Chaillot Paper

March 2004

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One year on: lessons from Iraq

R. Asmus, C. Bertram, C. Bildt, E. Brimmer, M. Dassu, R. de Wijk, J. Dobbins, W. Drozdiak, N. Gnesotto, P. H. Gordon, C. Grant, G. Gustenau, P. Hassner, J. Hulsman, A. Lejins, C. McArdle Kelleher, A. Moravcsik, J. Onyszkiewicz, J. Sedivy, N. Serra and A. Vasconcelos

Edited by G. Lindstrom and B. Schmitt

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Ron Asmus, Christoph Bertram, Carl Bildt, Esther Brimmer, Marta Dassu, Rob de Wijk, James Dobbins, William Drozdiak, Nicole Gnesotto, Philip H. Gordon, Charles Grant, Gustav Gustenau, Pierre Hassner, John Hulsman, Atis Lejins, Catherine McArdle Kelleher, Andrew Moravcsik, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Jiri Sedivy, Narcis Serra and Alvaro Vasconcelos

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Preface

Nicole Gnesotto

Le 19 mars 2003, les Etats-Unis lançaient les premières opérations militaires sur Bagdad. Depuis Suez, jamais intervention extérieure n'avait suscité une telle fracture de la communauté internationale et atlantique, le divorce entre Etats se doublant de clivages tout aussi massifs entre les opinions publiques et la plupart de leurs dirigeants.

Un an après, seule la question des armes de destruction massive irakiennes semble résolue : de l'aveu même du chef des inspections américaines, il n'y en avait pas. Toutes les autres questions – sur la pacification et l'avenir démocratique de l'Irak, les conditions d'une stabilisation régionale, le processus de paix israélo-palestinien, le terrorisme international, le rôle des Nations unies, la légitimité de l'usage de la force, les relations entre l'éthique et le stratégique, les conditions d'un partenariat euro-américain, etc. – restent ouvertes, mais tenues prudemment à distance. Entre Européens et Américains, la tendance politique est en effet désormais à l'apaisement et le discours général à la reconstruction : d'un Etat irakien souverain et pacifié, d'un partenariat euro-américain apaisé, d'une nouvelle relation avec l'ensemble de la région du Golfe et du Moyen-Orient.

En mars 2004, tirer les leçons de la guerre s'avère donc un exercice doublement difficile : d'abord parce qu'une année de recul est largement insuffisante pour évaluer l'impact structurel de la décision d'intervention américaine. Mutatis mutandis, presque trois ans après le renversement des Talibans en Afghanistan, le bilan demeure on ne peut plus ambigu. Ensuite, parce que le bilan varie sensiblement selon l'axe de référence – la réalité du terrain, l'idéologie, les principes d'action, les perceptions publiques – sur lequel on se situe.

Ce Cahier de Chaillot, *édité par Burkard Schmitt et Gustav Lindstrom, dresse toutefois une photographie passionnante de l'état des réflexions stratégiques, en Europe comme aux Etats-Unis, un an après le début de la guerre. Nous avons sollicité une vingtaine de personnalités, parmi les plus représentatives de la communauté stratégique euro-américaine. Toutes avaient été très impliquées, dans leur propre pays mais également dans le débat international, dans l'énorme*

polémique transatlantique suscitée dès l'origine par la crise irakienne. Leurs bilans comparés laissent aujourd'hui, à de très rares exceptions près, une surprenante impression de convergences : sur les failles de l'unilatéralisme, sur le besoin d'ONU, sur la complexité du phénomène terroriste, sur les limites de la puissance militaire à l'ère de la mondialisation, sur la nécessité et les vertus d'un partenariat équitable. Comme si l'un des effets majeurs de la guerre en Irak avait été de mettre en lumière les vulnérabilités propres de l'Union et de l'Amérique : la première impuissante parce que trop divisée, la seconde moins puissante parce que trop souveraine.

Paris, mars 2004

Introduction

Gustav Lindstrom

The war on Iraq was without any doubt the main international event in the security arena in 2003. In 2004, the ramifications of the war are taking centre stage as policy-makers gauge the future of Iraq, the Middle East, transatlantic relations and the role of international organisations.

This *Chaillot Paper* takes stock of the consequences of the war in Iraq one year after the initiation of the military campaign in March 2003. Rather than provide a definitive or conclusive verdict on the implications of the war, its objective is to offer a number of viewpoints concerning developments in its aftermath. Given the divergences that the war created, not only between the United States and Europe but also within the EU, we invited a wide spectrum of authors to participate in this project in order to get as representative a picture as possible. To do so, twenty-one authors from Europe and the United States were asked to respond to five questions covering different aspects of international relations. Respondents were asked to give their views on the consequences of the war in Iraq on:

- the war on terrorism;
- the Greater Middle East;
- the European Union's role as a global actor;
- transatlantic relations;
- the international system.

All authors, irrespective of nationality or background, were given the same guidance questions so as to facilitate the comparison of viewpoints across all five dimensions. We asked that the contributions be kept short, placing emphasis on the identification of the most important trends rather than detailed accounts of events. To ensure that individual opinions and approaches were not too constrained by the format, the editing process was kept to a minimum.

The net result is a vivid and complex picture of the state of international affairs, providing a unique snapshot of developments post-Iraq – including perceptions of their intended and unintended consequences.

This paper should be of interest to analysts, academics, and policy-makers concerned with international relations. It should also interest individuals following developments in key functional areas such as terrorism or transatlantic relations. For those specifically interested in the state of transatlantic relations, the Institute recently covered that dimension in its transatlantic book *Shift or rift. Assessing US-EU relations after Iraq* (November 2003).

I

Part I

European views

Christoph Bertram

1

Apart from the fall of Saddam Hussein, America's war against Iraq and the subsequent occupation produced none of the results in the region promised by those who waged it – and the opposite of what they wanted in America's relations to allies, alliances and international institutions.

