

*Chaillot Paper*

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March 2006

n° **87**

# EU security and defence

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## Core documents 2005

*Volume VI*



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*Volume VI*

**Institute for Security Studies**  
*European Union*  
*Paris*

## **Institute for Security Studies**

*European Union*

*43 avenue du Président Wilson*

*75775 Paris cedex 16*

*tel.: +33 (0)1 56 89 19 30*

*fax: +33 (0)1 56 89 19 31*

*e-mail: [institute@iss-eu.org](mailto:institute@iss-eu.org)*

**[www.iss-eu.org](http://www.iss-eu.org)**

*Director: Nicole Gnesotto*

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ISSN 1017-7566

ISBN 92-9198-086-2

Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in Condé-sur-Noireau (France) by Corlet Imprimeur. Graphic design by Claire Mabilille (Paris).

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*A year of striking contrasts, 2005 will go down in the annals as a year in which the European Union experienced a major political crisis, while at the same time showing remarkable dynamism on the international stage.*

*In May and June 2005, the French and Dutch No votes in the referenda on the Constitutional Treaty sent seismic shockwaves through the hitherto serene landscape of the EU. Over eighteen months of hard work and wrangling in the European Convention were wiped out overnight, trailing in their wake the demise, or at the very least the putting on ice, of the two major advances that the Treaty was to have inaugurated in terms of foreign and security policy: the creation of the post of a Minister for Foreign Affairs who would also be Vice President of the Commission, and the establishment of a European diplomatic service comprising officials of the Commission and the Council respectively. A series of deadlocks was to follow on from this initial shock, most notably impasse in terms of any new institutional initiatives, an intense battle over the budget which would only be resolved in the final hours of the UK presidency in December, major political apathy in the European capitals and, above all, growing mistrust and resentment among top European leaders.*

*And yet, despite this internal crisis of public confidence with regard to the European project, in 2005 the EU's external policy was marked by considerable achievements. In the field of ESDP, no fewer than six new operations were launched in 2005, involving a major expansion in terms of the geographical scope of such missions. Interventions in regions where troops had traditionally been deployed, like the Balkans and Africa, were complemented by missions in South-East Asia (the ceasefire monitoring mission in Aceh) and the Middle East (the advisory mission to the Palestinian police and the border assistance mission at the Rafah Crossing Point). The range of security partnerships established by the Union also increased in 2005, with the African Union and ASEAN becoming major partners in the Union's security operations. A new instrument was added to the ESDP toolbox: the European Defence College, although at this stage this is not necessarily a permanent institutional arrangement. The rationalisation of the arms market led the European Defence Agency to publish a code of conduct on defence procurement of the EU member states. The civil dimension of crisis management underwent a crucial new development with the cooperation between the five member countries for setting up a European Gendarmerie Force. On the political front, the highlights of 2005 were the beginnings, at long last, of European-American reconciliation in the aftermath of the Iraq crisis, progress with regard to extending enlargement to Croatia and Turkey, (successful) mediation in Ukraine and (more problematic) mediation over the Iranian nuclear issue.*

*This striking dichotomy between the internal political crisis of the EU and its renewed vigour in the external policy arena leads to ambiguous conclusions: on the one hand,*

*because it is not closely integrated into EU structures and is administered on an essentially inter-governmental level, EU foreign and security policy is shielded de facto from institutional and political crises emanating from within the EU. It can therefore continue to evolve in response to regional crises (e.g. Darfur), external demands and pressures (e.g. Aceh), or the EU's own economic constraints (the arms market): what is paramount in these areas is the consensual agreement of the member states, expressed at the initiative of a few or with the assent of all. On the other hand, precisely because it depends solely on the goodwill of the member states, the EU's security policy remains fragile as it is permanently subject to alteration: should the commitment of the member states falter for whatever reason (lack of budgetary or human resources, various external pressures, domestic policy priorities, electoral shifts) the entire foreign policy of the EU would be deprived of its major driving impetus. The positive results of 2005 in the field of security policy are therefore no guarantee for the future: however awkward and difficult it may be, pressing ahead with institutional reform remains a priority, if only because this is the only way to constrain the unpredictability of the member states.*

*Nicole Gnesotto  
Paris, February 2006*

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# Core documents

## 2005

## General Affairs and External Relations Council Extraordinary meeting

Brussels, 7 January 2005

On 26 December 2004, the tsunami that struck the coastal regions of the Indian Ocean resulted in one of the worst natural disasters in history, leaving almost 300,000 dead or missing people, with millions more injured and displaced. The response of the international community was immediate. For its part, the European Union implemented a series of measures to bring aid to the victims, to help the affected areas to recover and to explore how such a catastrophe might be prevented from happening again.

(...)

### EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

#### *'An unprecedented disaster*

1. The Council expresses its sympathy and solidarity for the populations affected by the earthquake and the tsunami in Asia and the Indian Ocean. This disaster, which is extremely serious owing to its geographical scope and the extent of human and material loss, has affected a total of 12 countries and resulted in over 150 000 deaths, thousands of missing and injured, and several million displaced or homeless people.
2. It restates the EU's solidarity in support of the States and peoples concerned, and mourns the high number of victims of the disaster. In this respect, the members of the Council wish to express their gratitude to the local authorities and populations for their support for those European citizens affected.
3. It welcomes the immense generosity and solidarity shown by European citizens and civil society following the disaster, and voices the determination of the Union and its Member States to meet the challenge and to deploy all available means to that end. Aid should go to the most affected regions and the people in greatest need, especially children. Since they are particularly vulnerable, they need special help, through the appropriate United Nations bodies such as UNICEF, among others.
4. The Council emphasizes the responsibility of the national and regional authorities of the countries concerned with regard to the identification of needs as well as the man-

agement and distribution of aid, and calls for aid to be sent swiftly to all populations concerned irrespective of the internal conflicts affecting some of the stricken countries.

5. It points to the United Nations' central role in the coordination and management of assistance to victims, and also stresses the particular importance of cooperation with the OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs).

6. The Council expresses its gratitude to ASEAN for its rapid action in calling a special extended summit in Jakarta, which the European Union was able to take part in at the highest level. It welcomes the meeting's final declaration.

### *Ongoing action*

7. The Council points to the effort already deployed by the European Union and its Member States in the humanitarian, financial and logistical field, as well as the various mechanisms put in place to coordinate the Union's work, in particular the coordination of humanitarian aid, the European Community's civil protection mechanism and consular cooperation. It commends ECHO's capacity to react to the situation swiftly to mobilize humanitarian aid.

8. It emphasises too the challenges of coordination on the ground, and the importance of surmounting administrative obstacles, particularly those faced by NGOs.

9. The Council has heard the reports given by the Presidency and Commission, which visited certain countries in the region as early as 1 January. United Nations representatives attending the Council provided an overview of the needs of the affected countries and the efforts to be undertaken on the basis of the appeal launched by the United Nations Secretary-General.

10. It points to the role played, particularly in terms of logistics, by the military capabilities of some Member States. In this connection, the SG/HR will examine the possibilities for better coordination of military resources through the appropriate bodies, so that they can be made available efficiently in support of the United Nations' OCHA.

### *Initiatives in the field of humanitarian assistance and aid for rehabilitation and reconstruction*

11. The Council stresses the vital importance of an efficient transition from the humanitarian phase, through the intermediate rehabilitation phase, to the longer-term reconstruction phase.

12. The Council stresses the need for appropriate coordination between all the players concerned for the assessment of medium-term needs in order to optimise the effectiveness and quality of aid. It emphasises that reconstruction efforts must be based on the national priorities of the countries concerned and must respect the principle of ownership.

13. The Council emphasises that, in the field of health, it is essential to anticipate the known risk of epidemic in order to prevent further loss of life, by supplying basic foodstuffs, drinking water, medicines and vaccines. The Council calls for a rapid and coordinated reconstruction of public health structures and capabilities. Care provision at all levels is an essential condition for the success of reconstruction efforts in the other sectors. With that in mind, the Union and its Member States will act in support of the WHO.

14. The Council welcomes the Commission's initiatives to contribute to the effort to restore the affected coastal regions, which will make it possible to assist fishing communities.

15. The Council recalls that the humanitarian-aid response of the European Union and its Member States and the initial forecasts for rehabilitation and reconstruction currently stand at over EUR 1,5 billion in official aid. That is the basis upon which the European Union and the Member States will adopt a position at the donor conference in Geneva on 11 January. In this context, solidarity in facing this disaster must not lead us to forget the general issue of development, humanitarian aid and the Millennium Goals, especially in Africa, nor to reduce the resources needed for that purpose. In this connection, it is important to ensure that resources released in the context of recent events are indeed additional to development commitments already made. The Council will come back to the implementation of commitments regularly.

16. The Council welcomes the Commission's decision to propose, in addition to the EUR 23 million already paid out, taking EUR 100 million from the Community budget's emergency reserve in the short term, thereby rapidly releasing additional financial resources for the phase of following up and boosting humanitarian aid. The budgetary authority is urged to formalise this agreement early next week. It also welcomes the Commission's intention to propose the release, via the appropriate budgetary instruments, of financial resources of EUR 350 million for the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase in the medium and long term, in preparation for the donor conference in Geneva on 11 January 2005. The Council supports the Commission's intention to make use of all available internal procedures to implement reconstruction aid programmes as swiftly as possible.



17. The Commission and the European Investment Bank are encouraged to continue preparatory work on the setting up of a concessional finance facility, the “Indian Ocean Tsunami Facility”, of up to EUR 1 billion.

*Longer-term action: risk prevention, effectiveness of humanitarian intervention and support measures*

18. The international response should make populations and governments less vulnerable and better equipped to cope with possible natural disasters in the future.

19. The Council urges the Commission to submit proposals for a strategy to strengthen measures on prevention, early warning and readiness for disasters, the need for which has been shown by recent events. The Council will adopt a position along those lines for the forthcoming Kobe Conference (World Conference on Disaster Reduction), and supports Germany’s initiative on organising, during 2005, an international conference under the auspices of the United Nations.

20. The Council will also examine all possible ways of improving the European Community’s civil-protection and humanitarian-aid mechanism, including analytical capacity, while taking account of the principles and specific nature of humanitarian aid. It emphasises the need to strengthen the role of the UN in the humanitarian response and for the European Union to contribute to it. In that spirit, it asks the Commission and the competent Council bodies to investigate the possibilities for developing a European Union rapid response capability (planning, coordination and resource mobilisation structure) to deal with disasters of the kind we have just experienced. The Council has also asked the appropriate bodies to begin to assess the setting up of a European Voluntary Humanitarian-Aid Corps.

21. The Union will swiftly assess lessons learned regarding the protection of European citizens, with a view to improving its ability to react in this area. In this context, the Union will examine additional ways of assisting citizens, in particular by coordinating the actions of Member States in fields such as relief, evacuation, shipment of foodstuff and provision of medical care. The Council believes it is particularly important swiftly to enhance the efficiency of consular cooperation between Member States. This factor will also be examined in the framework of preparatory work on setting up the joint external service.

22. The Council is also willing to examine other support measures such as trade-support measures, and also various types of bilateral partnership. In this context, it urges the competent authorities to set up twinning relationships between regions, towns and public and private establishments such as hospitals and schools.

23. The Council notes Member States' intentions to reschedule debt-servicing for the countries affected, particularly through a moratorium on the debts of countries wishing to enter discussions to that end with the Paris Club. It will, in addition, take stock of the economic consequences of the disaster at the ECOFIN Council meeting on 18 January.

24. At its meeting on 31 January the Council will return to all the measures envisaged by the European Union and its Member States for the medium and long term with a view to formulating a European Union operational action plan.'

(...)

## Javier Solana – ‘Shaping an effective EU Foreign Policy’ Foundation Konrad Adenauer

Brussels, 24 January 2005

Mr Chairman, ladies and gentlemen,

Thank you so much for giving me this opportunity to speak today to such a prestigious organisation as the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

Mr Chairman, as you mentioned in your introduction, the theme of today’s speech is Shaping an Effective EU Foreign Policy. This title is deceptively simple: without doubt we need a stronger and more capable Europe: it is the logical answer to the many challenges facing us and it is what many of our citizens are calling for. While we have made significant progress in the last few years – and I want to detail some of that progress in tonight’s speech – it is also true that EU foreign policy remains a work in progress.

I am convinced that 2005 will be a crucial year for the political development of the EU, for our ability to speak with one voice, for the improvement of our crisis management capabilities, and most of all for our effectiveness in promoting security and stability in our neighbourhood and beyond. Or, as President Köhler put it to me last week: the EU has a responsibility to work for the ‘global common good’. That is a fitting way of describing the EU’s global role and ambition.

### *The challenge: a new security environment*

We are living in a period of momentous change in the international system. Since the end of the Cold War, we have exchanged a world of dangerous certainties – the bipolar order built on a fragile balance of terror – for a world of unpredictable perils. We have moved from a state-based security paradigm to one where, increasingly, non-state actors present the greatest threats to our security and where solutions mostly transcend the power of the state.

The notion of human security – which puts the security of individuals front and centre – is fast gaining ground, and rightly so. The fact that borders are increasingly open, or irrelevant, to vast flows of goods, people and ideas has brought great opportunities, prosperity and freedom to many. But globalisation has equally created a sense of injustice and frustration – and it has increased our dependence and vulnerability on events far afield.

It is of course difficult to chart a stable course in this diffuse and fast-changing environment. To underscore this level of complexity, let me list some of the paradoxes that exist in today’s world of globalised insecurity:

Yes, the Cold War bipolar order is gone but at the same time the level of the global violence is growing. Since 1990, around 4 million people have died in conflicts, 90% of them civilians.

Yes, as some point out, Western democracies are a major driving force behind the process of globalisation. But that same globalisation process is reducing their ability to manage security crises. More positively, it is creating opportunities to new powers, such as China and India, to rise to the top table of global politics.

Yes, the two principal totalitarian ideologies of the 20th century are gone but democracy remains fragile or absent in many parts of the world – and cultural and religious radicalisation are on the rise.

Foreign policy is in essence about managing change, about safeguarding our people, about promoting our values and interests. Thus our response to this challenging security environment should not just be active but also flexible and multi-dimensional. While this ‘brave new world’ is confusing, one thing is certain: Europe can and must play a bigger role. To paraphrase John Donne, the outstanding English poet of the early 17th century: the EU knows it is not an island, we are part of a global community.

Indeed we are a global actor. With 25 member states, with over 450 million inhabitants, a quarter of the world’s GNP, and around 40% of the world merchandise exports; and with the comprehensive array of instruments – economic, legal, diplomatic, military – at our disposal, that claim is not an aspiration but a statement of fact.

The origins and subsequent development of the EU mean that the prospects for shaping an effective foreign policy are both difficult and promising at the same time. Difficult because EU was essentially set up to abolish foreign policy, in the traditional sense, among the participating member-states. But also promising because the EU is an amazing economic and political success story. Through hard work and common institutions we have ended centuries of wars and oppression by transforming the European continent into a zone of unprecedented prosperity, security and freedom.

Sometimes, non-Europeans have a better appreciation of what we have achieved in the last 50 years. Just read Jeremy Rifkin’s book ‘The European Dream’. For large parts of the world, the word Europe itself has become associated with a philosophy of humanity, solidarity and integration. This is a great honour and stimulus for us. Europeans can disagree amongst themselves about the precise definitions but, from the outside it looks like a loose ‘European model’ exists, both as a way of organising our societies and in approaching international affairs.

Others around the world are paying close attention. The African Union, Mercosur, Asean – these are all examples of strengthening regional regimes. They are explicitly taking their inspiration from the EU experience. There can be no simple export of a whatever we think the European model is, but the EU is seen as a source of inspiration. And of course, imitation and adaptation are easier than invention.

## *The European Security Strategy one year on*

As you know, in December 2003 EU heads of state and government adopted a European Security Strategy. At the heart of that strategy is the belief that multi-national challenges require multinational responses. This audience needs no reminding that the central elements of the EU philosophy are multilateralism, coherence and partnership.

At the time of the Security Strategy, many people were kind enough to herald this ‘mission statement’ as a great success for the EU. But what have we done since then in terms of follow up and implementation? How is the ESS guiding our day-to-day action? I don’t want to give an exhaustive list of what we have done, but let me highlight some key points.

Let’s start with a key threat and an area where we have been particularly active: the proliferation of WMD. A detailed European Strategy against the proliferation of WMD was adopted by the Council also in December 2003. This strategy gives us a fully fledged-roadmap for immediate and future action to tackle the proliferation of WMD. A central feature in the strategy is our belief that weapons-control regimes such as the OPCW, the Bioweapons Convention and the NPT are crucial and that we should support their extension and strengthening. Accordingly, we are giving a lot of support to various verification agencies (IAEA, OPCW) and we have initiated a crucial programme on the physical protection of nuclear sites in Russia.

In the area of nonproliferation, the case of Iran will continue to get a lot of attention. As you know, Iran has committed itself in the Paris agreement of November 2004 to maintain an indefinite suspension of uranium enrichment. This was without doubt a positive step, but now we need to shore up this agreement. In mid-January, the EU resumed its negotiations on a Trade and Co-operation Agreement with Iran. We are ready to deepen our ties with Iran, economically and politically. But full co-operation by Iran with the IAEA and objective guarantees on the civilian nature of Iran’s nuclear activities are needed for this cooperation between the EU and Iran to continue.

Terrorism, described in the ESS as a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe, is another crucial area where we have worked hard to implement our vision. The EU has understood the challenge. We have been busy developing a comprehensive strategy. And almost one year after the atrocious terrorist attacks in Madrid, we can start to list some concrete achievements:

We have stepped up co-operation in fields ranging from intelligence sharing to law enforcement and the control of financial assets so that authorities are better able to find, detain and bring terror suspects to justice. Furthermore, we have the European Arrest Warrant while criminal codes across the 25 Member States are being aligned so that terrorism is prosecuted and punished in the same manner. The appointment of Gijs de Vries as EU counter-terrorism co-ordinator should help to improve co-ordination and visibility of EU actions in this field.

I want to make two more points regarding how we fight terrorism: we need to keep in mind that terrorism does not happen in a political vacuum. There is no cause which justifies terrorist acts, but equally there can be no excuse for ignoring the causes of terrorism. While we need to confront the terrorist threat systematically, we also need to tackle the underlying causes such as political alienation and radicalisation. After all, people are not born as terrorist, they become one. Therefore we should reflect on what factors drives people to commit atrocities and ask whether we can do something about that, or not.

Second, while fully committed to the fight against terrorism, it is equally our duty to protect human rights. This is a very deep European conviction. It is a matter of preserving our basic values. There is absolutely no trade-off between security and human rights protection.

The ESS rightly highlighted regional conflicts as one of the 'old threats' that have not gone away. We all know that frozen conflicts threaten regional stability. They destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructures; they threaten minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights. And they are often interconnected with the so-called new threats such as terrorism, state failure and WMD proliferation. Sometimes, the most practical way of tackling new threats will be to deal with the older, underlying regional conflict. And that is precisely what we have been doing.

Perhaps the most salient example of this nexus of 'old' and 'new' threats is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Let me say two words about the new political situation. With the democratic elections in Palestine, which gave a strong mandate to President Mahmud Abbas and the arrival of a new Israeli government, we have a great opportunity to revive the long-stalled peace process.

Less than two weeks ago I was in the region, witnessing the elections and discussing the way ahead with all the relevant parties. I am more convinced than ever that we have to move as quickly as possible to a resumption of the political process, leading to the creation of a viable, democratic and sovereign Palestinian state, living in peace with Israel. And we as EU have a responsibility to do all we can use this opening to maximum effect.

Both sides know full well what they have to do to resume the road to peace: the roadmap sets out the respective steps in clear detail. Neither side can expect or demand that the other side moves first: both have to act in parallel. The great risk is that by slowing down the calendar, extremists in both camps will prevail and this window of opportunity, so scarce in the troubled Middle East, will close again.

### *From theory to practice*

Ladies and gentlemen, there was a time when the EU's foreign policy was criticised for being all talk and no action. And some people still feel today that we put too much emphasis on producing papers or creating structures in Brussels. I disagree because probably the biggest change in the past two years is that the EU is taking on important

operational tasks: in the Balkans, the Southern Caucasus, Africa and elsewhere. As the Security Strategy suggested: Europe needs to be more active and capable – and that is exactly what we have become.

Of all the missions that the EU is currently undertaking, operation Althea in Bosnia stands out. EUFOR is a large mission, consisting of about 7,000 Euro soldiers from 22 EU member countries and 11 other non-member states, including Canada, Chile, Turkey and Morocco.

In addition, we are making good progress in an area where our underperformance has traditionally hindered our ability to be as effective as we should be, namely military capabilities. Within the framework of the EU Rapid Reaction Force, the first of the planned 13 battle groups have been created. Last year, we also set up the European Defence Agency while civilian-military cooperation was brought to a new operational level through the creation of a civilian-military cell. And after the tragic events in Asia – which brought a total death toll more than 225,000 including than 9,000 Europeans – it also clear that we need to accelerate our work in the area of disaster relief, civil protection and, where we can add value, civilian crisis management.

### *Some future challenges*

Towards the end, the Security Strategy re-stated an old truth, namely that there are few if any problems we can deal with on our own. We clearly need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral organisations and through partnerships with key actors. Take the UN which is a powerful source and expression of multilateralism. Of course, the UN has its share of shortcomings. But it remains the cornerstone of the international system and the only universal international organisation we have.

The report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change is the most authoritative political and intellectual case for a new consensus on collective security. It has produced a raft of sensible measures to streamline UN procedures and programmes, making them more effective and relevant. No sensible person could argue that a rejuvenation of the UN is not possible or necessary. I want to salute the determination of Kofi Annan to lead this reform process and I am sure that as Europeans we want to give him all the necessary practical support.

When it comes to forging partnerships with key states, no task is more urgent than the need to revive the spirit of the Transatlantic cooperation. We must talk less of inevitable clashes in worldviews and put more emphasis on practical co-operation. We should re-learn the earlier habit of mutual compromise. When President Bush comes to visit the EU next month – the first US President ever to do so – we Europeans have a chance to show that we are ready to engage on wide range of issues and that we can deliver tangible added value. At the same time, we want the US-European relationship to become a more equal partnership in which the EU-US track, alongside NATO and the bilateral relations, is gaining in weight.

Third, we should enhance our economic, political and cultural cooperation with other main partners: with Russia especially – where we need predictability and co-operation; while they need respect and sustained economic help – but also with Japan and Canada.

But when we look around who the EU should work with, we should be fully conscious that there are new actors emerging on the global political stage: China, India, Brazil, and South Africa, offering us attractive new opportunities for co-operation. The world is changing rapidly. In less than 40 years, Chinese GDP is set to overtake US GDP; and the collective economic power of the what investment bankers call the ‘BRICS’ – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – will overtake that of the entire G-7.

We should think about what this rise of new centres of power means for global governance. We have a shared view on the need for a balanced international system – in both economic and political terms. And as the National Intelligence Council of the CIA recently concluded: in 2020 globalisation will have a less American ‘face’. But this could also herald a new era where future line ups in UN Security Council will not be, mainly, along ideological lines (or as some have misleadingly called it: ‘the West vs the Rest’) but also in interest terms. To manage such new sources of conflict, we will need to strengthen the rules-based system – and give new centres of power a stake in its success, in our mutual self-interest.

Let me conclude by referring to Ukraine, where I was last Friday. The momentous changes that have taken place there recently offer proof that the idea of common European standards and values is not an empty slogan but a reality. The idea that there are key European standards for the running of elections, and the magnetic power of the EU, played a hugely important role in the peaceful and democratic outcome of the crisis. We now have a new political leadership in Ukraine and a great opportunity for a deeper and more intensive EU-Ukraine relationship.

Ladies and gentlemen, we have made good progress in shaping an effective EU foreign policy. But clearly, much more work remains to be done. I know that you at the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung share our ambition for a more active, a more capable and a more united Europe. And I want to thank you for the enormous work that you have been doing in this area.

Thank you very much.



# External Relations Council

**Brussels, 31 January 2005**

Three electoral events – the election in November 2004 of the Ukrainian President Victor Yushchenko, of the Iraqi National Assembly on 30 January 2005, and of several parliamentary candidates, among them Yasser Arafat's successor, in the Palestinian elections – featured massive voter turnout at the ballot boxes. The Council of the European Union welcomed these three significant steps forward for democracy.

(...)

## **MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. The Council welcomes the holding of the Palestinian presidential elections and their free and fair nature. It voices its respect for the responsibility and democratic maturity shown by the Palestinian people. It expresses its appreciation to Israel for the measures taken to facilitate the electoral process. It presents its warmest congratulations to President Mahmoud Abbas and undertakes to work with him and his Prime Minister towards the goal of realizing legitimate Palestinian aspirations through the implementation of the road map as a matter of urgency. In this connection, the Council will develop the short-term action plan adopted by the European Council last November. The London meeting, which will take place on 1 March, will offer the international community an opportunity to support the efforts of the Palestinian President.

2. The Council is willing to support and encourage the efforts of the two parties to relaunch political contacts at all levels. To that end, the Council would urge all parties concerned to refrain from any act which would compromise the negotiations leading to a solution, by means of the process defined in the road map, based on the co-existence of the two States and leading to the creation of an independent, democratic and viable Palestinian State living alongside Israel and its other neighbours in peace and security.

3. The Council condemns all acts of terrorism and violence. Every effort must be made to seize the opportunity offered by the new political context. The two parties and the international community must seize the chance to give renewed impetus to the Peace Process by relaunching the road map. The Council stresses the importance it attaches to

current efforts to ensure a halt to violence. It would ask both parties to cooperate to that end. The Council calls upon the Israeli Government to take steps to alleviate the suffering and improve the living conditions of the Palestinians, including questions of freedom of movement.

4. The Council reaffirms that the European Union, in cooperation with the other members of the Quartet and Egypt, will support the implementation of withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and certain areas of the North of the West Bank as a first stage in the overall process, in accordance with the conditions defined by the European Council in March 2004.

5. The Council recalls that an overall peace settlement must also include Syria and Lebanon. It further recalls the importance of implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004).<sup>9</sup>

## **IRAQ – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

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The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘1. The Council very much welcomes the holding of the Iraqi national elections, in which the great majority of electors voted. The level of participation in the elections, the first for more than fifty years, reflects the deep attachment of the Iraqi people to democracy and the rule of law. The Council pays tribute to the Iraqis, who have shown courage, enthusiasm and determination in taking part in the elections despite a difficult security situation. The elections are an important and successful stage in the process of democratic transition in Iraq. They represent the first steps taken by the Iraqi people on the road to democracy, freedom and peace, which will continue well beyond the transition period. The European Union reaffirms its commitment to support for the Iraqi people in this aim and stresses the importance of achieving maximum inclusiveness in this process.

2. The Council accordingly welcomes the endeavours of the Iraqi Independent Electoral Commission, its Iraqi staff, the local observers, the Iraqi interim government and the United Nations, who enabled the elections to be held within the time-limit laid down by Resolution 1546 of the UN Security Council, and notes the support given by the international community, including the European Union. The Council notes the importance of the continuing support of the European Union in the constitutional process and in the elections planned for December 2005. The Council reiterates the importance of full involvement of all sections of Iraqi society in that constitutional process.

3. The Council reaffirms its aim of a safe, stable, unified, prosperous and democratic Iraq cooperating constructively with its neighbours and with the international community to meet common challenges. It reiterates the European Union's commitment to contributing to the economic, social and political reconstruction of Iraq and its support for UN activities in Iraq. In order to attain this goal, it emphasises the European Union's intention to continue implementation of the full European Union assistance programme as presented in Iraq on 5 November 2004. The Council re-states its determination to support the Iraqi authorities and people, in particular in reinforcing the judicial system and encouraging respect for the rule of law.

4. The Council attaches the greatest importance to the continuing implementation of the next stages laid down by Resolution 1546, in particular the formation of a transitional national assembly, whose tasks will include the formation of a transitional government for Iraq and the drafting of a permanent Constitution, resulting in the formation by 31 December 2005 at the latest of a government elected in conformity with that Constitution. The EU reaffirms its willingness to work with the Iraqi transitional government and the transitional National Assembly. If asked, it is ready to give its assistance with the constitutional process in accordance with Resolution 1546 and in full coordination with the UN.

5. The Council reiterates its firm condemnation of the terrorist attacks, intimidation and criminal violence against the Iraqi electors, election candidates and election workers; and of the hostage-takings and murders, which have been committed in Iraq. It expresses its solidarity and its compassion for the families and friends of those who were victims of such acts. The Council deplors the fact that the campaign of terrorist violence in Iraq is prolonging the suffering of the Iraqi people and hampering political progress and reconstruction in Iraq. It is pleased that all parties are committed, under Resolution 1546, to abiding by international law, including as regards the effective safeguarding and promotion of human rights.<sup>7</sup>

## **EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMIS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

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The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘1. Following its preliminary discussions at its extraordinary meeting on 7 January 2005 and in the light of initial lessons drawn from the recent events, the Council has adopted an action plan intended to encompass all the initiatives to be taken by the Union and its Member States.

2. The principal aim of this action plan is to better coordinate all the available resources at all levels and in all areas (analysis, planning of resources, operational action, prevention, etc.) to deal effectively with the consequences of such events now and in the future. The action plan assesses the short-term activities in the regions affected, especially as regards the mobilization of budgetary and financial resources and measures to bolster the action already being taken on the ground (humanitarian aid and military resources), as well as medium-term reconstruction efforts. The action plan also outlines possible action to deal with disasters of this type or a similar nature both inside and outside the Union, focusing on better use of existing instruments, the possibilities for developing an EU rapid response capability (a structure to plan, coordinate and mobilise resources), closer consular cooperation to assist European citizens) and, lastly, the potential role of projects such as the creation of a “European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps”.

3. On this occasion the Council heard a presentation by President Barroso outlining the work already under way at the Commission and the prospects, which it offers for stepping up Union action in the future. The Council welcomed this significant contribution to the activities in progress.

4. In order to ensure that this issue is properly monitored at political level, the Council will be kept abreast of developments and will reassess the situation at its meeting on 25 and 26 April 2005 in the presence of the Development Ministers.’

## **UKRAINE – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

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The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘Recent events in Ukraine demonstrate clearly that the Ukrainian people have chosen the democratic path for their country, based on respect for basic freedoms and on peace. This is credible proof that Ukraine’s European aspirations are based on common values shared by both European States and citizens.

The Council welcomes the election of the new President, Viktor Yushchenko, and is pleased at the extensive and ambitious political and economic reforms that he intends to carry out in Ukraine during his term of office, and also his undertaking to respect common European values and his desire to intensify and extend Ukraine’s cooperation with the European Union. A new, democratic government committed to reform opens the way to a strengthening of relations between the EU and Ukraine.

Against the backdrop of this far-reaching process, the Council would stress the EU’s full support for President Yushchenko and the Ukrainian people and would emphasise that the EU is ready to strengthen its relations with Ukraine, thereby taking maximum

advantage of the new opportunities offered by the Action Plan.

The Council, noting with satisfaction that the re-run of the second round of the presidential elections brought Ukraine more closely into line with international standards, is pleased that it will be able, at the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council meeting planned for 21 February, to launch the Action Plan negotiated jointly by the EU and Ukraine, thus opening the way to closer cooperation between the EU and Ukraine.

Against this background, the Council welcomes the letter from the High Representative and the Commission, setting out ten specific measures to intensify cooperation between the EU and Ukraine.

It will examine them with a view to preparing conclusions for the Council meeting on 21 February and the meeting of the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council on the same day.’

## **WESTERN BALKANS – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

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The Council adopted the following conclusions<sup>1</sup>:

‘The Council urged the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina decisively to implement all the reforms needed for the opening of negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU.

The Council resolutely supports the measures, which were taken on 16 December 2004 by the High Representative and EU Special Representative, Lord Ashdown, and backed up by effective action by EUFOR/ALTHEA. These targeted measures were intended to help ensure that Bosnia and Herzegovina cooperates fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). To that end, the Council has decided to extend the measures to prevent the entry into or transit through EU territory of persons supporting ICTY-indictees to include 9 persons also targeted by the measures taken by HR/EUSR Ashdown.

The Council recalled that full cooperation with the ICTY, in particular by the Republika Srpska, was an essential requirement for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s progress towards the EU, to which the EU remains committed. The Council therefore welcomed the voluntary surrender to and transfer by the Republika Srpska authorities of indictee Todovic as an important first step in the process of arresting and transferring all indicted persons who continue to evade international justice.

Recalling its conclusions of October 2004, the Council reaffirmed the need for the region to intensify its efforts to bring before the ICTY Mr Karadzic, Mr Mladic and Mr Gotovina, and all other indictees at large. Full and unconditional cooperation with the ICTY remains an essential requirement for further movement towards the EU.’

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1. In the context of its General Affairs meeting, the Council also adopted decisions on restrictive measures against certain persons in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and in support of the implementation of the mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

## SUDAN/DARFUR

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The Council adopted the following declaration<sup>2</sup>:

‘The Council of the EU is deeply concerned at the reports from African Union observers that several villages in Darfur were bombed by the Sudanese Air Force between 13 and 26 January 2005. The Council utterly condemns these attacks, in which more than a hundred civilians died including large numbers of women and children. These are the most recent and worst attacks to date in a series of violations of the N’ djamena ceasefire. They are a breach of the undertakings repeatedly given by the Sudanese Government and of the obligations imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1556.

The Council expects the Sudanese authorities to cooperate fully in the inquiry into these attacks to be conducted by the African Union and to make an example of all those responsible for what has happened. The Council would repeat that the progress of relations between the EU and Sudan will depend on effective implementation of the undertakings given by the Sudanese Government.

The Council again calls upon all parties to fulfil each and every one of the undertakings they gave in the context of the N’ djamena ceasefire and the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions.’

(...)

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2. In the context of its General Affairs meeting, the Council also noted the annual review of the EU’s common position on the imposition of an arms embargo on Sudan.

## ALTHEA – Agreement with Morocco

**Brussels, 1 February 2005**

On 1 February 2005, Javier Solana signed an agreement with the Moroccan ambassador, Menovar Alem, on Morocco's participation in Operation Althea in Bosnia Herzegovina. Morocco, which has already participated in SFOR, is the only North African country to be involved in this operation, with 130 soldiers. It is also the first EU military operation in which Morocco has participated.

(...)

*On 25 November, the EU Council adopted the decision to launch Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). This decision follows the unanimous adoption on 22 November of UN Security Council Resolution 1575 and enabled the EU to launch Operation Althea on 2 December. NATO decided to conclude its SFOR operation by the end of 2004.*

*Operation Althea is the largest in size ever launched by the EU, with 7,000 troops from 22 EU Member States and 11 third countries. It adds in a significant way to the EU's political engagement, its assistance programmes and its ongoing police and monitoring missions with a view to helping BiH make further progress towards European integration in the context of the Stabilisation and Association Process.*

*The EU force (EUFOR) has the main peace stabilisation role under the military aspects of the Paris/Dayton General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH. The force also provides support, within means and capabilities, to the efforts of High Representative Paddy Ashdown and of the international community, in fields such as the fight against organised crime and the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement.*

*General Sir John Reith, Deputy SACEUR, has been appointed Operation Commander. Major-General David Leakey has been appointed EUFOR Force Commander.*

(...)

## External Relations Council

Brussels, 21 February 2005

(...)

### MIDDLE EAST

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The Council adopted the following conclusions:

#### *Attack carried out in Beirut*

‘The Council firmly condemns the despicable attack which cost the life of the former President of the Council of Ministers of Lebanon, Mr Rafic Hariri, and of at least fourteen other people.

The Council pays tribute to the work done by the former President of the Council of Ministers of Lebanon for his country and for the strengthening of relations between Lebanon and the EU, and wishes an international enquiry to be carried out immediately in order to shed light on the circumstances of this attack and those responsible for it.

In accordance with the conclusions of the European Council of 16 and 17 December 2004, the Council reiterates the importance of implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004).

The Council has agreed to remain vigilant so that the forthcoming parliamentary elections in Lebanon may be held in accordance with a free and fair electoral process, without any foreign interference or influence.’

#### Middle East Peace Process

‘1. The Council expresses its profound satisfaction with the outcome of the Sharm el Sheikh Summit on 8 February 2005. It congratulates Prime Minister Sharon and President Abbas on the courageous decisions which they took during that Summit. It appreciates the contributions from President Mubarak and King Abdallah. The Council welcomes the possibilities offered for taking full advantage of this opportunity for peace. The determination expressed by both parties to work together in a spirit of understanding and cooperation must continue so that the peace process may be relaunched

2. The Council expresses particular satisfaction regarding the commitment made by both parties to stop all acts of violence and to cease all military activity in parallel. It calls on all parties concerned to respect this agreement and asks the regional players and the international community to give their full support. The Council strongly encourages



Israelis and Palestinians to rapidly implement the Sharm el Sheik commitments and to continue on the path of dialogue and political negotiation.

3. The Council undertakes to support the parties in their efforts to continue to work towards progress in the peace process. The goal remains the coexistence of the two States through the creation of an independent, democratic and viable Palestinian State living alongside Israel and its other neighbours in peace and security. It reaffirms its attachment to the Road Map, adopted by Security Council Resolution 1515, which maps out the path towards achieving this goal. The role of the Quartet in the success of this process remains central. The Council looks forward to the visit of President Bush to Brussels on 22 February, which will provide an opportunity for reaffirming the common transatlantic agenda with regard to achieving a fair, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

4. The Council continues to support Israel's withdrawal from Gaza and from certain parts of the northern West Bank as an initial stage in this overall process. It hails the decision taken in this connection by the Israeli Government on 20 February 2005. The withdrawal must be implemented in accordance with the conditions specified by the European Council of March 2004.

5. The Council welcomes the meeting in London on 1 March 2005 as an opportunity for the international community to support the current Palestinian efforts to consolidate the structures of the future Palestinian State.

6. The Council recalls that a fair, lasting and comprehensive peace must meet the legitimate aspirations of both the Israeli and Palestinian people and encompass Lebanon and Syria.

7. The Council urges all sides in the region to immediately implement policies conducive to dialogue and negotiation. The EU's relationship with those who take steps to the contrary will inevitably be affected by such behaviour.<sup>7</sup>

## **IRAQ**

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The Council reached political agreement on a draft joint action on an Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy, EUJUST LEX, and adopted the following conclusions:

‘1. The Council congratulates the Iraqi people on the elections held on 30 January, which reflect the attachment of the Iraqi people to the political process under way, to

democratic principles and to the rule of law. The Council takes note of the results announced on 13 February by the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI), which established that the elections had taken place in accordance with international standards. It also congratulates the democratically elected representatives of the Iraqi people. The Council reaffirms its support for the work of the IECI and the UN with a view to the constitutional referendum and elections in December 2005 and commends the willingness of the European Commission to provide financial and technical support in preparing these events. It reaffirms its commitment to support the Iraqi people and stresses the importance of achieving maximum inclusiveness in this process. It reiterates its willingness to work with the transitional National Assembly and the elected Iraqi transitional government.

2. The Council reaffirms its objective of a safe, stable, unified, prosperous and democratic Iraq that upholds human rights and cooperates constructively with its neighbours and with the international community. In order to attain this goal, it emphasises the European Union's willingness to continue implementation of the full assistance programme as presented to Iraq on 5 November 2004.

3. The Council reaffirms the importance it attaches to the continuing implementation of the next stages laid down by Resolution 1546, and in particular to the formation of a transitional National Assembly, whose tasks will include the formation of a transitional government for Iraq and the drafting of a lasting Constitution, resulting in the formation by 31 December 2005 at the latest of a government established in conformity with that Constitution. The Council welcomes the intention of the Commission and the Member States, if asked by the Iraqis, to provide support for the constitutional process in accordance with Resolution 1546 and in full coordination with the UN. It supports and encourages the Iraqi authorities in pursuing the full involvement of all sections of Iraqi society in the constitutional process and in promoting genuine national dialogue.

4. The Council wishes as of now to express its willingness to set up with the transitional government a political dialogue on areas of mutual interest. For this purpose, contacts will be developed between the European Union and Iraq, including at ministerial level. Depending on political developments in Iraq, a visit by the Troika to the elected transitional government may help deepen relations between the EU and Iraq with a view to establishing regular political dialogue.

5. The Council reiterates the European Union's commitment to contribute to the economic, social and political reconstruction of Iraq and its support for the UN's activities, and refers to the contribution of some EUR 320 million that the Community has already made to humanitarian aid, reconstruction and preparation for the elections on 30 January 2005. It reaffirms its commitment to assisting Iraq through a further

Community budget contribution of EUR 200 million for 2005, intended inter alia for the restoration of essential public services – education and health –, boosting employment, and support for the political process, civil society and human rights.

6. The Council notes the willingness of the Commission and the Member States to contribute to capacity-building of the Iraqi ministries and to support for the development of these institutions in a number of sectors, especially in the fields of trade and energy. It calls on the Commission to promote coordination of these European efforts at an initial stage through exchanges of information.

7. The Council has decided to launch an Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq, EUJUST LEX, which should be operational as soon as possible. The EU started planning the operation following consultations with the Iraqi interim authorities and on the basis of the report by the team of experts. The Mission falls under the scope of the ESDP. It will consist of integrated training in the fields of management and criminal investigation, to be given to a representative group of senior officials and executive staff, mainly from the judicial, police and prison sectors. The Council agreed that training activities would take place in the EU or in the region and that the Mission should have a liaison office in Baghdad. Depending on developments in the security conditions in Iraq and on the availability of appropriate infrastructure, the Council will be called upon to examine the possibility of training within Iraq and, if necessary, will amend the relevant joint action accordingly. The arrangements for the Mission, which is to complement international efforts under way, will be determined in consultation with the Iraqi authorities.

8. The Council recalls that Iraq is a beneficiary of the EU's Generalised System of Preferences. It welcomes the contacts already made by the Commission with the Iraqi authorities and the steps taken by the Commission to develop a bilateral trade assistance programme, as well as its readiness to pursue and intensify contacts with the Iraqi authorities, including in terms of technical expertise, in order to enable Iraq to benefit effectively from these trade preferences.

9. The Council takes note of the substantial contributions made by the Member States to the financing of the UN Protection Force in Iraq, i.e. the "middle ring" of their security arrangements, and reaffirms its willingness to contribute to the funding of the integrated security structure of the UN in Iraq ("inner ring"), with a view to facilitating the UN's role in promoting the political process and reconstruction in Iraq.

10. The Council reaffirms its intention to explore with Iraq the possibilities of an agreement with the European Union which takes account of the parties' interest in establishing a partnership and in promoting political and trade cooperation between each other. The Council welcomes the Commission's intention to continue providing support to

the Iraqi administration, including through targeted assistance programmes designed to create the necessary conditions for such an agreement.

11. In accordance with the Commission communication entitled “The European Union and Iraq – A Framework for Engagement”, the Council calls on the Commission to open a delegation in Iraq as soon as security conditions allow.

12. The Council reiterates its firmest condemnation of the terrorist acts, murders and hostage-takings which have been committed in Iraq. The two European journalists, the other European hostage and all the other hostages must be released at once.’

## **WESTERN BALKANS**

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The Council adopted the following conclusions:

### **‘Serbia and Montenegro / Kosovo**

The Council considered the situation in Kosovo, in the presence of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Kosovo. It offered Mr. Jessen-Petersen its full support for his work to implement Security Council Resolution 1244.

The Council took note of the public commitment made by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) to the implementation of the reforms needed to guarantee that the standards laid down by the United Nations are fully complied with. It urged the PISG to commit themselves unreservedly to the establishment of a multi-ethnic Kosovo. The Council called on the PISG to make full use of the powers transferred to them by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to guarantee that the standards are fully complied with. It encouraged UNMIK to examine the possibility of a further transfer of powers.

Mid-2005 will provide a first opportunity to carry out a full evaluation of progress made when it comes to effective compliance with the standards laid down by the United Nations.

Progress towards a process to determine the future status of Kosovo in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 will depend on the positive outcome of that evaluation.

The Council recalled that the European Union had been closely involved in this process, without prejudice to the United Nations’ role in determining the future status of Kosovo. The Thessaloniki summit clearly affirmed that the Western Balkans – including Kosovo, without prejudging its future status – were destined to join the European Union. The Union will therefore have an important role to play when the status of

Kosovo is being examined, to ensure that it is fully compatible with the process of European integration.

The Council also emphasised that Kosovo would not return to the situation before 1999. Its future can only be conceived in the form of a multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo which ensures effective protection for minorities, preserves the cultural and religious heritage of all its communities, and respects the right of refugees and displaced persons to return, contributing to the stability of the region and adhering to the values and standards of the EU.

The Council emphasised the importance which it attached to a substantial dialogue being established between the communities in Kosovo and between the authorities in Belgrade and Pristina. It called on all the communities to commit themselves actively to the important ongoing process to reform the local authorities and to establish a decentralised system which contributes to guaranteeing the protection of minorities, to ensure the best living conditions for the whole population and to set up a sustainable administration in Kosovo. In particular, the Council encouraged the Serbs in Kosovo to take their place in the PISG. It declared itself encouraged by the fact that the authorities in Belgrade had informed the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative of their readiness to resume direct dialogue with Pristina.

The Council stressed that full and unconditional cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is an international obligation and remains an essential requirement for further movement towards the European Union.

The Council recalled that the medium and long-term stability of Kosovo also depended on its economic development, to which the entire Kosovan population aspired. It reaffirmed the EU's support for the efforts made by UNMIK and the PISG in this respect.

The Council invited the SG/HR and the Commission, in close cooperation with the Presidency, to examine with the United Nations and other relevant players what might be the future contribution of the European Union to the efforts of the international community in Kosovo to implement Resolution 1244, how the EU might assist in the overall evaluation of the implementation of the standards, and what it might contribute to the later stages of the process, and to report back to it on this.

## **Serbia and Montenegro**

The Council welcomed the voluntary surrender and transfer by the Serb authorities of the indictee Lazarevic to the Hague, as an important step in the process of arresting and transferring all indicted persons who continue to evade international justice.

## Croatia

The Council welcomed the presentation by the Commission of its proposal for a negotiating framework with Croatia. It invited its competent bodies to examine the proposal with a view to reaching agreement on the framework in view of the opening of the accession negotiations on 17 March 2005 provided Croatia cooperates fully with the ICTY – as decided by the European Council on 16 and 17 December 2004.

Full and unconditional cooperation by the countries of the Western Balkans with the ICTY remains an essential requirement for their continuing movement towards the EU. The Council urged Croatia to take the necessary steps for full cooperation with the ICTY and reiterated that the last remaining indictee must be located and transferred to the Hague as soon as possible.’

(...)

## UKRAINE

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The Council adopted the following conclusions:

- ‘1. The Council welcomed the appointment of the new Government in Ukraine, and expressed support for its ambitious programme of political and economic reforms. A new commitment to democracy and reforms opens new prospects for Ukraine and for EU-Ukraine relations. The EU acknowledges Ukraine’s European aspirations and welcomes Ukraine’s European choice.
  
2. The Council underlined the EU’s commitment to support Ukraine at this crucial moment. It looked forward to the final endorsement of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan at the Cooperation Council and for work on its implementation to begin immediately. The Council underlined that the EU is prepared to move quickly ahead with all aspects of the Action Plan. While the pace of progress in the ENP Action Plan will depend on the quality of efforts undertaken by the Ukrainian authorities, the EU is strongly committed to responding in a timely manner on its side. The Council agreed to consider a first review of the implementation of the Action Plan already in the beginning of 2006, provided that significant progress has been made.
  
3. In order to further strengthen and enrich the Action Plan, the Council agreed on the following measures in support of a democratic and reform-oriented Ukraine:
  - ▶ To initiate early consultations on an enhanced agreement between EU and Ukraine, to replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement at the end of its initial ten-year period, as soon as the political priorities of the ENP Action Plan have been addressed.

- ▶ To explore possibilities for closer cooperation in the area of foreign and security policy, including European Security and Defence Policy, and to address in particular issues of regional stability and enhanced cooperation in both crisis management and non-proliferation. The EU is ready to intensify cooperation with Ukraine on the settlement process to solve the Transnistrian conflict in Moldova. Ukraine should be invited, on a case by case basis, to align itself with EU positions on regional and international issues.
- ▶ To deepen trade and economic relations between EU and Ukraine. Work on agreements for steel and textile products for 2005 will be intensified. The review of the existing feasibility study on establishing a Free Trade Area between Ukraine and the EU will be accelerated with a view to enable an early start of negotiations once Ukraine has joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
- ▶ To lend further support to Ukraine's WTO accession and to offer Ukraine continued assistance in meeting the necessary requirements.
- ▶ To grant 'Market Economy Status' to Ukraine, as soon as the limited remaining issues have been satisfactorily resolved. The EU will intensify contacts with Ukraine in order to resolve these issues.
- ▶ To study, with a view to the negotiations to be held between the EU and Ukraine before the next EU-Ukraine Summit options concerning the question of how, and in what framework, the granting of visas could be facilitated whilst complying rigorously with security requirements. In this context, progress in the ongoing negotiations on an EC-Ukraine readmission agreement will remain essential. The EU will continue to assist Ukraine in implementing the JHA Action Plan and the scoreboard.
- ▶ To enhance cooperation in key sectors, including energy, transport, environment and health as well as in private sector development. Preparations will be made for a high-level dialogue on energy and related issues and the environmental dialogue will be upgraded. Ukraine will be treated as a priority country in the ongoing preparations for the extension of Trans-European Networks.
- ▶ To step up support to the process of legislative approximation, including technical assistance and twinning to meet EU norms and standards and targeted advice and support legislative approximation through a mechanism such as TAIEX. Further efforts will be made to conclude bilateral agreements on the co-ordination of social security.
- ▶ To welcome and increase people-to-people contacts, including in the key areas of youth and education, through measures such as priority access to the Erasmus Mundus programme, reinforced participation in the Tempus programme, support to Ukraine's efforts to work towards convergence in higher education by participating in the Bologna process, considering the possibility of offering internships for young professionals, and continued support to independent media. Efforts in the field of democracy and rule of law will be an immediate imperative and further targeted assistance including support for the strengthening of civil society, is already envisaged.

- ▶ To maximise access to funding from the European Investment Bank (EIB). After final endorsement of the ENP Action Plan, up to 250 million of EIB lending could be made available to Ukraine.
- ▶ To provide increased assistance to Ukraine through the relevant instruments in order to help Ukraine to pursue the reform process.

4. Ukraine should have a result-oriented approach for which the Action Plan is an essential tool. As Ukraine makes genuine progress in carrying out internal reforms and adopting European standards, relations between the EU and Ukraine will become deeper and stronger.’

(...)



## Javier Solana – 'A partnership for action'

Geneva, 21 February 2005

War in Iraq, the Kyoto Protocol, the arms embargo on China – there has been no shortage of transatlantic disagreements. However both in Europe and in the United States there is a real will to renew links so as to be able to promote peace and democracy in the world together. Javier Solana stressed that the visit of President Bush on 22 February might be an opportunity to 'relaunch an action-oriented transatlantic partnership'.

I am looking forward to the visit of President Bush to the European Union next Tuesday. The transatlantic tone is now refreshingly positive. And in diplomacy, tone matters. His visit signals two things: that he wants to invest in our partnership and that the US recognises the value of engaging Europe collectively through the European Union. For our part, we are determined to seize this invitation to partnership and demonstrate that a strong and united Europe is the most capable, likeminded partner the US can find. The US-European partnership remains the world's most important force for peace and security around the world. We will never abolish all our differences. But these are mostly over tactics; on the objectives we agree. As in the past, we need trust and mutual compromise. But in future, we should talk less about each other and more to each other – especially about working together on the many pressing problems in the rest of the world.

Good work is underway. Joint action to fight international terrorism remains one of the unsung transatlantic success stories. Our intensive co-operation has led to agreements on extradition and mutual legal assistance, the Europol-US agreements, and the establishment of a consultation mechanism on border security and transports. Priority areas for future cooperation include the financing of terrorism, recruitment and assistance to third countries. More visibly, Europeans and Americans have worked together effectively on the Afghan and Iraqi elections. On Iraq, we Europeans must and will deepen our engagement collectively, i.e. through the EU. The best and indeed only option is to continue the process set out in UN Security Council resolution 1546. Together with the US we want to support the next steps in the Iraqi political process: drafting a constitution and building effective institutions. For example, the EU and the member-states will be training a large number of senior Iraqi judges, police and other officials active in the security field. Transatlantic co-operation also helped the Ukrainian people find a peaceful and democratic outcome to their recent political crisis. There was no transatlantic masterplan. But we both worked to the same outcome – genuinely fair elections – and we both contributed substantially.

Co-operation on the Balkans illustrates this further. In the context of a joint strategy, the European Union is now taking the lead, but with constant US support. The successful transition last December from Nato-led SFOR operation to EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina was testament to this. With difficult Balkan issues coming up this year, especially regarding Serbia-Montenegro- Kosovo, we will need to maintain this spirit of effective partnership.

So the conclusion is clear: when the US and Europe pull in the same direction, we can achieve great results. The task ahead is to find common ground on as many global challenges as possible, including the difficult ones. Let me mention two additional priority issues where common EU-US action is called for.

The first is Iran. We both want an Iran that is democratic and responsible and that can be integrated as a responsible player into the international community. We agree that a nuclear-armed Iran is not acceptable. We Europeans think the best chance of achieving these goals is through negotiations, political engagement and the liberalising effects of the market. But we are not naïve. We have stated clearly that we need objective guarantees on the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear ambitions.

The EU is strongly committed to seeking a diplomatic solution. Europe's diplomatic efforts have already made a small breakthrough: Iran has suspended its enrichment activities while negotiations continue to reach a broader solution. But the US has a role to play too. A concerted US-EU approach offers the best hope of consolidating the progress we have made with Iran and turn it into a genuine success.

The second top priority is the Middle East Peace Process. Both the EU and the US are determined to maximise the current political opening. The watchwords of the Palestinian Presidential elections were dignity and hope. We also have a new Israeli government. And a formal ceasefire is now in place. The best chance for peace in years deserves a maximum effort to see it through to success. Both Israelis and Palestinians are taking brave decisions, and both peoples are yearning for peace.

But many difficulties still remain. Israel's disengagement from Gaza will be a huge challenge. Everyone – Israelis, Palestinians, Europeans, Americans and the Arab neighbours – has a shared interest in making Gaza disengagement a success. This means hard work by all of us on security and law and order. But there must be an equal effort on how we can improve the catastrophic economic and social situation across the Palestinian territories. We therefore need rapid progress on jobs, social services and rebuilding of infrastructure.

Moreover, for the Gaza disengagement plan to work, we need to return to the implementation of the Road Map. We must give a political perspective to both sides. To Israel: peace, security and recognition by all countries in the region; to the Palestinians a viable, independent State, ending the occupation that began in 1967.

Of course the transatlantic agenda is much wider: Afghanistan, China, Russia, global warming, UN reform, the review of the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, the Doha Development Round: all these issues call for common EU-US approaches. The good

news is that there is a new and better tone to transatlantic relations. Both sides are listening hard to each other. Let's build on that by acting together on the broad security agenda we face. The visit of President Bush provides a great opportunity to re-launch an action-oriented transatlantic partnership.

*(EU Council website)*

## European Defence Agency

Brussels, 2 March 2005

At its third meeting, the Steering Board of the European Defence Agency lauded the Commission's Green Paper on Defence Procurement initiative and requested that the Agency continue to support this work. A programme of work on European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM) issues was also approved.

### EDA INPUT TO THE COMMISSION'S CONSULTATION PROCESS ON THE GREEN PAPER

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EDA welcomes the efforts of the Commission through their Green Paper on Defence Procurement. It identifies a number of important reasons for the creation of a European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM). In the more recent words of Commissioner Verheugen, 'We must also accept that in the long run, competitiveness cannot be served by protectionism. What was true in so many other sectors of the economy, is also true of the European defence industry whose long-term survival will not be served by systematic recourse Article 296 of the EC Treaty: a consolidation and restructuring both on the supply and on the demand side are necessary in Europe'.

The Green Paper also illustrates the limits of the existing legal framework. The Green Paper suggests two community instruments: an interpretative Communication and a Directive. They should not be considered mutually exclusive but rather deemed useful in a wider context of a sequence of workstrands towards a competitive EDEM.

- ▶ An interpretative Communication might help clarify in what circumstances the Commission would consider Article 296 to be legitimately invoked, and thereby assist MS in their judgements in this regard, without prejudice to their prerogatives under the Treaty, in particular in relation to the protection of the essential interests of their security. In the case that the Commission pursue such a Communication, the EDA would stand ready to offer its advice, working in partnership with the Commission as directed by the Steering Board in November 2004.
- ▶ A Directive would, as a binding Community instrument, ensure transparency, non-discrimination and equal treatment. The suggestion of such an instrument acknowledges in itself the specific elements of the defence market. A Directive, as a legal instrument, requires thorough knowledge about the nature of the market, including the segment where article 296 applies. According to EDA's judgement, this knowledge does currently not exist due to the lack of transparency in the practices of MS. A Directive should, therefore, be seen as a longer term solution to establish a level playing field for fair competition in areas where Article 296 does not apply. Nevertheless,

this should not prevent work on a Directive being initiated shortly.

- ▶ Meanwhile, the EDA will explore the possibilities for a voluntary regime covering procurements where Article 296 applies. Along this way, practical and gradual progress towards a more competitive EDEM may already be made. This approach may also include steps towards strengthening the market position of SMEs as particularly innovative parts of defence industry. This intergovernmental work might well pave the way for the above-mentioned longer-term solution provided by a Directive.

EDA stands ready to continue working in partnership with the Commission on common efforts to support the creation of an internationally competitive EDEM, including the strengthening of a European DTIB.

## **EDA WORK ON THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE EQUIPMENT MARKET (EDEM)**

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1. At its meeting of 2 March 2005, the Steering Board in NADs formation has decided as follows (bearing in mind Agency's efforts to promote consolidation of the demand side of the EDEM by harmonisation of requirements and fostering collaborations).
2. The Agency should pursue a programme of work on EDEM issues, drawing as appropriate on LoI work, as follows:
  - a) scope the feasibility and modalities for collecting data on participating Member States (pMS) invocation (and non-invocation) of Article 296 in their defence procurements;
  - b) identify the features required by an intergovernmental regime for encouraging competition in defence procurement in the Article 296 area on a fair and transparent basis, and outline the processes/procedures that would need to be adopted. (Necessary special provisions and exceptions required for reasons of national security would also be identified);
  - c) consider the scope for limited introduction of such a regime, on a pilot basis;
  - d) develop proposals for providing assurance that companies competing under such a regime did not enjoy some unfair advantage or 'helping hand';
  - e) develop proposals for achievement of mutual confidence on security of supply between pMS through concrete actions and measures, thereby permitting mutual dependencies;
  - f) develop proposals for achievement of mutual confidence on safeguarding of information between pMS;
  - g) collect data on use of off-set by pMS and underlying policies, and assess its impact on competition, and on defence industrial restructuring;
  - h) develop proposals on how to promote EDEM-wide awareness of specialist capa-

bilities which pMS believe should be recognised and developed within a European DTIB, including in particular small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).

3. A plan for action on 2 a) should be presented to the May Steering Board. The rest of the work programme should be taken forward so as to provide, before the end of 2005, the basis for a Steering Board decision on whether or not to proceed with a voluntary, non-binding intergovernmental regime.
4. The EDA should also provide the Commission with the maximum support possible as they pursue their work following their Green Paper.

## EUJUST LEX – Council Joint Action

Brussels, 7 March 2005

In the interests of reconstructing a stable and democratic Iraq in which human rights are respected, and which would be capable of building constructive relations with its neighbours, on 21 February 2005 the European Council gave its political agreement to launching EUJUST LEX, an integrated police, civilian administration and rule-of-law training mission. This mission must address the urgent needs of the Iraqi criminal justice system by providing training for high- and mid-level officials in senior management and criminal investigation. A document issued on 13 June 2005 including important data on the European programme of support to Iraq is attached as an annex.

### THE EUROPEAN UNION INTEGRATED RULE OF LAW MISSION FOR IRAQ

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#### THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 14, Article 25, third paragraph, Article 26 and Article 28 (3) thereof,

Whereas:

(1) The European Union is committed to a secure, stable, unified, prosperous and democratic Iraq that will make a positive contribution to the stability of the region. The EU supports the people of Iraq and the Iraqi Interim Government in their efforts towards the economic, social and political reconstruction of Iraq in the framework of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546 of 8 June 2004.

(2) The European Council on 5 November 2004 welcomed the Joint Fact Finding Mission for a possible integrated police, rule of law and civilian administration mission for Iraq and considered its report. The European Council recognised the importance of strengthening the criminal justice system, consistent with the respect for the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. It noted the wish of the Iraqi authorities for the EU to become more actively involved in Iraq and that strengthening the criminal justice sector would respond to Iraqi needs and priorities.

(3) The European Council agreed that the EU could usefully contribute to the reconstruction and the emergence of a stable, secure and democratic Iraq through an integrated mission, which could *inter alia* promote closer collaboration between the different

actors across the criminal justice system and strengthen the management capacity of senior and high-potential officials from the police, judiciary and penitentiary and improve skills and procedures in criminal investigation in full respect for the rule of law and human rights.

(4) As agreed by the European Council, by Joint Action 2004/909/CFSP<sup>(1)</sup> the Council decided to send an expert team to continue the dialogue with the Iraqi authorities, to start initial planning for a possible integrated police, rule of law and civilian administration mission to be launched after the elections, and in particular assess the urgent security needs for such a mission.

(5) The Council decided on 21 February 2005 to launch an integrated rule of law mission for Iraq, which would become operational as soon as possible, subject to an official invitation from the Iraqi authorities.

(6) The success of the mission will depend on an effective strategic and technical partnership with the Iraqis throughout the operation, in the framework of European Security and Defense Policy and in complementarity with the United Nations.

(7) The EU will use its dialogue with Iraq and its neighbours to encourage continuous regional engagement and support for improved security and for the political and reconstruction process in Iraq based on inclusiveness, democratic principles, respect for human rights and the rule of law, as well as support for security and cooperation in the region.

(8) EUJUST LEX will implement its mandate in the context of a situation posing a threat to law and order, the security and safety of individuals, and to the stability of Iraq and which could harm the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as set out in Article 11 of the Treaty.

(9) In conformity with the guidelines of the European Council meeting in Nice on 7 to 9 December 2000, this Joint Action should determine the role of the Secretary General/High Representative, hereinafter referred to as 'SG/HR', in accordance with Articles 18 and 26 of the Treaty.

(10) Article 14(1) of the Treaty calls for the indication of a financial reference amount for the whole period of implementation of the Joint Action. The indication of amounts to be financed by the Community budget illustrates the will of the legislative authority and is

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(1) Council Joint Action 2004/909/CFSP of 26 November 2004 on establishing an expert team with a view to a possible European Union integrated police, rule of law and civilian administration mission for Iraq (OJ L 381, 28.12.2004, p. 84).



subject to the availability of commitment appropriations during the respective budget year. EUJUST LEX will also receive contributions in kind from Member States,

## HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

### *Article 1*

#### **Mission**

1. The European Union hereby establishes an European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq, EUJUST LEX, comprising a planning phase beginning no later than 9 March 2005 and an operational phase beginning no later than 1 July 2005.
2. EUJUST LEX shall operate in accordance with the objectives and other provisions as contained in the mission statement set out in Article 2.

### *Article 2*

#### **Mission statement**

1. EUJUST LEX shall address the urgent needs in the Iraqi criminal justice system through providing training for high and mid level officials in senior management and criminal investigation. This training shall aim to improve the capacity, coordination and collaboration of the different components of the Iraqi criminal justice system.
2. EUJUST LEX shall promote closer collaboration between the different actors across the Iraqi criminal justice system and strengthen the management capacity of senior and highpotential officials primarily from the police, judiciary and penitentiary and improve skills and procedures in criminal investigation in full respect for the rule of law and human rights.
3. The training activities shall take place in the EU or in the region and EUJUST LEX shall have a liaison office in Baghdad.

Depending on developments in the security conditions in Iraq and on the availability of appropriate infrastructure, the Council shall examine the possibility of training within Iraq and, if necessary, shall amend this Joint Action accordingly.

4. An effective strategic and technical partnership with the Iraqi counterparts shall be developed throughout the mission, particularly in relation to the design of the curricula during the planning phase. Coordination will also be needed for the selection, vetting,

evaluation, follow-up and coordination of personnel attending the training with the aim of rapid appropriation by the Iraqis. There shall also be a need for close coordination during the planning and operational phases between EUJUST LEX and the Member States providing training. This shall include the involvement of the relevant Member States diplomatic missions in Iraq and liaison with those Member States with current experience in providing training relevant for the mission.

5. EUJUST LEX shall be secure, independent and distinct but shall be complementary and bring added value to ongoing international efforts, in particular of the United Nations, as well as develop synergies with ongoing Community and Member States efforts. In this context, EUJUST LEX shall liaise with Member States who presently conduct training projects.

### *Article 3*

#### **Structure**

EUJUST LEX shall, in principle, be structured as follows:

- (a) the Head of Mission;
- (b) a Coordinating Office in Brussels;
- (c) a Liaison Office in Baghdad;
- (d) Training Facilities and trainers provided by the Member States and coordinated by EUJUST LEX.

These elements shall be developed in the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and the Operation Plan (OPLAN).

### *Article 4*

#### **Head of Mission**

1. The Head of Mission shall assume the day-to-day management and coordination of EUJUST LEX activities and shall be responsible for staff and disciplinary matters.
2. The Head of Mission shall sign a contract with the Commission.

### *Article 5*

#### **Planning phase**

1. During the preparatory phase of the mission, a planning team shall be established and shall comprise the Head of Mission, who shall lead the planning team, and

the necessary staff to deal with functions ensuing from established needs of the mission.

2. A comprehensive risk assessment shall be carried out as a priority in the planning process and shall be updated as necessary.
3. The planning team shall draw up an OPLAN and develop all technical instruments necessary to execute the mission including the common curricula taking into account current training projects of Member States. The CONOPS and the OPLAN shall take into account the comprehensive risk assessment. The OPLAN shall contain the common EU curricula for the courses, which will be designed by the planning team in consultation with the Iraqis and Member States, including those providing training relevant for the mission. The Council shall approve the CONOPS and the OPLAN.
4. The planning team shall work in close coordination with relevant international actors, in particular the United Nations.

## *Article 6*

### **Staff**

1. The numbers and competence of EUJUST LEX staff shall be consistent with the mission statement set out in Article 2 and the structure set out in Article 3.
2. EUJUST LEX staff shall be seconded by EU Member States or institutions. Each Member State shall bear the costs related to EUJUST LEX staff seconded by it, including salaries, medical coverage, allowances other than per diems and travel expenses as defined in the financial statement.
3. International staff and local staff shall be recruited on a contractual basis by EUJUST LEX as required.
4. All staff shall remain under the authority of the appropriate EU Member State or institution and shall carry out their duties and act in the interest of the mission. Both during and after the mission, they shall exercise the greatest discretion with regard to all facts and information relating to the mission. The staff shall respect the security principles and minimum standards established by Council Decision 2001/264/EC of 19 March 2001 adopting the Council's security regulations<sup>(1)</sup>.

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(1) OJ L 101, 11.4.2001, p. 1. Decision amended by Decision 2004/194/EC (OJ L 63, 28.2.2004, p. 48).

## *Article 7*

### **Status of staff**

1. Where required, the status of EUJUST LEX staff, including where appropriate the privileges, immunities and further guarantees necessary for the completion and smooth functioning of EUJUST LEX shall be agreed in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 24 of the Treaty. The SG/HR, assisting the Presidency, may negotiate such an agreement on its behalf.
2. The EU Member State or institution having seconded a staff member shall be responsible for answering any claims linked to the secondment, from or concerning the staff member. The EU Member State or institution in question shall be responsible for bringing any action against the secondee.

## *Article 8*

### **Chain of command**

1. The structure of EUJUST LEX shall have a unified chain of command as a crisis management operation,
2. The Political and Security Committee (hereinafter referred to as 'PSC') shall provide the political control and strategic direction.
3. The Head of Mission shall lead the Mission and assume its coordination and day-to-day management.
4. The Head of Mission shall report to the SG/HR.
5. The SG/HR shall give guidance to the Head of Mission.

## *Article 9*

### **Political control and strategic direction**

1. The PSC shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council, the political control and strategic direction of the mission. The Council hereby authorises the PSC to take the relevant decisions in accordance with Article 25 of the Treaty. This authorisation shall include the powers to appoint, upon a proposal by the SG/HR, a Head of Mission, and to amend the CONOPS and the OPLAN and the chain of command. The powers of decision with respect to the objectives and termination of the operation shall remain vested in the Council, assisted by the SG/HR.

2. The PSC shall report to the Council at regular intervals.
3. The PSC shall receive reports by the Head of Mission regarding contributions to and the conduct of the mission, at regular intervals. The PSC may invite the Head of Mission to its meetings as appropriate.

## *Article 10*

### **Security**

1. The Head of Mission shall be responsible for the security of EUJUST LEX and shall, in consultation with the Security Office of the General Secretariat of the Council (hereinafter referred to as ‘GSC Security Office’), be responsible for ensuring compliance with minimum security requirements applicable to the mission.
2. For the elements of the mission which shall be carried out in Member States, the host Member State shall take all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure the security of the participants and the trainers on its territory.
3. For the Coordinating Office in Brussels, the necessary and appropriate measures shall be organised by the GSC Security Office in collaboration with the host Member State authorities.
4. Should the training take place in a third State, the EU, with the involvement of the Member States concerned, shall ask third States authorities to make the appropriate arrangements regarding the security of the participants and the trainers on its territory.
5. EUJUST LEX shall have a dedicated mission Security Officer reporting to the Head of Mission.
6. The Head of Mission shall consult with the PSC on security issues affecting the deployment of the Mission as directed by the SG/HR.
7. EUJUST LEX staff members shall undergo mandatory security training organised by the GSC Security Office and medical checks prior to any deployment or travel to Iraq.
8. Member States shall endeavour to provide EUJUST LEX, in particular the Liaison Office, secure accommodation, body armour and close protection within Iraq.

## *Article 11*

### **Financial arrangements**

1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the mission shall be EUR 10 000 000.
2. The expenditure financed by the amount stipulated in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the European Union with the exception that any pre-financing shall not remain the property of the Community. Should a part of the training be conducted in third States, nationals of third States shall be allowed to tender for contracts. In this case, goods and services procured for EUJUST LEX may also have their origin in third States.
3. Given the particular security situation in Iraq, services in Baghdad shall be provided through the existing agreements entered into by the United Kingdom with the companies listed in the Annex. The budget of EUJUST LEX shall cover these expenses up to a maximum of EUR 2 340 000. The United Kingdom shall, in consultation with the Head of Mission, report regularly with adequate information to the Council on these expenses.
4. The Head of Mission shall report fully to, and be supervised by, the Commission on the activities undertaken in the framework of his contract.
5. The financial arrangements shall respect the operational requirements of EUJUST LEX, including compatibility of equipment.
6. Expenditure shall be eligible as of the date of entry into force of this Joint Action.
7. The equipment and supplies for the Coordination Office in Brussels shall be purchased and rented on behalf of the EU.

## *Article 12*

### **Community action**

1. The Council notes the intention of the Commission to direct its action towards achieving the objectives of this Joint Action in all phases of the proposed operation, including in view of the elaboration by the Commission of potential follow-on actions to the European Security and Defense Policy operation under Community programs.
2. The Council also notes that coordination arrangements are required in Brussels as well as, as appropriate, in Baghdad.

### *Article 13*

#### **Release of classified information**

The SG/HR is authorised to release to the host State and the United Nations, as appropriate and in accordance with the operational needs of the mission, EU classified information and documents up to the level 'RESTREINT UE' generated for the purposes of the operation, in accordance with the Council's security regulations. Local arrangements shall be drawn up for this purpose.

### *Article 14*

#### **Entry into force**

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the date of its adoption

It shall expire on 30 June 2006.

### *Article 15*

#### **Publication**

This Joint Action shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Brussels, 7 March 2005.

*For the Council*

*The President*

J. Krecké

## ANNEXE – EU SUPPORT FOR IRAQ

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### *The EU working with Iraq*

The European Union is committed to a secure, stable, unified, prosperous and democratic Iraq that will make a positive contribution to the stability of the region. It supports the country in its efforts towards economic, social and political reconstruction in the framework of the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1546 of 8 June 2004.

The EU, together with the United States, will be co-hosting an **international conference** with Iraq at foreign minister level in Brussels on 22 June 2005 following a request from the new Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG). More than 80 countries and international organisations are expected to attend.

The aim of the conference is to provide a forum for the new ITG to present its priorities, vision and strategies for the transition period leading up to the next round of elections towards the end of the year. It is also an opportunity to mobilise international support for the ITG and its institutions.

The conference will be structured around three themes outlined in the UN Security Council Resolution 1546: political process; economic challenges and reconstruction; public order and rule of law.

### *The EU's contribution so far...*

The EU has been involved in almost all aspects of the effort to bring stability, democracy and prosperity to Iraq.

- ▶ **Military and police:** A number of EU Member States are participating in the Multi-National Force in Iraq. Some are conducting police and security personnel training operations outside Iraq.
- ▶ **Coordination and outreach:** The EU has worked with the other international actors in mobilising additional contributions to reconstruction and in coordinating international efforts to support Iraq. The EU hosted the first donors' conference in Madrid in October 2003 and promoted the establishment of the *International Reconstruction Facility for Iraq* (IRFFI) which has been crucial in generating international contributions for reconstruction of the country.
- ▶ **Funds pledged and delivered:** At the Madrid Conference the EU collectively pledged €1.2 billion. The European Community (EC) pledge amounted to €200 million for 2003-2004 for reconstruction and €100 million for humanitarian needs. It has since then deployed €320 million with a view to restoring key public services, boosting



employment and reducing poverty as well as strengthening governance, civil society and human rights. EC reconstruction assistance for 2003-2004 has primarily been channelled via the IRFFI, the multi-donor trust fund managed by the UN and the World Bank.

- Medium-term strategy:** The EU adopted a medium-term strategy for Iraq put forward by EU High Representative Solana and the European Commission in June 2004, based on the European Commission's communication *'The European Union and Iraq - a Framework for Engagement'*.
- Building ties with the new Iraq:** The EU has developed good relations with the Iraqi authorities, demonstrated by the participation of interim Prime Minister Allawi at the European Council in November 2004. On this occasion Member States endorsed a package of support including measures ranging from the perspective of an EU-Iraq agreement to continued reconstruction assistance.
- Trade and cooperation:** The EU supports Iraq's candidacy for WTO membership as part of the process of integrating Iraq into the region and the international community. As our political dialogue develops, a Trade and Co-operation Agreement could be the framework of future EU-Iraq relations.
- Electoral support:** The European Commission worked closely with the UN and the Iraqi Independent Electoral Commission in the preparations for the January 2005 parliamentary elections and provided a specific package of support for an amount of €31.5 million.
- Supporting the UN in Iraq:** As part of the EU's commitment to underline the UN's central role in the long-term reconstruction and stabilisation of Iraq, the EU is providing funding for the UN Protection Force.

### *... and in the pipeline*

- Assistance programme for 2005:**<sup>1</sup> The European Commission adopted a new Assistance Programme for Iraq for 2005 in March with a budget of **€200 million**, supporting the following needs:
- Provision of essential services and jobs (€130million):** The funds, also to be channelled through the IRFFI, will continue supporting activities to restore and strengthen delivery of **education and health services**, increasing **employment**

1. Full text of the programme is available at [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/iraq/doc/c\\_2005\\_718.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/iraq/doc/c_2005_718.pdf)

**opportunities**, and developing **administrative capacity** in the Iraqi administration. This support will be important in helping the new government meet the needs and expectations of the Iraqi population.

- Capacity-building in energy and trade (€15million):** The EU will offer its genuine expertise and know-how to public and private actors in form of bilateral technical assistance in key sectors for growth such as energy, trade and investment with the aim to increase the capacity of Iraqi institutions.
- Support for the political process (€10million):** Funds have been earmarked to continue supporting the **political process**, the **development of civil society** and **respect of human rights**. In this area, the EU stands ready to assist and provide experts, for example, to:

  - I** The Constitutional process, in co-operation with the UN;
  - I** Future elections, including a possible EU observation mission on the ground if invited by the Iraqi government and if security circumstances permit;
  - I** In addition €45million have been set aside allowing for a **flexible response** to changing circumstances on the ground and responding to the needs identified by the newly elected Iraqi government.
  - I** Primary focus will be on strengthening the Iraqi institutions.
- Rule-of-Law:** The EU is preparing an integrated rule-of-law mission focusing on training of Iraqi judges, prosecutors, police and penitentiary officers: see box below.
- The EU will **continue promoting Iraq's integration in the region** and the establishment of closer ties with neighbouring countries.
- The EU also stands ready to give support and provide expertise, if required, in the following areas:

  - I** assist with the **drafting of the new Constitution**, in cooperation with the UN;
  - I** look at how best to support **future elections**, including a **possible EU observation mission** on the ground if security circumstances permit.

(...)

### **EU Rule-of-Law Mission for Iraq**

The EU Council has decided on 21 February to launch an **integrated rule-of-law mission for Iraq - "EUJUST LEX"** - which should be operational by 1 July 2005, for a period of 12 months. The mission lies in the scope of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

The mission will consist of integrated **training in the fields of management and criminal investigation**, to be given to a representative group of senior officials and executive staff, mainly from the **judiciary**, the **police** and the **penitentiary**.

**Objective:** training of some **520 judges, investigating magistrates, senior police** and **penitentiary officers** in 13 senior management courses and of some **250 investigating magistrates and senior police** in 7 management of investigation courses. Total: some 770 persons to be trained over a period of a year.

Training will be carried out on the basis of a common curriculum. Training activities will take place in the EU or in the region and the mission will have a liaison office in Baghdad. Depending on developments in the security conditions in Iraq and on the availability of appropriate infrastructure, the EU Council will be called upon to examine the possibility of training within Iraq. The arrangements for this mission, which is to complement the international efforts under way, are being determined in consultation with the Iraqi authorities. A coordination office will be active in Brussels.

Mr. Stephen White was appointed Head of the EUJUSTLEX mission on 8 March 2005.

An amount of €10M from the **EU budget** is intended to cover the common costs of the mission. Member states will contribute training courses and trainers as well as some additional financial support.

The EU started planning the operation following consultations with the Iraqi interim authorities and on the basis of a report by a team of experts, as part of the implementation of the EU programme of action for Iraq presented in November 2004.

## Informal meeting of EU Defence ministers

Luxembourg, 18 March 2005

On 18 March 2005 the EU Defence Ministers gathered in Luxembourg, under the chairmanship of the Luxembourg Defence Minister Luc Frieden and in the presence of Javier Solana, for a meeting dedicated to European priorities in the field of security and defence. Javier Solana used this occasion to emphasize the necessity for the EU to maintain and increase its support to the African Union, especially in the DRC and in Darfur.

### RÉSUMÉ DES INTERVENTIONS DE JAVIER SOLANA

#### *Situation in the Western Balkans and Operation ALTHEA*

- D The year **2005 will be a crucial year** for the Western Balkans. While the **overall direction is right, the situation is highly uneven** in the various parts of the region. I would like to highlight only a few points:
- D The string of **recent surrenders of ICTY indictees**, ranging from Bosnian Serb Generals Todovic and Gvero to former Kosovo Prime Minister Haradinaj, **suggests that our message is getting through**.
- D **Bosnia and Herzegovina** is making progress on its reform agenda, approaching the threshold of opening negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU and joining Partnership for Peace. Significant roadblocks continue to stand in its way, however. BIH must deliver on ICTY co-operation and adopt security sector reform. Police restructuring is key.
- D **Serbia and Montenegro** is still a source of concern. It experiences great difficulties in grappling with the legacy of the Milosevic years. Some recent signs are more positive. Awareness on the need to co-operate with ICTY is growing and I believe we have to acknowledge some progress, while at the same time encouraging more efforts.
- D Let me add a word on **Kosovo**. This remains a delicate question with important implications, also for the wider region. Future status talks could start later this year if Standards implementation remains on track. We continue to support the work of UNMIK and KFOR as well as the efforts of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. Key challenges ahead include **improving the economic situation, protecting the security of all communities**, and advancing in Standards implementation, including real progress on reform of local self-government and decentralisation.
- D So, all in all, a packed and challenging year ahead.

## *Operation ALTHEA*

- ▶ So far OPERATION ALTHEA has been very successful. The seamless transition we wished for has taken place. Cooperation within the EU family works well and it creates synergy. As you all know, EUFOR has efficiently supported the actions taken by Lord Ashdown and created a safe and secure environment for the BiH authorities to continue their reforms. The cooperation with NATO on the ground works smoothly.
- ▶ I believe the Operation Commander will confirm this picture in his briefing and I will take this opportunity to thank him and the EU Force Commander, General Leakey, for their remarkable job.
- ▶ The first mission review will take place in May and in the beginning of June. This is the first mission review of an ESDP operation that will be done in complete coherence between civilian and military EU actors. I will be able to report to the Council based on input from both Lord Ashdown and General Reith. This is clear evidence that the EU take over of military operation in BiH has led to increased coordination between actors on the ground.

## *Capacités militaires, y compris les groupements tactiques*

- ▶ Nous nous sommes fixé un objectif ambitieux en mai dernier, lorsque nous avons approuvé le « **Headline Goal** » 2010. Les travaux ont commencé pour élaborer les différents catalogues. Nous devons aller de l'avant, notamment lors de la réunion du Conseil en mai.
- ▶ Sur la question de la **réponse rapide** et du rapport que vous m'avez demandé de préparer sur le processus de prise de décision et de planification : vous vous souviendrez que vous avez adopté en mai dernier un objectif ambitieux en matière de processus de prise de décision, allant de la présentation d'un concept de gestion de crise à la décision de lancer l'opération. Nous devons conduire celui-ci en 5 jours. Je voudrais rappeler que lors de l'opération Artémis le processus de prise de décision et de planification avait été conduit en 10 jours. Il s'agit donc de faire deux fois plus vite.
- ▶ Le rapport que je vous présente identifie plusieurs propositions pour atteindre cet objectif. Je vous avais annoncé lors de notre réunion à Noordwijk les pistes sur lesquelles nous avons travaillé: il s'agit de la planification d'avance, de la flexibilité nécessaire dans le processus de prise de décision et de planification, de la possibilité d'établir des contacts le plus tôt possible avec la nation cadre, et, bien sûr, de la nécessité de disposer de processus de prise de décision nationaux adaptés.
- ▶ Je voudrais recueillir vos réactions personnelles, vos difficultés éventuelles, et si vous en êtes d'accord, bénéficier de votre engagement politique pour que nous soyons réellement capables d'avoir, à Bruxelles, un processus de décision aussi rapide que ce que nous exigeons en termes de déploiement militaire.

### *Contribution de la PESD dans la lutte contre le terrorisme*

- ▶ Nous savons bien que les moyens militaires ne sont que complémentaires. Mais nous devons être en mesure de mobiliser tous les moyens, civils et militaires, disponibles, y compris s'ils sont le résultat du processus capacitaire de la PESD. Nous devons pouvoir faire le lien entre la dimension intérieure et extérieure permettant à l'information de circuler parmi les acteurs et les agences clef.
- ▶ Les moyens développés dans le cadre de la PESD doivent donc être prêts à être utilisés de manière coordonnée dans le contexte plus large de la réponse que nous apportons à une telle attaque.
- ▶ Le débat d'aujourd'hui devra permettre de dégager des lignes d'action afin de soutenir les travaux en cours dans la mise en œuvre du Cadre conceptuel pour la dimension PESD de la lutte contre le terrorisme. Je passe la parole à Gijs de Vries, notre coordonnateur pour la lutte contre le terrorisme.

### *Suivi du tsunami en Asie du Sud-Est*

- ▶ Le Plan d'action adopté par le Conseil en janvier m'invitait à présenter des propositions sur le renforcement de la capacité de réponse rapide de l'Union pour faire face à des catastrophes naturelles ou de tout autre genre, et en particulier sur la mise à disposition des moyens militaires des Etats membres dans ce contexte.
- ▶ Mon équipe est en train de finaliser un rapport sur cette question. Laissez-moi toutefois vous donner aujourd'hui quelques indications préliminaires à ce sujet. Le point de départ est la reconnaissance internationale de l'utilité du déploiement de moyens militaires en soutien d'autres efforts de protection civile dans une situation d'urgence. Il y a des capacités militaires uniques (transport lourd, capacités amphibies, capacités CBRN, etc.) et la capacité de déploiement militaire peut être supérieure à celle qui existe ailleurs. Nous avons pu constater ceci à l'occasion du Tsunami.
- ▶ Naturellement, il faut garder à l'esprit que les moyens militaires ne sont pas et ne peuvent pas être les seuls à être mobilisés dans ces situations.
- ▶ Nous arrivons ainsi à l'une des difficultés majeures dans la réponse à une catastrophe: la coordination de l'aide.
- ▶ Il s'agit tout d'abord d'une responsabilité nationale, c'est le pays affecté par la catastrophe qui doit coordonner. Mais quand cette capacité ne suffit plus d'autres acteurs internationaux, et tout d'abord l'OCHA (BCAH), doivent contribuer à ces efforts.
- ▶ Dans ce contexte, je crois qu'il est nécessaire d'explorer si une coordination spécifique de la contribution militaire que les Etats Membres de l'UE peuvent fournir en cas de catastrophe peut améliorer la qualité de notre réponse. Il faudra, pour cela, assurer aussi la coordination avec d'autres acteurs engagés dans la crise, UE et non UE. Le BCAH nous a, en tous cas, encouragés à poursuivre cette ligne de réflexion.

- ▶ Un autre but c'est d'encourager le développement ou l'identification dans les Etats membres de capacités militaires idoines pour l'intervention dans ce genre de situations. Simultanément, je propose que nous étudions des procédures qui permettraient le déploiement de ces capacités dans les brefs délais exigés par toute intervention qui a pour but sauver des vies humaines mises en danger par une telle catastrophe.
- ▶ Idéalement ces capacités militaires devraient constituer des modules pré-identifiés. Ces modules pourraient être composés par des contributions de plusieurs pays.
- ▶ Lors d'une catastrophe, les Etats membres pourraient déployer leurs capacités pré-identifiées ou bien à titre exclusivement national, ou bien dans le contexte d'une opération plus complexe coordonnée par l'UE. L'établissement d'un Centre d'opérations généré par la Cellule Civilo-Militaire au sein de l'EMUE, pourrait, le cas échéant, faciliter la coordination d'une telle opération et contribuer à assurer la coordination avec d'autres moyens déployés par l'UE ou par des instances tierces.
- ▶ La nature civilo-militaire de cette question me porte à penser qu'une étude approfondie sur ces questions devrait être menée par la Cellule une fois que celle-ci pourra commencer ses travaux à partir du mois d'avril. Evidemment, le moment venu, des exercices devront être faits dans le but de tester l'efficacité de ces systèmes.
- ▶ Naturellement, ce travail serait exécuté en pleine coopération avec la Commission et tout particulièrement avec le MIC (Mécanisme de Coordination pour les Interventions de Protection Civile).

### *Rôle de la PESD en Afrique*

- ▶ Je voudrais me borner à évoquer 2 points de particulière importance: République démocratique du Congo et Darfour.
- ▶ Après avoir initié le déploiement de la mission de police **EUPOL Kinshasa**, nous sommes en train de planifier suivant les orientations du Conseil le lancement d'une nouvelle **mission de conseil et d'assistance en RDC**, mais cette fois-ci pour la réforme de l'armée.
- ▶ Avec le soutien des Etats membres, cette mission devrait être capable de commencer à opérer dès la fin du mois prochain. Notre objectif est de contribuer à l'intégration des anciennes factions belligérantes dans une armée nationale unifiée et réformée afin de renforcer rapidement la sécurité et de permettre la tenue des élections.
- ▶ Je souhaite évoquer le soutien que l'UE apporte à l'Union Africaine dans sa mission au **Darfour**. Ce soutien à la mission AMIS, nous devons être capables de le maintenir dans la durée. Face à la situation difficile à laquelle l'on est confronté, l'Union Africaine envisage maintenant le renforcement des effectifs et du mandat de l'AMIS.
- ▶ Pour l'heure, je voudrais, encore une fois, encourager les Etats membres à poursuivre et renforcer leur soutien à l'Union Africaine, en particulier dans le domaine de la planification et à le faire de manière coordonnée. Fort de l'expérience récente, nous

devons aussi être en mesure de mieux orienter l'utilisation des fonds mis à la disposition de l'UA et d'aider la Commission en faisant en sorte que les acteurs de la PESD apportent l'expertise militaire appropriée.

- ▶ Le rôle de la PESD en Afrique, nous le voyons, peut prendre des formes diverses allant du soutien politique et financier à l'UA ou aux organisations sousrégionales à un engagement plus opérationnel. Je crois le moment venu de réfléchir ensemble à la façon de soutenir le développement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix.
- ▶ L'Union n'a pas de moyens militaires propres, mais elle dispose aujourd'hui d'une organisation structurée, compétente tant dans le domaine civil que militaire, qui est certainement la plus adaptée à assurer dans la durée la synergie des efforts nationaux pour une efficacité accrue.



## EU-UN Exercice (EST 05)

Brussels, 14 April 2005

### INTERVENTION DE JAVIER SOLANA – RÉSUMÉ

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- ▶ Je suis particulièrement heureux d'ouvrir les activités liées à l'Etude d'Exercice EST 05 et de le faire en la présence des représentants du Département de Maintien de la Paix, Secrétariat des Nations Unies, et en particulier de M. Annabi et de son équipe.
- ▶ Cette activité d'exercice est une première. Tant dans sa planification que dans sa conduite, elle prévoit la participation du Département du Maintien de la Paix du Secrétariat des Nations Unies afin de traiter de questions qui nous intéressent en commun.
- ▶ Pour nous, c'est donc une expression concrète de l'importance que nous attachons à la coopération avec les Nations Unies dans le domaine de la gestion de crise – que ce soit pour des aspects civils ou militaires. Elle illustre le progrès accompli jusqu'à maintenant. Elle démontre également la détermination de l'Union de contribuer aux objectifs des Nations Unies dans la gestion de crise.
- ▶ Je sais que vous allez travailler sur deux scénarios successifs. Dans un premier lieu, un scénario de type Artemis vous est proposé. Il appelle à un déploiement de capacités militaires de l'UE qui soient robustes et rapides, mettant en œuvre le travail accompli sur les Groupements tactiques, qui seraient donc déployés afin de donner le temps aux Nations Unies de renforcer leur mission. L'opération, qui a lieu sous le contrôle politique et la direction stratégique de l'UE, est effectuée en appui aux Nations Unies et suite à sa demande.
- ▶ Vous examinerez ensuite une deuxième situation, qui concerne cette fois les aspects civils de la gestion de crise, en particulier de police. Quatre ans ont passé, et l'Union européenne devra assurer la relève d'une opération de police des Nations Unies par une opération de police de l'UE.
- ▶ Comme vous voyez, les aspects UE-ONU que vous traiterez seront souvent liés aux moments critiques de transition entre deux opérations.
- ▶ Dans le cadre du scénario de gestion de crise militaire, l'opération UE sur le terrain sera achevée dès que l'opération de l'ONU sera renforcée. Dans le cadre du scénario de gestion de crise civile, l'opération ONU sur le terrain sera relevée par une opération UE.
- ▶ Cette approche est délibérée. Elle démontre notre volonté commune de se focaliser sur des aspects concrets opérationnels de nos planifications respectives, puisque ce que nous voulons c'est de nous préparer à agir de concert.
- ▶ Un travail important vous attend aujourd'hui et demain dans cette phase de conduite. Permettez-moi finalement de souligner l'utilité du processus d'évaluation qui

lui succédera, et qui représente également une étape critique de la mise en œuvre de cette activité d'exercice.

- ▶ Je déclare donc ouverte les activités de EST 05.

