions on access and movement and encouraged further steps to ease conditions for Palestinian civilian life and the economy. The Quartet called on the parties to re-double their cooperative efforts on security to ensure that both Israelis and Palestinians live in peace and safety. In particular, the Quartet urged the parties to continue cooperation in order to expand the success observed in Jenin to other major centres in the West Bank and called on the international community, including regional partners, to support these efforts with targeted and coordinated assistance and through the continued efforts of Quartet Representative Blair. The Quartet called for speedy implementation of the outcome of the Berlin conference and invited all donors to fulfil the pledges made at the Paris conference in line with the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan. It welcomed the September 22 statement of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee and recalled the importance of equitable burden-sharing.

The Quartet discussed the status of the parties' obligations under the Roadmap as an integral part of Annapolis follow-up. The Quartet expressed deep concern about increasing settlement activity, which has a damaging impact on the negotiating environment and is an impediment to economic recovery, and called on Israel to freeze all settlement activity, including natural growth, and to dismantle outposts erected since March 2001. In this regard, the Quartet

reiterated that the parties must avoid actions that undermine confidence and could prejudice the outcome of the negotiations. Quartet Principals condemned the recent rise in settler violence against Palestinian civilians, urging the enforcement of the rule of law without discrimination or exception. The Quartet also condemned acts of terrorism against Israelis, including any rocket attacks emanating from the Palestinian territories, and stressed the need for further Palestinian efforts to fight terrorism and dismantle the infrastructure of terror, as well as foster an atmosphere of tolerance.

The Quartet commended Egypt for its endeavour to overcome Palestinian divisions and to reunite Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza under the legitimate Palestinian Authority. The Quartet welcomed the continuing calm between Gaza and southern Israel, which has largely persisted for over three months and expressed its hope that this calm will result in further relief for the civilian population of Gaza, including the regular opening of the crossings for both humanitarian and commercial flows, and sustained peace on Israel's southern border. The Quartet stated its expectation that movement of persons and goods will be normalized in the coming months, as foreseen in the Agreement on Movement and Access, and expressed its strong support for the immediate resumption of stalled UN and other donor projects in Gaza. This will facilitate economic activity, reduce dependence on humanitarian assistance, and restore links between Gaza and the West Bank. The Quartet welcomed the offer by the EU to resume its monitoring mission at the Rafah crossing point. The Quartet called for the immediate and unconditional release of Israeli Corporal Gilad Shalit.

The Quartet welcomed efforts toward comprehensive regional peace and stability, including Turkey's facilitation of indirect Israeli-Syrian negotiations. It expressed hope for an intensification of these talks with the goal of achieving peace in accordance with the Madrid terms of reference. The Quartet noted the importance of the Arab Peace Initiative as a major element in moving the process forward and re-affirmed its support for a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace in the Middle East based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, 1397, and 1515.

The Quartet expressed its intention to work closely with the parties in the important period ahead. The Quartet agreed that the spring of 2009 could be an appropriate time for an international meeting in Moscow.

The Quartet noted with appreciation the parties' suggestion to brief the Quartet on their ongoing negotiation process, with due regard for the confidential and bilateral nature of the discussions. The Quartet expressed its interest in coordinating such a meeting for a mutually accepted time.

# EU-India Summit

Marseille, 29 September 2008

(...)

## 1. EU-INDIA JOINT PRESS COMMUNIQUÉ

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The ninth European Union – India Summit was held in Marseille on 29 September 2008.

The EU was represented by President Nicolas Sarkozy, in his capacity as President of the European Council; by Mr José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission; by Dr Javier Solana, High Representative for the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy; by Mr Bernard Kouchner, French Foreign Minister; by Mme Anne Marie Idrac, French Secretary of State for external trade and by Mr Peter Mandelson, European Commissioner for Trade. The Republic of India was represented by Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh; Shri Kamal Nath, Minister for Commerce and Industry; and Shri M. K. Narayanan, National Security Adviser.

The Leaders discussed regional situations, global issues and the strengthening of EU-India relations.

### I. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

The EU and India, as the two largest democracies in the world and global actors in a multipolar world, reiterated their commitment to their strategic partnership. The Partnership is firmly based on shared values of democracy and human rights, fundamental freedoms (including religious), pluralism, rule of law and multilateralism.

The EU and India are committed to promoting international peace and security. They reaffirmed their strong and continued commitment to the Government of Afghanistan in its efforts to build a democratic and pluralistic society. They agreed that strengthening Afghan security and military forces would help in the enforcement of the rule of law. They further agreed to assist the Afghan authorities in ensuring free and fair elections in the period ahead. They recalled their commitments taken at the Paris International Conference in Support of Afghanistan. They expressed deep concern at the continued deterioration of security conditions in areas bordering Afghanistan, and reiterated that the situation required sustained action. They noted the new commitments of the Government of Pakistan to address regional and international concerns.

They expressed their serious concern over the Iranian nuclear issue and called on Iran to take steps to re-establish confidence in the nature of its nuclear programme, as required by the IAEA Board of Governors. They expressed their support for the current diplomatic efforts and steps in order to find a satisfactory solution to the nuclear issue.

They discussed the situation in Burma/Myanmar, agreed on the need to strengthen efforts towards national reconciliation and reaffirmed the need for an inclusive dialogue, including with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the Myanmar ethnic groups, to progress towards democracy.

The Leaders condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purpose. The EU and India agreed to work actively towards a swift finalisation of a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism at the UN. At the

bilateral level, the two sides expressed commitment to continuing their cooperation on counter-terrorism and early formalisation of cooperation between Europol and Indian agencies.

(...)

## **2. GLOBAL PARTNERS FOR GLOBAL CHALLENGES: THE EU-INDIA JOINT ACTION PLAN (JAP)**

The EU-India Joint Action Plan (JAP) has now been working for three years. It has provided an agreed measure of progress, a mechanism for coordination and a spur to stronger cooperation.

The period since its adoption has been marked by worldwide growth of interdependence.

Climate change, terrorism and instability remain as much of a threat as in 2005 and new challenges have arisen. The unprecedented pressure on energy and natural resources, including foodstuffs, poses new difficulties and calls for immediate action, as well as long-term structural measures.

In light of these challenges, and on the basis of the shared values expressed in the 2005 JAP, the EU and India will build on the achievements of the past three years and ensure further progress in the coming period.

(...)

## **II. NEW ACTIVITIES**

The EU and India identified the following new activities to complement the 2005 India-EU Joint Action Plan, with the objective of promoting international peace and security and working together towards achieving economic progress, prosperity and sustainable development:

### **1. PROMOTING PEACE AND COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY**

- To strengthen their consultations in the United Nations Human Rights Council and sustain their dialogue on human rights with a view to promoting the universality of human rights.
- To organise seminars and exchange best practice on civil-military peace building issues, including on Africa.
- To reinforce co-operation in fighting proliferation and in export control.
- To intensify contacts in the fight against terrorism including through the operationalisation of cooperation between Europol and India.
- To co-operate on regional issues.
- To join efforts in the international fora in using expertise in global development policy to promote the achievement of the MDGs and aid effectiveness.

(...)

# Informal meeting of the Defence Ministers

Deauville, 1-2 October 2008

## SUMMARY OF REMARKS BY JAVIER SOLANA

### Civilian and military ESDP Operations

#### EUMM Georgia

- I have just returned from a visit to Georgia this morning. I met with all the authorities there including President Saakashvili and declared the launching of the mission. Today, the EU monitors have already entered the buffer zone as scheduled and they are patrolling there. Thanks to the huge efforts of the Council Secretariat and of you, the Member States – with very valuable support from your Ministries, including personnel, expertise and equipment at short notice – we have the required number of monitors in place and operational. We now have over 200 monitors deployed and altogether the EU presence in Georgia amounts to more than 300 persons.
- This is a significant achievement and I thank you for your countries' efforts in making it possible. Maintaining neutrality will be essential for the mission and the implementation of the six-point plan, especially withdrawal of Russian troops, is the immediate priority.
- The EU has acted with resolve since the war. Our resolve has been demonstrated by our concrete political, humanitarian, financial and practical support for Georgia. The EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) is a significant part of this support.

#### Opération EUFOR TCHAD/RCA

- En conformité avec le mandat reçu de ce Conseil, l'opération EUFOR Tchad/RCA est déployée depuis six mois. Aujourd'hui, plus de 3.300 soldats sont sur le terrain.
- Pendant cette période, l'EUFOR a déployé une force puissante et mobile sur un théâtre loin de l'Europe et d'accès difficile. L'EUFOR a patrouillé une zone particulièrement étendue. L'EUFOR a mis en œuvre, au profit des organisations humanitaires, des mesures de protection, qui ont de toute évidence amélioré l'accès humanitaire. L'EUFOR a apporté son soutien au déploiement en cours de la MINURCAT.
- La présence de l'EUFOR a contribué à stabiliser l'Est du Tchad et le Nord de la République centrafricaine ; elle a contribué à apaiser les tensions régionales.
- La résolution 1834 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies, adoptée le 24 septembre, contient les dispositions permettant une relève effective par les Nations unies à partir du 15 mars 2009, au Tchad et également en RCA.
- Les contacts récents pris sur le terrain font ressortir l'excellente qualité de la coordination entre l'EUFOR, la Mission des Nations unies en République centrafricaine et au Tchad (MINURCAT) et les acteurs humanitaires. Maintenant nous devons continuer le travail sur le terrain et préparer la transition vers les Nations unies.
- Nous travaillons en très étroite collaboration avec le Département des Opérations de Maintien de la Paix (DOMP) pour coordonner tous les aspects de cette transition et en assurer la réussite.
- Le départ de l'EUFOR ne constituera pas la fin de l'engagement de l'Union européenne

dans la région. De nombreux Etats membres envisagent de rester engagés dans le cadre d'une opération des Nations Unies. Nous restons actifs dans la région, en particulier sur le dossier du Darfour.

### **Piraterie**

- ▶ L'Union européenne a affirmé son intention de lutter contre la menace croissante de la piraterie au large de la Somalie. Il s'agit d'une menace directe sur les intérêts européens, et en particulier les routes commerciales et les zones de pêche. Mais c'est également une menace pour l'action de la communauté internationale en Somalie, et en particulier l'aide humanitaire apportée par le Programme Alimentaire Mondial (PAM). Le SG des Nations Unies Ban Ki-moon m'a demandé notre soutien.
- ▶ Pour répondre à l'urgence, nous avons mis en place une cellule de coordination, EU NAVCO, qui est déjà opérationnelle, destinée à faciliter les échanges d'informations entre marines marchandes et navires de guerre. Ce soutien s'inscrit dans le cadre fixé par la résolution 1816 du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies.
- ▶ Nous nous préparons à renforcer notre réponse en allant vers une véritable opération navale qui fera converger nos efforts. La planification d'une telle opération est déjà bien avancée. Il faut maintenant clarifier les questions qui restent et réunir les moyens maritimes nécessaires.
- ▶ Si cette opération est lancée, elle devra être coordonnée avec les autres acteurs de la communauté internationale actifs dans ce domaine. Compte tenu de la taille de la zone, il y a du travail pour tous, et toutes les contributions devraient être bienvenues si elles apportent une réelle valeur ajoutée.

### **Operation EUFOR ALTHEA (BiH)**

Despite the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) in June, the overall political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) continues to be challenging.

- ▶ The future of BiH lies with the EU. Its political leaders need to deliver and to facilitate a broader dialogue within BiH to implement the SAA and overcome the current institutional paralysis.
- ▶ The EU maintains its overall commitment and continues to adapt it to the political developments and the security situation. We are looking at the options for the future of our presence when we can put an end to the military force. Now, EUFOR is some 2.200 strong, backed up by over-the horizon reserves.
- ▶ It is clear that the purely military tasks are being accomplished but there is a continuing need for support to local institutions. We must think ahead and prepare ourselves for an evolution of our presence on the basis of real needs. In the meantime there will be no withdrawal.

### **Capacités militaires**

- ▶ L'Union européenne a besoin de décisions des États membres. Si nous voulons réduire efficacement nos lacunes, ce n'est pas de nouvelles études dont nous avons besoin, mais de décisions prises en connaissance de cause par les États membres sur des projets concrets. D'intéressantes propositions ont été faites par les États membres, avec le soutien actif de

l'Agence européenne de défense, notamment sur les hélicoptères, le transport stratégique, la coopération aéronavale et l'espace, l'observation navale militaire et le déminage maritime, pour n'en citer que quelques unes.

- ▶ J'ai bon espoir que nous puissions lancer plusieurs de ces projets à l'occasion de notre Comité directeur de l'Agence de défense de novembre. Si nous y parvenons, nous aurons progressé en substance vers nos objectifs – avec des actes tangibles dans les domaines prioritaires.
- ▶ L'Agence est à votre disposition. Elle continuera à générer, promouvoir et soutenir les efforts de coopération destinés à améliorer nos capacités.
- ▶ Je note en particulier les manifestations d'intérêt et les engagements pris lors de nos débats.

#### **Créer des capacités plus efficacement**

- ▶ Nous devons faire preuve d'imagination tout autant que de détermination. Notre débat devrait nous conduire à examiner l'ensemble du spectre des possibilités, de la constitution de capacités par simple agrégation de capacités nationales à l'acquisition de capacités collectives, en passant par la mutualisation et par le partage des rôles.
- ▶ J'attire votre attention sur l'importance, dans ce contexte, du Plan de Développement des Capacités.

#### **Mieux employer les capacités acquises**

- ▶ En ce qui concerne les forces multinationales, nous avons là des outils militaires à la disposition de l'UE que nous n'impliquons pas dans notre réflexion alors même que nous constatons un problème de disponibilité de ressources.
- ▶ J'ai déjà pris des mesures pour explorer les possibilités de développement de la contribution des ces forces à la PESD.
- ▶ Certaines de ces forces sont mentionnées par les Etats membres dans le Catalogue de forces 2007, mais ces contributions ne sont pas des mises à disposition. Aussi pourrions-nous réfléchir ensemble à l'intérêt de resserrer le lien entre le processus de développement capacitaire et la génération de forces pour nos opérations. C'est la même chose en ce qui concerne les groupements tactiques. Il s'agit pour nous de réfléchir à un meilleur emploi des forces et capacités existantes.

**Deauville, 2 October 2008**

### **EUROPEAN INITIATIVE FOR YOUNG OFFICERS 'INSPIRED OF ERASMUS'**

- ▶ I have often underlined the need to strengthen the ability of our armies to work together and to be interoperable. An important way to achieve this is by enabling officers to experience the armies of other Member States from the inside, and particularly in the early stage of training.
- ▶ I therefore give my full support to the French Presidency's initiative to explore the possibilities for exchanging officers during their basic training, in the spirit of the Erasmus concept. I look forward the adoption of a final declaration by the ministers of Defence on the next meeting on 10 November.
- ▶ A better understanding of other Member States' armed forces by young military officers

and a sound knowledge of the European crisis-management framework in which they are expected to work are essential to strengthen the capacity of European armies to operate together.

- ▶ The EU Council Secretariat has drawn up practical recommendations on the basis of information provided by Member States. Of course, implementation of the recommendations will be on a voluntary basis, respecting the autonomy of decision-making and the specificities of each Member State.
- ▶ Finally, I would also like to express my support for the potential role of the European Security and Defence College in implementing the initiative.



## Javier Solana – Conference ‘National interests and European Foreign Policy’

Berlin, 7 October 2008

I would like to thank the *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik* for convening this conference. It follows a good tradition. For many years it has hosted the NATO Review Conference. As NATO General Secretary I valued these intense political brainstormings. It is timely to launch a similar exercise for our Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Next year, it will be ten years since the Kosovo crisis, which played a fundamental role in the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy. The European Security Strategy will see its 5th anniversary in December. So this is a good moment to look back. But even more to think about the future. I hope and expect this conference to contribute to tangible progress in the evolution of Europe’s global role.

At the request of the organisers, my intervention will focus on the question of national interests and how they relate to building a common European foreign policy. This is not an easy topic. These days, when debating foreign policy, the concept of ‘national interest’ can seem outmoded and unattractive. In both public opinion and specialist circles, we tend to associate the idea with the cynical pursuit of self-interest.

Take historical figures like Machiavelli: ‘it is far safer to be feared than loved’. Or Lord Palmerston: ‘my country has no permanent friends, only permanent interests’. We like to think diplomats have moved beyond that kind of thinking in the twenty-first century.

In the European context this feeling becomes stronger. European integration has been built on compromises. So a ruthless pursuit of national interests sits ill with the European method of consensus-building. But are national interests and European foreign policy therefore incompatible?

It would be tempting to say yes. But that would miss an important point. For I think the relationship is more complex. Properly defined, national interests have a place in European policy-making. What has changed in Europe is how people define their interests and, even more, the structure in which they pursue them.

The point is not that we have abolished national interests in the European Union. Rather, the point is that we agree that the best way to safeguard these interests is by working together. Moreover, working together helps to create and identify common European interests. So, it is a two-way street. This is a fundamental truth, which bears repeating.

To avoid any misunderstanding: values matter as much as interests. A foreign policy which is not informed by our values is neither possible nor acceptable. This very much applies to the European Union. Values are at the core of our external actions and an expression of our collective identity. We promote them because of who we are. But also because it is in our interest to do so.

This explains why the European approach to international relations is characterised by the primacy of international law; the search for consensual solutions; and a commitment to making multilateral institutions effective. This is the European way. What we do abroad is shaped by who we are. Not only is this approach right. It is also very effective, as the history of Europe over the last fifty years demonstrates.

There is another aspect to all this. The very concept of national interest has changed in our globalised world. In a nutshell: interests have gone global. We face common problems. You all know the list: terrorism, climate change and energy security, proliferation, organised crime, failing states. These are complex and interconnected problems. They defy simple solutions.

No country acting alone can solve them. So, national and collective interests are linked. You cannot pursue one at the expense of the other. Of course there will always be differences of emphasis, based on history, geography and the electoral cycle. We should be aware of these differences – and discuss how they can be overcome. But the collective, common interest is clear. Global and complex issues require global answers.

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So much for the theory. How to do it in practice, in a Union of 27 member-states? By working hard every day. I believe it is possible, because there is such a thing as common European interests. Let me try to explain.

First, I believe it is an interest in itself for the 27 Member states to build unity. Unity is the best way to be heard in a globalised world. Unity is a precondition for Europe to be effective. In turn, being effective helps with creating unity, as the Balkan and Georgia conflicts have shown.

Second, there is the inter-connected nature of the threats that we face, as I mentioned earlier. We have a common interest in addressing complex threats, diplomatically and through collective action on the ground. What is stated in principle must be demonstrated in practice. And Europe is doing just that, tackling crises in our neighbourhood and beyond.

Let me mention some examples which seem of special relevance.

The Iran nuclear issue is a case in point. The importance of the Iranian issue cannot be overstated. At stake is nothing less than the treaty-based system of non-proliferation. Europe's role has been central. We have been at the forefront of international efforts to solve this sensitive and complex issue, working through the multilateral system. It is consistent with the objectives, interests and values we uphold. We hope for success, but know that it will require cooperation of many actors, first of all Iran.

Or take the Western Balkans. The scale of the EU commitment to putting that region on a path of sustainable peace, reconciliation and growth is unprecedented. From Bosnia Herzegovina to Kosovo, from Serbia to FYROM Europe is seen as an indispensable anchor of stability and development.

Europe is committed to the Balkans for good reasons. This is an area of strategic importance. And our engagement has made the difference, even in very sensitive issues like relations with Kosovo and Serbia. I do not deny or downplay the challenge that was posed by Kosovo's independence – including among EU Member States. But we delivered.

The Union agreed on a common interest in ensuring stability and security in Kosovo, and deployed the EULEX mission to achieve that aim. We were right. Since February, we have seen positive trends in both Kosovo and Serbia, with the EULEX mission gradually deploying and a pro-European political constellation in Belgrade.

All this would have been impossible without the impulse and political initiative from the European Union – and especially the incentive of the European perspective. Compare this situation to the mid-1990s. The progress we have made is remarkable.

Then there is Georgia. The initiatives taken by the European Union, under the leadership of the French Presidency, were key to preventing further dangerous escalation. It is too early for final

judgements at this stage. But over the last two months the EU has been crucial to establishing a path through the crisis, and providing the means, with the EU Monitoring Mission to doing so.

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Let me conclude. National interests and European foreign policy have to be linked. But it should be clear that in a globalised world, national interests can best be achieved through collective action.

European foreign policy is work in progress. We all know that we can and should improve the efficiency of our decision-making and the effectiveness of our actions. But perhaps paradoxically, the Georgian crisis gives me hope. It showed that strong political will and good co-ordination between the institutions and Member States is critical. And that it can be forthcoming when we need it.

Now we need to ensure that the same conditions will be there in the future. The Treaty of Lisbon will be a central part of delivering that. A swift entry into force of that Treaty is clearly in our common interest.

Dear friends,

The world today is more complex and interconnected. Our approach of bringing together member states into collective positions which are stronger than the sum of their parts, is the only realistic response. It is in our interest to continue on this path.

Thank you very much.

## General Affairs and External Relations Council

Luxembourg, 13 October 2008

(...)

### **GEORGIA – MONITORING MISSION – MANDATE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE SOUTH CAUCASUS**

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The Council adopted a Joint Action amending the mandate of the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus, Mr Peter Semneby, to extend his coordination role in the region in relation to the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (13185/08).

On 15 September 2008, the Council adopted a Joint Action establishing an EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia ('EUMM Georgia'), with the aim of contributing to stability in Georgia and in the region. This Mission, in which some 200 observers are participating, has been active on the ground since 1 October 2008.

### **ARMS EXPORTS – REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU CODE OF CONDUCT**

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The Council noted the tenth annual report on the EU Code of Conduct on arms exports (13539/08).

The Code of Conduct provides for the annual submission to the Council of a summary report drawn up on the basis of contributions from the Member States. The report reviews the operation of the Code and incorporates any improvements which need to be made.

The Code of Conduct sets out criteria for the control of conventional arms, and a denial notification procedure requiring Member States to consult on possible undercuts. It contributes to the harmonisation of national arms export control policies.

Several third countries have also aligned themselves with the criteria and principles of the Code: the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Iceland, Montenegro and Norway.

(...)

### **EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY**

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#### **EUFOR Tchad/RCA military operation – Participation by Russia**

The Council adopted a Decision approving the conclusion of an agreement with Russia on Russia's participation in the European Union military operation in Chad and in the Central African Republic (Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA) (10806/08).

## United States – Participation in the ‘EULEX KOSOVO’ Rule of Law Mission

The Council adopted a Decision authorising the conclusion of an agreement with the United States with a view to US participation in the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX KOSOVO) (12599/08).

(...)

## GEORGIA/RUSSIA – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘1. The Council notes with satisfaction that, following the deployment by the European Union, under the Security and Defence Policy, of an independent civilian observer mission in Georgia, comprising more than 200 observers, Russian troops have withdrawn from the zones adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia as an essential additional step in the implementation of the agreements of 12 August and 8 September, which were concluded with the mediation of the European Union. With reference to the conclusions of the European Council of 1 September and its own conclusions of 15 September, the Council calls on the parties to continue to implement their commitments, including with regard to the role of UNOMIG and OSCE observers. It notes with satisfaction UN Security Council Resolution 1839, which has extended the UNOMIG mandate by four months.

2. The Council reaffirms the willingness of the European Union to take an active part, in particular through its Special Representative for the crisis in Georgia, in the international discussions provided for in the agreements of 12 August and 8 September, which are set to commence on 15 October under the auspices of the EU, the UN and the OSCE. These discussions must focus on all the remaining problems, in particular that concerning arrangements for stability and security in the region and the urgent question of displaced persons, including the question of the upper Kodori valley and the Akhlagori region. In this context, the Council reiterates its support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia.

3. The Council thanks the Commission for convening the high-level conference of donors in Brussels on 22 October, with the aim, in particular, of assisting displaced persons and restarting the Georgian economy. The European Union will contribute substantially via the contributions of the Community and those of the Member States, based on an overall needs assessment carried out by the World Bank in cooperation with the European Commission and other institutions. To strengthen relations between the European Union and Georgia, the Council is preparing to begin negotiations with Georgia in the near future on visa facilitation and readmission, and invites the Commission to continue preparatory work on the possible establishment of a deep and comprehensive free trade area, as soon as conditions permit.’

(...)

## Somalia – EU anti-piracy naval operation

Brussels, 14 October 2008

### JAVIER SOLANA SE FÉLICITE DES AVANCÉES DANS LA PRÉPARATION D'UNE OPÉRATION NAVALE DE L'UE CONTRE LA PIRATERIE

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Javier Solana, Haut Représentant de l'UE pour la Politique étrangère et de sécurité commune (PESC), se félicite des décisions prises par les États membres, au sein du Comité politique et de sécurité, concernant les travaux en vue d'une opération navale de l'Union européenne au large de la Somalie.

Il a en effet été décidé le 14 octobre d'identifier Northwood (Royaume-Uni) comme quartier général de l'opération, de proposer le vice-amiral Philip Jones, de la Royal Navy, comme futur commandant de l'opération, et de demander à ce dernier de débiter la planification opérationnelle en vue d'un lancement envisagé pour le mois de décembre.

Javier Solana est confiant dans le fait que les travaux en cours permettront, à terme, de fournir une contribution importante de l'Union à la protection des navires du Programme alimentaire mondial, à la protection de navires vulnérables transitant au large des côtes de la Somalie, ainsi qu'à la dissuasion et à la répression des actes de piraterie et de brigandage.

Le 15 septembre dernier, le Conseil a décidé de mettre en place à Bruxelles une cellule de coordination chargée de soutenir les actions de surveillance et de protection menées par certains États membres au large des côtes de la Somalie. Cette cellule (EU NAVCO) est en place. Le Conseil a en outre approuvé une option militaire stratégique portant sur une opération navale militaire de l'Union européenne et marqué son souhait que les travaux de planification en cours progressent rapidement.

La Résolution 1838 (2008) du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies du 7 octobre a salué la planification en cours d'une éventuelle opération navale militaire de l'Union européenne.

# European Council

Brussels, 15-16 October 2008

## PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS

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(...)

### Energy security

17. Security of energy supply is a priority for the European Union. It involves the responsibility and solidarity of all the Member States. To this end, taking account of the report submitted by the Presidency<sup>1</sup>, the European Council has decided to step up the work in progress, by adopting the following guidelines and requesting the Commission to submit relevant proposals or initiatives, where necessary, to:

- (a) finalise the legislative package on the internal market in electricity and gas before the end of the legislative period;
- (b) expedite the implementation of the European Energy Efficiency Action Plan and the Strategic Energy Technology Plan;
- (c) pursue with determination the diversification of energy sources, to which the measures in the energy/climate package contribute directly;
- (d) promote improvement in the working of the market, in particular through greater transparency on flows and stockpiles and through sharing information on long-term requirements and resources;
- (e) develop crisis mechanisms to deal with temporary disruptions to supplies;
- (f) strengthen and add to critical infrastructure, particularly trans-European energy transport networks and liquefied natural gas terminals. Particular attention will be paid to interconnections and to the connection of the most isolated European countries, to the interface of European networks with supply infrastructure and to the need to diversify both sources and routes. The European Council supports the Commission initiative of establishing a plan of action to speed up interconnections in the Baltic region. A schedule of work will be drawn up for this purpose before the end of the year;
- (g) develop the Union's energy relations with producer and transit countries with a view to securing stability of supply and diversifying its energy sources and supply routes. In this connection, the European Council welcomes the energy security initiatives taken by several Member States and, in particular, the meeting with the Caspian Sea countries and transit countries which will be organised by the Czech Presidency in the spring of 2009.

18. The European Council will return to this issue at its meeting in March 2009 to take stock of progress, in the light, also, of the Commission's forthcoming strategic energy review, and to adopt the necessary decisions.

(...)

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1. 14090/08.

## Follow-up to the European Council of 1 september 2008 [*see pp. 297-299 of this Chaillot Paper*]

21. The European Council notes with satisfaction that Russian troops have withdrawn from the zones adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia as an essential additional step in the implementation of the agreements of 12 August and 8 September, as well as the launching in Geneva of the international discussions provided for by those agreements. The European Council is asking the Commission and the Council to continue a full in-depth evaluation of EU-Russia relations with a view to the forthcoming summit, scheduled to take place in Nice on 14 November. It will be taken into account in the further negotiations for a new Partnership Agreement with Russia.

22. The European Union is resolved, in particular through its neighbourhood policy, to continue supporting its eastern neighbours in their efforts to achieve economic modernisation and democratisation. The European Council stresses in this respect the importance of the outcome of the EU-Ukraine Summit in Paris and calls for relations between the Union and the Republic of Moldova and Georgia to be strengthened in accordance with the Council conclusions of 13 October. It is instructing the Council to conduct an initial examination of the proposals for a future 'Eastern Partnership' of the European Union which the Commission intends to submit in November.

(...)



# EU-Canada Summit

Quebec, 17 October 2008

## 2008 CANADA-EU SUMMIT STATEMENT

We, the leaders of Canada and the European Union (EU), meeting today in Quebec City, wish to enhance our strategic partnership and build our relationship for a better future. This Summit constitutes a fundamental opportunity to highlight our shared values and to strengthen the ties that bind us as we confront major global challenges. In response to the concerns of our citizens, we seek to undertake common initiatives and advance our objectives, particularly in three priority areas: our economic partnership, energy and the environment, and international peace and security.

(...)

### Peace and security

Canada and the EU will expand their joint efforts, particularly within the United Nations framework, to foster the establishment of an international order based on effective multilateralism, international law, democracy, the rule of law and human rights.

With regard to the latest developments in **Georgia**, we reaffirm our commitment to the principles of Georgia's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and condemn Russia's decision to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Canada and the EU welcome the significant progress in the implementation of the August 12 and September 8 agreements within the agreed deadlines, particularly notably regarding the international discussions held under point 6 of the August 12 accord, which began in Geneva on October 15. Canada and EU support the October 22 donors' conference in Brussels, organized by the European Commission and World Bank, which will be an important step for the reconstruction of the country. Canada and the EU seek the path of understanding and cooperation with Russia, with the expectation that Russia will conduct itself in a responsible fashion, consistent with its broader commitments.

Canada and the EU express their willingness to cooperate closely, in coordination with the OSCE and the United Nations, to contribute to the reduction of risks in the regions where frozen conflicts persist.

Canada and the EU reaffirm their long-term commitment to stabilization and development in **Afghanistan**, in accordance with the principles set out in the final statement of the International Conference in Support of Afghanistan, which took place in Paris on June 12, 2008. On this basis, the National Development Strategy must enable the Afghan authorities gradually to take over their responsibilities, and intensify their reform efforts at the political level (respect for human rights and judicial reform) and in terms of security and the economy (agriculture, energy), and better to engage civil society in development projects in order to increase aid effectiveness. We are pleased with the good cooperation between Canada and the EU, particularly regarding the deployment of Canadian police officers as part of the EU police mission in Afghanistan. We will therefore support:

- the planning and holding of the 2009 and 2010 elections;

- ▮ the reform of the security sector, notably the police, by reinforcing the EUPOL Afghanistan mission, and the justice and corrections system consistent with commitments made during the Rome conference in July 2007;
- ▮ strengthened cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbours in the form of increased support for the implementation of the G8 Afghanistan-Pakistan Initiative agreed in Potsdam in May 2007 and reaffirmed by the G8 Coordination Arrangement in June 2008; strengthened cooperation and capacity building of Afghani and Pakistani border authorities, particularly in the context of the Dubai process.

We are deeply concerned about the proliferation risks associated with Iran's nuclear program and its failure to comply with its international obligations. We urge Iran to respect fully without delay the United Nations Security Council resolutions, and in particular to suspend all uranium enrichment activities, failing which it faces sanctions and growing isolation under the 'dual-track' approach. We call on Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA and we firmly support the efforts made to resolve the issue through negotiations.

Canada and the EU remain committed to the **Middle East Peace Process** and stand ready to assist the parties in any way possible to reach a just, lasting and comprehensive peace. We support the Quartet's Roadmap and the Annapolis process and call on the parties to fulfill their respective commitments. We condemn all acts of violence and terrorism. We remain strongly concerned by the continuation of Israeli settlement activities. We urge all parties to respect the commitments made at the Paris donors' conference in support of Palestinian reforms and the establishment of a future Palestinian state that is independent, sovereign, democratic and viable, coexisting in peace and security with the State of Israel.

In **Haiti**, Canada and the EU are working in close collaboration with the Haitian authorities to promote the modernization of judicial institutions, better access to justice, and implementation of the rule of law, all of which are essential to the country's development. To this end, we commit to consolidate democratic institutions including support for the electoral process, and we will endeavour to promote strengthened local governance. We will continue our efforts to help Haiti recover from the effects of recent hurricanes, to modernize a transportation corridor, and to complete the construction of a border post between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

As donors to and partners of the AU-UN peace mission in **Darfur** (UNAMID), Canada and the EU are working to promote peace and improve the humanitarian situation in Sudan. In this regard, we call on all parties to honour their ceasefire commitments and we reaffirm our commitment to the fight against impunity. We call on Sudan to cooperate with the International Criminal Court. We call on the Government of **Sudan** and the autonomous government in southern Sudan to implement without delay the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between north and south Sudan.

Canada and the EU deplore the ongoing violence and the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in **Somalia**. We share the same concern with regard to the resurgence of piracy along the Somali coast, and reiterate our contribution to the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions 1814 and 1816.

Cooperation in **civilian and military crisis management** is now a critical tool in our joint approach to global and regional issues. In an effort to strengthen our cooperation, we have approved a joint work program dealing with crisis management, conflict prevention and training, including:

- ▶ strengthened police cooperation in the field in Afghanistan, the Balkans and the Palestinian territories;
- ▶ and strengthened cooperation to build capacity in the areas of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and crisis management in Africa.

We will deepen our dialogue on issues related to the **responsibility to protect**, with the objective of providing greater operational scope to this concept.

**Electoral observation** is an area of close cooperation between Canada and the EU. We welcome the exchange of letters to facilitate this cooperation and to make it more effective.

We will seek to identify and implement shared responses to address the world's **food crisis** in accordance with the Millennium Development Goals.

Last, we will continue to focus our attention on the consequences of the increase in the **cost of energy and raw materials**.

## **EULEX Kosovo – Joint press statement**

**Brussels, 22 October 2008**

### **JOINT PRESS STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION ON US PARTICIPATION IN THE EULEX MISSION IN KOSOVO**

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On 22 October 2008, 'the Agreement on the Participation of the United States of America in the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo' entered into force. This is a distinctive case of the United States participating in a civilian European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission.

The European Union and the United States have a common desire to work together to support the development of Kosovo's democratic standards, in particular the strengthening of an independent and multi-ethnic rule of law system. The deployment of the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) throughout Kosovo is of benefit to all the communities in Kosovo. It is critical for international efforts to deepen rule of law in Kosovo in order to contribute to greater stability in the region. Deployment of EULEX staff is continuing apace and EULEX's initial operational capability is expected to be declared at the start of December 2008.

The negotiations were led by Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union, for the EU delegation and Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, for the U.S. delegation.

## BACKGROUND

On 16 February 2008 the EU Council decided to launch ‘EULEX KOSOVO’, a European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo. EULEX KOSOVO will become operational after a transitional period, foreseen to end in the beginning of December 2008, during which the mission is being built up to be ready to support the Kosovo authorities in their efforts to build a sustainable and functional Rule of Law system. Meanwhile the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) will continue to exercise its executive authority under UN Security Council Resolution 1244. EULEX KOSOVO will not replace UNMIK but rather support, mentor, monitor and advise the local authorities while exercising executive responsibilities in specific areas of competence.

### Mandate and objectives

The objective of EULEX KOSOVO is to support the Kosovo authorities by monitoring, mentoring and advising on all areas related to the rule of law, in particular in the police, judiciary, customs and correctional services. This means that the mission will assist the Kosovo institutions, judicial authorities and law enforcement agencies in their progress towards sustainability and accountability and in further developing and strengthening an independent multi-ethnic justice system and multi-ethnic police and customs service. The key priorities of the mission are to address immediate concerns regarding protection of minority communities, corruption and the fight against organised crime.

The mission is conceived as a joint effort with local authorities, in line with the local ownership principle, with a view to foster a self sustainable judicial and administrative system in Kosovo, based on the rule of law and European standards. However, EULEX KOSOVO will have some executive powers in the broader field of rule of law, in particular to investigate and prosecute serious and sensitive crimes.

‘EULEX KOSOVO shall assist the Kosovo institutions, judicial authorities and law enforcement agencies in their progress towards sustainability and accountability and in further developing and strengthening an independent multi-ethnic justice system and multiethnic police and customs service, ensuring that these institutions are free from political interference and adhering to internationally recognised standards and European best practices.’

Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 2008 on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO.

### Next steps

EULEX KOSOVO is currently building up the mission and is foreseen to take up operational responsibilities starting from the beginning of December 2008 and onwards. The United Nations mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) will remain fully in charge until then. Once EULEX reaches full operational capability, the mission will have around 1900 international police officers, judges, prosecutors and customs officials and approximately 1100 local staff

deployed Kosovo wide and working under the general framework of UNSCR 1244. It will be based in headquarters in Pristina and in the regions, with staff working within the judicial and police system and mobile customs teams in Kosovo in accordance with the principle of co-location.

# 14<sup>th</sup> ECOWAS-EU Ministerial Troika Meeting

Ouagadougou, 23 October 2008

## FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ

- (1) The fourteenth ministerial Troika meeting between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the European Union (EU) was held in Burkina Faso on 23 October 2008 under the Co-Chairs of Mme Minata Samate, Deputy Minister for Regional Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Cooperation of Burkina Faso and H.E. Mr. Alain Joyandet, Secretary of State in charge of Cooperation and Francophone Affairs of France.
- (2) The ECOWAS Troika further included Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas, President of the ECOWAS Commission, Mrs Nana Bema Kumi, Ambassador of Ghana to the EU, Mr. Aougui Niandou, Director of African Union, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, the Republic of Niger and Mr. Felix Pwol, Director, ECOWAS Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The EU Troika included Mr Jean de Gliniasty Director of the Africa and Indian Ocean Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France, Stefano Manservisi, General Director, the European Commission, Director Bronislava Tomasova, MFA Africa Department, Czech Republic and General Pierre-Michel Joana, Counsellor to the Secretary-General, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Council of the European Union, Said Djinnit, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in West Africa, (UNOWA) and Mr Soumaila Cissé, President of the UEOMA Commission, also attended the meeting as observers.
- (3) Both parties commended the adoption of the EU/Africa joint strategy in Lisbon and undertook to continue to strengthen their relationship in this partnership.

### A. PEACE AND SECURITY

- (4) The EU/Africa joint strategy is a historical opportunity to enhance the capacity of Africa and EU to respond appropriately to security threats and join efforts in addressing global challenges. Many actions taken in the region could be strengthened under the framework of this strategy, e.g plans for combating drugs, arms and human trafficking as well as co-operation to ensure security, peace and development in the Sahel region. Peace and security are directly connected to sustainable development.
- (5) Both parties agreed on the necessity to reinforce links between AU and ECOWAS aiming at continental integration. Its shaping and implementation will take into full account the ongoing harmonisation processes of the approaches of the African Union (AU) and the ECOWAS commissions to the full achievement of the African architecture of peace and security. In this view, one of the challenges is the EU support to the ECOWAS Training Centres. ECOWAS is seeking to establish an adequate ownership, which would be helpful for EU to provide appropriate support. ECOWAS and EU continue working in close co-operation.
- (6) Both parties exchanged views on the peace and security situation of the region. To further consolidate the efforts of ECOWAS in terms of peace keeping, the discussion focussed on the reinforcement of its regional capacities and the operationalisation of the ECOWAS standby force and on the priorities as reflected in its conflict prevention framework. The EU com-

mended ECOWAS for its progress in this area. It will enable ECOWAS inter alia to reinforce its capacities of anticipation and response to regional crisis, to contribute to the consolidation of democracies in the region and provide support for post conflict reconstruction.

(7) Turning to country specific situations in West Africa, the parties discussed the consolidation of peace and democracy in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea Bissau and the Sahel region. In a number of these countries scourges such as terrorism, organised crime, trafficking of drugs and small arms as well as human trafficking are causing growing concern and have become prominent factors for political and socio-economic instability. In this context, the parties noted the importance of the ratification of the ECOWAS convention on small arms and light weapons and expressed their hope that it will enter into force by the end of this year.

### **Côte d'Ivoire**

(8) ECOWAS and the EU commended the progress achieved in Côte d'Ivoire in respect of the implementation of the Ouagadougou Comprehensive Peace agreement of 2007. ECOWAS and the EU exchanged views on the political situation in Côte d'Ivoire. The parties reiterated their satisfaction with President Blaise Compaoré's continued engagement in the process towards peace and development.

(9) ECOWAS and the EU noted the efforts of the authorities to be able to hold free and fair elections as soon as possible. They welcomed the launching of the registration process on 15 September 2008, and encouraged the Ivorian authorities to take all the necessary steps to complete this fundamental process in the organization of free and fair elections.

(10) Notwithstanding the stable political and security situation, Côte d'Ivoire still faces serious difficulties with regard to effective disarmament and demobilisation of the militias. These are essential elements of the peace process. Both Parties encouraged the international community to consider reinforcing the support in assisting the actors in achieving tangible results.

### **Guinea**

(11) ECOWAS and the EU expressed concern with the political, social and economic situation in Guinea. The country remains fragile. The parties took note of the appointment of a new Head of Government. ECOWAS and the EU discussed the findings of the recent EU mission to Guinea according to the article 96 consultation process of the Cotonou Agreement.

(12) ECOWAS and the EU encouraged all parties in Guinea to pursue efforts for the stabilisation of the country. The parties agreed on the fact that elections are to be seen as one of the key elements in the way forward to secure a stable political and socio-economic society. In this respect, they took note of the preparations for legislative elections that are underway. However, the parties strongly emphasised the urgency of the authorities setting a firm date for the elections. They also reiterated their availability to take part in the observation of these elections but the EU underlined the need to receive an official invitation from the Guinean government and the confirmation of the date in order to initiate the preparatory work for the electoral observation missions.

(13) ECOWAS and the EU expressed furthermore concern with the fact that the drug trafficking and human trafficking are becoming increasing problems for the Guinean society. The parties, however, took note of the will of the Guinean authorities to combat drug trafficking and urged them to continue to strengthen their efforts in both areas.