The war on terrorism

Even before the war began, those favouring it had been unable to prove links between international terrorism and the Saddam regime. By contrast, the view of those who had claimed that military intervention in Iraq would do nothing to advance the global fight against international terrorism was confirmed. The lawlessness following the war attracted rather than intimidated terrorist movements in the wider region set on defying Western and especially US power. US military action in Iraq thus served as a new and additional recruiter for young men seeking to join al-Qaeda-type operations. If, as is to be hoped, the domestic security situation within Iraq improves to the disadvantage of this 'international brigade' of fundamentalist Islamic terrorism, its members are likely to seek targets elsewhere in the region, just as the fighters against Soviet occupation in Afghanistan once did when it ended.

The Iraq experience thus underlines once again that 'terrorism' is an enemy very different from those familiar to the West. If confronted directly, it goes underground, as the al-Qaeda network did in Afghanistan. It flourishes, as does organised crime, in the instability of post-military operations, as in Iraq or Chechnya. And the distinction between local and international terrorists, important as it is to isolate perpetrators with an identifiable grievance from those using violence in a fundamentalist cause, inevitably becomes blurred in the gangrene of conflict. The terrorism that manifested itself in postwar Iraq counts different groups

pursuing a range of different objectives – Saddam adherents seeking revenge and those trying to prevent a distribution of power in the new Iraq that is disadvantageous to their ethnic or religious group, those who seek to profit from the continuing turmoil for criminal gain and those committed to chasing the 'infidels' from the soil of Islam.

No less significant, the Iraqi experience confirms that the most promising strategy against terrorists remains that of widening the zone of civil stability. Military stability alone will not make the men of violence give up their fight; it may even further ignite their furor and swell the numbers of their recruits.

The Greater Middle East

America's intervention in Iraq has sharpened the focus on the Arab world, and concern over the region's domestic and economic underdevelopment has joined that over Islamic fundamentalism and its potential dangers for the world beyond. The remedy, if there is one, is to help create the conditions for political reform. Yet while few would disagree that democratic reform would be an important, perhaps even essential step towards leading the region out of its present state of political apathy, despotic regimes and festering radicalism, there is little in the Iraq experience to suggest rapid progress in this respect.

It might be otherwise if postwar Iraq had remotely resembled that originally projected by the advocates of intervention. It did not. Stability in the country, though improving, is far from assured. The Iraqi exiles returning from abroad have failed to generate the popular support Pentagon planners had counted on. The structures of a democratic state have yet to be established, the mind-set of democracy has yet to be instilled in a population long acquainted with despotic rule. The risk of an erstwhile secular society becoming dominated by religious political forces remains real, as elections could lead to an absolute majority of the most populous Shia, producing ethnic and religious cleavages, tensions and perhaps even civil war and secession. At best it will take a considerable time for Iraq to demonstrate to the rest of the Arab world that democracy offers greater stability and prosperity than the region's regimes currently provide – at worst, it might well serve as a warning not to follow the example of Iraq.

If positive changes in the domestic political systems of the 'Greater Middle East' are slow in coming, real progress can nevertheless be registered in one of its underlying concerns, that of nuclear proliferation in the region. While no weapons of mass destruction have been found in Iraq, other potential WMD states in the region, Iran and Libya, are now formally committed to opening their nuclear programmes to the scrutiny of the IAEA, to renouncing the project for uranium enrichment (Iran) or to dismantling their WMD programmes entirely (Libya). In Pakistan, the network of 'business scientists' spreading nuclear technology for commercial and ideological reasons has been exposed.

Yet the war in Iraq does not suffice to explain these most welcome changes. Not only is the link between cause and effect in international politics tenuous and complex, but the new policy in Iran and Libya was finalised not at the moment of the US military triumph but much later when it had become clear that America was meeting major difficulties in assuring stability in Iraq. Iran's willingness to allow full inspections of its nuclear programme and to commit itself not to establish the complete fuel cycle was probably less influenced by fear of being next on a now much more theoretical US 'pre-emption list'. Rather, the leadership was concerned that mounting international pressure against Iran's now quite advanced nuclear programme would lead to economic sanctions which in turn would stifle the economic reforms needed to feed a large and rapidly growing population. As to Libya, its leaders had sought to mend their ways with the West well before the Bush administration took office in 2001; being caught with a nuclear weapons programme would immediately have frustrated all those efforts. Somewhere in the calculations leading up to these decisions the shadow of US force will have had some effect but not provided the primary or even the decisive push. It might even be argued that it was America's weakness rather than its strength which made the possession of WMD less urgent. After all, the option of another 'pre-emptive strike' against either of the two countries closed to the extent that the United States was tied down in Iraq and embroiled in a major controversy over the failure of its intelligence services to explain the absence of WMD arsenals in the country; it would now find it near impossible to generate domestic and international support for similar action against other parts of President Bush's 'axis of evil'.

The European Union's role as an international actor

For European unity, the split experienced over Iraq was nothing less than a disaster. No serious attempts were made by major members to reach a consensus well before the war when a common European position might still have had some impact on the unfolding events. As it was, the soon 25 member states of the European Union split into two seemingly irreconcilable camps, one siding with the United States, the other with France and Germany. These two, for so long regarded as the indispensable and trusted 'motor' of Europe's integration, have now lost that status, partly through their posture over Iraq, partly through the mixture of indifference and high-handedness which they displayed toward the smaller EU members during the conflict. Britain, on the other hand, so often eager to be 'in the heart of Europe' but never quite making it, succeeded not only in organising many of the other countries in a show of support for the United States but also in increasing its influence in the Union. When the test came later in 2003 – whether the 25 members would sign up to the more integrated Union proposed by France and Germany or the looser structure favoured by Britain – the latter prevailed.

It is true that once the war was over and the magnitude of the stabilisation task in Iraq manifest, the EU overcame its internal divisions through the desire on the part of all concerned to concentrate on the common task of rebuilding Iraq. Yet the emotional wounds left by the conflict will take time to heal, the more so since the lessons from Europe's failure are painful ones.

For one, it is now clear that while a common European policy is possible on economic, trade or ecological issues, any attempt to unite Europe in opposition to America over a matter of strategic security will tear Europeans apart once again.

The other lesson is more familiar: without a major step forward in the integration of concepts, procedures and means for a common foreign and security policy, Europe will have little or no influence on US strategic decisions and unilateral instincts. European leaders have so far proved unable to translate this banality into reality. The Convention proposal for a European Constitutional Treaty failed to be endorsed by the governments of the enlarged EU in December 2003 not least because many will still give preference to the semblance of national sovereignty over the effectiveness of a united European role in international matters.

