Chaillot Paper

April 2007

n°100

Building the future

The EU's contribution to global governance

Martin Ortega

Institute for Security Studies
Institut d'études de Sécurité
European Union
Union européenne

In January 2002 the **Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)** became an autonomous Paris-based agency of the European Union. Following an EU Council Joint Action of 20 July 2001, modified by the Joint Action of 21 December 2006, it is now an integral part of the new structures that will support the further development of the CFSP/ESDP. The Institute's core mission is to provide analyses and recommendations that can be of use and relevance to the formulation of the European security and defence policy. In carrying out that mission, it also acts as an interface between European experts and decision-makers at all levels.

Chaillot Papers are monographs on topical questions written either by a member of the EUISS research team or by outside authors chosen and commissioned by the Institute. Early drafts are normally discussed at a seminar or study group of experts convened by the Institute and publication indicates that the paper is considered by the EUISS as a useful and authoritative contribution to the debate on CFSP/ESDP. Responsibility for the views expressed in them lies exclusively with authors. *Chaillot Papers* are also accessible via the Institute's Website: **www.iss.europa.eu**

Chaillot Paper

April 2007

n° 100

Building the future

The EU's contribution to global governance

Martin Ortega

Institute for Security Studies
European Union
Paris

The author

Martin Ortega

has been Senior Research Fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies since August 2002. Previously, he taught international law and international relations at Complutense University, Madrid. He has edited *Chaillot Papers* nos. 62, 72 and 78, and is the author of *Cosmocracia. Politica global para el siglo XXI* (Madrid, 2006).

Institute for Security Studies
European Union
43 avenue du Président Wilson
75775 Paris cedex 16
tel.: +33 (0)1 56 89 19 30
fax: +33 (0)1 56 89 19 31
e-mail: info@iss.europa.eu
www.iss.europa.eu

Director: Nicole Gnesotto

ISSN 1017-7566
ISBN 978-92-9198-110-6
Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in Condé-sur-Noireau (France) by Corlet Imprimeur. Graphic design by Claire Mabille (Paris).

Contents

n° 100 April 2007

Préface **Nicole Gnesotto** 5

Introduction 7

1 Foreseeing and shaping the future 9
- *Foreseeing the future* 10
- *Shaping the future: warnings and vision* 16

2 Global futures, good and bad 25
- *Positive developments: international principles* 29
- *Negative developments* 35

3 Global governance: main substantive challenges 41
- *Multilateralism in crisis* 41
- *Towards a new approach: defining global governance* 45
- *Timing* 48
- *Governing multipolarity: emerging powers and global order and principles* 52
- *Security governance* 58
- *Economic governance and the environment* 62

4 Global governance: institutional issues 69
- *The institutional framework of global governance* 69
- *The role of the state and the two political cycles* 74
- *Reinforcing international institutions and regimes: the global demand* 76
- *Multilevel governance – and its obstacles* 80
- *UN Security Council reform* 84

5 The European Union and global governance 91
· *The EU's twofold contribution: model and actor* 91
· *Internal and external factors* 95
· *The EU's 'moment of truth'* 100
· *Four illustrative scenarios* 106
· *Vision and responsibility* 108
· *Twelve recommendations for the future* 113

6 Conclusion: the world to come 119

Annexes 129
· *Some recent studies on the future* 129
· *Glossary of terms used in futures studies* 133
· *Some centres and websites on global governance* 139
· *Abbreviations* 141

Préface

Nicole Gnesotto

Numéro cent ! Ce Cahier de Chaillot *est exceptionnel à plus d'un titre. Son chiffre est d'abord symbolique de la montée en puissance de cette collection des* Cahiers de Chaillot*, devenue, grâce à l'excellence de l'équipe de recherche et de son réseau de collaborateurs extérieurs, l'un des produits phare de l'Institut. Son auteur, Martin Ortega, était avec moi lors de la transformation de l'Institut en agence de l'Union européenne et il fut, à mes côtés durant cinq ans, l'un des collaborateurs les plus créatifs et les plus engagés dans l'aventure de l'Institut. Le thème de ce* Cahier de Chaillot*, surtout, est absolument essentiel : l'avenir de la gouvernance mondiale et du rôle que devrait y jouer l'Union européenne.*

Parler de gouvernance mondiale peut apparaître aujourd'hui désuet, utopique, voire carrément surréaliste. A contempler en effet les désordres du monde, le retour des instincts nationaux, la crise des institutions multilatérales, qu'il s'agisse de l'ONU, de l'OMC, des accords de désarmement tels que le TNP, et la crise des valeurs démocratiques dans les relations internationales, les temps semblent peu propices pour une gestion globale et collective du système international. S'ajoute à cela la crise interne de l'Union européenne, où les égoïsmes nationaux le disputent désormais aux principes d'intégration et de solidarité, affaiblissant et l'image de l'Union et son plaidoyer traditionnel pour la promotion d'un multilatéralisme efficace.

Et pourtant, Martin Ortega a raison. Il n'y a pas d'alternative plus conforme aux intérêts de l'Union européenne, plus fidèle aux valeurs des démocraties, plus porteuse de stabilité et de justice internationales que l'instauration collective, par tous et au profit de tous, d'un système de gouvernance mondiale. Son essai est toutefois beaucoup plus qu'un simple plaidoyer. C'est d'abord une étude précise, concrète, érudite et argumentée des différentes tensions qui affectent aujourd'hui le système international, des différents acteurs impliqués dans la régulation de ce système, qu'il s'agisse des institutions multilatérales, des Etats, des acteurs non étatiques, et bien évidemment de l'Union elle-même. C'est ensuite une analyse sans concession des destinées récentes du multilatéralisme, et notamment du

revers cuisant qu'il a connu depuis 2003 sous la pression de l'administration républicaine de George Bush. Les scénarios que ce Cahier de Chaillot *dessine pour l'avenir sont aussi bien ceux du pire que du meilleur. Tous font réfléchir. Tous nous ramènent à un devoir de responsabilité de l'Union européenne dans la mise en place des règles du monde de demain.*

Tel est en effet le paradoxe européen : l'Union européenne est en crise, mais le modèle européen est un modèle d'avenir. Dans son actualité immédiate, le moral de l'Union est au plus bas. Son identité confuse. Sa dynamique politique gelée, voire régressive. Dans de nombreux pays membres, l'intégration européenne fait moins recette désormais que le retour à la nation. Mais l'inverse est aussi incontestable que stimulant. Jamais en effet, depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, le modèle européen, parce qu'il est l'incarnation même d'un partage des pouvoirs et des solidarités, n'a autant figuré la modernité politique : il n'est pas en effet de système international mieux adapté aux réalités de la mondialisation que celui où le partage des pouvoirs et l'interaction des solidarités seraient devenus la norme commune.

Paris, avril 2007

Introduction

How will global relations appear in ten years' time? Will a peaceful global order prevail or will violence, war and weapons of mass destruction dominate the scene? What will the European Union be like in 2017? Can we Europeans do something to shape the future or are we going to be mere witnesses of developments that we are powerless to influence? These are the questions that this *Chaillot Paper* tries to explore and answer.

In October 2006, the Institute for Security Studies of the European Union published *The New Global Puzzle. What World for the EU in 2025?*, under the auspices of Nicole Gnesotto and Giovanni Grevi. This report is a comprehensive compendium of global trends in demography, the economy, energy, the environment and science and technology and provides an analysis of the impact of those trends on the most important international actors and regions, starting with Europe, of course. On the basis of that study and bearing its conclusions in mind, the purpose of this *Chaillot Paper* is to put forward some ideas on what the EU's role in building the future *should* be. Following an assessment of the major risks and threats that Europe and the world are currently facing, this paper suggests that the best method to confront those challenges effectively is to reinforce global governance. Individual European states, the European Union and other major world powers share a responsibility to reach agreement on how to collectively manage pressing global issues before it is too late.

The European Security Strategy, drafted by Javier Solana and adopted by the European Council in December 2003, laid the foundations for a more proactive EU role in world affairs. The strategy recognised that 'in a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system'. Together with tackling the threats and building security in its neighbourhood (as the document points out), the development of a stronger international society and a rule-based global order constitutes a strategic

objective for the European Union. This *Chaillot Paper* analyses how this objective can be carried forward in the complex circumstances of today.

The first chapter introduces the concept of foresight as a means of thinking about the future, and discusses the role of political communities in shaping their futures. Chapter Two contains an assessment of the most important current and future global developments. This assessment distinguishes between positive and negative forces, in the sense that historical developments may either contribute to or hamper global coexistence. The third chapter argues that, with a view to realising global opportunities and tackling global threats, reinforcement of global governance is needed. A definition of global governance is introduced, along with analysis of the main related challenges: governing multipolarity, security governance, and economic governance and protection of the environment. The fourth chapter addresses the institutional issues connected with the notion of global governance, including the role of states and the strengthening of international organisations and regimes. Among other institutional questions, the chapter focuses on reform of the UN Security Council, and suggests that EU member states should reach agreement on this issue. The European Union's role in global governance is analysed in Chapter Five. That role will depend on both internal – European – and external factors. If the Europeans want to make a decisive contribution to the way that global governance evolves in the future, they must organise the Union in a way that allows them to act globally, and they will have to show ambitious political vision. Otherwise, Europe will limit itself to reacting to global developments that may – or may not – be favourable to Europeans and the international global order.

For readers whose time is limited, the conclusion, which presents a synthesis of the main points and arguments of the *Chaillot Paper*, can be regarded as an executive summary.

Foreseeing and shaping the future

Currently, a growing interest in thinking about the future can be detected in many spheres. In academic, business and government circles, numerous articles, papers and speeches repeatedly dwell on what shape the future will take, which was not the case one or two decades ago, let alone before.

This new interest in the future stems principally from two sources: uncertainty and anxiety. Major changes since the 1980s – including the end of the Cold War, the emergence of globalisation, the rise of both international organisations and global civil society, and the expansion of science and technology – have called into question the old parameters for understanding international relations. Neither the intellectual tools that were traditionally utilised to understand the world (e.g. the realist tradition of international relations, the state-centric approach, balance of power, etc.) nor the prevailing new explanations (the end of history, clash of civilisations, new Middle Ages, etc.) offer comprehensive and satisfactory conceptual frameworks. People therefore feel lost and disoriented as they try to make sense of a very complex landscape. If the world has changed so much in the last twenty-five years, in a way that nobody could predict, how is it going to change in the next ten or twenty years?

Widespread anxiety in the world has also triggered a new interest in the future. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in America revealed the destructive potential of terrorism on a hitherto unprecedented scale. Despite the international community's efforts during the 1990s, an endless cycle of violence in the Middle East region has resumed in this century. Climate change and global warming suggest that destructive human activity is putting the planet's well-being and perhaps even its future existence in danger. Logically enough, people are worried. They ask themselves: how will these, and other, causes of concern evolve in the future? Will they affect our countries to the point of threatening our economies and our daily lives?

The new interest in the future has led to the publication of a number of papers, books and reports recently, both in Europe and elsewhere. Annex I of this paper lists some of these, in addition to the previously-quoted *The New Global Puzzle*. But, as we advance into this new century and find ourselves confronting the future, two questions arise. On the one hand, how much can we really know about the future? On the other, to what extent can political communities shape their futures? This chapter attempts to analyse these two questions.

Foreseeing the future

The perception that the future of international events is a black tunnel stretching ahead of us, and that human intelligence cannot penetrate it, is misleading. Similarly, the idea that either old or innovative formulas, ranging from prophecy to quantitative models, can predict the future is wrong. Somewhere between those two extremes, current knowledge and research allow for the description of general directions in world history, which is highly relevant for policy-making at the state, European and global levels. Let us discuss briefly, first, why the future is difficult to foresee, before explaining how much we know about the future today despite many difficulties.

Firstly, the international system is a highly complex one in which many elements and factors interact. Those elements can interrelate with the rest in infinite ways. *Ex post facto* it is possible for us to elucidate (and debate on) the causal chain that linked one historical event to the next, since the various factors that constitute the international system have already manifested themselves in a given way in the past. However, looking to the future, those factors can still act and materialise in a variety of manners and combinations, which makes it impossible to predict the exact way things will turn out in the future. For instance, although we know which factors drive up oil prices (higher demand, lower supply, disruptions in producer countries and supply chains, rough weather, etc.) and which ones cause prices to go down (lower demand, higher supply, stability in producer countries, mild winters, etc.), we do not know how these drivers are going to evolve and interact in the coming months and years. This characteristic of multi-factor systems is called 'complexity'. Complexity is present

in natural systems, such as the weather, and hinders long-term forecasts. But in social systems there are usually more factors and they are more unpredictable, which has led some experts to speak in this context of 'hyper-complexity'. You cannot try to predict oil prices, for instance, if you do not introduce the situations in the Middle East, Nigeria, Russia and Venezuela, among other elements, into the picture. Another aspect adding to complexity is adaptation, i.e., the ability of the international (and other) system(s) to adapt to new circumstances. Adaptive systems cannot be described as static webs of interlinked elements, for they change with time. For instance, one hundred years ago states were the only actors of international relations; at that time, the current proliferation of international organisations and regimes, including the European Union and the United Nations, was simply unthinkable. Organisations and regimes have grown as a response to the need for international cooperation.

Secondly, it is also difficult to try and foresee the course of future international affairs because the human factor is ubiquitously present. The human factor implies that individuals, acting with their inherent freedom, either alone or in groups, have a clear impact on world history. Nobody can predict how individuals are going to react according to certain motivations and whether they are going to be successful in their endeavours. This applies of course to both leaders and the man in the street, as well as to acts which have a positive or negative – depending on our judgement – impact on international issues. It is well known that the policies conducted by leaders in oil-producing countries have an influence on oil prices, but the PDVSA strike in Venezuela in December 2002, started at the initiative of business managers, reduced production dramatically. Voters in European countries can support or reject a draft EU Constitutional Treaty in referenda. On the other hand, some leaders may decide whether to launch a military intervention in a third country or not. Al-Qaeda terrorist plots may or may not penetrate the numerous security barriers that exist at national and international levels, their destructive impact being unpredictable as a consequence.

Thirdly, unexpected events, which are not directly man-made, also intervene in world history. The US Energy Information Administration's *Short-Term Outlook* of April 2005, for instance, predicted that oil prices were likely to remain within a range of between $45 and $65 per barrel throughout 2006.[1] A few months

1. US Energy Information Administration (EIA), *Short-Term Outlook*, April 2005. Available online at: www.eia.doe. gov.

later, in summer 2005, oil prices went beyond $65 and in summer 2006 prices reached $75 per barrel. The outlook had not sufficiently taken into account the impact of hurricanes in the area of the Gulf of Mexico, whereas hurricanes Rita and Katrina strongly affected international oil prices in summer 2005. The Hezbollah-Israel war of summer 2006 also pushed prices up. Other unpredictable events can take the form of natural disasters, such as pandemics, earthquakes, tsunamis or asteroids, and accidents, including worst-case calamities such as nuclear accidents and oil tankers wrecked at sea.

It is certainly difficult to predict the future, but this does not mean that it is impossible to think about it and draw important lessons from that exercise. In fact, given the inherent difficulties, the idea of prediction or forecast should be abandoned and replaced with the more open-ended notion of *foresight*. Thinking about the future does not necessarily mean predicting the future, but rather *reflecting* on possible future developments and their consequences for our societies. As a matter of fact, the three aforementioned difficulties clearly imply that, today, there is not a single future awaiting for us, but several possible futures. The election of one or another candidate in democratic elections in key states, for instance, which depends on unpredictable public preferences, will lead to diverse foreign policies conducted by those international players, which will in turn lead to diverse global situations. The latest parliamentary elections in Germany, Italy, Spain and the United States, among others, are a proof of this. An astonishing breakthrough in science and technology, including in the field of energy production, might transform the future as we see it today. This is why we can speak of 'futuribles', or possible futures, or 'futures' in the plural, as in 'futures studies'.

Both *foresight* and *futures studies* imply thinking about the future, and also help us to be better prepared for the various possible futures. The new interest in the future is therefore a positive development. In spite of obvious difficulties we now know, with a certain degree of accuracy, the directions that a number of international issues may take in the future. We have a fragmentary, incomplete, and essentially debatable, picture of Europe's futures and the global futures. This picture becomes more blurred as it moves farther away from our own time, but we know more about those futures today than in any previous time in history.

Notwithstanding complexity, we can foresee some clear trends in international affairs. Oil and gas reserves are concentrated in some regions, and most notably in the Middle East. As long as other sources of energy are not available for mass use in transportation, oil and gas will continue to be crucial assets for all global actors. Given both the increasing demand for oil and gas in the emerging powers and the ongoing crises in the Middle East, oil prices will continue to be volatile. On the other hand, there can be no doubt but that fossil fuel consumption will aggravate climate change and degradation of the environment.

Although the human factor may intervene in international affairs at any moment in an unexpected manner, we can at the same time anticipate that, in an interconnected and interdependent world, global civil society increasingly puts pressure on world leaders to act in conformity with international principles. Therefore, it must be expected that unjustified violence, whether of institutional or illegal origin, will trigger widespread criticism. On the other hand, the expansion of democracy, with its ups and downs, has been a constant trend in the last century and it seems that this tendency will continue in the future.

Finally, the fact that natural catastrophes and accidents are unforeseeable does not exclude thinking about their possible effects and the defences that national and international organisations can build against them. Thinking about natural catastrophes implies reviewing possible human causes (e.g. in the case of hurricanes) as well as possible early warning systems (e.g., for pandemics, tsunamis). Thinking about and anticipating future accidents entails better preparedness for such events.

These are just some examples of revealing indications with regard to global futures, associated with the three difficulties outlined above. Many other such insights have been put forward in recent publications. The previously quoted *The New Global Puzzle* explicitly affirms *inter alia*:

> The world's population is expected to increase from 6.4 billion in 2005 to 7.9 billion in 2025 (+23.4%). Population growth will be particularly strong in developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (+43% to 48.4%), MENA (+38%), Latin America (+24%) and Asia (+21%). (...) In 2025, the EU will only account for roughly 6% of the world's population. (...) Population ageing will be the main demo-

graphic feature in developed countries, but also in China. In many EU Member States, but even more so in Japan, this will have major implications for the composition of the workforce and dramatically increase old-age dependency ratios.[2]

China and India ... are likely to continue their economic rise, shifting the centre of the world economy to Asia. However, in both countries, sustainable economic growth will depend on domestic reforms, energy supply and the development of infrastructures.[3]

Between 2006 and 2025, global demand for primary energy is expected to grow at an average rate of 1.6% per year. By around 2030, energy requirements are predicted to be more than 50% higher than today.[4]

The United States National Intelligence Council's 2020 project produced the *Mapping the Global Future* report, which contains many stimulating indications as well as a number of scenarios. The report suggests, for instance, that:

The likelihood of great power conflict escalating into total war in the next 15 years is lower than at any time in the past century, unlike during previous centuries when local conflicts sparked world wars. The rigidities of alliance systems before World War I and during the interwar period, as well as the two-bloc standoff during the Cold War, virtually assured that small conflicts would be quickly generalised. The growing dependence on global financial and trade networks will help to deter interstate conflict but does not eliminate the possibility.[5]

The *Global Risks 2007* report prepared by the World Economic Forum also reaches interesting conclusions. The report suggests *inter alia* that most global risk indicators are worsening:

The Global Risk Network developed a qualitative global risk 'barometer', based on expert judgement of the outlook for global risks. This is essentially a forward-looking measure: it does not look at how the risk has played out over the last year; rather, it assesses whether the seriousness of the risk for the next 10 years has become more or less acute. For example, while 2006 saw fewer tropical storms than in 2005, expert consensus was clear that the risk trend is moving upwards, with growing agreement on the impact of climate change.[6]

2. Nicole Gnesotto and Giovanni Grevi (eds.), *The New Global Puzzle. What World for the EU in 2025?* (Paris: EUISS, 2006), p. 15.

3. Ibid, p. 31.

4. Ibid, p. 53.

5. National Intelligence Council, *Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project* (Washiongton D.C.: December 2004). The report is accessible online at: http://www.foia.cia.gov/2020/2020.pdf. Quotation from page 14.

6. World Economic Forum, *Global Risks 2007*, p. 10. Available online at: www.weforum.org.

But foresight can also refer to more specific issues – for instance, by resorting to a technique that might be called 'what if reasoning', in January 2007 Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack, two authors from The Brookings Institution in Washington published an analysis paper on the possible consequences of a civil war in Iraq. They suggested that:

> The United States will confront a range of problems stemming from the collapse of Iraq into all-out civil war. These will likely include the humanitarian tragedy of hundreds of thousands (or more) of Iraqis killed along with several times that number maimed and millions of refugees. American influence in the Middle East will be drastically diminished, as will our ability to promote economic and political reform there. The loss of Iraqi oil production could have a significant impact on global oil prices, and supply disruptions elsewhere in the region, particularly in Saudi Arabia, could be particularly devastating.
>
> However, the greatest problems that the United States must be prepared to confront are the patterns of 'spillover' by which civil wars in one state can deleteriously affect another, or in some cases destabilize a region or create global threats.[7]

To conclude, recent studies of the kind mentioned above allow us to think about the future of international issues. The old ideas of prophecy, prediction and forecasting, which were associated with the image of the future as a linear succession of events, should be abandoned. Instead, international and global futures must be understood as a multiplicity of possible developments which can be analysed from our own perspective through foresight activities. Even though we cannot know in advance the exact shape of the single future that will materialise, we can think about and explore various possible futures from today's point of view, using a number of quantitative and qualitative methods.

How did the quoted reports arrive at such conclusions on the future of international issues? Those studies employed both quantitative (emphasising data and trends analysis) and qualitative (based on substantive interpretation and expertise) methods. The authors of *The New Global Puzzle* declare in the introduction that they utilised mainly 'extrapolation of ongoing trends' through the review of a wide range of key sources. The *Mapping the Global Future* report was based on consultations with nongovern-

7. Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack, 'Things fall apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War', *Saban Center Analysis Paper* no. 11, January 2007 (Washington D.C: The Brookings Institution), p. XIII.

mental experts around the world, through a series of seminars and meetings organised by the US National Intelligence Council. The *Global Risks 2007* report relies on 'expert opinion' to assess changes in global risks, and then outlines three scenarios. The Brookings paper on the possible spillover effect of a civil war in Iraq favoured two methods: analogy with previous civil wars and a simulation exercise conducted on 4 October 2006. Indeed, there are many quantitative and qualitative methods available to foresee the future, and experts on international relations sometimes utilise them like Molière's Bourgeois Gentilhomme, who spoke prose without knowing it. In order to give a general overview of methods of foresight, Annex 2 of this paper contains a glossary on futures studies and a list of institutions and websites dealing with the concept of foresight.

Shaping the future: warnings and vision

Foreseeing the future or, in other words, thinking about possible futures and their implications, is a useful activity. Nonetheless, what is the purpose of foresight if you cannot exercise a significant influence on forthcoming developments? Foresight presents future opportunities and risks facing us. The next logical step is to try to exploit opportunities and avoid risks.

The future is not an immutable landscape with its mountains and valleys, never seen before by the human eye, like some of the remote uncharted territories that were explored for the first time in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The future is open-ended and changeable. The future will be what we make of it. From the many futures today possible, the one future that we will actually see and experience will depend partly on factors alien to the human will, and largely on human decisions and behaviour. Therefore, our actions in the present will shape the future. The question now is whether or not we will be able to direct our actions so that the most desirable futures actually occur.

As general interest in the future increases and thinking on the future progresses, states should strive to integrate this preoccupation in both national and international policy-making processes. The same can be said of the European Union and international organisations. There is a growing amount of information on possible future opportunities and challenges at non-governmental,

national, European and global levels. How can we integrate that information into the political process? More specifically, will the EU be able to react to reports on the future, so that it can have an impact on the global dangers anticipated in those reports?

Foresight is not a magic formula for action. Foresight gives a clearer image of possible futures, but it does not present an indisputable picture of those futures. Nevertheless, futures studies can justify, and even urge, a specific course of political action. For instance, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has produced four reports so far. The first report, published in 1990, stated that recent global warming could be associated with 'natural climate variability'. In 1995, the second IPCC report pointed out that 'the balance of evidence suggests a discernible human influence on the climate'. The third assessment, made in 2001 affirmed: 'most of the observed warming over the last fifty years is likely to have been due to the increase in greenhouse gas concentrations', whereas the fourth assessment's summary, published on 2 February 2007, declared that the increase in global average temperatures was 'very likely due to the observed increase in ... greenhouse gas concentrations'.[8] Therefore, we can conclude that action to reverse global warming has become more urgent. A large majority of international analysts similarly agree that lack of resolution of the protracted dispute between Israel and the Palestinians will continue to impinge upon stability and security in the whole Middle East region and beyond. And there is an analogous broad consensus on the deleterious effect of long-term demographic, social and economic trends in Africa.

Foresight and futures studies can make important contributions to the policy-making process in both states and international institutions, since they help to identify opportunities, risks and threats. Following a more accurate identification of challenges and opportunities, political communities can react with a view to making the most of opportunities and preventing threats. Let us examine briefly how those communities may react.

Most studies of the future, as well as most politicians, focus mainly on threats, which is only logical because they are more visible, and worrying, than opportunities. Futures studies therefore offer *warnings* about sensitive global issues. Warnings may be followed by reaction – or not. The warning/reaction equation can adopt a number of forms, of which three typical cases are sufficiently telling.

8. For all quotations cited in this paragraph, see the IPCC website: www.ipcc.ch.

Figure 1 — Shaping the future:
the *future's improvement process*



Firstly, warnings on possible negative consequences of global challenges can be followed by collective responses. This scenario is sketched out in Figure 1. From the present time (t1) and the current situation (w1), foresight foresees that a given course of action and policy (A) will lead to a worse situation (w2) in the future (t3). As usual, foresight also points out that other futures are possible (w3, w4, and so on). The warning triggers social and political reaction at some point in time (t2), which leads to a new policy (B), which in turn leads to a better situation in the future (w3). This development can be called *the future's improvement process*. Recent history has witnessed such a process on many occasions. In the 1960s common wisdom among governments and experts was that, twenty or thirty years down the line, more than twenty states would possess nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was then negotiated and adopted and a stringent international regime was established, which has led to the current situation whereby less than ten states have such military capability, and potential proliferators can be monitored and tackled. Another example would be the situation in the western Balkans since 1995. During a first phase, from the breakdown of the former Yugoslavia in 1991 up to 1995, the region was dominated by violence and instability. A more assertive phase started in August 1995 with NATO's Operation Deliberate Force and the international community's resolute involvement in the Dayton Accords. After some hesitation, the prospect of a nightmare humanitarian scenario on the European continent led the western powers and the international community as a whole to react firmly. In the mid-1990s, several futures were possible for the western Balkans. Today, international measures and influence, together with the determination of the concerned peoples, have realised one of the best possible futures for the region.

The future's improvement process could also be referred to as a 'self-defeating prophecy', as opposed to the widely used idea of 'self-fulfilling prophecy'. A 'self-defeating prophecy' would be a foresight warning that generates social reaction so as to offset the course of action leading to such an undesirable result. The 'prophecy' will have contributed to its own refutation. Self-defeating warnings are the futurist's dream. Analysts do not produce warnings to scare people or to seek out notoriety, but in the hope of provoking the reaction that will nullify their predictions on worse worlds. Reaction would prove that they were right in issuing

Figure 2 – Shaping the future:
sustaining wrongful political decisions



a warning and wrong in their conclusions. In those cases, political communities have actively contributed to shape the future – and analysts are happy to be proved wrong.

Warnings can also be ignored. This is the second typical form of the warning/reaction equation. Figure 2 portrays the situation in which a foresight warning on a future danger (w2) is not followed by social and political reaction. As a consequence, a wrong policy (A) is pursued, other alternative policies are excluded, and a given community finds itself in an unfavourable position – or at least one that is less favourable than other possible futures. Arguably, a good example would be the United States intervention in and occupation of Iraq since March 2003. Some key international actors, including some US allies, warned that the invasion could have negative consequences for the region, the US and the global order. Similarly, as has been previously mentioned, many scientific studies on climate change have warned that immediate and robust action is needed, and yet the international community drags its feet. In such cases, when governments and/or societies decide to sustain wrongful courses of action, they have indeed contributed to shape the future, except that in these cases the future they have built is harmful for them and for others. The international actors' actions, it can be said, have 'worsened' the future.

The third form of the warning/reaction equation occurs when adequate warning does not exist. In such cases, politicians, experts and institutions producing foresight are not able to identify future challenges or threats. Societies, political communities and governments cannot decide whether to react or not if they do not receive the right input of warning signals. The failure to foresee the possibility of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 immediately comes to mind as an example of warning failure.

While foresight focuses mainly on challenges and threats, opportunities also abound in international and global matters. Identification of opportunities has to do with futures studies, but this is rather a task for political thinkers, activists and, above all, political leaders. In the previously outlined scenario, threat perception led to warnings. If warnings lead to adequate reaction, a better future is built. As for opportunities, these are identified through *political vision*. When leaders present their vision of future opportunities, and communities agree to pursue policies conducive to that vision, then a positive version of the future's improvement process takes place.

Figure 3 – Shaping the future: seizing opportunities



Figure 3 represents, again schematically, a political vision that points to a different world (w3). Experts, activists and/or leaders suggest that, if a given political community chooses a given course of action, it could achieve a better future. Continuation of current policies will lead to a less brilliant future (w2). Therefore, in order to seize the opportunities that the vision embodies, a new policy must be followed.

With the creation of the United Nations in 1945, 'a group of far-sighted leaders, led and inspired by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, were determined to make the second half of the twentieth century different from the first half', as Kofi Annan once put it.[9] The creation of the European institutions in the 1950s is another good example of a seized opportunity. The founding fathers of a united Europe – Jean Monnet, Robert Schumann, Alcide de Gasperi, Paul-Henri Spaak, etc. – succeeded in identifying a unique opportunity for building a different, better future. Their writings and speeches clearly show that their purpose was not limited to the present but rather that they looked to the future and expected to 'transform' Europe's future into something different from a painful past. Also, the successive steps that have strengthened the European integration process have been the product of voluntary decisions to improve Europe's future. In his memoirs, Jacques Delors explains that in order to persuade national leaders that the single market should be achieved, the argument he utilised in his interviews with them was that their respective countries, individually, were going to benefit from unrestrained free markets, although he also knew that liberalisation entailed collective political benefits.[10] Further milestones, such as the Treaty of Maastricht, which established the EU, the Treaty of Amsterdam, which reinforced CFSP, or the Cologne European Council of 1999, which launched ESDP, also demonstrate a certain vision of the future together with the collective willingness to change things.