(14) The parties urged the Guinean authorities to honour its previous commitment to enable the National Enquiry Commission to start its important work and extend its mandate. In the area of human rights and governance, the parties commended the Guinean authorities for the creation of the National Observatory of Human Rights in June 2008 and expressed their hope of seeing this body sufficiently equipped and funded to work independently.

## Guinea Bissau

(15) ECOWAS and the EU took note of the political developments in the country since the last troika in April 2008. They expressed hope that the legislative elections scheduled for 16 November 2008 would strengthen democratic institutions. They agreed also that the elections could be an important step to restore confidence in the political development of Guinea-Bissau.

(16) The parties commended the authorities of Guinea-Bissau on the preparations for the elections. ECOWAS expressed satisfaction with the provision of funds by the EU to cover the outstanding elections budget deficit enabling the elections to take place as scheduled.

(17) The security sector remains an essential part of the reform process. ECOWAS and the EU discussed the on-going efforts of the international community, the ESDP mission in particular, in this respect. They underlined the necessity for all stakeholders to support the reform and urged them to remain actively committed in its implementation.

(18) The parties observed that the problem of drug trafficking continues to pose a serious threat to Guinea-Bissau, even though it is no longer an exclusive problem of Guinea-Bissau but has spread to all the sub-region. It therefore demands a broader approach from the international community in general and a deeper involvement from the African Organizations in all the actions taken to help fighting it.

(19) The parties expressed concern with the current socio-economic situation, which they found fragile. Arrears in State payments and the rise in food prices, coupled with the parallel economy of drug trafficking, and the recent outbreak of cholera make the continued attention from the international community very much needed. The parties underlined that they would cooperate both on the ground and within relevant international fora to that end.

## Sahel (Security Situation in Northern Niger/Northern Mali)

(20) EU and ECOWAS shared the same analysis regarding the recent positive developments in Northern Mali. They encouraged the parties to continue their efforts in order to fully respect the current agreements. This will have a beneficial effect on the security situation in the region. They also expressed their wish to see reinforcement in the fight against the illegal trafficking in drugs and arms, as well as human trafficking.

(21) ECOWAS and the EU reaffirmed their support for the Governments of Niger and Mali in their actions to preserve the peace and territorial integrity of their respective countries. Both sides again underlined the importance of regional cooperation to ensure security, peace and development in the Sahel. In this context, ECOWAS and the EU have firmly supported the organisation of a regional conference addressing both security and development aspects, initiated by the President of Mali.

(...)

## European Defence Agency – Code of Conduct

Brussels, 24 October 2008

### EU GOVERNMENTS AGREE VOLUNTARY CODE OF CONDUCT ON OFFSETS

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The Steering Board of the European Defence Agency agreed a voluntary Code of Conduct on Offsets in order to evolve towards more transparent use of offsets that can also help shape the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, whilst reducing reliance on them.

The Code applies to all compensation practices required as a condition of purchase or resulting from a purchase of defence goods or defence services and will take effect from 1 July 2009.

The key principles underlying the Code acknowledge that in a perfectly functioning market offset would not exist. Nevertheless, today's defence market is not perfect and strongly influenced by political considerations. Moreover, offsets are a global phenomenon that is unlikely to abate in the foreseeable future. Hence, while addressing offset on the EU level, cognisance will need to be taken of global practices and effects on European industry's global competitiveness.

'This a breakthrough decision and a first step in dealing with a very complex issue, knowing that offset is not the only market distortion. We are therefore in parallel working towards the creation of market conditions and a European industry in which offsets may no longer be needed. But, considering the present structure of the European industry and that our market opening efforts are still in their beginning, we need for the short term to focus, on evolving offsets, whilst starting to mitigate the adverse impact they have on cross-border competition.' said Alexander Weis, the EDA Chief Executive.

Member States subscribing to the Code will neither require nor accept offsets exceeding the value of the procurement contract. Recognising also the need to adjust national policies to this provision, National Armament Directors agreed to defer the application of the 100% ceiling until 15 October 2010.

'Offset often represents significant additional cost to the customer, which constrains already heavily-committed defence budgets. We simply cannot afford it. By limiting offset to 100% we want to see defence acquisition budgets focused on what they should be focused on, that is equipping our Armed Forces with the military capabilities they need and not the ones with the highest offset offer.' added Alexander Weis.

The Code of Conduct on Offsets also sets out a framework for increased transparency on national offset practices and underpinning policies and for using offset to help develop industrial capabilities that are capability driven, world class competent and globally competitive. As a result, offsets will help shape the aspired EDTIB, notably by facilitating the development of globally competitive Centres of Excellence, developing depth and diversity including Small- and Medium-sized companies and avoiding unnecessary duplication.

## Annual Conference of the Institute for Security Studies of the European Union – Speech by Javier Solana

Paris, 30 October 2008

*Seul le prononcé fait foi*

Mesdames, Messieurs, chers amis,

C'est un plaisir de vous retrouver comme chaque année pour notre traditionnelle conférence.

L'année 2008 est une année particulière. Des bouleversements majeurs se sont enchaînés à un rythme très soutenu par exemple la crise en cours dans les Grand Lacs, à l'est du Congo, en est le tout dernier. Tous ont un point commun : l'ampleur de l'impact sur le système international. En même temps et parce que les défis accumulés durant la dernière décennie sont toujours là, la réponse est naturellement compliquée à définir et à mettre en œuvre.

Un monde plus complexe impose des réponses plus complexes. C'est la raison pour laquelle, je crois, les modèles théoriques réducteurs ont fait long feu. Ni « choc des civilisations », ni « fin de l'Histoire », ni « village planétaire ». Aucun dogme, aucun slogan n'a finalement résisté face à la complexité du nouveau siècle et de ses enjeux. C'est aussi la raison pour laquelle il nous faut enfin assumer que le monde est entré dans une phase de transition. Les turbulences modifient les équilibres, ce qui inévitablement provoque de nouvelles turbulences, et ainsi de suite.

Qui dit transition dit adaptation. Sans quoi le déclin est inéluctable. Ceci m'amène aux deux axes qui devraient orienter notre réflexion sur les défis du moment: comment anticiper les prochaines étapes de la transition en cours? Et comment nous y adapter au mieux de nos intérêts?

La lucidité et la flexibilité seront les clefs pour y répondre.

\* \* \*

Dear friends,

Let me start our 'tour d'horizon' with the financial crisis. It has been the emblematic event of 2008, putting all else into the background.

It is worth analysing, especially for its consequences for foreign policy. Allow me to make some observations:

First, the **diagnosis**. This crisis has confirmed that globalisation remains the dominant force shaping our world. This really is a global crisis. It has spread at incredible speed. Functionally, from sub-prime mortgages to credit markets to the real economy. And geographically from the US to Europe to emerging markets. Not everyone is affected equally; but no one is immune.

In its wake, the balance between markets, states and individuals will have to be adjusted. But globalisation itself – that is the global spread of goods, people, ideas and technology – will not stop. The crisis has highlighted globalisation's central dilemma. Today's big problems are global in nature. But the main resources and legitimacy are located at the national level. In a way, European integration is an attempt to resolve this core dilemma.

Regarding, the **policy response**, the crisis has demonstrated – once more – the need for stronger global institutions. With goodwill and creativity a lot can and has been achieved. Through ad-hoc crisis management among political leaders, central bankers and others. But if

we are honest we must admit that the existing architecture is not up to the task – neither in Europe, nor globally.

I have been convinced, for some time, and I have underlined that in different fora, that the current international system is inadequate. Now the case for deep reform has become overwhelming. This must start with the international financial institutions. But we need to go further.

From the UN and the G8 to the regimes and institutions dealing with the big issues of our time: non-proliferation, energy and climate change, migration. Hopefully, the obvious need to deepen co-operation in the area of finance will act as a catalyst for these necessary wider reforms.

In any case, this effort cannot be handed by the US plus Europe alone. Even the talk of us ‘leading’ is misleading. Apart from changing formats, the mindset needs changing too. We better not see this as the Western powers inviting the others for coffee after our discussions. We need all relevant players ‘present at the creation’ of the new system, to use Acheson’s famous phrase. And we need to be ready to engage them seriously.

What about the **consequences**?

The core answer is that the crisis is accelerating the power shift from the West to the East. This is true both in terms of material resources and ideological ‘pull’.

The bad debts are in the West, the surpluses in the East – even if the pain is everywhere. It is striking that a number of capital injections into our troubled banks are coming from Asia and the Gulf.

The rise of key countries in Asia or Latin America used to be a subject for brainstormings and mid-term planning. This crisis has reduced the lead-time. The West needs the rising powers – and hence to get used to sharing power with them.

There is more. Too often we discuss these issues in terms of integrating the new powers into the global system we devised. But we better prepare for the new powers having their own ideas on how the system must be run and reformed.

Let me also say briefly what the crisis does not mean:

It does not mean that the ‘old’ agenda has gone away.

Take climate change. It remains the biggest global challenge we face. But rather than seeing this as a potential victim of the crisis, I prefer to underline the upside. Investing in green technologies, becoming a leader on carbon capture makes sense. In terms of climate change, energy policy, anti-poverty, inflation – but also our foreign policy.

We need to change our mental map. And consider this more as an opportunity to put our economies on a low carbon footing and less as unfair costs. Other mega-issues which have not gone away and which demand creative and determined efforts are non-proliferation and international terrorism. Moreover, enduring poverty remains an affront to our shared humanity.

Let us not forget that 3 billion people, half the world’s population, live on less than €2 per day. That means waking up every day and not knowing whether you will have enough food to feed your family. Roughly the same number of people lack access to clean water and basic sanitation.

As ever, the most vulnerable will be hit hardest by both climate change and the fallout of the financial crisis. It would therefore be wrong to delay or reduce our efforts to combat poverty just because the financial crisis has erupted. The other part of the ‘old agenda’, the regional crises, is also still there. The Middle East, Iran, the Balkans and Georgia: all remain urgent.

At another level, not all the consequences of the crisis are bad. For example, oil is down from \$145 to below \$70. This is good because it helps curb inflation. But it also underlines that a strategy of using oil as a weapon has a fragile foundation. More generally, the crisis may promote more discipline and responsibility for individuals, companies and countries, forcing them to live within their means.

Let me break down this macro picture into more detailed snapshots:

Concerning the **United States**, we are on the eve of crucial elections. Europeans and Americans alike, seem keen to begin a new chapter.

I have been and remain a firm believer in the power of the US and Europe to act as a force for good around the world.

What we need to do now is formulate an agenda for action. Of course the financial crisis means there are important constraints on any new administration. Managing expectations will be key. But the imperative for tackling urgent challenges is clear.

Beginning with Israel-Palestine. The parameters of an agreement are clear – and have been for some time. It is urgent to, finally, bring this conflict to an end, through persistent engagement.

Then there is Afghanistan, with elections looming and big dilemmas facing us on the effectiveness of our efforts and how we can maintain public support.

Together with the US, we need to work out what our strategy is. How can we best support the two governments, in Afghanistan and Pakistan, achieve the levels of effectiveness, legitimacy and cross-border co-operation they need? As a second step we should work out as Europeans what additional resources we might be able to provide.

Iran is not far behind, where the case for a determined and more creative effort, building on the two-track approach, is compelling.

A new push on non-proliferation and disarmament is also needed, with the NPT review conference coming up in 2010. I very much welcome the new thinking that has emerged in the US on these issues.

In all of this, the US and Europe need to pull in the same direction. At the same time we must realise that doing so is no longer enough.

From Sudan to Lebanon, from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe and beyond: we have long agreed with the US what must happen.

What we have learned is that we need to bring other players, with their own positions, with us and define solutions together. From China to Russia, from the African Union to Arab League, from the UN to the OSCE.

Still, politically, these elections present a unique opportunity to re-launch the Transatlantic relationship. Europeans tend to discuss this in terms of what we would like to see changed. That is understandable. But we must be willing to match ‘demands’ with ‘supplies’.

Thus, the emphasis should be on how Europe can help achieve common objectives. That we are ready to assume greater responsibilities. That we bring assets to the table. If Europe wants to be heard, it has to offer more than just advice.

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Let me now turn to **Russia**. It is clear we have had a difficult summer. The conflict in Georgia brought us images of violence, destruction and refugees we hoped we would no longer witness

in Europe. I believe we can say with a straight face that the EU rose to the occasion. In particular I want to recall the work done by the French Presidency, specially President Sarkozy.

From the negotiations on a ceasefire, to the agreement on troop withdrawals, to the deployment of our monitoring mission in record time and the co-hosting of the Geneva talks. We have acted in unity, with determination and we have achieved clear results.

Of course, many things remain to be done. Of course, the wider regional implications still need to be addressed. But I am pleased with the leadership that the European Union has shown, on the diplomatic front and with people on the ground.

Concerning Russia itself, I don't want to offer a Grand Theory. My job today is to deal with the diplomacy of a complicated world. What I have learned is that being aware of context and history is useful.

We think, for good reasons, that the liberation and integration of Central and Eastern Europe was exactly that. Liberation and integration. These are the basis for a stable Europe. The Russian memories of that period are different. They feel we took advantage of their weakness in the 1990s. They now talk of re-asserting themselves; of the need of the world to show respect. Trying to understand the mindset is not the same as agreeing with it.

Russia has changed. But so has the world around it. As I said before, globalisation will remain dominant trend, throwing up multiple new problems. You all know the list. We will solve these problems better if Russia is inside the system and feels committed to it. There are few international problems that can be solved without Russia; and almost nothing against Russia. At the same time, Russia needs the rest of the world to modernise its economy. That is President Medvedev's agenda.

This need for international cooperation gives us an opening. In today's world where so much rests on trust and reputations, it is not a good sign if you have bad relations with many of your neighbours.

I believe our policy on Russia should be both principled and rational. Principled means we expect international agreements to be honoured. We count on Russia to uphold international standards and the commitments it has made voluntarily, also inside. Rational means we should control our rhetoric – also when they don't. We should bear in mind that indignation is not a policy.

Negotiating with Russia is not always easy. But experience demonstrates that hard-headed engagement delivers results. And getting results in turn helps maintaining unity.

With Russia we also share a continent. That is why we have no interest in a Russia which feels insecure. In Western Europe we learned, the hard way, that security is best based on trust rather than power. Trust is built up over time.

Of course, the Georgia conflict is a big set back. It has strengthened the fears of Russia's neighbours. But at some point we have to start again. One obvious place to re-start would be the arms control and disarmament agenda. I regret it has been neglected.

In Europe we want to see the CFE Treaty functioning properly. There is also a real need to step up joint work on securing nuclear materials. Another possibility, perhaps for a later stage, is Medvedev's plan for a European Security Treaty. The fact that this is still vague is an advantage: it means that there is something to shape.

A last word on energy. The central notion here is interdependence. Yes the European Union imports 42 percent of its gas from Russia, but all the infrastructure runs West. The concern is not that Russia will cut supplies. That would cut their revenues and destroy their reputation. It

is rather that they are investing heavily in gaining leverage including downstream and not enough in future production. Gazprom production fell this year for the first time. As everyone knows, there is a lot we can do on energy savings, connecting our grids and pooling our efforts when we negotiate with suppliers. This does require more discipline on our side.

And Yes, diversification of supply and transit routes also makes sense. This is not easy but it is about time we got serious. To this end, we need to step up our engagement with Azerbaijan and Central Asia, underlining that what Europe has to offer is broader and deeper than just energy.

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Let me turn to **China**. No matter how often it is repeated these days, China's transformation is historic. It will truly change our world. And it is all the more impressive as it's only 30 years since the end of the Cultural Revolution. Our mental map still has China as a developing and mainly rural economy. But today China has as many workers in the industrial sector as the entire OECD world put together.

China's export performance is legendary – and increasingly competitive in high-tech markets. It is attracting record investments but also investing abroad itself, moving up the value chain. It is true that China is better at assembling than innovating. But according to a recent study, it is fast approaching the US and Europe in terms of scientific publications in nano-technologies.

And we all know that China has reserves of more than \$1.8 trillion – not insignificant if others are mired in deficits and debts.

Clearly, China's transformation is far from complete. Around 500 million farmers still work on tiny plots in deep poverty. The economy needs to grow by more than 8% to avoid a rise in unemployment which could threaten social stability.

Nor is its transformation without its problems. Think of the environmental damage, the costs of social exclusion and the absence of political freedoms. It is difficult to have a first rate economy based on a weak system of the rule of law. But what China has achieved is extraordinary: 400 million people lifted out of poverty in just one decade.

From my side, two things are important.

First, that we approach China not only, or even mainly, as an economic issue. We should use a wider prism and engage China in a strategic manner. Progress on all the big issues of our time requires constructive Chinese engagement, also in the field of human rights.

Second, it is wise to remember that how countries behave when they are on top depends on the manner in which they have been approached on the way there.

Let me touch briefly on **India**. In terms of foreign policy, India is the biggest 'swing' state in the system. It is phasing out its G77 mindset but has not yet replaced this with a clear alternative. It is a very robust democracy which we should engage. But questions remain over its stance on climate change. More than China, it seems content to describe this essentially as a problem created by others. Hence, it is perhaps too cautious about the notion of common but differentiated responsibility which other developing countries support.

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Dear friends,

Let me turn to the state of **Europe**.

First, let us count our blessings. Without the euro, the financial crisis would have created chaos on currency markets. Second, let us be clear: Europe has responded well to both the financial crisis and the political crisis of Georgia.

We can draw inspiration from these achievements. But clearly, there is a lot more to do.

I like to end with some thoughts on how we should play our cards in a more complex and less 'Western' world:

If this world is moving to a system of continents, the answer from Europe should be obvious. We need a greater sense of urgency and realise that a credible European Union foreign policy is not an optional extra. I know very well the difficulties this entails. But if we continue pretty much as we are, what world will be living in? There is a risk that this will be a world shaped by and for others.

One area where Europe can and must take more initiatives is in developing new rules and institutions for a more complex and unstable world. If we don't stand up for multilateralism, who will? For us, multilateralism is 'less than a religion' but more than 'just a method'. If so, then it's up to Europe to be creative in terms of ideas and generous in terms of making space at the reformed institutions we need.

If this is a world of turbulence and opposites then we need more targeted, bespoke solutions, not 'off the shelf' strategies. In some respects, Europe's niche and added value is the very fact that it has a feel for complexity. One of the things that Europe can do is get beyond totalising theories like the war on terror and get into the differences between China and Russia, between Hamas and Hezbollah, between Iran and Syria.

Above all, we should try harder to shape the agenda, not only react. It is true that almost no international issue or problem is discussed these days without the EU present. But being present is not the same as shaping the agenda. We still spend too much time on who in Europe will say something instead of what we will do. Process is not the same as progress.

We need to think more in terms of where we want to be in 6 or 12 months time; what levers we have and what price are we prepared to pay. To achieve this kind of step-change in our foreign policy, it is obvious that we need the Lisbon Treaty. We need it for the greater coherence and leadership it will provide. There is simply no way around it.

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Mes chers amis,

« Shape and share ». « Façonner et partager. »

Ces deux simples mots pourraient utilement conduire la politique de l'Union européenne. L'Europe a en effet cette capacité unique à emmener autant qu'à partager. Elle peut contribuer à davantage de stabilité dans un monde complexe dont elle est à la fois l'origine et le résultat.

Elle a aussi et surtout cette ambition d'y protéger les plus vulnérables et d'agir contre les injustices. C'est là notre rôle d'Européens. Celui d'acteurs volontaires et responsables.

Je vous remercie.



# Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean – Ministerial conference

Marseille, 3-4 November 2008

## FINAL DECLARATION

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The Paris Summit of the ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ (Paris, 13 July 2008) injected a renewed political momentum into Euro-Mediterranean relations. In Paris, the Heads of State and Government agreed to build on and reinforce the successful elements of the Barcelona Process by upgrading their relations, incorporating more co-ownership in their multilateral cooperation framework and delivering concrete benefits for the citizens of the region. This first Summit marked an important step forward for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership while also highlighting the EU and Mediterranean partners’ unwavering commitment and common political will to make the goals of the Barcelona Declaration – the creation of an area of peace, stability, security and shared prosperity, as well as full respect of democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms and promotion of understanding between cultures and civilizations in the Euro Mediterranean region – a reality. It was decided to launch and/or to reinforce a number of key initiatives: De-pollution of the Mediterranean, Maritime and Land Highways, Civil Protection, Alternative Energies: Mediterranean Solar Plan, Higher Education and Research, Euro-Mediterranean University and the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative.

Ministers propose that as from Marseille the ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ should be called ‘Union for the Mediterranean’.

Ministers decide that the League of Arab States shall participate in all meetings at all levels of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, therefore contributing positively to the objectives of the process, namely the achievement of peace, prosperity and stability in the Mediterranean region.

Ministers reaffirm their commitment to achieve a just, comprehensive, and lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, consistent with the terms of reference of the Madrid Conference and its principles, including land for peace, and based on the relevant UNSC resolutions and the Road Map. Ministers also stress the importance of the Arab Peace Initiative and underline their support for efforts to promote progress on all tracks of the Middle East Peace Process.

Ministers stress that the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean is not intended to replace the other initiatives undertaken in the interests of the peace, stability and development of the region, but that it will contribute to their success.

Ministers welcome the positive role played by the EU in the Middle East Peace Process, notably in the framework of the Quartet. They reaffirm their commitment to support the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in order to conclude a peace treaty resolving all outstanding issues, including all core issues without exceptions, as specified in previous agreements. They welcome the commitment of both parties to engage in vigorous, ongoing and continuous negotiations making every effort to conclude a peace agreement based on the Annapolis process, as agreed in November 2007. They also encourage the parties to intensify their efforts on the path of direct dialogue and negotiation in the fulfilment of the two states solution: a safe and secure Israel, and a viable, sovereign and democratic Palestinian State, living side by side in peace and security. Final status issues have to be agreed upon by the parties.

Ministers call on both parties to respect their commitment to immediately implement their respective obligations under the performance-based Roadmap to a permanent two state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and call on the parties to refrain from any measure that might prejudice the outcome of the negotiations.

Ministers welcome and support the indirect peace talks between Israel and Syria under the auspices of Turkey and encourage all efforts deployed to achieve stability, peace and security in the region.

Ministers welcome the establishment of diplomatic relations between Syria and Lebanon.

Ministers reiterate their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, regardless of the perpetrators, and their determination to eradicate it and to combat its sponsors and reaffirm their commitment to fully implement the Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism adopted in the Barcelona Summit on 28th November 2005 in order to enhance the security of all citizens within a framework that ensures respect for the rule of law and human rights, particularly through more effective counterterrorism policies and deeper cooperation to dismantle all terrorist activities, to protect potential targets and to manage the consequences of attacks. They also reiterate the complete rejection of attempts to associate any religion, civilization or culture with terrorism and confirm their commitment to do their utmost effort with a view to resolving conflict, ending occupation, confronting oppression, reducing poverty, promoting human rights and good governance, improving intercultural understanding and ensuring respect for all religions and beliefs.

Ministers reaffirm their common aspiration to achieve peace as well as regional security according to the Barcelona Declaration of 1995, which, inter alia, promotes regional security by acting in favour of nuclear, chemical and biological non-proliferation through adherence to and compliance with a combination of international and regional non proliferation regimes and arms control and disarmament agreements such as NPT, CWC, BWC, CTBT and/or regional arrangements such as weapons-free zones, including their verification regimes, as well as by fulfilling in good faith their commitments under arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation conventions.

The parties shall pursue a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems. Furthermore the parties will consider practical steps to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as excessive accumulation of conventional arms; refrain from developing military capacity beyond their legitimate defence requirements, at the same time reaffirming their resolve to achieve the same degree of security and mutual confidence with the lowest possible levels of troops and weaponry and adherence to CCW; promote conditions likely to develop good-neighbourly relations among themselves and support processes aimed at stability, security, prosperity and regional and sub-regional cooperation; consider any confidence and security-building measures that could be taken between the parties with a view to the creation of an 'area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean', including the long term possibility of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean pact to that end.

The Ministers welcome the dedication and interest expressed by three new members of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Croatia and Montenegro, together with Albania, to add their efforts in contributing to a successful integration of the Adriatic countries in the existing and future initiatives and projects in the Euro-Mediterranean region.

## I. Institutional structures of the ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’

Euro-Mediterranean Heads of State and Government agreed in Paris on 13 July 2008 to establish new institutional structures to contribute to achieving the political goals of the initiative, especially reinforcing inclusive co-ownership, upgrading the political level of EU-Mediterranean relations and achieving visibility through projects.

On the basis of the Paris Declaration adopted by and mandate received from Heads of State and Government, Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Affairs Ministers approve the following guidelines, in line with its scope and main objectives:

### Co-presidency

1. The co-presidency shall apply to Summits, all Ministerial meetings, Senior Officials meetings, the Joint Permanent Committee and, when possible, experts/ad hoc meetings within the initiative.
2. The co-presidents will assume the co-presidency of the Partnership as a whole.
3. One of the co-presidents will be from the EU and the other from the Mediterranean partner countries.
4. From the EU side, the co-presidency must be compatible with the external representation of the European Union in accordance with the Treaty provisions in force.<sup>1</sup>
5. From the Mediterranean partners side, the co-president must be chosen by consensus for a non-renewable period of two years.
6. The two co-presidencies will call and chair the meetings of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean.<sup>2</sup> The co-presidencies will submit for approval the agenda of the meetings.
7. The co-presidencies will conduct the necessary consultations with all partners, leading to the adoption of common conclusions of Summit, Ministerial, and other meetings when required,<sup>3</sup> that shall be adopted by consensus, as well as consulting on all other issues relevant to the good functioning of the Partnership.

### Senior Officials

8. The Senior Officials are mandated to deal with all aspects of the initiative. They will take stock of and evaluate the progress of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean in all its components including issues previously handled by the Euromed Committee. Senior officials will continue to convene regularly in order to prepare the Ministerial meeting, and submit project proposals to them as well as the annual work programme for adoption.
9. The biennial Summits of Heads of State will endorse the strategic priorities of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean passed to it through Foreign Ministers. Foreign Ministers mandate Senior Officials to approve guidelines and criteria for assessing the merits of project proposals. In doing so, the Senior Officials shall be guided by a broad, comprehensive and inclusive approach to the projects, which could be mutually beneficial and aiming at the prosperity of all.

They shall also uphold the principle that every project must:

- strive to contribute to stability and peace in the whole Euro-Mediterranean region;

1. This includes the role of the Presidency and the European Commission in the external representation of the EU.

2. If a State other than the two co-presidencies hosts a meeting, it will also co-chair the meeting.

3. Without prejudice to the consultations to be carried out within the EU in accordance with the relevant Treaty provisions.

- not jeopardise the legitimate interest of any member of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean;
  - take account of the principle of variable geometry;
  - respect the decision of member countries involved in an ongoing project when it is subject to further development.
10. In drawing up the agenda of the Senior Officials meetings, the co-presidencies identify those items on which discussion is intended and items for information. Delegations may submit particular items to the co-presidencies for inclusion in the agenda.

#### **Joint Permanent Committee**

11. The Joint Permanent Committee will be based in Brussels. It will assist and prepare the meetings of the Senior Officials and ensure the appropriate follow-up. The Joint Permanent Committee will deal with issues previously handled by the Euromed Committee that do not fall under the competence of the Senior Officials. The Euromed Committee will thus be dissolved. The Joint Permanent Committee may also act as a mechanism to react rapidly if an exceptional situation arises in the region that requires the consultation of Euro-Mediterranean partners.

#### **The Secretariat**

12. The joint Secretariat will have a key role within the institutional architecture. The Secretariat will:

- Give an impulse to this process in terms of identification, follow-up, promotion of new projects and the search for funding and for implementation partners.
- Work in operational liaison with all structures of the process, particularly with the co-presidencies, including by preparing working documents for the decision-making bodies.
- Have a separate legal personality with an autonomous status.

13. The mandate of the Secretariat is of a technical nature while the political mandate related to all aspects of the initiative remains the responsibility of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Senior Officials.

14. Tasks: The Secretariat will gather, within the project priorities, regional, sub regional or transnational project initiatives (from various sources such as sectoral ministerial meetings, national or regional authorities, regional groupings, private sector, civil society). The Secretariat shall examine project initiatives and inform on their implementation to the Joint Permanent Committee and the Senior Officials after close coordination with concerned States and funding partners. Once approved, the Secretariat will work on the basis of the guidelines to be set by Senior Officials, as mentioned above.

The Summit, the Foreign Affairs Ministers Conference, the appropriate Euromed Sectoral Ministerial Meeting or the Senior Officials will instruct the Secretariat to propose the necessary follow-up in terms of initiating the promotion of the projects and the search for partners for their implementation. The funding and implementation of projects will be pursued on a case-by-case basis by the various interested partners according to their own procedures and by ad hoc sub-groups, if necessary, with the assistance of the Secretariat. The Secretariat will lead on monitoring and evaluation of projects implementation.

15. The Secretariat will inform the Joint Permanent Committee and report to the Senior Officials.

16. The statute of the Secretariat will be adopted by Senior Officials (on the basis of a proposal to be prepared by a drafting group of experts to be established for this purpose<sup>1</sup>) before the end of February 2009,<sup>2</sup> taking into account the legal system of the country in which the Secretariat will be established. It will be a lean Secretariat based on the following principles:

- a) **Composition:** The objective is to achieve a sufficiently higher level of involvement of all partners to increase co-ownership and participation. There will be one Secretary General<sup>3</sup> and five Deputy Secretaries General.<sup>4</sup> They are to be selected by consensus by Senior Officials following proposals made by Euro-Mediterranean partners and on the basis of a short list presented by the co-presidency and the Commission, following consultations to be held with all partners. Their term of office will be of 3 years. The term of office may be extended once for a maximum of three years. The Secretariat will include seconded officials from participants in the process to be appointed by the Secretary General together with the Deputy Secretaries General on the basis of competence and geographical balance.
- b) **Funding:** The running costs of the Secretariat (support staff, equipment etc) will be funded from an operating grant on a shared and balanced basis by the Euro-Mediterranean partners, on a voluntary basis and the Community budget. Funding from the Community budget will come from existing resources within the ENPI (and other relevant instruments) within the Financial Framework ceilings. The Community funding will need to follow the provisions of the Financial Regulation. The host country will provide the premises of the Secretariat free of charge. Seconded officials will be financed by their respective administrations (possibly through a trust fund). Senior Officials shall adopt the annual budget of the Secretariat upon proposal of the Secretary General and the Deputy Secretaries General (revenue and expenditure of the Secretariat including allocations of staff). Initial financial contributions shall be made available as soon as the statutes are adopted so as to allow the Secretariat to start functioning by May 2009. Funding provisions should aim at ensuring an uninterrupted and regular working of the Secretariat and reflect the EU and Mediterranean partners' co-responsibility of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean.
- c) The seat of the Secretariat will be in Barcelona. A Headquarters Agreement between the host country and the Secretariat will ensure the autonomous status of the latter, its legal personality to carry out its activities and the status, privileges and immunities of the Secretariat and its international personnel. The Headquarters Agreement shall be concluded before May 2009.

On the matter of the governance of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, Ministers decide to continue their consultations in line with the mandate given by Heads of State and Government at the Paris Summit. Ministers agree that delegations may submit their proposals to the French-Egyptian co-presidency, which undertakes to consult Heads of State and Government, notably on the modalities for the establishment of the Secretariat and the new name for the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean.

1. This drafting group will be composed as follows: host country, co-presidencies, incoming presidency, European Commission and General Secretariat of the Council, and will be open to interested countries.

2. EU position shall be agreed in advance in the relevant working group.

3. The Secretary General will be chosen among candidates from Mediterranean partner countries.

4. For the first term of office, the five Deputy Secretaries General will be from the following Euro-Mediterranean partners: Palestinian Authority, Greece, Israel, Italy, Malta. All the Euro-Mediterranean partners are eligible for these posts on a rotational basis.

### **Relations with Parliaments, local and regional authorities**

The Ministers believe that the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) reinforces the democratic legitimacy of the Partnership. They duly take note of the EMPA recommendation adopted in Jordan on the 13<sup>th</sup> October 2008. The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean requires a strong parliamentary dimension. Therefore the Ministers underline that the position of the EMPA should be further consolidated and its work better articulated with the other institutions of the Partnership.

The Ministers stress the need to promote the implementation of concrete action at local and regional level. In this respect, they commend the Forum of Local and Regional Authorities that was held on 22 and 23 June 2008 in Marseille. They also duly take note of the Committee of Regions' opinion issued on 9 October 2008 and the proposal to create a Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly. The Assembly's members would represent EU local and regional elected officials and elected officials from Mediterranean partner countries equally, similar to parliamentary representation in the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly.

The Ministers mandate the Senior Officials to consider the possibility of the involvement of the EMRLA once it is established in the Partnership.

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## **II. WORK PROGRAMME FOR 2009**

Important steps need to be taken in 2009 to implement the Barcelona Five-Year Work Programme and the declaration of the Paris Summit in order to advance the regional integration process. The following meetings are a proposed indicative list for 2009:

- the 3<sup>rd</sup> Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Water,
- the 1<sup>st</sup> Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on sustainable development-projects,
- the 6<sup>th</sup> Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Transport and Urban Development,
- the 2<sup>nd</sup> Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Higher Education & Scientific Research,
- the 6<sup>th</sup> Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Energy,
- the 4<sup>th</sup> Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on the Environment,
- the 2<sup>nd</sup> Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Strengthening the Role of Women in Society,
- the annual Euro-Mediterranean Economic Transition conference,
- the 9<sup>th</sup> FEMIP Ministerial Meeting,
- the 5<sup>th</sup> Euro-Mediterranean ECOFIN Ministerial meeting,
- the 8<sup>th</sup> Euro-Mediterranean Trade Ministerial Conference,
- the 1<sup>st</sup> Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Food Security, Agriculture and Rural Development,
- the 1<sup>st</sup> Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Justice, Liberty and Security,
- the 11<sup>th</sup> Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Foreign Affairs,
- the 1<sup>st</sup> Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Human Development.

### III. FIELDS OF COOPERATION TO BE PURSUED IN 2009

#### A. Political and security dialogue

The political and security dialogue has focused on the following areas:

- a. Regular review of the political situation in the Middle East.
- b. Implementation of the Code of Conduct on countering terrorism. The Ministers agree to build on the recommendations of previous international and regional initiatives.
- c. Deepening of the dialogue on ESDP and crisis management.
- d. At the Paris Summit, the Heads of State and Government underlined their commitment to strengthen democracy and political pluralism through expansion of participation in political life and respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms.
- e. The Ministers acknowledge that the deepening of regional dialogue on joint cooperation, best practices and exchange of experience in the area of elections has been further pursued at Senior Official level. Ministers agreed that joint cooperation and exchange of experience could be developed on a voluntary basis upon the request of any of the partners.
- f. The Ministers have highlighted the role of the regional 'Bridge Programme (2004-2008) on Prevention, Mitigation and Management of Natural and Man made Disasters' and laid the foundations for a Long-Term Programme, the Euro-Med Programme for the Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Natural and Man-made Disasters – PPRD (2008-2011).

#### B. Maritime Safety

The growing number of transit vessels, the increasing risks of accidents, the persisting terrorist threat, the rise in organised crime and illicit trafficking, especially drug trafficking, could tend to port infrastructures inefficiency and jeopardise trade flows. To enhance cooperation, the creation of a centre to coordinate the fight against drugs in the Mediterranean region could be explored.

In 2009, a forum of Mediterranean Coast Guard Services and, as appropriate, Maritime Services, could be organised. This event might represent an opportunity to exchange experiences in the fields of marine and coastal environment protection from pollution, as well as safety of navigation, maritime search and rescue and safeguard of human life at sea. Italy is prepared to host this Forum.

Ministers recommend to study the possibility to develop initiatives in the maritime domain, for instance the implementation of integrated Vessel Traffic Management systems, systems for the management of intermodal transport and sea ports, integrated systems for the management and control of environmental risks and sea pollution with the participation of all willing and able Mediterranean partners.

(...)

## European and National Parliaments – Remarks by Javier Solana

Brussels, 5 November 2008

### SUMMARY OF REMARKS BY JAVIER SOLANA TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE AND THE CHAIRS OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE COMMITTEES OF THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS

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Mr. Chairman,

Thank you for inviting me once again to address you in the European Parliament. I am happy to speak at this joint meeting of the EP Foreign Affairs Committee with the Chairs of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees of the National Parliaments.

I spoke to most of you, National Parliamentarians, in Paris in late July at the COFACC – and to you, Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, in Brussels in early September. But it is true that, at the speed with which events are taking place, two or three months can look like an eternity.

Mr Chairman,

Barack Obama will be the new President of the United States. I would like to take this opportunity to publicly congratulate him on what we can call an historic victory. President elect Obama has run on a platform of change and I think that this should be very welcome. There are many things in the world that will have to be changed. My core message to you, to the American People and to the citizens of Europe is that we have to try to do this together. Elections are always about renewal. The stakes are very high and we have to formulate a common agenda. And what is more important: to implement it together.

Much has happened in the last period of time. Not least yesterday's historic US elections, but also the global financial crisis, which is shaping the international landscape in profound ways. This is a global problem and therefore requires a global solution. The European Union has shown leadership but we have to maintain our attention focussed. The financial crisis will accelerate what has already been taking place in the world for some time, that is a shift of power from the West to the East. The financial crisis has also shown that we need stronger global institutions. Therefore we need to change the formats of these institutions and bring new powers around the table.

However, I would like to stress that these new challenges of the financial and economic crisis should not make us forget the old agenda: climate change, non-proliferation, poverty, many of the things that have been with us for sometime. They remain on the agenda and we must continue to work to find solutions for them.

Mr Chairman, let me now turn to some urgent foreign policy issues.

In recent days and weeks, we have seen dramatic events in the Democratic Republic of Congo. A real human tragedy is taking place there. Over the last years, the EU has been very much engaged in that country and has invested a lot in peace and stability in DRC, a country of great importance for the overall stability of Africa.

I have spoken to all key players and leaders looking for a solution to this crisis, including



President Kabila, President Kagame of Rwanda, the Chairman of the African Union Commission, Mr Ping, and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon.

The UN and the African Union are the key actors. The efforts that we have been undertaking recently in cooperation with the French Presidency and the summit that will take place in Nairobi next Friday are crucial. The EU stands ready to assist as best as it can: on the humanitarian front, also politically. I will see the Secretary-General of the United Nations in Sharm el-Sheik in the margins of the Quartet meeting this weekend. The EU has been working on potential actions in order to find a solution to this crisis and we will continue to be engaged.

Another point I want to raise is Somalia. Almost every day we hear about new acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia. This is the reason why the EU has decided to launch an ESDP naval operation. It will be the first naval operation under the ESDP. The operational planning is now taking place at the Operational HQ in Northwood (UK), under the authority of a British Rear Admiral. We aim to launch it in December. The operation will contribute to the implementation of UNSC resolutions 1814 and 1816, assist in deterring piracy and escort World Food Program shipping. We will cooperate closely with all actors involved in the region.

Let me stress that action against piracy cannot replace support to the political process in Somalia. The ceasefire agreed among the parties should take effect as of today. I have called on all Somalis and all countries involved and the Arab League to join this process.

Mr. Chairman,

Since I was here last time, in late September, Georgia has been very, very high on the EU agenda. As you know, we are active on the diplomatic front. We play a leading role in the Geneva talks and we hope that the next round foreseen for 18/19 November will be constructive. But, as you know, we are also present on the ground, with more than 200 monitors. Our monitoring mission deployed in record time, honouring our side of the commitments of the 8 September agreement reached in Moscow. The deployment of the EU Monitoring Mission led to the swift withdrawal of Russian forces from the ‘adjacent areas’ to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It was a very important step, allowing many internally displaced people to return.

These two elements, the political one and the one on the ground demonstrate that the EU has achieved concrete results. We will continue to push for further progress, step by step, in close coordination with our partners – particularly the UN and the OSCE. Of course, there is still a lot to be done. Maintaining unity inside the EU and commitment to our principles remains essential.

This brings me to our relations with Russia. It is clear that EU-Russia relations have been affected by the Georgian crisis. You will remember that the special European Council of September asked the Commission and the Council Secretariat to produce a review of where we stand with Russia. Our paper is factual. The recommendations will be for the Council. It will be up to the Foreign Ministers at the GAERC meeting on Monday to discuss them, as part of the preparations for the EU-Russia Summit in Nice on 14 November.

Although we are at a critical juncture with Russia, there is no alternative to a strong relationship. We need Russia as much as Russia needs the EU and that is why contacts are ongoing. I was in St. Petersburg recently at a Foreign Minister’s meeting with Russia. We had frank but open talks with Foreign Minister Lavrov.

Let me now move on to the Western Balkans. In Kosovo our top priority is the deployment of EULEX throughout the territory of Kosovo. We hope very much that our mission will be deployed by early December. As you know, we have a very intense dialogue with Belgrade,

underlining that the mission constitutes the best guarantee for the Rule of Law and the protection of the Serb community in Kosovo. We also want to see how we can get Serbia closer to the EU. Serbia is making good progress on the road to the European Union. The report released today by the European Commission says how much progress has been made. The SAA has not yet been implemented but the ideas are there and we hope now that Serbia will prove full cooperation with ICTY and that the report to be presented by the prosecutor in December will be positive.

A word about Bosnia and Herzegovina. We are concerned about the current political situation and the type of statements coming from some political leaders. Extreme nationalism is coming back. We have to be very careful about that. We want Bosnia and Herzegovina to move closer to the European Union. But let me make this point very clear: they must comply with what was agreed with us and what was agreed in Dayton. We will have a debate about Bosnia and Herzegovina next Monday. As you know the office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina may have to move into a new structure. We hope that we will have the possibility of doing so next year.

Let me also say a few words about the Middle East. There will be a Quartet ministerial meeting in Egypt next weekend. It will provide an opportunity to analyse the situation in view of the US elections and to see how we can move the process forward. We have a complex picture with elections in Israel in February and a change in the US of administration. But we do not have time to waste and I hope that the new administration will not spare a day in helping to find a solution.

Last week I visited the Gulf region and Syria. I have been in the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Syria. The economic and political context in which we are living, makes it necessary to construct deep relations with the countries of the region.

In Syria there are signs of change and signs of hope after the decisions taken by the President. We hope that this will continue and have an impact on the overall region, in particular Lebanon, where elections are to be held in 2009.