This does not mean that the move towards greater European cohesion in foreign policy will now grind to a halt. But instead of being advanced actively it will meander forward, as the sensitivities aroused by the Iraq crisis slowly give way to traditional pragmatism and as events again shape common perceptions. The European Security Strategy adopted by European Council in December 2003 bears witness to this, as does the EU's decision to take over from NATO in Bosnia from the summer of 2004. But these demonstrations of European purpose remain vulnerable to two familiar enemies: the reluctance, not least at a time of financial constraints, to undertake the investments required to follow through on the declarations; and the risk of being divided all over again by a future transatlantic crisis. If European powers want to avoid that fate and at the same time gain greater international weight, they will have to tie themselves to each other by fusing their respective military capabilities, a step that, in the best of circumstances, can only be begun by a very small number of countries, not the 25 which will form the Union from 1 May 2004.

Transatlantic relations

The impact of the Iraq conflict and its aftermath on transatlantic relations cannot be overestated. For the first time in the history of the US-European alliance, America engaged in a war for which Europe's public opinion saw no justification and which two major US allies actively opposed.

It is true that here, too, the recent US recognition of the need for allies and the desire of formerly opposing European governments to mend fences has brought back to the transatlantic discourse not merely a more traditional civility but also a willingness to join efforts in securing stability in Iraq. But what will remain ingrained in Europe's collective memory, for those that had sided with the United States as much as for those who had not, is that America will usually get its way, perhaps respecting European sensitivities in form, but not in substance. While it was of comfort to those sensitivities that America's power had been shown to be limited in Iraq to the extent that it had to seek the support of its allies for the postwar effort, the fact remains that the power gap between the United States and its European partners has not narrowed in recent years but, on the contrary widened further.

This has also increasingly undermined the symbol of transatlantic cooperation, NATO. Since uncertainty over the future relevance of the Atlantic relationship and its organisation dates back to well before the Iraq war, agreement now on how to deal with postwar Iraq will not remove that uncertainty. The deeper crisis follows from more general doubts over NATO's relevance in a post-Cold War, post-9/11 environment. For the United States, the main interest now lies in the extent to which its military structures and the means of some allies can be helpful in US operations, and NATO has obliged by streamlining its command structure, agreeing to set up a NATO Response Force, and becoming involved in conflicts way beyond its traditional area of operation.

Yet an alliance of sovereign states with no enemy at their borders will only hold together over time if they agree not merely on the strategic tools but the strategy itself. Much will depend therefore, on whether the United States is willing, and its European partners able, to engage in such an exercise. On both counts, the prospects remain obscure.

The international system

In the early weeks after America's triumphant and indeed impressive military success against the crumbling forces of Saddam Hussein, there was a fleeting moment when a new and very different international system was imaginable, with the United States at the centre. International institutions would serve only to transmit US influence, international alliances would be reduced to US military appendices.

It was not to be. America's power, the subsequent months have amply shown, is limited even in military terms. A unipolar world is not upon us. Neither is a 'multipolar world' which would require what does not exist, namely a number of powers of approximate weight linked together by a basic set of common rules. Nor is a 'multilateral world' emerging, which also supposes behaviour that does not exist – the willingness of most states to cooperate within agreed institutions and according to agreed rules. Instead, America's limited if unrivalled power will be part of a patchwork of international cooperation and balancing, the cantus firmus of the emerging international system but not its only melodic line.

The UN has thus been resurrected. All international organisations work best when the major powers want them to. Now the UN, which had largely been bypassed after Resolution 1441 in November 2003 and had played a more than modest role during the first months of the occupation, has become increasingly indispensable to the United States as resentment against the coalition authorities and their proposals of a handover to Iraqi sovereignty have mounted.

Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, has rightly shown little enthusiasm for a subservient role in Iraq; the only real option will be to become involved as the central political authority should an autonomous Iraqi government demand it. With the date for elections and the subsequent handover from the US-led coalition to such a government approaching, a rapid increase in the role of the UN will be inevitable. The institution which to some seemed destined to irrelevance in a world dominated by the United States has come back into its own with the recognition, shared by the United States, that America, too, needs a functioning United Nations. Fortunately the issues which Kofi Annan and his team now have to tackle are no longer controversial among members of the Security Council.

A hopeful outlook nevertheless

Had the United States emerged triumphant after moving against the Saddam regime, it would have emerged as the world's sole arbiter of right and wrong. Governments all over the globe would have resigned themselves to that, much as the Administration's chief ideologues had predicted. As things have turned out there is now the chance of a rebirth of the West and for more effective policies to fight terrorism and promote change in the Greater Middle East, and for strengthening a still fragile international order.

It is a chance, no more. Many things can still go wrong. The post-Iraq war world remains a world in need of statesmanship. But the chance is there. It is an outcome few could have hoped for a year ago when the war began.

Carl Bildt

2

The war on terrorism

It is far too early to assess what impact the situation in Iraq will have on the long-term efforts to shift the balance between the forces of reform and reaction in the wider Muslim world so decisively that the threat of terrorism is substantially reduced. Much will depend on what sort of Iraq we will see emerging during the coming years.

In the shorter perspective, I believe the impact has been limited either way. But in the longer term, Iraq could develop either into a pillar of stability, reform and representative government in the wider Arab and Muslim world, or it could descend into a chaos that would have the potential to serve as a training ground for the next generation of terrorists in much the same way as we saw during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan or in some extremist operations in the Balkans.

One year after the war, both of these options are open. It goes without saying that the countries of the European Union have a huge stake in the outcome. Accordingly, we should try to muster the resources we have in order to increase the possibilities that Iraq evolves towards the first of these options. If that is the case, then there is no doubt that an Iraq that moves from repression to reform will be an important contribution to the efforts to combat terrorism.