The degree of regional *rapprochement* and integration constitutes a good indicator of international opportunities seized or missed. More positive experiences in the American continent, such as Mercosur and NAFTA, and Asia (ASEAN + 3) stand out in contrast to other less successful attempts. The plan for a 'new Middle East' that Shimon Peres and others floated in the mid-1990s, whereby Israel would have cooperated with its neighbours, including the Palestinians, in a regional network of exchanges, has been abandoned. In northern Africa, some think tanks have tried

9. Kofi Annan, speech delivered at the UN General Assembly, 23 September 2003.

10. Jacques Delors, 'L'Acte unique : mon traité favori', in *Mémoires*, chapter 5 (Paris: Plon, 2003).

to calculate *le coût du non-Maghreb*, i.e. the economic cost of lack of trade and exchanges between the Maghreb countries.[11]

Not only regions, but, of course, also countries can show lucidity when planning and shaping their future. Turkey's successive governments have decided to consolidate democracy and move towards the European Union, which implied a vision of Turkey as a modern, reliable country.[12] On the other hand, in the mid-1990s, Den Xiao Ping's plan to develop China through an open economy and improved relations with neighbours and other major powers can equally be considered a positive vision come true.

The future's improvement process through seizing – and missing – opportunities is also occurring at the global level. The establishment of the United Nations at the end of the Second World War was a good example of a realised opportunity. More recent global initiatives have equally shaped the future. For instance, in the 1990s, it was decided to utilise peacekeeping operations as a means to stabilise dangerous situations with an international presence. Without any doubt the world today would be different if those situations had been left unattended.[13] Also, to give another example, with a view to guaranteeing and expanding free trade, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) was created in 1995. Ever since, it has monitored any dubious practices against free trade by member states and, to that end, is entrusted with dispute-settling mechanisms that did not exist before.

From the discussion in this chapter the following conclusion can be inferred: foresight is a very important activity that contributes to identifying international challenges and opportunities. If foresight is not sufficiently introduced into the process of political decision-making, political communities will not be in a good position to shape their futures in order to achieve the best possible future. Therefore, the exercise of foresight should be promoted in both the European Union and its member states. More support should be given to academic and private bodies dealing with foresight. In addition, at both European and national levels, futures studies should be incorporated into official institutions. In France, where there is a tradition of foresight studies (*prospective*), the Centre d'analyse stratégique conducts research on the future with the aim of informing the policymaking process.[14] The United Kingdom Office of Science and Innovation created a Horizon Scanning Centre in 2005, which is another interesting initiative in this field.[15]

11. See contributions to the seminar 'Du coût du non-Maghreb au tigre nord-africain', organised by IEMED and CITPAX in Madrid in May 2006, at www.iemed.org and www.toledopax.org.

12. Kemal Kirisci, in 'Turkey's foreign policy in turbulent times', *Chaillot Paper* no. 92 (Paris: EUISS, September 2006), explains how Turgut Özal, developing Kemal Ataturk's vision, exercised a constructive leadership role in the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s.

13. See Centre on International Cooperation, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007* (Boulder, CO - London: Lynne Rienner, 2007).

14. The CAS, which replaced the Commissariat général du Plan in March 2006, maintains a website: www.strategie.gouv.fr. In France, foresight studies are also carried out by the Délégation aux affaires stratégiques (Ministry of Defence), and the Centre d'Analyse et de Prévision (Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

15. The UK's OSI Horizon Scanning Centre (www.foresight.gov.uk/horizonscanning) has recently produced a number of reports on the future of science and technology (see www.deltascan.org) and the future of social and political trends (www.sigmascan.org).

Global futures, good and bad

2

The preceding chapter has emphasised the importance of foresight and explored ways of shaping collective futures. This chapter now focuses on the most likely global futures. The central question in this *Chaillot Paper* is the European Union's role in global governance in the timeframe of the next ten years or so. With a view to analysing that role, it is crucial to describe first of all the main developments that can be expected in that time span. Bearing in mind that the future is today open to conjecture, instead of predicting a single future or a number of possible scenarios, it seems more appropriate to elucidate, from our vantage point in 2007, the main international factors and forces that are shaping the future.

It goes without saying that different observers will give different descriptions of the current international situation and its possible future developments. The global picture presented in this chapter – which is, of course, this author's sole responsibility – has taken into account four preliminary considerations. These are as follows: (1) both quantitative and qualitative methods must be utilised, (2) history does not repeat itself, (3) the national point of view must be complemented with a global point of view, and (4) future developments may be positive or negative.

First, in order to look at the international realities of today and their possible futures, both quantitative and qualitative methods must be used. In more quantifiable fields, such as the economy, demography, energy and the environment, we have valuable indicators and publications at our disposal. Foresight studies, including many that are not technically labelled as such, offer numerous clues on possible futures. Science and technology, in particular, are two fields in which foresight is crucial. The Seville-based Institute for Prospective Technological Studies, one of the seven institutes of the European Commission's Joint Research Centre, prepares reports in a range of areas, including energy, transport, techno-economic foresight, the life sciences, industrial, information and communications technologies.[16] Conversely, future

16. See http://www.jrc.es/home/pages/about_ipts.htm. In this connection, FORERA (Foresight for the European Research Area) produces future-oriented technology analyses. In European Foresight, its website, the following description is given: 'Foresight provides a framework for a group of people concerned with an issue at stake (e.g. future of EU manufacturing, R&D and innovation priorities, transport and mobility, etc) to jointly think about the future in a structured and constructive way.' See: http://forera.jrc.es/index.html.

developments in less quantifiable fields – such as ideology, religion, political attitudes, tolerance, aggressiveness, racism, multilateralism, etc. – are more difficult to assess.

Reports on future quantitative trends are less controversial, even though there are a number of problems associated with data interpretation, and, as illustrated in the previous chapter, unexpected events and the human factor always intervene. One example of controversial data interpretation occurs in the context of the current scientific debate on the rise of sea levels owing to global warming. Various scientific equations give different results depending on how rapidly polar ice is considered to be melting. Following publication of the fourth IPCC Assessment Report in February 2007, the International Polar Foundation declared:

> Although the report clearly presents the Arctic as amongst the most affected and rapidly changing regions, it also suggests that most of Antarctica will be less affected by the global rise in temperatures. This has lead some prominent experts to criticize [the IPCC] Working Group 1 for overlooking the potential magnitude and rate of the contribution of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet to sea level rise, as well as the fact that the greatest temperature rise on Earth over the last five decades has been measured on the Antarctic Peninsula.[17]

Voicing a dissenting opinion, Christopher Monckton, a British analyst, has written on the same subject:

> Globally, temperature is not rising at all, and sea level is not rising anything like as fast as had been forecast. (...) Though carbon dioxide in the air is increasing, global temperature is not. (...) Overall ... the report is drafted so as to allow environmental extremists to cite its high-end projections as evidence of the need for urgent action.[18]

Another example of difficult data projection, due to the human factor, can be found in population changes. Five years ago, Spain's population appeared to be doomed to decrease, because of very low fertility rates. However, in the past five years, Spain's population has increased by 9.4 per cent, since it has grown from 40.8 million in 2001 to 44.7 million in 2006, due to immigration from Europe, Latin America and Africa.[19]

17. See, 'IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: The Polar Perspective', 12 February 2007. Available online at: www.sciencepoles.org.

18. Christopher Monckton, 'IPCC Fourth Assessment Report 2007: analysis and summary', February 2007. Available online at www.scienceandpolicy.org.

19. See: www.ine.es. More than nine percent of Spain's inhabitants in 2006 were foreigners.

Despite those problems, quantitative trends are well known and can be extrapolated (provided of course that the usual precautions are observed). The future of international phenomena that cannot be quantified is much more difficult to grasp, and the value of foresight studies on those issues usually depends on the observer's talents, degree of intuition, and expertise. Many different aspects have to be regarded at the same time in order to properly assess possible future developments of multilateralism, war and peace, ideology, and political attitudes, among other non-quantifiable parameters. The language utilised to explain international issues – which is inevitably connected to natural language – is crucial in this respect. International issues must be *understood* and the inherent complexity of international reality must be elucidated in words that ought to be accurate and simple at the same time. Quantitative data and qualitative assessments must be combined adequately. For instance, we may sift through many statistics on terrorist attacks; however, while doing so, it is important to look at the underlying definition of terrorism. Who are terrorists, according to the statistical study, and who are fighting to free their country against foreign occupation? Answers to those questions are key to putting statistical data in context. History has to be gauged with a view to determining whether past, clearly identifiable patterns are changing, and whether and to what extent those patterns could be prolonged in the future. Finally, international relations theories inevitably influence our thinking, and analysts cannot easily escape from the fixed mindsets that those theories entail.

The second main point that must be made is that in order to present a proper picture of global futures we have to eschew the generalised assumption that history will repeat itself in one way or another. When looking to the future, the natural reflex is to look to the past first in order to search for ideas and prototypes on how international relations might evolve. But recent history clearly demonstrates that this is not a good approach. If past events really do provide a reliable compass for understanding the future, major nation states in Europe should be fighting each other some time soon. If two historical 'laws' associated with realism –namely, balance of power and the rise and fall of great powers – are correct, then, following their economic success, Brazil, the European Union, India, Japan and China should by now be rearming themselves, or establishing mutual alliances, with a view to

challenging the United States' military predominance. Although there is an ongoing debate on China's intentions in the long run, it is obvious that both current Chinese policies and China-US economic ties rule out a strategic confrontation, such as the one in which the United States and the USSR were engaged for decades, in the foreseeable future.[20] Most interpretations of past, current and future global affairs are based on the dominant theories of international relations – realism and its offspring neo-realism –, which emphasise that states' pursuit of their respective national interests is the main driving force of the international system. This *was* indeed true for centuries. However, today things have changed considerably and these theories are not well-suited to take into account recent developments such as global consensus on substantial international principles, the significance of global civil society, and cooperative efforts from development aid to peacekeeping, as well as their potential impact on the future.

Thirdly, in addition to a certain obfuscation stemming from analysts' fixation with the past, another widespread erroneous assumption is that we can make assessments of current international relations and their possible futures from strictly national points of view. According to this approach, the future will be 'better' or 'worse' depending on whether a given state or group of states will be in a better or worse position irrespective of the rest of the world's future situation. However, when thinking about global futures, you have to bear in mind that historical developments can be positive or negative not just for a given state or group of states, but rather for the global order. When it comes to comprehending the future of international relations in an interdependent, interconnected world, the international actors' chances cannot be interpreted as a zero sum game. In this respect, looking to possible threats and opportunities from a global point of view is crucial. This does not mean that political communities must abandon their pursuit of a better future. Rather, it means that their success in the future is not mutually exclusive in relation to the others' successes – to a large extent it is *complementary*. The title of the European Security Strategy of 2003, *A secure Europe in a better world*, is a good expression of that idea.

Fourthly, while the darkest and most ominous futures are always present in analysts' minds, more promising scenarios are regularly excluded. It is true that, in 1989, Francis Fukuyama correctly predicted the triumph of democracy and the market

20. See the US National Intelligence Council's *Mapping the Global Future* , op.cit., p. 14.

economy, and that a school of international thought nowadays foresees the widespread success of economic globalisation. But why, twenty years ago, was nobody able to foresee the world of today? In 1987 nobody thought that in 2007 we would be living in an interconnected world, facilitated by the Internet, global trade and easier transport, with a thriving global economy and a vibrant global civil society, where democracy is the prevailing form of government, and international institutions such as the European Union play an important role, because nobody really understood that positive developments in many fields, from science to politics, were going to come to pass. When it comes to comprehending international relations, international analysts are instinctively 'programmed' to foresee a worse world, and are therefore not prepared to entertain the notion of a better world. This is not to say, of course, that a better world is an unavoidable outcome of current historical processes, for many futures are possible, from nuclear war to peaceful global governance. Rather, it is a reminder that it is important to include some scenarios that today may seem utopian at first sight in the range of *possible* futures.

Bearing all of these considerations in mind, in order to produce an account of possible futures that is as comprehensive and accurate as possible, we have to: (1) pay especial attention to qualitative factors that call for understanding of global issues and adequate language to explain them; (2) be ready to accept that the future can depart greatly from the past; (3) complement the national with the global point of view; and (4) be ready to accept that the future can be worse than today's situation, but also that it can be better.

Positive developments: international principles

In order to give a comprehensive picture of possible global futures, the following account outlines positive and negative forces that are present in current international relations, and foresees how these forces may develop in the coming years. In *Cosmocracia. Política global para el siglo XXI*, a book published in Madrid in 2006,[21] this author claims that a new international political system, which can be called 'cosmocracy', has been in the making since the end of the Cold War. Continuation of current global trends, which are for the most part positive, will probably lead to consolidation of this global system in the future. However, the book also argues that

21. Martin Ortega Carcelén, *Cosmocracia. Política global para el siglo XXI* (Madrid: Editorial Síntesis, 2006).

negative forces are equally present in international relations and that their destructive impact can be huge in a globalised world.[22]

To explain positive forces in recent history, *Cosmocracia* underlines that most international relations studies wrongly ignore the fact that progress does exist in history. The book equally stresses the idea of principles, another concept that is missing in the dominant discourse on international relations and politics. Finally, it is suggested that the new global system is being developed as an adaptation to the new circumstances, in the sense that species adapt themselves to their changing environment in order to survive according to the evolution theory. Confronted with global dangers such as weapons of mass destruction and ecological devastation, people and political leaders perceive that human survival is at risk. In addition to adaptation as a way of avoiding global catastrophes, a more constructive type of adaptation occurs, for instance through international cooperation and organisations, which can achieve objectives unattainable for individual states.

Leaving aside the notions of 'progress' and 'adaptation', which are rather theoretical, the notion of 'principle' is crucial to understand positive global developments. The idea of the clash of civilisations, so popular lately, implies the existence of a fragmented world, with different values in each cultural region. The omnipresent belief that defence against threats should be the main driving force of foreign policy also suggests that external threats, stemming from 'the other', are assailing our communities. None of these powerful ideas, well-ingrained in the Western discourse during the last few years, sufficiently take into account an essential positive force in current global relations: consensus on international principles.

There is a widespread feeling among both governments and citizens across the globe that respect for the core content of those principles is needed to ensure global coexistence. Principles have been created in successive historical phases. Classic principles include state sovereignty and equality, the state's right to self-defence, non-intervention in domestic affairs, and respect for treaties and international law. The Second World War led to the United Nations Charter, where another set of principles was introduced: prohibition of the use of armed force, international cooperation and organisation, and human rights. From 1945 to the end of the Cold War, principles such as humanitarian law in armed conflicts, and self-determination of colonial peoples, were estab-

22. In futures studies, the term 'trend' is frequently utilised. However, 'force' is a better term to name the evolution of non-quantifiable factors, such as ideology and political attitudes. 'Force' here means a qualitative feature of global relations, which changes in time, and may have positive or negative consequences on global coexistence.

lished. The latest period, from the end of the Cold War to the present day, has seen general agreement on new principles: peacekeeping, democracy (following the demise of communism), free trade, protection of the environment, and multilateralism. There is an ongoing debate on the content of those principles, and they are not always respected, but we can identify a clear historical drive, whereby both the substance and the number of international principles have expanded during the last century.[23]

Principles represent the aspirations of the global community, as expressed in international documents and declarations endorsed by governments, and are present in both international politics and language. Today's diplomatic language is very different from its equivalent at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, for instance, when concepts such as race, colonial expansion, backwardness of barbarian peoples, ethnic hate, and the usefulness of war were ubiquitous. Although the relevance of principles is not sufficiently recognised, current international relations cannot be properly understood if the principles' importance is not acknowledged.

And here we are referring to universal principles, as they are developed in the multilateral process of exchanges between states, international organisations, NGOs and global public opinion. Sometimes unilateral interpretations of principles are utilised to justify foreign policy goals, in order to give some ethical cover to a specific state's international behaviour. In those cases, the global debate generates a majority opinion on the correct interpretation of principles that eventually prevails over the unilateral interpretation. For instance, the debate on whether promotion of democracy abroad can be done using military means – a view supported by the current American Administration – shows that a clear majority of states and other international actors rejects such an idea.

It is not easy to foresee how principles will evolve in the near future. Global civil society seems to continue to support further development of principles. In democracies, the public expect that their governments will abide by the principles, and will contribute to their reinforcement. But people living under non-democratic regimes also show explicit support for international principles. For its part, the European Union has repeatedly declared its commitment to principles.[24] However, it is obvious that many obstacles remain. In particular, the interests and behaviour of

23. On this concept see among others Dorothy Jones, *Code of Peace* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Bruce Russett and John O'Neal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International Organizations* (New York: Norton, 2001); and Régis Chemain and Alain Pellet (eds.), *La Charte des Nations unies, constitution mondiale ?* (Paris: Pedone, 2006).

24. Article 11.1 of the Treaty on European Union, See also Articles I-3(4) and III-292 of the draft constitutional treaty.

major powers may clash with international principles and reverse the current positive trend. Following its crucial role during and after the Second World War in defending principles such as democracy, human rights, and free trade, the United States under President George W. Bush has entered a phase in which it has ignored global demands with regard to a number of principles, from the prohibition on using armed force, to human rights, to protection of the environment. The fact that most states and global public opinion do not share the US Government's points of view and disapprove of key aspects of American international behaviour proves that there is a divergence between global aspirations with regard to international principles and the US global position as the only superpower.

In this context, the November 2008 presidential elections seem to be of exceptional relevance. The new US Administration will have to decide whether to continue to counter global trends on principles, which may further distort its relations with the rest of the world, or, conversely, to align itself to, and even take the lead in, those trends. If the new US President chooses multilateralism and international engagement, the United States can recover its role as global leader. If the United States sticks to the main lines of its current foreign policy after January 2009, other global powers may then profit from a better understanding of global desires on principles. Not only the behaviour of the United States, but also the future behaviour of China, India, Pakistan and Russia, all possessors of nuclear weapons, will be crucial to maintain the recent positive development of global principles. Also, the attitudes of other traditional and emerging powers, from Brazil to Indonesia, from Turkey to Japan, may contribute to the consolidation of international principles.

The expansion of international principles since the end of the Cold War – as well as their possible future evolution – has been favoured by two key events. On the one hand, general rejection of war as a means of conducting foreign policy and, on the other, accommodation of national interests and collective interests within multinational institutions and regimes. Both have brought about a historic change in international relations. For centuries, inter-state relations were based on the defence of national interests by any possible means, including war. Thomas Hobbes described that situation very well, when he wrote that the purpose of the Leviathan was to protect citizens and advance their

interests against other Leviathans.[25] As a corollary to that situation, historical evidence shows a recurrent pattern, described by Professor Paul Kennedy, whereby major powers rise first in economic and population terms only to reinforce their military capacities next, and then challenge the dominant world power through war.[26] In this 'Hobbesian world' international principles, which represent common aspirations of humanity, cannot exist.

The short period from the end of the Cold War to today has witnessed the triumph of two new and unprecedented patterns in international relations. On the one hand, people in democratic and non-democratic states alike do not seem to want to wage and sustain wars. Emmanuel Kant wrote in the eighteenth century that democracies would not fight each other because citizens would understand the financial and human costs of wars for themselves and the adversary and, therefore, would choose not to fight. This intuition has, late in the day admittedly, proved correct for the democratic world, but, on top of that, a broader application of the same idea seems apposite today. A majority of the world's governments are elected democratically, which in principle will lead to expansion of the 'democratic peace'.[27] In addition, citizens in non-democratic states, with some exceptions, do not seem to favour all-out wars to resolve international disputes. Empirical studies carried out by the University of Uppsala and the University of British Columbia[28] show that the number of armed conflicts and their lethal effects have declined during the last decade. Although the Iraq war is a sad exception and even though civil strife in Africa continues to hinder that continent's stability, globally speaking, wars are today less frequent than in any other period after the Second World War. The international community's involvement in crisis management and peacemaking is a sign of this positive development. Peacekeeping activities have transformed the purpose of armed forces in many countries. The European Defence Agency's *Long-Term Vision*, published in 2006, points out that peacekeeping will continue to be an important feature of global relations in the years to come.[29]

On the other hand, cooperative attitudes among states are prevailing over confrontation. This is true both globally and regionally. In the regional context, Jean Monnet's idea that the pooling of economic interests would avert violent clashes between states was absolutely right. Today globalisation of trade and investment has also 'globalised' Monnet's foresight. In this 'Kantian' (people pre-

25. In this paper, the terms 'Hobbesian' and 'Kantian' are used as academic conventions. Hobbes, Kant and other classical political philosophers lived in different historical and conceptual contexts, very far removed from ours, and we utilise their writings on inter-state relations as inspirations to put an easily understandable label on current and future global scenarios. On the value of traditions of international relations, see among others Martin Ortega, 'Francisco de Vitoria and the universalist conception of international relations', in Ian Clark and Iver Neumann (eds.), *Classical Theories of International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1996).

26. See Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) and Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987).

27. Freedom House index points out that sixty percent of the world's governments are elected democratically. See: www.freedomhouse.org.

28. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program can be found at www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP, and British Columbia University's Human Security Centre at www.humansecuritycentre.org.

29. See the document 'An initial long term vision for European defence capability and capacity needs', dated 3 October 2006, at www.eda.europa.eu.

fer peace to war) and 'Monnetian' (shared interests create peace) world, international principles can thrive.

Looking to the future from the perspective of 2007, the fact that respect and promotion of global principles are very much appreciated in both the internal political debate and the international arena suggests that those principles will continue to be a positive force in global relations. However, setbacks in principles are obviously also possible, as is discussed below.

In addition to the development of international principles, positive forces can similarly be detected in global institutional affairs. While some generalisations (e.g. the return of the nation-state) emphasise the resilience of the state, and other theories point to increasing global chaos (e.g. the 'new Middle Ages'), the fact of the matter is that, with historical perspective, it can be seen that enormous changes in the institutional architecture of international relations have occurred since the mid-twentieth century. As a consequence, explanations of international relations that recognise the new institutional multiplicity are more pertinent for understanding current global relations than the conservative theories that focus on the state.[30] It must be expected that multiple international actors will continue to underpin the future institutional outlook in the coming years. International organisations and regimes are indeed necessary to manage global challenges and opportunities. Region building in Europe and elsewhere is likely to continue, although the limits of this positive force are currently being tested in Europe. Global civil society has become a vigorous actor operating via many non-governmental organisations with global scope. Some multinational corporations increasingly play a positive role in global relations, since they must adapt to the consumer's preferences and their activities across the world are increasingly under surveillance, reflecting a new global preoccupation with ethics in international business practices. An ongoing debate involving all international actors serves as an informal scheme of 'checks and balances' among them, based on international principles. When principles are not respected, multiple actors, ranging from states, to international and non-governmental organisations, to the press, compare notes and criticise breaches of more or less explicitly stated common principles and rules. In this context, multilateralism appears to be the normal state of affairs in future state-to-state relations, against the broader backdrop of the more open-ended, multi-actor debate.

30. Many authors in the liberal tradition of international relations have formulated worldviews in which international institutions are important: see the works of Robert Keohane, Richard Falk, Fred Halliday, John Ruggie, Pierre de Senarclens and Alexander Wendt, among others.

When governments, be it of major or smaller powers, decide not to participate in that multilateral exchange, they are more likely to lose than to gain from such self-imposed isolation.

Negative developments

Together with positive forces, the opposite tendencies also exist. Negative forces would dominate the scene when the two classical patterns of international relations referred to above, which constitute the basis for a 'Hobbesian world', reappear. If states believe that the defence not only of their territory but also of their national interests requires the use of armed force, regardless of other states' views and international public opinion, war will re-emerge as a recurrent feature of global relations. Similarly, if major powers reach the conclusion that their competition with other powers must be pursued by military means, the spectre of a new world war will again loom large over international relations. In those circumstances, recent advances made in the domain of international principles will be lost.

A reversion of the principle that prohibits the use of force in international relations can occur in at least three areas: war, terrorism and rearmament (the latter category including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction). Regarding war, the most obvious negative development would be resumption of military rivalry between major powers, which could lead to the inevitable and all too familiar adverse consequences: rearmament, spheres of influence, attacks on democracy, human rights and state sovereignty, wars 'by proxy', and, worst of all, direct hostilities between global powers. On the other hand, regional wars can also occur even if major powers do not intervene directly. The most probable scenario for future regional wars is the Middle East region, where deterioration of the current conflict in Iraq, military strikes against Iran, a worsening of the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, or renewal of hostilities between Israel and its neighbours, as well as other less probable but equally possible outbreaks of violence, including civil strife, may all occur. Hostilities during the summer of 2006 demonstrated (a) that protracted disputes can deteriorate very rapidly, and (b) that war can take on new forms in the Middle East. Such conflicts would have harmful consequences both within and beyond the region. It would be very difficult for

the international community to act as an effective peacemaker in those cases, bearing in mind the magnitude of the potential crises, and the fact that Western peacekeeping capacities are already overstretched.

Terrorism can also impinge upon the global political situation, but its effects may take many forms. Without any doubt, the worst form would be terrorist attacks with weapons of mass destruction. It must be remembered, nonetheless, that conventional means can also produce devastating effects. While international efforts to contain terrorism have been relatively successful overall in the last few years, continuation of the current conflicts in the Middle East will constitute a major source of terrorism in the future. Terrorist attacks in Arab countries and against oil and gas plants and supply lines may push oil and gas prices upwards and trigger world economic crises. In Western countries, it remains to be seen whether further terrorist attacks would bring about a change of Western policies in the Middle East. Finally, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction may equally constitute a threat to global stability. The international community is actively watching the most conspicuous cases of possible proliferation, Iran and North Korea, so it must be expected that their nuclear ambitions will be contained. If, however, Iran does acquire a military nuclear capability, the situation in the Middle East will become very dangerous. In addition to horizontal proliferation, vertical proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a negative development and should be a global cause of concern.

Many economists are warning against global commercial and financial imbalances. It is true that the global consumer is currently making the virtuous economic circle work. But it is also true that, in terms of being exposed to sudden losses of confidence and/or unexpected events, such as terrorism, hurricanes, pandemics, earthquakes and other natural catastrophes, the global economy is today highly vulnerable to brutal shocks. Should a global recession happen, the most delicate challenge would be to maintain social and political stability within both industrialised and emerging countries. Internal instability might lead to protectionism and, in time, to aggressive international behaviour. Progress in science and technology has accompanied globalisation, and generally has a positive impact on the economy, but the effects of some recent developments, such as nanotechnology, have yet to be assessed thoroughly.

The current virtuous economic circle has two black holes, however. Globalisation is boosting the economic development of emerging powers and consequently reducing poverty. But Africa and the Middle East have so far been excluded from globalisation to a large extent. Unless effective measures are adopted at the local and the international spheres, Africa, a continent with growing population and enormous structural problems, will not be able to find its own way to development and could become a source of global instability in the future. As the United Nations has pointed out repeatedly, most of the African continent has become the 'sick man' of the planet. Millions of people are suffering there from the worst forms of deprivation and degradation, including slavery, extreme poverty, illiteracy and infectious diseases that can be prevented and treated.

The second problem regarding the global economy, the degradation of the environment, is even more intractable because it is inextricably linked to the global economic system. In all countries across the world, the economy is based on continuous growth. General consensus on capitalism and free trade – which, along with consensus on democracy, has constituted the basic ideological tenet in the world since the end of the Cold War – has boosted the economy almost everywhere during the last decade. Nevertheless, continued growth is based on consumption of resources, including fossil fuels, coal, gas and oil, which accelerates global warming and climate change, as well as other kinds of pollution. It is difficult to calculate the extent and the consequences of climate change in the future. As has been mentioned above, in February 2007 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) declared that fossil fuel consumption was causing global warming and predicted a rise in temperatures and sea levels until 2100. But, even though scientists have been able to measure the adverse effects of human activity on the planet's environment up to now, their models cannot fully predict the cumulative effects of further climate change. There is, therefore, an ongoing scientific debate, with a whole range of estimates that vary from the more to the less alarming. It can be affirmed, however, that most scientists are increasingly leaning towards the more pessimistic end of the spectrum and that alarming reports have become frequent.[31]

The scientific evidence has fuelled political and economic debates. Global warming issues have emerged at the forefront of

31. Among the most startling books are: Donella Meadows, Dennis Meadows and Jorgen Randers, *The Limits to Growth: the 30-year Update* (South Burliugton, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing Company, 2004); James Kunstler, *The Long Emergency: Surviving the Converging Catastrophes of the 21st Century* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2005); Jared Diamond, *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed* (New York: Penguin, 2005). Al Gore's documentary film *An Inconvenient Truth* (2006) also had a considerable impact worldwide.

the international agenda with amazing rapidity in the past couple of years. For instance, the fact that 'climate protection' and reduction of greenhouse gases emissions was a central issue at the European Council of March 2007 would have been unthinkable a mere couple of years ago. In parallel with the scientific consensus, the public perception of the gravity of the problem is increasing exponentially. If both the public and politicians continue to believe that the environment's degradation is a serious global risk, it seems obvious that concern *vis-à-vis* protection of the environment will play a central role in international politics over the next ten years. Today the public is not ready to fully recognise the medium-term dangers of a global economic system based on uncontrolled growth, extensive consumption of natural resources, cheap energy and wide-ranging pollution. But, if changes in the environment and the climate as well as natural disasters, such as tropical storms, floods, and desertification, become too obvious and begin to directly affect national economies, people will start to become alarmed and attitudes may change. For governments, it will not be easy to manage a shift in economic priorities, and clashes of opinions on the need to react and take measures will be intense both at the national and international levels. Businesses and the public will suffer from the necessary adjustments, which will not be adopted evenly across the world. The common wisdom among experts on energy security is that the most probable future scenario is a fight for limited natural resources. However, in addition to that possibility, another 'fight' in the economic battlefield may well be an intense ideological, economic and legal debate on how to deal with the deterioration of the global environment. Potentially, divergence of points of view in this area may lead to domestic and international tensions and disputes. At some point in time, for example, state A, which is taking strict measures to protect the environment, may consider that state B's policies, which are promoting fossil fuel consumption and other sorts of pollution, constitutes a threat to its security.