Turning to Afghanistan. The situation there is complex and difficult both in terms of security and governance. The year 2009 will be an important year. We have to work together with the US taking into consideration Pakistan. The EU is increasingly active in Afghanistan, including our police mission, EUPOL Afghanistan, with 160 additional international personnel to be deployed to reinforce the mission, starting in December. With a new Head of EUPOL and a new EUSR in total cooperation with the UN Secretary General Envoy Mr. Eide, we hope we will be able to move the process forward with our partners and the Afghans themselves.

Mr. Chairman,

I think we have many more issues that we would like to discuss together, but I think that these are the most acute problems on the table right now. As I said at the beginning we are at a very historical moment, one of hope but also one of crisis. The current economic crisis will probably last for some time. We will have to see how we will tackle this because it will also have consequences on the foreign policy agenda. We will have to work with all the important actors, the United States and other countries, as well as with international organisations. Global problems require global solutions.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for your attention.

## American elections – Javier Solana congratulates Barack Obama

Brussels, 5 November 2008

### JAVIER SOLANA CONGRATULATES BARACK OBAMA ON HIS ELECTION AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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‘I want to congratulate Barack Obama on his impressive election victory. Elections are about political renewal. The campaign has been exciting and uplifting and the turnout impressive. The sense of renewal also applies to the transatlantic relations. Europeans and Americans are keen to open a new chapter in their relations.

President-elect Obama ran on a ticket of change. This is most welcome since many things in the world today need changing. Let us do that together.

Europe is willing and able to help. There is a high number of very complex global problems: from the Middle-East to Iran and Afghanistan and Pakistan, from climate change to nonproliferation. We need to address those problems together with determination and creativity.

President-elect Obama personifies what is good and impressive about America. He also personifies today’s complex and globalized world where change is a constant. As we grapple with these problems, it is good to have someone who put change, empathy and good judgement at the heart of his campaign.

I am looking forward to working with President Obama and his administration.’

## Middle East Peace Process – Quartet Statement

Sharm El Sheikh, 9 November 2008

Representatives of the Quartet-U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union Javier Solana, European Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner, and French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner met today, and heard from Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni at their request. They were joined by Quartet Representative Tony Blair.

President Abbas and Minister Livni briefed the Quartet on Palestinian-Israeli negotiating efforts since the November 27, 2007 international conference in Annapolis, Maryland that formally launched bilateral negotiations to bring an end to the conflict by achieving the goal of two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security. The Palestinian and Israeli representatives reaffirmed their commitment, as stated in the Annapolis 'Joint Understanding,' to vigorous, ongoing and continuous negotiations in order to conclude a peace treaty resolving all outstanding issues, including all core issues, without exception, as specified in previous agreements.

The parties' representatives affirmed that, over the last year, they have engaged in direct, sustained, and intensive bilateral negotiations, based on a joint work plan that included the establishment of more than ten committees. They described how the parties have been actively engaged not only on core issues but on an array of other topics necessary to turn the two-state solution into a reality. Without minimizing the gaps and obstacles that remain, the representatives of the parties shared their assessment that the present negotiations are substantial and promising and they have succeeded in putting in place a solid negotiating structure for continued progress in the future.

President Abbas and Foreign Minister Livni stated the parties had reached a number of mutual understandings on the principles governing their negotiating process. These include:

- The need for continuous, uninterrupted, direct, bilateral negotiations;
- The principle that nothing would be considered agreed until everything is agreed;
- The need to reach a comprehensive agreement addressing all issues, as agreed at Annapolis, rather than just announce agreement on selected items in isolation.

The parties' representatives also confirmed that, as stated in the Annapolis Joint Understanding, the parties remained committed to implementation of their respective obligations under the Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and to the agreed mechanism for monitoring and judging Roadmap implementation and that, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, implementation of the future peace treaty will be subject to implementation of the Roadmap, as judged by the United States.

In addition to describing the structure of the negotiations and indicating areas in which progress has been achieved, President Abbas and Minister Livni expressed gratitude for international support provided during the last year and requested continued support from the Quartet and all members of the international community. First, they asked that the international community support the parties' sustained efforts in the framework of the Annapolis process and that it respect the agreed principles for their negotiations as described to the

Quartet. Second, they asked that all States promote an environment conducive to peace, non-violence, and the two-state solution. In this regard, they urged political and economic assistance, especially in relation to institutional and security reform, capacity building, economic development and the fulfillment of pledges, to the legitimate Palestinian government which has accepted the Quartet principles and respects the PLO commitments. They asked the international community to redouble efforts to confront and deny support for extremism, incitement, terrorism, and intolerance. Finally, the representatives stressed that, absent the joint request of the parties, third parties should not intervene in the bilateral negotiations. At the same time, they confirmed that international support and assistance will be vital once an agreement is reached, and that they intend to jointly consult members of the international community on this issue at the appropriate time.

The Quartet expressed its appreciation for the description by the parties of their joint efforts, which confirmed the seriousness of the Annapolis process and underscored the determination of the parties to reach a comprehensive agreement. The Quartet reiterated its commitment to supporting the parties' efforts, underlined its commitment to the irreversibility of the bilateral negotiations, pledged to respect the bilateral and confidential nature of the negotiations, and called on all states to adhere to these same commitments. The Quartet endorsed the goals set out by the parties and called on all states to lend their diplomatic and political support to that end, including by encouraging and recognizing progress to date.

The Quartet renewed its call on relevant states and international organizations to assist in the development of the Palestinian economy, to maximize the resources available to the Palestinian Authority, and to contribute to the Palestinian institution-building program in preparation for statehood, as decided during the Paris, Bethlehem, and Berlin Conferences. The Quartet cited Jenin as an example of the success of reforms instituted by the Palestinian government and of cooperation between the two sides, made possible in the context of the Annapolis process. The Quartet further welcomed the recent deployment of Palestinian security services in the Hebron governorate as a sign of the progress that has resulted from increased security cooperation. The Quartet emphasized its determination to continue to work with Israel and the Palestinian government to facilitate access and movement and an improvement in conditions on the ground in order to address urgent humanitarian needs, foster economic activity, and improve the atmosphere for the negotiations. The Quartet reiterated its call to the parties to fully implement their obligations under phase one of the Roadmap, including in relation to freezing settlement activity and the dismantlement of the infrastructure of terrorism.

The Quartet emphasized the importance of continuity of the peace process. The Quartet agreed that the spring of 2009 could be an appropriate time for an international meeting in Moscow.

The Quartet reaffirmed its previous statements, including the September 26, 2008, statement issued in New York. Further, welcoming the recent calls for a broader peace, the Quartet offered its support for the expansion of ongoing diplomatic efforts toward regional peace, noted the importance of the Arab Peace Initiative, and reaffirmed its commitment to a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace in the Middle East based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, 1397 and 1515.

## General Affairs and External Relations Council

Brussels, 10-11 November 2008

### EU-AFRICA PARTNERSHIP – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. The Council thanks the Commission for its communication “One year after Lisbon: the Africa-EU partnership at work”. It regards the communication as a useful contribution to the work initiated by the EU on assessing progress made one year after the Lisbon summit and identifying the main challenges to be met. It also considers that the content of the communication will contribute, along with, amongst other, contributions by the Africa-EU partnership implementation teams, to preparation of the joint progress report to be approved at the EU-Africa ministerial troika meeting in Addis Ababa on 20 and 21 November 2008.
2. The Council takes note of the priority activities proposed in the Commission working paper. It invites the European teams implementing the EU-Africa Action Plan to take them into consideration in their discussions, in particular with a view to forthcoming meetings of the joint expert groups.
3. The Council further notes the recommendations in the communication. It invites Member States to continue and intensify their efforts to implement the commitments of the Lisbon summit. It also invites them to encourage the mobilisation of African partner countries and regions with a view to implementing the eight partnerships under the EU-Africa Action Plan.’

### BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION

The Council adopted a Joint Action in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, in the framework of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (14362/08).

The European Council adopted the strategy, which contains a list of measures to combat such proliferation, in December 2003. The universalisation of the convention on the prohibition of biological and toxin weapons, and assistance to third countries with the aim of reinforcing the implementation of that convention at national level, are among those measures.

(...)

### EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

In the presence of the Ministers for Defence, the Council conducted a broad review of recent developments and projects in the area of European Security and Defence Policy. It discussed ESDP operations, the Western Balkans, Afghanistan, civilian crisis management capabilities, military capabilities and the European Defence Agency, as well as a number of Presidency initiatives.

The Council noted a number of real advances, such as:

- the adoption of a joint action on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast (EU NAVFOR Somalia – operation Atalanta);
- agreement on extending the mandate of the Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq

(EUJUST LEX) from June 2009 and also the mandate of the EUBAM Rafah Mission by a further year, until 24 November 2009;

- the endorsement of commitments by the Ministers for Defence as regards the development of military capabilities;
- progress on force projection, with work under way on helicopters and the signing by several Member States of declarations of intent on optimising the use of their airlift aircraft, on an A400M multinational unit and on a European carrier group interoperability initiative;
- the signing by five Member States of a letter of intent on the MUSIS project relating to space surveillance;
- the adoption by the Council of a statement on cooperation between the European Defence Agency (EDA) and OCCAR (Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation);
- the endorsement of commitments by the Ministers for Development as regards the development of civilian capabilities;
- the adoption of a statement on a European young officers exchange scheme, modelled on Erasmus.

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

## I. ESDP OPERATIONS AND MISSIONS

### Africa

#### The fight against piracy off the Somali coast: EU NAVCO coordination action and operation ATALANTA

##### EU NAVCO

The Council noted with satisfaction that the EU NAVCO military coordination action had been established at the General Secretariat of the Council since 19 September 2008. This measure in support of UN Security Council Resolutions 1816 and 1814 enables coordination of the protection needs of vessels chartered by the World Food Programme (WFP) and of other vulnerable vessels with the presence of Member States' and third States' naval units operating in the region. EU NAVCO has, since October 2008, made it possible to organise warship accompaniment of merchant vessels and has contributed to increasing Member States' mobilisation, including in providing continued protection for WFP chartered vessels.

##### Operation ATALANTA

The Council recalled its resolve, in support of UN Security Council Resolutions 1816, 1814 and 1838, to contribute to the improvement of maritime security off the Somali coast as part of the European Union's overall action to stabilise Somalia. Against this background, planning is continuing on a maritime operation intended to contribute to the protection of WFP vessels delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia, in accordance with the humanitarian objectives of UN Security Council Resolution 1814, to the protection of vulnerable vessels cruising off the Somali coast and to deterrence, prevention and intervention with a view to putting an end to acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1816.

The Council adopted the Joint Action on operation ATALANTA, thus confirming its decision to take action. It hoped to see operational planning and force generation move ahead rapidly and that operation ATALANTA would commence at the beginning of December 2008.

### **EUFOR Tchad/RCA**

EUFOR Tchad/RCA, deployed in a remote theatre which is difficult to access, is making a significant contribution to the security of this area of Africa, to containing regional tensions and to supporting international efforts to protect civilians hit by the Darfur regional crisis. EUFOR has patrolled very extensive areas and has lent its support to the deployment of MINURCAT. EUFOR has also implemented protection measures for humanitarian organisations, thus highlighting the European Union's essential role in facilitating access to humanitarian aid.

The EUFOR Tchad/RCA operation forms part of the multidimensional support which the European Union is providing for the region. The Council noted with satisfaction the complementary nature of the European force's action and the cooperation and development measures taken by the European Community on the ground, as well as the continuing provision of humanitarian aid. The Council particularly welcomed the Commission's implementation of the Accompanying programme for the stabilisation of eastern Chad, whose purpose is to contribute to that region's rehabilitation and reconstruction.

In the context of the mid term review of EUFOR Tchad/RCA, the Council had emphasised that an international military presence would still be needed in the region after the European force had departed to ensure that the progress achieved would be lasting. The Council welcomed the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1834, which stated the United Nations' intention that a military component of MINURCAT should take over from EUFOR. The Council expressed its hope that the United Nations would be able to expedite the preparations for an efficient transition, together with the planning and force generation, with a view to effective transfer of authority to a United Nations military operation when the EUFOR mandate expires on 15 March 2009.

The Council was pleased to note that close cooperation had been established to that end between the General Secretariat of the Council in Brussels, the Operation Headquarters at Mont Valérien and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York.

The Council welcomed the participation by three non Member States of the European Union: Albania, Croatia and Russia.

### **Democratic Republic of the Congo: EUSEC RD Congo and EUPOL RD Congo**

The Council expressed its grave concern at the serious developments which have recently occurred in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). With respect to Security Sector Reform (SSR), the Council reaffirmed the need to continue the efforts undertaken in support of the local authorities.

#### **EUSEC RD Congo**

The extension of the EUSEC RD Congo Mission by one year, until 30 June 2009, is witness to the European Union's ongoing commitment to supporting SSR in the field of defence and to the



stabilisation of the Great Lakes Region. In addition, the EUSEC RD Congo Mission has continued to provide support to the EU Special Representative.

#### **EUPOL RD Congo**

The Council supports the efforts of the EUPOL RD Congo Mission to assist with the reform of the Congolese national police and its interaction with justice. The Council took note of the planned deployment of the mission in the east of the DRC.

#### **EU SSR Guinea-Bissau**

The Council reiterated its support for the EU SSR Guinea-Bissau Mission in assisting the local authorities in the process of security sector reform with respect to police, justice and defence. The Council reaffirmed that the process was intended to contribute to promoting stability in the country and region.

#### **South Caucasus**

##### **EUMM Georgia**

The Council welcomed the rapid and effective deployment, on 1 October, of the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia). It emphasised the quality of the work done to date and the need to maintain the same level of engagement over the coming months, and reaffirmed its determination that the mission would continue fully to implement its mandate in Georgia.

#### **Western Balkans**

##### **Operation EUFOR ALTHEA**

The Council assessed operation ALTHEA and approved the recommendations made in the Secretary-General/High Representative's six-monthly report on the operation.

The Council expressed deep concern at the recent political developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, it noted that despite a difficult political situation, the security situation remained stable.

In the context of the European Union's overall commitment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Council highlighted the decisive progress made by operation ALTHEA towards accomplishing its mandate, and in particular the completion of the military and stabilisation tasks provided for by the Dayton/Paris Agreement. Accordingly, the Council considered that the preparatory work for a possible development of the operation should be continued, taking into account the future role of the EU Special Representative.

The outcome of this preparatory work will be submitted to the Council in March 2009 so that it can take a decision on the future of the operation as soon as the conditions have been met. The future development of operation ALTHEA will have to take political developments into account.

The Council noted that cooperation with NATO on operation ALTHEA was continuing to work smoothly.

**European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

The Council noted the efforts made by the EUPM to support the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina in implementing the police reform legislation adopted in April 2008 and improving coordination of the police forces and judicial system. The EUPM, the mandate of which expires in December 2009, will continue to play an important role in the stabilisation and European integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina. When the time comes, the Council will consider the prospects for the development of the mission after 2009.

**EULEX KOSOVO**

The Council welcomed the preparations made for the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX KOSOVO), including the current deployment of the mission personnel, to enable the mission to fulfil its mandate from the beginning of December 2008.

**Asia****EUPOL AFGHANISTAN**

The Council reaffirmed its determination to make a significant contribution to the reform of the Afghan national police and welcomed the actual deployment, in Kabul and in some fifteen provinces of Afghanistan, of the EUPOL Afghanistan Mission. The decision to double the number of mission personnel so that there are 400 staff members in the field will be implemented progressively from December 2008. That will enable the mission, on the basis of a renewed mandate, to reinforce its activities in support of the Afghan national police.

**Near East****EUJUST LEX**

The Council agreed to continue and strengthen the European Union's engagement in reinforcing the rule of law in Iraq and promoting human rights, including via the Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq, EUJUST LEX, by extending its mandate from June 2009. This will enable the mission to carry out, progressively and on an experimental basis, where security conditions permit, pilot activities in the area of the rule of law on Iraqi territory.

**EUPOL COPPS**

The Council took note of the current increase in the number of mission staff deployed and the continued activities by EUPOL COPPS in support of the Palestinian civilian police. The Council has begun work with a view to extending the mission mandate by two years, until 31 December 2010, without prejudice to a possible expansion of the mandate in the light of the evaluations to be carried out at the beginning of 2009.

**EUBAM Rafah**

The Council extended the mandate of the EUBAM Rafah Mission by a further year, until 24 November 2009. It pointed out that since the closure of the Rafah crossing point the mission had maintained its operational capability and that the European Union was determined and prepared to redeploy its personnel at the crossing point as soon as conditions permitted.

**Human rights and ESDP**

The Council reiterated the need to mainstream human rights issues, including children and women affected by armed conflict and gender issues, in the planning and conduct of ESDP missions. In this connection, it called for the efforts to implement UN Security Council Resolutions 1325, 1612 and 1820 to be stepped up and for increased participation by women in ESDP missions and operations. The Council also urged closer cooperation on these issues with the EU Special Representatives (EUSRs), whose mandates henceforward contain dedicated human rights provisions, and with the European Commission.

**II. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES****Civilian capabilities**

The Council endorsed the Ministerial Commitments as Regards the Development of Civilian Capabilities. It also endorsed the progress report on the implementation of the new Civilian Headline Goal 2010 and approved the guidelines for lessons learned and good practice in civilian missions.

The Council welcomed the statement that the Watchkeeping Capability and Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability had attained full operational capability in August and November 2008, respectively.

**Military capabilities (including capability projects developed in the European Defence Agency)**

The Council noted the work being carried out by the Member States in the area of military capabilities. The Council endorsed the Defence Ministers' Military Capabilities Development Commitments and called for work to continue with a view to a capabilities development declaration by the European Council.

The Council stressed that if the European Union was to match the ambitions of its security and defence policy, it was necessary resolutely to continue its efforts and strive to address the main capability shortfalls identified.

In this connection, the Council underlined the importance of the Capabilities Development Plan, which enabled Member States to orientate their capability efforts. It applauded the quality of the work of the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the European Defence Agency (EDA) on capability development.

**Force projection**

The Council noted with interest the current project to develop a European airlift fleet, the signing by 12 Member States of a Declaration of Intent on optimising the use of their airlift aircraft, and the signing by four Member States of a Declaration of Intent on an A400M multinational unit. These projects will enable the Member States concerned to improve the projection of their forces on external theatres. The projection of an airbase during the BAPEX national exercise will illustrate the deployment of an airbase intended for a European force.

The European Carrier Group Interoperability Initiative (ECGI), based on a Declaration of Intent signed by 9 Member States, will promote the interoperability of European navies and

their carrier air groups and improve the efficiency of EU and of NATO operations.

The Council emphasised the importance of work under way on improving helicopter deployment in multinational, including European Union, operations. It reaffirmed in this connection the key role played by the EDA in training pilots and upgrading helicopters. The Council noted the possibility that the Franco-German project on a future transport helicopter might be transferred to the EDA.

### **Space**

The Council was pleased to note that the European Union Satellite Centre was soon to benefit from government-source satellite images. This will enhance the Union's capability for analysis in the conduct of ESDP crisis management operations and missions.

To this end, the Council recalled the need to secure the European Union's future space observation capability. It welcomed with interest the signing of a Letter of Intent by 5 Member States on the MUSIS project and the possibility of its being transferred to the EDA. It further noted the European Space Agency's programme and the work conducted in the EDA on strengthening Europe's space surveillance capability.

### **Maritime aspect**

The Council welcomed with interest the EDA's commitment to improving Europe's maritime surveillance capability, in particular through the future surveillance Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV) project and the networking of European military maritime surveillance systems.

The Council also noted the importance of the maritime mine clearance project which will be developed by the EDA.

### **Force Protection**

The Council noted that the biological equipment development and enhancement programme would be prepared under EDA auspices in 2009.

### **Information – communications**

The Council noted the work in hand on the network-enabled capabilities project, which should facilitate European civilian military cooperation and be consistent with the work of NATO. It also noted the work in progress on establishing communications and information systems, such as the OPSWAN system, connecting Brussels, EU Operation Headquarters provided by Member States, and the agencies concerned, such as the EU Satellite Centre.

### **Rapid response**

The Council reiterated the importance of maintaining a high level of ambition with regard to rapid response. It noted the review of the European Union's rapid response concept, which is due for completion by the end of the year.

### **European multinational forces**

The Council noted the work in hand to facilitate the use of European multinational forces in ESDP operations. The Council stressed the considerable potential that multinational forces represented for the European Union's capability for external action.

## Evacuating nationals

The Council noted that consideration was being given to questions regarding the mobilisation of military assets in the framework provided by the consular lead State concept.

## European Defence Agency

The Council noted the report by the Head of the European Defence Agency and the EDA's work in support of the ESDP.

The Council noted with satisfaction the establishment of a European long term strategic framework, founded on:

- ▶ the Capabilities Development Plan, which has led to the initial identification of twelve priority actions;
- ▶ three strategies approved by the Steering Board regarding: the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB), armaments cooperation, and defence research and technology.

The Council welcomed the implementation of the strategy to strengthen the EDTIB, notably through: (i) agreement on specific measures to support small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and non traditional suppliers; (ii) adoption of a Code of Conduct on offsets, aimed at mitigating their adverse impact on competition and the EDTIB.

In addition to the advances made on practical capabilities projects (see above), the Council also welcomed the progress achieved on specific projects and initiatives, in particular the promising implementation of the Code of Conduct on defence procurement, the setting up of an EU forum for military airworthiness authorities, the intelligence training activities provisionally supported by the EDA and the signing of the arrangement for a defence research and technology Joint Investment Programme on innovative concepts and emerging technologies.

The Council noted with satisfaction the EDA's efforts to ensure that its work was complementary with the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR) and the LoI and consistent with NATO work, in compliance with the provisions of the Joint Action. The finalisation of an administrative arrangement between the EDA and OCCAR will enable the two bodies to organise their cooperation on the basis of the Statement on cooperation between the EDA and OCCAR (see Annex I).

## European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB)

The Council emphasised the need for the European Union to pursue its efforts, also within the EDA, to secure a robust and competitive EDTIB capable of meeting the Member States' capability requirements and of supporting the ESDP. In particular, further consideration should be given to the questions of reinforcing security of supply, opening up national markets and strengthening supply chains, notably through measures to encourage SMEs.

## Training

In a separate statement (see Annex II), the Council approved the launching of the European young officers exchange scheme, modelled on Erasmus. The aim is to develop exchanges

between officers in their initial training phase, in order to reinforce the ability of the European armed forces to work together and the interoperability of forces. This initiative, which will facilitate exchanges between national training colleges, will be implemented on a national and voluntary basis, with assistance from the European Security and Defence College.

The Council noted that work on the study into the outlook for the European Security and Defence College was under way.

### **Exercises**

The Council noted the successful holding of the third European Union military exercise (MILEX 08) from 19 to 27 June 2008, which demonstrated the full capability of the Rome Operation Headquarters to conduct European Union military operations. The Council also noted the satisfactory state of preparation for the crisis management exercise CME09 which would see the involvement, in an appropriate scenario, of the Operations Centre.

The Council pointed out that the forthcoming European Union crisis management exercise (CME 08), from 24 November to 5 December 2008, will involve the Mont Valérien Operation Headquarters and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability and see the simultaneous and coordinated planning of a military operation and a civilian mission engaged in the same theatre.

### **Security Sector Reform**

The Council emphasised the importance of enhancing the capability of the European Union in the area of Security Sector Reform (SSR). It approved the creation of a pool of European SSR experts, which would make it possible to set up teams deployable as needed to take part in SSR support operations in partner countries. The missions and training courses in which these experts take part will contribute to creating a community of European experts in the field of SSR.

Work on implementing this project is already under way. Member States will receive a progress report at the beginning of 2009.

### **Organisation of the European Union Military Staff (EUMS)**

The Council welcomed the statement that the European Union Watchkeeping Capability (WKC) had attained full operational capability on 1 August 2008. The WKC monitors all ESDP operations.

The Council noted the implementation of the measures which in May 2007, following the informal Ministerial meeting in Wiesbaden, it had asked the Secretary-General/High Representative to take, regarding in particular enhancing the planning abilities of the EUMS, increasing its staffing, undertaking its provisional restructuring and reviewing its terms of reference. The Council will return to this matter at its meeting in May 2009, on the basis of a report from the Secretary-General/High Representative.

### III. PARTNERSHIPS TO PROMOTE SECURITY

#### European Union – United Nations

The Council took note of the progress achieved in implementing the 2007 Joint Statement of UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management, in particular by a deepening and widening of the area of cooperation between the two organisations in the following fields: early warning; training and exercises; planning; arrangements for transition between operations; and security sector reform.

It also stressed the need for continued close coordination between the two organisations in theatres of operation in which they are jointly committed, notably in the Central African Republic, Chad, Kosovo, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau and Somalia.

#### European Union – NATO

The Council gave a reminder of the importance of good operational cooperation between the European Union and NATO in theatres in which the two organisations are jointly committed. The high-level seminar on relations between the Union and NATO, organised in Paris on 7 July 2008 in the presence of the Secretaries-General of the two organisations, confirmed the need for more far-reaching cooperation between them in the direction of mutual reinforcement of their activities.

In this context, the Council recalled the need to strengthen the strategic partnership between the European Union and NATO.

The Council reaffirmed the importance of continued cooperation between the European Union and NATO on military capabilities development matters. The EU-NATO Capability Group continued to provide a forum for exchanging information on the development of military capabilities in the European Union and in NATO where requirements overlapped (e.g. externalisation of logistic support, helicopters, radio spectrum, etc.). In this way the EU-NATO Capability Group has contributed to transparency between the two organisations in accordance with the capabilities development mechanism. Before and after each meeting Member States were briefed in detail on the items on the agenda of the Capability Group's proceedings. Henceforward Malta will attend EU NATO Capability Group meetings. The Council pointed out that the participation of all the EU Member States would facilitate exchange of information in the field of military capabilities further still.

#### European Union – African Union: reinforcing African capabilities

The Council noted the progress made in implementing the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and its Action Plan (2008-2010), adopted at the European Union-Africa Summit in Lisbon in December 2007.

The first meeting between the members of the European Union Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the members of the African Union Peace and Security Council in Brussels on 30 September 2008 was the opportunity for the African Union and the European Union to further reinforce their ties and their dialogue regarding crisis management and to discuss key questions, such as strengthening the African peace and security architecture and African peace-keeping capabilities. The meeting also provided the opportunity to reiterate the need to

advance on a number of practical matters, including the launch of the AMANI AFRICA/EURO RECAP cycle designed to support the establishment of the African Standby Force, and European Union support for African peace-keeping training centres.

The Council encouraged the holding of regular joint meetings between the members of the EU Political and Security Committee and the AU Peace and Security Council.

### **Mediterranean partners**

The Council was pleased to note the continued dialogue and cooperation between Euro-Mediterranean partners in the ESDP field, which included several partners' participation in operations and training activities.

### **Informal meeting with some key partners**

The Council noted the value of the meeting between members of the PSC, non-EUNATO members and countries that are candidates for accession (Canada, Croatia, FYROM, Iceland, Norway, Turkey and the United States) held in Brussels on 8 October 2008. That informal meeting resulted in a fruitful exchange on operational questions of mutual interest.

## **ANNEX I – STATEMENT OF THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ON COOPERATION BETWEEN THE EDA AND OCCAR**

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The Council of the European Union,

*emphasising* the need for the Member States to cooperate closely in order to produce the military and civilian capabilities required for the ESDP,

*stressing* the need for smooth coordination and for complementarity between European level armaments structures in order to ensure successful continuity between the preparation and conduct of programmes, and thereby avoid unnecessary overlapping of effort and expertise,

*recalling* in this connection the evolution of the European Defence Agency (EDA) since its establishment in 2004 and its role in developing defence capabilities, research, procurement and armaments, which has encouraged identification of new opportunities for cooperation between participating Member States,

*recalling* the expertise developed by the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR) in the management of armaments programmes,

*recalling* the Joint Action on the establishment of the European Defence Agency, including the provisions referring to working relations with OCCAR,

*stressing* the desired benefits accruing from cooperation between the EDA and OCCAR in terms of reduced administrative costs and shorter lead times between the definition of requirements and the production of the corresponding capabilities,

*1/ Invites the EDA to seek in its activities the greatest possible synergy with OCCAR in line with the following:*

- OCCAR is a favoured partner of the EDA. On a decision by the contributing Member States, where appropriate on the basis of an EDA proposal, the Agency facilitates use of OCCAR for the management of programmes resulting from its own preparatory work, in



compliance with the European Armaments Cooperation Strategy and the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) Strategy, including through the development of a genuine European market for defence equipment.

- ▀ In the interests of consistency and continuity, the EDA is involved in following up programmes which have been transferred to OCCAR management and may make recommendations on those programmes to OCCAR.

*2/ On that basis, calls on the EDA to conclude, at the earliest opportunity, an administrative arrangement with OCCAR (which was established by the Convention of 1998 and whose members are Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy and the United Kingdom) which reflects the relevant provisions of the Joint Action (Article 25 of the Joint Action on the establishment of the EDA). (...)*

## MINISTERIAL COMMITMENTS AS REGARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVILIAN CAPABILITIES

In 2008 the European Union launched, in Kosovo, the largest civilian mission conducted under the ESDP. It also successfully, and within a very short timescale, deployed a civilian monitoring mission in Georgia. The determination and readiness to act of those concerned, both European institutions and Member States, demonstrated that the European Union has the capability, in political and operational terms, to manage major crises.

In 2008 the European Union also deployed a new mission for reform of the security sector in Guinea-Bissau. It increased its personnel in Afghanistan, the Palestinian Territories and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and continued its efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Iraq.

Thanks to improved command and control structures, the Union now has ten civilian missions deployed in satisfactory conditions, in eight theatres of operation. The Ministers welcome the statement that the Watchkeeping Capability and Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability attained full operational capability in August and November 2008, respectively.

Five years after the first police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, civilian missions have thus become, like military operations, an essential tool of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in support of peace and international security. With the growing number of missions and increasing participation of our partners in these operations, the European Union is establishing itself as an acknowledged major player in crisis management.

As the number of threats and challenges to security multiplies, the Union must expect ever more calls on its assistance. We must therefore continue determinedly to improve our capability to anticipate, react, plan and execute, in order to ensure that civilian missions are put in place rapidly and effectively.

Accordingly, the Ministers have noted the work being carried out within the framework of the 2010 Headline Goal and agree to continue making qualitative improvements to their capabilities commitments for civilian missions.

The Ministers also consider that in the course of 2009 the following priority measures should be accomplished:

- ▀ strengthening the EU's capacity for planning and deploying several missions at the same time; in particular developing a model suited to rapid-reaction situations, based on the procedures for the rapid deployment of the missions in Georgia, Rafah and Aceh;

- speeding up the development of capabilities management tools, improving training for personnel who are likely to be deployed on missions and continuing to strengthen civilian response teams;
- improving the capacity of crisis management structures to give missions the necessary support for their deployment, particularly support in administrative and financial matters, logistics, and human resources management, and to that end seeking wherever possible to pool civilian and military resources;
- developing national strategies to facilitate the deployment of mission personnel and encourage exchange of good practices between Member States;
- strengthening coherence between ESDP missions and other European Union instruments;
- developing synergies with the capabilities of other players, in particular those of other international organisations, partner States and civil society organisations, while respecting the European Union's independence.

The Ministers agree to review at their November 2009 meeting the progress made in developing civilian capabilities, with particular reference to the above points.

## DEFENCE MINISTERS' MILITARY CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT COMMITMENTS

For a European capabilities and armaments policy

1. Since 2003, the European Union has conducted five military operations in the Western Balkans and in Africa and has thus played a part in stabilising these regions. In 2008, the European Union deployed in Chad and the Central African Republic the largest autonomous military operation carried out under the European security and defence policy (ESDP), and it is preparing to undertake its first maritime military operation off the coast of Somalia.

Almost ten years after it was set up, the European security and defence policy is a political and operational reality. The European Union is a recognised and sought-after player in crisis management. In order to contribute to international security, it cooperates closely with the United Nations, NATO and the African Union.

It is therefore clear that the European Union will increasingly be called upon to conduct several operations simultaneously, often far away and requiring both military and civilian assets. In order to rise to this ambition, it must strengthen its civilian and military response capabilities.

2. To this end, the Ministers for Defence have examined several projects and issues and, with varying configurations, have decided to launch a number of practical operational initiatives:

- to improve force projection in operations: modernisation of helicopters and training of their crews, in particular on the basis of a tactical training programme being drawn up by the European Defence Agency which should be ready in 2010; preparation of a blueprint for a future transport helicopter; establishment of a European airlift fleet and creation of a multinational unit of A400M aircraft; European Carrier Group Interoperability Initiative around an aircraft carrier, carrier air groups and escort vessels; projection of an airbase during a national exercise to illustrate the deployment of an airbase intended for a European force.
- to strengthen information-gathering and space-based intelligence: provision of images from the Cosmo Skymed, SAR-Lupe and Helios 2 satellites to the European Union Satellite Centre; preparation of the new generation of observation satellites (MUSIS programme); taking account of military requirements in space surveillance;



# Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers

Brussels, 10 November 2008

## SPEAKING POINTS FOR JAVIER SOLANA

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### Civilian capabilities

- ▶ The development of civilian capabilities is a success story for the EU – look at the speed with which we deployed our mission to Georgia and the recent expansion of our police mission in Palestine – EUPOL COPPS.
- ▶ Some 1 500 people are on the ground serving in nine civilian European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions, in eight theatres. The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) is now at full operational capacity.
- ▶ In today's world, civilian capabilities are as important for our security as military capabilities. Everybody responded magnificently when we were setting up the Georgia mission. But we all know that we are close to the limit of our capacity.
- ▶ I welcome the Council's agreement that each Member State will develop national programmes to recruit more deployable civilians. Foreign ministers and defence ministers have a strong interest in this. I will speak to justice and home affairs ministers myself on the 27<sup>th</sup> of this month.

### Capacités militaires

- ▶ Depuis notre dernière rencontre, de nombreuses avancées concrètes, que nous appelions tous de nos vœux, ont été réalisées. Nous avons évoqué certaines d'entre elles lors du Comité directeur de l'Agence européenne de Défense (AED) ce matin.
- ▶ Il s'agit entre autres du transport stratégique aérien, de l'amélioration de la disponibilité des hélicoptères, de l'interopérabilité aéronavale, du déminage maritime, du rapprochement de l'AED et de l'OCCAR et de l'échange de jeunes officiers.
- ▶ Ces projets se concrétisent par la signature de documents importants et par un engagement de votre part pour le développement des capacités militaires.
- ▶ Ces avancées concrètes et ces engagements nous permettront d'avancer ensemble et de produire à terme les capacités militaires qui nous font encore défaut aujourd'hui. Il nous faudra pour cela réfléchir ensemble aux méthodes nouvelles d'acquisition des capacités, dont la mutualisation, la spécialisation et l'acquisition en commun. Elles seront d'autant plus nécessaires que le contexte financier imposera une contrainte d'efficacité et de gestion de plus en plus forte sur les budgets de défense.
- ▶ Permettez-moi de saisir cette occasion pour souligner que ce n'est pas parce que nous rencontrons des difficultés pour identifier les mesures à prendre pour atteindre l'objectif que nous nous sommes fixé, que cet objectif doit être remis en question.
- ▶ Je pense en particulier aux travaux en cours sur la Réponse rapide et les Groupements tactiques dont la situation internationale nous rappelle chaque jour le besoin. Bien au contraire, il nous faut travailler ensemble aux moyens d'atteindre notre niveau d'ambition.

## EU Operations

### EU NAVFOR Somalia

- EU operational planning is under way at the EU Operation Headquarters in Northwood, under the authority of Rear Admiral Phil Jones whom we are happy to welcome amongst us. Our aim is to launch the operation in December; a Force Commander, probably afloat, will be appointed imminently. We extend our thanks to all the Member States that are contributing.
- EU NAVFOR Somalia is intended to deter piracy acts off the coast of Somalia and escort World Food Program ships under UN Security Council Resolutions 1814 and 1816.
- We intend to cooperate as closely as possible with all actors involved in the region, notably for the exchange of information, including NATO. NATO's decision to divert up to two ships from its Standing NATO Maritime Group II allows a temporary contribution to the protection of World Food Program shipping.
- EU NAVFOR Somalia is open to third countries willing and able to contribute to repressing piracy or protecting WFP shipping.

### EUFOR Tchad/RCA

- L'opération EUFOR Tchad/RCA continue d'apporter une contribution essentielle à la sécurisation de la région et, par conséquent, aux efforts de consolidation de la paix et de réconciliation ainsi qu'à l'amélioration de la situation humanitaire. Lors de la réunion informelle de Deauville, nous avons insisté sur les conditions à mettre en place pour une reprise de l'opération par les Nations unies le 15 mars 2009. Ces conditions concernaient en particulier la génération de force et le transfert des infrastructures et des équipements.
- Nous devons tout faire pour assurer le succès de cette transition et ne pas créer de vide sécuritaire à la fin du mandat d'EUFOR. Le Secrétariat du Conseil y travaille en très étroite collaboration avec le Département des opérations de maintien de la paix (DOMP).
- Nous devons poursuivre nos efforts pour faire de la transition un plein succès. Il subsiste des capacités manquantes. J'ai signé la semaine dernière l'accord avec la Russie concernant les hélicoptères. Dès la mi-novembre, les quatre hélicoptères et 90 hommes seront déployés.
- Cette relève ne constitue pas la fin de l'engagement de l'Union européenne dans la région. L'UE continue son soutien au processus de paix au Darfour et elle continue à accompagner le processus politique au Tchad.

### EUFOR ALTHEA

- The agreement reached on Saturday on several key issues for the European future of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a step in the right direction. We now expect this political agreement to be translated into concrete action through the appropriate institutions, so that the country can make real progress.
- We share the concern over the current political situation. We have no intention of prejudging the decision of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) on the future of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) – the EU will be ready when the decision comes.
- As regards Operation ALTHEA, good progress has been made towards achieving the military end-state. Military and stabilisation tasks deriving from Dayton have been accom-

plished but the political impact has to be taken into consideration.

- Further work is being carried out on options for a possible evolution towards a non-executive operation, taking into consideration the future role of the EU Special Representative. The results of that preparatory work will be presented to the Council in March 2009.
- All this work will be complementary to and coherent with other EU activity and would meet genuine Bosnia and Herzegovina requirements; the strong support of the BiH authorities is important.

### **Multinational Forces**

- Following our informal meeting in Deauville, the Council General Secretariat was invited to draw up options for facilitating the potential use of multinational forces to support ESDP operations.
- We will now conduct an analysis of the challenges and possible options for the potential use of multinational forces in ESDP operations.
- I am convinced that we need to develop a better relationship with some of these formations (e.g. the EUROCORPS and the European Gendarmerie Force). This could be in the form of information exchange, involvement in exercises, and common workshops or meetings. In the end it will lead to better preparation of and participation in these Multinational Forces in our ESDP operations.

### **Surveillance maritime**

- Le travail d'inventaire des actions en cours qui a été fait par le Secrétariat, comme vous l'avez demandé à Deauville, en étroite collaboration avec la Commission et l'Agence européenne de défense, a permis de prendre la mesure de la complexité de ce sujet et de la multiplicité des acteurs impliqués. Je me félicite de l'excellente collaboration qui a permis de mener à bien cette tâche.
- Ce papier n'est qu'une photographie des actions engagées ou planifiées. Il pourrait être suivi par une réflexion sur les synergies possibles entre les différents acteurs, afin d'améliorer leur coopération là où cela s'avérerait utile.

### **Exchange of young officers**

- As regards the European initiative for the exchange of young officers, I would like to recall what I said in Deauville. I fully support this French Presidency's initiative to explore the possibilities for improving the exchange of officers during their basic training. I consider it an important contribution to increasing the interoperability of the European armed forces and to providing full knowledge of EU instruments and EU objectives to ensure the comprehensive approach towards crisis management that we want to promote.
- With the support of the European Security and Defence College and the voluntary contributions and participation of the Member States, I hope we can reach rapid and suitable results in implementing the initiative. I am ready to provide a progress report to you as soon as possible in 2009.

## Coopération dans le domaine spatial

- ▶ Notre coopération en matière d'espace devient de plus en plus significative.
- ▶ Le Centre Satellitaire de Torrejón, en Espagne, est devenu un véritable acteur de la Politique étrangère et de sécurité commune (PESC) et de la gestion de crises. Il a été mobilisé pour toutes nos opérations récentes: Géorgie, Tchad, lutte contre la piraterie. Nous mettons ses produits à la disposition de la MONUC pour renforcer ses sources d'informations dans la crise actuelle à l'Est du Congo. Je pourrais citer maints autres exemples.
- ▶ Désormais, grâce à la signature des arrangements avec les États détenteurs d'imagerie gouvernementale, France, Italie, Belgique, Espagne, Grèce pour Hélios, Italie encore pour COSMO-SkyMed, Allemagne pour SAR-Lupe, le Centre satellitaire bénéficiera d'imagerie à haute résolution, acquise et analysée par les Européens.
- ▶ Five Member States (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Spain) signed a Letter of Intent on the second generation of space-based imaging capacity. This Multinational Space-based Imaging System for surveillance, reconnaissance and observation (MUSIS) project aims at continuity of service from 2015 onwards. The MUSIS partners intend to launch an EDA Category B project on the basis of their initiative, which will be open for other Member States' participation
- ▶ Par ailleurs, avec le Commissaire Verheugen, nous coopérons étroitement pour que le système global « Kopernikus », géré par la Commission, puisse aussi couvrir les besoins de sécurité, dans des conditions qui permettent d'assurer notamment la protection de données sensibles.