The Greater Middle East

Again, it is far too early to make too safe predictions on where we are heading. One of the reasons sometimes given for the war against the Saddam Hussein regime was that, much like the Gulf War of 1991, it would give impetus to the stalled peace process between

Israel and Palestine. With the Quartet's 'road map' – much inspired by concepts advanced by the EU – there was indeed a window of opportunity immediately after the defeat of Saddam.

We did see some encouraging moves. The United States committed itself to the setting up of a Palestinian state. The Aqaba summit brought hope that there would be a possibility to start moving along the path set by the road map.

But we have been disappointed, and now one would be hard pressed to see even faint signs of any peace process. Perhaps it is only the desperate realisation on both sides that the situation risks deteriorating even further that can bring them back towards some sort of mutual accommodation.

Over time, it is important to realise that there is a relationship between the two enormous state-building efforts in Iraq and Palestine. If the liberation of Iraq from its past is not followed by the liberation of Palestine from its present – bringing security also to Israel – there is a very clear risk that the tactical victory in Baghdad will turn into a strategic defeat in the wider Muslim world.

For me it is natural to see Iraq as another part of the post-Ottoman area that stretches from Bihac in Bosnia in the north-west to Basra near the Gulf in the south-east. Throughout this wide area we are confronted with the task of building state structures that can command the loyalty of different national and religious groups. Let us not forget that Iraq and Yugoslavia were both forged out of the debris of the collapsed Ottoman Empire less than a century ago. There are the Kosovo and Kurdish issues, and between them it is still an open question whether the magnetism of the European Union, in combination with the negotiating skills of the United Nations, will be enough to united the divided island of Cyprus.

It is obvious that if we succeed in setting up a viable new state in Iraq, this should help in bridging similar divisions elsewhere, although the actual solutions are likely to differ. But if we are seen to be condoning a fracturing of Iraq, it is equally obvious that it will risk having negative repercussions throughout the region. From a European point of view, we have every reason to be particularly concerned with the situation of Turkey as it undergoes its sensitive process of transition.

The European Union's role as a global actor

Early 2003 was probably the low point in modern times for the ambitions of the European Union as a global actor in the field of foreign affairs and security. Not only were views among key member countries very divided, but it was also obvious that practically no one tried to use the mechanism of the EU to try to bridge the divisions.

Communication between Washington and individual EU capitals – of 'old' and 'new' member states alike – was much more intense than communication between the various EU capitals.

Since then, we have seen the EU trying to rise out of the ashes in three different respects with important implications for the future. The first is the attempt – as of yet not completed – to get agreement on a Constitutional Treaty that seeks to create institutions that could give greater coherence and clarity to the Union's efforts in this field. It is important to note that the issues that prevented agreement at the December 2003 Brussels meeting were not related to these areas. On the contrary, the Brussels meeting brought an important agreement on the beefing-up of some of the planning capacities for some European military operations. Thus, our instituitional structures continue to improve.

But – second – more important than the endless Brussels discussions on the wiring diagram of the different institutions is the progress achieved through the adoption of the European Security Strategy. This is the first time a more comprehensive attempt has been made to go beyond the old question of Henry Kissinger's – where's the telephone number? – to the far more important question of what to say in the event that someone does actually call. We are starting to fill the hardware of our different institutions with the software of policies, and hopefully the European Security Strategy will be the evolving operating system that makes it possible for our other programmes and policies to work in a comprehensive and coherent way.

And – third – we have started to demonstrate an element of capability when it comes to European crisis management operations. The very limited Operation *Concordia* in Macedonia was run through the elaborate 'Berlin-plus' arrangements, although I

doubt that this contributed much to the mission. The far more challenging Operation *Artemis* in Congo demonstrated the potential of a new model with Brussels political leadership, operational command through a beefed-up national command authority and a coalition of willing and able military forces. Particularly in support of different UN operations, I believe *Artemis* will have set the pattern for the future.

But these are only faint beginnings. We might have started to recover from the low point of a year ago, but there is a long way to go.

Transatlantic relations

I believe it is important to realise that the dominating agendas on the different sides of the Atlantic now are different, and will remain so for a considerable time.

Our main agenda is the one set in 1989. It is the question of setting up a system of peace and security that can guarantee peace and prosperity for as large parts of Europe as possible for generations to come. With the admission of the ten new members, we are at best only halfway towards realisation of the first phase of that truly historic mission. We seek peace by the sharing of sovereignty on our continent.

The dominating agenda of the United States – irrespectively of who is occupying the White House – will remain the one that was set in 2001 by the 11 September attacks. We Europeans might hesitate to use the word 'war' for the struggle against global terrorism, but it is important to understand that this is the way in which it is perceived across the political spectrum in the United States. They seek security in a threatening world through asserting what they consider their sovereign right of self-defence.

These agendas are very different, and it is important that we recognise them as such. We Europeans have reason to expect the United States to be fully understanding of the importance of our agenda, and America has every reason to expect the same of us in respect of its agenda. It is by understanding, respecting and supporting the different dominating agendas that we can start to work more constructively together.

Over time, these two agendas are complementary and mutually supportive, although occasional careless rhetoric on both sides during the past year sometimes led to the impression that they stood in conflict with each other. I believe that it is particularly when we are together confronted with all the issues of the post-Ottoman area, the Greater Middle East or – as Zbigniew Brzezinski has recently called an even wider area – the Grand Balkans that we will see the 1989 agenda of peace through economic integration, political state-building and extension of the rule of the law go hand in hand with the 2001 agenda of decisvely fighting global terrorism and combating the spread of the technologies of mass destruction.

But for the transatlantic relationship to improve it is essential that steps are taken to heal the trans-Channel dispute on this side of the Atlantic and the trans-Potomac dispute on the other side. If this happens, transatlantic tension will be seen to subside almost automatically.

On both issues, there are notably signs of progress. The attempts to intensify the dialogue between London, Paris and Berlin is of crucial significance, and the powers of this combination were demonstrated in Iran, although a greater coordination with the rest of the European Union would probably have strengthened the impact even further. And the change in tone we can note on Iraq policy – with Lakhdar Brahimi called in from the UN to try to achieve what Paul Bremer of the Coalition Provisional Authority manifestly could not – is perhaps a sign that greater realism is leading to a lessening of the trans-Potomac dispute as well.