In addition to more predictable negative developments, a number of less probable 'strategic shocks' are nonetheless also possible. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence's *Global Strategic Trends Programme 2007-2036* points out that, among other global surprises, the following are possible: collapse of fish stocks, genetic modifications in humans, technological developments such as the military use of electromagnetic pulse, and separatism

and secession in some major states.[32]

Negative forces in international institutional matters point towards fragmentation and confrontation. While positive forces in this field are reflected in the ideas of international organisation, region-building and multilateralism, the opposite forces will lead to the return of the isolated nation-state. If some states choose not to cooperate with other states and international institutions, those states will not profit from the benefits of cooperation. The consequences for international coexistence will depend on the nature of the states that decide to go it alone. Isolationism in some marginal states would not necessarily have far-reaching repercussions, whereas the same policy carried out by major actors can blur the future of global order. As discussed below, negative developments in the European integration process cannot be ruled out either. Future scenarios for the European Union may include institutional collapse and other kinds of splits between member states, owing to diverging views on the ultimate orientation and purpose of the EU. Another institutional setback would be proliferation of weak or failed states. Lack of effective government in those states generates twilight zones that can provide a fertile breeding ground for all sorts of criminal organisations, including terrorist groups. As a general rule, the international community tries to prevent the appearance of failed states and works for their rehabilitation. However, a serious problem is the contribution of the 'civilised' world to the failure of certain states, a phenomenon that has happened in the past and could still occur in the future. Last but not least, non-state actors sometimes act as strong negative forces that jeopardise global peace and security. Criminal organisations and networks engaged in illicit trafficking of people, drugs, arms, etc. frequently develop violent capabilities. They prosper in weak states and uncontrollable metropolitan areas. Corruption usually affects undemocratic governments but it can also surface in democratic states. One of the main institutional challenges in the future will be to create national and international institutions that can cope with corruption and protect the citizen from organised crime and terrorist organisations.

Bearing in mind the negative forces discussed so far, a short list of the most alarming risks that humanity is confronting should include the following:

1. Confrontation between global powers
2. Wars in the Middle East region

32 This publication is available at www.dcdc-strategictrends.org.uk.

3. Climate change, ecological meltdown, wars over natural resources
4. Humanitarian catastrophes in Africa, and extreme poverty
5. Rearmament, in particular with weapons of mass destruction
6. Global financial and economic crises
7. Organised crime and terrorism.

To conclude, it must be remembered that global risks change with time, and periodic assessments may find that old negative forces are less relevant whereas new threats have appeared. Thus, twenty years ago global warming would not have turned up in any list of global threats. Instead, in 1987, the prospect of a major outbreak of violence between the two power blocs was still a general preoccupation, and ten years ago, in 1997, instability in the western Balkans would surely have emerged in most catalogues as a threat to international security. This is why foresight must be encouraged and global threat assessments must be made periodically.

However, current negative forces are extraordinary in both their scope and intensity. Firstly, 'negative' here does not just refer to threats to a given state, but to global threats, which affect not only humanity as a whole but also the planet. Secondly, the gravity of current negative forces is unique. For centuries, countries have been fighting each other as part of an endless pursuit of power and dominance, but today the continuation of this war cycle would entail a serious risk of extermination or, at least, a serious degradation of life conditions on earth, owing to the likely use of weapons of mass destruction.[33] Throughout the ages, mankind has exploited the world's natural resources in an unrestrained manner, but today the continuation of human activity in this damaging way, given the impressive industrial and technological means that we have, would lead to a global ecological disaster. Also, for centuries human groups have enslaved, killed and subjugated others – the large-scale slave trade that flourished between Africa and America in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is but one example of this – but today, and especially since the Holocaust, genocide has acquired a new dimension, as it now endangers global coexistence. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to state that our very survival may be at stake in the future.

33. Bernard Brodie's well known comment of 1947 that 'thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars; from now on its chief purpose must be to avert them; it can have almost no other useful purpose' is now as, if not more, pertinent than it was at the end of the Second World War.

Global governance: main substantive challenges

Both positive and negative forces are active in global relations and we cannot tell in advance which direction will prevail in the future. Global risks, in particular, are especially worrying, given that the triumph of some negative forces would entail serious threats for global coexistence. After describing positive and negative forces in the previous chapter, it is time to focus again on the idea of shaping the future, already discussed in Chapter One. Can we intervene, in one way or another, to take advantage of positive forces and counter negative ones? Which are the respective roles of the various international actors in this regard?

Without any doubt, a number of global challenges and opportunities, which concern all international actors, can be identified today. However, those risks and opportunities can be managed individually, if states and other international actors take responsibility for them separately, or alternatively they can be dealt with in a collective manner. This *Chaillot Paper* argues that the current approach, which mainly consists of a panoply of unilateral initiatives to resolve global problems, is not producing the desired results, and that a new approach based on the idea of global governance must be preferred if global threats and challenges are to be tackled adequately in the future.

Multilateralism in crisis

The current international scheme to manage global affairs cannot be described as 'global governance' in the proper sense of the term. This scheme, in which major powers, other states, international institutions and other actors take part, is the product of historical developments rather than of any organised plan. Even so, the current system provides a certain degree of governance 'by default'. Hanns Maull, a German expert, has called the present international system a 'thin order' as opposed to the 'thick order' that would be

embodied by global governance.[34] The current scheme is both extremely decentralised, because states retain the principal role in any aspect of international governance, and fragmentary, because it refers to some areas of concern only, and international efforts in those areas are not always sufficiently coordinated.

The main components of the current international governance system were introduced in the 1990s, when a 'multilateral moment' occurred. Universal organisations, such as the United Nations, and regional organisations, most notably the European Union, were reinforced, crises and disputes were dealt with, and new international regimes were created. Some of the main achievements of that era can be listed as follows:

- Reactivation of the UN Security Council after the Cold War
- Expansion of peacekeeping activities
- At the regional level, creation of the European Union with external and security dimensions
- International action to bring peace and stability to regions such as the Balkans, Central America, the Middle East and South East Asia
- Transformation of GATT into the World Trade Organisation in 1995
- Adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997
- Adoption of the Rome Statute for an International Criminal Court in 1998.

The multilateral moment of the 1990s was not completely interrupted by the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States. Following those attacks, the international community as a whole backed both the US-led military campaign against the Taliban government in Afghanistan and measures aimed at countering international terrorism. But the Iraq crisis changed all of this. At the beginning of that crisis, between summer 2002 and the military intervention of March 2003, an interesting debate, which might be entitled 'unilateralism versus multilateralism', took place. Many states and other international actors felt that the United States government was trying to tackle the perceived Iraqi threat in a unilateral manner, while a multilateral approach, which favoured inspections and international pressure, was preferable in the view of the majority. Europeans were deeply divided during the crisis, and sharp divisions were also visible

34. Hanns W. Maull, 'Europe and the new balance of global order', *International Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 4, July 2005, p. 775.

during deliberations at the United Nations. But shortly after the US-led invasion of Iraq, a new tide in favour of multilateralism could be detected both at the European and global levels. In December 2003, the EU member states decided to adopt the European Security Strategy, which contains shared views on global issues and European foreign policy. Ten new member states formally acceded to the European Union on 1 May 2004, and intense negotiations led to the signature of a Constitutional Treaty on 29 October 2004. At the same time, the UN Secretary General launched a worldwide debate aimed at reforming the United Nations on the occasion of the 60th anniversary summit, which was going to take place in September 2005. A number of reports, including the well-known *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility* (the High Level Panel Report of December 2004), which addressed global security threats and UN institutional reform, were published. Multilateralism was also the order of the day in the Middle East following the publication of the Roadmap in June 2003. A range of initiatives for the broader Middle East region were launched at the Sea Island G-8 summit in June 2004, with a view to finding some common political ground in that region.

The European Security Strategy (ESS) introduced a new concept in international relations: 'effective multilateralism'. While the term 'multilateralism' designates international action through states' combined efforts – a course of action that is diametrically opposed to unilateralism –, the notion of 'effective multilateralism' is more specific, and refers to the need to build capable and efficient international institutions and regimes. The ESS points out that this means, first of all, reinforcing the United Nations: 'The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter ... Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority.' But, at the same time, the Europeans uphold other objectives: 'it is a condition of a rule-based international order that law evolves in response to developments such as proliferation, terrorism and global warming. We have an interest in further developing existing institutions such as the WTO and in supporting new ones such as the International Criminal Court.'[35] In the European Security Strategy, thus, the Europeans proclaimed their faith in multilateral solutions to global challenges.

35. *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 15.

However, a turning point in this multilateral mood occurred in 2005. Some examples will suffice. In Europe, referendums in France (29 May) and the Netherlands (1 June 2005), which resulted in voters rejecting the text of the Constitution, put the ratification process on hold. In the Middle East, a virtual abandonment of the Roadmap by all parties led to Ariel Sharon's Gaza 'disengagement plan' in August 2005, which, despite its virtues, was fundamentally a unilateral move. Multilateral initiatives for the broader Middle East region also lost their momentum.

Other setbacks to multilateralism at the global level are quite revealing. The NPT review conference of spring 2005 did not produce encouraging results. To explain the reasons for the conference's (lack of) outcome, Jon B. Wolfsthal of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace wrote: 'the United States ... fought any attempt to refer to past US commitments to bring the CTBT into force, pursue a verifiable ban on the production of fissile material, and unequivocally pursue nuclear disarmament, arguing they had been endorsed by a previous administration in 2000.' This was unfortunate, for the conference did not strengthen the IAEA inspections regime and the treaty's withdrawal provisions. According to Wolfsthal, 'many delegations left New York wondering if the NPT and the concept of non-proliferation had much of a future'.[36]

The United Nations World Summit in September 2005 reaffirmed the Millennium Development Goals and established a Peacebuilding Commission, but most observers were unenthusiastic in their assessments of the final document. In his speech at the summit on 14 September 2005, Kofi Annan was quite explicit:

> The clear danger [is] that states of all kinds might increasingly resort to self-help, leading to a proliferation of ad hoc responses that would be divisive, destabilizing, and dangerous. ... Our biggest challenge, and our biggest failing, is on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Twice this year – at the NPT review conference, and now at this Summit – we have allowed posturing to get in the way of results. This is inexcusable. Weapons of mass destruction pose a grave danger to us all, particularly in a world threatened by terrorists with global ambitions and no inhibitions. ... Likewise, Security Council reform has, for the moment, eluded us, even though everyone broadly agrees that it is long overdue. The fact that you have not reached agreement on these and other issues does not render them any less urgent.[37]

36. John B. Wolfsthal, 'A lost nuclear opportunity', BBC News online, 28 May 2005. See also Joshua Williams and Jon B. Wolfsthal, 'The NPT at 35', *UNA-USA Policy Brief* no. 7, April 2005. Available online at www.unausa.org, and www.ceip.org.

37. Secretary General Kofi Annan's Address to the 2005 World Summit, United Nations, 14 September 2005. Available online at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/msummit/millenni/2005/0914kofi.pdf.

In this particular case, the EU member states did not emerge in a very favourable light, for they were divided on the crucial issue of UN Security Council reform.

To give another example, the Montreal conference on the environment (November-December 2005) did not scrap the Kyoto Protocol, as some had feared, but no agreement was reached on two crucial issues: what to do after 2012, when the Kyoto regime comes to an end, and what to do with 'outsiders', i.e. the United States, on the one hand, and the emerging powers, on the other, who had not signed up to the regime's restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions.

Finally, the Doha round of the World Trade Organisation negotiations to liberalise trade suffered from various crises in 2006. In July, negotiations were suspended because disagreements between key players remained too wide, and no agreement on reduction of farming subsidies and lower import taxes could be reached. The head of the WTO, Pascal Lamy, declared that this was a setback for all members: 'today there are only losers', he said on 24 July 2006.[38]

No one in particular – and everybody in general – is to blame for this general trend, which has penetrated all aspects of international relations in the last few years. Indeed, this phenomenon may be seen as the *zeitgeist* of our time. Coordinated solutions to global challenges are no longer in vogue, and progress on the European integration process, which is another form of multilateralism, is stalled. It seems indisputable that multilateralism is in crisis today.[39]

Towards a new approach: defining global governance

The continuation of this unilateralist and fragmentary approach to global challenges is doomed to failure. If negative forces described above are not tackled, they may lead to a dangerous situation in the future. If positive forces are not supported, their benefits will not be fully exploited. In short, the current approach to global issues is not auspicious for the future. Left to their spontaneous interaction, negative and positive forces might lead to a decent future, but they could also lead to apocalyptic scenarios.

With a view to achieving the best possible state of affairs in the years to come, major international actors, including the European

38. Statement by Pascal Lamy, Geneva, 24 July 2006, available at www.wto.org.

39. See Edward Newman, Ramesh Thakur, and John Tirman (eds.), *Multilateralism under Challenge? Power, International Order, and Structural Change* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2006).

Union and its member states, must act resolutely. To maximise global opportunities and deal with global challenges, a new approach is needed, whereby states and other international actors actively cooperate to deal with global issues. It must be recognised that this approach, which could be labelled 'global governance', is not explicitly present on the current international political agenda but, nevertheless, it is worth considering in depth.

Global governance can be generally described as *the management of global problems and the pursuit of global objectives through the concerted efforts of states and other international actors*. Five elements are present in this definition:

- *Management*, in the sense of action, supervision, organisation; here 'management' does not necessarily mean the establishment of centralised international institutions or the creation of a world government.
- *Global problems*, such as degradation of the environment, climate change, scarce resources, maintenance of peace and security, fight against terrorism, underdevelopment and poverty, organised crime, etc.
- *Global objectives*, for instance, advancement of international principles, promotion of democracy, protection of human rights, crisis management and peacekeeping.
- *Concerted efforts* imply cooperation, constant negotiation and the willingness to compromise.
- *States and other international actors* include states, international organisations, non-governmental organisations, multinational corporations, media, etc.

'Governance' is usually associated with management. It is important to insist on the idea that 'global governance' is not the government of the world, in the institutionalised sense that 'government' has within states. A pioneer in this area, James Rosenau, used 'governance' to denote the regulation of interdependent relations in the absence of overarching political authority.[40] Adil Najam, of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, has defined global governance as the management of global processes in the absence of global government.[41]

The list of global problems, which is a summary of the negative forces discussed above, justifies the need for global governance. The third element of our definition, global objectives, is equally

40. See James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds.), *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1992.

41. See Adil Najam et al., *Global Environmental Governance: a Reform Agenda* (Ottawa: International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2005).

described in broad terms. Historically, from antiquity to the nineteenth century, states and other political communities cultivated individual objectives, and it was not possible to identify global goals, which could be shared by all international actors. For centuries, therefore, states fought with other states to advance their respective interests and did not feel the need to cooperate to fulfil common objectives. In the last century that situation has changed, and global objectives have emerged on the international scene. Following cooperation on technical matters, such as postal and telegraphic communications, after the Second World War, more relevant global objectives were identified in the United Nations Charter and other documents. However, during the Cold War those objectives were not effectively implemented owing to profound disagreement between the UN Security Council's permanent members. The end of the Cold War changed the situation, and, since 1990, the list of global objectives has been growing steadily: prevention of massive violations of human rights, crisis management and peacekeeping, nuclear non-proliferation, protection of the environment, etc.

The fourth element of the definition refers to 'concerted international efforts'. Thomas G. Weiss, former editor of the journal *Global Governance*, defines the concept thus: 'collective efforts to identify, understand, or address worldwide problems that go beyond the capacity of individual states to solve.'[42] Indeed, it is generally recognised that 'no single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own', to quote again the European Security Strategy of 2003.[43] The same document acknowledges that not only individual states, however powerful, but also the European Union, must work in a multilateral manner: 'There are few if any problems we can deal with on our own. The threats described above are common threats, shared with all our closest partners. International cooperation is a necessity'.

Finally, a multitude of international actors, as indicated in the last point of the definition, may intervene in the resolution of global problems and the achievement of global objectives. Unlike classic international relations, when states were sole actors, today's global relations witness the active participation of a whole range of actors. States continue to be the main protagonists, but international organisations, multinational corporations, non-governmental organisations, the media, illicit groups and even individuals also play an important role. The challenge, as will be

42. Ramesh Thakur and Thomas G. Weiss (eds.), *The UN and Global Governance: an idea and its prospects* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2007).

43 European Security Strategy, op. cit.

discussed further on in this chapter, is to find the adequate synergy between them.

Combining the international actors' efforts to deal with global issues is a cumbersome task. Indeed, two experts, Francesco Grillo and Simona Milio, have underlined the difficulties in the title of their work: 'The mother of all questions: how to reform global governance?'[44] Horizontally, global governance implies coordination of states and international organisations across the world. In a vertical dimension, this idea includes the relationship between institutions, be it national or international, and citizens, considered individually or collectively, for instance, associated in non-governmental organisations. Finally, from a substantive point of view, global governance refers to all possible fields of international action, from security to the economy, from transport to the environment. Classical issues of political science and international relations, including leadership, representation and legitimacy, are put to a new test through the idea of global governance. In short, huge challenges must be addressed at the time of planning global governance. Annex 3 to this *Chaillot Paper* lists some of the main universities, think tanks and websites that are working on this idea.

Timing

Global governance will occur – if it occurs at all – in the future. No such phenomenon has existed in the past, and, in the present, as we have seen, management of global problems and opportunities is done in a fragmentary manner. Looking to the future, which factors might trigger new attitudes conducive to the emergence of global governance? Fresh global leadership, a levelling of the major powers, increased EU participation, a renewed sense of urgency, and global shocks are some of the factors that come to mind.

Steps towards global governance could be taken in the future if the United States exercises a more constructive leadership role. As the only global superpower, the United States could have taken advantage of its position at the beginning of the twenty-first century to broker agreements on general or sectorial global issues. Indeed, this would have been advantageous not only for the United States but also for the global order, in the sense that Washington could have promoted, through such agreements, interna-

44. Francesco Grillo and Simona Milio, 'The mother of all questions: how to reform global governance?', in the Open Democracy website (www.opendemocracy.net), paper dated 1 May 2003. See also Paul Hilder et al., *The Democratic Papers. Talking about democracy in Europe and beyond* (Brussels: British Council, 2004).

tional principles based on human equality, dignity and freedom. However, the narrow worldview of President George W. Bush's Administrations, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the war and occupation of Iraq since 2003, and their aftermath have led to a situation in which it now appears unthinkable that the United States could exercise global leadership to strengthen governance. The current US Government, bogged down in the Iraq war and distracted by other immediate preoccupations, does not consider the idea for a minute. It is clear that the rest of the world, whether allies or emerging powers, would not be ready to follow such a leadership, bearing in mind widespread international scepticism and reserves *vis-à-vis* recent American initiatives. Therefore, aspects of global governance could only be discussed substantially when a new President arrives in the White House from January 2009.

The scope of the forthcoming political change in the United States cannot be predicted, but it may well be that the intensity of the change will largely depend on the public's perception of the Iraq war. If the American electorate realise that the Iraqi adventure has been a badly managed, financially ruinous fiasco which has proved very costly in terms of American lives, they will choose presidential candidates who advocate a less military-oriented foreign policy. Also, if the situations in Afghanistan and other Middle Eastern hotspots do not improve, and global terrorism continues to strike, the American voter may be tempted to test alternative foreign policies. This is applicable, *a fortiori*, if President Bush orders military strikes against Iran, and a visible Iranian reaction – as seems foreseeable – ensues. Besides, the link between oil consumption and natural catastrophes is set to become increasingly clear, which may equally have repercussions on the American elections.

It seems probable, thus, that the new American Administration will have to put in place a less introverted foreign policy and explore multilateral solutions to global problems that also affect the Americans.[45] It is true, though, that isolationism will also be tempting, particularly if the US double deficit continues to worsen and the voters sense some possible or actual economic difficulties. But this would mean that the new US Government might try protectionism as a means to reverse negative economic trends, to the detriment of free trade and economic global governance, while political and security aspects of global governance would not be upset as a consequence.

45. In winter 2006-2007 many authoritative American voices, including James Baker, Henry Kissinger and Strobe Talbott, were suggesting precisely that US foreign policy should become more multilateralist.

If the new American Administration offers multilateral overtures from 2009 onwards, what will be the response from other major international actors? Most probably, they will agree to participate in a multilateral debate, in order to introduce some rationality in a number of global challenges and objectives. A cooperative attitude may prevail in those actors because emerging powers will be ready to compromise in fields such as trade and the environment if their new global status is recognised, in exchange, in some key institutions and regimes. Therefore, the levelling of global powers, a process that is already taking place in economic terms, could become a propitious context for global agreements. More specifically, if Brazil, China, India and Russia, as well as other emerging powers, have decided to participate in an economic global competition but not in a military contest, at some point in time they will have to negotiate with the United States, and also with the European Union and its member states, as well as Japan, a *modus operandi* for dealing with global challenges, which, if unchecked, may undermine the necessary conditions for such economic competition. A window of opportunity to reach an agreement on (at least some crucial aspects of) global governance would, therefore, appear around 2010-2012. Whether this window of opportunity is effectively utilised, including to forge global 'grand bargains', or not, remains to be seen.

Whether the EU becomes a global actor, with a coherent and ambitious vision for the global order, will also determine the future of global governance. The draft Constitutional Treaty introduced some useful provisions to reinforce the EU's international role, including the creation of a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. The current stalemate in the constitutional debate has put those advances on hold. However, exchanges among the EU member states will probably lead to a 'moment of truth' in the near future, when they will have to define the main parameters of the Union – institutions, decision-making process, competencies, and external action. As is discussed in Chapter Five of this paper, if that 'moment of truth' includes agreement on a more substantial foreign policy, as occurred in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, the EU will be able to participate fully in the debate on global governance at the beginning of the 2010s.

In addition to the multipolar context, a widespread sense of urgency might also contribute to the perceived need for global governance. Public stress will probably push in the direction of

global agreements if a number of events and developments accelerate the sense of urgency; for instance, public perception of natural catastrophes associated with global warming and climate change, the eruption of new or protracted conflicts in the Middle East with disastrous humanitarian consequences, and massive terrorist attacks in the West. Following those and/or analogous events, a public sense of urgency might contribute to specific advances in global governance if the adequate political circumstances, including sensible leadership, exist.

A window of opportunity might present itself, but it may or may not be availed of. If the opportunity does exist, the European Union and its member states should seize it and work to promote global governance, as is discussed in this paper's last chapter. But another possibility is that such a window of opportunity simply may not appear at the beginning of the 2010s. The new American government may be insensitive to the need for global governance and maintain the idea of 'American exceptionalism'. Moreover, relationships between traditional and emerging powers could prove problematic.

A different analysis of the future timing for global governance would be the 'historical shocks' theory. This theory suggests that changes in leadership alone or incremental developments cannot produce enough momentum to persuade international actors that reform of global governance is necessary. Indeed, the reform of global order requires a 'constitutional moment', which is not present today owing to the prevailing political circumstances, and will not be present in the future unless some 'historical shocks' occur. Constitutional moments have been identified in political history.[46] In global relations, such constitutional moments appear only rarely, and are usually linked to serious crises or extraordinary events. Such a moment existed, in particular, after the First and Second World Wars, and led to the creation of the League of Nations and the United Nations respectively. In a different environment, a significant constitutional change in the international order took place at the beginning of the 1990s – although it did not entail formal modification of the UN Charter. The end of the Cold War and Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait triggered an unprecedented consensus amongst the five UNSC permanent members that led to effective action by the Security Council. For the first time since its creation, this body decided to authorise large-scale (and later, smaller) uses of force, to make

46. Professor Bruce Ackerman has defined this idea and identified three constitutional moments in American history. See his article 'Revolution on a Human Scale' in the special issue of *Yale Law Journal*, entitled 'Constitutional Change and the Politics of History', vol. 108, no. 8, June 1999, p. 2279.

substantive pronouncements on certain international conflicts and disputes, and to mandate peacekeeping operations. Also, in a peaceful environment, a regional constitutional moment existed in Europe from 2002 until 2004-05, although the impetus has vanished after the French and Dutch referendums of 2005.

According to the shocks theory, it makes no sense to speculate about the timing for global governance in the future. Global affairs will continue to be managed just as today, and a new global arrangement to re-organise collective management of global issues would only be possible after another world war or after another worldwide, large-scale 'catharsis' occurs. This may be true. But it might also be true that some ongoing phenomena that we are witnessing today could be described, with time, as slow-motion catharsis: for instance, the various crises in the Middle East, including Iraq, and climate change. Especially damaging events related to these or other global problems may act as catalysts in the eyes of both public opinion and governments, so as to transform the 'problems' into 'historical shocks' that call for a wholly new approach.

Governing multipolarity: emerging powers and global order and principles

One of the main challenges of any form of global governance in the future will be to accommodate the points of view and interests of major powers. The rise and fall of great powers, as was discussed in Chapter Two above, can take place either in a peaceful or in a violent manner. The historical pattern has been bellicose confrontation between dominant powers, wars by proxy, as in the Cold War, and coalition building aimed at matching the dominant power militarily. A key challenge of the future will be to manage the rise and fall of major powers in a way that does not result in military confrontation between them.

Experts in international relations agree that the world is becoming increasingly multipolar in economic terms. The United States' military supremacy has not been challenged by anyone since the end of the Cold War. Therefore, strategically, the world can be qualified as unipolar. But from an economic point of view it is obvious that a number of both old and emerging powers are increasingly competing with the United States on the global scene.

As was pointed out in the previous chapter, if the economic ascent of certain states is followed by their military rise, the idea of a global military confrontation in the future, which will surely include the use of weapons of mass destruction, is a dire prospect. This problem should be explicitly addressed in any discussion on global governance and innovative measures to prevent such a possibility should be explored. Even if the European Union and its member states have excluded any sort of participation in such a suicidal search for global supremacy, they must insist on the need to avert future wars of global scope.

The UN Charter did not provide for an adequate mechanism to avoid clashes between world powers. Indeed, the main purpose of the Charter was to 'save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind', as the preamble states.[47] But the Charter provisions make it sufficiently clear that the type of war that the new body was entrusted to tackle was a war of 'enemy states' against the allies in the Second World War, acting as permanent members of the Security Council. Any breach of peace or act of aggression that was unpalatable to all permanent members – the former allies in the war – could be repressed according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, the Charter did not regulate future confrontation between the former allies. As soon as the Cold War started, the United Nations system was simply unable to tackle direct or indirect conflict between the Security Council's permanent members. In those cases, the council had to abstain, for the veto power of one or the other permanent members impeded any kind of collective involvement. During the 1990s, and up to now, on many occasions the Security Council has been able to fulfil its mission because agreement between the permanent members prevailed in most cases, and vetoing has become rare. But a future confrontation amongst permanent members may reduce the council to the limbo in which it dozed for decades. Looking to the future, in the event of a serious conflict between current permanent members, for instance China and the United States, the Security Council will be deadlocked again.

It must be expected that, while a future enlargement of the Security Council will make the body more representative, the abovementioned problem will not be resolved. New members of the Security Council – whatever the duration of their mandate – will probably not enjoy veto rights, but they will have increased

47. Charter of the United Nations, Preamble, 1945.

influence in global security issues, which might be utilised to hinder collective decisions against their interests. If old and new members of the Security Council decide to cooperate, an enlarged council can become an irreplaceable instrument for global governance and peace. Conversely, if they decide to transform their economic competition into military struggle, the Security Council would become a useless body.

There are no magic wands to prevent confrontation between global powers, and it does not seem probable that any future reform of global institutional structures could regulate this issue adequately. However, increased awareness of the problem is a good start, and future debates on global governance should include explicit references to that issue. Military confrontation among major powers would lead to arms races, wars by proxy, worsening of local disputes and loss of independence in zones of influence, while the use of weapons of mass destruction cannot be excluded. The economic consequences, not only for the powers involved, but also for the rest of the world in the era of globalisation, would be huge. General awareness of the dangers of such a military confrontation will not necessarily trigger a system of global governance with legal restrictions applicable to major powers. But that awareness may increase general scrutiny *vis-à-vis* those powers, and help to dissuade old and emerging powers from resorting to bellicose methods. Global civil society, including the major powers' own national publics, can play a crucial role in this respect. If one global power harbours aggressive intentions, its own population as well as that of the rest of the world should persuade the government to abandon them. This kind of globalised popular reaction is quite possible in an increasingly interconnected world, as the Iraq crisis showed.

Major powers can, of course, continue to rise and fall. Other, medium and smaller, powers do the same. But this dynamic must be pursued in a peaceful manner, on economic, commercial, cultural, and similar fronts, but not on the battlefield. Today, the only available battlefield for military confrontation between global powers is a frail planet.

The rise of new, emerging powers with global reach poses another challenge to global governance. Current international principles and values are sometimes presented as the brainchild of Western predominance. Principles such as democracy, human rights and free trade, it is argued, are the product of the post-Cold

War period in which there was no ideological alternative to the Western worldview. The ascent of new powers, in particular China and India, is likely to be followed by their demand to revise the prevailing set of principles and values. China, for instance, will call into question the idea that democracy and human rights must underpin the political systems of all states, since China will rather favour the idea of 'harmony' of the body politic instead. Some voices in Russia, to give another example, are suggesting that democracy should be interpreted in each case according to national needs. The confluence of those and similar demands on the part of emerging powers would lead to a reform of the current set of international principles and values in the future, to a point where new – or old, depending on the perspective – and completely different principles and values will inspire global relations.

Would a future debate on international principles produce such a radical shift? How would that debate affect global governance? It is doubtful that the demands from emerging powers will trigger a sweeping change in international principles. In fact, those principles are not the result of Western predominance, but reflect rather many contributions of different and varying origins that have intervened during a long historical process. Current international principles originated in various periods: the classical ages, the aftermath of the Second World War, the Cold War, and post-Cold War era. While Western powers have contributed to the development of a number of principles, countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America have equally made key inputs in the process – for instance, as regards the principles of non-intervention during the Cold War, development aid, peacekeeping and multilateralism in a more recent phase. Also, the idea that Western powers always support current international principles is a false assumption, as recent examples of Western attitudes against the principles of non-use of armed force or free trade clearly show. In the last few decades, the debate over international principles has been truly global, and states from all continents and conditions have participated actively – along with other international actors such as international organisations and NGOs. From this point of view, a more outspoken participation of emerging powers will just be a continuation of present realities. Those powers can emphasise a particular interpretation, or highlight one or another of the existing principles, but they can neither 'drop' principles, nor 'invent' new principles from scratch and 'impose' them on other

major powers or on the international community, because the global debate on principles and values is a collective endeavour by its own nature.