## A EUROPEAN DEFENCE RESEARCH & TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY

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### Introduction

1. According to the Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP on the establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA), the mission of EDA is to support the Council and the participating Member States (pMS) in their effort to improve the EU's defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain ESDP as it stands now and develops in the future. For this purpose, four functions and tasks are allocated to the Agency. These are the development of defence capabilities in crisis management, the promotion and enhancement of European armaments cooperation, the strengthening of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) and the enhancement of the effectiveness of European Defence Research and Technology (EDRT).
2. The establishment of an EDRT Strategy will enable the EDA to better perform its role in each of the above functions, and particularly in the enhancement of the effectiveness of EDRT. The need for a EDRT Strategy is reinforced by the following trends: growing need for research and technology in order to face new defence and security challenges, introduction of a European capability drive for research and technology programming for the development of defence equipment and systems, restructuring and cross-border ownership on the industrial supply side, and multi-lateralisation of collaborations.
3. Furthermore, the EDRT Strategy should be implemented in concert with the on-going work on the 'Capability Development Plan' (CDP) – endorsed by the EDA SB on 8 July 2008 – and the 'EDTIB Strategy' – endorsed by the EDA SB on 14 May 2007 – which have already recognised R&T collaboration as a key factor for success. The synergy between these three strategies, in addition to the 'European Armament cooperation strategy' – endorsed by the EDA SB on 15 October 2008, will enable the achievement of the main objective of improving European defence capabilities.
4. In this context, an EDRT Strategy is an ambitious guide for the different Defence R&T stakeholders (pMS, industry & research suppliers, European Commission, NATO, OCCAR, ESA, ...) in their investment. In addition to maintaining a strong link with the other strategies in the Capability, EDTIB and Armament cooperation areas, the EDRT Strategy should support the efforts of pMS to improve their investment and collaboration in R&T.

### Vision

***To enhance and develop more effective research collaboration in science, technology and demonstrators to deliver in time the right technologies in support of military capabilities for short, medium and long term needs.***

5. The EDRT Strategy covers two phases: a planning phase and an implementation phase. The 'Ends' represent the areas where R&T investment is required in order to improve European defence capabilities; the 'Means' describe the tools which may improve the efficiency and accelerate the implementation of the 'Ends'. The implementation phase of the EDRT Strategy embraces R&T collaborative projects which will deliver the 'Ends' effectively through the use of appropriate 'Means'. Roadmaps and action plans will be crucial tools to describe the 'ways' and connect the planning and the implementation phases of the EDRT Strategy.



## Strategic aim: the ‘Ends’ – Defining a list of key technologies for European Defence R&T

6. The ‘Ends’ are the technologies to which investment should be directed to serve the ambitions of pMS for improved European defence operational and industrial capabilities. The immediate questions are how to identify and accomplish these ‘Ends’? A prioritised European list of key technologies in which to invest will provide the core of the EDRT Strategy. All other objectives will contribute to the achievement of these priorities or ‘Ends’, delivering the right technologies with the performances required by the operational needs, at the right time.
7. The ‘Ends’ need to be substantiated in order to justify pMS investment. Firstly, the capability-driven approach in research and technology programming dictates that they should be linked with operational requirements. Such a link would need to be established through a translation process deriving R&T priorities from the capability priorities identified through the CDP; and to be indicated through the integrated roadmaps showing the ‘Ways’ of implementing the R&T. Other criteria also need to be considered such as the impact of technological breakthroughs on capabilities, EDTIB strengthening, less- or non-dependence on critical technologies, opportunities for collaboration, options for acquisition, etc.
8. Considering the time and effort needed to provide this level of substantiation, a preliminary European Defence key technologies exercise has provided initial R&T priorities at European level. This first guidance will now be progressively refined by the outputs of the CDP through successive translation exercises.
9. The initial list of ‘Ends’ will include both key-technologies and skills that need to be developed or preserved in Europe. However, a fully adequate DTIB is no longer sustainable on a strictly national basis and pMS need therefore to press on with developing a truly European DTIB, which is more than a sum of its national parts. On this basis, the initial list of ‘Ends’ represents a first alignment of pMS needs which should be used, together with other inputs, to guide the defence suppliers towards a better integrated European DTIB.
10. The ‘Ends’ should be accomplished through collaborative R&T projects detailed in roadmaps, with an adequate balance between capability driven research projects and more scientific and bottom-up projects to anticipate new threats and to stay aware of progress in science and technology for operational superiority. In particular, a special attention on disruptive technologies and emerging technologies must be carried out by pMS to evaluate their potential defence applications. The roadmaps should take into consideration appropriate ‘Means’ that may enable a more effective accomplishment of the ‘Ends’. These roadmaps will bridge the planning and the implementation phases of the EDRT Strategy.
11. Appropriate use of funds should be made to accomplish the ‘Ends’ taking into account projects which are currently in the pipeline and also results of previous collaborative efforts. ‘Ends’ will require the generation of R&T collaborative projects/programmes under an appropriate framework (e.g. EDA) and using appropriate tools (Cat.A, Cat.B, Joint Investment Programmes, EDA Operational Budget, etc.).

## Strategic aim: the ‘means’ – developing the right tools to achieve the ends

12. The ‘Means’ are objectives that must be pursued in terms of frameworks, mechanisms, processes and structures to help improve performance in delivering the ‘Ends’ through various

forms of collaboration – whilst also fulfilling the complementary needs for autonomy and national operational sovereignty – including co-operation with international institutions. Achieving these objectives will ensure the effective and sustainable identification and delivery of the ‘Ends’.

13. A number of ‘Means’ are necessary in order to improve collaboration in R&T and achieve the ‘Ends’ quickly and efficiently. Such ‘Means’ have been identified through an appropriate analysis and grouped into the following clusters:

- ▶ Improve integration of the defence technology and industrial base into the wider supply base: ‘Means’ within this cluster include, establishing a strategic dialogue with industry and research providers, including civil research, ensuring appropriate coordination with other R&T networks and bodies, broadening the supplier base; and promoting R&T Networks of Excellence. These ‘Means’ are aimed at maintaining the European security of supply by strengthening the competitiveness and increasing the efficiency of the EU defence industry through improvements in the R&T base.
- ▶ Promote technology push: ‘Means’ within this cluster include improving the shared R&T watch mechanism, promoting awareness of civil technologies for defence purposes and developing technology roadmaps. Such ‘Means’ are aimed at ensuring that the EU has appropriate tools in place to identify emerging and disruptive technologies that may lead to future ‘Ends’, thus ensuring that the EU remains one step-ahead of possible adversaries and on-par with industrial competitors.
- ▶ Improve the effectiveness of R&T collaboration: ‘Means’ within this cluster include encouraging a stronger pMS commitment to R&T collaboration and budget alignments, providing better management of R&T, creating an enabling environment for R&T collaboration; and accelerating new technology insertion into programmes in priority areas. These ‘Means’ are aimed at improving the speed and efficiency of delivering the ‘Ends’ whilst ensuring that the delivered ‘Ends’ will have a direct benefit for EU Defence capabilities.

### **Strategic aims: the ‘ways’ – Implementing ‘Ends’ and ‘Means’ through roadmaps and actions plans**

14. When used correctly, roadmaps can be an important tool in the transition from the technology strategy level, to the ‘make it happen’ level, organising more detailed objectives, implementing the strategic ones – both from the ‘Ends’ and the ‘Means’ areas, allowing for better application of R&T resources, as well as a closer and sustained coordination with adjacent roadmaps in the Capability, Armament and DTIB areas. Such roadmaps should clearly indicate how the R&T activities are connected to operational and industrial capabilities.

15. The implementation of the Strategy using roadmaps is best seen as a concurrent process reducing the possible investment risks. In helping to identify the possible paths to meeting strategic goals, road mapping can inform strategic choices. A good roadmap highlights the advantages and disadvantages of various possible ‘paths’, assisting the strategic level to choose between different options. It will also provide a reference for later ‘a posteriori’ evaluation of implementation phases by tracking R&T projects against the different objectives.

16. Road mapping can however be a very complex and time-consuming task and needs to be carried out by experienced personnel working within a coherent and mature organisational framework. This requirement can limit its application at a multilateral level. Moreover road-

mapping requires consensus among participants as to not only the general objectives, but also on the ways to keep future options open. Roadmaps will therefore need to be applied, on a case-by-case basis, very often in variable geometries of pMS rather than at a European level.

## Conclusion

17. The EDRT strategy, as described above, should encourage the commitment of all stakeholders (EDA, pMS, industry, academia, research centres, etc) towards the realisation of the **Vision** of this EDRT Strategy. A first step towards this goal would be the realisation of collective benchmarks and the establishment of voluntary R&T expenditure targets. Such voluntary benchmarks (in the sense that turning them into national targets is optional) were approved by the Ministerial Steering Board on the 19 November 2007:

- Defence R&T spending: 2% of total defence expenditure,
- European collaborative Defence R&T spending: 20% of Defence R&T expenditure.

18. The EDRT Strategy should enable the development of effective collaborations taking into consideration priorities from Capability (e.g. the EDA's Capability Development Plan), Armaments cooperation and EDTIB strategies whilst also influencing them. Taking into account the substantial effort required in terms of definition, agreement and implementation there is a necessity to prioritise among the strategic objectives, in both 'Ends' and 'Means' areas, in order to implement them effectively. However a fair balance between addressing short term and longer term objectives is also needed. The EDRT Strategy will therefore give rise to an incremental living process, benefiting progressively from iterative and successive developments, aimed at providing the appropriate level of scrutiny and substantiation to achieve pMS buy-in.

## **HEAD OF THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY'S REPORT TO THE COUNCIL**

In its fourth year of operation, the Agency has continued to deliver concrete results on its agenda, as by Council Guidelines of 19 November 2007. EDA has completed European strategies and has been implementing them; it has pursued and intensified the generation and establishment of ad hoc projects in order to improve participating Member States' defence capabilities and sustain the ESDP, within the minimum time required and in the most cost-effective manner.

The delivery of the initial Capability Development Plan constitutes this semester's major achievement in terms of overall impact. It will serve as the reference point for steering the Agency's and pMS' agendas regarding R&T investments, Armaments cooperation, and industrial developments.

### **1. The Agency has been busy completing and implementing the European long-term strategic framework, with the following steps:**

- a) Last July the Steering Board (SB) endorsed the initial Capability Development Plan (CDP) as a living process to identify priorities for capability development and to bring out opportunities to pool and cooperate. It is the result of an exemplary cooperation between actors involved – the Brussels based structures the Agency, the EUMC and the EUMS, and of course the participating Member States (pMS).

The initial CDP delivered useful analysis to help keep moving forward, together in the same direction. The conclusions highlight issues such as the importance of operations being supported by iterative intelligence and information, a comprehensive approach and coordinated action (e.g. civil/military actions), and the human factor.

But the CDP is not only analysis; it is also a practical tool. Therefore pMS selected a first tranche of twelve priority Actions<sup>1</sup>, and EDA has been directed to prepare together with pMS a detailed way forward for each of them in view of generating concrete collaborative initiatives. There are other important areas to consider, which are emerging from the CDP and where initiatives are well under way with EDA's involvement (such as Space and Maritime Surveillance).

The number of pMS involved differs from one project to another. We have already compiled a database of pMS' programmes, with the intention of bridging the short to longer term, and also to identify potential collaborative opportunities. From an initial look at 366 programmes (from 20 pMS) we identified 19 programmes for collaboration in areas such as Biological Warfare, Unmanned Vehicles, CBRN (Chemical Biological and Radiological Nuclear) protection for soldiers, and Maritime Mine Counter Measures. With increased facilitation and input from pMS, this has the potential to develop into real cooperative projects.

Work is in hand to develop a process to derive further tranches of actions from the CDP and present it at the SB at the beginning of next year.

In summary, the initial CDP is an important milestone which will serve as the reference point for steering the Agency's and pMS' agendas in the fields of R&T, armaments and

1. Network Enabled Capability, Increased Helicopters' availability, Counter-Improvised Explosive Device, Third Party Logistic Support, Chemical Biological-Radiological and Nuclear Defence, Medical Support, Intelligence/Surveillance/Target Acquisition/Reconnaissance Architecture, Military Human and Cultural/Language training, Comprehensive approach/military implications, Maritime Mine Counter Measures, Computer Network Operations, Counter Man Portable Air Defence Systems.

industry areas. PMS efforts to take the CDP into account when reviewing and adapting their national defence plans will be essential in that regard.

- b) The strategy adopted in 2007 to strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) is being successfully implemented in order to turn theory into practice through, notably, the following steps (endorsed by the SB):
  - adoption of a voluntary Code of Conduct on Offsets aimed at mitigating adverse impact of offsets on cross border competition and the European DTIB. This Code, which applies to all compensation practices required as a condition of purchase or resulting from a purchase of defence goods or defence services, will take effect from 1 July 2009;
  - approval of a methodology for identifying the key Future Air Systems defence related industrial capabilities to be preserved or developed in Europe. EDA will present an initial assessment next spring and propose concrete response measures in autumn 09;
  - agreement of a number of specific measures to support and encourage defence related Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) and non-traditional suppliers.
- c) In October the SB endorsed a 'European Armaments Cooperation Strategy' to promote and enhance more effective European Armaments Cooperation in support of the ESDP, through: generating, promoting and facilitating cooperative programmes to meet capability needs; ensuring the European DTIB and investment therein is capability oriented and supports future cooperative programmes; and improving the efficiency of European Armaments cooperation.
- d) The third Strategy, on European Defence Research and Technology, will hopefully be adopted by the SB in November. It is aimed at enhancing more effective research collaboration in science, technology and demonstrators in order to deliver in time the right technologies in support of military capabilities for short, medium and long term need. The strategy includes 'Ends' – i.e. identifying the key technologies to which investments should be directed in order to improve European defence capabilities, and 'Means' – i.e. developing the right tools to achieve the ends, including increasing the effectiveness of R&T collaborations. A roadmap for follow-up actions will be presented to the Steering Board in spring 2009.

Before the end of 2008 all the building blocks of the strategic framework will be in place and influence each other – and should enable, notably, the development of effective collaborations. It is therefore crucial to ensure coherence between efforts, and EDA will keep increasing and intensifying interlinks.

## 2. The Agency also progressed on implementing existing policies and developing policy/conceptual work with, notably:

- a) the positive assessment of the overall implementation of the Code of Conduct on defence procurement and, in general, the encouraging observation that subscribing Member States have adapted their procurement practices to the CoC's provisions. The volume of Government contract opportunities posted on the Agency's portal (EBB1) has steadily grown, and we are seeing signs that cross border bidding and contract awarding take place. There is however a need to increase cross-border bidding by industry which is still limited;
- b) the approval of a Conceptual Guide for the Defence Test and Evaluation Base (DTEB) to target priority areas, coordinate investments, encourage reciprocal use of facilities and create a network of Test and Evaluation capabilities;

- c) the creation, expected to take place at the November SB, of an EU-wide forum for Military Airworthiness Authorities with the associated Roadmap, in order to address the lack of a coherent approach on military airworthiness regulations within the EU. Such an initiative is expected to substantially reduce costs and time scales and increase competitiveness of the European DTIB;
- d) the delivery of the 'Draft EU Concept for Network Enabled Capabilities (NEC) in support of ESDP', produced by the Wise Pen General (Ret.) Rainer Schuwirth in consultation with relevant EU stakeholders. The draft Concept was supported by the SB, and it is now being considered by the relevant Council committees;
- e) continuous support to the GSC's project on defining CIS Information Exchange Requirements (user needs), and encouraging initial results highlighting key CIS capability gaps within the EU;
- f) the results of the Road Map on UAVs insertion in General Air Traffic successfully delivered to pMS, who also approved the first Business Case (under the Earmarked Revenue decided in 2007) on 'Frequency Allocation'.

**3. Within the strategic framework (described in section 1) which gives common direction and frames future concrete initiatives, the Agency is also focused on implementing existing cooperative programmes and preparing the launch of new projects and programmes.**

- a) EDA achieved substantial results on its two Defence R&T Joint Investments Programmes:
  - The JIP on Force Protection is well on its way, with 8 contracts signed (worth 36 million €). In particular, we are now launching three projects on: wireless robust communication for urban operations, in liaison with the Commission FP7; air defence high energy laser weapon; and advanced helmet and devices for individual protection;
  - Only five months after approval of the JIP on Innovative Concept and Emerging Technology, its Programme Arrangement is expected to be signed on 10 November in the margin of the SB.
- b) Progress has been made also on preparing the ground for setting up other projects and programmes in key areas:
  - concrete steps took place to contribute to increasing helicopters' availability for ESDP operations, notably: (i) an ad hoc Project Group on Helicopter Training was established in order, notably, to develop and implement the concept of a Helicopter Tactics Training Programme (HTP) to enhance aircrew skills. EDA is currently launching two studies and coordinating the preparation of an exercise (to take place in spring 2009), which will help shape the future Programme; (ii) on upgrading, EDA has exchanged experiences with pMS and Industry over current equipment upgrades and technical shortfalls. A detailed menu will be provided by spring 2009; (iii) lastly, looking at the longer term, we hope to be able to establish in the near future an EDA ad hoc project based on the joint initiative by Germany and France on the preparation of the Future Transport Helicopter (aimed at providing a solution for an intra-theatre lift capability in the years 2020+);
  - a Declaration of Intent is expected to be approved by a number of interested pMS on their participation in the establishment of a future European Air Transport Fleet, in order to prepare the ground towards increasing the EU's strategic transportation capabilities;

- ▶ the way ahead for the implementation of the European Industrial-based Third Party Logistic Support Platform in 2009 was endorsed with a view to starting the live Phase at the beginning of 2010;
  - ▶ EDA successfully launched and run a series of activities in the domain of Intelligence Training. The Intelligence Understanding of the Mission Environment Courses and the Open Source Intelligence Exploitation Course unveiled a broad interest. EDA will continue in 2009, but there is an need to find another European body to take over this important work from 2010;
  - ▶ preparation continued towards the launch, in 2009, of the programme preparation phase for a 3 year Biological Equipment Development and Enhancement Programme;
  - ▶ we hope to be able to establish at the November SB two ad hoc projects in the Maritime area: one to conduct the assessment phase of a 'Maritime Mine Counter Measures' (MMCM) system (one of the 12 CDP priorities); the other one on 'Maritime Tactical Unmanned Aerial System with a Joint Approach' in the context of EDA's work on Maritime Surveillance;
  - ▶ six pMS (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain) have announced their intention to bring into EDA their cooperation on a Multinational Space-based Imaging System (MUSIS) for surveillance, reconnaissance and observation. Space-based and space-related assets are increasingly needed to strengthen European military capabilities for ESDP operations – in particular with regard to communications and information-gathering. We therefore hope to be able to establish MUSIS as an EDA project in the near future;
  - ▶ lastly, the Agency has started to work on linking the Capabilities priorities arising from the CDP and the key technologies arising from the EDRT strategy so as to highlight opportunities for R&T collaborations – in other words looking for R&T projects to contribute to close key capability gaps.
4. In full respect of the Joint Action, the Agency has: (i) intensified efforts to ensure complementarity and coherence of work with NATO, OCCAR, and the LoI 'group'; and (ii) initiated informal contacts with the European Space Agency to discuss issues such as SATCOM and Space Situational Awareness in view of seeking synergies between civil and military agendas.

## CONCRETE INITIATIVES AND PROJECTS FOR IMPROVING EUROPEAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES

European Defence Ministers, meeting in the Steering Board of the European Defence Agency, launched today concrete initiatives and projects for improving European military capabilities. Decisions were taken on programmes related to air transport, maritime surveillance and helicopters, amongst others.

*'This is the concrete follow-up to the discussions which took place at the Informal EU Defence Ministers meeting in Deauville early October. We are seeing today that the Agency can very quickly translate political intentions into concrete proposals. These programmes will create tangible European capabilities and improve the capacity for crisis management operations'*, said Head of the Agency Javier Solana, who chaired the meeting.

### European Air Transport Fleet

European Defence Ministers launched today EDA work on establishing a **European Air Transport Fleet (EATF)**. A Declaration of Intent on participation in the initiative was signed by Defence Ministers of Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Spain.

The EATF aims at reducing European air transport shortfalls by pooling aircraft such as the A400M and C130. Participation can take different forms: making aircraft available; purchasing, providing or exchanging flying hours; or to provide and benefit from shared and/or pooled support functions (training, maintenance, etc.). Milestones have been set with the aim of reaching EATF initial operational capability by the next decade.

*'The EATF Declaration is most welcome, as pooling European aircraft and services will improve the lift capabilities and alleviate a significant European shortfall'*, said Alexander Weis, the Agency's Chief Executive.

### Maritime Mine Counter-Measures

The Steering Board also launched two other projects. Ten Member States (Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Sweden) plus Norway will work closely together in an EDA project for the future replacement of their **maritime mine counter-measures** capabilities in an EDA project. Activities will commence with an assessment phase, leading to recommendations for the selection of systems solutions and addressing all relevant aspects. Mine counter-measures in littoral sea areas has been identified as one of the initial 12 prioritised actions in the context of the Agency's Capability Development Plan (CDP).

### Future Unmanned Aerial System

Another project, related to Maritime Surveillance, is the launch of work for a **Future Unmanned Aerial System**. Based on common requirements, seven Member States (Finland, France, Germany, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden) will begin the preparations for the



development of an unmanned aerial system, which will be able to take off and land on a ship's deck. This future system will increase the capability for wide area surveillance in support of ESDP operations, a need which has been identified in the Capability Development Plan.

### Space-based Earth Surveillance System

Five Member States (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Spain) signed a Letter of Intent on the second generation of space-based imaging capacity. This Multinational Space-based Imaging System for surveillance, reconnaissance and observation (MUSIS) project aims at continuity of service from 2015 onwards. The MUSIS partners intend to launch an EDA Category B project on the basis on their initiative, which will be open for other Member States' participation.

### Helicopters

The Steering Board endorsed a roadmap for the Helicopter Tactics Training Programme, part of the Agency's work to improve availability of helicopters for ESDP operations. The contents of this programme will be defined in the course of 2009, based on the results of two studies – focussing on the requirements – and the lessons learned from an exercise, to take place in France in spring 2009. The Programme itself will start in 2010.

*'The Agency is quickly progressing with its helicopter work. The Helicopter Tactics Programme is proving that in some cases training can provide additional capabilities in the short-term. Improving ESDP capabilities does not always require new equipment'*, said Alexander Weis, EDA's Chief Executive.

Ministers also took stock of the progress made on the Agency's work on upgrading helicopters, with the aim to offer a detailed menu with upgrade options by spring 2009.

Germany and France informed the Steering Board of their intent to bring their bilateral initiative for a Future Transport Helicopter into the Agency in the near future, opening up the project to other interested Member States. The project aims at developing intra-theatre transport helicopter for the 2020+ timeframe.

### European Defence Research and Technology Strategy

Ministers endorsed the **European Defence Research and Technology** (EDRT) Strategy to enhance and develop more effective research collaboration to deliver timely the right technologies in support of military capabilities. The Strategy defines 'Ends' (key technologies to invest in), 'Means' (how to invest better, such as through improved R&T collaborations) and 'ways' (roadmaps and action plans). Four of the 12 priority actions of the Capability Development Plan have been chosen for identifying potential R&T projects: Counter-Man Portable Air-Defence Systems (C-MANPADS), Mine Counter-Measures, Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) and Chemical, Biological and Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) – specifically detection of biological weapons. The EDRT Strategy completes the EDA work on its strategic framework. With the CDP as the overall strategic tool this framework consists of the EDRT Strategy, the Armaments Cooperation Strategy (endorsed in October 2008) and the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base Strategy (endorsed in May 2007).

## Innovative Concepts and Emerging Technologies

Ten Member States (Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain) plus Norway signed the Programme Arrangement for the **Joint Investment Programme on Innovative Concepts and Emerging Technologies** (JIP-ICET). The Programme aims at promoting basic research cooperation, for example on an integrated navigation architecture and on nanotechnologies for soldier protection.

## Forum for Military Airworthiness Authorities

Ministers decided to create a European Union-wide **Forum for Military Airworthiness Authorities**. This Forum will be used to harmonise the different national military airworthiness regulations within the European Union in order to stop duplication of work, to reduce costs and to shorten timelines for multinational procurement.

## Work Programme

The Steering Board approved the **Agency's Work Programme for 2009**. The focus of the Work Programme is on concrete projects, in particular related to the 12 prioritised actions stemming from the Capability Development Plan. The Agency will have a 2009 budget of € 30m, including € 8m operational budget for studies, and will recruit ten new staff. The budget was adopted by the General Affairs and External Relations Council in Defence Ministers formation.

## Defence Data 2007

Ministers were informed on the results of the Agency's defence data-collecting for 2007 and on the assessment of the collective benchmarks for Defence R&T and equipment procurement. A dedicated brochure has been released.

## Piracy – Council Joint Action

Brussels, 10 November 2008

### **COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/851/CFSP ON A EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY OPERATION TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE DETERRENCE, PREVENTION AND REPRESSION OF ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY OFF THE SOMALI COAST**

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THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 14, the third subparagraph of Article 25 and Article 28(3) thereof,

Whereas:

- (1) In its Resolution 1814 (2008) on the situation in Somalia, adopted on 15 May 2008, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has called on States and regional organisations, in close coordination with one another, to take action to protect shipping involved in the transport and delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia and in activities authorised by the United Nations.
- (2) In its Resolution 1816 (2008) on the situation in Somalia, adopted on 2 June 2008, the UNSC expressed its concern at the threat that acts of piracy and armed robbery against vessels pose to the delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia, the safety of commercial maritime routes and international navigation. The UNSC encouraged, in particular, States interested in the use of commercial maritime routes off the coast of Somalia to increase and coordinate their efforts, in cooperation with the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG), to deter acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea. It authorised, for a period of six months from the date of the resolution, States cooperating with the TFG, of which advance notification had been given by the TFG to the UN Secretary-General, to enter the territorial waters of Somalia and to use, in a manner consistent with relevant international law, all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea.
- (3) In its Resolution 1838 (2008) on the situation in Somalia, adopted on 7 October 2008, the UNSC commended the ongoing planning process towards a possible European Union (EU) naval operation, as well as other international or national initiatives taken with a view to implementing Resolutions 1814 (2008) and 1816 (2008), and urged States that have the capacity to do so, to cooperate with the TFG in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea in conformity with the provisions of Resolution 1816 (2008). The UNSC also urged States and regional organisations, in conformity with the provisions of Resolution 1814 (2008), to continue to take action to protect the World Food Programme (WFP) maritime convoys, which is vital to bring humanitarian assistance to the affected populations in Somalia.
- (4) In its conclusions of 26 May 2008, the Council expressed its concern at the upsurge of piracy attacks off the Somali coast, which affect humanitarian efforts and international maritime traffic in the region and contribute to continued violations of the UN arms embargo. The Council also commended the sequenced initiatives of some Member States to provide protection to WFP vessels. It stressed the need for wider participation by the international community in these escorts in order to secure the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Somali population.

- (5) On 5 August 2008, the Council approved a crisis management concept for action by the EU to help implement UNSC Resolution 1816 (2008) and for peace and international security in the region.
- (6) On 15 September 2008, the Council reaffirmed its serious concern at the acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, deploring, in particular, their recent resurgence. As regards the EU's contribution to the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1816 (2008) on combating piracy off the Somali coast and to the protection, under Resolutions 1814 (2008) and 1816 (2008), of vessels chartered by the WFP and bound for Somalia, the Council decided to establish a coordination cell in Brussels with the task of supporting the surveillance and protection activities carried out by some Member States off the Somali coast. On the same day, it approved, on the one hand, a plan for the implementation of this military coordination action (EU NAVCO) and, on the other, a strategic military option for a possible EU naval operation for which those Member States wishing to cooperate with the TFG under Resolution 1816 (2008) would make available military resources for the deterrence and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast.
- (7) On 19 September 2008, the Council adopted Joint Action 2008/749/CFSP on the European Union military coordination action in support of UN Security Council Resolution 1816 (2008) (EU NAVCO)<sup>(1)</sup>.
- (8) On the launch of the Atalanta military operation, the tasks of the military coordination cell will be exercised under this Joint Action. The coordination cell should then be closed.
- (9) The Political and Security Committee (PSC) should exercise political control over the EU military operation in order to help deter acts of piracy off the Somali coast, provide it with strategic direction and take the relevant decisions in accordance with third subparagraph of Article 25 of the Treaty.
- (10) Under Article 28(3) of the Treaty, the operational expenditure, arising from this Joint Action, which has military or defence implications, should be borne by the Member States in accordance with Council Decision 2007/384/CFSP of 14 May 2007 establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications (Athena)<sup>(2)</sup> (hereinafter referred to as 'Athena').
- (11) Article 14(1) of the Treaty calls for Joint Actions to lay down the means to be made available to the European Union. The financial reference amount, for a twelve month period, for the common costs of the EU military operation constitutes the best current estimate and is without prejudice to the final figures to be included in a budget to be approved in accordance with the rules laid down in the decision regarding Athena.
- (12) By letter dated 30 October 2008, the EU made an offer to the TFG, pursuant to point 7 of Resolution 1816 (2008), which contains proposals for States other than Somalia to exercise jurisdiction over persons captured in Somali territorial waters who have committed, or are suspected of having committed, acts of piracy or armed robbery.
- (13) In accordance with Article 6 of the Protocol on the position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Denmark does not participate in the elaboration and implementation of decisions and actions of the European Union which have defence implications. Denmark does not participate in the implementation of this Joint Action and therefore does not participate in the financing of the operation,

(1) OJ L 252, 20.9.2008, p. 39.

(2) OJ L 152, 13.6.2007, p. 14.

## HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

### *Article 1*

#### **Mission**

1. The European Union (EU) shall conduct a military operation in support of Resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008) and 1838 (2008) of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), in a manner consistent with action permitted with respect to piracy under Article 100 et seq. of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea signed in Montego Bay on 10 December 1982 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’) and by means, in particular, of commitments made with third States, hereinafter called ‘Atalanta’ in order to contribute to:

- the protection of vessels of the WFP delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia, in accordance with the mandate laid down in UNSC Resolution 1814 (2008),
- the protection of vulnerable vessels cruising off the Somali coast, and the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, in accordance with the mandate laid down in UNSC Resolution 1816 (2008),

2. The forces deployed to that end shall operate, up to 500 nautical miles off the Somali coast and neighbouring countries, in accordance with the political objective of an EU maritime operation, as defined in the crisis management concept approved by the Council on 5 August 2008.

### *Article 2*

#### **Mandate**

Under the conditions set by the relevant international law and by UNSC Resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008) and 1838 (2008), Atalanta shall, as far as available capabilities allow:

- (a) provide protection to vessels chartered by the WFP, including by means of the presence on board those vessels of armed units of Atalanta, in particular when cruising in Somali territorial waters;
- (b) provide protection, based on a case-by-case evaluation of needs, to merchant vessels cruising in the areas where it is deployed;
- (c) keep watch over areas off the Somali coast, including Somalia’s territorial waters, in which there are dangers to maritime activities, in particular to maritime traffic;
- (d) take the necessary measures, including the use of force, to deter, prevent and intervene in order to bring to an end acts of piracy and armed robbery which may be committed in the areas where it is present;
- (e) in view of prosecutions potentially being brought by the relevant States under the conditions in Article 12, arrest, detain and transfer persons who have committed, or are suspected of having committed, acts of piracy or armed robbery in the areas where it is present and seize the vessels of the pirates or armed robbers or the vessels caught following an act of piracy or an armed robbery and which are in the hands of the pirates, as well as the goods on board;
- (f) liaise with organisations and entities, as well as States, working in the region to combat acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, in particular the ‘Combined Task Force 150’ maritime force which operates within the framework of ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’.

### *Article 3*

Appointment of the EU Operation Commander Rear admiral Phillip Jones is hereby appointed EU Operation Commander.

### *Article 4*

#### **Designation of the EU Operational Headquarters**

The EU Operational Headquarters shall be located at Northwood, United Kingdom.

### *Article 5*

#### **Planning and launch of the operation**

The Decision to launch the EU military operation shall be adopted by the Council following approval of the Operation Plan and the Rules of Engagement and in the light of the notification by the TFG to the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the offer of cooperation made by the EU pursuant to point 7 of UNSC Resolution 1816 (2008).

### *Article 6*

#### **Political control and strategic direction**

1. Under the responsibility of the Council, the Political and Security Committee (hereinafter referred to as the 'PSC') shall exercise the political control and strategic direction of the EU military operation. The Council hereby authorises the PSC to take the relevant decisions in accordance with Article 25 of the EU Treaty. This authorisation shall include the powers to amend the planning documents, including the Operation Plan, the Chain of Command and the Rules of Engagement. It shall also include the powers to take decisions on the appointment of the EU Operation Commander and/or EU Force Commander. The powers of decision with respect to the objectives and termination of the EU military operation shall remain vested in the Council, assisted by the Secretary-General/High Representative (hereinafter referred to as the 'SG/HR').

2. The PSC shall report to the Council at regular intervals.

3. The PSC shall receive reports from the chairman of the EU Military Committee (EUMC) regarding the conduct of the EU military operation, at regular intervals. The PSC may invite the EU Operation Commander and/or EU Force Commander to its meetings, as appropriate.

### *Article 7*

#### **Military direction**

1. The EUMC shall monitor the proper execution of the EU military operation conducted under the responsibility of the EU Operation Commander.

2. The EUMC shall receive reports from the EU Operation Commander at regular intervals. It may invite the EU Operation Commander and/or EU Force Commander to its meetings as appropriate.

3. The chairman of the EUMC shall act as the primary point of contact with the EU Operation Commander.

### *Article 8*

#### **Coherence of EU response**

The Presidency, the SG/HR, the EU Operation Commander and the EU Force Commander

shall closely coordinate their respective activities regarding the implementation of this Joint Action.

## *Article 9*

### **Relations with the United Nations, neighbouring countries and other actors**

1. The SG/HR, in close coordination with the Presidency, shall act as the primary point of contact with the United Nations, the Somali authorities, the authorities of neighbouring countries, and other relevant actors. Within the context of his contact with the African Union, the SG/HR shall be assisted by the EU Special Representative (EUSR) to the African Union, in close coordination with the presidency.
2. At operational level, the EU Operation Commander shall act as the contact point with, in particular, ship-owners' organisations, as well as with the relevant departments of the UN General Secretariat and the WFP.

## *Article 10*

### **Participation by third States**

1. Without prejudice to the decision-making autonomy of the EU or to the single institutional framework, and in accordance with the relevant guidelines of the European Council, third States may be invited to participate in the operation.
2. The Council hereby authorises the PSC to invite third States to offer contributions and to take the relevant decisions on acceptance of the proposed contributions, upon the recommendation of the EU Operation Commander and the EUMC.
3. Detailed modalities for the participation by third States shall be the subject of agreements concluded in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 24 of the Treaty. The SG/HR, who shall assist the Presidency, may negotiate such agreements on behalf of the Presidency. Where the EU and a third State have concluded an agreement establishing a framework for the latter's participation in EU crisis management operations, the provisions of such an agreement shall apply in the context of this operation.
4. Third States making significant military contributions to the EU military operation shall have the same rights and obligations in terms of day-to-day management of the operation as Member States taking part in the operation.
5. The Council hereby authorises the PSC to take relevant decisions on the setting-up of a Committee of Contributors, should third States provide significant military contributions.
6. The conditions for the transfer to a State participating in the operation of persons arrested and detained, with a view to the exercise of jurisdiction of that State, shall be established when the participation agreements referred to in paragraph 3 are concluded or implemented.

## *Article 11*

### **Status of EU-led forces**

The status of the EU-led forces and their personnel, including the privileges, immunities and further guarantees necessary for the fulfilment and smooth functioning of their mission, who:

- are stationed on the land territory of third States,
- operate in the territorial or internal waters of third States, shall be agreed in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 24 of the Treaty. The SG/HR, who shall assist the Presidency, may negotiate such arrangements on behalf of the Presidency.

## *Article 12*

### **Transfer of persons arrested and detained with a view to their prosecution**

1. On the basis of Somalia's acceptance of the exercise of jurisdiction by Member States or by third States, on the one hand, and Article 105 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, on the other hand, persons having committed, or suspected of having committed, acts of piracy or armed robbery in Somali territorial waters or on the high seas, who are arrested and detained, with a view to their prosecution, and property used to carry out such acts, shall be transferred:

- ▶ to the competent authorities of the flag Member State or of the third State participating in the operation, of the vessel which took them captive, or
- ▶ if this State cannot, or does not wish to, exercise its jurisdiction, to a Member States or any third State which wishes to exercise its jurisdiction over the aforementioned persons and property.

2. No persons referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 may be transferred to a third State unless the conditions for the transfer have been agreed with that third State in a manner consistent with relevant international law, notably international law on human rights, in order to guarantee in particular that no one shall be subjected to the death penalty, to torture or to any cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

## *Article 13*

### **Relations with the flag States of protected vessels**

The conditions governing the presence on board merchant ships, particularly those chartered by the WFP, of units belonging to Atalanta, including privileges, immunities and other guarantees relating to the proper conduct of the operation, shall be agreed with the flag States of those vessels.

## *Article 14*

### **Financial arrangements**

1. The common costs of the EU military operation shall be administered by Athena.
2. The financial reference amount for the common costs of the EU military operation shall be EUR 8 300 000. The percentage of the reference amount referred to in Article 33(3) of Athena shall be 30 %.

## *Article 15*

### **Release of information to the United Nations and other third parties**

1. The SG/HR is hereby authorised to release to the United Nations and to other third parties associated with this Joint Action, classified EU information and documents generated for the purposes of the EU military operation up to the level of classification appropriate for each of them and in accordance with the Council's security regulations<sup>(1)</sup>.
2. The SG/HR is hereby authorised to release to the United Nations and to other third parties associated with this Joint Action, unclassified EU documents relating to Council deliberations on the operation which are covered by the obligation of professional secrecy pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Council's Rules of Procedure<sup>(2)</sup>.

(1) Council Decision 2001/264/EC of 19 March 2001 adopting the Council's security regulations (OJ L 101, 11.4.2001, p. 1).

(2) Council Decision 2004/338/EC, Euratom of 22 March 2004 adopting the Council's Rules of Procedure (OJ L 106, 15.4.2004, p. 22).



## *Article 16*

### **Entry into force and termination**

1. This Joint Action shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
2. Joint Action 2008/749/CFSP shall be repealed as from the date of closure of the coordination cell put in place by that Joint Action. It shall be closed on the launch date of the operation referred to in Article 6 of this Joint Action.
3. The EU military operation shall terminate 12 months after the initial operating capability is declared, subject to the prolongation of UNSC Resolutions 1814 (2008) and 1816 (2008).
4. This Joint Action shall be repealed following the withdrawal of the EU force, in accordance with the plans approved for the termination of the EU military operation, and without prejudice to the relevant provisions of Athena.

## *Article 17*

### **Publication**

1. This Joint Action shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.
2. The PSC's decisions on the appointment of an EU Operation Commander and/or EU Force Commander, as well as the PSC's decisions on the acceptance of contributions from third States and the setting-up of a Committee of Contributors shall likewise be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Brussels, 10 November 2008.

*For the Council*

*The President*

B. Kouchner

## **FACTSHEET – MILITARY OPERATION OF THE EU – EU NAVFOR SOMALIA**

The European Union is getting ready to conduct a military operation in order to contribute to the deterrence, the prevention and the repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast. The Council has adopted a joint action to this end on 10 November 2008.

This military operation, called EU NAVFOR Somalia Ý operation ‘Atalanta’, will be launched in support of Resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008) and 1838 (2008) of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in order to contribute to:

- the protection of vessels of the WFP (World Food Programme) delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia;
- the protection of vulnerable vessels cruising off the Somali coast, and the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast.

This operation, which is the first EU maritime operation, will be conducted in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

### **Mandate**

The operation’s mandate will in particular include the following elements:

- provide protection to vessels chartered by the WFP, including by means of the presence on board those vessels of armed units of the operation, in particular when cruising in Somali territorial waters;
- provide protection to merchant vessels cruising in the areas where it is deployed;
- keep watch over areas off the Somali coast, including Somalia’s territorial waters, in which there are dangers to maritime activities, in particular to maritime traffic;
- take the necessary measures, including the use of force, to deter, prevent and intervene in order to bring to an end acts of piracy and armed robbery which may be committed in the areas where it is present.

### **Structures and plans**

Rear admiral Phillip Jones is appointed EU Operation Commander and the EU.

### **Operational**

Headquarters is located at Northwood, United Kingdom.

Under the responsibility of the Council, the Political and Security Committee will exercise the political control and strategic direction of the EU military operation. The operation is planned for a period of 12 months.

The estimated financial reference amount for the common costs of the operation is EUR 8,3 millions.

In view of judicial prosecutions potentially being brought by the competent States, the operation can arrest, detain and transfer persons who have committed, or are suspected of having committed, acts of piracy or armed robbery in the areas where it is present and seize the vessels of the pirates or armed robbers or the vessels caught following an act of piracy or an armed robbery and which are in the hands of the pirates, as well as the goods on board.

The operation can liaise with organisations and entities, as well as States, working in the region to combat acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast.

As a reminder, greatly preoccupied with regard to the acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, the Council established in September 2008 a coordination cell in Brussels with the task of supporting the surveillance and protection activities carried out by some Member States off the Somali coast. The activities of the EU NAVCO cell will be closed on the launch date of the EU NAVFOR military operation.

## BTWC – Council Joint Action

Brussels, 10 November 2008

### **COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/858/CFSP IN SUPPORT OF THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION (BTWC), IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU STRATEGY AGAINST THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION**

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THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 14 thereof,  
Whereas:

- (1) On 12 December 2003, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (hereinafter referred to as the EU Strategy), Chapter III of which contains a list of measures to combat such proliferation.
- (2) The European Union (EU) is actively implementing the EU Strategy and is giving effect to the measures listed in Chapter III thereof, in particular those relating to the reinforcement, implementation and universalisation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (hereinafter referred to as the BTWC).
- (3) In this regard, Council Joint Action 2006/184/CFSP of 27 February 2006 in support of the BTWC, in the framework of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction<sup>(1)</sup>, has achieved substantial results in terms of universality and national implementation, since seven more States have subsequently become States Parties to the BTWC and two States have benefited from the legal assistance provided by EU experts.
- (4) Equally, the priorities and measures set out in Council Common Position 2006/242/CFSP of 20 March 2006 relating to the 2006 Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)<sup>(2)</sup>, in particular support for the Inter-Sessional Process, national implementation, Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) and universality, continue to guide EU actions, including assistance and outreach projects. Those aspects of that Common Position which gained a consensus among the States Parties to the BTWC (hereinafter referred to as the States Parties) and which are reflected in the Final Document of the Sixth Review Conference of the BTWC (hereinafter referred to as the Sixth Review Conference), are of particular relevance for the EU's initiatives in support of the BTWC.
- (5) The EU should also help States Parties to benefit from the expertise that the Member States have acquired with regard to the confidence-building process and transparency in the framework of the BTWC, in particular through the Action Plan on biological and toxin weapons adopted by the Council on 20 March 2006, which provides for regular submission of CBM declarations by the Member States and for an update of the lists of nominated experts and laboratories available to assist in the United Nations Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigating Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons,

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(1) OJ L 65, 7.3.2006, p. 51.