The international system

I do not think it is possible to look at the challenges to the international system arising from the Iraq conflict in isolation from the other challenges with which it has been confronted. I believe a number of developments have come together in such a way as to make it possible to speak about the Westphalian international order coming to its end, and something more or less different gradually taking shape.

Prior to 2001, the debate was all about the non-intervention in Rwanda in 1994 and the intervention in Kosovo in 1999 centred on the right, or perhaps even duty, of humanitarian intervention in certain cases. Immediately after 11 September, the UN Security Council, in a landmark resolution, extended the right of self-defence, clearly recognised in the UN Charter, to cases of support of terrorism, and later the issue of the the threat of weapons of mass destruction led to a heated debate about a possible right to pre-emption.

What we have seen in Iraq so far has not given credence to the position that it was necessary to attack pre-emptively because of some imminent possibility of the use of weapons of mass destruction. In both the United States and the United Kingdom, major reviews of the collection, assessment and use of intelligence have been initiated. It seems obvious that not even the most significant intelligence power has sufficiently refined instruments to be able to judge whether imminent threats of this sort are present or not, thus undermining a central part of a doctrine of pre-emptive attacks in cases like these.

For me, a policy of regime change in Iraq was necessary as a consequence of the utter failure of the policy of sanctions pursued by the Security Council during the last decade, and the virtual certainty that these devastating and morally indefensible sanctions would not be lifted as long as Saddam Hussein remained in power. The longer the sanctions went on, the harder and more difficult for Iraq would be the road back. The sanctions drove the middle class into either despair or exile, while de facto enriching the regime stalwarts and reinforcing their hold on power. To get rid of the Saddam Hussein regime was the only way to start to bring Iraq back from its misery and despair.

What was amply demonstrated was that a coalition to build peace must be substantially broader than a coalition to conduct war. To destroy a regime is relatively straightforward – some regimes even do it to themselves – while the task of building a new one is a far more complicated and demanding process. It is, as we have also seen in the relatively benign environment of the Balkans, beyond the capabilities of even a fairly strong but limited coalition of powers.

Accordingly, we have seen requests for UN assistance becoming more and more pronounced. It is not only a question of the resources and experience the world organisation brings, but also the critically important legitimacy. Stalin was not too impressed with the Pope since he did not have any army divisions, but it is worth noting that the empire of Stalin no longer exists, while that of the Pope certainly does. And in Iraq, even the Coalition Provisional Authority has now recognised that the legitimacy offered by the United Nations is an asset it simply cannot do without.

Thus, after a debate in which many feared the demise of the United Nations, we have yet again seen that it remains the indispensable organisation. Had it not existed, we would have had to invent it very quickly.

Marta Dassu

3

By choosing to go to war against Iraq with few supporters and on a false rationale, the Bush administration took a big gamble – effectively making success in Iraq a test of its entire foreign policy. One year later, the balance sheet is still, at best, unclear. Saddam Hussein has been defeated, which is obviously good; however, turning a rogue state into a failed state would be equal to failure.

Moreover, the human and economic costs of the occupation are proving much higher than anticipated by the Bush administration: Iraq might thus remain the first and last military intervention to achieve regime change by the current Administration (even including a possible Bush II). In other words, the logic of preventive wars is not going to dominate world politics: intervention in Iraq will probably remain the exception, not the rule. Witness the way in which Washington is now approaching both North Korea and Iran.

While the Iraqi war is not necessarily a trendsetter for American foreign policy towards 'rogue states', it could be a trendsetter for an American (un)diplomatic attitude towards traditional allies and potential partners – unless a serious effort is made to strike a new deal. In the short term, however, there is little room for relaunching US-European relations: in the run-up to the American presidential election Europe will certainly be off the screen; meanwhile, the Europeans themselves will be busy with the constitutional tangle and enlargement.

Iraq marks the end of old Atlanticism – which had been rendered obsolete by 1989, as we only discovered over a decade later.

The war on terrorism

Over the past 12 months, we have achieved undeniable successes in the fight against international terrorism, especially along the lines inaugurated in parallel with the intervention in Afghanistan: intel-

ligence, police and law enforcement cooperation, including financial tracking.

Afghanistan itself epitomised a reasonably successful endeavour, as a targeted military operation in a country harbouring the leadership of the larger al-Qaeda network: thus, despite the precarious state of today's Afghanistan, and notwithstanding Osama bin Laden's (likely) survival, removing the Taliban from power served to deprive al-Qaeda of an important safe haven. Since then, more than 3,000 al-Qaeda operatives have, according to American official sources, been 'incapacitated'. Terrorist cells have been disrupted across Europe, and some previously reluctant countries seem finally ready to cooperate: first of all Saudi Arabia, which has itself been hit by terrorist strikes.

The obvious problem, however, with such complex and multi-level types of anti-terrorist activities, is that success is never 'complete' or definitive, and never easily presented to the public. The war, in short, cannot be won: it is obviously a continuing and long-term fight, with much more still to be done.

Looking ahead, it is crucial to maintain a distinction between at least two kinds of terrorist threats: one from radical Islamists (committed to global *jihad* and with an often nihilistic approach to violence), the other from 'neo-traditional' Islamists (aiming at a return to traditional Islam in Muslim societies and in some case connected to terrorist 'wings'). The latter have strong roots in today's Muslim societies, and in the short term a narrower agenda; they are also more willing to compete within the political system – even as they pursue an anti-liberal agenda involving the tactical use of terrorist acts. If the two trends were to converge, the terrorist threat would increase and focus mostly within the Arab and Muslim world itself – opening up the prospect of a sort of Muslim civil war well beyond Iraq. Signs of this trend came with the series of attacks in 2003 targeting Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Turkey.

Al-Qaeda retains, with bin Laden, its original strategic advantages: a long-term perspective in a Messianic context, partial 'deterritorialisation' and a diffuse nature, the ability to claim 'victories' even when a suicide bomber acts alone. If anything, the events of the past few months have pushed the individual 'cells' into becoming even more independent from the 'centre', giving a boost to 'terrorism by franchising' – groups from Bali to Rabat may well use the al-Qaeda brand despite weak or non-existent links.