## European Parliament – Resolution on the European Security Strategy

Strasbourg, 14 April 2005

### *The European Parliament,*

- ▶ having regard to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, signed in Rome on 29 October 2004,
- ▶ having regard to the European Security Strategy adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003, following an initiative in this connection by the Greek Presidency, the informal Council of Foreign Ministers (Kastellorizon, May 2003) and the conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council (19-20 June 2003),
- ▶ having regard to its resolution of 30 November 2000 on the establishment of a common European security and defence policy after Cologne and Helsinki<sup>1</sup>,
- ▶ having regard to its resolution of 10 April 2003 on the new European security and defence architecture – priorities and deficiencies<sup>2</sup>,
- ▶ having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2005 on the Non-Proliferation Treaty 2005 Review Conference – Nuclear arms in North Korea and Iran<sup>3</sup>,
- ▶ having regard to the Proposal for a White Paper on European defence as presented by the EU Institute for Security Studies in May 2004,
- ▶ having regard to the report on a Human Security Doctrine for Europe<sup>4</sup> as presented to the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy on 15 September 2004,
- ▶ having regard to the various programmes on conflict prevention as made public by all the European Institutions,
- ▶ having regard to Rule 45 of its Rules of Procedure,
- ▶ having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A6 0072/2005),

A. considering the milestone reached in the evolutionary development of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as set out in the Franco-British St Malo Declaration of 3-4 December 1998,

B. considering the subsequent ESDP development agenda as expressed during the European Council Summits in Cologne (3-4 June 1999), Helsinki (10-11 December 1999) and Göteborg (15-16 June 2001),

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1. OJ C 228, 13.8.2001, p. 173.

2. OJ C 64 E, 12.3.2004, p. 599.

3. Texts adopted, P6\_TA(2005)0075.

4. The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities.

C. considering the need to strengthen arms exports control in and from the EU and at global level,

D. recognising the important role played by various EU assistance programmes and the indispensable contribution they make to economic development, to supporting the growth of democratic institutions, to the implementation of reconstruction measures, to drawing up macro-economic programmes and to promoting human rights,

E. acknowledging that the comprehensive approach advocated in the European Security Strategy is already being actively pursued in the Balkans, as demonstrated by the scale of EU instruments currently being applied to bring stability to the region: the CARDS assistance programme; the civilian missions PROXIMA and EUPM; and the military mission ALTHEA,

F. recognising the consistent support levels established over a ten-year period of public opinion surveys, which have shown that more than 60% of EU citizens are in favour of a common EU foreign policy and more than 70% in favour of a common defence policy; noting, however, other opinion surveys which do not show support for increased military spending,

G. noting and regretting that the level to which the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is subject to scrutiny by the European Parliament in accordance with Article III-304 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe has not significantly been increased and that Parliament is not and has never been consulted on numerous Council decisions and actions; recognising nevertheless the goodwill demonstrated by the High Representative and his services in keeping Parliament informed and engaging in dialogue with Parliament; urging the High Representative and his services to continue to strengthen this transparent dialogue with Parliament,

H. observing, without prejudice to the previous point, the continued accountability of actions undertaken within the Union's CFSP framework to the national parliaments, particularly with regard to those Member States where parliamentary approval is required in order to undertake any military action,

I. acknowledging that all actions and measures undertaken within the framework of the Union's CFSP are to be exercised in strict adherence to international law and with respect for the principles of the UN Charter, as stated clearly in Articles I-3 and III-292 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe,

J. whereas many EU Member States (including the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Italy and Greece) have had, and in some cases are still having, their own experiences with various forms of terrorism and the philosophies which underlie them,

K. whereas, for the foreseeable future, Islamist terrorism represents the greatest challenge to the EU, as to other regions, particularly in the event that terrorists succeed in gaining control of weapons of mass destruction,

L. whereas the European Security Strategy forms part of the comprehensive CFSP and ESDP, in which the whole spectrum of political activities available to the EU, including those of a diplomatic, economic or development nature, may come into play,

### *The European security environment*

1. Emphasises that only a comprehensive understanding of the concept of 'security' can properly take into account both the influence of issues of political democratic concern (e.g. violation of human rights, wilful discrimination against particular groups of citizens, the existence of repressive regimes) and the wide range of social, economic and environmental factors (e.g. poverty, famine, disease, illiteracy, scarcity of natural resources, environmental degradation, inequitable trade relations, etc.) in contributing to existing regional conflicts, the failure of states and the emergence of criminal and terrorist networks, though the actions of the latter may not be seen as being justified in any way, shape or form by the above-mentioned factors;

2. Welcomes, therefore, the comprehensive understanding of the concept of 'security' as expressed in the European Security Strategy (ESS); shares the view expressed within the ESS that key threats to our global security presently include terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), unresolved regional conflicts, failed and failing states and organised crime; emphasises that these threats can neither be primarily addressed nor exclusively resolved by military means;

3. Draws, therefore, the same conclusion as that expressed within the ESS that a combination of the various assistance programmes and instruments, including those of development policy, at both EU and Member State level, in conjunction with diplomatic, civilian and military capabilities and expertise can best serve to contribute to a more secure world;

4. Consequently stresses the urgent need for the practical transposition of this concept of the security environment within the existing structures of the Union, so as to enable the Union to detect crises sufficiently far in advance to act in a pro-active manner; in that connection, recommends greater efforts to establish an early-warning system for

threats using innovative technologies from the civilian IT sector to carry out news analysis and assessment; expresses its view in this regard that the establishment of “tension detection centres” in regions particularly susceptible to crises, centres which may be set up under the auspices both of the future European External Action Service and of services outside the European Union, such as those of the African Union, would be one of many sensible ways of identifying, reporting on and helping to eradicate the roots of conflicts and thus preventing any violent escalations; stresses further in this regard the importance which it attaches to the integration of conflict prevention and the fight against terrorism as components within all EU policy areas;

### *Strategic objectives for the EU*

5. Agrees fully with the strategic objectives for the Union as expressed in the ESS: addressing the threats; building security in the Union’s neighbourhood; and strengthening the international order via effective action through effective multilateral structures; emphasises that the objectives of the ESS go well beyond the military aspects of the European Security and Defence Policy;

6. Notes that, in addressing the threats, it will be necessary to determine those of a regional and/or those of a global nature, so that the Union can effectively mobilise its available instruments and resources in order to address the problem; notes that the establishment of security in the Union’s neighbourhood will serve in large measure to counter threats of a regional nature, whereas those of a global nature must be tackled through effective multilateral international structures in which the EU is a driving force; notes, however, that multilateral organisations and structures may also be called upon to address regional threats;

7. Shares fully the view expressed in the Union’s New Neighbourhood Policy and the ESS that the Union’s neighbourhood should be understood in more far-reaching terms, covering not only those eastern European countries sharing borders with the EU but also regions further east and south, such as the Caucasus, the Middle East and northern Africa; notes the congruency of this policy with the continuing activities of the Union in seeking a resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict also through the Barcelona process; stresses that democracy and the rule of law are the most important preconditions for the peaceful coexistence of peoples;

8. Emphasises the primacy of the UN within the multilateral institutional framework and the need for the EU to play a leading role in re-invigorating the structures and capabilities of this indispensable institution; takes note in this connection of the report presented by the Secretary-General of the UN entitled “In larger freedom: towards development, security, and human rights for all” on 21 March 2005; welcomes this report –

without prejudice to any future detailed assessment by the Parliament – as the starting point for an open discussion on reforming the UN so that it may face the challenges of the 21st century; urges the EU and the Member States to coordinate their position within the framework of these discussions in full awareness of the consistent support demonstrated by public opinion surveys for a stronger representation of CFSP/ESDP through the EU than that which currently exists;

9. Underlines, further, the need for the Union to play a leading role in cooperating with other international and regional organisations that foster peace and security in the world; emphasises in particular the need for full cooperation with the OSCE;

10. Stresses that it is important for the EU to pursue a firm and fair development policy in order to contribute efficiently to the universally agreed Millennium Development Goals;

### *Recent ESDP milestones*

11. Notes the valuable experience gained in civilian and police missions over the course of the last two years, including: the assumption of control by the International Police Task Force (now EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 2003; PROXIMA in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and EUJUST THEMIS in Georgia; welcomes also the forthcoming deployment of a European Union police force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUPOL Kinshasa);

12. Recognises the significant progress made in expanding the military capabilities of the Union; at the same time notes the importance of the Berlin Plus Framework agreed with NATO, which made the first EU military mission CONCORDIA in FYROM and the ALTHEA mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina possible; acknowledges the advantageous flexibility of the Union's ESDP framework in further allowing the execution of Operation ARTEMIS in the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

13. Emphasises the positive contributions already made by the EU Situation Centre (SITCEN) in combining all available civil, military and diplomatic intelligence to produce cogent background analyses of any given situation; urges the Member States to further intensify their information-sharing with the SITCEN, so as not to unduly hinder the fulfilment of ambitions expressed in the ESS;

14. Emphasises that the defining characteristic and the additional value of the ESDP lie in the combination of civilian and military components and notes, in observance of the aforementioned accomplishments, that the EU will in future be increasingly faced with the challenge of striking a good and proper balance between military and civilian

components in order to fulfil the objectives and the spirit of the ESS; takes the view that the ALTHEA mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina will provide valuable experience in this regard, in so far as the Union will be able to coordinate its military efforts with the civilian operations and programmes currently under way;

### *Progress towards Headline Goal 2010 and towards a Civilian Headline Goal 2008*

15. Agrees with the targets set out in the Headline Goal 2010 as formally adopted by the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) on 17 May 2004 and the agreement to work out a Civilian Headline Goal 2008 as approved by the GAERC on 13 December 2004 as a means of concentrating efforts to empower the EU with the necessary capabilities to pursue the ESS strategic objectives; considers that these substantive and time-related targets should be given concrete form in a White Paper;

16. Recognises in this connection the progress made at the GAERC meeting on 22 November 2004 concerning the further development of the rapid deployment 'Battle Groups' concept for high-intensity military operations; notes that these Battle Groups are to be primarily derived from the bi-national and multinational forces already existing within the EU; also notes the agreement to work out a Civilian Headline Goal 2008, as approved by the GAERC, and welcomes the intention expressed therein of making the existing civilian instruments more comprehensive and effective, so that the combination of various integrated contingents can take place on the basis of specific needs on the ground; recognises, therefore, that future civilian crisis management within the framework of the ESDP will in effect go beyond the four priority areas set out in Feira (police, rule of law, civil administration and civil protection);

17. Underscores, in particular with respect to achieving the full operational mobility of the Battle Groups by 2007, the importance of the Global Approach on Deployability and, in this context, welcomes the contributions made by the coordinating centres of Athens and Eindhoven in the military transport sector;

18. Welcomes further in this regard the formal adoption by the European Council of the proposal for a Civilian/Military Cell (Civ/Mil) within the European Union Military Staff; notes that Civ/Mil will play a particularly crucial role in the strategic planning of all operations (i.e. civil, military and joint civil/military) and – as of 2006 – in setting up an operations centre for autonomous EU missions in cases where no national HQ has been designated; emphasises further the importance of Civ/Mil in developing principles and models for the management of the civilian/military interface; acknowledges, however, that many of these principles and models will be derived as a result of ongoing and future operations;



19. Draws attention, as regards the planning for future EU mixed civil/military missions, to the proposals and ideas contained in the report entitled “A Human Security Doctrine for Europe”; welcomes in this regard not only the current developments in the field of ESDP, such as the establishment of Civ/Mil, which are in congruence with the general direction of this report, but also the future creation of a European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps as provided for in Article III-321(5) of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe; notes, however, that the European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps is primarily envisaged, in that article, as “a framework for joint contributions from young Europeans”; demands therefore that the framework of this be either expanded or complemented by the setting-up of a complementary “Corps” drawing upon the experience and expertise of mid- and post-career professionals, so as to create a functional corps more along the lines of the European Civil Peace Corps – as proposed on several occasions by the Parliament;

20. Notes that on 7 January 2005 the GEARC also – partly on the basis of provisional proposals put forward by the Foreign Affairs Commissioner – called on its competent subsidiary bodies and on the Commission to assess the scope for boosting the EU’s crisis reaction capabilities as regards disaster aid;

21. Urges the Council and the Commission to guarantee the complementarity and cohesion of existing instruments and capabilities as well as those of new proposals, particularly regarding the close link between conflict protection and crisis management; considers that measurable success in this as yet uncompleted task may be regarded as progress with a view to the future establishment of the European Foreign Service;

22. Welcomes the initiative by certain Member States to establish a European Gendarmerie Force and their readiness to make it available for ESDP purposes; highlights the particular usefulness of this force in ensuring the transition from an essentially purely military phase of operations to a mixed or purely civilian phase;

23. Emphasises the need to develop a European security culture through an effective implementation of the EU Training Concept in ESDP which increases interoperability among all actors involved in EU crisis management; stresses in this context the need for the establishment of a European Security and Defence College (ESDC) which will provide EU bodies and Member States with knowledgeable personnel able to work efficiently on all ESDP matters; considers that this College must be based on sound organisational and financial modalities;

24. Notes with satisfaction the rapid action taken in creating the European Defence Agency (EDA) in advance of the formal adoption of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe; notes that the activities of the EDA should benefit the Union, not only in fur-

ther developing defence capabilities in crisis management, but also in bringing about a rationalisation of research and development costs within the Member States and, in the long run, helping to contribute to the creation of a European armaments market; considers that the Armaments Agency should pay particular attention to the arming and equipping of Battle Groups and should ensure their compatibility; calls for the Battle Groups to be supplied as a first priority with new, common equipment; cautions, however, that any future achievements of the EDA will, in large measure, be dependent on the (political) goodwill of the Member States; calls for the availability of sufficient budgetary means to permit the realisation of EDA-led armaments initiatives; notes further in this connection that the EDA must not be hindered from pursuing longer term capability goals – goals beyond the Headline Goal 2010 – in order that the Union may benefit from pursuing the ESS objectives;

25. Regards a European Space Policy as one of the most important strategic challenges facing the EU in the 21st century; notes that, in the field of telecommunications and intelligence, many projects have been developed in parallel, reducing efficiency and increasing costs; calls for these projects, such as the French Helios satellite system and the German SAR-Lupe system, to be merged within the framework of European security research;

26. Welcomes the Commission's efforts to promote security research within the EU in the near future; advocates, therefore, the establishment within the next framework programme for research of an independent European security research programme endowed with instruments, rules and funding models tailored to the work of researching security issues, in keeping with the recommendations of the Group of Eminent Persons; points out, however, the risk of duplication with research initiatives of the EDA; calls, therefore, on the Commission, the Council and the Member States to maintain close working relations with a view to avoiding this risk; recommends, in this connection – parallel to technology-driven research – that the emphasis should be placed on the development of joint modelling and simulation capabilities and the ability to analyse threats and security concepts, exploiting the respective comparative benefits they offer;

### *Capability deficiencies*

27. Takes note of the following three categories of material deficiencies, which could seriously affect the Union's ability to conduct both civilian crisis management operations and humanitarian intervention operations of high-intensity dimensions using mainly military means, such as halting humanitarian catastrophes of similar dimensions to that in Rwanda:

- a) lack of deployable forces required for maintaining the rotation needed (1/3 on

deployment, 1/3 on training, 1/3 resting) in such long-term/high-intensity operations;

- b) lack of permanent large-scale airlift capabilities for transporting forces abroad;
- c) lack of sufficient deployable command, control and communications capabilities as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance resources within the collective framework of ESDP;

28. Notes that the continuing development of the Battle Groups will address the first deficiency in large measure; notes that the planned construction of the A400 M transport aircraft will not resolve the second deficiency completely and urges that measures be taken to address the deficiency further; urges, nonetheless, that consideration be given to establishing a rotation scheme for the deployment of forces; demands, in view of a rotation scheme of this kind, common standards in training, for instance as regards helicopters; considers that operational capability could be increased and costs reduced by a joint training system; urges strongly, as regards the final deficiency, that measures be taken to enable the EU to conduct missions requiring the assistance of military forces without recourse to NATO or to any single Member State's resources; points out that such measures could realistically entail the pooling of existing resources and capabilities within the Member States with the goal of establishing a dual-use communications base or network at the service of the ESDP;

29. Emphasises further that the goals and aims expressed in the Headline Goal 2010 would not be sufficient to allow missions of a more intense nature or of a duration of more than one year; therefore urges the Commission, in close cooperation with the Council, to submit a White Paper on the practical requirements for the development of the ESDP and the ESS, so that a debate concerning the development of a future European Defence Strategy can also be further promoted;

### *Arms export control and non-proliferation of WMDs and light weapons*

30. Acknowledges, within the framework of the Union's CFSP, the overall coherence of the European Strategy against the proliferation of WMDs, as formally adopted by the European Council in December 2003, with the strategic objectives of the European Security Strategy; notes with satisfaction the work undertaken by the Personal Representative of the High Representative in pursuing the implementation of Chapter III of this Strategy, particularly as expressed in the priority list endorsed by the European Council in December 2004;

31. Agrees with the European Security Strategy that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is potentially the greatest threat to our security and urges, in accordance with the provisions of the European Security Strategy, that the EU use the full

panoply of instruments at its disposal in defeating the WMD threat, noting in this regard that the possible combination of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction requires prompt and appropriate action;

32. Stresses the need for the European Union to take over the initiative of strengthening the international arms control regime, thereby contributing to the reinforcement given to effective multilateralism within the international order; notes further the congruence of efforts to integrate aspects of non-proliferation within the EU Neighbourhood Policy with the overall strategic objective of building security within the Union's neighbourhood;

33. Welcomes the intended inclusion of WMD non-proliferation clauses in all future partnership and cooperation agreements between the EU and third countries, as exemplified by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Tajikistan of 11 October 2004<sup>1</sup> as well as the draft Association Agreement with Syria now awaiting approval;

34. Welcomes the fact that the EU's negotiations with Iran as a regional power, aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, were carried out in connection with legitimate economic and regional security interests; notes that this policy is an expression of foreign and security policy based on the principles of international law and multilateralism in the best interests of the international community; welcomes the fact that the EU and US positions on Iran have come significantly closer;

35. Takes note of the Peer Review currently being undertaken of the EU export control system; notes that the main finding derived from the first stage of this review, conducted in Spring 2004, was the need for Member States to collectively (i.e. the EU) and individually adopt a more pro-active approach in controlling the export of dual-use items; urges the Member States to follow up without delay the recommendations based on this finding and to make more use of SITCEN in this regard, as well as in general, as a base for exchanging information; welcomes the efforts made by the EU to coordinate and organise as far as possible a common EU position within the various export control regimes and, further, the efforts made by the EU to include the new Member States in the various export control regimes;

36. Takes note of the current practical difficulties in implementing the strategy against the proliferation of WMDs, due in particular to the various sources and procedures through which budgetary means are to be mobilised; urges the Council and the Commission to engage, together with Parliament, in a dialogue on streamlining and simplifying these procedures with a view to adopting such changes within the framework of the relevant new financial instrument for the budgetary period 2007-2013;

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1. OJ L 340, 16.11.2004, p. 2.

37. Stresses the need to further strengthen the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports as well as to maximise the EU's contribution to countering the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, notably by the establishment of an international arms trade treaty;

38. Calls on the countries defined in the Non-Proliferation Treaty as nuclear-weapon states, in particular the USA, China and Russia, in view of the uncontrollably spreading danger of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to review their own nuclear policies in the spirit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; regrets, therefore, the efforts made by the US administration over the last four years to promote research into, and the development of, new nuclear weapons and its refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; expresses concern at Russia's inadequate efforts to protect its nuclear stocks; is alarmed at China's massive increase in military spending (12,6%), its comprehensive modernisation of its nuclear armed forces and the increase in its imports of modern weapons technologies;

### *Budgetary challenges*

39. Notes that the greatest threat to the coherence and success of the ESS remains the possible lack of sufficient budgetary resources made available across the entire spectrum of EU policies and instruments; notes in this connection the particular importance of EU assistance programmes and their substantial contribution to the pro-active comprehensive approach expressed within the ESS; demands that this point be borne in mind within the framework of the current negotiations concerning the Future Financial Perspective for 2007-2013;

40. Notes further that the effectiveness of the ESS, and in particular that of the ESDP, is dependent to a large extent on the expenditure of the Member States outside the framework of the EU; recommends in this connection, first, a more sensible and more effective use of national expenditure in the defence field, which might be achieved in certain Member States, for example by a speedier modernisation and restructuring of their armed forces, and, second, the establishment of a mechanism for assessing the proportion of a Member State's GDP spent on defence; urges the Member States, therefore, to cooperate with the EDA to that end;

41. Regrets that Article III-313 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe has maintained the status quo of dual budgeting for CFSP operations; notes the Council's efforts to ensure greater transparency of the mechanism (ATHENA) by which common costs for operations of a military or defence nature are to be administered outside the Union's budget<sup>1</sup>; emphasises, none the less, its strongly held view that the continued sep-

1. Council Decision 2004/197/CFSP of 23 February 2004 establishing a mechanism to administer the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications (OJ L 63, 28.2.2004, p. 68).

aration of financing for common costs in civil operations through the budget of the Union from those with military or defence implications outside the Union's budget will prove increasingly untenable given that missions conducted within the framework of CFSP will be increasingly mixed in nature, as evidenced by the establishment of the Civil/Military Cell;

42. Points out in this connection the substantial problems that current tendering procedures create regarding organisation of rapid actions within the ESDP; therefore urges the Council and the Commission to conclude as soon as possible their thorough examination regarding special procedures or exemptions for future ESDP measures and operations within the Financial Regulation<sup>2</sup>;

### *Transatlantic relations*

43. Takes note of the substantive congruity in the global threat assessments presented in both the ESS and the US National Security Strategy; takes the view that this congruity should be seen as a basis upon which both the EU and the United States can re-establish a dialogue of equal partners in attaining a common understanding for the resolution of particular issues of concern, such as the authorisation and use of military force in relation to the relevant provisions of the UN's Founding Charter and its legitimising role, and for the re-invigoration of Transatlantic security cooperation in general;

44. Stresses that a major element of the Transatlantic security dialogue must be focused on empowering other international organisations such as the OSCE and, in particular, the African Union to make their own contribution to global security; emphasises in this regard the utility of informal multilateral formations such as the Quartet in achieving a lasting resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict;

45. Expresses its wish for a stronger cooperation with the United States in the fields of non-proliferation and the fight against terrorism; urges the EU and the US none the less to continue with their positive dialogue in these areas and to fully pursue an action plan for further cooperation as reflected in the EU-US Declarations on combating terrorism and on the non-proliferation of WMDs adopted at the EU-US Summit on 26 June 2004; considers that these points should be addressed in the context of all EU-US meetings relevant to security policy;

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2. Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (OJ L 248, 16.9.2002, p.1).

## *NATO*

46. Notes the continued recognition by many Member States of NATO as the cornerstone of their security in the event of an armed aggression; takes the view that cooperation and complementarity should be the key elements upon which EU/NATO relations are based; proposes in this vein discussions – taking into account the different character of each organisation – concerning improved coordination of national contributions to the NATO Response Force and those of the EU Headline Goals in order to avoid any duplication; urges Member States to continue to reform their armed forces with a view to making those forces more deployable, transportable and sustainable; notes in this regard that for the foreseeable future most Member States will continue to commit the same units to both NATO and the EU owing to the lack of units possessing the right skills and capabilities; urges Member States to continue to enlarge their pool of readily available forces so that in the future the operational needs of both the EU and NATO can be readily satisfied;

47. Notes that the current problems, which are regrettably hampering the necessary cooperation between the EU Military Committee and NATO, can be very speedily resolved given political goodwill on the part of the decision-makers involved;

48. Calls on Turkey, in the context of NATO, to create the conditions to promote better cooperation – which is urgently needed – between the EU Military Committee and the relevant NATO bodies;

49. Encourages the new European Defence Agency to examine the possibilities for cooperation with NATO in the area of armaments and to explicitly provide for the possibility of such co-operation within the framework of the Administrative Agreement to be signed in due course between the two as provided for in Article 25 of Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP on the establishment of the European Defence Agency<sup>1</sup>;

50. Takes note of the complementary nature of certain policies and programmes of NATO (Partnership for Peace and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and Mediterranean Dialogue) and the EU (Neighbourhood Policy and the Barcelona Process); encourages both parties to examine how these programmes and policies can more effectively serve to mutually reinforce each other;

## *Homeland security and combating terrorism*

51. Observes that the ESS draws significant attention to the blurring of previously static boundaries existing in the traditional conceptions of internal and external secu-

1. OJ L 245, 17.7.2004, p. 17.

rity; notes, however, the sparsity of content within the ESS on linking the two concepts so as to address threats coherently; is nevertheless aware, in spite of this conceptual omission, of the many and varied efforts made by the Council, the Commission and the Member States in the fields of home and foreign affairs;

52. Takes note, in the field of prevention of terrorism, consequence management and protection of critical infrastructures, of the proposals put forward by the Commission for the ARGUS system, which would be capable of circulating information and coordinating action responses, and its possible linkage both with a crisis centre and with an alarm network (CIWIN) for the protection of critical infrastructures within the EU;

53. Notes in the same connection the European Council's call, in the 'Hague Programme' of 4-5 November 2004, for the Council and the Commission to set up, while fully respecting national competences, integrated and coordinated EU crisis-management arrangements for crises with cross-border effects within the EU, to be implemented at the latest by 1 July 2006;

54. Welcomes the work accomplished or initiated so far on the basis of the above-mentioned proposals and calls, as well as a number of other measures and proposals which traditionally form part of national internal policy; also welcomes in this connection the special role which SITCEN will have in producing risk assessments and analyses in connection with potential terrorist targets; calls in this connection for unrestricted cooperation between all intelligence departments attached to national defence ministries so as to create a corresponding capability within SITCEN;

55. Welcomes in particular the objective of arranging for the cross-border exchange of intelligence and security service information in accordance with the principle of availability set out in the Hague Programme – where it relates to the future exchange of law-enforcement information – a principle whereby, taking into account the special nature of these services' methods (e.g. the need to protect the information-gathering procedure, information sources and the continued confidentiality of data after exchange), information available to a service in one Member State should be made available to the corresponding services in another Member State;

56. As regards internal security policy, is deeply concerned by the inadequate implementation by the Member States of all of the measures and instruments listed within the original anti-terrorism plan adopted in October 2001;

57. Takes note of the report submitted by the EU High Representative to the European Council on 16-17 December 2004 on integrating the fight against terrorism into EU External Relations Policy; notes the conclusion in that report that the capabilities in the



context of the Headline Goal 2010 and the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 should be adapted to the requirements of the various possible terrorist threats and scenarios – including a possible intervention under the Solidarity Clause (Article I-43 of the Constitution);

58. Calls, within the framework of the New Neighbourhood Policy and in the context of EU foreign relations in general, for an enhanced political dialogue with third countries on terrorism, to cover not only the need for their unrestricted cooperation with international and regional organisations but also the strict application of the clause on combating terrorism contained in agreements with third countries where there is evidence of terrorist threats or specific terrorist activities;

59. Is however concerned – with all due respect for the work accomplished so far in seeking to draw a line between the two fields of home and foreign affairs – about the coherence and coordination of this work and, in particular, the degree to which democratic freedoms and the rule of law are taken into account; therefore urges its Committees on Foreign Affairs and on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs to find an appropriate procedure for the preparation of recommendations on the matter to be addressed to both the Council and the Commission, in order not only to check the coherence and coordination of such work but also to ensure that the civil and political rights of citizens and organisations are not compromised in any way and thus, where appropriate, to make recommendations to Parliament's relevant committees, for forwarding to both the Council and the Commission;

### *External Action Service*

60. Salutes the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe as an important basis for pursuing the ESS and its ongoing development; considers that the creation of the new External Action Service will be a vitally important instrument for external action under the CFSP and therefore for the ESS; emphasises that an effective ESS must fully utilise available diplomatic capabilities (i.e. the EU Minister for Foreign Affairs and the European External Action Service (Articles I-28 and III-296(3)) and, if necessary, military capabilities (i.e. permanent structured cooperation between Member States for the fulfilment of high-intensity missions demanding higher military capabilities (Articles I-41(6), III-312 and the Specific Protocol));

61. Urges the Council and the Commission forthwith to take the necessary steps to integrate their activities in a spirit of cooperation prior to the final ratification of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe; emphasises that Parliament will seek to assess those steps in a positive and constructive manner and will judge all proposed actions and measures during the transitional period on the basis of their quality rather

than their origin, with a view to setting up a functioning and effective European External Action Service; stresses that Parliament will also judge these efforts in the light of whether they respect the political will, expressed in the Constitution, to formulate a common policy so that Europe may speak with a single voice in the world;

62. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Parliaments of the Member States and the Secretaries General of the United Nations, NATO, the OSCE and the Council of Europe.

## EU COPPS – Support to the Palestinian Police

Brussels, 20 April 2005

Anxious to help the peace process in the Near East move forward, the Union created a Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support, in accordance with the Council's pledge in June 2004 to 'support the Palestinian Authority in taking responsibility for law and order and, in particular, in improving its civil police and law enforcement capacity.'

### **JAVIER SOLANA ANNOUNCES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EU COORDINATING OFFICE FOR PALESTINIAN POLICE SUPPORT**

Javier Solana, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, made the following comments on the occasion of the establishment today in Ramallah of the European Union Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support:

*I am pleased to announce that we are setting up the EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support today in Ramallah.*

*With this initiative in the field of police support, another key part of the Action Plan proposed last year and including an array of actions in the fields of security, reforms, elections and the economy, is now coming to fruition.*

*This important event is the culmination of a dialogue between the EU and the PA and testifies to the commitment of Palestinian leaders – in primis Prime Minister Ahmed Qureia and Minister of Interior Nasser Youssef – to police transformation.*

*Assisting the Palestinian Authority on the crucial path to assuming responsibility for law and order and improving its civil police and law enforcement capacity is and will remain a priority for the EU. Today's agreement is an important step to that end.'*

### **APPENDIX 1**

Today's exchange of letters between the EU and the Palestinian Authority (PA) establishes the European Union Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EU COPPS). The exchange of letters was signed in Ramallah by Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Qureia and the EU Special Representative to the Middle East Peace Process Marc Otte.

The agreement involves a twin-track approach to assist the PA in developing a modern, effective and accountable civil police service. It entails providing support both for operational priorities and longer-term transformational change. The formulation of a

Transformational and an Operational Plan, owned by the PA, remains the priority in providing long-term capacity building. In the short-term, the project aims to improve operational capacity and performance on the ground. A number of operational projects are currently being implemented. The objective is to deliver urgently needed training and equipment that will enable the police to deliver enhanced services to the Palestinian people and help to create a climate free from the fear of violence.

A team currently consisting of four senior EU police advisers headed by Chief Superintendent Jonathan McIvor has been deployed in the West Bank and Gaza since mid-January 2005. The team is based in the Ministry of Interior building in Ramallah. It acts primarily in coordinating EU Member State donor activity and assists in the creation of a coherent framework for change. It will be available to international donors for information and advice. It will also provide facilitation and advice to those engaged in policing development, liaison with other stakeholders and will monitor and facilitate project implementation.

In December 2004, the European Council endorsed a programme of action proposed by the High Representative.

The programme aims to promote steps in four areas: security including support to the Palestinian police; Palestinian reforms; elections (the EU monitored the Palestinian presidential elections in January 2005) and economic recovery and development.

The European Council also stressed that these initiatives would need full cooperation from and between the parties, as well as coordination with other partners involved. The European Council reiterated its readiness to support the Palestinian Authority in taking responsibility for law and order.

## APPENDIX 2

### *Factsheet*

#### **EU assistance to the Palestinian civil police**

- The *European Union Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EU COPPS)* was established following an exchange of letters on **20 April 2005** between Palestinian Prime Minister, Ahmed Qureia and EU Special Representative to the Middle East Peace Process, Marc Otte.
- Various factors have contributed to the creation of EU COPPS, *inter alia*:
  - The **recognition** that support to the Palestinian civil police has the potential to contribute to improving the lives of the Palestinian people by reducing crime and insecurity and helping create the conditions for economic recovery, as well and to assist the PA in meeting Roadmap commitments to consolidate its security services and to reform its institutions;
  - the **Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and parts of the West Bank** as of July 2005



with results due by the end of April 2005. It will form the basis for a needs assessment regarding material support for the short-, medium- and long-term. EU COPPS is also co-ordinating the refurbishment of the Jericho Police Training Centre.

- ▶ In the **medium-term**, there is a need to help the police develop a policing strategy as well as the necessary implementing structures and management capacity. This needs to be closely co-ordinated with the implementation of the PA's Roadmap commitments on security.
- ▶ Such efforts will take time and require a **long-term donor commitment**. Objectives would include (a) the development of a coherent legislative framework and proper accountability mechanisms for the police and (b) a contribution to police restructuring. Future projects include conferences and workshops to facilitate transformational planning and involvement of civil society, as well as drug enforcement and training programme (in co-ordination with UN Office on Drug Control and Crime Prevention).
- ▶ EU COPPS will seek **complementarity** with support for reform efforts in the wider criminal justice system. Co-ordination with the EU's Quartet partners as well as with other actors in the security area, notably Egypt, is also sought.
- ▶ Meetings continue to be held with **donor community members** and third parties who have expressed an interest in the work of EU COPPS. At a later stage and depending on how the situation develops on the ground, an expanded EU role in police reform and development could be considered, building on the experience gained by the EU in the field of civil crisis management in different regions (such as the Balkans).

# European Defence Agency

Brussels, 22 April 2005

## EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY STEERING BOARD AGREES TRANSFER OF WEAG/WEAO ACTIVITIES TO EDA

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The Steering Board of the European Defence Agency agreed today on the aim that the Agency should gradually take over the activities, in particular those covering Research & Technology, of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) and the Western European Armaments Organisation (WEAO).

The Steering Board, the principal decision-making body of the EDA on which the 24 participating member states are represented, was meeting for the first time in the formation of Research & Technology Directors. The meeting, the fourth Steering Board session since the Agency was created, was chaired by Mr Dirk Ellinger, R&T Director in the German Defence Ministry, on behalf of Javier Solana, Head of the Agency.

‘We intend to preserve the valuable content and features of existing defence R&T cooperation,’ Ellinger said. ‘But we believe that by bringing these activities under the new EDA framework, we can make collaboration in research and technology more cost-effective and tie it more closely to the capabilities needed to implement the European Security and Defence Policy.’

WEAG, established in 1993 as the successor to the Independent European Programme Group, and WEAO, created in 1996 as an executive body to manage joint research projects, have until now been the main focus for defence research and technology co-operation in Europe. Member States have already agreed to close WEAG from next month and the Steering Board agreed on the need for early complementary legal decisions within WEAO by the Member States concerned to allow the transfer of its functions to the EDA.

The Steering Board decided that the EDA should aim to take over the relevant activities of WEAG and WEAO progressively during 2005 and the first quarter of 2006, when additional resources should be available to EDA to handle transferred contracts.

‘Absorbing the work of WEAG and WEAO into the EDA will give R&T collaboration a much stronger political impulse,’ said EDA Chief Executive Nick Witney.

The Steering Board also approved a set of principles governing the Agency’s Research & Technology functions, including plans to establish networks of experts from governments, research centres, industry and international bodies to collaborate in specific areas.

The ‘operational concept’ for R&T defines the operating principles and internal organisation which will allow the Agency to absorb existing valuable activities such as those from WEAG and WEAO, manage future collaborative projects, put R&T contracts to industry, monitor progress and allow the Steering Board to define and oversee a European defence R&T strategy.

‘The R&T Directors emphasized their commitment to supporting the work of the Agency in this field and intend to remain closely involved in it,’ Ellinger said.

The Steering Board also reviewed the Agency’s work to date on the technology required for Long Endurance Unmanned Air Vehicles for intelligence and surveillance, one of the Agency’s four flagship projects for 2005. The aim is to encourage collaboration within the European industry to demonstrate the technologies required for such UAVs.

‘There are three major and at least five smaller national programmes under way in this area within the EU,’ said Witney. ‘By studying some of the critical technology elements for UAVs together at a European level, we can ensure that research money is spent in the most effective way – one of the central aims of the Agency.’

The Steering Board also heard a presentation from the European Commission on the European security research programme, part of the 7th Framework Research Programme. The EDA will be represented on the European Security Research Advisory Board to identify synergies between the defence R&T work of the Agency and the civilian-oriented security research programme.

## **STEERING BOARD DECISION ON KEY OPERATING RULES FOR THE R&T OPERATIONAL CONCEPT**

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At its meeting of 22 April, the Steering Board in R&T formation decided to approve the key operating rules for the R&T Operational Concept as follows:

### ***1. Capability orientation***

1. Segmentation of the technology playing field in three major blocks corresponding to the three major capability domains (as identified within the Capability Directorate):

- IAP: Information Acquisition & Processing <---> Knowledge
- GEM: Guidance, Energy & Materials <----> Engagement
- ESM: Environment, Systems & Modelling <----> Manoeuvre



2. Mapping of these three blocks through different Capability Technologies (CapTech) areas where cooperation should develop. The technologies covered by each of the CapTechs shall be more precisely defined by using the existing WEAG Technology Taxonomy, to offer an, as much as possible, exhaustive and non overlapping coverage of the technology playing field. For the time being, we are proposing to create 12 CapTechs, to be launched by 1 July 2005 and progressively activated before the end of 2005.

3. Definition of a small number of simple criteria allowing to check how much CapTech's projects are contributing to capability priorities.

## *2. Network centric management*

1. Establishment of a network of pMS experts, including industry and research centre representatives, for each CapTech, and its development according to changing needs.

2. Animation of the work within each CapTech provided by EDA staff, allowing better impetus and permanence on the one hand, transversal exchanges between different CapTechs on the other.

3. Stimulation of the exchanges on line through an adapted and efficient extranet system.

4. Progress of work within CapTech to be monitored on a simple and permanent basis: creation of a centralised and transparent projects scoreboard updated online.

5. Organisation – as need arises – of meetings of CapTech networks, including workshops and seminars, to be held mainly in EDA premises.

## *3. Transparency through monitoring and reporting*

1. The Steering Board to approve on a regular basis an updated R&T roadmap, proposed by the Agency and based on an R&T strategy, as part of EDA long-term vision.

2. In between R&T Steering Board meetings, consultation with pMS, on a regular and bi-directional basis, on overarching strategies and policies, as well as on the implementation and update of this Operational Concept, through Points of Contact – of the appropriate level and competence – delegated for that purpose by R&T Directors.

3. Results of R&T co-operation within EDA to be measurable at the level of the Steering Board: definition of a small set of indicators for that purpose.

4. The output of CapTechs work to be known and understood by end-users: in particular, proper liaison to be established within EDA with Capability and Armaments Directorates.

#### *4. Embracing valuable existing co-operation and networks*

1. Existing networks and working groups are invited to transfer their activities to EDA's R&T organisation, provided they accept above-mentioned structure and management principles.

2. Specifically, the WEAG CEPAs and APGs are welcome, if and when they think they may transfer their activities in one (or several) of the CapTechs. This transfer process should however take place before the end of 2005 (all EDA's CapTechs activated by that date).

#### *5. Effective interface with dual-use and civil research*

1. CapTechs expertise and networks to contribute identifying where synergies with dual-use and non-defence security research exist, and where there could be a risk of duplication on dual-use research funding.

2. EDA to provide advice on priorities for security research.

#### *6. Involvement of industry*

1. Participation of industry in each of the CapTech networks under specified conditions (identification of companies and experts in liaison with EDA I&M Directorate).

2. Ideas and proposals from industry (bottom-up) to be recognised and stimulated.

3. Guidelines – based on identified capability needs – for approval or selection of industry projects within EDA framework.

4. Visits of industrial sites and facilities organised when needed for CapTechs purposes.

5. Each CapTech tasked with identifying technical capabilities and centres of excellence in its area of responsibility.

## 7. Using EDA contracting capacity for R&T

1. The Agency to fund and manage R&T studies and projects, selected on transparent and understandable criteria, linked to capability-oriented priorities (article 13.2.a).ii), 17 and 20 of JA).
2. The Agency to provide support, including contracting if asked, to R&T co-operative projects proposed by a limited number of pMS (articles 17 and 21 of the JA).
3. Both types of contracts to be managed in each of the CapTechs (with the support of EDA's corporate services).

### *Conclusion*

Implementation of the above-described 7 operating rules leads to:

- A. An organisation for EDA's R&T Directorate.
- B. A structured internal dialogue between R&T Directorate and the other 3 EDA functional Directorates.
- C. A good visibility from the decision-making level (EDA Steering Board) on both the strategy and the output of R&T co-operation within EDA framework.
- D. A capacity to identify Defence R&T priorities based on capability needs.
- E. An active but controlled participation of industry in the process.
- F. Practical proposals for taking over WEAG Panel II activities.
- G. A structured and constructive dialogue with the European Commission on dual-use and security research.
- H. A capacity to provide analysis and data for DTIB monitoring.

## External Relations Council

Luxembourg, 25 April 2005

(...)

### **EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI IN THE INDIAN OCEAN**

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The Council took note of the Commission's presentation of two communications<sup>1</sup> and a report from the Secretary-General/High Representative, Javier Solana, on the follow-up to the action plan launched by the Council for the regions affected by the earthquake and tidal wave in the Indian Ocean on 26 December 2004.

The Council instructed its preparatory bodies to prepare a more detailed debate on that basis, to take place in the presence of development ministers at the meeting on 23 and 24 May.

### **MIDDLE EAST**

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#### *Iraq – Council conclusions*

Council adopted the following conclusions:

'The Council encourages the swift formation of the Iraqi transitional government as an important further step in the process of Iraq's political transition under Resolution 1546. The Council reiterates its willingness to work with the transitional National Assembly and the Iraqi transitional government. In this connection, the Council congratulates Mr Jalal Talabani on his inauguration as President of Iraq and Mr Hajim al-Hassani on his election as President of the transitional National Assembly.

The Council reaffirms the EU's willingness to continue implementation of the full assistance programme it presented to Iraq on 5 November 2004 and in its conclusions of 21 February 2005 in order to achieve the objective of a safe, stable, unified, prosperous and democratic Iraq that upholds human rights, fully exercises its sovereignty and cooperates constructively with its neighbours and with the international community. The Council expresses its satisfaction at the progress made by the Commission in implementing that full assistance programme and its support for the next stages of discussions with the Iraqi authorities. The Council would also recall the willingness of the

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1. COM (2005) 153: Reinforcing EU Disaster and Crisis Response in third countries, and COM (2005) 137: Improving the Community Civil Protection Mechanism.

Commission and the Member States, if asked by the Iraqis, to provide support for the constitutional process in accordance with Resolution 1546 and in full coordination with the UN. It supports and encourages the Iraqi authorities in pursuing the full involvement of all sections of Iraqi society in the constitutional process and in promoting genuine national dialogue.

In this connection, the Council also reaffirms its willingness to set up with the Iraqi transitional government a political dialogue on areas of mutual interest and to develop for this purpose contacts between the European Union and Iraq, including at ministerial level. Depending on political developments in Iraq, a visit by the Troika to the elected transitional government may help deepen relations between the EU and Iraq with a view to establishing a regular political dialogue.

The Council reiterates the European Union's commitment to contribute to the economic, social and political reconstruction of Iraq and its support for the UN's activities. It reaffirms that it is prepared to organise, together with the United States, in close collaboration with Iraq and the UN, and should the new Iraqi government so request, an international conference to foster, enhance and coordinate the international community's support for Iraq during the transitional period, as announced at the EU-United States summit meeting in Brussels on 22 February 2005.'

### *Middle East peace process – Council Conclusions*

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

'The Council notes the ongoing contacts between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and the commitment made by both parties to stop all acts of violence and to cease all military activity in parallel. However, the Council is concerned to note the lack of dynamism in the implementation of the commitments made at Sharm el Sheikh. At a time when there is a genuine window of opportunity, a lack of real and tangible progress could threaten the relaunch of the peace process. The European Union calls on Israelis and Palestinians urgently to renew their efforts to implement the commitments they made in Sharm el Sheikh and to avoid any action likely to undermine the climate of mutual confidence.

The Council is particularly concerned by the announcement of increased settlement-building in the West Bank, even though the Road Map provides for a freeze. It is also concerned by continuing construction of the separation barrier in the occupied Palestinian territories, including within and around East Jerusalem. Settlement policy threatens to make a solution based on the coexistence of two States physically impossible. The Council reaffirms its position that no party should take unilateral measures which might prejudice the outcome of negotiations on the final settlement. It welcomes recent statements by President Bush concerning a freeze on settlement activity.

The Road Map remains the main tool for the relaunch of the Peace Process. The Council recalls its support for Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and certain parts of the

northern West Bank insofar as they satisfy the conditions set out in the conclusions of the March 2004 European Council. The Council stresses the importance of accelerating reforms within the Palestinian Authority and welcomes the measures recently taken as regards the reorganisation of the Palestinian security services.

The Council welcomes the appointment of the current President of the World Bank, Mr Wolfensohn, as the Quartet's envoy for disengagement. The European Union undertakes to provide its political and practical support for the success of his mission, and welcomes the willingness expressed by both parties to cooperate with his efforts to ensure the success of the withdrawal.

The European Union is determined to support the parties in their efforts to make progress in the Peace Process and to achieve the objective of the coexistence of two States, by the creation of an independent, democratic, continuous and viable Palestinian State, living side by side with Israel and its other neighbours in peace and security.

The political perspective set out in the Road Map, which must be rapidly implemented, remains the international community's objective.'

### *Lebanon – Council Conclusions*

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

'The Council would point to the importance it attaches to full implementation of Security Council Resolution 1559 and reaffirms its full support for the mission of the United Nations Secretary-General's Special Envoy Terje Roed-Larsen. It welcomes the continuing withdrawal of Syrian troops and expects all Syrian troops and security services to have been withdrawn from Lebanon by 30 April 2005. In this connection, the Council awaits with interest the United Nations Secretary-General's report on the implementation of Resolution 1559.

The Council takes note of the appointment of Mr Najib Miqati as President of the Council of Ministers of Lebanon and welcomes the formation of the new government. It expresses the wish that this government will be able to organise, on schedule, free, fair and transparent elections, conducted without any outside interference or meddling, and under local and international monitoring.

The Council reaffirms its readiness to provide assistance for the electoral process in Lebanon which might, with the Lebanese Government's consent, include the dispatch of an election observation mission.

The Council welcomes the unanimous adoption, on 7 April 2005, of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1595 and the decision to establish an independent international commission of enquiry based in Lebanon to assist the Lebanese authorities in investigating all aspects of the attack on 14 February 2005. It is the Council's wish that this commission be able to start work quickly so that those responsible for the assassination of Mr Rafik Hariri can be brought to justice in Lebanon.'

## WESTERN BALKANS – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

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The Council adopted the following conclusions:

### ‘SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO

The Council welcomed the Commission’s presentation of its communication on the state of preparations in Serbia and Montenegro for the negotiation of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the European Union, an agreement based on the dual approach as confirmed in the conclusions of 11 October 2004. It expressed its agreement with the Commission’s conclusions. It recognised the substantial progress made by Serbia and Montenegro and invited the Commission to build on that dynamic with a view to submitting draft negotiating directives as quickly as possible.

The Council confirmed that the European Union wished to enter into negotiations as soon as possible with a view to concluding a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Serbia and Montenegro. The Council reaffirmed its commitment to a strengthened State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, based on the constitutional charter. It called on the State Union and its two Republics to pursue those negotiations without weakening their own preparations or the implementation of the necessary reforms, taking full account of the points raised in the Commission’s communication. The Council also welcomed the political agreement on the constitutional amendments concerning the question of direct elections to the State Union Assembly, and called on the relevant parliaments to ratify that agreement without delay.

The Council welcomed the Commission’s intention of intensifying discussions with the authorities of Serbia and Montenegro in the context of the enhanced permanent dialogue in order to support the current reform process and with a view to backing the efforts being made by Serbia and Montenegro before the formal opening of negotiations and throughout that process.

The speed at which Serbia and Montenegro, like all the countries in the Western Balkans, will move closer to the European Union will depend on how quickly the Union and the two Republics adopt and implement the necessary reforms and conform to the Copenhagen criteria and to the requirements of the stabilisation and association process, including full cooperation with the ICTY.

The Council, recalling United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1503 and 1534, expects the recent improvement in cooperation with the ICTY to continue and be strengthened until all those accused who continue to evade international justice are brought before the Tribunal.

## SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO/KOSOVO

The Council took note of the Commission's communication on the European future of Kosovo. This communication, which constitutes an important contribution to the report which it had requested from the SG/HR and the Commission, in close cooperation with the Presidency, at its meeting on 21 February 2005, confirms Kosovo's long-term European prospects and the importance of implementing standards.

## FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

The Council noted the holding of local elections. It encouraged the elected municipal officials to commit themselves wholeheartedly to the important decentralisation reform. While noting the largely peaceful conduct of the local elections, the Council nevertheless expressed disappointment at the irregularities observed by the ODIHR and other international observers in certain constituencies. The holding of free and democratic elections, in accordance with international standards, is an essential requirement for closer relations with the EU. The Council underlined the importance of pursuing and punishing those responsible for irregularities and taking the measures necessary to ensure that such irregularities do not recur in future elections, as the Government has stated to be its intention.

The Council noted recent developments concerning the dispute as to the name of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and, in particular, all of the ideas put forward by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, whose efforts it supports. The Council encouraged Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to intensify their efforts with a view to finding a negotiated and mutually acceptable solution within the framework of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 817/93 and 845/93 as quickly as possible.'

## **RUSSIA**

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The Council took note of the information provided by the Presidency, the Secretary General/High Representative and the Commission on preparations for the EU-Russia Summit to be held in Moscow on 10 May 2005 and of the input from delegations and instructed the Presidency and the Commission to finalise preparations for the summit on that basis.

The main aim of the summit in Moscow is to adopt a package of four road maps to create four common EU-Russia spaces in the fields of the economy, freedom, security and justice, external security, research and education (including cultural aspects).

The summit will be the fifteenth to take place under the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Russia.



## AFRICA

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### *Great Lakes – Council conclusions*

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘The transition process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has reached a decisive phase. Although considerable progress has been made since 2003, there are also considerable challenges still to be met. The Council calls on the Presidential milieu, the transition institutions and their representatives to remain steadfast in their commitment to implementing the transition agenda and to strengthening good governance. The Council reaffirms its determination to support the transition. The Council invites the political opposition to play a constructive role in the implementation of the transition in a climate of social calm.

A reliable electoral process, and free and transparent elections in accordance with the provisions of the 2002 peace agreements, are the main objective of the transition. The National Assembly should quickly adopt the new Constitution which will ensure institutional stability after the elections and which meets international standards. The various legislative, organisational, security and communications aspects of the electoral process and the elections are the responsibility of the Congolese authorities and call for sustained action on their part. The Council is ready to offer continued support for this process.

The demobilisation of the combatants and reform of the security sector are crucial to the success of the transition and to the post-crisis strategy in the DRC. The Council is concerned at the delays in these areas. In this context, the Council declares its full support for MONUC, in particular in its efforts to support these processes. In order to bring about stability and security, the Council calls on the Government of the DRC to take the measures necessary to ensure the regular payment of soldiers’ wages. Furthermore, it calls on the Congolese government and the MDRP (Multi country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme) partners to do everything in their power to expedite the demobilisation process. The European Union also asks the Congolese Government to give equal priority to the implementation of the strategic election security plan. The EUPOL police mission, and shortly the EUSEC security sector reform advisory mission, boost the efforts already being made by the Commission and the Member States in the area of security sector reform. The European Union and its Member States are ready to consider support on a more practical level for the integration of the Congolese army, particularly on the basis of feedback from the EUSEC mission.

The Council is concerned about the negative trend in macro-economic indicators, which risk damaging political and economic stability, and invites the Congolese Government to take the corrective measures necessary to ensure good governance and transparency without delay.

The Council takes note of the current state of funding for elements of the transition, as presented by the Commission, and asks Member States and the Commission to examine the possibilities for further support, as well as the terms on which such support might be provided.

The Council welcomes the declaration made by the FDLR (Forces for the Democratic Liberation of Rwanda) in Rome and encourages their leadership in Europe and on the spot to carry through those commitments without delay. The EU calls on the DRC and Rwandan Governments to work together and cooperate closely with MONUC to ensure that the FDLR forces are disarmed, repatriated and reintegrated in line with the proposed timetable, which would constitute an important step in the Great Lakes Region peace process. The Council encourages the Congolese and Rwandan Governments to make the most of this opportunity and to cooperate closely to successfully complete the peace process. The Council is pleased at MONUC's robust action against armed groups in the East of Congolese territory and fully supports the continuation of the mission throughout the territory and its readiness to assist the voluntary return of the FDLR.

The Council notes the progress achieved in Burundi and expresses its satisfaction with the outcome of the Summit of the Regional Initiative in Entebbe, held on 22 April 2005. It reiterates the importance it attaches to the current electoral process, in the context of which the establishment and publication of an electoral timetable during the Summit of the Regional Initiative constitute an important step. This must ensure the swift holding of properly organised elections. The Council is ready to provide continued financial support for this process. It is pleased at the progress made with the DDR process and with security sector reform, which it will continue to support. It notes with satisfaction the recent declaration by the FNL rebel group and calls on it to join the peace process. It expresses its satisfaction with the decisions taken in this regard by the Regional Initiative and congratulates the regional mediators, especially Tanzania, for their efforts in this area. It would urge all the parties in Burundi to do everything possible to ensure a positive outcome to the negotiations between the Government and the FNL.'

### *Zimbabwe*

The Council held an exchange of views on the recent parliamentary elections in Zimbabwe.

### *Sudan*

The Council held an exchange of views on the situation in Sudan, inter alia in the light of the adoption of UN Security Council Resolutions 1590, 1591 and 1593.

Delegations reiterated their concerns regarding the situation in Darfur. They called

on the parties to comply with the undertaking they had given to seek a peaceful and negotiated solution to the conflict.

The Council also confirmed its willingness to continue to support the efforts of the African Union by providing assistance to strengthen the AU mission in Darfur.

(...)

## **EUSEC RD Congo – Council Joint Action**

Brussels, 2 May 2005

### **COUNCIL JOINT ACTION ON THE EUROPEAN UNION MISSION TO PROVIDE ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE FOR SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (DRC)**

#### **THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,**

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 14, the third paragraph of Article 25, Article 26 and Article 28(3), first subparagraph thereof,

Whereas:

- (1) On 12 April 2005, the Council adopted Common Position 2005/304/CFSP concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa and repealing Common Position 2004/85/CFSP<sup>(1)</sup>.
- (2) On 22 November 2004, the Council approved an action plan for ESDP support to Peace and Security in Africa. It approved guidelines for implementing that Action Plan on 13 December 2004.
- (3) On 13 December 2004, the Council, in its conclusions, stated the EU's readiness to contribute to security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
- (4) On 28 June 2004, the Council adopted Joint Action 2004/530/CFSP<sup>(2)</sup> extending and amending the mandate of Mr Aldo Ajello as the Special Representative of the European Union for the African Great Lakes Region.
- (5) On 9 December 2004, the Council adopted Joint Action 2004/874/CFSP on the European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa (DRC) regarding the Integrated Police Unit (EUPOL 'Kinshasa')<sup>(3)</sup>.
- (6) The Global and Inclusive Agreement signed by the Congolese parties in Pretoria on 17 December 2002, followed by the Final Act signed in Sun City on 2 April 2003, has initi-

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(1) OJ L 97, 15.4.2005, p. 57.

(2) OJ L 234, 3.7.2004, p. 13, as amended by Joint Action 2005/96/CFSP (OJ L 31, 4.2.2005, p. 70)

(3) OJ L 367, 14.12.2004, p. 30.

ated a transition process in the DRC which includes establishing a restructured and integrated national army.

(7) On 30 March 2005, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1592 (2005) on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in which it reaffirmed, inter alia, its support for the transition process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, urged the Government of National Unity and Transition to carry out reform of the security sector and decided to extend and strengthen the mandate of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), as contained in Resolution 1565 (2004).

(8) On 26 April 2005, the DRC government sent an official invitation to the Secretary-General/High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (SG/HR) with a view to obtaining assistance from the European Union through the establishment of a team to provide the Congolese authorities with advice and assistance for security sector reform.

(9) The current security situation in the DRC may deteriorate, with potentially serious repercussions for the process of strengthening democracy, the rule of law and international and regional security. A continued commitment of EU political effort and resources will help to embed stability in the region.

(10) On 12 April 2005, the Council approved the General Concept for setting up a mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

(11) The status of the mission will be subject to consultation with the DRC government with a view to ensuring that the Status of Mission Agreement relating to EUPOL 'Kinshasa' is applicable to the mission and its staff,

## HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

### *Article 1*

#### **Mission**

1. The European Union hereby establishes a mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) called EUSEC DR Congo with the aim of contributing to a successful integration of the army in the DRC. The mission must provide the Congolese authorities responsible for secu-

rity with advice and assistance, while taking care to promote policies compatible with human rights and international humanitarian law, democratic standards and the principles of good governance, transparency and respect for the rule of law.

2. The mission shall operate in accordance with the objectives and other provisions as contained in the mission statement set out in Article 2.

## *Article 2*

### **Mission Statement**

The mission shall aim, in close cooperation and coordination with the other actors in the international community, to provide practical support for the integration of the Congolese army and good governance in the field of security, as set out in the General Concept, including identifying and contributing to the development of various projects and options that the European Union and/or its Member States may decide to support in this area.

## *Article 3*

### **Structure of the mission**

The mission shall be structured as follows:

- (a) an office in Kinshasa, composed of the Head of Mission and staff not attached to the Congolese authorities;
- (b) experts assigned, inter alia, to the following key posts within the Congolese administration:
  - the private office of the Minister for Defence,
  - the combined general staff, including the integrated military structure (IMS),
  - the army general staff,
  - the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (Conader), and
  - the Joint Operational Committee.

## *Article 4*

### **Preparatory stage**

1. The General Secretariat of the Council, assisted by the Head of Mission, shall draw up an implementation plan for the mission.
2. The implementation plan and the launching of the mission shall be approved by the Council.

## *Article 5*

### **Head of Mission**

1. General Pierre Michel JOANA is hereby appointed Head of Mission. The Head of Mission shall assume day-to-day management of the mission and shall be responsible for staff and disciplinary matters.
2. The Head of Mission shall sign a contract with the Commission.
3. All mission experts shall remain under the authority of the appropriate Member State or EU institution, and shall fulfil their duties and act in the interest of the mission. Both during and after the mission, mission experts shall exercise the greatest discretion with regard to all facts and information relating to the mission.

## *Article 6*

### **Staff**

1. Mission experts shall be seconded by Member States and by the EU institutions. Except for the Head of Mission, each Member State or institution shall bear the costs relating to the experts seconded by it, including salaries, medical coverage, travel expenses to and from the DRC and allowances, other than per diem and housing allowances.
2. International civilian staff and local staff shall be recruited on a contractual basis by the mission as required.

## *Article 7*

### **Chain of command**

The mission shall have a unified chain of command:

- The Head of Mission shall lead the advice and assistance team, assume its day-to-day management and report to the SG/HR through the EUSR.
- The EUSR shall report to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and to the Council through the SG/HR.
- The SG/HR shall give guidance to the Head of Mission through the EUSR.
- The PSC shall exercise political control and strategic direction.

## *Article 8*

### **Political control and strategic direction**

1. Under the responsibility of the Council, the PSC shall exercise the political control and strategic direction of the mission. The Council hereby authorises the PSC to take the

relevant decisions in accordance with Article 25 of the Treaty. This authorisation shall include the power to amend the implementation plan and the chain of command. It shall also include powers to take subsequent decisions regarding the appointment of the Head of Mission. The power of decision with respect to the objectives and termination of the mission shall remain vested in the Council, assisted by the SG/HR.

2. The EUSR shall provide the Head of Mission with the political guidance required to fulfil his duties at local level.
3. The PSC shall report to the Council at regular intervals, taking into account the EUSR reports.
4. The PSC shall receive, at regular intervals, reports by the Head of Mission regarding its conduct. The PSC may invite the Head of Mission to its meetings as appropriate.

## *Article 9*

### **Financial arrangements**

1. The financial reference amount to cover expenditure relating to the mission shall be EUR 1 600 000.
2. As regards expenditure financed out of the amount stipulated in paragraph 1, the following shall apply:
  - (a) expenditure shall be managed in accordance with the Community rules and procedures applicable to the budget, with the exception that any pre-financing shall not remain the property of the Community. Nationals of third States shall be allowed to tender for contracts;
  - (b) the Head of Mission shall report fully to, and be supervised by, the Commission regarding the activities undertaken in the framework of his contract.
3. The financial arrangements shall respect the operational requirements of the mission, including compatibility of equipment.

## *Article 10*

### **Community action**

1. In accordance with his mandate, the EUSR shall be responsible for coordination with other EU players as well as relations with host State authorities.
2. Without prejudice to the chain of command, the Head of Mission shall act in coordination with EUPOL 'Kinshasa' so as to ensure that the two missions are consistent with



the broader context of EU activities in the DRC. The Head of Mission shall cooperate with the other international players present, in particular MONUC and the third States involved in the DRC.

3. Without prejudice to the chain of command, the Head of Mission shall also act in coordination with the Commission delegation.

4. The Head of Mission shall cooperate with the other international players present, in particular MONUC and the third States involved in the DRC.

### *Article 11*

#### **Release of classified information**

The Council takes note of the Commission's intention to direct its action, where appropriate, towards achieving the objectives of this Joint Action.

### *Article 12*

#### **Release of classified information**

1. The SG/HR is authorised to release to the United Nations, third States and the host State, in accordance with the operational needs of the mission, EU classified information and documents generated for the purposes of the mission, in accordance with the Council's security regulations.

2. The SG/HR is authorised to release to the United Nations, third States and the host State EU non-classified documents relating to the deliberations of the Council with regard to the mission covered by the obligation of professional secrecy pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Council Rules of Procedure.

### *Article 13*

#### **Status of the mission and of its staff**

1. The status of the mission and of its staff shall be governed by arrangement with the competent authorities of the DRC.

2. The State or Community institution having seconded a staff member shall be responsible for dealing with any complaints linked to the secondment, from or concerning the staff member. The State or Community institution in question shall be responsible for bringing any action against the person seconded.

## *Article 14*

### **Evaluation of the mission**

The PSC shall evaluate the initial results of the mission at the latest six months after the launching of the mission and shall submit its conclusions to the Council, including, if applicable, a recommendation that the Council should take a decision to extend or amend the mandate of the mission.

## *Article 15*

### **Entry into force, duration and expenditure**

1. This Joint Action shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

It shall apply until 2 May 2006.

2. The expenditure shall be eligible after the adoption of the Joint Action.

## *Article 16*

### **Publication**

This Joint Action shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Brussels, 2 May 2005.

*For the Council*

*The President*

J. Asselborn

# Council of the European Union 15<sup>th</sup> EU-Russia Summit

Moscow, 10 May 2005

## PRESS RELEASE

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(...)

Further to a decision at the EU/Russia Summit in St. Petersburg on 31 May 2003 to create in the long term a Common Economic Space, a Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice, a Space of Co-operation in the field External Security, as well as a Space of Research and Education, including Cultural Aspects, in the framework of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA), the leaders of the EU and Russia today adopted a single package of road maps for the creation of the four Common Spaces (in annex). These Road Maps set out shared objectives for EU/Russia relations as well as the actions necessary to make these objectives a reality, and determine the agenda for co-operation between the EU and Russia for the medium-term.

### *Common Economic Space*

The objective of the common economic space is to create an open and integrated market between the EU and Russia. Work on this space will bring down barriers to trade and investment and promote reforms and competitiveness, based on the principles of nondiscrimination, transparency and good governance. Among the wide range of actions foreseen in the road map, an EU/Russia regulatory dialogue on industrial products is to be launched, as well as greater co-operation on investment issues, competition and financial services. It is also foreseen to enhance co-operation in the telecommunications, transport and energy fields, on issues such as regulatory standard-setting and infrastructure development. Moreover, it has been agreed to strengthen co-operation in the area of environment, notably on climate change and the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, and outer space activities, such as space launching.

### *Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice*

The underlying principles of the common space of freedom, security and justice are democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including free and independent media and the effective application of common values by independent judicial systems. Work on this space will see adoption in the near future of agreements on readmission and visa facilitation, which together will promote greater contact

between the citizens of the EU and Russia via travel and tourism as well as facilitate business and official travel. The EU will continue to examine with Russia the conditions for visa-free travel as a long-term perspective. The regular EU/Russia consultations on human rights, which were successfully launched in March, fall within this space, as does co-operation on combating terrorism, organised crime and corruption.

### *Common Space of External Security*

The road map for the Common Space of External Security underlines the shared responsibility of the EU and Russia for an international order based on effective multilateralism, their determination to co-operate to strengthen the central role of the United Nations, and promote the role and effectiveness of relevant international and regional organisations, in particular the OSCE and the Council of Europe. Building further on their already on-going co-operation, the EU and Russia will strengthen their cooperation and dialogue on security and crisis management in order to address the global and regional challenges and key threats of today, notably terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, existing and potential regional and local conflicts. They will give particular attention to securing international stability, including in the regions adjacent to Russian and EU borders, where they will co-operate to promote resolution of frozen conflicts in Europe (e.g. in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh), in line with UN and OSCE commitments. The EU will continue to provide support through humanitarian assistance, economic rehabilitation, confidence building and efforts to tackle poverty and human rights abuses.

### *Common space on research, education and culture*

Work to create the common space of research and education, including cultural aspects, aims to capitalise on the strength of EU and Russian research communities and cultural and intellectual heritage by identifying key measures to promote economic growth and strengthen competitiveness, reinforce links between research and innovation, encourage close cooperation in the field of education – including the convergence of university course formats and qualifications – and promote cultural and linguistic diversity. A European institute in Moscow, co-funded by the EU and Russia, is to be set up in 2006.

The leaders of the EU and Russia also briefly discussed the future of EU/Russia relations after the expiry of the first period of validity of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) in 2007.

The leaders of the EU and Russia addressed in a constructive spirit internal developments in the EU and Russia, including the situation in Chechnya. They also discussed a wide range of international issues.

(...)

## ANNEX: ROAD MAP FOR THE COMMON SPACE OF EXTERNAL SECURITY

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### *1. Objectifs*

The EU and Russia share responsibility for an international order based on effective multilateralism. They will therefore co-operate to strengthen the central role of the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and act effectively, and promote the role and effectiveness of relevant international and regional organisations, in particular the OSCE and Council of Europe, as well as regimes and treaties, which make an important contribution to a more just and secure world.

The EU and Russia will also strengthen co-operation and dialogue on security and crisis management in order to address the global and regional challenges and key threats of today, notably terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, existing and potential regional and local conflicts. They will give particular attention to securing international stability, including in the regions adjacent to the EU and Russian borders.

The EU and Russia recognize that processes of regional cooperation and integration in which they participate and which are based on the sovereign decisions of States, play an important role in strengthening security and stability. They agree to actively promote them in a mutually beneficial manner, through close result-oriented EU-Russia collaboration and dialogue, thereby contributing effectively to creating a greater Europe without dividing lines and based on common values.

The EU and Russia share common values, as defined in the Helsinki Final Act as well as in the PCA and other relevant international documents notably respect for international law, including respect for democratic principles and human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, equality and respect of mutual interests. The EU and Russia will aim at preventing the spread of practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance. EU-Russia co-operation will aim at strengthening international peace and stability, in accordance with the UN Charter, creating favourable external conditions for security and prosperity in the European Union and Russia.

### *2. Scope*

In order to pursue these common objectives, the European Union and the Russian Federation will enhance co-operation in the following priority areas:

- ▶ Strengthened dialogue and co-operation on the international scene;
- ▶ Fight against terrorism;
- ▶ Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, strengthening of export control regimes and disarmament;

- ▶ Co-operation in crisis management;
- ▶ Co-operation in the field of civil protection.

These objectives, that do not exclude the possibility of elaborating action plans for particular areas of EU-Russia co-operation in the sphere of external security, will be monitored within existing formats at the meetings of the PSC Troika at Ambassadors' level and at Political Directors' consultations. The parties will report on the implementation of this Road map to the PPC Ministerial meetings and/or Ministerial EU/Troika-Russia meetings. Conclusions will be formulated as required at EU-Russia summits. This Road Map can be amended by mutual consent and upon proposal of either of the parties. Work will continue to further develop and operationalise the political dialogue and cooperation, including the exploration of appropriate ways and modalities in order to ensure full implementation of the Road Map.

### **1. Strengthened dialogue and co-operation on the international scene**

**Objective:** to strengthen EU-Russia dialogue and co-operation on the international scene, in particular in regions adjacent to the EU and Russian borders, both bilaterally and within international and regional organisations with the aim to promote security and stability based on international law and respect for democratic principles and human rights. In order to pursue this overall objective, the EU and Russia will enhance co-operation in the following priority areas:

- ▶ Strengthening and deepening of the EU-Russia bilateral dialogue on political and security issues and on human rights;
- ▶ Strengthening of the international order based on effective multilateralism in support of the United Nations playing the central role, and of other relevant international and regional organisations, in particular the OSCE and the Council of Europe. This will include full implementation of all international commitments, including the OSCE commitments;
- ▶ Promoting conflict prevention and settlement through mutual result-oriented cooperation, including through elaboration of possible joint initiatives in support of efforts in agreed formats as well as by relevant international organizations and structures, in particular the UN and the OSCE. To this end the EU and Russia will consult, on a regular basis, on early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management actions and post-conflict rehabilitation;
- ▶ Exchange of views on new initiatives and on possible use of instruments related to security and stability;
- ▶ Strengthened political dialogue at all levels on EU and Russian security and foreign policy strategies and concepts, and academic co-operation in this field;
- ▶ Exchange of information on relevant major international contacts of the EU and Russian officials with respect to the space of external security;
- ▶ Promotion of contacts between the EU and Russian military structures, including the

European Defence Agency;

- ▶ Optimisation of agenda and parameters of political dialogue with a view to making the dialogue more effective;
- ▶ Exchange of relevant experts of the EU Institute for Security Studies and the network of Russian academic bodies with a view of possible joint research projects concerning security problems.

## 2. Fight against terrorism

**Objective:** to work together at the international level to prevent and combat terrorism in accordance with international law, in particular international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law.

In order to pursue this overall objective, EU and Russia will enhance co-operation in the following priority areas:

- ▶ Implementation of the Joint Statement on the fight against terrorism adopted in November 2002;
- ▶ Intensification and enhancement of co-operation between the EU and Russia in all relevant international and regional fora (including, inter alia, the UNSC Counterterrorism Committee), including improvement of capacity of third countries to fight terrorism;
- ▶ Co-operation within the UN in implementing UNSC resolutions, in particular 1373 and 1566, with a view to further improving and strengthening international efforts in the fight against terrorism;
- ▶ Cooperation between the EU and Russia, in accordance with their obligations under international law, in order to find, deny safe haven and bring to justice, on the basis of the principle to extradite or prosecute, any person who supports, facilitates, participates or attempts to participate in the financing, planning, preparation or commission of terrorist acts or provides safe havens;
- ▶ Co-operation within the UN on elaborating under UN aegis an integrated strategy to respond to global threats and challenges of the 21st century in the context of advancing towards the goals approved in the UN Millennium Declaration;
- ▶ Becoming party to all 12 UN counter-terrorism conventions and protocols and implementing fully their provisions;
- ▶ Promotion of the early signature and ratification of the UN International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism;
- ▶ Promotion of the early finalisation of the UN Comprehensive Convention Against International Terrorism;
- ▶ Co-operation within the Council of Europe for developing and adopting instruments in the fight against terrorism;
- ▶ Cooperation within the OSCE as a forum for the promotion of international norms and standards and taking collective decisions on crucial matters of European security in order to strengthen its antiterrorist efforts as well as promoting implementation of

OSCE commitments in this field;

- ▶ Develop co-operation to strengthen the fight against the financing of terrorism, including freezing of funds and other terrorist assets, in accordance with the relevant international instruments.

Co-operation will be intensified through dialogue at both political and expert level between the relevant EU and Russian bodies inter alia by:

- ▶ Information exchange on the issues of the fight against terrorism through consultations in Brussels and in Moscow or by other means;
- ▶ Consultations on the eve of major antiterrorist meetings to exchange views on positions and possible joint actions;
- ▶ Consultations during such events to co-ordinate positions and activities.

### **3. Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, strengthening of export control regimes and disarmament**

**Objective:** to strengthen EU-Russia dialogue and co-operation on non-proliferation, export controls and disarmament with a view to possible closing in of positions as well as coordination of actions within existing international fora.

In order to pursue this overall objective, EU and Russia will enhance co-operation in the following priority areas:

- ▶ Dialogue on non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control, including regional aspects, for further convergence of positions and possible co-ordination of activities within existing international mechanisms, including relevant international and regional fora;
- ▶ Promotion of universal adherence to and greater effectiveness of the relevant international instruments (such as NPT, CWC, BTWC, CTBT, IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards and Additional Protocol, HCOC), enhancement and, where relevant, enlargement of export control regimes (MTCR, NSG, WA), promotion of a policy of reinforcing compliance with multilateral treaty regimes and other international obligations such as UN Security Council resolution 1540, as well as strengthening of export controls for WMD, their means of delivery, conventional weapons and related goods and technologies;
- ▶ Enhancement of ongoing work, including in the context of the G8 Global Partnership in accordance with the Kananaskis documents, including new projects in the priority areas identified at Kananaskis;
- ▶ Strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament activities (e.g. coordination of EU and Russian positions at the 2005 NPT Review Conference, promotion of earliest entry into force of CTBT, contribution to early commencement of negotiations on a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices) and arms control;
- ▶ Strengthening of chemical and biological non-proliferation activities (e.g. co-ope-



tion on implementing action plans of promoting the CWC universality and national implementation, strengthening of BTWC through promoting its universality and implementation as well as developing adequate measures to verify compliance with the BTWC;

- ▶ Co-operation on further universalisation of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile proliferation (HCOC) in facilitating subscription in particular of countries possessing missile technology or capability to develop it and on furthering implementation of the Code's confidence building measures;
- ▶ Dialogue on the opportunity of developing a legally binding arrangement for a global system of control for the non-proliferation of missiles and their related technology, taking into account the wide subscription to the HCOC and efforts on establishing a link with the UN;
- ▶ Active support through the UN and the Conference on Disarmament to the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space as an essential condition for the strengthening of strategic stability and for the promotion of international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes;
- ▶ Comparative analysis of EU's and Russian approaches to non-proliferation with a view to elaborating a joint document on strategic partnership in this area by 2006;
- ▶ Enhancement of ongoing work on threats posed by old ammunition, including antipersonnel land-mines, and explosive remnants of war;
- ▶ Strengthening co-operation to resume substantial work of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva;
- ▶ Establishment of a channel for regular exchange of views within existing formats on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons;
- ▶ Dialogue on the implementation of the UN Programme of Action on the illicit trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its aspects.

Co-operation will be intensified through dialogue at both political and expert level between relevant EU and Russian bodies, inter alia by:

- ▶ Information exchange on the issues of non-proliferation through consultations in Brussels and in Moscow or by other means;
- ▶ Consultations on the eve of major non-proliferation or disarmament events to exchange views on positions and possible joint activities;
- ▶ Consultations during such events to exchange views on positions and to co-ordinate activities;
- ▶ Paying special attention to co-operation and regular consultations between the EU and Russia in the context of the G8 Global Partnership.

#### **4. Co-operation in crisis management**

**Objective:** strengthen EU-Russia dialogue on matters of practical co-operation on crisis management in order to prepare the ground for joint initiatives, including in support of

ongoing efforts in agreed formats and resulting from the strengthened EU-Russia dialogue and co-operation on the international scene, in the settlement of regional conflicts, inter alia in regions adjacent to EU and Russian borders.

In order to pursue this overall objective, the EU and Russia will enhance co-operation in the following priority areas:

- ▶ Exchange of views at expert level on matters related to the EU's and Russia's procedures in response to crisis situations, including exchange of views on lessons learnt, in order to improve mutual understanding of respective procedures and concepts and to explore possibilities for joint approaches. This exchange of views could lead to the development of principles and modalities for joint approaches in crisis management;
- ▶ Conclusion of a standing framework on legal and financial aspects in order to facilitate possible co-operation in crisis management operations;
- ▶ Conclusion of an agreement on information protection;
- ▶ Experts' exchange of views on specific areas like logistical aspects of crisis management operations, naval forces co-operation in the sphere of navigation and hydrography, underwater exploration with a view of ensuring navigation safety, hydrometeorology and early warning of disasters, co-operation of the EU Satellite Centre with Russia;
- ▶ Consideration of possibilities for co-operation in the field of long-haul air transport;
- ▶ Co-operation in the field of training and exercises which could include observation and participation in exercises organized by either Russia or the EU and participation in training courses;
- ▶ Strengthening of the EU-Russia academic networking in the field of crisis management through exchange of research fellows between the EU Institute for Security Studies and the network of Russian academic bodies for the purpose of joint studies;
- ▶ Promotion of contacts between the EU and Russian military and civilian crisis management structures.

##### **5. Co-operation in the field of civil protection**

**Objective:** strengthen EU-Russia dialogue and co-operation to promote common ability to respond to disaster and emergencies, including in specific crisis management situations.

In order to pursue this overall objective, the EU and Russia will enhance co-operation in the following priority areas:

- ▶ Strengthening of co-ordination on the most effective use of relevant available capabilities, including through possible practical steps of co-operation in the field of civil protection;
- ▶ Work on implementation of the administrative arrangement between the Monitoring and Information Centre and the Operations Centre of EMERCOM signed on 19 May 2004. In particular, to exchange contact details in order to be able to contact each other on a 24-hour basis; to exchange templates for early warnings and

requests/offers for assistance; to exchange information during an emergency, where appropriate; to conduct communication exercises on an agreed basis; and to enable operation staff to spend one week a year in the operational centre of the other service in order to gain practical experience;

- ▶ Continued discussion on concrete areas of EU-Russia cooperation, including concerning civil protection and assistance in response to natural disasters and crisis situations in order to ensure an effective response to disasters and emergencies.
- ▶ Exchange of information on lessons learnt from terrorist attacks;
- ▶ Invitation, on a case-by-case basis of experts to specific technical workshops and symposia on civil protection issues;
- ▶ Invitation, on a case-by-case basis of observers to specific exercises organized by the EU or Russia;
- ▶ Facilitate mutual assistance in search and rescue operations for submarines, ships and aircraft in emergency situations.

## Javier Solana 'The three reasons for Europe'

Rotterdam, 17 May 2005

Almost 50 years after the signature of the Treaty establishing the EEC, Europe was planning to acquire its own Constitution, whose aim was to reform and improve the functioning of the EU-25. The referenda on the Constitutional Treaty due to take place in France and in Holland were already giving cause for concern.

The case for choosing Europe is as strong as ever. And yet, amongst some Europeans, self-doubt and hesitation has crept in. The fevered referendum debates in France and the Netherlands bear this out. But there is a wider sense of drift. When I travel around Europe, I am struck that the very idea of Europe is being contested. This is curious, for when I travel around the world, I see the exact opposite. Europe is universally admired and most people want Europe as a partner.

The precise reasons for this disenchantment are hard to pin down. It rests in part on an amorphous sense of insecurity. Ours is a confusing world, which demands a lot from citizens and leaders. It is understandable that some prefer simpler schemes of national action or ideological purity. Understandable, but self-defeating.

Others object to the trade-offs that are inevitable in building a Union for a large and diverse continent. The fault-lines and coalitions are familiar: large vs. small; old vs. new; liberal vs. social market, net-payers vs. net-receivers. In the EU we have to reconcile these differences on a daily basis – and we do. But like all compromises, they risk disappointing some – and they do.

From time to time, we have to re-make the case for Europe and its role in the world. It is easy to lose a sense of purpose and perspective amid an endless stream of European directives and summits. At the risk of simplifying things, let me stress that the case for Europe rests essentially on three arguments. First, to exorcise the demons of our past. Second, to extend the zone of peace and prosperity across our continent. And third to deal with a borderless and chaotic world.

To start, why did we embark on this project? Europe experienced the horrors of the 20th century to a degree unmatched anywhere else: invasion, occupation, civil war and the descent into barbarism. It was no surprise that after 1945 an exhausted continent was ready to try a radical new idea: building a zone of peace through institutional integration and the voluntary pooling of sovereignty. What was a surprise, even to the founding fathers, was how successful this project turned out to be.

The watchwords of this European journey have been simple: deepening, widening and reform. Each element depended on the other for success – and still does today. From

coal and steel, via atomic energy to the single market, Schengen and the euro. From six, to nine, to twelve, fifteen, and twenty-five today. From Paris in 1951, via Rome, Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice to the Constitution signed, once again, in Rome in 2004. We have come a long way and achieved a great deal. It is worth saying so, especially in this period of misgiving.

Foreign and security policy was not part of the original package. Quite the contrary. The European Community had adopted a posture of self-denial in matters of security and diplomacy. It was only at Maastricht that we first tried to construct a seaworthy foreign policy. But when Maastricht entered into force, Yugoslavia had already fallen apart. A divided and hesitant Europe was unable to stop the bloodshed. The wars in ex-Yugoslavia scarred a generation of Europeans, myself included. They represented a frightening return of the demons. They taught us that diplomacy not backed by credible threats was no match for determined ultra-nationalists. And when we finally took action, together with the US – in Bosnia and later in Kosovo – Europe’s weakness in military capabilities stood out.

But the key strength of the European Union is that after every setback, we re-group and emerge stronger. So our Balkans misadventures also led to the creation, in Amsterdam, of the post of High Representative for the CFSP. Bosnia and Kosovo gave a decisive impulse to the ESDP. And in a way, Iraq led to the European Security Strategy.

We should remain vigilant. But in Europe at least, the demons are gone for good. In 50 years, we have moved from the vagaries of the balance of power, ad-hoc alliances and imperial designs to a new regional order based on peace, integration, democracy and the rule of law. This is quite an accomplishment.

The second rationale for the European project is to spread this zone of peace, democracy and prosperity to all corners of our continent. The new member-states understand just how difficult the transition is which all post-communist societies have to make. Ralf Dahrendorf has described it as travelling through a ‘valley of tears’. But surely it helped to pass this ‘valley of tears’, knowing that there was a clear destination at the other end. The strong incentives and resources of the EU made it easier to mobilise support for the necessary reforms. This was the underlying bargain of EU enlargement. Despite the doomsayers, enlargement happened on time, without favours or special pleading. This was a great way to re-unite our continent.

Best of all, enlargement is not over. Europe as a transformative power has further to go. Romania and Bulgaria have just signed their accession treaties. If the appropriate conditions are met, Turkey and Croatia will start their negotiations later this year. And our long-term vision is eventual accession by all Balkan states to the European Union.

Moreover, Europe’s power of attraction remains strong further afield. Think of Georgia in 2003. Think also of Ukraine in 2004 where the EU played a major role in ensuring a peaceful and democratic outcome to the political crisis. This was EU foreign policy at its best: robust in its support for European values; staunch in its defence of the

democratic aspirations of Ukraine; open and frank in our dialogue with Russia, and pragmatic in the co-operation between capitals and Brussels.

Moldova has also chosen the path of closer links with the EU. And who knows what is still to come, for instance in Belarus next year? When I met with Belarus opposition groups last month, I detected a strong desire for European values and democracy.

The third reason for wanting Europe is to become a global power. Gaza, Darfur, Belarus, Uzbekistan and Myanmar: each requires a different response. But being a bystander, accepting the status quo, that is not the European way. This is a troubled world. Europe has to be engaged. First, there is really no such thing as doing nothing. If you do nothing, people often believe that is our deliberate policy. The genocide in Rwanda happened in part because the perpetrators thought we, the international community, would do nothing. Second, it would be unreasonable to leave the US as the sole global actor – or to create that impression in Washington. America needs help and support just as much as a responsible Europe deserves respect and influence. And third, in our globalised world, things that happen in far away places, such as Afghanistan, can and do affect our security in unexpected ways. Distance and borders offer no protection.

If the complexity of this world is one reason for an ambitious EU foreign policy, then size is another. For what is each of us, acting alone, capable of achieving? Divisions among Europeans all too often translate into strategic irrelevance. We can already see the contours of an emerging international order where new powers such as China, India and others will play leading roles. Unless we Europeans club together, future historians may conclude that, at the beginning of the 21st century, Europe's moment came and went.

It is encouraging that despite the unease in some quarters about the broader European project, there is widespread support for a stronger European role in the world. The verdict from the opinion polls is clear. If that is the agreed objective, we should support for the Constitution. Why? Because what Maastricht did for the euro, the Constitution could do for Europe's role in the world.

Firstly, the Constitution offers a massive improvement in our ability to tackle old and new security threats. Think of the solidarity clause which will cover both terrorist and natural or man-made disasters. Then add enhanced cooperation on civil protection and structured co-operation on defence. Both promise a more capable Europe, addressing today's and tomorrow's problems.

Secondly, in terms of effectiveness, the Constitution inaugurates a new way of preparing and taking decisions. Perhaps the biggest innovation is the proposed EU Foreign Minister which will combine, in one person, the ability to mobilise all the different components of EU external relations. To ensure more consistency, the EU Foreign Minister will also represent the Union abroad. Our partners will thus have one interlocutor – something which is long overdue.

Finally, the Constitution foresees the creation of an EU External Action Service. Europe will thus have a single team working under one roof and answerable to one person responsible for the full range of EU external relations.

It is the cumulative total that matters. If you add up the EU Foreign Minister, the External Action Service, the solidarity clause and structured co-operation, you will see a real difference to Europe’s international impact. This is what European citizens demand. And this is what non-Europeans, including Americans, insist upon.

Let us be clear. Neither Europe nor the world can afford the self-inflicted wound of a rejection of the Constitution. Failure to ratify would not just put a break on future progress in EU foreign policy. It could even endanger the massive progress we have already made in recent years.

Schopenhauer once said that all truths pass through three stages. First, they are ridiculed. Second, they are violently opposed. Third, they are accepted as self-evident. The idea that Europe could develop a credible foreign policy is now stuck between the second and third phase. It is up to us to make it a reality.

*(NRC Handelsblad)*

## External Relations Council

Brussels, 23 May 2005

### ESDP CONCLUSIONS

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(...)

#### *Military capabilities*

##### **Requirements Catalogue**

1. In the context of implementation of the 2010 Headline Goal, the Council approved a Requirements Catalogue incorporating the results of the technical work done to date and elements of the iterative process between the EU Military Committee and the Political and Security Committee. The Catalogue will be the basis for future work. It contains considerations regarding strategic planning hypotheses, the five illustrative scenarios and an initial list of the capabilities required to meet the aims set in the 2010 Headline Goal. The Council will approve the final 2005 Requirements Catalogue once the operational analysis has been applied and its results have been approved.

##### **Single Progress Report**

2. The Council noted the Single Progress Report on military capabilities, drawn up in line with the EU Capability Development Mechanism. The Council welcomed the Capability Improvement Chart, which is an integral part of the Single Progress Report and makes it possible to keep track of the progress made under the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP). An overview of the chart will keep the public and the media informed. In this context, the Council considered that further progress will be necessary in the development of military capabilities to remedy the current shortfalls, taking advantage of the impetus given by the establishment of the European Defence Agency and taking account of the evaluation of the EPAC.

##### **ECAP evaluation**

3. The Council approved the ECAP evaluation report drawn up by the EU Military Committee and the European Defence Agency. The report contains a detailed review of the Project Groups set up under the ECAP, thereby enabling their work to be refocused in the light of the new 2010 Headline Goal. Consequently, most of the Project Groups will migrate to a new, more integrated process associated with the functions and tasks of the European Defence Agency as defined in the Joint Action of 12 July 2004 on the establishment of the Agency, which include coordinating the implementation of the (ECAP) and any successor plan. The Council asked the European Defence Agency and



the relevant Council bodies to implement the report's recommendations and conclusions without delay.

#### **Rapid response**

4. The Council noted the encouraging outcome of the Battlegroups Coordination Conference on 11 May 2005. The Council noted that the first two years of full operational capability, 2007 and 2008, will be covered by battlegroups formed by Member States, along with one third State, in accordance with the Council conclusions of 22 November 2004, except in the second half of 2007, for which one of the two contributions required is still awaited. The Council encouraged the Member States to make good this deficiency at a future Battlegroups Coordination Conference so that, as from January 2007, the EU will be fully capable of running two concomitant rapid response operations involving a battlegroup, and of launching the two operations almost simultaneously. The Council also noted that initial offers had been announced for the period beyond 2008.

5. The Council welcomed the SG/HR's report on an accelerated decision making and planning process for EU rapid response operations, submitted in March 2005. The Council approved the recommendations made on that basis by the Political and Security Committee, taking into account the advice of the EU Military Committee. These recommendations are designed to ensure that the EU decision-making and planning process can be completed in five days, from approval of the crisis management concept by the Council to the decision to launch an operation, in particular for operations involving battlegroups. The Council asked its relevant subsidiary bodies to implement these recommendations without delay.

6. The Council welcomed the progress made by its subsidiary bodies in implementing the battlegroups concept, and particularly in defining standards and criteria for battlegroups.

7. The Council noted that the EU-NATO Capability Group had continued to address issues of coherent and mutually reinforcing development of military capabilities in the EU and NATO where requirements overlap, including on EU Battlegroups-NATO Response Force. All EU Member States were informed of these issues.

8. The Council welcomed the adoption of the Model Agreement on the status of the forces for EU military crisis management operations. It asked its competent bodies to continue work on providing the EU with the means of improving its rapid reaction capabilities still further.

**European Defence Agency**

9. The Council welcomed the first report on the activities of the European Defence Agency, presented to it by the Head of the Agency, the SG/HR for the CFSP. The Council encouraged the Agency to continue implementing its 2005 work programme and stressed the importance of the four flagship projects launched by the Agency in its four areas of operation. These projects concern command, control and communications (C3), drones, combat armoured vehicles and the European defence equipment market.

10. The Council received with satisfaction the action plan adopted by the Steering Board of the Agency on the creation of a European defence equipment market. It asked the Agency to implement the plan swiftly, in particular as regards the voluntary arms acquisition regime.

11. The Council also welcomed the progress made regarding resumption of the relevant activities of the Western European Armaments Group and the Western European Armaments Organisation and encouraged the Agency to complete this task within the planned timeframe.

12. The Council stressed the importance of the first three-year financial framework for the Agency, which would be submitted to it for approval in the autumn and would set the level of ambition for the Agency up to the end of 2008.

**Operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

13. The Council welcomed the action taken under Operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is part of the EU's comprehensive approach in the country and helps achieve the EU's long-term objective: a stable, viable, peaceful and multi-ethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina, cooperating peacefully with its neighbours and remaining irreversibly on track in its European perspective. The Council welcomes the fact that Operation ALTHEA has proven to be effective since it was launched on 2 December 2004, which constitutes a sound basis for the first six-monthly review of the Operation.

**Launch of the EUSEC RD Congo Mission**

14. Further to the invitation letter of 26 April 2005 from the President of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Council decided to launch a European Union Mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the EUSEC RD Congo on 8 June 2005. This Decision was taken in accordance with Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP of 2 May 2005 on the EUSEC RD Congo Mission.

15. In close cooperation and coordination with the other actors in the international community, this Mission aims to provide practical support for the DRC's competent

authorities in the field of security in their efforts to integrate the Congolese army, while taking care to promote policies compatible with human rights and international humanitarian law, democratic standards and the principles of good governance, transparency and respect for the rule of law.

16. This Mission, which is the first of its kind, is a tangible example of the action plan in practice providing support through the ESDP for peace and security in Africa and, on a larger scale, is an example of European security strategy in action. This Mission bolsters the EUPOL Kinshasa police mission and boosts the efforts already being made by the Commission and the Member States in the area of security sector reform in the DRC. The European Union and its Member States confirm that they are ready to consider support on a more operational level for the integration of the Congolese army, particularly on the basis of feedback from the EUSEC RD Congo Mission.

#### **Generic Standards of Behaviour for ESDP Operations**

17. The Council noted the generic document on standards of behaviour to be adhered to by all categories of personnel, whether military or civilian, involved in ESDP operations. This document is based on provisions already in force and applied to ESDP operations under way, and it could be adapted, in particular, according to the lessons drawn from ESDP operations and in the light of work currently being conducted by the United Nations and in other international organisations. This “living” document will be used in planning forthcoming ESDP operations in order to ensure that the personnel involved in ESDP operations comply with the highest standards of behaviour.

18. The Council considers that these standards of behaviour should also be applied, as appropriate, to personnel involved in other types of EU presence in areas of operations, in order to ensure consistency in the EU’s approach. The Council would also encourage its relevant bodies to carry out further work in areas related to standards of behaviour and in the implementation of other specific aspects of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security.

#### **Fight against terrorism**

19. The Council endorsed the Report on the implementation of the Conceptual Framework of the ESDP dimension in the fight against terrorism. This is a “living” document that should be updated regularly, in particular so as to ensure coherence and synergy between the actions undertaken in the field of ESDP to support the fight against terrorism. The report makes concrete recommendations to be implemented as soon as possible for each action point in the Conceptual Framework.

(...)