Take the example of democracy and human rights. Future discussions on those principles, in which old and emerging, northern and southern, powers will participate, is unlikely to diminish their relevance. Rather, most indicators point towards a multiplication of demands regarding those principles. In the last few years, people in the street, from Bolivia to Lebanon, from Ukraine to Indonesia, have called for more democracy. Requests for human rights to be respected made by Shirin Ebadi of Iran, Rigoberta Menchú of Guatemala, and Aung San Suu Kyi of Burma, three women who were awarded Nobel Prizes, did not stem from a desire to imitate the Western way of life, but rather from a universal sentiment that inspires people to fight for human dignity and equality. Human rights violations in Chechnya, Darfur and Iraq have been criticised, regardless of the purported violators' nationality or international status. The problem is that states and international organisations do not always make balanced assessments of the state of democracy and human rights. For instance, most western countries turn a blind eye to verified violations of human rights in Israel, for political reasons, or in China, for economic reasons. As a result, assessments made by non-governmental organisations with global reach are perceived as more reliable than official reports. The challenge for global governance will be to establish international institutions and regimes that promote democracy and human rights in a balanced manner, excluding political and economic considerations. Following the High-Level Panel's and Kofi Annan's recommendations, in April 2006, the United Nations decided to create a Human Rights Council to replace the previous commission on human rights. In spite of some progress, this is an unfinished process. The advocacy group Human Rights Watch has written: 'In this first year of its existence, the Council is understandably preoccupied with institution building. But human rights violations haven't been suspended while the Council focused on these tasks; in fact they have worsened in many locations'.[48]

The global debate on international principles and values will continue in the foreseeable future, and will certainly lead to gradual, consensual – sometimes tacit, sometimes explicit – reformulations of global principles, as has been the case in the past. Global

48. See Human Rights Watch, 'More business than usual: the work which awaits the Human Rights Council', 12 March 2007, at www.hrw.org. See also Amnesty International, 'UN Human Rights Council: Member governments must do more to build an effective Council', at www.amnesty.org; and Desmond Tutu, 'Two wrongs don't make a rights council', in *International Herald Tribune*, 18 March 2007.

governance can accompany this historical process through periodic multilateral negotiations, which can be translated into more or less binding documents and declarations, encapsulating the state of play of international principles in a given moment. In 1945, Articles 1 and 2 of the UN Charter established the first-ever official list of international principles. The United Kingdom representative at the San Francisco Conference declared:

> The purposes and the principles in the Charter seem to me and to my Delegation of the highest importance. I think they introduce a new idea into international relations, for instead of trying to govern the actions of the members and the organs of the United Nations by precise and intricate codes of procedure, we have preferred to lay down purposes and principles under which they have to act. And by that means, we hope to ensure that they act in conformity with the express desires of the nations assembled here, while, at the same time, we give them freedom to accommodate their actions to circumstances which today no man can foresee.[49]

In 1970, a far-reaching reformulation of international principles took place at the UN General Assembly. After years of negotiations, UN General Assembly declaration 2625 (XXV) offered a consensual and updated expression of the Charter's principles,

> [n]oting that the great political, economic and social changes and scientific progress which have taken place in the world since the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations give increased importance to those principles and to the need for their more effective application in the conduct of States wherever carried on.[50]

In a regional context, the CSCE Helsinki Final Act of 1975 also formulated a list of principles. This document was legally nonbinding and its scope was only regional; nevertheless, its historical significance was enormous, since it developed a common minimum denominator on principles between the two blocs during the Cold War.

The new situation created after the fall of the Berlin Wall was reflected in numerous regional and global texts with references to principles. In November 1990, the CSCE summit formulated the Paris Charter for a New Europe. The Barcelona Declaration of 1995 contained a list of principles that should guide relationships

49. UNCIO Documents, vol. 6, page 26, quoted by Leland M. Goodrich, Edvard Hambro and Anne Patricia Simons, *United Nations Charter. Commentary and documents* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, third edition), p. 24.

50. Text from the preamble of UNGA Resolution 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970.

amongst the Euro-Mediterranean partners. In September 2000, the UN Millennium summit produced a groundbreaking declaration, where new global principles were endorsed by all states. The Millennium Declaration acknowledged universal values – freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature, and shared responsibility – along with more traditional principles. The last value is spelled out thus:

> Shared responsibility. Responsibility for managing worldwide economic and social development, as well as threats to international peace and security, must be shared among the nations of the world and should be exercised multilaterally. As the most universal and most representative organization in the world, the United Nations must play the central role.

The Millennium Declaration goes on to describe general directives on 'peace, security and disarmament', 'development and poverty eradication', 'protection of our common environment', 'human rights, democracy and good governance', and 'meeting the special needs of Africa', *inter alia*.

Future attempts at global governance should include similar declarations on principles and values, which, regardless of their legal status as treaties or non-binding documents, would provide opportunities to discuss essential global issues, and offer a 'snapshot' of global principles and values at a given moment.

Security governance

The UN High Level Panel Report, A *More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, contained a detailed analysis of problems related to global security governance as well as a number of pragmatic recommendations, including the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission and a Council on Human Rights. The HLP recognised that the nature of threats to the global community has changed dramatically since 1945.

> Sixty years later, we know all too well that the biggest security threats we face now, and in the decades ahead, go far beyond states waging aggressive war. They extend to poverty, infectious, disease and environmental degradation; war and violence within states;

> the spread and possible use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and transnational organized crime. The threats are from non-state actors as well as states, and to human security as well as state security.[51]

Along with the complexity of global threats, the HLP report also acknowledged that the international community as a whole must participate in the fight against those threats. *Collective* security, which involves states, international organisations and other actors, acquires, thus, a renewed sense today.

> The central challenge for the twenty-first century is to fashion a new and broader understanding, bringing together all [actors and issues], of what collective security means – and of all the responsibilities, commitments, strategies and institutions that come with it if a collective security system is to be effective, efficient and equitable.

Finally, the HLP report points out that collective security requires a 'framework for preventive action' including diplomacy and development. Other kinds of measures, from economic sanctions to coercion, should come afterwards.

The report, published in December 2004 and discussed before the UN World Summit of September 2005, refers to many aspects of global security governance. This *Chaillot Paper* addresses some of these issues only: reform of the UN Security Council – which is discussed in the next chapter –, the need for early warning and crisis management, human and financial resources for peacekeeping, and disarmament.

Rapid response to international crises is crucial to ensure effective action. The experience of the last few years includes both examples of delayed reaction (Darfur) and cases where the international community's intervention has been really swift and beneficial. One interesting case in this respect was the international community's involvement in the end of the Hezbollah-Israel war of summer 2006. After 33 days, almost unexpectedly, a fully-fledged war gave way to a ceasefire and to a fragile peace. That rapid shift was the product of several causes, including military stalemate on the ground and international pressure linked to disapproval of the war in international public opinion.[52] The main lesson from this precedent is that UNSC Resolution 1701 and its

51. *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, Report of the Secretary General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (New York: United Nations, 2004). See www.un.org/secureworld. Quoted paragraphs are from the report's synopsis.

52. See Franck Mermier and Elizabeth Picard (eds.), *Liban, une guerre de trente-trois jours* (Paris: Editions de La Découverte, 2006).

subsequent implementation were a result of multilateral diplomacy, in which Israel, Lebanon, the European Union and its member states, the United States and the United Nations were directly and constantly involved. Confronted with a serious crisis, the Europeans stood ready to help to ensure robust peacekeeping and security in the Middle East region. All this means that effective, multilateral crisis management is possible, even in difficult circumstances. Bearing in mind positive and negative experiences of early warning and crisis management, the challenge for global governance in the future will be to reinforce mechanisms and practices that contribute to rein in crises at early stages. This is particularly true in the Middle East, where a number of protracted disputes are intertwined. One of the most urgent challenges for global security governance is to break the current cycle of violence in the Middle East, through crisis management and resolution, and transform it into *rapprochement* and region building.

Another crucial issue for global governance in the security field will be to find the necessary financial and human resources to respond to the global peacekeeping needs. As Jean-Marie Guéhenno, UN Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, has pointed out repeatedly, the fact that UN peacekeeping has reached a historical high in terms of both personnel and number of operations puts the UN capabilities under strain. Without any doubt there is a mismatch between the United Nations's increasing demand (and regional demand) and the available supply for peacekeeping. Thierry Tardy of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy has emphasised that it will be difficult to fill that gap, owing to the states' limited resources, and the need to make political decisions on which crises to tackle.[53] Gunilla Herolf of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs has written that, since the EU wants to be both a regional pacifier and a global actor, 'difficult decisions' will have to be made in terms of choosing between several crisis situations.[54] Even though the European contribution to global peacekeeping is very important from a qualitative point of view and there is an ongoing working relationship between the European Union and the United Nations in this field, it remains to be seen whether contributions from the EU member states can reinforce the UN capabilities substantially. Both other industrialised countries and major powers also have a special responsibility in this respect. The debate that accompanied the creation of a Strategic Military Cell at the UN Department of

53. Thierry Tardy, 'EU-UN Cooperation in Peacekeeping: A Promising Relationship in a Constrained Environment', in Martin Ortega (ed.), 'The European Union and the United Nations. Partners in Effective Multilateralism', *Chaillot Paper* no. 78 (Paris: EUISS, June 2005).

54. Gunilla Herolf, 'The EU as a global actor', in Bo Huldt et al. (eds.), *European security and defence policy: a European challenge*, Strategic Yearbook 2006 (Stockholm: Finnish National Defence College/ Swedish National Defence College, 2006), p. 45.

Peacekeeping Operations in New York in order to coordinate UNIFIL II military planning in summer 2006 is revealing. The European contributors to UNIFIL proposed the creation of the cell, which was a good initiative, because the UN unit dealing with planning at the UN Headquarters was composed of less than twenty personnel. In financial terms, while political support to multilateralism is laudable, the main problem continues to be lack of resources, and this is not sufficiently underlined in the present debate on the reform of the United Nations. Bearing in mind the broad range of tasks, particularly peacekeeping, that the United Nations has to carry out worldwide, the UN is clearly underfunded. In 2004, for instance, the assessed UN budget for regular activities was $1,483 million and the peacekeeping operations budget was $5,154 million. Since $2,927 million was unpaid at 31 December ($357 million from the regular budget, $2,570 million from the peacekeeping budget), the UN functioned with $3,710 million that year.[55] By way of comparison, the combined defence expenditure of the twenty-four EU members that participate in the European Defence Agency amounted to $193 *billion* in 2005[56] – whereas the United States spent more than $500 *billion*.[57] In order to strengthen the United Nations, its human and financial resources must be augmented, and the EU and its member states, which already pay a large share of the UN budget, should be ready to meet this challenge.

Finally, the fight against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a noble and laudable objective. The international community's current efforts to prevent Iran's and North Korea's proliferation must be pursued. However, the global political debate shows that this goal must be put in perspective. On the one hand, the NPT review conference in 2005 and other debates on WMD and their means of delivery demonstrate that vertical issues (development of new WMD, arsenals' growth, anti-missile defence and space-defence systems) are as important as horizontal ones. On the other hand, while the destructive potential of WMD is enormous, conventional arms, including small arms, have tragically lethal effects as civil wars in Africa and the Middle East remind us every day. Therefore, any future attempt at global governance in the security field will have to involve a serious overhaul of the preoccupations of the international community at the end of the Second World War. At that time, the issue of effective steps towards disarmament and arms control was high on the agenda.

55. Data compiled by Klaus Hüfner, www.globalpolicy.org/finance. The United Nations and all its agencies and funds spend about $20 billion each year.

56. See the European Defence Agency website, www.eda.europa.eu.

57. See the CIA World Factbook, at https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html.

As a consequence, Article 26 of the United Nations Charter was formulated thus:

> Article 26. In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

Although this Article was for a long time stillborn because of the Cold War, and even though the Military Staff Committee has not been developed,[58] global governance in the future should encompass international regimes for disarmament. Bearing in mind the Security Council's active role in the fight against terrorism, measures to implement Article 26 on disarmament could equally be decided at any time.

Economic governance and the environment

Nowadays economic governance presents four challenges: how to deal with the 'outcasts' of globalisation, ensure free trade, the prevention of financial crises, and protection of the environment. During the Cold War, global economic governance was not possible owing to the spectacular divide between the industrialised and the developing worlds, whereas the communist states remained in a sort of economic limbo. If there was a global economic issue at that time, it was development in the 'global south'. The ascent of the 'Asian tigers', including Japan, thirty to forty years ago and the recent rise of emerging powers such as Brazil, China and India thanks to the globalisation process, has shown that development is achieved through sensible policies and free trade, rather than planned economy, external aid, or other methods. Although the emerging powers still face difficulties, hundreds of millions of people in those countries have overcome poverty during the last decade. The problem now is that some regions, and more specifically Africa and the Middle East, are not profiting from the tide of globalisation. Also, in parts of Asia and Latin America whole swathes of societies live below the poverty line. The hopeless state

58. The UN Security Council authorisations for coercive operations since 1990 required neither special agreements between states and the UN – as Article 43 of the UN Charter imposes – nor the involvement of the Military Staff Committee of Article 47.

of these destitute people may easily lead to insecurity, civil strife, organised crime, ungovernable metropolises and illicit trafficking.

Many studies show that current international efforts are not contributing significantly to tackle this challenge. The UN Millennium summit in 2000 defined the Millennium Development Goals, which *inter alia* calls for reducing poverty, hunger, lack of access to drinking water, disease, and child mortality by 2015. In 2005, an in-depth report entitled *Investing in Development* underlined that, in order to advance towards those goals, a combination of good governance in poor countries and more external financial aid was needed. But the report also showed that progress was meagre on both fronts.[59] Jeffrey D. Sachs, the director of the report, has insisted that the industrialised countries' aid is lagging behind the 0.7 percent of GDP objective reiterated at the Monterrey summit in 2002. Whereas European countries are closer to that objective, the United States and Japan are farther. Professor Sachs points out that some practical steps are quite simple, such as providing African families with mosquito nets and anti-malaria medicines, and with improved seeds and fertilizers. And yet, official development assistance continues to be too low, many countries use aid for political purposes, rich countries' promises of post-crisis reconstruction are not always honoured, and economic sanctions often have adverse effects on populations. The World Bank, the financial institution entrusted with development, is carrying out an important task; but its activities are not having a decisive impact. Some observers, for instance, criticise the stress that the World Bank's president, Paul Wolfowitz, puts on the fight against corruption in less developed countries, at the expense of the main task of tackling poverty.[60]

One of the best methods to promote development is to embrace free trade policies. But ensuring free trade globally has other positive effects. Commercial exchanges have been growing steadily since the end of the Cold War and have contributed decisively to the global economic bonanza of the last decade. The World Trade Organisation, established in 1995, acts as the guarantor of free trade worldwide. Its 150 members (as of January 2007) give the WTO a nearly universal scope. However, despite lengthy negotiations, the Doha round of liberalisation has not been completed. The main challenge to global governance of trade continues to be protectionism in key economic actors, and even if the WTO has acquired important instruments to uphold free

59. See www.unmillenniumproject.org.

60. See www.worldbank.org for official information. For more critical reports, see: Steven R. Weisman, 'Wolfowitz corruption drive rattles World Bank', *The New York Times*, 14 September 2006; Francis Fukuyama, 'A battle Paul Wolfowitz can't win', *The American Interest Online*, 16 September 2006; and Emad Mekay, 'Bank's graft crusade exaggerated, critics say', in Inter Press Service News Agency, 7 February 2007.

trade, states have not as of yet agreed upon an international system that puts aside protectionist temptations. Pascal Lamy, Director-General of the WTO, described the failure of negotiations before the European Parliament Committee on International Trade on 17 October 2006 in the following terms:

> not as a major economic shock that would precipitate any particular market crisis, or a breakdown in trade or in the operating environment in the short-term, but rather as a slowly developing disease that would progressively sap the strength of the multilateral trading system built up over the past 50 years, damaging its economic lungs, its political heart, and its systemic bone structure.[61]

According to Lamy, negotiations in the Doha round have been difficult precisely because of the high level of ambition established at the outset, which applies both to the conventional North-South dimension and to the newer South-South dimension, since, in the space of ten years, the proportion of developing countries in world trade has gone from one third to one half of the total. Moreover, the Doha round was explicitly designed to promote development and to 'correct the injustices that persisted in the international trading order'. Pascal Lamy went on to say:

> It is as if economic decolonisation had had to wait 50 years after political decolonisation. It is now an acknowledged fact that should the negotiations fail, the main victims of the WTO's inability to correct the inequalities that the Uruguay Round had begun to narrow in the agricultural or textiles and clothing areas would be the weakest and the poorest. In other words, the developing countries, and in particular the least developed countries, for which a successful outcome represents the only hope of dealing with the adverse effects of agricultural subsidies on cotton or sugar, or of gaining unhampered access to the markets of the rich countries.

History shows that financial crises can be very harmful to the global economy. In an interconnected and interdependent world, such crises may have devastating effects. After having gone through various transformations, the institution created after the Second World War to avert financial crises, the International Monetary Fund, has an obsolete structure today. The financial

61. See www.wto.org and www.europarl.europa.eu.

strength of the emerging powers, the US deficit and its position as borrower, and the creation of the euro are but some factors that call for a profound reform of the IMF. A timid reform process started at the Singapore annual meeting of September 2006. China, Mexico, South Korea, and Turkey were allowed more voting power. In particular, China became the sixth most powerful IMF member behind the US, Japan, Germany, France and the United Kingdom. Before that meeting, China had fewer votes than either Belgium or the Netherlands, for instance. However, the reform was only partial. Other emerging powers were opposed to the deal, because they did not get what they had expected. India, to cite another member, lost voting power from 1.95 percent to 1.91 percent, which led the Indian Minister of Economy to declare that the reform was 'hopelessly flawed'.[62] Also, voting power in the IMF is traditionally organised in clusters and European countries are split in many of those groups, which is hardly consistent with the existence of a common currency in a number of EU member states. The IMF plans to continue the reform process in 2008, but it remains to be seen whether states will be able to reach compromises that enable the fund to effectively prevent financial crises in the volatile circumstances of today.

All the previous challenges pale compared to what can be considered as the most formidable challenge for global economic governance in the future: protection of the environment. In the last century, and more so in the last thirty years, the astonishing expansion of the world economy has been based on cheap and easily available energy. But, as was pointed out in Chapter Two (in the section headed 'Negative Developments'), growing consumption of fossil fuels has put the planet's health in danger.

This poses an unprecedented challenge to global governance. The faltering and timid international measures adopted so far are blatantly insufficient. Some parties to the Kyoto Protocol are not very scrupulous in respecting its rules. Those who do not take part in that international regime are not ready to accept curbs on their greenhouse gas emissions. The United States, which produces almost twenty five percent of the world's emissions, has not presented a credible plan to substantially reduce those emissions. China and India seem not ready to join a post-Kyoto arrangement. As Indian Environment Minister Andimuthu Raja declared at the Montreal conference on the environment in 2005: 'our emissions of CO_2 are only 3 percent of the world's total, while we have 17 per-

62. See www.imf.org, and 'India attacks "flawed" IMF reform', BBC News online, 19 September 2006.

cent of the global population. I do believe that the calls for developing countries to take up G-8 abatement commitments ... are misplaced, and responsive to agendas other than genuine mitigation of climate change.'[63]

There are two schools of thought in this respect. On the one hand, some experts and politicians believe that the market will resolve the problem. As consumers perceive the damage done to the environment, enterprises will offer environment-friendly products. As oil prices increase and the adverse effects of coal, gas and oil consumption become more visible and are better known by everybody, governments will promote research and development of alternative energy sources. On the other hand, other academics and politicians believe that collective intervention is necessary, either because they think that economic actors will not change attitudes by themselves, or because there is simply not enough time to wait for this to happen. Intervention here implies regulation at both the national and international levels. So far, the first approach has not worked, and there are no reasons to believe that problems such as global warming and climate change are going to be resolved by the market. When it comes to guaranteeing essential public goods – or 'externalities' as economists say – it is necessary to have some form of collective intervention, including agreed rules and institutions.

The European Union and its member states have firmly endorsed the second approach. They subscribed to the Kyoto Protocol and have enacted a series of national and European regulations to reduce polluting activities. The European Council of 9 March 2007 underlined that the EU wanted to take the 'leading role' in the protection of the global environment. The European Council recognised that 'developed countries should continue to take the lead by committing to collectively reducing their emissions of greenhouse gases in the order of 30 percent by 2020 compared to 1990. They should do so also with a view to collectively reducing their emissions by 60 percent to 80 percent by 2050 compared to 1990'.[64] The EU made a formal commitment:

> 32. The European Council emphasises that the EU is committed to transforming Europe into a highly energy-efficient and low greenhouse-gas-emitting economy and decides that, until a global and comprehensive post-2012 agreement is concluded, and without prejudice to its position in international negotiations, the EU

63. See report by Richard Black, BBC News online, 11 December 2005, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/.

64. Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, 8/9 March 2007. Available online at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/93135.pdf.

makes a firm independent commitment to achieve at least a 20% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 compared to 1990.[65]

Some EU member states are going even beyond that. The United Kingdom has shown itself to be particularly preoccupied with global warming. In October 2006, a report on its economic consequences, *The Economics of Climate Change: the Stern Review*, was presented. Nicholas Stern's report suggested that failing to curb greenhouse gas emissions would cut the world's economic output by 5 to 20 percent per year. Conversely, action to limit the effects of climate change would cost only about one percent of the industrialised countries' GDP. The case that the cost of immediate action is less than the cost of inaction is 'blindly obvious'.[66] The UK government has adopted a series of measures following the main lines of the Stern report.

However, European initiatives cannot hide the fact that global warming and climate change are global problems. The fact that the EU and its member states are ready to take the lead sheds more light on the huge gap between policies across continents. From a global governance point of view, the EU's determination is just a point of departure, since negotiations with other industrialised states, on the one hand, and emerging powers, on the other, are still uncertain. Similarly, the creation of an international organisation to deal with global environmental issues with a view to integrate the United Nations Environment Programme and the Kyoto regime seems a remote prospect. Therefore, protection of the environment continues to be one of the main challenges to global governance.

65. Ibid.

66. See http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/index.cfm (Independent Reviews, *Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change*, 30 October 2006).

Global governance: institutional issues

The previous chapter has addressed some of the most relevant substantive questions regarding global governance. Any future form of global governance will have to ensure that major powers do not fight each other, peacekeeping and disarmament are pursued, democracy and human rights are more firmly guaranteed, and economic development is sustainable.

In addition to challenges regarding the advancement of international principles, global governance also faces formidable challenges related to the institutional architecture that characterises the contemporary political world. Today's institutional landscape is made up of states, as the main protagonists, plus a whole range of international organisations and regimes, and other international actors. The current institutional structure is a product of the spontaneous development of many societal and political inventions and innovations, from the nation-state to non-governmental advocacy groups. A process of historical 'sedimentation' has led to the existing institutional system. However, bearing in mind once more both the huge threats and opportunities confronting us, the question must be asked: is the current international architecture the most appropriate to shape the global future?

The institutional framework of global governance

It is obvious that we cannot answer that question in the affirmative. Therefore, alternative models must be explored. We can list at least nine options for re-organising international institutions, from the most conservative to the most radical, with a view to planning the best possible institutional architecture.

Option A

Back to the state. Widespread lack of trust in international organisations and regimes leads to the reappearance of the state as the only international actor, as was the case in the nineteenth century, for instance. A global web of bilateral (and regional) relations is deemed largely sufficient to deal with the most important international issues.

Option B

Status quo. In a sense, global governance is actually happening today, for it can be argued that 'management' of global problems and opportunities exists to a certain degree, even if this management is not entirely satisfactory. Looking to the future, the *status quo* option would be management of global affairs as in the present. No major change is introduced in institutional structures. Individual states continue to be the main protagonists, and international institutions and regimes continue to languish. In this scenario, a prolonged crisis in multilateralism does not preclude dealing with global threats in a decentralised manner, but global risks remain high, while global objectives are not efficiently pursued.

Option C

Directoire. The select 'clubs' existing today (G-8, UN Security Council, IMF, etc.) acquire a stronger role in world affairs. Through those groupings, major powers make decisions that have global repercussions. Medium and smaller powers, and multilateral bodies such as the United Nations, have to follow suit. This option may take two different forms: (C1) Members of the current *directoire* refuse to admit new members into the exclusive clubs; (C2) Old members recognise that they have to incorporate emerging powers and, therefore, a new *directoire* is created. An example would be the L-20 proposal, which includes the G-8 countries plus emerging countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America.[67] In this case, while those new groupings might better represent the realities of power, many players are still excluded. Nevertheless, arguing that they are the only ones to have the required capabilities, or invoking similar reasons, the members of those restricted groups take the lead in global affairs.

Option D

Ad hoc sectorial solutions. Given that global multilateral institutions are not up-to-date, some problems have to be addressed using *ad*

67. See www.L20.org.

hoc measures. This allows for variable membership in a whole range of *ad hoc* initiatives. The Middle East Quartet, the UNSC P-5 plus Germany plus the EU on Iran, states parties to the Kyoto Protocol, the Group of Six working on North Korea's nuclear disarmament, etc. are but harbingers of what will become a widespread practice. Resorting to *ad hoc* solutions has obvious drawbacks – some problems are dealt with, some are not; key states may opt out; coordination between groups and with multilateral institutions and regimes is not always possible; etc. – but it is the only way to ensure some sort of global governance. Also, 'adhocery' ensures that the states' will is scrupulously respected in all circumstances.

Option E

Reformist option. Little by little, international institutions and regimes are reformed and adapted to the new needs. In this scenario, the UN 60th anniversary summit opens the way for a policy of gradual reform. Intricate and long negotiations lead to modest but useful changes in the UN, the international financial institutions, the EU and other regional bodies, and international regimes. However, synchronisation between this slow-motion reform and global needs is less than perfect. For instance, UN Security Council reform is not achieved. A window of opportunity for constructive multilateralism and global reform is actually open during the 2010s, but progress is sluggish, the Security Council is less and less relevant, and regional wars, terrorism and natural catastrophes loom large.

Option F

Transformation of existing institutions and regimes. Acknowledging that states and international institutions, as they are now defined, are incapable of managing the world's problems, governments decide to revamp existing institutions and regimes profoundly. Some intergovernmental conferences negotiate reforms. This would be another way of approaching the window of opportunity in the 2010s. The United Nations becomes the privileged forum to discuss global problems, an enlarged Security Council operates effectively, and the new UN budget, which is tenfold the current figure, allows for robust peacekeeping where needed. On the other hand, significant steps are taken in the context of region building in Europe and elsewhere. A European Minister for Foreign Affairs is appointed in 2011. Greater coordination between international institutions is agreed upon, which leads to fruitful division of labour.

Option G

A regional world. After Europe, other continents develop their own regional structures, which allows for direct relationships among the continental blocs. Global institutions and regimes are not necessary – or are relegated to the background – because regional groups can deal with others. This scenario implies that regional groups will fight for their respective interests: compromises may be found on a number of issues, but clashes between the regions may also exist.

Option H

Networks. Global accords to collectively manage some fields of international activity are signed. In addition to governments and international organisations, multinational companies and NGOs representing civil society are involved in the management of global problems through the creation of governance networks. Jean-François Rischard, a former official with the World Bank, for instance, has proposed the creation of 'Global Issues Networks', that is to say, broad agreements to deal with major global issues, such as the environment, trade, and international security, where states share the decision-making process with other actors.[68] From a legalistic point of view, Anne-Marie Slaughter has pointed out that a 'networked world order' is already in the making and has suggested ways to reinforce it.[69]

Option I

Constitutional option. Following general recognition of the current system's inadequacy, or as a result of a global catastrophe, such as a nuclear war or drastic climate change, states and other international actors decide to convene a global constitutional conference. A sort of San Francisco Conference II would lay the foundations of the new global order. This course of action is more radical than Option F, in the sense that, instead of introducing bold changes in existing structures, as in Option F, the whole international system is overhauled and rewritten.[70]

From the perspective of 2007, the most probable options seem to be B, D, and E. Option C is also likely but would find strong opposition from non-participants in *directoires*. Despite foreseeable difficulties in its implementation, Option F must be analysed in depth, for it may represent the best approach to global governance.

68. Jean-François Rischard, *High noon. Twenty global problems, twenty years to solve them* (Oxford: Perseus, 2002).

69. Anne-Marie Slaughter, *A New World Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).

70. These options are not mutually exclusive and elements thereof could be combined in different fashions but let us agree that they are autonomous types for the sake of discussion.

This paper argues, for instance, that reform of the UN Security Council should be achieved in the short term with a view to strengthening the maintenance of international peace and security. Options A, G, H and I are less probable, but they should not be excluded from our radar screen, since some unpredictable future developments may lead to unexpected situations.

Indeed, Option I has attracted the attention of a number of intellectuals and advocacy groups belonging to the cosmopolitan tradition.[71] From the more utopian end of the spectrum, some voices are propounding 'bottom-up' global governance: for instance, some advocacy groups have suggested the creation of a world parliament.[72] The more pragmatic side of the constitutional option includes serious pieces of work drafted by respected public figures and academics. In its report entitled *Our Global Neighbourhood*, published in 1995, the Commission on Global Governance, chaired by Ingvar Carlsson, former Prime Minister of Sweden, recommended expanding the authority of the United Nations to provide global taxation, a standing UN army, an Economic Security Council, an end to the veto power of permanent members of the Security Council, a new parliamentary body of NGO representatives, and a new Court of Criminal Justice.[73] Some of these measures may be unachievable; the report proposed, for instance, numerous ideas to introduce 'global taxation', such as a surcharge on airline tickets for use of the 'global commons' (the air space), a charge on ocean maritime transport, user fees for ocean fishing, and parking fees for geostationary satellites. It must be remembered, however, that a legal scheme for exploitation of metallic nodules in the deep seabed was negotiated and adopted in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, but its implementation has been arduous.[74] It is therefore hard to envisage global schemes to collect revenues for global purposes – even though this might change in the future. At least one idea from the Commission on Global Governance report has already been put into practice: the creation of an International Criminal Court (Rome Statute, 1998). Other ideas may follow suit in the future, although it is obviously difficult to say *when* in the future. In the academic world, interesting proposals include the suggestion made by David Held of the London School of Economics to negotiate a 'global covenant' in order to improve global governance and introduce some social values at the heart of international relations.[75]

71. The cosmopolitan tradition is analysed in Ulrich Beck, *Cosmopolitan Vision* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006).