The US case for war against Saddam included his alleged links to al-Qaeda, but as of today these are yet to be fully proven; it is clear, on the contrary, that terrorist groups have decided to fight directly in Iraq and the Middle East a main battle in their war against the United States and its local allies.

The Bush administration consequently hopes – somewhat paradoxically – to have accomplished a sort of useful 'mission impossible': transforming the diffuse enemy into a local adversary and forcing it to concentrate its efforts along a more 'conventional' front, while also keeping it away from US territory. Is 'externalising' the threat a positive result from a US standpoint? And is it enough to justify *ex post facto* the costs and risks of war and occupation? In any case, it is a temporary and reversible accomplishment, as one major terror strike in the United States or even in Europe would call into question the entire assumption.

Two general conclusions can be drawn – or corroborated. First, the logic of terrorist groups differs greatly from that of state governments (even when these are considered 'rogue' regimes), and is unresponsive to traditional deterrence or compulsion. It is almost impossible to determine whether the recent terrorist attacks have been encouraged or reduced (in number or effectiveness) by 'regime destruction' in Iraq. This shows that evaluating 'success' is extremely difficult, and will continue to be so. More than concentrating the fight against the al-Qaeda brand of terrorism, the Iraq war has compressed a series of challenges and opened threats into the Iraqi territory, confirming how the long and difficult transition from one regime to another is fertile ground for terrorist infiltration. This may be an additional cost of regime change in other circumstances as well, thus contributing to a more cautious and nuanced approach from the US side.

At the same time – second conclusion – it is becoming harder, after Iraq, to persuade Western publics that the 'war' on terrorism demands a consistent expansion of Western (so far especially, but not only, American) military commitments in distant theatres, and the long-term occupation of sovereign countries. After the relatively targeted and limited engagement in Afghanistan, Iraq is showing that the concept of an overall war on terrorism may be a sort of huge 'mission creep'; the general notion of war should thus be narrowed to become more specific and selective, lest it gradually loses its mobilising potential – perhaps even in the United States. In sum, aiming too high (or too wide, so to speak) may

ultimately erode consensus within the West and make our societies even more vulnerable to terrorist attacks by lowering the level of attention needed for more effective defence and counter-attack.

In truth, there are signs that the risk of excessive militarisation of the anti-terrorist campaign by the United States is now being countered by voices within the Bush administration itself: after all, the emphasis on democratisation requires a long-term commitment to tackling the root causes of social and political estrangement. On their part, the Europeans have signalled a readiness to contribute to 'robust interventions' against distant threats. An important degree of convergence is visible here – following the painful debate on Iraq.

The United States continues to be in a unique position, however, given its military and diplomatic exposure in the Muslim world – with close links to some key 'moderate' regimes: an inherent cost of the conduct of the war on terrorism, combined with negative perceptions of US policy towards Iraq and Palestine, is a dramatic increase in anti-Americanism.

The Greater Middle East

In the aftermath of the Iraq war, there has been no straightforward domino effect in the Greater Middle East – there are both positive and negative signs. Clearly, the war has made the previous regional status quo virtually untenable – something the Bush administration wished to achieve, and the Europeans have finally accepted a necessity. The centre of gravity in the region is shifting from the West, Egypt and Syria, to the East. The domestic scene seems to be moving more rapidly than before in Iran – which has profited from Saddam's defeat and where the struggle for a post-revolutionary equilibrium is open; and in Saudi Arabia, where Crown Prince Abdullah is under pressure from without (witness the US decision to move military installations out of the country) and from within (terrorist acts and social protest). On the Israeli-Palestinian front, it is abundantly clear that the 'road map' did not really benefit from the momentum of the Iraqi war, and has run into the usual difficulties of all previous settlement proposals: there is no automatic virtuous circle starting in Baghdad and ending in Jerusalem. Palestine is not the source of America's problems in the region, clearly; and yet it must be part of the solution – if a grand strategy for the

Greater Middle East has to succeed. In the meantime, Libya seems to have learned a stark lesson from the fate of Saddam Hussein and there may be more change in the offing in North Africa, with US military installations being negotiated with Morocco and Tunisia. Not all is changing – Pakistan's internal situation, for instance, remains particularly worrisome – and not all the changes in the making are thoroughly planned or necessarily benign in terms of ultimate consequences. In any case, they have all been accelerated by the Iraqi war. The tremors that were set in motion may be far-reaching, but seizing the opportunities they present requires a type of nuanced and patient diplomacy for fostering change that is quite different from enforced 'regime change'.

Iraq's evolution is not the entire game, therefore; but it will have a very strong impact on regional trends. If Iraq is not stabilised (whether an 'Afghan-plus' model will suffice is more than open to question) and the coalition forces withdraw before order has been re-established, a large-scale Lebanon will follow, with negative repercussions throughout the Gulf. This is why Europe, and even the countries that opposed the war, have acknowledged their interest in postwar success. If post-Saddam Iraq shapes up as a new dictatorship, any regional strategy for democratic change will be weakened from the very beginning, showing the inherent contradiction in the US approach.

Stabilisation of Iraq – and of the entire region – is hardly conceivable without engaging Iran and Turkey. And here the role of Europe can be particularly useful. With Iran, recent developments concerning the proliferation issue are encouraging for a more effective European role and are rendering externally fomented regime change a less likely option; a second Bush administration could even contemplate a slow-paced effort in reactivating a dialogue with Tehran. As far as Turkey is concerned, the Iraq war has increased both its geopolitical role and the country's (long-standing) interest in membership of the EU. For those who want Turkey in, notably the United States and 'Atlantic Europe', recent terrorist acts provide further arguments; for those who are sceptical, including Germany and France, reasons for scepticism are even stronger now.

Inevitably, a key factor in measuring success at the regional level is the prospects on the Israeli-Palestinian front: in fact, the picture is as complex as ever, with the 'parallel diplomacy' efforts of the Geneva virtual accords among non-governmental groups

showing once again the Israeli and Palestinian governments' short-sightedness. The internal dynamics have been left to dominate the agenda for Israelis and Palestinians: despite the initial American push to launch the 'road map', the Bush administration is now bound to become less, not more, involved at least until election day in November.