## Meeting of the defence ministers

Brussels, 23 May 2005

### SUMMARY OF THE INTERVENTIONS OF JAVIER SOLANA

#### *ESDP Military Capabilities*

- ▶ It is of utmost importance to **improve the EU's military capabilities** in order to meet the ambitions the EU set itself with the *European Security Strategy* (ESS) and the *Headline Goal 2010*;
- ▶ This year's **Requirements Catalogue** is an important **leap forward** as it must reflect a new **qualitative approach** under the Headline Goal 2010. Outstanding work needs to be concluded before the end of the year;
- ▶ The **Single Progress Report** points to significant progress as regards battle-groups.
- ▶ As regards the **European Capacity Action Plan (ECAP) Evaluation**, I look forward to the implementation of measures that could help make the ECAP process more efficient, working in a more integrated manner with the European Defence Agency and helping enhance efforts to overcome existing capacity shortfalls;
- ▶ I particularly welcome the initiative to start a reflection about the **maritime dimension of the Headline Goal 2010**;
- ▶ I would like to emphasise the overall need for **further Member State contributions**.

#### *Réponse rapide*

- ▶ Je me réjouis des **résultats de la conférence de coordination des groupements tactiques**, qui montrent un engagement important des EtatsMembres;
- ▶ Les **progrès conséquents** réalisés en moins de deux ans montrent que le projet des groupements tactiques répond à un besoin réel et permet de développer des outils adaptés pour permettre à l'UE de mettre en oeuvre ses ambitions en matière de gestion de crise;
- ▶ Il sera essentiel que les **déclarations d'intentions** faites lors de la conférence de coordination des groupements tactiques soient **suivies d'effets** lorsque nous aurons besoin de lancer une opération;
- ▶ En ce qui concerne **l'accélération du processus de prise de décision et de planification**, je souhaite souligner l'importance de prendre des décisions dans des délais compatibles avec les exigences propres à la réponse rapide;

- ▶ Je voudrais rappeler que **l'ambition fixée par le Conseil** lui-même est que **ce processus**, dans certains cas, puisse être conduit en **5 jours**. Le respect de ce délai mettrait en exergue non seulement la crédibilité de l'UE mais aussi son efficacité d'intervention.

### *European Defence Agency (EDA)*

- ▶ I have submitted a report on the EDA's performance and am keen to note **results in the months to come**. The Agency was formally established in July 2004 but became operational only at the start of this year. It is still a few months short of its 'full operational capability';
- ▶ The EDA has worked hard on the **ECAP Evaluation** and provided support to the work of the **Headline Goal Requirements**. Work on **defence procurement** is already demonstrating exciting potential. Two of three subordinate formations of the Steering Board have now met (armaments; research & technology) with the third scheduled for June;
- ▶ Five months since it became operational, I am convinced that **the EDA can make a real difference**, provided that both the Agency and its Member States play their full parts.

### *Sudan*

- ▶ The EU's support to the second African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS II) has taken place on three levels: **political**: provision of personnel to the AU Mediator's team to support the Abuja process; **financial**: €2 million of EC financial assistance; €30 million cash and in-kind assistance from Member States; **planning and technical support**: in terms of equipment and personnel to support the Cease-fire Commission (CFC);
- ▶ It is clear that the expansion of **AMIS II will need the full range of EU support**. I met Mr. Konaré, AU Chairman, in Brussels on 17 May and he requested our assistance. We would need to be in a position to consolidate all we have to offer in order to make a substantial contribution to the AU mission;
- ▶ **Policing** is an area that needs significant support and where the EU has a unique experience and capabilities. We should be ready, if so requested by the AU, to rapidly mobilise a small number of experienced advisors to support all levels of the police chain of command;
- ▶ Anything of **added value** the international community can bring is welcome. In this light, we will continue to consult with the UN, NATO and other existing donors;
- ▶ I will attend a **high-level donors meeting** scheduled on **26th May** in Addis Ababa. The outcome of discussions in this Council meeting will form the basis of a potential EU offer of assistance at this meeting.

## *Lunch – EU Military Operations*

### ALTHEA

- ▶ The European Commission was **unable to give a green light** for the opening of negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) last week. **Police restructuring talks broke down** and necessary agreement on police restructuring was not reached;
- ▶ The first sixmonthly Operation ALTHEA Mission Review takes place against this political background. I presented my first review report to the PSC last week and described the political situation with guarded optimism. The breakdown of the police restructuring reform and the recent refusal of some conscripts to pledge allegiance to the BiH army are important reminders that **serious setbacks are** unfortunately **still possible in BiH**;
- ▶ It is recommended that **EUFOR continue its operations to fight organized crime** in coordination with the EU Special Representative, the EUPM and local BiH authorities. Based on a more detailed analysis, we will revert to the role of EUFOR in the fight against organized crime during the next review;
- ▶ I take the opportunity to **commend** our OpCdr, General Reith and also the wonderful job performed on the ground by General Leakey;

### Mission EUSEC RD Congo (RDC)

- ▶ Je souhaite souligner au préalable le **caractère novateur** pour l'UE de la **mission EUSEC** qui sera conduite en RDC, dans la mesure où c'est la première mission d'assistance technique de l'UE sur les **questions de défense**. L'opération vise la réforme du secteur de la sécurité en RDC en vue de contribuer à une intégration réussie de l'armée en RDC;
- ▶ La mission comprend 8 conseillers; elle est dirigée par le Général Joana et a un mandat initial de douze mois. Elle sera **lancée le 8 juin prochain**. Son rôle constitue à apporter un **soutien au gouvernement de transition** et **encourager les réformes indispensables**, notamment en vue des élections nationales;
- ▶ Je tiens à **remercier les États membres** qui se sont engagés dans EUSEC, notamment à la **Belgique** pour son action déterminée;
- ▶ Les réformes dans le secteur de sécurité contribueraient à la fois à la stabilité **nécessaire au développement du pays**. Les NationsUnies ont lancé un fort appel pour un engagement de l'UE dans ce secteur, **l'accomplissement des objectifs d'EUSEC** étant vu comme une contribution importante permettant à la MONUC de porter à terme sa mission.

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## CAPABILITY IMPROVEMENT CHART I / 2005

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The development of military capabilities for crisis management has been a key aspect of the European Security and Defence Policy since its inception. In this framework, the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) launched in 2001 underpins Member States' progress in remedying identified shortfalls with respect to the Helsinki Headline goal set in 1999 by rationalising Member States respective defence efforts and increasing synergy between their national and multi-national projects.

Every six months a progress report on EU military capabilities is submitted to the Council, in accordance with the 'Capability Development Mechanism' established by the Council in March 2003 for the follow-up and evaluation of military capabilities objectives and commitments by Member States.

### *The attached chart indicates progress in addressing shortfalls and deficits*

The chart takes as a starting point the Capability Improvement Chart published in November 2001. Military requirements identified in 2002 and 2003 have been included as have contributions by Member States addressing these requirements.

The Headline Goal 2010, set in 2004, aims at the further development of European capabilities for crisis management with a horizon of 2010, reflecting the European Security Strategy, the evolution of the strategic environment and of technology and drawing on lessons learned from the EU-led operations.

The Headline Goal 2010 builds on the existing goal and recognises that existing shortfalls still need to be addressed. Member States have decided to commit themselves to be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on the European Union. The Headline Goal 2010 adopts a long-term perspective and focuses on the qualitative aspects of capability development and also provides a framework within which to address further the delivery of capability.

The European Defence Agency, which was established by Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of 12 July 2004, provides additional support and impulse to the co-ordinated development of military capabilities by Member States.

In light of the establishment of the European Defence Agency and of the Headline Goal 2010, the ECAP has been evaluated and the Project Groups created under the ECAP to address identified shortfalls have been reviewed. The objective is to further improve the development of military capabilities in the framework of the European Defence and Security Policy.

#### **Note:**

This Capabilities Improvement Chart draws on Member States contributions to the military requirements identified in 2002 which was updated subsequent to the 2001

### Capabilities Improvement Chart.

The chart lists Shortfalls and Deficits and indicates improvement or otherwise in accordance with the following legends:

Solved Shortfall/Deficit solved

- Situation has improved
- ≈ Situation remains approximately the same
- S In HPC 2001 identified as significant in the assessment of capability

A specific column highlights qualitative (Q)/readiness (R) shortfalls.

Information reflected in the P&I column should not be regarded as a contribution nor a commitment.



## Capabilities Improvement Chart I / 2005

Capabilities Shortfalls and Catalogue Deficits <sup>1</sup>	Progress 2002-2005	Impact	EC/AP-PC Details	Qualitative/Readiness Shortfalls	Projects and Initiatives
<b>LAND</b>					
Attack Helicopter Battalions	≈	S			YES
Composite Army Aviation Battalions	≈			R	YES
Medium/Helicopter Transport Battalions	≈	S	Helicopters (H/C) ECAP-PG		YES
Reconnaissance and Liaison Helicopter Battalions	≈				YES
Nuclear, Biological & Chemical (NBC) Battalions	Solved	S	Nuclear, Biological & Chemical ECAP-PG		
NBC Coy (balanced)	≈		NBC ECAP-PG	R	
Logistic Battalion	≈			R	
Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA) / Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Battalions	≈	S			YES
STA Units	≈	S			
Medical Collective Protection Unit Role 3	≈		ECAP-PG Medical		YES
Deployable Laboratories	↗	S	NBC ECAP-PG	Q	YES
<b>MARITIME</b>					
Carrier Based Air Power	≈				YES
Helicopter Carrier	≈				
Primary asaulty Receiving Ship (PCRS)	≈		ECAP-PG Medical		
Port and Shipping advisory Team	≈				
Support of Disembarkation (SPOD) Units	↗				
Amphibious Brigade HQ (including Signal Company)	≈			R	

<sup>1</sup> This list does not reflect any order of priority.

Capabilities Shortfalls and Catalogue Deficits <sup>1</sup>	Progress 2002-2005	Impact	ECAP-PG Details	Qualitative/Readiness Shortfalls	Projects and Initiatives
<b>AIR</b>					
Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC)	Solved			R	
Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD)	≈	S			YES
Air to Air Refuelling (AAR)	≈	S	Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR) ECAP-PG		YES
Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)	≈	S	Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) ECAP-PG		YES
Tactical Air Transport (TAC - M)	≈				YES
Cruise Missiles and Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) Equipped A/C	≈	S			YES
Tactical Air Support for Maritime Operations (TASMO) Aircraft (A/C)	Solved			R	
Dispersed Operating Base (DOB) Air Traffic Control (ATC) and Fire & Crash Support Element	≈				
DOB Fuel distribution Support Element	≈				
DOB Personnel Support Element	≈				
<b>C3I</b>					
Operation Headquarters (OHQs)	➔	S		Q	YES
Force Headquarters (FHQs)	≈	S		Q	YES
Land Component Commander (LCC) Headquarters	≈	S		Q	YES
Maritime Component Commander (MCC) Headquarters	≈	S		Q	YES
Air Component Commander (ACC) Headquarters	≈	S		Q	YES
			HQ ECAP-PG		

<sup>1</sup> This list does not reflect any order of priority.

Capabilities Shortfalls and Catalogue Deficits <sup>1</sup>	Progress 2002-2005	Impact	ECAP-PG Details	Qualitative/Reachness Shortfalls	Projects and Initiatives
<b>Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR)</b>					
Imagery Intelligence Collection	≈	S	Space ECAP-PG ECAP-PGs on ISTAR Information Exchange Framework and UAVs		YES
Signal Intelligence Collection	≈	S			YES
Early Warning and Distant Detection Strategic Level	≈	S			YES
Theatre Surveillance and Reconnaissance Air Picture	≈	S	ECAP-PGs on ISTAR IE Framework and UAVs		YES
Theatre Surveillance and Reconnaissance Ground Picture	≈	S			YES
<b>STRATEGIC MOBILITY</b>					
Strategic Airlift	≈	S	Strategic Air Lift (SAL) ECAP-PG	R in relation to passenger aircraft	YES
Strategic Sealift (including Strategic Medical Evacuation)	≈	S	Strategic Sea Lift (SSL) ECAP-PG		YES

<sup>1</sup> This list does not reflect order of priority.

Capabilities Shortfalls and Catalogue Deficits <sup>1</sup>	Progress 2002-2005	Impact	ECAP-PG Details	Qualitative/Reachness Shortfalls	Projects and Initiatives
OTHER CAPABILITY					
Tactical Ballistic Missile Defence	≈	S	Tactical Ballistic Missile Defence (TEMD) ECAP-PG	Q	YES
CATALOGUE DEFICITS					
Force Headquarters (HQ) Carrying Ship	≈				YES
Repair Support Ship	≈				
Amphibious Ship	≈			R	YES
Patrol Vessel/Corvette (PV/FS)	Solved				
Harbour & Shallow water Mine Counter Measures (MCM) Unit	≈				
Aircraft Carrier (CV) Based Force Pads	≈			R	YES
Division HQ	≈			R	
Light Infantry Brigade HQ	≈				YES
Light/Medium Armoured Squadrons	≈				YES
Mechanised Infantry Battalions	≈			R	YES
Light Infantry Battalions	≈				YES
Amphibious Infantry Battalion	≈			R	
Field Artillery Battalion (Amphibious)	≈			R	
Short Range Air Defence (SHORAD) Battalion	≈			R	YES
Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) Medium Level Battalion	≈			R	YES
Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) Battery	Solved			R	
GBAD Battery (Amphibious)	≈			R	

<sup>1</sup> This list does not reflect order of priority.

Capabilities Shortfalls and Catalogue Deficits <sup>1</sup>	Progress 2002-2005	Impact	ECAP-PC Deficits	Qualitative/Readdress Shortfalls	Projects and Initiatives
Combat Engineer Battalion (Amphibious)	≈			R.	
General Support Engineer Battalions	≈				
General Maintenance Engineer Battalions	≈	S			
Reconnaissance Squadron (Amphibious)	≈			R.	
Medical Treatment Facilities Role 3 (including In-Theatre ashore and afloat Medical Treatment Facilities)	Solved		ECAP-PG Medical	R.	
Multinational Support Unit (MSU) Battalion	≈			R.	
Forward Tactical Aeromedical Evacuation Helos	Solved			R.	

<sup>1</sup> This list does not reflect any order of priority.

## European Defence Agency

Brussels, 23 May 2005

### I. EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY MINISTERS CALL FOR MORE COOPERATION ON NEW ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

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European Defence Ministers agreed today that more cooperation was urgently needed on up to 23 separate national programmes to acquire new armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) for their armed forces.

The ministers, meeting as the Steering Board of the European Defence Agency, instructed the Agency to work with governments planning for next generation AFVs to ensure that they would have as much in common as possible. That would include pooling efforts and resources on new technologies to improve protection whilst reducing weight, and even collaborative programmes.

“This sector is a perfect example why the Agency is needed: these are the vehicles which our future operations will require,” said Javier Solana, the Head of the Agency, after chairing the ministerial meeting.

“But the Agency has shown that there is enormous fragmentation in both supply and demand and almost no international cooperation between member states. We agreed that we cannot go on as we are; together we must find a way to change,” he added.

AFVs – smaller than a main battle tank and larger than a 4x4 – are designed to provide protected mobility and additional fire-power to soldiers in actual or potential combat situations. An Agency report prepared for the meeting said some 20,000 such vehicles are currently in service with European armed forces and estimated that, over the next decade, there would be demand for around 10,000, which could cost up to 30 billion.

“European governments will spend this money much more effectively if they spend it together,” said Nick Witney, Chief Executive of the EDA, noting the increasing US domination of the industry in Europe.

Ministers also agreed that the Agency should promote “user clubs” for countries who bought the same AFVs to achieve savings in running costs. They also ordered a further study by the end of the year into European industrial strengths and capabilities in this area, including an analysis of the market inside and outside Europe.

In another move aimed at strengthening the European Defence Equipment Market, one of the major aims of the Agency, ministers agreed that it should carry out a study into the extent to which EU governments have exempted defence contracts from the normal workings of the internal market using the exemption provided for in Article 296 of the Treaty on the European Community.

The ministers said the current fragmentation of the defence equipment markets in Europe was detrimental to the effectiveness of defence spending and, especially in the

long term, to creating a strong European Defence Technology and Industrial Base.

The new data-gathering exercise will be part of the work leading to EDA proposals by the end of the year for the launch of a new “Code of Conduct” on defence procurement. The aim is to introduce cross-border competition within the EU for defence purchases which have hitherto been reserved for national suppliers under the Article 296 exemption from internal market rules. Ministers strongly backed this objective.

During the meeting Witney also reported on the Agency’s activities and progress with its first year’s work programme. The Ministers agreed that a good start had been made, whilst emphasising the need for early results.

The Steering Board, which is the decision-making authority for the Agency, also approved detailed Rules of Procedure for meetings of the Board. It was meeting at ministerial level for the third time, and for the first time since the Agency became operational at the beginning of this year.

#### **Steering Board Conclusions on Armoured Fighting Vehicles**

The Steering Board of the European Defence Agency:

- a) agrees that consolidation of demand for AFVs in Europe is necessary and urgent 7- for operational, economic and industrial reasons;
- b) instructs the Agency to:
  - encourage near-term co-operation on pMS AFV programmes due to be contracted in the near future, without jeopardising or causing detriment to ongoing national procurement programmes already under commitment;
  - work with those pMS who plan to introduce to service in 2010-2015 “next generation” AFVs, aiming to develop a common staff requirement and programme, with high commonality of platform and sub-system solutions, and associated joint research and technology demonstration ( relevant work under LoI could serve as a useful basis);
  - conduct by the end of the year an AFV-related study using external consultant services focusing on European industrial strengths/capabilities and relevant national industrial interests, including market analysis in and outside Europe.

The Agency is tasked to report on this work by the November 2005 Steering Board at Defence Ministers level; and

- c) encourages the Agency to take the following further steps towards broader collaboration in the AFV sector:
  - expand the definition work in due course on staff requirements to “new generation” Infantry Fighting Vehicles targeting to meet the pMS demand 2020+;
  - promote “user-clubs”;
  - support expanding European defence standardisation efforts in the AFV area towards more commonality and enhanced interoperability.

## *European Defence Agency Background on Armoured Fighting Vehicles*

Vehicles offering protected mobility to land forces will remain of fundamental importance. In future there will be an increased emphasis on deployed operations under the EDSP. This brings with it technological challenges to improve protection whilst reducing weight. The use of modular structures and advanced communication systems will help reduce the logistic burden of disparate inventories of Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) on deployed operations.

There are a huge variety of types of AFVs in service with European armed forces (some with hull and chassis as old as 50 years) – well over 20,000 in number.

### **European demand:**

- ▶ **Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs).** Demand over the next decade seems relatively thin – about 1000 vehicles, the majority of which are already under contract. Some ideas exist for “next generation” high-tech/high cost IFVs, for which demand is probably only in the hundreds.
- ▶ **“Classic” Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs).** Orders for some 2500 such vehicles are planned. In addition, a further 700 vehicles are expected to be ordered shortly and separately by three nations running their own individual programmes. Future development of APCs is likely to be incremental – progressive introduction of modularity and the use of COTS components.
- ▶ **“Next generation” APCs.** There is a demand for over 5000 of such vehicles, with in-service dates from the early to the middle years of the next decade. The general aim is to meet enhanced requirements on air-portability, better protection, networking and modularity. The main part of this demand will be for APC-type platforms capable of being equipped for many different tasks.

### **European supply:**

- ▶ In the late 1990s, there were some 13 companies in Europe with a full design, development and production capability for AFVs. In recent years there have been two consolidation thrusts: General Dynamics of the U.S. has bought Santa Barbara (Spain), MOWAG (Switzerland) and STEYR (Austria); and the UK and Swedish industries (Alvis and Hägglunds) have now been brought together with United Defence Industries (UDI), under BAE Systems ownership. Further consolidation seems inevitable.

Overall, the estimated identifiable European demand is for around 10,000 vehicles over the next ten years, with the majority wheeled rather than tracked. The estimated total business value for this demand will be perhaps between 20 and 30 billion over ten years. Currently there are some 23 different programmes ongoing to satisfy the demand, of which only one is currently planned as collaboration – the BOXER programme of



Germany and the Netherlands. Modest co-operation also exists through “user-club” type of arrangements between nations which have bought similar vehicles. Some efforts have been also made in WEAG and between LoI nations to identify future common needs and harmonise requirements, with as yet limited results.

## **II. STEERING BOARD DECISION NO. 2005/03 ON EUROPEAN DEFENCE EQUIPMENT MARKET**

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In order to increase transparency on the part of pMS on the extent and nature of use of Art. 296 of the TEC in defence procurement, and, in order to prepare for a proposal by the Agency in November 2005, providing the basis for a decision whether to proceed with a voluntary, non-binding intergovernmental regime

### **the SB decides:**

EDA will collect data from pMS on the invocation (and non-invocation) of Article 296 on the basis of the following structure:

- 1) The collection of data will make use of a common typology of the information, and include data of the years 2002, 2003 and 2004.
- 2) As a basis for the collection of data, the first group of questions will aim at clarifying
  - national procedures used to decide whether or not to invoke Art. 296 for a defence procurement;
  - the typical national security reasons for invoking (explicitly or implicitly through negotiating procedures) the Art. 296 exemption;
  - national procedures for determining the procurement strategy in cases where Art. 296 is invoked.
- 3) The second part will be the actual data collection, which will be based on contracts (numbers and values only) divided into contracts based on EC Public Procurement Rules (PPR) and Art. 296 contracts. For the Art. 296 area, EDA will, still only in terms of numbers and values, distinguish
  - between national programs and collaborative programs
  - national and international competition and
  - goods and services.
- 4) Data should be provided on the overall value and number of all contracts excluding those dealing with nuclear weapons, nuclear propulsion systems and cryptographic equipment as these would by their nature not become part of a more common EDEM.

- 5) EDA will collect data on the size of suppliers involved, to provide a picture of the industrial landscape, including, in particular, SMEs.
- 6) EDA will ensure confidentiality of the data provided and also ensure that no individual pMS data will be reported or distributed.
- 7) Nations will provide the best possible data, taking into account the limits of national registration procedures and systems; the fullest possible data will be provided to the EDA by mid-July 2005 in respect of 2004; by mid-September 2005 in respect of 2003; by mid-October 2005 in respect of 2002.

## EUSEC RD Congo – Launching of the mission

Brussels, 23 May 2005

### COMMENTAIRES DE JAVIER SOLANA À L'OCCASION DE LA DÉCISION DE L'UE DE LANCER UNE MISSION EN MATIÈRE DE RÉFORME DU SECTEUR DE LA SÉCURITÉ EN RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO

Le Conseil a décidé de lancer, le 8 juin 2005, une mission de conseil et d'assistance de l'Union européenne en matière de réforme du secteur de la sécurité en République Démocratique du Congo (RDC) (la mission « EUSEC RD Congo »)<sup>1</sup>.

A cette occasion, le Haut Représentant pour la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune, M. Javier Solana, a déclaré:

*« C'est la première fois que l'Union déploie une mission d'assistance technique dans le domaine de la réforme du secteur de sécurité. Cette mission, tout comme la mission de police EUPOLKINSHASA et l'opération militaire ARTEMIS en 2003, témoigne de l'engagement continu de l'UE envers la transition et la stabilisation en RDC.*

*L'UE est prête à soutenir les activités du gouvernement de transition qui s'est engagé dans un processus de reconstruction de l'Etat congolais, capable de garantir la sécurité de son peuple, et de permettre la réconciliation nationale et la stabilité dans la région. »*

La décision d'établir la mission « EUSEC R.D. Congo » fait suite à une invitation officielle adressée par le Président Joseph Kabila au Haut Représentant Javier Solana. La mission devrait fournir conseil et assistance aux autorités congolaises compétentes en matière de sécurité en veillant à ce que ces autorités puissent promouvoir des politiques fondées sur les droits de l'homme et le droit international humanitaire, les normes démocratiques et les principes de bonne gestion des affaires publiques, de transparence et de respect de l'Etat de droit.

« EUSEC R.D. Congo » comprendra huit experts. Elle couvrira une période de 12 mois. Le général Pierre JOANA (France) a été nommé chef de la mission. Dans le cadre de la mission, des experts seront affectés notamment aux postes clés suivants au sein de l'administration congolaise : cabinet du ministre de la défense, état-major général, y compris la Structure Militaire Intégrée (SMI), état-major et forces terrestres, Commission Nationale du désarmement, de la démobilisation et de la Réinsertion (CONADER), Comité Opérationnel Conjoint.

1. Cette décision est prise conformément à l'action commune 2005/355/PESC du Conseil du 2 mai 2005 relative à la mission EUSEC RD Congo (J.O. n° L 112, du 3 mai 2005, p. 20).

La Résolution 1565 (2004) du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies (CSNU) appelle la RDC à procéder rapidement à l'intégration des forces de sécurité en particulier celle des forces armées et encourage les Etats membres à apporter un soutien dans ce domaine. De même, la Résolution 1592 (2005) du CSNU demande au Gouvernement d'unité nationale et de transition de mener à bien la réforme du secteur de la sécurité.

## **ANNEXE – THE EUROPEAN UNION’S ENGAGEMENT TOWARDS STABILITY AND SECURITY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC)**

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The European Union is intensifying its efforts to facilitate a successful transition in DRC. Two new missions under the European Security and Defence Policy, which are in line with the military operation, ARTEMIS (carried out in 2003), help to illustrate the EU’s determination to contribute to DRC stability, which ultimately has a bearing on that of the Great Lakes region as a whole.

### **■ EU police mission in Kinshasa (DRC) for the Integrated Police Unit (“EUPOL KINSHASA”)**

- In April 2005, the EU, in close coordination with the United Nations, launched a police mission in Kinshasa (DRC) (“EUPOL KINSHASA”) within the framework of the European Defence and Security Policy (ESDP).
- The launching ceremony of EUPOL KINSHASA will take place on 30th April on the occasion of the visit of the EU High Representative of the EU for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana.
- In response to an invitation of the DRC government, the EUPOL KINSHASA mission is the first civil mission for crisis management in Africa within the ESDP framework.
- The objective of the mission is to provide a framework for and advice to the Integrated Police Unit<sup>2</sup> (IPU) under the Congolese line of command. The purpose is to guarantee that the actions of the IPU are in line with international police best practices. The mission will deploy personnel to different sections of the IPU line of command.
- EUPOL KINSHASA will comprise about 30 persons. Commissioner Adilio Custodio (Portugal) has been appointed head of mission.
- The budget for the mission amounts to around EURO 4.3 million.
- The EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes region, Mr. Aldo Ajello, will provide political guidelines to the head of mission, Commissioner Adilio Custodio. He will facilitate coordination with other EU stakeholders on the ground as well as relations with local authorities.

### **■ EU advisory and assistance mission for DRC security reform (“EUSEC – R.D. CONGO”)**

- Following an official request by the DRC government, the EU has decided to

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2. This IPU is the subject of a project whose aim is to train 1008 Congolese police. The IPU's objective is to scale up the neutral force currently made available by MONUC to guarantee the security of the government and transitional institutions. IPU training and equipment will be financed by the European Development Fund, managed by the European Commission, and by a joint action covering contributions from the budget of the CFSP and of the Member States.

establish an EU advisory and assistance mission for security reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (“EUSEC – R.D. CONGO” mission)

- The mission will provide advice and assistance to the Congolese authorities in charge of security while ensuring the promotion of policies that are compatible with human rights and international humanitarian law, democratic standards, principles of good public management, transparency and observance of the rule of law.
  - The mission is to be launched during on 8 June 2005. It will cover a period of 12 months.
  - General Pierre Joana (France) has been appointed head of mission. The mission should comprise eight experts who will be seconded by the Member States and by the EU institutions. Within the framework of this mission, experts will be assigned in particular to the following key posts within the Congolese administration:
    - the private office of the Minister of Defence,
    - general military staff, including the Integrated Military Structure,
    - staff of the land forces,
    - the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-assignment (CONADER), and
    - the Joint Operational Committee.
  - The financial reference amount for the expenses related to this mission is EURO 1.6 million.
- EU and DRC: an ongoing commitment
- The “EUPOL-KINSHASA” and “EUSEC-RD CONGO” missions, as well as the ARTEMIS military operation (launched by the EU in 2003) confirms the determined political commitment of EU vis-à-vis the DRC transition process as well as MONUC.
  - After the end of the ARTEMIS operation, the EU had pointed out that its engagement in the DRC would continue. The EU is prepared to accompany the political process in DRC on three levels: economic, political and security.
  - The EU emphasises the importance it gives to respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence in the DRC and in all the states in the region as well as its support for the comprehensive and inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo, signed in Pretoria on 17th December 2002.
  - While renewing its determination to support transition in the DRC, the Union calls on the espace présidentiel, the transitional institutions and their representatives to continue without respite their engagement in view of the implementation of a transition agenda and of the strengthening of good governance. The demobilisation of combatants and security reform are crucial for the successful achievement of transition and for the DRC’s strategy to exit the crisis.

## Darfur – EU support to the African Union

Addis Abeba, 26 May 2005

Since January 2004, the EU and its member states have been helping the African Union to stabilize the situation in Darfur (Sudan). Apart from the Abuja talks and the Ceasefire Commission, they are active in the AMIS I and AMIS II operations. During the International Donors' Conference which was held at Addis Ababa on 26 May, Javier Solana and Louis Michel outlined a substantial aid package, including in particular support in the fields of planning, logistics, air transportation, and training, as well as the enhancement of aerial observation capacities.

### INTERVENTION DE JAVIER SOLANA

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(...)

Si nous sommes réunis aujourd'hui, c'est parce qu'une crise humanitaire dramatique continue de frapper les populations civiles du Darfour. Aujourd'hui c'est vers ces populations que la solidarité européenne s'exprime. Les 25 Ministres des Affaires étrangères et les 25 Ministres de la Défense de l'Union européenne qui se sont réunis à Bruxelles lundi m'ont chargé de vous porter un seul message, simple et bref : oui !

Oui, aujourd'hui encore, l'Europe répond présente. Le succès de la nouvelle mission de l'Union africaine est impératif. Nous n'avons pas le choix. Par son ampleur, mais aussi par les risques régionaux qu'elle implique, la crise du Darfour exige tous les efforts de chacun.

Avec à l'esprit un enjeu évident : du succès de la mission actuelle de l'Union Africaine au Soudan dépendra l'avenir des populations du Darfour, mais aussi la capacité future de l'Union africaine à prévenir et à régler d'autres crises en Afrique.

Le soutien de la communauté internationale à l'Union africaine est sans équivoque : l'Union Africaine a et continuera d'avoir la responsabilité politique de l'opération; elle a et continuera d'avoir le rôle exclusif dans le déploiement et la conduite de l'opération AMIS II. C'est là un enjeu capital : la prévention et la résolution des conflits en Afrique sont d'abord aux mains des Africains eux-mêmes. C'est sur cette base qu'ensemble, l'Union européenne et l'Union africaine, nous construisons un partenariat stratégique efficace.

L'Union africaine est d'ores et déjà en passe de relever ce pari. Grâce à la mission AMIS. Mais aussi grâce à son action politique que, là encore, l'Union européenne soutient sans équivoque. Il n'y a pas en effet de solution militaire au conflit du Darfour. Et je veux lancer ici un appel solennel à toutes les parties pour qu'elles s'engagent rapidement et de bonne foi dans la recherche d'une solution pacifique et durable. Là encore, l'Union Africaine a la première responsabilité. Mais elle sait la disponibilité de l'Union

européenne à apporter, en plus de sa contribution à l'équipe de médiation, un soutien politique supplémentaire pour faciliter plus encore le processus de négociation.

Nous ne pouvons pas non plus oublier que le processus de paix au Soudan est un processus global. Les signataires de l'Accord global doivent eux aussi assumer leurs responsabilités et contribuer à la paix au Darfour. Ceci sera l'un des critères déterminants pour l'avenir des relations entre l'UE et le Soudan.

Dès le début de la crise au Darfour, le choix de l'Union européenne, en étroite coordination avec les Nations Unies, a été de soutenir la voie tracée par l'Union Africaine.

Ainsi elle a contribué d'une manière décisive, l'année dernière, au déploiement de la Commission de cessez-le-feu ainsi qu'au déploiement de la première mission de l'Union africaine au Darfour. La contribution financière à travers la Facilité de Paix, complétée par la présence d'experts de l'Union européenne travaillant au quotidien, sur le terrain, avec les hommes de l'Union africaine en témoignent. Au total, ce sont 600 millions d'euros que les Européens ont déjà mobilisés. Rien de moins !

Sur cette base, l'Union européenne, par ma voix, est en mesure aujourd'hui d'annoncer les nouvelles contributions dans les domaines suivants.

**Sur le plan militaire**, les Ministres de l'Union européenne se sont engagés à fournir une réponse substantielle et globale aux demandes de l'Union Africaine dans l'ensemble des secteurs identifiés par celle-ci :

- ▶ nous offrons un soutien en planification en fournissant des experts logistiques et opérationnels pour travailler auprès de l'Union Africaine à Addis Abeba, Khartoum et El Fascher; nous proposons de coopérer avec les Etats membres de l'Union Africaine et de financer la mise à disposition, au sein de la chaîne de planification de l'Union Africaine, de planificateurs africains expérimentés qui seront identifiés dans les Etats contributeurs;
- ▶ nous offrons du transport aérien stratégique et tactique ainsi que la coordination de ce transport;
- ▶ nous offrons, en termes de soutien logistique, de fournir des équipements, et en particulier des véhicules, des équipements de communication, des générateurs mobiles, des avions de transport tactique ; nous proposons aussi de fournir des planificateurs et des experts pour contribuer au déploiement de ces moyens, notamment en soutien du centre de coordination logistique d'El Fascher;
- ▶ nous proposons de fournir des équipes pour entraîner les troupes en vue de leur déploiement et entraîner des pilotes sur les C 212 offerts;
- ▶ nous proposons de fournir à l'Union Africaine, pour Amis II des capacités d'observation aérienne;
- ▶ nous pouvons enfin envoyer des moniteurs supplémentaires et donner un appui en matière de stratégie d'information.



**Dans le domaine policier**, l'UE est prête à apporter l'assistance technique à la chaîne de commandement de la mission de police de l'UA à Addis Abeba, à Khartoum, et à El Fasher ainsi que dans les secteurs où l'opération est déployée. L'UE pourrait également contribuer aux efforts dans la sélection et formation du personnel de police qui intègre la mission. Enfin elle est disposée à soutenir le développement des capacités civiles de gestion de crise de l'UA et à partager son expérience dans ce domaine.

Voici l'offre européenne. Elle est flexible : notre objectif est de répondre aux besoins de l'Union Africaine; nous souhaitons que tous ceux qui sont prêts à aider puissent faire des efforts réels, adaptés et complémentaires. Nous sommes à votre disposition pour travailler à vos côtés dans cet esprit.

Monsieur le Président,

De nouveau, vous pouvez compter sur les Européens. Ceux-ci comptent également sur vous et toutes les forces vives de l'Union africaine. L'enjeu de la crise du Darfour est immense. Comme vous-même l'avez expliqué la semaine dernière à Bruxelles devant le Comité Politique et de Sécurité de l'Union européenne et le Conseil de l'Atlantique-Nord, cet enjeu va bien au-delà des seules frontières du Soudan. Il y a de la capacité de la nouvelle Union africaine à répondre aux besoins de paix et de sécurité du continent tout entier, avec encore une fois tout le soutien que vont lui apporter les Européens, avec leurs alliés américains et canadiens, aux côtés des Nations Unies bien sûr.

Je vous remercie.

## **ANNEXE – CONSOLIDATED EU PACKAGE IN SUPPORT OF AMIS II**

Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), conveyed today information on additional EU support to the African Union's AMIS II mission in the Darfur region of Sudan at the international Pledging Conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

The following elements represent a basis for the consolidated EU package in support of AMIS II.

### *Support in the area of Police:*

- ▶ Support to AMIS II CIVPOL chain of command (Senior police advisors in Addis Ababa, the office of the Head of Mission in Khartoum, the office of the Police Commissioner in El Fasher, and Police Commanders in each sector);
- ▶ Assistance to pre-Deployment and In-Mission Training for CIVPOL Personnel;
- ▶ Assistance to the AU in developing its longer term capacity to plan and conduct police operations by providing support to the development of a police unit within the Secretariat of the AU;
- ▶ Assistance in building premises for CIVPOL in refugee camps.

### *Planning and Technical Experts:*

- ▶ Work with AU Member States to select experienced African officers for the AMIS II Chain of Command and to provide financing for them;
- ▶ Provide operational and logistic planners for AMIS headquarters in Addis Ababa, Khartoum and El Fasher.

### *Airlift:*

- ▶ Provision of strategic and tactical airlifts and airlift coordination to assist with the Force rotation and AMIS II expansion.
  - Strategic;  
Lift of at least two African Battalions (pending further contributions).
  - In-theatre transport;  
Tactical lift 2-4 rotations per week, (deployment, including of logistic assets, sustainment); Offered aircraft (two An 2; two C212).

### *Logistic Support:*

- ▶ Provision of vehicles, communications equipment, mobile generators and other required materiel; (water road tankers and medical supplies, personnel equipment sets);

- ▶ Provision of logistic planners, in support of the Darfur Integrated Taskforce (DITF) and particularly the Joint Logistic Coordination Centre in El Fasher.

### *Training, Assistance and Advisory Teams:*

- ▶ Provision of teams to assist AMIS II in preparing the additional personnel and those rotated, pending further contributions;
  - ▮ Training already identified in particular for the Senegalese Battalion in early July and Nigerian component mid-June;
  - ▮ Training of pilots for the offered aircraft (two AN 2, two C212s).

### *Aerial Observation:*

- ▶ Providing aerial observation capacity for AMIS II.

### *Media Support:*

- ▶ Assistance to the AU to develop the AU media strategy.

### *MILOBS:*

- ▶ Provision of additional monitors.

### *Financial:*

- ▶ Provision of financial support, pending further contributions;
  - ▮ At least additional 1 million Euros for civilian aspects to be updated later,
  - ▮ 57 million Euro still available from the African Peace Facility to support the enhancement of AMIS II (salaries, rations for soldiers, fuel and insurance).

### *Administrative and management coordination cell:*

- ▶ Co-located with AU in Addis Abeba;
- ▶ Liaison officers with ability to operate as required in Darfur
- ▶ Movement coordination officer

*In providing this offer to the African Union, the EU will seek transparency and complimentary with the partners and major contributors of the international community.*

## European Constitution

Brussels, 30 May 2005

In the referendum of 29 May, the French massively rejected the European Constitution. This was the first time that France had voted negatively on a European treaty. Reflecting a general sense of dissatisfaction, but also revealing a certain fragility in the European project as a whole, this NO vote caused consternation throughout the capitals of Europe.

### **SUMMARY OF THE REMARKS TO THE PRESS BY THE EU HR JAVIER SOLANA ON THE RESULTS OF THE REFERENDUM IN FRANCE**

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The people of France have spoken and its majority has decided not to support the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. Of course I respect this choice, but I am equally sorry to learn of this outcome. It will be no surprise that I would have preferred a different result.

I firmly believe that after last year's enlargement, the European Union was ready for a deeper form of engagement which the Constitution would provide. With the 'no'-vote in France, we are definitely in a difficult situation. However, as the current President of the Council, Jean-Claude Juncker, has already said, we are going to continue our work and there are still other referenda to be held in the upcoming months and it is important that the ratification process continues.

The decision taken by the French people is an important decision, taken by an important country of the EU. What is of crucial importance now is that we keep on working as we did before and that we do not get into a psychological paralysis. Let me assure you that this will undoubtedly not happen to me!

The European Council in mid-June will give the leaders of Europe the opportunity to discuss the situation collectively and in further detail. The new situation will need to be analysed in a calm and lucid manner. There is no doubt that the European people as well as the European leaders wish the EU to become an increasingly important actor in the international arena.

In the meantime, our work has to continue and we need to explain our partners around the world that the EU will remain an active global player. Our partners need a strong Europe that acts with determination on the international stage. Life continues and the course of the world will not stop. The world's challenges will not change because of yesterday's vote and there are many problems of the world that keep on challenging us. We as the EU have to face these problems and we have to keep on working on their resolution 24 hours a day. This is what we will have to do and this is what I will certainly do. A good example of these necessary efforts is our renewed engagement for an improvement of the situation in Darfur, which we stated at the pledging conference in Addis Ababa last week.

## Questions and Answers

- ▶ **Question:** In how far is the French vote a setback for the European Union’s ambitions to a strong role on the international stage?
- ▶ **Answer:** I am convinced that the ‘no’-vote in France is not a setback for the EU as an actor on the world stage. The EU was already an international actor, before we even started talking about the Constitution. The Constitution was certainly designed to improve the visibility of the Union, to make it more effective and to allow more rapid decision-making. However, neither the constitutional text nor the ideas contained in it are dead. Furthermore, we do already have appropriate instruments to act and with these instruments we will face our obligations. We will carry on working and we will keep on acting on the international stage in order to face the numerous challenges. The European Union will definitely continue to be an important actor in international affairs.

Amongst other things, I am about to travel to the Euromed ministerial meeting in Luxembourg right now and I will be travelling to the United States later this week. There is a lot of work to be done, there are various crises and conflicts in the world and Europe will remain engaged. It would be irresponsible to give up our worldwide engagement in the face of an internal setback.

- ▶ **Question:** It is suitable to continue the preparatory work on the European External Action Service after the ‘no’-vote in France?
- ▶ **Answer:** Even if the Constitution was rejected in France, I think that it is suitable to keep on working on the establishment of an European External Action Service (EEAS). This service will definitely come into existence sooner or later. The more we work on a thorough preparation, the better and more successful it will be when it comes into action. It is not important when this will exactly happen – it is crucial that we get mentally and practically used to the fact that the EEAS will become a reality. I am working with Commission President Barroso on this issue and we will present a report on it to the European Council in June.

## European Council

Brussels, 16 and 17 June 2005

### PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS

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Delegations will find attached the Presidency conclusions of the Brussels European Council (16 and 17 June 2005).

1. The meeting of the European Council was preceded by an expose by the President of the European Parliament, Mr Josep Borrell, followed by an exchange of views.
2. The European Council welcomes the signing of the Accession Treaty in Luxembourg on 25 April 2005, which marks a further important step towards the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union. Those countries will now participate in the proceedings of the European Council, the Council and its preparatory bodies as active observers.
3. The European Council also refers to its conclusions of 17 and 18 June 2004 and of 16 and 17 December 2004 on enlargement and highlights the need to implement them fully.
4. The Council addressed the following issues:
  - I. Financial perspective
  - II. Economic, social and environmental issues (Lisbon Strategy; sustainable development)
  - III. Area of freedom, security and justice (the Hague Programme; terrorism)
  - IV. External relations
  - V. Other business

(...)

### *III. Area of freedom, security and justice*

#### **The Hague Programme**

12. The European Council is pleased to note the adoption by the Council and Commission of the Action Plan implementing the Hague Programme on strengthening the area of freedom, security and justice. That Plan translates the objectives of the Hague Programme into specific measures. Given the growing importance of the external dimension of the area of freedom, security and justice, it will be supplemented at the end of the year by the strategy to be adopted by the Council on a proposal from the SG/HR and the Commission.

13. It is of prime importance that Member States should implement the various measures adopted to carry out the Action Plan effectively and within the deadlines. The European Council therefore notes that the Council is currently examining the measures taken by Member States to transpose and implement the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant. It considers that that method of evaluation should in general be developed.

14. The European Council welcomes the emphasis given by the Action Plan to operational cooperation between the various actors involved in the Union's internal security. In that context, it notes the more operational character of recent work by the Police Chiefs Task Force, Europol and Eurojust and welcomes the start of activities by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders. The European Council invites the Council to step up coordination both amongst these various actors and between them and the competent authorities of the Member States.

15. The European Council agrees to take stock of the implementation of the Hague Action Plan during the second half of 2006, in accordance with the decision it took in November 2004.

16. The European Council welcomes the Drugs Action Plan (2005-2008) in the framework of the Drug Strategy (2005-2012).

#### **Fight against terrorism**

17. The European Council took note of the Council's report on the implementation of the Action Plan to combat terrorism. It commends the progress made on the legislative front in the area of the exchange of judicial and police information and the fight against the financing of terrorism. It also notes the guidelines defined by the Council for draw-

ing up a strategy on radicalisation and terrorist recruitment, including, among other things, the promotion at national level of dialogue between religions, the finalisation of the peer review of domestic anti-terrorism arrangements and the development of analytical capacity within the Council Secretariat. Finally, it welcomes the adoption by the Council of the document on the implementation of the Conceptual Framework on ESDP and terrorism.

18. The European Council stresses the importance which it attaches to progress in all areas of the Action Plan to combat terrorism, particularly as regards compliance with the deadlines for the entry into force of the measures considered to be a priority for the effectiveness of the fight against terrorism as agreed by the March 2004 European Council.

19. The European Council wishes the following points to be addressed as a priority during the second half of 2005:

- as far as possible, concerning the exchange of information between police authorities, the evidence warrant, the retention of data on telecommunications traffic, and the exchange of information and cooperation on terrorist offences;
- further efforts to achieve better sharing of strategic and operational information between Member States, and between the latter and the competent agencies and services of the Union, in accordance with the Hague Programme;
- the drafting of the strategy and action plan on radicalisation and terrorist recruitment, in the light of the guidelines defined by the Council;
- follow-up to the recommendations stemming from the peer review of domestic anti-terrorism arrangements;
- continued implementation of the strategy on the financing of terrorism, in particular by adopting a code of conduct to prevent the abuse of charitable organisations and by strengthening the procedures concerning the freezing of assets;
- the strengthening of civil protection capabilities, particularly the medical resources available to deal with a bioterrorist attack, and the development of a rapid reaction capability based on the civil protection modules of the Member States;
- the strengthening of political dialogue on terrorism with third countries, and of international cooperation in the fight against terrorism, in particular the adoption of the United Nations comprehensive convention on international terrorism;
- the finalisation of programmes of assistance for certain priority third countries to strengthen their anti-terrorist mechanisms, and the implementation, in that respect, of the network of experts responsible for responding to requests for technical assistance from third countries;
- customs cooperation measures to improve the security of the supply chain.

20. The European Council will assess the progress made at its meeting in December 2005 and revise the Action Plan to combat terrorism.



#### IV. *External relations*

##### Preparation for the September 2005 United Nations Summit

21. The European Council considers that the United Nations Summit will provide an opportunity to reaffirm our support for the UN as an international relations instrument founded in law. It reaffirms its strong support for effective multilateralism and for the process of reform of the United Nations. It emphasises that the report which the Secretary-General presented on 21 March 2005 and the contribution from the President of the General Assembly on 3 June 2005 provide an excellent working basis for the declaration to be adopted in September in New York.

22. The European Council wishes to express its gratitude to the Secretary-General for the exhaustive and coherent nature of his report. It shares the Secretary-General's views on his integrated concept of collective security and supports the idea that development, security and human rights are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. It welcomes the strategies proposed in the areas of development, security, human rights, the rule of law and democracy.

23. The European Council considers it essential to achieve a balanced and ambitious outcome enabling the UN to be reformed so that it can respond more practically and effectively to the multi-dimensional threats and challenges identified in the Secretary-General's report.

24. Against that background, the European Council emphasises the European Union's commitment to pursuing a substantial dialogue with all UN member countries with a view to preparing for the Summit.

25. The European Union supports the development of cooperation with the United Nations and the regional organisations, in particular on the occasion of the high-level dialogue between the United Nations and the regional organisations which will take place on 25 and 26 July 2005.

26. Development plays a crucial role in the preparation of the Summit. In this respect, recalling the prime responsibility of developing countries for their own development, the European Council welcomes the agreement reached by the Council concerning Official Development Assistance (ODA). In the context of the commitment to attain the internationally agreed ODA target of an ODA/GNI ratio of 0,7%, the European Council notes with satisfaction that its Member States are on track to achieve the 0,39% target of GNI in 2006 for ODA volumes contained in the Barcelona commitments. While reaffirming its determination to fulfil these commitments, the Council decided on a new collective

European Union target of an ODA/GNI ratio of 0,56% by 2010. That would result in an additional EUR 20 billion a year in ODA.

27. In this context, the European Council can reiterate, in accordance with the outcome of the Council on 24 May 2005, that Member States which have not yet achieved an ODA/GNI ratio of 0,51% undertake to attain that level, within their respective budget allocation processes, by 2010, while those that are already above that level undertake to continue their efforts. Member States which joined the EU after 2002, and have not yet achieved an ODA/GNI ratio of 0,17%, will endeavour to increase their ODA to attain that level, within their respective budget allocation processes, by 2010, while those that are already above that level undertake to continue their efforts; Member States undertake to achieve the target of an ODA/GNI ratio of 0,7% by 2015, while those which have achieved that target commit themselves to remaining above that target; Member States which joined the EU after 2002 will endeavour to increase their ODA/GNI ratio to 0,33% by 2015.

28. The European Council invites the Council to pursue its consideration of the most promising options for innovative sources of funding for development, so as to increase the resources available in a sustainable and predictable manner.

29. The European Union remains determined to find, in cooperation with the international financial institutions, an agreement on the scope and arrangements for further multilateral debt relief in order to guarantee, following a case-by-case approach, that the burden of debt is bearable in the long term. In this context, it welcomes the G8's agreement to grant 100% multilateral debt relief to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries.

30. The European Union recalls the need, in parallel with funding-related efforts, to improve the quality and effectiveness of Official Development Assistance, and the need to reinforce capacities and ensure the viability of increased Official Development Assistance for partner countries. It welcomes the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and recalls the commitment by the Member States and the Commission to ensure that it is implemented and followed up without delay, that verifiable key targets are established, and that the specific commitments which the European Union adopted at the High-level Forum in Paris are implemented.

31. The European Council underlines the importance of taking into account the social dimension of globalisation in various policies and in international cooperation.

32. The European Council confirms that the European Union will continue to take account of development cooperation objectives in all policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries. The EU will make a particular effort to promote and

increase the consistency of development policies in the context of the Global Partnership for Development under Millennium Development Goal (MDG) No 8.

33. The EU considers the development of Africa a priority and will step up its efforts to assist African countries to reach the Millennium Development Goals. In this context, the European Council reaffirms the European Union's intention of increasing its financial assistance for sub-Saharan Africa by collectively allocating at least 50% of the agreed increase in ODA resources to the African continent, respecting the priorities of the various Member States. Aid for countries which are emerging from conflict and for fragile States will also be improved.

34. The European Council regards the creation of the Peace Building Commission, conflict prevention, the fight against terrorism, the adoption of principles governing the use of force, disarmament, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems and the strengthening of the United Nations' peacekeeping capabilities as its priorities in the preparation of the Summit.

35. The European Council welcomes the agreement reached at the United Nations General Assembly on 13 April 2005 on the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and calls on all members of the United Nations to sign that Convention during the Summit in September.

36. With regard more specifically to disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the European Council deplores the fact that despite the EU's efforts, the NPT Review Conference was not able to achieve a document by consensus, dealing with the basic questions. The European Council reiterates the importance which it attaches to the consolidation of the NPT and hopes that the issue will be addressed at the September Summit. It confirms its common position, adopted for the Review Conference, as the basis for pursuing its objectives in the forthcoming examination of the NPT.

37. The European Council welcomes the prominent place given to human rights, the rule of law and democracy in the reform proposals. In this connection, the European Council reaffirms the importance which it attributes to the concept of responsibility to protect, which must be implemented by the Security Council. It supports the reinforcement of the role and resources of the High Commissioner and the establishment of a Human Rights Council meeting throughout the year and reflecting the universality of human rights and their central position in the UN system. It shares the concern to place human rights on the same footing as development, peace and security matters. It also supports the call for the strengthening of the High Commissioner's Office, *inter alia* through its interaction with the Security Council. Those initiatives should increase the extent to which account is taken of human rights in the United Nations' activities.

38. In the area of institutional reforms, the European Council recognises the need to reform the main UN bodies, among them the General Assembly, ECOSOC and the Security Council, with a view to enhancing the representativeness, transparency and efficiency of the system. It also supports reform efforts in the areas of the budget and administrative management, to enable the UN better to fulfil its mandate.

39. Sustainable development, including environmental questions and concerns, must be integrated to a greater extent in national and international development programmes and strategies. The European Council supports the Secretary-General's urgent appeal for a more integrated international environmental governance structure, based on existing institutions. In this perspective, and given the environmental challenges associated with development, the EU proposes that the high-level meeting in September 2005 initiate a process, as part of UN reform, which will lead to negotiations on the establishment of a UN agency for the environment, based on UNEP, with a revised and strengthened mandate, supported by stable, adequate and predictable financial contributions and operating on an equal footing with other UN specialised agencies. This agency, based in Nairobi, would make it possible to develop the environmental dimension of sustainable development in an integrated and consistent manner, and would cooperate closely with multilateral agencies, each using its comparative advantages to best effect.

40. The European Council underlines that it is necessary for the WTO Ministerial Conference planned for December 2005 in Hong Kong to establish the broad lines of an agreement for the conclusion of the Doha Development Agenda. Ambitious and balanced results must be achieved in view of the economic challenges which Europe has to face and in order to provide developing countries with an opportunity to fully integrate into the global economy.

### **Western Balkans**

41. The European Council reaffirms its commitment to full implementation of the Thessaloniki agenda, which emphasises that the future of the Western Balkans lies in the European Union. It reiterates that each country's progress towards European integration, taking account of the evolution of the *acquis*, depends on its efforts to comply with the Copenhagen criteria and the conditionality of the stabilisation and association process. Moreover, in this process, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations will remain essential elements of EU policy.

42. The European Council encourages the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to intensify its efforts with a view to the opinion that the Commission is to submit on its application for accession to the EU. It commends the substantial efforts made by Serbia and Montenegro, encourages it to intensify these, and reaffirms that the European Union

wishes to enter into negotiations as soon as possible with a view to concluding a stabilisation and association agreement. It reiterates its determination to act likewise with Bosnia and Herzegovina as soon as the conditions for so doing are fulfilled. The European Council also recalls the importance of holding free and democratic elections in Albania in accordance with international standards, including in the regions where minorities live, in the context of that country's rapprochement with the EU.

43. On the eve of the commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre, the European Council underlines that full and unrestricted cooperation by countries in the region with the ICTY remains an essential requirement for continuing their progress towards the EU. It expects that this cooperation will continue and be strengthened until all those charged with crimes who continue to elude international justice have been brought before the Tribunal.

44. The European Council has adopted a declaration on Kosovo which is set out in Annex III.

### European Neighbourhood Policy

45. The European Council welcomes the conclusion of a first wave of action plans, within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, with Israel, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia and Ukraine, and welcomes the decision to establish similar action plans in 2005 with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, which were included in the European Neighbourhood Policy in June 2004, as well as with Egypt and Lebanon, and to draw up a national report on Algeria. The European Council invites the Commission and the High Representative to report regularly on progress made.

46. The European Council welcomes the reform efforts of the Ukrainian government towards a full-fledged democracy and social market economy and its commitment to European norms and values. It looks forward to continuing the intensified dialogue and contacts between the EU and Ukraine and supports a speedy implementation of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan.

47. The European Council takes note, in addition to the adoption of the EU-Moldova Action Plan, of the appointment of an EUSR for Moldova, soon to become a direct neighbour of the European Union. It expresses its preparedness to take active part in finding a solution to the Transnistrian conflict and appreciates an increased dialogue with Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE on this issue.

48. The European Council reiterates the EU's commitment to strengthening its relations with Belarus, inter alia by drawing up an action plan, once the authorities of that

country have clearly demonstrated their intention to respect democratic values, the rule of law, and human rights. The EU is concerned by the intensification of the repression of democratic forces and civil society in Belarus. The EU will take steps to make the people of Belarus aware of the advantages of the European neighbourhood policy, and will support the strengthening of civil society and the democratisation process in that country.

### **Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean region and the Middle East**

49. The European Council approved the report by the Presidency, the Secretary-General/High Representative and the Commission on the implementation of the Strategic Partnership between the EU and the Mediterranean region and the Middle East. The European Council stresses the importance of the Strategic Partnership for the EU's relations with countries in the Middle East region. It will continue to monitor implementation of the objectives of the Strategic Partnership in accordance with the principles of action of joint ownership and partnership. The European Council agrees on the need to pay particular attention to the implementation of the Strategic Partnership in the countries situated to the east of Jordan. The common political will to promote relations and cooperation in all areas, extending beyond commercial and economic issues, was reaffirmed in particular at the 15th GCC-EU Joint Council and Ministerial Meeting on 5 April 2005 in Manama.

### **Barcelona Process**

50. The European Council welcomes the holding, in Luxembourg, of the Seventh Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, which enabled a comprehensive review of the Partnership since its initiation in 1995 to be carried out and the bases for the future of the Process to be defined, and also enabled joint conclusions to be adopted for the first time, amongst other matters on the need to promote political and social reforms in the partner countries. It also noted with satisfaction the progress made in the political and security dialogue and in implementation of the social, cultural and human partnership of the Barcelona Process, in particular through the inauguration, in Alexandria, of the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures, and the establishment in Luxembourg of the Euro-Mediterranean Non-Governmental Platform. Lastly, the European Council welcomes the holding of the first plenary session of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly in Cairo, which reflects the attachment to democratic values and the principle of joint ownership intrinsic to the Barcelona Process. It welcomes the organization in Barcelona at the end of November 2005 of an extraordinary high-level meeting to mark the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration.

51. The full integration of Libya into the Barcelona Process is the overall objective of the EU's policy of engagement with that country. Participation in this Process, and subse-

quent progression towards the conclusion of an Association Agreement, remain dependent on Libya's readiness to accept the Declaration and the Barcelona acquis in full and unconditionally. Consultations on this matter and on other outstanding issues are continuing.

## Iraq

52. The European Council reaffirms the EU's willingness to pursue the implementation of the full assistance programme agreed by the Council on 5 November 2004 and on 21 February 2005, to achieve the objective of a safe, stable, unified, prosperous and democratic Iraq that upholds human rights, fully exercises its sovereignty and cooperates constructively with its neighbours and with the international community. It recalls the readiness of the Commission and of the Member States, at Iraq's request, to support the constitutional process in accordance with Resolution 1546 and in full cooperation with the UN. It encourages the Iraqi authorities to pursue the full involvement of all sections of Iraqi society in the constitutional process and in promoting genuine national dialogue.

53. The European Council reiterates its commitment to supporting the Iraqi authorities and people, in accordance with the Commission communication entitled "The European Union and Iraq – A Framework for Engagement", approved by the European Council in June 2004, in particular by providing support for the strengthening of the criminal justice system and the rule of law through the EUJUST LEX mission, by contributing to the political, economic and social reconstruction of Iraq and by continuing efforts to deepen relations between the EU and Iraq with the aim of establishing a regular political dialogue. In this context it welcomes the Ministerial Troika's visit to Baghdad on 9 June 2005 and confirms its willingness to develop contacts between the EU and Iraq. The European Council welcomes the adoption by the Council on 13 June 2005 of the operation plan for the Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX), enabling this EU training mission for Iraq to be officially launched. It welcomed the Commission's announcement of its intention to open a delegation in Baghdad in the near future.

54. It expresses the wish that the Iraq International Conference, jointly organised by the European Union and the United States in the framework of the political process defined by Resolution 1546, to be held on 22 June 2005 in Brussels, will provide an opportunity to demonstrate the international community's support for the priorities identified by the Iraqi authorities for the transition period, with a view to a new coordination framework for aid efforts as soon as possible. In this connection, the European Council emphasises the importance of the Iraqi Government playing a leading role and the United Nations acting to provide advice and support.

## Iran

55. The European Council welcomes the resumption of negotiations for a trade and cooperation agreement and for a political agreement with Iran made possible by the conclusion and effective implementation of the Paris Agreement in November 2004. It stresses the importance it attaches to fair treatment of all Member States in the commercial sector. It confirms that the European Union is ready to continue looking into ways of further developing political and economic cooperation with Iran, following action taken by that country to address other areas of concern to the EU regarding the fight against terrorism, human rights and Iran's approach to the Middle East peace process. The European Council recalls its commitment to a credible and effective dialogue on human rights and hopes that the next meeting will take place rapidly on the basis of the new arrangements agreed by both parties.

56. The European Council would point out that the total suspension of all enrichment-related and all reprocessing activities had to be maintained if the overall process was to continue. It expresses its support for the continuation of efforts to reach an agreement on long-term arrangements, giving the international community objective guarantees of the exclusively peaceful purpose of the Iranian nuclear programme. The European Council welcomes the international support this process enjoyed.

## Middle East Peace Process

57. The European Council adopted a declaration on the Middle East Peace Process, which is set out in Annex IV, and a declaration on Lebanon (Annex V).

## Transatlantic Relations

58. The European Council welcomes the positive development of Transatlantic Relations during the first half of 2005. It notes with satisfaction the visit by US President George W. Bush to the European institutions in Brussels on 22 February 2005, and in particular the meeting of the Heads of State or of Government with the President. The annual summit between the Union and the United States on 20 June 2005 in Washington will be a further opportunity to note progress made in relations with this irreplaceable strategic partner of the Union, and in particular to deepen Transatlantic economic ties. It welcomes the launching of a strategic dialogue between the Union and the United States on East Asia. The European Council looks forward to the forthcoming EU-Canada Summit on 19 June 2005 in Niagara-on-the-Lake when it will be possible to take note of the consolidation of the EU-Canada relationship since the Partnership Agenda was adopted at the last Summit in March 2004. It also welcomes the recent opening of negotiations with Canada on an agreement to increase trade and investment.



## Russia

59. The European Council expresses satisfaction at the outcome of the 15th EU-Russia Summit, which was held on 10 May 2005, and more particularly at the adoption of the road maps for the creation of four common spaces, which it was decided to set up at the St Petersburg Summit in May 2003 (common economic space, common space of freedom, security and justice, space of cooperation in the field of external security, and a space of research and education, including cultural aspects). These road maps, which make a balanced set, define common objectives for EU-Russia relations, as well as the actions necessary to attain these objectives, and determine the medium-term programme for cooperation between the EU and Russia. Their implementation will strengthen the strategic partnership between the EU and Russia, as well as regional cooperation, in particular in the framework of the Northern Dimension.

60. The European Union is pleased to note that the first consultations on human rights between the European Union and Russia, launched in March 2005, were held successfully.

61. The European Council welcomes the signing of the border agreement between Russia and Estonia and hopes that a similar agreement can soon be signed with Latvia.

62. The European Council also welcomes Russia's commitment to complete the evacuation of the remaining Russian military bases in Georgia in the course of 2008. It expects the full implementation of all commitments entered into in Istanbul in 1999.

## Relations with Asia

63. The European Council reaffirms the importance it attaches to the development of relations with Asia in the light of the increasing role that the region is called upon to play in the resolution of fundamental issues arising in the international community. In this context, it welcomes the outcome of the EU-ASEAN and ASEM ministerials which took place during the first half of the year.

64. The European Council reiterates its resolve to expand its partnership with Japan both in response to major international issues and on a strictly bilateral level. It is determined to strengthen the strategic dialogue on East Asia's security environment, the need for which was emphasised at the 14th EU-Japan Summit in Luxembourg on 2 May 2005. The European Council welcomes the considerable progress made with the implementation of the action plan, adopted in 2001, which reflects the deepening relations between the enlarged Union and Japan. The need for closer cooperation on environmental, energy and

science and technology issues was recalled. The European Council is pleased to note the success of the EU-Japan Year of People to People Exchanges.

65. The European Council welcomes the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the EU and China. It reiterates its determination to develop the strategic partnership with China by intensifying the dialogue in all areas, whether of an economic or political nature, and by working towards a rapid solution to its trade dispute. It asks the Council and the Commission to speed up the proceedings on a new framework agreement. It underlines the importance it attaches to the human rights dialogue, the 19th round of which took place on 24 and 25 February in Luxembourg.

66. The European Council also recalls its conclusions of 16 and 17 December 2004. It welcomes the progress made on the revision of the code of conduct and the “toolbox”, and invites the Council to continue its work on that basis.

67. Finally, the European Council welcomes the launch of a strategic dialogue on Asia with the United States and Japan.

68. The European Council encourages further work on formulating the action plan with India, which is due to be approved at the sixth summit to be held in the second half of 2005 in New Delhi.

### **Relations with the ACP**

69. The European Council welcomes the conclusion of the negotiations on the revision of the Cotonou Agreement, and the agreement reached on this subject with the ACP States on 23 February 2005. This revised agreement, while maintaining the Cotonou acquis, represents an improvement of the partnership between the ACP States, the Community and its Member States, in all its component parts.

### **Relations with Africa**

70. The European Council welcomes the increase in dialogue and cooperation between the EU and all the African countries, made possible by the affirmation of the African Union (AU) as the political framework able to put forward African responses to the challenges of development. The purpose of this dialogue is an EU-Africa strategic partnership focusing on four main lines: four peace and security, governance, regional integration and trade, and development. The European Council welcomes the boosting of peace-keeping and security maintenance capabilities in Africa and the fact that the relevant structures have been made operational, particularly in the framework of the African Union and the sub-regional organisations which the EU has pledged to support.

71. The European Council is anxious to point out in particular that the European Union, and its Member States, will pursue their aid efforts, notably in Sudan, in the Great Lakes region, in West Africa and in Somalia. It expresses its full support for the continental initiatives such as NEPAD or regional initiatives such as the process following on from the International Conference on the Great Lakes, and welcomes the growing activity by African organizations such as ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD.

72. The EU will pursue its commitment to restoring peace and development throughout Sudan, in particular through its support for AMIS. For example, at the AMIS donor conference on 26 May 2005 in Addis Ababa the EU tabled a comprehensive and substantial offer involving support for planning, logistics and operation, equipment, strategic and tactical airlift, development of AU's observation capabilities and training of police experts and in other civilian areas, in keeping with the requests made by the African Union and in coordination with the other international community players, in particular the United Nations, NATO, the United States and Canada. The EU also calls on all parties to cooperate with the International Criminal Court so as to put an end to impunity and obstacles to justice and the reconciliation of the peoples of Darfur. The European Council continues to be deeply concerned at the serious infringements of human rights and of international humanitarian law committed against the civil population in Darfur, and at the hindrance of the efforts of humanitarian organisations, and reminds the Sudanese Government of its responsibility to guarantee the safety of its citizens and of those working on their behalf. It urges all the parties in Darfur, when the announced resumption of peace negotiations takes place, to negotiate a complete and definitive peace agreement in good faith, and to cooperate fully with the United Nations. It also calls on all the Sudanese parties fully and completely to implement the Global Peace Agreement and to launch an inclusive democratisation process.

73. The European Union contributed to security sector reform, transition and stabilisation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by launching the EU police mission in April 2005 in Kinshasa (EUPOL Kinshasa), and by launching on 8 June 2005 its mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform (EUSEC RD Congo). The EU and its Member States confirm that they are prepared to consider more operational support for the integration of the Congolese army, particularly on the basis of information provided by EUSEC RD Congo. Such missions are tangible examples of implementation of the action plan providing ESDP support for peace and security in Africa. Through this commitment, the EU renews its support for transition and repeats its call to the Congolese authorities to take the necessary measures to ensure a smooth electoral process, good governance and transparency and, in particular, the regular payment of soldiers' wages. It urges the political opposition and civil society to play a constructive and calming role in the implementation of transition.

74. In view of the close link between peace and security, on the one hand, and the development of the African countries, on the other, the European Council reaffirms the EU's determination to continue supporting the development of the African continent in compliance with the principles of equality and African ownership. In this context, holding the second EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon as soon as possible is an important objective. The European Council also commends the priority treatment given to Africa in the G8 proceedings and has taken note of the contribution by the "Commission for Africa".

75. In this context the European Council recalls the importance it attaches to relations between the European Union and Africa. It invites the Council to draw up a long-term global strategy towards Africa in the light of the UN Summit with a view to the European Council in December 2005.

### **Relations with Latin America**

76. The European Council recalls the European Union's commitment to reinforce its partnership with Latin America. It notes with satisfaction the outcome of the 12th ministerial meeting between the Union and the Rio Group, and of the ministerial meetings with the various sub-regional organisations of Central and South America, which took place on 26 and 27 May 2005 in Luxembourg.

77. The European Council welcomes the resolution expressed at the recent meeting with Mercosur to conclude bi-regional negotiations to establish an inter-regional association agreement. The European Council also welcomes the launch in January 2005 of joint evaluation exercises on regional economic integration by the Andean Community and Central America, applying the decisions adopted at the EU-LAC Summit which took place in Guadalajara in May 2004.

### **ESDP**

78. The European Council approves the Presidency report on the ESDP, which comprises the mandate for the incoming Presidency.

79. As regards military capabilities, conceptual work on battlegroups (as part of rapid response elements) has continued with success. At the battlegroup coordination conference on 11 May it was established that Member States' commitments will enable the desired goal for the initial operating capability period 2005 and 2006 to be achieved. The European Council underlines the progress made with a view to securing the necessary contributions for the full operating capability period in 2007/2008.

80. The European Council welcomes the measures taken to enable the decision-making and planning process to be speeded up for EU rapid response operations.
81. The development of European civilian capabilities to achieve the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 has been actively pursued in accordance with the deadlines set by the December 2004 European Council. It has thus been possible to prepare the strategic planning assumptions and illustrative scenarios concerning stabilisation and reconstruction, conflict prevention, targeted strengthening of institutions and civilian support for humanitarian operations. Work on the rapid deployment of civilian crisis management capabilities has also continued.
82. The European Council notes that the development of ESDP instruments is part of a consistent approach. The civilian/military cell, the establishment of which was adopted at the European Council in December 2003, has begun its proceedings. The cell will have the capacity to generate an operations centre, available in June 2006 at the latest.
83. The European Defence Agency (EDA) is now fully engaged in implementing its first annual work programme. Flagship projects have been submitted in the areas of military capabilities, armaments, industry and the market, and research and technology, the four pillars of the EDA's work.
84. The European Council notes with satisfaction that the concept of EU training in the field of the ESDP has begun to be implemented with success. The operating procedures for the European Security and Defence College have been defined. The conditions necessary to establish the college have thus been met.
85. The European Council reaffirms its interest in strengthening partnerships and cooperation with third States and international bodies. The EU and NATO have pursued their cooperation within a strategic partnership on crisis management. The European Union welcomes the fact that the implementation of operation ALTHEA, led by the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina, has taken place efficiently, in the context of the Berlin Plus arrangements with NATO.
86. Cooperation with the United Nations on crisis management has continued to show progress, reflected particularly in an intensive EU-UN Exercise Study and in close collaboration between EUPOL Kinshasa and MONUC.
87. The European Council also notes with satisfaction the progress made in strengthening the operations-related partnership on EU-led crisis management with Ukraine and Canada, in the framework of the common space of external security with

Russia, in the context of Euromed with the Mediterranean partners, and with the African Union.

88. The European Union is pleased to note the implementation of the Action Plan for ESDP support to Peace and Security in Africa. The aim of the Action Plan is to help African organisations and States gain autonomous conflict prevention and management capacities, with special attention being paid to the African Union.

89. The European Council approved the Presidency report on EU activities in the framework of conflict prevention and stressed the need to continue work in this area.

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### **ANNEXE III**

#### *Declaration on Kosovo*

1. The European Council recalled the European Union's contribution to the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 on Kosovo. The European Union has made a substantial political commitment, particularly in support of UNMIK activities, and has taken on major responsibilities for the reconstruction and economic development of Kosovo. The Thessaloniki Declaration of June 2003 confirmed that the future of the Western Balkans, including Kosovo, was in the European Union.

2. The European Council considered that the situation in Kosovo was entering a critical phase, with the United Nations preparing for a comprehensive review of the implementation of standards, which could lead to the opening of negotiations on the future status of Kosovo.

3. On standards, the European Council welcomed the United Nations Secretary-General's recent report on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and welcomed the appointment of Ambassador Kai Eide as Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General, charged with carrying out a comprehensive review of the situation in Kosovo this summer.

4. The European Council stressed that the outcome of this comprehensive review was not a foregone conclusion: the implementation of standards, particularly those which have been identified as a priority, and the decentralisation process are of particular importance. The European Council therefore recommended all those responsible for

implementing standards, particularly the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) in Kosovo, to redouble their efforts to achieve concrete results urgently, particularly as regards the return of refugees and displaced persons and the protection of all the communities in Kosovo. It called on all political leaders, in Pristina as in Belgrade, not to obstruct this process.

5. The European Council recalled that the opening of the procedure to determine the future status of Kosovo in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1244 would depend on the positive outcome of the comprehensive review. It noted that compliance with standards was a fundamental and continuing obligation which was an integral part of that process. Rapprochement with the EU will also depend on such compliance and on the full implementation of standards; the EU will therefore continue to follow this process closely.

6. The European Council formally asks the parties to show goodwill, so as to achieve a mutually acceptable solution. It indicated the importance which it attached to constructive and sustained dialogue being established at all levels between Belgrade and Pristina, and between the different communities in Kosovo. It asked the authorities in Belgrade actively to encourage the Serbs of Kosovo to take their place in Kosovar institutions, to exercise their democratic rights there.

7. On the status of Kosovo, the European Council reaffirmed that any solution must be fully compatible with European values and norms, comply with international legal instruments and obligations and the United Nations Charter, and contribute to realising the European prospects of Kosovo and the region. At the same time, any agreement on status must ensure that Kosovo does not return to the pre-March 1999 situation.

8. The European Council declared that the determination of the future status of Kosovo must be based on multi-ethnicity, and on full respect for human rights, including the right for all refugees and displaced persons to return home safely. The status must offer effective constitutional guarantees to ensure that minorities are protected, including mechanisms to ensure their participation in central government and in the new local administrative structures to be put in place. It should also include specific safeguards to protect the cultural heritage and religious sites and to promote effective mechanisms to combat organised crime, corruption and terrorism.

9. The European Council also declared that the determination of the status of Kosovo must reinforce the security and stability of the region. Thus any solution which was unilateral or resulted from the use of force, as well as any changes to the current territory of Kosovo, would be unacceptable. Thus there will be no partition of Kosovo, nor any union of Kosovo with another country or with part of another country following the resolution

of the status of Kosovo. The territorial integrity of neighbouring countries must be fully respected. Likewise, the status must guarantee that Kosovo can continue to develop in a way which is both economically and politically sustainable, and not constitute a military or security threat to its neighbours.

10. The European Council stressed that Kosovo will, in the medium term, continue to need a civilian and military international presence to ensure security and in particular protection for minorities, to help with the continuing implementation of standards and to exercise appropriate supervision of compliance with the provisions contained in the status agreement. In this respect, the European Council stressed the EU's willingness to play a full part, in close cooperation with the relevant partners and international organisations.

11. The European Council stressed that the European Union would continue to contribute to the international community's efforts in Kosovo. It is determined to reinforce its actions further, particularly in the consolidation of the rule of law and a viable economic environment, in keeping with its special responsibility for the future of the region, particularly by actively pursuing the Thessaloniki agenda, and to be fully involved in the definition of the status of Kosovo, which must enable Belgrade and Pristina to make progress towards Euro-Atlantic integration.

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## **ANNEXE IV**

### *Declaration on the Middle East peace process*

1. The European Council stresses the global strategic importance of peace, stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean. This is the context in which the European commitment to the resolution of the Middle East conflict must be seen. The European Union is firmly resolved to continue its action with a view to achieving this goal.

2. The European Council welcomes the positive developments in recent months. Thus, the peaceful transition of power in the Palestinian Authority with respect for the institutions, the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit, and the materialisation of the withdrawal from Gaza and from certain parts of the northern West Bank have all created an opportunity for tangible progress towards the resolution of the conflict. It is crucial that the parties to the conflict, along with the international community, make every effort to make the most of this context and avoid a new escalation of violence.

3. The European Council recalls in this regard the importance of full implementation by the parties of the obligations incumbent upon them under the first phase of the



Roadmap. It notes that the latter provides for measures to be taken in parallel by the two sides.

4. The European Council stresses the importance for the Palestinian Authority of fulfilling all its obligations with regard to security, including those accepted at Sharm el-Sheikh, where all parties undertook to cease all acts of violence. The Palestinian Authority must in particular demonstrate its complete determination to combat terrorism and continue with the reorganisation of all security services. The European Council calls on the Palestinian Authority to continue with the ongoing reform process, to intensify consolidation of the institutions and to set as soon as possible a date for the organisation of free and fair legislative elections.

5. The European Council calls on all parties to take all necessary steps to enable those elections to be held in all the Palestinian territories, including East Jerusalem.

6. The European Council also stresses the need for a halt to Israeli settlement activities in the Palestinian Territories. This implies a complete cessation of construction of dwellings and new infrastructures such as bypass roads. The European Council also calls for the abolition of financial and tax incentives and direct and indirect subsidies, and the withdrawal of exemptions benefiting the settlements and their inhabitants. The European Council urges Israel to dismantle illicit settlement outposts. Settlement policy is an obstacle to peace and threatens to make any solution based on the coexistence of two States physically impossible.

7. The European Council, while recognising the right of Israel to protect its citizens from attacks, remains concerned by the continuing construction of the separation barrier in the occupied Palestinian territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, which is contrary to the relevant provisions of international law.

8. The European Council commends the political courage shown by the leaders of the two sides with regard to the withdrawal from Gaza and certain parts of the northern West Bank. The Council calls on countries in the region to facilitate the Palestinian Authority's efforts to establish control in its territory and to step up their political and economic support. It stresses the importance of a successful disengagement, including for the advancement of the peace process. The European Council confirms the European Union's support for the Quartet's Special Envoy for disengagement, Mr James Wolfensohn, and its determination to work in close cooperation with him to ensure the success of the project. To ensure the social and economic viability of Gaza, the European Council stresses the need for access to the outside, particularly through the borders with Egypt and through a port and an airport, and to establish a meaningful link with the West Bank.

9. In this context, the European Council reasserts that the Israeli withdrawal must be carried out in the framework outlined in the conclusions of the European Council of March 2004, and in particular form an integral part of the process specified by the roadmap.

10. The European Council undertakes to intensify its assistance to the Palestinian Authority to pursue institutional consolidation.

11. The European Council reiterates the importance it attaches to compliance with international law by the parties. In particular, no party should undertake unilateral measures or prejudge questions relating to final status. The European Union will not recognise any change to the 1967 borders other than those negotiated between the parties. A just, lasting and comprehensive settlement of the conflict must be based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242, 338 and 1515, the terms of reference of the Madrid Conference and the principle of land-for-peace.

12. The European Union encourages the parties to move forward resolutely in implementing the Roadmap on the basis of these principles. It undertakes to assist Israelis and Palestinians in advancing the peace process and achieving the goal of coexistence of the two States through the creation of an independent, democratic, contiguous and viable Palestinian State, living side-by-side with Israel and its other neighbours in peace and security. The European Union cannot commit itself to any other path.

13. The European Council reaffirms that a just, lasting and comprehensive peace must meet the legitimate aspirations of both the Israeli and Palestinian peoples and include Lebanon and Syria. It calls for a relaunch of efforts to make progress on all the tracks of the peace process.

14. The European Union will continue to oppose all those who have recourse to violence and to support all those who reject violence and strive for peace and security in order to construct a better future for the region.

## **ANNEXE V**

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### *Declaration on Lebanon*

1. The European Council notes the withdrawal of Syrian military forces from Lebanon and the impending return of the United Nations verification team to the country. It reaffirms the importance it attaches to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon and reiterates its call for Security Council

Resolution 1559 to be implemented in full. In this connection it renews its full support for Mr Terje Roed-Larsen's mission.

2. The European Council welcomes the smooth conduct, so far, of Lebanon's parliamentary elections, which correspond to the Lebanese people's desire for independence. It awaits with interest the overall report which will be drawn up by the European Union's Election Observation Mission after the elections.

3. The European Council strongly condemns the recent politically motivated attacks and assassinations, expresses its dismay at their destabilising effect, and calls for their perpetrators to be brought to justice at the earliest opportunity.

4. The European Council reaffirms its support for the independent international investigation Commission into the assassination of Rafic Hariri which was set up in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1595. It renews its appeal to the Lebanese authorities to continue to provide their unqualified support to the international investigation Commission and hopes that the latter will be able to bring its work rapidly to a successful conclusion.

## **PRESIDENCY REPORT ON THE ESDP**

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1. In line with the mandate defined by the European Council in Brussels in December 2004, the Presidency hereby submits this report on ESDP.

2. In presenting this report, the Presidency has noted that Denmark has drawn attention to Protocol No 5 on the position of Denmark, which is annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty.

### ***I. EU operations***

#### **Current operations**

3. The European Union force deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the framework of the ALTHEA military operation continued its activities on the ground in accordance with its mandate, contributing to the maintenance of a stable and secure environment and supporting the High Representative's Mission Implementation Plan, the fight against organised crime and the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). Coordination with NATO headquarters in Sarajevo was efficient.

The reserves training exercise, which took place in the spring, provided an opportunity to deploy elements of the strategic reserve and to use tactical reserves. It helped strengthen the credibility of the force, and its reputation for effectiveness and determination.

Coordination between the force's activities and the activities of other European Union players in Bosnia and Herzegovina was ensured largely by the European Union Special Representative, thereby strengthening the European Union's coordination and internal cohesion in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This allowed an integrated approach, and improved the effectiveness of the European Union's action to support the objectives laid down in the High Representative's mission implementation plan (MIP).

The European Union continued to act in concert with the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Operation ALTHEA is contributing to the achievement of the EU's long term objective of a stable, viable, peaceful and multi-ethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina, cooperating peacefully with its neighbours and irreversibly on track in its European perspective.

The analysis of lessons learned from the planning phase of the operation has been carried out.

The first six monthly review of the mission was completed with the Council's approval of the SG/HR's report. This report recommends that the tasks and mandate of the force should be maintained for the coming six months, and that no significant changes should be made to its size and organisation.

4. During the first half of 2005, the EU Police Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) continued to implement its mandate to improve in particular the administrative management capabilities of the police of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In doing so, the EUPM maintained the principle of the "co localisation" of its personnel with the police chain of command, so that it could advise and monitor the local police and evaluate its performance. The principal objective of the implementation of EUPM projects and programmes was to enable Bosnia and Herzegovina to increase its own policing resources. The EUPM's priorities related to the fight against organised crime, by facilitating the establishment of the SIPA (State Investigation and Protection Agency) and supporting the process of restructuring police bodies. The EUPM also had the aim of raising the awareness of the local authorities and the public of the need for reliable and effective police. The EUPM launched a large-scale campaign to inform the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

5. On the basis of the success of its first 12 months in operation, EUPOL PROXIMA in FYROM has focused its activities on the most urgent operational needs in the framework of three programmes: maintaining order, organised crime and the border police. The mission has widened the geographical scope of its responsibilities at national level, while maintaining a stronger presence in the former areas of crisis.

Under the authority of the European Union Special Representative in Skopje, and in partnership with the host Government authorities, PROXIMA police experts continued to supervise, monitor and advise the country's police, focusing on middle and senior ranking officers.

The mission assisted the FYROM authorities in developing and applying directives from senior police authorities, based on the best international standards, throughout the country. Those directives relate particularly to criminal investigations and the border police.

6. The aim of the EUJUST THEMIS mission in Georgia is to help the Georgian authorities to draw up and to monitor the implementation of a strategy to reform the criminal justice system and to bring it closer to the best international and European standards. In May 2005, the Georgian Government approved the reform strategy, which enabled the mission to enter its third and final phase of operations. This phase consists of monitoring the beginning of the implementation of the reform strategy. The two previous phases of the operation related to analysis of the criminal justice system and to providing advice on drawing up the strategy for reform. Given the expiry of the mandate of EUJUST THEMIS on 15 July 2005, the European Union will ensure that the Georgian authorities continue to benefit from appropriate long-term aid in the area of the rule of law, including initiatives via the EUSR office, by the European Commission and by the Member States.

7. EUPOL Kinshasa, which is the first civilian crisis management mission in Africa, was officially launched on 12 April 2005. Consisting of 29 people, this ESDP operation is to supervise, monitor and advise the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) in Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The task of the IPU is to provide protection for the institutions and main transitional Government authorities, and to assist in public security in the capital during the general elections which are to take place in the DRC. The IPU will replace the MONUC “neutral force” which has ensured security in Kinshasa up to now.

8. The EU has created a mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the DRC, known as EUSEC DR Congo, with a view to contributing to successful integration of the army in the DRC.

The mission is to provide advice and assistance to the competent Congolese authorities in security matters, taking care to promote policies compatible with human rights and international humanitarian law, democratic norms and the principles of good governance, transparency and respect for the rule of law. This advice and assistance mission, to be launched on 8 June 2005, will be able to identify, and contribute to the preparation of, projects and options which the EU and its Member States will be able to decide to support, particularly as regards the establishment and operation of intermixing centres bringing together combatants from the former armed factions.

9. The Council decided on 21 February 2005 to launch an Integrated Rule of Law mission for Iraq, EUJUST LEX. The objective of the mission is to address the urgent needs in the Iraqi criminal justice system through providing training for high and middle ranking officials in the areas of management and criminal investigation. The mission will also promote closer cooperation between the different players across the Iraqi criminal justice system, strengthen the management capability of senior officials primarily from the police, judiciary and penal system, and improve skills and procedures in criminal investigation in the context of full respect for the rule of law and human rights. The operational phase will begin on 1 July at the latest. The mission aims to train about 770 people and to cover a twelve month period up to 30 June 2006. The Council agreed that the training activities would take place in the EU or in the region and that the mission should have a Liaison Office in Baghdad. Depending on how the security situation in Iraq develops, and depending on the availability of adequate infrastructure, the Council will be asked to consider the possibility of training within Iraq.

**Other activities and possible missions in prospect**

10. The EU has decided to provide overall substantial support for the African Union mission in Sudan (AMIS). Practical arrangements for this support are being examined by the competent Council bodies and are being discussed with the African Union.

11. An EU support office for the Palestinian Police (EU COPPS) has been set up within the framework of the office of the EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process. There was an exchange of letters in April 2005 between the Palestinian Prime Minister and the EUSR. The approach is designed to support the Palestinian authority in developing a modern, efficient, responsible police force, providing support for operational priorities and long term reform.

12. Following a request from the Georgian authorities for EU support in the follow up to the OSCE border monitoring mission, the EU Special Representative for the Caucasus held consultations with the Georgian authorities in January 2005 and a fact finding mission took place in February 2005. An increase in the size of the EUSR office in Tbilisi will make it possible to support the necessary institutional reforms and contribute to improving communications between Tbilisi and the border.

13. The EU has begun examining the possibility of support for the Crisis Management Initiative in relation to the peace process in Aceh.

14. The EU has also begun preparations for responding to the African Union request for a putative African Union mission in Somalia.

### **Standards of behaviour for operations**

15. In order to ensure that all categories of personnel involved in ESDP operations comply with the highest standards of behaviour, a document has been drafted on generic standards of behaviour, which the Council has noted. The document is based on provisions already in force and applied to current ESDP operations. It could be adapted, particularly on the basis of lessons learned from ESDP operations, and taking account of work underway at the United Nations and in other international organisations. This document will be used when planning future ESDP operations.

The Council considers that these standards of behaviour should also be applied, as appropriate, to personnel involved in other types of EU presence in areas of operations, in order to ensure consistency in the EU's approach. The relevant Council bodies have also been encouraged to carry out further work in areas related to standards of behaviour and in the implementation of other specific aspects of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security.

### **Model Agreement on the status of forces**

16. The Model Agreement on the status of forces for EU led military crisis management operations has been approved. The Council has authorised the Presidency, assisted by the SG/HR, to commit itself on this basis, in future operations of this type, to negotiations with third States to conclude agreements on the status of forces (SOFA) under EU direction. This model agreement contributes to efforts to improve the EU's rapid reaction capabilities, by accelerating the conclusion of specific agreements on the status of forces for each operation.

To complete the picture, work has begun on drafting a model agreement on the status of civilian missions (SOMA).

## ***II. Development of European military capabilities***

17. Work has continued on establishing EU Battlegroups which are part of the rapid response capability. A Battlegroups Coordination Conference was held on 11 May 2005. It noted that the commitments made by the Member States will enable the objective set for the initial period of operational capability for 2005 and 2006 to be met: one Battlegroup permanently available. For the first two years of full operational capability, 2007 and 2008, commitments by the Member States, including a third State in accordance with the Council conclusions of 22 November 2004, will make it possible to have two Battlegroups permanently available, except in the second half of 2007, for which the second contribution needed is still awaited. Member States have been encouraged to remedy the situation. Preliminary indications were provided on the availability of

Battlegroups for the period beyond 2008. These initial offers are to be confirmed at forthcoming Battlegroups Coordination Conferences.

Conceptual work on Battlegroups continued. In particular, the standards and criteria for Battlegroups were agreed. They will apply with effect from 1 January 2007, when the phase of full operational capability begins. Initial considerations on the question of command and control of Battlegroups have been developed, and work is continuing on training and certification, on logistics and on strategic mobility.

The acceleration of the decision-making and planning process for EU rapid response operations was the subject of a report by the SG/HR, which proposed measures to meet the level of ambition defined by the Council, namely to conduct this process within five days from approval of the crisis management concept by the Council to the decision to launch the operation, in particular for operations involving Battlegroups. On the basis of this report, the Political and Security Committee drew up recommendations which have been approved by the Council.

The amendment of the ATHENA mechanism by Council Decision of 24 January 2005 has also allowed EU tools to be adapted to crisis rapid response requirements.

18. In the context of implementation of the 2010 Headline Goal, the Council approved a Requirements Catalogue incorporating the results of the technical work done to date and elements of the iterative process between the EU Military Committee and the Political and Security Committee. The Catalogue will be the basis for future work. It contains considerations regarding strategic planning hypotheses, the five illustrative scenarios and an initial list of the capabilities required to meet the aims set in the 2010 Headline Goal. The Council will approve the final 2005 Requirements Catalogue once the operational analysis has been applied and its results have been approved.

19. Development of a new questionnaire on the Headline Goal has begun, including the use of NATO software which is being adapted to the European Union's specific needs. At the same time, work has begun on the development of an information collection system and an operational analysis instrument for the EU's needs. Work will be carried out in compliance with the EU capability development mechanism and must involve examining the options and ensuring that these tools provide the best possible response to specific EU requirements.

20. Evaluation of the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) was completed, and the role of the Headline Goal Task Force (HTF) was evaluated in this context. The Council approved the ECAP evaluation report drawn up by the EU Military Committee and the European Defence Agency. The report contains a detailed review of the Project Groups set up under the ECAP, thereby enabling their work to be refocused in the light of the new 2010 Headline Goal. Consequently, most of the Project Groups will migrate to a new,



more integrated process associated with the functions and tasks of the European Defence Agency as defined in the Joint Action of 12 July 2004 on the establishment of the Agency, which include coordinating the implementation of the ECAP and any successor plan. The refocusing of the Project Groups is an important element in remedying the shortfalls remaining in the area of military capabilities in relation to the Helsinki Headline Goal. In this respect, the Single Progress Report which the Council took note of, evaluated progress on the development of capabilities and helped determine what work remains to be done. An updated Capability Improvement Chart has been drawn up, to keep the public and media informed.

21. Work on the global approach on deployability continued. The aim is to improve the ability of the EU to deploy forces, in particular with respect to strategic transport – a key enabler for rapid response – by primarily focusing on more effective use of all available means for transport coordination, the idea being to create effective links between the Coordination Centres/Cells.

22. The Presidency presented a non paper on the maritime dimension of the 2010 Headline Goal including a proposed road map. The purpose of this non paper was to initiate a process to define the terms of reference and methodology of a study designed to improve information on the Member States' maritime requirements and forces.

### *III. European Defence Agency*

23. Since the beginning of the year, the European Defence Agency (EDA) has been fully engaged in implementing its 2005 work programme. The recruitment process is almost complete, and the Agency is about to move into its own building.

24. The Steering Board has met at Minister for Defence level, as well as in the planned special configurations at the level of research and technology directors and armaments directors, pending the first meeting to be held on 21 June 2005 at the level of defence capabilities managers, together providing the impetus needed for the Agency's work. As planned, the head of the Agency submitted a report on the EDA's activities to the Council in May.

25. The EDA has started work on four flagship projects in its four areas of operation: C3 (command, control and communications) in the area of capabilities; combat armoured vehicles in the armaments area; the European defence equipment market, in liaison with the European Commission, for the area of industry and the market; and drones for the research and technology area.

The Council received with satisfaction the action plan adopted by the Steering Board of the Agency on the creation of a European defence equipment market. It asked the

Agency to implement the plan swiftly, in particular as regards the voluntary arms acquisition regime.