72. See amongst others www.voteworldgov.org, www.parlementmondial.com, www.worldparliamentgov.net, www.world-democracy.org, www.tgde.org.

73. Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

74. See the International Seabed Authority website, www.isa.org.jm.

75. David Held, *Global Covenant: the Social-democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004).

The role of the state and the two political cycles

In the four institutional options that seem to be the most probable – *status quo* (B), *directoire* (C), sectorial solutions (D), and the reformist option (E) – states maintain the leading role in global governance. International organisations and regimes are not substantially strengthened in those scenarios.

States are, and will continue to be, the basic units of political legitimacy across the world. Governments ensure law and order within their own state's frontiers and are the main stakeholders of international relations. As is well known, governments have a dual function, domestic and international. In the 1930s, at the very origin of the international organisation phenomenon, Georges Scelle, a French professor of international law, described that dual function as the state's 'role splitting' (*dédoublement fonctionnel des Etats*).[76] Nevertheless, even though states enjoy this well-established international role, the question remains: are they well suited to confronting global challenges and providing global governance?

In the last few decades, states have adapted to the new international circumstances. Economic globalisation, the need to respect human rights and other fields of international law, and, for the EU member states, the need to abide by agreed rules within the Union, have changed the classical perception of the state as a sovereign entity with no constraints whatsoever to its freedom to act on the international scene, including the right to resort to war. Two extreme interpretations of these changes have been put forward. On the one hand, some observers have suggested that states are now weaker. Many aspects of globalisation, from multinational companies' activities to migration, to the Internet, escape from the state's traditional regulation and control. On the other hand, analysts who are more sceptical about the impact of globalisation on political institutions contend that states – and more specifically industrialised states – continue to be the only architects of international order. In some pre-modern regions the state is in a shambles, but, in the rest of the world, national sovereignty and power underpin international relations, so much so that globalisation cannot be conceived of outside the leading role of states. Somewhere between these two extremes, the most convincing explanation of the states' current role is that they have transformed themselves. David Held and Anthony McGrew present a balanced view in this respect:

76. Antonio Cassese, 'Scelle's theory of role splitting', *European Journal of International Law*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1990, p. 210.

> Globalisation does not prefigure the 'end of politics', nor the simple persistence of old state ways; instead, it signals the continuation of politics by new means. ... This is not to assert that territorial political communities are becoming obsolete but, rather, to recognize that they are nested within global, regional and transnational communities of fate, identity, association, and solidarity.[77]

Transformed states are good news for international relations. Although this transformation process is more pronounced in Europe, the same premises are roughly applicable worldwide. Nonetheless, the question as to whether 'transformed' states will be able to offer adequate solutions to ensure global governance remains unanswered. The principal function of states, from the more to the less engaged in the abovementioned transformation process, is to guarantee the welfare and security of their own citizens, not to resolve the world's problems. When governments decide to cooperate, some global challenges may be tackled; if they choose not to cooperate, then those problems and challenges continue to fester.

Jean-Marc Siroen, professor of economy at the University of Paris-Dauphine, has aptly summarised the difficulties of global governance when it is exclusively based on states.[78] Professor Siroen asks: who is going to provide essential global public goods, for instance security and protection of the environment? And, who is going to pay for their costs? States are not inclined to finance them since they would be paying with their taxpayers' money for benefits that would accrue to other countries and peoples. Therefore, there is a clear mismatch between the individual states' objectives and the global objectives. While all will win from global governance, states as institutions are not necessarily geared towards providing it. To exemplify this argument, it can be said, for instance, that the United States' military strength is not designed to guarantee global peace and security, but rather to defend American citizens and uphold national interests. The same can be said of other states' armed forces. Therefore, in order to ensure global peace and security, some sort of international mechanism, like UN and regional peacekeeping today, must be established. In the same vein, taxing the country's companies with a view to limiting the greenhouse gas effect would imply costs for national enterprises and benefits for all countries around the world. It does not seem realistic to expect that companies and

77. David Held and Anthony McGrew, 'Globalization', in Joel Krieger (ed.), *Oxford Companion to Politics of the World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 324.

78. Jean-Marc Siroen, 'Vers une gouvernance économique mondiale?', in 'Les politiques économiques', *Cahiers français* no 335 (Paris: La Documentation française, November-December 2006).

governments are going to act if an international system does not ensure that every international actor will abide by some agreed rules. Finally, measures to reduce poverty in poor countries, including debt relief and free trade of some agricultural products, have to be financed by rich countries. But governments, companies and citizens in these countries are not ready to enact compulsory rules to help poor countries, because that sort of political solidarity only applies within borders.

In addition to the mismatch between the state's national objectives and global objectives, there is also a glaring disparity between the political agendas of national governments and the global political agenda. The usual political timeframe in democratic countries is four years, after which the electorate judges the incumbent government. The government's priorities, thus, are mainly national, and they are restricted to a limited deadline. This is why both risks and goals that are situated beyond their frontiers and in long-term horizons are not the most pressing for governments. In elections, the national government's term in office is not assessed with regard to its contribution to the resolution of global problems and the advancement of global objectives. Nor are the electorates in democratic states going to decide on who to vote for by paying attention to which candidate is going to work better on those global threats and objectives in the next four years. Rather, electorates will make their decisions primarily in terms of national issues and interests. It can be said, then, that the national and global political cycles do not coincide. The internal political cycle is short, whereas global challenges have a longer lifespan. As a result, neither the national point of view that, logically enough, states utilise, nor the short term of office characteristic of internal political cycles, allow for a decisive contribution to global governance by states. Consequently, while states have the legitimacy and the capabilities, and even though most of them have adapted to a globalised world, states by themselves cannot realise global objectives, tackle global challenges, and ensure global governance.

Reinforcing international institutions and regimes: the global demand

The previous discussion leads to three clear conclusions:

- States by themselves cannot cope with global challenges;

- Common institutions and rules are needed to tackle global challenges and take advantage of global opportunities;
- Therefore, the international level of governance must be reinforced.

Various lines of reasoning can be utilised to justify these conclusions. Global risks pointed out at the end of Chapter Two (war among major powers, war in the Middle East, degradation of the environment, the situation in Africa, etc.) exist on such an enormous scale that it is obvious that individual states cannot cope with them. Examples of successful international cooperation can also be given; for instance, post-war nation building constitutes a collective effort in which universal and regional international organisations, states and NGOs take part.

The idea that common institutions and rules are needed to realise collective goals can also be justified by the 'domestic analogy'. Within states, individuals enjoy freedom of action but the government legislates in order to guarantee some basic public goods: security, freedom, health, as well as a certain degree of solidarity. Should a similar pattern be applied to the international community, global objectives could be achieved. It is obvious that states are not individuals and the international community cannot be likened to the state. As a consequence, international institutions and rules will never be the same as their national counterparts. However, the 'domestic analogy' has some relevance because it underlines the need for concerted action.

Finally, the European regional integration process is also a source of inspiration for global governance. Admittedly, the 'domestic analogy' can easily be dismissed. But it is much more difficult to deny that the European experience has set an important precedent of international governance through the definition of common objectives and the establishment of common institutions and rules.

Be that as it may, the abovementioned conclusions are not just the product of academic arguments. Increasingly, citizens across the world perceive that states cannot fulfil all their expectations, and they are calling for a different approach to resolve global challenges. An impressive number of recent world opinion studies confirms this.

An opinion poll conducted in nine major states at the end of 2005 and published by the Bertelsmann Stiftung foundation in

June 2006 showed a generalised preference for multilateral structures. On the question of what would be the 'best framework for ensuring peace and stability', respondents were given four choices: a system led by the United Nations, a balance of regional powers, a single world power, or two world powers. The multipolar and multilateral options were by far the most popular. In five countries, the most common answer was a system headed by the United Nations while four preferred a balance of regional powers. On average, these options were preferred by 42% and 36% respectively. The least popular choices were a bipolar system, favoured on average by only 5% of respondents in the nine countries surveyed, and a system dominated by a single power, supported by 7%. Despite their status as the world's sole superpower today, Americans also rejected the model of a world order based on a single world power. Instead, they indicated that they would prefer an international system where power was shared among nations. A majority in the United States (52%) thought a balance of regional powers was the best framework but a third (33%) said they would like the United Nations to lead the world.[79] In another global opinion poll published in June 2004, a majority worldwide (59%) said they trust the United Nations to 'operate in the best interests' of their society. The only type of institution to receive a higher rating were non-governmental organisations such as environmental and social advocacy groups, which were trusted by 65%. Institutions receiving lower levels of trust were national governments (53%), large domestic companies (52%), press and the media (50%), trade unions (48%), and global companies (42%).[80] More recent data confirms the same conclusion. In January 2006 the BBC released a worldwide study, in which, in 30 of the 32 countries polled, a majority rated the United Nations positively. On average 59% assessed the United Nations as having a positive influence, while just 16% rated it as having a negative influence. Of all the global players examined in the poll, NGOs got the highest grades with an average of 60% rating them as having a positive influence on the world, just 12% negative.[81]

As far as substantial issues are concerned, global public opinion fervently endorses international action to reinforce peacekeeping, human rights, and protection of the environment, among other international principles. For instance, in a poll

79. Summary reproduced from www.worldpublicopinion.org. TNS Emnid conducted the polls, conducting more than 10,000 interviews between 29 October and 17 December 2005 in Brazil, China, France, Germany, Great Britain, India, Japan, Russia and the United States.

80. Findings from a poll of 18,797 people from 19 countries around the world conducted by the international polling firm GlobeScan from November 2003 until February 2004 and analysed in conjunction with the Program on International Policy Attitudes of the University of Maryland. Summary quoted from www.worldpublicopinion.org.

81. The poll of 37,572 people was conducted for the BBC World Service by the international polling firm GlobeScan together with the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland. The 32-nation fieldwork was coordinated by GlobeScan and completed between October 2005 and January 2006. See www.bbc.co.uk.

conducted in 2006 in nineteen countries, eight out of ten citizens (81%) were concerned about the impact that current energy policy is having on the earth's environment and climate. But this concern for environmental impact is closely followed by three out of four citizens expressing concern that energy shortages and prices can destabilise the world economy (77%) and that competition for energy can lead to greater conflict and war between nations (73%). Strong majorities across the nineteen countries wanted governments to actively address energy issues, especially through tax incentives to develop renewable energy supplies, research on alternative sources and higher fuel efficiency standards.[82]

When it comes to strengthening international institutions in the future, global public opinion has equally strong views. A BBC World Service poll released in March 2005, which surveyed 23 countries, found nearly universal support for dramatic reforms in the United Nations, in parallel with a desire for increased UN power in the world. Majorities in 22 of those countries favoured adding permanent new members to the UN Security Council. In addition, most favoured giving the Security Council the power to override the veto power of the permanent members, including majorities in three of the permanent member states: the United States, the United Kingdom, and China.[83]

At the present moment, it is difficult to say whether these demands stemming from global public opinion will be translated into reinforcement of international institutions. For the time being, governments have been unable to reach substantial agreements with a view to upgrading global multilateral institutions. However, it is obvious that the world's citizens perceive that there are global problems and challenges that surpass their own states' capabilities, and international institutions and rules are preferable with a view to tackling those problems. Those demands, if they are sustained in time, will probably lead to further changes in the respective status of states and multilateral institutions. It appears that the current emergence of global challenges and objectives calls for additional political transformations nationally and internationally to realise citizens' expectations. Global governance is generally perceived as a necessity – and the principle that 'necessity creates the organ', as affirmed in the life sciences, seems also to preside over political developments.

82. GlobeScan coordinated fieldwork between May and July 2006, for this poll of 19,579 citizens in 19 countries commissioned by the BBC World Service.

83. The poll of 23,518 people was conducted for the BBC World Service by the international polling firm GlobeScan together with the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland. The 23-nation fieldwork was coordinated by GlobeScan and completed during December 2004 in most countries.

Multilevel governance – and its obstacles

The most probable institutional framework for global governance in the future will include a combination of various actors, including above all states and international organisations. The challenge will be, precisely, to find an adequate distribution of roles between these two categories of actors. In other words, of the most likely abovementioned scenarios, there is a continuum from option B (*status quo*) to F (transformation of existing institutions), going through C (*directoire*), D (*ad hoc* solutions), and E (the reformist option). The challenge will be to find a balanced position in that continuum.

Most likely, the future shape of global governance could be called *multilevel governance*, since it will involve different institutions, from universal to regional organisations, to states, sub-state and local institutions, and private organisations. As a matter of fact, many international issues are today dealt with in this manner. To give just an example, development and stability in Africa requires collaboration of the United Nations, the African Union, regional organisations in Africa, concerned states, external partners such as the European Union and the World Bank, as well as a myriad of non-governmental organisations and bodies.

As has been argued above, the most appropriate form of multilevel governance in the future will require reinforcement of the international level. However, while strengthening global institutions and rules appears to be a necessary step towards addressing global threats and opportunities, the materialisation of that idea encounters at least five formidable obstacles: the states' reluctance to assign competencies and means to international institutions, the intrinsic lack of legitimacy of international organisations, their size, the notion of state equality, and participation of non-governmental bodies.

Governments are not willing to transfer competencies and funds from states to international organisations despite the perceived need for reinforcement of the latter. This obstacle can be illustrated with examples taken from the European context, but the same or even bigger difficulties are observed in global international organisations such as the United Nations. In the everyday functioning of the European Union, even if competencies have been transferred to Brussels, it is difficult for states to accept the consequences of their commitments; for instance, abiding by the

Stability Pact and respecting the curbs on national deficits. Similarly, the definition of a common foreign and security policy is hampered by the intergovernmental approach and the unanimity rule, which make it difficult to attain the declared external objectives of the EU. The respective roles of member states, the High Representative, the rotating Presidency, and the Commission are not always clear. The fact that EU member states share in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy but also maintain their own foreign policies, renders the Union a 'schizophrenic' international actor. The United Nations encounters bigger obstacles – multiplied by the global factor. The UN Charter and other legal texts define the competencies of the organisation, including the maintenance of international peace and security. However, the right synergy between member states and the organisation to attain that goal does not always exist. Clashes between states and the organisation with regard to security issues have been very serious, as during the Iraq crisis. Whereas everyone agrees that peacekeeping is an important global objective entrusted to the United Nations, the necessary means are not allocated. And reforming the United Nations is made impossible by inflexible national positions, as the 60th anniversary summit showed.

The second obstacle to reinforcement of international organisations is the difficult attribution of legitimacy to international bodies. States are the basic units of political legitimacy. In each state, the political debate and democratic procedures guarantee the legitimacy of both government action and legislation. In the international arena, this equation is more precarious. The GARNET network on 'Global governance, regionalisation and regulation: the role of the EU', sponsored by the European Commission,[84] produces an impressive number of useful reports and publications. In one of these papers, Robert O. Keohane has argued that leaders of multilateral organisations typically claim that the scope, diversity and inclusiveness of their organisation's membership provide legitimacy for their actions. 'But in a democratic era, inclusiveness alone is not a sufficient basis for legitimacy. In democratic theory, individuals, not states, are the subjects of political and moral concern'.[85] Keohane concludes that, today, international organisations are legitimate because they are superior to the alternative of unregulated state competition. 'For the moment, the legitimacy of international institutions is protected less by their own merits than by the lack of attractive

84. See www.garnet-eu.org. See Annex 3 for references to centres for the study of global governance.

85. Robert O. Keohane, 'The contingent legitimacy of multilateralism', *GARNET Working Paper* no. 09/06, September 2006, page 22.

alternatives', such as unilateralism and coalitions of the willing, which avoid any constraints on the exercise of power. Nevertheless, this relative legitimacy should not be the end of the story. According to Keohane, multilateral institutions, including the United Nations,

> should begin to reconstruct their legitimacy on a 21st century basis – with more emphasis on democratic principles and less on sovereignty. Otherwise, multilateral institutions will be in danger of losing legitimacy to a revival of democratic nationalism, or to new forms of transnational organisation that are designed to bypass sovereignty, and that will be in many ways problematic for those of us who believe in the accountability of power-wilders to ordinary people.[86]

The lack of democratic credentials of some UN member states' governments has led to an interesting debate on how to integrate the democratic principle into universal multilateral institutions. On the one hand, some scholars have suggested the creation of an alliance of democratic states; on the other, most commentators, including many in Europe, favour a comprehensive approach, given the divisive consequences of the previous idea. Democracy should be a home-grown process and external action should encourage such a process but it cannot impose it. Nevertheless, international institutions could do more to promote internal democracy. One initiative in this direction is the establishment of a United Nations parliament, where representatives from national parliaments could sit.[87] The respective states' population might be taken into account at the time of organising the states' representation, as is the case for instance in the Inter-Parliamentary Union.[88]

Thirdly, bearing in mind that the number of member states increases complexity, international organisations will have to find the appropriate equilibrium between their size and the objectives they are assigned. For universal organisations, such as the United Nations, size is not an issue in the sense that they have to incorporate all states, but at the same time, it is a problem, since those organisations have to take into account all states' positions. At the regional level, this problem takes on a different aspect: size of international organisations is a matter of choice, and the right balance between the number of members, the purpose, and the

86. Ibid, page 23.

87. See for instance the 'Empower the UN' programme, at www.empowertheun.org, and the Committee for a more democratic UN, at www.uno-komitee.de/en.

88. See Article 15 of the Statutes of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, at www.ipu.org.

organisation's capabilities must be found. Successive enlargements of regional organisations – for instance, the EU, NATO and the OSCE – have shown that multilateral work becomes extremely cumbersome at some point, since many national views have to be integrated into a number of decision-making processes.

Fourthly, strengthening international institutions in the future will also be difficult because the principle of state equality leads to unanimity as the favourite decision-making mechanism, and obstructs the idea of varied state representation. In the European Union, this issue has been dealt with via two measures mainly: weighted state representation at the European Parliament, and weighted voting at the Council. This does not mean that the principle of equality has been abandoned, because member states continue to have similar roles in many domains including decisions adopted by unanimity. However, a medium point has been reached between the states' equality and the individual's equality. Indeed, strict application of state equality in international organisations implies putting aside the democratic principle whereby all citizens have the same political rights. In the United Nations and other international organisations a similar compromise should be negotiated, with a view to avoiding the distortions stemming from stringent interpretations of state equality. For instance, of the 192 current members of the United Nations, about forty states have less than one million inhabitants. Is it reasonable to maintain that those states must have the same political rights in all the UN forums as the others?

Finally, reinforcement of the international level of governance will encounter the obstacle of how to integrate non-state actors, and more specifically multinational corporations and non-governmental organisations.[89] These actors could continue to be involved in international relations in an informal manner, as they are today. But if the future global institutional framework is to recognise their role more straightforwardly, it will be difficult to find adequate mechanisms. Some initiatives have been taken for each of those actors. From 2000 onwards, major multinational corporations are participating in the UN Global Compact, a voluntary, informal group that underlines corporate responsibility. On the other hand, prior to the 2005 UN World Summit, Kofi Annan commissioned a comprehensive report on the role of civil society in global governance, which supported a more explicit involvement of NGOs in the work of the United Nations.[90] Carry-

89. See Marlies Glasius, Mary Kaldor and Helmut Anheier (eds.), *Global Civil Society 2005/6* (London: Sage, 2005). Also see www.unglobalcompact.org.

90. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, chairman, 'We the peoples: civil society, the United Nations and global governance', Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations, 7 June 2004. The book by Andrew Cooper, John English, and Ramesh Thakur (eds.), *Enhancing Global Governance: Towards a New Diplomacy?* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2002) puts the accent on the role of NGOs and multilateral diplomacy.

ing on both initiatives in the future, and transforming them into a more structured association with international organisations, will be a very difficult task. Another possible option would be the creation of a 'United Nations' for NGOs, where the most important organisations could discuss their common views on global issues.

UN Security Council reform

One single institutional issue stands out from the rest: reform of the UN Security Council. Without any doubt, many other problems, including synergy between the numerous international organisations,[91] state-building,[92] and region-building and regionalism across the world,[93] are of interest. However, for understandable reasons, this *Chaillot Paper* has to select the most important issue. In this section, an overview of the current debate on UN Security Council reform is followed by a few policy recommendations for the European Union.

As is well known, the 2005 UN world summit could not reach agreement on the enlargement of the council, despite the general perception that composition of that body should be updated. The EU member states were divided on that occasion, which was a blow to the idea of a common foreign and security policy.

Discussions in the United Nations have been pursued during 2006 and 2007 with no tangible result. So far four different positions have been submitted to the General Assembly for consideration.

- **G-4 proposal (Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan)**. Six new permanent seats, one for each of the G-4 countries as well as two seats for Africa, plus four new non-permanent seats. The question of the extension of veto is deferred to a later date.

- **Uniting for Consensus proposal** (supported by Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Italy, Pakistan and Spain amongst others). Ten new non-permanent members chosen on a rotating basis by regional groups, including three new seats for Africa, three new seats for Asia, two new seats for Latin America, and one new seat for Western Europe and Eastern Europe. It also calls for restraint in the use of the veto by the current permanent members.

91. See for instance Volker Rittberger (ed.), *Global Governance and the United Nations System* (Washington D.C.: Brookings, 2002) and Colin I. Bradford and Johannes F. Linn, *Global Governance Reform: Breaking the Stalemate* (Washington D.C.: Brookings, 2007).

92. See James Dobbins, 'The United Nations' role in nation-building: from the Congo to Iraq', (Washington D.C.: RAND, 2005); Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff, and Ramesh Thakur (eds.), *Making States Work: State Sailure and the Crisis of Governance* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005); Thomas Carothers (ed.), *Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad* (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006).

93. See the website of the United Nations University Centre for Regional Integration Studies in Bruges, www.cris.unu.edu.

- **African Union proposal**. Six new permanent seats, two for Africa, two for Asia, one for Latin America, and one for Western Europe, and five new non-permanent seats, including two more for Africa. The new permanent members would be given the same privileges as current permanent members including the veto.

- **S-5 proposal** (the so called 'small five' are Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore, and Switzerland). Reform of the working methods of the Security Council, including limiting the use of veto in cases of genocide and serious human rights violations, further consultations between members and non-members, particularly troop-contributing countries, and other reforms to increase transparency and accountability.[94]

In February 2006, Japan floated a new plan, which has not been endorsed by many countries. Even though Japan continues to support the G-4, it is considering a new approach for a number of reasons: Japan is the second largest contributor to the United Nations budget (around 19%), so it believes its plea to become a permanent member is more than justified; the United States has declared that it would not accept any enlargement that puts the membership in the region of 25 members, for this would make the council unmanageable; the United States has also declared that it will accept 'one or two' new permanent members only, and a council membership of around 20; and Japan believes that China's opposition to its candidature can be dealt with in a bilateral manner. More recently, at the beginning of 2007, Panama presented another proposal.

- Japanese plan. Six new members would enlarge the UN Security Council membership from 15 to 21. Two new members from Asia, two from Africa, one from Latin America and one from Europe. Candidates that receive a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly would become permanent members, while others would be eligible for semi-permanent seats, meaning that they could be re-elected after their terms end.[95]

94. See www.reformtheun.org. Factsheet: 'Member States positions on Security Council Reform', August 2006.

95. Bill Varner, 'Japan seeks 6 new seats on UN Council to end expansion deadlock', Bloomberg, 1 February 2006, available at www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform. See also Walter Hoffmann, 'A competing model: a Security Council with 20 members', *UN Reform Watch* no 8, February 2006, at www.centerforunreform.org.

- Panama's 'transitionary' proposal. Increase size of the Council from 15 to 21. One new seat will be for Latin America, two for Asia, two for Africa and one for Western Europe. The new members would serve five-year terms and will have the right to immediate re-election. Any member state that is elected for four consecutive terms will automatically receive permanent status without the right of veto.

On the other hand, the President of the General Assembly decided on 8 February 2007 to divide the reform issue into five working groups for discussion: categories of membership, question of the veto, question of regional representation, size of an enlarged Security Council, and working methods including the relationship with the General Assembly.

Although it is too soon to evaluate the impact of those recent developments, they introduce new dynamics in the process. Which does not imply, of course, that final agreement among the concerned actors and UN reform according to the requirements of Article 108 of the UN Charter, including ratification of the five permanent members, is more likely. The current political situation in the world does not allow for such a breakthrough in global governance. However, the diplomatic, more technical debate now seems easier. Following years and years of lack of consensus on this issue, nowadays positions are getting slightly closer.[96]

In 1945 the Security Council had eleven members and the majority to adopt binding decisions was seven positive votes and no veto from permanent members. In 1965 membership was enlarged from eleven to fifteen and the majority from seven to nine positive votes. In parallel, a decision was taken at the UN General Assembly on geographical distribution of non-permanent members. UNGA Resolution 1991 (XVIII) of 1963 requires election of ten elected members according to this pattern: five from African and Asian states; one from Eastern European states, two from Latin American states, and two from Western European and other states. In the mid-1960s, UN membership had increased from the 51 founding members to around 115 and the council was expanded. The fact that, today, UN membership has attained 192 member states justifies further enlargement.

Nevertheless, reform of the Security Council is a complex, multidimensional issue, which encompasses at least the following aspects: (a) membership should be expanded; (b) membership should not be

96. Commenting on the new Japanese plan, the United Kingdom Ambassador to the United Nations, Emyr Jones Parry, said that the idea 'gets closer to what I perceive to be the middle ground'. Quoted in Bill Varner, op. cit.

too numerous, though, in order to allow for the Council to function effectively; (c) regional groups for election purposes must be rethought; and (d) the criteria for choosing new members must be the states' capacity and the states' contribution to the United Nations principles and purposes, as the Charter indicates.

It is obvious that global agreement on UN Security Council reform, if and when it comes, will be the result of political negotiations among groups and major powers, and will not necessary respond to any predetermined logic. However, it is possible to make some remarks on this thorny issue from a European point of view. For the Europeans, the final objective of any future UNSC reform should not be the increased representation in the Council of this or that state, but rather the reinforcement of the body with a view to better accomplish its main function, which is the maintenance of international peace and security. To confront global challenges, it is crucial to revamp the UN Security Council in such a way that it can prevent, or contribute to preventing, regional and global wars, and confrontation among major powers.

Bearing this goal in mind, firstly, UN Security Council membership should be expanded. Current proposals vary between 21 and 25 members.[97] Even if a smaller membership is easier to handle, the ratio between 192 UN member states and 25 Council members does not seem disproportionate. Therefore, secondly, any option in the range between 21 and 25 appears to be feasible, but enlargement from the current 15 to 25 allows more room for manoeuvre to integrate various expectations. The idea that increased membership will trigger a smaller caucus of the most important members, where everything is negotiated and decided, does not pose a problem, for this is precisely what is happening today with the P-5, and such a development occurring in any similar group of more than 20 states is hardly avoidable.

Thirdly, all regional groups for election purposes are defined in terms of continents, except the two European groups, a division which is still a legacy of the Cold War. Apart from being obsolete, such a division of members of the European Union runs counter to the very idea of the EU and its attempts to define a common foreign and security policy. EU member states should analyse the possibility of establishing a new European group around the EU, including candidate states, Balkan states, and other members of the OSCE and the Council of Europe. This would be consistent with the development of the EU's common foreign and security

97. Some commentators have made the case for a smaller UNSC membership: see, for instance, James Paul and Céline Nahory, 'Theses towards a democratic reform of the UN Security Council', in *Global Policy Forum*, 13 July 2005, at www.globalpolicy.org.

policy, and will open the door for new forms of EU representation at the UN Security Council in the future. Nevertheless, the prerequisite or *sine qua non* for the creation of a new European regional group should be that this development should not impinge upon the current EU member states' status, for election or other purposes, in the United Nations. Other UN member states and regional groups should understand that EU members would take this step in order to rationalise their activity at the UN, and that they could not accept, as a consequence, any diminution in their presence in UN bodies. For European states, reform of UNSC membership must not necessarily be a zero-sum game but rather can, and indeed should, be beneficial for all EU members.

Finally, the key issue of UN Security Council reform is the criteria for election of new members. The High Level Panel's report *A More Secure World*, published before the 2005 UN summit, to a large extent 'de-dramatised' the issue of permanent membership. The report showed that between the permanent and non-permanent status, 'third ways' could be explored: i.e., renewable seats, four-year terms, etc. Generally speaking, in order to reflect the various realities of state power and the various degrees of contribution to the UN's purposes and principles, UNSC membership should vary from permanent to occasional membership. This is not to say that many types of membership must be envisaged, but some flexibility in this respect may be useful.

The Charter utilises two criteria to name non-permanent UNSC members: contribution to the UN purposes and principles and equitable geographical distribution. Article 23.1 of the UN Charter states:

> The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.[98]

The Charter's first criterion is very important, in the sense that the UN Security Council should be composed of states that are both capable and willing to maintain international peace and security. One of the most important consequences of enlargement should be to have around the table all states that count globally –

98. Charter of the United Nations, Chapter V, 'The Security Council', Article 23.1 (New York: United Nations, 1945).

and which are ready to contribute to reinforcement of the UN principles. The key question now is how to translate this criterion in today's circumstances.