The Europeans for their part are becoming more directly involved in pushing for regional change – following their contribution on the ground in Afghanistan. If Europe was divided on Iraq, and to a certain extent it remains so, this is not the case with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and on how to deal with Iran. This was evidenced by the new stance on funding the Palestinian authority – with the introduction of more conditionality and the banning of Hamas; by a renewed willingness to pressure Syria on its links with terrorists; and by the tripartite mission to Tehran. In a best-case scenario, dealing with Iran could be envisaged as the beginning of a rather effective transatlantic division of labour – pragmatic in nature yet potentially very useful. It will be much more difficult to overcome differences in approach – especially among public opinion – to the Israeli-Palestinian conundrum. Should the differences not be bridged or managed, in the Greater Middle East, the West will divide again – and fail.

The European Union's role as a global actor

The Iraqi crisis was a major transatlantic crisis, but also a dramatically divisive experience within Europe. As such, the crisis has pointed to the limits of cohesion in foreign and security policy. However, the learning curve has been very steep, and the merits of close coordination among the key capitals were soon confirmed – as seen above – by the tripartite Franco-German-British diplomatic mission to Tehran. The inescapable lesson is that whenever France and the United Kingdom are on opposite sides, the EU's foreign policy is paralysed and has virtually no influence: standing up to the United States, or simply bandwagoning, are both – when played bilaterally – doomed to failure. When the two major European powers do agree on policy, Europe is capable of acting; but the problem becomes how to provide leadership without generating feelings of exclusion among the other members.

The de facto decision-making structure of the EU in the security field is shaping up on the basis of the Paris-London-Berlin triangle, which was also the precondition for the recent agreement on defence planning and the EU-NATO relationship. It remains to be seen how durable this agreement will be: any crisis involving the 'American factor' may easily divide Europe again. And it remains to be seen how other important contributors to this collective effort – the mid-size EU members such as Italy, Spain and Poland – can be accommodated in such a scheme. At the same time, smaller countries will continue to rely on institutional mechanisms to protect their interests.

Despite the temporary failure of the IGC, some progress is being made in enhancing institutional arrangements: by modifying the rotating presidency and strengthening the role of the HR-CFSP.

In the meantime, the European Security Strategy exploited the Iraq effect to press forward an agenda for increased responsibility, engagement, and resource commitment. In particular, the Union now recognises that international terrorism and WMD proliferation are top priorities, to be tackled globally through a variety of actions including 'robust and early intervention' when deemed necessary. Here, structured cooperation on defence and the launching of the Armaments Agency could help.

The Iraqi crisis has however provided further evidence that the EU has inherent difficulties in dealing with any form of 'robust' out-of-area intervention in the absence of a UN mandate; and that EU countries are under great strain when the United States builds ad hoc coalitions: this twin dilemma is decisive for the future of CFSP and the ability of the Europeans to contribute to (and help shape) potential interventions.

In and around Europe the situation may be significantly different: as the EU develops further and pursues policies specifically designed for its immediate 'neighbourhood' (beyond enlargement), its role will tend to become that of a fully-fledged regional power. A process of 'taking over' is under way in the Balkans, partly as an effect of the shift of US attention to the Greater Middle East, and the European continent is seen increasingly as the area of direct EU responsibilities across the board – including in the field of security and defence. This combines with the specific role the Union is starting to play, under UN mandate, in Africa's crisis management: the mission in Bunia could be seen as the expression of a wider trend in Europe's global security outlook.

Transatlantic relations

'Iraq 2002-03' will be remembered as the gravest transatlantic crisis since the Suez crisis of 1956, but it served to concentrate minds on an agenda for the twenty-first century, not just a rather vague 'post-Cold War' adaptation. Mending fences is a necessary process because the battle of words reached truly worrisome levels, combined with growing anti-Americanism in most European countries and an American temptation to play a 'disaggregation' card.

No major breakthrough can be expected soon, since US priorities are obviously not focused on Europe, while the EU is largely self-absorbed (the IGC and enlargement).

On the positive side, we are making some progress on separating issues, in order to preserve the alliance and pursue joint policies whenever possible even while disagreement remains on other issues – such as Iraq. Continuing cooperation on the ground in Afghanistan, and the relatively smooth transition now under way towards greater EU responsibilities in the Balkans in the context of the 'Berlin-plus' arrangement, confirm this trend. This may point towards a more selective relationship across the Atlantic, even amid serious (possibly growing) difficulties posed by diverging approaches and growing economic tensions in both the commercial arena and in the monetary field. Maturity in accommodating differences will be badly needed to manage a relationship that is no longer automatic but elective.

For NATO, the problem is structural, since 'out-of-area' concerns have practically become its core mission. Yet, there are few precedents of active US-European cooperation outside the European periphery; therefore, criteria for coordinated action must be gradually developed if NATO is to get heavily involved in the Greater Middle East. Although NATO has been weakened politically, its role in Iraq may inexorably grow as a more legitimate Iraqi government takes hold. NATO's eventual leading role in the stabilisation of Iraq would even open the way for potential involvement in (and around) Palestine – scenarios could include Lebanon and the Golan Heights. After Afghanistan, hypotheses of the likes cannot be ruled out.

The optimistic scenario, as Dominique Moïsi has convincingly argued,[1] is that we move towards a transatlantic arrangement based on two 'Monroe Doctrines' pursued by the United States and the EU, and hopefully cooperation in the Greater Middle East

1. Dominique Moïsi, 'Reinventing the West', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 82, no. 6, November/December 2003.

(which is too complex and important for either to tackle alone). This could lead to a reasonably stable balance, provided the Europeans can fully recognise America's unique global role (sometimes accommodating its 'revisionist' instincts) and the United States acknowledges the coming of age of the EU as both a regional power and a global partner.

In terms of division of labour and responsibilities, the 'functional' option is also attractive, potentially in combination with the regional one. Certain forms of intervention – or certain phases of a complex intervention – are more amenable than others to multilateral solutions. In fact, the particular assets with which the EU is better endowed – peacekeeping forces and capabilities useful in reconstruction programmes – are in great demand. 'Shock and awe' or 'overwhelming force' per se do not build (or rebuild) countries and societies; peacekeepers and money can help do so.