26. The Steering Board approved a transition plan in connection with the closure of the Western European Armaments Group, and with a view to the gradual transfer of the research and technology responsibilities of the Western European Armaments Organisation, and of its research cell (with respective contracts) in the first quarter of 2006.

27. The development of working relationships has been initiated with the Letter of Intent (L.o.I), the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR), NATO, the defence industry and academic institutions, in accordance with the Common Position and the Agency's work programme for 2005.

28. The Agency's first contract was concluded with NATO's Agency NC3A, for an operational analysis contributing to work carried out by the European Union Military Staff on the 2005 Requirements Catalogue. It is a contract on technical assistance for the EU.

#### *IV. Development of European Civilian Capabilities*

29. In accordance with Civilian Headline Goal 2008 adopted by the European Council in December 2004, the EU has started a process of strategic planning of its civilian capabilities. The first phase, concluded as planned in April 2005, involved the drawing up of "planning assumptions" and "illustrative scenarios" concerning stabilisation and reconstruction (including substitution missions), conflict prevention (particularly monitoring missions and support for EUSR offices), the targeted strengthening of institutions, and civilian support for humanitarian operations.

30. This process is being managed in close cooperation with that being run by the EU Military Staff as regards the 2010 Headline Goal. Above all, despite the difference in the timetables for the two processes, compatibility must be ensured in civilian/military scenarios, including time limits for intervention and the terminology used. The EU is also taking care to ensure that, where appropriate, there is consistency with the action of other players with whom the EU intends to cooperate at international level in the area of civilian crisis management.

31. Also in the context of the 2008 Civilian Headline Goal, work has begun on the rapid deployment of civilian crisis management capabilities, including the concept of "civilian crisis reaction teams". Following discussions on this subject in Luxembourg in February and in mid April in Stockholm, the General Secretariat of the Council presented a conceptual document at the end of May 2005.

In parallel, the Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council have cooperated on developing optimum synergy between work on rapid deployment of civilian crisis management capabilities and the Commission plan to establish identification and planning teams within the Community civil protection mechanism.

32. The Police Unit, together with experts from the Member States, has developed a concept of rapid deployment of police personnel in an EU led substitution mission. The concept would make it possible to develop interoperability of European police, not just for rapid deployment but also for their coordination and for the establishment of headquarters for a police mission in a substitution context.

33. In the framework of follow-up to the Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP of June 2004, a conference was organised by the Presidency in Brussels on 23 and 24 March 2005 with representatives of NGOs and of civil society, to consider, as part of a conflict prevention approach, possible areas for cooperation between the EU and civil society in crisis management, including in conflict zones, and to address questions of training those involved in crisis management and the links between development cooperation and security.

34. A seminar was organised in Warsaw in March on civilian capabilities development at national level, to analyse the problems of recruiting civilian experts, particularly senior legal and financial staff, as well as coordination and the division of responsibilities between different ministries/government agencies.

### *V. Civilian/military cell*

35. In accordance with the conclusions of the European Councils in December 2003, June 2004 and December 2004, work to implement the Civilian/Military Cell and the operations centre has been actively pursued. The Cell was prepared for by an establishment team and began work on 23 May 2005. The terms of reference and organisation of the EU Military Staff have been amended to take account of the creation of the civilian/military cell and of the new tasks entrusted to the European Union Military Staff (EUMS).

36. The EU is awaiting responses to its proposals regarding the EU Cell's mandate in SHAPE and the NATO liaison team in the EUMS.

### *VI. EU-NATO relations*

37. The EU and NATO continued to cooperate within the framework of their strategic partnership for crisis management and their permanent relationship. In the context of

the “Berlin Plus” arrangements, exchanges of information and consultations took place on the implementation of the ALTHEA operation led by the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina using NATO’s collective resources and capabilities, and on the activities of the NATO headquarters in Sarajevo.

38. The EU/NATO Capability Group met periodically for exchanges of views and information to ensure the consistent and mutually enhancing development of military capabilities within the EU and NATO where requirements overlap, including between the EU’s Battlegroups and the NATO Reaction Force (NRF). All EU Member States were kept informed about these issues.

### *VII. Cooperation with international organisations*

39. Implementation continued of the agreed texts on relations with the United Nations as regards military and civilian crisis management. Regular contacts took place between the services concerned in the context of the joint consultative mechanism established following the joint declaration by the EU and the United Nations on 24 September 2003. Progress was made in relations between the EU and the United Nations, and is expected particularly in cooperation on the ground between EUPOL Kinshasa and MONUC.

40. An EU Exercise Study was carried out with the participation of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The operational conclusions will be implemented through the EU-UN steering committee and monitored by the Political and Security Committee. This work is intended to define the practical arrangements for the transition between an EU operation and a United Nations operation, and to analyse in more detail the nature of and arrangements for the relationship to be established between the two secretariats, both in normal circumstances and in a crisis.

41. Cooperation continued with the OSCE and the Council of Europe.

42. Cooperation also intensified with the African Union and the African subregional organisations.

### *VIII. Cooperation with third countries*

43. As authorised by the Council in February 2004, the Presidency continued the negotiations which had begun with third countries, with a view to concluding agreements establishing a framework for their participation in EU crisis management operations. Negotiations with Bulgaria and Ukraine were completed.

44. In the framework of the strategic partnership with the Russian Federation, a joint Road Map for the Common Space on External Security, one of the four EU Russia common spaces, was agreed on 10 May. This Road Map contains provisions designed to increase EU Russia dialogue and cooperation in the crisis management area within the agreed framework in order to face regional and global challenges more effectively.

### *IX. Dialogue and cooperation with Mediterranean partners in the field of crisis management*

45. A EuroMed Senior Officials meeting on ESDP, co chaired by the Chairman of the Political and Security Committee, was held on 11 April 2005. This meeting provided an opportunity to address recent developments in the ESDP, and to confirm the interest of the Mediterranean partners in these questions. There was also a first exchange of views on a concrete proposal by the European Union to strengthen its cooperation with the Mediterranean countries in security and defence matters, and to give it more visibility by implementing an annual action plan. A fruitful contribution on the possibilities for cooperation in practice was also made by the Institute for Security Studies in its report on the seminar on 10 May devoted to prospects for dialogue on security and defence matters under the Barcelona Process.

### *X. ESDP and Africa*

46. The Action Plan for ESDP support to Peace and Security in Africa aims to support African organisations and States in building autonomous conflict prevention and management capacities, with special attention to the African Union, within the framework of overall EU policy on Africa. In this context, following a field mission in Addis Ababa by the Politico Military Working Party, the Political and Security Committee examined operational recommendations to strengthen EU relations with the African Union in the area of peace and security in Africa. These recommendations could be proposed for examination by the African Union's Peace and Security Council.

Implementation of the Action Plan for ESDP support to Peace and Security in Africa took shape in particular with preparations for handing over relevant EU documents to the African organisations.

47. Dialogue between the EU and the African Union (AU), African sub-regional organisations and African States on the potential role of the ESDP in contributing to peace and security in Africa is continuing. The Chairman of the AU Commission, Alpha Oumar Konaré, and the Commissioner for Peace and Security, Said Djinnit, held exchanges of views with the Political and Security Committee on strengthening links between the EU and the AU and on the situation in Darfur.

48. The EU continued to provide active support for the African Union and for the international community's activities in Darfur, in particular by acting as vice chair of the Ceasefire Commission and by supporting the political process and the African Union mission in Sudan (AMIS). In practical terms, this support took the form of making experts available to help the AU set up and manage the AMIS operation, and the granting of funding through the Peace Facility. An evaluation with which the EU was associated led the AU to decide to reinforce AMIS. EU assistance was requested in planning and putting in place this increased AU presence in Darfur.

At the donors' conference held on 26 May in Addis Ababa, the EU presented a comprehensive and substantial offer including military and civilian elements, particularly police. The relevant Council bodies have already begun looking into the various forms that such support could take, with particular regard to planning, logistics, equipment, strategic and tactical airlift, development of the AU's observation capabilities and training. Consultations have taken place with other players in the international community, particularly the United Nations, NATO, the United States and Canada, who contribute to supporting the AU mission in Sudan.

### *XI. ESDP and the fight against terrorism*

49. On 23 May 2005 the Council endorsed the first report on the implementation of the Conceptual Framework on the ESDP dimension of the fight against terrorism. This report is a living document that will have to be updated regularly. It takes stock of implementation of action points and makes concrete recommendations to be implemented as soon as possible for each action point in the Conceptual Framework.

50. Implementation of the Conceptual Framework covers a vast spectrum of capability and operational sectors, including management of the consequences of a terrorist attack. Amongst the most innovative sectors agreed in the implementation report on the Conceptual Framework, the following might be mentioned: interoperability between military and civilian assets, including civil protection assets; extension of the military database to all natural and man-made disasters; protection in the framework of crisis management operations. Without prejudice to the final decision, work is underway on the proposal to create an NRBC Centre of Competence.

51. Consistency between ESDP activities and other EU instruments is essential and must be promoted to ensure a comprehensive EU response to the multidimensional terrorist threat. The General Secretariat of the Council and the Presidency will provide the interface between all the committees and working parties concerned. The Commission will be involved, within its areas of competence.

52. On 7 March 2005, on the basis of a mandate in the Conceptual Framework, the European Union Institute for Security Studies organised a seminar on the contribution of the ESDP to the fight against terrorism, which allowed areas for further study in this important area to be identified. The seminar also provided an opportunity for more thorough dialogue with the United States on this issue.

### *XII. EU training in the field of ESDP*

53. The concept of EU training in the field of ESDP was successfully implemented. Courses were organised in the EU Training Programme in ESDP for the years 2005 to 2007. The pilot course – a high-level ESDP course – of the future European Security and Defence College ended in March, and an orientation course on the ESDP was organised in Brussels from 28 February to 4 March. On that basis, a final report on training in the ESDP area and an analysis of requirements in this area have been drawn up and approved by the Political and Security Committee. Thus the arrangements for the functioning of the European Security and Defence College have been defined. The necessary conditions to establish the College have been fulfilled in preparation for the 2005/2006 academic year.

Training activities in the area of civilian crisis management are also being conducted under the auspices of the Commission.

### *XIII. Crisis management exercises*

54. The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations was involved in the preparation and running of an Exercise Study (EST 05) on 14 and 15 April 2005, which provided an opportunity to analyse in more detail the question of the transition between an EU operation and a UN operation. The scenario called for the robust and rapid deployment of EU military capabilities under the political control and strategic direction of the EU, in support of the United Nations and following its request. The scenario also covered civilian crisis management, with a UN police operation being followed by an EU operation.

55. Preparatory work took place for the EU-Mediterranean Partners Crisis Management Seminar which will take place in Athens from 27 to 29 June 2005. Its proceedings will provide material for subsequent common consideration of the paths to be followed in this area.

56. The EU Exercise Programme for the period 2006 2010 was approved, and preparation began for the CME 06 exercise.

#### *XIV. Role of space applications in the ESDP framework*

57. In order to ensure that security and defence aspects are taken into account in the European space programme, inter pillar exchanges of information took place. An initial road map was established for the effective implementation of the stages identified in the document on European space policy entitled “ESDP and Space” approved by the Council in November 2004.

#### *XV. Action Plan adopted following the earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean*

58. Following the Action Plan adopted by the Council on 31 January 2005, after the earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean, the Council and its competent bodies examined proposals to strengthen the EU’s rapid response capability. In a report to the Council in April, the SG/HR made a number of proposals concerning the mobilisation and use of military resources and consular cooperation in the event of natural or man made disasters. The May Council surveyed the implementation of the Action Plan on the basis of a note from the Presidency.

#### *XVI. Mandate for the incoming Presidency*

On the basis of the present report and taking into account the European Security Strategy, the incoming Presidency, assisted by the Secretary-General/High Representative and in association with the Commission, is invited to continue work on developing the European Security and Defence Policy, and in particular:

**to continue the successful development of an active ESDP, and in particular:**

- ▶ to continue to ensure the effective management of Operation Althea, and review the operation taking account of both the wider EU presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the expected evolution of the international community’s involvement;
- ▶ to continue effective management of the EU Police Mission in Bosnia, review the operation and prepare recommendations on its future taking into account the wider EU presence;
- ▶ to continue effective management of the EU Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, review the operation and prepare recommendations on follow up;
- ▶ to continue effective management of the EU policing mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, to review the mission and to prepare recommendations on its future;
- ▶ to ensure effective management of the security sector reform mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC DRC); review the mission, taking account of



- proposals from the head of mission on further possible assistance;
- to ensure effective management of and review the Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq;
- to consider the future of the EU Coordination Office for Palestinian Police Support, presently in the office of the EUSR;
- to provide further EU support for the AU operation in Darfur in consultation with other international actors;
- to further work to ensure the sustainability of the achievements of the Rule of Law Mission in Georgia and prepare a lessons learned exercise;
- to implement effectively any other operations that the Council may decide;

**to continue work on making ESDP more capable, and in particular:**

- to finalise the military Requirements Catalogue 2005 following detailed computer assisted Operational Analysis of the military assets necessary for the EU to undertake the full range of crisis management operations;
- to finalise the Headline Goal Questionnaire 2005 in preparation for the process of identifying the national contributions necessary to meet these requirements;
- to take forward the study into how best to meet the EU's future requirements for information gathering and computer-assisted operational analysis;
- to take forward work on the EU Battlegroups initiative (as part of Rapid Response elements) on the basis of the agreed Roadmap;
- to take forward work on the Global Approach on Deployability;
- to continue work on the actions identified in the Conceptual Framework on ESDP and Terrorism and the recommendations of the report on its implementation;
- to define the terms of reference and methodology for a study into the maritime dimension of ESDP in the context of the Headline Goal 2010;
- to continue work on the establishment of the civ/mil cell, including its capacity to rapidly generate, when needed, an operations centre for particular autonomous operations;
- to reach agreement on a three-year financial framework for the EDA, within which the budget and the work programme for 2006 can be set;
- to finalise a Civilian Capabilities Requirements List; to issue a call for national contributions against this list; and to agree a capability improvement plan at a Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference. In this context, to take forward work on rapid deployment, notably Civilian Response Teams;
- to take forward work on improving procedures for the procurement of equipment for civilian crisis management operations;
- to continue the implementation of the European Programme for the Prevention of Violent conflict;

**to continue work on improving the coherence of EU efforts, through enhancing its ability to undertake joint civil-military operations, in particular:**

- ▶ to take forward work to improve civ/mil coordination, focusing in particular on a framework to support comprehensive planning for EU operations with civilian and military elements;
- ▶ to take forward, in accordance with the action plan adopted by the Council on 31 January 2005, work on improving ESDP-related aspects of the EU's ability to respond rapidly to the aftermath of major disasters;
- ▶ to develop the ESDP elements of an overarching EU concept for Security Sector Reform drawing inter alia on the experience from EUSEC DRC;

**to maintain the EU's commitment to work with key partners, and in particular:**

- ▶ to maintain a close EU/UN dialogue, and to contribute to an effective EU response to the High Level Panel proposals on peace and security; and pursue further work in areas related to standards of behaviour and other aspects of UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security;
- ▶ to continue to build the EU/NATO strategic partnership in crisis management, including through the establishment of an EU cell at SHAPE and a NATO liaison team at the EUMS;
- ▶ to maintain and develop further EU cooperation with the AU and African Sub Regional Organisations, both through further support for capacity-building, and further implementation of the ESDP Africa Action Plan;
- ▶ to strengthen dialogue and cooperation with Mediterranean partners in the field of ESDP;
- ▶ to take forward work on the implementation of the 3<sup>rd</sup> space with Russia.

## CIVILIAN HEADLINE GOAL 2008

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(...)

### *‘Multifunctional Civilian Crisis Management Resources in an Integrated Format – Civilian Response Teams’.*

(...)

*The European Security Strategy recognises that today’s security challenges have to be tackled with the full spectrum of EU capabilities and resources. The EU needs to be more active, more coherent and more capable. Drawing on experience to date of civilian crisis management and lessons learned, the EU is committed to improving its effectiveness in civilian crisis management.*

*(Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP)*

#### **Definition**

1. A Civilian Response Team (CRT) is a civilian crisis management rapid reaction capability of flexible size and composition, consisting of Member State experts with, in principle, Council Secretariat participation. European Commission experts will be invited as appropriate to participate with a view to ensuring the coherence of EU external action. A CRT is drawn from an EU-wide pool of experts, pre-selected by Member States, in accordance with agreed criteria and procedures. Before their first deployment, CRT experts have undergone specific CRT training. CRTs are deployed and work in accordance with generic terms of reference and pre-agreed methodology contained in a CRT Handbook. Logistics support ensures that a CRT is appropriately equipped for its mission as well as, when required, capable of contributing to the establishment of an incoming civilian crisis management operation.

#### **Aim and objectives**

2. Civilian Response Teams increase the rapid reaction capacity and also contribute to the adequacy and effectiveness of a EU crisis management response, as well as to its coherence with other actors.

3. The objectives of the CRT capacity<sup>1</sup> include:

- a) to carry out assessment and fact-finding missions in a crisis or impending crisis situation and, when appropriate, provide input to the development of a crisis management concept before a possible Joint Action is adopted by the Council and, in

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1. CRTs are not intended to duplicate the disaster response capacity of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism, as laid out in the Joint Declaration by the Council and the Commission on the use of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism in Crisis Management referred to in Title V of the Treaty on European Union (doc. 10639/03).

- agreement with the Commission, to possible action to be developed in the framework of Community instruments;
- b) to establish a rapid initial operational presence in the field after a Joint Action is adopted by the Council and to support the entry into operation of a civilian crisis management operation;
  - c) where the CRT pool contains appropriate expertise (e.g. conflict prevention, mediation, stabilisation and confidence-building measures including monitoring), to provide, as appropriate, timely reinforcement of existing EU mechanisms for crisis management at country and regional level in response to urgent and distinct needs, notably under the auspices of a EUSR function.
4. Logistics support will accompany the CRT as appropriate, either integrated into a multifunctional CRT or as a stand-alone CRT function in support of already existing crisis management capacities.

#### **Rationale**

5. An effective and credible EU response to a crisis situation is enhanced by a thorough assessment of the situation and by fast deployment and early presence on the ground once needs for civilian crisis management actions have been identified. A timely deployment for crisis response can have a positive effect on trust and confidence among stakeholders in the affected country and thus facilitates the implementation of a civilian crisis management mission. Deployment of a well-prepared and well-equipped CRT enhances the effectiveness and timeliness of EU action.

#### **Pool of experts**

6. CRTs are drawn from a pool comprising initially up to 100 named experts nominated by Member States. The composition and size of the pool of experts, who may be drawn from existing capacities, are determined in the course of the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 process.
7. The pool of Member States experts is accessed through national rosters containing CVs and further relevant professional details of the CRT experts. The format of these rosters is established according to minimum requirements to be agreed. These rosters are managed by the Member States in conformity with their national procedures and legislation.
8. The combined expertise in the pool of experts corresponds to the competencies required to realise the CRT mission objectives, as outlined in paragraphs 3.a) and 3.b). It may also be drawn upon, as appropriate, to meet the objective outlined in paragraph 3.c). More specifically, the pool of Member States experts consists of individuals with expertise in one or several of the following areas:

- a) expert knowledge and experience relevant to one or more of the CRT objectives (including within the current priority areas identified for the development of civilian crisis management capabilities) and with a clear understanding of the broader role and concepts of the European Union in crisis management;
- b) knowledge of the administrative procedures of the European Union, including finance, human resources and procurement.
- c) knowledge and experience in operations support functions, including mission planning and set-up, logistics, CIS, security and medical support.

9. The roster as well as the composition of CRTs take into account, whenever possible, the objective of gender-balance.

#### **Mobilisation and deployment**

10. Member States take the decision to make CRT experts available for a CRT mission in accordance with pre-determined procedures ensuring its timely deployment. A CRT is mobilised where other instruments will not be either timely, adequate or effective.

11. The decision to deploy a CRT does not prejudge action to be taken by the European Union in response to a crisis.

12. A decision to deploy a CRT for assessment and fact-finding purposes before a possible Joint Action is adopted by the Council on a Civilian ESDP operation is taken by the PSC, the SG/HR or the Council in accordance with current guidelines on fact finding missions (doc.15048/01). Assessment or fact-finding CRTs are led by the Council Secretariat and may, in order to enhance coherence of EU action, include Commission staff. In the interests of the coherence of EU action, the Secretariat and the Commission should seek to undertake joint assessment missions wherever possible and appropriate.

13. A decision to deploy a CRT after a Joint Action is adopted by the Council, e.g. to establish a rapid initial presence and/or support the entry into operation of an incoming civilian ESDP operation as well as in reinforcement of existing EU mechanisms, is made in accordance with CRT procedures ensuring that CRTs can meet the objectives of the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 concerning rapid deployment. When appropriate, the accelerated decision-making and planning process for EU Rapid Response Operations will be duly taken into account, once approved by the Council.

14. A CRT will be led by a CRT Team Leader appointed by the Council Secretariat. CRT missions carried out before the appointment of a Head of Mission fall under the chain of command of the Council Secretariat. When a Head of Mission has been appointed, CRTs

work under the Mission chain of command. When deployed in support of an EUSR, CRTs work under the authority of the EUSR.

15. A CRT is generally multinational with the participation, in principle, of the Council Secretariat. As appropriate, the Commission may be invited to offer its specific expertise with a view to ensuring a coherent EU response to a crisis. Furthermore, a CRT may also include non-CRT experts, as appropriate, offered by Member States in order to ensure the availability of specific competence in aspects of a given crisis situation.

16. A CRT can be mobilised and deployed within five days of a request by the SG/HR, PSC or Council. The duration of a CRT deployment normally does not exceed three months. However, if needs be, the CRT can be rotated or extended in order to stay beyond this timeframe. At the request of a Head of Mission, individual CRT experts can be seconded to a civilian crisis management operation for a longer period of time on a voluntary basis and with the agreement of the concerned Member States.

17. Country- and mission-specific briefings will be given within the framework of a CRT mission, either before departure or, when time does not allow for this, by the Team Leader upon assembly of the CRT in the mission theatre.

#### **Terms of reference and methodology**

18. Generic terms of reference make the CRT a distinct tool with focused objectives. The generic terms of reference serve as a basis from which mission-specific terms of reference are developed to suit the situation and tasks at hand at the time of deployment.

19. Agreed CRT methodology provides a manual for the work of a CRT, ensuring the effective use of the skills and expertise of the CRT members. The CRT methodology will be collected in a CRT Handbook. The CRT Handbook will be continuously updated based on, mission experience and lessons learned.

#### **Training**

20. Training is an integral part of the CRT concept. Before being included in the pool of experts, all CRT members (including Council Secretariat and, as appropriate, European Commission staff members) have received specific CRT induction training. In order to maintain a high level of commitment and readiness of CRT experts and to keep CRT experts posted on new developments, all CRT experts may be invited to attend CRT refresher training, as appropriate.

21. The Council Secretariat provides the lead in defining CRT training needs. It will work closely with the European Commission, in particular as regards the possible contribution that could be made through the European Community Project on Training for

Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management and the Commission's training courses on procurement and financial management. All existing EU training instruments in the field of civilian crisis management (e.g. CEPOL, ESDC) also need to be taken into account. Care should be taken not to duplicate exiting efforts in Member States.

22. CRT training focuses exclusively on the special needs of a CRT and the application of the professional skills and experience of the participants in the context of ESDP and a CRT mission. It is interactive and based on case studies. Distance learning techniques and training methodologies are used as appropriate. It draws on the participants' skills and experiences in order to develop further the CRT procedures and methodology. It is also an essential instrument in establishing team dynamics amongst CRT experts that will allow them to function effectively in rapid deployment. Therefore, it is set in a physical environment which is conducive to the development of team spirit and provides possibilities for practical training and simulation exercises.

23. Member States are encouraged to identify other relevant training at national, EU and international level and facilitate the participation of CRT experts in such training. In this respect, it is recalled that valuable training opportunities are provided through the European Community Project on Training as well as through the ESDP training programme.

#### **Logistics support**

24. Logistics support capacity is an integral component of the CRT system. The objective of such a capacity is to ensure that a CRT can operate effectively in the mission theatre. It can also contribute to the establishment of an initial capacity to support the rapid deployment of an incoming civilian crisis management mission. The equipment of the ESDP mission proper will continue to be provided through the applicable procurement procedures in accordance with the Financial Regulation.

25. Logistics support includes, inter alia, the following functions: transport, communications, IT, office facilities, accommodation, catering and medical support.

26. Logistics support is flexible and, depending on the mission, capable of providing any or all of these functions on a scale ranging from one or two persons hand-carrying equipment to a larger deployment in preparation for an incoming civilian crisis management mission. Interoperability at EU level is assured.

27. When on a CRT mission, CRT experts are issued with the basic equipment to support their work, such as laptop computers, mobile communications, etc, in accordance with agreed standards. In addition, Member States Embassies and Commission Delegations will be invited to provide support, as appropriate.

28. The logistics support will need to be taken into consideration in the discussions on procurement and logistics.

#### **Member state responsibilities<sup>2</sup>**

29. Member States are responsible, at their discretion, for selecting Member State CRT experts and for managing the national roster in accordance with agreed criteria. Each Member State participating in the CRT system ensures that its CRT expert(s) can be made available within the agreed timeframe. Member States are also responsible for making CRT experts available for CRT induction training and regular CRT refresher training.

30. Member States establish a national Point of Contact, in principle the National Focal Point in CIVCOM, to facilitate contacts with the Council Secretariat. They formally communicate all relevant details of the national Point of Contact to DGE IX.

31. Each Member State is responsible for establishing the necessary modalities to ensure the availability of Member State CRT experts in accordance with the set objectives for rapid deployment<sup>3</sup>.

#### **Council Secretariat responsibilities**

32. The Council Secretariat is responsible for developing and updating CRT methodology and for taking the lead in organising CRT induction and refresher training, in agreement with Member States. The Council Secretariat will coordinate with the Commission, in particular as regards the possible contribution that could be made through the European Community Project on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management and the Commission's training courses on procurement and financial management. All existing EU training instruments in the field of civilian crisis management (e.g. CEPOL, ESDC) also need to be taken into account.

33. The Council Secretariat maintains a list of names of all CRT experts nominated by Member States and informs the national Points of Contact regularly on developments relevant to the CRT; the Commission will be informed on these developments as well.

34. The Council Secretariat (DGE IX) will liaise through the national Point of Contact for all official communication.

35. The Council Secretariat draws up mission-specific terms of reference and appoints the team leader and selects CRT experts made available by Member States for CRT deployments.

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2. It is understood that Member States work in close coordination with the Council Secretariat in the implementation of its responsibilities.

3. Given the expected level of skills and experience of the CRT experts, it is borne in mind that at any given time, the availability of individual experts may vary as some of them might have been deployed for services in other missions, including Community projects, as appropriate.



36. The Council Secretariat, together with Member States, systematically evaluates the lessons learned from CRT deployments. Based on these, it may call upon Member States for support in developing procedures and other resources for the CRT.

#### **Financial arrangements**

37. The guiding principle of the CRT financial framework is to ensure rapid deployability of CRTs within existing financial mechanisms.

38. When a CRT is deployed **before** a possible joint action is adopted by the Council, cost lie where they fall. Each Member State covers all costs related to its CRT experts. This includes, inter alia, the salaries, travel and other related entitlements. This position may be reviewed after the first lessons learned have been conducted.

39. When a CRT is deployed to establish a rapid initial operational presence in the field **after** a joint action is adopted by the Council, the CRT will be financed in accordance with agreed procedures for financing civilian ESDP operations<sup>4</sup> and provisions of article 28 (3) of the TEU. Modalities will be defined in the joint action.

40. Costs related to ensuring, at the national level, the availability and rapid deployability of CRT experts are borne by the respective Member States.

#### **Way ahead**

41. Specific requirements for the establishment of the CRT pool of experts will be included in the CHG 2008 capabilities requirements list. This includes detailed qualifications and selection criteria for CRT experts, a training schedule as well as the logistics support and equipment required for CRTs to achieve their objectives in accordance with the present document and the CHG 2008 capabilities planning process.

42. Upon approval of the CRT concept the Council Secretariat will further develop the framework for CRT implementation. The Commission will be fully associated in this process in order to ensure consistency of the EU external activities as a whole. This will include amongst others:

- a) drafting of generic terms of reference for CRT deployments;
- b) minimum requirements for national rosters of CRT experts will be proposed;
- c) CRT mobilisation and deployment procedures (including a model for the status of CRT personnel in deployment);
- d) a CRT handbook containing a first outline of CRT methodology; and,
- e) a detailed training concept, curriculum and course schedule.

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4. Guidelines for financing civilian crisis management operations under Title V TEU, doc. 12582/03.

43. In this context, the Commission and the Council Secretariat are invited to examine, within their respective scope of its competences, the possible synergies between Assessment and Planning Teams and the CRTs.
44. The CRT logistics support capacity should be further studied including, inter alia, the basic equipment (mission kit) to be carried by CRT experts when on mission. Existing cooperation amongst Member States, e.g. in the International Humanitarian Partnership, as well as logistics support models of other organisations, notably the United Nations and the OSCE could contribute to this reflection.
45. Before the end of 2006, the financial arrangements will be reviewed.
46. An initial readiness for rapid deployment could be in place before the date of the full implementation of the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 commitment. A CRT capacity, comprising up to 100 experts who have completed CRT induction training could be an initial goal for the end of 2006.
47. The CRT concept and scope may be reviewed at a later stage in the light of lessons learned.
48. The further development of multi-functional civilian crisis management resources in an integrated format will be considered in accordance with the Civilian Headline Goal 2008.

#### References

- A. Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference – Ministerial Declaration (doc. 14848, 17 November 2004)
- B. Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP adopted by the European Council 17 – 18 June 2004 (doc. 10547/04, 15 June 2004)
- C. Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (15863/04, 7 December 2004)
- D. Civilian Headline Goal 2008 – revised proposals by the Council Secretariat on the management of the process during 2005 (7891/05, 8 April 2005)
- E. Civilian Headline Goal 2008 – Report on the workshop on “Modalities for Rapid Deployment and Civilian Response Teams”, Stockholm, 14-15 April 2005 (8665/05, 3 May 2005).
- F. Guidelines on fact-finding missions (doc. 15048/01, 6 December 2001)

## **EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION – PRESS RELEASE OF THE PRESIDENCY**

Jean-Claude Juncker states that there will be a period for reflection and discussion but the process to ratify the Constitutional Treaty will continue with no renegotiation.

At the end of the first day of the European Council being held on 16 and 17 June 2005 in Brussels, Jean-Claude Juncker, current President of the European Council, made the following statement regarding ratification of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and the decisions taken on this issue by Heads of State and Government.

‘Together with the President of the European Commission and the President of the European Parliament, who sat in on all our discussions at my invitation – the Parliament played its part in all the preparatory work leading to the Constitution – we have carefully considered the issues surrounding ratification of the Constitutional Treaty.

We held a lengthy debate with contributions from all the Prime Ministers and Heads of Government and State as well as from the President of the European Commission and the President of the European Parliament.

We think that the Constitutional Treaty is the right answer to many questions posed by people in Europe. We feel, therefore, that the ratification process must continue. This Treaty is the best one, which means that its renegotiation cannot even be envisaged.

Secondly, we have taken note with regret – with a heavy heart as I said the other day – of the French and Dutch rejection of the draft Constitutional Treaty. The questions and issues raised during the debates in the Netherlands and France, and in other countries too, and the fears expressed, mean that we cannot continue as if nothing had happened.

This leads us to think that a period for reflection, clarification and discussion is called for both in the countries which have ratified the Treaty and in those which have still to do so. During this period, changes should be seen in all these countries in the European Union’s institutions, the Commission, the European Parliament, the Council and the Member States, civil society, management and labour, national parliaments, political parties and other players.

Europe must pay more attention to what its citizens are saying. I would like to refer specifically here to the ideas put forward yesterday by the President of the Commission as to how this period for reflection should be organised. Following the French “non” and the Dutch “nej”, we do not feel that the date initially planned for a report on ratification of the Treaty, the 1 November 2006, is still tenable, since those countries which have not yet ratified the Treaty will be unable to furnish a clear reply before mid 2007.

10 EU Member States have ratified the draft Constitutional Treaty. The remainder intend doing so either via a referendum or by parliamentary vote. The European Council fully understands that those Member States who must hold a referendum before ratification may need a longer and more intense period for reflection, clarification and discussion than those countries which ratify via parliamentary vote. If you have to talk, if you have to have a debate, if in fact, as José Manuel Barroso said, you have a plan D involving

dialogue and debate with the nation, you need more time.

Member States who wish to ratify the Treaty via parliamentary vote will do so during the clarification debate. If they wish to postpone this until later they may do so.

Member States who intend holding a referendum will take a sovereign and independent decision regarding the date on which it will be held.

All the members of the European Council have stated that they understand the need of countries which intend holding a referendum for more time.

In brief: the ratification process will continue. There won't be any renegotiation because there never was a plan B, but there is a plan D involving dialogue and debate. Member States who intend ratifying via parliamentary vote will do so when they deem this to be opportune. Member States who intend holding a referendum will also do so when they deem this opportune. The remaining Member States understand that the period for clarification could last longer in countries holding a referendum than in other countries. The European Council will look under the Austrian Presidency at the situation regarding debates on ratification of the Constitutional Treaty in all the European Union's Member States.'

# European Union/United States Summit

Washington DC, 20 June 2005

## **EU-U.S. SUMMIT DECLARATION – THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES WORKING TOGETHER TO PROMOTE PEACE, STABILITY, PROSPERITY, AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA**

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1. We remain committed to combining and accelerating our efforts in support of Africa and its leadership, while acknowledging its ownership of present and future African development.
2. We share the same belief that solidarity is an essential principle that should guide our action and that we, together with all other members of the international community, have an obligation to assist African efforts in the quest for peace, stability, democracy and prosperity. We share the same objectives with poverty eradication as the primary aim of our relations with the developing world and we therefore undertake to increase our efforts to assist Sub Saharan Africa in its efforts to achieve sustainable economic growth and reach the internationally agreed goals contained in the Millennium Declarations.
3. We share the same hope built on the realisation that today there is an environment and leadership in much of Africa with a genuine commitment to better governance and a new resolve to take care of Africa's own conflicts.
4. We are working to support Africa's efforts to expand peace and security across the continent. In this context, we welcome that an increasing number of African nations are committing themselves to holding democratic elections, thereby paving the way for more representative government. Improving respect for human rights and governance, consolidating democratic processes and reforming the security sector are central prerequisites for development. African nations are undertaking increased efforts to resolve conflicts and have achieved important progress in establishing their own security structures through the African Union and its Peace and Security Council as well as at the sub-regional level.
5. Together we have been working to strengthen the African Union and other regional organisations that aim to improve stability in Africa and we are collaborating on the G8/African Union action plan to enhance capacity for peace support operations. We are committed to continue to assist African peace support operations as the EU has done through its African Peace Facility and contributions from its Member States and the US through the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative by increased contributions to

enhance the Peace Support Operations capacity and support for ongoing operations in Africa.

6. The African Union/NEPAD have provided Africa with an ambitious vision and strategy for the 21st century. We will work closely with the African Union as a key political interlocutor in our relations with Africa.

7. The African Union and the sub-regional organisations have decisively assumed responsibility and leadership for resolving many of the armed conflicts that for so long have marred the continent. We are prepared to contribute to these efforts through:

- Supporting broad and inclusive processes of implementing the comprehensive peace agreement in Sudan, capable of reconciling and accommodating the aspirations of all sectors of society and all regions of the country, while ensuring that the fight against impunity from violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law is sustained. To end the continuing violence and suffering of hundred of thousands in Darfur is an immediate priority. We reaffirm our strong support for the AU leadership in resolving the crisis and urge the parties to commit themselves wholeheartedly to resolve the conflict peacefully and engage constructively in the AU-sponsored negotiations in Abuja.
- Reaffirming our continued support to the Somalia reconciliation process and assisting the Somali people and institutions, in their efforts to re-establish stability and governance. We are also committed to support efforts to resolve the border stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Both processes have much to contribute towards stability, development and security in the strategic region of the Horn of Africa.
- Combining support for stability in the Great Lakes region, including through the disarmament of armed groups, Security Sector Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo, assistance in the organisation of the coming democratic elections in Burundi and the DRC and international observation thereof, and participation aimed at a successful outcome of the International Conference on the Great Lakes region. We have instructed the Joint Contact Group to continue to work together in order to address the problems in the region.
- Continuing to support a regional approach to peace and security in West Africa, with a view to enhancing conflict management in ECOWAS and particularly by supporting United Nations and African efforts to consolidate transition processes in Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau and encouraging national reconciliation in Togo.

8. Effective and well-governed states are critical to a peaceful and secure environment and protecting human rights; encouraging transparent and accountable public management and private sector growth delivering essential services and allowing resources to

be used effectively. We will support the African Peer Review Mechanism as an important tool for peer learning and reforms it will trigger at the country level.

9. The U.S. and the EU note with deep concern the continuing governance and human rights crisis in Zimbabwe, which has led to a near breakdown of the economic situation of one of the most promising economies in Africa and caused huge flows of Zimbabweans to flee to neighbouring countries. We call upon the Government of Zimbabwe to reverse anti-democratic policies and to open a genuine dialogue with all stakeholders. We also note that serious food shortages are looming in Zimbabwe, and we stand ready, as in the past, to assist the Zimbabwean people with food aid and other humanitarian assistance.

10. Life expectancy is increasing in every continent except Africa, where it has fallen for the last 20 years. HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis continue to affect too many people in Africa. We are committed to continue our support for the Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria. We recognise the importance of education and gender equality for life expectancy and agree to intensify efforts in this regard.

11. We commit to work together to address both the immediate needs and the underlying causes of natural disasters and complex emergencies which plague the continent, including through collaboration on the assessment process, to ensure that needs are identified in an accurate and timely fashion, that assistance is appropriately targeted and arrives in time to save lives. Together, we commit to urgently increasing both our funding and engagement in these humanitarian emergencies.

12. To ensure a longer-term solution to the problem of famine and poverty in Africa, we will work with AU/NEPAD to support implementation of its Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Plan, which will help expand production and market opportunities, enhance agricultural productivity, and thus reduce the risk facing Africa's poorest farmers. We further commit to support AU/NEPAD's efforts to increase regional economic integration in Africa as an important element of efforts to increase agricultural productivity, open our market to allow African exports to enter duty free until 2015 and, in this regard, will undertake efforts to promote accession of African countries to the WTO.

13. These commitments require resources. These should come from many sources, as set out at Monterrey, including increased foreign direct investment, trade, remittances, public aid and private charitable contributions. We recall the responsibility of developing countries for their own development through good governance, the rule of law, and sound policies, and the crucial importance of national ownership for development strategies. We stand ready to increase our financial assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa to

meet urgent needs, promote development and economic growth, reinforce sound policies and good governance and support their efforts towards meeting the Millennium Goals.

14. In today's globalised world, developments in one continent often have immediate and far-reaching repercussions on life in other continents. Peace, stability and better economic prospects for all people in Africa are therefore in the interest of Americans and Europeans alike. The long road towards sustainable social, political, and economic development in Africa is a road that Africa should not be left to walk alone.

### **EU-U.S. SUMMIT DECLARATION ON THE 60<sup>TH</sup> ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNING OF THE SAN FRANCISCO CHARTER**

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1. Sixty years ago, on June 26th, 1945 the San Francisco Charter creating the United Nations was signed. Born out of the desire "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice has brought untold sorrow to mankind" (Preamble of the Charter of the UN), the United Nations has ever since provided the framework for the nations of the world to strive for peace and security, prosperity and international cooperation based on respect of international law. We salute the groundbreaking work accomplished six decades ago by the authors of the Charter and we rededicate ourselves to the noble principles and values embodied in this fundamental text.

2. Today, the world faces threats and challenges, both old and new, which can only be addressed in common, based on a spirit of cooperation, shared institutions, and a rule-based international system as exemplified by the United Nations.

3. True to the inspiration of the San Francisco Charter, the nations of the world are called to define a new international consensus on the ways and means to manage together the burning questions of our time. In this respect, the High Level Event on Millennium Review in September of this year provides an opportunity to assess the implementation of the commitments of the Millennium Declaration and the results of the major UN Summits and Conferences.

4. It also offers the occasion for the international community to promote the emergence of a United Nations better oriented towards the threats and challenges of our time, more responsive to the needs of its members and more efficient and effective in the way it operates.

5. The United States and the European Union share the objective of such a renewed United Nations and are willing to cooperate closely in order to contribute to a balanced



and ambitious outcome of the September High Level Meeting. They share, *inter alia*, the perspective that the interlinked dimensions of peace and security, human rights, rule of law, democracy, and development need to be addressed coherently, within more efficient and transparent institutions and procedures.

6. Satisfactory solutions need to be found in the crucial areas of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The creation of a properly configured Peacebuilding Commission can provide useful and timely guidance for the management of post-conflict situations.

7. Achieving the development goals of the Millennium Declaration will require significant additional resources, which should come from many sources, as set out at Monterrey, including increased foreign direct investment, trade, remittances, public aid and private charitable contributions. Developing countries will need to make concerted efforts in their own development through good governance, the rule of law, respect for human rights and sound policies that promote sustainable development and empower individuals to participate more fully and freely in economic activity. We underline the importance of national ownership for development strategies. We stand ready to increase our financial assistance to countries with good governance and sound policies and transparent, ambitious and accountable strategies to achieve long-term economic growth and reach the internationally-agreed development goals in the Millennium Declaration.

8. The strengthening and mainstreaming of the dimensions of human rights, rule of law and democracy should be achieved, *inter alia*, through the creation of a new, effective and credible Human Rights Council and the establishment of a UN Democracy Fund.

9. The improvement of the overall performance of the UN system will imply major reforms in the budget and management areas, including accountability and oversight mechanisms

10. On these issues as well as on other questions that will be on the agenda of the High-Level meeting, the US and the European Union will consult closely in the weeks and months to come in order to contribute to a successful and substantive outcome in September.

## **EU-U.S. SUMMIT DECLARATION – THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES WORKING TOGETHER TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY AND SUPPORT FREEDOM, THE RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS WORLDWIDE**

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1. The European Union and the United States believe that the spread of accountable and representative government, the rule of law, and respect for human rights as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, are a strategic priority as well as a moral necessity. We will continue to work together to advance these priorities around the world.
2. The work of the United Nations is central both to democracy and human rights. We welcome the proposals put forward by Kofi Annan to renew the UN's commitment and enhance its effectiveness in these areas. Specifically, we value the UN Secretary General's initiatives for reforming the UN human rights mechanisms and for creating a Peacebuilding Commission. We pledge to support the establishment of the UN Democracy Fund to assist countries in strengthening civil society and democratic institutions.
3. We express our admiration and pledge our support for all those engaged in the defence of freedom, democracy and human rights, in many cases at great personal risk.
4. We are encouraged by the efforts of many governments to open their societies and political systems. Recognizing that democratic reform is a process that deserves our support, we promise our solidarity and support to those promoting democracy around the world, be it in Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, or elsewhere. We will continue to support pluralism and the development of civil society, and will encourage the political participation of women and minorities.
5. Free and fair elections are central to democracy. We congratulate the many thousands of citizens who have participated in organizing and observing elections in their own countries and abroad. We pledge to support the work of the United Nations in assisting in the organization of elections and will work together in multilateral fora to further strengthen international election standards and to spread the implementation of objective and fair election assessment mechanisms. We support the principles of impartially-conducted and transparent election administration and observation and commend the efforts undertaken by various regional organizations such as the OSCE or civil society in this context. We will continue to support the holding of free and fair elections in countries undergoing or desiring democratic transitions, including in Afghanistan, Haiti, DRC, Iraq, and in the Palestinian territories.

6. Democracy is not just a matter of elections; it must be anchored in democratic institutions, separation of powers, human rights, the rule of law, tolerance, good governance, and justice. Our assistance to third countries increasingly takes into account the need to sustain democracy in all these dimensions.

7. We have worked closely to create a Europe whole, free, and at peace; both the EU and NATO have played an important part in this, and continue to do so. We are confident that the reform process in the Balkans will further the region's successful integration into Europe. The European Neighbourhood Policy and U.S. support for democratic and economic transitions will contribute further to stability, prosperity and partnership. We will in particular continue to coordinate our efforts to promote democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights in Belarus.

8. We are witnessing a growing desire for reform in the Middle East and welcome recent democratic developments. Democratic elections in the Palestinian territories, Iraq, and Lebanon have successfully taken place. We recognize the importance of transparent and fair elections and the need to expand freedom and opportunity across the region. We reaffirm our commitments made at Dromoland and Sea Island, and our support for the Forum for the Future and other elements of the G-8 BMENA Initiative. Recognizing that the threat of conflict can undermine democratic reforms, we commit ourselves to support those who are working for the resolution of conflicts, in the Middle East and elsewhere.

9. We have both encouraged the growth of democratic institutions in many countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. We acknowledge the important contributions by regional and multilateral organizations, as well as initiatives such as the Community of Democracies, to promote democracy and respect for fundamental human rights.

10. We recognize that differences in history, culture and society mean that the paths taken towards democracy and the rule of law will be different and that the systems of government that result will be varied, reflecting local traditions and preferences. Democracy, while it is based on universal values, will not be uniform. However, the desire for justice, freedom, human rights, and accountable and representative government is universal. In the long term, only systems responsive to the wishes of the people they govern can achieve political stability.

## **EU-U.S. SUMMIT DECLARATION – THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES INITIATIVE TO ENHANCE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND GROWTH**

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At the 2004 Dromoland Summit, we committed to finding ways to:

- further transatlantic economic integration,
- spur innovation and job creation, and
- realize the competitive potential of our economies.

We called on our businesses and citizens to join in a vigorous discussion and directed our senior officials to explore means to eliminate impediments to further economic integration and to develop a forward-looking strategy to enhance our economic partnership. We thank all who participated in our discussions and who contributed hundreds of written submissions and comments.

These consultations underscored that our citizens desire to have access to the widest possible range of goods and services while enjoying the protection of high public health, environment and safety standards. Stakeholders called for stronger collaboration between our regulatory authorities to minimize unnecessary regulatory divergences. They asked us to promote the efficient and safe flow of people and products across the Atlantic, stressed the benefits of further integration of our capital markets and called for protection of intellectual property rights. They asked us to facilitate investment, make progress on services, improve procurement opportunities, further cooperation in competition policy, and stimulate innovation and entrepreneurship in areas ranging from basic research to business startups, so that our businesses remain competitive in the global economy.

### *A Forward-Looking Agenda*

By removing the impediments to trade and investment, increasing integration of markets, and enabling more dynamic private commercial activity, we seek to enhance economic growth and innovation across the Atlantic, make progress towards integration of the transatlantic market and strengthen our joint leadership in the global economy. We know this will be a multi-year effort and seek regular reports on progress. We are actively engaged in addressing many aspects of this work in the multilateral trade liberalization negotiations of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and we support early and ambitious conclusions to Doha Development Agenda by the end of 2006. For this purpose and in order to fully realize the development dimension of this crucial WTO round, we re-iterate our utmost commitment to achieve by this year's Hong Kong Ministerial ambitious and balanced progress in the areas of market access for trade in industrial and agricultural products, services, as well as in the multilateral rule making agenda.

To expand economic opportunity, promote prosperity, and maintain the health and safety of our peoples, the United States and the European Union will work together to:

- promote regulatory cooperation and establish a high-level Regulatory Cooperation Forum;
- stimulate open and competitive capital markets;
- spur innovation and technological development by promoting cooperation in a wide range of areas, including research and development, space, education and exchanges, information and communications technologies, and health and medical technologies;
- enhance trade and transport security while facilitating the movement of people and goods;
- develop and help disseminate energy efficiency technologies;
- support effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, at home and abroad, in line with the highest international standards;
- take measures to facilitate investment flows that contribute to sustained economic growth;
- explore ways to exchange certain confidential information in international competition cases;
- improve transatlantic procurement opportunities; and
- reinforce cooperation on services (mutual recognition of professional qualifications and aviation).

Initial work we will undertake is described in more detail in the Annex to this Declaration.

### *Ensuring Coordination and Measuring Success*

We look to our senior levels of government to carry forward the tasks we have outlined in this Declaration. We encourage them to meet regularly with their transatlantic counterparts to establish work programs, review progress, and advance areas of cooperation we have agreed on today. These work programs should be developed in the next six months and include objectives and timelines to help measure progress. Those responsible will report to leaders at each U.S.-EU Summit on progress made under this initiative. Taking into account our strengthening global partnership, we will keep under continuous review the strategic priorities and structures of our dialogues to ensure they are fully adapted to meet the challenges ahead.

### *Promoting Legislative Cooperation*

Recognizing the importance of our respective legislatures in furthering transatlantic integration, we encourage legislators on both sides of the Atlantic (including the Transatlantic

Legislators' Dialogue) to meet regularly, notably to discuss economic policy issues and regulatory matters, with a particular focus on their potential transatlantic impact.

### *Continuing Stakeholder Consultations*

Many of the ideas we are pursuing to promote transatlantic economic integration stem from the stakeholder consultation process launched at the 2004 Summit, and we will continue to consult regularly with stakeholders on both sides of the Atlantic, including through the Transatlantic Business Dialogue and the Transatlantic Consumers Dialogue.

(...)

## **ANNEX TO THE ANNEX**

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### **Energy Security, Energy Efficiency, Renewables and Economic Development**

The European Union and the United States share a long tradition of working together to promote strong economic growth and improve energy security. We pursue this through such mechanisms as the International Energy Agency, the G-8 initiatives and the Bonn "Renewables 2004" Action Plan.

By working together the European Union and the United States intend to cooperate to promote sound energy policies, improve energy security and foster economic growth and development. We recognize the need for stronger actions to increase energy security and reduce the economic impact of high and volatile energy prices.

We recognize that one of the greatest needs for developing countries today is to provide the basic energy services necessary to lift their citizens out of poverty. We believe that the advancement and deployment of technology can contribute to the solution of the problem. By developing clean, efficient, affordable energy technologies for the longer term, while continuing to improve and deploy the current generation of lower-emission technologies, we can help all nations, including developing countries, meet the energy needs of their people and grow their economies.

The European Union and the United States recognize the important potential that can result from further efforts. We will continue to address energy efficiency through effective policy measures and technology, and focus our efforts on achieving security of supply and helping the developing world to address energy challenges.

To further these objectives, the United States and the European Union will focus their activities in the following areas of common action:

- ▶ Working in partnership with developing countries to help them reduce poverty by promoting energy efficient policies and the use of renewable energy sources, as

well as deploying advanced, efficient, affordable energy technologies to help meet their energy needs.

- ▶ Working together through the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum to foster the development and deployment of clean, efficient technologies, especially in key developing economies, as global reliance on fossil fuels, particularly coal, continues.
- ▶ Promoting our work on hydrogen technologies and the International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy.
- ▶ Working together to ensure the continued safe operation of existing nuclear generation and to exchange experience on nuclear safety measures and control. We take note of the efforts of those states who will continue to use nuclear energy, to develop more advanced technologies that would be safer, more reliable, and more resistant to diversion and proliferation.
- ▶ Continuing work to advance all forms of renewable energy, and to promote the use of renewable and energy efficiency technology and policy measures, including promotion of energy conservation. As members of the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP), we will place a greater emphasis on cost-effective energy efficiency opportunities.
- ▶ Working together to promote the development, deployment and adoption of cleaner, more efficient diesel vehicle technologies, including by seeking to better align our regulatory standards for diesel engines and fuels.
- ▶ Working through the international Methane to Markets Partnership to capture and use methane as a clean-burning energy source from coal mines, landfills and oil and gas systems.

## **EU-U.S. SUMMIT DECLARATION – THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES WORKING TOGETHER TO PROMOTE PEACE, PROSPERITY AND PROGRESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST**

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1. At our Summit in Dromoland last year, the United States and the European Union pledged our support to the governments and the peoples of the Middle East who have expressed their determination to meet the challenges of modernization, to advance political, social and economic progress, to strengthen democracy, and to respect and promote human rights. We offered this support in a spirit of partnership as well as respect and friendship.
2. Since then, we have strengthened our dialogue on our respective efforts towards promoting progress and stability in the Broader Middle East and the Mediterranean.
3. At the June 2004 Summit, we reaffirmed our commitment to a just, comprehensive, and lasting settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and our common vision of the

co-existence of two states, Palestine and Israel, by the creation of an independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state with contiguity in the West Bank living side by side with Israel and its neighbours in peace and security.

4. Since then, we have witnessed the successful election of a new leader by the Palestinian people. We are now at a moment of opportunity, and, with our partners in the region, we must seize it. In order to achieve and maintain a lasting peace, we recognize the importance of building a climate of mutual trust and cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians.

5. We endorse the May 9, 2005, declaration of the Quartet. We stress the importance of a complete and peaceful Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and parts of the northern West Bank in a manner consistent with the road map. We urge the parties to respect their commitments and to refrain from unilateral actions that could prejudice final status issues. We further pledge our full support to the mission of the Quartet's Special Envoy for Gaza Disengagement James Wolfensohn, and we will work with him and the parties to promote viable economic and social development.

6. We support the holding of free, fair, and transparent multi-party legislative elections in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem, under the scrutiny of international observers and with full freedom of movement for candidates and voters, as another vital step forward on the path towards building a reformed and accountable Palestinian Authority.

7. We desire that the Israeli and Palestinian people live in a secure and stable environment. We affirm our support for the mission of General William Ward and will pursue in close coordination our respective efforts to assist the Palestinian security forces. As is required under the roadmap, there must be effective action against terrorism, dismantling of terrorist infrastructure, a freeze on all settlement activity, and dismantling of outposts.

8. The United States and the European Union share the objective of a peaceful, secure, democratic, and prosperous broader Middle East and Mediterranean region. With close to 3 billion annually in grants and loans from the EU and approximately \$2.2 billion in assistance and loan guarantees from the U.S., we are the major donors of assistance to the region.

9. Through our respective efforts, we seek to promote, in close cooperation with our partners, human rights and democracy, increased access to education and economic opportunities through modern and open societies, closer integration within the region and with the global economy. Our ongoing cooperation to promote peace



throughout the region will help our partners to reap the full benefit of their efforts and our support.

10. We welcome the accomplishments of the Barcelona Process which were reviewed at the 7th Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference in Luxembourg ahead of the 10th anniversary leaders meeting in November, as well as the U.S. Middle East Partnership Initiative, launched in 2002. We reaffirm our support for the G8's Broader Middle East and North Africa initiative. We welcome in particular the establishment of the Forum for the Future and look forward to its next meeting in Bahrain this autumn.

11. We have instructed our respective experts on the region to intensify their cooperation in order to strengthen further our support for reform and democratic development.

12. We welcome the successful elections that have recently taken place in Afghanistan, the Palestinian Territories, Iraq and Lebanon.

13. While notable progress has been made in a number of countries, significant challenges remain. We welcome the amendment to the Egyptian constitution as progress towards a more broadly-based representative government and encourage the Government of Egypt to play a leadership role by opening its forthcoming elections to international observers. In these, as in all other elections, we stress the importance of freedom of speech, freedom of association and unfettered access to the media, for all candidates.

14. We share the goal of a peaceful, united and stable Iraq and will continue our cooperative efforts towards this end. The confirmation of the Iraqi Transitional Government following the successful election in January represents an important landmark in the political reconstruction of Iraq. We condemn the terrorist acts of forces seeking to disrupt the lives of the Iraqi people and the political transition process.

15. Two days from today, at the request of the Iraqi Transitional Government, we will co-host a conference of nations to express international support for Iraq's political transformation, economic recovery, and reconstruction, and strengthening of public order and the rule of law, in accordance with UNSCR 1546 (2004). We have worked closely together to prepare for this important event and we will pursue these efforts in following up the Conference. Working with the Iraqi authorities, the UN, and other relevant actors, we will seek to contribute to the constitutional process and to support the elections which will take place on the basis of the new Constitution.

16. We recognize the withdrawal of Syrian military personnel from Lebanon as a positive first step toward Syria's compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1559.

We remain insistent that Resolution 1559 be implemented in its entirety, including the disarming of all militias, and the complete and full withdrawal of all Syrian intelligence operatives, as well as an end to interference in Lebanon's internal affairs. We reaffirm our full support for the United Nations' efforts towards these ends.

17. We urge full cooperation by all parties with the independent international commission of enquiry of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, established by UNSCR 1595 (2005).

18. We welcome the events that have taken place this year in Lebanon in furtherance of the democratic process, including the recent elections. We recognize the inherent difficulties facing the new government and remain committed to working with the people of Lebanon to strengthen democratic institutions and promote peace and stability.

19. Once the Lebanese government has defined its reform agenda and should it so request, we will consider convening an international conference to consolidate support for the Lebanese people and the new government.

### **EU-U.S. SUMMIT DECLARATION ON ENHANCING COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF NON PROLIFERATION AND THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM**

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1. Promoting international peace and security is of vital importance to the United States and the European Union. People all over the world should have freedom from fear and want and live in dignity. Societies have become more interconnected and more interdependent. And as the events of September 11, 2001 and March 11, 2004 show, the United States and the European Union have also become more vulnerable to threats which are more diverse, less visible, and less predictable.

2. Fighting terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, coupled with the risk that such weapons could be acquired by terrorists, remain our greatest security challenges. In this context, we recall the 2004 Dromoland Castle Declarations on Combating Terrorism and on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, which still provide the framework for our cooperation. We are fully committed to strengthen and support the important role of the United Nations in assisting member states in combating both challenges.

3. We reaffirm our commitment to cooperate in our efforts to combat global terrorism in full respect of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, and to address the underlying conditions that terrorists can seize to recruit and exploit to their

advantage. We pledge to intensify our efforts to strengthen international cooperation to encourage the global and effective implementation of UN conventions and protocols on terrorism. We also work together with a view to adopting the Comprehensive Convention Against Terrorism. We broadly support the principles of the comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy as proposed by UNSG Annan at the Madrid Conference in March 2005.

4. Our bilateral cooperation extends to developing comprehensive and efficient border security processes, more secure travel documents, contacts between our law enforcement agencies and improved information-sharing abilities. We will reinforce and expand our cooperation in the fight against terrorist financing. We will continue to strengthen the abilities of our legal systems to prosecute terrorists and will enhance our judicial cooperation in criminal matters. We will also continue our work to enhance the capacities of other countries to combat terrorism.

5. We will further strengthen measures against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by state and non-state actors. In this context, we reaffirm our support for the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty and will continue to work together to strengthen it. We pledge to intensify our collaboration and coordination in promoting strict implementation of and compliance with relevant treaties, agreements and commitments on non proliferation. We will enhance the security of weapons-usable materials, facilities, and technology. We reaffirm also our willingness to work together to strengthen and universalise the disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and regimes that ban the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

6. We will assist other states around the world to build stronger legal, regulatory, enforcement and other institutional capacity against proliferation. And we will work for more effective responses to address proliferation threats and prevent or remedy non-compliance. Our shared commitment to address proliferation threats is reflected in the "US-EU Joint Programme of Work on the Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

7. We remain united in our determination to see the proliferation implications of Iran's advanced nuclear program resolved. Towards that end, we reconfirm our full support for the ongoing European efforts to secure Iran's agreement to provide objective guarantees that its nuclear program is intended for exclusively peaceful purposes. As those discussions proceed, we urge Iran to abide fully by the terms of the November 2004 Paris Agreement and by the November 2004 IAEA Board of Governors resolution, including the need to suspend fully and verifiably all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. We reiterate the need for Iran to cooperate fully with IAEA requests for information and access, to comply fully with all IAEA Board requirements and resolve all

outstanding issues related to its nuclear programme. Finally we call on Iran to ratify without delay the Additional Protocol and, pending its ratification, to act in accordance with its provisions.

8. We note with deep concern the DPRK's nuclear weapons program and its 10 February statement that it has manufactured nuclear weapons. The DPRK has clearly violated its commitments under the NPT and its IAEA safeguards agreement and other international non-proliferation agreements. The DPRK must comply fully with its non-proliferation obligations, and dismantle its nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons programs in a permanent, transparent, thorough, and verifiable manner. We stress that the Korean Peninsula should be free from nuclear weapons, the security and stability on the Peninsula be maintained and the nuclear issue be peacefully resolved through dialogue and negotiations. We fully reaffirm our support for the Six-Party Talks and believe this represents an important opportunity to achieve a comprehensive solution to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

### **EU-U.S. SUMMIT EUROPEAN UNION AND UNITED STATES JOINT PROGRAM OF WORK ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION**

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1. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems continue to be a preeminent threat to international peace and security. This global challenge needs to be tackled individually and collectively, and requires an effective global response. We are fully committed to support in that respect the important role of the United Nations Security Council and other key UN institutions.

2. The United States and the European Union are steadfast partners in the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and will undertake several new initiatives to strengthen our cooperation and coordination in this important arena, even as we enhance our ongoing efforts.

3. Building Global Support for Nonproliferation: The European Union and the United States will enhance information sharing, discuss assessments of proliferation risks, and work together to broaden global support for and participation in nonproliferation endeavors. We will increase transparency about our nonproliferation dialogues with other countries to ensure, to the extent possible consistency in our nonproliferation messages.

4. We reaffirm our willingness to work together to implement and strengthen key arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties, agreements and commitments that ban the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems. In particular we

underline the importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. We will increase our effort to promote, individually or, where appropriate, jointly, the universalisation of these Treaties and Conventions and the adherence to the Hague Code of Conduct against the proliferation of ballistic missiles.

5. Reinforcing the NPT: The EU and the US reaffirm that the NPT is central to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The EU and the US stress the urgency to maintain the authority and the integrity of the Treaty. To that end, the EU and the U.S. recommit to fulfill our obligations under the Treaty while working together in order to strengthen it. We will evaluate lessons learned from the 2005 Review Conference and continue to stress the importance of compliance with and universal adherence to the NPT.

6. Recognizing the Importance of the Biological Threat: The EU and the US will work together in advance of the upcoming BTWC- Review Conference in 2006, in order to strengthen the Biological Weapons and Toxin Weapons Convention.

7. Promoting Full Implementation of UNSCR 1540: We will coordinate efforts to assist and enhance the work being done by the UNSCR 1540 Committee, and compliance with the resolution. We will work together to respond, where possible, to assistance requests from States seeking to implement the requirements set by the UNSC Resolution 1540 and in particular, to put in place national legal regulatory, and enforcement measures against proliferation.

8. Establishing a Dialogue on Compliance and Verification: The European Union and the United States renew their call on all States to comply with their arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation agreements and commitments. We will seek to ensure, through regular exchanges, strict implementation of compliance with these agreements and commitments. We will continue to support the multilateral institutions charged with verifying activities under relevant treaties and agreements. We will ask our experts to discuss issues of compliance and verification in order to identify areas of possible cooperation and joint undertaking.

9. Strengthening the IAEA: The U.S. and the EU welcome the steps taken earlier this month by the Board of Governors of the IAEA that created a new Committee on Safeguards and Verification, which will enhance the IAEA's effectiveness and strengthen its ability to ensure that nations comply with their NPT safeguards obligations. We will work together to ensure all States conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an Additional Protocol with the IAEA. We agree that the Additional Protocol should become a standard for nuclear cooperation and non-proliferation.

10. Advancing the Proliferation Security Initiative: As we enhance our own capabilities, laws and regulations to improve our readiness for interdiction actions, we pledge to strengthen the Proliferation Security Initiative and encourage PSI countries to support enhanced cooperation against proliferation networks, including tracking and halting financial transactions related to proliferation.

11. Global Partnership: The U.S. and the EU reaffirm our commitment to the Global Partnership Initiative Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. We will assess ongoing and emerging threats and coordinate our nonproliferation cooperation, including with other participating states, to focus resources on priority concerns and to make the most effective use of our resources.

12. Enhancing Nuclear Security: We intend to expand and deepen cooperation to enhance the security of nuclear and radiological materials. We welcome the establishment of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and will cooperate closely to implement this important new initiative, including by exploring opportunities under the GTRI to reduce the threat posed by radiological dispersal devices and by identifying specific radiological threat reduction projects that could be implemented.

13. Ensuring Radioactive Source Security: We remain concerned by the risks posed by the potential use of radioactive sources for terrorist purposes. We will work towards having effective controls applied by the end of 2005 in accordance with the IAEA Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. We will support IAEA efforts to assist countries that need such assistance to establish effective and sustainable controls.

14. Rationalizing Multilateral Disarmament Work: We will continue to cooperate in order to overcome the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament and pursue reforming of the UN General Assembly's First Committee on disarmament and international security. These initiatives are part of our broader efforts to streamline and make the multilateral disarmament, arms control and nonproliferation machinery more responsive.

15. The U.S. and the EU take special note of the Conference to Consider and Adopt Amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) that will take place at the IAEA, July 4-8 2005, and we urge all States Parties to the CPPNM to attend and fully support adoption of an amended Convention.

# Iraq International Conference

Brussels, 22 June 2005

At the request of the new Iraqi transitional government, an international conference with Iraq, co-hosted by the European Union and the United States, was held at Foreign Minister level in Brussels on 22 June. The aim was to provide Iraq with a forum where it could present its priorities and strategy for the transition period leading to the next elections at the end of the year. It was also an opportunity to mobilise international support. The conference was structured around three main themes: the political process, economic challenges and reconstruction, and public order and rule of law.

## REMARKS BY JAVIER SOLANA

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(...)

I am deeply honoured to preside over the last working session of today's important conference together with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. I would like to thank you all for your overwhelming presence at today's proceedings and the Iraqi Transitional Government for the excellent presentations we have witnessed so far.

It is clear Iraq's transition, based on the timeline endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 1546, is at a decisive juncture. In everything we do, inclusiveness must be our watchword.

First, we need inclusiveness in the political process inside Iraq. This means full participation and involvement of all groups and communities committed to peaceful and democratic means. It also requires national unity, reconciliation and a willingness to compromise. Peace and reconciliation will be favoured by a better security context, and you know well, there is no security without law and order, our main subject in this session.

Second, we need inclusiveness with respect to the region. Iraq needs to fit into a wider regional structure. Iraq's neighbours have a crucial role to play. More broadly, the Gulf region has seen too many wars and crises. We now have a duty and a chance to expand regional security co-operation.

Beyond the region, we need an inclusive international consensus. The EU, together with the UN, the US and many others, is now fully engaged. And we are willing to do more.

We have heard, today, a clear overview of the vision, strategy and needs of Iraq's Transitional Government.

I note, in particular, Iraq's emphasis on defeating terrorism and at the same time develop its law enforcement capacity – including the judicial and penitentiary systems – in due respect for human rights, so as to establish rule of law and create a secure and prosperous environment for public order.

In this regard, you will know well that in response to an Iraqi request, the EU has agreed to establish an Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq, EUJUST LEX, which will be launched on 1st July. This Mission will focus on addressing urgent needs in the criminal justice system by providing training to 770 Iraqi officials in management positions in the police, judiciary and penitentiary sectors. I hope this will turn out to be an important contribution to enhancing rule of law in Iraq.

We have heard the Iraqi Prime Minister this morning re-iterate his aspiration for the Iraqi people to assume responsibility for their stability and prosperity, and I look forward to hearing from each one of you, how best we can support the achievement of this very important goal.

NATO is another of Iraq's international partners which has responded actively to support Iraqi needs through its training activities. I am therefore particularly pleased to extend a warm welcome to Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Secretary-General of NATO.'



## CONFERENCE STATEMENT

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More than 80 countries and organisations gathered in Brussels on 22 June, 2005 at the invitation of the EU and the US, building a renewed international partnership with Iraq, to support Iraq's political transition process, to encourage its economic recovery and reconstruction, and to help establish the rule of law and public order in the country. They resolved to support the democratically-elected Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1546. They welcomed the vision and strategy set out by the Iraqi Transitional Government. The ITG presented a comprehensive review of its political, economic, and public order programs, stressing areas that required priority action.

Participants expressed support for Iraqi efforts to achieve a democratic, pluralist, federal and unified Iraq, reflecting the will of the Iraqi people, in which there is full respect for political and human rights. They reaffirmed their commitment to the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Iraq as well as to the right of the Iraqi people to freely determine their political future through democratic means and to exercise full authority and control over their financial and natural resources. They also reiterated the importance of applying due process of justice to members of the previous Iraqi regime who have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Participants congratulated the Iraqi people on successfully holding the January 2005 elections with the support of the United Nations (UN) and underscored support for Iraq's continuing political transition based on UNSCR 1546 and following the timeline outlined in the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). Participants welcomed the representation of women in the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) and encouraged their further participation in governance. They urged all Iraqis to participate in the political process and called on the ITG, including the TNA, to continue and intensify efforts to engage all parties renouncing violence in the political process, thereby promoting national reconciliation. Participants strongly condemned all acts of terrorism, including kidnapping and assassination, as well as violence directed against innocent civilians, religious leaders and holy shrines, Iraqi authorities, and those helping to establish stability in Iraq, and called for the cessation of all those acts. They called on all parties to work with the Iraqi authorities to bring an end to the violence.

Participants welcomed the constructive cooperation and positive engagement embodied in the Initiative of the Neighbouring Countries and expressed their appreciation to Egypt for convening the 2004 Sharm el Sheikh Meeting. Participants called on Iraq and regional states, consistent with obligations under UNSCR 1546 and with commitments they made at the Meeting of Neighbouring Countries in Istanbul on 30 April, 2005, to cooperate with each other to prevent cross-border transit and support for terrorists, to strengthen good neighbourly relations and to improve regional security. They welcomed the decision reached in Teheran to hold a second meeting of Interior Ministers of the Neighbouring countries in Turkey. Participants urged all countries to,

as the case may be, re-establish or strengthen diplomatic relations with Iraq at the earliest possibility.

Iraq pledged its commitment to the political process outlined in the TAL and endorsed in UNSCR 1546: a constitution to be drafted by 15 August, 2005 and approved through a national referendum by 15 October, 2005, leading to a constitutionally elected government by 31 December, 2005. Participants strongly supported efforts by the ITG to ensure that this process is inclusive and transparent, and that the outcome guarantees the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including women's rights and rights of minorities, and promotes the active involvement of civil society, with the objective of building a nationwide consensus. They endorsed the leading role of the UN in supporting the political process per its mandate in UNSCR 1546 and confirmed their commitment to assist its efforts to that end. They expressed their support to the UN Secretary General and his Special Representative for Iraq (SRSG), as well as to the United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI). They recognised the UN's significant support to the drafting of a permanent constitution and elections thereafter and agreed to coordinate their contributions to the political and constitutional process with the UN.

Iraq outlined its priorities for the reconstruction and development of Iraq's infrastructure, the better provision of basic services to the population, and economic recovery. Participants welcomed the Iraqi vision for economic recovery and reaffirmed the importance of creating the conditions for a socio-economic development that can benefit all Iraqis. Hence they pledged to continue supporting the provision of basic services and the strengthening of Iraqi national and regional administrations accountable to citizens. They recalled commitments made to reduce Iraq's debt and called on other creditors to provide debt relief on generous terms comparable to those agreed by the members of the Paris Club. They agreed to support Iraq's integration into the relevant international economic organisations, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). Furthermore participants urged the ITG to meet its commitments to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with a view to reaching a stand-by arrangement by the end of 2005. They called on all partners to complete the transfer of Iraqi assets to the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI). Participants underscored the importance of transparency and called on Iraq to follow the recommendations of the International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB).

They engaged to actively follow up on the 2003 Madrid Conference and the consecutive 2004 Tokyo Donor Meeting by further expediting disbursement of the US\$ 32 billion pledges and by providing further contributions to Iraq's reconstruction including through the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI). They also invited countries that have not yet pledged to join the international efforts supporting the reconstruction process in Iraq. They encouraged the ITG to develop further its priorities for external assistance in advance of the Donors Meeting in Amman on 18-19 July, 2005, building upon the National Development Strategy (NDS). Participants warmly welcomed the ITG's decision to establish a donor co-ordination mechanism under Iraqi leadership with the support of the UN, based in Baghdad with links to the donors' com-

munity in Amman and elsewhere. They agreed to determine by the Amman Meeting ways in which to boost coordination of their assistance to Iraq. They reaffirmed the need for continued humanitarian, reconstruction, development, institutional and human rights assistance in line with Iraqi priorities set out in the NDS, by the implementation of programmes and technical advice delivered bilaterally, through international financial institutions and through the UN.

Iraq pledged to strengthen the legal and institutional framework for the rule of law and public order in Iraq, and to accelerate the build up of its armed forces so that they can assume responsibility for Iraq's national security, as soon as possible. Participants welcomed the UN Security Council's press statement in support of the continuation of the mandate of the Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I) in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 12 of UNSCR 1546 and at the request of the newly elected Iraqi Government. Participants fully recognised the importance of the consent of the sovereign Government of Iraq to the presence of multinational forces and that these forces have indicated the commitment to act in accordance with international law, including obligations under international humanitarian law. Participants welcomed progress on reconstituting institutions of public order and the training of security, judicial and corrections personnel reflecting the diversity of the Iraqi society. They commended international efforts supporting the ITG in assuming responsibility for Iraq's national security as soon as possible. They underlined the importance of other members of the international community joining ongoing regional and multilateral efforts to support the ITG in this endeavour and pledged to further support the improvement of the Iraqi investigative, judicial and penal bodies.

The Conference recognised the essential interdependence of the political, security and economic dimensions of Iraq's transition process as described in UNSCR 1546 and underlined the need for a comprehensive approach to supporting Iraq. Participants committed to ensure an effective follow up through existing mechanisms of the international community.

## General Affairs and External Relations Council

Brussels, 18 July 2005

(...)

### TERRORISM

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The presidency expressed gratitude to colleagues for their expressions of sympathy and solidarity after the London attacks of 7 July 2005. The Council adopted conclusions on this issue (see below) and condemned the latest attacks in Turkey and Iraq.

‘The Council condemned the terrorist attacks on London and sent its profound condolences to the victims and their families. The Union stands together as it did after the attacks on Madrid last year. The attacks are an affront to everything that the European Union stands for. The Union is absolutely determined that the terrorists will not succeed. The Council underlined the need to ensure that the Union and Member States have the necessary measures, as appropriate, in place to confront this threat, be they to track terrorists down, protect potential targets, prepare for an attack or prevent people turning to terrorism. The Council has agreed a set of measures aimed at accelerating efforts in this regard. The Council stressed the importance of retaining counter-terrorism, in accordance with the European Security Strategy, as a focus of the Union’s foreign policy in order to fight and prevent terrorists working internationally.

The Council reaffirmed its commitment to work to assist other countries combat this scourge both collectively, as a Union, and nationally. It agreed to maintain terrorism as a key part of its dialogue with third countries and called for the Union to intensify its efforts by November 2005 to deliver commitments for technical assistance and capacity building to key priority countries including in the areas of countering radicalisation and terrorist financing through the appropriate funding sources. The Council has committed to agreeing a strategy, by December, to combat radicalization and recruitment to terrorism, building on our existing efforts to resolve conflict, confront oppression, reduce poverty and promote good governance. The Council pledged to continue to support the central role of the UN and support proposals for a global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. It will work to ensure that the UN Summit in September reiterates the international community’s clear condemnation of terrorist acts whatever their motivation and strive for agreement to a Comprehensive Convention for the Suppression of International Terrorism.’

## ENLARGEMENT

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The Council took stock of the situation regarding Croatia's request for accession to the EU, in particular on the basis of a briefing by the presidency on a task force meeting on this issue last week, and as regards further work scheduled for September within this task force. The negotiations will be launched once the Council has established that Croatia is cooperating fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

It took note of the presentation by the Commission of a proposal for a framework for accession negotiations with Turkey, as requested by the European Council last December with a view to launching the negotiations on 3 October.

Ministers are due to return to this issue at their informal meeting on 1 and 2 September.

## PRESIDENCY WORK PROGRAMME

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The Council took note of the presentation by the presidency of its work programme for the second half of 2005, stating its intentions as regards the following priorities:

- ▶ further work aimed at achieving agreement on the EU's budgetary framework for the 2007-13 period;
- ▶ follow-up to the European Council's discussions on ratification of the EU's constitutional treaty;
- ▶ EU enlargement.

The presidency also briefed the Council on its plans for an informal meeting in the autumn of heads of state and government.

(...)

## IRAQ

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*The Council adopted the following conclusions:*

‘1. The Council welcomed the Iraq International Conference, held in Brussels on 22 June and co-hosted by the EU and the US. It congratulated the Luxembourg Presidency on the success and smooth running of the Conference. The Council reaffirmed its strong support for the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) and for the priorities set out by Iraqi Prime Minister Ja'afari, Foreign Minister Zebari, Speaker of the Transitional National Assembly al Hassani and other Iraqi Ministers at the Conference. It underlined its commitment to ensure an effective follow-up.

2. The Council welcomed the support offered by all delegations to the Iraqi people and ITG at the Conference. In particular, it welcomed their support for Iraq's continuing political transition based on UNSCR 1546, including drafting a Constitution, holding a referendum and elections for a constitutionally elected government by the end of this year. The Council recalled its commitment to the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Iraq. The Council underlined the importance all delegations attached to an inclusive and transparent political process. All sections of Iraqi society should be fully involved in the constitutional process and in promoting genuine national dialogue and reconciliation. The Council called on the states of the region to co-operate with Iraq to prevent cross-border transit and support for terrorists, to strengthen good neighbourly relations, to improve regional security and to give their full support to Iraq's political process.

3. In its efforts to follow a comprehensive approach in the support of reconstruction in Iraq, the Council took note of the areas that required priority action that were stressed by the ITG at the Conference. It noted the need for increased capacity building across the Iraqi administration, for further assistance on security, rule of law, infrastructure, energy and economic issues, as well as debt reduction. In this context, it welcomed the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq meeting in Jordan on 18-19 July and urged donors to expedite the disbursement of earlier pledges and to increase their support wherever possible. The Council recalled the ongoing support provided by the Commission and Member States to the Constitution drafting process and referendum, December elections and the provision of essential services, including in the area of education and health services, increasing employment opportunities and developing administrative capacity in accordance with Iraqi needs and priorities. The Council reaffirmed its support to the work of UNAMI. The Council also welcomed the ITG's decision to establish a donor coordination mechanism in Baghdad, with the support of the UN, and underlined the importance of this becoming operational quickly.

4. The Council reiterated its firmest condemnation of the terrorist acts, murders and hostagetakings which have been committed in Iraq. The Council deplored the fact that the campaign of terrorist violence in Iraq is prolonging the suffering of the Iraqi people and hampering political progress and reconstruction in Iraq.

5. The Council welcomed the launch of the EU's Rule of Law mission for Iraq (EU JUST LEX) and the Commission's commitment to begin preparations on complementary work in this field. Noting the needs set out by Iraq, particularly in the rule of law and human rights sectors, the Council invited relevant Council bodies to consider what further follow-up action the EU could take to help Iraq address these needs.

6. Following the Ministerial Troika visit to Baghdad on 9 June, the Council recalled its commitment to continue efforts to deepen relations between the EU and Iraq with the

aim of establishing a regular political dialogue. In this context and recalling the Commission Communication entitled “The European Union and Iraq – A Framework for Engagement” approved by the European Council in June 2004, the Council considered that political dialogue, to cover areas of mutual interest and concern, should be taken forward through a joint political declaration. It invited relevant Council bodies to prepare this, with a view to issuing the declaration at the EU-Iraq Ministerial Troika in the margins of UNGA Ministerial week. The Council considered that a follow-up Troika visit to Baghdad at Political Director level could hold a round of dialogue in the autumn.

7. The Council welcomed the Commission’s intention to open a delegation in Baghdad in the near future. It also welcomed the Commission’s readiness to establish contractual trade and co-operation relations with Iraq and to work with the ITG on focused assistance programmes aimed at developing the conditions for such an agreement.’

(...)

## **EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY**

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### *Sudan – Darfur – EU supporting action*

The Council adopted a Joint Action on an EU civilian-military supporting action to the African Union mission (Amis II) in the Darfur region of Sudan. The objective of this supporting action under the European security and defence policy is to ensure effective and timely EU assistance to support the Amis II enhancement.

The supporting action will include a civilian and a military component.

- The military component of the EU supporting action to Amis II will cover: provision of planning and technical assistance to all Amis II levels of command, including the logistic support coordination structure; provision of military observers, in the context of the Amis II enhancement plan; training of African troops and observers forming part of Amis II enhancement, as required; strategic and tactical transportation; aerial observation, if required by the African Union.
- The civilian police component (Civpol) of Amis II will provide: support to the Amis II police chain of command by providing the AU with highly experienced senior police advisors at all levels of the chain of command; support for training of Civpol personnel through providing a capacity for in-mission training by a group of EU trainers; support to the development of a police unit within the secretariat of the AU.

Under the Joint Action, the EU will continue the close and effective co-ordination with all institutional and bilateral donors engaged in supporting Amis II. The EU will

also continue to work in close co-ordination with the UN, and, regarding the military component of the supporting action, Nato.

The Council also appointed Mr Pekka Haavisto as EU special representative for Sudan (see also above Council conclusions on EU support for international peace and security in the framework of CFSP and ESDP).

(...)

### *Crisis management – Agreement with Chile – Operation Althea*

The Council adopted a decision approving an agreement with Chile on its participation in the EU's military crisis management operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation Althea) (10475/05 + ADD 1, 9843/05).

### *EU crisis management exercise 2006*

The Council approved exercise specifications for the EU's crisis management exercise 2006 (CME 06).

CME 06, which is a part of the EU's exercise programme, will be held from 25 September to 6 October 2006.

### *EU civilian crisis management missions in host states*

The Council authorised the presidency, assisted where necessary by the secretary-general/high representative, in the event of any future EU civilian crisis management missions, to open negotiations with host states with a view to concluding agreements on the status of EU civilian crisis management missions.

### *Improving European civil protection capabilities*

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

'The Council of the European Union,

1. HAVING REGARD TO:

- ▶ the conclusions of the Council of 7 January 2005 on the earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean<sup>1</sup>;
- ▶ the European Union Action Plan of 31 January 2005 on the earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean<sup>2</sup>;

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1. 5187/05.

2. 5788/05.



- ▶ the conclusions of the Council of 4 October 2004 on strengthening the overall Civil Protection Capacity in the European Union<sup>3</sup>;
- ▶ the conclusions of the Council of 25 November 2004 on prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist attacks<sup>1</sup>;
- ▶ the Communication from the Commission of 20 April 2005 on Improving the Community Civil Protection Mechanism<sup>2</sup>;
- ▶ the Communication from the Commission of 20 April 2005 on Reinforcing EU Disaster and Crisis Response in third countries<sup>3</sup>;
- ▶ the note from the Secretary-General/High Representative of 20 April 2005 on the Follow-up to the EU Action Plan following the earthquake and tsunamis in the Indian Ocean<sup>4</sup>;
- ▶ the note from the Presidency of 20 May on the Follow-up to the EU Action Plan following the earthquake and tsunamis in the Indian Ocean<sup>5</sup>;
- ▶ the Presidency conclusions of the European Council of Brussels of 16 and 17 June 2005, which wished addressing as a priority during the second half of 2005 the strengthening of civil protection capabilities, particularly the medical resources available to deal with a bioterrorist attack, and the development of a rapid reaction capability based on the civil protection modules of the Member States<sup>6</sup>.

2. BEARING IN MIND that the financial implications of the proposed improvements, and in particular of the proposal establishing a Rapid Response and Preparedness Instrument for major emergencies, must be compatible with the financial framework set for the period 2007-2013 and respect the principle of subsidiarity.

3. REAFFIRMS the need to develop an “European Union rapid response capability” to tackle natural or man-made disasters inside or outside the Union, drawing on national resources and teams trained to work together.

4. WELCOMES in general the Communication from the Commission on Improving the Community Civil Protection Mechanism, which sets out short term and medium term proposals to strengthen European cooperation in the framework of the Civil Protection Mechanism.

5. INVITES the Commission together with the Member States to improve, within their respective competences, the European civil protection cooperation, including the

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3. 11549/04.

1. 15232/04.

2. 8430/05 - COM(2005) 137 final.

3. 8382/05 - COM(2005) 153 final.

4. 8204/05.

5. 8961/1/05 REV 1.

6. 10255/05.

strengthening of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism, in order to ensure that the European Union can provide civil protection assistance rapidly and effectively in case of all kinds of emergencies inside and outside the Union.

6. UNDERLINES the overall role and responsibility of the United Nations in coordinating international civil protection assistance in third countries, where present. The EU should support the capabilities of the United Nations in coordinating civil protection interventions in third countries. In this regard, the European Union rapid response capability could contribute to the strengthening of the UN capacity building for rapid action in the face of humanitarian disasters.

7. ENCOURAGES the Commission together with the Member States, within their respective competences, to further develop a modular approach through a program which will establish scenarios, capability assessment, operational plans, training and exercises and common methodologies for risk assessment under an all-hazard approach covering natural and man-made disasters, including terrorism. This program should drive action, building on the principles of subsidiarity and complementarity, and of operating under national responsibility. The civil protection identified modules are one in a number of significant assets in the EU rapid response capability and will be able to operate independently or in cooperation with or support to other EU bodies or international institutions.

8. STRESSES that evaluations, taking into account risk assessments, deficit analyses and lessons learned from emergencies, training and exercises, are the basis for decisions on improving the response capacity of the EU.

9. ENCOURAGES the Commission and the Member States to take forward, in the short term, work in the following priority areas:

- (1) further assess the civil protection capabilities which the Member States may make available to each other for all types of major disasters;
- (2) develop a rapid response capability based on the civil protection modules of the Member States and for that purpose establish a program building on the principles of subsidiarity and complementarity, the modules being independent and self-sufficient units operating under national responsibility, which could be used alone or in addition with other contributions;
- (3) further develop training activities, exercises and the exchange of experts to stimulate the capacity to work together and to promote interoperability;
- (4) develop at the latest by 31 December 2005, in addition to national insignia, common EU insignia for intervention and assessment/ coordination personnel on site;
- (5) further develop civil-military cooperation with the EU Military Staff, in particular the Civil-Military Cell;

- (6) strengthen the on site assessment of needs by developing a common assessment methodology, based on internationally agreed methodologies where they exist, and by reinforcing the assessment capacity;
- (7) strengthen the capacity to facilitate the coordination on site and at head quarters, both within the EU and with relevant international organizations;
- (8) reinforce the links between the Mechanism and early warning systems at EU and UN level;
- (9) further work on facilitating the transport of civil protection assistance.

10. WELCOMES the Commission's offer to make the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) available for the European consular cooperation in order to support EU citizens victims of disasters in third countries.

11. INVITES the Commission to submit as soon as possible more complete proposals on strengthening preventive action, inspired by the terms of the Civil Protection Action Programme<sup>1</sup>, the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2012<sup>2</sup> and the European Union Action Plan on the earthquakes and tsunamis in the Indian Ocean<sup>3</sup>, and enhancing detection and early warning systems in general, and in particular for the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean.

12. INVITES the Commission to submit as soon as possible, and at the latest by October 2005, further legislative proposals for improving civil protection cooperation, including the Community Mechanism, taking into account the above conclusions.

13. WILL RETURN to the whole issue dealing with the European Union rapid response capability before the end of 2005.'

### *Civilian response teams*

The Council took note of a report on multifunctional civilian crisis management resources in integrated format civilian response teams.

The report presents the civilian response teams (CRT) concept in detail, focusing on its possible role in the early assessment of a crisis situation; in support of the establishment of a civilian European security and defence policy mission; when appropriate, in temporary support of an EU special representative or an ongoing civilian crisis management operation.

A CRT is a civilian crisis management rapid reaction capability of flexible size and composition, consisting of member states' experts with the participation of the Council secretariat.

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## UZBEKISTAN

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The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. The Council remains profoundly concerned about the situation in Uzbekistan and condemns the Uzbek authorities' refusal to allow an independent international enquiry into the recent events in Andijan.
2. The Council recalls its Conclusions of May 23 and June 13 and regrets the fact that Uzbek authorities did not reconsider their position by the given deadline of the end of June.
3. The Council is particularly concerned with the conclusions of the ODIHR and OHCHR reports on the events in Andijan. The Council recalls the need for a credible, comprehensive and transparent independent international enquiry and will coordinate the necessary steps in that direction with the UN, OSCE and other relevant international organisations. In this context, the possible use of the Moscow mechanism of the OSCE is being considered.
4. EU-Uzbekistan relations are based on mutual respect for the principles of democracy, rule of law and human rights, which are enshrined in the EU-Uzbekistan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement as well as other international agreements. The Council condemns the Uzbek leadership for breaching these principles in the light of the reported excessive, disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force by the Uzbek security forces during the Andijan events.
5. The Council notes the Commission's postponement of the subcommittee on economic issues scheduled for 13 July in Brussels. The Council invited the EUSR for Central Asia, Mr Jan Kubiš, to visit the region as soon as possible and agreed to review the EU-Uzbekistan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in the light of his report.
6. The Council has decided that all bilateral ministerial contacts of the EU and its Member States with President Karimov and his government should include strong messages on the importance of respect for democracy, the rule of law and human rights in Uzbekistan.
7. The Council requests relevant Council bodies to follow closely the situation in Uzbekistan and to recommend subsequent measures as appropriate. In particular, they should keep under review the case for suspension of further elements of the EU-Uzbekistan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, the introduction of an embargo on exports to Uzbekistan of arms, military equipment and equipment which might be used for internal repression as well as other targeted measures.

8. The Council is ready to re-examine these measures as soon as the Uzbek authorities have proven their readiness to allow an independent international enquiry into the events in Andijan of 13 May last, thus demonstrating their willingness to adhere to the principles of respect for human rights, rule of law and fundamental freedoms.

9. The Council takes note of the work already carried out by the Commission to re-orientate the Tacis programme in order to support increased focus on democracy and human rights, as well as on the needs of the population and to foster closer links with Uzbek civil society.

10. The Council remains concerned about the situation of the Uzbek refugees in the Kyrgyz Republic and calls on the Kyrgyz and Uzbek authorities to respect their international commitments and abide by international norms concerning the protection of refugees and asylum seekers.’

## **ZIMBABWE**

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The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘1. The EU agreed that the situation in Zimbabwe is of deepest concern. The Council recalled that it has repeatedly urged the Government of Zimbabwe to take effective measures to improve the situation. The Council expressed deep concern that there has been little progress.

2. Against this background, the Council condemned the latest developments under “Operation Murambatsvina” (forcible demolitions and internal displacement) which have caused great human suffering, as already expressed in the Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the EU issued on 7 June. The Council regretted that the Government of Zimbabwe has chosen not to tackle the root causes of the current crisis. It expressed its profound concern that these evictions and demolitions have been undertaken in contravention of international law on human rights.

3. The Council expressed utmost concern that forcible displacement to rural areas does not provide a humane and sustainable solution at a time when the rural areas are suffering acute food shortages.

4. The Council noted that the Government of Zimbabwe has outlined measures to provide alternative shelter and informal trading areas and insisted that this be done urgently and with due consideration to those who have lost their dwellings and livelihoods due to this operation.

5. The Council further noted that the European Commission and member states are already providing much-needed assistance and stood ready to increase assistance to those in need, in accordance with the principles of humanitarian aid, especially where there is a threat to life, and in this context, called for unfettered and unconditional access to the displaced population.
6. The Council welcomed the despatch of the UN Special Envoy (Anna Tibaijuka) to assess the situation, and looks forward to her report. The Council also supported the decision of the AU to send a Special Envoy (Tom Nyanduga) and looked forward to the successful completion of his mission.
7. The Council welcomed the statement by G8 leaders on 8 July expressing concern about the recent actions of the Government of Zimbabwe.
8. The Council recalled Common Position 2005/444/CFSP of 13 June 2005 and reiterated its decision in 2002 that, while the Government of Zimbabwe continues to engage in serious violations of human rights and of the freedom of opinion, of association, and of peaceful assembly, the EU will apply restrictive measures against the Government of Zimbabwe and those who bear a wide responsibility for such violations.
9. The Council reiterated its commitment to work closely with African partners to address Zimbabwe as an issue of mutual concern. The Council recalled Africa's commitment to human rights and good governance and called on the African Union, and in particular SADC, to use their influence to bring an end to the government provoked sufferings in Zimbabwe. The Council recalled that EU would keep its policy toward Zimbabwe under constant review including on restrictive measures.'

## UN SUMMIT

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The Council adopted the following conclusions:

'The Council discussed preparations for the United Nations Summit to be held from 14 to 16 September 2005. The Council welcomed the Commission Communication – "The 2005 UN Summit: Addressing the global challenges and making a success of a reformed UN" – as an important contribution in shaping the European Union's aspirations for the Summit. The Council recalled the European Union's recent decision on increasing aid volumes and effectiveness, enhancing policy coherence for development, and focusing on Africa, and welcomed the commitments made at the G8 meeting in Gleneagles.