The European Union and its member states should define a common position whereby they would insist on the importance of the first criterion of Article 23.1 and propose some parameters for its effective implementation. To insist on the importance of the first criterion raises the issue of concretisation of the wording of Article 23.1. The High Level Panel (HLP) report suggested that future UNSC reform should,

> in honouring Article 23 of the Charter of the UN, increase the involvement in decision-making of those who contribute most to the UN financially, militarily and diplomatically – specifically in terms of contributions to UN assessed budgets, participation in mandated peace operations, contributions to voluntary activities of the UN in the areas of security and development, and diplomatic activities in support of UN objectives and mandates. Among developed countries, achieving or making substantial progress towards the internationally agreed level of 0.7 per cent of GNP for ODA should be considered an important criterion of contribution.[99]

Concretisation of the first criterion must not be done through a rigid checklist, but rather via an indicative list, which could be included in a General Assembly declaration. The HLP report's inventory, however, does not mention respect for human rights, an explicitly stated purpose of the UN Charter (Article 1 and Preamble), and democracy, a fundamental principle recognised by the international community since the 1980s and in the UN Millennium declaration of 2000. The EU and its member states should support inclusion of all international principles as valid standards for the interpretation of Article 23.1 of the UN Charter. Instead of putting the accent on geographical distribution, which is the second criterion, the EU member states should emphasise the importance of the first criterion of Article 23.1. In purely quantitative terms, it is true that the United States contributes around 23% to the UN budget, and Japan 19%, but it is also true that the Europeans pay around 38% of both the regular and peacekeeping UN budgets. The European contribution to development aid and other multilateral efforts should also be taken into account. Consequently, although a balanced geographical distribution of

99. *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, op. cit.

elective UNSC members must be defined, the idea that states who are able and willing to contribute to the UN purposes and principles must participate in the work of the Security Council, which is enshrined in the Charter, should be encouraged.

On the other hand, the General Assembly's political role as constitutional 'check and balance' for the Security Council should not be excluded. It is true that the major precedent in this respect, the Uniting for Peace resolution of 1950, took place in a different historical context, and the current majority in the General Assembly does not share some Western views on peace and security issues. However, the General Assembly might play an important role in upholding UN principles in the future, for instance, if and when the Security Council is unable to fulfil its function owing to repeated vetoes by permanent members.

In sum, the Europeans failed to seize the symbolic opportunity of the 60th anniversary to define a common vision for the future of the United Nations. More specifically, instead of negotiating a common position on UN Security Council enlargement, the Europeans showed profound divisions. One would have expected that the twenty-five EU member states would have dealt with UN Security Council reform between themselves at the highest political level, instead of aligning themselves along global fracture lines. In the conclusion of this paper, it is suggested that the EU member states should negotiate and reach an agreement on this global constitutional issue. Divisions between the Europeans multiply international misunderstandings on UNSC reform, making the development of the CFSP more difficult, and global arrangements impossible. Agreement among the EU members on this vital issue would strengthen CFSP, and, most probably, trigger global consensus, which could only be beneficial for the global order.

The European Union and global governance

In its conclusion, the European Security Strategy declares: 'An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world'.[100] More recently, Javier Solana has suggested that the European Union must be ready to explore new forms of multilateral cooperation, and work for fresh global bargains with a view to facing the international landscape of tomorrow.[101]

However, it remains to be seen whether the European Union can make a substantial contribution to the global order in the future. Depending on a number of factors internal to the European process, and also on external factors, the EU's contribution to global governance may range from essential to valuable to half-hearted to even irrelevant. This chapter examines those factors, and puts forward some recommendations as to how the European Union could maximise its contribution to global governance in the future.

The EU's twofold contribution: model and actor

In more than one way, the European Union and its former incarnation, the European Communities, have been contributing to global governance since the very moment of their creation. A historical novelty, economic and political integration has proven to be a valuable way of organising relationships between neighbours, which has brought peace and prosperity to the European continent. As some analysts have put it, the process displays a 'transformative power' beyond its borders, which has been confirmed in successive waves of enlargement.[102]

Some experts have suggested that certain aspects of the EU model of internal governance can be adapted to other regions and even to the global order.[103] The European Commission's White Paper on Governance of 2001 stated:

100. European Security Strategy, op. cit.

101. Javier Solana, speeches at the Arthur Burns dinner, New York (14 February 2007), and at the Brookings Institution, Washington (21 March 2007).

102. See Mark Leonard, *Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century* (London: Fourth Estate Books, 2005), and Heather Grabbe, *The EU's Transformative Power. Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe* (London: Palgrave, 2006).

103. See the special issue of the *European Foreign Affairs Review*, edited by Mary Farrell and entitled 'EU external relations. Exporting the EU model of governance?', vol. 10, no. 4, winter 2005.

> The objectives of peace, growth, employment and social justice pursued within the Union must also be promoted outside for them to be effectively attained at both European and global level. This responds to citizens' expectations for a powerful Union on a world stage. Successful international action reinforces European identity and the importance of shared values within the Union.[104]

One of the main characteristics of the European process is that rule of law presides over relations among states instead of brute power, thus countering the paradigm that dominated in international relations for centuries. Zaki Laïdi has underlined that the European contribution to global governance could well be this insistence on rules over power:

> La norme est pour les Européens le moyen de « tenir les Etats », de les discipliner, de les contraindre. La norme est donc omniprésente dans la construction européenne. L'Europe fait le pari qu'à l'échelle mondiale, les choses peuvent être envisagées de manière équivalente : normaliser le système mondial dans le plus grand nombre de domaines pour le rendre plus prévisible, mieux gérable, moins erratique, plus contrôlable. Le projet européen à l'échelle mondiale se mesure à cette recherche d'une normativité du système international.[105]

With historical perspective, *region building* in Europe can be seen to be a contribution to global governance in two different senses. First, the European integration process can be considered as a model. That process has broken the endless cycle of violence and wars between European states that the old continent witnessed throughout history. Other countries and regions across the world would like to be able to ensure peace and stability in similar ways. Without any doubt, the European integration experience cannot be directly replicated in other regions. Each continent and region has its own distinctive identity and history. However, the European integration process is perceived, if not as a model, at least as an example or a precedent that can inspire other regional processes. Therefore, the European experience is followed with great interest in all regions around the world.[106]

Secondly, the European Union has become a relevant international actor in the space of a couple of decades. Through perma-

104. 'European Governance: A White Paper', COM(2001) 428 final, European Commission, Brussels, July 2001.

105. Zaki Laïdi, 'La norme avant la force', in Bernard Adam (dir.), *Europe, puissance tranquille ? Rôle et identité sur la scène mondiale* (Brussels: GRIP, 2007), p. 30. See also Zaki Laïdi, *La norme sans la force. L'énigme de la puissance européenne* (Paris: Sciences Po, 2005).

106. Martin Ortega (ed.), 'Global views on the European Union', *Chaillot Paper* no. 72 (Paris: EUISS, November 2004).

nent multilateral negotiation among its member states, the EU has defined a foreign and security policy that favours diplomacy, cooperation and resolution of disputes, rather than military solutions. Both the EU's common foreign and security policy, including ESDP and EU-led military peace operations, and the EU's worldviews as expressed in numerous documents, including the European Security Strategy, have not triggered disapproval in the rest of the world. The rationale behind this positive assessment lies in the new EU's approach to international relations. In describing the global scope of its foreign and security policy, the EU is at the same time implicitly stating what is not included in that policy. The EU is *not* attempting to compete militarily with other world powers, the EU is *not* building up a military capacity independent of that of its member states, the EU is *not* trying to acquire WMD, the EU has *no* territorial claims to make, the EU does *not* intend to intervene militarily to change regimes, and the EU is determined to work hand-in-hand with the United Nations. In short, as it embodies a new category of international actor, the EU's approach to global relations is different from the traditional approach of major powers. As a consequence, the rest of the world welcomes the European Union as a new kind of more constructive actor in global relations.

As a global actor, along with its member states, the EU participates in virtually all international issues and has established fruitful relationships with all states and international organisations. The European contribution to global affairs is the sum of the EU's and its member states' contributions. For instance, the EU gives aid to development, which has to be added to the member states' official development assistance to calculate the total European contribution in this domain. It is true that both the parallel foreign action of the EU and member states, and the intricate institutional nature of the European Union, introduces complexity into the European Union's external projection, but this does not detract from the fact that the European approach to global relations is overall peaceful and cooperative, and is well perceived across the world.

A number of analysts have offered interesting conceptual tools to explain the new type of international actor. In the 1970s, François Duchêne coined the term 'civilian power' to speak of the European Communities.[107] In 1997, Robert Cooper

107. François Duchêne, 'Europe's role in world peace', in Richard Mayne (ed.), *Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead* (London: Fontana, 1972); and François Duchêne, 'The European Community and the uncertainties of interdependence', in Max Kohnstamm and Wolfgang Hager (ed.), *A Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems before the European Community* (London: Macmillan, 1973). See also Pierre Buhler, 'L'Europe et la puissance', in *Annuaire français de Relations internationales*, vol. VII, 2006.

distinguished between the 'modern' world, where frontiers and wars between states are the rule, and 'post-modern' spaces, starting with Europe, in which inter-state war has been excluded.[108] More recently, the notion of 'normative power' has been developed by Ian Manners.[109] When Joseph Nye referred to 'soft power' as opposed to military power, he was thinking of the global context, but he also recognised that the European Union epitomises the former idea.[110] Also, the term *puissance tranquille* has been proposed to describe the EU lately.[111] The author of this paper has suggested elsewhere that old global powers that rely on military force to realise their foreign policy objectives can be called 'dinosaurs' whereas both the European Union and states that rely on peaceful means can be considered 'mammals', i.e. a radically new species of international animal.[112] Jürgen Habermas has written that the European 'political identity' fits well into the new 'post-national constellation'.[113] Commenting on the European constitutional process, and comparing it with the drafting of the American constitution, John Erik Fossum of Arena, the Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo, has suggested that 'the American notion of City on the Hill (and Manifest Destiny), is not the bridge to the future that Europeans have yearned for. Its nationalist and religious orientation might actually more serve to remind Europeans of what they have sought to and should be leaving behind'.[114] In contrast, he points out that the European Union is based on a 'post-national and multicultural' dream, which has a fresh international projection. Kalypso Nicolaidis has suggested that the draft Constitutional Treaty was a 'third way' between federal states and intergovernmental entities, creating a 'federal union'.[115] For his part, Andrew Moravcsik has written that the collapse of the European constitutional project should not be seen as a failure, for an informal 'constitutional settlement' prior to the draft Treaty was already in place.[116] The uniqueness and originality of the new European actor has been described in many ways, but everyone agrees that its international role is different from the classical role of states and alliances in international relations.

While the European Union currently plays an important global role both as a model and as an actor, the question remains: will the EU be able to shape the future global order? And, should the European Union endorse, adapt and develop the notion of global governance?

108. Robert Cooper, 'Is there a new world order?', in Geoff Mulgan (ed.), *Life after Politics: New Thinking for the 21st Century* (London: Fontana, 1997).

109. Ian Manners, 'Normative Power Europe', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 40, no. 2, 2002.

110. Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

111. Tzvetan Todorov coined the term in *Le nouvel désordre mondial* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2003), which has been discussed in Bernard Adam (ed.), *Europe: Puissance tranquille?,* op. cit.

112. Martin Ortega Carcelén, *Cosmocracia*, op. cit.

113. See Jürgen Habermas, 'The postnational constellation and the future of democracy', fourth chapter of his book *The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays* (MIT Press, 2001); and 'Construcción de una identidad política europea', in Manuel Castells and Narcís Serra (eds.), *Europa en construcción: integración, identidades y seguridad* (Barcelona: CIDOB, 2004).

114. John Erik Fossum, 'Europe's American dream?', Arena Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, September 2006, available online at http://www.arena.uio.no/events/seminars_autumn06.xml.

115. Kalypso Nicolaidis, 'Constitutionalizing the federal vision?', in Anand Menon and Martin Schain (eds.), *Comparative Federalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). See also Kalypso Nicolaidis and Robert Howse (eds.), *The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Gaovernance in the United States and the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

116. Andrew Moravcsik, 'What can we learn from the collapse of the European constitutional project?', in *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, vol. 47, no. 2, 2006, pp. 219-41.

Internal and external factors

The future role of the European Union in global governance will depend on two sets of conditions, internal and external. Political developments in the European Union will determine whether it has a more or less assertive international presence. Internal factors include: (a) the relationships of governments and leaders in the EU capitals, and whether they can reach a common vision of the European Union; (b) constitutional arrangements towards a more or less permanent 'division of labour' in international affairs between member states and the European Union; (c) the decision-making process that is agreed among states to define the EU's foreign policy on specific issues; (d) the coherence and efficiency of the EU's institutional setting in Brussels; (e) the capabilities given to the EU institutions to carry out their tasks; and (f) the size of the European Union, for it is obvious that the larger the membership, the more difficult it will be to reach common ground on international issues.

Those internal factors have an impact in the course of the day-to-day definition of EU's foreign and security policies, and they also have a bearing at key constitutional moments, in which general rules and principles have to be established, such as negotiation and ratification of the draft Constitutional Treaty. Josef Janning, who has studied the 'shifting political constellations' of governments in Europe, has affirmed: 'it remains to be seen whether the "Big Three" will be able to provide a workable central axis within the constellations of the current European Union or one even larger than that'.[117] It is not easy to predict how those, and other possible, internal factors are going to interact in the foreseeable future and what impact they are going to have on the EU's foreign policies. However, in the last few years, it has clearly proved difficult to reach agreement on a number of specific issues – from Iraq, to relations with Russia, to the Middle East peace process –, as well as on more long-term constitutional matters. As a consequence, the prospect of the European Union adopting a more assertive stance on global governance issues is far from certain in the present circumstances.

The EU cannot contribute substantially to global governance if member states have not attributed to Brussels both enough competencies and the appropriate means. Therefore, the balance between the national and the EU decision-making power in

117. Josef Janning, 'Leadership coalitions and change: the role of states in the EU', in *International Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 4, July 2005, p. 832.

foreign and security policy is the key issue. The European Security Strategy followed a reformist approach. The strategy indicated the way forward to further reinforce the EU's common foreign and security policy. The strategy emphasised that, in order to tackle dynamic threats effectively, the EU should be 'more active'. The European Union 'need to be able to act before countries around us deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise'.[118] The European Security Strategy equally calls for a 'more capable' European Union, including better military capabilities and coordination, greater capacity to bring in civilian resources in crisis and post-crisis situations, stronger diplomatic capability, improved sharing of intelligence, and preparation for a wider spectrum of missions. Finally, the strategy also demands a more coherent common foreign and security policy, which implies better coordination between EU institutions, and between the EU and member states.

The draft Constitutional Treaty introduced a new, more ambitious approach, which consisted in making changes in the EU institutional architecture, as happened in the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties. The proposed constitution put forward a whole range of innovative measures, including the streamlining of institutions and practices and the creation of a European Foreign Minister and a European external service. Without any doubt, these measures would have permitted a stronger European input to global governance in the future. Following negative votes in the French and Dutch referendums in 2005 and suspension of the ratification process in other countries, it seems unlikely that the draft constitution will enter into force as it is today. However, this does not prevent the provisions regarding the EU's common foreign and security policy being implemented separately, as many voices are suggesting. Gilles Andréani and Jean de Ruyt have maintained that, even if the Constitutional Treaty is not ratified, the foreign and security policy instruments of the European Union should be reinforced.[119] Nevertheless, the establishment of both a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs and a European External Service, as the draft Constitutional Treaty foresees, will require resolute political will. The German Friedrich Ebert Stiftung has underlined how much should be done in this respect:

> The national environment and the diplomatic traditions of the [EU] member states shape European diplomats. They get their

118. European Security Strategy, op. cit.

119. Gilles Andréani and Jean de Ruyt, 'Can Europe's foreign policy rekindle the constitutional process?', *Policy Paper* no. 23 (Paris: Notre Europe, September 2006), available online at www.notre-europe.eu. See also Wolfgang Wessels, 'La voie d'une puissance européenne ou bien cosmétique intergouvernementale ? Les dispositions du traité constitutionnel sur la PESC', *Annuaire français de Relations internationales*, vol. VI, 2005.

> training in national diplomatic academies and pursue their career in national administrations. They learn to defend national interests; and in the course of the years they develop a national 'esprit de corps'. This must change in the long term. National diplomats must more and more defend common European interests. As a common European foreign policy develops we shall witness the emergence of a European culture of diplomacy. EU institutions and member states should act to encourage this trend. Priority should be on two measures: regular exchange of diplomats between member states and with the EU; and creation of a European Diplomatic Academy for the training of attachés for the EEAS and specific training courses for EU officials and national diplomats.[120]

Along with internal factors, the EU's global role will also be defined by external factors. The most important *inter alia* will be: (a) a peaceful or violent international environment; (b) the foreign policy of the United States; (c) political developments and foreign policy in other major powers, including China and other emerging powers; (d) the situation in the EU's neighbourhood and whether there are direct threats to the EU; and (e) unexpected events, crises, man-made and natural catastrophes that could bring about a change in European attitudes.

Looking to the future, global relations can correspond to either a Hobbesian or a Kantian pattern. As was discussed in Chapter Two, a Hobbesian world means a return to any of the various forms of violent confrontation among major powers of the past, including global war. A Kantian world implies peaceful relations among democratic states, and the existence of principles that uphold human dignity and equality. While the European Union can prosper in the latter scenario, it would be totally lost in a Hobbesian world. In that scenario, states take precedence over multinational cooperative frameworks. The main form of international cooperation would be military alliance. But it cannot be taken for granted that all EU member states would have the same threat perception and the same reaction with regard to the prospect of global war, including the use of WMD.

Putting aside the worst-case scenario of a worldwide military confrontation, the global role of the European Union in the future will depend in the first place and above all on the relationship between the Europeans and the United States. Without any doubt,

120. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Working Group on European Integration, 'The EU needs a Foreign Affairs Minister with an effective European External Action Service', May 2005, available online at www.fes.de. See also Alan K. Henrikson, 'The Future of Diplomacy? Five Projective Visions', Clingendael Discussion Paper in *Diplomacy* no 96 (The Hague: Clingendael Institute, January 2005), available online at www.clingendael.nl.

this will the most important external factor influencing the development of European views on global governance. But, at the same time, it becomes a factor that is internal to the European process from the moment that a number of EU member states' governments are not ready to implement, or even consider, a foreign and security policy decision that runs against the views of the incumbent American administration.

The future evolution of transatlantic relations is very difficult to foresee. Following many years, both during and after the Cold War, of fruitful cooperation on international issues – admittedly with its ups and downs – most analysts concur in emphasising that the relationship between the European and the American allies has been at a historical low since the Iraq crisis. One of the main reasons for this is the uncertainty of the current global situation and the diverging assessments of many international issues that are made on both sides of the Atlantic. In the recent EUISS publication *Friends again? EU-US relations after the crisis*, Nicole Gnesotto has written:

> L'absence de lisibilité du système international pèse sur la relation euro-américaine : c'est en effet l'interprétation même du monde, de ses enjeux stratégiques majeurs et de ses modes de gouvernance souhaitables qui peut devenir l'objet de divergences, voire de désaccords entre les deux partenaires. Les coopérations transatlantiques de l'après-Irak peuvent donc être nombreuses, voire même fructueuses ; mais elles restent aléatoires, parce que fondées sur des convergences ponctuelles, davantage que sur une vision commune de ce que devrait être le système international de demain.[121]

Bearing in mind diverging points of view on key global issues, such as multilateralism and protection of the environment, Mary Farrell has also referred explicitly to a lack of transatlantic understanding on global governance:

> While the EU and most Member States (although not all of them) still refer to globalisation and the existence or need for a global governance framework in the course of defining their own foreign policies, these notions have practically disappeared from American rhetoric if not the practice of its external relations. ... The decline of the American commitment to the collective project of global governance is a serious challenge for the European Union.[122]

121. Nicole Gnesotto, 'Le challenge, c'est le réel', in Marcin Zaborowski (ed.), *Friends again? EU-US relations after the crisis* (Paris: EUISS, 2006), p. 14.

122. Mary Farrell, 'EU external relations: exporting the EU model of governance?', in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, winter 2005, vol. 10, no. 4, p. 459.

Other analysts are more upbeat on the prospects of the transatlantic alliance, although they do not address the problem of the lack of transatlantic consensus on global governance issues. Ron Asmus, Philip Gordon and other authors in the United States have pointed out the potential for cooperation on specific issues such as the Middle East region and relations with China.[123] Ivo Daalder has proposed revamping the Atlantic Alliance, with accession of Australia, Israel, Japan and other countries, to transform it into a global NATO.[124] In Europe, Jonathan Eyal, Peter van Ham and Roberto Menotti, among others, have insisted on the intrinsic value of the transatlantic relationship and the need to reinforce the alliance.

However, articulating a more pragmatic and balanced point of view, William Wallace has advised that we 'set our expectations lower':

> There remain closer political and economic ties across the Atlantic than between any other two regions of the world. ... [But we should accept] a greater degree of reasoned disagreement between American and European policy-makers and publics, reflecting their different geographical positions, cultural and historical traditions, and domestic pressures. That should, in turn, allow for a less impassioned transatlantic dialogue: a partnership between North America and Europe built not on a demand for others to accept contested 'common values' but on the solid foundations of intensive economic interdependence, social interaction, and a dispassionate debate on the best means available to promote a sustainable, open, well-regulated and prosperous global order.[125]

A recent report entitled *Transatlantic Relations and Global Governance* expounds the same ideas. Burkhard Auffermann and Taina Järvinen have suggested that the range of common interests and values, which historically have strengthened the transatlantic relationship, is narrowing, and, therefore, 'a new beginning is required to allow a better management of global problems in the future'.[126]

Any assessment of the transatlantic relationship has to take into account the fact that both Europe and the United States have to act in a multipolar context. Transatlantic relations are also defined by internal factors, which concern the partners, such as the political leaning of governments, and external factors, i.e. the situation in the rest of the world. Consequently, the more or less

123. See for instance Ivo Daalder, Nicole Gnesotto and Phil Gordon (eds.), *Crescent of Crisis: US-European Strategy for the Greater Middle East* (Washington D.C.: Brookings-EUISS, 2006).

124. Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, 'Global NATO', *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2006.

125. William Wallace, 'A rational partnership in a post-Atlantic world', in Marcin Zaborowski (ed.), *Friends again? EU-US relations after the crisis*, op. cit., p. 53.

126. Burkhard Auffermann and Taina Järvinen, 'Transatlantic partnership to address global problems?', in Kari Möttölä (ed.), *Transatlantic Relations and Global Governance* (Washington D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2006), pp. 50-51. The authors draw three scenarios: building up an equal EU-US partnership, the EU containing the US through active multilateralism and coalition-building, and complementarity and division of labour at the global level.

convergent world vision of the allies will be a crucial element at the time of shaping the transatlantic relationship in the future. If attitudes towards global multipolarity and threat assessments continue to diverge, the alliance may become less meaningful. If other global actors develop peaceful and cooperative foreign policies, the transatlantic relationship will have to compete with other global partnerships. If, conversely, other major global actors become aggressive, the alliance will have to be strengthened in order to respond militarily if necessary.

Finally, the European Union's global role in the future will depend on unexpected events, crises, and (both man-made and natural) catastrophes. Indeed, the experience of the Kosovo war in 1999 was instrumental in the creation of the EU's ESDP in the Cologne European Council, a process that had been started at the St. Malo Franco-British summit in December 1998. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 led to increased international cooperation in the fight against terrorism, at the European, transatlantic and global levels. And the Iraq crisis in 2003 spurred the drafting of the European Security Strategy. Other international events may affect the configuration of the European Union as an international actor. As a general rule, it can be said that perceived external threats will act as catalysts of greater unity in foreign European action. Whether the need for unity will be felt at the European or the transatlantic level will depend on the similarity of the respective threat assessments on both sides of the Atlantic.

The EU's 'moment of truth'

It is not possible to foresee how these internal and external factors will combine among themselves and the framework they would produce as a result. However, the current political debate on the EU's future direction and institutions, which is taking place in the wake of rejection of the draft Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands, will have to lead to some tangible result in the near future. The draft Constitutional Treaty was a compromise solution on both the EU's internal and external dimensions, and the fact that the treaty's ratification process is now on hold opens new possible horizons, from the continuation of the ratification process, perhaps with some modifications in the text, to the elaboration of a totally new treaty.

It must be expected that, at some point in the near future, the EU member states will have to find an overall agreement on the EU's nature, competencies and institutional setting. The Berlin Declaration on the occasion of the EU/EC's 50th anniversary has stated the 'aim of placing the European Union on a renewed common basis before the European Parliament elections in 2009'. This would be a defining moment, like the Treaty of Maastricht, in which an enlarged European Union will establish new parameters to organise its internal work and external projection. Although this new step would not be 'definitive' – no such thing is possible in a rapidly changing world – it would introduce renewed political and institutional underpinnings for some time to come. This 'moment of truth' for the European Union will be the result of complex and unpredictable negotiations, in which both forces in favour of more integration and those pushing for more state autonomy will undoubtedly intervene.

In that defining 'moment of truth', one essential underlying issue will be the definition of the EU's *finalité* or ultimate purpose. Putting such an idea in perspective, the states' traditional vocation was protection of nationals and of national interests. In so doing, states were doomed to fight each other. The nineteenth-century quotation attributed to Lord Palmerston, 'nations have no permanent friends and no permanent enemies; only permanent interests' correctly summarises the *interests paradigm* of international relations. But, historically, states were able to protect neither their citizens' interests nor the collective national interests on their own in cases of extreme danger, so they had to organise themselves in alliances. For instance, the Second World War was fought and won by a strong alliance of states, and, following the war, the two superpowers headed two diametrically-opposed military alliances. This kind of association is based on the second pattern of international politics: the *alliance paradigm*.

In addition, a new paradigm has been developed in the last fifty years. The European Union and other regional organisations constitute peculiar 'alliances' in the sense that states group together for purposes other than defence, i.e. commercial, technical, cooperative, and even political purposes. Their ultimate goal (*finalité*) is no longer defence, but integration. The added value of such groupings is more positive (objective-oriented) than negative (threat-oriented): states associate to achieve peace, prosperity and ensure democratic practices, human rights and the rule of law

within their territories. This inter-state initiative leads to a new paradigm of international politics: the *integration paradigm*. The EU member states are trying to cope with the problematic coexistence of the three paradigms. European governments have to find the right balance between (1) their respective national interests, (2) their positions as allies within NATO, and (3) their participation in the EU integration process.

Things have become even more complicated in the last two decades because a new paradigm has appeared in international politics: the *principles paradigm*. According to this idea, the states' behaviour is not only inspired by the defence of a given state or alliance, or the pursuit of their interests; nor is it only based on the achievement of collective objectives in a regional integration process. On top of that, the objective of international actors would also be to ensure global principles such as protection of the environment, peace, democracy and human rights across the world. European citizens cherish ambitious expectations, and those expectations cannot be fulfilled at the national or regional level. As the citizens' expectations on peace and prosperity led to strengthening and consolidation of the European Union, from its institutional origins in the late 1950s and the 1960s, the public's current expectations are putting pressure on governments towards new political arrangements that can guarantee the achievement of global objectives.

Although paradigms of international relations have appeared in a historical succession, the new paradigms do not replace the old ones. From a European point of view, all four paradigms overlap and citizens and governments have to find the right balance between them. The EU member states may therefore decide that they are going to favour their individual interests, their military alliances, the European integration process, or global principles. Sometimes those paradigms are compatible, sometimes they are not, which puts European governments in a difficult position. Political debates within states on paradigms of international politics have become a frequent occurrence and, on occasion, can be very divisive.

The future constitutional arrangements in the European Union will define both substantive rules and the institutional architecture to respond to the *paradigms dilemma*. In addition to the institutional framework quoted above, including a European Minister for Foreign Affairs and a European External Service, the draft Constitutional Treaty put forward some significant sub-

stantive norms. Draft Article III-292 contained a list of international principles and values that the EU's common foreign and security policy should respect, draft Article I-41 included a military assistance clause compatible with NATO's Article 5 guarantee, and Article I-43 referred to a solidarity clause in case of natural and man-made disasters, including terrorism. In the present circumstances it is not possible to foresee whether such substantive and institutional provisions could be maintained in future constitutional agreements.

Citizens' expectations on global principles have led to a demand for a more assertive EU role in global affairs, as the draft Constitutional Treaty suggests. Conversely, some European governments are not ready to attribute new competencies and capabilities to the EU because they prefer the national interests and alliances paradigms. An enlarged EU membership implies more varied national views on many international issues, from neighbourhood policies, to energy, to global challenges.[127] Therefore, it seems that the EU's 'moment of truth' will be a difficult political exercise, with a serious risk of fragmentation among EU member states. A constitutional agreement among all EU members may be found in the future. But, at the same time, both the continuation of the current uncertain situation and the division of the EU bloc on the issue of the EU's ultimate vocation and purpose (*finalité*) are equally likely possibilities.

The forthcoming constitutional debate will have to address the European Union's institutional architecture, in which a more or less lasting division of labour between states and EU institutions on external action ought to be defined. The old tensions regarding *subsidiarity* will surface again. It is obvious that individual European states are too small to confront global challenges. As economists speak of 'economies of scale', the European Union's common foreign and security policy should be construed as the search for 'policies of scale' to ensure an impact on international issues. But it is very difficult to reach consensus on those issues among 27, and even more, sovereign states. If a group of EU member states decide to create a smaller organisation within the EU in order to develop a more assertive foreign and security policy, this initiative will encounter reluctance and opposition on the part of the non-participating governments. This is the EU's *'size' dilemma*: a common policy at 27 and more will be deprived of real content and, therefore, will be useless on the international scene, whereas

127. See Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (ed.), *The Future of the European Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after Enlargement* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006).

the definition of a stronger foreign policy by a group of EU member states will prove controversial.

On the other hand, the overlapping of the four paradigms casts new light on relations between major global powers, including the European Union. With a view to accomplishing the global purpose, the EU member states will have to cooperate with other global actors that share a similar world vision. The most obvious global partnership would be a reinforcement of the transatlantic link. In this respect, there are proposals *inter alia* to create a transatlantic free trade area. However, bearing in mind recent divergences on key global issues, the question arises as to whether such initiatives will enjoy solid political backing. Recent cases, such as the Iraq crisis, negotiations on the Kyoto protocol, the Middle East conflict, and the current debate on the US missile defence facilities in Europe, show that the Europeans have to decide between a foreign policy aligned with the American views, or a more autonomous foreign and policy. This EU's *autonomy dilemma* is not new, but it appears in a new light in the current global multipolar context, where international principles play a growing role.

From the American point of view, the first priority seems to be to maintain the United States' position as the economic and political global leader. The US National Intelligence Council's *Mapping the Global Future* report concludes that:

> The United States may be increasingly confronted with the challenge of managing – at an acceptable cost to itself – relations with Europe, Asia, the Middle East and others, absent a single overarching threat on which to build consensus. For all the challenges ahead, the United States will nevertheless retain enormous advantages, playing a pivotal role across the broad range of issues – economic, technological, political, and military – that no other state can or will match by 2020. Even as the existing order is threatened, the United States will have many opportunities to fashion a new one.[128]

Although this is true, it is also true that increasingly global leadership will have to be exercised not only against 'overarching threats' but also in terms of profiting from *global opportunities*, and this calls for negotiation and compromise.