(2) OJ L 88, 25.3.2006, p. 65.

## HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

### *Article 1*

1. For the purpose of the immediate and practical implementation of certain elements of the EU Strategy, and to consolidate the progress achieved in the universalisation and national implementation of the BTWC through Joint Action 2006/184/CFSP, the EU shall further support the BTWC, with the following general objectives:

- promoting the universalisation of the BTWC,
  - providing support for the implementation of the BTWC by the States Parties,
  - promoting the submission of CBM declarations by the States Parties,
  - providing support for the BTWC Inter-Sessional Process.
2. The projects to be supported by the EU shall have the following specific objectives:
- (a) providing States not yet parties to the BTWC with means to carry out such initiatives at the national or sub-regional level as will raise awareness of the BTWC, by providing legal advice concerning the ratification of and accession to the BTWC, and by offering training or other forms of assistance in order for the national authorities to be able to comply with their obligations under the BTWC;
  - (b) assisting the States Parties in the implementation of the BTWC at national level, in order to ensure that the States Parties implement their obligations under the BTWC by means of national legislation and administrative measures and establish functioning relationships between all national stakeholders, including the national legislature and the private sector;
  - (c) facilitating the regular submission of CBM declarations by the States Parties, by preparing explanatory materials relating to the CBM process and by improving the technical aspects of the electronic submission of existing CBM declarations as well as by improving the security and maintenance of a restricted website, by facilitating the establishment of national points of contact and the submission of the first CBM declarations and by organising a conference of CBM points of contact in connection with BTWC meetings in 2008 and 2009;
  - (d) promoting a focused discussion at the regional level among representatives of the government, universities, research institutes and industry on BTWC inter-sessional topics, in particular the oversight of science and education. A detailed description of the projects referred to above is set out in the Annex.

### *Article 2*

1. The Presidency, assisted by the Secretary General of the Council/High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (hereinafter referred to as the SG/HR), shall be responsible for the implementation of this Joint Action. The Commission shall be fully associated.

2. The technical implementation of the activities referred to in Article 1 shall be carried out by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (hereinafter referred to as the UNODA) in Geneva. It shall perform its task under the control of the SG/HR, assisting the Presidency. For this purpose, the SG/HR shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the UNODA.

3. The Presidency, the SG/HR and the Commission shall keep each other regularly informed concerning the implementation of this Joint Action, in accordance with their respective competences.

### **Article 3**

1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the measures referred to in Article 1(2) shall be EUR 1 400 000 to be funded from the general budget of the European Communities.
2. The expenditure financed by the amount set out in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the European Communities.
3. The Commission shall supervise the proper management of the expenditure referred to in paragraph 2, which shall take the form of a grant. For this purpose, the Commission shall conclude a financing agreement with the UNODA. The financing agreement shall provide that the UNODA is to ensure the visibility of the EU contribution, appropriate to its size.
4. The Commission shall endeavour to conclude the financing agreement referred to in paragraph 3 within three months after the entry into force of this Joint Action. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of conclusion of the financing agreement.

### **Article 4**

The Presidency, assisted by the SG/HR, shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Joint Action on the basis of regular reports prepared by the UNODA. These reports shall form the basis for the evaluation carried out by the Council. The Commission shall be fully associated. It shall report on the financial aspects of the implementation of this Joint Action.

### **Article 5**

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the day of its adoption.

It shall expire 24 months after the date of conclusion of the financing agreement referred to in Article 3(3), or six months after the date of its adoption if no financing agreement has been concluded within that period.

### **Article 6**

This Joint Action shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Brussels, 10 November 2008.

*For the Council*

*The President*

B. Kouchner

## ANNEX

### 1. General Framework

Building on the successful implementation of Joint Action 2006/184/CFSP, this Joint Action serves as an operational policy tool for carrying forward the objectives of Common Position 2006/242/CFSP and focuses in particular on those aspects on which a general consensus was reached at the Sixth Review Conference, as reflected in its Final Document.

This Joint Action will be guided by the following principles:

- (a) making best use of the experience gained through Joint Action 2006/184/CFSP;
- (b) reflecting on specific needs expressed by the States Parties as well as States not parties to the BTWC with respect to better implementation and universalisation of the BTWC;
- (c) encouraging local and regional ownership of the projects in order to ensure their long-term sustainability and to build a partnership between the EU and third parties in the framework of the BTWC;
- (d) focusing on those activities that bring concrete results and/or contribute to an early framing of common understanding relevant for the 2011 BTWC review process;
- (e) supporting the Chair of the States Parties' meetings and making best use of the mandate of the Implementing Support Unit (hereinafter referred to as the ISU) as agreed at the Sixth Review Conference.

### 2. Objective

The overall objective of this Joint Action is to support the universalisation of the BTWC, to enhance the implementation of the BTWC, including the submission of CBM declarations, and to support the best use of the Inter-Sessional Process 2007-2010 for the preparation of the next Review Conference.

The EU will, in its assistance to the BTWC, take fully into account the decisions and the recommendations adopted by the States Parties at the Sixth Review Conference held in Geneva on 20 November-8 December 2006.

### 3. Projects

#### *3.1. Project 1: Promotion of the universalisation of the BTWC*

##### **Project purpose**

To increase adherence to the BTWC and awareness of the States Parties' obligations under the BTWC either through country-focused assistance activities or through structured sub-regional initiatives, building on the experience and contacts resulting from Joint Action 2006/184/CFSP.

This project will animate the decisions made by the States Parties at the Sixth Review Conference concerning the types of universalisation activities, the exchange of information and the reporting on universalisation efforts, and the support for the Chair of States Parties' meetings in his role of coordinator for universalisation activities.

**Project results**

- (a) Increased adherence to the BTWC in all geographical regions;
- (b) Enhanced understanding of the BTWC among the relevant national authorities and/or strengthened sub-regional networking concerning the BTWC in order to promote accession to the BTWC;
- (c) Promotion of voluntary implementation of the BTWC by States prior to their accession thereto.

**Project description**

In 2006 and 2007 the EU carried out regional outreach to almost all those States which are not parties to the BTWC with the intention of encouraging the ratification of or accession to the BTWC. Seven States have subsequently adhered to the BTWC. As a next step, this project provides for an outreach to up to seven States not parties to the BTWC, either in the form of targeted country assistance or sub-regional workshops, in order to achieve the objectives and results of this project.

**Project implementation**

The Chair of the States Parties' meetings, assisted by the ISU, will be asked to inform those States which are not parties to the BTWC of the EU assistance available for the promotion of universalisation, which can take the following forms:

- (a) Country-specific or sub-regional (maximum of five countries) legal assistance related to the ratification of or accession to the BTWC. If, in a country applying for assistance, the accession to or ratification of the BTWC requires the adoption of legislative or administrative measures relating to its implementation, the legal assistance may also cover those measures;
- (b) Country-specific or sub-regional (maximum of five countries) assistance to raise awareness of and support for the BTWC among political and opinion leaders and to encourage those States which are not parties to the BTWC to take the measures necessary for the implementation of the BTWC, such as setting up of points of contact, networking among key national stakeholders, and provision of training;
- (c) Country-specific financial assistance allowing the participation of relevant national stakeholders, in particular the authorities responsible for the ratification of the BTWC, in the BTWC process (e.g. participation as observers at the experts' and/or States Parties' meetings). This type of assistance shall be provided for on a case-by-case basis and only when it can make a realistic difference for the prospects of a State acceding to the BTWC;
- (d) Financial grants for training and awareness-raising visits of relevant national stakeholders to the authorities of EU Member States responsible for the implementation of the BTWC.

This project will enable partnerships between the EU Member States and beneficiary countries to ensure continuity of the EU's universalisation efforts and to offer a permanent point of reference for the beneficiary countries throughout the process of ratification of or accession to the BTWC. The participating EU Member States may volunteer to accompany, either individually or in groups, the selected beneficiaries throughout the ratification or accession process.



### ***3.2. Project 2: Assistance to States Parties for the national implementation of the BTWC***

#### **Project purpose**

To ensure that the States Parties implement their obligations under the BTWC by means of national legislation and administrative measures and enforce them effectively, taking into account the final document of the Sixth Review Conference, the common understanding reached at the relevant meetings of the States Parties and the synthesis drawn from the discussions at the experts' and States Parties' meeting.

#### **Project results**

- (a) Adoption of appropriate legislative or administrative measures, including criminal law provisions, which encompass the full scope of the prohibitions and preventive measures provided for in the BTWC;
- (b) Effective implementation and enforcement to prevent violations of the BTWC and to impose sanctions in cases of breaches;
- (c) Better coordination and networking among all stakeholders involved in the BTWC process, including the private sector, in order to promote effective implementation.

#### **Project description**

Based on positive experience of cooperation in the area of legislative assistance relating to the implementation of the BTWC in Peru and Nigeria, the EU will continue to provide legal advice to a maximum of seven interested States Parties.

The ISU will be asked to inform the States Parties of the EU assistance available for the implementation of the BTWC, which can take the following forms:

- (a) legal advice and assistance relating to the drafting of legislative and administrative measures relevant for the implementation of any prohibitions and preventive measures provided for in the BTWC or agreed on by virtue of a common understanding;
- (b) awareness-raising workshops relating to the national implementation of the BTWC and the enforcement of national measures, which may target:
  - the decision-making authorities and national legislatures in order to facilitate political consensus on this issue,
  - the government stakeholders involved in the implementation of the BTWC in order to create networks and designate points of contact/competent national authorities,
  - the industry, universities and research institutes and non-governmental organisations to create public-private partnerships.

A strong preference will be given to bilateral projects focused on legal drafting.

### ***3.3. Project 3: Promotion of the submission of CBM declarations on a regular basis by States Parties to the BTWC***

#### **Project purpose**

To promote and increase the submission of CBM declarations by the States Parties on a regular basis, by encouraging and facilitating the preparation, compilation and transmission of the required data on an annual basis, including by contributing to the improvement of the electronic submission of the CBM declarations and enhancing the security of the website relating to the CBMs, and by providing assistance particularly for the points of contact.

**Project results**

- (a) Appointment of national points of contact for the submission of CBM declarations;
- (b) Creation or enhancement of national mechanisms for the preparation and compilation of information requested in the CBM declarations;
- (c) Regular submission of the CBM declarations to the ISU by national points of contact;
- (d) Improvement of the technical aspects of the electronic submission of CBM declarations and of the security and maintenance of the website for the CBMs.

**Project description**

The Sixth Review Conference recognised an urgent need for increasing the number of States Parties participating in the CBMs. In that regard, it also recognised the technical difficulties experienced by some States Parties in submitting complete and timely declarations. In order to increase participation of States Parties in the CBM process, the EU will offer assistance to States Parties through three types of activities:

- (a) Preparation of comprehensive documentation covering the methodology of national preparation and compilation of CBM data, including a brochure and a schedule for the submission of CBM declarations, to provide examples of good practices while recognising differences in the national procedures. The documentation will also provide descriptions of tools and information made available on this subject by the ISU and will take into account similar initiatives of other institutions and States Parties. The brochure will be reproduced in all the official languages of the UN.

Overall coordination of the preparation of the brochure will be carried out by the UNODA. A meeting of EU experts involved in the drafting of the brochure may be convened to discuss and finalise it. The brochure will be distributed to the States Parties.

- (b) Provision of support for the creation and functioning of national points of contact in charge of preparing the submission of CBM declarations, including in-country assistance to a maximum of seven States Parties in the preparation of the first CBM declarations. Those States with a significant level of bio-research or with high incidents of endemic diseases will be considered a priority.

The ISU will be asked to inform the States Parties of the assistance made available by the EU in the area of CBMs.

- (c) Organisation of two workshops involving existing and newly designated CBM points of contact in connection with the experts' or States Parties' meetings, in order to share experience gained from the CBM process and from the collection of data, and to encourage all States Parties to designate a point of contact.

The invitations to the workshops will specify that the workshops are part of an EU initiative. The ISU will inform the States Parties that for each conference, if necessary, the EU can cover the expenses of a maximum of ten participants from the non-EU States Parties which have recently made the decision to appoint a point of contact.

Those States with a significant level of bio-research or with high incidents of endemic diseases will be considered a priority for possible funding on a case-by-case basis.

- (d) Financial contribution to the UNODA to facilitate the further improvement and maintenance of the existing secure CBM website and to improve the technical aspects of the electronic submission of existing CBM declarations, in accordance with the decision of the States Parties at the Sixth Review Conference.

### 3.4. Project 4: Support for the BTWC Inter-Sessional Process

#### Project purpose

To support the BTWC Inter-Sessional Process, and in particular the discussion on the 2008 and 2009 inter-sessional topics, within and outside the EU, with a view to promoting the adoption of concrete measures.

#### Project results

- (a) Launching the discussion between the private and public sectors in the EU on the security challenges associated with the progress in bio-sciences and bio-technology research and on the appropriate measures to be adopted at the national, regional or global level to address those challenges, and in particular concerning the oversight of science, education, awareness-raising and the development of codes of conduct for the bio-sciences and biotechnology industry, as well as encouraging a discussion on the enhancement of international cooperation and assistance in the area of disease surveillance, detection, diagnostics with a view to identifying concrete assistance needs;
- (b) Submitting a report to the inter-sessional meetings on the findings and recommendations generated by the discussions in the EU context;
- (c) Facilitating the discussion on the inter-sessional topics in different regions of the world, especially in those not represented adequately at the inter-sessional meetings.

#### Project description

This project provides for two workshops at the EU level, bringing together representatives of the government, industry, universities and research institutes and non-governmental organisations, to allow an exchange of experience and a reflection on the 2008 and 2009 inter-sessional topics. The workshops will ideally take place before the experts' or States Parties' meetings. A report on the workshops will be submitted to the States Parties.

In order to promote reflection on these issues globally, funds will be made available for two types of activities:

- (a) Participation of a maximum of seven non-EU representatives in each EU regional workshop, in particular from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM);
- (b) Organisation of a maximum of four national workshops to discuss the 2008 and 2009 inter-sessional topics in different regions of the world. It is expected that non-EU States Parties which participated in the EU regional workshops may wish to organise similar national workshops in their respective countries and ask for EU assistance for that purpose.

## 4. Procedural aspects, coordination and the Steering Committee

In principle, applications by third states for any assistance and cooperation under this Joint Action must be addressed to the SG/HR, assisting the Presidency, and to the UNODA. The UNODA will review and assess those applications, as appropriate, and submit recommendations to the Steering Committee. The Steering Committee will examine the applications for assistance as well as the action plans and their implementation. The Steering Committee will present a final list of beneficiary countries, which will thereafter be endorsed by the Presidency, assisted by the SG/HR, in consultation with the competent working party of the Council.

The Steering Committee will be composed of a representative of the Presidency, assisted by the SG/HR, as well as of the incoming Presidency, and of the UNODA. The Commission will be fully associated. The Steering Committee will review the implementation of the Joint Action regularly, at least once every 6 months, including by the use of electronic means of communication.

To ensure strong ownership and sustainability of EU-initiated activities by the beneficiary countries, it is envisaged that whenever possible and appropriate, the selected beneficiaries will be asked to prepare action plans which will specify, among others, a schedule for carrying out funded activities (including through national resources), details on the scope and duration of the project, main stakeholders. The UNODA or the Member States, as appropriate, shall be associated with the preparation of the action plans. The implementation of the projects shall be carried out in accordance with the action plans.

## **5. Reporting and assessment**

The UNODA will submit to the Presidency, assisted by the SG/HR, regular bi-monthly progress reports on the implementation of the projects. The report will be transmitted to the relevant working party of the Council for an assessment of progress and for an overall evaluation of the projects as well as for a possible follow-up. Whenever possible, the States Parties will be informed of the implementation of this Joint Action.

## **6. Information and Collaboration Management System (ICMS)**

The ICMS, which was developed under Joint Action 2006/184/CFSP, will be maintained and used for the purpose of exchange of information, drafting and other communication among EU experts, the UNODA and third countries, as appropriate, as well as for the preparation of relevant assistance visits.

## **7. Participation of EU experts**

Active involvement of EU experts is necessary for the successful implementation of this Joint Action. Their costs relating to the implementation of the projects will be covered by this Joint Action. The UNODA will be encouraged to make use of the existing list of EU legal experts and to develop similar tools for the CBMs and other aspects of implementation as appropriate.

It is expected that in connection with envisaged assistance visits (e.g. legal assistance, CBM assistance), the involvement of a group of a maximum of three experts for a maximum duration of five days will be considered a standard practice.

## **8. Duration**

The total estimated duration of the implementation of this Joint Action is 24 months.

## **9. Beneficiaries**

The beneficiaries of universalisation activities are States which are not parties to the BTWC (both signatory States and non-signatory States).

The beneficiaries of implementation and CBM-related activities are the States Parties.

The beneficiaries of the activities relating to the Inter-Sessional Process are the government representatives of Member States and other States Parties as well as representatives of the private sector, universities and research institutes and non-governmental organisations.

## **10. Third-party representatives**

In order to promote regional ownership and sustainability of the projects, the participation of non-EU experts, including those from regional and other relevant international organisations, may be funded by this Joint Action.

The participation of the Chairperson of States Parties' meetings as well as of the ISU staff may be funded on a caseby- case basis.

## **11. Implementing entity**

Technical implementation of this Joint Action will be entrusted to the UNODA in Geneva which will perform its task under the control of the SG/HR assisting the Presidency.

In carrying out its activities, the UNODA will cooperate with the Presidency, assisted by the SG/HR, and the Member States and other States Parties and international organisations as appropriate.

## **12. Implementing entity – Staff issues**

Given the extra-budgetary character of the activities envisaged to be assigned to the UNODA in this Joint Action, additional staff will be needed to implement the planned projects.

## Darfur – Declaration by the Presidency

Brussels, 18 November 2008

### DECLARATION BY THE PRESIDENCY ON BEHALF OF THE EUROPEAN UNION CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN DARFUR

1. The European Union welcomes the announcement by the Sudanese President of a unilateral ceasefire in Darfur.
  - ▶ It solemnly calls on the Sudanese authorities to honour their commitment and urges all parties to follow suit. The EU will keep a close watch on the implementation of this measure, which represents an essential prerequisite in building the trust required in order to relaunch the peace process. In particular, the EU calls for the disarming of militias to be embarked upon without delay by the Sudanese authorities, in liaison with UNAMID.
  - ▶ The EU urges all parties to desist from violence, respect international humanitarian law and actively engage in the search for a political solution. It calls on the Sudanese authorities and rebel groups to cooperate actively with the AU/UN chief mediator and with UNAMID, in establishing effective arrangements for monitoring the cessation of hostilities.
  - ▶ The EU has heard reports of possible military operations conducted by the Sudanese army in recent days in Darfur, in particular aerial bombardments. It calls on UNAMID to carry out a full investigation of these incidents.
2. The European Union calls on the Sudanese government to consider the recommendations of the Sudan People's Initiative forum for a political settlement of the Darfur crisis. It notes in particular the proposals concerning security, powersharing and compensation for victims. The EU calls on the rebel movements to participate constructively in current efforts to resolve the conflict in Darfur.
3. The European Union reiterates its support for the AU/UN chief mediator, Mr Djibril Bassolé. It applauds the facilitation efforts being made by Qatar, in close coordination with Mr Bassolé.
4. The European Union calls for the Sudanese authorities to implement all of their commitments in speeding up deployment of UNAMID, as they stand following the tripartite meeting on 7 October 2008 in particular. The EU calls on Sudan to extend the moratorium on restrictions on humanitarian access, due to expire in early 2009, which is essential for the continuation of humanitarian operations in Darfur.
5. The European Union welcomes the resumption of diplomatic relations between Sudan and Chad. This represents a first step in the normalisation of relations between the two countries. The EU calls on both sides to continue along that path, with the support of the contact group for the Dakar Agreement signed on 13 March 2008 and of all States in the region.
6. The European Union deplors Sudan's failure to cooperate with the International Criminal Court. It calls for the Sudanese authorities to comply with their obligations under Security Council Resolution 1593, by implementing the two arrest warrants issued for Mr Ahmad Harun and Mr Ali Kushayb.

The Candidate Countries Turkey, Croatia\* and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\*, the Countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candi-

dates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Armenia and Georgia align themselves with this declaration.

\* Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

## CME 08 – Fourth EU Crisis Management Exercise

Brussels, 19 November 2008

The European Union will conduct its fourth crisis management exercise (CME 08)<sup>1</sup> from 24 November to 5 December 2008 in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

This exercise will focus on how the EU manages crises using both civilian and military instruments, including their coordination in the context of a response to a crisis situation in an unstable operational environment. It is based on a scenario which leads to the planning of an autonomous EU-led operation.<sup>2</sup>

The exercise will test and evaluate a range of EU crisis management structures, procedures and consultation arrangements, in the context of a crisis-management operation, with a view to improving EU capacity, including the EU decision-making process, to manage crises with civilian and military instruments, including their coordination within the EU.

CME 08 will provide an opportunity, for the first time, to undertake simultaneously, in an exercise, operational planning for a military operation and a reconfigured civilian ESDP mission engaged in the same theatre. The headquarters for this exercise will be the HQ at Mont Valérien (France), which also has responsibility for the operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA. The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) will be participating in an EU crisis-management exercise for the first time.

Although generic, the CME 08 scenario contains fictitious elements to support the objectives and the decision-making process of the exercise. It will emphasise the need for a commitment by the EU, including the Community, and the deployment of the full range of the EU's instruments (e.g. a military force, police mission with rule of law elements, etc.).

CME 08 will be conducted in Brussels and in capitals. There will be no deployment on the ground, in accordance with the European Union's exercise policy.

The exercise will involve Member States (capitals and delegations), the Secretary-General/High Representative, relevant EU Council bodies, including the Civilian Commander and the CPCC, the Operation Commander and the HQ, the European Commission and the EU Satellite Centre at Torrejón (Spain).

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1. In May 2002, the EU conducted its first crisis-management exercise (CME 02) in the framework of the ESDP. In November 2003, the EU and NATO conducted a joint crisis management exercise (CME/CMX 03). In May 2004, CME 04 concentrated on how the EU manages crises using both civilian and military instruments, including their coordination, based on a scenario of an autonomous EU-led operation, without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. The first military exercise (MILEX 05) was conducted in November 2005; the second MILEX 07, including the first activation of the EU OpsCentre, was conducted in June 2007, and the third, MILEX 08, was conducted in June 2008.

2. Without recourse to NATO common assets and capabilities.



# 11<sup>th</sup> Africa-EU Ministerial Troika Meeting

Addis Ababa, 20-21 November 2008

## JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ

(...)

### 1. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JOINT STRATEGY/FIRST ACTION PLAN

#### *a) Consideration of the Joint Experts Group (JEG) Report on the eight partnerships (Projects, activities, financing, implementation timeframe)*

Ministers welcomed the progress report on the implementation of the Africa-EU Joint Strategy and its first Action Plan (2008-2010). They underlined that the full implementation of the ambitious and far-reaching Strategic Partnership is a long-term project and that progress is achieved only step by step. In this light Ministers commended the Joint Experts Groups for the work done so far and called on all parties to expedite efforts with a view to attaining tangible results within the timeframe of the First Action Plan (2008-2010).

Ministers stressed the need for adequate financial resources to effectively implement the Joint Strategy/First Action Plan, and reiterated their request for efforts to be made by both sides to allocate the necessary funds in order to foster implementation. In this regard, they attached particular importance to the work to be done by the Joint Expert Groups in identifying the financing requirements, the sources of financing and the procedures for accessing these financial instruments.

Ministers welcomed efforts to strengthen the dialogue between the two sides and noted with satisfaction the College to College meeting of the AUC and European Commission held on 1 October 2008 in Brussels.

On each of the eight partnerships, Ministers particularly welcomed the achievements as reflected in the attached Joint Progress Report, notably:

#### **i. Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security**

The training cycle for the African Stand-by Force, Amani Africa/Euro Recamp, has been launched, the new African Peace Facility for the period 2008-2010 with an amount of EUR 300 million has been agreed, and the first joint meeting of the EU Political and Security Committee and the AU Peace and Security Council has taken place in September 2008. Furthermore, the Joint Expert Group agreed to organise a seminar on the support of the EU to African training centers in the first trimester of 2009. Ministers agreed to enhance cooperation between the EU and the AU situation centres and to set up a Common Interactive Watch and Anticipation Mechanism.

(...)

#### **v. Africa-EU Partnership on Energy**

A Joint Statement on the Implementation of the Africa-EU Energy Partnership was signed by the two Commissions, which defines inter alia actions regarding improved energy access and

services in Africa as well as energy security for both sides. Several energy projects have been or are about to be launched in 2008, financed by individual EU Member States as well as by the European Commission.

#### **vi. Africa-EU Partnership on Climate Change**

Progress has been made in setting up priorities for cooperation and in identifying deliverables and joint initiatives as contained in the Joint Progress report. Ministers took note of the progress made in the elaboration of a Joint Declaration to be submitted in time by Africa and the EU to the Poznan Conference on Climate Change on 3 December 2008. They mandated the Troika at ambassadorial level to meet in November 2008 in order to adopt the Joint Declaration taking into account the African position on climate change as adopted by the Conference of African Ministers of Environment in Algiers held on 20 November 2008.

(...)

## **2. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE 10<sup>TH</sup> MINISTERIAL TROIKA MEETING**

### **A. Update on current issues**

#### **Democratic Republic of Congo**

Ministers welcomed the Joint Communiqué of the Heads of State of the Great Lakes Region on the DRC, resulting from the Summit held in Nairobi on 7 November 2008.

They welcomed the missions by H.E. Olusegun Obasanjo, former President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, UNSG Special Envoy, and H.E. Benjamin Mkapa, former President of the United Republic of Tanzania, appointed by the Great Lakes Summit.

They strongly condemned the continuation of fighting in North Kivu, in the East of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), following the offensive of *Congrès national pour la défense du peuple* (CNDP). They are deeply concerned about the very grave humanitarian and security situation, which affects hundreds of thousands of displaced persons, and which has also a regional impact. They also call on all conflict parties to respect the international humanitarian law, in particular to end abusive attacks against women and children.

They reiterated their support to the institutions resulting from the 2006 elections, as well as the Nairobi and Goma processes.

In this regard, Ministers requested the Government of the DRC to continue with the implementation of the disarmament of illegal armed groups in the East of the DRC, notably the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR). They urged the countries of the region to continue to support the peace process in the DRC and speed up the implementation of the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region, which was signed in Nairobi, on 15 December 2006 and entered into force on 21 June 2008.

Ministers welcomed the efforts of the UNSG to reinforce MONUC, in particular by reinforcing its equipment and staffing, and to focus its action in the Kivus, helping MONUC to implement the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Ministers commended the efforts of the AU, including the visit of the Chairperson of the Commission H.E. Mr. Jean Ping to the DRC in October 2008, the visit of the Commissioner for Peace and Security to the region in November 2008, and that of the Envoy of the Chairperson of

the Commission to the DRC. They commended the visit of the Minister for Foreign and European Affairs H.E. Mr. Bernard Kouchner in his capacity as President of the EU Council, together with Hon. Mr. David Milliband, Foreign and Commonwealth Minister of the UK, the visit of H.E. Commissioner Louis Michel, as well as the efforts of other international stakeholders, namely SADC and the United Nations. They urged the CNDP to resume its place within the National Programme for the Security, Peace, Stability and Reconstruction of the Kivus (AMANI Programme).

Ministers paid tribute to the humanitarian organizations for the remarkable work they are accomplishing on the ground to assist the civilian population in general and displaced persons in particular. They expressed their willingness to increase their support to these organisations.

### **Somalia**

Ministers welcomed the signing, in Djibouti on 26 October 2008, of an Agreement on the *Modalities for the Implementation of the Cessation of Armed Confrontation* between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). They commended the TFG and the ARS for this further step in the implementation of the Djibouti Agreement of 19 August 2008, and urged them to scrupulously comply with their commitments and to form as soon as possible a Unity Government.

Ministers strongly deplored the humanitarian situation in Somalia and underlined the urgency to find a lasting political solution for Somalia. They called upon all parties to respect the human rights in Somalia and particularly underlined the vulnerability of women and children in that respect.

Ministers condemned terrorist actions in Somalia and the recent attacks on AMISOM troops. They also condemned war methods causing the death of civilians.

Ministers further welcomed the Declaration adopted by the 13<sup>th</sup> Extraordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government, held in Nairobi, Kenya, on 29 October 2008. They deplored, however, the further aggravation of the situation in spite of this Declaration, and welcomed in this light of the 18 November 2008 IGAD communiqué with the view to speeding up the implementation of the Djibouti Agreement.

The EU congratulated the AU for the work of AMISOM and confirmed that it will continue its financial and technical support to this stabilisation force. Ministers once again called on AU Member States to contribute additional troops to AMISOM to enable it reach its authorized strength, and appealed to the international community to provide the necessary financial and logistical support to AMISOM.

The AU and EU await with interest the details of the UNSG plan for the establishment of a multinational stabilisation force which could reinforce AMISOM.

Ministers further noted with concern that the aggravation of the instability in Somalia favored the increasing occurrence of acts of piracy in Somali waters and the Gulf of Aden and called on the international community to promote pragmatic solutions to the problem and, particularly to support measures to ensure effective prosecution and provision of correctional facilities.

In this context, the African side congratulated the EU for the establishment of a coordination cell EU NAVCO, mandated to coordinate the fight against piracy along the Somali coast, and for the adoption by the EU Council on 10 November 2008 of a Joint Action launching the operation ATALANTA due to be operational in December 2008 which will significantly increase existing capabilities.

Ministers reiterated their support to the efforts of the UNSGSR for Somalia, H.E. Mr. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, to advance the political process in the country.

### **Sudan and Chad**

Ministers reviewed evolutions since their last meeting and welcomed the recent developments in the relations between Chad and the Sudan, marked by the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries. They paid tribute to the countries that facilitated this positive development. They urged the leaders of the two countries to consolidate the progress thus made in order to promote, in a spirit of appeasement, relations of cooperation, good neighbourliness and friendship within the framework of the different agreements they have concluded, including the Dakar Agreement.

Ministers expressed satisfaction at the initiatives taken by the AU Commission in implementation of the decision of the AU Peace and Security Council of 29 June 2008, notably the sending of a high-level delegation led by H.E. Pierre Buyoya, former President of the Republic of Burundi, in order to contribute to the restoration of confidence and the normalization of relations between the two countries.

Ministers stated that they were convinced that the normalisation of relations between the Sudan and Chad would contribute to efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Darfur.

Ministers welcomed the progress achieved in the implementation of the CPA between North and South Sudan, notably in the Abyei region.

Despite the initiatives to re-launch the Darfur peace process, particularly the initiative of Qatar supported by the AU and the EU, Ministers noted an extremely worrying increase of violence in Darfur. Security conditions for the population and for the humanitarian organisations deteriorated heavily. Ministers urged all parties to cooperate with the joint mediator of the AU and the UN, Djibril Bassolé, without any preconditions.

Ministers encouraged the Sudanese authorities to continue to implement the commitments made at the tripartite meeting with the AU and UN to ensure rapid deployment and effective functioning of UNAMID.

Ministers reaffirmed that peace and justice are two necessary components in the search for a lasting solution. To this end, the fight against impunity as well as the promotion of reconciliation and healing, should be priority for the Sudanese government. The African side reiterated the AU position on this issue, including the call on the UNSC to defer the application by the ICC prosecutor, as contained in the communiqué adopted by the PSC in Addis Ababa on 21 July 2008. The EU recalled that the International Criminal Court (ICC) is an independent judicial institution and plays a fundamental role in the promotion of justice, and reiterated its call on the Sudanese government to cooperate with the ICC.

Ministers considered that the announcement by the Sudanese government of a cease-fire in Darfur a step in the right direction. They urged the parties to respect this cease-fire and asked for an effective mechanism for its control. They also urged the parties to do everything to facilitate the distribution of humanitarian aid to the populations and the displaced persons. They favorably welcomed the results of the Initiative of the Sudanese People (ISP) and invited the Sudanese Government to take these results into account. They also called on all parties to the conflict to stop without delay the repeated human rights violations including sexual violence against women and abuse of children.

On Chad, Ministers noted with satisfaction the continuation of the political dialogue in the framework of the Political Agreement of 13 August 2007 and supported this effort to consolidate democracy. They expressed their concern at the continuation of the humanitarian crises in the east of Chad and north-east of the Central African Republic.

In this context Ministers underlined the importance to complete deployment of the United Nations Mission in Chad and CAR (MINURCAT) and welcomed the contribution of the EU mission (EUFOR) for the stabilisation of this region. They noted with satisfaction the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1834 of 24 September 2008 which renewed the mandate of MINURCAT and foresees the deployment of a UN force to replace EUFOR.

### **Zimbabwe**

Ministers noted with concern that the Zimbabwean parties have not yet succeeded in forming a Government of National Unity, as called for by the Agreement of 15 September 2008, they signed in Harare, Zimbabwe.

In this regard, Ministers took note of the call made by the Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) in Sandton, South Africa, on 9 November 2008, which, inter alia, called for the formation, forthwith, of an inclusive Government in Zimbabwe. In this context Ministers expressed their deep concern about the current stalemate in the creation of an inclusive government with the agreement of all parties necessary to undertake economic and social reforms so urgently expected by the people.

The EU and Africa expressed their wish that the Republic of South Africa and SADC mediation succeeds and called on the guarantors of the global political agreement to ensure the rapid and credible implementation of this agreement.

### **Mauritania**

Ministers reiterated their strong condemnation of the coup d'état which took place in Mauritania on 6 August 2008, as well as their determination to spare no effort towards the rapid restoration of constitutional order.

In this regard, Ministers welcomed the outcome of the Consultative Meeting on the Situation in Mauritania held on 10 November 2008 in Addis Ababa, at the initiative of the Chairperson of the Commission. They stressed that any solution to the crisis resulting from the coup d'état should be based on the following key elements: the unconditional release of President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi; his participation in the resolution of the crisis in his capacity as the democratically elected President; the involvement of all stakeholders, and the respect of the Mauritanian Constitution and the international commitments of Mauritania.

Ministers urged the Junta to present solutions within the one month time limit in the framework of the consultations of Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement. They agreed that the AU and the EU, in close collaboration with the other partners, will review the situation in light of the Mauritanian proposals to be submitted, and of the consultative meeting to be held on 21 November 2008, called for by the AU. This would be the unique occasion to demonstrate the Junta's active participation in constructing a way out of the crisis, thus avoiding sanctions imposed by the EU.

**Georgia**

The EU reiterated its attachment to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia. The EU reaffirmed its condemnation of Russia's decision to recognize the independence of South-Ossetia and Abkhazia. The EU welcomed the progress which has been made within the foreseen timeframe in the implementation of the agreements of 12 August 2008 and 8 September 2008, and particularly noted the holding of international discussions stipulated in point 6 of the agreement of 12 August which started in Geneva on 15 October 2008 and continued on 18 November 2008. The African side took note with interest and encouraged Georgia and Russia to find a peaceful solution to the conflict.

(...)

# General Affairs and External Relations Council

Brussels, 8-9 December 2008

(...)

## WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION – PROGRESS REPORT ON THE EU STRATEGY

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The Council approved a six-monthly report on progress in the implementation of the EU strategy to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The report was drawn up by the personal representative of the High Representative Javier Solana for non-proliferation, in coordination with the Commission.

The EU strategy was adopted by the European Council in December 2003.

## WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION – COMBATING PROLIFERATION – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

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The Council adopted the following conclusions (15565/08):

‘The Council welcomes the active implementation of the EU WMD Strategy adopted by the European Council in December 2003.

The Council underlines the usefulness of efforts which are being made to further improve the efficiency of the implementation of the Strategy through targeted action. It therefore endorses the document “New lines for action by the European Union in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery system” which identifies the following deliverables:

- an updated risk and threat evaluation document;
- models for awareness raising for undertakings, scientific and academic circles, and financial institutions;
- intensifying cooperation with third countries to help them to improve their non-proliferation policies and export controls;
- measures to combat intangible transfers of knowledge and know-how, including mechanisms of cooperation in terms of consular vigilance;
- intensifying efforts to impede proliferation flows and sanction acts of proliferation;
- intensifying efforts to combat proliferation financing;
- intensifying coordination/collaboration with, and contribution to, relevant regional and international organisations.

The Council calls on competent Council formations and bodies, the Commission, other institutions and Member States, to give a concrete follow-up to this document with a view to achieving its objectives by the end of 2010.’

(...)

## **ILLICIT ACCUMULATION OF AND TRAFFICKING IN SMALL ARMS – IMPLEMENTATION OF EU STRATEGY**

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The Council approved a progress report on implementation of the EU's strategy to combat the illicit accumulation of and trafficking in small arms, light weapons and ammunition.

The report covers EU activities in this field during the first half of 2008.

## **SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS – AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE EU AND THIRD COUNTRIES – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

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The Council adopted the following conclusions (15506/08):

'The Council:

1. considers that the illicit manufacture, transfer and circulation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their excessive accumulation and uncontrolled spread constitute a serious threat to peace and international security;
2. stresses that the EU Strategy to combat the illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition, adopted in 2005 in the framework of the European Security Strategy, continues to set the priorities and guidelines for the EU action in this field;
3. recalls the importance of countering the illicit supply and destabilising spread of SALW and their ammunition through the support to relevant national and international initiatives and norms, including the UN Programme of Action (UN PoA) to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects and UNSC embargoes;
4. recalls the commitments undertaken under the above-mentioned EU Strategy on SALW to include the topic of SALW and its security aspects in the political dialogues between the EU and third countries and international, regional and sub-regional organizations and to use relations with third countries in this respect as part of an integrated approach to the European Union's external action, as it is already the case for other threats, such as WMD and terrorism;
5. notes that during recent negotiations of international agreements with third countries, and in particular negotiations of the non-proliferation of WMD standard clause, an increasing number of third countries required to complement this clause with a separate article addressing the illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW, as part of an integrated approach to disarmament and arms control;
6. underlines the general need to include in the provisions relating to CFSP in all relevant international agreements with third countries<sup>1</sup>, a specific article on illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition in order to ensure coherence and systematization in addressing SALW issues in the contractual basis between the EU and its Member states and third countries. To this end, the following text will be used as a reference in future negotiations:

### **SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS**

- I. The Parties recognise that the illicit manufacture, transfer and circulation of small arms and light weapons, including their ammunition, and their excessive accumulation, poor

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1. Agreements, other than purely Community agreements, which contain provisions related to CFSP, as specified in Council document 14997/03, 'Fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – Mainstreaming non-proliferation policies into the EU's wider relations with third countries', pp. 2-3.



management, inadequately secured stockpiles and uncontrolled spread continue to pose a serious threat to peace and international security.

- II. The Parties agree to observe and fully implement their respective obligations to deal with the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, including their ammunition, under existing international agreements and UN Security Council resolutions, as well as their commitments within the framework of other international instruments applicable in this area, such as the UN Programme of Action to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects.
  - III. The Parties undertake to cooperate and to ensure coordination, complementarity and synergy in their efforts to deal with the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, including their ammunition, at global, regional, sub-regional and national levels and agree to establish regular political dialogue that will accompany and consolidate this undertaking.
7. with regard to the CFSP and pursuant to Article 18 of the Treaty on European Union, invites the Presidency, assisted by the SG/HR, to implement these conclusions, with the assistance and support of the relevant Council bodies. The Commission will be fully associated;
  8. recognizes that the present Council conclusions on CFSP aspects of small arms and light weapons (SALW) do not prejudge the competences that the European Community has on SALW related issues in the context of development cooperation.’
- (...)

## ZIMBABWE – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions (16639/08):

1. The Council reiterates its deep concern at the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Zimbabwe, particularly as a result of the cholera epidemic and the continuing violence against supporters of the MDC. It reaffirms the European Union’s commitment to the Zimbabwean people through a substantial and long-standing programme of humanitarian aid. It shares the opinion expressed by the “Group of Elders” in their statement on the crisis in Zimbabwe. It considers unacceptable the decision to bar its members from even entering Zimbabwe. The Council demands respect for the principles of humanitarian aid and, in particular, respect for the principle of impartiality and equal access to humanitarian aid for the entire Zimbabwean population.
2. The Council notes the conclusion of an agreement in principle between the parties on constitutional amendment number 19, the entry into force of which is one of the prerequisites for the implementation of the political agreement of 15 September. It nevertheless regrets the long standoff in negotiations since the agreement was signed and hopes that an agreement satisfactory to all parties can be reached soon. Eight months after the elections and almost three months after the initial power sharing agreement was signed, the Council recalls the importance of reaching a fair and viable power sharing agreement without delay. It calls for the cessation of unilateral decisions, such as the decision to confirm the appointment of the Governor of the Central Bank, which contradict the spirit of the agreement. The Council stresses the need for all parties to acknowledge that, if it is to be both lasting and democratic, the outcome of negotiations must reflect the will and choice of the Zimbabwean people as expressed in the 29 March elections.
3. The Council underlines the importance of the SADC, the African Union and the UN remaining actively engaged vis-à-vis the parties in order to reach a lasting and equitable solu-

tion. The Council emphasises the importance of remaining vigilant in relation to the possible consequences for the region of a continuation in the deterioration of the humanitarian situation and destabilisation of Zimbabwe.

4. The Council has decided to update the list of persons subject to EU individual restrictive measures, in particular by adding to the list names of persons actively engaged in violence or human rights infringements.

5. The Council reaffirms that the European Union stands ready to support the economic and social recovery of Zimbabwe once a government reflecting the will of the Zimbabwean people has been formed and shows tangible signs of a return to respect for human rights, rule of law and macroeconomic stabilisation.'

(...)

## **MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT – RULES GOVERNING THE CONTROL OF EXPORTS**

The Council established, in the form of a common position, common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment, and replacing a Code of Conduct on that subject (15972/1/08).