Recalling the conclusions agreed by the European Council in June and its own decisions of 24 May, the General Affairs and External Relations Council agreed that the

European Union should continue to attach the highest priority to ensuring a balanced and ambitious Summit outcome, resulting in substantive actions to support the full implementation of the Millennium Declaration and related commitments, as well as in a stronger and more effective UN that can better meet today's interconnected challenges to international development, peace and security, and human rights. The Council supports the efforts of the UN General Assembly President in drafting a declaration, based on the concepts and proposals contained in the Secretary-General's March Report "In larger freedom."

In particular, the Council emphasises the importance of:

- more and better aid, including debt relief and innovative sources of funding for development, to meet the ODA objectives and the Millennium Development Goals and other existing commitments from major international conferences and recalls the EU's recent commitments to increase levels of ODA;
- good governance, the social dimension of globalisation, and the special needs of Africa;
- international trade as an engine for development, the call for rapid completion of the Doha Development Round, and the call for market access for LDCs;
- its conclusions of 24 May, which inter alia highlight the importance of an intensified multisectoral response to HIV/AIDS as laid down in the European Programme for Action to confront HIV/AIDS. The EU further recognises that the MDGs cannot be attained without progress in achieving the Cairo goal of universal sexual and reproductive health and rights;
- the need to make progress on environmental sustainability issues such as climate change and biodiversity, and a more coherent institutional framework of international environmental governance built on existing institutions including through launching a process leading to the creation of United Nations Environment Organisation;
- the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission;
- strong language on terrorism (leading to a definition of terrorism and conclusion of the Comprehensive Convention), disarmament, non-proliferation, and strengthening the rule of law;
- the responsibility to protect;
- strengthening the UN's human rights machinery including the establishment of a Human Rights Council in order to truly elevate the Commission on Human Rights and reinforcing the role and resources of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights;
- strengthening gender equality in all UN activities;
- strengthening the new UN capacity building for rapid action in the face of humanitarian disasters;

modernising and reforming the UN administrative system, including the Secretary General's longer term vision for grouping the various agencies, funds and programmes into more tightly managed entities in the field of development, humanitarian assistance and environment, and further improving UN system coherence at country level.

The Council recognises the need to reform the main UN bodies, among them the General Assembly, ECOSOC and the Security Council.

The Council welcomed the work of the Latvian President and Irish Foreign Minister as two of the UN Secretary General's Special Envoys for preparation of the Summit and agreed that the Presidency should conduct intensive consultations in New York and capitals ahead of the Summit and carry out further outreach in third country capitals as necessary. The Council agreed that Presidency should prepare a written statement, drawing on the June 2005 European Council Conclusions, the Commission Communication, and EU statements and position papers, for circulation at the Summit."

## **SYRIA AND LEBANON**

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Over lunch, ministers had a discussion with Mr Terje Roed-Larsen, the UN secretary-general's special envoy for the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1559.

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

- ‘1. The Council welcomes the important and timely discussion with Mr Terje Roed-Larsen and expresses its full appreciation for his mission. It reconfirms the importance of full implementation of UNSCR 1559.
2. The Council strongly condemns the bombings which have taken place since October 2004. The Council calls upon the Lebanese government to mount a full investigation into these attacks.
3. The Council underlines the importance of full implementation of UNSCR 1595 and the need for all parties to co-operate towards this. In this context, the Council reaffirms its full support for the independent international investigation Commission into the assassination of Rafic Hariri.
4. The Council notes Mr Terje Roed-Larsen's report on discussions with Syria. While noting the withdrawal of Syrian military forces from Lebanon, it expresses deep concern at the current situation in the region and calls on Syria to take action to promote regional stability, including by:
  - ▀ supporting the legitimate and sovereign new government of Lebanon and allowing for smooth circulation of goods between the two countries;



- supporting the political process in Iraq including by co-operating with the Iraqi authorities to prevent cross-border transit and support for terrorists;
- and ending support for groups that oppose the Middle East Peace Process and calling on them to abstain from the use of violence.

5. The Council recalls its readiness for a full and productive relationship with Syria. It notes that a positive Syrian contribution to regional stability would contribute to deepening the EU/Syria relationship.

6. The Council welcomes the nomination of Mr Fouad Siniora as the President of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Lebanon. It welcomes the successful completion of legislative elections in Lebanon, which represents a decisive step towards an independent, sovereign and democratic Lebanon and an encouraging signal for the region. It thanks the United Nations and the EU Election Observation Mission for their important work and calls on the Government of Lebanon to consider their recommendations. The Council will work with the new government and stands ready to support credible and effective plans for political and economic reform, which should be implemented rapidly.

7. The Council underlines the importance of disbanding and disarming Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias as called for by UNSCR 1559, within the framework of the Lebanese political dialogue. It calls upon the Government of Lebanon to extend its control over all Lebanese territory.

8. The Council expresses its deep concern about the recent attack initiated by Hezbollah along the Blue-Line and calls upon the Government of Lebanon to put an end to all attacks emanating from its territory. The Council calls on all parties to avoid any further escalation of violence and fully to respect the Blue-Line.'

## **MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS – DISENGAGEMENT**

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The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘1. The Council recalled the declaration of the European Council of 16-17 June 2005 which stressed the global strategic importance of peace, stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean and the European commitment to the resolution of the Middle East conflict. It recalled its support for the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and parts of the northern West Bank, in line with the framework outlined in the conclusions of the European Council of March 2004 and as an initial stage towards achieving a fair, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East. The Council welcomed the briefing by SG/HR Solana on his visit to the region from 10-14 July. It expressed its support for the High

Representative's commitment to keep both parties engaged in the peace process and in the implementation of the Roadmap. The Council fully endorsed the support the High Representative offered the parties, as well as his commitment that EU action should be coherent, focused and coordinated with the Quartet and the international community.

2. The Council expressed its grave concern at the recent escalation in violence in Israel and the Occupied Territories. The Council condemned unreservedly the recent terrorist attacks on Israel that have resulted in a number of Israeli fatalities and injuries. The Council also condemned violence by Palestinian militants against Palestinian security personnel. While having repeatedly condemned terrorist atrocities against Israelis and recognising Israel's right to protect its citizens against terrorist attacks, the European Union has consistently opposed extra-judicial killings which are contrary to international law. The Council emphasised that Palestinians and Israelis must not return to the cycle of violence that has been characteristic of recent years. It urged Israel to exercise maximum self-restraint and the Palestinian Authority to take immediate and effective action against those involved in attacks.

3. The Council commended the political courage shown by the leaders of the two sides with regard to the withdrawal from Gaza and certain parts of the northern West Bank. The Council stressed the importance of a successful disengagement and noted that only one month remains until it is scheduled to start. The Council reaffirmed the need for both parties to the conflict to make every effort to take advantage of the opportunity presented by disengagement. The Council urged Israel to ensure withdrawal was complete and coordinated with the Palestinians and the international community. The Council called for intensified co-ordination between Israel and the Palestinians, which is central to achieving tangible results, especially with regard to the crucial issues of access to and from the Gaza Strip.

4. The Council reiterated its full support for the Quartet and its Special Envoy for disengagement, James Wolfensohn. The Council confirmed its support for his mission and the Union's determination to work in close co-operation with him to ensure the success of disengagement. It urged the international community, including Arab states, to do likewise. The Council emphasised the urgent need for Israel and the Palestinian Authority to co-operate effectively with each other and with Mr Wolfensohn to support Palestinian institutional and economic development. It urged the Palestinian Authority to accelerate reforms and Israel to put in place the conditions essential to viable Palestinian economic growth. The Council noted Mr Wolfensohn's intention to present further details on his work to the Quartet in the autumn, as well as the ongoing role played by the Commission in leading donor activity on Palestinian governance issues.

5. The Council noted the ongoing contacts between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, including the meeting between Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas on 21 June in Jerusalem. The Council stressed the need for such contacts to improve in both substance and frequency and to take place at all levels. It called on both sides to renew their efforts to implement the commitments made in Sharm el Sheikh. The Council also urged both sides to avoid any action likely to undermine mutual confidence. The Council reaffirmed its position that no party should take unilateral measures which might prejudice the outcome of negotiations on the final settlement. In this context, the Council expressed its concern about the recent Israeli cabinet decision to immediately complete the separation barrier in and around East Jerusalem.

6. The Council urged the Palestinian Authority to step up its efforts to ensure a secure environment in which its citizens' own needs for law and order are met. The Council reiterated its commitment to contributing to the development of Palestinian security capacity through the Palestinian Civil Police, in co-ordination with US Security Coordinator General Ward. The Council also agreed in principle that EU support to the Palestinian Civil Police should take the form of an ESDP mission building on the work of the EU Co-ordination Office for Palestinian Policing Support in cooperation with all the parties concerned.

7. The Council recalled that the EU will not recognise any change to the pre-1967 borders other than those arrived at by agreement between the parties. The Council reaffirmed its view that the way to achieve a permanent peace is a viable two-state solution achieved through the full implementation by both parties of their commitments under the Roadmap.'

(...)

## European Security and Defence College

Brussels, 18 July 2005

### GENERAL AFFAIRS AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS COUNCIL MEETING

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(...)

#### *European Security and Defence College*

The Council adopted a Joint Action establishing a European Security and Defence College (ESDC), a network of national institutes, colleges, academies and institutions within the EU dealing with security and defence policy issues and the European Union Institute for security studies.

The ESDC will establish links with the EU institutions, providing training in the field of the European security and defence policy (ESDP) at the strategic level in order to develop and promote a common understanding of ESDP among civilian and military personnel, and to identify and disseminate, through its training activities, best practice in relation to various ESDP issues. It will also help to promote professional relations and contacts among training participants.

The main tasks of the ESDC will be to organise and conduct training activities in the field of ESDP. ESDC training activities will consist of: (a) an ESDP high-level course; and (b) an ESDP orientation course.

The following bodies will be set up for the functioning of the ESDC:

- A steering committee will be responsible for the overall co-ordination and direction of the training activities of the ESDC. The steering committee will be composed of one representative appointed by each member state.
- An executive academic board will be responsible for implementation of training activities and for ensuring their quality and coherence.
- A permanent secretariat for the ESDC will assist the steering committee and the executive academic board. The general secretariat of the EU Council will act as the secretariat of the ESDC.

ESDC training activities will be open to participation by nationals of all member states and acceding states (training activities will in principle be open to participation of nationals of candidate countries and, as appropriate, of third states). Participants will be civilian and military personnel dealing with strategic aspects in the field of ESDP. Representatives inter alia from nongovernmental organisations, academic institutions

and the media as well as members of the business community may be invited to participate in ESDC training activities.

## **COUNCIL JOINT ACTION ESTABLISHING A EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE COLLEGE (ESDC)**

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### **THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,**

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 14 thereof,

Whereas:

- (1) On 19 and 20 June 2003, at its meeting in Thessaloniki, the European Council endorsed the development of a coordinated EU Training Policy in the field of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), encompassing both civilian and military dimensions.
- (2) On 17 November 2003, the Council approved the EU Training Policy in ESDP and subsequently on 13 September 2004 approved the EU Training Concept in ESDP, which included the definition of the principles for the establishment of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC).
- (3) On 16 and 17 December 2004, the European Council endorsed the initiation of work on defining the modalities for the functioning of the ESDC.
- (4) On 31 May 2005, the Political and Security Committee endorsed the modalities for the functioning of the ESDC, including the setting up of a Steering Committee, an Executive Academic Board and a permanent Secretariat, which should carry out their tasks in accordance with those modalities.
- (5) The ESDC should be a key training actor providing training in the field of ESDP with a special focus on ESDP training courses at strategic level. As such, it should be an active partner in the overall EU training management,

**HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:**

### *Article 1*

#### **Establishment**

1. A European Security and Defence College (ESDC) is hereby established.
2. The ESDC shall be organised as a network between national institutes, colleges,

academies and institutions within the EU dealing with security and defence policy issues and the European Union Institute for Security Studies (hereinafter referred to as institutes).

3. It shall establish close links with the EU institutions.

## *Article 2*

### **Mission**

The ESDC shall provide training in the field of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) at the strategic level in order to develop and promote a common understanding of ESDP among civilian and military personnel, and to identify and disseminate, through its training activities, best practice in relation to various ESDP issues.

## *Article 3*

### **Objectives**

The objectives of ESDC shall be the following:

- (a) to further enhance the European security culture within ESDP;
- (b) to promote a better understanding of ESDP as an essential part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP);
- (c) to provide EU instances with knowledgeable personnel able to work efficiently on all ESDP matters;
- (d) to provide Member States' administrations and staff with knowledgeable personnel familiar with EU policies, institutions and procedures; and
- (e) to help promote professional relations and contacts among training participants.

## *Article 4*

### **Tasks of the ESDC**

1. The main tasks of the ESDC are in accordance with its mission and objectives to organise and conduct training activities in the field of ESDP.
2. ESDC training activities shall consist of two types of training activities:
  - (a) the ESDP High Level Course; and
  - (b) the ESDP Orientation Course.

Other training activities shall be undertaken, as decided by the Steering Committee referred to in Article 5.

3. In addition, the ESDC shall in particular:

- (a) support the relations to be established between national institutes;
  - (b) install and run an Internet-Based Advanced Distance Learning (IDL) System to support the ESDC training activities;
  - (c) develop and produce training material for EU Training in ESDP;
  - (d) provide contributions to the annual EU Training Programme in ESDP; and
  - (e) establish an Alumni Network between former training participants.
4. The ESDC training activities shall be conducted through the institutes forming the ESDC network.
5. As part of the ESDC network, the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EU ISS) shall support the ESDC training activities, in particular through EU ISS publications and by providing lectures given by EU ISS researchers as well as by making available its web site within and for the Internet-Based Advanced Distance Learning (IDL) System.

## *Article 5*

### Organisation

1. The following bodies shall be set up under the ESDC:
- (a) a Steering Committee which shall be responsible for the overall coordination and direction of the training activities of the ESDC;
  - (b) an Executive Academic Board which shall ensure the quality and coherence of the training activities;
  - (c) a permanent Secretariat for the ESDC (hereinafter referred to as the Secretariat) which shall in particular assist the Steering Committee and the Executive Academic Board.
2. The Steering Committee, the Executive Academic Board and the Secretariat shall carry out the tasks set out in Articles 6, 7 and 8 respectively.

## *Article 6*

### **The Steering Committee**

1. The Steering Committee shall be composed of one representative appointed by each Member State. Each member of the Committee may be represented or accompanied by an alternate. Letters of appointment, duly authorised by the Member State, shall be directed to the Secretary-General/High Representative (SG/HR). Representatives from acceding States may attend its meetings as active observers.
2. The Committee shall be chaired by the representative of the Member State holding the Council Presidency and shall meet at least once a year.



3. Representatives of the SG/HR and of the Commission shall be invited to attend the meetings of the Committee.
4. The tasks of the Committee shall be to:
  - (a) establish the annual academic programme of the ESDC;
  - (b) select the Member State(s) hosting the ESDC training activities and the institutes conducting them;
  - (c) develop and agree the annual academic programme and the outline curricula for all ESDC training activities;
  - (d) adopt evaluation reports and a general annual report on ESDC training activities, to be forwarded to the relevant Council bodies; and
  - (e) appoint for each academic year the Chairperson of the Executive Academic Board.
5. The Committee shall adopt its Rules of Procedure.
6. Decisions of the Committee shall be taken by qualified majority. The votes of the Member States shall be weighted in accordance with Article 205(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community. For their adoption, decisions shall require the number of votes provided in Article 23(2), third subparagraph of the Treaty on European Union.

## *Article 7*

### **The Executive Academic Board**

1. The Executive Academic Board shall be composed of senior representatives from those institutes which are active in the relevant academic year.
2. The Chairperson of the Board shall be appointed by the Steering Committee among the members of the Board.
3. Representatives from institutes involved in ESDC training activities in the preceding and following academic year as well as representatives from the SG/HR and of the Commission shall be invited to attend the meetings of the Board. Academic experts and senior officials from national and European institutions may be invited to attend its meetings.
4. The tasks of the Board shall be to:
  - (a) implement, through the institutes forming the ESDC network, the agreed annual academic programme;
  - (b) oversee the Internet Based Advanced Distanced Learning (IDL) System;
  - (c) develop detailed curricula for all ESDC training activities building on the agreed outline curricula;

- (d) ensure general coordination of ESDC training activities among all institutes;
  - (e) review standards of the training activities undertaken in the previous academic year;
  - (f) submit to the Steering Committee proposals for training activities in the next academic year; and
  - (g) prepare draft evaluation reports on each ESDC training course and a draft general annual report on ESDC activities to be forwarded to the Steering Committee.
5. The Rules of Procedure of the Board shall be adopted by the Steering Committee.

## *Article 8*

### **The Secretariat**

1. The General Secretariat of the Council shall act as the Secretariat of the ESDC.

Staff shall be provided by the General Secretariat of the Council, Member States and the institutes forming the ESDC network.

2. The Secretariat shall assist the Steering Committee and the Executive Academic Board, carry out administrative tasks in support of their activities, and provide support for the organization of the ESDC training activities that take place in Brussels.

3. The Secretariat shall closely cooperate with the Commission. Each institute forming the ESDC network shall designate a point of contact with the Secretariat to deal with the organizational and administrative issues connected with the organisation of the ESDC training activities.

## *Article 9*

### **Participation in the ESDC training activities**

1. All ESDC training activities shall be open to participation by nationals of all Member States and acceding States. The organising and conducting institutes shall ensure that this principle applies without any exception.

The ESDC training activities shall in principle be open to participation of nationals of candidate countries and, as appropriate, of third States.

2. Participants shall be civilian and military personnel dealing with strategic aspects in the field of ESDP.

Representatives of, inter alia, non-governmental organisations, academic institutions and the media, as well as members of the business community, may be invited to participate in ESDC training activities.

3. A certificate signed by the SG/HR shall be awarded to a participant who has completed an ESDC course. The modalities of the certificate shall be decided by the Steering Committee.

The certificate shall be recognised by the Member States and by the EU institutions.

## *Article 10*

### **Cooperation**

The ESDC shall cooperate with and draw on the expertise of international organisations and other relevant actors, such as national training institutes of third States.

## *Article 11*

### **Financing**

1. Each Member State, EU institution, EU agency and institute forming the ESDC network shall bear all costs related to its participation in ESDC, including salaries, allowances, travel expenses and costs related to organisational and administrative support of the ESDC training activities.

2. Member States and the institutes forming the ESDC network shall each bear the costs related to the personnel they provide to the Secretariat, including salaries, allowances and travel expenses.

3. The General Secretariat of the Council shall bear all costs arising from and related to its tasks as set out in Article 8, including the personnel it provides.

4. Each participant in ESDC training activities shall bear all costs related to his/her participation.

5. For financing specific activities, in particular the development, setting up and running of information system

networks or applications for the ESDC, as referred to in Article 4(3), voluntary contributions by Member States, EU institutions, EU agencies and institutes forming the ESDC network shall be managed by the General Secretariat of the Council as earmarked revenue.

6. Practical arrangements for the contributions referred to in paragraph 5 shall be decided by the Steering Committee.

## *Article 12*

### **Security regulations**

The Council's security regulations set out in Council Decision 2001/264/EC of 19 March 2001 adopting the Council's security regulations<sup>(1)</sup> shall apply to the ESDC activities.

## *Article 13*

### **Review**

The Steering Committee, acting by qualified majority, shall adopt and submit to the Council no later than 31 December 2007 a report on the activities and perspectives of the ESDC, including on the financial modalities and with regard to the Secretariat with a view to a revision of this Joint Action.

## *Article 14*

### **Entry into force**

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the day of its adoption.

## *Article 15*

### **Publication**

This Joint Action shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Brussels, 18 July 2005.

*For the Council*

*The President*

J. Straw

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(1) OJ L 101, 11.4.2001, p. 1. Decision as amended by Decision 2004/194/EC (OJ L 63, 28.2.2004, p. 48).

## VIII<sup>th</sup> China-EU Summit

Beijing, 5 September 2005

(...)

### JOINT STATEMENT

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1. The eighth China-EU Summit was held in Beijing on 5 September 2005. Premier Wen Jiabao of the State Council of China attended the meeting on behalf of the People's Republic of China. The EU was represented by the President of the European Council, Prime Minister Tony Blair of the UK, President of the European Commission, Mr. José Manuel Barroso, and Secretary General of the Council of the EU and High Representative for the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, Mr. Javier Solana.
  
2. Leaders of the two sides reviewed the development of China-EU relations and celebrated the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. Both were of the view that the past three decades had seen great changes in China and the EU and a progressive deepening of the relationship, which is fast maturing into a comprehensive strategic partnership. They believed that the strengthening of the relationship had been of great value to the long-term interests of China and the EU, to cooperation between Asia and Europe, as well as to peace, stability and development in the world at large. The leaders now wished to look ahead to the future, developing the strategic relationship through concrete actions.
  
3. During the Summit, the two sides endorsed:
  - a memorandum of understanding on labour, employment and social affairs
  - a joint statement on cooperation in space exploitation, science and technology development
  - a memorandum of understanding on China-EU dialogue on energy and transport strategies
  - a maritime protocol extending the existing maritime agreement to new member states and
  - two major financing agreements for the China-EU bio-diversity and river basin management programmes

Furthermore, leaders witnessed the signing of a 500 million Euro loan from the European Investment Bank for the extension of Beijing airport.

4. During the meeting, a Joint Declaration on Climate Change between China and the EU was issued, which confirmed the establishment of a China-EU partnership on climate change. The two sides were determined to tackle the serious challenges of climate change through practical and results-oriented cooperation. This partnership will fully complement the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. It will strengthen cooperation and dialogue on climate change including clean energy, and will promote sustainable development. It will include cooperation on the development, deployment and transfer of low carbon technology, including advanced near-zero-emissions coal technology through carbon capture and storage.
5. The two sides emphasised the importance of high-level political dialogue and consultations at all levels in enhancing understanding, expanding common ground and advancing bilateral relations. Leaders of the two sides welcomed the recently established high-level coordination mechanism and agreed to launch a regular vice foreign ministerial strategic dialogue mechanism by the end of 2005 to discuss important international and regional issues and exchange views on bilateral issues of common concern.
6. The two sides agreed to move towards early negotiations on a new China-EU Framework Agreement. The leaders instructed their respective services to expedite preparatory work with a view to concluding at an early date an agreement that will reflect the full breadth and depth of the strategic partnership between China and the EU.
7. The EU side reaffirmed its continued adherence to the one China policy and expressed its hope for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question through constructive dialogue. The Chinese side appreciated EU's commitment to the one China policy and reiterated its principled position on the Taiwan question.
8. Leaders discussed the EU arms embargo. The Chinese side was of the view that lifting the arms embargo would be conducive to the sound development of the China-EU comprehensive strategic partnership and urged the EU to lift the arms embargo at an early date. The EU side reaffirmed its willingness to continue to work towards lifting the embargo on the basis of the Joint Statement of the 2004 EU-China Summit and the subsequent European Council Conclusions on this subject.
9. As strategic partners, the two sides reiterated their cooperation in the fields of non-proliferation and disarmament. They will continue to maintain and enhance dialogue and cooperation on the basis of the Joint Declaration of the People's Republic of China and the European Union on Non-proliferation and Arms Control which was adopted at the 2004 China-EU Summit.

10. The two sides underlined their commitment to the protection and promotion of human rights and continued to place a high value on the EU-China human rights dialogue. They underlined the importance of concrete steps in the field of human rights and reaffirmed their commitment to further enhance cooperation and exchanges in this field on the basis of equality and mutual respect, while making efforts to achieving more meaningful and positive results on the ground. The EU welcomed China's commitment to ratifying the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as soon as possible. Both sides confirmed their commitment to co-operate with UN human rights mechanisms and their respect for international human rights standards provided for in relevant international human rights instruments including the rights of minorities. In respect of the global fight against genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, they also noted the importance of the International Criminal Court.

11. Both sides reiterated that China and the EU were committed to efforts to promote world peace, security and sustainable development, with the United Nations at its core. The two sides expressed support for UN reform aimed at improving its ability to cope with the existing and new threats and challenges. The two sides reiterated that any model of reform should be decided upon by consensus through consultations.

12. The two sides will continue to cooperate in international and regional affairs, including through ASEM and the ASEAN Regional Forum. The two sides shared a desire to enhance and promote security and stability in East Asia. The EU reiterated its support for achieving a nuclear-weapon-free Korean Peninsula and maintaining peace and stability there. It expressed its appreciation for China's active role in this and stood ready to provide necessary help when appropriate.

13. The two sides agreed to further strengthen mutual cooperation and sectoral dialogues to deepen and broaden trade and investment flows, which should take place in a balanced and mutually beneficial way. The two sides welcomed the first China-EU Financial Dialogue that took place in Brussels in February 2005.

14. The EU side welcomed the achievements China has made towards building a market economy. The two sides agreed to launch high-level dialogues to address outstanding issues with a view to achieving positive progress on the issue of MES.

15. Both sides welcomed the China-EU Business Summit being held here today. They recognised the vital importance of transparency in commercial decision making, robust corporate governance, effective implementation of protection of intellectual property and safeguarding the interest of consumers in creating a positive business environment for continued economic growth and individual prosperity. With this in mind China and the EU agreed to deepen the dialogue on intellectual property rights, strengthen coopera-

tion in the field of sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) and consumer product safety and in particular welcomed the recently established intellectual property rights working group.

16. Both sides were determined to honour and implement their WTO commitments, and work together closely to achieve a successful Hong Kong Ministerial Conference that will deliver an ambitious and balanced package allowing completion of the Doha Development Agenda in 2006.

17. Both sides confirmed their intention to strengthen the China-EU Science and Technology partnership, which is based on substantial achievements of mutual benefit. They recognised that the Joint Declaration and the Vision Paper adopted in Beijing in May 2005 and the COREACH initiative laid a strategic foundation for further cooperation. They will create the appropriate conditions for a series of high impact Science and Technology events in China and Europe starting in 2006 to prepare for a “China-EU science and technology year”.

18. Both sides expressed their satisfaction at China-EU cooperation within the framework of the Galileo programme. They stressed their full commitment to making Galileo a commercial and technical success worldwide, and called for detailed talks on the conditions related to China’s joining of the European GNSS Supervisory Authority and the participation of Chinese enterprises in the Galileo Operation Concessionaire.

19. The two sides looked forward to the early implementation of the ITER scheme and further strengthening of their cooperation in the relevant fields.

20. Leaders of the two sides also pledged to work together to tackle the problem of illegal logging in the Asian region.

21. The two sides welcomed the Memorandum of Understanding launching a dialogue between China and the EU on their strategies in the energy and transport sectors. Both sides highlighted the importance of continuing and intensifying their cooperation in the energy and transport sectors.

22. Leaders of the two sides noted that they would take active measures to expand education cooperation and exchanges through intensified dialogues. They also welcomed the strengthening of cooperation in higher education through the Erasmus Mundus programme and planned to hold a China-EU forum on higher education in Beijing in 2005.

23. The two sides agreed to start negotiations before the end of 2005 on a China-EU horizontal aviation agreement. This will aim to resolve outstanding legal issues in bilat-



eral air services agreements between China and EU Member States. The two sides also agreed to engage in negotiations in the coming months with a view to concluding an agreement relating to technical cooperation in civil aviation. The two sides believed that the successful China-EU Aviation Summit held in Beijing on 30 June 1 July 2005 marked the beginning of a new era in China-EU civil aviation.

24. The two sides will intensify their cooperation in order to guarantee the smooth and efficient implementation of the Approved Destination Status (ADS) Memorandum of Understanding.

25. The leaders underlined that activities on facilitating people-to-people exchanges and cooperation in combating illegal migration are a priority for both sides. In the spirit of full reciprocity, leaders discussed issues of readmission and visa facilitation. The two sides planned to open negotiations on issues of their respective concern.

26. Leaders of the two sides welcomed the exchanges between scholars and think-tanks of China and the EU, including the cooperation and exchanges between the China Institute of International Studies, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the relevant European research institutions.

## Council of the European Union

Brussels, 7 September 2005

### **POLITICAL DECLARATION ON THE INDIA-EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP**

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India and the EU, as the largest democracies in the world, share common values and beliefs that make them natural partners in the modern inter-connected world. We share a common commitment to democracy, pluralism, human rights and the rule of law and seek to pursue economic progress and prosperity for our peoples in a peaceful, stable and secure global environment.

The fifth Summit at The Hague on 8 November 2004 endorsed the India-EU Strategic Partnership. This is a qualitative transformation in the way we engage as equal partners and work together in partnership with the world at large. Today in Delhi, at the sixth India-EU Summit, we commit ourselves to strengthened dialogue and engagement as Strategic Partners.

In acknowledgement of our Strategic Partnership and our shared responsibility to contribute to international peace, security and prosperity, we today adopt a comprehensive and forward looking Action Plan.

#### *Political Dialogue and Cooperation*

- ▶ We recognize the fact that terrorism constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security, and reaffirm our condemnation of all acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations as criminal and unjustifiable, irrespective of their motives. As part of our joint efforts to fight terrorism, we will establish contacts between the Indian and EU Counter Terrorism Coordinators, work towards blocking access to terrorist financing and co-operate in the fight against money laundering.
- ▶ We hold a common belief in the fundamental importance of multilateralism and in the essential role of the United Nations for maintaining international peace and security, promoting the economic and social advancement of all people and meeting global threats and challenges. We will work closely to promote effective multilateralism and strengthen UN peacekeeping and peace building through exchanging best practice and engaging in joint training.
- ▶ We will establish an EU-India security dialogue on global and regional security issues, disarmament and non-proliferation.
- ▶ We will work together to uphold human rights in a spirit of equality and mutual respect.

### *Economic Dialogue and Cooperation; Trade and Investment*

- ▶ We will establish a High Level Trade Group to explore ways of increasing bilateral economic flows, including discussions on the possible launch of bilateral negotiations on a comprehensive trade and investment agreement. Within this framework we agree to explore the scope of a possible investment agreement.
- ▶ We will aim to enhance significantly EU's development co-operation in social sectors, specifically in the universalisation of elementary education (Sarva Siksha Abhiyan) and the National Rural Health Mission of the Government of India.
- ▶ We will launch an India-EU Initiative on Clean Development and Climate Change, with the aim of promoting cleaner technologies and their use.
- ▶ We will build on our cooperation in the energy sector to develop more efficient, cleaner and alternative energy chains and work to secure India's membership in the ITER nuclear fusion project.
- ▶ We will strengthen our collaboration in science and technology, especially by looking to co-sponsor collaborative research projects in areas such as genomics, nanotechnology and high-energy physics. In biotechnology we will cooperate in confronting the global challenges posed by HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria.
- ▶ We will conclude a framework agreement on India's participation in Galileo Satellite Navigation Systems.
- ▶ We will work towards an agreement on Maritime Transport and launch a comprehensive dialogue on Civil Aviation.
- ▶ We will encourage business-to-business contacts, including holding a Business Round Table, along with Business Summits.
- ▶ We will continue to work closely together to achieve a successful Hong Kong Ministerial Conference that delivers an ambitious package allowing completion of the Doha Development Agenda in 2006 Bringing together People and Cultures

### *Bringing together People and Cultures*

- ▶ We will hold dialogues on migration and consular issues in the context of the opportunities and challenges flowing from the large-scale movement of people between us.
- ▶ We will increase educational co-operation through the facilitation of academic exchanges, such as Erasmus Mundus, and through encouraging the development of EU studies in India and Indian studies in the EU.
- ▶ We will continue to support civil society dialogue and the EU-India Round Table.

(...)

## Monitoring Mission in Aceh – Council Joint Action

Brussels, 9 September 2005

For the first time, the European Union decided to get involved in Asia within the framework of ESPD and to launch a monitoring mission in Aceh (the Aceh Monitoring Mission) in Indonesia. This decision demonstrated not only its commitment to the Aceh peace process but also its eagerness to promote partnership with the countries of South-East Asia.

### **COUNCIL JOINT ACTION ON THE EUROPEAN UNION MONITORING MISSION IN ACEH (INDONESIA)**

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#### THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 14 and third subparagraph of Article 25 thereof,

Whereas:

- (1) The European Union (EU) is committed to promote a lasting peaceful settlement to the conflict in Aceh (Indonesia) and to increase stability throughout South East Asia, including progress in the economic, legal, political and security sector reforms.
- (2) On 11 October 2004, the Council reiterated its attachment to a united, democratic, stable and prosperous Indonesia. It reiterated the EU's respect for the territorial integrity of the Republic of Indonesia and recognition of its importance as a major partner. The Council encouraged the Government of Indonesia (GoI) to seek peaceful solutions in conflict and potential conflict areas and welcomed the statement by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono that he intended to implement Special Autonomy for Aceh. The Council reaffirmed the EU's wish to build a closer partnership with Indonesia.
- (3) On 12 July 2005, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, on behalf of the GoI, invited the EU to participate in an Aceh Monitoring Mission to assist Indonesia in implementing the final agreement on Aceh. The GoI sent a similar invitation to the ASEAN countries Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) also indicated its support for a participation of the EU.
- (4) On 18 July 2005, the Council noted the report of the Joint EU Council

Secretariat/Commission assessment mission to Indonesia/Aceh. It welcomed the successful conclusion of the Helsinki negotiations and agreed that the EU was prepared, in principle, to provide observers to monitor implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). It asked the competent bodies to continue planning for a possible monitoring mission at the request of the parties and to establish contact with ASEAN and ASEAN countries with a view to their possible cooperation.

(5) On 15 August 2005, the GoI and the GAM signed a MoU detailing the agreement and principles guiding the creation of conditions within which the government of the Acehese people can be manifested through a fair and democratic process within the unitary state and constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. The MoU foresees the establishment of the Aceh Monitoring Mission to be established by the EU and ASEAN contributing countries with the mandate to monitor the implementation of the commitments taken by the GoI and the GAM in the MoU.

(6) The MoU notably provides that the GoI is responsible for the security of all Aceh Monitoring Mission personnel in Indonesia and that a Status of Mission Agreement will be concluded between GoI and the EU.

(7) The Aceh Monitoring Mission will be conducted in a situation which may deteriorate and could harm the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as set out in Article 11 of the Treaty.

(8) In conformity with the guidelines of the European Council meeting in Nice on 7-9 December 2000, this Joint Action should determine the role of the Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR) in accordance with Articles 18 and 26 of the Treaty.

(9) Article 14(1) of the Treaty calls for the indication of a financial reference amount for the whole period of implementation of the Joint Action. The indication of amounts to be financed by the EU budget illustrates the will of the political authority and is subject to the availability of commitment appropriations during the respective budget year,

## HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

### *Article 1*

#### **Mission**

1. The EU hereby establishes an European Union Monitoring Mission in Aceh (Indonesia), named the 'Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)', with an operational phase beginning on 15 September 2005.

2. The AMM shall operate in accordance with its mandate as set out in Article 2.

## *Article 2*

### **Mandate**

1. The AMM shall monitor the implementation of the commitments undertaken by the GoI and the GAM pursuant to the MoU.
2. In particular, the AMM shall:
  - (a) monitor the demobilisation of GAM and monitor and assist with the decommissioning and destruction of its weapons, ammunition and explosives;
  - (b) monitor the re-location of non-organic military forces and non-organic police troops;
  - (c) monitor the reintegration of active GAM members;
  - (d) monitor the human rights situation and provide assistance in this field in the context of the tasks set out in points (a), (b) and (c) above;
  - (e) monitor the process of legislation change;
  - (f) rule on disputed amnesty cases;
  - (g) investigate and rule on complaints and alleged violations of the MoU;
  - (h) establish and maintain liaison and good cooperation with the parties.

## *Article 3*

### **Planning phase**

1. During the planning phase, the Planning Team shall comprise a Head of Mission/Head of Planning Team and the necessary staff to deal with functions ensuing from the needs of the AMM.
2. As a priority, a comprehensive risk assessment shall be carried out as part of the planning process. This assessment may be updated as necessary.
3. The Planning Team shall draw up the Operation Plan (OPLAN) and develop technical instruments necessary to execute the mandate of the AMM. The OPLAN shall take into account the comprehensive risk assessment and shall include a security plan. The Council shall approve the OPLAN.

## *Article 4*

### **Structure of the AMM**

In principle, the AMM shall be structured as follows:

- (a) Headquarters (HQ). The HQ shall consist of the Office of the Head of Mission and

the HQ Staff, providing all necessary functions of command and control and mission support. The HQ shall be located in Banda Aceh;

- (b) 11 geographically distributed District Offices, conducting monitoring tasks;
- (c) 4 Decommissioning Teams.

These elements shall be further developed in the OPLAN.

## *Article 5*

### **Head of Mission**

1. Mr Pieter Feith is hereby appointed Head of Mission of the AMM.
2. The Head of Mission shall exercise Operational Control over the AMM and assume the day-to-day management and coordination of the AMM activities, including the management of the security of mission staff, resources and information.
3. All staff shall remain under the authority of the appropriate national authority or EU Institution and shall carry out their duties and act solely in the interest of the mission. National authorities shall transfer Operational Control to the Head of Mission. Both during and after the mission, the staff shall exercise the greatest discretion with regard to all facts and information relating to the mission.
4. The Head of Mission shall be responsible for disciplinary control over the staff. For seconded staff, disciplinary action shall be taken by the national or EU authority concerned.
5. The Head of Mission shall rule on disputes regarding the implementation of the MoU as provided therein and in accordance with the OPLAN.

## *Article 6*

### **Staff**

1. The numbers and competence of the AMM staff shall be consistent with its mandate as set out in Article 2 and its structure as set out in Article 4.
2. Mission staff shall be seconded by Member States and EU Institutions. Each Member State and EU Institution shall bear the costs related to the mission staff seconded by it, including salaries, medical coverage, allowances (other than per diems) and travel expenses.
3. International staff and local staff shall be recruited on a contractual basis as required.

4. Third States may also, as appropriate, second mission staff. Each seconding Third State shall bear the costs related to any of the staff seconded by it including salaries, medical coverage, allowances and travel expenses.

### *Article 7*

#### **Status of staff**

1. The status of the AMM and its staff in Aceh, including where appropriate the privileges, immunities and further guarantees necessary for the completion and smooth functioning of the mission shall be agreed in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 24 of the Treaty. The SG/HR, assisting the Presidency, may negotiate such an agreement on its behalf.

2. The Member State or EU Institution having seconded a staff member shall be responsible for answering any claims linked to the secondment, from or concerning the staff member. The Member State or EU Institution in question shall be responsible for bringing any action against the seconded staff member.

3. The conditions of employment and the rights and obligations of international and local contracted staff shall be laid down in the contracts between the Head of Mission and the staff member.

### *Article 8*

#### **Chain of command**

1. The structure of the AMM shall have a unified chain of command.

2. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) shall provide the political control and strategic direction of the mission.

3. The Head of Mission shall report to the SG/HR.

4. The SG/HR shall give guidance to the Head of Mission.

### *Article 9*

#### **Political control and strategic direction**

1. The PSC shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council, the political control and strategic direction of the mission. The Council hereby authorises the PSC to take the relevant decisions for the purpose and duration of the mission, in accordance with third



subparagraph of Article 25 of the Treaty. This authorisation shall include the powers to amend the OPLAN and the chain of command. The powers of decision with respect to the objectives and termination of the mission shall remain vested in the Council.

2. The PSC shall report to the Council at regular intervals.
3. The PSC shall receive reports by the Head of Mission regarding the conduct of the mission at regular intervals. The PSC may invite the Head of Mission to its meetings, as appropriate.

## *Article 10*

### **Participation of Third States**

1. Without prejudice to the decision-making autonomy of the EU and its single institutional framework, Acceding States shall be invited and Third States may be invited to contribute to the AMM provided that they bear the cost of the staff seconded by them, including salaries, High Risk insurance, allowances and travel expenses to and from Aceh (Indonesia), and contribute to the running costs of the AMM, as appropriate.
2. Third States making contributions to the AMM shall have the same rights and obligations in terms of day-to-day management of the mission as Member States taking part in the mission.
3. The Council hereby authorises the PSC to take the relevant decisions on acceptance of the proposed contributions and to establish a Committee of Contributors.
4. Detailed arrangements regarding the participation of Third States shall be subject of an agreement, in conformity with Article 24 of the Treaty. The SG/HR, assisting the Presidency, may negotiate such arrangements on its behalf. Where the EU and a Third State have concluded an agreement establishing a framework for the participation of this Third State in the EU crisis management operations, the provisions of such an agreement shall apply in the context of the AMM.

## *Article 11*

### **Security**

1. The Head of Mission shall, in consultation with the Council Security Office, be responsible for ensuring compliance with minimum security standards in conformity with the agreed Council's security regulations.

2. The Head of Mission shall consult with the PSC on security issues affecting the deployment of the mission as directed by the SG/HR.
3. AMM staff members shall undergo mandatory security training before their entry into function.

## *Article 12*

### **Financial arrangements**

1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the AMM shall be EUR 9 000 000.
2. The expenditure financed by the amount stipulated in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the EU with the exception that any pre-financing shall not remain the property of the Community. Nationals of Third States shall be allowed to tender for contracts.
3. The Head of Mission shall be accountable to the Commission for all expenditure charged to the general budget of the EU and shall to that effect sign a contract with the Commission.
4. Expenditure shall be eligible as of the date of entry into force of this Joint Action.

## *Article 13*

### **Community action**

1. The Council and the Commission shall, each within their respective powers, ensure consistency between the implementation of this Joint Action and external activities of the Community in accordance with second subparagraph of Article 3 of the Treaty. The Council and the Commission shall cooperate to this end.
2. The Council also notes that coordination arrangements are required in Banda Aceh and also in Jakarta, as appropriate, as well as in Brussels.

## *Article 14*

### **Release of classified information**

1. The SG/HR is authorised to release to Third States associated with this Joint Action, as appropriate and in accordance with the operational needs of the mission, EU classified information and documents up to the level 'RESTREINT UE' generated for the purposes of the mission, in accordance with the Council's security regulations.

2. In the event of a specific and immediate operational need, the SG/HR is also authorised to release to the host State EU classified information and documents up to the level ‘RESTREINT UE’ generated for the purposes of the mission, in accordance with the Council’s security regulations. In all other cases, such information and documents shall be released to the host State in accordance with the procedures appropriate to the host State’s level of cooperation with the EU.

3. The SG/HR is authorised to release to Third States associated with this Joint Action and to the host State EU nonclassified documents related to the deliberations of the Council with regard to the mission covered by the obligation of professional secrecy pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Council’s Rules of Procedure<sup>(1)</sup>.

### *Article 15*

#### **Review**

The Council shall, not later than the 15 March 2006, evaluate whether the AMM should be extended.

### *Article 16*

#### **Entry into force, duration**

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.  
It shall expire on 15 March 2006.

### *Article 17*

#### **Publication**

This Joint Action shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Brussels, 9 September 2005.

*For the Council*

*The President*

J. Straw

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(1) Council Decision 2004/338/EC, Euratom of 22 March 2004 adopting the Council's Rules of Procedure (OJ L 106, 15.4.2004, p. 22). Decision as amended by Decision 2004/701/EC, Euratom (OJ L 319, 20.10.2004, p. 15).

## FACTSHEET – EU MONITORING MISSION IN ACEH (INDONESIA)

The European Union, together with five contributing countries from ASEAN, as well as with Norway and Switzerland, is deploying a monitoring mission in Aceh (Indonesia) – **the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)**. This mission is designed to monitor the implementation of various aspects of the peace agreement set out in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the **Government of Indonesia (GoI)** and the **Free Aceh Movement (GAM)** on **15 August 2005**. The AMM becomes operational on 15 September 2005, date on which the decommissioning of GAM armaments and the relocation of non-organic military and police forces is due to begin.

An Initial Monitoring Presence has already been operational since the day of the signing of the MoU between the parties.

### *The Peace Process*

The peace negotiations were initiated in Helsinki between the GoI and the GAM under the auspices of the **Crisis Management Initiative (CMI)**, a non-governmental organisation chaired by former Finnish President Martti AHTISAARI.

Since January 2005, peace talks have progressed through five sets of negotiations, the latest of which was completed in Helsinki on 17 July 2005. Upon conclusion of the fifth round of talks, the Parties agreed on a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed on 15 August 2005.

The EU has supported the peace process negotiations by providing direct support to CMI through the EC Rapid Reaction Mechanism.

### *Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)*

The GoI and the GAM commit themselves in the MoU to achieve a peaceful, comprehensive and sustainable solution to the conflict in Aceh. The MoU details the agreement and the principles that will guide the **political process** in Aceh, covering the following topics *inter alia*:

- ▶ political reforms in Aceh (including a law on the governing of Aceh, political participation, economy, and rule of law),
- ▶ **human rights**,
- ▶ **amnesty** and **re-integration** of GAM members into society,
- ▶ appropriate **security arrangements** for the implementation of the MoU provisions,
- ▶ **establishment of the Aceh Monitoring Mission**, and
- ▶ agreement on a **dispute settlement mechanism**.

## *Initial Phase*

Given that both the GoI and the GAM have indicated that they would like to see a monitoring presence in Aceh immediately after the signature of the MoU, an initial monitoring presence (IMP) was deployed on 15 August 2005. The IMP, which consisted of 80 monitors from EU and ASEAN countries, covered the period between the signing of the MoU (15 August 2005) and the full deployment of the AMM (15 September 2005).

The IMP provided an early demonstration of the EU and ASEAN contributing countries' commitment to monitoring the peace process while contributing to confidence-building amongst the population of Aceh during the early stage of the implementation of the MoU.

## *Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)*

The EU together with five ASEAN contributing countries (Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) and Norway and Switzerland, are deploying a monitoring mission in Aceh (Indonesia). The monitoring mission is of a civilian nature and is EU-led.

The deployment of the AMM follows an official invitation addressed to the EU and the five ASEAN contributing countries by the GoI. The GAM leadership has also stated its full support for such a mission. The mission is being launched on 15 September 2005.

## *Aims and Scope of the Aceh Monitoring Mission*

The objective of the AMM is to support the GoI and the GAM in their implementation of the Peace Agreement. This includes the following tasks:

- monitor the demobilisation of GAM and monitor and assist with the decommissioning and destruction of its weapons, ammunition and explosives;
- monitor the re-location of non-organic military forces and non-organic police troops;
- monitor the reintegration of active GAM members;
- monitor the human rights situation and provide assistance in this field in the context of the tasks set out in the above points;
- monitor the process of legislation change;
- rule on disputed amnesty cases;
- deal with complaints and alleged violations of the MoU;
- establish and maintain liaison and good cooperation with the parties.

The AMM will not take on a facilitation or negotiation role. Should this be needed during the implementation process, it will be the responsibility of the two parties and the original facilitator, i.e. the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI).

### *Size and Structure of the Mission*

The AMM is a civilian mission within the framework of the **European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)**. The EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) will exercise the political control and the strategic guidance of the AMM under the responsibility of the Council of the EU. The costs of the mission will be financed from the EU budget (the reference amount for the mission under the EU's Common foreign and security policy budget line is EUR 9 million) and by contributions of EU Member States and participating countries (EUR 6 million).

The AMM numbers some 226 international unarmed personnel, of which 130 from EU Member States as well as Norway and Switzerland, and 96 from the five participating ASEAN countries. It comprises personnel with appropriate expertise in the range of competencies needed to fulfil the tasks of the mission.

The Headquarters and monitoring teams comprise personnel from the EU, ASEAN contributing countries and Norway and Switzerland. Monitors wear recognizable civilian mission attire with clear mission identification markings.

The mission, whose headquarters are in Banda Aceh, will establish a monitoring capability with 11 geographically distributed District Offices to demonstrate EU-ASEAN contributing countries' support and engagement throughout Aceh. The mission also includes 4 mobile decommissioning teams. Monitors will conduct their monitoring tasks by patrolling and communicating with both parties, and by carrying out inspections and investigations as required.

The Head of the mission (HoM), Pieter Feith, seconded from the EU Council Secretariat, is supported by three deputies, two EU and one from ASEAN.

The Joint Action (EU Council decision establishing the mission) expires on 15 March 2006.

### *Reporting*

The Head of the mission (HoM) reports to Javier Solana, Secretary General/High Representative of the Council of the EU on matters related to the AMM, and will inform the parties, the CMI, the PSC and the contributing countries from ASEAN and Europe on possible violations of the MoU.

### *The EU and Indonesia*

The EU has supported the rehabilitation and reconstruction needs in the countries affected by the tsunami. EUR 200 million were committed for the rehabilitation and reconstruction needs of Indonesia alone for 2005-6. Planned EU Member State contributions amount to an additional EUR 391 million. The European Commission Humanitarian Co-ordination Office (ECHO) has channelled EUR 40 million worth of

relief assistance to tsunami victims.

Excluding tsunami assistance, total EU aid (EC+25) amounts to EUR 200 million per annum. In addition, the European Commission's « Country Strategy Paper » for Indonesia (2002-2006 period) foresees commitments for over EUR 215 million covering different development sectors over that period. The disbursements foreseen in 2005 for Indonesia are in the order of EUR 75 million.

The European Commission will further support the Aceh peace process through flanking measures including support to re-integration of former GAM combatants into civil society and democratic political life; support to persons displaced by the conflict and to returnees from third countries; EU observation of local elections in 2006; technical assistance and capacity-building in public safety, local governance, human rights and municipal elections.

The EU has confirmed its attachment to a united, democratic, stable and prosperous Indonesia. It has reiterated its respect for the territorial integrity of the Republic of Indonesia and recognition of its importance as a major partner.

(...)

## Council of the European Union (Turkey)

Brussels, 21 September 2005

In December 2004, the European Council agreed to open accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005, on the condition, among others, that Turkey sign the 'Ankara Agreement Protocol.' Turkey did so on 29 July 2005, but with the proviso that this protocol did not entail 'any form of recognition of the Republic of Cyprus.' On 21 September, the EU adopted a 'counter-declaration.'

### ENLARGEMENT: TURKEY

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#### *Declaration by the European Community and its member states*

The declaration below by the European Community and its Member States was adopted today<sup>1</sup>, following the declaration made by Turkey upon signature on 29 July 2005 of the Ankara Agreement Protocol:

1. The European Community and its Member States acknowledge the signature by Turkey of the Additional Protocol to the Agreement establishing an Association between the European Community and its Member States on the one part and Turkey on the other, in accordance with the conclusions of the European Council of December 2004. They regret that Turkey felt it necessary to make a declaration regarding the Republic of Cyprus at the time of signature.
2. The European Community and its Member States make clear that this declaration by Turkey is unilateral, does not form part of the Protocol and has no legal effect on Turkey's obligations under the Protocol.
3. The European Community and its Member States expect full, non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol, and the removal of all obstacles to the free movement of goods, including restrictions on means of transport. Turkey must apply the Protocol fully to all EU Member States. The EU will monitor this closely and evaluate full implementation in 2006. The European Community and its Member States stress that the opening of negotiations on the relevant chapters depends on Turkey's implementation of its contractual obligations to all Member States. Failure to implement its obligations in full will affect the overall progress in the negotiations.

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1. By written procedure



4. The European Community and its Member States recall that the Republic of Cyprus became a Member State of the European Union on 1st May 2004. They underline that they recognise only the Republic of Cyprus as a subject of international law.
5. Recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process. Accordingly, the EU underlines the importance it attaches to the normalisation of relations between Turkey and all EU Member States, as soon as possible.
6. The Council will ensure a follow-up on the progress made on all these issues in 2006.
7. In the context of this declaration, the European Community and its Member States agree on the importance of supporting the efforts of the UN Secretary General to bring about a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem in line with relevant UNSCRs and the principles on which the EU is founded, and that a just and lasting settlement will contribute to peace, stability and harmonious relations in the region.’

## **ANNEXE – DECLARATION BY TURKEY ON CYPRUS (29 JULY 2005)**

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1. Turkey remains committed to finding a political settlement of the Cyprus issue and has clearly demonstrated its resolve in this regard. Accordingly, Turkey will continue to support the efforts of the UN Secretary-General towards achieving a comprehensive settlement which will lead to the establishment of a new bi-zonal partnership State. A just and lasting settlement would greatly contribute to peace, stability and harmonious relations in the region.
2. The Republic of Cyprus referred to in the Protocol is not the original partnership State established in 1960.
3. Turkey will thus continue to regard the Greek Cypriot authorities as exercising authority, control and jurisdiction only in the territory south of the buffer zone, as is currently the case, and as not representing the Turkish Cypriot people and will treat the acts performed by them accordingly.
4. Turkey declares that signature, ratification and implementation of this Protocol neither amount to any form of recognition of the Republic of Cyprus referred to in the Protocol; nor prejudice Turkey's rights and obligations emanating from the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance, and the Treaty of Establishment of 1960.
5. Turkey reaffirms that its existing relationship with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus remains unchanged by becoming a party to the Protocol.
6. Pending a comprehensive settlement, the position of Turkey on Cyprus will remain unchanged. Turkey expresses its readiness to establish relations with the new partnership State which will emerge following a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus.

# Annual conference of the European Union Institute for Security Studies

Paris, 25-26 September 2005

## DISCOURS DE JAVIER SOLANA

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Mesdames, Messieurs, chers amis,

Nul besoin de vous dire la joie de vous retrouver cette année. Désormais, en septembre, après le rendez-vous « diplomatique » new-yorkais de l'Assemblée générale, il y a le rendez-vous « stratégique » parisien de l'Institut. Et j'en remercie très chaleureusement Nicole Gnesotto.

Le moment aujourd'hui est particulier. Différent de ce que nous aurions pu espérer. C'est un fait.

Beaucoup d'encre a coulé. Beaucoup d'analyses ont été développées sur les raisons profondes des « non » aux référenda en France et aux Pays-Bas. Je ne vais pas m'attarder là-dessus. Mais – vous vous en doutez – je regrette cette impasse institutionnelle. Ne serait-ce que parce que l'Europe que nous connaissons n'est pas celle du Traité de Rome. Le pacte fondateur qui unissait les Européens depuis 1957 devait être consolidé. Des solutions s'imposaient. Deux Etats membres les ont écartées pour l'instant.

Au-delà de ces consultations référendaires, le financement de l'élargissement a rendu plus ardu le débat sur les perspectives financières de l'Union européenne. Le climat politique s'est fait moins serein.

Les difficultés de la croissance économique en Europe n'y sont pas étrangères. Et ces mêmes difficultés d'alimenter à leur tour les interrogations des opinions sur le bien-fondé de l'élargissement.

Sommes-nous à nouveau en crise ?

Permettez-moi de ne pas rentrer dans le rang. De ne pas céder à l'autodénigrement.

L'Europe n'a pas des perspectives de croissance à deux chiffres. Bien sûr : elle reste au tout premier rang des zones de la planète les plus prospères ! La vie n'y est pas toujours facile pour tous, mais elle y est en tout cas plus facile pour tous que nulle part ailleurs dans le monde ! De ce point de vue, le vœu des pères fondateurs a été réalisé.

L'élargissement a un coût. Economique et politique. C'est évident. Mais il reste notre plus formidable réalisation stratégique. En termes de développement économique : les entreprises des 15 ne cessent d'applaudir à l'élargissement à 25. Et en termes de stabilisation politique : la chute du Mur de Berlin aurait-elle eu la même fin heureuse sans la perspective de l'élargissement ?

Je veux le répéter inlassablement : l'Europe est le modèle le plus abouti et le plus vaste d'intégration politique fondé sur le droit et les libertés ; l'Europe est le premier four-

nisseur d'aide au monde; elle en est aussi la première puissance commerciale. Voilà de quoi être respecté, sollicité et écouté par nos partenaires!

J'en viens à la question particulière du Traité constitutionnel. Il ne m'appartient pas de vous dire pourquoi Français et Hollandais ont voté de la même manière pour des raisons différentes. Ce n'est pas mon rôle de spéculer ni sur cela, ni sur les étapes à suivre maintenant.

Ce que je peux vous dire en revanche, c'est que les problèmes pour lesquels la Constitution proposaient des solutions et des outils, demeurent, y compris dans le domaine de l'action extérieure.

Les exigences de cohérence entre les instruments politiques, économiques et militaires, les exigences d'une représentation plus efficace de l'Union, les exigences de professionnalisme dans l'action diplomatique, n'ont pas faibli. Loin de là.

Le monde devient moins sûr. Or il ne nous laisse pas le temps de songer à transformer éventuellement nos mentalités ou d'envisager de renoncer progressivement à nos égoïsmes nationaux. Nous n'avons plus le temps de ne pas être audacieux. Nous n'avons plus le temps de manquer de souffle et d'idées.

Les questions pressantes d'un monde exigeant restent là – et bien là. En même temps, aucun problème n'est à la mesure d'un seul acteur. Plus que jamais, cette déclaration contenue dans la Stratégie de Sécurité de l'Union européenne reste valide. Plus que jamais les Européens doivent poursuivre la mutualisation de leurs compétences et de leurs ressources amorcée depuis 1999.

Je vais même plus loin : je suis personnellement convaincu que la Politique étrangère et de Sécurité commune (PESC) a son rôle à jouer dans la reconquête des opinions publiques en faveur du projet européen.

L'action internationale de l'Union peut maintenant avoir une influence positive sur la dynamique intérieure de l'Europe, sur les perceptions des citoyens, sur leur ambition de construire ensemble, sur leurs inquiétudes également. C'est ce que j'appellerai la légitimation par l'action. Même quand le débat d'idées nous sépare, la poursuite de nos intérêts, l'affirmation de nos valeurs nous rassemble.

Pourquoi? Le simple bon sens impose à lui seul deux réponses directement liées aux débats actuels :

- oui, la croissance et la prospérité de l'Union sont aussi fonction de la stabilité que l'Union est capable d'assurer à sa périphérie et plus loin, si besoin avec ses partenaires;
- oui, la sécurité intérieure des citoyens est directement liée au niveau d'engagement de l'Union. Engagement dans la règlement de conflits qui nourrissent la folie terroriste ou tout autre type de menaces. Mais aussi engagement pour lutter contre la pauvreté ou les nouvelles pandémies, protéger l'environnement.

Au-delà, le potentiel d'entraînement de la PESC tient également aux acquis indubitables de ces dernières années. Or ces acquis, personne ne songe à les remettre en cause.

L'Union dispose maintenant de structures et de procédures permettant de préparer et de mettre en œuvre des décisions en temps réel. A force d'opérations et de missions, les Européens ont acquis des réflexes et une expérience solides. Sans l'expérience des missions en ex-Yougoslavie, en Géorgie, au Proche-Orient (je songe à la mission EU COPPS – European Union Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support – en Palestine), la dimension civile de la Politique européenne de Sécurité et Défense (PESD) n'aurait pas les développements que l'on connaît. Le succès des premières opérations militaires, autonomes comme Artémis en 2003, ou en liaison avec l'OTAN comme en Bosnie, ouvrent la voie à de nouvelles opérations toujours plus ambitieuses. Aujourd'hui la mission à Aceh ouvre la perspective à une politique nouvelle en Asie. Et ainsi de suite.

Deuxième acquis : une capacité de gestion de crise unique. Ni purement civile, ni purement militaire, mais simplement globale. Tout n'est pas encore parfait. Mais là encore sachons agir avec pragmatisme.

Troisième acquis: une doctrine. Ni plus, ni moins. C'est-à-dire une certaine vision du monde fondée sur des intérêts communs et la volonté de les défendre, en bonne intelligence avec chacun de nos partenaires. Tel est le sens de la Stratégie de sécurité mise au point en 2003.

So, let us draw strength and self-confidence from what we have accomplished in recent years. For we have a daunting agenda in front of us.

I would like to use this encounter with Europe's strategic community to focus on three key regions: the Balkans, the Middle East and Africa which, for different reasons, deserve a closer look. Then, going beyond next year's agenda, I want to offer some reflections on the changing nature of the international system, on effective multilateralism and the need for partnerships.

2006 will be a crucial year for the Balkans. Ten years after Dayton and with a new generation of political leaders at the helm, the region has made good progress. But we still face substantive political and security challenges. The importance of continued EU engagement cannot be over-stated. More than any other region in the world, this is a European responsibility. Simply put, we cannot afford to fail.

The issue which will put the whole Balkan region at the centre of our strategic agenda is the Kosovo status process. We can expect, on the basis of Kai Eide's review of standards, that negotiations will begin later this year. To say this will be a delicate process is an understatement. Not only do Belgrade and Pristina hold diametrically opposing views. Both also lack a stable political leadership, able to take tough decisions.

When approaching the Kosovo conundrum, we should base our strategy on three fundamental points. First, it is impossible to solve the Kosovo question without considering the implications for the whole region. We need a comprehensive approach so that all the pieces of the puzzle do fit together – regionally and beyond.

The second point is that this will not be cheap. Our engagement will continue to require substantial European resources: money, people and especially an expanded com-

mitment in the area of security: in Bosnia, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and, increasingly, in Kosovo.

The third point to make is that our Balkans strategy rests on a fundamental promise. Provided the countries of the region advance on the path of internal reform and regional reconciliation, we said that we would assist them to their ultimate destination: entry into the Union. That was the commitment we made in Thessaloniki. Croatia is now close to a major leap forward in this respect, but we need the rest of the region to follow suit. Both with respect to Kosovo and in its own right, we need to ensure that Belgrade advances on the European track. The same is true for former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania and Bosnia – despite the stalemate there over police reform.

Maintaining the European membership perspective is the only way we will have real leverage over local leaders so that they take the tough decisions that are needed. It is the only way to achieve the stabilisation and integration of this region, in which we have such an enormous political and moral stake.

Let me turn now to the Middle East. Together with the Balkans, this is the theatre where we will have to be more engaged next year – both diplomatically and on the ground. The key task is to seize the opportunity that Gaza disengagement represents; make a maximum effort to ensure its success; and use it as a springboard for a return to political negotiations and the implementation of the Roadmap.

The stakes are high. The leadership on both sides is under serious pressure. Both sides need Gaza disengagement to work, with important elections looming next year, and so do we.

For the Palestinians this is a chance to win over the sceptics, in Israel and elsewhere, that they can actually run their own affairs in a responsible manner. If they rise to the occasion, it could provide them with the much-needed hope and reassurance that they are on their way to full statehood across the occupied territories.

For Israel, the logical priority is to ensure that Gaza will not become hostile territory from which terrorists launch attacks on neighbouring communities and the rest of Israel. Events in the last few days and hours have reminded us that this will not be easy.

And for us Europeans, this is a chance to show that we are ready, not just to offer political support, but to commit resources and take political risks to make progress in this most intractable conflict.

As you know, the EU and its member-states have long been the largest donor to the Palestinians, giving both €500 million annually in emergency support and medium-term assistance to institution building projects. There is also special money for the disengagement process.

But we are offering more than money. We are also assisting the Palestinians in the area of police and security reform. Through training, equipment and financial support, the EU and the member-states are helping Palestinian police forces to increase their operational capacity and transform their organisational set up. A core unit of EU advisers is already deployed in Ramallah and Gaza city. Plans are underway to turn this EU COPPS

mission into a formal European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission by January.

These steps, all of which are co-ordinated closely with the US and others in the Quartet, present tangible evidence that the EU does not just say it wants disengagement to succeed: we are prepared to step up our engagement to make that happen. That is the best way to promote the ideas we have for the peace process beyond Gaza. And it is fully in line with the broader vision I have for the EU's international stance: engaged and result-oriented.

Africa is the third region I'd like to touch on. It is striking how the threats identified in the Security Strategy – terrorism, failed states, organised crime, proliferation and regional conflicts – all manifest themselves in Africa. More than that, we can see how these different threats are all inter-connected. Africa therefore is a textbook example of why we need comprehensive strategies – and why we need a better output of our policy mix of trade, aid and security measures.

Let us start with the security element. We all know that endemic insecurity is the main reason why parts of Africa are going backwards. Overall, the number of wars in Africa is going down. But for many Africans, their daily existence is characterised by warlords, militias and rebel groups. Conflict always hurts the vulnerable and it remains the biggest obstacle for development. More than that: functioning politics is a precondition for development.

With insecurity widespread, it is no surprise that our traditional development policy has so far failed to make a decisive impact. Our moral engagement with Africa is not in doubt. Still, some figures illustrate the scale and urgency of the problem. Over the last 50 years, sub-Saharan Africa has received more than \$1 trillion in aid, or more than \$5,000 dollars in today's terms for every man, woman and child on the continent. And yet today many African countries are poorer than they were 50 years ago.

Africans want and deserve a better deal. At the December European Council we should adopt a new strategy for Africa. I would like us to use that opportunity to frame a new paradigm. Let us develop more creative strategies for conflict prevention, crisis management, good governance, trade promotion and human rights protection. Let us make a reality of our oft-stated aim of policy coherence. Only then will we have the conditions in place for a long-term development strategy to work.

The current WTO Round is a good way to illustrate what I have in mind. Let us remember that it is called the Doha Development Round. Its basic rationale is to enable developing countries, notably in Africa, to integrate into the global economy. Doing so should enable them to reap the benefits of increased trade, investment and the use of new technologies. That in turn will help to break the cycle of poverty, war and disease. But there is also another side to it. If we integrate our development and security prisms, we will also begin to see a successful conclusion of the Doha Round not just as an economic or political issue, but also as a security imperative.

In practice, we are getting better at removing the Chinese walls between different policy communities. The African Peace Facility of €250 million, paid out of the European

Development Fund, is a good example. Operationally, we are getting better too at building security capacity at regional and local levels. This is what we are doing in the Democratic Republic of Congo with EU SEC (on security sector reform) and EU POL (on police). And it is what we are trying to do with the African Union in Sudan, despite the well-known difficulties. But we cannot be satisfied with the impact we are making today. We still need to be more creative and push the policy integration further. If we do, we could make a real difference.

Finally, let me end with some more conceptual observations. Being a group of strategic analysts, I imagine that you would also like me to offer some reflections on the concept that lies at the core of our common doctrine: effective multilateralism.

I am pleased that in the global market of political ideas, the concept of effective multilateralism has been a great success. But if we are honest, we must admit that it is sometimes proving a hard sell in practice. The threats identified in the European Security Strategy are steadily becoming more acute. At the same time, the capacity of the international system to address these risks is falling behind. The world is not necessarily becoming more dangerous. But it is becoming more complex and insecure – and harder to manage.

If I look at the world, I am struck by 2 paradoxes:

Paradox 1: the intellectual strength and attractiveness of the West – of open markets, human rights and constitutional democracy – is assured. But our relative political influence is weakening, while our physical vulnerability is increasing. Paradox 2: the need for collective international action to tackle globalised insecurity is widely accepted, including by the second Bush administration. But such collective action is hard to organise in practice – and especially at the speed in which solutions are needed in today's world.

We have what analysts call the multilateral system, of international organisations including the UN, the WTO and NATO and international regimes, on non-proliferation or the environment. That system is struggling in a less auspicious climate. It is struggling in terms of effectiveness, legitimacy and relevance. There are some worrying indications: the failure of the NPT review conference in May; the limited scope of the UN reform package; the stalemate inside the WTO; the poor prospects for a post-Kyoto deal on global warming.

For good reasons we Europeans see multilateralism as more than 'just a method'. For us, it is a way of ensuring a sense of international order, of building trust, of combining effectiveness with legitimacy. It is the best manner to manage conflicts of interests and, more than that, prevent them from emerging in first place. As Einstein said: intellectuals solve problems, geniuses prevent them.

But the international system is changing and 'democratising', with new powers from the developing world emerging. This is mostly beneficial – and unavoidable anyway. But there is a cost: the multilateralism which Europeans grew up with, is gradually disappearing. With multilateral action blocked, or at least slower in coming, bilateralism and



ad hoc alliances are proliferating. Such initiatives are often necessary and sometimes useful. But bilateralism and ad hoc groupings do not build long-term trust.

What do to? My answer is clear: we must stick to our principles and convictions. But we must acknowledge that this is a more complex world and that new players need to be brought on board. Thus we should focus on forging new 'bargains' – on development policy, on energy security or global warming.

When we push for multilateral regimes, our bona fides should not be in doubt. Perhaps we should make a greater effort to explain that our support for Kyoto and its follow-up is not about protectionism. Perhaps we should be prepared to mount a stronger defence of international humanitarian law, which sometimes looks like an endangered species. Perhaps we should attach a greater priority to unblocking the Doha Development Round, to break down the North-South divide. Saving multilateralism is about persuading others. But it is also about looking critically at our own positions.

Time is not neutral in this respect. We should realise that in 20 years time, it will be harder to convince giants like China, India and others that a rules-based international system is in their interest too. By 2020, the world's population will have reached close to 8 billion. Some 56 out of every 100 people will be Asian. Only 5 will come from western Europe and 4 from the US. The West, if we can still call it that, suddenly will look a very small place.

The second part of a European response should be to embrace and mobilise the potential of the new 'regionalism'. Everywhere, we are seeing regional organisations grow up, in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Increasingly, clubs like the African Union, ASEAN and Mercosur are trying to fill the gap between ad hoc bilateralism and 'traditional', global multilateralism. Not all regional clubs deserve our unqualified support. But on the whole, they are a force for progress. And they are natural allies for our campaign for effective multilateralism.

If so, should we do more, with political and financial incentives, to promote such regional integration? And should we stimulate regional security co-operation in regions, such as the Gulf, which are over-armed but under-institutionalised? My answer is a clear yes.

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It is time to conclude. I have given you my thoughts on the political situation of today; on our agenda for the next year; plus some wider thoughts on the geopolitical landscape of tomorrow.

Let me end where I began. With the need to avoid paralysis, to be pragmatic and result-oriented. The outside world will not wait for the EU to get its act together. And the call for the EU to act is there, every day.

We have the instruments plus a shared vision of the world. We also have significant operational experience. What we need is self-confidence, not risk avoidance. Some say that ships are safest in the harbour. But that is not where ships are supposed to be.

## General Affairs and External Relations Council

Luxembourg, 3 October 2005

(...)

### ENLARGEMENT

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#### *Turkey: negotiating framework and opening of discussions*

The Council approved a framework for negotiations with Turkey on its accession to the EU, as mandated by the European Council last December, thus enabling the negotiations to begin immediately after the meeting.

#### *Croatia: opening of negotiations – Council conclusions<sup>1</sup>*

The Council gave the go-ahead to accession negotiations with Croatia, after a ministerial task force gave a positive assessment of Croatia's cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), enabling the negotiations to begin immediately after the meeting.

It adopted the following conclusions:

'The Council recalled that in March 2005 it had confirmed that Croatia was a candidate country for accession and had agreed that a bilateral intergovernmental conference would be convened by common agreement in order to open negotiations, as soon as the Council had established that Croatia was co-operating fully with the ICTY.

The Council warmly welcomed the report to the Croatia Task Force by the ICTY Chief Prosecutor that Croatia was now co-operating fully with the ICTY, as well as the clear commitment by the Croatian Prime Minister that full co-operation would be maintained until the last remaining indictee was in The Hague, and as long as required by the ICTY. It noted the Chief Prosecutor's assessment that, if Croatia continued to work with the same resolve and intensity, she was confident that Ante Gotovina would be transferred to The Hague soon.

The Council concluded that Croatia had met the outstanding condition for the start of accession negotiations, and that negotiations should therefore begin as soon as possible.

The Council confirmed that sustaining full co-operation with the ICTY would remain a requirement for progress throughout the accession process. The Council

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1. The Council decided that these conclusions form part of the negotiating framework.

invited the Commission to continue to monitor this closely, on the basis of regular reports from the ICTY, and report to the Council if full co-operation is not maintained. The Council noted that an assessment of co-operation with the ICTY would form part of the Commission's reports to the Council on Croatia's fulfilment of the political criteria. The Council agreed that less than full co-operation with the ICTY at any stage would affect the overall progress of the negotiations and could be grounds for triggering the mechanism in paragraph 12 of the negotiating framework.'

The accession negotiations were launched immediately after the meeting.

## **IN THE MARGINS OF THE COUNCIL**

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### *Accession conference with Turkey*

A ministerial meeting opening negotiations with Turkey on its accession to the EU took place on 3 October.

### *Accession conference with Croatia*

A ministerial meeting opening negotiations with Croatia on its accession to the EU took place on 3 October.

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## **MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

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The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. The Council welcomed the successful conclusion of the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and parts of the northern West Bank. It commended Israel's armed forces and police for the smooth and professional way in which settlers were evacuated and the Palestinian Authority and people for maintaining a peaceful environment during the evacuation.
2. The Council welcomed the Quartet meeting in New York on 20 September, and fully endorsed the statement made by the Quartet at that meeting.
3. The Council welcomed disengagement as a significant step towards implementing the Roadmap. It praised the positive steps on both sides but emphasised that more remains to be done. It called for renewed action in parallel by both parties to fulfil their obliga-

tions under the Roadmap, and commitments made at Sharm el Sheikh. The Council urged contacts and co-ordination between the parties to be intensified at all levels.

4. The Council expressed its concern at the renewed violence in Israel and the Occupied Territories. The Council condemned the violence perpetrated by Palestinian militants and encouraged the Palestinian Authority to continue to take firm action against those responsible and to take all necessary steps to take full control of security in the Gaza Strip. The Council emphasised that terrorist attacks damage the interests of the Palestinians and that they have dire humanitarian consequences. While recognising Israel's right to protect its citizens against terrorist attacks, the Council called on Israel to act with restraint and to refrain from all extra-judicial killings, which are contrary to international law.

5. The Council emphasised the importance of Palestinian security sector reform and of the co-ordination of international efforts in this regard. It urged the Palestinian Authority to take sustained action against individuals involved in terrorism and terrorist groups. The Council emphasised the EU's commitment to continued and enhanced support to Palestinian civil policing through the EU Co-ordination Office for Palestinian Police Support. The Council welcomed the agreement between Israel and Egypt on security arrangements along the Gaza/Egypt border.

6. The Council expressed its grave concern about the ongoing expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the continuing construction of the separation barrier in occupied Palestinian territory. These activities form an obstacle to peace and threaten to make any solution based on the coexistence of two states physically impossible. The Council urged Israel to stop settlement expansion and to remove unauthorised outposts. The Council reiterated that, while recognising Israel's right to protect its citizens, the construction of the separation barrier in the occupied Palestinian territory is contrary to international law. The Council remained particularly concerned by the settlement building and the construction of the separation barrier in and around East Jerusalem, which is having a detrimental effect on the lives of Palestinians and jeopardises a final status agreement on Jerusalem.

7. The EU stands ready to help the Quartet Special Envoy for disengagement, James Wolfensohn, resolve outstanding issues on disengagement, particularly concerning the economic viability of Gaza and confidence-building at Gaza's southern border. The Council emphasised the importance of reaching an agreement on access to Gaza for people and goods through land borders, a port and airport. The Council welcomed the Commission's recently announced package for increased support for infrastructure and for the Palestinian economy. The Council further welcomed the Commission's intention to submit proposals on EU/Palestinian co-operation beyond disengagement, focussing

on institution-building and economic recovery, including support to the private sector, in particular SMEs. The Council underlined the importance of the whole international community playing a part in supporting the Palestinian Authority in taking effective control of Gaza and facilitating sustainable growth.’

## **IRAN – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

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The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘The Council welcomes and fully supports the Resolution adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on 24 September.

The Council notes that the Resolution gives Iran the opportunity, through its actions, to influence the international community’s next steps. It urges Iran to take this opportunity by implementing all the measures requested by the IAEA Board, including reinstating a full suspension of all fuel cycle activities.

The Council reaffirms the EU’s support for a diplomatic solution to international concerns over Iran’s nuclear programme, which should include an agreement on long-term arrangements. Such a solution would help create the climate for a better relationship with Europe and the international community as a whole. The EU’s preferred approach remains the resumption of negotiations within the framework agreed in Paris last November. The EU urges Iran to take the steps necessary to make this possible.’

## **WESTERN BALKANS – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

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The Council adopted the following conclusions:

### *‘Bosnia and Herzegovina*

The Council expressed its deep disappointment at the decision by the National Assembly of Republika Srpska to reject the latest proposal for police reform which met the EU principles, and regretted that it would not now be possible for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to start negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU by the 10<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Dayton Peace Agreement.

The Council reaffirmed that the European Union stands ready to open SAA negotiations with BiH as soon as possible, once the necessary conditions have been met. The Council expressed the hope that this might still be possible before the end of the year, but emphasised that a pre-requisite for this was agreement on police reform that respected the three EU principles.

The Council urged all parties involved in negotiations on police reform, in particular those representing Republika Srpska, to make renewed efforts to reach an agreement in line with EU requirements. It emphasised that the establishment of an efficient police force – free from political interference, with policing areas based on technical and professional criteria, and with exclusive state-level competence for policing – was a vital element of BiH's broader efforts to meet EU standards on the rule of law, respect for human rights and the protection of minorities.

### *Serbia and Montenegro*

The Council commended the substantial progress made by Serbia and Montenegro, which had allowed the Commission to recommend the opening of negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement. On this basis, and mindful of the forthcoming anniversary of the democratic uprising in October 2000, the Council authorised the Commission to open negotiations at the earliest opportunity.

The opening of negotiations marks the first important step towards the establishment of contractual relations between the EU and Serbia and Montenegro. It demonstrates the EU's commitment to the full implementation of the Thessaloniki agenda, which emphasised that the future of the Western Balkans lies in the EU.

The Council recalled that the speed with which Serbia and Montenegro moves closer to the EU will depend on how quickly it adopts and implements the necessary reforms and conforms to the Copenhagen criteria and requirements of the Stabilisation and Association process. The Council judged that the pace and conclusion of negotiations would depend in particular on Serbia and Montenegro's progress in developing its legislative framework and administrative capacity, the effective implementation of the constitutional charter, and full co-operation with the ICTY. The Council and Commission will jointly review Serbia and Montenegro's performance in these areas before negotiations conclude.

Recalling UN Security Council resolutions 1503 and 1534, the Council emphasised its expectation that Serbia and Montenegro will now take decisive action to ensure that all fugitive indictees, notably Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, are finally brought to justice. Full cooperation with the ICTY is essential to achieve lasting reconciliation in the region and lift a fundamental obstacle to EU integration.

The Council encouraged the authorities of the state union of Serbia and Montenegro and its republics to build on the dynamic provided by the opening of negotiations to pursue with commitment their shared reform agenda, and thereby realise the country's full potential. The Council underlined that a stable and prosperous Serbia and Montenegro is vital to the future of the region. The Council reaffirmed the EU's continuing readiness to support Serbia and Montenegro in achieving its ambitions of moving closer to the EU.'

**Serbia and Montenegro – Stabilisation and association process**

The Council adopted a decision authorising the Commission to negotiate a stabilisation and association agreement with Serbia and Montenegro.

The Council and the Commission will jointly review, before the end of the negotiations, the progress made by Serbia and Montenegro in the following areas:

- ▶ development of its legislative framework and administrative capacity so as to allow for proper implementation of the agreement;
- ▶ implementation of the constitutional charter of the state union of Serbia and Montenegro;
- ▶ co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

## ANNEXE – NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK FOR TURKEY

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### *Principles governing the negotiations*

1. The negotiations will be based on Turkey's own merits and the pace will depend on Turkey's progress in meeting the requirements for membership. The Presidency or the Commission as appropriate will keep the Council fully informed so that the Council can keep the situation under regular review. The Union side, for its part, will decide in due course whether the conditions for the conclusion of negotiations have been met; this will be done on the basis of a report from the Commission confirming the fulfilment by Turkey of the requirements listed in point 6.
2. As agreed at the European Council in December 2004, these negotiations are based on Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union. The shared objective of the negotiations is accession. These negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand. While having full regard to all Copenhagen criteria, including the absorption capacity of the Union, if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond.
3. Enlargement should strengthen the process of continuous creation and integration in which the Union and its Member States are engaged. Every effort should be made to protect the cohesion and effectiveness of the Union. In accordance with the conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, the Union's capacity to absorb Turkey, while maintaining the momentum of European integration is an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and Turkey. The Commission shall monitor this capacity during the negotiations, encompassing the whole range of issues set out in its October 2004 paper on issues arising from Turkey's membership perspective, in order to inform an assessment by the Council as to whether this condition of membership has been met.
4. Negotiations are opened on the basis that Turkey sufficiently meets the political criteria set by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, for the most part later enshrined in Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union and proclaimed in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Union expects Turkey to sustain the process of reform and to work towards further improvement in the respect of the principles of liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including relevant European case law; to consolidate and broaden legislation and implementation measures specifically in relation to the zero tolerance policy in the fight against torture and ill-treatment and the implementation of provisions relating to freedom of expression, freedom of religion, women's rights, ILO standards including trade union rights,



and minority rights. The Union and Turkey will continue their intensive political dialogue. To ensure the irreversibility of progress in these areas and its full and effective implementation, notably with regard to fundamental freedoms and to full respect of human rights, progress will continue to be closely monitored by the Commission, which is invited to continue to report regularly on it to the Council, addressing all points of concern identified in the Commission's 2004 report and recommendation as well as its annual regular report.

5. In the case of a serious and persistent breach in Turkey of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law on which the Union is founded, the Commission will, on its own initiative or on the request of one third of the Member States, recommend the suspension of negotiations and propose the conditions for eventual resumption. The Council will decide by qualified majority on such a recommendation, after having heard Turkey, whether to suspend the negotiations and on the conditions for their resumption. The Member States will act in the Intergovernmental Conference in accordance with the Council decision, without prejudice to the general requirement for unanimity in the Intergovernmental Conference. The European Parliament will be informed.

6. The advancement of the negotiations will be guided by Turkey's progress in preparing for accession, within a framework of economic and social convergence and with reference to the Commission's reports in paragraph 2. This progress will be measured in particular against the following requirements:

- ▶ the Copenhagen criteria, which set down the following requirements for membership:
  - ▶ the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
  - ▶ the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;
  - ▶ the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union and the administrative capacity to effectively apply and implement the *acquis*;
- ▶ Turkey's unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations and its undertaking to resolve any outstanding border disputes in conformity with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter, including if necessary jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice;
- ▶ Turkey's continued support for efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework and in line with the principles on which the Union is founded, including steps to contribute to a favourable climate for a comprehensive settlement, and progress in the normalisation of bilateral relations between Turkey and all EU Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus.

- ▶ the fulfilment of Turkey's obligations under the Association Agreement and its Additional Protocol extending the Association Agreement to all new EU Member States, in particular those pertaining to the EU- Turkey customs union, as well as the implementation of the Accession Partnership, as regularly revised.
7. In the period up to accession, Turkey will be required to progressively align its policies towards third countries and its positions within international organisations (including in relation to the membership by all EU Member States of those organisations and arrangements) with the policies and positions adopted by the Union and its Member States.
8. Parallel to accession negotiations, the Union will engage with Turkey in an intensive political and civil society dialogue. The aim of the inclusive civil society dialogue will be to enhance mutual understanding by bringing people together in particular with a view to ensuring the support of European citizens for the accession process.
9. Turkey must accept the results of any other accession negotiations as they stand at the moment of its accession.

### *Substance of the negotiations*

10. Accession implies the acceptance of the rights and obligations attached to the Union system and its institutional framework, known as the *acquis* of the Union. Turkey will have to apply this as it stands at the time of accession. Furthermore, in addition to legislative alignment, accession implies timely and effective implementation of the *acquis*. The *acquis* is constantly evolving and includes:

- ▶ the content, principles and political objectives of the Treaties on which the Union is founded;
- ▶ legislation and decisions adopted pursuant to the Treaties, and the case law of the Court of Justice;
- ▶ other acts, legally binding or not, adopted within the Union framework, such as interinstitutional agreements, resolutions, statements, recommendations, guidelines;
- ▶ joint actions, common positions, declarations, conclusions and other acts within the framework of the common foreign and security policy;
- ▶ joint actions, joint positions, conventions signed, resolutions, statements and other acts agreed within the framework of justice and home affairs;
- ▶ international agreements concluded by the Communities, the Communities jointly with their Member States, the Union, and those concluded by the Member States among themselves with regard to Union activities.

Turkey will need to produce translations of the *acquis* into Turkish in good time

before accession, and will need to train a sufficient number of translators and interpreters required for the proper functioning of the EU institutions upon its accession.

11. The resulting rights and obligations, all of which Turkey will have to honour as a Member State, imply the termination of all existing bilateral agreements between Turkey and the Communities, and of all other international agreements concluded by Turkey which are incompatible with the obligations of membership. Any provisions of the Association Agreement which depart from the *acquis* cannot be considered as precedents in the accession negotiations.

12. Turkey's acceptance of the rights and obligations arising from the *acquis* may necessitate specific adaptations to the *acquis* and may, exceptionally, give rise to transitional measures which must be defined during the accession negotiations.

Where necessary, specific adaptations to the *acquis* will be agreed on the basis of the principles, criteria and parameters inherent in that *acquis* as applied by the Member States when adopting that *acquis*, and taking into consideration the specificities of Turkey.

The Union may agree to requests from Turkey for transitional measures provided they are limited in time and scope, and accompanied by a plan with clearly defined stages for application of the *acquis*. For areas linked to the extension of the internal market, regulatory measures should be implemented quickly and transition periods should be short and few; where considerable adaptations are necessary requiring substantial effort including large financial outlays, appropriate transitional arrangements can be envisaged as part of an on-going, detailed and budgeted plan for alignment. In any case, transitional arrangements must not involve amendments to the rules or policies of the Union, disrupt their proper functioning, or lead to significant distortions of competition. In this connection, account must be taken of the interests of the Union and of Turkey.

Long transitional periods, derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses, i.e. clauses which are permanently available as a basis for safeguard measures, may be considered. The Commission will include these, as appropriate, in its proposals in areas such as freedom of movement of persons, structural policies or agriculture. Furthermore, the decision-taking process regarding the eventual establishment of freedom of movement of persons should allow for a maximum role of individual Member States. Transitional arrangements or safeguards should be reviewed regarding their impact on competition or the functioning of the internal market.

Detailed technical adaptations to the *acquis* will not need to be fixed during the accession negotiations. They will be prepared in cooperation with Turkey and adopted by the Union institutions in good time with a view to their entry into force on the date of accession.

13. The financial aspects of the accession of Turkey must be allowed for in the applicable Financial Framework. Hence, as Turkey's accession could have substantial financial consequences, the negotiations can only be concluded after the establishment of the Financial Framework for the period from 2014 together with possible consequential financial reforms. Any arrangements should ensure that the financial burdens are fairly shared between all Member States.

14. Turkey will participate in economic and monetary union from accession as a Member State with a derogation and shall adopt the euro as its national currency following a Council decision to this effect on the basis of an evaluation of its fulfilment of the necessary conditions. The remaining *acquis* in this area fully applies from accession.

15. With regard to the area of freedom, justice and security, membership of the European Union implies that Turkey accepts in full on accession the entire *acquis* in this area, including the Schengen *acquis*. However, part of this *acquis* will only apply in Turkey following a Council decision to lift controls on persons at internal borders taken on the basis of the applicable Schengen evaluation of Turkey readiness.

16. The EU points out the importance of a high level of environmental protection, including all aspects of nuclear safety.

17. In all areas of the *acquis*, Turkey must bring its institutions, management capacity and administrative and judicial systems up to Union standards, both at national and regional level, with a view to implementing the *acquis* effectively or, as the case may be, being able to implement it effectively in good time before accession. At the general level, this requires a well-functioning and stable public administration built on an efficient and impartial civil service, and an independent and efficient judicial system.

## **NEGOTIATING PROCEDURES**

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18. The substance of negotiations will be conducted in an Intergovernmental Conference with the participation of all Member States on the one hand and the candidate State on the other.

19. The Commission will undertake a formal process of examination of the *acquis*, called screening, in order to explain it to the Turkish authorities, to assess the state of preparation of Turkey for opening negotiations in specific areas and to obtain preliminary indications of the issues that will most likely come up in the negotiations.

20. For the purposes of screening and the subsequent negotiations, the *acquis* will be

broken down into a number of chapters, each covering a specific policy area. A list of these chapters is provided in the Annex. Any view expressed by either Turkey or the EU on a specific chapter of the negotiations will in no way prejudice the position which may be taken on other chapters. Also, agreements reached in the course of negotiations on specific chapters, even partial ones, may not be considered as final until an overall agreement has been reached for all chapters.

21. Building on the Commission's Regular Reports on Turkey's progress towards accession and in particular on information obtained by the Commission during screening, the Council, acting by unanimity on a proposal by the Commission, will lay down benchmarks for the provisional closure and, where appropriate, for the opening of each chapter. The Union will communicate such benchmarks to Turkey. Depending on the chapter, precise benchmarks will refer in particular to the existence of a functioning market economy, to legislative alignment with the *acquis* and to a satisfactory track record in implementation of key elements of the *acquis* demonstrating the existence of an adequate administrative and judicial capacity. Where relevant, benchmarks will also include the fulfilment of commitments under the Association Agreement, in particular those pertaining to the EU- Turkey customs union and those that mirror requirements under the *acquis*. Where negotiations cover a considerable period of time, or where a chapter is revisited at a later date to incorporate new elements such as new *acquis*, the existing benchmarks may be updated.

22. Turkey will be requested to indicate its position in relation to the *acquis* and to report on its progress in meeting the benchmarks. Turkey's correct transposition and implementation of the *acquis*, including effective and efficient application through appropriate administrative and judicial structures, will determine the pace of negotiations.

23. To this end, the Commission will closely monitor Turkey's progress in all areas, making use of all available instruments, including on-site expert reviews by or on behalf of the Commission. The Commission will inform the Council of Turkey's progress in any given area when presenting draft EU Common Positions. The Council will take this assessment into account when deciding on further steps relating to the negotiations on that chapter. In addition to the information the EU may require for the negotiations on each chapter and which is to be provided by Turkey to the Conference, Turkey will be required to continue to provide regularly detailed, written information on progress in the alignment with and implementation of the *acquis*, even after provisional closure of a chapter. In the case of provisionally closed chapters, the Commission may recommend the re-opening of negotiations, in particular where Turkey has failed to meet important benchmarks or to implement its commitments.

(...)

## Speech by Javier Solana at the 40<sup>th</sup> Commanders Conference of the German Bundeswehr

Bonn, 11 October 2005

Mr President,  
Minister Struck,  
General Schneiderhahn,  
Dear Generals,  
Dear friends,

I am delighted to be able to be with you this morning and mark this occasion full of historic significance. Today we are celebrating three anniversaries: the foundation of the Bundeswehr and your entry into NATO 50 years ago and the 15th anniversary of German unification.

I want to pay tribute to Germany's enormous contribution to European security and stability over these years, through your active participation in both NATO and the European Union. I remember well from my time as Secretary-General of NATO, how Germany played a crucial role in the many crucial decisions that we took over that period: NATO enlargement, the NATO-Russia founding act, the Partnership for Peace – and the very first calls to act militarily, in Bosnia and, later, over Kosovo.

For a long time Germany represented what some call the *Verdichtung Europas*. It is a good term to express how all characteristics and developments, good and bad, that typified Europe could be found in a condensed way in Germany, or even in a single city: Berlin. The German people had to wait a long time before their goal of national unity was realised. It was Richard von Weizsäcker who, as German President, coined the apt phrase that the German question would remain open as long as Brandenburger Gate was closed.

Ending the forced separation of Germans from Germans was a triumph but also a call to duty. You have worked hard on integrating the Eastern Länder and two different societies into one democratic state. You have likewise taken up the challenge of integrating the armed forces of two former adversaries into one service, firmly anchored in NATO and the EU.

Since unification and with the enlargement of both the EU and NATO, Germany has moved from Europe's frontline to its centre. With that position comes responsibility. It is Germany's strategic role and obligation to promote the unity, security and stability of the whole of Europe as much as it is to serve the cause of security and justice around the world.

I would like to talk this morning about the EU's growing stature as a global security actor, and Germany's role in it.

Since the mid-1990s, the European Union has made massive progress in framing and implementing an increasingly credible foreign policy. Since 1999, we have also made

huge strides in developing a comprehensive capacity for crisis management. These two developments have slightly off-putting labels: CFSP and ESDP (As you know, nothing in the EU, nor in NATO for that matter, happens without an acronym).

But while the label may be uninspiring, the content is. Foreign and defence policy is probably the area where the Union has advanced most in recent years. And such progress is all the more relevant as it takes place in a fast-moving environment which has altered the very nature of international security.

Our work on CFSP and ESDP has been driven by two fundamental factors. First, they complement the original purpose of EU, which was to put an end to war in Europe through integration. Europe, as Germans know well, experienced the horrors of the 20<sup>th</sup> century to a degree unmatched anywhere else. It was no surprise that after 1945 an exhausted continent was ready to try a radical new idea: building a zone of peace through institutional integration and the voluntary pooling of sovereignty. What was a surprise, even to the founding fathers, was how successful this project has turned out.