Richard Higgot of the University of Warwick, and coordinator of the GARNET network, has underlined the difficulties of

128. *Mapping the Global Future*, op. cit.

accommodating American 'exceptionalism' and European pluralism. The world being increasingly multipolar, Europeans are better equipped conceptually than Americans to take part in global affairs. Arguing that, in a world where power is more evenly distributed, there will not be absolute leaders, Higgot adds: 'Europe will not, as the title of Leonard's work implies, "run the twenty first century". But neither, of course, will the United States'.[129] For his part, Mario Telò has indicated that global issues in the future will call for 'shared leadership'.

> [Global governance] needs a widespread network of cooperation, driven by civilian powers, including regional political organisations, which are capable of creating fruitful mediations between nations and a new multilateralism. Moreover, it requires a fresh, positive and expansive new shared leadership.[130]

If the United States chooses to put the principles paradigm – interpreted as universal principles – higher on its foreign policy agenda, there will be more room for understanding with the EU and its member states. If not, the Europeans will have to find other ways to realise the global purpose (*finalité*) that European citizens demand. The European Union favours a 'normative multipolarity' or a 'Kantian multipolarity' instead of a 'strategic multipolarity',[131] and, therefore, will find common ground for understanding with other global powers that have the same approach to international relations. The talks between France, Germany and Russia during the Iraq crisis in 2002-2003, the trilateral meetings between China, India and Russia, China's rearmament, and President Vladimir Putin's recent speech at the Verkunde in February 2007, all have been interpreted as signals of renewed strategic confrontation. However, it is more probable that we are witnessing the beginning of a 'normative competition', in which major powers have to demonstrate their commitment to international principles.[132] Indeed, global competition on respect for international principles – if it is confirmed – would be a healthy development for the global order.

In addition to the United States, other major powers across the world have to choose between foreign policy paradigms. If major powers opt for a Kantian world too, and for the principles paradigm, this will open new possibilities for global cooperation and governance. In this connection, César del Prado has recently

129. Richard Higgot, The theory and practice of global and regional governance: accommodating American exceptionalism and European pluralism', in *European Foreign Affairs* Review, winter 2005, vol. 10, no. 4, p. 582.

130. Mario Telò, *Europe: A Civilian Power? European Union, Global Governance, World Order* (London: Palgrave, 2006), p. 273.

131. On those concepts, see contributions by Amitav Acharya and Martin Ortega in Martin Ortega (ed.), 'Global views on the European Union', *Chaillot Paper* no. 72, op. cit.

132. For instance, one of the main themes of Putin's speech was that 'Unilateral force has nothing to do with global democracy', which was the title of op-ed press articles he signed in the international press.

suggested that, bearing in mind that the EU has grown into a remarkable model of supranational integration, and that countries in Southeast and Northeast Asia are gradually developing the ASEAN + 3 process into an East Asian community, the potential for cooperation between these two regions is enormous. Prado concludes that the convergence of European and East Asian political, economic and social agendas could spur the United States and other powers and regions to engage in global multi-level governance, and reinvigorate multilateral organisations such as the United Nations in the future.[133]

In conclusion, confronted with a 'moment of truth', the EU member states will have to resolve in one way or the other the *paradigms dilemma*, the *'size' dilemma*, and the *autonomy dilemma*. Whether they define a permanent arrangement on those issues or they continue to muddle through remains to be seen. From the global governance point of view, if those dilemmas are not tackled, both the EU's and its member states' contributions to the resolution of global problems might be less than relevant.

Four illustrative scenarios

Taking into account the abovementioned internal and external factors, as well as the preceding considerations on future EU constitutional arrangements, four indicative scenarios can be described for the sake of discussion.

Disunited States of Europe (DSE). Although some regional architecture remains, many European states decide to return to national sovereignty as the main form of conducting their internal and external policies. Those states claim a new independence and establish their own network of alliances in the economic and security fields. This scenario may be caused by social and political crises in some key European states, which decide to withdraw from the European Union. But other causes are equally possible. Profound disagreement on a number of international issues can also lead to a backlash in the European process – for instance, divergences on energy policy, environmental policies, Russia or the Middle East. Individual European states decide autonomously their role in global issues, while the residual EU institutions have a marginal participation in international relations.

133. César del Prado, *Global Multi-level Governance: European and East Asian Leadership* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2007).

Commercial Union (CU). The EU is a successful free trade area, which guarantees a consultation forum on political issues for member states. The EU common foreign and security policy limits itself to a series of modest initiatives, very far from the ambitious project contained in the draft constitution. The CFSP is patchy, for it refers to certain areas where consensus is unanimous only. Most member states are happy with this situation, since it allows for national decision-making and *ad hoc* 'coalitions of the willing'. When there is widespread agreement, as was the case for some peacekeeping operations in Sub-Saharan Africa, the EU presents itself united. When divergences prevail, as was the case in Iraq, and when it is more appropriate to act in small groups, as in UNIFIL in Lebanon, individual states take the leadership. But all this is done naturally, because there exists neither the legal obligation nor the political expectation to act in unison. As the constitutional debate goes on for years and years, there is no substantive or institutional reinforcement of the EU as a unitary actor on the global scene.

Little Europe (LE). A group of member states decide to create a new organisation within the European Union. Common institutions in Brussels continue to exist and exercise their functions for the EU. In addition, a super-union, open to all EU members willing to join, announces deeper coordination of foreign policies, external services and armed forces. This group names super-ministers of foreign affairs, defence, interior, energy and the environment, who coordinate the super-councils of ministers of those areas. The group's membership is almost identical to that of the euro area, and the European Central Bank becomes the common financial authority. While the new American administration has no serious objections, some EU members harshly criticise the initiative. The new organisation defines specific policies on foreign, security and defence matters, as well as other areas within its competences, which are compatible with those of the EU. In spite of some problems of coordination between the EU and the super-union, this two-speed Europe is the only political solution to previous clashes between two divergent visions of the EU.

Great Europe (GE). A new version of the Constitutional Treaty is negotiated and agreed. A European Minister for Foreign Affairs is named. Some EU member states decide to opt out from certain institutional arrangements, but overall the European integration

process finds a new momentum. A catastrophic nuclear accident, natural disasters, the new US Administration's policies, or China's aggressive behaviour *vis-à-vis* its neighbours might constitute some of the reasons for such a change of attitude in Europe. On the CSFP front, the EU announces a comprehensive agreement on a common position on UN Security Council and IMF reform.

It goes without saying that these, and other possible scenarios, are merely food for thought. The purpose of describing scenarios is just to prepare our minds for a complex future and help to take decisions, by imagining possible chains of events.

Nevertheless, the preceding discussion on internal and external factors, as well as the scenario exercise, has the value of emphasising the importance of the European constitutional debate for the global role of the European Union. The future shape and competences of the European Union will be a measure of whether the Europeans can contribute to global governance – or not. As is suggested in *The New Global Puzzle*, the current European debate on constitutional arrangements should not focus on domestic concerns only, but it must also introduce global concerns.

> The ongoing debate on reforming the European policies and institutions must be reviewed in light of the future challenges the EU will have to face, and not only of past and present controversies. No doubt, managing a larger Union, due to expand further, proves complicated and absorbs a lot of intellectual energy and political capital. The real challenges for Europe's future prosperity and stability, however, lie beyond its borders, from geopolitical tensions in neighbouring areas to the impact of emerging global players on international politics and economics. In other words, the debate on EU reform should go hand-in-hand with a strategic reflection on the values, interests and goals of the EU in international affairs.[134]

Vision and responsibility

The first chapter in this volume described the *future's improvement process*. With a view to reacting to global challenges, good foresight, warnings and threat assessments are needed. In order to profit from global opportunities, political vision is needed. Once warn-

134. *The New Global Puzzle*, op. cit., p. 209.

ings and vision are presented to political communities, they have to react if they want to shape the future. Will the Europeans be able to identify both global challenges and opportunities and show the required political vision with a view to creating the European Union that is needed to confront the future?

In a famous speech delivered at the UN General Assembly on 23 September 2003, Kofi Annan, the then UN Secretary-General, compared two moments when global vision was called for.

> We have come to a fork in the road. This may be a moment no less decisive than 1945 itself, when the United Nations was founded. At that time, a group of far-sighted leaders, led and inspired by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, were determined to make the second half of the twentieth century different from the first half. They saw that the human race had only one world to live in, and that unless it managed its affairs prudently, all human beings may perish. So they drew up rules to govern international behaviour, and founded a network of institutions, with the United Nations at its centre, in which the peoples of the world could work together for the common good. Now we must decide whether it is possible to continue on the basis agreed then, or whether radical changes are needed.

The difference between the two moments is that the San Francisco Conference was able to articulate, in very special historical circumstances, a vision for the future, whereas the last few years' attempts to reform the United Nations have resulted in an interminable, tiresome process, in spite of the perceived urgency. Kofi Annan and other global leaders have expressed their visions for the future of global governance but to no avail.

As was pointed out in Chapter Four, the EU member states did not take advantage of the symbolic opportunity of the UN 60th anniversary Summit to define a common vision for UN Security Council reform, which is one of the keystones for global governance. Nor have they responded to the European public's expectations on other international issues. Now it remains to be seen whether the European governments will be able to develop a vision for global governance in the future.

Some European leaders are putting forward interesting ideas in this respect. Javier Solana has shown vision on many occasions, not least at the time of drafting the European Security Strategy. More recently, in a speech delivered on 14 February 2007 in New

York, Solana highlighted three main issues with regard to reform of global governance: how to integrate new major powers in multilateral schemes, regional integration across the world, and the challenge of non-state actors. Firstly, Solana emphasises that we need to give new forms to multilateral cooperation 'which reflect the problems and power distribution of today's world rather than that of 1945'. This means that new players must be incorporated to the 'top table of global diplomacy', even though Solana does not advocate one precise modality for doing this. Secondly, Javier Solana stresses the importance of regional cooperation, since 'the future global system will in some ways be a system of continents and continent-wide regimes'. Here he points to a worrying exception, for the Middle East continues to be 'rife with tensions, over-armed and under-institutionalised'. Finally, Solana argues that we must be ready to transcend the inter-state framework; in other words, 'to tackle the dark side of globalisation, we must mobilise new networks of actors, from the public, private and NGO sectors'. Solana mentions diplomats, politicians, business leaders and journalists, but he also points out that, today, 'more people are working in our NGOs than our armies'. In another recent speech, Solana has concluded: 'we need to share power (with new players); re-think power (beyond the state paradigm) and tame power (extend the rule of law internationally)'.[135]

Other European leaders have equally demonstrated political vision. The UK Prime Minister Tony Blair has been at the vanguard of initiating public policies for the protection of the environment. The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel also insisted on the need to tackle climate change in the European Council that took place in March 2007. Merkel, who at that time held the EU Presidency, maintained that the European Union should take the lead on this issue, and start negotiating a post-Kyoto regime with other major powers. 'The key now will be to decouple growth from energy consumption', she said.[136] Also, Jacques Chirac, Tony Blair and Angela Merkel, in their respective presidencies of the G-8, insisted that developing and emerging powers should be invited to the industrialised countries' club to discuss some global issues. For his part, Guy Verofstadt has proposed a qualitative leap forward with the creation of the 'United States of Europe'.[137]

Academic proposals with visions for the European Union, which take into account its global role, are also available. Those proposals are not homogeneous and sometimes are even contra-

135. Javier Solana, 'Managing global insecurity', speech given at the Brookings Institution, Washington, 21 March 2007.

136. 'German chancellor lays out roadmap to follow-up treaty on climate change', *Financial Times*, 7 March 2007.

137. Guy Verofstadt, *Les Etats-Unis d'Europe* (Brussels: Editions Luc Pire, 2006).

dictory, but they offer a background on which political vision can be built up. For instance, following previous ideas in this sense, Werner Weidenfeld and his collaborators at the University of Munich have recently propounded the creation of a European army.[138] Jean Pisani-Ferry of the Bruegel think-tank in Brussels has suggested an economic global agenda for the EU, including a single European or a euro area seat at the IMF Board.[139] The Notre Europe association created by Jacques Delors has hinted at the creation of a small group of EU member states, based on the participants in the euro, who would be ready to commit to a higher level of political integration.[140] In contrast, experts associated with the UK advocacy think tank The Bruges Group are presenting alternatives to the European Union and analysing 'policies for a post-EU Britain'.[141]

The art of political leadership consists of defining visions that can offer better prospects to the concerned political communities. Angela Merkel, Javier Solana and others are presenting fresh, stimulating ideas. Both European analysts and civil society are also offering warnings and vision. Now the challenge is to bring to the European negotiating table all those inputs, discuss them seriously at the highest level, and arrive at convincing proposals on both the EU's shape and its role in global issues and governance. This is not an easy task, for there are many different points of departure, but it is worth trying. At least, serious negotiations on global governance would reveal the various countries' positions and expectations.

Nevertheless, crucial issues of global governance – UN Security Council reform, global warming, peace in the Middle East, poverty in Africa, etc.– cannot be treated as 'other business' in the Council's agenda. They need calm reflection and profound discussions among European leaders. It is therefore here suggested that EU leaders organise *ad hoc* meetings to deal with issues of a global constitutional nature. If EU member states do not make that effort collectively, the alternative is to present individual proposals, and align with countries from other regions on this or that front, as was the case for UN Security Council reform. This would spell the end of a common European world vision – and could have negative consequences on the world order.

Just as European leaders should take the task of defining a European vision on global governance more seriously, European universities and think tanks should also provide more foresight

138. Werner Weidenfeld, Janis A. Emmanouilidis and Almut Metz, 'Europe's Strategic Responses', *CAP Policy Analysis* no. 4, October 2006, available at http://www.cap.lmu.de/download/2006/CAP-Policy-Analysis-2006-04.pdf. Angela Merkel mentioned this idea in her speech on the occasion of the celebration of the EU/EC's 50th anniversary in Berlin.

139. Alan Ahearne, Jean-Pisani-Ferry, André Sapir & Nicolas Verón, 'Global governance: an agenda for Europe', *Bruegel Policy Brief* 2006/7, December 2006, available online at www.bruegel.org.

140. In November 2006, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of this association, Notre Europe published a number of papers on the current crisis and the future of the EU: see www.notre-europe.eu.

141. See www.brugesgroup.com.

and reflection on international and global issues. It is true that, with the means available to them, European academics and experts are producing interesting studies. But the European intellectual contribution to the international debate does not match European needs. In this respect, even a superficial comparison between the size and capabilities and the human and financial resources of American and European centres is striking. The Europeans may have useful ideas to improve the global order, but it is more difficult for them than for their American colleagues to publicise those proposals.

To correctly identify global opportunities and challenges, and to put forward adequate solutions, it is indeed necessary to demonstrate political vision. But vision must be complemented with *responsibility*. There have been too many examples of whimsical visions devoid of any sense of historical or political wisdom. Like sorcerer's apprentices, some political leaders have wanted to transform the world's future based on wrong assumptions of current global problems. In the interconnected, interdependent world of the twenty-first century, global challenges and risks are so acute that political leaders and communities must combine vision and global responsibility.

Responsibility emanates from the urgency of global challenges mentioned in Chapter Two. Among other authors, the German philosopher Hans Jonas has emphasised the imperative of moral, social and international responsibility in today's world.[142] In the light of the awesome transformations wrought by modern technology – the threat of nuclear war, ecological disaster, genetic engineering, etc.–, Jonas underscores the broad scope of the new moral obligation. Inspired by a deep reverence for human life, Jonas makes the case for man's duties toward himself, his posterity, and the environment through 'future-oriented' ethics and thinking. For his part, Jürgen Habermas has equally explained that language as it is used in our time reveals a shared feeling of obligation *vis-à-vis* global values. The Europeans should exemplify commitment to that obligation.[143]

Experts feel that urgency. But ordinary citizens also demand both vision and responsibility from the European Union and its member states. Recent Eurostat barometers clearly demonstrate that there is a sustained demand on the part of the European public for reinforcement of the European common foreign and security policy, including security and defence.[144] A similar attitude is

142. Hans Jonas, *The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age* (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1984).

143. Jürgen Habermas, 'Construcción de una identidad política europea', op. cit.

144. *Eurobarometer* no. 66 (fieldwork: September-October 2006, publication: December 2006) showed that 68 percent of European citizens support the CFSP, and 75 percent support the ESDP, following past trends.

observed worldwide. There is a clear demand for more European involvement in many global issues. In April 2005, the international polling firm GlobeScan together with the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland published a poll conducted in 23 countries. The study found that in 20 of those countries a majority of citizens think that it would be mainly positive if the European Union became more influential than the US in world affairs. Currently, Europe is seen as having a primarily positive influence in the world in 22 countries.[145] In a more recent poll, the respective roles of Canada, Japan, the European Union, and France in global affairs were judged most positively. Britain, China, and India received more positive than negative evaluations while Russia was viewed slightly more negatively than positively. On the date of publication of this report in March 2007, Steven Kull, director of the Program on International Policy Attitudes, concluded:

> It appears that people around the world tend to look negatively on countries whose profile is marked by the use or pursuit of military power. This includes Israel and the US, who have recently used military force, and North Korea and Iran, who are perceived as trying to develop nuclear weapons. Countries that relate to the world primarily through soft power, like Japan, France, and the EU in general, tend to be viewed positively.[146]

Both European and the world's citizens generally are demanding greater European involvement in global issues. Together with the urgency of the world's problems, this consensus should spur European governments to develop new ideas on global governance. In sum, huge global challenges and opportunities call for both European vision and responsibility.

Twelve recommendations for the future

For the time being there is no political initiative in Europe that binds together a *vision* for the future global role of the European Union and *responsibility* with regard to global challenges. The purpose of this *Chaillot Paper* is not to present a comprehensive plan for the EU's role in global governance in the future, but rather to carry on the current debate and shed light on some of its main aspects.

145. The most enthusiasm for greater European influence (other than in Europe) is among US neighbours – Mexico (66%) and Canada (63%) – and China (66%), South Africa (63%), Australia (62%), and Russia (60%). The only countries where a majority sees this prospect as negative are the Philippines (54%), and the US. However, among Americans only 55 percent see it as negative while 34 percent say it would be positive, reflecting the deep political divide among Americans over US foreign policy. Indians are divided, with, 35 percent saying mostly positive, 38 percent mostly negative. The BBC World Service commissioned this poll of 23,518 people.

146. See www.worldpublicopinion.org. Respondents were asked to rate 12 countries – Britain, Canada, China, France, India, Iran, Israel, Japan, North Korea, Russia, the USA, Venezuela – and the European Union, as having a positive or negative influence. The BBC world service published this poll of over 28,000 people in 27 countries in March 2007.

On the basis of the ideas that have been elaborated in the preceding chapters, this paper puts forward the following twelve suggestions.

Recommendations 1 and 2 refer to the debate's methodology. Recommendations 3 to 6 deal with the promotion of international principles and values, while some institutional issues are mentioned from recommendations 7 to 12.

1. Develop the idea of effective multilateralism into that of global governance

Effective multilateralism is a useful concept and the European Union could still pursue its implementation. However, the notion of global governance offers a broader, more positive approach. While effective multilateralism implies reform of existing institutions, global governance refers to management of global problems and opportunities. Also, it is more understandable to the larger public. The adoption of a new term, even if it encompasses most of the content of the previous concept, would equally have a symbolic value, in the sense that the European Union would reaffirm its commitment to global issues.

2. Start preparing reform of global governance from today

Instead of waiting (a) to resolve all the internal institutional questions at the EU and (b) for the arrival of a new American President after the November 2008 US presidential elections, the EU and its member states should start preparing reform of global governance. The main reason is the manifest urgency of threats and challenges. It is obvious that the time is not ripe to negotiate and agree bold reforms of global issues – including UN Security Council reform and protection of the environment – with other major international actors. However, the EU should start thinking about those reforms, discussing them, and defining its priorities in order to be better prepared when the time comes. As was discussed in Chapter Three, a window of opportunity to reinforce global governance may present itself at the beginning of the 2010s, and the Europeans should be ready by then. It is here proposed that the European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council deal with issues of global governance in a separate manner, in order for them to find a more propitious context to reflect and discuss on issues of particular relevance and historic significance.

3. Insist on the peaceful rise and fall of major powers and non-use of force

The most important global principle is the prohibition of the use of armed force in international relations. The EU and its member states should insist on the strict respect of this principle by all powers – old, new, industrialised and emerging. The use of force in international relations is today subject to stringent conditions, and the international community closely scrutinises its legitimacy. The Europeans should also insist on crisis management and conflict resolution in all cases. Allowing for exceptions undermines both the EU's credibility and the principle. Not only WMD non-proliferation but also arms control and disarmament of both non-conventional and conventional weapons should be the EU's priority. Last but not least, the Europeans should substantially increase their involvement in countering the non-state actors' illicit activities, including the fight against terrorism and organised crime.

4. Fight for a 'Kantian world': further promote democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and peaceful resolution of disputes

The EU and its member states have a good record in the promotion of international principles. But their efforts will be useless if other major global actors are not equally involved in the principles' implementation. Global and regional declarations on principles constitute an interesting exercise, for they allow for exchanges of points of view on crucial global issues, and the Europeans should propose drafting of such declarations to their interlocutors on the occasion of inter-regional meetings. But this declaratory policy should be complemented with institutional developments and concrete actions that guarantee the expansion of democracy and respect for human rights worldwide. The lack of consistency between the EU's principles and practices in the Middle East in this area is especially worrying.

5. Make substantial contribution to the debate on growth and the environment

The EU's unilateral measures to protect the environment and its proposals for a post-Kyoto international regime are laudable. However, the EU's efforts will not resolve the problems of climate

change and extensive pollution because other international actors must be equally involved. The EU and its member states should be more assertive on the seriousness of this global threat. New, imaginative formulas must be explored in Europe and proposed to the EU's global interlocutors, including emphasis on energy saving and sustainable economic activity. This challenge entails an important political philosophy dimension, and the Europeans should encourage political thinking that analyses pragmatic alternatives to the damaging myth of endless growth.

6. Increase development aid and trade for development to reduce extreme poverty, especially in Africa

Extreme poverty constitutes an attack on human dignity. It is also a major source of insecurity. Poverty sustains and aggravates local conflicts, which affect the local population. But desperate situations also spill over to neighbouring countries and regions. The pitiful situation in many parts of Africa should be a matter of concern for the Europeans. Current European efforts to help the African national and regional authorities should be multiplied. The EU and its member states, along with the United Nations, the United States, China, Japan and other international actors, should design a long-term 'Marshall Plan' for Africa. The gravity of the situation there calls for a long-term, well-designed engagement of both local and external actors.

7. Give the EU the necessary means and capabilities to realise global objectives

The current constitutional debate in Europe should be based not only on national interests but also on the need to fulfil European citizens' expectations with regard to global challenges and opportunities. Individual EU members, however powerful, are not able to achieve those goals by themselves. Therefore, European governments should find ways to define common European positions on global issues, and establish EU institutions that are relevant on the global scene. The draft Constitutional Treaty provisions on external action, and more specifically the creation of a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs as well as the recognition of principles that should inspire the EU's CFSP, constituted a positive initiative in this respect. Nevertheless, the discussion of various scenarios in this *Chaillot Paper* has shown that disagreements between EU member states on the EU's competencies and ultimate purpose (*finalité*),

including its international role, may also lead to an institutional split in the EU and to re-nationalisation of European foreign policy.

8. Promote state-building and fight illicit non-state actors, including terrorist groups

As the European Security Strategy declares: 'The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states'. In Africa, the Middle East and other regions, the European Union should identify weak states where firm European support can make a difference. In those cases, the EU should define preferential action plans with the necessary human and financial resources. Reinforcement of the EU Special Representatives' position is crucial in this respect. On the other hand, the EU should continue the fight against illicit non-state actors, including terrorist groups and criminal organisations.

9. Make an explicit plea for region building across the world, particularly in the Middle East

Given the success of the European regional process in the last fifty years, the EU and its member states should stand ready to help other regions, if they so wish, to develop similar processes. The EU should overtly include support to region building as one of its global objectives. As external assistance for state-building is necessary in case of weak or war-torn states, region building for contentious regions could also become a feature of global relations in the future. Among all the world's regions, the Middle East needs regional *rapprochement* more than any other. The European Union should help the local actors to explore regional schemes that could introduce new, cooperative dynamics into what increasingly looks like a hopeless region.

10. Promote single representation of the EU at international bodies

The establishment of a European Union since the Maastricht Treaty and the subsequent development of a common foreign and security policy were followed by better coordination of the EU member states' representations at international organisations. However, in some cases, the European states are still sitting in different groups within those organisations. The EU member states should examine the creation of EU or EU-led groupings in

international organisations, including the United Nations and the IMF, if those initiatives do not impinge upon their current weight in those organisations.

11. Contribute to long-term global institutional reform, starting with the United Nations Security Council

The United Nations and other international organisations should be strengthened if global challenges are to be tackled. Enlargement and reform of the UN Security Council should be a priority for the Europeans. They should discuss at the highest political level a common European vision for the United Nations and the UN Security Council with a view to later negotiating with other global actors. Participation in the UN Security Council should be based above all on respect of the UN purposes and principles, as Article 23 of the UN Charter requires.

12. Increase the EU's and the UN's peacekeeping capabilities

Bearing in mind that the UN is under-funded and taking into account that the need for peacekeeping operations is increasing and will probably continue to grow in the future, the EU should support a substantial improvement of the UN peacekeeping capabilities. The fact that external assistance is absolutely necessary in cases of crisis management, state-building, post-war reconstruction, security sector reform, democratisation processes, etc. implies that demand for peacekeeping will increase in the future. The EU should therefore reinforce its own capabilities and should work with other regional organisations and the United Nations to that end.

Conclusion: the world to come

We do not know what the world of the future will be like, but we know for sure that it will not resemble that of the past. Between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries, European states shaped the world through colonial expansion and cultural influence. The twentieth century was also European, in the sense that Europe continued to transmit to the world both its ideas – good and bad – and its vices in the form of violent shockwaves, i.e. the two world wars. But the twentieth century was also, and for the first time, American, since the United States emerged as the most powerful actor after the Second World War, and the sole political and military superpower following the end of the Cold War.

The twenty-first century presents a more complicated picture. Although the United States is still the only global superpower, the domestic and foreign policies of President George W. Bush's administrations during two terms in office have weakened the US's relative position on the world scene. From the economic point of view, the United States competes with the European Union, Japan, China and other emerging powers, while, at the same time, there is a dense web of investment, commercial and other exchanges that binds them together. Global civil society has started to play an important role in international relations, and unjustified war has become highly unpopular. On the European continent, regional integration between states has produced a new form of international actor, the European Union. And not only in Europe but also in other regions and globally, international institutions and rules have become more and more relevant.

Again, we do not know what kind of world is being heralded by these developments. It seems clear, however, that the Europeans will not have the same kind of political, economic and cultural presence that they enjoyed in previous centuries. In an increasingly multipolar world, the Europeans will partake in global exchanges of all sorts but will not have a quasi-monopoly thereof, as in the past. To cite an example from the previously-quoted *The*

New Global Puzzle. What World for the EU in 2025?, in terms of population the European Union will represent just over six percent of the world's inhabitants by 2025.[147] Even though some basic international principles seem indisputable for all global actors, from both the economic and cultural points of view the world will be more complex and uncertain. Responses to global issues, from security to the environment, will have to be negotiated permanently among political actors.

Faced with this prospect, if you are a European leader or citizen looking to the future, you have two alternatives: either to resist and try to maintain old privileges, or to participate in global processes in order to introduce the best possible input into them. The risk of trying to resist is that historical developments in the twenty-first century are so unstoppable that those who try to hang onto the past may be simply bypassed and ignored. Conversely, participating in global processes gives us an opportunity to contribute to shaping the future and making it better.

This *Chaillot Paper*'s first conclusion is that foresight and futures studies should constitute an important ingredient of the public debate. Therefore, the European Union and its member states should promote futures studies at both the academic and official levels. From our vantage point, the future is not a linear succession of events, but rather a rich landscape with many possible roads for us to take. Confronting challenges and profiting from opportunities require good foresight, warnings and vision, which can be then introduced into the democratic decision-making process. Political communities that can utilise good foresight are freer when it comes to making decisions, and better prepared to confront possible futures.

The second main conclusion is that, responding to both adequate warnings and vision, political communities can 'transform' and 'choose' their futures through what can be called the *future's improvement process*. From the various futures that are still possible today, foresight and vision allow for the shaping of one of the better futures among them. In other words, the world to come depends on us to a large extent. Some historical cases show how the future's improvement process works. The nuclear non-proliferation regime established in 1968 is an example of collective reaction to warnings. The development of the European Communities since 1957, leading to the current European Union, constitutes a good example of vision and 'creation' of a better future.

147. Nicole Gnesotto and Giovanni Grevi (eds.), *The New Global Puzzle: What World for the EU in 2025?* (Paris: EUISS, 2006), op. cit., p. 15.

The third conclusion is that, looking to global futures, both positive and negative forces acting in the present can lead to more or less promising futures. The rapid changes that have occurred in the last few decades plainly show that, in addition to a violent world – a Hobbesian world – such as we have experienced in the past, a peaceful world where cooperation prevails can also occur. It is important to be aware of this possibility because the Kantian world of the future would be very different from anything previously recorded in history, and hitherto unimaginable situations, even if they are pleasant, also present challenges. This author believes that, despite the current negative trends and risks, this Kantian world or 'cosmocracy' is a likely possibility.[148]

However, we cannot take the advent of that positive scenario for granted. The future will be what we make of it. If major powers act clumsily, pursue short-term interests and encourage tribal thinking, global war will be a real possibility and, with the available military means including weapons of mass destruction, the survival of the international system, and even of humanity and the planet as we know them, will be in danger. If, conversely, states and other international actors are able to negotiate multilaterally and reach a *modus operandi* for the main challenges and opportunities, global order can prevail. If we continue to deplete natural resources and consume fossil fuels as we are doing today, deterioration of the environment may seriously affect the global economy. If multilateral measures to protect the environment are taken, our societies will be able to adapt to sustainable development. If current tensions in the Middle East continue to fester, future crises there will impinge upon global peace and security. By contrast, a region-building process in the Middle East can bring new hopes to that region and the rest of the world. And so on.