Under that Common Position, each EU Member State must assess, on a case-by-case basis, export licence applications made to it for items on the EU Common Military List, in accordance with the following criteria:

- respect for the international obligations and commitments of Member States;
- respect for human rights in the country of final destination as well as respect by that country of international humanitarian law;
- internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts;
- preservation of regional peace, security and stability;
- national security of the Member States and of territories whose external relations are the responsibility of a Member State, as well as that of friendly and allied countries;
- behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law;
- existence of a risk that the military technology or equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions;
- compatibility of the exports of the military technology or equipment with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that States should meet their legitimate security and defence needs with the least diversion of human and economic resources for armaments.

This Common Position does not prevent EU Member States from conducting a more restrictive national policy in this area.

(...)

## **EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY**

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### **Launch of the EU NAVFOR Somalia military operation**

The Council adopted a Decision on the launch of a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast (EU NAVFOR Somalia / Operation Atalanta, 15376/1/08).

The commander of Operation Atalanta has been authorised by the Council to release the activation order in order to execute the deployment of the forces and start execution of the mission.

The operation was therefore launched on 8 December 2008.

For more information on EU NAVFOR: [www.consilium.europa.eu/eunavfor-somalia](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eunavfor-somalia)

### **Statement on tighter international security**

The Council adopted a statement on tighter international security (16751/08).

This statement, which will be endorsed by the European Council on 11 and 12 December, gives further details of the principles and objectives set out in the European Security Strategy, with particular reference to counter-terrorism, drug trafficking, proliferation and disarmament.

In addition to the EU's contribution to security and development – in particular through crisis prevention, conflict management and post-conflict stabilisation – Europe also has to face up to new threats to its security and to its values of democracy and liberty. These new threats are more diverse, less visible and less predictable.

According to the statement, the EU has to provide credible responses to these threats, whatever their source, whatever their form, through prevention, deterrence and response, in close coordination with its principal partners in the world and with the relevant international organisations, in particular the United Nations.

In conjunction with the report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy, this statement will enable the European Union better to address the challenges and threats with which it will have to deal in the coming years.

### **Half-yearly report on the ESDP**

The Council approved a Presidency report on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) with a view to its submission to the European Council on 11 and 12 December (16686/08).

The report covers questions relating to the ESDP which were examined during the second half of the year and contains a mandate for the future Presidency.

### **Future perspectives of the European Security and Defence College**

The Council approved the recommendations set out in a study carried out by the General Secretariat of the Council on the future perspectives of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC), emphasising, in particular, the growing demand for training provided by the College (16629/08 and 16631/08).

The ESDC Steering Committee recommends improving the functioning of the College,

inter alia by providing it with a larger secretariat and its own budget and endowing it with legal personality.

The ESDC is organised in the form of a network of institutes, colleges, academies, universities and institutions within the EU concerned with security policy and defence issues, as well as the EU Institute of Security Studies. It establishes close links with the relevant EU institutions and agencies.

Since its creation in 2005, the ESDC has provided training in the field of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) at strategic level, with a view to establishing and promoting a shared understanding of the ESDP among civilian and military personnel and to compiling and disseminating, through its training activities, best practice with regard to various ESDP-related issues.

For further information on the ESDC: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/esdc>

### **Appointment of the Chairman of the Military Committee of the EU**

The Council approved the appointment of General Håkan Syrén (Sweden) as Chairman of the Military Committee of the EU for three years from 6 November 2009 (15582/08). General Syrén will succeed General Henri Bentégeat.

(...)

### **Combating violence against women, in the ESDP framework – Conclusions**

The Council adopted the following conclusions (16520/08):

1. The Council reaffirms the need to make the theme of women's rights a priority of the policy to defend human rights, and a subject for long-term action by the European Union.
2. The Council emphasises its willingness to take greater account in its external policy of women's rights and of the issue of equality between women and men, as defined in European and international instruments and in the relevant standards and commitments, in particular the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the additional protocol to it, the 1994 Cairo Action Programme, the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, the Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Millennium Development Goals.
3. To this end, the Council is adopting guidelines which make respect for women's rights and combating violence against them a priority of the external action of the European Union and its Member States. In particular, the EU must continue to play a leading role in combating sexual violence in armed conflicts.
4. In this context, the Council emphasises the importance of Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820, which constitute the guiding principles for ESDP operations. It also commends the work of the competent EU bodies, in liaison with civil society, which has led to the definition of principles and actions to step up measures to combat violence against women and to promote the role of women, especially by ensuring their effective participation in peace negotiations and in post-conflict reconstruction efforts. It welcomes the recommendations made by the conference held in Brussels on 10 October 2008, "From commitment to action – the EU delivering to women in conflict and post-conflict", which contributed to the drafting of a joint paper by the General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission on a comprehensive EU

approach to protection and the role of women in conflict and post-conflict situations, and to the revision of the operational ESDP document on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 as reinforced by UNSCR 1820 in the context of ESDP.

5. The Council recalls the close link between peace, security, development and gender equality. It stresses the need for a consistent and continuous approach, from crisis management to reconstruction and development activities.

6. The Council recalls the need to take account of the issue of gender in the EU's policies, particularly in questions of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), support for security sector reform (SSR), democratic governance, support for civil society, economic security and humanitarian action.

7. The Council stresses the need for effective coordination and cooperation, including on the ground, with the United Nations system, other international organisations, and the OSCE, as well as other international structures (the ICRC, the DCAF, etc.).

8. The Council invites the relevant bodies at the Council, the Commission and the other European institutions, and in the Member States, within the framework of their respective competences, to ensure that the documents attached to these conclusions are properly implemented.'

(...)

## **DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

The Council discussed the situation in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Union's response to this crisis.

Following the discussions, it adopted the following conclusions:

'1. The Council recalls the conclusions on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) adopted at the General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting on 10 November and continues to be very concerned by the situation in the east of the country resulting from the return to arms of all parties – and in particular the CNDP's offensive – and by its humanitarian consequences, with access to displaced people remaining very difficult in certain areas of North Kivu. The Council calls on all parties involved in the Goma and Nairobi processes to respect the ceasefire, ensure the safety of humanitarian staff and allow unconditional access to the civilian population.

2. The Council is deeply concerned at the continuing serious violations of human rights, and in particular the summary executions, systematic sexual violence and recruitment and use of child soldiers by the armed groups, already pointed out by the Human Rights Council at its special session on 28 November and 1 December. The Council condemns these acts and urges all parties concerned to stop them. In particular, it calls on the government of the RDC to put an end to the behaviour of some members of the Congolese armed forces who have been attacking the persons and property they are supposed to protect. The Council calls on all parties to take all necessary measures to stop violations of human rights and to arrest and punish those responsible for them.

3. The Council welcomes the efforts of the European Commission and the Member States to help the civilian victims of the conflict and contribute to finding a political solution to the crisis by providing a further EUR 45,6 million in humanitarian aid and making many ministerial trips to the DRC and the rest of the region. The Council encourages the Commission and the

Member States to continue these efforts in close cooperation with the United Nations, the African Union and the countries in the region, whose involvement it commends.

4. The Council reiterates the need for further efforts to bring to an end the activity of foreign armed groups, in particular the FDLR, in the east of the DRC. It reaffirms the EU's commitment to facilitating the settlement of that problem by relaunching the Goma and Nairobi peace processes. It urges the DRC and other governments in the region to take the necessary steps to this end. It calls on the countries in the region to respect the sovereignty of the DRC.

5. The Council commends the region's involvement within the framework of the Goma and Nairobi peace processes. In this respect, it welcomes the renewed dialogue between the governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda and encourages them to intensify their cooperation with a view to normalising their relations and contributing to stabilising the situation in the long term. It commends the efforts made by former President Olusegun Obasanjo, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to find a political solution to the conflict. It reaffirms the EU's commitment under the International Facilitation.

6. The Council emphasises the need to pursue cooperation with the Congolese authorities in order to enhance their capacities, in particular as regards security, with a view in particular to strengthening stability in the east and fighting impunity and the illegal exploitation of natural resources, the persistence of which is fuelling the crisis. The Council reaffirms the EU's willingness to step up its efforts to that end, including through its EUSEC and EUPOL RD Congo missions and the Commission, in collaboration with the Congolese authorities.

7. The Council reiterates its support for MONUC's action on the ground and encourages it to continue reinforcing its deployment in North Kivu. The Council welcomes the Security Council's unanimous adoption, on 20 November, of resolution 1843 authorising an increase in MONUC's personnel, which is intended to assist in improving the protection of the civilian population and accompanying the mission's ongoing redeployment. Beyond the urgent strengthening of personnel, the Council is closely monitoring the current discussions within the Security Council on renewing MONUC's mandate with a view to increasing its effectiveness. The Council took note of the letter from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Secretary-General/High Representative and asked the latter, and the Commission, rapidly to outline technical, humanitarian and political responses in the light of the comments made.

8. The Council will continue to keep a close eye on the humanitarian, political and security situation in the east of the DRC.'

## **MIDDLE EAST/MEDITERRANEAN – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

### **Middle East Peace Process**

Over lunch the Ministers had an exchange of views on the Middle East Peace Process. They will return to this matter on 11 December 2008 in the margins of the European Council.

The Council then adopted the following conclusions:

'1. The Council reiterates its support for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiating process under way since the Annapolis Conference.

Even if this negotiating process has not yet realised its full potential in terms of results, the political momentum it has set in motion is irreversible. The European Union reaffirms its commitment to the role of the Quartet in the process. It supports the commitment of the parties to

pursue vigorous, ongoing and continuous negotiations in order to reach a peace agreement providing for the creation of a Palestinian State, comprising the West Bank and Gaza, that is viable, independent, democratic and sovereign, living in peace and security alongside Israel within secure and recognised borders.

The Council reiterates its commitment to a comprehensive and regional approach to the resolution of the Israeli-Arab conflict. It commends the indirect peace talks between Israel and Syria under the auspices of Turkey and encourages the two parties to open direct talks. It supports all the efforts deployed to achieve stability, peace and security in the region.

2. The European Union calls for a major change in the situation on the ground, in accordance with the undertakings given in the context of the roadmap, in order to build mutual trust. The political momentum has contributed to real progress in terms of security, governance and rule of law. The results achieved by the Palestinian Authority, in particular in Jenin, Nablus and Hebron, should be commended in this connection and its efforts continued.

3. The European Union condemns all forms of violence, especially in Gaza, as well as the firing of rockets at the civilian population, which must stop completely; the fight against terrorism must continue unabated. Corporal Gilad Shalit must be unconditionally released.

4. The EU continues to be deeply concerned by the recent acceleration in settlement expansion. Settlement activity, including natural growth and settlements in East Jerusalem, must end as a matter of urgency. It is contrary to international law and compromises the creation of a viable Palestinian State. Obstacles to movement to and within the Occupied Palestinian Territories must be lifted, in particular to support economic development. The humanitarian situation in Gaza must urgently be alleviated by continuing the truce, reopening crossing points and supplying goods and services to the population. The ability of relief agencies, particularly UNRWA, to supply aid must be safeguarded. Palestinian prisoners should be released in greater numbers, with priority being given to minors.

5. The European Union supports Egypt's mediation efforts for inter-Palestinian reconciliation. The EU is prepared to support any government which respects the PLO's commitments, resolutely supports the peace negotiations with Israel, and pursues policies and measures that reflect the Quartet's principles.

6. The EU is determined to work towards a stronger monitoring role for the Quartet on the ground, jointly with the United States and the other members of the Quartet. In order to foster a lasting settlement, the European Union, while neither intervening in the negotiations nor pre-judging their outcome, reiterates its willingness to assist in the implementation of a final peace agreement, when the time comes. The Council takes note of the discussions under way at the General Secretariat of Council and the Commission in this respect.

7. The European Union is convinced that any lasting peace must be comprehensive, and reiterates its support for resolution of all aspects of the Israel-Arab conflict, in accordance with the terms of reference of the Madrid Conference, in particular land for peace, and with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and the Quartet's roadmap. The EU reiterates the importance of the Arab partners' sustained, broad and constructive commitment. In this respect, it considers that the Arab Peace Initiative offers a solid and appropriate basis for peace in the Middle East to which all parties should give their consideration.'

(...)

## **REPORT ON THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY**

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Over lunch, the High Representative Javier Solana presented to the Ministers his 'Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World'. The High Representative's report aims to reinforce the European Security Strategy adopted in 2003, without replacing it. It gives an opportunity to examine how the strategy works in practice, and what can be done to improve its implementation.

During his presentation Mr Solana said the European Security Strategy identified a range of threats and challenges to our security interests. Five years on, these have not gone away: some have become more significant, and all more complex. Moreover, globalisation is accelerating shifts in power and is exposing differences in values.

He also stressed that 'Europe will rise to these new challenges, as we have done in the past. The EU has made substantial progress over the last five years. We are recognised as an important contributor to a better world. Over the last decade, the European Security and Defence Policy, as an integral part of our Common Foreign and Security Policy, has grown in experience and capability, with over 20 missions deployed in response to crises, ranging from post-tsunami peace building in Aceh to protecting refugees in Chad.

But, despite all that has been achieved, implementation of the ESS remains work in progress. For our full potential to be realised we need to be still more capable, more coherent and more active.'

The discussion showed there was broad support for the report, which will now be sent to the European Council.

The European Council adopted the European Security Strategy in December 2003. For the first time, it established principles and set clear objectives for advancing the EU's security interests on the basis of the Union's core values. The strategy is comprehensive in its approach and remains fully relevant.

## **DRAFT DECLARATION ON STRENGTHENING CAPABILITIES**

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The Council approved a declaration on strengthening capabilities. The declaration notes that almost ten years after the founding of the European security and defence policy (ESDP) – the operational component of the common foreign and security policy – the European Union is a recognised and sought-after player in the international arena.

The purpose of the declaration, which is to be presented to the European Council, is to put the Union, with all the resources at its disposal, in a position to enhance its contribution to international peace and security and to develop its capacity to tackle the risks and threats to its security as identified in the European Security Strategy and the document updating it. Strengthening available capabilities in Europe will therefore be the principal challenge faced in the years ahead. In a tough budgetary environment, such a goal can only be achieved through a joint, sustained and shared effort which meets operational needs.

That means that Europe should be capable, in the coming years, of planning and conducting simultaneously a series of operations and missions, of varying scope, be they major stabilisation and reconstruction operations, rapid-response operations of limited duration, emergency operations for the evacuation of European nationals, maritime or air surveillance/interdiction missions, civilian-military humanitarian assistance operations or



civilian missions (inter alia police, rule-of-law, civilian administration, civil protection, security sector reform, and observation missions).

The declaration identifies the priority civilian capability objectives and a series of military capability initiatives (air transport, space surveillance, protection of forces, interoperability and the ability of European personnel to work together).

The declaration reiterates the ministers' full support for the European Defence Agency (EDA). It also deals with pooling of efforts, specialisation and sharing of costs. It identifies ways of reinforcing the European defence technological and industrial base.

(...)

## European Parliament – Speeches by Javier Solana

Brussels, 9 December 2008

### KEYNOTE SPEECH ON ‘EUROPEAN PROPOSALS FOR STRENGTHENING DISARMAMENT AND THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME’ AT THE PES CONFERENCE ON ‘PEACE AND DISARMAMENT: A WORLD WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS?’

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Mr. President,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,  
Thank you very much

I want to start by thanking the Socialist Group in the European Parliament for organising this conference and for asking me to participate. I am pleased to be here for two reasons. First, I am happy to be among friends. But second, and more important, I think that the topic of this conference is well chosen.

The question of nuclear disarmament has again moved to the top of the international agenda. This is most welcome. Nuclear disarmament matters. Not only to politicians and diplomats but also to the people. Large nuclear arsenals reflect old and current political tensions. But they also contribute to tensions – and with that, the risk of conflict.

Moreover, the more nuclear weapons there are, the greater the chances of their use. Or misuse should they fall into the wrong hands.

Therefore: a world with fewer nuclear weapons is a safer world – for everybody. If you forgive me the phrase: a world without nuclear weapons is a world worth looking for.

This why I am fully behind the recent initiative of President Sarkozy, which built on earlier work involving the UK and others of the European Union.

Sarkozy has written a letter, on behalf of the EU, to the UN Secretary General with a list of concrete EU priorities and proposals.

This is, to my mind, a major European contribution to push forward the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agenda.

I am also pleased that, in the US, fresh thinking has emerged. Both on why and how it can inject new momentum into this topic.

As you well know, a few years ago, a bipartisan group, led by former secretaries of state and of defence, called for gradual disarmament steps, with a view to ultimately reaching the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, provided robust verification mechanisms could be arranged.

I am happy to see that President-elect Obama for his part has announced that he will be seeking significant changes in US nuclear policy, with respect to the number of nuclear warheads and overall US posture.

Of course, we need to remember that the Russian Federation is a central player in this too.

I am convinced that through constructive engagement with Russia in this area, there is a lot that can be achieved. The Russian Federation too benefits from a world with fewer nuclear weapons. A more predictable world with strong agreements and greater international confidence.

Before getting into some of the more specific elements of what the EU is doing and could do

in this area, I want to state why the political context in which we operate is so important. That context is one where the overall, multilateral non-proliferation regime is under growing pressure.

The core problem is a lack of trust. Lack of trust between the nuclear and the non-nuclear states. Lack of trust between the North and the South.

There is a perception that there is an overall imbalance between the three pillars of the regime. That is non-proliferation, access to technology and disarmament. It is in our common interest to address this trust deficit.

We must rebuild trust and confidence and reinforce multilateralism that has been eroding during the past ten years. I am convinced that we need a new pact of confidence and trust between the developed and the developing world.

We need to recognize that international agreements will bring more security. We need new agreements between technology holders and those that are dependent on technology transfers. We need new trust that nuclear-weapon states fulfil their obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament. And we need trust that there is access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, provided countries fully comply with their non-proliferation obligations.

The timeline, in my mind, is clear. That is why we need a balanced and effective outcome at the next NPT Review Conference in 2010. That is why the EU is working hard to make this conference a success, engaging all players in an active dialogue. There are also a few more specific points I would like to raise:

As mentioned by the chairman, just yesterday in the Council, we decided to support the IAEA nuclear fuel bank with a contribution of up to € 25 million for its construction. This will allow the IAEA to finalise the modalities for the bank, so that the IAEA Board can approve it.

The idea of a fuel bank is not new. It has been discussed for many years. I am hopeful that this time we will succeed. We want the bank to be established very soon. In any case before the next NPT Review Conference in spring 2010.

I am convinced that the creation of a fuel bank will have a positive impact on the general climate of the NPT Review Conference. It will facilitate progress on all three pillars of the NPT, namely nonproliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

It is important to note that the fuel bank is not exclusive in its character. There are parallel initiatives and ideas that may prove useful to meet different situations. But the fuel bank would be the first concrete step to make the long-discussed project into a reality.

The EU considers that the development of nuclear energy requires the best possible standards of safety, security and non-proliferation. The multilateral mechanisms should offer a real alternative to countries to forego developing their own national enrichment and reprocessing capabilities – which can constitute a significant risk for nuclear proliferation.

We cannot afford to fail. If we do, we may face new problems. New countries that are tempted to cross the red line and go nuclear. But if we succeed, on the other hand, we will strengthen the multilateral nuclear non-proliferation system which is a core EU objective and strengthen international cooperation.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction was adopted in 2003. At the time, we were farsighted. This strategy and its core principles remain valid.

The EU remains committed to the multilateral treaty-based system. To all other relevant disarmament and non-proliferation instruments and international organisations: We want to pursue universalisation of multilateral agreements. We want to reinforce strict implementation of these

agreements, and we want to co-cooperate with partners and give assistance to third countries.

Since 2003, the EU has adopted more than 20 Joint Actions to support the work of international organisations in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament. To give you an example, the EU is the biggest donor to the IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund, contributing more than € 20 million as financial support. Our assistance has helped dozens of countries in Africa, the Balkans, Central Asia and South East Asia to prevent nuclear terrorism by strengthening the physical protection, security and control of nuclear and other radioactive materials.

We can be satisfied, to a certain extent, with the implementation of the Strategy. But we can make it even more operational. Yesterday, EU Foreign Ministers endorsed new lines for EU action to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery system. The overriding goal of the plan is to achieve greater coordination within the EU – to maximise the impact of our action:

We will intensify efforts to counter proliferation flows and proliferation financing, we will sanction acts of proliferation, we will develop measures, including cooperation on consular vigilance, to prevent intangible transfers of knowledge and know-how, we will raise awareness in undertakings, scientific and academic circles, and financial institutions. We will continue cooperation with international organisations and third countries to help them improve non-proliferation policies and export controls.

To achieve this ambitious agenda, we have to mainstream non-proliferation in our overall policies.

Non-proliferation is not just a security and external matter but is a cross-cutting issue that affects visa issuing, university cooperation, financial supervision and so on.

In the foreign policy field, non-proliferation concerns are taken into account by including WMD clauses into EU agreements with third countries. Negotiations have been concluded successfully with nearly 100 States in the world. We are now going to assess the implementation of the WMD clause and how to react in case of non-compliance.

It has been 40 years since the signature of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The EU remains committed to the NPT and supports all its three pillars. The NPT is not a perfect system.

But it is the only one we have. All in all, it has served us well.

Apart from upholding the NPT, the EU is also launching a big campaign to promote the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Equally, we should stop the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament.

We need to start negotiations, without preconditions, on a multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. I spoke to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva last June. Of course, we also hope that the US and Russia will make progress in their negotiations on a post-START agreement.

Dear friends,

Let me end where I began. The world badly needs more progress on nuclear disarmament. With new thinking in the major countries and also in the countries which can experience the temptation of nuclear armament, progress is possible. The task of political leaders is to set a sense of direction. And to build trust among the key players. That is a task for many people, including in the European Union.

I thank you for your attention.

Brussels, 10 December 2009

## DISCOURS DE JAVIER SOLANA À L'OCCASION DE LA REMISE DU 2ÈME PRIX DU LIVRE EUROPÉEN

Messieurs les Présidents,  
Mesdames, Messieurs,  
très chers amis,

C'est un réel plaisir d'être à vos côtés.

Je félicite naturellement les trois finalistes du prix du livre européen.

Ce soir nous célébrons aussi le soixantième anniversaire de la Déclaration de 1948.

Les droits de l'Homme sont au cœur des valeurs fondatrices de l'Union européenne.

Il était donc naturel que les Européens décident, dès l'origine, de faire du respect des droits de l'Homme l'un des objectifs de leur politique étrangère.

Les Européens ont choisi de l'affirmer dans le Traité qui les lie entre eux. Ils ont choisi d'affirmer qu'il n'y a pas de contradiction entre droits de l'homme et politique étrangère.

La Politique étrangère de l'Union européenne repose sur deux fondements.

Le premier de ces fondements est la conviction que la paix dépend de l'efficacité du multilatéralisme.

En clair, que la paix est l'affaire de tous.

« The structure of the world peace cannot be the work of one man or one party or one nation. It must be a peace which rests on the cooperative effort of the whole world. » Cette phrase du Président Roosevelt me plaît.

C'est elle qui a inspiré l'épouse du Président américain, Eleanor Roosevelt, lorsque celle-ci, avec René Cassin, a rédigé la Déclaration universelle de 1948.

Le deuxième fondement de la politique étrangère de l'Union européenne tient à une vision du monde. Une vision basée sur la reconnaissance et le respect de l'Autre.

Il ne serait pas crédible que notre politique extérieure ne soit pas fondée sur nos intérêts et nos valeurs propres.

Mais ce serait courir le risque de l'échec que de tenir pour acquis que le reste du monde, c'est-à-dire l'immense majorité de l'humanité, considère que nos valeurs sont aussi les siennes.

Assumer et projeter nos valeurs tout en restant conscient de l'existence d'une altérité, voilà la deuxième clef de l'approche européenne.

Comment traduire cette ambition dans l'action ?

Très concrètement, de trois manières: prévenir, intervenir et reconstruire.

Prévenir les crises. Pour cela l'Union européenne développe sans relâche un dialogue politique avec tous ses partenaires. Un dialogue confiant mais exigeant aussi, basé sur le respect mutuel mais également sur l'affirmation de nos principes.

Intervenir. Lorsque, malgré tous les efforts, le conflit a éclaté, il faut intervenir. Il faut agir. C'est pourquoi l'Union européenne s'est progressivement dotée d'instruments de gestion de crise.

Reconstruire enfin. Parce que, lorsqu'un conflit s'achève, tout reste encore à faire. Il faut en effet avoir les moyens de construire ou de reconstruire l'Etat de droit et l'économie.

L'engagement européen s'est développé selon ces trois axes.

De la Géorgie aux Grands Lacs. Des Balkans à la Palestine et à l'Afghanistan. Ainsi ce sont au total une vingtaine d'opérations, civiles et militaires, qui ont été lancées au cours des dernières années.

L'expression toujours plus forte d'une demande d'Europe à travers le monde démontre que l'engagement des Européens est légitime.

Il a fait de l'Union européenne un nouvel acteur global. Avec, entre autres responsabilités, celle d'aider et de protéger les plus démunis et les plus faibles.

Avec une vraie capacité à enrayer les drames humains, l'oubli ou l'ignorance qui sont à l'origine des violations des droits de l'homme dans les conflits.

Mais aussi avec la possibilité de peser dans la lutte contre la pauvreté ou le changement climatique.

C'est-à-dire de faire face aux grands enjeux dont dépendront la sécurité humaine et le bonheur des générations futures.

La grande aventure que représente la construction européenne est loin d'être achevée.

Il nous faut continuer de progresser. Il nous faut maintenir l'élan.

Demain le Conseil européen y veillera.

Il actera de l'évolution de notre environnement de sécurité en actualisant la Stratégie de sécurité dont s'est dotée l'Union européenne depuis 2003.

Il décidera également du renforcement des capacités civiles et militaires de l'Union européenne.

Pour mieux faire face aux crises d'un monde toujours plus complexe.

Mesdames et Messieurs,

Avec une sincère et une forte volonté politique, nous pouvons achever de grands desseins.

Car c'est une véritable éthique de responsabilité et de liberté qui gouverne nos efforts. A l'intérieur comme à l'extérieur de l'Union européenne.

J'ai la conviction que c'est ainsi que nous respecterons le mieux les espoirs et les attentes de nos concitoyens mais aussi du reste du monde.

Je vous remercie.

# European Security Strategy

Brussels, 11 December 2008

## REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY – PROVIDING SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD

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### Executive Summary

Five years on from adoption of the European Security Strategy, the European Union carries greater responsibilities than at any time in its history.

The EU remains an anchor of stability. Enlargement has spread democracy and prosperity across our continent. The Balkans are changing for the better. Our neighbourhood policy has created a strong framework for relations with partners to the south and east, now with a new dimension in the Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership. Since 2003, the EU has increasingly made a difference in addressing crisis and conflict, in places such as Afghanistan or Georgia.

Yet, twenty years after the Cold War, Europe faces increasingly complex threats and challenges.

Conflicts in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world remain unsolved, others have flared up even in our neighbourhood. State failure affects our security through crime, illegal immigration and, most recently, piracy. Terrorism and organised crime have evolved with new menace, including within our own societies. The Iranian nuclear programme has significantly advanced, representing a danger for stability in the region and for the whole non-proliferation system.

Globalisation has brought new opportunities. High growth in the developing world, led by China, has lifted millions out of poverty. But globalisation has also made threats more complex and interconnected. The arteries of our society – such as information systems and energy supplies – are more vulnerable. Global warming and environmental degradation is altering the face of our planet. Moreover, globalisation is accelerating shifts in power and is exposing differences in values. Recent financial turmoil has shaken developed and developing economies alike.

Europe will rise to these new challenges, as we have done in the past.

Drawing on a unique range of instruments, the EU already contributes to a more secure world. We have worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity. The EU remains the biggest donor to countries in need. Long-term engagement is required for lasting stabilisation.

Over the last decade, the European Security and Defence Policy, as an integral part of our Common Foreign and Security Policy, has grown in experience and capability, with over 20 missions deployed in response to crises, ranging from post-tsunami peace building in Aceh to protecting refugees in Chad.

These achievements are the results of a distinctive European approach to foreign and security policy. But there is no room for complacency. To ensure our security and meet the expectations of our citizens, we must be ready to shape events. That means becoming more strategic in our thinking, and more effective and visible around the world. We are most successful when we

operate in a timely and coherent manner, backed by the right capabilities and sustained public support.

Lasting solutions to conflict must bind together all regional players with a common stake in peace. Sovereign governments must take responsibility for the consequences of their actions and hold a shared responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

It is important that countries abide by the fundamental principles of the UN Charter and OSCE principles and commitments. We must be clear that respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states and the peaceful settlement of disputes are not negotiable. Threat or use of military force cannot be allowed to solve territorial issues – anywhere.

At a global level, Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral order. The UN stands at the apex of the international system. Everything the EU has done in the field of security has been linked to UN objectives. We have a unique moment to renew multilateralism, working with the United States and with our partners around the world. For Europe, the transatlantic partnership remains an irreplaceable foundation, based on shared history and responsibilities. The EU and NATO must deepen their strategic partnership for better co-operation in crisis management.

The EU has made substantial progress over the last five years. We are recognised as an important contributor to a better world. But, despite all that has been achieved, implementation of the ESS remains work in progress. For our full potential to be realised we need to be still *more capable, more coherent and more active*.

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## Introduction

The European Council adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003. For the first time, it established principles and set clear objectives for advancing the EU's security interests based on our core values. It is comprehensive in its approach and remains fully relevant.

This report does not replace the ESS, but reinforces it. It gives an opportunity to examine how we have fared in practice, and what can be done to improve implementation.

## I. GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND KEY THREATS

The ESS identified a range of threats and challenges to our security interests. Five years on, these have not gone away: some have become more significant, and all more complex.

### **Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

Proliferation by both states and terrorists was identified in the ESS as 'potentially the greatest threat to EU security'. That risk has increased in the last five years, bringing the multilateral framework under pressure. While Libya has dismantled its WMD programme, Iran, and also North Korea, have yet to gain the trust of the international community. A likely revival of civil nuclear power in coming decades also poses challenges to the non-proliferation system, if not accompanied by the right safeguards.

The EU has been very active in multilateral fora, on the basis of the WMD Strategy, adopted in 2003, and at the forefront of international efforts to address Iran's nuclear programme. The Strategy emphasises prevention, by working through the UN and multilateral agreements, by



acting as a key donor and by working with third countries and regional organisations to enhance their capabilities to prevent proliferation.

We should continue this approach, with political and financial action. A successful outcome to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2010, with a view in particular to strengthening the non-proliferation regime, is critical. We will endeavour to ensure that, in a balanced, effective, and concrete manner, this conference examines means to step up international efforts against proliferation, pursue disarmament and ensure the responsible development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy by countries wishing to do so.

More work is also needed on specific issues, including: EU support for a multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle; countering financing of proliferation; measures on bio-safety and bio-security; containing proliferation of delivery systems, notably ballistic missiles. Negotiations should begin on a multilateral treaty banning production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

### **Terrorism and Organised Crime**

Terrorism, within Europe and worldwide, remains a major threat to our livelihoods. Attacks have taken place in Madrid and London, while others have been foiled, and home-grown groups play an increasing role within our own continent. Organised crime continues to menace our societies, with trafficking in drugs, human beings, and weapons, alongside international fraud and money-laundering.

Since 2003, the EU has made progress in addressing both, with additional measures inside the Union, under the 2004 Hague Programme, and a new Strategy for the External Dimension of Justice and Home Affairs, adopted in 2005. These have made it easier to pursue investigations across borders, and co-ordinate prosecution. The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, also from 2005, is based on respect for human rights and international law. It follows a four-pronged approach: preventing radicalisation and recruitment and the factors behind them; protecting potential targets; pursuing terrorists; and responding to the aftermath of an attack. While national action is central, appointment of a Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator has been an important step forward at the European level.

Within the EU, we have done much to protect our societies against terrorism. We should tighten co-ordination arrangements for handling a major terrorist incident, in particular using chemical, radiological, nuclear and bioterrorism materials, on the basis of such existing provisions as the Crisis Coordination Arrangements and the Civil Protection Mechanism. Further work on terrorist financing is required, along with an effective and comprehensive EU policy on information sharing, taking due account of protection of personal data.

We must also do more to counter radicalisation and recruitment, by addressing extremist ideology and tackling discrimination. Inter-cultural dialogue, through such fora as the Alliance of Civilisations, has an important role.

On organised crime, existing partnerships within our neighbourhood and key partners, and within the UN, should be deepened, in addressing movement of people, police and judicial cooperation. Implementation of existing UN instruments on crime is essential. We should further strengthen our counter-terrorism partnership with the United States, including in the area of data sharing and protection. Also, we should strengthen the capacity of our partners in South Asia, Africa, and our southern neighbourhood. The EU should support multilateral efforts, principally in the UN.

We need to improve the way in which we bring together internal and external dimensions. Better co-ordination, transparency and flexibility are needed across different agencies, at national and European level. This was already identified in the ESS, five years ago. Progress has been slow and incomplete.

### **Cyber security**

Modern economies are heavily reliant on critical infrastructure including transport, communication and power supplies, but also the internet. The EU Strategy for a Secure Information Society, adopted in 2006 addresses internet-based crime. However, attacks against private or government IT systems in EU Member States have given this a new dimension, as a potential new economic, political and military weapon. More work is required in this area, to explore a comprehensive EU approach, raise awareness and enhance international co-operation.

### **Energy Security**

Concerns about energy dependence have increased over the last five years. Declining production inside Europe means that by 2030 up to 75% of our oil and gas will have to be imported. This will come from a limited number of countries, many of which face threats to stability. We are faced therefore with an array of security challenges, which involve the responsibility and solidarity of all Member States.

Our response must be an EU energy policy which combines external and internal dimensions. The joint report from the High Representative and Commission in June 2006 set out the main elements. Inside Europe, we need a more unified energy market, with greater inter-connection, particular attention to the most isolated countries and crisis mechanisms to deal with temporary disruption to supply.

Greater diversification, of fuels, sources of supply, and transit routes, is essential, as are good governance, respect for rule of law and investment in source countries. EU policy supports these objectives through engagement with Central Asia, the Caucasus and Africa, as well as through the Eastern Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean. Energy is a major factor in EU-Russia relations. Our policy should address transit routes, including through Turkey and Ukraine. With our partners, including China, India, Japan and the US, we should promote renewable energy, low-carbon technologies and energy efficiency, alongside transparent and well-regulated global markets.

### **Climate change**

In 2003, the ESS already identified the security implications of climate change. Five years on, this has taken on a new urgency. In March 2008, the High Representative and Commission presented a report to the European Council which described climate change is a 'threat multiplier'. Natural disasters, environmental degradation and competition for resources exacerbate conflict, especially in situations of poverty and population growth, with humanitarian, health, political and security consequences, including greater migration. Climate change can also lead to disputes over trade routes, maritime zones and resources previously inaccessible.

We have enhanced our conflict prevention and crisis management, but need to improve analysis and early warning capabilities. The EU cannot do this alone. We must step up our work with countries most at risk by strengthening their capacity to cope. International co-operation, with the UN and regional organisations, will be essential.

## II. BUILDING STABILITY IN EUROPE AND BEYOND

Within our continent, enlargement continues to be a powerful driver for stability, peace and reform.

With Turkey, negotiations started in 2005, and a number of chapters have been opened since. Progress in the Western Balkans has been continuous, if slow. Accession negotiations with Croatia are well advanced. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has obtained candidate status. Stabilisation and Association agreements have been signed with the other Western Balkan countries. Serbia is close to fulfilling all conditions for moving towards deeper relations with the EU. The EU continues to play a leading role in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but, despite progress, more is required from local political leaders to overcome blockage of reforms.

We are deploying EULEX, our largest civilian ESDP mission to date, in Kosovo and will continue substantial economic support. Throughout the region, co-operation and good neighbourly relations are indispensable.

It is in our interest that the countries on our borders are well-governed. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), launched in 2004, supports this process. In the east, all eligible countries participate except Belarus, with whom we are now taking steps in this direction.

With Ukraine, we have gone further, with a far-reaching association agreement which is close to being finalised. We will soon start negotiations with the Republic of Moldova on a similar agreement. The Black Sea Synergy has been launched to complement EU bilateral policies in this region of particular importance for Europe.

New concerns have arisen over the so-called 'frozen conflicts' in our eastern neighbourhood. The situation in Georgia, concerning Abkhazia and South Ossetia, has escalated, leading to an armed conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008. The EU led the international response, through mediation between the parties, humanitarian assistance, a civilian monitoring mission, and substantial financial support. Our engagement will continue, with the EU leading the Geneva Process. A possible settlement to the Transnistrian conflict has gained impetus, through active EU participation in the 5+2 negotiation format, and the EU Border Assistance Mission.

The Mediterranean, an area of major importance and opportunity for Europe, still poses complex challenges, such as insufficient political reform and illegal migration. The EU and several Mediterranean partners, notably Israel and Morocco, are working towards deepening their bilateral relations. The ENP has reinforced reforms originally started under the Barcelona process in 1995, but regional conflict, combined with rising radicalism, continues to sow instability.

The EU has been central to efforts towards a settlement in the Middle East, through its role in the Quartet, co-operation with Israel and the Palestinian Authority, with the Arab League and other regional partners. The EU is fully engaged in the Annapolis Process towards a two-state solution, and is contributing sustained financial and budgetary support to the Palestinian Authority, and capacity-building, including through the deployment of judicial, police and border management experts on the ground. In Lebanon, Member States provide the backbone of the UNIFIL peacekeeping mission. On Iraq, the EU has supported the political process, reconstruction, and rule of law, including through the EUJUST LEX mission.

Since 2003, Iran has been a growing source of concern. The Iranian nuclear programme has been subject to successive resolutions in the UNSC and IAEA. Development of a nuclear mili-

tary capability would be a threat to EU security that cannot be accepted. The EU has led a dual-track approach, combining dialogue and increasing pressure, together with the US, China, and Russia. The High Representative has delivered a far-reaching offer for Iran to rebuild confidence and engagement with the international community. If, instead, the nuclear programme advances, the need for additional measures in support of the UN process grows. At the same time, we need to work with regional countries including the Gulf States to build regional security.

The ESS acknowledged that Europe has security interests beyond its immediate neighbourhood. In this respect, Afghanistan is a particular concern. Europe has a long-term commitment to bring stability. EU Member States make a major contribution to the NATO mission, and the EU is engaged on governance and development at all levels. The EU Police Mission is being expanded. These efforts will not succeed without full Afghan ownership, and support from neighbouring countries: in particular Pakistan, but also India, Central Asia and Iran. Indeed, improved prospects for good relations between India and Pakistan in recent years have been a positive element in the strategic balance sheet.

### **Security and development nexus**

As the ESS and the 2005 Consensus on Development have acknowledged, there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace. Threats to public health, particularly pandemics, further undermine development. Human rights are a fundamental part of the equation. In many conflict or post-conflict zones, we have to address the appalling use of sexual violence as a weapon of intimidation and terror. Effective implementation of UNSCR 1820 on sexual violence in situations of armed conflict is essential.

Conflict is often linked to state fragility. Countries like Somalia are caught in a vicious cycle of weak governance and recurring conflict. We have sought to break this, both through development assistance and measures to ensure better security. Security Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration are a key part of post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction, and have been a focus of our missions in Guinea-Bissau or DR Congo. This is most successful when done in partnership with the international community and local stakeholders.

Ruthless exploitation of natural resources is often an underlying cause of conflict. There are increasing tensions over water and raw materials which require multilateral solutions. The Kimberley Process and Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative offer an innovative model to address this problem.

### **Piracy**

The ESS highlighted piracy as a new dimension of organised crime. It is also a result of state failure. The world economy relies on sea routes for 90% of trade. Piracy in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden has made this issue more pressing in recent months, and affected delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia. The EU has responded, including with ATALANTA, our first maritime ESDP mission, to deter piracy off the Somali coast, alongside countries affected and other international actors, including NATO.

### **Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), Cluster Munitions and Landmines**

In 2005, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and

trafficking of SALW and their ammunition. In the context of its implementation, the EU supports the UN Programme of Action in this field. The EU will continue to develop activities to combat threats posed by illicit SALW.

The EU has given strong support to the concept of an international Arms Trade Treaty and has decided to support the process leading towards its adoption. The EU is also a major donor to anti-mine action. It has actively supported and promoted the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines worldwide. The Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions, agreed at Dublin in May 2008, represents an important step forward in responding to the humanitarian problems caused by this type of munitions, which constitute a major concern for all EU Member States. The adoption of a protocol on this type of munitions in the UN framework involving all major military powers would be an important further step.

### III. EUROPE IN A CHANGING WORLD

To respond to the changing security environment we need to be more effective – among ourselves, within our neighbourhood and around the world.

#### A. A more effective and capable Europe

Our capacity to address the challenges has evolved over the past five years, and must continue to do so. We must strengthen our own coherence, through better institutional co-ordination and more strategic decision-making. The provisions of the Lisbon Treaty provide a framework to achieve this.

Preventing threats from becoming sources of conflict early on must be at the heart of our approach. Peace-building and long-term poverty reduction are essential to this. Each situation requires coherent use of our instruments, including political, diplomatic, development, humanitarian, crisis response, economic and trade co-operation, and civilian and military crisis management. We should also expand our dialogue and mediation capacities. EU Special Representatives bring EU influence to bear in various conflict regions. Civil society and NGOs have a vital role to play as actors and partners. Our election monitoring missions, led by members of the European Parliament, also make an important contribution.

The success of ESDP as an integral part of our Common Foreign and Security Policy is reflected by the fact that our assistance is increasingly in demand. Our Georgia mission has demonstrated what can be achieved when we act collectively with the necessary political will. But the more complex the challenges we face, the more flexible we must be. We need to prioritise our commitments, in line with resources. Battlegroups and Civilian Response Teams have enhanced our capacity to react rapidly.

Appropriate and effective command structures and headquarters capability are key. Our ability to combine civilian and military expertise from the conception of a mission, through the planning phase and into implementation must be reinforced. We are developing this aspect of ESDP by putting the appropriate administrative structures, financial mechanisms, and systems in place. There is also scope to improve training, building on the European Security and Defence College and the new European young officers exchange scheme, modelled on Erasmus.

We need to continue mainstreaming human rights issues in all activities in this field, including ESDP missions, through a people-based approach coherent with the concept of human security. The EU has recognised the role of women in building peace. Effective implementation

of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security and UNSCR 1612 on Children and Armed Conflict is essential in this context.