The watchwords of this European journey have been simple: deepening, widening and reform. Each element depended on the other for success – and still does today. From coal and steel, via atomic energy to the single market, Schengen, the euro and defence. From six, to nine, twelve, fifteen, now twenty-five and soon twenty-seven. We have come a long way and achieved a great deal. It is worth saying so, especially in this period of uncertainty.

Originally, foreign and security policy was deliberately excluded from the remit of the European Community. These were tasks for nation-states individually. For those countries that were members, NATO enshrined the primacy of the transatlantic link. But through the years, and sometimes through the hard school of failure, we learned that Europe had to take on a more active role in the area of security. That was also the consistent message from our American friends.

With war breaking out in the Balkans on our doorstep, we realised that we could not remain an island of tranquillity in a sea of instability. In particular, we learned that different foreign policies among European states could be a source for conflicts.

The Balkan dramas proved that there is a high price to pay for hesitation and internal political divisions. They drove home the message that diplomacy with nationalist extremists is of little use if not backed up by robust crisis management capabilities – and the determination to use them. In short, if you want a credible EU foreign policy, you need a credible defence policy too. And that is what we have been building up since 1999.

The second reason for CFSP and ESDP is a more familiar one: if you act together you can have more influence. For what is each of us, acting alone, capable of achieving? Divisions among Europeans all too often translate into strategic irrelevance. We can already see the contours of an emerging international order where new powers such as China, India and others will play leading roles. Time is not neutral. Unless we Europeans club together, future historians may conclude that, at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Europe's moment came and went.

In the past five years, we have developed what we lacked and needed: a set of civilian and military capabilities; new structures and decision-making mechanisms; plus the experience of joint operations and exercises. As a result, the EU is now in a position to play a role that matches its responsibilities.

In particular, there has been progress in three key areas: doctrine, operations and capabilities. I'd like to touch briefly on each of these three.

We Europeans share interests and values. But we also have a strategic outlook in common. In recent years, we have developed a sense of EU doctrine. In the European Security Strategy, our strategic identity card if you like, we have set out how we look at world, what our objectives are and how we intend to achieve them. The scarlet threads running through the Security Strategy are effective multilateralism, the need for partnerships and a comprehensive approach to promoting security.

For the EU, the defence component has always been part of a broad approach to confronting insecurity and managing crises. This stance fits with the new strategic environment. These days, the biggest threats often arise from frail or failing states and from non-state actors, such as terrorist networks, criminal gangs or Janjaweed-style militias. We have moved beyond clearly demarcated front-lines, with armies facing each other. Instead people are at risk everywhere, including in our own city centres. Of course this is a world of great opportunities for increased freedom and prosperity. But it is also one of unpredictable perils.

Dealing with this dynamic security environment has required a paradigm shift. Because the new threats are diffuse and complex, they defy traditional ways of operating. They call for agile and multi-faceted responses. In principle, the EU has it all. A wide panoply of instruments: from trade, aid, visa bans, diplomacy to civil and military crisis management tools. But also an acute awareness of the need to act plus the staying power to remain engaged for the long-term. More than other actors, the EU can bridge the worlds of diplomats, soldiers and development experts. But we have to deliver on our potential. We must ensure coherence across policy areas and over time.

In the Balkans and elsewhere, we have learned that there is no simple sequencing of military first and civilians later. The strictly military phase of crisis management is never as short as one thinks or hopes. And the stabilisation and reconstruction efforts are never as civilian as one wishes. Thus we need both civilian and military tools from day one. The concept of comprehensive planning is all about this civil-military interplay. It is popular these days in strategic circles, even if it is hard to put into practice. But for the EU, because of our origins, it comes relatively natural.

ESDP is all about enabling Europeans to address the new security challenges effectively. It is not about substituting NATO. We all recognise NATO's indispensable role and we all agree on the need for a complementary, not competitive, relationship between the EU and NATO.

Nor is ESDP about militarising the Union. The same principles that were the foundation of the European project still guide us today. But all of us know that to promote



peace, law, justice and democracy around the world, we need a Europe that takes its responsibilities seriously. We need a Europe that is willing and able to act.

A shared strategic outlook has been a key component of ESDP's success. But thankfully it has not been limited to that. It was also the basis for the deployment of several EU missions. At present, the EU is conducting no fewer than seven operations simultaneously, on four continents.

In the Balkans we have three missions. One is EUFOR, the EU's military mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is the most extensive and hence most important mission the EU is currently handling. In addition we have two police missions: Proxima, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and EUPM in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

We have had an autonomous mission too: Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Following its success, we decided to mount a police mission there, called EUPOL Kinshasa. We also have a second, complementary mission in Congo, called EU SEC, to assist the Congolese authorities in the area of security sector reform. Elsewhere in Africa, we are helping the African Union in Sudan/Darfur, with a large support package including financial, planning training and equipment support for AMIS II.

A relatively new element in our crisis management toolbox are our so-called 'rule of law missions'. We have just finished one in Georgia and started another in Iraq.

Finally, since mid-August we have deployed a mission in Aceh, in Indonesia, to monitor the peace agreement between Government of Indonesia and the Aceh rebel (GAM). This Aceh mission is interesting, remarkable and important at the same time. Interesting because the EU was probably the only organisation that could mount this kind of mission, at such short notice. Remarkable because it shows that something good – a peace accord ending a 30-year conflict – can come out of a catastrophe like the Tsunami. And important because it is an excellent occasion to strengthen our co-operation with ASEAN countries. The Aceh mission demonstrates, far better than any declaration could, that the EU is committed to promoting peace and stability around the world, not just in our backyard. Taken together, these missions highlight the operational value of ESDP. Surely there are more to come. For example, plans are underway to turn our support and training efforts for the Palestinian police into a formal ESDP mission by January. There is also the possibility of the EU doing more in the area of police in Kosovo. So, the days that European defence could be dismissed as all talk and no action are long gone. More importantly, these 'real world' experiences allow us to integrate the 'lessons learned' into our evolving defence planning and doctrine.

At the moment, European countries have more than 70,000 troops deployed on various peace support missions around the world, in EU and other contexts. These 70,000 men and women do a fantastic job. But they need the right tools to succeed. Through the Helsinki Headline Goal and the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP), we have been working hard to step up the modernisation of European armed forces, especially in the areas of technology, deployability and inter-operability. We have made some progress, but clearly more work remains to be done.

We need all member-states to make the right defence spending decisions to address the critical shortfalls that we have identified together. The reality is that all member-states are struggling to maintain their existing level of commitment. And no one is really keen to take on new tasks. It is striking that Europe has more than 2 million men and women in uniform. But we find it hard to deploy more than 5% of our combined forces – despite the evident need to send more troops to distant trouble spots. We all know that the way forward lies in pooling of resources, task sharing and specialisation. So little output – €180 bn per year between us – suggests we are not spending enough on our defence budgets, and certainly not on the right things.

The European Defence Agency has been set up to improve this input-output ratio. In essence, the EDA is about ensuring that we have the tools to do the job, and spend our money on the right things – what tomorrow's operations will require, not yesterday's. And it is about the member-states addressing the challenge together. The logic is operational, and it is economic. Europe's crisis management operations will be multinational, with different national contingents required to work together more closely than ever before. It does not make sense for each contingent to bring along different guns requiring different ammunition, different vehicles requiring different spare parts, and different radios which cannot talk to each other.

The EDA exists to help member-states address this challenge. It is focusing its efforts on solving critical European shortfalls, such as in Command, Control and Communications, intelligence; or strategic air reconnaissance. The scattered landscape in Europe on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles demands a collaborative effort. This week the Agency's Steering Board will launch an initiative to look for new approaches to solve the shortage of Air-to-Air Refuelling. On the European Defence and Equipment Market, Ministers are preparing a decision, hopefully to be taken by late November, to open up their nationally protected defence industries for competition on a voluntary basis.

The Defence Agency has great potential to get more capabilities for Europe's armed forces. But it will not happen by itself. The Agency will be nothing unless it enjoys the commitment and support of all participating Member States. So, it needs your ideas and your energy. It needs your willingness to move from analysis to decisions, from decisions to investment, and from investment to delivery of real capability.

I would like to end with some remarks about role of Germany and the Bundeswehr. For what is true for the Defence Agency is also true for ESDP generally. The progressive development of ESDP will be one of main projects of the EU in coming years. The call for the EU to act to is already there, every day. It can only increase.

But for ESDP to succeed, we need Germany's full support. You are of course a significant contributor to many ESDP operations. You have been with us when we launched our first autonomous mission, Artemis in the Congo. Today, just under one-sixth of EUFOR soldiers are Germans. You are also taking part in our missions in Aceh and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Moreover, Rainer Schuwirth was the very first Director-General of the EU Military Staff, where he did an outstanding job. Colonel Reinhard Linz is the first-ever EU military liaison officer to the African Union where he is contributing a lot to the EU's support efforts to the AMIS II mission. And another German, Brigadier General, Heinrich Brauss, is heading up the new Civil-Military cell. Its purpose is to maximise our core strength, that is the interplay between our different crisis management instruments right through comprehensive planning and faster decision-making.

So you have sent some of your most talented people, to our operations and to Brussels. But a great nation like Germany, conscious of its responsibility for European and international security, should always examine whether it can do more. Collective ambitions and common objectives need resources to be realised. So when we decide together that a particular EU operation or other effort is called for, I very much hope that Germany, like other member-states, will make the necessary resources available. This means money, it means equipment and it means people.

Let me conclude. For me, ESDP is a means, not an end in itself. But it has a clear rationale. There is a growing number of crises on our doorstep. We live in a world where events in faraway places affect our security and interests. And the complexity of today's threats means that only collective and comprehensive efforts will work. No country can do this on its own. Nor will a strategy relying only, or even mainly, on military tools.

All these factors point to the same conclusion: Europeans need to work together and we need a comprehensive approach to tackle threats to our security.

The EU started as a peace project. And in many ways it still is. Promoting peace and cooperative security is exactly what we are doing in the Balkans, the Middle East, in Africa and elsewhere. The EU will always favour negotiation over confrontation. But all of us also know that to secure peace and protect the vulnerable, it is sometimes necessary to intervene and, in extremis, to coerce. I want to congratulate you on 50 years of Bundeswehr and NATO membership, and 15 years of a united Germany. There is much that you can be proud of. And there is a lot more that we can achieve together.

Thank you very much.

## Informal meeting of EU defence ministers and European Defence Agency Steering Board

Lyneham, 13 October 2005

Meeting at Lyneham, the defence ministers examined military capability issues, the role of the European Defence Agency, the regional crises in which the EU is involved and the future of the ESPD. They attended a demonstration of air-to-air refuelling and decided to work together with a view to acquiring more aircraft specialised in this domain.

### REMARKS BY JAVIER SOLANA

#### *Bosnia and Herzegovina – Operation ALTHEA – EU Police Mission*

- ▶ On the way ahead concerning EUFOR/Althea and EUPM: There is need to maintain the current operational strength of EUFOR in order to continue providing deterrence. Organised crime, corruption, failings in the rule of law and governance continue to be one of the main threats to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)'s self-sustainability and progress towards the EU. It is not time to slow down our efforts in that area. We need to make the best possible use of our various instruments.
- ▶ We need in particular to reinforce the role of our EU Police Mission (EUPM) regarding the coordination of our overall effort on organised crime and commit EUPM to assisting the local authorities on counter-organised crime activities.
- ▶ EUFOR should maintain its operational strength. That means that it should be given the resources needed to execute its mission. We must, you must sustain your level of efforts for the time ahead.
- ▶ I think we all agree that EUFOR has been and continues to be a major success for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). We should thank our commanders, General Reith (operation commander) and General Leakey (force commander) for that. General Leakey will leave his command in a few weeks, I will therefore allow myself to pay him a special tribute for the outstanding job he has accomplished.

#### *Africa*

- ▶ EUFOR is our "largest" current operation, but I would like to take this opportunity to emphasize the importance I attach to the new tasks ESDP is now encompassing.
- ▶ In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), we are in the process of expanding our involvement in the security sector reform process. I would like to underline again the importance I attach to this project. We are bringing together all our instruments to

achieve our political objective. Developments funds, a police mission, a security sector mission, itself supported by flanking measures from the European Development Fund. This is what the EU is about. We need to have a success, for the DRC first and to make sure that all the efforts that have been invested in the transition process will bear fruit.

- ▶ On Sudan: I was in Khartoum and Darfur last weekend; yesterday I had an extensive discussion with AU President Konaré and AU Commissioner Djinnit. The process in Sudan is coming to a critical point. Dr Garang's death is affecting both the pace and the solidity of the southern peace process. The deterioration of the situation in Darfur risks derailing the implementation of the peace process. Without a common government position and without a united rebel agenda, prospects for early progress in the political negotiations in Abuja are slim.
- ▶ I was in El Fasher. I met with EU military and police staff in Darfur. I think they are doing a good job. The killings and the abduction of AMIS military pose however a serious challenge to the AU. It is fundamental that the AU succeeds in its mission, for Darfur, for the future of the AU and for our partnership with the AU.

### *European Defence Agency steering board*

- ▶ The European Defence Agency is only just over one year old and today was the fourth ministerial meeting of the EDA Steering Board and the eighth in all. But it is only in the last few months that the Agency has been fully staffed and has become fully operational.
- ▶ So, we have reached the end of the beginning. Now, the moment has arrived to conduct real business and to deliver. Expectations are high. This Agency has to prove that Europe can deliver the military capabilities needed for crisis management.
- ▶ There is much good work going on: for instance on capability analysis, the identification of R&T priorities and the decision to set up innovative mechanisms, such as the Code of Conduct on defence procurement.
- ▶ But that is only half an Agency. The other half is an Agency of ad hoc projects, of groups of participating Member States pooling their efforts and providing the required resources. Most likely they would operate in smaller groups, within which decisions will be made on such collaborative efforts. There, much more must be done. Particularly in Research and Technology, Europe urgently needs more and more focussed cooperation.
- ▶ Our challenge is to move beyond the phase of studies and analysis and start projects to address the military shortfalls which we have identified. In the end, it is up to the participating Member States to deliver these capabilities, but the EDA should be used extensively to assist and support you in your efforts to improve Europe's defence performance and to develop further the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base.

## FACTSHEET

### *EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation EUFOR – Althea)*

#### The parameters of the operation:

The EU launched the military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Operation ALTHEA on 2 December 2004 in a seamless transition from NATO's SFOR mission. This is the third military operation in the framework of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). (After EU Military Operation CONCORDIA in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and EU Military Operation ARTEMIS in the Democratic Republic of Congo).

The EU Force (EUFOR) comprises some 6,500 troops who operate under a robust UN Chapter VII mandate (UNSCR 1575 adopted on 22 November 2004). In addition to twenty-two EU Member States, Albania, Argentina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Romania, Switzerland and Turkey participate in the operation.

The main objectives of Operation ALTHEA are:

- First and foremost, **to maintain a safe and secure environment in BiH and to ensure continued compliance with the Dayton/Paris Agreement;**
- Also, **to support the international community's High Representative in BiH and the local authorities, inter alia in the fight against organised crime.**

In addition, EUFOR provides support to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and relevant authorities, including for the detention of persons indicted for war crimes. It also contributes to defence reform in BiH.

ALTHEA is carried out with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, on the basis agreed with NATO ("Berlin Plus"). The Operation Commander is General John REITH (UK).

ALTHEA's Force Headquarters are established in Sarajevo (Camp Butmir). The EU Force Commander is Major-General David LEAKEY (UK). Major-General Leakey will complete his term as EUFOR Commander in early December 2005. He will hand over command of EUFOR to Major-General Gian Marco CHIARINI of the Italian Army during a ceremony on 6 December.

The EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) exercises the political control and strategic direction of the operation, under the responsibility of the Council.

The common costs of Operation Althea are estimated at €71.7 million in 2005 and are paid through contributions by Member States based on GDP.

## **EUFOR is part of a broader EU policy and presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

The Thessaloniki declaration of 2003 reaffirmed the EU's determination that the future of the Western Balkans lies within the EU. Operation Althea thus reinforces the EU's political engagement, its assistance programmes and its ongoing police and monitoring missions in BiH. The Stabilisation and Association Process will help BiH make further progress towards European integration, paving its way to future accession. On 3 October 2005, EU Foreign Ministers reaffirmed the EU's readiness to open Stabilisation and Association Agreement negotiations with BiH as soon as possible, once the necessary conditions have been met. A pre-requisite for this is agreement on police reform in line with EU principles and the recent acceptance by the National Assembly of Republika Srpska of these principles has gone some way towards unlocking this process.

The EU Special Representative (EUSR) Lord Ashdown promotes overall EU political co-ordination in BiH. He is also the High Representative of the International Community under the Dayton/Paris agreement.

### **Achievements**

Deterrence and reassurance is ensured by exerting presence, visibility, robustness, and authority. EUFOR inspected and closed the Han Pijesak underground facilities, establishing its credibility and visibility from its very beginning. EUFOR has also garnered the support of the local population and is held in high regard by the local authorities.

EUFOR gives support to the EU, the international community and the local authorities. For instance, EUFOR has been conducting searches of a number of companies suspected of pursuing activities in contravention of the Dayton agreement, it has conducted actions to disrupt illegal activities by those involved in organized crime and corruption (cf. operation "Spring Clean"). It has also conducted activities against illegal logging, as well as de-mining operations and collection of weapons.

Whilst it is not a police force, EUFOR provides support to the fight against organized crime by putting pressure on networks and developing and strengthening the capacity of local police and agencies. By doing so, EUFOR helps to disrupt support to ICTY indictees and contributes to a safe and secure environment.

EUFOR has been pro-active in ensuring the integration of its efforts with those of other EU actors in theatre including the EUSR, the EUMM (EU Monitoring Mission) and the EUPM. The synergies that this holistic EU approach bring have had positive effect in helping BiH towards its European perspective.

## **EDA INITIATIVE TO FILL AIR-TO-AIR REFUELLING GAP**

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(...)

Following their meeting in the European Defence Agency's Steering Board, the Ministers of 10 Member States (Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and Belgium and Portugal) issued the following joint announcement:

'Initiatives to build European air-to-air refuelling capabilities, whether in NATO or the EU, have not made the necessary progress in recent years, despite the efforts of some individual EU Member States. ESDP's new Headline Goal 2010, like the Helsinki Headline Goal before it, will fall short unless we can find a new approach to filling this key capability gap. At Javier Solana's initiative, therefore, we reviewed current air to air refuelling national capability plans. As a result of our discussion, we have decided to instruct our national staffs to work together, in an EDA-supported ad hoc group, to monitor current developments and consider possible new approaches to filling the capability gap.'



## General Affairs and External Relations Council

Brussels, 7 November 2005

(...)

### **EU SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

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The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘The Council recalled the European Security Strategy and reviewed the EU’s support for international peace and security in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and noted the important contribution that community programmes make to these objectives.

#### *Middle East Peace Process*

The Council recalled its commitment to support the Palestinian Authority in taking responsibility for law and order and, in particular, in improving its civil police and law enforcement capacity. In this context the Council decided to launch a Civilian ESDP Police Mission to the Palestinian Territories to build on the work of the EU Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EU COPPS). This mission will support the Palestinian Authority in establishing sustainable and effective policing arrangements. The new mission, which will have a three-year mandate, will assist in the implementation of the Palestinian Civil Police Development Plan, advise and mentor senior members of the Palestinian Civil Police and criminal justice system, and co-ordinate EU and, where requested, international assistance to the Palestinian Civil Police. It will act in close co-operation with the European Community’s institution building programmes as well as other international efforts in the security sector including criminal justice reform.

#### *Sudan/Darfur*

The Council strongly condemned the killing of five AMIS (African Union Mission in Sudan) staff and two civilian contractors in Darfur on 8 October and offered its condolences to the African Union (AU). The Council expressed its grave concern about other recent serious clashes in Darfur apparently involving members of the rebel armed movements, the Government of Sudan and Arab militias. The Council reiterated its deep concern at violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed

against the civilian population in Darfur. The Council called on all sides to rein in their fighters and to respect the cease-fire. The Council encouraged the AU to conclude rapidly its investigations into the violence; to publish these; and to pass what information it has about the perpetrators to the UN's Committee of Experts to consider whether sanctions are appropriate, and to the International Criminal Court.

The Council welcomed the spirit of engagement demonstrated by the parties during the sixth round of the African Union-led Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks on Darfur in Abuja, which concluded on 20 October. The Council called on all parties to ensure that, by the time the talks resume on 20 November, they have made the necessary preparations to be able, with all possible speed, to negotiate a just and lasting peace settlement for Darfur. The Council therefore called on the leaders of the Sudan Liberation Movement to meet and to resolve their differences before the resumption of the talks.

The Council noted further progress in implementing the EU's supporting action to AMIS II. The Council welcomed the continuing close co-operation with other international actors, notably the UN and NATO. The Council agreed to extend the supporting action to AMIS II for a further six-month period and note agreement that it is politically appropriate to release a further 70MEUROS from the African Peace Facility. The Council welcomed the positive nature of the latest round of the EU's dialogue with the Government of Sudan, and call on the latter to establish promptly the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, as provided for by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The Council underlined the importance of continued EU engagement, including through the involvement of the EUSR for Sudan in the talks process and the Assessment and Evaluation Commission.

## *DRC*

The Council recalled that the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in particular in the east, still constituted a risk to regional peace and security. The Council recalled the important role being played by EUSEC RD Congo, EUPOL Kinshasa and the European Community in supporting the transition process in the DRC, including in the area of Security Sector Reform (SSR). The Council welcomed the six-month review of EUSEC RD Congo, and noted in particular the central co-ordination role being played by the mission in the area of SSR. The EU will continue to operate in the DRC in close co-ordination with MONUC and other relevant partners in the areas of SSR and DDR. The Council looked forward to agreeing the launch in the immediate future of a Chain of Payments Project to assist with the modernisation of the financial administration system of the DRC Ministry of Defence. The Council also agreed to extend the current mandate of the EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL KINSHASA) for one year. The Council reiterated its commitment to supporting the election process in the DRC, and noted that the elections would mark an important step in securing peace and providing the foundations for a democratic and accountable government. The Council called on

the Congolese authorities to remain steadfast in their commitment to strengthening good governance.

### *Africa Standby Force*

The Council recalled the readiness of the EU and its Member States to support the development of the Africa Standby Force under the auspices of the African Union, noting in particular support for African Union workshops establishing policy and practice for key areas of the Force structure.

### *Implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the Context of ESDP*

The Council noted and welcomed the document on Implementation of UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security in the Context of ESDP. The Council invited Member States, the Council General Secretariat and all other relevant EU bodies to implement the proposed measures; and noted that the Council General Secretariat would review their implementation based on a case study to be undertaken by the Institute of Security Studies, and in the light of lessons learned.'

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## **WESTERN BALKANS – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

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The Council adopted the following conclusions:

### **'BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**

1. The Council welcomed the Commission's communication on the state of preparations in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the negotiations of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the European Union. The Council expressed its agreement with the Commission's conclusions and invited the relevant Council bodies to examine the Commission's proposed negotiating directives with a view to opening the negotiations as soon as possible.

2. The Council welcomed the significant progress made by Bosnia and Herzegovina with its reform agenda, and encouraged it to take full account of the points raised in the Commission's communication, the upcoming progress report and the European Partnership. The Council welcomed in particular the recent political agreement on police reform and called for its implementation to begin without delay. It also stressed the importance of the adoption and implementation of all necessary public broadcasting legislation.

3. The Council reaffirmed that the speed at which Bosnia and Herzegovina, like all the countries in the Western Balkans, moves closer to the European Union will depend on how quickly it adopts and implements the necessary reforms for it to become a fully functioning and viable State and conforms to the Copenhagen criteria and to the requirements of the Stabilisation and Association process, including full cooperation with the ICTY.

4. In this context, the Council, recalling United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1503 and 1534, expects co-operation with the ICTY to be strengthened until all those accused who continue to evade international justice are brought before the Tribunal.

#### SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO/KOSOVO

5. The Council welcomed Ambassador Kai Eide's Comprehensive Review of the situation in Kosovo and expressed its full support for the UN Secretary General's intention to start a political process to determine Kosovo's future status.

6. The Council welcomed the UN Secretary General's intention to appoint Mr Martti Ahtisaari as UN Status Envoy, and Mr Albert Rohan as his deputy, and underlined the EU's support for his mandate and its intention to work closely with him.

7. The Council called on both Pristina and Belgrade to engage in good faith and constructively in this process to determine Kosovo's future status. All communities in Kosovo, including minorities notably Serbs, should play their part in this process.

8. The Council underlined the paramount importance of the ongoing implementation of Standards now and in the future. Of particular importance is the protection of minorities. The Council expressed its appreciation for the work of Mr Søren Jessen-Petersen, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General.

9. Recalling the EU's Thessaloniki agenda and the European Council's Declaration on Kosovo of 17 June 2005, the Council reaffirmed the European Union's determination to participate fully in the definition of the status of Kosovo and readiness to be closely involved in the negotiations and implementation of its future status. In this context, the Council reaffirmed its willingness to cooperate closely with relevant partners and other international organisations, including the OSCE which through its field presence plays an important role in Kosovo.

10. The Council welcomed Mr Martti Ahtisaari's readiness to cooperate closely with the EU. The Council endorsed the SG/HR's nomination of Mr Stefan Lehne as EU representative to the Kosovo future status process. Under the guidance of the SG/HR and the

Council, the EU representative will support the UN Status Envoy in the implementation of his mandate and will provide regular and timely reports to the SG/HR and the relevant bodies of the Council. He will also contribute, under guidance of the Council and in close cooperation with the Commission, to preparations for the EU's future role in Kosovo.

11. In view of the possibility of the EU enhancing its engagement in Kosovo, the Council invited the SG/HR together with the Commission to continue their work in identifying the possible future EU role and contribution, including in the areas of police, rule of law and the economy, and to submit joint proposals to the Council in the near future.

12. The Council also welcomed the Commission's co-operation with UNMIK and the PISG to promote the progressive alignment of the Kosovo Standards and the priorities identified in the European Partnership with a view to fostering progress towards EU standards.

13. The Council reaffirmed that Kosovo's future status must be fully compatible with European values and norms, comply with international legal instruments and obligations and the United Nations Charter. The status settlement should aim at a Kosovo, where all – regardless of ethnic background – are free to live, work and travel without fear, hostility or danger and all citizens are treated equally and different cultures are respected. The settlement should protect the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return safely. It should also include specific safeguards to protect cultural heritage and religious sites. At the same time, agreement on status should ensure that Kosovo does not return to the pre-March 1999 situation. Any solution which was unilateral or resulted from the use of force, as well as any changes to the current territory of Kosovo would be unacceptable. There can also be no partition of Kosovo, nor any union of Kosovo with another country or with part of another country following the resolution of the status of Kosovo. The territorial integrity and the internal stability of neighbouring countries must be fully respected. Likewise, Kosovo's future status should enable it to develop in a way which is both economically and politically sustainable and ensure it does not constitute a military or security threat to its neighbours. The resolution of Kosovo's future status must enable both Belgrade and Pristina to make progress towards the European Union.'

## **MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

'1. The Council underlined the need to maintain forward momentum towards full implementation of the Roadmap and of the commitments made at Sharm el Sheikh. It

reiterated its commitment to the goal of the coexistence of two States, by the creation of an independent, democratic, contiguous and viable Palestinian State, living side by side with Israel and its other neighbours in peace and security. It recalled that the EU will not recognise any change to the pre-1967 borders other than those arrived at by agreement between the parties.

2. The Council condemned unreservedly the recent terrorist attacks on Israel that have resulted in a number of Israeli fatalities and injuries. The Council also condemned the further violence perpetrated by Palestinian militants. While recognising Israel's right to protect its citizens against terrorist attacks, the Council called on Israel to act with restraint and to refrain from all extra-judicial killings, which are contrary to international law.

3. The Council expressed its grave concern at continued violence in Gaza and the West Bank. It underlined the need for the Palestinian Authority to take full control of law and order in the Occupied Territories. The Council also stressed the importance of the Palestinian Authority taking urgent action against Palestinian militants and to dismantle terrorist capabilities and infrastructure.

4. The Council underlined the importance of the forthcoming elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council as an essential element for progress in the peace process. The Council emphasised that violence and terror are incompatible with democratic processes and urged all factions, including Hamas, to renounce violence, recognise Israel's right to exist, and disarm. The Council urged Israel to facilitate the preparations and conduct of the elections, including in occupied East Jerusalem.

5. The Council reiterated its support for the work of James Wolfensohn, the Quartet Special Envoy for Disengagement, and welcomed his recent report to the members of the Quartet. It urged the parties to reach rapid agreement on the issues contained in the Rapid Action Plan, including arrangements for Gaza's borders and crossings, the Gaza seaport and airport, movement of goods and people between Gaza and the West Bank, and freedom of movement in the West Bank. The Council called on both Israel and the Palestinians to work with equal determination towards resolution of the outstanding issues. It underlined the importance of progress on these points for the growth of the Palestinian economy, including support to the private sector and in particular SMEs. The Council noted James Wolfensohn's letter of 2 November in which he requested on behalf of the parties that the EU consider playing a third party monitoring role at the Rafah crossing point on the Gaza-Egypt border. The Council noted the EU's willingness in principle to provide assistance with the operation of crossings at Gaza's borders on the basis of an agreement between the parties. It looked forward to receiving a full report from the scoping mission visiting the region, as the basis for an early decision on EU involvement and timely planning.

6. The Council urged the Israeli government to cease all activities in the Palestinian territories, including settlement building, the construction of the separation barrier as well as the demolition of Palestinian homes, which are contrary to international law and threaten to make any solution based on the co-existence of two states physically impossible. The Council was particularly concerned about the implementation of these policies in and around East Jerusalem. The Council called for the re-opening of Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem in accordance with the Roadmap, in particular the Orient House and the Chamber of Commerce. It called on the Israeli government to cease all discriminatory treatment of Palestinians in East Jerusalem, especially concerning work permits, access to education and health services, building permits, house demolitions, taxation and expenditure.

7. The Council underlined the important role played by EU COPPS (EU Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support) and by US Security Co-ordinator General Ward in the reform and strengthening of Palestinian security and police structures. In this regard, the Council decided to launch an ESDP Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories to build on the work of EU COPPS. This mission will have a long term reform focus and will provide enhanced support to the Palestinian Authority in establishing sustainable and effective policing arrangements. The new mission, which will have a three-year mandate, will assist in the implementation of the Palestinian Civil Police Development Plan, advise and mentor senior members of the Palestinian Civil Police and criminal justice system and co-ordinate EU and, where requested, international assistance to the Palestinian Civil Police. The mission will act in close co-operation with the European Commission's institution building as well as other international efforts in the security sector and judicial reform.

8. The Council welcomed the Commission's detailed Communication entitled "EU-Palestinian co-operation beyond disengagement – towards a two-state solution" and the comprehensive medium term strategy and suggested priorities it sets out for EU engagement with the Palestinians. The Council welcomed the Commission's proposal to consider ways in which EU assistance to the Palestinians could be more effective and co-ordinated and looked forward to further discussion of this issue.'

## **SYRIA AND LEBANON – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

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The Council adopted the following conclusions:

'1. The Council welcomes the unanimous adoption by the United Nations Security Council of Resolution 1636, acknowledging the report of the UN International Investigation Commission under Mr. Detlev Mehlis. The report's conclusions are very

serious. The Council takes note with extreme concern of the report's conclusions that there is converging evidence pointing at the involvement of both Lebanese and Syrian officials in the assassination of Rafic Hariri.

2. The Council deplores the clear indication that Syria has not co-operated fully with the investigating team and calls upon Syria to co-operate unconditionally with the investigators as they continue their efforts to shed light on these appalling crimes and to bring about justice. The Council takes note of recent statements and steps made by Syria regarding its intention to co-operate with the UN Commission and expects all Syrian bodies to act fully in accordance with this intention.

3. The Council welcomes the Secretary-General's report on UNSCR 1559. The report notes that considerable progress has been made towards the implementation of 1559, in particular through the efforts of the Government of Lebanon.

4. The Council underlines the importance it attaches to the full implementation of 1559, including disbanding and disarming of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, and strict respect of the sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and political independence of Lebanon. The Council underlines the importance of reinforcing the Lebanese Armed Forces. It notes the report's conclusion that more needs to be done by the Government of Lebanon to extend its control over all Lebanese territory.

5. The Council further calls on Syria to take immediate action to promote regional stability, including by engaging and working with the legitimate and sovereign Government of Lebanon to take forward the co-operation identified by the Secretary General's report as necessary for the full implementation of 1559; and by ending support for groups that oppose the Middle East Peace Process and taking steps to require such groups with headquarters or representatives in Syria to abstain from the use of violence.'

## **IRAN – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

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The Council adopted the following conclusions:

'1. The Council reviewed its overall approach to Iran.

2. The Council condemns in the strongest terms the comments in respect of the State of Israel made by President Ahmedinejad. It deplores calls for violence and for the destruction of any state. These comments cause concern about Iran's role in the region and its future intentions.



3. The Council reiterates its grave concern at Iran's resumption of activity at the Uranium Conversion Facility in Esfahan. The Council urges Iran to implement all measures requested by the IAEA Board of Governors in its Resolution on 24 September, including reinstating a full suspension of all fuel cycle activities, thus allowing negotiations with the European side to resume before the IAEA Board meets again in November. The Council underlines the EU's continued support for a diplomatic solution to international concerns over Iran's nuclear programme.

4. The Council underlines the long-standing importance it attaches to sustainable political and economic reform in Iran. In this regard, the Council agreed on the importance of the Comprehensive Dialogue. The Council agreed that the Comprehensive Dialogue is an appropriate framework for discussing issues of mutual interest and concern. These include not only areas such as counter-narcotics but also areas of long-standing concern to the EU: terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, Iran's approach to the Middle East peace process, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and regional issues. While noting progress in the co-operation between Iran and Europe in the field of counter-narcotics, the Council reiterates that the evolution of the long-term relationship, avoiding a deterioration, between Iran and Europe will depend on action by Iran to address effectively all the EU's areas of concern. The Council reiterates that it is up to Iran to determine, through its actions, whether its long-term relationship with the EU will improve or deteriorate.

5. The Council expresses its deep concern at the serious violations of human rights which continue to occur in Iran. It urges Iran to strengthen respect for human rights and the rule of law. The Council is disappointed that the EU-Iran Human Rights Dialogue has not been held since June 2004, despite repeated attempts on the EU's part to agree dates for the next round. The Council urges Iran to take steps to resume substantive discussions under the Dialogue and to demonstrate by its actions that it is willing to improve respect for human rights including by fulfilling its obligations and earlier commitments in relation to juvenile executions and by permanently releasing Akbar Ganji and other prisoners of conscience.

6. The Council stresses that discrimination between EU Member States by Iran in any field is unacceptable and contrary to EU principles of solidarity. It calls on Iran to lift all discriminatory restrictions against individual Member States, which could impact negatively on Iran's stated desire to pursue greater co-operation with the EU.

7. The Council agrees to keep the EU's approach to Iran under close review in light of progress on the nuclear file and other issues of concern.'

## IRAQ – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

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The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. The Council welcomes the 15 October referendum on the Iraqi Constitution as part of Iraq's continuing political transition leading to a constitutionally elected government based on UNSCR 1546. The referendum on the Constitution marks an important stage in the process of political transition and a further step by the Iraqi people on the road to democracy, freedom and peace, which will continue beyond the transition period. The high turnout of voters from all communities and across the country bears testament to the Iraqi people's commitment to a process aiming at building a peaceful and democratic Iraq. The Council pays tribute to the courage and determination of those who took part in the voting, braving difficult conditions and the threat of violence. The Council congratulates the Independent Electoral Commission for Iraq and the Iraqi authorities on the smooth running of the referendum. It welcomes the support given to the process by the UN.

2. Although a large majority of voters voted in favour of the Constitution, the Council notes that the results of the referendum show there are still substantial divisions to be overcome. In this regard, it looks forward to the implementation of the review mechanism contained in the Constitution after the December elections. The Council believes this offers an important opportunity for the Iraqis to forge a broader consensus on the future of their country and will assist the creation of an inclusive political system. The EU stands ready to support actively in these important efforts. The Council also welcomes the Arab League's suggestion to work with Iraq in holding a National Dialogue Conference.

3. The Council stresses the importance the EU attaches to the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Iraq and encourages all members of the international community to support the consolidation of democracy in Iraq. The Council welcomes the visit by Amr Moussa, the Secretary General of the Arab League, to Iraq on 20-24 October. The Council encourages Iraq's neighbours and other countries in the region to re-establish or strengthen diplomatic relations with Iraq at the earliest possibility. It strongly urges regional states, in particular Syria, to support the political process in Iraq, including by co-operating with Iraq to prevent cross-border transit and support for terrorists and insurgents.

4. The Council looks forward to the elections planned for December and urges all Iraqis across the country to participate in them. It encourages the IECI to continue its excellent work in preparing for the December elections, with the support of the UN and including the contribution made by the EU. The EU will provide support to the moni-

toring process for the December elections, including through supporting the work of domestic election observers.

5. The Council condemns the terrorist acts, murders and hostage-takings which have been committed in Iraq. The Council deplors the campaign of terrorist violence in Iraq which is prolonging the suffering of the Iraqi people and hampering political progress and reconstruction.

6. The Council welcomes the signature of the Joint EU-Iraq Political Declaration during the EU-Iraq Ministerial Troika meeting in New York on 21 September. The Declaration and the regular political dialogue which will now be taken forward under it represent an important step towards closer partnership between the EU and Iraq. In this regard, the Council welcomes the EU Political Directors Troika visit to Baghdad on 24-26 October, during which the first formal dialogue meeting was held.

7. The Council welcomes the improvement in the human rights situation since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime and condemns the atrocities committed by terrorists since then. The Council emphasises the importance of full respect for human rights in Iraq. It underlines the EU's strong opposition to the use of the death penalty. It notes with concern recent reports, including by the UN, of human rights violations by the Iraqi Security Forces. It urges the Iraqi Transitional Government to address all allegations of human rights abuses in a decisive and transparent manner. The EU stands ready to offer further support in this area, noting the contributions already being made by the Member States and the Commission to strengthening human rights and the Rule of Law in Iraq.

8. The Council commends the ongoing work of the EU's Rule of Law mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX), and the training it is providing for over 700 Iraqi judicial, police and prison personnel. The Council notes the ITG's request to extend the mission beyond the end of its current mandate and to expand the scope of the training provided, and invites relevant Council bodies to consider this. The Council reiterates its support for the Commission's preparations to undertake complementary work in this field.

9. The Council reaffirms the EU's continuing support to the reconstruction of Iraq. The Council welcomes the Commission's ongoing work to assist in capacity building in Iraq's administration and institutions as well as the provision of further assistance in the field of basic services. The Council notes the progress towards the establishment of a Commission office in Baghdad. The Council welcomes the establishment of the Sector Working Groups by the ITG, with the support of the UN, and notes the positive contribution they are making to the co-ordination of donor activity. The Council notes the leading role being played by the EU in the Rule of Law Sector Working Group.

10. The Council reaffirms the importance of creating the conditions for socio-economic development that can benefit all Iraqis. To this end, it welcomes that the process of Iraq's WTO accession is underway and looks forward to the establishment of contractual trade and co-operation relations between the EU and Iraq.'

## **BELARUS – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

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The Council adopted the following conclusions:

'1. Recalling its conclusions of 15 September 1997 and 22-23 November 2004, the Council expresses its deep concern at the deteriorating situation of human rights and political freedoms in Belarus, in particular the harassment of political parties, independent media and NGOs and the reluctance to conduct independent investigations into disappearances of prominent opponents of President Lukashenko.

2. The EU wishes to see a stable, prosperous and democratic Belarus, respecting human rights and the rule of law. Underlining that the Belarusian people's sovereign right to decide their own country's future should be realised in a democratic way, the Council notes the importance of the Presidential election in 2006, and in particular:

- Calls on the Belarusian Government to reverse the current deteriorating trend in respect of democracy and human rights, to ensure that the electoral process is conducted in a free and fair manner in accordance with international standards, and to abide by its commitments in the OSCE and the UN;
- Calls on the Belarusian Government to issue an early invitation to a full OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission, in accordance with the 1990 Copenhagen document, and to allow it to operate unimpeded; and notes the willingness of EU Member States to contribute to that mission;
- Calls on the Belarusian Government to ensure that all eligible candidates are allowed to register for the elections, to campaign freely and to enjoy equal access to state-controlled media;
- Notes that the 17 October 2004 parliamentary elections and referendum in Belarus were not conducted in a free and fair manner; and recalls its lack of confidence that the results truly reflected the will of the Belarusian people. The Council notes the view of the Council of Europe's Venice Commission that the referendum was unlawful; expresses its concern that the 2006 Presidential election should be conducted on a legal and democratic basis. The Council, therefore, calls on the Belarusian Government to fully implement the recommendations of the respective reports of the OSCE/ODIHR in time for the Presidential election of 2006.

3. The Council confirms its determination to intensify the EU's support for democracy and human rights in Belarus. In this context, the Council:
- Notes the importance of political pluralism and in this regard encourages the EU's political parties to strengthen links with their counterparts in Belarus, and welcomes the selection of a united opposition candidate;
  - Confirms its willingness to continue to work through a range of channels to support Belarusian civil society, and welcomes the Commission's significant allocation for support for independent media in Belarus and its commitment to designate Belarus a priority country for the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights and Decentralised Cooperation Instruments in 2005-2006. On support for independent media in particular, the Council requests the Commission – on the basis of experience gained – to consider taking further action. The Council also stresses the importance of a flexible use of existing instruments and of the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI) serving as a more flexible source of funding for building and promoting democracy from 2007-2013;
  - Underlines the willingness of Member States and the institutions of the EU to promote shared democratic values between the people of the EU and Belarus by intensifying people-to-people contacts and by strengthening good neighbourly relations across borders (e.g. through student and scientific exchanges, scholarships, youth travel, contacts between small- and medium-sized enterprises, training local authority officials, etc.)
4. In seeking to convey its positions clearly to the Belarusian authorities and maximise the impact of its policies, the Council:
- Reaffirms its policy on limited ministerial contact agreed on 22-23 November 2004 but highlights its willingness to engage with Belarusian officials;
  - Welcomes the decision of the Secretary General/High Representative to nominate, for his part, a point of contact under his authority on Belarus; and his decision to send his Personal Representative for Human Rights to Belarus before the end of the year to engage with civil society and to express EU concerns to President Lukashenko's Government;
  - Welcomes the Commission's decision to open a regionalised delegation in Minsk by the end of the year;
  - States its willingness to maintain and intensify engagement, cooperation and coordination with international partners in order to promote democratisation in Belarus.
5. The Council will continue to monitor the situation in Belarus closely and will revert to it in January 2006. It also underlines its concern at the harassment of civil society organisations, including the Union of Poles of Belarus. The Council states its readiness

to take further appropriate restrictive measures against the responsible individuals in the event of failure to uphold international standards, in particular commitments made in the OSCE context.

6. At the same time, the Council reiterates its willingness to have closer and better relations with Belarus – including within the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and the European Neighbourhood Policy – once the Belarusian authorities clearly demonstrate their willingness to respect democratic values and the rule of law. In this context, the EU will seek to communicate and demonstrate the benefits of the ENP to the Belarusian population at large.<sup>7</sup>

The Council also had a forward looking and strategic discussion on the basis of three questions. On the first, a number of delegations stressed the need for a credible EU response in the case of failure to uphold international standards in the conduct of the 2006 presidential elections. Examples given included visa bans and assets freezes. On the second, a number of delegations stressed the importance of working with international partners, including the US and Russia. On the third, a number of delegations stressed the importance of support for civil society and people to people contacts as ways of encouraging reform in Belarus.

(...)

## Moldovan-Ukrainian Border – Council Joint Action

Bruxelles, 7 November 2005

The deployment of a customs control and monitoring mission on the Transnistrian segment of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border marked an important step forward in the cooperation between these two countries and the European Union in the fight against weapons trafficking, smuggling, organised crime and corruption. The mandate of the Special Representative for Moldova was modified to take account of the tasks pertaining to this mission, due to be officially launched on 30 November 2005 (EU BAM Moldova/Ukraine).

### COUNCIL JOINT ACTION AMENDING THE MANDATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR MOLDOVA

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 14, 18(5) and 23(2) thereof,

Whereas:

- (1) On 23 March 2005, the Council adopted Joint Action 2005/265/CFSP(1) appointing Mr Adriaan JACOBOVITS de SZEGED as European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for Moldova.
- (2) On 28 July 2005, the Council adopted Joint Action 2005/584/CFSP(2) extending the mandate of the EUSR until 28 February 2006.
- (3) On 2 June 2005, President Voronin of Moldova and President Yuschenko of Ukraine sent a joint letter, inter alia requesting the European Union to examine the possibilities for offering assistance in establishing an international customs control on the Transnistrian segment of the Moldovan-Ukrainian state border, as well as for creating an effective international monitoring mechanism on this segment of the border.
- (4) On 20 September 2005, the Political and Security Committee agreed to the establishment of an EU Border Mission for Moldova-Ukraine including through the reinforcement of the team of the EUSR for Moldova.

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(1) OJ L 81, 30.3.2005, p. 50.

(2) OJ L 199, 29.7.2005, p. 95.

(5) Given the new tasks of the EUSR for Moldova in relation to the EU Border Mission for Moldova-Ukraine, his mandate should be amended accordingly,

## HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

### *Article 1*

Joint Action 2005/265/CFSP is hereby amended as follows:

(a) the following point shall be added to Article 2(1):

“(g) to enhance the effectiveness of border and customs controls and border surveillance activities in Moldova and Ukraine along their common border, with a particular focus on the Transnistrian section, notably through an EU Border Mission.”;

(b) the following point shall be added to Article 3(1):

“(e) through a support team led by a Senior Political Adviser to the EUSR:

- (i) assure political overview of developments and activities related to the Moldovan-Ukrainian state border;
- (ii) analyse the political commitment of Moldova and Ukraine to improving border management;
- (iii) promote cooperation on border issues between the Moldovan and Ukrainian sides, also in view of building preconditions for a settlement to the Transnistrian conflict.”;

(c) in Article 5, paragraph 1 shall be replaced by the following:

“1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the EUSR’s mandate shall be EUR 430 000.”;

(d) in Article 8, the single paragraph shall be numbered 1 and a new paragraph shall be added as follows:

“2. The Council and the Commission shall, each within their respective powers, ensure consistency between the implementation of this Joint Action and external activities of the Community in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 3 of the Treaty. The Council and the Commission shall cooperate to this end.”;

(e) the second paragraph of Article 10 shall be replaced by the following:

“It shall apply until 28 February 2006.”.

### *Article 2*

This Joint Action shall enter into force on 1 December 2005.



***Article 3***

This Joint Action shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Brussels, 7 November 2005.

*For the Council*

*The President*

J. Straw

## REMARKS OF JAVIER SOLANA AT THE LAUNCH OF THE EU BORDER MISSION FOR MOLDOVA-UKRAINE

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Odessa, 30 November 2005

- ▶ On 2 June, the Presidents of Ukraine and Moldova signed a joint letter addressed to President Barroso and to me, requesting assistance on the Ukrainian – Moldovan border, including the Transnistrian segment. They asked also for international monitoring of the border.
- ▶ Their request underlined the strong European values of Ukraine and Moldova: their wish to improve the quality of controls on their common border, and to bring transparency to it. This is particularly significant in relation to our joint efforts to find a viable settlement to the Transnistrian conflict. It is a major confidence-building measure.
- ▶ The EU was quick to give a positive answer. An EU Fact-Finding Mission, headed by the EUSR for Moldova, was sent in late August. It found that an engagement by the EU was not only feasible, but was backed by the strong political commitment of both governments.
- ▶ It is only six months since the request was made. Today we are here in Odessa, marking the launch of new milestone in our European partnership. But it is a milestone, not the end station. Now the real work starts. The degree of success will be a test case for our cooperation, for a closer partnership.
- ▶ The EU has sent you high level customs and border professionals. The Team of the EUSR for Moldova has also been enhanced by top-level diplomats and experts, with General Banfi, Head of the Border Mission, playing a co-ordinating role as Senior Political Adviser to the EUSR.
- ▶ The decisive factor is not what the EU does, but what we do together. Our border engagement is here to help you in many crucial fields – from technical assistance to deep political co-operation and from making your fight against corruption a success to building the preconditions for a settlement on the future status of Transnistria.
- ▶ I am confident of our success. We share a strong political commitment. We can be proud that we have got as far as we have today. The EU looks forward to working with the governments of Ukraine and Moldova – at all levels – to achieve our shared aims and values on this border, and to bring sustainable stability to the region. I am personally committed to these aims and will work closely with the leaders of both countries to ensure their realisation.

## **EUPOL COPPS – Council Joint Action**

**Brussels, 14 November 2005**

### **COUNCIL JOINT ACTION ON THE EUROPEAN UNION POLICE MISSION FOR THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES**

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#### **THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,**

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 14 and the third subparagraph of Article 25 thereof,

Whereas:

- (1) The European Union, as part of the Quartet, is committed to assisting and facilitating the implementation of the Roadmap, which lays out reciprocal steps by the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority in the political, security, economic, humanitarian, and institution building fields, that will result in the emergence of an independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbours.
- (2) The European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004 reaffirmed the readiness of the EU to support the Palestinian Authority in taking responsibility for law and order, and in particular, in improving its civil police and law enforcement capacity.
- (3) The European Union Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support was formally established by an Exchange of Letters on 20 April 2005 between the Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei and the EU Special Representative to the Middle-East Peace Process Marc Otte.
- (4) The General Affairs and External Relations Council of 18 July 2005 reiterated the EU commitment to contributing to the development of Palestinian security capacity through the Palestinian Civil Police, in coordination with the US Security Coordinator. It also agreed in principle that EU support to the Palestinian Civil Police should take the form of an European Security and Defence Policy mission building on the work of the EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support in cooperation with all the parties concerned.
- (5) The follow-on to the EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support is an expression of the EU continued readiness to support the Palestinian Authority in com-

plying with its Roadmap obligations, in particular with regard to 'security' and 'institutionbuilding', including the process of consolidating the Palestinian security organisations into three services reporting to an empowered Palestinian Minister of Interior. Furthermore, the support of the EU to the Palestinian Civil Police aims at increasing the 'safety and security' of the Palestinian population and at serving the domestic agenda of the Palestinian Authority in reinforcing the rule of law.

(6) In a letter of invitation of 25 October 2005 the Palestinian Authority invited the EU to launch an European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS).

(7) EUPOL COPPS will be complementary and will bring added value to current international efforts, as well as develop synergies with ongoing European Community and Member States efforts. EUPOL COPPS will seek coherence and coordination with the capacity-building actions of the Community, notably in the domain of criminal justice.

(8) EU assistance will be conditional on the extent of the Palestinian Authority's commitment and support for police reorganisation and reform. An adequate mechanism for coordination and cooperation with the relevant Palestinian authorities will be established during the planning phase to ensure their involvement in the development and follow-up of EUPOL COPPS. An adequate mechanism for coordination and cooperation with the relevant Israeli authorities will be established to ensure their facilitation of the EUPOL COPPS activities.

(9) EUPOL COPPS will be set in the wider context of the international community's effort to support the Palestinian Authority in taking responsibility for law and order, and in particular, in improving its civil police and law enforcement capacity. Close coordination between EUPOL COPPS and other international actors involved in security assistance, including the US Security Coordinator, as well as those providing support to the Palestinian Ministry of Interior, will be ensured.

(10) EUPOL COPPS will implement its mandate in the context of a situation which poses a threat to law and order, the security and safety of individuals, and to the stability of the area and which could harm the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as set out in Article 11 of the Treaty.

(11) In conformity with the guidelines of the European Council meeting in Nice on 7 to 9 December 2000, this Joint Action should determine the role of the Secretary-General/High Representative, in accordance with Articles 18 and 26 of the Treaty.

(12) Article 14(1) of the Treaty calls for the indication of a financial reference amount for the whole period of implementation of the Joint Action. The indication of amounts to be financed by the Community budget illustrates the will of the legislative authority and is subject to the availability of commitment appropriations during the respective budget year,

## HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

### *Article 1*

#### **Mission**

1. The European Union hereby establishes the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories, hereinafter referred to as the European Union Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS), with an operational phase beginning no later than on 1 January 2006.
2. EUPOL COPPS shall operate in accordance with the mission statement as set out in Article 2.

### *Article 2*

#### **Mission statement**

1. The aim of EUPOL COPPS is to contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements under Palestinian ownership in accordance with best international standards, in cooperation with the Community's institution building programmes as well as other international efforts in the wider context of Security Sector including Criminal Justice Reform. To this end EUPOL COPPS shall:
  - (a) assist the Palestinian Civil Police (PCP) in implementation of the Police Development Programme by advising and closely mentoring PCP, and specifically senior officials at District, Headquarters and Ministerial level;
  - (b) coordinate and facilitate EU and Member State assistance, and where requested, international assistance to PCP;
  - (c) advise on police-related Criminal Justice elements.

### *Article 3*

#### **Duration**

The mission will have a duration of three years.

## *Article 4*

### **Review**

A six-monthly review process, in accordance with the assessment criteria set out in the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and the Operation Plan (OPLAN) and taking into account developments on the ground, will enable adjustments to be made to the EUPOL COPPS size and scope as necessary.

## *Article 5*

### **Structure**

In achieving its mission, EUPOL COPPS shall consist of the following elements:

1. Head of Mission/Police Commissioner,
2. Advisory Section,
3. Programme Coordination Section,
4. Administration Section.

These elements shall be developed in CONOPS and OPLAN. The Council shall approve the CONOPS and the OPLAN.

## *Article 6*

### **Head of Mission/Police Commissioner**

1. The Head of Mission/Police Commissioner shall exercise Operational Control (OPCON) over EUPOL COPPS and assume the day-to-day management of EUPOL COPPS and coordination of EUPOL COPPS activities including the management of security of EUPOL COPPS staff, resources and information.
2. The Head of Mission/Police Commissioner shall be responsible for disciplinary control over the EUPOL COPPS staff. For seconded staff, disciplinary action shall be exercised by the national or EU authority concerned.
3. The Head of Mission/Police Commissioner shall sign a contract with the Commission.

## *Article 7*

### **Planning phase**

1. During the planning phase of the mission, a planning team shall be established and shall comprise the Head of Mission/Police Commissioner, who shall lead the planning team, and the necessary staff to deal with functions ensuing from established needs of the mission.
2. A comprehensive risk assessment shall be carried out as a priority in the planning process and shall be updated as necessary.
3. The planning team shall draw up an OPLAN and develop all technical instruments necessary to execute the mission. The OPLAN shall take into account the comprehensive risk assessment and shall include a security plan.

## *Article 8*

### **EUPOL COPPS staff**

1. The numbers and competence of EUPOL COPPS staff shall be consistent with the mission statement set out in Article 2 and the structure set out in Article 5.
2. EUPOL COPPS staff shall be seconded by Member States or EU institutions. Each Member State shall bear the costs related to EUPOL COPPS staff seconded by it, including salaries, medical coverage, travel expenses to and from the mission area, and allowances other than per diems.
3. International staff and local staff shall be recruited on a contractual basis by EUPOL COPPS as required.
4. Third States may also, as appropriate, second mission staff. Each seconding third State shall bear the costs related to any of the staff seconded by it, including salaries, medical coverage, allowances, high-risk insurance and travel expenses to and from the mission area.
5. All staff shall remain under the authority of the appropriate sending State or EU institution and shall carry out their duties and act in the interest of the mission. All staff shall respect the security principles and minimum standards established by Council Decision 2001/264/EC of 19 March 2001 adopting the Council's security regulations<sup>(1)</sup>.

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(1) OJ L 101, 11.4.2001, p. 1. Decision as last amended by Decision 2005/571/EC (OJ L 193, 23.7.2005, p. 31).

## *Article 9*

### **Status of EUPOL COPPS staff**

1. Where required, the status of EUPOL COPPS staff, including, where appropriate, the privileges, immunities and further guarantees necessary for the completion and smooth functioning of EUPOL COPPS shall be subject of an agreement to be concluded in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 24 of the Treaty. The Secretary-General/High Representative, assisting the Presidency, may negotiate such arrangements on its behalf.
2. Member State or EU institution having seconded a staff member shall be responsible for answering any claims, from or concerning the staff member, linked to the secondment. Member State or EU institution in question shall be responsible for bringing any action against the secondee.
3. The conditions of employment and the rights and obligations of international and local staff shall be laid down in the contracts between the Head of Mission/Police Commissioner and the staff member.

## *Article 10*

### **Chain of command**

1. EUPOL COPPS shall have a unified chain of command, as a crisis management operation.
2. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) shall provide the political control and strategic direction.
3. The Secretary-General/High Representative shall give guidance to the Head of Mission/Police Commissioner through the EU Special Representative.
4. The Head of Mission/Police Commissioner shall lead EUPOL COPPS and assume its day-to-day management.
5. The Head of Mission/Police Commissioner shall report to the Secretary-General/High Representative through the EU Special Representative.
6. The EU Special Representative shall report to the Council through the Secretary-General/High Representative.



## *Article 11*

### **Political control and strategic direction**

1. The PSC shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council, the political control and strategic direction of the mission.
2. The Council hereby authorises the PSC to take the relevant decisions in accordance with Article 25 of the Treaty. This authorisation shall include the powers to appoint a Head of Mission/Police Commissioner, upon a proposal by the Secretary-General/High Representative, and to amend the OPLAN and the chain of command. The Council, assisted by the Secretary-General/High Representative, shall decide on the objectives and termination of the mission.
3. The PSC shall report to the Council at regular intervals.
4. The PSC shall receive reports by the Head of Mission/Police Commissioner regarding contributions to and the conduct of the mission, at regular intervals. The PSC may invite the Head of Mission/Police Commissioner to its meetings, as appropriate.

## *Article 12*

### **Participation of third States**

1. Without prejudice to the decision-making autonomy of the EU and its single institutional framework, acceding States shall be invited and third States may be invited to contribute to EUPOL COPPS provided that they bear the cost of the staff seconded by them, including salaries, medical coverage, allowances, high-risk insurance and travel expenses to and from the mission area, and contribute to the running costs of EUPOL COPPS, as appropriate.
2. Third States making contributions to EUPOL COPPS shall have the same rights and obligations in terms of day-to-day management of the mission as Member States taking part in the mission.
3. The Council hereby authorises the PSC to take the relevant decisions on acceptance of the proposed contributions and to establish a Committee of Contributors.
4. Detailed arrangements regarding the participation of third States shall be subject of an agreement to be concluded in accordance with the procedures laid down in Article 24 of the Treaty. The Secretary-General/High Representative, assisting the Presidency, may negotiate such arrangements on its behalf. Where the EU and a third State have concluded an agreement establishing a framework for the participation of this third State in

the EU crisis management operations, the provisions of such an agreement shall apply in the context of EUPOL COPPS.

### *Article 13*

#### **Security**

1. The Head of Mission/Police Commissioner shall be responsible for the security of EUPOL COPPS and shall, in consultation with the Security Office of the General Secretariat of the Council, be responsible for ensuring compliance with minimum security requirements in conformity with the Council's security regulations.
2. EUPOL COPPS shall have a dedicated mission Security Officer reporting to the Head of Mission/Police Commissioner.
3. The Head of Mission/Police Commissioner shall consult with the PSC on security issues affecting the deployment of EUPOL COPPS as directed by the Secretary-General/High Representative.
4. EUPOL COPPS staff members shall undergo mandatory security training organised by the Security Office of the General Secretariat of the Council and medical checks prior to any deployment or travel to the mission area.

### *Article 14*

#### **Financial arrangements**

1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the mission shall be EUR 2,5 million for 2005 and EUR 3,6 million for 2006.
2. The final budget of EUPOL COPPS for the years 2006, 2007 and 2008 shall be decided by the Council on an annual basis.
3. The expenditure financed by the amount referred to in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the EU with the exception that any pre-financing shall not remain the property of the Community. Nationals of third States participating financially in the mission, of host parties and, if required for the operational needs of the mission, of neighbouring countries shall be allowed to tender for contracts.
4. The Head of Mission/Police Commissioner shall report fully to, and be supervised by, the Commission on the activities undertaken in the framework of his contract.

5. The financial arrangements shall respect the operational requirements of EUPOL COPPS, including compatibility of equipment and interoperability of its teams.
6. Expenditure shall be eligible as of the date of entry into force of this Joint Action.

## *Article 15*

### **Community action**

1. The Council and the Commission shall, each in accordance with their respective powers, ensure consistency between the implementation of this Joint Action and the external activities of the Community in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 3 of the Treaty. The Council and the Commission shall cooperate to this end.
2. The necessary coordination arrangements shall be put in place in the mission area, as appropriate, as well as in Brussels.

## *Article 16*

### **Release of classified information**

1. The Secretary-General/High Representative is authorised to release to third States associated with this Joint Action, as appropriate and in accordance with the operational needs of the mission, EU classified information and documents up to the level 'RESTREINT UE' generated for the purposes of the mission, in accordance with the Council's security regulations.
2. In the event of a specific and immediate operational need, the Secretary-General/High Representative is also authorised to release to the local authorities EU classified information and documents up to the level 'RESTREINT UE' generated for the purposes of the mission, in accordance with the Council's security regulations. In all other cases, such information and documents shall be released to the local authorities in accordance with the procedures appropriate to their level of cooperation with the EU.
3. The Secretary-General/High Representative is authorised to release to third States associated with this Joint Action and to the local authorities EU non-classified documents related to the deliberations of the Council with regard to the mission covered by the obligation of professional secrecy pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Council's Rules of Procedure<sup>(2)</sup>.

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(2) Council Decision 2004/338/EC, Euratom of 22 March 2004 adopting the Council's Rules of Procedure (OJ L 106, 15.4.2004, p. 22). Decision as amended by Decision 2004/701/EC, Euratom (OJ L 319, 20.10.2004, p. 15).

### *Article 17*

**Entry into force**

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

It shall expire on 31 December 2008.

### *Article 18*

**Publication**

This Joint Action shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Brussels, 14 November 2005.

*For the Council*

*The President*

T. Jowell

## FACTSHEET – EUROPEAN UNION POLICE MISSION FOR THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

The European Union is preparing an “EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories” due to start on 1 January 2006. Code-named EUPOL-COPPS, this Mission will support the Palestinian Authority in establishing sustainable and effective policing arrangements.

### *Aims and Scope of EUPOL-COPPS*

EUPOL-COPPS will be a civilian mission in the framework of the **European Security and Defence Policy** (ESDP).

EUPOL-COPPS will aim at contributing to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements under Palestinian ownership in accordance with best international standards. More specifically the tasks of the new Mission are as follows:

- ▶ Assist the Palestinian Civil Police in implementation of the Police Development Programme by advising and closely mentoring the Palestinian Civil Police, and specifically senior officials at District, Headquarters and Ministerial level;
- ▶ Co-ordinate and facilitate EU Member State assistance, and – where requested – international assistance to the Palestinian Civil Police;
- ▶ Advise on police-related Criminal Justice elements.

The new Mission will act in close co-operation with the European Community’s institution building programmes as well as other international efforts in the security sector including criminal justice reform.

EUPOL-COPPS will be set in the wider context of the international community’s effort to support the Palestinian Authority in taking responsibility for law and order, and in particular, in improving its civil police and law enforcement capacity. Close co-ordination between the Mission and other international actors involved in security assistance, including the US Security Coordinator, as well as those providing support to the Ministry of Interior, will be ensured.

EUPOL-COPPS will build on the work of the EU Co-ordination Office for Palestinian Police Support (EU COPPS)<sup>1</sup>.

### *Size, Structure and Budget of the Mission*

- ▶ EUPOL-COPPS will include approximately 33 unarmed personnel mainly seconded

1. EU COPPS was established in January 2005 within the office of the EU Special Representative (EUSR) to the Middle East Process, Marc Otte. It aims at assisting the Palestinian Authority in developing a modern and effective civil police service.

from EU Member States<sup>2</sup>. The Mission personnel will not have executive powers.

- ▶ The operational phase of the Mission will begin on 1 January 2006. EUPOL-COPPS will have an initial duration of 3 years.
- ▶ The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the Mission until the end of 2006 will be 6.1 million euros (common costs).

### *Political control*

- ▶ The EU's Political and Security Committee will exercise, under the responsibility of the EU Council, the political control and strategic direction of the Mission. High Representative Javier Solana will give guidance to the Head of Mission through the EU Special Representative for the MEPP.

### *Background*

- ▶ At the European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004, EU leaders reaffirmed the readiness of the EU to support the Palestinian Authority in taking responsibility for law and order, and in particular, in improving its civil police and law enforcement capacity.
- ▶ In July 2005, EU foreign ministers reiterated the EU's commitment to contributing to the development of Palestinian security capacity through the Palestinian Civil Police, in co-ordination with the US Security Co-ordinator. They also agreed in principle that EU support to the Palestinian Civil Police should take the form of an ESDP mission building on the work of the EU Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support in cooperation with all parties concerned.
- ▶ The EU is the largest donor to the Palestinians.
- ▶ The EU has been at the forefront of efforts for peace in the Middle East, and is an active member of the Quartet alongside its partners the US, Russia and the UN. Resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe<sup>1</sup>. Accordingly, the EU is a facilitator in the Middle East Peace Process, notably through regular meetings with the main actors involved; visits to the Near East by EU leaders and the activities of the EU High Representative Javier Solana, as well as the EU Special Representative for the Peace Process, Ambassador Marc Otte.

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2. A number of third countries will also be invited to contribute to the Mission.

## Rafah – Remarks by Javier Solana on the agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority

Brussels, 15 November 2005

### SUMMARY OF REMARKS BY JAVIER SOLANA ON THE AGREEMENT ON RAFAH

In comments made today in Jerusalem at a joint press conference with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Quartet Special Envoy Jim Wolfensohn, Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy welcomed the agreement reached earlier in the day between the parties on movement and access to and from Gaza, including the agreed principles for Rafah crossing, and stressed the EU's future role in the framework of that agreement.

*“I think this is a very, very important agreement. It has taken a long time to finalise but it will give the Gaza disengagement its full content in particular because the border between the Gaza and Egypt will now be opened.*

*And as you know from the document that you are going to read in a moment, the European Union will assume the “third-party role” on that very important and complicated border. We are ready. We have the plans ready and prepared and by the end of the month we will be in a position to take full responsibility and have the border function.*

*It's not an easy task, but I'm sure it will be successful and it will contribute for the first time to the Palestinians having a border that is open and controlled by them with a third party present so that they can go to Egypt and the outside world.*

*As you know, the Philadelphia Road will be controlled by the Egyptians but at the border crossing the European Union will act as third party. We assume that responsibility as a very important contribution to the finalisation of the Gaza disengagement.*

*I want to say that Jim Wolfensohn, the Quartet envoy for the disengagement, has played a fundamental role, and I want to thank him very, very warmly, as much as I want to say thank you to Condoleezza Rice for the long hours that we have had to put in over the past few days.*

*This is the first time that a border is opened and given to the Palestinians to control themselves with the help of a third party. This is a very important step.*

*We will be about 50 - 70 people, policemen, border experts, from different countries. They will be headed by a general from the Italian Carabinieri, who will be appointed shortly.”<sup>1</sup>*

1. EU Member States today agreed in principle to appoint Major-General Pietro Pistolese as Head of the future EU border control monitoring Mission in Rafah. A CV of Major-General Pistolese is attached.

## MILEX 05 – Press release

Brussels, 18 November 2005

The MILEX 2005 exercise marks the involvement of the EU OHQ in the planning and conduct of large-scale EU crisis management exercises. This takes place as part of ongoing European training procedures whose purpose is, through regular military exercises of this nature, to test the different crisis management capacities available to the EU.

### EU MILITARY EXERCISE (MILEX 05)

The European Union (EU) will conduct a military exercise (MILEX 05)<sup>1</sup> from 22 November to 1 December 2005 in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The EU is conducting this type of exercise (MILEX) for the first time.

MILEX 05 will focus on key military aspects and it will be the first time that an EU Operation Headquarters (OHQ) will have been fully activated as part of an EU exercise. It will concentrate on the interaction between an EU OHQ in Paris, France<sup>2</sup> and an EU Force Headquarters (FHQ) in Ulm, Germany<sup>3</sup> in the context of an autonomous EU-led military operation.

MILEX 05 will be based on a fictitious crisis scenario. The scenario will depict a situation on a fictitious island (Atlantia), where friction between two ethnic groups over a contested area is leading to the growing danger of instability and spill-over into hostilities. The exercise scenario will support the need for an autonomous EU-led operation which will require the deployment of military forces. No troops will be deployed in the exercise.

MILEX 05 will be coordinated from Brussels under the direction of the EU Military Committee (EUMC), which is supported by the EU Military Staff (EUMS), and under the guidance of the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC). The exercise will be conducted in Paris (OHQ) and in Ulm (FHQ). Some 450 'players' and supporting personnel are expected to take part in what will be a major step forward in the EUMS's involvement in the planning and conduct of large-scale EU crisis management exercises. The Council decision to schedule the exercise is carried out under the operational authority of the High Representative Javier Solana. The Director General of the EUMS is responsible for preparing the implementation of the exercise.

1. In May 2002, the EU conducted its first Crisis Management Exercise (CME 02) in the framework of the ESDP. In November 2003, the EU and NATO conducted a joint Crisis Management Exercise (CME/CMX 03). A third Crisis Management Exercise (CME 04) was conducted by the EU in May 2004.

2. Key nucleus provided by Response Forces Operations Command located in the EU - dedicated facilities in Mt Valérien, France.

3. Response Forces Operations Command (formerly II GE/US Korps), Ulm, Germany.



Representatives of NATO staff, the UN, the OSCE, as well as the non-EU European NATO Members and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU, Canada, Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean Partners, will be invited to information briefings concerning the exercise.

## External Relations Council

Brussels, 21-22 November 2005

### WESTERN BALKANS

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#### *Council conclusions*

Defence ministers discussed the EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUFOR Althea.

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

#### 'BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

1. On the tenth anniversary of the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement, which made a historic contribution to peace and stability in the region, the Council reviewed developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It applauded the progress that Bosnia and Herzegovina has made in the ten years since the end of the war.
2. The Council warmly welcomed the fact that the progress made by Bosnia and Herzegovina had now made it possible for the Commission to recommend the opening of negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement. The Council authorised the Commission to open negotiations at the earliest opportunity.
3. The opening of negotiations marks an historic moment in Bosnia and Herzegovina's development, as the first important step towards its establishment of contractual relations with the EU. It demonstrates the EU's determination fully to implement the Thessaloniki agenda, according to which the future of the Western Balkans lies in the EU. It underlines how far Bosnia and Herzegovina has come in the ten years since the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement, and marks a key moment in the region's transition from stabilisation towards the EU. The Council noted with satisfaction that all the countries in the region have made sufficient progress to have established, or to be negotiating, contractual relations with the EU.
4. The Council recalled that the speed with which Bosnia and Herzegovina moves closer to the EU will depend on how quickly it adopts and implements the necessary reforms for it to become a fully functioning and viable state and conforms to the Copenhagen criteria and requirements of the Stabilisation and Association process. The Council judged that the pace and conclusion of negotiations would depend in particular

on Bosnia and Herzegovina's progress in developing its legislative framework and administrative capacity, the implementation of police reform in compliance with the Agreement on Police Restructuring of October 2005, the adoption and implementation of all necessary Public Broadcasting legislation, and full co-operation with the ICTY. The Council and Commission will jointly review Bosnia and Herzegovina's performance in these areas before negotiations conclude.

5. Recalling UN Security Council resolutions 1503 and 1534, the Council emphasised its expectation that Bosnia and Herzegovina will now take decisive action to ensure that all fugitive indictees, notably Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, are finally brought to justice. Full cooperation with the ICTY is essential to achieve lasting reconciliation in the country and the region, and to lift a fundamental obstacle to EU integration.

6. Bosnia and Herzegovina's journey towards the EU has now begun in earnest. The Council encouraged all parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina to build on the dynamic provided by the opening of negotiations to pursue with commitment the shared reform agenda, and thereby realise the country's full potential to the benefit of all its citizens. The Council reaffirmed the EU's continuing readiness to support Bosnia and Herzegovina in achieving its ambitions of moving closer to the EU.

7. The Council expressed its gratitude for the work of EU Special Representative (EUSR) and High Representative Lord Ashdown for the key role he has played in Bosnia and Herzegovina's progress. The Council agreed to strengthen the EUSR's role in co-ordinating all its instruments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and invited the EUSR to maintain an overview of the EU's efforts to strengthen the rule of law. These changes reflect the EU's changing relationship with Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Council looked forward to an increasing role for the EUSR with the transition from the OHR to an EUSR-led mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

8. The Council reviewed the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM), and commended its contribution to sustainable policing arrangements in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Council agreed to establish a follow-on mission with a mandate re-focused on supporting the fight against organised crime in a more proactive way and implementation of police reform, working closely with other EU actors and local law enforcement agencies. In this context, the Council welcomed the recent decisions by Bosnia and Herzegovina on police restructuring, recalled the three key principles endorsed by the Commission which should guide that work, and urged the authorities to move forward rapidly on implementation.

9. The Council also reviewed the EU Military Operation, Althea, on completion of its successful first year. The Council welcomed the positive contribution of the operation to

ensuring a safe and secure environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and confirmed that a continuing EU military presence remained at this stage essential to that end. It noted that the operation was a practical example of the strategic partnership with NATO in crisis management. It approved the SG/HR's recommendation that force levels should remain broadly unchanged for the coming year and that decisions on the future size and structure of EUFOR should be based on an assessment of conditions on the ground. The Council furthermore confirmed that EUFOR should retain its tasks for the coming six months. Sustained progress within the Stabilisation and Association process, and an assessment of the impact of elections in 2006 will allow Ministers then to consider options for the future presence of EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

10. The Council expressed its determination that all EU instruments should be employed in a coherent manner to enable Bosnia and Herzegovina to overcome the remaining legacy of the war and to make progress towards a brighter future as a modern democratic country in Europe. The Council called on the Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities to play their full role in this process.”

### *Bosnia and Herzegovina – Stabilisation and association agreement*

The Council adopted a decision authorising the Commission to negotiate a stabilisation and association agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina.

### *EU monitoring mission*

The Council also decided to extend until the end of 2006 the mandate of the EU monitoring mission in the Western Balkans and the mandate of the EUMM head of mission (see “General Affairs” press release 14171/05).

## **EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

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The Council, in the presence of defence ministers, discussed recent progress under ESDP and adopted the following conclusions:

### *‘A. Military Capabilities Issues*

#### **Headline Goal 2010**

The Council approved the Requirements Catalogue 05. This identifies the military capabilities and force requirements needed for the EU to fulfil the tasks stemming from the

Treaty of the European Union (Art. 17.2) and the European Security Strategy and for the objectives set out in the Headline Goal 2010. The remaining shortfalls from the Helsinki Headline Goal are included in this catalogue. The strategic planning assumptions and illustrative scenarios used in the Catalogue form the basis for the further development of military requirements and subsequently of military capabilities. The work leading to the production of RC 05 has been validated by computer-assisted operational analysis. This catalogue represents an improved level of refinement over the previous Requirements Catalogue.

The Requirements Catalogue 05 represents an important step in the capability development process of the Headline Goal 2010. It identifies the agreed military requirements against which Member States will be invited to make their commitments using the Headline Goal Questionnaire. Those commitments, once collated and analysed, will allow the outstanding capability gaps, to be identified and addressed. The process of developing an information gathering instrument and an operational analysis tool for EU's use to meet the EU's specific needs continues.

The Requirements Catalogue 05 focuses on developing the qualitative approach to capability planning called for by the Headline Goal 2010. It puts renewed emphasis on rapidly deployable, highly interoperable armed forces that can be sustained as necessary over long periods on operations through rotation of forces and provision of the requisite enabling, support and logistic elements. The Catalogue takes account of the EU's ambition to be able to run concurrent operations thus sustaining several operations simultaneously at different levels of engagement.

The use of capability reference units, reflecting the military units or assets necessary to deliver the capabilities, will assist Member States in understanding the qualitative aspects of producing effective capabilities and will help them to frame their commitments to the Headline Goal 2010. The Illustrative Scenarios include some elements for a possible EU response to both man-made and natural disasters, and a realistic assessment of the terrorist threat, in view of which capabilities need to be developed for planning purposes.

### **Single Progress Report on Military Capabilities**

The Council noted the Single Progress Report on military capabilities, drawn up in line with the EU Capability Development Mechanism, including the Capability Improvement Chart, which records progress made under the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP).

An overview of the chart will keep the public and the media informed. In this context, the Council recognized that there has been further progress in capability development since the Helsinki Progress Catalogue 03, but stressed the urgent need for further progress to be made in the development of military capabilities to remedy the current shortfalls and to address the largely qualitative limitations and constraints stemming from them.

The increasingly active role played by the European Defence Agency, working with the EU Military Committee assisted by the EU Military Staff and in close co-ordination with the Political and Security Committee, will give added impetus to this work.

### **Rapid Response**

In the context of Rapid Response, the Council noted the successful outcome of the Battlegroups Co-ordination Conference on 8 November. It welcomed, in particular, the agreement by Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Cyprus to fill the outstanding gap in Member States' commitments in the second half of 2007. This ensures that from January 2007, the EU will have the full operational capability to undertake two battlegroup size operations of rapid response, including the ability to launch two such operations nearly simultaneously. The Council also welcomed the progress made by its subsidiary bodies in implementing the Battlegroups Concept, and particularly on aspects of strategic movement and transportation, logistics issues and health and medical support. The Council looks forward to further progress on the outstanding issues.

The Council noted that the EU-NATO Capability Group had continued to address issues of coherent and mutually reinforcing development of military capabilities in the EU and NATO where requirements overlap, including on EU Battlegroups-NATO Response Force. All EU Member States were informed of these issues.

### **European Defence Agency**

The Council welcomed the report submitted by the Head of the Agency on its activities during the year and noted with satisfaction the establishment of systematic EDA processes for tackling capability shortfalls. The Council welcomed progress in encouraging competition in, and consolidating the European defence equipment market, and agreed that much of the Agency's work next year should focus on the flagship projects of 2005 and their follow-on work, with further priorities emerging organically during the operation of the aforementioned systematic processes.

The Council urged the Agency also to focus work in 2006 on the elaboration of a sound and viable financial framework for 2007-2009, to be approved by the Council unanimously, to take work forward in association with participating Member States, the EUMC and other competent Council bodies, and to continue to establish relations with third States, organisations and entities as provided for in Article 25 of the EDA Joint Action.

### ***B. EU concept on comprehensive planning as part of civil-military co-ordination:***

The Council noted that the PSC had noted the EU Concept for Comprehensive Planning as a practical framework for effective planning co-ordination between EU

actors for EU crisis management in accordance with the agreed EU Crisis Management Procedures which it does not supersede. The concept is a living document which will be amended in the light of experience. It underlined the importance of adhering to the approach contained therein when planning for EU engagement in crisis management activities.

The Council noted with approval that work was already underway to provide a single comprehensive overview of EU engagement in the DRC.

The Council underlines the need for further operationalisation of the concept in the light of experience and lessons learnt from ongoing EU operations and actions. The Council welcomes the intention of the SG/HR and the Commission to join efforts also to provide a single comprehensive review of all EU activities in each of the following three areas: Aceh; Sudan/Darfur and Bosnia and Herzegovina during the course of the Austrian Presidency.

The Council also recognised the need for further work on the improvement of civil-military co-ordination, in particular concerning the management of operations.

### *C. EU Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform (SSR):*

The Council noted that the PSC had agreed on an EU Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform (SSR), and recalled that support to SSR in partner countries is a core area for EU action as identified in the European Security Strategy (ESS). A concrete manifestation of this is the ongoing ESDP mission in support of SSR in the DRC (EUSEC RD Congo). The Council underlined that this concept will facilitate the planning and conduct of ESDP missions in the field.

The Council furthermore noted that EU support to SSR would be based on democratic norms, internationally accepted principles of human rights, the rule of law, respect for local ownership, and coherence with other areas of EU external action. The Council welcomed the Commission's intention to develop an EC Concept for SSR covering first pillar activities, and agreed that due consideration be given to joining these two strands within the framework of an overarching EU concept for SSR.'

(...)

## **MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

'1. The Council recalls its detailed conclusions of 7 November. It reiterates to both parties the importance of maintaining forward momentum towards full implementation of the Roadmap.

2. The Council welcomes the Agreement on Movement and Access between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority. These issues are fundamental to improving the humanitarian situation in Gaza and essential for promoting peaceful economic development. The Agreement signifies a major breakthrough. The priority now is to ensure that the commitments made in it are translated into reality. On the basis of the Agreement and the detailed planning undertaken by the EU with the parties, the Council agrees the EU should undertake the Third Party role proposed in the Agreement. It therefore decides to launch, as a matter of urgency, an ESDP mission to monitor the operations of the Rafah border crossing point and welcomes the provision of EU assistance to reinforce Palestinian border management capacities. The Council endorses the appointment of Major General Pietro Pistolese as Head of Mission, approves a Concept of Operations for the EU Mission and looks forward to the early deployment of an initial team of monitors to allow operations at Rafah to begin as soon as possible. The Council expects the team to be supplemented rapidly to enable the full operation of the EU mission and the full opening of the border crossing point. The Council noted that letters of invitation from the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority are expected, to which the Secretary General/High Representative will reply and ensure that the necessary arrangements are put in place. The Council also notes that the necessary capacity building, through training, equipment and technical assistance is being taken forward through the Community's assistance to the Palestinian Authority.

3. The Council welcomes the holding of multi-party elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council foreseen for 25 January 2006. The Council underlines that free and fair elections are an indispensable step in the process of consolidating democratic institutions.

4. The Council urges the Palestinian Authority to uphold all provisions of the electoral law. In this regard, the Council welcomes the Code of Conduct for Political Parties and encourages all parties to adhere to its terms. The Council notes that the independent Palestinian Central Election Commission should have sole responsibility for organising the elections. The Council urges Israel to co-operate fully with the Palestinian Authority in facilitating the preparation and conduct of the elections. The Council is especially concerned about freedom of movement for all candidates, election workers and voters, including in occupied East Jerusalem where it calls on Israel urgently to improve voting arrangements, including to facilitate effectively voter registration, access to polling stations and campaigning. The Council urges the Israelis and Palestinians to implement the recommendations made in the final report of the EU Election Observation Mission headed by Mr Rocard for the Palestinian Presidential election of January 2005.

5. The Council welcomes the Palestinian Authority's statements condemning violence and urging Palestinian groups who have engaged in terrorism to abandon this



course and engage in the democratic process. The Council recalls the EU's position that all factions, including Hamas, should renounce violence, recognise Israel's right to exist, and disarm. Ultimately, those who want to be part of the political process should not engage in armed activities, as there is a fundamental contradiction between such activities and the building of a democratic State.

6. The EU stands ready to assist the Palestinian Authority financially, technically and politically with the elections, and to send an observer mission which, in liaison with other members of the Quartet and international community, would assess whether the electoral process is conducted in accordance with international principles for genuine democratic elections. Members of an EU Election Observation Mission would have contact with all candidates, but this would be strictly limited to that necessary to observe the election satisfactorily and in a credible manner. EU observers would not engage in political discussions, unrelated to the election process, with candidates of any parties.

7. The Council once again underlined its grave concern at Israeli activities in and around East Jerusalem, including construction of the separation barrier, settlement building and house demolitions. These reduce the possibility of reaching a final status agreement on Jerusalem, threaten to make any solution based on the co-existence of two viable states physically impossible and are contrary to international law. In this light, the Council tasks relevant Council bodies to submit a detailed EU analysis on East Jerusalem to be adopted and made public at the next GAERC.'

(...)

## **EFFECTIVENESS OF EU EXTERNAL ACTION – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

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The Council, and the representatives of the governments of the member states meeting within the Council, held their sixth annual debate on improving the effectiveness of EU external action, on the basis of a discussion paper from the presidency. They adopted the following conclusions:

'1. The Council recognises that transaction costs on partner countries of receiving aid are too high, and will increase as new aid comes on stream, unless donors focus on the quality of the aid and the nature of partnerships.

2. The Council affirms that the EU, in its capacity as a global leader in providing development aid with the ambition to contribute positively to eliminating poverty and meeting the MDGs, must be fully equipped to deliver rapidly increasing aid volumes in ways

that support best practice and strengthens partner government processes and systems.

3. In this context, the Council reaffirms its intention to take concrete action on the commitments made in the GAERC in November 2004, at the DAC High Level Forum on Aid effectiveness in Paris in March 2005 and again at the Millennium Review Summit in September 2005 by increasing partner country ownership of the development process and aligning support with partners' development strategies, institutions and procedures; by promoting more harmonised, transparent and collective EU actions; by focusing on results and mutual accountability; and by promoting more decentralised aid delivery.

### **Promoting more effective delivery of European aid**

4. The Council recognises the need to monitor progress against recent commitments to improve the effectiveness of European aid. Therefore, the Council calls upon the Commission and Member States to work for a system for monitoring progress against the Paris Declaration indicators by the DAC, to be in place in early 2006. The Council should also monitor the additional EU commitments made at the November 2004 GAERC and in Paris, and should review progress in the context of the annual Monterrey review exercise starting in April 2006 and in the yearly Annual Report on Community external action;

5. The Council supports the need for Member States and the Commission to increase their participation in joint multi-annual programming based on partner countries' development strategies and preferably led by the partner country, as a key element to promote more effective aid. This should progressively apply to all European official development assistance as soon as national contexts permit. Joint multi-annual programming will pave the way for coordination of policies, harmonisation of procedures and opportunities and decisions relating to complementarity. In this process the EU should respect partner countries' ownership and leadership for multi-annual programming with donor-wide engagement. Alignment with the partner countries' multi-annual programming cycles (Poverty Reduction Strategies and budget processes) will increase opportunities to synchronise the Member States' and the Commission's multi-annual programming processes. In that regard, it is recommended that Member States and the Commission ensure flexibility in their own procedures. The Council invites the Commission to present a proposal for an updated Common Framework for Country Strategy Papers by February 2006, and for Council to discuss this in spring 2006. The Council looks forward to the next generation of Community country strategies, which will progressively be based on the revised Common Framework for Country Strategy Papers;

6. The Council wishes to promote mutually supporting actions between EU donors as well as other donors at field level to avoid duplication, ensure more focused aid, reduce transaction costs and maximise impact. Arrangements of delegated cooperation and lead donors may be explored in this context. The establishment of EU roadmaps in support of national harmonisation plans will, where feasible and appropriate, support such actions;

7. The Council notes the need for better quality, outcome and impact-based indicators linked to meeting the MDGs. In this context, the Council welcomes the Commission's assessment framework based on 10 indicators related to the MDGs, and encourages the use of this framework in the programming of forthcoming Community country strategies.

### **Promoting more effective allocation of resources**

8. Since the Community is the world's third largest provider of official development assistance, the Council invites the Commission to do its utmost to help partners meet the MDGs, including by increasing its support to low income countries, as set out in the Development Policy Statement 2005;

9. The Council reconfirms the importance of using objective and transparent resource allocation criteria based on needs and performance within global geographic and thematic allocations of Community external assistance. The particular difficulties faced by countries in crisis or in conflict will be borne in mind, alongside the specificity of the different programmes. The Council invites the Commission to share with Member States their criteria for allocating resources to countries as soon as possible in 2006 and stresses the importance of applying these criteria from the start of the next Financial Perspective;

10. The Council recognises partner countries' need for more long-term, predictable development funding; and therefore encourages the Commission to bring forward detailed proposals for a new long-term, flexible and harmonised budget support mechanism, targeted on the best-performing poor countries, by April 2006;

11. The Council recognises the need to improve predictability of aid and calls upon both Member States and the Commission to make further efforts to this effect. The Council invites Member States and the Commission to publish, where possible, indicative projections of aid by type (according to DAC criteria) and country over the next three years, and possibly also over a longer term.

## Promoting more effective management of Community aid

12. The Council welcomes the reforms made in the field of Community external action since 2000, and considers that the steps taken have had a positive impact on the effectiveness of Community aid. Likewise, the Council welcomes the assessment of the review exercise of all Community strategies and agrees that the programming framework, and mechanisms set up to develop strategies, have improved the focus and coherence of Community aid. The Council invites the Commission to inform Council of the further impact of its reform efforts on an annual basis;

13. The Council stresses the importance of a country-based approach to development where decisions are taken close to the beneficiaries and in partnership with stakeholders. The Council therefore welcomes the devolution of aid management to Commission delegations and considers this a crucial step in making Community aid more effective and responsive. The Council invites the Commission to further strengthen its delegations in terms of staffing and skills mix without jeopardising the skills base at headquarters, and also to explore ways to further increase their financial authority, thereby reinforcing their capacity to interact with partner governments and donors;

14. The Council notes that Community aid is still hampered by complex rules and procedures. Therefore, the Council invites the Commission to further rationalise and streamline its systems and rules, including its Financial Regulations, with a view to facilitating its role in co-funding, joint donor actions and national harmonisation efforts, to further improving the quality of its actions, and to helping it to deliver aid in line with best practice, including through budget support, in the context of the next Financial Perspective;

15. The Council welcomes the steady improvement in financial performance since 2000, and invites the Commission to set targets to eliminate as far as possible its old RAL (Reste à Liquidier) and inactive commitments, and to further increase the speed of delivery across all regions.

16. The Council notes the importance of concentrating Community aid in partner countries so as to maximise its impact and promote the most effective use of resources. The Council invites the Commission to adhere closely to this principle when programming the next generation of country strategy programmes.

17. The Council welcomes the Commission's commitment to further deepen its reform efforts with a focus on impact, quality and more devolution, building on the achievements of the 2000 reform programme, and aiming to equip the Commission with the right tools to deliver more effective and higher quality aid. The Council invites the Commission to keep it informed of progress in deepening its reform efforts.

## Strengthening the EU's role in Middle-Income Countries

18. The Council acknowledges the need to provide the most effective mix of support to partners based on country-specific circumstances. The Council therefore invites the Commission and the European Investment Bank to develop proposals for a more coherent deployment of loans and Community external grant resources, including an increased role for lending where the economic and political conditions are appropriate; and suitable measures to encourage the emergence of projects for loan funding, and to present such ideas to Council in 2006;

19. The Council asks the Commission to articulate clearly its purposes and role in using official development assistance in middle-income countries, distinguishing between upper middle-income and lower middle-income countries, including: its particular advantages in different contexts; the range of its objectives, policies and approaches and their impact, including on poverty and inequality; the way in which it is implementing the Paris commitments on aid effectiveness; the criteria by which it allocates its resources and the proportion of its aid that is focused on reducing poverty and inequality.'

(...)

## Ministers of Defence Meeting

Brussels, 21 November 2005

### INTERVENTION DE JAVIER SOLANA

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#### *Overview of military capabilities*

Je me réjouis du solide résultat obtenu dans l'identification du besoin militaire pour la conduite de nos opérations, en ligne avec l'approche qualitative de l'objectif global 2010. Cependant, des lacunes continuent à exister. Il faut que les nouveaux outils que nous développons nous servent à combler effectivement ces lacunes. Il nous appartiendra de donner toute l'attention et l'impulsion politique à ce processus.

En ce qui concerne les groupements tactiques, les travaux conceptuels ont progressé. Lors de la conférence de coordination du 9 novembre, nous avons pu confirmer les offres indicatives pour les périodes à venir ainsi que les engagements de principe couvrant également nos besoins jusqu'en 2009. Le dernier créneau pour 2007 a été couvert et j'en remercie la Grèce, la Bulgarie, la Roumanie et Chypre. Enfin, au-delà de 2009 certaines indications initiales ont été données. Dans l'ensemble, nous avons des engagements fermes pour 18 groupements tactiques.

La vision militaire à long terme est un sujet auquel j'attache une grande importance. C'est une suite naturelle à la Stratégie européenne de sécurité qui lui donne son cadrage. Je vais donc suivre ces travaux avec beaucoup d'attention et je note avec plaisir que tous les acteurs compétents sont impliqués dans cet exercice complexe et essentiel à un développement de capacités adaptés aux besoins de demain.

#### *Comprehensive Planning*

A comprehensive approach in crisis management is a necessity – all the more so in the dynamic security environment in which we live, where threats are diffuse and complex and defy traditional ways of operating. More than other actors, the EU has the ability to bridge the world of diplomats, soldiers and development experts.