Chapter Two points out some global challenges and opportunities. On the one hand, positive forces are today present in international relations. Those forces are pushing world history towards the consolidation of international principles and the creation of a worldwide debate in which all international actors, from states to international organisations, to non-governmental organisations, to public opinion and the press, participate. Along with those and analogous forces, negative forces also exercise their influence in global relations. A short list of the gravest risks that humanity is confronting today should include the following: confrontation between global powers, wars in the Middle East region,

148. Martin Ortega Carcelen, *Cosmocracia: política global para el siglo XXI* (Madrid: Editorial Síntesis, 2006).

climate change, ecological meltdown, wars over natural resources, humanitarian catastrophes and extreme poverty in Africa, and rearmament, in particular with weapons of mass destruction.

With a view to tackling those threats, collective arrangements have to be found. Individual states, however powerful, cannot deal with those challenges alone and, similarly, states cannot take advantage of global opportunities if they do not cooperate with the rest. The current state of affairs whereby individual states decide if and when to collaborate with others on crucial global issues, which has led to a crisis in the practice of multilateralism, is not satisfactory. This *Chaillot Paper* maintains that a new approach is needed, based on the notion of global governance.

Global governance can be generally described as *the management of global problems and the pursuit of global objectives through the concerted efforts of states and other international actors*. The current political situation is not propitious to reaching global agreements with a view to strengthening that form of governance. However, a number of circumstances may offer a window of opportunity around the beginning of the 2010s. Among those circumstances, the inauguration of a new US Administration – which will have to be more multilateralist – from January 2009, the emerging powers' need for recognition of their new global status, decisions taken in Europe on the EU's size and competencies, and possible natural and man-made catastrophes, especially the continuing degradation of the environment, will probably allow for global agreements, which could be either comprehensive or sectorial in scope.

Future agreements on global governance will face significant challenges. They should ensure as much as possible that the rise and fall of major powers does not degenerate into global (whether cold or hot) war, that global principles such as democracy and human rights are respected and that crisis management, peacekeeping and disarmament are pursued. Global principles, which are the result of a permanent debate among international actors, will continue to be at the centre of international relations. States that do not respect principles, as they are interpreted by the majority, and those who would like to make unilateralist interpretations of the principles, with a view to utilising them as means rather than as ends, will be doomed to ostracism. One of the most important substantive challenges will be to stop the current vicious cycle of violence in the Middle East region and to transform the situation there via cooperation schemes and region building. Another

demanding test will be to contain global warming, climate change and extensive pollution through collective measures agreed by both industrialised and emerging powers. Science and technology may contribute to find solutions. But the problem is not of an exclusively technological nature: new economic and political thinking will have to offer alternatives to uncontrolled growth based on cheap energy and extensive fossil fuel consumption. Along with those substantive challenges, thorny institutional issues will have to be addressed too. Drawing from many international studies that underline the realities of interdependence, Chapter Four has drawn the following conclusions:

- States by themselves cannot cope with global challenges;
- Common institutions and rules are needed to tackle global challenges and take advantage of global opportunities;
- Therefore, the international level of governance must be reinforced.

This is not an academic syllogism. Numerous global opinion polls show that the public in industrialised and developing countries alike trust international organisations and non-governmental organisations more than national governments. The public perceive that international organisations and law are necessary to fulfil goals such as peace, security and development. Also, global public opinion favours international principles and the reinforcement of international structures. Looking to the future, *The New Global Puzzle* concludes: 'over the next twenty years, the demand for global governance will increase steeply'.[149]

In this connection, one important conclusion of this *Chaillot Paper* is that states have to show a more positive attitude towards the strengthening of international institutions and regimes. Global governance in the future will be 'multilevel', in the sense that it will involve universal and regional institutions, states, local communities, and other organisations, including private corporations and NGOs. With a view to defining the most suitable format for multilevel governance, the balance between the states' and international organisations' respective roles will be the key issue. Nowadays governments appear to have too many reservations concerning international organisations. Governments are not keen on attributing more competencies to those organisations, and are not allocating the necessary resources for them. Generally

149. *The New Global Puzzle*, op. cit., p. 197.

speaking, in both the global and regional contexts, governments still want to be the sole protagonists of international relations and to keep the upper hand when it comes to tackling global crises and risks. This situation is hampering the pursuit of global objectives. It is true that states are the basic units of political legitimacy and they have the necessary capabilities, but, unless states agree to reinforce multilateral schemes, global threats and opportunities will not be dealt with adequately.

This paper has described a number of institutional options for global governance. One of the most probable options has been called 'reformist'. In this option, small steps are taken to tentatively change current structures. Another option, *transformation* of international organisations and regimes so that they are more capable and efficient, seems preferable. Transformation of international organisations has to start with reform of the UN Security Council, a 'long overdue' issue, as Kofi Annan put it. This paper suggests that membership expansion from the current 15 members to between 21 and 25 members would allow for better representation of all UN member states. Modalities of expansion have to be negotiated among member states. But Article 23.1 of the UN Charter must be respected, in the sense that the election of any new members to the Security Council should be based on their contribution to the principles and purposes of the UN Charter. The EU member states have a special responsibility to reach agreement among themselves on UN Security Council reform. This is the best way to both implement their commitment to effective multilateralism and contribute to global governance. On the other hand, this *Chaillot Paper* proposes that all EU member states, as well as other countries that would like to associate, should create a regional group at the UN General Assembly.

At the present moment, the European Union contributes to the global order in two different ways: as a model and as an actor. Being a successful example of regional integration in the commercial, economic, political and military spheres, the European Union is an interesting precedent for other regions that strive to find ways to avoid confrontation and consolidate good neighbourly relations. Thus, in itself, the European regional integration process constitutes a significant contribution to global governance. On the other hand, through a vast array of external policies and actions, the EU is a regional and global actor, which entertains relations with all other states and organisations around the world,

and participates actively in all global issues. From development aid to international trade to peacekeeping, the EU has become a crucial global player in a mere couple of decades. The European Union and its member states have developed a new approach to international relations that favours cooperation, crisis management and the rule of law – instead of the pursuit of short-sighted interests even with military means – which has been welcomed by other international actors and global public opinion.

It remains to be seen, however, what the EU's contribution to global issues will be in the future. The future global role of the European Union will depend on two sets of conditions, internal and external. Internal factors include: (a) the 'constellation' of governments and leaders in the EU capitals, and whether they can reach a common vision of the European Union; (b) the constitutional arrangements towards a more or less permanent 'division of labour' in international affairs between member states and the European Union; (c) the decision-making process that is agreed among states to define the EU's foreign policy on specific issues; (d) the capabilities given to the EU institutions to carry out their tasks; and (e) the size of the European Union, for it is obvious that the larger the membership, the more difficult it will be to reach a consensus on international issues.

Together with internal factors, the EU's global role will also be determined by external factors. The most important of these *inter alia* will be: (a) a peaceful or violent international environment; (b) the foreign policy of the United States; (c) political developments and foreign policy in other major powers, including China and other emerging powers; (d) the situation in the EU's neighbourhood and whether there are direct threats to the EU; and (e) unexpected events, crises, man-made and natural catastrophes that may lead to a change in European attitudes.

It is not possible to foresee how those factors are going to interact, or how the EU will have developed in ten or twelve years time and, consequently, what its global role will be. However, the European governments' need to respond to their citizens' expectations on global issues may lead to a reinforcement of the EU as a global actor. This seems to be the most likely scenario. Indeed, nowadays, the European states' overriding concern is not only protection of national interests, but also the pursuit of regional integration in Europe and the resolution of global problems. Similarly, the European Union's ultimate aim and ambition cannot be completely

explained today through the integration 'shopping list' as in the 1970s and 1980s. Rather, an important part of the new EU's *finalité* is to tackle global risks and to achieve global objectives.

The current constitutional debate will probably lead to a 'moment of truth' for the European Union in the near future – a defining moment when the EU member states will clarify the EU's competencies, institutional architecture and external action. The draft Constitutional Treaty constituted a compromise, which allowed for a more relevant EU global role. Reaffirmation of international principles, the military assistance and solidarity clauses, and the creation of a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs are positive initiatives in this respect. However, in the current political circumstances, it is not possible to say whether the treaty, or some modified version thereof, will be maintained. Bearing in mind the open-ended constitutional debate that will take place in the coming months and years, instead of predicting a single result for that EU's 'moment of truth', this *Chaillot Paper* has described four illustrative scenarios – Disunited States of Europe, Commercial Union, Little Europe, and Great Europe – as food for thought for the ongoing discussion.

In any event, the current constitutional debate should include the global dimension. European leaders should demonstrate both political vision and responsibility to propose a credible role for the European Union in global affairs in the future. The urgency of global challenges and opportunities requires such a proactive role. Moreover, European citizens, on the one hand, and public opinion in many other countries across the world, on the other, are calling for a greater European commitment to global governance.

This *Chaillot Paper* proposes that the European Council and the EU Council of Foreign Affairs should assign particular attention to issues of global governance, through separate channels and meetings. Crucial issues of global governance – UN Security Council reform, global warming, peace in the Middle East, poverty in Africa, etc.– cannot be treated as 'other business' in the Council's agenda. They are global constitutional issues that need calm reflection and intensive debates among European leaders.

Bearing in mind the preceding discussion, this paper presents the following twelve recommendations for defining the EU's contribution to global governance.

1. *Develop the idea of effective multilateralism into that of global governance*

2. *Start preparing reform of global governance from today*

3. *Insist on the peaceful rise and fall of major powers and non-use of force*

4. *Fight for a 'Kantian world': further promote democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and peaceful resolution of disputes*

5. *Make a substantial contribution to the debate on growth and the environment*

6. *Increase development aid and trade for development to reduce extreme poverty, especially in Africa*

7. *Give the EU the necessary means and capabilities to realise global objectives*

8. *Promote state-building and fight illicit non-state actors, including terrorist groups*

9. *Make an explicit plea for region-building across the world, particularly in the Middle East*

10. *Promote single representation of the EU at international bodies*

11. *Contribute to long-term global institutional reform, starting with the enlargement of the United Nations Security Council*

12. *Increase the EU's and the UN's peacekeeping capabilities.*

This is not a closed or exhaustive list. Rather, it is a compilation of suggestions on some of the main issues that the Europeans will have to urgently address if they want to make a meaningful contribution to global governance.

Some recent studies on the future

The New Global Puzzle. What World For the EU in 2025?, directed by Nicole Gnesotto and Giovanni Grevi (Paris: EUISS, 2006).

The book is divided into three sections: the first analyses major long-term trends in five key areas: demography, the economy, energy, the environment, and science and technology. The second presents regional outlooks. The final section examines key questions for the future of international relations, and in particular outlines the implications for the EU. Three main points can be emphasised:

- Globalisation will remain a key factor shaping world politics, economics and culture. Economic globalisation will bring considerable benefits, but its gains will be unevenly distributed.
- By 2025 a multipolar international system is likely to have consolidated and a redistribution of power signalling the end of western hegemony will take place, with other powers coming to the forefront. The question is, what type of multipolar system will emerge, and will it be stable?
- While the international system will be more heterogeneous, it will also be more interdependent. Therefore effective governance structures will be essential.

http://www.iss.europa.eu/books/NGP.pdf

Mapping the Global Future (Washington: United States National Intelligence Council, December 2004).

This report, based on extensive consultations undertaken by the US intelligence community with nongovernmental experts around the world, presents the possible future directions of globalisation, the changing global geopolitical landscape, democracy and politics within states, and security threats. The report describes four scenarios, which are not meant as actual forecasts, but rather as illustrations of possible futures: a 'Davos world' where globalisation triumphs; Pax Americana; a new 'Caliphate'; and a 'cycle of fear'. The paper, the result of the US NIC's 2020 project, is the third in a series, which will be continued with a new publication in 2008.

http://www.foia.cia.gov/2020/2020.pdf

Zwanzig Zwanzig 2020 (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2006).

This collective report published by the Bertelsmann Foundation draws on current trends to produce a picture of what Europe will look like in 2020. Through seven fictional scenarios, the authors present a 35-member state EU, with 25 countries belonging to the euro area. The Constitutional Treaty will have been ratified (in reduced form) and a Minister of Foreign Affairs will coordinate foreign policy. Terrorists having access to WMD will remain the biggest threat to the EU. The European security policy will have shifted towards Africa, following the complete withdrawal of American and British

This and the following annexes offer the reader useful information on sources and resources relating to the issues analysed in this *Chaillot Paper*. The lists presented here are by no means exhaustive; rather, they are merely illustrative and organised in random order. The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of Catherine Meldrum, an EUISS intern in 2006, in preparing the annexes.

troops from Iraq and a peace accord between Israel and Palestine. The EU will have enforced energy-saving and alternative energy technologies, reducing its dependency on foreign energy sources.

http://www.20zwanzig.de

Global Risk Report 2007 (World Economic Forum, Davos, 2007).

The 2007 edition of the WEF Global Risk Report presents an overview of risks to the global community over the next decade. Expert opinion suggests that levels of risk are rising in almost all of the 23 areas for which indicators are utilised by the authors, while mechanisms to manage and mitigate risks are inadequate. The report describes three possible scenarios for the future: a pandemic with huge impact on global business and finance, a sudden rise in public awareness of the extent and implications of climate change, and an oil shock. The report makes the case for active engagement of the international community in dealing with global risks.

http://www.weforum.org/pdf/CSI/Global_Risks_2007.pdf

An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs (European Defence Agency, October 2006).

In November 2005, the Ministerial Steering Board of the European Defence Agency (EDA) tasked the Agency to conduct a wide-ranging exercise to develop an initial long-term vision of European defence capability and capacity needs, looking some two decades ahead. The resulting text does not 'forecast' the future, nor does it offer a route map for member states. Instead, the report aims to identify some of the most relevant and robust trends, and presents them to defence planners, technologists and industrialists across Europe, who have to take decisions on defence procurement issues.

http://www.eda.europa.eu

United Kingdom Ministry of Defence's DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme 2007-2036

This report is an independent review of future trends and issues produced by the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre of the UK Ministry of Defence. The report goes beyond identifying potential future military threats and looks at other areas that will shape the global context in which the UK will have to operate.

http://www.dcdc-strategictrends.org.uk

Divided World: the Struggle for Primacy in 2020, by Mark Leonard (London: Centre for European Reform, 2007).

The author predicts that the future until 2020 will be defined by mounting tension between competing conceptions of world order. Shifts in economic power will be overlaid with an ideological struggle, and the major powers will

become increasingly split along two axes: democratic and autocratic states. Leonard suggests that the four emerging poles of ideological competition will be the United States, China and Russia, the European Union, and the Middle East, as a 'faith zone'. In this 'quadripolar' world, a global competition to co-opt 'swing' countries, such as India, will take place. However, a global war is unlikely, since the four spheres of influence will be bound together by economic exchanges. The EU's most urgent challenge will be to engage the relevant forces in each of the other blocs in order to prevent violent clashes.

http://www.cer.org.uk/publications_new/707.html

Une brève histoire de l'avenir, by Jacques Attali (Paris: Fayard, 2006).

The book utilises a long-term perspective, with forecasts for the next fifty years. By 2050, the author suggests, US supremacy will have vanished, the EU will have declined, while the 'market democracies' of Asia will thrive. Later on, the global marketplace's success will imply the end of both the state and the notion of public services. Global order will then be guaranteed by private organisations and insurance companies, and technology will play a key role.

Europe in the World. Political Choices for Security and Prosperity, by Tom Burke & Nick Mabey (London: Third Generation Environmentalism, 2006).

This report sets out a number of critical political choices, which Europe must make to define its global policies for the future: building inter-generational cooperation by investing in sustainable development, achieving energy security and 'climate security' – since the EU will not fare well in a global conflict for scarce resources –, investing in a successful China, and defining a EU budget for the future.

http://www.e3g.org/images/uploads/Europe_in_the_World_Pamphlet.pdf

An Inclusive World, in which the West, Islam and the Rest have a Stake, by Sundeep Waslekar (Mumbai: Strategic Foresight Group, 2006).

This paper propounds a new global security architecture. After analysing incidences of terrorism across the world – not only in the West, but also in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East –, the report examines why extremism may replace terrorism as the greatest threat to world security and engulf the politics of the United States and Europe. The paper also exposes contradictions in self-serving Eastern and Western discourses of international affairs. Finally, it envisages the framework for a sustainable global security architecture in the future, through action plans for leaders, experts and civil society.

http://www.strategicforesight.com/AnInclusiveWorld.pdf

State of the Future 2005, by Jerome C. Glenn and Theodore J. Gordon (Washington: American Council for the United Nations University, 2005).

The American Council for the United Nations University leads the so-called Millennium Project, which publishes annual editions of *The State of the Future*. Edited by Jerome C. Glenn and Theodore J. Gordon, this publication collects and assesses insights from experts across the world on emerging crises, opportunities, strategic priorities, and the feasibility of international initiatives. The same authors have edited useful compilations of futures studies methods.

http://www.acunu.org/index.html

Glossary of terms used in futures studies

This glossary is divided into four categories: 1. General terms; 2. Quantitative methods; 3. Qualitative methods; and 4. Main research centres, projects, networks and websites on futures studies.

1. GENERAL TERMS

Analysis / international analysis / analyst of international issues

Following collection of data, international analysis is the activity carried out to interpret and understand information on international issues as well as their current and future implications. Analysts are experts working in Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Ministries of Defence, other public institutions, intelligence services, international organisations, multinational companies, NGOs, think tanks, the media and universities.

Complexity

The natural condition of international reality, whereby many different factors shape events, and which makes its development both unpredictable and difficult to comprehend. 'Complexity science' is a new discipline that examines this phenomenon.

Forecast/predict

Telling in advance one event or succession of events that will come to pass in the future. Forecasting focuses on one future rather than on several possible futures.

Foresight

A broad term covering various methods of envisaging the future; it differs from forecasting in that it tends to emphasise alternative futures.

Human factor

Unpredictable human decisions and deeds that affect international developments.

Indicator

An event or trend in the present that can point to a relevant future development.

Information inflation

Information inflation or 'explosion' refers to the increasing amount of data that is available to the international analyst, particularly through Internet and technological means.

Prospective

'Prospective' is the French term for foresight, as developed by a group of French thinkers.

Risk analysis

A technique or set of techniques to identify and assess factors that may potentially cause economic harm. It is utilised mainly by multinational companies, such as banks and insurance companies.

Scanning

A futures studies technique, involving the systematic examination of all major trends, issues, events and ideas across a wide range of activities. Slight variations are 'environmental scanning', which includes the immediate factors, and 'horizon scanning', which also refers to issues at the margins of current thinking.

System/adaptive systems

A concept to explain and understand aspects of reality that are composed of various elements, which interrelate and interact with each other. In the natural world, the observed realities (for instance, the solar system) are less complex. The international system, where many international actors, historical trends, and unexpected events intervene, is perhaps one of the most difficult to understand. Human-based systems are not static; rather, they adapt continuously to emerging circumstances, which is applicable to the international system too. It can be said, therefore, that systems 'learn' from experience.

Tactical and strategic (foresight and warning)

These two adjectives refer respectively to the short- and long-term temporal scopes of foresight and warning.

Trend

A feature of society that evolves over time. A *megatrend* is a large-scale historical development which gradually has a significant impact on international society.

Uncertainty/unknown

Uncertainty is a term applied to the future, in the sense that our knowledge cannot encompass all possible futures.

Warning/early warning

Notification of impending events that may have adverse effects, timely enough to allow for preventative or preparatory measures. A warning failure or error is the absence of warning prior to an action or event that has negative consequences for national or international security.

2. QUANTITATIVE METHODS

Chaos theory

A notion derived from mathematics and physics, describing the behaviour of systems that should be predictable in principle but, given the existence of minor variations within them, are unpredictable.

Extrapolation

Projection of trends towards the future. Trend extrapolation generally assumes that underlying patterns of the past will continue to exist in the future.

Formal methods

A number of methods that formalise or codify international reality and propose future projections thereof, such as morphological analysis, the 'futures wheel', 'text mining', etc.

Game theory

A way of testing human behaviour in situations where rational actors make choices that are interdependent with the choices of others. It can be used as a predictive tool to foresee how human populations will behave.

Linear and non-linear developments

Linear evolution of systems assumes continuity of the defining parameters. Linearity permits certain mathematical assumptions to be made, allowing for simple computation of results. A non-linear development or system entails substantial changes, which make the system's modelling more difficult.

Matrices

The factors of a system are organised in matrices, so that their variations are presented in many possible combinations.

Modelling

International reality is codified in models and figures. Variables are related in equations. Using formal analytic techniques, pictures of the future can be drawn. Special software can be used, or a simple spreadsheet.

Noise

An indicator that does not provide meaningful information and which obscures or reduces the clarity of analysis

Simulation

Similar to game theory. The construction and development of a model, using either a computer game or a game with human players. A series of events is simulated to find out what is likely to happen next.

Statistics

A formal method to quantify and organise international data.

Structural analysis

The formal study of relationships between different elements within a system. The quantitative analysis of the international system has led to some structural interpretations. On occasion, quantitative and qualitative methods are utilised simultaneously, as in Barry Buzan and Richard Little's book *International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

Weak signal

A factor, trend or idea, which will eventually have an impact on the international system, but nowadays is difficult to spot amidst other indicators and noises.

3. QUALITATIVE METHODS

Analogy thinking

Possible future developments are foreseen and described bearing in mind similar situations in the past.

Delphi method

Foresight is conducted asking a group of experts to give their opinion and making estimates on specific international issues. The method can be utilised in different ways, including discussion of opinions within the group and elicitation of the group's preferences. A process of 'brainstorming', in which free expression of views is crucial, is usually utilised.

Heuristics

Decision-making method based on experience and intuition. It can also be utilised to foresee the future.

Language/natural language

Both international reality and possible futures are described using natural language. Therefore, the use of appropriate terms from natural language to describe and analyse international reality becomes a constant challenge.

Public opinion

Increasingly, studies on public opinion have become relevant to understand current and possible future international developments.

Scenario thinking

This method presents various possible future worlds. Their purpose is not to predict, but rather to help think about several possible futures, and their potential consequences.

Scenarios as consequences

Potential outcomes of current policies and events are portrayed as possible states of affairs. For instance, when we say 'attacking Iran would lead to three scenarios'.

Scenarios as narratives

Future scenarios are described as a succession of interconnected events.

Understanding

Human capacity to grasp reality and explain it in natural language. Quality understanding of international reality is sometimes called 'insight'.

'What if' reasoning

Future events are described following a cause-and-effect sequencing. It is similar to scenarios as consequences. Looking to the past, this method is sometimes utilised to present 'counterfactual thinking', i.e. a succession of possible consequences from a hypothetical 'historical' fact that never took place.

4. MAIN RESEARCH CENTRES, PROJECTS, NETWORKS AND WEBSITES ON FUTURES STUDIES

Institute for Prospective Technological Studies, Seville
European Commission Joint Research Centre
http://www.jrc.es/index.htm
http://www.jrc.cec.eu.int

CORDIS Science and Technology Foresight, European Commission, and FORLEARN
http://cordis.europa.eu/foresight/home.html
http://forlearn.jrc.es/index.htm

European Futurists Conference, Lucerne
http://www.european-futurists.org/

Futuribles, Paris
http://www.futuribles.com

Crisis and Risk Network, ETH Zurich
http://www.crn.ethz.ch

Institute for the Future, Palo Alto, California
http://www.iftf.org

Millennium Project, American Council for the United Nations University
http://www.acunu.org

Pradee Center, Rand Corporation
http://www.rand.org/nsrd/pardee

United Kingdom, Horizon Scanning
http://www.hse.gov.uk/horizons

France, Centre d'Analyse Stratégique
http://www.strategie.gouv.fr

World Economic Forum, Global Risks Network
http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/globalrisk/index.htm

OECD International Futures Programme
http://www.oecd.org/department/0,2688,en_2649_33707_1_1_1_1_1,00.html

Journal of Futures Studies
http://www.jfs.tku.edu.tw

World Future Society
http://www.wfs.org

Foundation for the Future
http://www.futurefoundation.org

Futures journal
http;//www.elsevier.com

Strategic Foresight Group, Mumbai
http://www.strategicforesight.com

Finland Futures Research Centre
http://www.tukkk.fi

Zukunftsinstitut, Frankfurt
http://www.zukunftsinstitut.de

Some centres and websites on global governance

GARNET Network - Global Governance, Regionalisation and Regulation: The Role of the EU

http://www.garnet-eu.org

European Commission, White Paper on European Governance

European Commission, White Paper on Governance – Working Group No 5 Report, Strengthening Europe's contribution to world governance, May 2001

http://ec.europa.eu/comm/governance/areas/group11/report_en.pdf

World Economic Forum's Global Governance Initiative

http://www.weforum.org

Global Governance Project

http://www.glogov.org

Critical Perspectives on Global Governance

http://www.cpogg.org/index2.html

Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation of the University of Warwick

http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/

Centre for the Study of Global Governance, LSE, London

http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/

Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)

http://www.igloo.org/cigi

Global Governance Group – Club of Athens

http://www.globalgovgroup.com

Global Governance journal

http://www.arts.ualberta.ca/globalgovernance/english/index.shtml

UN High-Level Panel on UN-Civil Society

http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/initiatives/panels/cardoso/0611report.pdf

'We the peoples: civil society, the United Nations and global governance', Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations, 11 June 2004.

See also Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 'Civil society and global governance', contextual paper prepared by the Panel's chairman:

http://www.un.org/reform/pdfs/cardosopaper13june.htm

United Nations University

http://www.unu.edu/pg

See also the United Nations University Centre for Regional Integration Studies in Bruges, at http://www.cris.unu.edu.

Brookings Institution

http://www.brookings.edu

Global Public Policy Institute

http://www.gppi.net

Global Policy Forum

http://www.globalpolicy.org

Friedrich Ebert Stiftung

This foundation has produced a number of publications on global governance: see

http://www.fes-globalization.org/, and http://www.fesny.org/govern.htm.

Centre for Global Change and Governance, Rutgers University

http://dga.rutgers.edu/cggc.html

Centre for Global Development

http://www.cgdev.org/

Global Environmental Governance Project

http://www.environmentalgovernance.com/

Centre on Global Change and Health

http://www.lshtm.ac.uk/cgch/govern.html

UNDP Oslo Governance Centre

http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/

Global Stakeholder Panel Initiative on Globalisation and Global Governance

http://www.2020fund.org/

Abbreviations

ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
HLP	High Level Panel
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSI	Office of Science and Innovation
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organisation

Chaillot Papers

All *Institute publications*
can be accessed via the Institute's website:
www.iss.europa.eu

n°**99**	Sécurité et développement de l'Afrique : une nouvelle approche pour l'UE *Charles Goerens*	**April 2007**
n°**98**	EU security and defence. Core documents 2006 *Volume VII, compiled by Catherine Glière*	**March 2007**
n°**97**	Enter the EU Battlegroups *Gustav Lindstrom*	**February 2007**
n°**96**	Monitoring a region in crisis: the European Union in West Africa *Marie V. Gibert*	**January 2007**
n°**95**	Etats-Unis : le temps de la diplomatie transformationnelle *Justin Vaïsse*	**December 2006**
n°**94**	Facing China's rise: Guidelines for an EU strategy *Philip Andrews-Speed, Axel Berkofsky, Peter Ferdinand, Duncan Freeman, François Godement, Eberhard Sandschneider, Antonio Tanca and Marcin Zaborowski; edited by Marcin Zaborowski*	**December 2006**
n°**93**	Enforcing non-proliferation. The European Union and the 2006 BTWC Review Conference *Jean Pascal Zanders and Kathryn Nixdorff; edited by Gustav Lindstrom*	**November 2006**
n°**92**	Turkey's foreign policy in turbulent times *Kemal Kirisci*	**September 2006**
n°**91**	EU stakes in Central Asia *Anna Matveeva*	**July 2006**

Books

The New Global Puzzle. What World for the EU in 2025? *directed by Nicole Gnesotto and Giovanni Grevi*	**2006**
Friends again? EU-US relations after the crisis *Nicole Gnesotto, James Dobbins, Federico Romero, David Frum, William Wallace, Ronald D. Asmus, István Gyarmati, Walter B. Slocombe, Gilles Andréani, Philip H. Gordon, Werner Weidenfeld, Felix Neugart, Geoffrey Kemp, Dov Lynch, Fiona Hill, Baudoin Bollaert, Joseph Quinlan, Marcin Zaborowski; edited by Marcin Zaborowski*	**2006**
Defence procurement in the European Union – The current debate Report of an EUISS Task Force *Chairman and Rapporteur: Burkard Schmitt*	**2005**

To a large extent, the world to come depends on us. Political communities can respond to warnings and visions regarding their futures and organise themselves in order to shape and 'improve' those futures. The European integration process is a good example of a change of historical direction, marking a watershed between a past marred by devastating wars and a present characterised by common institutions and rules.

This *Chaillot Paper* suggests that the next frontier in the future's improvement process is global governance. Global challenges and opportunities call for concerted action. Individual states, including major — both old and emerging — powers cannot tackle challenges and exploit opportunities on their own. Therefore, new global agreements are needed to shape the future with a view to ensuring peaceful coexistence and avoiding widespread conflict and destruction.

This paper foresees that a global 'constitutional moment' may appear at the beginning of the 2010s. Numerous issues will have to be addressed at this juncture: UN Security Council reform, peace and institution building in the Middle East region, reinforcement of peacekeeping capabilities, fossil fuel consumption, climate change and the spectre of extreme poverty in Africa.

The European Union and its member states are well placed to contribute to future efforts conducive to global governance. However, a significant European contribution will require a more cohesive EU foreign policy. At a time when the EU's future role as a global player is being defined, European governments should bear in mind that more and more European citizens are demanding a firmer commitment to international principles and values.

published by
the European Union
Institute for Security Studies
43 avenue du
Président Wilson
F-75775 Paris cedex 16
phone: +33 (0)1 56 89 19 30
fax: +33 (0)1 56 89 19 31
e-mail: info@iss.europa.eu
www.iss.europa.eu
€ 10

ISSN 1017-7566
ISBN 978-92-9198-110-6