For civilian missions, we must be able to assemble trained personnel with a variety of skills and expertise, deploy them at short notice and sustain them in theatre over the long term. We need full interoperability between national contingents. In support of this, Member States have committed to draw up national strategies to make experts available, complemented by more deployable staff for mission support, including budgeting and procurement. The ways in which equipment is made available and procured should be made more effective to enable timely deployment of missions.

For military missions, we must continue to strengthen our efforts on capabilities, as well as mutual collaboration and burden-sharing arrangements. Experience has shown the need to do more, particularly over key capabilities such as strategic airlift, helicopters, space assets, and maritime surveillance (as set out in more detail in the Declaration on the Reinforcement of Capabilities). These efforts must be supported by a competitive and robust defence industry across Europe, with greater investment in research and development. Since 2004, the European Defence Agency has successfully led this process, and should continue to do so.

### **B. Greater engagement with our neighbourhood**

The ENP has strengthened individual bilateral relationships with the EU. This process now needs to build regional integration.

The Union for the Mediterranean, launched in July 2008, provides a renewed political moment to pursue this with our southern partners, through a wide-ranging agenda, including on maritime safety, energy, water and migration. Addressing security threats like terrorism will be an important part.

The Eastern Partnership foresees a real step change in relations with our Eastern neighbours, with a significant upgrading of political, economic and trade relations. The goal is to strengthen the prosperity and stability of these countries, and thus the security of the EU. The proposals cover a wide range of bilateral and multilateral areas of cooperation including energy security and mobility of people. Lasting stability in our neighbourhood will require continued effort by the EU, together with UN, OSCE, the US and Russia. Our relations with Russia have deteriorated over the conflict with Georgia. The EU expects Russia to honour its commitments in a way that will restore the necessary confidence. Our partnership should be based on respect for common values, notably human rights, democracy, and rule of law, and market economic principles as well as on common interests and objectives.

We need a sustained effort to address conflicts in the Southern Caucasus, Republic of Moldova and between Israel and the Arab states. Here, as elsewhere, full engagement with the US will be key. In each case, a durable settlement must bring together all the regional players. Countries like Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have played an increasingly important role in the region, whereas this has not been the case with Iran. There is a particular opportunity to work with Turkey, including through the Alliance of Civilisations.

### **C. Partnerships for Effective Multilateralism**

The ESS called for Europe to contribute to a more effective multilateral order around the world. Since 2003, we have strengthened our partnerships in pursuit of that objective. The key partner for Europe in this and other areas is the US. Where we have worked together, the EU and US have

been a formidable force for good in the world.

The UN stands at the apex of the international system. Everything the EU has done in the field of security has been linked to UN objectives. The EU works closely in key theatres, including Kosovo, Afghanistan, DRC, Sudan/Darfur, Chad and Somalia, and has improved institutional links, in line with our joint 2007 EU-UN Declaration. We support all sixteen current UN peacekeeping operations.

The EU and NATO have worked well together on the ground in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, even if formal relations have not advanced. We need to strengthen this strategic partnership in service of our shared security interests, with better operational co-operation, in full respect of the decision-making autonomy of each organisation, and continued work on military capabilities. Since 2003, we have deepened our relationship with the OSCE, especially in Georgia and Kosovo.

We have substantially expanded our relationship with China. Ties to Canada and Japan are close and longstanding. Russia remains an important partner on global issues.

There is still room to do more in our relationship with India. Relations with other partners, including Brazil, South Africa and, within Europe, Norway and Switzerland, have grown in significance since 2003.

The EU is working more closely with regional organisations, and in particular the African Union. Through the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, we are supporting enhanced African capacities in crisis management, including regional stand-by forces and early warning. We have deepened links with our Central Asia partners through the Strategy adopted in 2007, with strengthened political dialogue, and work on issues such as water, energy, rule of law and security. Elsewhere, the EU has developed engagement with ASEAN, over regional issues such as Burma, with SAARC, and Latin America. Our experience gives the EU a particular role in fostering regional integration. Where others seek to emulate us, in line with their particular circumstances, we should support them.

The international system, created at the end of the Second World War, faces pressures on several fronts. Representation in the international institutions has come under question. Legitimacy and effectiveness need to be improved, and decision-making in multilateral fora made more efficient. This means sharing decisions more, and creating a greater stake for others. Faced with common problems, there is no substitute for common solutions.

Key priorities are climate change and completion of the Doha Round in the WTO. The EU is leading negotiations for a new international agreement on the former, and must use all its levers to achieve an ambitious outcome at Copenhagen in 2009. We should continue reform of the UN system, begun in 2005, and maintain the crucial role of the Security Council and its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The International Criminal Court should grow further in effectiveness, alongside broader EU efforts to strengthen international justice and human rights. We need to mould the IMF and other financial institutions to reflect modern realities. The G8 should be transformed. And we must continue our collective efforts to meet the Millennium Development Goals.

These issues cross boundaries, touching as much on domestic as foreign policy. Indeed, they demonstrate how in the twenty-first century, more than ever, sovereignty entails responsibility. With respect to core human rights, the EU should continue to advance the agreement reached at the UN World Summit in 2005, that we hold a shared responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

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Maintaining public support for our global engagement is fundamental. In modern democracies, where media and public opinion are crucial to shaping policy, popular commitment is essential to sustaining our commitments abroad. We deploy police, judicial experts and soldiers in unstable zones around the world. There is an onus on governments, parliaments and EU institutions to communicate how this contributes to security at home.

Five years ago, the ESS set out a vision of how the EU would be a force for a fairer, safer and more united world. We have come a long way towards that. But the world around us is changing fast, with evolving threats and shifting powers. To build a secure Europe in a better world, we must do more to shape events. And we must do it now.



# European Council

Brussels, 11-12 December 2008

## PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS

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### V. External relations and European Security and Defence Policy

#### European Neighbourhood Policy

28. The European Council endorses the guidelines evolved at the ministerial meeting in Marseilles on 3 and 4 November 2008, which made it possible to define the working methods of the Union for the Mediterranean. Within the framework of the structures put in place, it calls for the further ambitious implementation of this initiative in all its dimensions.

29. Likewise, the Eastern Partnership will bring about a significant strengthening of EU policy with regard to the Eastern partners of the European Neighbourhood Policy<sup>1</sup> in a bilateral and multilateral framework, to complement the other forms of cooperation already existing in the Union's neighbourhood, such as the Black Sea Synergy, which will have to be taken into account. The Eastern Partnership should help the partner countries to make progress in their reform processes, thereby contributing to their stability and helping to bring them closer to the EU. The European Council welcomes the proposals put forward by the Commission in its communication of 3 December 2008 and instructs the Council to study them and to report back with a view to this ambitious initiative being approved at its meeting in March 2009 and the Eastern Partnership being launched at a summit meeting with the partner countries organised by the incoming Czech Presidency.

#### European Security and Defence Policy

30. The European Council states its determination to give, by means of the attached declaration<sup>2</sup>, a fresh impetus to the European Security and Defence Policy. Compliant with the principles of the United Nations Charter and the decisions of the United Nations Security Council, this policy will continue to develop in full complementarity with NATO in the agreed framework of the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO and in compliance with the decision making autonomy and procedures of each. To this end, the European Council shares the analysis of the report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy of 2003 and endorses the declarations adopted by the Council<sup>3</sup>, which agree on new goals for strengthening and optimising European capabilities in the years ahead and emphasise the EU's desire to work for the cause of international peace and security, while making a tangible contribution to the security of its citizens.

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1. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Republic of Moldova, Ukraine.

2. See Annex 2.

3. See references in Annex 6.

## ANNEX 2 – DECLARATION BY THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON THE ENHANCEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (ESDP)

1. Over the last ten years, the European Union has established itself as a global political player. It has assumed increasing responsibilities, as witnessed by its ever more ambitious and diversified civilian and military operations in the service of effective multilateralism and peace.
2. The Union's action continues to be based on a shared analysis of the threats and risks affecting the common interests of Europeans. The European Council here endorses the analysis presented by the Secretary General/High Representative, in consultation with the Commission, in the document reviewing the implementation of the 2003 security strategy so as to improve it and add new elements to it. This document reveals the continuing existence of the threats identified in 2003 as well as the emergence of fresh risks likely to threaten the security of the EU, directly or indirectly, which it has to tackle globally.
3. In order to rise to these challenges, the European Council intends to make good the shortfall in the resources available in Europe by gradually improving civilian and military capabilities. This effort is also the prerequisite for allowing Europeans to assume in a credible and effective manner their responsibilities under a renewed transatlantic partnership, to which the European Council reaffirms its commitment. To this end, it subscribes to the declaration on capabilities adopted by the Council, which sets numerical and precise targets to enable the EU, in the coming years, to conduct simultaneously, outside its territory, a series of civilian missions and military operations of varying scope, corresponding to the most likely scenarios.<sup>1</sup>
4. This renewed goal requires a commitment to develop robust, flexible and interoperable capabilities. This will entail, on a voluntary basis, innovative forms of specialisation, pooling and sharing of major equipment projects, with priority being given to planning, crisis management, space and maritime security. In this respect the declaration on capabilities highlights several concrete projects in key sectors. The European Council voices its determination to support this effort in the long term and calls on the Member States to convert these commitments into national requirements in terms of equipment.
5. Restructuring of the European defence technological and industrial base, in particular around centres of European excellence, avoiding duplication, in order to ensure its soundness and its competitiveness, is a strategic and economic necessity. It calls for a strengthening of corporate governance mechanisms, for an increased research and technology drive and for making the European armaments market more dynamic. In this connection, the European Council

1. Europe should actually be capable, in the years ahead, in the framework of the level of ambition established, inter alia of deploying 60 000 men in 60 days for a major operation, within the range of operations envisaged within the headline goal for 2010 and within the civilian headline goal for 2010, of planning and conducting simultaneously:

- two major stabilisation and reconstruction operations, with a suitable civilian component, supported by a maximum of 10 000 men for at least two years;
- two rapid response operations of limited duration using inter alia the EU's battle groups;
- an emergency operation for the evacuation of European nationals (in less than ten days), bearing in mind the primary role of each Member State as regards its nationals and making use of the consular lead State concept;
- a maritime or air surveillance/interdiction mission;
- a civilian-military humanitarian assistance operation lasting up to 90 days;
- around a dozen ESDP civilian missions (inter alia police, rule of law, civil administration, civil protection, security sector reform and observation missions) of varying formats, inter alia in a rapid reaction situation, including a major mission (possibly up to 3 000 experts), which could last several years.

For its operations and missions, the European Union uses, in an appropriate manner and in accordance with its procedures, the resources and capabilities of Member States, of the European Union and, if appropriate for its military operations, of NATO.

calls for early finalisation of the Directives on intra-Community transfer of defence goods and on defence procurement.

The European Council also supports the decision to launch an initiative, based on the Erasmus programme, to promote exchanges of young European officers.

6. The European Council would encourage the efforts of the Secretary-General/High Representative to establish a new, single civilian-military strategic planning structure for ESDP operations and missions.

7. The European Council states the Union's determination to continue its support for the United Nations and for the efforts made by regional security organisations, including the African Union, to promote international peace and security. It also reaffirms the goal of strengthening the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO in order to address current needs, in a spirit of mutual enhancement and respect for their decision-making autonomy. To this end, it backs the setting up of an informal EU-NATO high-level group to improve cooperation between the two organisations on the ground in a pragmatic manner. It recalls the need to exploit fully the approved framework that enables European allies which are not members of the EU to be associated with the ESDP, in compliance with EU procedures.

8. Lastly, the European Council endorses the declaration on international security adopted by the Council, which decides on specific actions to enable the EU to play a more active role in combating terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime and cyber-attacks. It asks the Council and the Member States to give substance to it by adopting appropriate policies and instruments.

### **ANNEX 3 – EUROPEAN COUNCIL DECLARATION ON THE MIDDLE EAST**

The Middle East Peace Process will remain a top priority for the European Union in 2009. A just, lasting and comprehensive peace is urgently needed. The EU will do all it can both practically and politically to drive the peace process forward next year, working closely with our international partners, and in particular in the Quartet, to promote a solution to the Israel/Palestine conflict on the basis of two states living in peace and security. The EU will also support talks between Israel and Syria, and if possible Lebanon. The European Council welcomes efforts to reinvigorate the Arab Peace Initiative (including the Arab Foreign Ministers' letter to President-elect Barack Obama) as part of a comprehensive approach for a peace between Israel and the whole region. We urge the United States under its new Administration to join us in making the Middle East Peace Process an immediate and central priority.

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## PRESIDENCY REPORT ON ESDP

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In accordance with instructions from the European Council in December 2007, the Presidency hereby submits this report on ESDP.

In submitting this report, the Presidency noted that Denmark drew attention to Protocol No 5 on the position of Denmark, annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam.

### *I. Operational activities*

#### **Africa**

##### **The fight against piracy off the Somali coast: EU NAVCO coordination action and operation ATALANTA**

###### **EU NAVCO**

With its adoption of a crisis management concept on 5 August 2008, the Council decided to contribute actively to the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1814 and 1816. The first measure to be taken was the establishment on 19 September 2008 of the **military coordination action EU NAVCO, to combat piracy and protect maritime trade**. Situated within the General Secretariat of the Council, the EU NAVCO cell, headed by naval captain Andrés Breijo Claur, consists of naval experts from several Member States. It has thus been possible to form a wide network of relationships with professionals in the maritime world.

This measure has facilitated coordination between the protection needs of vessels chartered by the World Food Programme (WFP) and other vulnerable vessels, and the presence of Member States' and third States' naval units operating in the region. Since October 2008 the action of EU NAVCO has facilitated the establishment of escort slots, to the benefit of many merchant and fishing vessels. This has enabled warships, operating under national command, to accompany merchant vessels. EU NAVCO has also contributed to increased mobilisation of the Member States, including the provision of continuous protection for vessels chartered by been invited to participate in operation ATALANTA, which is due to begin in early December 2008. The tasks of EU NAVCO will be taken over by operation ATALANTA once it is launched.

###### **Operation ATALANTA**

Increasing maritime security off the Somali coast is part of the European Union's overall action to stabilise Somalia. The task of the European Union's naval force (operation **ATALANTA**) will be to contribute to the protection of WFP vessels delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia, in accordance with the humanitarian objectives of UN Security Council Resolution 1814, the protection of vulnerable vessels cruising off the Somali coast and deterrence, prevention and intervention with a view to putting an end to acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast.

Planning work on operation ATALANTA has made rapid progress during the autumn of 2008, with the designation of the operational headquarters at Northwood (United Kingdom) and the appointment of the operation commander, Vice Admiral Philip Jones. The first on-board Force Commander, Commodore Antonios Papaioannou, has been appointed to command the naval force from the launch of the operation in December 2008.

For operational planning reasons in particular, a rotation of several on-board Force Commanders has been proposed, to cover the duration of the mandate which was set at one year by the Council Joint Action adopted on 10 November 2008. Activities will also have to be coordinated with other actors present in the operational area.

### **EUFOR Tchad/RCA**

**EUFOR Tchad/RCA**, deployed in a remote theatre which is difficult to access, is making a significant contribution to the security of this area of Africa, containing regional tensions and supporting international efforts to protect civilians hit by the Darfur regional crisis. EUFOR is patrolling a very extensive area and is lending its support to the deployment of MINURCAT. EUFOR is also implementing protection measures for humanitarian organisations, thus highlighting the European Union's essential role in facilitating access to humanitarian aid.

The EUFOR Tchad/RCA operation forms part of the multidimensional support which the European Union is providing for the region. There is complementarity between the European force and the cooperation and development measures taken by the European Community on the ground, as well as the continuing provision of humanitarian aid by the latter. The Commission's effective implementation of the accompanying programme for the stabilisation of eastern Chad, whose purpose is to contribute to that region's rehabilitation and reconstruction, is worthy of note.

In the context of the mid-term review of EUFOR Tchad/RCA, the Council had emphasised that an international military presence would still be needed in the region after the European force had departed to ensure that the progress achieved would be lasting. The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1834, which stated the United Nations' intention that a military component of MINURCAT should take over from EUFOR, is thus an important step.

The European Union has expressed its hope that the United Nations will be able to expedite the preparations for an efficient transition, together with the planning and force generation, with a view to effective transfer of authority to a United Nations military operation when the EUFOR mandate expires on 15 March 2009.

In this context, close cooperation has been established between the General Secretariat of the Council in Brussels, the operational headquarters at Mont Valérien (France) and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York.

Three non-Member States of the European Union are taking part in the operation: Albania, Croatia and Russia.

### **Democratic Republic of the Congo: EUSEC RD Congo and EUPOL RD Congo**

The two ESDP missions, together with the European Community activities, have maintained their support for the Security Sector Reform (SSR) process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) through the provision to the local authorities of expertise and technical assistance in the various areas involved (police, justice and defence). These activities are continuing despite the serious developments in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in recent months.

The extension of the **EUSEC RD Congo Mission** by one year, until 30 June 2009, demonstrates the European Union's ongoing commitment to supporting SSR in the field of defence and to the stabilisation of the Great Lakes Region. The EUSEC RD Congo mission has continued to provide support to the European Union Special Representative.

As regards the renovation of the military administration, the EUSEC RD Congo mission has continued the biometric census of the Armed Forces personnel. At the request of the Congolese Minister for Defence, implementation of the chain-of-payments project has been extended to the whole of the Armed Forces.

**EUPOL RD Congo** has, since it was launched in July 2007, continued to support the efforts to reform the Congolese National Police (CNP), in particular through the Police Reform Monitoring Committee (CSRP). The Mission also continues to facilitate links between the police and the various stages of the judicial system with the help of its justice interface.

The Mission is pursuing preparations for deployment of its unit in the east of the country (Goma and Bukavu) and is closely following the way in which the security situation in the region is developing.

In addition, a study visit by two Council working parties, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management and the Politico-Military Working Party, has been organised in December 2008. That visit should provide an opportunity to meet the EUSEC and EUPOL missions on the ground.

### **EUSSR Guinea-Bissau**

The **EUSSR Guinea-Bissau** Mission to assist the local authorities in the process of Security Sector Reform with respect to police, justice and defence was launched on 16 June 2008 for an initial period of twelve months.

There has been progress albeit not at a uniform pace in all three sectors. Despite a change of government in August, the Mission has been able to establish good relations with the local authorities, in particular through workshops organised in cooperation with the local bodies responsible for the reform process. The Mission is seen as an important contribution by the international community to the reform process.

The Mission has established very good contacts with all the international actors involved in the reform process and in particular with the European Commission delegation, the representatives deployed under the Stability Instrument, United Nations sub-organisations and ECOWAS. A meeting of the 'Friends of Guinea-Bissau' organised by the European Commission on 4 November in Brussels stressed that increased coordination between actors would be necessary.

The desire of the national political authorities for a successful conclusion of the reform process has been shown *inter alia* by completion of the census of the armed forces and the holding on 16 November of parliamentary elections which were deemed fair and transparent by international observers. That desire will be a *sine qua non* for the future commitment of the European Union and the international community.

## **Western Balkans**

### **Operation ALTHEA**

Following the successful reconfiguration of Operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in 2007 the European Union force (EUFOR) numbers some 2 200 troops on the ground, backed up by over-the-horizon reserves. Its operational priorities remain the maintenance of a safe and secure environment, the transfer of Joint Military Affairs (JMA) tasks to relevant national authorities, and support for the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina as regards training.

On 10 November 2008 the Council assessed operation ALTHEA and approved the recommendations made in the Secretary-General/High Representative's six-monthly report on the operation. The Council expressed deep concern at the recent political developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, it noted that despite a difficult political situation, the security situation remained stable.

In the context of the European Union's overall commitment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Council highlighted the decisive progress made by operation ALTHEA towards accomplishing its mandate, and in particular the completion of the military and stabilisation tasks provided for by the Dayton/Paris Agreement. Accordingly, the Council considered that the preparatory work for a possible development of the operation should be continued, taking into account the future role of the EU Special Representative.

The outcome of this preparatory work will be submitted to the Council in March 2009 so that it can take a decision on the future of the operation as soon as the conditions have been met. The future development of operation ALTHEA will have to take political developments into account.

The Council noted that cooperation with NATO on operation ALTHEA was continuing to work smoothly.

#### **EULEX Kosovo**

The **EULEX Kosovo** mission has continued its deployment and preparations for taking over operational responsibility, in accordance with the arrangements in the United Nations Secretary-General's reports of 12 June and 24 November 2008. The 24 November report was welcomed in a UN Security Council presidential statement of 26 November 2008. The mission reached its initial operational capability on 2 December. With 1 600 personnel deployed, it will commence its operations in the coming days.

In this framework, the mission will be able to start operational fulfilment of its mandate, which is to uphold and promote the rule of law Kosovo-wide under UN Security Council Resolution 1244.

In accordance with its mandate as described in the Joint Action adopted by the Council of the European Union on 4 February 2008, the EULEX mission will act in three key areas: the police, justice and customs. In these areas, EULEX Kosovo's activities will involve monitoring, mentoring and advising the competent Kosovo institutions, whilst retaining certain executive responsibilities. EULEX Kosovo will ensure that cases of war crimes, terrorism, organised crime, corruption, inter-ethnic crimes, financial/economic crimes and other serious crimes are properly investigated, prosecuted, adjudicated and enforced, according to the applicable law, including, where appropriate, by international investigators, prosecutors and judges.

EULEX will help to ensure that all Kosovo rule-of-law services, including a customs service, are free from political interference. EULEX will contribute to strengthening cooperation and coordination throughout the whole judicial process, particularly in the area of organised crime. EULEX will be able to contribute to the maintenance of public order and security in Kosovo, in cooperation with the local and international actors concerned.

#### **EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM)**

The **EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM)** has continued to promote and support the reform of the BiH police services. The Mission has concentrated on supporting the

BiH authorities in implementing the two police reform laws adopted in April 2008. The EUPM has continued its action on concrete capacity building at State level and country-wide harmonisation of all laws pertaining to law-enforcement agencies and police officials.

With the assistance of the EUPM, the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) has made substantial progress in implementing sustainable policing arrangements for the targeting of organised crime networks and bringing to justice key figures allegedly involved in serious criminal offences. The EUPM has also stepped up its action to combat organised crime by assisting with the in-depth analysis of crimes, using advanced investigative techniques and intelligence and organising a major communication and awareness-raising campaign.

The EUPM has further developed effective mechanisms for coordination between the law-enforcement agencies and the judiciary, particularly as regards relations between police and prosecutors.

The EUPM has offered to assist the BiH authorities with implementation of the strategy for border management and combating illegal immigration, which are important elements of the process of European integration.

Stefan Feller succeeded Vincenzo Coppola as head of mission on 1 November 2008.

## Asia

### **EUPOL AFGHANISTAN**

The EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (**EUPOL Afghanistan**) has actively pursued implementation of its mandate, in particular by monitoring, mentoring, advisory and training action at all levels of the command chain of the Afghan Police.

The Mission is now fully up and running. It is deployed in Kabul and in some fifteen provinces of Afghanistan, accommodated in Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Regional Commands. The Mission has endeavoured to render its action more coherent throughout Afghan territory.

The Mission has been actively contributing to work and thinking on reform of the Ministry of the Interior and the police, in particular with regard to the drafting of a *Vision for the Afghan Police* drawn up under the auspices of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, and the restructuring of the Ministry of the Interior. The Mission has also put considerable effort into interaction between the police and justice, and the areas of criminal investigation and border management.

In carrying out its mandate, in parallel with the Community actions, the Mission has sought to act in coordination with its international partners, in particular UNAMA and the United States, within the framework of the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB). Coordination has been strengthened, inter alia through the setting up of Integrated Project Teams with the United States partners. The Mission has continued to assist in the running of the IPCB Secretariat by making available staff and funding.

The decision to double the number of Mission personnel so that there are 400 staff members in the field will be implemented progressively from December 2008. That will enable the Mission, on the basis of a renewed mandate, to reinforce its activities in support of the Afghan National Police.

Kai Vittrup took over from Jürgen Scholz as Head of Mission on 16 October 2008.



## Southern Caucasus and Eastern Europe

### **EUMM Georgia**

The Council adopted the Joint Action on the **European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia)** on 15 September 2008 for a period of one year. It was launched on time under the terms of the agreement on implementation of the Ceasefire Plan of 12 August, signed by the parties on 8 September. The EU observers were deployed and began their monitoring activity, as from 1 October, mainly in the areas adjacent to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On 10 November the Council reaffirmed its determination that the mission would continue fully to implement its mandate in Georgia.

In October and November, the Mission carried out nearly 500 patrols, by day and night. Nevertheless, frequent incidents in the vicinity of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia are a reminder that the situation remains volatile and that the safety of the observers remains a priority.

In accordance with its mandate, the Mission is involving itself on the spot in the development of a conflict prevention and resolution mechanism. The EUMM acts in coordination with the actions of the European Community and complements those of the other international actors in the field, in particular the UN and the OSCE.

### **Georgia Border Support Team**

The activities of the Border Support Team in Georgia, within the office of the EUSR for the South Caucasus, have continued. The team has continued to assist the implementation of the border reform in line with Priority Area 4 of the Action Plan drawn up by the EU and Georgia under the European Neighbourhood Policy. The Georgian authorities have asked for the Border Support Team's mandate to be continued in 2009.

### **EUBAM Moldova-Ukraine**

The **EU Border Assistance Mission to the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM Moldova-Ukraine)**, which is a European Commission activity staffed to a large extent by seconded experts from EU Member States, has continued its activities. EUBAM Moldova-Ukraine assists the governments of the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine in areas involving border, customs and fiscal matters, including through monitoring activities.

## Near and Middle East

### **EUPOL COPPS**

The **EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS)** has continued its action to assist the Palestinian Civilian Police in establishing lasting and effective policing arrangements.

The Mission has embarked on setting up its Rule of Law section to assist the Palestinian justice system. It began deployment of its new staff in September bringing its personnel in the field up to around fifty. The Mission has started to draft its strategy for assisting the Palestinian courts and the prison sector. This document should be finalised by the beginning of 2009. In parallel, the Council has begun discussions on the extension of the Mission's mandate until the end of 2010.

The EU has also embarked on an evaluation of what is needed by the Palestinian Authority to reinforce its support for the rule of law in the Palestinian Territories. Following deployment of a fact-finding mission in June 2008, supplementary evaluations in the field have been launched with a view to a possible expansion of the EUPOL COPPS mandate at the beginning of 2009, and the stepping up of actions by the European Community and the Member States as part of the implementation of the EU Action Strategy.

### **EUBAM Rafah**

The **EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah)** suspended its operations after the closure of the Rafah Crossing Point at the time of the takeover of Gaza by Hamas in June 2007 while maintaining its operational capability to redeploy at short notice.

The Council has reiterated its commitment to the EUBAM Rafah, to the Agreements concluded and to the region, in particular the population of Gaza. It has underlined the importance of the implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access by all parties. The EU remains ready, as it has promised, to redeploy to the Rafah Crossing Point as soon as conditions allow. On 10 November 2008 the Council adopted a Joint Action extending the mandate of the Mission until November 2009.

Alain Faugeras took over from Pietro Pistolese as Head of Mission on 25 November 2008.

### **EUJUST LEX**

The EU's Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (**EUJUST LEX**) continued its activities to assist with the training provided by the Member States for senior Iraqi police officers, prosecutors, judges and prison governors. So far, the Mission has facilitated the training of more than 1 800 senior Iraqi civil servants.

Work on a renewed European Union commitment to the rule of law involving Community assistance, the ESDP Mission and Member States' programmes has been initiated on the basis of an evaluation of what is needed for justice and the rule of law in Iraq.

The EU has agreed in particular to extend and reinforce the EUJUST LEX's mandate as from June 2009, making it possible for the Mission to carry out pilot activities on Iraqi territory where security conditions permit.

Pilot actions would focus on consolidation of the activities undertaken, training on Iraqi territory and strategic advice, while pursuing the activities conducted in the Member States.

## *II. Lessons learned*

The Council of the European Union on 10 November adopted **guidelines for the identification and implementation of lessons learned and best practice** in ESDP civilian missions. Certain international organisations and NGOs gave accounts of their experience for the purpose of drawing up these guidelines.

The guidelines should make possible a systematic follow-up in order to identify and implement lessons learned, as well as the creation of an institutional training programme in which the lessons identified are turned into best practice. This new system will be implemented gradually in 2008 and 2009. Similarly, a report identifying lessons learned after the end of the EUPOL Kinshasa Mission has been approved.

### III. Capabilities

#### (a) Civilian capabilities

In accordance with the plan for implementation of the new **Headline Goal 2010**, the process of planning civilian capabilities has focused in the second half of 2008 on the establishment of a **civilian strategic option** (on the basis of the common pilot illustrative scenario drawn up during the first half of 2008, a scenario supportive of both civilian and military ESDP capability development processes, taking into account the relevant capabilities available to the European Community).

This civilian strategic option has served as the basis for drawing up a list of **the capabilities necessary**, with the emphasis on personnel requirements. The General Secretariat of the Council has launched a study of the possibility of Member States making available the experts required. In parallel, the Member States have been invited to confirm again or modify the indications regarding the possibility of making available civilian personnel for ESDP Missions which they gave for the Capability Headline Goal 2008.

The General Secretariat of the Council has continued work on finalisation of the **Civilian Capability Management Tool**, and in particular of a specific software application comprising several interconnected modules on a secure internet site.

On the issue of **mission support**, the implementation of a global work programme to strengthen capacity is continuing (traffic light). The lessons learned from the rapid deployment of the Mission in Georgia will help to reinforce the work that has been undertaken.

On the issue of **human resources**, the expert workshops set up in the summer of 2008 under the 'Human Resources Action Plan for Civilian ESDP Missions' are considering the requirements to be satisfied by such personnel together with the procedures for generating forces and for deployment. The final report, scheduled for the winter of 2009, will ensure a standard approach and the dissemination of best practice. The publicising of ESDP Mission calls for contributions on the websites of the Council General Secretariat and the Missions has continued (for example, in a context of rapid deployment, to recruit support staff for EUMM Georgia Mission). Finally, a review of the 'guidelines for the daily allowances applicable to civilian ESDP personnel' has begun in order to adapt the existing system of allowances.

Regarding the **Civilian Response Teams (CRTs)**, the creation of a group of 100 experts, which was begun at the end of 2007, was concluded in the summer of 2008. A fifth induction training course for the Civilian Response Teams was held in October 2008 with financial support from the European Commission. The need to increase the number of experts in the fields of finance and procurement has already been highlighted. Efforts are continuing to train the members of the CRTs in order to equip them with the appropriate tools and facilitate their rapid deployment. In the second half of 2008, a Civilian Response Team comprising seven people was deployed in Georgia.

The concept of **Preparatory Measures** (and preparatory teams, in the context of the preparatory-measures budget line within the CFSP budget, still being drawn up) was tested in the case of planning the EUMM Georgia. That experience highlighted in particular the importance of deploying a sufficient number of administration experts and the need for an instrument making possible procurement for a forthcoming mission during the preparatory period.

The lessons learned will be taken into account in the European Commission's Framework Decision on this budget line in 2009.

On the issue of logistics, a framework document on logistics for Civilian ESDP Missions has been drawn up to provide common bases for all missions. A detailed logistics handbook covering all the necessary procedures is being finalised.

Regarding **procurement**, the conclusion of framework contracts is continuing in order to establish a proper catalogue of contracts. The framework contract for off-road vehicles drawn up in the spring of 2008 plays a key role in equipping EULEX Kosovo whereas some difficulties are being experienced with implementation of the framework contract for armoured vehicles. For insurance policies and communication and information systems, contractual procedures are in progress. In future, the catalogue should be supplemented by framework contracts in the medical and container fields. In addition to this catalogue, a study is under way on possible equipment-storage options to deal with immediate-deployment situations.

The procurement and finance training of experts for ESDP Missions and CRTs continues to strengthen ESDP personnel capacity in these specialised fields. At the same time, common tools have been put in place, in particular a technical database for the preparation of calls to tender. Support reinforced by the deployment of a roving expert is also planned by the European Commission.

A practical **handbook** to assist missions is being drawn up by the General Secretariat of the Council and the European Commission and will be distributed to missions via a secure website. A system for transmitting the missions' administrative reports to the General Secretariat of the Council and the European Commission has been put in place. All these developments might make it possible to decentralise funding powers to Heads of Mission.

In further work on civilian capabilities, the Council of the European Union on 10 November 2008 endorsed **Ministerial Commitments as regards the Development of Civilian Capabilities** and a **progress report** on the implementation of the new Civilian

The Council of the European Union on 10 November noted the statement that the **Watchkeeping Capability** and **Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability** had attained full operational capability in August and November 2008 respectively.

## **(b) Military capabilities (including capability projects developed in the European Defence Agency)**

Within the context of the Headline Goal 2010, new contributions to the Force Catalogue have been announced by some Member States, and are currently being studied. They will be taken into account in a new version of the Force Catalogue, to be produced during the first half of 2009. The EUMC has launched work to draw up a methodology to measure progress on capability development.

The **Capability Development Plan**, of which an initial version and a first series of priority actions were approved by the EDA Steering Board in July 2008, will enable the Member States to focus their capability efforts on areas where there are gaps in the European Union's operational capability.

Through the 'Defence Ministers' Military Capabilities Development Commitments', considerable efforts have already been made to contribute by means of concrete and operational initiatives to resolving those gaps and thus strengthen the European Union's external action capability.

### Force projection

A series of initiatives, launched in variable configurations, should enable the Member States concerned to ensure better **force projection in external theatres**: preparations with a view to the establishment of a European airlift fleet (signing of a Declaration of Intent by 12 Member States), the establishment of an A400M multinational unit (signing of a Declaration of Intent by four Member States) and the imminent establishment of a European airlift command, initiated by several Member States. Lastly, the projection of an airbase during the BAPEX national exercise will illustrate the deployment of an airbase for a European force.

**The European Carrier Group Interoperability Initiative**, based on a Declaration of Intent signed by nine Member States, will promote the interoperability of European navies and their carrier air groups and improve the efficiency of EU and of NATO operations.

With a view to improving **helicopter deployment** in crisis management operations, including EU ones, the EDA Steering Board has approved a roadmap with a view to the launch in 2010 of a tactical training programme for helicopter pilots, and the EDA has started work on upgrading helicopters, the preliminary results of which are due to be presented in the spring of 2009. A multinational helicopter fund has been put in place. This should allow the financing of initiatives, including projects in the EDA or NATO framework, relating to the training of pilots and crews and to the upgrading of helicopters. The intention to assign the ad hoc Franco-German project on a future transport helicopter to the EDA has been confirmed by both countries.

### Space

The future of the European Union's space observation capability must be ensured.

A Letter of Intent has been signed by five Member States, which confirmed their intention to cooperate under the MUSIS project and to involve the EDA under an ad hoc project.

The European Space Agency and the EDA are working, in their respective spheres of competence, to increase European space surveillance capability.

Finally, considerable efforts have been made to facilitate access to government-source satellite images by the European Union Satellite Centre. This will enhance the Union's analysis capability for the conduct of ESDP crisis management operations and missions.

### Maritime aspect

European maritime **surveillance capability** should be improved, especially as a result of EDA initiatives, including the ad hoc project on the future surveillance UAV (Unmanned Air Vehicle) (with the participation of seven Member States) and the work on the networking of European maritime surveillance systems.

A major effort will be made as regards maritime mine clearance following the launch by 10 Member States (plus Norway) of an ad hoc project in the EDA framework.

### Force Protection

Progress has been made in the EDA framework with a view to the launch in 2009 of a programme to enhance and develop equipment to combat biological agents.

### Communications

Work is under way on establishing communications and information systems, such as the EU

OPSWAN (*Operations Wide Area Network*) system, connecting Brussels, EU operational headquarters provided by the Member States, and the agencies concerned, such as the EU Satellite Centre.

### **Rapid response**

The review of the rapid response concept should be concluded as soon as possible. It will take into account the progress made since 2003: the drawing up of the battlegroup concept in 2006, and the drafting in 2007 of maritime and air rapid response concepts. This work will maintain a high level of ambition with regard to rapid response, from the planning phase.

Progress has been made in the implementation of the Maritime Rapid Response and Air Rapid Response Concepts: at the Maritime Rapid Response and Air Rapid Response information conferences held in October 2008, the Member States reviewed the resources and capabilities they had declared for 2009, and gave their initial indications for 2010 and beyond.

At the Battlegroups Coordination Conference held in October 2008, Member States committed themselves in detail to providing the required number of battlegroups up to the first half of 2011. A generic preparation guide for battlegroups was finalised in July; it will be used by those Member States which wish to do so, to prepare battlegroups before their standby period. The document provides for the harmonisation of battlegroup planning and training, and hence better interoperability between the forces of the Member States.

### **European multinational forces**

Multinational forces represent a considerable potential for the European Union's capability for external action. Work is in hand to facilitate the use of European multinational forces in ESDP operations.

The first stage, which is currently being studied, consists of identifying Member States' willingness to facilitate the use of such forces in the ESDP framework.

### **Evacuating nationals**

Issues relating to the mobilisation of military assets within the framework provided by the consular lead State concept are under consideration.

### **Organisation of the European Union Military Staff (EUMS)**

The European Union Watchkeeping Capability has been fully operational since 1 August 2008. It monitors all ESDP operations and missions.

On 10 November 2008, the Council noted the implementation of the measures which it had asked the Secretary-General/High Representative to take, in May 2007 following the informal Ministerial meeting in Wiesbaden, regarding in particular enhancing the planning abilities of the EUMS, increasing its staffing, undertaking its provisional restructuring and reviewing its terms of reference.

The EUMS was restructured in March 2008. The EUMS now has a team of military planners who have already been working to support the planning of the European Union mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia), and planning for the European Union operation to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia (ATALANTA). The new military analysis and planning section of the Military Staff has only just completed its training period. New more selective recruitment criteria should make it possible to improve the quality of Military Staff personnel in the medium term.

The Council has indicated that it will return to this matter at its meeting in May 2009, on the basis of a report from the Secretary-General/High Representative.

### **Feedback from experience**

The Military Staff continued developing the 'lessons learned' process (ELPRO – EUMS Lessons Process), which has proved to be a useful tool for managing feedback from experience in military activities. The database currently contains 455 lessons relating to 8 types of military activity (linked to operations, exercises and battle groups). Among them, 102 come from recent lessons learned from EUFOR CHAD/CAR, MILEX08 and the Nordic battle groups and HELBROC.

### **(c) European Defence Agency**

The Head of the Agency's report highlighted noticeable progress on finalising the strategic framework and implementing elements of it (the CDP and three strategies), and on preparing, generating and launching specific cooperative initiatives.

The long-term strategic framework has been supplemented by:

- ▶ the initial version of the Capability Development Plan (CDP), approved by the Steering Board in July, which will enable the Member States to focus their capability related efforts. Twelve priority areas of action have been selected by the Member States;
- ▶ two new strategies, one on European armaments cooperation and the other on defence research and technology in Europe, adopted by the Steering Board in October and November respectively.

Concrete progress has been made in the implementation of the strategy to strengthen the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB), adopted in May 2007, in particular: (i) adoption of a Code of Conduct on offsets, aimed at mitigating their adverse impact on competition and the EDTIB; (ii) agreement on specific measures to support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and non-traditional suppliers; (iii) the encouraging continuation of efforts to open up defence markets in Europe through the Code of Conduct on defence procurement.

In addition to the progress made on practical capabilities projects (see above), the EDA has made substantial progress on specific projects and initiatives:

- ▶ in the field of airworthiness, the setting up of a European Union forum for military airworthiness authorities;
- ▶ provisional support for intelligence training activities;
- ▶ increased efforts in cooperation on research and technology, with the signature of the arrangement for a defence research and technology Joint Investment Programme on innovative concepts and emerging technologies, and the launch of eight projects in the framework of the Joint Investment Programme on force protection.

The EDA continued its efforts to ensure that its work is complementary with the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR) and the LoI, in compliance with the provisions of the Joint Action. In its statement on cooperation between the EDA and OCCAR,

the Council called on the EDA to conclude an administrative arrangement with OCCAR, to organise the relationship between them. Cooperation between the two bodies will help to safeguard the continuity of the development of capability plans. The EDA continued its efforts to ensure that its work was consistent with NATO's, in accordance with the provisions of the Joint Action. The EDA also made a substantial contribution to the EU-NATO Capability Group.

#### **European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB)**

The European Union must pursue its efforts, also in the Community context and within the EDA, to secure a robust and competitive EDTIB capable of meeting the Member States' capability requirements and of supporting the ESDP. In particular, further consideration should be given to the questions of reinforcing security of supply, opening up national markets and strengthening supply chains, notably through measures to encourage SMEs.

#### ***IV. Civil-military coordination***

The Council took note of the continuing work on Information Exchange Requirements, in the framework defined by the competent Council bodies.

The Council also noted that a project on network-enabled capabilities in the ESDP framework is currently being examined by the relevant Council bodies. Development of the concept is to be based on work relating to Information Exchange Requirements (IER).

The Secretary-General/High Representative intends to set up a single strategic civilian-military planning structure for ESDP operations and missions, aiming to enhance the coherence of the civilian and military aspects of our operations, which represent the European Union's specific and unique added value.

#### ***V. EU Satellite Centre***

The European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC) is now going to have access to government-source satellite images from Helios II, Cosmo-Skymed and SAR-Lupe. That access will improve the quality of its products.

The EU Satellite Centre has continued to provide analytical products and services in support of the ESDP and European Union operations and missions.

In particular, in support of EUFOR Tchad/RCA, successful cooperation has continued between the Operational Headquarters in Mont Valérien and the EUSC. This cooperation has been facilitated by an ad hoc arrangement between Helios partners, with the aim of providing access to government images available very rapidly.

The Satellite Centre has also offered products and analyses in support of the European Union mission in Georgia.

In addition, the Satellite Centre is offering support to the Operational Headquarters in Northwood for the ATALANTA operation.

The establishment of the secure communications network EU OPSWAN will facilitate access to products from the Satellite Centre, particularly for the European Union's operational headquarters. The tactical station for the exploitation of images, currently at the demonstration stage, will make it possible to receive data from different sources for exploitation and use in the context of EU operations and missions.



Close cooperation with the UN has continued, particularly in connection with the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).

The EUSC has taken an active role in the framework of the European initiative of Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES). The Centre has also participated in research projects relating to the security aspect of GMES.

## *VI. EU Institute for Security Studies*

The EU Institute for Security Studies continued its work with regard to research, debate and analysis on security issues.