We have been developing a coherent and comprehensive EU approach to crises, more through the conduct of actual operations than by conceptual drafting. Effective action requires a range of civilian and military tools to address both the causes and consequences of a crisis. It also requires that these instruments are employed coherently in pursuit of a clear political objective. Clearly, a unity of purpose and effort is required by all EU actors to ensure that this is the case.

We have to think about our structures and whether they satisfy the requirement for being truly comprehensive and offer the best response to our new challenges. The Heads

of state and government mandated me in Hampton Court to study possible improvements. I will come back with proposals.

### *Security Sector Reform (SSR)*

Security Sector Reform is a growing necessity and activity worldwide. The EU is already involved in supporting SSR through different activities. Of course, many Member States are also involved in bilateral SSR activities.

Support to SSR may be provided directly as through the *EUSEC* mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This relatively small mission has garnered achievements that are well in excess of its size. It is involved in providing strategic as well as practical advice and assistance, mainly to the Congolese Defence Ministry and army, with the main objective of contributing to a successful integration of the Congolese army.

I appreciate that Member States have already given significant support but I urge you to continue to engage with our very important mission in DRC and, further, to consider identifying and providing experts in SSR and DDR (disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration) and the other financial and material resources that will be required in future.

### *Military Operations*

#### **Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)**

I would like to present the main recommendations I have made in the Second Mission Review Report on *Operation ALTHEA*, namely:

- ▶ *EUFOR* should retain its current tasks for the coming six months and the force levels should not be reduced until the outcome of the elections in BiH in October 2006 can be taken into account.
- ▶ To strengthen EU support to the rule of law in BiH and to achieve a greater effect of the support to the fight against organised crime, the EU Special Representative (EUSR), *EUFOR* and *EUPM* will deepen their cooperation. The revised mandate of the EUSR, a more pro-active mandate of the *EUPM* follow-on mission as well as appropriate structures and resources for this mission will allow *EUFOR* to hand over to the *EUPM* its operational coordinating role and its task to assist the local law enforcement agencies in operational planning. The transfer of responsibilities will be a gradual process, as *EUPM*'s capabilities are building up. *EUFOR* will remain engaged providing support when requested by EU actors and BiH authorities. Results of increased co-operation between *EUFOR* and *EUPM* can already be seen on the ground.
- ▶ The Operation Commander will conduct pre-planning in order to enable a potential

swift adjustment of *EUFOR* to the situation on the ground after the October 2006 elections.

Based on the above, I would like to thank Member States for their support to the EU Military Operation in BiH and to urge the need for continued backing. We must keep *EUFOR*'s operational capacity well in sight. I invite all Member States to consider further military or civilian contributions and extend my thanks to Bulgaria for its decision to deploy a manoeuvre company for next year.

Taking the opportunity to brief you on the latest Council decisions regarding BiH, I am pleased to note that this morning the Council welcomed process made by Bosnia and Herzegovina and authorised the Commission to open negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement. Symbolically, the launching of these negotiations coincides with the 10th anniversary of the Dayton Peace Agreement.

The Council has also agreed to strengthen the EUSR's role in co-ordinating all EU instruments in BiH, in particular in the area of rule of law. The Council will soon take a decision on the successor to the current EUSR, Lord Ashdown.

The Council has agreed to establish a follow-on mission to *EUPM* with a mandate refocused on supporting the fight against organised crime in a more proactive way and on implementation of police reform.

#### **Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)**

I touched earlier on the successful initial steps of *EUSEC* in DRC. Since it was launched last spring, this relatively small team of 8 advisors has achieved tangible results on the ground and is widely commended by the international community which is present in DRC for contributing to the success of the transition process.

As you must be aware, in line with its mandate, *EUSEC RD CONGO* has identified the renovation of the chain of payment of the Ministry of Defence as a central issue requiring urgent attention. As we have seen, the EU has really made a difference even with limited human resources. Let us keep up our support.

#### **Sudan**

The last month and a half have seen no abatement in violence. During this period, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has suffered its first combat casualties. There have been attacks on a camp for internally displaced persons and also across the border in Chad.

Clearly, there is no military solution to the problem in Darfur. Meanwhile, the absence of a political process is highly detrimental. We need to exert a concerted effort to re-invigorate the political process, primarily through the EUSR.

More specifically on AMIS, the Mission has a crucial role to play in maintaining a sufficiently secure environment without which, it is unlikely that there will be a political solution in Darfur. We are building a strategic partnership with the African Union (AU).



Hence, it is our responsibility to deliver on our commitments to provide personnel, equipment and financial support. I would like to thank those Member States who have contributed and welcome the key role played by the Peace Facility. All this support is proving very valuable and we will continue to depend on you to provide experts for some time to come. We stand ready to enhance our overall capacity-building effort in the context of our longer-term strategic partnership and to answer positively to the request of the AU on strategic airlift.

The AU is responsible for addressing some aspects of AMIS's capability in particular some of the Command and Control issues that they themselves have identified during the Joint Assessment mission of March this year.

## FACTSHEET

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### EU BATTLEGROUPS

The Battlegroup (BG) is a specific form of the EU's rapid response elements, and is one possible answer to the timely provision of the necessary capabilities for an EU rapid response operation.

In this context a BG:

- *is the minimum militarily effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations, or for the initial phase of larger operations;*
- *is based on a combined arms, battalion sized force and reinforced with Combat Support and Combat Service Support elements;*
- *will be based on the principle of multinationality and can be formed by a Framework Nation or a multinational coalition of Member States. In any case, interoperability and military effectiveness have to be the key criteria;*
- *must be associated with a (F)HQ and pre-identified operational and strategic enablers, such as strategic lift and logistics.*

#### *Characteristics:*

- Designed for a range of possible missions
- Generic composition of a BG = +/- 1500 troops
- All deployment assets & capabilities will be associated with it
- Sustainability: 30 days initially, extendable to 120, if re-supplied appropriately
- Close relation between the core of the BG (Infantry Battalion) and the (F)HQ; prior training and interoperability required.

#### *Requirements:*

- Utility across all Treaty<sup>1</sup> + ESS<sup>2</sup> tasks; full potential best in tasks of combat forces in crisis management, bearing in mind their limited size
- Could be on request of the UN or under UN mandate
- Potential area: outside EU (possibly for long range operations)
- Concurrency: 2 single BG ops
- Number on standby: minimum 2
- Readiness: 5 – 10 days
- Assured deployability
- Training and certification is MS responsibility.

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
1. TED Art 17.2

2. European Security Strategy

**BG Provision:**

- Different ways of construction of BG-Package; tailoring by the OpCdr possible
- MS indicate stand-by time and recurrence of BG-Package
- MS to offer complete BG-Packages, which may be different the next time they are offered
- BG needs to be both militarily effective and based on the principle of multinationality
- Battle Group Co-ordination Conference twice a year.

**Timelines:**



## Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference

Brussels, 21 November 2005

### MINISTERIAL DECLARATION

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1. The role of civilian crisis-management in the EU's support for international peace and security continues to grow. Considerable progress has been made over the last year in making civilian ESDP more active, with the number and scope of civilian crisis-management operations increasing markedly. The EU has launched new civilian missions to monitor implementation of the peace process in Aceh, support the stabilisation process in the Democratic Republic of Congo, support the Iraqi rule of law sector and the reform of Palestinian civil police. The EU continues to contribute to building police capacity in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and is further developing its regional approach to the fight against organised crime in the Western Balkans. The EU is supporting policing elements of the African Union Mission in Sudan and is also contributing to rule of law reform and border monitoring in Georgia. In addition, other missions are in preparation, including in Moldova/Ukraine and at Rafah.
2. The development and focusing of civilian crisis-management capabilities is key to sustaining this activity and continued growth in the future. Ministers of Foreign Affairs therefore welcomed the opportunity to meet in the context of the Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference, on 21 November 2005, to review progress on the enhancement of civilian capabilities and to provide direction for the way ahead, notably in the form of elements for an action plan which are set out in the Annex.
3. Ministers reiterated their strong commitment to the further development of civilian crisis-management and noted with satisfaction the work undertaken, since the Civilian Capability Commitment Conference in November 2004, on the Civilian Headline Goal 2008. The civilian capabilities the EU needs to fulfil its ambitions in line with the European Security Strategy have been clearly defined in a detailed capability requirement. Member States have indicated contributions towards the capability requirement, including in new capability areas such as specialists in the field of border policing, organised crime, sexual and violent crime, human trafficking and human rights.
4. As the primary means of making civilian ESDP more capable, in line with the European Security Strategy, Ministers attach great importance to meeting the Civilian Headline Goal 2008. Ministers noted that initial responses from Member States indicate

likely shortfalls against the capability requirement in a number of areas. Initial indications are that these will include, for example, forensic specialists, judges and administrative staff with financial expertise.

5. Ministers underlined the priorities for future action. Further steps should be taken to:

- Improve the ability of civilian ESDP to react more quickly to crises through continuing work on rapidly-deployable capabilities;
- Explore, with the individual Member States concerned, additional details in order to further improve understanding of the particular abilities of Member States' personnel;
- Establish a "targeted list" of the highest-priority capability shortfalls and a system to ensure that efforts to address them remain co-ordinated;
- Consider issues related to ensuring the quality of civilian-crisis management personnel;
- Actively foster the involvement of key national stakeholders in ESDP civilian crisis-management, notably those engaged in the raising of mission personnel in each priority area for ESDP civilian crisis management;
- Intensify activity to address Mission Support, including the requirement for equipment procurement and disposal, logistics, security, human resources, and financing for civilian operations;
- Share best practice amongst Member States, other international actors and third states to improve or generate new ways for Member States to recruit civilian personnel to crisis-management missions;
- Provide adequate resources to meet EU ambitions in the field of Civilian ESDP; and
- Continue to reinforce, as appropriate, planning and mission support capacity within the Council Secretariat.

6. Ministers welcomed progress on new rapidly-deployable capabilities, notably the agreement of a concept for setting up and deploying Civilian Response Teams (CRTs) and the development of new doctrine for the rapid deployment of police, including Integrated Police Units and Formed Police Units.

7. Ministers underlined the need for the EU to foster a more integrated approach, including with Community activities.

8. Ministers also noted synergies between capability improvement and work on Security Sector Reform, Comprehensive Planning, Civil-Military Co-ordination and the Headline Goal 2010.

9. In addition, Ministers noted that to enhance the effectiveness of EU-led civilian ESDP missions, non-EU states, notably acceding states, candidate countries, non-EU European NATO members as well as other third states which have concluded a framework agreement on the participation in EU crisis-management operations will be invited to make offers of personnel in order to provide supplementary contributions towards the Civilian Headline Goal 2008.

10. Ministers agreed that a plan for 2006 should include the elements set out in the Annex. Ministers further underlined that progress and direction of work on civilian capabilities will continue to require systematic review. A first opportunity for such a review will be at a second Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference at the end of 2006. Furthermore, in order to ensure that Civilian Headline Goal capability can be met and maintained, a comprehensive vision addressing subsequent years up to 2008 and beyond, will be presented and agreed by the end of 2006.

## **ANNEX – ELEMENTS OF A CIVILIAN CAPABILITY IMPROVEMENT PLAN**

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### *1. Action to Address the Capability Requirement*

#### **a. Action at Member States' level:**

The Civilian Capability Improvement Plan should channel Member States to:

- Address highest priority shortfalls according to a “targeted list” of priority shortfalls based on a comprehensive views of capability shortfalls;
- Actively foster the involvement of key national stakeholders in ESDP civilian crisis-management, notably amongst those involved in the raising of mission personnel in each priority area for ESDP civilian crisis management; and
- Share best practice of national co-ordinating structures aimed at facilitating the mobilisation of civilian resources for crisis management and the liaison with the EU and international organisations.

#### **b. Action at EU level:**

The Civilian Capability Improvement Plan should include steps to:

- Explore, with the individual Member States concerned, additional details concerning the state of readiness of personnel indicated by Member States;
- Establish, in consultation with Member States' experts, a “targeted list” of the highest-priority capability shortfalls and a system to ensure that Member States' efforts to address them are co-ordinated;
- Ensure that capability requirements are stated in terms which allow swift matching with Member States' records;

- ▶ Facilitate, in close co-operation with technical experts from the Member States, the examination of mechanisms by which Member States raise personnel for civilian missions, with a view to sharing best practice and further improving the understanding of Member States' capabilities;
- ▶ Issue, by April 2006, a Mission Support Concept covering equipment procurement and disposal, logistics and operations support, security, human resources, and finance; to this end the General Secretariat and the Commission should put forward concrete proposals on the issue of procurement and mission support;
- ▶ Outline a generic Mission Support Requirement for civilian crisis management operations, including fact-finding missions and issue a Mission Support Requirements Questionnaire to Member States;
- ▶ Draw up, in co-operation with the Commission as appropriate, a Training Paper which brings together the training requirement in civilian ESDP;
- ▶ Invite non-EU states, notably acceding states, candidate countries, non-EU European NATO members and other third states which have concluded a framework agreement on the participation in EU crisis-management operations to provide separate additional contributions to the Targeted List of Priority Shortfalls; and
- ▶ Share best practice and expertise in consultation with other international actors engaged in the field of civilian crisis-management, respecting EU agreed procedures and modalities.

## *2. Rapidly Deployable Capabilities*

### **a. Civilian Response Teams (CRTs)**

Work will be taken forward to:

- ▶ Establish terms of reference and a pool of experts for CRTs, in consultation with other international actors, notably the UN;
- ▶ Establish a concept for, and deliver, CRT induction training;
- ▶ Put in place, by the end of 2006, an initial CRT pool of experts of up to 100 experts; and
- ▶ To take forward other work outlined in the agreed CRT concept.

### **b. Rapidly-Deployable Police Elements**

In line with agreed concepts, rapid deployment of police may be required in some EU civilian missions. Proper identification of these police elements and procedures for their rapid deployment should be taken forward.

The Civilian Headline Goal process in 2006 will continue to be co-ordinated with the military Headline Goal 2010. International organisations, in particular the UN and the OSCE, will continue to be consulted.

## CAPABILITIES IMPROVEMENT CHART II/2005

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The development of military capabilities for crisis management has been a key aspect of the European Security and Defence Policy since its inception. In this framework, the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) launched in 2001 underpins Member States' progress in remedying identified shortfalls with respect to the Helsinki Headline goal set in 1999 by rationalising Member States respective defence efforts and increasing synergy between their national and multi-national projects.

Every six months a progress report on EU military capabilities is submitted to the Council, in accordance with the « Capability Development Mechanism » established by the Council in March 2003 for the follow-up and evaluation of military capabilities objectives and commitments by Member States.

The attached chart indicates progress in addressing shortfalls and deficits.

This chart takes as a starting point the Capability Improvement Chart published in November 2001. Military requirements identified in 2002 and 2003 have been included as have contributions by Member States addressing these requirements.

The Headline Goal 2010, set in 2004, aims at the further development of European capabilities for crisis management with a horizon of 2010, reflecting the European Security Strategy, the evolution of the strategic environment and of technology and drawing on lessons learned from the EU-led operations.

The Headline Goal 2010 builds on the existing goal and recognises that existing shortfalls still need to be addressed. Member States have decided to commit themselves to be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on the European Union. The Headline Goal 2010 adopts a long-term perspective and focuses on the qualitative aspects of capability development and also provides a framework within which to address further the delivery of capability. Future versions of this chart will also reflect the military requirements as updated in 2005 and the upcoming contributions against such requirements.

In light of the establishment of the European Defence Agency and of the Headline Goal 2010, the ECAP has been evaluated and the Project Groups created under the ECAP to address identified shortfalls have been reviewed. Council on 23 May approved the migration in whole or in part of 11 ECAP Projects Groups to a more integrated process coordinated by the European Defence Agency. The remaining ECAP Project Groups will pursue their work following the ECAP principles and under guidance from the EU Military Committee. The objective is to further improve the development of military capabilities in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy.



**Note:**

This Capabilities Improvement Chart draws on Member States contributions to the military requirements identified in 2002, which led to the identification of capability shortfalls and catalogue deficits that needed to be addressed.

This chart lists those Shortfalls and Deficits and indicates improvement or otherwise in accordance with the following legends:

Solved Shortfall/Deficit solved

- ↗ Situation has improved
- ≈ Situation remains approximately the same
- S Identified as significant in the assessment of capability

A specific column highlights qualitative (Q)/readiness (R) shortfalls.

Information reflected in the P&I column should not be regarded as a contribution nor a commitment.

CAP ABILITIES IMPROVEMENT CHART II 2006

Capabilities Shortfalls and Catalogue Deficits <sup>1</sup>	Progress 2002-2006	Impact <sup>2</sup>	ECAP-PG Deficits <sup>2</sup>	Qualitative/Readiness Shortfalls	Project # and Indicators
<b>LAND</b>					
Attack Helicopter Battalions	2	S	Helicopters (H/C)	R	YES
Composite Army Aviation Battalions	2		ECAP-PG		YES
Medium/Heavy Helicopter Transport Battalions	2	S			YES
Reconnaissance and Liaison Helicopter Battalions	2				YES
Nuclear, Biological & Chemical (NBC) Battalions	Solved	S	Nuclear, Biological & Chemical ECAP-PG		
NBC Coy (balanced)	2		NBC ECAP-PG	R	
Logistic Battalion	2			R	
Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA) / Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Battalions	2	S			YES
TA Units	2	S			
Medical Collective Protection Unit Role 3	2		ECAP-PG Medical		YES
Deployable Laboratories	7	S	NBC ECAP-PG	Q	YES
<b>NAUTIME</b>					
Carrier Based Air Power	2				YES
Helicopter Carrier	2				
Primary Casualty Recovery Ship (PCRS)	2		ECAP-PG Medical		
Port and Lifting Advisory Team	2				
Support of Disembarkation (POD) Units	7				
Amphibious Brigade HQ (including Signal Company)	2			R	

<sup>1</sup> This list does not reflect any order of priority.

<sup>2</sup> The subject of the ECAP-PG's marked in *italics* with *fully* or *partly* migrate in a more integrated process within the ED A.

Capabilities Shortfalls and Catalogue Deficits <sup>1</sup>	Progress 2002-2006	Impact	ECAP-PG Deficits <sup>2</sup>	Qualifies/Resolves Shortfalls	Project to and Indefinites
<b>AIR</b>					
Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC)	So lve d			R	
Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD)	≈	§			YES
Air to Air Refuelling (AAR)	≈	§	Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR) ECAP-PG		YES
Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)	≈	§	Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) ECAP-PG		YES
Tactical Air Transport (TCC - II)	≈				YES
Cruise Missiles and Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) Equipped A/C	≈	§			YES
Tactical Air Support for Maritime Operations (TASMO) Aircrafts (A/C)	So lve d			R	
Dispersed Operating Base (DOB) Air Traffic Control (ATC) and Fire & Crash Support Element	≈				
DOB Fuel distribution Support Element	≈				
DOB Personnel Support Element	≈				
<b>CSI</b>					
Operational Headquarters (OHQ)	7	§		Q	YES
Force Headquarters (FHQ)	≈	§		Q	YES
Land Component Commander (LCC) Headquarters	≈	§		Q	YES
Maritime Component Commander (MCC) Headquarters	≈	§	HOECAP-PG	Q	YES
Air Component Commander (ACC) Headquarters	≈	§		Q	YES

<sup>1</sup> This list does not reflect any order of priority.

<sup>2</sup> The subject of the ECAP PGs marked in *italics* with *fully* or *partly* migrate in a more integrated process within the ED A.

Capabilities Shortfalls and Catalogue Deficits <sup>1</sup>	Progress 2002-2006	Impact	ECAP-PG Details <sup>2</sup>	Quality and Readiness Shortfalls	Project and Initiatives
<b>Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR)</b>					
Imagery Intelligence Collection	≈	§	<i>Spies ECAP-PG</i> <i>ECAP-PG's on ISTAR</i> <i>Information Exchange</i> <i>Framework and UAV's</i>		YES
Signal Intelligence Collection	≈	§			YES
Early Warning and Disturb Detection Strategic Level	≈	§			YES
Theatre Surveillance and Reconnaissance Air Picture	≈	§	<i>ECAP-PG's on ISTAR IE</i> <i>Framework and UAV's</i>		YES
Theatre Surveillance and Reconnaissance Ground Picture	≈	§			YES
<b>STRATEGIC MOBILITY</b>					
Strategic Airlift	≈	§	<i>Strategic Air Lift (SAL)</i> <i>ECAP-PG</i>	R in relation to passenger aircraft	YES
Strategic Sealift (including Medical Evacuation)	≈	§	<i>Strategic Sea Lift (SSL)</i> <i>ECAP-PG</i>		YES
<b>OTHER CAPABILITY</b>					
Tactical Ballistic Missile Defence	≈	§	<i>Tactical Ballistic Missile</i> <i>Defence (TBMD) ECAP-PG</i>	Q	YES

<sup>1</sup> This list does not reflect any order of priority.

<sup>2</sup> The subject of the ECAP-PG's marked in *italics* with *fully* or *partly* migrate in a more integrated process within the ED A.

Capabilities Shortfalls and Catalogue Deficits <sup>1</sup>	Progress 2002-2006	Impact	ECAP PGs Details <sup>2</sup>	Qualitative/Readiness Storyline	Projects and Initiatives
<b>CATALOGUE DEFICITS</b>					
Force Headquarters (HQ) Carrying Ship	==				YES
Repair Support Ship	==				YES
Amphibious Ship	==			R	YES
Patrol Vessel / Corvette (PV/FS)	Solved				
Harbour & Shallow water Mine Counter Measures (MCM) Unit	==				
Aircraft Carrier (CV) Based Rescue Pods	==			R	YES
Division HQ	==			R	
Light Infantry Brigade HQ	==				YES
Light/Infantry Armoured Squadron	==				YES
Mechanised Infantry Battalions	7			R	YES
Light Infantry Battalions	==				YES
Amphibious Infantry Battalion	==			R	
Field Artillery Battalion (Amphibious)	==			R	
Short Range Air Defence (SHORAD) Battalion	==			R	YES
Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) Medium Level Battalion	==			R	YES
Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) Battery	Solved				
GBAD Battery (Amphibious)	==			R	
Combat Engineer Battalion (Amphibious)	==			R	
General Support Engineer Battalions	==				
General Maintenance Engineer Battalions	==	S			
Reconnaissance Squadron (Amphibious)	==			R	

<sup>1</sup> This list does not reflect any order of priority.

<sup>2</sup> The subject of the ECAP PGs marked in *italics* with *fully* or *partly* migrate in a more integrated process within the EDA.

Capabilities Shortfalls and Catalogue Deficits <sup>1</sup>	Progress 2002-2006	Impact	ECAP-PG Details <sup>2</sup>	Qualitative Readiness Shortfalls	Projects and Initiatives
Medical Treatment Facilities Role 3 (including In-Theatre as above and afloat Medical Treatment Facilities)	Solved		<i>ECAP-PG Medical</i>	R	
Multinational Support Unit (MSU) Battalion	is			R	
Forward Tactical Aeromedical Evacuation Helos	Solved			R	

<sup>1</sup> This list does not reflect any order of priority.

<sup>2</sup> The subject of the ECAP-PG is marked in *italics* with *fully* or *partly* migrate in a more integrated process within the ED A.

## INTERVENTION OF JAVIER SOLANA

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EU Civilian Crisis management operations have increased considerably in the past year. Today we are present in the Balkans, South Caucasus, Africa, the Middle East and even in Asia.

The more we do, the more people expect from us. Our Aceh monitoring mission has transmitted a new image of the EU in places very distant from Europe. Our growing involvement in Palestine, contributing to the Police reform and now, very soon to the opening of borders in Gaza, may become a key factor in advancing the peace process.

Yours are the resources: high quality police officers, judges, prosecutors, civil servants, monitors, etc. Yours the necessary material resources that allow us to deploy rapidly in civilian crisis management operations.

The prime objective of the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 is to improve on these capabilities. That means getting the right people, in sufficient numbers, well-trained and deploying them swiftly to the theatre of operation with the resources necessary for them to be successful in their task.

A lot of work has been done over the last year to advance these goals.

We now have a much clearer idea of what capabilities are needed and what can be delivered by Member States. The initial picture that emerges is very encouraging. The overall commitment by Member States has increased. This is particularly impressive for rule of law, where we would now have more than 1.000 experts.

Progress has also been made on rapidly deployable capabilities. Within this category, the Civilian Response Teams, pre-identified and pre-trained personnel that can be mobilized within 5 days, would provide a remarkable capability for early assessment of a crisis situation, fact finding and the crucial face of mission build up. So far you have pledged up to 90 experts for this purpose, very close to our 100 goal. We must press ahead with the development of this instrument which should be ready by the end of 2006.

Certainly progress in many areas is still required. Understaffing in some of our operations, like EUJUST LEX in Iraq or our assistance mission to AMIS II in Sudan clearly demonstrate this.

We need to interact much more closely with other stakeholders, for instance Ministers responsible for Justice and Home Affairs, and motivate them. Civilian crisis management resources, notably police, are now being identified in some countries specifically for their deployment abroad. We should further encourage this. Some Member States have established co-ordinating structures with a view to mobilising more efficiently such resources and to act as an interface towards the EU and others. We should intensify the sharing of best practices.

Professional incentives and adequate per diems should be put in place for those going on missions

Training is another area, where I see scope for improvement. My staff is engaged in ongoing work to produce a paper on training requirements for civilian ESDP, having in

mind already efforts in this field.

The whole area of mission support is of course crucial to crisis management operations. We are now working on a concept that includes procurement, logistics and operation support, field security, human resources and finances to allow for even more efficient support of current and future operation, commensurate with the ambitions set out in the Civilian Headline Goal.

We discussed finances at Hampton Court and I will shortly submit to you my proposals. Whatever detailed solution we eventually agree upon, we must achieve three key objectives:

- ▶ We must ensure that operational funding is available for preparatory and fact-finding missions;
- ▶ We must ensure rapid disbursement of funds when they are required in all phases of a crisis management operation, in particular during the start-up phase;
- ▶ We must enable procurement of essential equipment to occur more speedily.

I am very confident, especially after Hampton Court, that we are on the right track. The Civilian Headline Goal is crucial for a sustained capability development. This will allow us to assume greater responsibility, in Kosovo and elsewhere.



# European Defence Agency

Brussels, 21 November 2005

## EUROPEAN DEFENCE EQUIPMENT MARKET

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The EDA Steering Board,

- recalling the Conclusions of its second meeting on 22 November 2004, and its direction to the Agency to bring forward proposals on the European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM);
- recalling subsequent direction given by the Steering Board, meeting in National Armaments Directors (NADs) formation on 2 March 2005, on a work programme to provide the basis for a decision on whether or not to proceed with a voluntary, non-binding intergovernmental regime to encourage competition in defence procurement in the Article 296 area on a fair and transparent basis;
- recalling the European Commission's efforts to facilitate the development of a more integrated EDEM, pursuant to its September 2004 Green Paper on Defence Procurement;
- reaffirming the importance they attach to the development of an internationally competitive European Defence Equipment Market, as a key means to strengthen the European defence technological and industrial base;
- noting that subscription to such a voluntary, non-binding regime would be without prejudice to the subscribing Member States' rights and obligations under the Treaties and their national legislation and international obligations;
- noting the desirability of the widest possible participation in the regime, but that not all pMS might be ready to join at the outset, or indeed later;
- noting that a number of closely associated issues, whilst not constituting a bar to early implementation of the regime, would require further work to enable the improvement of the regime over time;

Has decided, at its meeting of 21 November 2005:

- to implement, from 1 July 2006, a voluntary, non-binding intergovernmental regime to encourage competition in defence procurement in the Art. 296 area - the regime to be operated on the basis of the principles and practices set out in the attached Code of Conduct;
- to direct the Agency, in close cooperation with participating Member States (pMS), to:
- develop a single portal for announcement of all new contracting opportunities, and

to set up a reporting and monitoring system, both to become operational at the time of implementation of the regime;

- ▶ develop a Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain, to ensure fair opportunities especially for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), for adoption at the same time as implementation of the regime, as an integral part of it;
- ▶ work further with pMS on security of supply (in all circumstances) and harmonisation of offset requirements at a European level, and on common minimum standards for security of information, perhaps adapted from new Council Security rules; and to present roadmaps for this work for adoption at the next meeting of the Steering Board in NADs formation; and
- ▶ to examine the prospects for introducing greater intra-European competition into the R&T area and to develop proposals for systematic data collection on R&T; and
- ▶ to invite any pMS deciding not to subscribe to the regime on 1 July 2006 to so notify the Agency by 30 April 2006.

## THE CODE OF CONDUCT ON DEFENCE PROCUREMENT OF THE EU MEMBER STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY

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The European Defence Agency's participating Member States (pMS) have agreed on the need for decisive progress towards creation of an internationally competitive European Defence Equipment Market, as a key means to strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base.

A significant proportion of their defence procurement takes place outside EU internal market rules, on the basis of Article 296 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. The pMS have therefore decided, without prejudice to their rights and obligations under the Treaties, to establish a voluntary, non-binding intergovernmental regime aimed at encouraging application of competition in this segment of Defence procurement, on a reciprocal basis between those subscribing to the regime.

Member States who choose to subscribe to the Regime ("subscribing Member States", or sMS) will undertake to open up to suppliers having a technological and/or industrial base in each others' territories, all defence procurement opportunities of 1 m or more where the conditions for application of Art. 296 are met, except for procurement of research and technology; collaborative procurements; and procurements of nuclear weapons and nuclear propulsion systems, chemical, bacteriological and radiological goods and services, and cryptographic equipment.

Within the scope of the regime thus defined, it is recognised that sMS may exceptionally need to proceed with specific procurements without competition, in cases of pressing operational urgency; for follow-on work or supplementary goods and services; or for extraordinary and compelling reasons of national security. In such exceptional cases sMS will, once the procurement route has been confirmed, provide an explanation to the EDA, in its capacity as monitor of the regime on behalf of sMS. Data will also be provided to the Agency on collaborative procurements.

The key principles of this regime will be as follows:

- a. **A voluntary, non-binding approach.** No legal commitment is involved or implied. The regime will operate on the basis of sovereign Member States voluntarily choosing to align their policies and practices, on a reciprocal basis, in this area. Those who elect to join the regime, and follow this Code, will be free to cancel their participation in the regime at any time. No sanction is envisaged for any non-observance of this Code by any sMS, beyond the requirement to account to the other members of the regime. In all cases, the final authority for contract award remains with sMS national authorities.

- b. Fair and equal treatment of suppliers. We wish to maximise opportunities for all suppliers based on each others' territories to compete in our competitions. This will require transparency and equality of information; arrangements will be made for all relevant new defence procurement opportunities offered by SMS to be notified on one single portal, which will provide advance notification of Invitations To Tender to be issued under the regime, and links to national websites or other directions to where full documentation can be obtained. A brief "vade mecum" will also familiarise suppliers with national defence procurement authorities and procedures. The notification will briefly describe the requirement, the procedures and timescales for the competition and the award criteria. A standard-format announcement will also be posted on contract award. In the conduct of the competition itself, fair and equal treatment will be assured in:
- selection criteria. All companies will be evaluated on the basis of transparent and objective standards, such as possession of security clearance, required know-how and previous experience;
  - specifications and statements of requirements. These will be formulated as far as possible in terms of function and performance. International standards will, wherever possible, be included in the technical specifications rather than national ones or detailed and specific company-linked requirements;
  - award criteria. These will be made clear from the outset. The fundamental criterion for the selection of the contractor will be the most economically advantageous solution for the particular requirement, taking into account inter alia considerations of costs (both acquisition and life cycle), compliance, quality and security of supply and offsets;
  - debriefing. All unsuccessful bidders who so request will be given feed-back after the contract is awarded.
- c. Mutual transparency and accountability. Each SMS will wish regularly to review comprehensive data which demonstrates how the regime is in practice impacting on defence procurement practices and outcomes. The regime will embody certain classes of exception; when exceptions are invoked or when other irregular events occur, SMS will wish to have an explanation – and the opportunity, if need be, to debate the circumstances in the Agency Steering Board. The EDA will be the instrument to achieve this mutual transparency and accountability. Whilst no SMS will wish the EDA to assume the role of independent investigator of its affairs, we recognise that mutual visibility and reassurance about how each SMS is operating the Code will require an effective EDA monitoring and reporting system with regular reports to the Steering Board. We will therefore ensure that the Agency receives the necessary cooperation from national staffs to provide the insight into the operation of the regime that we will require. SMS will also inform the Agency of any use of Art. 296 in relation to the award of state aid or in mergers and acquisitions issues.

- d. Mutual support. The privilege of improved opportunity to sell into each other's defence markets implies a reciprocal obligation to do everything possible to ensure supply. In defence procurement, this is not merely a commercial matter – it involves the role of governments as well as industries.

We recognise that fully-effective operation of the regime will depend on strong mutual confidence and interdependence. sMS intending to place contracts on suppliers elsewhere in Europe are entitled to expect that the latter are and remain dependable and competitive sources of supply. Uncertainty on this point may count against them in competition. Each sMS government will therefore do everything possible, consistent with national legislation and international obligations, to assist and expedite each others' contracted defence requirements, particularly in urgent operational circumstances, and will work to increase the level of mutual confidence amongst the sMS, in particular by improving the predictability and dependability of its regulations and policies. All sMS will support efforts to simplify amongst them intra-community transfers and transits of defence goods and technologies.

- e. Mutual benefit. We recognise, too, that this regime will not prosper unless all sMS find benefit in subscribing to it. An important part of this is the expansion of opportunities for small- and medium-sized companies from across Europe to sell into a continental-scale market. In defence procurement, the customers for such companies may be a prime contractor rather than the end-user. We will therefore seek to ensure that fair competition and the benefits of the regime are driven down the supply-chain. We accordingly see a Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain, to be agreed with industry, as an integral part of the regime. Its principal tenets will be to promote transparency and fair competition at the sub-contract level. Prime contractors will be expected to evaluate and select suppliers on a fair and equitable basis. Implementation will be supported by arrangements for bench-marking, reporting and monitoring.

We are confident that mutual transparency and accountability will support over time the growth of confidence and ever-more effective operation of the regime. Experience will also enable us to identify improvements to these initial arrangements, and to consider adaptation and possible expansion of the regime. We will therefore keep its operations under continuous review, based on the EDA-led monitoring and reporting arrangements, and pursue progressively closer alignment of our policies and practices over time.

## **EUPAT (FYROM) – Council Joint Action**

**Brussels, 24 November 2005**

The police mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL PROXIMA) being scheduled to terminate on 14 December 2005, the Council decided, in agreement with the government of the FYROM, to set up an advisory team (EUPAT) which will, until May 2006, help in the creation of an efficient and professional police service based on European standards of policing.

### **COUNCIL JOINT ACTION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EU POLICE ADVISORY TEAM (EUPAT) IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA (FYROM)**

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#### **THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,**

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union and, in particular Article 14, the third subparagraph of Article 25, Article 26 and Article 28(3) thereof,

Whereas:

(1) Pursuant to the Ohrid Framework Agreement, the Union's contribution is based upon a broad approach with activities to address the whole range of rule of law aspects, including institution building programmes and police activities which should be mutually supportive and reinforcing. The activities of the Union, supported, inter alia, by the Community's institution building programmes under the CARDS Regulation, will contribute to the overall peace implementation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as well as to the achievements of the Union's overall policy in the region, notably the stabilisation and association process.

(2) The Union appointed a European Union Special Representative (EUSR) to contribute to the consolidation of the peaceful political process and the full implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, to help to ensure the coherence of the EU external action and to ensure coordination of the international community's efforts to help in the implementation and sustainability of the provisions of that Framework Agreement.

(3) The UN Security Council Resolution 1371(2001) adopted on 26 September 2001 welcomes the Framework Agreement and supports its full implementation by the efforts of, inter alia, the EU.

(4) In the interest of preserving and building upon the significant results achieved in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia through a considerable commitment of EU political effort and resources, the EU has enhanced its role in policing to further contribute to a stable secure environment to allow the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia government to implement the Ohrid Framework Agreement.

(5) The security situation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has continued to improve since the conflict in 2001. In 2005 stability has been further strengthened. Steps in the preparation for and implementation of key Ohrid Framework Agreement reforms were taken and efforts to address other reform priorities, including in the field of rule of law, were made. A continued commitment of EU political effort and resources will nonetheless help to further embed stability in the country as well as in the region.

(6) On 16 September 2003, the authorities of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia invited the EU to assume responsibility for an enhanced role in policing and the deployment of an EU Police Mission (EUPOL Proxima).

(7) Council Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP<sup>(1)</sup> established EUPOL Proxima for the 12-month period from 15 December 2003 to 14 December 2004. Council Joint Action 2004/789/CFSP<sup>(2)</sup> extended EUPOL Proxima for the 12-month period from 15 December 2004 to 14 December 2005.

(8) During consultations with the EU, the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) have indicated they would welcome, under certain conditions, a EU Police Advisory Team bridging between the end of EUPOL Proxima and a planned project funded by CARDS aiming at providing technical assistance in the field.

(9) In accordance with the guidelines of the European Council meeting at Nice on 7 and 9 December 2000, this Joint Action should determine the role of the Secretary-General/High Representative (hereinafter referred to as ‘SG/HR’), in accordance with Articles 18(3) and 26 of the Treaty in the implementation of measures falling within the political control and strategic direction exercised by the PSC.

(10) Article 14(1) of the Treaty calls for the indication of a financial reference amount for the whole period of implementation of the Joint Action. The indication of amounts to be financed by the Community budget illustrates the will of the legislative authority and is subject to the availability of commitment appropriations during the respective budget year.

(1) OJ L 249, 1.10.2003, p. 66. Joint Action as amended by Joint Action 2004/87/CFSP (OJ L 21, 28.1.2004, p. 31).

(2) OJ L 348, 24.11.2004, p. 40.

(11) Recourse should be made to the extent possible to redeployment of equipment left over from other EU operational activities, especially EUPOL Proxima, taking into account operational needs and the principles of sound financial management.

(12) The mandate of EUPAT will be implemented in the context of a situation where the rule of law is not fully secured and which could harm the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as set out in Article 11 of the Treaty,

## HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

### *Article 1*

#### **Objective**

1. The European Union hereby establishes a European Union Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) from 15 December 2005 to 14 June 2006.
2. The objective of EUPAT shall be to further support the development of an efficient and professional police service based on European standards of policing.

### *Article 2*

#### **Mandate**

EUPAT, in line with the objectives of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, in partnership with the relevant authorities, and within a broader Rule of Law perspective shall further support the development of an efficient and professional police service based on European standards of policing, in close coordination with the Commission, notably in view of the implementation of relevant Community institution-building programmes and in complementarity with OSCE and bilateral programmes. Under the guidance of the EUSR and in partnership with the host Government authorities, EU police experts shall monitor and mentor the country's police on priority issues in the field of Border Police, Public Peace and Order and Accountability, the fight against corruption and Organised Crime. EUPAT activities shall focus on the middle and senior levels of management.

To this end, EUPAT shall give special attention to:

- overall implementation of police reform in the field,
- police-judiciary cooperation,
- professional standards/internal control.



## *Article 3*

### **Planning phase**

1. In preparation for the establishment of EUPAT, the EUPOL Proxima Police Head of Mission shall, building on the work done by EUPOL Proxima, and on the basis of the guidance given by the Political and Security Committee (PSC), draw up a General Plan and develop all technical instruments necessary to execute the establishment of EUPAT.
2. To this end, the current Head of Mission shall consult and coordinate with the Commission and the OSCE in Skopje, as well as with the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as appropriate.

## *Article 4*

### **Structure**

1. EUPAT shall consist of the following elements:
  - (a) headquarters in Skopje, composed of the Head of EUPAT and staff as defined in the General Plan;
  - (b) one central co-location unit at the Ministry of Interior level;
  - (c) mobile units co-located within the FYROM at appropriate levels.
2. These elements shall be developed in the General Plan.

## *Article 5*

### **Head of EUPAT and staff**

1. The Head of EUPAT shall be responsible for managing and coordinating EUPAT activities.
2. The Head of EUPAT shall assume the day-to-day management of EUPAT and shall be responsible for staff and disciplinary matters. For seconded personnel, disciplinary action shall be exercised by the national or EU authority concerned.
3. The Head of EUPAT shall sign a contract with the Commission.
4. Police officers shall be seconded by Member States. The period of secondment shall be 6 months beginning on 15 December 2005. Each Member State shall bear the costs related to the police officers seconded by it, including salaries, medical coverage, travel expenses to and from the FYROM, and allowances other than per diems.

5. EUPAT shall recruit international civilian staff and local staff on a contractual basis as required.
6. Member States or Community institutions may, if required, also second international civilian staff for a period of six months beginning on 15 December 2005. Each Member State or EU institution shall bear the costs related to any of the staff seconded by it including salaries, medical coverage, travel expenses to and from the FYROM, and allowances other than per diems.
7. While remaining under the authority of their sending Member States or Community institutions, all experts in EUPAT shall carry out their duties and act in the sole interest of the EU supporting action. All staff shall respect the security principles and minimum standards established by Council Decision 2001/264/EC of 19 March 2001 adopting the Council's security regulations<sup>(1)</sup> (hereinafter referred to as Council's security regulations).
8. Through appropriate measures, the members of EUPAT shall ensure visibility of the EU action.

## *Article 6*

### **Chain of Command**

1. The structure of EUPAT as part of the broader EU Rule of Law approach in the FYROM shall have a unified chain of command.
2. The PSC shall provide the political control and strategic direction.
3. The Secretary-General/High Representative (SG/HR) shall give guidance to the Head of EUPAT through the EUSR.
4. The Head of EUPAT shall lead EUPAT and assume its day-to-day management.
5. The Head of EUPAT shall report to the SG/HR through the EUSR.
6. The EUSR shall report to the Council through the SG/HR.

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(1) OJ L 101, 11.4.2001, p. 1. Decision as last amended by Council Decision 2005/571/EC (OJ L 193, 23.7.2005, p. 31).

## *Article 7*

### **Political control and strategic direction**

1. The Political and Security Committee shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council, the political control and strategic direction of EUPAT.
2. The Council hereby authorises the PSC to take the relevant decisions in accordance with Article 25 of the Treaty. This authorisation shall include the powers to appoint a Head of EUPAT, upon a proposal from the SG/HR, and to approve and amend the General Plan and the chain of command. The Council, assisted by the SG/HR, shall decide on objectives and termination of EUPAT.
3. The EUSR shall provide local political guidance to the Head of EUPAT. The EUSR shall ensure coordination with other EU actors as well as relations with host party authorities and media.
4. The PSC shall receive reports by the Head of EUPAT regarding the conduct of the supporting action at regular intervals. The PSC may invite the Head of EUPAT to its meetings as appropriate.
5. The PSC shall report to the Council at regular intervals.

## *Article 8*

### **Financial arrangements**

1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to EUPAT shall be EUR 1,5 million.
2. The expenditure financed by the amount referred to in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the rules and procedures applicable to the general budget of the EU, with the exception that any pre-financing shall not remain the property of the Community.
3. The Head of EUPAT shall report fully to, and be supervised by, the Commission on the activities undertaken in the framework of his contract.
4. The financial arrangements shall respect the operational requirements of EUPAT, including compatibility of equipment and interoperability of its teams.
5. Expenditure shall be eligible as of the date of entry into force of this Joint Action.

## *Article 9*

### **Consistency with Community action**

The Council and the Commission shall, each in accordance with its respective powers, ensure consistency between the implementation of this Joint Action and other external activities of the Community in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 3 of the Treaty. The Council and the Commission shall cooperate to this end.

## *Article 10*

### **Release of classified information**

1. The SG/HR shall be authorised to release to NATO/KFOR and to the third parties associated with this Joint Action, EU classified information and documents up to the level 'CONFIDENTIEL UE' generated for the purposes of the supporting action, in accordance with the Council's security regulations.
2. The SG/HR shall be also authorised to release to the OSCE, in accordance with the operational needs of the Mission, EU classified information and documents up to the level 'RESTREINT UE' generated for the purposes of the supporting action, in accordance with the Council's security regulations. Local arrangements shall be drawn up for this purpose.
3. In the event of a specific and immediate operational need, the SG/HR shall also be authorised to release to the host State EU classified information and documents up to the level 'CONFIDENTIEL UE' generated for the purposes of the supporting action, in accordance with the Agreement between the FYROM and the European Union on the security procedures for the exchange of classified information<sup>(1)</sup>.
4. The SG/HR shall be authorised to release to third parties associated with this Joint Action EU non-classified documents related to the deliberations of the Council with regard to the supporting action covered by the obligation of professional secrecy pursuant to Article 6(1) of Council Decision 2004/338/EC, Euratom of 22 March 2004 adopting the Council's Rules of Procedure<sup>(2)</sup>.

## *Article 11*

### **Status of staff of EUPAT**

1. The necessary arrangements shall be made regarding the extension of the Agreement between the European Union and the FYROM on the status and activities of

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(1) OJ L 94, 13.4.2005, p. 39.

(2) OJ L 106, 15.4.2004, p. 22. Decision as amended by Council Decision 2004/701/EC, Euratom (OJ L 319, 20.10.2004, p. 15).

the European Union Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL Proxima)<sup>(3)</sup> to EUPAT.

2. The Member State or Community institution having seconded a staff member shall be responsible for answering any claims linked to the secondment, from or concerning the staff member. The State or Community institution in question shall be responsible for bringing any action against the secondee.

## *Article 12*

### **Entry into force and duration**

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the date of its adoption. It shall apply until 14 June 2006.

## *Article 13*

### **Publication**

This Joint Action shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Brussels, 24 November 2005.

*For the Council*

*The President*

I. Lewis

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(3) Council Decision 2004/75/CFSP (OJ L 16, 23.1.2004, p. 65).

## STATEMENT BY JAVIER SOLANA ON THE OCCASION OF THE CEREMONY MARKING THE END OF THE EU POLICE MISSION

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Skopje, 9 December 2005

A ceremony marking the end of the EU Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, EUPOL PROXIMA, was held today in Skopje. The mission was launched on 15 December 2003. On the occasion of the ceremony, the following message was read on behalf of EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana.

- ▶ 'It is an important day today. Both for the EU and for this country. In partnership and through competent work of people on both sides, for two years, PROXIMA has been instrumental in supporting the further development of a police service based on European standards. It has not always been an easy task, but it has been a necessary one, and together you have made progress in a number of key areas that has improved public confidence in the police.
- ▶ I want to express my personal gratitude towards Head of Mission Juergen SCHOLZ and all mission members and local staff. Because of your dedication, hard work and close cooperation with local policemen and women we have been able to reach the results we had hoped for and contribute to improving the performance of the police service in this country.
- ▶ In light of the progress made time has come to end the presence of PROXIMA and the presence of EU Crisis Management Missions under the European Security and Defence Policy. The European Union's relationship with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is therefore moving from post-crisis stabilisation to pre-accession integration.
- ▶ However, the end of PROXIMA is not the end of the EU support to the broader Rule of Law area in this country. We will continue our efforts by the establishment of the EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) that will assist our local counterparts in the police reform efforts from 15 December and for the six months ahead. EUPAT will then hand over to a European Commission local implementation support project that will provide you with police advisors at central and local level.
- ▶ I think this evolution shows how far the country has come. It also illustrates the EU's ability to adapt its different tools to specific situations, with specific needs. We began by taking over a military operation, continued with an ESDP police mission, the ending of which we mark today, and will follow up with EUPAT and the European Commission projects.
- ▶ I will finish here by expressing to the men and women of PROXIMA my sincere thanks for the work done and by extending my best wishes to all of you for the holiday season and for the time ahead.'

# EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina – Council Joint Action

Brussels, 24 November 2005

The EUPM, operational since January 2003 in Bosnia Herzegovina, is the first operation launched by the EU in the framework of the ESDP. Undertaken in order to support local police in developing a police infrastructure as well as in the fight against organised crime and corruption, it was due to come to an end on 31 December 2005. The Council decided to extend it until December 2007.

## COUNCIL JOINT ACTION ON THE EUROPEAN UNION POLICE MISSION (EUPM) IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (BIH)

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THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union and, in particular, Article 14 and the third subparagraph of 25 thereof,

Whereas:

- (1) On 11 March 2002, the Council adopted Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP<sup>(1)</sup> on the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). That Joint Action expires on 31 December 2005.
- (2) The EU-Western Balkans Summit, held in Thessaloniki on 21 June 2003 concluded that the future of the Balkans is within the European Union.
- (3) The Brussels European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004 adopted the European Security Strategy: Comprehensive Policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. It states that the long-term objective of the EU is a stable, viable, peaceful and multiethnic BiH, cooperating peacefully with its neighbours and irreversibly on track towards EU membership, and the Union's medium-term objective is the signing of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with BiH.
- (4) On 18 July 2005 the Council of the European Union agreed that continued EU engagement in support of policing in BiH would be needed following the completion of the current mandate of the EUPM on 31 December 2005. The EUPM will continue with an adjusted mandate and size.

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(1) OJ L 70, 13.3.2002, p. 1. Joint Action as last amended by Joint Action 2005/143/CFSP (OJ L 48, 19.2.2005, p. 46).

- (5) In a letter of invitation of 26 October 2005, the BiH authorities invited the EU to deploy a refocused EUPM in BiH.
- (6) The High Representative in BiH is also the EU Special Representative in BiH (EUSR). The EUSR will continue to promote overall EU political coordination in BiH and give guidance to the EUPM's Head of Mission/Police Commissioner.
- (7) In accordance with the guidelines of the European Council meeting in Nice on 7 to 9 December 2000, this Joint Action should determine the role of the Secretary-General/High Representative (hereinafter referred to as 'SG/HR'), in accordance with Articles 18(3) and 26 of the Treaty.
- (8) Article 14(1) of the Treaty calls for the indication of a financial reference amount for the whole period of implementation of the Joint Action. The indication of amounts to be financed by the Community budget illustrates the will of the legislative authority and is subject to the availability of commitment appropriations during the respective budget year.
- (9) The mandate of EUPM will be implemented in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could harm the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as set out in Article 11 of the Treaty,

## HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

### *Article 1*

#### **Mission**

1. The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), established by Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP shall be continued from 1 January 2006 in accordance with the following provisions.
2. The EUPM shall operate in accordance with the objectives and other provisions as contained in the mission statement set out in Article 2.

### *Article 2*

#### **Mission statement**

The EUPM, under the guidance and coordination of the EUSR and as part of the broader rule of law approach in BiH and in the region, will aim, through mentoring, monitoring



and inspecting, to establish in BiH a sustainable, professional and multiethnic police service operating in accordance with best European and international standards.

This police service should operate in accordance with commitments made as part of the Stabilisation and Association Process with the European Union, in particular with regard to the fight against organised crime and police reform. The EUPM will operate in line with the general objectives of Annex 11 of the Dayton/Paris Agreement and its objectives will be supported by the Community instruments. Under the direction of the EUSR, the EUPM will take the lead in the coordination of policing aspects of the ESDP efforts in the fight against organised crime, without prejudice to the agreed chains of command. It will assist local authorities in planning and conducting major and organised crime investigations.

### *Article 3*

#### **Review**

A six-monthly review process, in accordance with the assessment criteria set out in the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and Operation Plan (OPLAN) and taking into account developments in police reform, shall enable adjustments to be made to the Mission's activities as necessary.

### *Article 4*

#### **Structure**

1. The EUPM shall in principle be structured as follows:
  - (a) main headquarters in Sarajevo, composed of the Head of the Mission/Police Commissioner and staff as defined in the OPLAN. Part of this staff shall consist of a variable number of Liaison Officers to coordinate with other international organisations on the ground;
  - (b) co-locations within the various BiH police services at senior level, including within the State Investigation and Protection Agency, the State Border Services, Interpol, Entities, Public Security Centres, Cantons, and the Brcko district.
2. These elements shall be developed in the CONOPS and the OPLAN. The Council shall approve the CONOPS and the OPLAN.

## *Article 5*

### **Head of Mission/Police Commissioner**

1. The Head of Mission/Police Commissioner shall exercise Operational Control (OPCON) over EUPM and assume the day-to-day management of EUPM and coordination of EUPM activities, including the management of security of Mission staff, resources and information.
2. The Head of Mission/Police Commissioner shall be responsible for disciplinary control over the personnel. For seconded personnel, disciplinary action shall be exercised by the national or EU authority concerned.
3. The Head of Mission/Police Commissioner shall sign a contract with the Commission.

## *Article 6*

### **Staff**

1. The numbers and competence of the EUPM staff shall be consistent with the mission statement set out in Article 2 and the structure set out in Article 4.
2. Police officers shall be seconded by Member States for a minimum period of one year. Each Member State shall bear the costs related to the police officers seconded by it, including salaries, allowances and travel expenses to and from BiH.
3. The EUPM shall recruit international civilian staff and local staff on a contractual basis as required.
4. Member States or EU institutions may, if required, also second international civilian staff if required for a minimum period of one year. Each Member State or EU institution shall bear the costs related to any of the staff seconded by it, including salaries, allowances and travel expenses to and from BiH.
5. All staff shall remain under the authority of the appropriate seconding State or institution and shall carry out their duties and act in the interest of the Mission. Staff shall respect the security principles and minimum standards established by Council Decision 2001/264/EC of 19 March 2001 adopting the Council's security regulations<sup>(1)</sup> (hereinafter referred to as Council's security regulations).

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(1) OJ L 101, 11.4.2001, p. 1. Decision as last amended by Decision 2005/571/EC (OJ L 193, 23.7.2005, p. 31).

## *Article 7*

### **Status of staff of EUPM**

1. The necessary arrangements shall be made regarding the continuation of the Agreement between the EU and BiH of 4 October 2002 on the activities of the European Union Police Mission in BiH for the duration of the EUPM.
2. The Member State or EU institution having seconded a staff member shall be responsible for answering any claims linked to the secondment, from or concerning the staff member. The Member State or EU institution in question shall be responsible for bringing any action against the secondee.
3. The conditions of employment and the rights and obligations of international and local contracted staff shall be laid down in the contracts between the Head of Mission/Police Commissioner and the staff member.

## *Article 8*

### **Chain of Command**

1. The EUPM shall have a unified chain of command, as a crisis management operation.
2. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) shall provide the political control and strategic direction.
3. The SG/HR shall give guidance to the Head of Mission/Police Commissioner through the EUSR.
4. The Head of Mission/Police Commissioner shall lead the Mission and assume its day-to-day management.
5. The Head of Mission/Police Commissioner shall report to the SG/HR through the EUSR.
6. The EUSR shall report to the Council through the SG/HR.

## *Article 9*

### **Political control and strategic direction**

1. The PSC shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council, the political control and strategic direction of the Mission. The Council hereby authorises the PSC to take the

relevant decisions in accordance with Article 25 of the Treaty. This authorisation shall include the powers to appoint a Head of Mission/Police Commissioner, upon a proposal by the SG/HR, and to amend the OPLAN and the chain of command. The Council, assisted by the SG/HR, shall decide on the objectives and termination of the Mission.

2. The PSC shall report to the Council at regular intervals taking into account the EUSR reports.

3. The PSC shall receive reports by the Police Head of Mission regarding the conduct of the Mission at regular intervals. The PSC may invite the Police Head of Mission to its meetings as appropriate.

### *Article 10*

#### **Participation of Third States**

1. Without prejudice to the Union's decision-making autonomy and its single institutional framework, acceding States, non-EU European NATO members and other non-EU OSCE Member States currently providing the EUPM with staff shall be invited, and other third States may be invited to contribute to the EUPM on the basis that they bear the cost of sending the police officers and/or the international civilian staff seconded by them, including salaries, allowances and travel expenses to and from BiH, and contribute to the running costs of the EUPM as appropriate.

2. Third States making contributions to the EUPM shall have the same rights and obligations in terms of day-to-day management of the operation as EU Member States taking part in the operation.

3. The Council hereby authorises the PSC to take the relevant decisions on acceptance of the proposed contributions and to establish a Committee of Contributors.

4. Detailed arrangements regarding the participation of third States shall be subject to agreements to be concluded in accordance with procedures laid down in Article 24 of the Treaty.

### *Article 11*

#### **Financial arrangements**

1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the Mission shall be (a) EUR 3 million for 2005, (b) EUR 9 million for 2006.

2. The final budget for the years 2006 and 2007 shall be decided on an annual basis.

3. The expenditure financed by the amounts stipulated in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the EU with the exception that any pre-financing shall not remain the property of the Community. Nationals of third States participating financially in the Mission and of the host country shall be allowed to tender for contracts.
4. The Head of Mission/Police Commissioner shall report fully to, and be supervised by, the Commission on the activities undertaken in the framework of his contract.
5. The financial arrangements shall respect the operational requirements of the EUPM.
6. Expenditure shall be eligible as of the date of entry into force of this Joint Action.

## *Article 12*

### **Security**

1. The Head of Mission/Police Commissioner shall be responsible for the security of the EUPM and shall, in consultation with the Security Office of the General Secretariat of the Council, be responsible for ensuring compliance with minimum security requirements in accordance with the Council's security regulations.
2. The EUPM shall have a dedicated Mission Security Officer reporting to the Head of Mission/Police Commissioner.
3. The Head of Mission/Police Commissioner shall consult with the PSC on security issues affecting the deployment of the Mission as directed by the SG/HR.
4. EUPM staff members shall undergo mandatory security training organised by the GSC Security Office and medical checks prior to any deployment or travel to the Mission area.

## *Article 13*

### **Community action**

1. The Council and the Commission shall, each in accordance with their respective powers, ensure consistency between the implementation of this Joint Action and the external activities of the Community in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 3 of the Treaty. The Council and the Commission shall cooperate to this end.
2. The Council notes that coordination arrangements already exist in the Mission area as well as in Brussels.

## *Article 14*

### **Release of classified information**

1. The SG/HR is authorised to release to third States associated with this Joint Action, as appropriate and in accordance with the operational needs of the Mission, EU classified information and documents up to the level 'RESTREINT UE' generated for the purposes of the Mission, in accordance with the Council's security regulations.

2. In the event of a specific and immediate operational need, the SG/HR is also authorised to release to the local authorities EU classified information and documents up to the level 'RESTREINT UE' generated for the purposes of the Mission, in accordance with the Council's security regulations. In all other cases, such information and documents shall be released to the local authorities in accordance with the procedures appropriate to their level of cooperation with the EU.

3. The SG/HR is authorised to release to third States associated with this Joint Action and to the local authorities EU non-classified documents related to the deliberations of the Council with regard to the Mission covered by the obligation of professional secrecy pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Council's Rules of Procedure(1)(1).

## *Article 15*

### **Entry into force and duration**

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

It shall apply from 1 January 2006 until 31 December 2007.

## *Article 16*

### **Publication**

This Joint Action shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Brussels, 24 November 2005.

*For the Council*

*The President*

I. Lewis

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(1) Council Decision 2004/338/EC, Euratom of 22 March 2004 adopting the Council's Rules of Procedure (OJ L 106, 15.4.2004, p. 22). Decision as amended by Decision 2004/701/EC, Euratom (OJ L 319, 20.10.2004, p. 15).

# 10<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

Barcelona, 27-28 November 2005

## CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT

On the 10th anniversary of the adoption of the Barcelona Declaration in November 1995, the leaders of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership pledge their renewed commitment to the objective of achieving a common area of peace, stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean region through ongoing dialogue, exchange and co-operation. They reaffirm that this objective requires a comprehensive approach to enhancing security, the just resolution of regional conflicts, strengthening democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and exclusion, and the promotion of greater understanding between cultures and peoples.

The partners recognise that only determined action will enable the region's young people to fulfil their aspirations of a better future.

They reaffirm their commitment to the principles and objectives of the Barcelona Declaration and re-emphasise the importance of co-ownership of the Process, which remains the cornerstone of the Euromed partnership. They reiterate that their partnership should serve as a framework for building regional co-operation and understanding.

The Barcelona Process provides an important contribution to promoting progress in the Middle East Peace Process and to furthering mutual understanding, even if it is not the forum in which a settlement will be reached. They call for the rapid and full implementation of the Road Map and encourage the parties to continue on the path of direct dialogue and negotiation in the fulfilment of the vision of two states, a safe and secure Israel and a viable, sovereign, contiguous, democratic Palestine, living side by side in peace and security. Final status issues have to be agreed by the parties.

Partners reaffirm their commitment to achieve a just, comprehensive and lasting settlement consistent with the Road Map and principles of the Madrid Conference including land for peace and based on relevant UNSC resolutions, including 242, 338 and 1397 and take note of recent regional developments and initiatives, including the Beirut Arab Peace Initiative.

Partners also call for the reinvigoration of efforts to promote progress in the Middle East Peace Process on all tracks, Palestinian, Syrian and Lebanese.

They recognise that major changes have occurred in the European Union and internationally since the Barcelona Declaration was signed in 1995. The EU has launched the European Neighbourhood Policy to reinforce and complement the Barcelona Process. The EU has also developed the European Security and Defence Policy on which a dia-

logue has been initiated with Mediterranean partners. They also recall Turkey's special situation as a candidate country and a member of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

The partners make the following collective commitments:

- 1) To strive collectively to achieve peace in the region.
- 2) To strengthen democracy, expanding participation in political life, public affairs and decision making, and further promoting gender equality. To enhance respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression in accordance with their international obligations. To continue maintaining and ensuring the independence of the judiciary and expand access to justice to all. In this context the EU will establish a substantial financial Facility to support willing Mediterranean partners' in carrying out their reforms, taking into account that successful reforms must develop from within the societies of the region.
- 3) To enhance the security of all citizens, particularly through more effective counter-terrorism policies and deeper co-operation to dismantle all terrorist activities, to protect potential targets, to manage the consequences of attacks, and to implement the Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism they have agreed today. To condemn terrorism, wherever it is committed, without qualification and reject all attempts to associate any religion or culture with terrorism
- 4) In the context of the implementation of the chapter on political and security partnership: to promote regional security by acting, inter alia, in favour of nuclear, chemical and biological nonproliferation through adherence to and compliance with a combination of international and regional non-proliferation regimes, and arms control and disarmament agreements such as NPT, CWC, BWC, CTBT and/or regional arrangements such as weapons free zones including their verification regimes, as well as by fulfilling in good faith their commitments under arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation conventions.

The parties shall pursue a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems. Furthermore the parties will consider practical steps to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as excessive accumulation of conventional arms.

Refrain from developing military capacity beyond their legitimate defence requirements, at the same time reaffirming their resolve to achieve the same degree of security and mutual confidence with the lowest possible levels of troops and weaponry and adherence to CCW.



Promote conditions likely to develop good-neighbourly relations among themselves and support process aimed at stability, security, prosperity and regional and subregional cooperation.

Consider any confidence and security-building measures that could be taken between the parties with a view to the creation of an “area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean”, including the long term possibility of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean pact to that end.

5) To contribute to achieving an area of shared economic development by: fulfilling the undertaking to achieve a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area by 2010; promoting broad-based equitable sustainable economic development and employment by inter alia pursuing economic reform, supporting efforts to promote domestic and attract foreign investment in the region, enhancing public financial management, strengthening the role of the private sector, improving legal systems, reinforcing industrial cooperation, enhancing equitable access to basic services; developing integrated transport, energy and telecommunications networks and encouraging the objective of establishment of a Euro-med Energy Market. To assess in December 2006 the possibility of the incorporation of an EIB majority owned subsidiary dedicated to the Mediterranean partner countries, on the basis of an evaluation of FEMIP’s performance. In this context they welcome the EIB’s intention to provide a further tranche of financial assistance to the region in 2006.

6) To develop the Mediterranean Strategy for Sustainable Development and review the implementation of all relevant regional agreements and action plans. To endorse a feasible timetable to de-pollute the Mediterranean Sea by 2020, while providing appropriate financial resources and technical support to implement it, using the Mediterranean Strategy for Sustainable Development and exploring possible areas for co-operation in this regard with UNEP.

7) To reinforce and support the efforts of all countries in the region to meet the Millennium Development Goals, particularly in the areas of education, vocational training and of gender equality, given the importance of human development and knowledge-based societies to modernisation. To significantly enhance national efforts to meet agreed targets for standards of education across the region, through developing educational systems, administration and management, with a particular focus on creating skilled workforces. In this context partners will increase significantly resources devoted to education.

8) To create an area of mutual cooperation on migration, social integration, justice, and security.

- 9) To strengthen the management of regular migratory flows in a comprehensive manner beneficial to the peoples of both shores of the Mediterranean, respecting migrants' rights. To intensify cooperation on all aspects of illegal immigration between all parties concerned, including human trafficking, reflecting shared responsibility and solidarity.
- 10) To act jointly against racism, xenophobia and intolerance, stressing respect for all religions, rejecting extremist views which attempt to divide us and incite violence and hatred, and joining together to promote common understanding. To improve intercultural dialogue aiming at promoting understanding, building on our cultural heritage, including through the work of the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue Between Cultures, and in support of the UN Alliance of Civilisations.
- 11) To strengthen dialogue between governmental and non-governmental actors across the Euro-Mediterranean region, including through the promotion of dialogue between Parliamentarians within the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, contacts between civil society associations, youth, trade unions, business and professional associations and cooperation between regional and local administrations.

The partners recall the application presented by the Islamic Republic of Mauritania to join the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership which will be given consideration in due time.

Expressing their renewed determination to drive the Process forward in pursuit of a better future for the youth of the region and fully implement the principles of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration, the leaders of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership commit to work towards the objectives contained in the attached work plan over the next five years and to regularly review progress against these undertakings.

## EURO-MEDITERRANEAN CODE OF CONDUCT ON COUNTERING TERRORISM

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The countries of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, guided by the principles and objectives of the Barcelona Declaration, are united in the struggle against terrorism. The threat that terrorism poses to the lives of our citizens remains serious and terrorist attacks seriously impair the enjoyment of human rights. We remain determined to strengthen co-operation and coordination to respond to this global challenge. Today, we reiterate our total condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and our determination to eradicate it and to combat its sponsors.

We have exerted considerable effort and had significant success in combating terrorism. We must continue to prevent terrorists accessing money and weapons, to disrupt their plans and disrupt their networks and to bring them to justice, by strengthening international co-operation. Our response must remain proportionate and solidly anchored within international and domestic legal frameworks that ensure respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. We must not imperil the democratic values to which we are committed.

We confirm that we will:

- implement in full all Security Council resolutions addressing the issue of terrorism, ensuring respect for the Charter of the United Nations, international law and international humanitarian law.
- strive to achieve the ratification and implementation of all 13 UN Counter-Terrorism Conventions;
- welcome the work on the development of the UNSG's strategy in the fight against terrorism and co-operate with UN anti terrorism bodies;
- encourage the full implementation of the standards established by the Financial Action Task Force;
- exchange information on a voluntary basis on terrorists and their support networks, in accordance with international and national law;
- work bilaterally and in accordance with national legislation to develop our effective and operational co-operation to disrupt networks and bring individuals involved in terrorist acts to justice;
- refuse asylum to terrorists and deny them safe haven in accordance with international law;
- share expertise and best practices on countering terrorism on a voluntary basis, including through technical assistance;
- ensure respect for human rights in the fight against terrorism in accordance with international law;

- ▶ Consider convening a high level conference under the auspices of the UN to formulate an international response to terrorism in all its aspects and manifestations, following agreement on a comprehensive convention on international terrorism.

Terrorism can never be justified. If we are to succeed in the long term in enabling international institutions, governments to stop terrorism we need to address all its causes. We recognise the links between peace, security, social and economic development and human rights. We will continue to do all we can to resolve conflict, end occupation, confront oppression, reduce poverty, promote good governance and human right, improve intercultural understanding and ensure respect for all religions. Such actions serve directly the interests of the people of the Euromed region and work against the interests of the terrorists and their networks.

We confirm that we will:

- ▶ condemn terrorism in all its manifestations without qualification.
- ▶ reject any attempts to associate terrorism with any nation, culture or religion;
- ▶ prohibit and prevent the incitement of terrorist acts through the adoption of appropriate measures and in accordance with international law and the national legislation of each country;
- ▶ implement the commitments we have made on security and development in our Work Programme;
- ▶ work together to conclude the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, including a legal definition of terrorist acts, before the end of the 60th session of the United Nations General Assembly;
- ▶ encourage moderation, tolerance, dialogue and understanding amongst our societies;
- ▶ co-ordinate our work to identify the factors which contribute to the terrorist threat and share experiences and expertise on how to address them.

As well as reducing the terrorist threat, we must lessen our vulnerability to attack by protecting our citizens. We have taken huge steps in improving security over recent years, notably in protecting aviation. We will also develop further efforts in the field of maritime security.

We must also be prepared to minimise the consequences of attacks. We have conducted exercises and anticipated such a moment. We will share the lessons of past attacks and provide technical and other assistance where appropriate.

We confirm that we will:

- ▶ strengthen our national and collective mechanisms to deal with the aftermath of terrorist attacks;
- ▶ share experience on managing the consequences of terrorist attacks and build contacts as appropriate;

- ▶ consider inviting one another to participate in or observe our emergency exercises;
- ▶ help victims of terrorism and provide assistance to the competent authorities in dealing with the consequences of a major attack.

## EU BAM Rafah – Council Joint Action

12 December 2005

On 15 November 2005, Israel and the Palestinian Authority came to a definitive agreement on Rafah, the designated border crossing point between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, which, due to Israel's withdrawal from Gaza, was to be placed under Palestinian control before the end of 2005. The European Union was therefore asked to set up a border assistance mission there, whose operational phase was to start on 25 November.

### **COUNCIL JOINT ACTION ON ESTABLISHING A EUROPEAN UNION BORDER ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR THE RAFAH CROSSING POINT (EU BAM RAFAH)**

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#### THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 14 and the third subparagraph of Article 25 thereof,

Whereas:

- (1) The European Union, as part of the Quartet, is committed to assisting and facilitating the implementation of the Roadmap, which lays out reciprocal steps by the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority in the political, security, economic, humanitarian, and institution-building fields, that will result in the emergence of an independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbours.
- (2) Following Israel's unilateral disengagement from Gaza, the Government of Israel is no longer present at the Rafah Crossing Point and the terminal is closed apart from exceptional cases.
- (3) The European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004 reaffirmed the readiness of the EU to support the Palestinian Authority in taking responsibility for law and order, and in particular, in improving its civil police and law enforcement capacity.
- (4) The Council of 7 November 2005 reiterated the EU's support for the work of the Quartet Special Envoy for Disengagement, and welcomed his recent report to members of the Quartet. The Council also noted his letter of 2 November 2005 in which he

requested on behalf of the parties that the EU consider playing a Third Party monitoring role at the Rafah Crossing Point on the Gaza-Egypt border. The Council noted the EU's willingness in principle to provide assistance with the operation of crossings at Gaza's border on the basis of an agreement between the parties.

(5) The opening of the Rafah Crossing Point has economic, security and humanitarian implications.

(6) The EU has identified as a priority the building up of a Palestinian customs administration in EC-Palestinian cooperation. The Community has provided assistance to the Palestinian border management and has an established tripartite dialogue on customs issues with the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian Authority is engaged in developing detailed plans for border security procedures with the support of the USA and Israel.

(7) On 24 October 2005 the Palestinian Prime Minister sent a letter to the European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy in which he requested the EC's assistance in such areas as capacity building of Palestinian personnel at the Rafah crossing point, the development and installation of needed systems and equipment, and providing advice and support of Palestinian officials on duty at the Rafah Crossing Point.

(8) On 15 November 2005 the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority concluded an Agreement on Movement and Access at border crossing points with Gaza, which, inter alia, indicated the role of the EU as a third party regarding the operation of the relevant crossing points.

(9) In letters of invitation, on 20 November 2005 and on 23 November 2005 respectively, the Palestinian Authority and the Government of Israel invited the EU to establish a European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah).

(10) The European Union mission will be complementary and will bring added value to current international efforts, as well as develop synergies with ongoing European Community and Member States efforts. The mission will seek coherence and coordination with the capacitybuilding actions of the Community, notably in the domain of customs administration.

(11) The mission will be set in the wider context of the EU and of the international community's effort to support the Palestinian Authority in taking responsibility for law and order, and in particular, in improving its civil police and law enforcement capacity.

(12) Appropriate liaison with the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories, referred to as the European Union Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS)<sup>(1)</sup>, should be ensured.

(13) The mission will implement its mandate in the context of a situation which poses a threat to law and order, the security and safety of individuals, and to the stability of the area and which could harm the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as set out in Article 11 of the Treaty.

(14) Security is a prime and continuing concern and appropriate arrangements to ensure security should be adopted.

(15) In conformity with the guidelines of the European Council meeting in Nice on 7 to 9 December 2000, this Joint Action should determine the role of the Secretary-General/High Representative, in accordance with Articles 18 and 26 of the Treaty.

(16) Article 14(1) of the Treaty calls for the indication of a financial reference amount for the whole period of implementation of the Joint Action. The indication of amounts to be financed by the Community budget illustrates the will of the political authority and is subject to the availability of commitment appropriations during the respective budget year,

## HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

### *Article 1*

#### **Mission**

1. A European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah) is hereby established, with an operational phase beginning on 25 November 2005.
2. EU BAM Rafah shall operate in accordance with the mission statement as set out in Article 2.

### *Article 2*

#### **Mission statement**

The aim of EU BAM Rafah is to provide a Third Party presence at the Rafah Crossing

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(1) Council Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP of 14 November 2005 (OJ L 300, 17.11.2005, p. 65).



Point in order to contribute, in cooperation with the Community's institution-building efforts, to the opening of the Rafah Crossing Point and to build up confidence between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

To this end, EU BAM Rafah shall:

- (a) actively monitor, verify and evaluate the Palestinian Authority's performance with regard to the implementation of the Framework, Security and Customs Agreements concluded between the Parties on the operation of the Rafah terminal;
- (b) contribute, through mentoring, to building up the Palestinian capacity in all aspects of border management at Rafah;
- (c) contribute to the liaison between the Palestinian, Israeli and Egyptian authorities in all aspects regarding the management of the Rafah Crossing Point.

EU BAM Rafah shall implement the responsibilities entrusted to it in the Agreements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority regarding the management of the Rafah Crossing Point. It shall not undertake substitution tasks.

### *Article 3*

#### **Duration**

The mission will have a duration of 12 months.

### *Article 4*

#### **Structure of the mission**

EU BAM Rafah shall consist of the following elements:

- (a) Head of Mission, assisted by an advisory staff;
- (b) Monitoring and Operations Department;
- (c) Administration Services Department.

These elements shall be developed in the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and Operation Plan (OPLAN). The Council shall approve the CONOPS and the OPLAN.

### *Article 5*

#### **Head of Mission**

1. Major General Pietro Pistolese is hereby appointed Head of Mission of EU BAM Rafah.

2. The Head of Mission shall exercise Operational Control over EU BAM Rafah and assume the day-to-day management of EU BAM Rafah and coordination of EU BAM Rafah activities including the management of security of EU BAM Rafah personnel, resources and information.
3. The Head of Mission shall be responsible for disciplinary control over the EU BAM Rafah personnel. For seconded personnel, disciplinary action shall be exercised by the national or EU authority concerned.
4. The Head of Mission shall sign a contract with the Commission.
5. The Head of Mission shall ensure appropriate visibility of the EU presence.

## *Article 6*

### **Planning phase**

1. During the planning phase of the mission, a planning team shall be established and shall comprise the Head of Mission, who shall lead the planning team, and the necessary personnel to deal with functions ensuing from established needs of the mission.
2. A comprehensive risk assessment shall be carried out as a priority in the planning process and shall be updated as necessary.
3. The planning team shall draw up an OPLAN and develop all technical instruments necessary to execute the mission. The OPLAN shall take into account the comprehensive risk assessment and shall include a security plan.

## *Article 7*

### **EU BAM Rafah personnel**

1. The numbers and competence of EU BAM Rafah personnel shall be consistent with the mission statement set out in Article 2 and the structure set out in Article 4.
2. EU BAM Rafah personnel shall be seconded by Member States or EU institutions. Each Member State shall bear the costs related to EU BAM Rafah personnel seconded by it, including salaries, medical coverage, travel expenses to and from the mission area, and allowances other than per diems.
3. International and local staff shall be recruited on a contractual basis by EU BAM Rafah as required.

4. Third States may also, as appropriate, second mission personnel. Each seconding third State shall bear the costs related to any of the personnel seconded by it, including salaries, medical coverage, allowances, high-risk insurance and travel expenses to and from the mission area.

5. All personnel shall remain under the authority of the appropriate sending State or EU institution and shall carry out their duties and act in the interest of the mission. All personnel shall respect the security principles and minimum standards established by Council Decision 2001/264/EC of 19 March 2001 adopting the Council's security regulations<sup>(1)</sup>.

6. EU police officers will wear national uniforms and EU insignia as appropriate and other members of the mission will wear identification as appropriate, subject to the decision by the Head of Mission, taking into account security considerations.

## *Article 8*

### **Status of EU BAM RAFAH personnel**

1. Where required, the status of EU BAM Rafah personnel, including, where appropriate, the privileges, immunities and further guarantees necessary for the completion and smooth functioning of EU BAM Rafah shall be subject of an agreement to be concluded in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 24 of the Treaty. The Secretary-General/High Representative, assisting the Presidency, may negotiate such arrangements on its behalf.

2. Member State or EU institution having seconded a staff member shall be responsible for answering any claims, from or concerning the staff member, linked to the secondment. The Member State or EU institution in question shall be responsible for bringing any action against the secondee.

3. The conditions of employment and the rights and obligations of international and local staff shall be laid down in the contracts between the Head of Mission and the staff member.

## *Article 9*

### **Chain of command**

1. EU BAM Rafah shall have a unified chain of command, as a crisis management operation.

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(1) OJ L 101, 11.4.2001, p. 1. Decision as last amended by Decision 2005/571/EC (OJ L 193, 23.7.2005, p. 31).

2. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) shall provide the political control and strategic direction.
3. The Secretary-General/High Representative shall give guidance to the Head of Mission through the EU Special Representative.
4. The Head of Mission shall lead EU BAM Rafah and assume its day-to-day management.
5. The Head of Mission shall report to the Secretary-General/High Representative through the EU Special Representative.
6. The EU Special Representative shall report to the Council through the Secretary-General/High Representative.

### *Article 10*

#### **Political control and strategic direction**

1. The PSC shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council, the political control and strategic direction of the mission.
2. The Council hereby authorises the PSC to take the relevant decisions in accordance with Article 25 of the Treaty. This authorisation shall include the power to amend the OPLAN and the chain of command. It shall also include powers to take subsequent decisions regarding the appointment of the Head of Mission. The Council, assisted by the Secretary-General/High Representative, shall decide on the objectives and termination of the mission.
3. The PSC shall report to the Council at regular intervals.
4. The PSC shall receive reports by the Head of Mission regarding contributions to and the conduct of the mission, at regular intervals. The PSC may invite the Head of Mission to its meetings, as appropriate.

### *Article 11*

#### **Participation of third States**

1. Without prejudice to the decision-making autonomy of the EU and its single institutional framework, acceding States shall be invited and third States may be invited to contribute to EU BAM Rafah, provided that they bear the cost of the staff seconded by them, including salaries, medical coverage, allowances, high-risk insurance and travel

expenses to and from the mission area, and contribute to the running costs of EU BAM Rafah, as appropriate.

2. Third States making contributions to EU BAM Rafah shall have the same rights and obligations in terms of day-to-day management of the mission as Member States taking part in the mission.

3. The Council hereby authorises the PSC to take the relevant decisions regarding the participation of third States, including their proposed contributions and to establish a Committee of Contributors.

4. Detailed arrangements regarding the participation of third States shall be subject of an agreement to be concluded in accordance with the procedures laid down in Article 24 of the Treaty. The Secretary-General/High Representative, assisting the Presidency, may negotiate such arrangements on its behalf. Where the EU and a third State have concluded an agreement establishing a framework for the participation of this third State in the EU crisis management operations, the provisions of such an agreement shall apply in the context of EU BAM Rafah.

## *Article 12*

### **Security**

1. The Head of Mission shall be responsible for the security of EU BAM Rafah and shall, in consultation with the Security Office of the General Secretariat of the Council, be responsible for ensuring compliance with minimum security requirements in conformity with the Council's security regulations.

2. EU BAM Rafah shall have a dedicated mission Chief Security Officer, assisted by a security team, reporting to the Head of Mission.

3. The Head of Mission shall consult with the PSC on security issues affecting the deployment of EU BAM Rafah as directed by the Secretary-General/High Representative.

4. EU BAM Rafah staff members shall undergo mandatory security training and medical checks prior to any deployment or travel to the mission area.

## *Article 13*

### **Financial arrangements**

1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the mission shall be EUR 1 696 659 for 2005 and EUR 5 903 341 for 2006.

2. The expenditure financed by the amount referred to in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the EU with the exception that any pre-financing shall not remain the property of the Community. Nationals of third States contributing financially to the mission, host parties and, if required for the operational needs of the mission, of neighbouring countries shall be allowed to tender for contracts.
3. The Head of Mission shall report fully to, and be supervised by, the Commission on the activities undertaken in the framework of his contract.
4. The financial arrangements shall respect the operational requirements of EU BAM Rafah, including compatibility of equipment and interoperability of its teams.
5. Expenditure shall be eligible as of the date of entry into force of this Joint Action.

### *Article 14*

#### **Community action**

1. The Council and the Commission shall, each in accordance with their respective powers, ensure consistency between the implementation of this Joint Action and the external activities of the Community in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 3 of the Treaty. The Council and the Commission shall cooperate to this end.
2. The necessary coordination arrangements shall be put in place in the mission area, as appropriate, as well as in Brussels.

### *Article 15*

#### **Release of classified information**

1. The Secretary-General/High Representative is authorised to release to third States associated with this Joint Action, as appropriate and in accordance with the operational needs of the mission, EU classified information and documents up to the level 'RESTREINT UE' generated for the purposes of the mission, in accordance with the Council's security regulations.
2. In the event of a specific and immediate operational need, the Secretary-General/High Representative is also authorised to release to the local authorities EU classified information and documents up to the level 'RESTREINT UE' generated for the purposes of the mission, in accordance with the Council's security regulations. In all other cases, such information and documents shall be released to the local authorities in accordance with the procedures appropriate to their level of cooperation with the EU.

3. The Secretary-General/High Representative is authorised to release to third States associated with this Joint Action and to the local authorities EU non-classified documents related to the deliberations of the Council with regard to the mission covered by the obligation of professional secrecy pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Council's Rules of Procedure<sup>(1)</sup>.

### *Article 16*

#### **Entry into force**

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

It shall expire on 24 November 2006.

### *Article 17*

#### **Review**

This Joint Action shall be reviewed by 30 September 2006 at the latest.

### *Article 18*

#### **Publication**

This Joint Action shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Brussels, 12 December 2005.

*For the Council*

*The President*

J. STRAW

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(1) Council Decision 2004/338/EC, Euratom of 22 March 2004 adopting the Council's Rules of Procedure (OJ L 106, 15.4.2004, p. 22). Decision as amended by Decision 2004/701/EC, Euratom (OJ L 319, 20.10.2004, p. 15).

## FACTSHEET

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### European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah)

The European Union (EU) has established a EU Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point (Gaza-Egypt border), in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

Code-named “EU BAM Rafah”, the Mission has been established on the basis of the “Agreement on Movement and Access” reached between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) on 15 November, and following an invitation by the Palestinian Authority and the Government of Israel.

#### *Aims/Scope of EU BAM Rafah*

The aim of “EU BAM Rafah” is to provide a Third Party presence in the Rafah Crossing Point in order to contribute, in co-operation with the European Community’s institution building efforts, to the opening of the Rafah Crossing Point and to build up confidence between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority. To this end, EU BAM Rafah will:

- ▶ actively monitors, verifies and evaluate PA performance with regard to the implementation of the APRC (Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing) and will act with authority to ensure that the PA complies with all applicable rules and regulations concerning the Rafah crossing point and the terms of the APRC;
- ▶ contributes to Palestinian capacity building in all aspects of border control and customs operation;
- ▶ contributes to the liaison between the Palestinian, Israeli and Egyptian authorities in all aspects regarding the management of the Rafah Crossing Point.

The Mission will not undertake substitution tasks. Responsibility for border and custom management will remain fully with the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian Authority will implement procedures as established in the Framework Agreement.

The EU BAM Rafah will have the authority to ensure that the Palestinian Authority complies with all applicable rules and regulations concerning the Rafah crossing point and the terms of the Agreement between the parties. In case of non-compliance it has the authority to order the re-examination and reassessment of any passenger, luggage, vehicle or goods. While the request is being processed, the person, luggage, vehicle or cargo in question is not allowed to leave the premises of the Rafah crossing point.



### *Size, Structure and Duration of the Mission*

The operational phase of EU BAM Rafah will begin on 25 November 2005.

The Mission will have a duration of 12 months.

EU BAM Rafah will include approximately 70 personnel mainly seconded from EU Member States.

Major-General Pietro Pistoiese (Italy) has been appointed Head of Mission of EU BAM Rafah.

### *Political Control*

The EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) will exercise, under the responsibility of the Council of the EU, the political control and strategic direction of the Mission. High Representative Javier Solana will give guidance to the Head of Mission through the EU Special Representative for the MEPP.

## European Council

Brussels, 15-16 December 2005

### **PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS**

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(...)

#### *V. Counter-terrorism*

11. The European Council underlines the importance of a comprehensive and proportionate response to the threat from terrorism. The European Council adopts the EU Counter Terrorism Strategy (doc. 14469/4/05 REV 4) which sets out a framework for work to prevent radicalisation and the recruitment to terrorism, to protect citizens and infrastructure, to pursue and investigate terrorists, and to improve the response to the consequences of attacks. The European Council notes that the EU Counter-Terrorism Action Plan, the instrument for tracking implementation, is being revised to ensure full coherence with the new Strategy.

12. The European Council also welcomes the progress made on priority dossiers as set out in the Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator's six monthly report and calls for this momentum to be maintained. The European Council will monitor progress on implementing the Counter Terrorism Strategy at its meeting in June 2006.

(...)

#### *X. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*

23. The European Council welcomes the Commission's Opinion on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's application for EU membership. It welcomes the significant progress made by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia towards meeting the political criteria set by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and the Stabilisation and Association Process requirements established by the Council in 1997.

24. In the light of the Commission's analysis, the European Council decides to grant candidate country status to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, taking into account, in particular, the substantial progress made in completing the legislative framework related to the Ohrid Framework Agreement, as well as its track record in implementing the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (including its trade-related provisions) since 2001.

25. The European Council makes clear that further steps will have to be considered in the light of the debate on the enlargement strategy, as provided for by the Council conclusions of 12 December 2005; of compliance by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with the Copenhagen political criteria; of the requirements of the Stabilisation and Association Process and the effective implementation of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement; and of the need for further significant progress to respond to the other issues and criteria for membership included in the Commission's Opinion and implementation of the priorities in the European Partnership, on the basis of specific benchmarks. The absorption capacity of the Union also has to be taken into account. The European Council invites the Commission to report on developments in future progress reports.

### *XI. International fund for Ireland*

26. The European Council noted the important work carried out by the International Fund for Ireland in promoting peace and reconciliation. It asked the Commission to take the necessary steps with a view to continued EU support for the Fund as it enters the crucial final phase of its work up to 2010.

### *XII. External relations*

27. The European Council adopts a declaration on the Mediterranean and the Middle East annexed to these conclusions.

28. The European Council endorses the Presidency report on ESDP (doc. 15678/05), including the mandate for the incoming Presidency.

29. trafficking of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition (doc. 13066/05).

30. The European Council welcomes the adoption by the Council, the Member States, the Commission and the European Parliament of "the European consensus on development", which provides the Union with a common vision of values, objectives, principles and means for development (doc. 14820/05). The European Council welcomes the fact that the Council will make a regular assessment, on the basis of a Commission monitoring report, of the aid volume targets agreed in the Council conclusions of May 2005.

31. The European Council invites the future Austrian Presidency to continue work on improving cooperation in the consular and visa field.

(...)

### ANNEX III – DECLARATION OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL

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1. The European Council renews its commitment to a secure, prosperous and peaceful Middle East and Mediterranean, based on respect for the rule of law, democracy and human rights.
2. The European Council recognises the challenges that the countries of the Middle East and Mediterranean face. It urges all its partners to settle their disputes peacefully, renounce the threat or use of force, end incitement and promote regional security. It urges them to adhere to and comply with international non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament agreements, and to pursue a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. It urges them to tackle terrorism and terror-networks. The EU is committed to working with all countries to deal with these challenges.

#### *Iran*

3. The European Council condemns unreservedly President Ahmadinejad's call for the eradication of Israel and his denial of the Holocaust. These comments are wholly unacceptable and have no place in civilised political debate. The European Council recalls that in November this year the UN General Assembly adopted by consensus, including Iran, a resolution which "rejects any denial of the Holocaust as an historical event either in full or in part" urging all Member States to educate their population about the Holocaust. The European Council reaffirms the right of the State of Israel to exist within secure and recognised borders. The European Council recalls that all Members of the United Nations have undertaken to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State. The EU calls on the Iranian leadership to join the international consensus on the need for a two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israel conflict, to support the search for peace between Israel and its neighbours and to end support for groups which advocate or engage in acts of terrorism.
4. The European Council is gravely concerned at Iran's failure to build confidence that its nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. Iran's resumption of activity at the Uranium Conversion Facility in Esfahan, its continuing lack of transparency and its refusal to take the steps required of it in successive IAEA Board Resolutions only add to the EU's profound concerns about Iran's intentions. While the EU continues to work for a diplomatic solution, the window of opportunity will not remain open indefinitely and the European Council urges Iran to respond constructively, including by implementing all the confidence-building measures the IAEA Board has sought and refraining from any further unilateral move which might aggravate the situation.

5. The European Council underlines that whether the EU's long-term relationship with Iran improves or deteriorates will depend on progress on all issues of concern. Given provocative political moves by Iran since May, the Council agrees on the need to keep the EU's diplomatic options under close review and continue to calibrate the EU's approach in light of Iranian declarations and actions. The European Council reiterates its deep concern about the lack of respect for human rights and fundamental political freedoms in Iran, and calls on Iran to demonstrate respect for these principles by taking concrete steps, including permanently releasing Akbar Ganji and other prisoners of conscience. In the spirit of EU solidarity, it calls on Iran to lift all discriminatory restrictions against individual Member States.

### *Iraq*

6. The European Council reaffirms the EU's continued support for Iraq's political transition in line with UNSCRs 1546 and 1637 and its commitment to assist the Iraqi people in building a secure, stable, unified and prosperous Iraq. It warmly welcomes the 15 December elections as a further step towards democracy and stability in Iraq, and encourages the swift formation of a new government thereafter. The European Council recognises that divisions remain within Iraq. It calls on all parties in Iraq to commit themselves to exclusively peaceful activities, and to work actively towards reconciliation. It condemns utterly the terrorist atrocities. The European Union stands ready to support the Iraqi people in broadening further the consensus on the future of their country, including through the review of the Constitution, and continuing to build up a new and inclusive post-Saddam political system. The European Council welcomes the meeting on Iraq organised by the Arab League on 19-21 November and supports the convening of a conference on national accord in early 2006. The European Council strongly urges regional states, in particular Syria and Iran, to support the political process in Iraq and to develop good neighbourly relations, including by co-operating with Iraq to prevent cross-border transit and support for terrorists.

7. The European Council reiterates its commitment to supporting Iraq's reconstruction, including through the EU's Rule of Law mission. The European Council expresses its concern about recent reports of human rights violations in Iraq, and urges the Iraqi authorities to address these urgently and transparently. It underlines the EU's strong opposition to the use of the death penalty. It remains committed to regular political dialogue with Iraq under the Joint EU-Iraq Political Declaration. The EU hopes to broaden and enhance its relationship further with Iraq once the constitutionally elected government is set up, including through the establishment of contractual relations.

## *Lebanon*

8. The European Council reiterates its support for Lebanon's unity, stability and independence, and reminds its neighbours of their obligations to respect Lebanon's sovereignty. The European Council strongly condemns the assassination of Gibran Tueni and the murder of companions travelling with him. This assassination is the latest in a vicious campaign against Lebanese citizens, journalists, political leaders and their right to freedom of expression. The European Council also notes with extreme concern the conclusions of the second report of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIC) under Mr. Detlev Mehlis. It notes the confirmation of serious indications of the involvement of Lebanese and Syrian security services in the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, and expresses its concern at the incomplete co-operation provided by the Syrian authorities to the Commission. It urges Syria to co-operate unconditionally with UNIIC as they continue their efforts to bring to justice those responsible for the assassination of Rafiq Hariri. It welcomes the unanimous adoption of UNSCR 1644 of 15 December which extends the mandate of the UNIIC; authorises the UNIIC to provide technical assistance to the Lebanese Authorities in their investigations into other terrorist attacks perpetrated in Lebanon since 1 October 2004; and acknowledges the Lebanese Government's request that those charged with involvement in Rafiq Hariri's assassination should be tried in a tribunal of an international character.

9. The European Council reaffirms its full support for the Government of Lebanon and urges it to extend its authority throughout the country and to tackle urgently economic and political reform as agreed at the Core Group meeting held in New York last September. It welcomes the International Conference to be held in early 2006. It reminds all concerned of their obligation to implement UNSCR 1559 in its entirety, including the disbanding and disarmament of all militias.

## *Middle East Peace Process*

10. The European Council reaffirms its commitment to the full implementation of the Quartet Roadmap. It welcomes the Israeli disengagement from Gaza and parts of the West Bank as a significant step towards implementing the Roadmap. The launch of the EU Border Assistance Mission to monitor the operation of the Rafah crossing and EU assistance to reinforce Palestinian border management capacities reflect the strong commitment of the EU to support the parties as they work together for a lasting, negotiated settlement. It calls for swift implementation of all aspects of the 15 November agreement on movement and access. It commends the efforts of the Quartet Special Envoy and underlines the importance of continued international engagement in the Peace Process.

11. The European Council emphasises that all Palestinian factions, including Hamas, should renounce violence, recognise Israel's right to exist, and disarm. Those who want to be part of the political process should not engage in armed activities, as there is a fundamental contradiction between such activities and the building of a democratic state. In this respect, the European Council welcomes the Palestinian Authority's statements condemning violence and urging groups who have engaged in terrorism to abandon this course and engage in the democratic process. It urges the Palestinian Authority to take firm action against those committing acts of violence or intimidation and assume full control of security in the areas under its authority. The EU remains committed to supporting Palestinian reforms and strengthening the Palestinian security forces and civil policing capacity, including through the EU Civil Policing Mission and working with the US Security Co-ordinator.

12. The European Council emphasises the importance of the elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council foreseen for January 2006. It urges Israel to co-operate fully with the Palestinian Authority on the preparation and conduct of the elections, especially concerning freedom of movement for all candidates, election workers and voters, in particular in East Jerusalem, and welcomes the launch of the EU's Electoral Observation Mission.

13. The European Council urges the Israeli government to cease all activities in the Palestinian Territories that are contrary to international law, including settlement building, the demolition of Palestinian homes and the construction of the separation barrier on occupied land. These threaten to make any solution based on the co-existence of two viable states physically impossible. Israeli activities in and around East Jerusalem cause particular concern, especially with regard to reaching a final settlement agreement on Jerusalem.

### *Regional Stability*

14. The European Council urges all states concerned to take immediate practical measures to support regional stability. This includes supporting the search for peace between Israel and its neighbours, the inclusive political process within Iraq and the implementation of UNSCR 1559 and other relevant Resolutions in Lebanon, and by ending support for groups which use violence, by preventing their movement, organisation and arms supplies, and by influencing them to abstain from terrorism.

### *Political, Social and Economic Reform*

15. The European Council underlines its commitment to support political, social and economic reform. It emphasises the importance it attaches to full implementation of the

EU's Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and Middle East and its commitment to work with all countries of the region, including the GCC countries, Yemen, Iran and Iraq.

### *Barcelona Process*

16. The European Council recalls that the Barcelona Process, enhanced through the European Neighbourhood Policy, provides the central framework for relations with the Mediterranean countries. The European Council welcomes the progress on implementing the European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plans that have been concluded with Israel, Jordan, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority and Tunisia; notes the start of negotiations with Egypt and the preliminary consultations with Lebanon; and invites the Commission to draw up a national report on Algeria with a view to negotiating an action plan.

17. The European Council welcomes the 10th Anniversary Euromed Summit in Barcelona on 27 28 November, which adopted a jointly agreed Five-Year Work Programme and a Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism. The Five-Year Work Programme contains medium term targets in the field of political and security partnership; sustainable economic growth and reform; education and socio-cultural exchanges; and migration, social integration, justice and security. It recommends that every Presidency, after consulting with the Commission and Member States, present a report to the Council detailing their plans to implement the Work Programme and invites the Commission to update the Council periodically on its implementation. The Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism represents a significant advance in our political and security co-operation with Mediterranean partners.

### *Libya*

18. The European Council notes the progress in the development of the EU's relations with Libya, while urging a continued effort to resolve EU concerns and other outstanding bilateral issues. It recalls the EU's wish to see Libya become a full member of the Barcelona Process, in which Libya could play a valuable role. Participation in the Process, and subsequent progression towards the conclusion of an Association Agreement, would require Libya to accept the Declaration and Barcelona acquis in full.



## PRESIDENCY REPORT ON ESDP

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1. In line with the mandate defined by the European Council in June 2005, the Presidency hereby submits this report on ESDP.

2. In presenting this report, the Presidency has noted that Denmark has drawn attention to Protocol No 5 on the position of Denmark, which is annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty.

### *I. EU Civilian and Military Operational Activity*

3. Under the UK Presidency ESDP operational activity has continued to expand, particularly in the civilian field. The EU is now undertaking a wide range of civilian and military missions, on three continents, with tasks ranging from peacekeeping and monitoring implementation of a peace process to advice and assistance in military, police, border monitoring and rule of law sectors. Further missions are under active preparation.

4. This rapid increase in the EU's level of activity in the field of civilian crisis-management has highlighted the need for an increase in the CFSP budget and the need to address the issue of financing civilian operations rapidly.

5. The EU force deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the framework of the UN-authorized **ALTHEA** military operation has continued to guarantee a safe and secure environment in the country and enjoys the confidence of the local population and authorities. In addition to its primary mission of providing deterrence, reassurance and a safe and secure environment, the force has also provided assistance to the fight against organised crime and capacity building for local authorities and law enforcement agencies, and support to the Mission Implementation Plan of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) as well as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Co-ordination between the force's activities and the activities of other EU players in Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to be ensured largely by the EU Special Representative, thereby strengthening the EU's co-ordination and internal cohesion in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Co-operation with NATO continues to be good, including on the ground.

6. The Council reviewed operation ALTHEA on completion of its successful first year, on the basis of the SG/HR's report. This report confirms that a continuing EU military presence remains essential for the maintenance of a safe and secure environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina; that force levels should remain broadly unchanged for the coming year; and that decisions on the future size and structure of the force should be based on an assessment of conditions on the ground. Sustained progress within the

Stabilisation and Association process, and an assessment of the impact of elections in 2006, will allow Ministers then to consider options for the future presence of the force in BiH.

7. **The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM)** has continued to work towards establishing sustainable policing arrangements under Bosnian ownership, through monitoring mentoring and inspecting. In the course of its three year mandate, EUPM has made a substantial contribution to this process. Notable achievements include the transformation of the State Investigations and Protection Agency into an operational police agency with enhanced powers to fight major and organised crime; development of other state level institutions such as the Ministry of Security and the State Border Service; and progress towards police reform under clear local ownership.

8. In light of the end of EUPM's mandate on 31 December 2005 the EU reviewed the mission. The EU commended EUPM on its achievements but considered that continued engagement would be needed. The EU therefore decided on 21 November to put in place a follow-on mission to EUPM. Under the guidance and co-ordination of the EUSR and as part of the broader rule of law approach in BiH and in the region, the follow-on mission will mentor, monitor and inspect BiH police with the aim of establishing a sustainable, professional and multiethnic police service operating in accordance with best European and international standards. The mission will start on 1 January 2006 and have a two-year mandate with reviews every six months. The tasks of the mission will be refocused on the fight against organised crime, through strengthening BiH operational capacity and assisting in the planning and conducting of major and organised crime investigations, and the implementation of police reform, which will create a single structure of policing, improve law enforcement co-operation and reduce corruption and waste. EUPM, EUFOR and the EUSR will strengthen their co-ordination in line with agreed principles, under the overall political direction of the EUSR.

9. **The EU Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, (EUPOL PROXIMA)** has continued monitoring and mentoring of police on priority issues including Border Police, Public Peace and Order and Accountability and the fight against corruption and Organised Crime. Assistance given by the mission has contributed to progress in areas such as: improved cooperation between the police and judicial authorities (Law Enforcement Monitors); the introduction of an Integrated Border Management strategy; the creation of additional internal control mechanisms; enhanced regional and international cooperation; improved public perception in the police; and the fight against criminal groups.

10. The EU reviewed the mission in light of this progress, the improved security situation, and steps towards implementing the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. The

EU decided that the mission had successfully completed its mandate and should close as planned on 15 December 2005. EU assistance to FYROM policing will continue through Community activities and programmes, including a project focusing on implementation of police reform at field level. To ensure a smooth transition between the end of EUPOL PROXIMA and the start of the EC field level project, the EU decided to establish a team of up to 30 EU police advisors to provide further support to the development of an efficient and professional police service based on European standards of policing from 15 December 2005 for a period of 6 months.

11. **The EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL Kinshasa)** has continued to implement its mandate to monitor, mentor and advise on the setting up and initial running of the Integrated Police Unit in Kinshasa. EUPOL KINSHASA has successfully interacted with the IPU, helping it become a highly-regarded unit contributing significantly to the protection of the Transitional Government. The EU reviewed the mission and, in light of the re-scheduling of the Presidential elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo to June 2006 at the latest, decided to extend EUPOL Kinshasa's mandate until 31 December 2006. The mission will provide a greater presence of EUPOL monitors alongside IPU units or patrols operational on the ground; more extensive advice to the chain of command of the IPU regarding the execution of missions; increased mentoring and advising on other issues complementary to the effective conduct of policing in DRC; enhanced co-ordination with local partners, both national and international and; more extensive liaison with EUSEC RD CONGO in the field of security sector reform. This will allow the EU to continue its support during the critical election period and enable the IPU to consolidate its vital role and complete its integration with the Congolese National Police.

12. The ESDP mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the DRC, **EUSEC/RD Congo**, has continued to work closely with the DRC authorities, with the aim of contributing to the successful integration of the Congolese army. It has also provided valuable information on the situation on the ground, and played a key role in the co-ordination of the efforts of the international community to support DRC army reform. It has highlighted the most pressing needs – notably reform of the army pay systems – and recommended donor and DRC government actions. In November, it was agreed that a new technical assistance programme (Chain of Payments Project), under the authority of the Head of Mission/EUSEC RD Congo, would focus on improvements in the financial administration of the DRC Ministry of Defence, by contributing to the regularisation of the payments of salaries for the military, with a view to their possible revaluation by the DRC authorities. The project will support reform of the central pay structures with a team of experts based in Kinshasa and also seek to ensure that, through the attachment of temporary advisors to the newly integrated brigades, reforms are implemented at brigade level so that salaries duly reach the soldiers on the ground.

13. On 1 July 2005 the EU launched the operational phase of the **EU Integrated Rule of Law mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX)**. By the end of 2005 the mission has trained nearly 300 high- and middle-ranking Iraqi officials from across the criminal justice system in senior management and management of investigations. It is making good progress towards its overall target of training more than 700 Rule of Law professionals. This training is promoting closer co-operation between the different players in the Iraqi Rule of Law sector, strengthening management capability and improving skills and procedures in criminal investigation in the context of full respect for the rule of law and human rights. The first review of EUJUST Lex highlighted the successful completion of four months of operations. Initial feedback on the courses has been positive and many lessons have been learned; these will inform further developments within the mission.

14. Following a peace agreement between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Helsinki on 15 August 2005, facilitated by the Crisis Management Initiative, chaired by President Ahtisaari and financially supported by the European Community, the EU launched a monitoring mission to Aceh to monitor the compliance of the parties to their commitments under the agreement. An Initial Monitoring Presence was put in place on 15 August and the **Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)** became operational on 15 September with a mandate lasting six months. AMM is a 240-strong joint mission led by the EU with five ASEAN countries, Norway and Switzerland. It is the first ESDP mission to take place in Asia. In its first months, AMM has ensured that the parties are meeting their targets for the decommissioning and destruction of GAM weapons and the relocation of non-organic units of the Indonesian security forces. Good progress is being made towards completing these processes by 31 December 2005. Close liaison and good co-operation with the parties has been established and maintained through the Committee on Security Arrangements. AMM has also been monitoring the demobilisation and reintegration of GAM members and the human rights situation. AMM is co-ordinating closely with other EU activities including the EC programme on reintegration of former GAM combatants and political prisoners.

15. Following agreement between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority on the opening of the Rafah Border Crossing Point and the invitation to the EU to provide a third party presence, the EU agreed on 21 November to launch a **Border Assistance Mission at Rafah (EU BAM Rafah)**, with an initial duration of one year, in co-operation with the European Community's institution capacity-building efforts for the Palestinian Authority border-management system. EU Member States, the EUSR, the Council Secretariat and the European Commission have worked together to set up the mission rapidly. The rapid launch of EUBAM Rafah enabled the border-crossing to open on 25 November 2005. EUBAM Rafah will actively monitor, verify and evaluate

Palestinian performance; build up Palestinian capacity in all aspects of border management at Rafah; and contribute to liaison between the Palestinian, Israeli and Egyptian authorities on management of the Rafah Border-crossing. EU BAM Rafah will liaise with EUPOL COPPS as regards the role and presence of Palestinian civil police at the Rafah crossing-point and the support provided by the Palestinian civil police to the security of EU BAM Rafah and its personnel.

16. The EU agreed at the 7 November GAERC to establish an EU Police **Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS)** building on the work of the EU Coordination Office for Palestinian Policing Support (EU COPPS). EUPOL COPPS will launch on 1 January 2006. It aims to support the Palestinian Authority in establishing sustainable and effective policing arrangements. EUPOL COPPS will have a three-year mandate to assist in the implementation of the Palestinian Civil Police Development Plan, advise and mentor senior members of the Palestinian Civil Police and criminal justice system, and co-ordinate EU and where requested, international assistance to the Palestinian civil police. EUPOL COPPS will liaise with EU BAM Rafah. It will also act in co-operation with the European Community's institution-building programmes as well as other international efforts in the security sector including criminal justice reform.

17. **The EU Rule of Law Mission in Georgia (EUJUST THEMIS)** successfully completed its mandate on 15 July 2005 with agreement by the Georgian authorities to a criminal justice reform strategy. In order to aid the full implementation of the strategy, the EU decided on 18 July 2005 to strengthen the EU Special Representative's team for a six-month period to assist the Georgian authorities with implementation of the Criminal Justice Reform Action Plan and to ensure continuity with further support provided through European Community programmes.

18. The EU also agreed to reinforce the EUSR for the Southern Caucasus with a team to provide support and advice on the reform of the Georgian Border Guard, mentoring of the Guard Force in the field and continued assessment of the Georgian border situation. This team started its operations on 1 September, and aims to lay the ground for further EU action in support of the reform of the Georgian Border Guard.

19. As part of the EU civilian-military **supporting action** to the **African Union mission (AMIS II)** in the Darfur region of Sudan, the EU launched in September 2005 a civilian policing contribution to AMIS II. This contribution plays a key role in building AMIS's civilian policing capacity, through support to the AMIS II chain of command, pre-deployment training and training courses for trainers. The EU is also supporting the development of the African Union policing capacity through assistance in establishing a police unit within the AU Secretariat in Addis Ababa.

20. The EU has also provided increased military assistance to AMIS in terms of planning and management support, funding, and logistics. This includes provision of: equipment and assets, planning and technical assistance to all AMIS II levels of command, additional military observers, training for African troops and observers forming part of AMIS II enhancement, and strategic and tactical air transport. The EU also supported the development and execution of the UN-led MAPEX exercise in August 2005.

21. The EU has decided to continue both civilian and military elements of the supporting action to AMIS II for a further six-month period.

22. The EU has maintained close and effective co-ordination with institutional and bilateral donors and worked closely and effectively with the UN, as well as with NATO regarding military support in-theatre, including through a joint cell in Addis Ababa. The EU Special Representative for Sudan has been appointed, in order to co-ordinate the EU's support to the African Union mission in Darfur amongst other responsibilities.

23. Following a request from Presidents Voronin and Yuschenko, the EU agreed to launch a Border Assistance Mission on the Moldova/Ukraine border, including the Transnistrian segment (**EU BAM Moldova/Ukraine**), consisting of a field mission, managed by the Commission, with Member-State seconded experts. EU BAM Moldova/Ukraine will be accompanied by a reinforced office of the EUSR assuring political overview of developments on border issues. These arrangements are an exceptional case and do not constitute a precedent. This mission launched on 30 November and is co-operating closely with the Moldovan and Ukrainian authorities in order to contribute to the fight against weapons trafficking, smuggling, organised crime and corruption.

## *II. Development of European military capabilities*

24. Work towards Headline Goal 2010 has continued with the finalisation of Requirements Catalogue 05. This identifies the military capabilities and force requirements needed for the EU to fulfil the tasks stemming from the Treaty of the European Union (Art. 17.2) and the European Security Strategy and for the objectives set out in the Headline Goal 2010. The remaining requirements from the Helsinki Headline Goal are included in this catalogue. The strategic planning assumptions and illustrative scenarios used in the Catalogue formed the basis for the further development of military requirements and subsequently of military capabilities. The work leading to the production of RC05 has been validated by computer-assisted operational analysis. This catalogue represented an improved level of refinement over the previous Requirements Catalogue.

25. The Requirements Catalogue 05 focuses on developing the qualitative approach to capability planning called for by the Headline Goal 2010. It puts renewed emphasis on rapidly deployable, highly interoperable armed forces that can be sustained as necessary over long periods on operations through rotation of forces and provision of the requisite enabling, support and logistic elements. The Catalogue takes account of the EU's ambition to be able to run concurrent operations thus sustaining several operations simultaneously at different levels of engagement.

26. The Headline Goal Questionnaire has been elaborated. The EU has completed the adaptation of NATO-originated software to EU requirements. This enables those Member States concerned to provide information to both organisations in the most efficient way.

27. On the basis of the Requirements Catalogue 05 Member States will be invited to make their commitments using the Headline Goal Questionnaire. Those commitments, once collated and analysed, will allow the outstanding capability gaps to be identified and addressed. As part of the Requirements Catalogue 05, a list of reference units was developed, reflecting the military units or assets necessary to deliver the capabilities. They form part of the supplement to the Requirements Catalogue 05. The EUMC will update the list on a routine basis, with the assistance of the EUMS.

28. With the finalisation of the Requirements Catalogue 05 it will now be possible to extract and refine the actual ESDP requirements for space-based capabilities

29. A report on the process of developing an information gathering instrument and an Operational Analysis (OA) tool for the EU's use has been presented to the PSC. Concepts of Analysis for the studies were developed by a specialist technical panel of the EUM-CWG/HTF in order to implement the EU studies into operational analysis and information gathering. The panel analysed the EU needs for OA in support of capability planning and the process of defining the tools' requirements in order to address the EU's needs is ongoing. The process of developing an information gathering instrument and an operational analysis tool for EU's use to meet the EU's specific needs continues. The development of an information gathering system would benefit from lessons learned from the development of the Headline Goal Questionnaire.

30. The second Battlegroup Co-ordination Conference (BGCC) was held on 8 November 2005 and resulted in the commitment by Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Cyprus of a battlegroup filling the remaining gap in the second half of 2007. This ensures that from January 2007, the EU will have the full operational capability to undertake two battlegroup size operations of rapid response, including the ability to launch two such operations nearly simultaneously. Preliminary indications have been provided on the

availability of battlegroups beyond 2008. In line with the agreement that it is essential that the potential OHQ for a battlegroup package be pre-identified as early as possible, OHQs have been identified for most battlegroup commitments, noting that the final decision is the prerogative of the Council. The conference was held using a detailed BGCC Methodology agreed as a result of lessons learned from the first conference.

31. Further work was undertaken on the Battlegroups Concept, including agreement of an annex on Logistics arrangements and a paper on strategic movement and transportation issues. A paper was presented on Lessons Identified from Battlegroups Initial Operational Capability and a Lessons Learned Methodology is being established for future use.

32. A seminar held in the Czech Republic in early November provided an opportunity for Member States to consider strategic-level decision-making issues such as the necessary national mandates that would have to be agreed before a battlegroup deployment could take place. Further work on the issues arising from this seminar will now be taken forward. The European Defence Agency hosted a seminar in July on command, control and communications issues. The December Battlegroups Tactical Workshop held in the UK focused predominantly on the more practical problems and challenges of Battlegroup operations.

33. All the work outlined above will feed into an updating of the battlegroup roadmap at the beginning of 2006.

34. Work has continued to implement the conclusions of the paper on Global Approach on Deployability (GAD). This has focused on generation and update of concepts, agreement of co-ordination centre procedures and the exercising of the GAD arrangements within the framework of CME 06.

35. The terms of reference and methodology for a study of the Maritime Dimension of ESDP in the context of Headline Goal 2010 were agreed. This will provide the basis for a thorough examination of present and future EU maritime missions, requirements and capabilities.

36. Work to develop a Long Term Vision (LTV) to guide capability development has been taken forward by the EUMC and the EDA jointly. The European Security Strategy and the Headline Goal 2010 will be used as the basis for this work. The EDA hosted a seminar on 21 September at which national experts discussed the methodologies that the EU could adopt in order to develop a LTV. The EUMC has explored the possible military implications of the strategic trends over the next 10-20 years. It is envisaged that the EDA will take the lead in co-ordinating analyses of the global context and science and tech-



nology trends. The EUMC will take the lead in assessing the future military environment, under the political direction of the PSC.

37. The increase in the variety and location of ESDP operations has seen a need to review and develop duty of care procedures for military personnel deployed on EU reconnaissance and operations. Work is in hand to address these issues.

### *III. Achievements to broaden and strengthen the work of SATCEN and ISS*

38. The EU Satellite Centre (SATCEN) continued to work in support of ESDP related activities, in particular for EU missions to Aceh (AMM), Bosnia and Herzegovina (ALTHEA), Sudan/Darfur (support to AMIS II), Georgia (EUJUST-THEMIS) and the Palestinian Territories (EU-COPPS); for EUMS and SITCEN counter-proliferation and contingency planning; and for EU exercises MILEX 05 and CME 06.

39. The EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) continued to develop its work on a wide range of priority global and regional issues. The Institute's role as a focal point for academic exchange, networking and monitoring of the European security agenda was further broadened and strengthened during 2005. A lessons-learned process of the first five years of activity has been initiated.

### *IV. European Defence Agency*

40. In its first year of existence the European Defence Agency has already achieved important advances, notably the Steering Board's decision to open up the Defence Equipment Market within Europe in order to contribute to the consolidation and strengthening of the European defence technological and industrial base through a voluntary, non-binding, intergovernmental regime based on a Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement. This will encourage competition and is intended to improve the competitiveness of European defence industry and access to Member States' defence markets. The Agency will continue to work on the linked issues, in particular on provisions for the achievement of security of supply.

41. The Agency has also made good progress in the other flagship areas: Command, Control and Communications (C3); Unmanned Aerial Vehicles; and Armoured Fighting Vehicles. In addition, the Agency has taken other initiatives to improve military capabilities. At the Ministerial Steering Board on 13 October eleven Member States decided to form an ad-hoc group to address how best to meet air-to-air refuelling requirements.

42. Following the study on C3 conducted jointly by the EDA and the EUMS, a number of areas have been highlighted for action including the launch of a feasibility study into Software Defined Radio. A programme for collecting data on the basis of an initial set of

indicators on defence spending, including R&T expenditure, will allow potential strategic defence capability and research targets to be developed for the future.

43. Systematic EDA processes for tackling capability shortfalls have been established, completing the end-to-end process for capability development which ESDP requires. Integrated Development Teams, covering the entire spectrum of capability areas, have been set up and a growing number of associated Project Teams are being established. Most ECAP Project Groups are being migrated into this framework. The Agency's capability development process is also carefully integrated with its new R&T networks.

44. The Agency has established effective relations with key stakeholders, in the first place with its participating Member States. Close relations are in place with relevant Council bodies (in particular with the PSC and the EUMC), with the General Secretariat of the Council, and with the Commission. WEAG has been closed down and the transfer of responsibilities from WEAO for R&T should be completed by the end of March 2006, subject to Council approval of Administrative Arrangements with non-EU WEAG members. The EU-NATO Capability Group and informal staff-to-staff contacts have promoted transparency with NATO. Working relations have been established with LoI, OCCAR, defence industry, academic institutions and others.

45. On 21 November 2005 the EDA Steering Board adopted a budget proposal for 2006, this was approved by the Council on 12 December 2005. The Council postponed the requirement for a decision on a three-year financial framework by one year until autumn 2006. On 21 November 2005 the Steering Board approved the EDA Work Programme 2006, established within the guidelines adopted by the Council.

46. The Head of the Agency has submitted a report to the Council on the Agency's activities in 2005. In the report he underlines the need for launching concrete proposals for ad hoc collaborative projects, especially in R&T. The Head of the Agency has announced that, as recognised by the informal meeting of Heads of State and Government at Hampton Court, both levels of defence R&T spent in Europe and the amount spent collaboratively will be priority areas for next year.

### *V. Development of European Civilian Capabilities*

47. Further progress was made on the Civilian Headline Goal 2008. The civilian capabilities the EU needs to fulfil its ambitions in line with the European Security Strategy were clearly defined in a detailed capability requirement. Member States indicated contributions towards the capability requirement, including in new capability areas such as specialists in the field of border policing, organised crime, sexual and violent crime, human trafficking and human rights.

48. Progress was also made on new rapidly-deployable capabilities. A concept for setting up and deploying Civilian Response Teams (CRTs) was agreed, with the initial goal, for the end of 2006, of a CRT pool of up to 100 experts. New doctrine for the rapid deployment of police, including robust capabilities such as Integrated Police Units and Formed Police Units has also been developed.

49. Ministers of Foreign Affairs met in the context of the Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference, on 21 November 2005. Ministers reiterated their commitment to meeting the Civilian Headline Goal 2008, highlighted priorities for future action and provided direction for the way ahead. Building on this, a Civilian Capability Improvement Action Plan was adopted by the Council in December which forms the basis for work in 2006. As well as measures to tackle the highest-priority capability short-falls, the Capability Improvement Plan includes steps:

- to foster actively the involvement of key national stakeholders and the sharing of best practice, notably regarding the raising of mission personnel;
- to address mission support including equipment procurement and disposal, logistics and operations support, security, human resources, and finance; and
- to continue work on rapidly-deployable capabilities.

## *VI. Civil-Military Co-ordination*

50. Developing Civil-Military Co-ordination was one of the key themes of the UK Presidency. The UK, Austria and Finland set out an approach by which civil-military co-ordination would be taken forward during their three successive Presidencies, to ensure continuity. Based on already agreed concepts and procedures, this would enhance the EU's ability to guarantee a comprehensive approach.

51. The PSC noted a Concept for Comprehensive Planning as a practical framework for effective planning co-ordination between EU actors for crisis management in accordance with the agreed crisis management procedures, which it does not supersede. Comprehensive Planning is a systematic approach designed to address the need for effective intra-pillar and inter-pillar co-ordination of activity by all relevant EU actors in crisis management planning. Consultations and contacts with external actors (e.g. UN, NATO, OSCE, non-EU European NATO members) are to be carried out in each phase in accordance with the Crisis Management Procedures. The Council underlined the importance of adhering to the approach contained in the Concept when planning for EU engagement in crisis management activities. In addition to the comprehensive overview of EU engagement in DRC, the Secretary-General and Commission will join efforts to provide a single comprehensive review of all EU activities in Aceh, Sudan/Darfur and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This work will involve the Civil-Military Cell as appropriate.

52. A Presidency seminar in October on Civil-Military Co-ordination focused on a number of related issues and generated ideas on how the EU could take Civil-Military Co-ordination forward. The UN, NATO and a number of third countries and non-governmental organisations also participated in this seminar. Work on enhancing EU Civil Military Co-ordination will continue along the lines of the tri-Presidency approach agreed between the UK, Austria and Finland.

53. A Presidency cross-pillar expert seminar was held in September on the role of civilian and military ESDP missions in the fight against organised crime in the Western Balkans.

54. Work has continued on the implementation of the European Programme on the Prevention of Violent Conflict.

### *VII. ESDP support to Security Sector Reform*

55. Agreement was reached on an EU Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform (SSR), which is a core area for EU action as identified in the European Security Strategy (ESS). ESDP support to SSR will be based on democratic norms, internationally accepted principles of human rights, the rule of law, respect for local ownership, and coherence with other areas of EU external action. Plans will be developed for the creation of integrated military and civilian SSR teams. The Council welcomed the Commission's intention to develop an EC Concept for SSR covering first pillar activities. Consideration will be given to joining these two strands within the framework of an overarching EU concept for SSR. In this context, the Presidency co-hosted with the European Commission and the non-governmental organisations Saferworld and International Alert an expert seminar on "Developing a Security Sector Reform Concept/Strategy for the EU".

### *VIII. Civil-Military Cell*

56. The Civil-Military Cell is now fully staffed, in accordance with the conclusions of the European Council in December 2003 and December 2004, and has undertaken a valuable programme of work including preparations for the missions to Aceh and Rafah and work on security sector reform. Facilities for an operations centre continue to be prepared, including the drawing up of Standard Operating Procedures and the identification of staff, and will be ready for use by mid 2006.

### *IX. EU-NATO Relations*

57. The EU and NATO have continued to develop their strategic partnership in crisis management. In Bosnia and Herzegovina their co-operation in the context of Berlin Plus

arrangements has been smooth and efficient. The EU and NATO have cooperated including through a joint cell in Addis Ababa to ensure effective support to AMIS in Darfur.

58. The objective of full transparency between the EU and NATO, embodying their strategic partnership in crisis management, has been further pursued, in accordance with the Presidency document entitled “European Defence: NATO/EU Consultation, Planning and Operations” which was welcomed by the European Council on 12 December 2003. In this context, the terms of reference for a permanent EU cell at SHAPE and a permanent NATO liaison team at the EU Military Staff were agreed, following an exchange of letters between the EU SG/HR and the NATO SG.

59. In the field of capability development, work has continued, in particular over the adaptation of NATO Defence Planning Automated Software System (NDPASS) for use by the EU for the Headline Goal Questionnaire. The EU-NATO Capability Group has facilitated an ongoing exchange of information, in accordance with the CDM, discussing inter alia overall coherence and complementarity between EU Battlegroups and the NATO Response Force. All EU Member States were kept informed about these issues.

### *X. Co-operation with international organisations*

60. Building on the 2003 EU-UN declaration, civilian and military relations between the two organisations are stronger than ever, with links and support in DRC and Darfur (AMIS II) being key catalysts. An EU military liaison officer was established in DPKO at UN Headquarters in New York in November 2005 to enhance operational co-ordination and co-operation between the two. Regular meetings between representatives of both organisations continued to take place, inter alia through the consultative mechanism known as the EU-UN Steering Committee.

61. UN experience in the field of civil-military co-ordination could contribute to the development of EU systems and structures in this area. The UN World Summit in September 2005 endorsed the efforts of the European Union and other regional entities to develop capacities such as for rapid deployment, standby and bridging arrangements. Discussions are ongoing between the EU and the UN in relation to how EU Battlegroups might be used in this context.

62. Co-operation also intensified with the African Union and the African sub-regional organisations, through EU support both to the AU’s AMIS II mission and to longer-term capacity building measures (see section XIII).

63. The successful planning and implementation of the Aceh Monitoring Mission has enhanced co-operation with ASEAN countries.
64. An active co-operation with the OSCE continued through various in-theatre activities.
65. Co-operation with the Council of Europe continues in a satisfactory manner.

### *XI. Dialogue and co-operation with Mediterranean partners in the field of crisis management*

66. A Euro-Med meeting on ESDP, co-chaired by the PSC Chair, took place on 5 December. The meeting provided an opportunity to address recent developments in ESDP and to confirm the continuing interest of Mediterranean Partners in these issues. Follow-up actions have also been initiated in relation to the report of the Athens Seminar, which included a number of recommendations agreed by the PSC on 22 July, in particular further seminars as part of a more structured and focussed information exchange, identification of suitable training activities for Mediterranean partners, and participation in and observation of EU exercises by the Mediterranean partners. In this context the Secretariat provided an information briefing to Mediterranean Partners on 17 November. This included the provision of general information on EU training activities on ESDP, and on modalities for possible participation in EU-led operations.
67. In the framework of the five-year work programme for the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, partners also agreed to develop and deepen dialogue on ESDP and security issues with a view to strengthening co-operation, on a voluntary basis in conflict prevention, partnership building measures and crisis management activities, and also on civil protection and natural disaster preparedness.

### *XII. Co-operation with third countries*

68. The EU-Russia Summit on 4 October discussed the Third Common Space, External Security, and both sides welcomed the good progress in a short time in EU-Russian co-operation on crisis management, including in training and exercises, where Russia was set to participate. Contacts have also been established with the European Defence Agency. The EU and Russia will continue to strengthen co-operation and dialogue on security and crisis management in order to address the global and regional challenges and key threats of today, notably terrorism, the proliferation of WMD and existing and potential regional and local conflicts. The dialogue continued in the EU/Russia Foreign Ministers' Troika on 9 November.

69. The EU-Canada Summit on 24 November welcomed signature of an Agreement establishing a framework for the participation of Canada in EU crisis management operations, and agreed on enhanced, practical co-operation between the EU and Canada's Stabilisation and Reconstruction Team (START). The EU and Canada will continue to work together to assist the AU, African countries and sub-regional organisations to prevent and resolve conflict, including through developing an effective African Standby Force. The Summit also discussed continuing EU-Canada collaboration on issues related to the security sector in the DRC, such as the EU Police Mission in the DRC (EUPOL Kinshasa). Canada welcomed the EU's invitation to join the new EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS).

70. The EU-Ukraine summit of 1 December noted that EU-Ukraine relations had been made deeper and stronger through the significant progress achieved in implementation of the Action Plan signed on 21 February 2005. The EU welcomed Ukraine's firm commitment to shared values of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights; and recognised the progress made in promoting economic reforms. Leaders noted the importance of advancing co-operation in the field of European Security and Stability.

### *XIII. ESDP and Africa*

71. Implementation of the Action Plan for ESDP support to Peace and Security in Africa continued, particularly through ongoing ESDP operational activity in Africa, with the aim of helping to build Africa's own capacity for the prevention and management of conflicts, in full respect of the principle of African ownership. The EU has recalled its readiness to support the development of the African Standby Force under the auspices of the AU, in particular support for African Union workshops establishing policy and practice for key areas of the Force structure. These workshops will enable the AU to define more clearly the type of support and assistance it needs from the international community, including the EU and its Member States. Furthermore, the General Secretariat of the Council (GSC) and/or the Commission participated in a number of missions and meetings in Africa (a joint EU/UN assessment mission to AU HQ to assist in the strengthening the AU situation centre; mission to the Central African Republic to assess continued Peace Facility funding of the multinational forces of the Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale (CEMAC); a visit to Guinea-Bissau under the auspices of the UN Special Representative to the country; AU/Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) meetings in connection with a peace support mission to Somalia (IGASOM) as well as a joint Council/Commission visit to Nairobi to assess the preparation of the mission). Arrangements are under way to appoint an EU Liaison Officer(s) to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); and discussions are ongoing with the AU on drawing up a security agreement to allow the exchange of classified documents.

72. The Council-approved Conclusions on an EU Strategy for Africa include commitments to broaden and invigorate the EU-AU political dialogue on peace and security including crisis management; to reinforce co-operation with the UN, AU, and sub-regional organisations; to exploit, develop and refine CFSP and ESDP instruments, policies and activities, building on the ESDP Africa Action Plan; and to seek a more comprehensive and coherent approach in order to achieve synergy between CFSP/ESDP, first pillar instruments, policies and activities, and the approaches of individual Member States, including in the area of reinforcing African peace support capabilities. In this context, work has been launched on proposals to develop a European concept for strengthening African capabilities for the prevention and management of conflicts.

#### *XIV. Implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in the context of ESDP and Gender Mainstreaming*

73. The Council welcomed the document on Implementation of UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security in the context of ESDP. The document proposes measures to implement UNSCR 1325 within ESDP, contributing at the same time to the application of the EU's general approach on gender mainstreaming. These measures cover all planning and implementation processes from pre-conflict to post-conflict phases. The paper constitutes a further step towards more a systematic integration of the gender perspective in the EU's external relations. The Council invited Member States, the Council General Secretariat and all other relevant EU bodies to implement the proposed measures. The Council General Secretariat will review their implementation based on a case study to be undertaken by the Institute of Security Studies, and in the light of lessons learned.

#### *XV. ESDP and the fight against terrorism*

74. Work has continued within the Conceptual Framework on ESDP and Terrorism, specifically in the areas of civ-mil interoperability, in accordance with the agreed roadmap and on the military database, the content of which has been made available to the Community Civil Protection Mechanism. In another context, work to assist the counter-terrorism centre of the AU in Algiers has been initiated.

#### *XVI. ESDP and Disaster Response*

75. On 22 November the Council took stock of the state of play of the different components of the Action Plan adopted on 31 January 2005 in response to the disaster caused by the tsunamis in the Indian Ocean, notably on the basis of an updated Presidency Report highlighting particular areas of progress and identifying tasks that require further work, including better co-ordination of the use of military assets. In line with the follow-up to the informal meeting of Heads of State or Government in Hampton Court



work has been taken forward ensuring EU crisis management structures can meet the new demands including for responding to natural disasters.

76. In civilian crisis-management work towards enhancement of EU civilian capabilities in response to humanitarian relief situations has been taken forward within the framework of the Civilian Headline Goal 2008. Under this process, necessary civilian capabilities and capabilities shortfalls have been identified [and a Civilian Capabilities Improvements Plan agreed.]

#### XVII.ESDP Training

77. A Joint Action was adopted establishing the European Security and Defence College. The ESDC is organised as a network between national institutes, colleges, academies and institutions within the EU dealing with security and defence policy issues and the European Institute for Security Studies. The ESDC provides training in the field of ESDP at the strategic level in order to develop and promote a common understanding of ESDP among civilian and military personnel, and to identify and disseminate, through its training activities, best practice in relation to various ESDP issues. The ESDC Steering Committee met for the first time in September.

78. The first ESDC High Level Course has started successfully, consisting of five separate modules delivered by different Member States' academies and institutions. Also underway are a number of ESDP orientation courses. Work is in progress to plan and develop an Internet-Based Distance Learning facility.

79. Further courses were organised according to the EU Training Programme in ESDP for the years 2005-2007. Training activities in the area of civilian crisis-management are also being conducted under the auspices of the EC Project on Training. A draft EU Training Programme in ESDP for the years 2006-2008 has been elaborated with a view to Council approval in due course.

#### *XVIII. Exercises*

80. The first EU military exercise (MILEX 05) in the framework of ESDP was held successfully from 22 November to 1 December 2005. The exercise focused on key military aspects and marked the first occasion on which an EU Operation Headquarters (OHQ) was fully activated as part of an EU exercise. It concentrated on the interaction between an EU Operation HQ in France and an EU Force Headquarters in Germany in the context of an autonomous EU-led UN-authorized military operation.

81. Planning continues for the next EU crisis management exercise in 2006 (CME 06), to be held in the period 25 September to 6 October 2006. The aim of CME 06 is to exer-

cise and evaluate a range of EU crisis management structures, new concepts, and to validate the EU decision-making process as set out in the Suggestions for Procedures for Coherent Comprehensive EU Crisis Management in the context of a Crisis management exercise without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, with a view to improving the EU capacity to manage crises requiring Rapid Response with civilian and military instruments. CME 06 will exercise, inter alia, co-operation with the UN in crisis management.

82. Planning has also commenced on the EU Exercise Study EVAC 06 to be held in April 2006. The aim of EVAC 06 is to consider aspects related to the planning and conduct of an EU evacuation operation using military means, and the necessary co-ordination modalities with the consular authorities.

### *XIX. Mandate for the incoming Presidency*

On the basis of the present report and taking into account the European Security Strategy, the incoming Presidency, assisted by the Secretary-General/High Representative and in association with the Commission, is invited to continue work on developing the European Security and Defence Policy, and in particular:

*to continue the successful development of ESDP activities, and in particular:*

- to continue to ensure the effective management of the EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea);
- to ensure the effective implementation of the new mandate for the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM);

Both missions will be reviewed taking account of both the wider EU presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the expected evolution of the international community's involvement.

- to continue effective management of the EU Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUPOL KINSHASA);
- to continue effective management of the security sector reform mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC RD Congo); to ensure a successful build-up of the technical assistance project on the improvement of the chain of payments system; and prepare recommendations on the future of the mission.
- to continue effective management of the EU civilian-military supporting action to the African Union mission in the Darfur region of Sudan (AMIS II) in consultation with other international actors and taking account of future decisions by the AU on the future of its mission and of the future of the international community's involvement;
- to continue effective management of the EU Monitoring Mission in Aceh (AMM),

review the operation early in 2006 and prepare recommendations on its follow-up activities, notably taking into account activities conducted under the responsibility of the European Commission;

- to continue effective management of the Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX), review the operation and prepare recommendations on its follow-up;
- to ensure the effective implementation of the new EU Police mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) and review the operation taking into account other EU activities;
- to ensure the effective implementation of the new EU Border Assistance Mission in the Palestinian Territories at Rafah (EU BAM Rafah) taking into account other EU activities;
- to conduct an EU Evacuation Operation Exercise Study (EVAC 06);
- to continue the preparation of the crisis management exercise CME 06
- to implement effectively any other operations that the Council may decide;
- take into account and integrate relevant human rights aspects, in particular women's and children's rights, during all phases of operations, especially during the planning phase;
- continue implementation of the measures set out in the document "Implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in the context of ESDP" and of UNSCR 1612 on Children and Armed Conflict;
- take into account the Council conclusions of 21 November on comprehensive planning as part of civil-military co-ordination.

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- to ensure the effective implementation of the mandate of the EU police advisory team (EU PAT) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as a bridging capacity between EUPOL PROXIMA and a future EC field monitoring project in the area of police reform;
- to review the state of play of the EU engagement in the criminal justice reform in Georgia, as a follow-on to EUJUST Themis;
- to continue to follow border assistance activities in Georgia and on the Moldova/Ukraine border;
- to start preparations on the EU's possible future ESDP role in Kosovo;
- take into account the regional dimension of the fight against organised crime in the Western Balkans when carrying out activities in this field;

*to continue work on making ESDP more capable, and in particular:*

- to take forward work on the Civilian Headline Goal 2008, in particular on meeting identified shortfalls, on rapid deployment, notably Civilian Response Teams and

- rapidly-deployable police elements, and on mission support;
- to consider ways to contribute to the strengthening of the planning and mission support capacity of the Council Secretariat for Civilian ESDP operations;
  - to take forward work on improving procedures for the rapid and efficient procurement of equipment and logistical support for Civilian crisis management operations;
  - to contribute to work on securing adequate funding for Civilian ESDP operations through the CFSP budget;
  - work on the preparation of the Force Catalogue and of the Progress Catalogue on the basis of the agreed Roadmap ;
  - to continue the process of developing an information gathering instrument and an operational analysis tool for EU's use to meet the EU's specific needs;
  - to take forward work on the EU Battlegroups initiative (as part of Rapid Response elements) on the basis of the agreed Roadmap;
  - to take forward work on the Global Approach on Deployability;
  - to take forward the study of the Maritime Dimension in ESDP;
  - to support as required the continued development of the European Defence Agency;
  - to continue work on the actions identified in the Conceptual Framework on ESDP and Terrorism and the recommendations of the report on its implementation as well as the implementation of relevant practical steps according to the EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism;
  - to continue work on the European Space Policy "ESDP and Space" on the basis of the agreed roadmap;
  - to implement further the concept for training in the field of ESDP, including by making full use of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC); to continue work on training for civilian crisis management taking into account Community programmes and initiatives;
  - to continue the implementation of the European Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts and to prepare the annual presidency report on Conflict Prevention for adoption by the European Council in June 2006 in close cooperation with the European Commission;
  - to address the follow-up to the initial orientations by the SG/HR to improve CFSP/ESDP (follow-up to Hampton Court), as noted by the European Council;

*to continue work on improving the coherence of EU efforts, in particular:*

- by making full use of the Civil-Military Cell within EUMS and contribute to the work on the capacity of the Cell to rapidly generate, when needed, an operations centre;
- to take forward work on the improvement of civil-military co-ordination, in particular on the management of EU operations;

- to take forward work on improving ESDP-related aspects of the EU's ability to respond rapidly to the aftermath of major disasters;
- to take forward work on implementation of the EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform in relation to certain regions; once the Commission has developed an EC concept for SSR covering first pillar activities, give due consideration to joining these two strands within the framework of an overarching EU concept for SSR;

*to maintain the EU's commitment to work with key partners, and in particular:*

- to take forward the EU/UN dialogue on the basis of the Joint Declaration on UN-EU co-operation in Crisis Management; to examine options for concrete modalities for EU/UN cooperation in crisis management;
- to continue to develop the EU/NATO strategic partnership in crisis management;
- to maintain a close dialogue with the OSCE and evaluate EU-OSCE cooperation; identify areas for concrete cooperation in crisis management;
- to maintain and develop further EU co-operation with the AU and African Sub Regional Organisations, through further implementation of the Action Plan for ESDP support to Peace and Security in Africa and taking into account the wider framework of the EU Africa Strategy; to examine options in the area of support to African capabilities for the prevention and management of conflicts;
- to continue to strengthen dialogue and co-operation with Third countries, including Canada, Russia and Ukraine, and the Mediterranean partners in the field of ESDP.

## CONTRIBUTIONS BY JAVIER SOLANA TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF DEFENCE CAPABILITIES

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*Improving our defence capabilities by increasing levels of research spending, finding opportunities for research collaboration, tackling capability gaps and collaborating as partners on training*

### I. INCREASING LEVELS OF RESEARCH SPENDING, FINDING OPPORTUNITIES FOR RESEARCH COLLABORATION.

1. R&T is crucial to our aspirations for European Defence. It is the seed-corn of our future equipment capabilities, and vital to the health of our defence technological and industrial base.

2. National defence investment programmes are difficult to re-orient. Long procurement cycles and financial pressures make it tough both to rebalance toward new capability needs, and to switch from national to collaborative approaches. But the place to focus is on R&T, both because such programmes are more flexible than major equipment programmes, and because successful collaborations require convergence at the earliest stages of exploration of new requirements and possibilities.

3. R&T is of fundamental importance for our future. The US is out-spending Europe by 5:1 in defence R&D. Calls for urgent action have been made by industry to increase the proportion of the whole spent collaboratively in Europe from less than 5% to 20%.

4. There is also a wider economic dimension – the contribution defence R&T can make to ensuring Europe's future as an innovative, knowledge-based, globally competitive economy.

5. The case for investing more, and investing more together, seems clear. The following practical steps should be taken in the coming months.

(i) **Accurate data, and targets:** No fully reliable statistics are available at the European level. The European Defence Agency (EDA)'s Steering Board of Defence Ministers has already agreed to prioritise assembly of good data on defence R&T, as a basis for setting targets (on spending levels, and on collaboration). In this process EDA should identify the reasons why European nations collectively and individually currently spend too little on defence R&T.

(ii) **Ad hoc collaborations:** Efforts should be redoubled to generate these within the EDA context. The Agency has been designed as a better « incubator » than the previous arrangements; the hand-over of responsibilities needs to be completed rapidly, with full commitment to the new framework. A first set of priorities

should be designated by the EDA R&T Steering Board on 16 December; by the end of the Austrian Presidency we need both specific commitments to take these forward, and a good « road-map » for realising further joint projects, for example in the 18 technology fields recently highlighted for collaboration by the 6 LoI nations.

- (iii) A European strategy and priorities: Historically, European defence R&T cooperation has worked by looking for common ground between nationally-derived approaches and priorities. Such cooperation needs a top-down, jointly-developed view of where Member States collectively should be going, and which technologies we should especially seek to preserve or develop in Europe. Such an agreed strategy will ensure the most effective use of resources available, and facilitate collaboration.

It will need to be based upon future capability requirements, and take into account issues of defence industrial policy. Though the EDA has made a start on capability-derived priorities, it will take more than one Presidency to achieve an agreed, comprehensive strategy. But the process should be begun.

- (iv) Financial aspects: Proposals are needed on how defence resources might be redeployed – with cutting wasteful duplication in infrastructures, such as those for materiel test and evaluation, an obvious possibility. And we must concentrate on deriving the maximum synergies from the investments of others, including industry. Today, technology is “spun in?” to defence from the civil sector as much as (or more than) it is “spun out”: so we need to think about mechanisms to guarantee full complementarity between civil security & space activities and defence research expenditure.

Bringing defence or R&T programmes together is not easy in spite of the obvious logic and long term cost savings. There are many recent examples of failure. The EDA needs to be able to stimulate defence establishments into greater collaborative efforts, including through examining the option of preassigning some portion of national provision to collaboration and considering whether that would best be done through the EDA or via some other joint funding mechanism.

6. Much of this will require debate with Member States and other stakeholders in coming months. The personal engagement of Defence Ministers will be crucial: and an important milestone will be the EDA Steering Board meeting in Innsbruck in early March.

## II. TACKLING CAPABILITY GAPS

7. As noted above, the inflexibility of defence investment programmes is a major obstacle to rapid capability improvements. The priorities are widely recognised and will

no doubt be confirmed by the work on Headline Goal 2010: deployed, multinational operations put a particular premium on such capabilities as :

- ▶ Command, Control and Communication (the Agency is already active)
- ▶ Surveillance and Reconnaissance (where the Agency must take forward work on unmanned air vehicles and space-related capabilities)
- ▶ Strategic lift, both air and sea (an immediate challenge for Battlegroups, and highly relevant to disaster relief)
- ▶ All aspects of casualty minimisation, i.e. protection of own forces and precision in the use of force
- ▶ Other “enabling” capabilities such as air-to-air refuelling (already reactivated in the EDA context) and logistics.

8. Given the pressures on defence budgets, different funding models should be considered – more use of private finance, extra-defence funding for specific projects, creation and protection of a “wedge” of uncommitted funding in forward defence investment plans to be reserved for the key capabilities. These options should be analysed in the EDA’s Capabilities Steering Board.

9. Meanwhile, progressing the air-to-air refuelling initiative, tackling the strategic lift shortfall and pursuing improvements in command, control and communication should be the top priorities during the coming months.

### III. TRAINING

10. Work on training should include efforts to coordinate training inside the Union (e.g. by promoting common/multinational training on the utilisation and maintenance of similar equipment, or developing a dedicated EU training programme for Battlegroups, which would be compatible with the NRF’s training and exercises programme and would ensure exchange of lessons identified between battlegroup participants. Its implementation would be left to members of a given Battlegroup, under the responsibility of the respective framework nation);

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*Ensuring our crisis management structures can meet the new demands on them including for responding to natural disasters*

### IV. CRISIS MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES

11. The Union’s crisis management structures were created, out of nothing, five years



ago. Since then twelve operations have been undertaken. These have helped both in preventing crises and in post-crisis normalisation. They have had a significant political impact. This has been a period of growth and success for the CFSP; but there is much the Union can do better.

12. We are currently close to the limits of our capacity. More money and more flexible financing procedures are required, as explained in a separate paper. The Secretariat is increasing its human resources for ESDP operations within its budgetary constraints. Further steps are needed, drawing on the experience of recent years, to increase efficiency, professionalism and also capacity.

### *Structures*

13. The added value which the Union brings to crisis management is its ability to bring together civilian and military assets. Every crisis needs some mixture of civilian and military assets. Almost all military operations need civilian follow up; almost all civilian crisis management takes place in a security environment where military assistance may be needed. A comprehensive approach to strategy, planning and operation makes sense. The creation of the Civ/Mil Cell has been a step in the right direction, but does not go far enough. It should be seen as a pathfinder, leading the way to a more complete integration of civilian and military expertise within the Council's structures. A more integrated framework must remain fully capable for military operations, including cooperation with national headquarters and international organisations.

### *Capabilities*

14. Particular attention needs to be paid to police resources and organization. It may be desirable for Member States to consider creating extra police capacity for deployment abroad. In today's world, such capacities can be as important for security as military resources.

15. The Union's largest 'civilian' assets are its aid programme and other Community policies, including both long-term measures and short-term interventions like the Rapid Reaction Mechanism and the future Stability Instrument. The more coherence that can be achieved between CFSP and ESDP actions and Community policies and programs, the greater the effectiveness of the EU. In some areas, such as DDR, ways should be explored of establishing joint teams and working more closely with the Commission during both planning and implementation to ensure that the Union is more effective in serving its interests and achieving its overall objectives.

*Management of Operations*

16. We have an increasing number of challenging missions (Rafah, Aceh, etc). Arrangements for management and control of these missions need to be strengthened. We have not yet been faced with a serious crisis in an operation. Steps should be taken to clarify the chains of command and responsibility and to ensure access to the planned operational facilities, so that we can deal with such situations twenty-four hours a day/seven days a week as necessary. (This should be without prejudice to the agreed TOR's for the facilities for an operations centre). These improvements can be informed by better arrangements for evaluation and learning lessons.

17. Many practical problems make the task of crisis management harder than it need be. These often stem from a lack of flexibility in procedures used when managing funds through the CFSP budget. Effective procedures have been devised for handling certain crisis situations (e.g. ECHO); similar flexibility needs to apply to ESDP crisis management operations taking account of the timescales involved and chains of command.

**V. RESPONDING TO NATURAL DISASTERS**

18. The Union has an array of instruments for responding to natural disasters, including the Commission's Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) for coordinating Member States' civil protection resources, and humanitarian assistance delivered through ECHO. Speed of response and delivery is essential to saving lives. Experience shows that military resources, in particular transport means, can make an important contribution to the response to a natural disaster. This is particularly the case when it is difficult to deliver relief through more normal means.

If the Union wishes to be ready to respond in this fashion we need:

- ▶ A decision making process that can react within hours of a disaster. The arrangements for emergency and crisis coordination recently agreed by the Council – a Crisis Steering Group consisting of the Presidency, Commission, the Council Secretariat and concerned Member States (doc.15106/05) – seem well adapted to this purpose.
- ▶ Timely planning of assistance with civil and military assets. This can be assisted by pre-identifying capabilities and generic force packages likely to be of the greatest utility. The EUMS, making use of the Civ-Mil cell, in consultation with the Commission, can take this work forward by developing generic plans and scenarios and by arranging for the procedures to be exercised.
- ▶ Arrangements for transport coordination of the relief effort. These should build on existing instruments. Coordination should cover: military assets made available by Member States (using the Eindhoven and Athens centres); and coordination between

military assets and assistance mobilized through the MIC and ECHO. These efforts should be coordinated sensibly with those of other international actors including OCHA and NATO.

Making this work will of course depend on the extent to which EU Member States are able to make assets available.

## VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

19. In addition to tackling practical problems, I recommend that:

- ▶ We restructure our organization to achieve the maximum possible civilian/military integration in all areas, taking into account the need for the Union to remain fully capable for conducting military operations;
- ▶ We put in place more robust arrangements for the management and control of missions and operations, involving clearer chains of command and responsibility and ensuring access to planned operational facilities;
- ▶ I come forward with suggestions for improving the planning and coordination of EU Member States for the speedy delivery of assistance, including through the use of military assets, in response to natural disasters, as well as scenarios to test them. I will build on the proposals made in the follow up to the Action Plan on the Tsunami in the Indian Ocean, in particular on consular protection.

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### *Increasing CFSP funding, with a better way to finance civilian operations rapidly*

20. Over the last few years, the development of European Security and Defence Policy, particularly the launching of crisis management operations in the Balkans, Africa, Asia and the Middle East, has boosted the Union's influence and served its interests, as identified in the European Security Strategy (ESS). This is one of the EU's success stories.

21. The low overall level of funding for civilian crisis management operations, coupled with slow disbursement and procurement, have hampered the EU's ability to act. The quicker the Union acts, the greater the impact. The EU should always be in a position to respond quickly.

22. In accordance with the remit following the informal meeting of Heads of State or government at Hampton Court (doc. 13992/05), this note sets out orientations for (i)

increasing CFSP funding; and (ii) ensuring rapid financing of civilian crisis management operations.

## I. INCREASING CFSP FUNDING

### *Overall level of funding*

23. At Hampton Court, there was general agreement on the need for a substantial increase in funds to cover the common costs of EU crisis management operations and other CFSP measures. The figure of €300 million *per annum* suggested by one Head of government received widespread support. Given the Union's ambitions and capacities, this figure is not unreasonable.

**Current funding arrangements** for crisis management operations vary according to the operation's objectives and means, and command structure:

For "civilian" operations, costs borne by the EU are financed as a general rule from the CFSP budget. Additional costs are borne by Member States. Three practical drawbacks exist: it has not proved possible to fund operational preparations and fact-finding missions under the budget; funds can only be disbursed two to three weeks after adoption of the Joint Action launching the operation; and delays in procuring essential equipment are frequent and hamper effectiveness.

For "military" operations, the Athena mechanism was set up in 2004 to administer the common costs for such operations. This mechanism has worked well for financing all stages of such operations, including preparation and fact-finding missions. Funds can be disbursed immediately once the concept is agreed, and procurement can proceed swiftly, fully respecting the relevant Financial Regulation.

24. Funding would need to be catered for in the context of the next Financial Perspective and the annual budget process. In any given year the actual funds required should be based on real, predictable needs, assessed by the Council, plus a sufficient margin for contingencies given the inherent unpredictability of crisis management.

### *Addressing immediate needs for 2006*

25. Estimates for CFSP needs in 2006, plus a contingency margin, total around €120 million (not including a possible operation in Kosovo). This is slightly more than the amount of €102.6 million foreseen in the 2006 CFSP budget. Although this represents a significant increase over the 2005 budget, most of this money is already earmarked. So while most the costs for ongoing operations in 2006 should be financed from the budget, additional funding may be required, particularly if new operations are launched during the year.

Two **options** exist **for additional funding**:

Making budgetary transfers. Around six weeks are required to get agreement of both branches of the budgetary authority once the Commission has made a proposal. Little scope exists to compress these deadlines, and this procedure pre-supposes political will by all institutions to move rapidly. The Commission has indicated that it will study favourably making such proposals should the need arise;

Seeking contributions from Member States, in accordance with article 28(3) TEU. When such contributions are sought, proper arrangements are needed for administering and managing them.

## II. A BETTER WAY TO FINANCE CIVILIAN OPERATIONS RAPIDLY

26. Heavy procedures are inherent in the current system. These hamper rapid financing and procurement. Greater coherence and simplified management structures are needed. Moreover, differentiating the sources of financing operations depending on whether they are “civilian” or “military” is not always possible. No such distinction exists in the Treaty in Article 17 TEU. Article 28(3) TEU distinguishes between CFSP expenditure and expenditure “arising from operations having military or defence implications”. The reality is that many crisis management operations in the modern world require rapid response and a combination of instruments used in an integrated manner. The recently established Civ/Mil Cell was conceived with this reality in mind.

27. Rapid disbursement of funds is needed when (a) CFSP budget funding is not available for civilian operations; or (b) operational preparation or fact finding work are necessary to launch an operation. In both cases, practical solutions urgently need to be found if the Union wishes to launch civilian operations or missions rapidly and effectively in future.

## III. ORIENTATIONS FOR CARRYING WORK FORWARD

28. More money is needed to meet the Union’s ambitions in this area. Funds should accordingly be provided by continuing to increase the CFSP budget chapter in line with real predictable needs assessed by the Council, plus a sufficient margin for contingencies. Procedures for streamlining the processes by which funds are made available should also be developed urgently.

29. If, for whatever reason, funds under the CFSP budget are not available, contributions may be made by Member States in accordance with Article 28(3) TEU. To ensure rapid financing in such an eventuality, a permanent mechanism is needed for adminis-

tering and managing such contributions in a transparent and accountable manner respecting the principles of sound financial management. This would avoid lengthy discussions to determine ad hoc arrangements before launching each operation or mission.

30. More rapid disbursement of funds for civilian crisis management operations also requires solutions to ensure that: (a) operational funding is available immediately for preparatory and fact-finding missions; (b) funds can be rapidly disbursed when needed in all phases of a crisis management operation, in particular as soon as the operation is launched; and (c) procurement of essential equipment can occur speedily. Until now, we have muddled through. We urgently need to consider how to achieve these objectives by:

- (v) Finding a solution under the CFSP budget which allows speedy and flexible funding, procurement and stockpiling for preparatory and fact-finding missions, and for the initial start-up phase of operations or missions;
- (vi) Making it possible for an existing or alternative mechanism to administer Member State contributions for this purpose rapidly and effectively.

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*Ensuring the EU is ready to assume greater responsibility in Kosovo  
Improving the coordination of EU action in the Balkans, especially on organised crime*

**VII. ENSURING THE EU IS READY TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITY IN KOSOVO.**

I have submitted to the GAERC a joint report with Commissioner Rehn on the future EU role. Here also the EU is likely to find itself with a prominent part to play and a number of different instruments to coordinate. The situation will be different from that of Bosnia where the institutional pattern is longer established (and where the EU is also responsible for the main peacekeeping force). It may however be even more delicate politically. We shall make further reports to the GAERC on this issue.

**VIII. IMPROVING THE COORDINATION OF EU ACTION IN THE BALKANS**

31. The coordination of EU action in the Balkans has made progress in the last years. In particular the Stabilisation and Association process has provided a comprehensive framework both for individual countries and for the region as a whole. The Union's activity in the region is nevertheless characterized by a multiplicity of actors and instruments: EU Special Representatives, Commission Delegations, Member States' Diplomatic

Missions, EUMM, the European Agency for Re-construction, Police and Military Operations.

32. In an ideal world we would operate a clear strategy, through a co-ordinated chain of command, and would deliver a coherent message from the EU in the Balkans. Effective “coordination” depends on the active engagement and common sense of those concerned. In this respect, there is room for improvement.

33. The countries in the region that have been the focus of EU attention are each at different stages and present different problems:

In **Skopje** the Council and the Commission have now appointed the same person to be the EU Special Representative and Commission Head of Delegation. This was a sensible and pragmatic response to a particular need.

In **Sarajevo** we will face a particular challenge next year if the Office of the High Representative (OHR) transitions to an office of a EU Special Representative.

#### **Recommendation**

34. We should ask ourselves whether we can find a way of creating a more unified structure in the Balkans. I am convinced that we will achieve more if we can create a more coherent and unified structure under strong and sensitive political leadership. This is a matter on which we all need to reflect further. I would welcome the views of both the Commission and the Council.

**Tackling organised crime** requires political commitment and courage; we need to ensure that the need to take bold, determined political action becomes a firm and regular feature of our discussions with the leaders and political actors in the region and a constant feature of our communications strategy.

The planned Ministerial Conference on organised crime, that will be organised by the incoming Austrian Presidency in Vienna on the 4/5 May 2006, and the mandate given by the Justice and Home Affairs Council to the Presidency (working with the General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission) to produce in 2006 an action oriented paper on “...improving co-operation on organised crime, corruption, illegal immigration and counter-terrorism, between the EU, Western Balkans and relevant ENP countries” will constitute important steps in carrying this work forward.

ESDP operations in the Western Balkans region offer an opportunity, within the framework of their mandate, to support local capacity and extend the fight against organised crime to countries of origin or transit. These operations need to be dovetailed with the considerable assistance provided through Community projects, which inter alia supports institution-building activities in the field of security.

### III. ORGANISED CRIME

35. Organised crime in the Balkans constitutes a serious political, economic and security problem for the countries of the region, and is a major source of crime in EU member states.

36. In recent years, the EU has developed a number of instruments to support the fight against organised crime, and is actively engaged almost everywhere in the region. The range of instruments is impressive: EUROPOL, EUROJUST, Border Control Agency, ESDP missions, Commission activities, notably thanks to the CARDS programme, dialogue under Stabilisation and Association Agreement structures and OLAF, Member States activities etc.

#### **Recommendations**

Tackling organised crime requires political commitment and courage; we need to ensure that the need to take bold, determined political action becomes a firm and regular feature of our discussions with the leaders and political actors in the region and a constant feature of our communications strategy. The planned Ministerial Conference on organised crime, that will be organised by the incoming Austrian Presidency in Vienna on the 4/5 May 2006, and the mandate given by the Justice and Home Affairs Council to the Presidency (working with the General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission) to produce in 2006 an action oriented paper on "...improving co-operation on organised crime, corruption, illegal immigration and counter-terrorism, between the EU, Western Balkans and relevant ENP countries" will constitute important steps in carrying this work forward. ESDP operations in the Western Balkans region offer an opportunity, within the framework of their mandate, to support local capacity and extend the fight against organised crime to countries of origin or transit. These operations need to be dovetailed with the considerable assistance provided through Community projects, which inter alia supports institution-building activities in the field of security.

37. To improve coordination between the various instruments and policy activities involved, I recommend a threefold approach:

- We need a thorough assessment of the impact of organised crime in the Balkans. I suggest that the SITCEN and EUROPOL should be invited to carry out this analysis and to submit an assessment to the Council by March 2006, if possible jointly;
- On the basis of this analysis we should adopt a comprehensive strategy to tackle Western Balkans organised crime. This should set priorities, so that the many bodies concerned can direct their activities towards a coherent set of goals. This comprehensive strategy should also involve the beneficiary countries who have a vital



interest in ensuring the rule of law;

- ▶ Within this framework we should look also at information flows to ensure effective communication among the many EU bodies concerned, as well as with the local authorities.

## THE EU AND AFRICA TOWARDS A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

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The European Council, at its meeting on 15 and 16 December adopted the following text:

### **‘Introduction: Our Vision**

1. Europe and Africa are bound together by history, by geography, and by a shared vision of a peaceful, democratic and prosperous future for all their peoples.
2. This strategy sets out the steps the European Union will take with Africa between now and 2015 to support African efforts to build such a future. It is a strategy of the whole of the EU for the whole of Africa. It takes into account regional and country-specific needs and African countries’ national strategies. Its primary aims are the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and the promotion of sustainable development, security and good governance, in Africa.
3. The strategy builds on important progress made by the Africans themselves. Its core principles are partnership based on international law and human rights, equality and mutual accountability. Its underlying philosophy is African ownership and responsibility, including working through African institutions.

### **Peace and security**

4. Without peace there can be no lasting development. Without African leadership to end African conflicts there can be no lasting peace. So we will:
  - a) Work with the African Union (AU), sub-regional organisations and African countries to predict, prevent and mediate conflict, including by addressing its root causes, and to keep the peace in their own continent. In particular, we will strengthen the Africa Peace Facility with substantial, long-term, flexible, sustainable funding. We will help develop African capabilities, such as the AU’s African Standby Force, and will build on existing activities by Member States to provide training and advisory, technical, planning and logistical support.
  - b) Provide direct support to African Union, sub-regional or UN efforts to promote peace and stability through Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) activities, and military and civilian crisis management missions, including potential deployment of EU battlegroups; continue implementation of the ESDP Africa Action Plan; and develop the dialogue with Euromed countries.
  - c) Enhance our support for post conflict reconstruction in Africa, so that we secure lasting peace and development. We will support in particular the new UN Peacebuilding Commission; the strengthening of fragile states; and

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, and Security Sector Reform programmes in African states.

- d) Redouble our efforts to stem the illicit flow of weapons, including small arms. We will encourage others to adopt minimum common standards and associate themselves with the EU Code of Conduct on arms exports, discourage transfers which contribute to instability, develop ways to share and act on information on illegal trafficking and support border management controls and an international arms trade treaty.
- e) Join with African states to counter terrorism worldwide. We will provide technical assistance, enhanced information sharing and support to the AU Anti-Terrorism Centre in Algiers and continue to support the implementation of international counter-terrorism agreements.

## Human Rights and Governance

5. Successful development requires; adherence to human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law; and effective, well-governed states, and strong and efficient institutions. We will:

- a) Promote and protect human rights, including the rights of women, children and other vulnerable groups; help end impunity, including through the International Criminal Court; and promote fundamental freedoms and respect for the rule of law in Africa, including through capacity-building for judicial systems, national Human Rights Commissions and civil society organisations. The substantial funding under EC and member states' bilateral programmes will be maintained.
- b) Support good governance programmes at country level and help build the capacity of the African Union and Africa regional and national institutions, building on the €35 million already allocated for this purpose under the Africa Peace Facility and the €50 million under EDF 9.
- c) Support, through political dialogue and consultations with African partners, African efforts to monitor and improve governance, including through supporting the New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD)'s African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). This should result in their goal of four completed reviews a year from 2006 being achieved and the development of a Governance Initiative to support national reforms triggered by the APRM process. Develop a governance facility in the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument.
- d) Support the fight against corruption, human trafficking, illegal drugs and organised crime and promote transparency to meet the aspirations of African citizens and to ensure Africa wealth benefits its people. This will include helping improve public accountability and financial management systems in Africa, early ratifica-

1. The full text, accompanied by the relevant minutes statements, is set out in the Conclusions of the Council of 24 May 2005 (Ref 9266/05).

tion by all EU member states and African partners of the UN Convention on Corruption, assisting proper management of conflict resources including timber as well as mineral resources, support to the Kimberly Process and to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) so that eleven African countries begin implementation of the EITI by July 2006.

- e) Support the growth of participatory democracy and accountability in Africa, including through support to African parliaments and civil society and an enhanced programme of election assistance and EU Electoral Observation Missions including a review of their remit in 2006.

### Development Assistance

6. If Africa is to meet the challenge of development, sound policies and good leadership must be backed by increased, sustainable and predictable financial flows at a level consistent with our ambitions. We will:

- a) Increase our aid, by delivering on our collective commitment to give as official development assistance 0.56% of EU GNI by 2010, with half of the additional €20 billion going to Africa, and 0.7% of GNI by 2015 in the case of 15 Member States, whilst other MS will strive to increase their ODA to 0.33% by 2015.<sup>1</sup>
- b) Secure more effective and predictable EU financial assistance for Africa, including by reaching early agreement on a successor to the 9<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund as soon as possible and ensuring adequate resources for North Africa in future EC budgets.
- c) In order to help to reach the 0.7% target for development assistance, implement on a voluntary basis, innovative financing mechanisms, such as a contribution on airline tickets or through financing the International Finance Facility for Immunisation.
- d) Support the proposal, agreed in principle with the International Financial Institutions, to cancel outstanding debts owed by Heavily Indebted Poor Countries that qualify by helping to meet the costs. This is expected to deliver in total further debt relief of up to €42 billion for African countries.
- e) Reinforce EU humanitarian and disaster response capability by strengthening the EC humanitarian aid department (ECHO) so that it maintains its strong role in under-funded emergencies, in support of the UN's lead.
- f) Make our aid more effective, by ensuring early implementation for Africa of our EU and international commitments, as agreed in Paris in March 2005.

### Sustainable Economic Growth, Regional Integration and Trade

7. Rapid, sustained and broad-based growth is essential for ending poverty in Africa. We will:

- a) Facilitate a better-connected Africa, to itself and the rest of the world; including by establishing an EU/Africa Infrastructure Partnership, which will be complementary to the new Infrastructure Consortium for Africa and include existing initiatives on transport and to facilitate peoples' access to water and sanitation, energy and information technology.
- b) Promote a stable, efficient and harmonized legal business framework in Africa, for example by convening a Euro-African Business Forum in 2006.
- c) Help to integrate Africa fully into the world trade system, by pressing for a successful outcome to the Doha Round of world trade talks that is ambitious, maximises development gains, ensures special differential treatment, addresses preference erosion and makes trade work for the poor, and extends duty and quota-free market access for Least Developed Countries to all industrialised country markets.
- d) Provide increased aid for trade, building on the Community's commitment of €1 billion per year by 2010.
- e) Agree Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with Africa regional groupings by 2008 that are instruments of development, promote regional integration, improve African access to European and regional markets; support asymmetric and flexible implementation of EPAs; and reduce non-tariff barriers. We will closely monitor EPAs so that they help achieve development objectives; and also redouble efforts to complete by 2010 agreement on an EU-Mediterranean Free Trade Area.
- f) Help African countries comply with EU rules and standards, establish clear rules for services, simplify rules of origin and make them more development friendly.
- g) Support Africa in countering the effects of climate change in accordance with the EU Action Plan on Climate Change and Development; and in protecting its environment, through a range of policies, by combating desertification and ensuring the sustainable management of its forests, land and biodiversity fisheries and water. Such support includes, for example, €500million for the EU Water Facility and €220 million for the Energy Facility under EDF9.

## Investing in people

8. A successful Africa requires a well-educated, healthy population and the full empowerment of women. We will:

- a) Support African efforts to ensure that all children have free primary education of good quality by 2015, including through the implementation of Africa Education for All programme, with increased resources for the Fast Track Initiative, such as the €63 million agreed under EDF9; and through the plan agreed at the 2005 Barcelona Summit.
- b) Promote development of Euro-Africa networks of universities and centres of

excellence, including through helping the AU establish a new exchange programme (the Nyerere Programme) for students in Africa.

- c) Provide predictable, multi-year financing for health systems in Africa so that all Africans have access to basic healthcare, free where governments choose to provide this and in support of African governments' goal of allocating 15% of their public budgets to Health.
- d) Enhance our support for the fight against infectious diseases, including by providing further EU contributions to the Global Fund for AIDS, TB and malaria, thereby maintaining the EU share of global contributions (at least 50%). We will continue to support research and development of drugs for AIDS and other communicable diseases, and help countries deliver prevention strategies and universal access to HIV treatment and care for all who need it by 2010, through further support for the EU Programme for Action for AIDS, TB and malaria; and support fair access to drugs under WTO patent protection rules.
- e) Improve food security for the most vulnerable, by helping lift 8 million Africans out of hunger by 2009 through country-led safety-nets for chronically food insecure populations who rely on humanitarian programmes.
- f) Maximise the developmental benefits and minimize the negative aspects of migration and strengthen protection for refugees, through engaging in balanced dialogue and cooperation with the AU, other African organisations and states on a broad range of migration issues. In particular this means addressing the root causes of migration, fostering links with development and promoting co-development<sup>1</sup> and combating illegal immigration. We will take this forward through a series of concrete priority actions as agreed by the European Council.
- g) Recognise the importance of women in all our policies towards Africa in view of their crucial role in economic growth, development, education and the disproportionate effects on women of conflict, poverty related diseases and lack of maternal health care; and give appropriate support to sexual and reproductive rights, in line with the International Conference on Population and Development Cairo agenda.

### The future: an EU partnership with Africa

9. Europe has a strong interest in a peaceful, prosperous and democratic Africa. Our strategy is intended to help Africa achieve this. We commit to:

- a) Deliver on this strategy. We will review progress on its implementation at the December 2006 European Council, and at least every two years thereafter. Our Ministers will discuss and oversee the development of detailed delivery and monitoring plans for this purpose, based on timelines and indicators proposed jointly

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1. Co-development involves migrant communities in the EU contributing to the development of their countries of origin.

by the Commission and Council Secretariat. In 2006, the Council will review implementation of the aid volume targets agreed in May 2005 and thereafter, on the basis of monitoring reports from the Commission.

- b) Develop this strategy, in partnership with the African Union, NEPAD and other African partners, respecting the principles of African ownership, the importance of working more closely with Africans in multilateral fora, and in coordination with multilateral partners.
- c) Building on the Cairo Summit, enhance the EU political dialogue and broader relationship with Africa and its institutions, and hold the second EU/Africa Summit in Lisbon as soon as possible.<sup>2</sup>

## THE EU COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY

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### STRATEGIC COMMITMENT

**To combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights, and make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice**

### INTRODUCTION

1. Terrorism is a threat to all States and to all peoples. It poses a serious threat to our security, to the values of our democratic societies and to the rights and freedoms of our citizens, especially through the indiscriminate targeting of innocent people. Terrorism is criminal and unjustifiable under any circumstances.
2. The European Union is an area of increasing openness, in which the internal and external aspects of security are intimately linked. It is an area of increasing interdependence, allowing for free movement of people, ideas, technology and resources. This is an environment which terrorists abuse to pursue their objectives. In this context concerted and collective European action, in the spirit of solidarity, is indispensable to combat terrorism.
3. The four pillars of the EU's Counter-Terrorism Strategy – prevent, protect, pursue, and respond – constitute a comprehensive and proportionate response to the international terrorist threat. The Strategy requires work at national, European and international levels to reduce the threat from terrorism and our vulnerability to attack. The Strategy sets out our objectives to prevent new recruits to terrorism; better protect potential targets; pursue and investigate members of existing networks and improve our capability to respond to and manage the consequences of terrorist attacks. This Strategy takes into the next phase the agenda of work set out at the March 2004 European Council in the wake of the Madrid bombings.
4. Across the four pillars of the Union's Strategy a horizontal feature is the Union's role in the world. As set out in the European Security Strategy, through its external action the European Union takes on a responsibility for contributing to global security and building a safer world. Acting through and in conjunction with the United Nations and other international or regional organisations, the EU will work to build the international consensus and promote international standards for countering terrorism. The EU will promote efforts in the UN to develop a global strategy for combating terrorism. Continuing to make counter-terrorism a high priority in dialogue with key partner countries, including the USA, will also be a core part of the European approach.



5. Given that the current international terrorist threat affects and has roots in many parts of the world beyond the EU, co-operation with and the provision of assistance to priority third countries – including in North Africa, the Middle East and South East Asia – will be vital. Finally, working to resolve conflicts and promote good governance and democracy will be essential elements of the Strategy, as part of the dialogue and alliance between cultures, faiths and civilisations, in order to address the motivational and structural factors underpinning radicalisation.

## PREVENT

6. In order to prevent people from turning to terrorism and to stop the next generation of terrorists from emerging, the EU has agreed a comprehensive strategy and action plan for combating radicalisation and recruitment into terrorism. This strategy focuses on countering radicalization and recruitment to terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and the groups it inspires, given that this type of terrorism currently represents the main threat to the Union as a whole.

7. Terrorism can never be justified. There can be no excuse or impunity for terrorist acts. The vast majority of Europeans, irrespective of belief, do not accept extremist ideologies. Even amongst the small number that do, only a few turn to terrorism. The decision to become involved in terrorism varies from one individual to another, even though the motives behind such a decision are often similar. We must identify and counter the methods, propaganda and conditions through which people are drawn into terrorism.

8. The challenge of combating radicalisation and terrorist recruitment lies primarily with the Member States, at a national, regional and local level. However, EU work in this field, including the contribution of the European Commission, can provide an important framework to help co-ordinate national policies; share information and determine good practice. But addressing this challenge is beyond the power of governments alone and will require the full engagement of all populations in Europe and beyond.

9. There are practical steps an individual must take to become involved in terrorism. The ability to put ideas into action has been greatly enhanced by globalisation: ease of travel, transfer of money and communication – including through the internet – mean easier access to radical ideas and training. We need to spot such behaviour for example through community policing and monitoring travel to conflict zones. We also need to disrupt such behaviour by: limiting the activities of those playing a role in radicalisation; preventing access to terrorist training; establishing a strong legal framework to prevent incitement and recruitment; and examining ways to impede terrorist recruitment through the internet.

10. The propagation of a particular extremist worldview brings individuals to consider and justify violence. In the context of the most recent wave of terrorism, for example, the core of the issue is propaganda which distorts conflicts around the world as a supposed proof of a clash between the West and Islam. To address these issues, we need to ensure that voices of mainstream opinion prevail over those of extremism by engaging with civil society and faith groups that reject the ideas put forward by terrorists and extremists that incite violence. And we need to get our own message across more effectively, to change the perception of national and European policies. We must also ensure that our own policies do not exacerbate division. Developing a non-emotive lexicon for discussing the issues will support this.

11. There is a range of conditions in society which may create an environment in which individuals can become more easily radicalised. These conditions include poor or autocratic governance; rapid but unmanaged modernisation; lack of political or economic prospects and of educational opportunities. Within the Union these factors are not generally present but in individual segments of the population they may be. To counter this, outside the Union we must promote even more vigorously good governance, human rights, democracy as well as education and economic prosperity, and engage in conflict resolution. We must also target inequalities and discrimination where they exist and promote inter-cultural dialogue and long-term integration where appropriate.

12. Radicalisation and recruitment is an international phenomenon. There is much we can do with our partners overseas to assist them in combating radicalisation, including through co-operation and assistance programmes with third countries and work through international organisations.

13. Key priorities for 'Prevent' are to:

- Develop common approaches to spot and tackle problem behaviour, in particular the misuse of the internet;
- Address incitement and recruitment in particular in key environments, for example prisons, places of religious training or worship, notably by implementing legislation making these behaviours offences;
- Develop a media and communication strategy to explain better EU policies;
- Promote good governance, democracy, education and economic prosperity through Community and Member State assistance programmes;
- Develop inter-cultural dialogue within and outside the Union;
- Develop a non-emotive lexicon for discussing the issues;
- Continue research, share analysis and experiences in order to further our understanding of the issues and develop policy responses.

## PROTECT

14. Protection is a key part of our Counter Terrorism Strategy. We must strengthen the defences of key targets, by reducing their vulnerability to attack, and also by reducing the resulting impact of an attack.

15. While Member States have the primary responsibility for improving the protection of key targets, the interdependency of border security, transport and other cross-border infrastructures require effective EU collective action. In areas where EU-level security regimes exist, such as border and transport security, the EU and European Commission in particular have played an important role in raising standards. Further work between Member States, with the support of the European institutions, will provide an important framework in which Member States are able to co-ordinate their policies, share information about responses developed at national level, determine good practice, and work together to develop new ideas.

16. We need to enhance protection of our external borders to make it harder for known or suspected terrorists to enter or operate within the EU. Improvements in technology for both the capture and exchange of passenger data, and the inclusion of biometric information in identity and travel documents, will increase the effectiveness of our border controls and provide greater assurance to our citizens. The European Borders Agency (Frontex) will have a role in providing risk assessment as part of the effort to strengthen controls and surveillance at the EU's external border. The establishment of the Visa Information System and second generation Schengen Information System will ensure that our authorities can share and access information and if necessary deny access to the Schengen area.

17. We also must work collectively to raise standards in transport security. We must enhance the protection of airports, seaports, and aircraft security arrangements in order to deter terrorist attacks and address the vulnerabilities in domestic and overseas transport operations. These measures will be developed by a combination of specific assessments of threat and vulnerability, the implementation of agreed EU legislation on aviation and maritime security, and the agreement of revised EU legislation on aviation security. There is also scope for working together to increase road and rail security. To support work in all of these fields, EU research and development policy including the European Commission's R&D programmes should continue to include security related research in the context of terrorism.

18. Reducing the vulnerability across Europe of critical infrastructure to physical and electronic attack is essential. To further enhance our protection, we agreed to establish a Programme of work aimed at improving the protection of critical infrastructure across

Europe. We will continue work to this end, developing an all hazard approach which recognises the threat from terrorism as a priority.

19. We must also ensure that our collective work, and particularly EU research efforts, contribute to developing methodologies for protecting crowded places and other soft targets from attacks.

20. Internationally, we must work with partners and international organisations on transport security, and non-proliferation of CBRN materials and small arms/light weapons, as well as provide technical assistance on protective security to priority third countries as a component of our wider technical assistance programmes.

21. Key priorities for 'Protect' are to:

- Deliver improvements to the security of EU passports through the introduction of biometrics;
- Establish the Visa Information System (VIS) and the second generation Schengen Information System (SISII);
- Develop through Frontex effective risk analysis of the EU's external border;
- Implement agreed common standards on civil aviation, port and maritime security;
- Agree a European programme for critical infrastructure protection;
- Make best use of EU and Community level research activity.

## PURSUE

22. We will further strengthen and implement our commitments to disrupt terrorist activity and pursue terrorists across borders. Our objectives are to impede terrorists' planning, disrupt their networks and the activities of recruiters to terrorism, cut off terrorists' funding and access to attack materials, and bring them to justice, while continuing to respect human rights and international law.

23. As agreed in the Hague Programme, when preserving national security, Member States will also focus on the security of the Union as a whole. The Union will support the efforts of Member States to disrupt terrorists by encouraging the exchange of information and intelligence between them, providing common analyses of the threat, and strengthening operational co-operation in law enforcement.

24. At national level the competent authorities need to have the necessary tools to collect and analyse intelligence and to pursue and investigate terrorists, requiring Member States to update their policy response and legislative provisions where necessary. In this respect our common aim is to follow up and take full account of the recommendations

identified during the EU's peer evaluation process. Member States will report back on how they have improved their national capabilities and machinery in light of these recommendations.

25. Developing a common understanding of the threat is fundamental to developing common policies to respond to it. The Joint Situation Centre's assessments, based on the contributions of national security and intelligence agencies and Europol, should continue to inform decisions across the range of the EU's policies.

26. Instruments such as the European Arrest Warrant are proving to be important tools in pursuing and investigating terrorists across borders. Priority should now be given to other practical measures in order to put into practice the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions. A key measure is the European Evidence Warrant, which will enable Member States to obtain evidence from elsewhere in the EU to help convict terrorists. Member States should also improve further the practical co-operation and information exchange between police and judicial authorities, in particular through Europol and Eurojust. In addition, Joint Investigation Teams should be established where necessary for cross-border investigations. Evaluation of the implementation of legislative measures will be important and will inform further work, and Member States should ensure that they implement agreed European measures as well as ratify relevant international Treaties and Conventions, to ensure an appropriate legislative response to the threat.

27. To move from ad hoc to systematic police co-operation, one important step will be developing and putting into practice the principle of availability of law enforcement information. In addition, the development of new IT systems such as the Visa Information System and the next generation Schengen Information System, while safeguarding data protection, should provide improved access to those authorities responsible for internal security thereby widening the base of information at their disposal. Consideration should also be given to developing common approaches to the sharing of information on potential terrorists and on individuals deported for terrorism-related offences.

28. Terrorists must also be deprived of the means by which they mount attacks – whether directly (eg weapons and explosives) or indirectly (eg false documentation to enable undetected travel and residence). Their ability to communicate and plan undetected should be impeded by measures such as the retention of telecommunications data. They must also be deprived as far as possible of the opportunities offered by the Internet to communicate and spread technical expertise related to terrorism.

29. Creating a hostile operating environment for terrorists also means tackling terrorist financing. The EU has already put in place provisions for freezing terrorist assets. The

next stage is to implement the EU-wide legislation concerning money laundering and cash transfers, and to agree steps to impede money (wire) transfers by terrorists. In addition, tackling the misuse of the non-profit sector remains a priority. We must also ensure that financial investigation is an integral part of all terrorism investigations. These measures and others which build on the Financial Action Task Force's recommendations, form part of the EU's comprehensive strategy for combating terrorist financing. A review of the EU's performance against terrorist financing is currently being conducted to ensure our approach is kept up to date.

30. Much of the terrorist threat to Europe originates outside the EU. 'Pursue' must therefore also have a global dimension. The EU will work to reinforce the international consensus through the United Nations and other international bodies and through dialogue and agreements (which include counter-terrorism clauses) with key partners, and will work for agreement of a UN Comprehensive Convention against Terrorism. Assistance will be provided to priority countries to help them introduce and implement the necessary mechanisms to disrupt terrorism, in coordination with the work of other donors.

31. Key priorities on 'Pursue' are to:

- Strengthen national capabilities to combat terrorism, in light of the recommendations of the peer evaluation of national anti-terrorism arrangements;
- Make full use of Europol and Eurojust to facilitate police and judicial cooperation, and continue to integrate the Joint Situation Centre's threat assessments into CT policy making;
- Further develop mutual recognition of judicial decisions, including by adopting the European Evidence Warrant;
- Ensure full implementation and evaluation of existing legislation as well as the ratification of relevant international Treaties and Conventions;
- Develop the principle of availability of law enforcement information;
- Tackle terrorist access to weapons and explosives, ranging from components for homemade explosive to CBRN material;
- Tackle terrorist financing, including by implementing agreed legislation, working to prevent the abuse of the non-profit sector, and reviewing the EUs overall performance in this area;
- Deliver technical assistance to enhance the capability of priority third countries.

## RESPOND

32. We cannot reduce the risk of terrorist attacks to zero. We have to be able to deal with attacks when they occur, recognising that attacks can have effects across EU borders. The response to an incident will often be similar whether that event is natural, technological

or man-made, hence the response systems in place to manage the consequences of natural disasters may also be used to alleviate the effects on citizens in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. Our response to any such events should make full use of the existing structures, including the Civil Protection Mechanism, which the EU has developed to respond to other major European and international crises, and be co-ordinated with the action of other international organisations involved.

33. In the event of an incident with cross border effects there will be a need for rapid sharing of operational and policy information, media co-ordination and mutual operational support, drawing on all available means, including military resources. The ability of the EU to take consistent or collective action will also be essential to an effective and efficient response. The development of EU crisis co-ordination arrangements, supported by the necessary operational procedures, will help ensure the coherence of the EU response to terrorist attacks.

34. Member States have the lead role in providing the emergency response to a terrorist incident on their territory. Nevertheless, there remains a need to ensure that the EU collectively, supported by the European Institutions including the Commission, has the capability to respond in solidarity to an extreme emergency which might overwhelm the resources of a single Member State, and could constitute a serious risk to the Union as a whole. Reviewing and revising the current framework for mutual support – the Community Mechanism for civil protection – is important in ensuring this safeguard.

35. Developing a risk based approach to capability assessment – focusing on preparing for those events which are judged most likely to occur, and which would have the greatest impact – will enable Member States to develop their capabilities to respond in the event of an emergency. The shared EU database listing the resources and assets which Member States might be able to contribute to dealing with such events in other Member States or overseas complements this work.

36. The solidarity, assistance and compensation of the victims of terrorism and their families constitutes an integral part of the response to terrorism at national and European level. Member States should ensure that appropriate compensation is available to victims. Through sharing of best practice on national arrangements, and the development of contact between national victims' associations, the European Commission will enable the EU to take steps to enhance the support offered to those who most suffer from terrorist attacks.

37. Internationally, there is a need to provide assistance to EU citizens in third countries and to protect and assist our military and civilian assets on EU crisis management operations. We should also ensure that our work on disaster response is closely co-ordi-

nated with related work in international organisations and in particular the United Nations. Finally, the technical assistance provided by the EU to priority third countries will need to factor in assistance on managing the consequences of terrorist attacks.

38. Key priorities on 'Respond' are to:

- Agree EU Crisis Co-ordination Arrangements and the supporting operational procedures for them;
- Revise the legislation on the Community Mechanism for civil protection;
- Develop risk assessment as a tool to inform the building of capabilities to respond to an attack;
- Improve co-ordination with international organisations on managing the response to terrorist attacks and other disasters;
- Share best practice and develop approaches for the provision of assistance to victims of terrorism and their families.

## DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY

39. The European Council will review progress on the Strategy once every six months.

40. Once per Presidency, and ahead of the European Council's review of progress, a High Level Political Dialogue on Counter-Terrorism, bringing together the Council, European Commission, and European Parliament, will meet to allow the three Institutions to consider progress together and promote transparency and balance in the EU's approach.

41. This Strategy will be complemented by a detailed Action Plan listing all the relevant measures under the four strands of this strategy. This will allow for detailed progress to be monitored on a regular basis by the Committee of Permanent Representatives, with regular follow-up and updates from the Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator and the European Commission.



## Core documents

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All Chaillot Papers  
can be accessed via the Institute's website :  
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
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A year of striking contrasts, 2005 will go down in the annals as a year in which the European Union experienced a major political crisis, while at the same time showing remarkable dynamism on the international stage.

This volume contains as comprehensive a compendium as possible of the initiatives undertaken by the European Union in the field of security and defence in 2005. In the field of ESDP, no fewer than six new operations were launched, notably in South East Asia (the ceasefire monitoring mission in Aceh) and in the Middle East (the advisory mission to the Palestinian police and the border assistance mission at the Rafah crossing point). A new instrument was added to the ESDP toolbox: the European Defence College. The rationalisation of the arms market led the European Defence Agency to publish a code of conduct on defence procurement of the EU Member States. The civil dimension of crisis management underwent a crucial new development with the setting up of a European Gendarmerie Force. On the political front, the highlights of 2005 were the beginnings, at long last, of European-American reconciliation in the aftermath of the Iraq crisis, progress with regard to extending enlargement to Croatia and Turkey, (successful) mediation in Ukraine and (more problematic) mediation over the Iranian nuclear issue.

*published by*  
*the European Union*  
*Institute for Security Studies*  
*43 avenue du*  
*Président Wilson*  
*F-75775 Paris cedex 16*  
*phone: +33 (0) 1 56 89 19 30*  
*fax: +33 (0) 1 56 89 19 31*  
*e-mail: [institute@iss-eu.org](mailto:institute@iss-eu.org)*  
[www.iss-eu.org](http://www.iss-eu.org)  
€ 15

ISSN 1017-7566  
ISBN 92-9198-086-2