The Institute formed a focal point for academic exchange, networking and monitoring of the European security agenda as well as a policy-orientated think tank supplying European policy-makers with analysis, advice and suggestions.

The Institute organised, in cooperation with other European political and research centres, a series of seminars on the implementation of the European Security Strategy, which contributed to a better understanding of the Union's progress as an international player and in promoting a stronger and safer Europe. On 5 and 6 June 2008 in Rome, the Institute co-organised a seminar with the Istituto Affari Internazionali, on the EU and global governance. It also held a seminar on European neighbourhood on 27 and 28 June 2008 in Warsaw, with the Natolin European centre and a seminar on the EU's approach to international security on 18 and 19 September in Helsinki with the Finnish Institute of International Affairs and the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. The debate ended with the Paris Forum on Europe's strategic interests and options, held in cooperation with French Presidency of the Council of the European Union.

The Institute organised a series of seminars, for example on security in the Middle East, WMD, non-proliferation and disarmament on 19 and 20 June 2008, and on strengthening ESDP on 18 and 19 September 2008. The annual conference was held on 30 and 31 October 2008, and the first EU-Washington Forum took place on 20 and 21 November 2008. The Institute co-organised a seminar on Georgia and the EU from 15 to 18 July 2008 in Tbilisi with the Georgian foundation for security and international studies. Finally, the ISS contributed actively to the organisation, with the Ravand Institute, of a seminar in Tehran on 6 and 7 December 2008 on the European Union and Iran, which focused on the European Union's foreign policy and on the future of relations between the European Union and Iran.

## *VII. Security Sector Reform (SSR)*

Security Sector Reform is an important field of the European Union's activities, as is illustrated by several ESDP missions.

To enhance the European Union's capability in the area of Security Sector Reform, on 10 November 2008 the Council approved the creation of a pool of European experts in this area, which will make it possible to set up teams deployable as needed to take part in actions to support security sector reform in partner countries. The missions and training courses in which these experts take part will contribute to creating a community of European experts in the field of SSR.

Work on implementing this project is already under way. Member States will receive a progress report at the beginning of 2009.

A pilot project on security sector reform was organised jointly by France and the Netherlands in the Hague from 20 to 23 October 2008, under the auspices of the European Security and Defence College.

A seminar on cooperation between the European Union and civil-society actors in the area of Security Sector Reform was organised in Brussels by the French Presidency on 12 September 2008, in cooperation with the EPLO (European Peace-building Liaison Office) European network and the Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). The Council General Secretariat, the European Commission, representatives of CIVCOM, the PMG, the CODEV and COAFR Working Parties and several experts from civil society organisations attended the meeting.

### *VIII. Human rights and gender issues*

The need to mainstream human rights issues, including children and women affected by armed conflict and gender issues, in the planning and conduct of ESDP missions and operations, has been reiterated.

In this connection, the need for continuing implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1325, 1612 and 1820 and for increased participation by women in ESDP missions and operations was underlined. In particular, closer cooperation on these issues with the EU Special Representatives (EUSRs), whose mandates henceforward contain dedicated human rights provisions, and with the European Commission, was advocated.

On 10 October 2008, in the context of the priority it is giving to combating violence against women, the French Presidency organised a conference in cooperation with UNIFEM entitled 'Implementing SCR 1325 and 1820 in EU missions: Improving immediate and long-term security for women'. The conference focused on concrete examples of implementation and on the interaction between political decision-makers and personnel present on the ground. The conference ended with a series of concrete and operational conclusions and recommendations for enhanced EU action to implement United Nations Security Council resolutions 1325 and 1820. On this basis, the relevant European Union texts have been merged and amended to produce a new document entitled 'Implementation of UNSCR 1325 and 1820 in the context of ESDP'. The document was approved by the Council on 8 December 2008.

### *IX. Conflict prevention*

Efforts were pursued to improve the culture and strategy of conflict prevention. In this connection, the French Presidency of the European Union, in close cooperation with the general Secretariat of the Council, the European Commission and the EPLO (European Peace-building Liaison Office) European network, supported a seminar organised by the Madariaga – College of Europe Foundation and the Folke Bernadotte Academy on Conflict Prevention and the Fight against Illicit Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (16 and 17 October 2008, Brussels).

This seminar formed part of the work of the United Nations Group of Experts on the Arms Trade Treaty and made possible an update on implementation of the European Strategy to Combat SALW, which was adopted in 2005 by the European Council in association with representatives of the African Union and other sub-regional organisations and the representatives of civil society.

An action plan for pooling Member States' best practices in the field of conflict prevention has been approved for 2009-2010.

### *X. Visibility of the ESDP*

During the second half of 2008, the EU continued its action to enhance visibility of the ESDP. While its activities in the field of crisis management are growing and the EU is taking on increasing responsibility for the stabilisation and peaceful development of regions affected by conflicts throughout the world, there is a clear need to continue to effectively communicate its goals and aims to the broader public, decision-makers and major stakeholders. The communications activities carried out by the Council Press Office on the occasion of the launching of the Civilian Monitoring Mission in Georgia and of a maritime operation off the coast of Somalia have highlighted the EU's capacity to respond to these challenges. Other outreach campaigns have targeted key events in the course of operations. The ESDP continues to attract very considerable public interest.

### *XI. Cooperation with non-governmental organisations*

In order to step up the dialogue between NGOs and Council preparatory bodies, the Presidency invited NGO representatives to brief members of the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, in accordance with the recommendations for increased cooperation with NGOs and civil society organisations.

The Presidency has also organised two seminars, on reform of the security sector and conflict prevention respectively, in partnership with NGOs and civil society organisations.

### *XII. ESDC and training*

On the basis of the Study on the future perspectives of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC), which particularly stresses the growing demand for training in the ESDP field faced by the College, its Steering Committee recommended improving the functioning of the College by giving it a larger secretariat, a budget of its own and legal personality. The Council has approved these recommendations.

On 10 November 2008, the Council approved the launch of the European young officers exchange scheme, modelled on Erasmus. The aim is to develop exchanges between officers in their initial training phase, in order to reinforce the ability of the European armed forces to work together and the interoperability of forces. This initiative, which will facilitate exchanges between national training colleges, will be implemented on a national and voluntary basis, with assistance from the European Security and Defence College (ESDC).

In July 2008, the analysis of training needs in the ESDP area was approved. It has been published on the European Security and Defence College website.

In the last six months, the European Security and Defence College has begun the 2008/2009 academic year with the ESDP High Level Course 2008/2009. An experimental internet-based distance-learning (IDL) course was established to support the first module of the High Level Course. Experience has confirmed the great potential which IDL capacity could have in the training process.

The ESDC also organised two ESDP Orientation Courses, with the aim of giving participants a solid general knowledge of the ESDP. The two courses, which were organised jointly with the French *Institut des hautes études de défense nationale* (IHEDN) and the German *Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik*, took place in Brussels from 15 to 19 September and from 24 to 28 November 2008.

The ESDC organised a course jointly with the IHEDN intended for press and public information staff from 17 to 19 November 2008, to familiarise them with the ESDP.

The ESDC also developed new types of training activity. From 20 to 23 October 2008, a pilot course on security sector reform (SSR) was organised jointly in The Hague. Several Member States expressed their intention to organise a further course on SSR in 2009. In addition, a seminar on leadership and decision-making in the ESDP area was organised jointly with the Italian Centro Alti Studi Difesa in Rome from 29 to 31 October 2008. Finally, a course on the planning process for European Union crisis management operations and missions was organised jointly in Brussels from 3 to 5 December 2008.

In total, the ESDC has provided training to 1543 people since it was created in 2005.

The second session of the programme for the operational training of police experts to be deployed in international missions including those of the United Nations, co-financed by the European Commission under the Instrument for Stability, was held in France in November, at the National Training Centre for Gendarmerie Forces at St Astier. Some 300 personnel from 20 police forces from 18 Member States participated in that session.

### *XIII. Exercises*

The holding of the second European Union crisis management exercise CME 08, which went well, made possible the simultaneous and coordinated planning of a military operation and a civilian mission engaged in the same theatre. The exercise took place from 24 November to 5 December, and involved the European Operational Headquarters in Mont Valérien (France), which is also involved in the conduct of the EUFOR Tchad/RCA operation, as well as the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPC).

The third European Union military exercise (MILEX 08) from 19 to 27 June 2008 went well and demonstrated the full capability of the Rome (Italy) European Operational Headquarters to conduct European Union military operations.

There was satisfactory progress with preparations for the CME 09 crisis management exercise. That exercise will involve the Operations Centre, in an appropriate scenario.

There has been satisfactory progress with preparations for the military exercise MILEX 09. That exercise will, in the framework of a scenario for a military operation including maritime aspects, involve the European Operational Headquarters in Larissa (Greece) and the European Forces Headquarters in Naples (Italy).

### *XIV. Cooperation with international organisations, Mediterranean partners and third states*

#### **European Union – United Nations**

EU-UN cooperation is an important component of ESDP.

On 10 November 2008 the Council took note of the progress achieved in implementing the

2007 joint statement, in particular by a widening and deepening of the area of cooperation between the two organisations in the following areas: early warning; training and exercises; planning; arrangements for transition between operations; and security sector reform.

It is necessary to continue close coordination between the two organisations in theatres of operation in which they are jointly committed, notably in the Central African Republic, Chad, Kosovo, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau and Somalia. On 26 September 2008, the Presidency organised a ministerial seminar on cooperation between the EU and the UN on crisis management, in the margins of the United Nations General Assembly and in the presence of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Secretary-General/High Representative, the Commissioner with responsibility for External Relations and the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Discussions covered possible new areas of cooperation, and the resources needed to strengthen the partnership between the two organisations on crisis management and security.

Also, jointly with the Folke Bernadotte Academy (Sweden), the Presidency organised an International Forum from 20 to 22 October 2008 in Paris on the challenges of peacekeeping operations, entitled '*Partnerships – The United Nations, the European Union and the regional dimensions of peace operations: examples of cooperation within the framework of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter*'. The seminar analysed the evolution of the relationship between the United Nations and other international organisations, using the example of UN-EU cooperation and the lessons learned from recent cooperation. Humanitarian aspects, the development and consolidation of peace, and the reform of security systems were also addressed.

The EU-UN Steering Committee met on 24 and 25 November 2008 in New York. It discussed the operations which are under way or at the planning stage, as well as horizontal aspects such as planning, joint support for mission and operations, civil protection and mediation capabilities. The PSC was informed of the outcome of the Committee's proceedings.

## European Union – NATO

The importance of good operational cooperation between the European Union and NATO in theatres in which the two organisations are jointly committed was recalled. The high-level seminar on relations between the Union and NATO, organised in Paris on 7 July 2008 in the presence of the Secretaries-General of the two organisations, confirmed the need for more far-reaching cooperation between them in the direction of mutual reinforcement of their activities. In this context, the strategic partnership between the European Union and NATO must be strengthened.

It is also important to continue cooperation between the European Union and NATO on military capabilities development matters. As the Council noted on 10 November 2008, the EU-NATO Capability Group continued to provide a forum for exchanging information on the development of military capabilities in the European Union and in NATO where requirements overlapped (e.g. externalisation of logistic support, helicopters, radio spectrum, etc.). In this way the EU-NATO Capability Group has contributed to transparency between the two organisations in accordance with the capabilities development mechanism. Before and after each meeting Member States were briefed in detail on the items on the agenda of the Capability Group's proceedings. Henceforward Malta will attend EU-NATO Capability Group meetings. The participation of all the EU Member States would facilitate exchange of information in the field of military capabilities further still.

## European Union – Africa

Progress has been made with implementing the European Union-Africa Joint Strategy and its 2008-2010 Action Plan, both adopted at the European Union-Africa Summit which took place in Lisbon in December 2007.

The first meeting in Brussels on 30 September 2008 between the members of the European Union's Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the members of the African Union's Peace and Security Council (PSC) afforded the opportunity of further enhancing crisis-management ties and dialogue between the African Union and the European Union, with regard to such essential issues as strengthening the African peace and security architecture and African peace-keeping capabilities. The meeting made it possible to reiterate the need for progress on specific dossiers, in particular concerning the AMANI AFRICA (EURO RECAMP) Cycle intended to assist with establishment of the African Standby Force, which was launched on 21 November 2008, and with European Union support for the African peacekeeping training centres, which will already take effect in the first quarter of 2009 as part of the new Peace Facility.

Regular organisation of the joint meetings between members of the European Union's PSC and the African Union's PSC is to be encouraged.

## EU – OSCE

In Georgia, the OSCE and the Civilian ESDP Mission EUMM are cooperating closely in monitoring the plan for implementation of the agreement of 12 August, signed by all parties on 8 September. Coordination between the monitoring actions of the two organisations is important for the success of the Missions and for peace in the region.

## Cooperation with EUROPOL

Work on mechanisms for cooperation between civilian ESDP missions and EUROPOL on the exchange of strategic information led to the signing on 18 July 2008 of an arrangement between the Secretary-General/High Representative for the CFSP and the Director of EUROPOL. The Council called on Member States, in close cooperation with EUROPOL and the Council General Secretariat, to implement a mechanism for the exchange of information via the National Units for the EULEX Kosovo Mission without delay. The Council also invited the Council General Secretariat and EUROPOL to conduct a joint assessment of the implementation of the mechanism before June 2009.

## Cooperation with third States

The European Union continued the close cooperation in ESDP crisis management with the non-EU European NATO members and countries which are candidates for accession to the EU, and with Canada, the United States, Russia, Ukraine and other third States. Non-EU European NATO members and countries which are candidates for accession to the EU met regularly with the PSC and the EUMC regarding the development of European Union military operations.

Dialogue and cooperation with Mediterranean partners in the area of ESDP continued. Several of them participate in operations and training activities run by the European Union.

An informal meeting was held between members of the PSC and non-EU NATO members and countries that are candidates for accession (Canada, Croatia, FYROM, Iceland, Norway, Turkey and the United States) in Brussels on 8 October 2008. That meeting resulted in a fruitful exchange on operational questions of mutual interest.

Many third-country participants also took part in the ESDP Orientation Course organised by the European Security and Defence College, which took place in Brussels from 15 to 19 September 2008. Several third States were invited to propose candidates for the course which was held from 24 to 28 November 2008.

Several third States continued to take part in the ALTHEA military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Albania, Chile, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Switzerland and Turkey). Albania, Croatia and Russia are participating in the EUFOR Tchad/RCA operation. In the context of the military coordination action being conducted by EU NAVCO in support of United Nations Security Council resolutions 1816 and 1814, contacts have been established with several third States which are concerned by the situation in the region. Those contacts will be continued with a view to the possible participation of third States in the ATALANTA operation.

### *XV. Mandate for the incoming presidency*

On the basis of the present report and taking into account the European Security Strategy, the incoming Presidency, assisted by the Secretary General/High Representative and in association with the Commission, is invited to continue work on developing the European Security and Defence Policy, and in particular:

- To prepare and ensure effective implementation of decisions relating to present and future missions and operations, both civilian and military.
- To continue to develop civilian capabilities in the framework of the Civilian Headline Goal 2010, taking into account the commitments of Ministers on the Civilian Capabilities approved on 10 November 2008, and to ensure follow-up to the initiatives for the enhanced effectiveness of civilian crisis management.
- To continue work on the development of military capabilities in the framework of the Headline Goal 2010, focusing on recommendations from the Progress Catalogue 07 in conjunction with the Capability Development Plan.
- To support the European Defence Agency (EDA) in its work, in particular with regard to the Capability Development Plan (CDP) and strengthening the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), taking into account consequent steps elaborated by the EDA.
- To further develop work on concrete capability projects and initiatives, including those developed by the EDA.
- On the basis of the report and recommendations by the Secretary-General/High Representative which were adopted by the GAERC in November 2007, to continue work on implementing the recommendations addressing shortcomings in the EUMS's ability to conduct planning for EU-led operations at the strategic level, with a view to the SG/HR's presenting a report at the GAERC in May 2009.
- Relating to the civil-military coordination (CMCO), to further develop work on the EU Network Enabled Capability concept.
- To continue implementing the EU exercise programme, including conducting the compre-

hensive evaluation of CME 08 and taking forward the work on the planning of the Crisis Management Exercise CME 09.

- ▶ To continue the effort to maximise the efficiency and effectiveness of the planning, conduct and control of civilian ESDP missions.
- ▶ To implement the Guidelines for identification and implementation of lessons and best practices in civilian ESDP missions.
- ▶ To strengthen training in the field of ESDP, encompassing both civilian and military dimensions, in particular through the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) and taking into account national activities as well as the Community instruments.
- ▶ To take further the work on the ESDP contribution to Security Sector Reform (SSR), in particular on creating a pool of experts who would form teams deployable in the framework of EU missions.
- ▶ On the basis of the 'Joint Statement on EU – UN Cooperation in crisis management', to continue to promote consultations and cooperation with the United Nations in the field of crisis management.
- ▶ To enhance EU-NATO strategic partnership in crises management, to ensure effective and practical coordination, including on the security of EU civilian missions, where the two organisations are engaged in the same theatre, notably in Kosovo and Afghanistan; to ensure the mutually reinforcing development of capabilities where the requirements overlap, including through exchange of information in the EU-NATO Capability Group; to continue the implementation of the existing framework of cooperation between the EU and NATO
- ▶ To continue the EU engagement in the Western Balkans through ongoing and future activities and to continue the dialogue with Mediterranean partners participating in the Barcelona process.
- ▶ On the basis of the Africa-EU Joint Strategy and the Action Plan (2008-2010), to continue strengthening the strategic partnership between the EU and Africa in the area of African capabilities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. To further assist in development of the African Standby Force, including through conduct of the AMANI AFRICA/EURO RECAMP Cycle.
- ▶ To continue close dialogue and cooperation with other key partners.
- ▶ To follow on promoting the implementation of relevant human rights-related provisions in the context of the ESDP crisis management activities, as well as gender mainstreaming and the subject of Children and Armed conflicts.
- ▶ To continue dialogue and exchange of information with NGOs and civil society in accordance with Recommendations for Enhancing Cooperation with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in the Framework of EU Civilian Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention.
- ▶ To continue the implementation of Conflict Prevention including launching a two-year programme 'Sharing of Best Practices' as well as to prepare a Presidency Report on Conflict Prevention to be adopted by the European Council in June 2009.
- ▶ To enhance the ESDP information and communication activities with a view to further raising the ESDP profile within the EU and outside.
- ▶ To work on implementing the European young officers exchange scheme, modeled on ERASMUS.



## Middle East Peace Process – Quartet Statement

New York, 15 December 2008

Representatives of the Quartet – U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union Javier Solana, European Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner, and French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner – endorsed the following statement on the situation in the Middle East. They were joined by Quartet Representative Tony Blair.

The Quartet reaffirmed support for the bilateral, comprehensive, direct, uninterrupted, confidential and ongoing Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and commended Israel and the Palestinians for their continuous efforts to conclude a peace treaty resolving all outstanding issues without exception, as stated by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni during their November 9 briefing in Sharm el Sheikh. The Quartet expressed its considered view that the bilateral negotiations process launched at Annapolis is irreversible and that these negotiations should be intensified in order to put an end to the conflict and to establish as soon as possible the state of Palestine, living side by side in peace and security with Israel. The Quartet affirmed that a final treaty and a lasting peace will be reached through simultaneous and mutually re-enforcing efforts on three tracks: negotiations; building the institutions of a Palestinian state – including facilitating economic development through an improvement of conditions on the ground; and implementation of the parties' obligations under the Roadmap, as stated in the Annapolis Joint Understanding.

Taking note of the resolutions adopted by the Arab League on November 26, the Quartet reiterated that a lasting solution to the situation in Gaza can only be achieved through peaceful means. It reiterated its previous call for all Palestinians to commit themselves to non-violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations. Restoring Palestinian unity based on the commitments of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) – the legitimate and internationally recognized representative of the Palestinian people – would be an important factor in this process.

The Quartet reiterated its support for the Egyptian-brokered calm that came into effect on June 19, 2008, urged that it be respected and extended, and expressed the hope that it would lead to improved security and humanitarian conditions for Israelis and Palestinians alike, actions to alleviate humanitarian conditions, and the restoration of normal civilian life in Gaza. In this regard, the Quartet expressed concern that the Egyptian-brokered calm had been challenged, condemned indiscriminate attacks on Israel, and called for an immediate cessation of violence. The Quartet stated its acute concern regarding the recent increase in the closures of crossing points in response to violence in Gaza, which have limited the range and quantity of basic commodities, humanitarian supplies, and PA and UNRWA currency needs available in Gaza, worsening the economic and humanitarian situation on the ground. The Quartet emphasized that the provision of humanitarian supplies, including food, fuel, pharmaceuticals, water and sewage maintenance items, and to the people in Gaza must be assured continuously. The Quartet also reiterated its previous call for Israel to allow into Gaza sufficient materials to facilitate the resumption of stalled UN and other donor projects and expressed its support for the efforts of the Secretary General and Quartet Representative Blair

in this regard. The Quartet called for the immediate and unconditional release of Israeli Corporal Gilad Shalit.

The Quartet called on all States to demonstrate their support for the Annapolis process and their commitment to the two-state solution by contributing to an environment conducive to an end to the conflict. In this regard, it noted that lasting peace can only be based on an enduring commitment to freedom, security, justice, dignity, respect and mutual recognition, the propagation of a culture of peace and nonviolence and the confrontation of terrorism and incitement, and the two-state solution, building upon previous agreements and obligations. Responding to the request of the parties, international donors have pledged at the Paris conference unprecedented levels of support for the success of Annapolis, providing an essential element of stability as the process unfolded. The Quartet further called on all states and international organizations to continue to provide economic assistance in a spirit of equitable burden-sharing to the legitimate Palestinian government, which accepts the Quartet principles, in the areas of security reform, institution and capacity building, economic development and through the fulfillment of pledges. The Quartet called for a redoubling of support for Palestinian efforts to develop a sustainable economy that promotes growth, employs its people, and integrates into the global economic system. Significant improvements of access and movement and security are indispensable in that context.

The Quartet commended the Palestinian Authority for its progress in security performance and welcomed the robust Israeli-Palestinian cooperation for the expansion of security and law and order in the West Bank, most notably in Jenin and Hebron. The Quartet viewed the successful deployment of the Palestinian security services to Hebron as the most recent demonstration of the substantial progress that has been made since Annapolis.

Reminding the parties of their renewed commitment at Annapolis to implement their Roadmap obligations, the Quartet called on the Palestinians to continue their efforts to reform the security services and dismantle the infrastructure of terrorism. The Quartet also called on Israel to freeze all settlement activities, which have a negative impact on the negotiating environment and on Palestinian economic recovery, and to address the growing threat of settler extremism. The Quartet urged further progress on the ground in the period ahead in fulfillment of the package of measures of Quartet Representative Blair.

The Quartet offered its support for an intensification of diplomatic efforts toward peaceful co-existence among all states in the region and a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace in the Middle East based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, 1397, 1402 and 1515. In this context, the Quartet welcomed efforts to reinvigorate the Arab Peace Initiative, as part of a comprehensive approach for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and looked forward to an intensification of Israeli-Syrian negotiations. The Quartet supported, in consultation with the parties, an international meeting in Moscow in 2009.

# European Defence Agency

Brussels, 17 December 2008

## EDA SIGNS A CONTRACT ON NETWORK ENABLED CAPABILITIES

The European Defence Agency (EDA) signed today the contract for the Network Enabled Capabilities Implementation Study (NEC IS) that has been awarded to the EURONEC consortium.

In an increasingly complex and challenging security environment, the European Union (EU) seeks a comprehensive approach in response to any crisis by exploiting the full range of civil and military instruments. Recognising ongoing efforts in the EU, in the Member States, and in industry, Network Enabled Capabilities (NEC) could facilitate this comprehensive approach through informed and timely decision-making and coherent execution, based on the seamless and efficient sharing and exploitation of information by competent personnel, properly tailored processes, and developed networks.

Moreover, NEC is one of the 12 actions emerging from the *Capability Development Plan* as critical priorities for the European Union, as agreed in 2008 by the EDA participating Member States.

The study will start early 2009 and will last 18 months; it will deliver a description of what future NEC will have to achieve in terms of users, information and technology ('NEC Vision') with the overall aim of enabling a unified effort of civilian and military actors in ESDP crisis management operations.

The value of the study is € 750.000. It will also deliver a 'NEC Roadmap' with clear actions and milestones (2012, 2018 and beyond 2025) for an effective implementation of NEC.

The EURONEC consortium consists of 6 European companies, all of which have already been successfully involved in past and present NEC initiatives in Europe:

- BAE Systems IST Ltd (UK);
- EADS Deutschland GmbH (Germany);
- Indra Sistemas S.A. (Spain);
- SAAB AB (Sweden), administrative leader of the project;
- SELEX Sistemi Integrati SPA (Italy);
- THALES Communications SA (France).

## North Korea – Six-party talks

Brussels, 22 December 2008

### **DECLARATION BY THE PRESIDENCY ON BEHALF OF THE EU FOLLOWING THE FAILURE OF THE LATEST SIX-PARTY TALKS ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUE**

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The European Union notes that the latest session of six-party talks on the resolution of the North Korean nuclear weapons issue (Beijing, 8-11 December) has not produced the results expected by the parties concerned, particularly in relation to the consensual drafting of a verification protocol of a DPRK declaration on nuclear facilities and programmes issued on 26 June 2008.

The European Union, which had welcomed (30 June 2008 statement) this North Korean action that it qualified as a significant step forward in the denuclearisation process, today notes with concern the absence of a written agreement between the relevant parties.

The European Union supports the six-party talks, whose progress it has noted over the past two years, but regrets that it was not possible to reach consensus on the establishment of a verification regime at its last session. We call on the DPRK to uphold its commitments in this respect.

The European Union's aim remains the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of the North Korean nuclear programmes in order to achieve a verifiable denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula and maintain peace and stability in the peninsula and in North East Asia.

## 2<sup>nd</sup> Brazil-European Union Summit

Rio de Janeiro, 22 December 2008

### JOINT STATEMENT

The Second Brazil-European Union Summit was held in Rio de Janeiro on 22 December 2008 chaired by the President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, Mr. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the President of the French Republic, Mr. Nicolas Sarkozy, in his capacity as President of the Council of the European Union, and the President of the European Commission, Mr. José Manuel Durão Barroso.

The leaders discussed global issues, regional situations and the strengthening of EU-Brazil relations. They welcomed the completion of the Brazil-EU Joint Action Plan, which will serve as the framework for practical action in their Strategic Partnership in the next three years.

(...)

### Joint Action Plan

Brazil and the European Union agree to construct a comprehensive strategic partnership by:

- ▶ Promoting peace and comprehensive security through an effective multilateral system;
- ▶ Enhancing the Economic, Social and Environmental Partnership to promote sustainable development;
- ▶ Promoting regional cooperation;
- ▶ Promoting science, technology and innovation;
- ▶ Promoting people-to-people exchanges.

The relations between the EU and Brazil will be enhanced on the basis of annual dialogues at the highest level and regular Summits and Ministerial meetings. Such meetings will notably address global challenges and crises that threaten the stability and sustainable development of societies and economies around the world. Senior Official meetings and the European Community-Brazil Joint Committee meetings will contribute to the preparation of the Summit and Ministerial meetings as well as to the monitoring of progress on the ongoing dialogues and the implementation of the Joint Action Plan. This Joint Action Plan has a life span of three years and is due to be revised ahead of the EU-Brazil Summit in 2011. Progress will be reported to the Summits.

### I. PROMOTING PEACE AND COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY THROUGH AN EFFECTIVE MULTILATERAL SYSTEM

#### 1. Promoting human rights and democracy, and upholding international justice

Brazil and the EU are firmly committed to promoting and protecting all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to development and to strive for the full protection and promotion in all our countries of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights for all. Moreover, both are strongly committed to the principles of democracy and respect for the rule of law. Both Parties reaffirm that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community should not go unpunished and that their prosecution should be ensured by measures

at either the domestic or international level, in full compliance with the principles of due process. In this connection both Parties reaffirm the importance of the International Criminal Court in deterring crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocides fighting impunity and achieving lasting peace and reconciliation.

Based on these shared values, Brazil and the EU will further intensify their relationship to strengthen their effective implementation and work together to promote them at the international level. To this end, Brazil and the EU will:

- Establish regular human rights consultations, both on multilateral and bilateral issues at appropriate levels in Geneva, New York, Brussels and Brasilia, as well as in the context of the High Level Political Dialogue between Brazil and the EU.

This would allow for a dialogue aiming at a greater mutual understanding and a definition of common stances. In particular, human rights consultations will: (1) assess the main challenges concerning the respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, (2) advance human rights and democracy policy priorities and (3) identify and whenever possible coordinate policy positions on relevant issues in international fora;

- Encourage an EU-Brazil civil society forum on human rights protection and respect for democratic principles, with the objective of promoting better understanding of mutual concerns at the level of non-state actors;
- Identify and promote specific cooperation projects aimed at achieving tangible results in this sphere, with a view to promote human rights, including those of the individuals belonging to the most vulnerable groups;
- Cooperate on human rights issues in developing countries through triangular cooperation, for instance by using existing instruments such as the EC Agreement with the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP);
- Work together to achieve universality and preserve the integrity of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;
- Cooperate towards reinforcing the credibility and effectiveness of the International Criminal Court.

## **2. Strengthening the multilateral system**

As global actors in a multipolar world, the EU and Brazil concur that the best way to deal with global issues is through a strengthened multilateral system placing the United Nations at its centre. They reiterate their commitment to a comprehensive reform and revitalization of the UN in order to reinforce its democratic nature, representativeness, transparency, accountability and efficiency. To that end, Brazil and the EU recognize the need to pursue the reform of the main UN bodies, among them the General Assembly, ECOSOC and the Security Council with a view to enhancing the representativeness, transparency and effectiveness of the system.

The Parties reiterate the political importance and strategic significance they confer to the multilateral system and understand that the UN must be equipped with the means necessary to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and to deal effectively with challenges such as promotion of human rights, gender equality, children's rights, social inclusion, climate change and sustainable development, fight against poverty and hunger, energy security, migration, world trade, disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, fight against terrorism. To this end, Brazil and the EU agree to:

- Maintain the High Level Political Dialogue on all issues of mutual interest, regional and

international, and make full use of opportunities for contacts between Brazilian Ministers and their EU counterparts on issues of mutual relevance;

- ▶ Continue to collaborate in international fora and to consult on themes of the agendas of multilateral meetings so as to promote reciprocal support and eventually develop joint initiatives. To this end, Permanent Representatives in New York and Geneva will hold regular consultations on issues prior to the UN General Assembly, its specialized agencies and bodies' meetings;
- ▶ Work together on negotiations and implementation of the outcome of major international conferences and Summits as appropriate, including in human rights, security, trade, environment, sustainable development, and social and labour policies;
- ▶ Continue the coordination on the reform of the United Nations.

### **3. Disarmament, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and security dialogue**

Brazil and the EU agree to work together to address the issues of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, in particular regarding nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, trafficking of small arms, light weapons and ammunition. They agree on the importance of complying with obligations under existing international disarmament and non-proliferation treaties.

To this end, they will:

- ▶ Support and promote the full implementation of their existing commitments assumed under the international non-proliferation and disarmament treaties and agreements and other relevant international obligations, bearing in mind the three main objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: non-proliferation, disarmament and the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes;
- ▶ Take steps to sign, ratify, or accede to, as appropriate, and fully implement all other relevant international instruments;
- ▶ Cooperate in promoting the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and in seeking the immediate launching of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a fissile material cut-off treaty;
- ▶ Cooperate on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as their means of delivery including through implementing UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004), ensuring full compliance with existing national and international obligations and promoting the accession to and implementation of relevant international instruments;
- ▶ Further develop cooperation in the prevention of and fight against the illicit trafficking of WMD-related materials;
- ▶ Cooperate on developing effective national systems of export control, controlling export and transit of WMD-related materials, including effective end-use control on dual use of technologies;
- ▶ Improve the overall coordination in the disarmament and non-proliferation area and examine risks and threats related to WMD and assess the scope of cooperation by addressing them, continuing and enhancing the thematic dialogue through regular consultations at the Brazil-EU Troika meetings;
- ▶ Co-operate in combating destabilizing accumulation and illicit trade of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition.

#### **4. Conflict prevention and crisis management**

The EU and Brazil will endeavour to strengthen the multilateral conflict prevention and crisis management capabilities at the UN, in regional organizations and the bilateral level, by means of:

- Integrating the different aspects of crisis management and conflict prevention;
- Common assessment of ongoing and emerging crises as a basis for formulating common approaches within international institutions;
- Coordinating efforts in United Nations peacekeeping and stabilization operations.

#### **5. Peacebuilding and post-conflict assistance**

The EU and Brazil share the view that the international community should engage in a dialogue on peacebuilding activities in countries that are on the verge of or emerging from conflict or crisis situations. Both parties agree that the participation of women in these activities should be improved.

Regarding peacebuilding and post-conflict assistance in the future, the Parties resolve to:

- Join efforts for the establishment of the foundations for peace, by means of the strengthening of the political institutions and the promotion of socio-economic development of countries;
- Avail themselves of opportunities for coordinating positions and for cooperation in the context of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC);
- Enhance donor coordination processes in the field to ensure ownership of the national authorities;
- Strengthen cooperation on gender perspectives of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction, and on children, through enhanced implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security, and UNSC Resolution 1612 (2006) on children in armed conflict;
- Cooperate in the context of peacebuilding and post-conflict assistance in interested lusophone developing countries through triangular cooperation, for instance by using existing instruments, such as the EC Agreement with the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP);
- Coordinate to improve national and international capabilities to tackle conflict and its multiple root causes, including through improving institutional coherence at the UN in the field of peacebuilding;
- Exchange lessons learned in the area of post-conflict reconstruction, particularly regarding Haiti;
- Establish a local dialogue in Haiti on the feasibility of engaging in tripartite cooperation and seek to use lessons learned in that context in other areas, such as Guinea-Bissau.

#### **6. Fight against terrorism**

The EU and Brazil will cooperate in the prevention and suppression of acts of terrorism, in accordance with international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law, relevant international conventions and instruments, the relevant UN resolutions and their respective legislation and regulations and, in accordance with the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, contained in UN General Assembly Resolution 60/288 of 8 September 2006.

They shall in particular:

- Support international efforts to ensure full respect for international law, in particular



human rights law, refugee law, and international humanitarian law in the fight against terrorism;

- ▶ Implement the UN global counter-terrorism strategy adopted by the UNGA in September 2006 and ensure full implementation of and universal respect for all relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, in particular 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001), and all subsequent Resolutions modifying these, UN conventions on terrorism and related protocols;
- ▶ Pursue efforts to arrive at a UN Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism;
- ▶ Work together to fully implement the nine Financial Action Task Force recommendations on the prevention of and fight against terrorism financing;
- ▶ Cooperate on issues of terrorism prevention and use of the Internet for terrorist purposes, in due consideration of the respective internal legislation;
- ▶ Explore ways to pursue a dialogue on this matter as appropriate.

### **7. Preventing and fighting organised crime and corruption**

The EU and Brazil agree to cooperate, including in international fora, in fostering the implementation of international standards to combat organized crime and corruption by promoting cooperation in criminal matters and in particular the full implementation of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and supplementary Protocols on the fight against organized crime and the UN Convention against Corruption.

To that end, they agree to:

- ▶ Discuss in the framework of UN institutions and bodies (Commission for Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), UNGA to ensure that international policies are in line with the principles approved in that framework, including sharing views on draft resolutions for the annual Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) session;
- ▶ Cooperate in preventing the use of their financial systems for laundering proceeds arising from criminal activities in general and implementing Financial Action Task Force (FATF/GAFI) recommendations;
- ▶ Explore the possibilities of sharing experiences and best practices among Financial Intelligence Units (FIU) of Brazil and EU member countries;
- ▶ Express their willingness to offer to interested Latin American countries cooperation in fighting against serious organised crime activities, including with the support of Brazil and EU cooperation programmes;
- ▶ Consider involving, in their cooperation activities, inter-agency bilateral exchange of information and best practices on law enforcement;
- ▶ Express their interest in bilateral judicial and police cooperation.

### **8. Prevention and control of illicit drugs and related crime**

Based on the principle of shared responsibility and balanced approach between drug supply and demand reduction, and while taking into account the realities of both Parties, cooperation between the EU and Brazil in tackling illicit drug problems should be centred on the exchange of experiences and good practices and the identification of areas in which capacity building and training activities could be mutually extended. The exchange of operational information to enable each Party to request and deliver juridical information, as well as other forms of collaboration, should be explored.

In this framework, they agree to:

- Co-operate in the framework of UN and intergovernmental bodies to ensure that initiatives suggested for adoption in those fora are in line with the principles enshrined in all the three international drug conventions. This cooperation may include sharing views on draft resolutions to be presented to the annual Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) sessions;
- Exchange information, including with a view to exploring possibilities of triangular cooperation with third countries for capacity building;
- Explore the possibilities for cooperation on exchanging information on the world drug situation, with a view to develop joint strategies to combat drugs and related crime;
- Promote joint efforts to develop cooperation at the bilateral level to fight against drugs trafficking and serious organised crime activities and contribute to the setting up of drugs monitoring capabilities;
- Support the Mechanism for Coordination and Cooperation on Drug Matters between the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean as a key forum for dialogue between both regions in the area of drugs.

(...)

## DR Congo

Brussels, 23 December 2008

### DECLARATION BY THE EUROPEAN UNION ON THE SITUATION IN THE EAST OF THE DRC

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The EU continues to be concerned by the situation in the east of the DRC and in particular by its humanitarian consequences.

The EU welcomes the opening of talks in Nairobi between the government of the DRC and Nkunda's CNDP, and the facilitating role played by former Presidents Obasanjo et Mkapa.

The EU regrets the CNDP's decision not to sign an agreement on ceasing hostilities and calls on the parties concerned, in particular the CNDP, to continue their engagement in the negotiations with a view to finding a political solution to the present crisis.

The EU applauds the resumption of dialogue between the DRC and Rwanda, and urges them to continue on this path, in particular with a view to ending the activity of the FDLR operating in the eastern part of the DRC.

The EU reiterates its support for the activity of MONUC in the field and welcomes the unanimous adoption by the Security Council on 22 December 2008 of Resolution 1856 authorising the renewal, until 31 December 2009, of MONUC's mandate, and reinforcing especially the priority given to protecting the civilian population and resolving the crisis in the east of the country.

The EU also welcomes the Security Council's unanimous adoption on 22 December 2008 of Resolution 1857 renewing, until 30 November 2009, the embargo on arms and individual sanctions, which is indispensable in combating the illegal armed groups operating in the east of the DRC.

The EU applauds the action taken by the authorities of the DRC, Uganda and South Sudan against the LRA rebellion, and urges the parties concerned to give special attention to the humanitarian consequences of such action.

The EU is determined to pursue its efforts, in close cooperation with the United Nations, the African Union and the countries of the Great Lakes region, to bringing long-term stability to the situation in the east of the DRC.

## Middle East Peace Process – Statement

Paris, 30 December 2008

### STATEMENT BY THE EUROPEAN UNION ON THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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The Foreign Ministers or their representatives of the Member States of the European Union, the High Representative for the CFSP and the European Commission met on 30 December to discuss the situation in the Middle East, following current tragic events in Israel and Gaza. This meeting is part of the international community's efforts, particularly the Quartet and the Arab League, to find a solution to this crisis.

The European Union, conscious of the suffering and anguish of all civilian populations, puts forward the following proposals to resolve the crisis:

- ▶ **Immediate and permanent ceasefire:** there must be an unconditional halt to rocket attacks by Hamas on Israel and an end to Israeli military action.

The cessation of fighting should allow lasting and normal opening of all border crossings, as provided for in the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access. The European Union is ready to re-dispatch the EUBAM to Rafah to enable its re-opening, in cooperation with Egypt, the Palestinian Authority and Israel. It is also willing to examine the possibility of extending its assistance to other crossing points, provided that the issues relating to security have found a satisfactory response.

- ▶ **Immediate humanitarian action:** food, urgent medical aid and fuel should be delivered to the Gaza Strip, the evacuation of the injured and unhindered access of humanitarian workers should be made possible through the opening of crossing points. The European Union, the leading aid donor to the Palestinians, dispatched a field mission to provide the most appropriate response as quickly as possible in cooperation with the United Nations and NGOs. It has also agreed to coordinate aid donated by each Member State, in collaboration with the European Commission and the outgoing and incoming presidencies.

- ▶ **Stepping up the peace process,** as called for by Security Council Resolution 1850. There is no military solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in Gaza or elsewhere. The solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be based on the process set out in Annapolis and on the establishment of a viable Palestinian state existing side by side with Israel in peace and security. Work must be carried out, notably on the basis of the Arab peace initiative, to deal with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a comprehensive and operational manner. Europe encourages the inter-Palestinian reconciliation behind President Mahmoud Abbas, as called for by the Ministers of the Arab League on 26 November, and supports the mediation efforts of Egypt and the Arab League in this respect.

The European Union is more determined than ever to assist alongside the other members of the Quartet and the region's states in ending violence and re-launching the peace process. In this respect, it has been agreed that a European ministerial delegation will travel to the region shortly.

## Core documents

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
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- n° 108** Ukraine: Quo Vadis? **February 2008**  
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## Books

- The New Global Puzzle. What World for the EU in 2025?** **2006**  
*directed by Nicole Gnesotto and Giovanni Grevi*
- Friends again? EU-US relations after the crisis** **2006**  
*Nicole Gnesotto, James Dobbins, Federico Romero, David Frum, William Wallace, Ronald D. Asmus, István Gyarmati, Walter B. Slocombe, Gilles Andréani, Philip H. Gordon, Werner Weidenfeld, Felix Neugart, Geoffrey Kemp, Dov Lynch, Fiona Hill, Baudoin Bollaert, Joseph Quinlan, Marcin Zaborowski; edited by Marcin Zaborowski*
- Defence procurement in the European Union – The current debate** **2005**  
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*published by*  
*the European Union*  
*Institute for Security Studies*  
*43 avenue du*  
*Président Wilson*  
*F-75775 Paris cedex 16*  
*phone: +33 (0) 1 56 89 19 30*  
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[www.iss.europa.eu](http://www.iss.europa.eu)

ISSN 1017-7566  
ISBN 978-92-9198-141-0  
QN-AA-09-117-EN-C