However, there are serious drawbacks emerging from the Iraqi experience: as the postwar occupation and management of the country is demonstrating daily – the political framework for reconstruction and transition is largely set by the early stage of a military operation. As things stand in terms of European capabilities, the United States is most likely to set the framework in future contingencies in which the EU might become involved, especially for large operations. Should this be the case, the 'US factor' remains central, and potentially a source of division within the EU.

The international system

On the whole, the more lasting effect of the Iraq war may be a general appreciation of complexity, with old and new conflicts interacting. There is a growing need for governance (in terms of political concepts, legal means and operational instruments), and the unintended consequences of forceful action cannot be discounted when opting for a more 'proactive' attitude in the face of asymmetrical and unconventional threats.

Iraq has truly substituted the post-1989 agenda with a new one. It is now clear to everybody, however, that the 'new threats' need to be incorporated into the 'old threats', since the latter are not going to disappear but will instead assume new forms in conjunction with the new ones.

In general, the prevailing representations of the current international system are crude and possibly misleading – although they respond to a natural yearning for simplicity. Both unipolarity and multipolarity seem to be poor, inaccurate (and certainly very rough) descriptions of how the world functions. The United States is constantly involved in forms of coalition-building which prove to be uncertain, frustrating and time-consuming – not the situation of a 'hegemon' comfortably calling the shots. Seen from an economic viewpoint, the unipolar picture is even less persuasive. As for multipolarity, no 'poles' are easily identifiable: rather, there are ad hoc alignments formed mostly to constrain US behaviour or cooperate with the United States under specific conditions. Iraq has seen both situations, but the prevailing trend is for local dynamics to defy the will and designs of 'the internationals' and outside powers. Instead of 'poles' determining political outcomes for the smaller powers, the picture is one of 'black holes' attracting the major powers and sucking them in to deal with long-standing disputes in a dangerous and interdependent environment. The risk, in sum, is anarchy or loss of control.

On the other hand, the Iraq war has clearly shown that the founding principles of international law are considered to be sorely inadequate by the world's greatest military power, thus putting great strain on the UN, in particular. In a logic of effective multilateralism, the structure of the UN would need major revision in terms of criteria for action, decision-making processes and instruments. In the meantime, political cover for providing legitimacy is needed more than ever before: a new balance must be established between these sometimes conflicting requirements – in order to reduce the gap between legality and legitimacy in international policy.

The post-11 September period eventually exposed major divisions within the West, but it has so far facilitated relations between the United States on one hand and both Vladimir Putin's Russia and Hu Jintao's China on the other. Should the post-11 September impulse decline, the US-Russian relationship will become more difficult (as already signalled last December by the US reaction to the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and the conduct of the electoral campaign), and the US-China relationship more exposed to the strains of a growing trade competition. Making the war on terrorism the centrepiece of a new international order – with the United States as the hub and other regional powers as spokes – remains hard to imagine.

On a more positive note, the debate ignited by the Iraqi crisis has had the healthy effect of raising the issue of enforcing anti-proliferation regulations and policies. The inadequacies of the current regimes have been recognised more openly than ever before. However, the 'message' sent by a pre-emptive/preventive action against a past proliferator such as Iraq can be interpreted in different ways: witness the divergent reactions of North Korea, Iran and Libya. Depending on the specific motivations for each proliferation process, forceful actions against actual or potential proliferators can accelerate those programmes (North Korea), contribute to stopping them (Libya), or even be irrelevant (almost certainly for the India-Pakistan duo, which has largely responded to its own dynamic so far). The case of Iran is more complex to judge, since the signing of the IAEA Protocol and the acceptance of enhanced inspections, a very welcome move, do not amount, for the time being, to giving up the nuclear option.

The WMD non-proliferation regime is under constant attack from various sides. A single superpower (mistrusted by some and seen as unpredictable by many), flexible alliances, ad hoc coalitions and shifting regional balances, all seem to encourage proliferation instead of constraining it. It is extremely hard to pursue a comprehensive policy against proliferation at the global level – even more so if different threats are conflated, such as the activities of terrorist networks and WMD proliferation by governments.

Instead, by focusing on the regional level, more specific 'messages' can be sent effectively to individual regimes, combining incentives and disincentives and involving interested parties from the region itself.

Much of the effectiveness of any conceivable anti-proliferation policy rests on adequate early warning mechanisms, intelligence data and – most importantly – correct and balanced assessments of the available information. This is almost a truism, but it is worth reflecting on it in light of the abysmal failure of Western intelligence services to provide, prior to the war, reliable data on Iraq – a country with one of the worst records of complying with UNSC Resolutions, which had been under constant monitoring for more than a decade and under heavy international sanctions. The problem will have serious repercussions for Western societies and leaderships, first and foremost, since the degree of public confidence in governments' ability to make correct assessments is, following Iraq, extremely low.

Rob de Wijk

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This contribution argues that the current state of international affairs is influenced by a number of developments following the Iraq crisis: the failure to find weapons of mass destruction and to prove links between Iraq and international terrorism; the impossibility to apply the democratic peace thesis on the Greater Middle East; the acceleration of the ESDP as an expression of the desire to turn the EU into a global actor; the recognition that the EU and the United States have distinct political cultures and consequently different ways of dealing with international crises; and finally the undermining of the international system as a result of the desire to carry out preventive wars.

The war on terrorism

During the early days of the intervention in Iraq, Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld listed the eight objectives that the Bush administration sought to achieve: regime change; seizure of biological and chemical weapons; driving out terrorists who found a safe harbour in Iraq; collecting intelligence about terrorist networks in Iraq and beyond; collecting intelligence concerning the global network of illicit weapons of mass destruction activity; ending sanctions and delivering humanitarian relief, food and medicine; securing Iraq's oil fields; and finally, creating conditions for a rapid transition to representative self-government.

Due to the fact that neither weapons of mass destruction nor links between international terrorism and Saddam Hussein were found, the legitimacy of the intervention was widely questioned. Consequently, it is safe to assume that American credibility is undermined and that it will be increasingly difficult to gain support for new interventions.

Moreover, the intervention in Iraq did not reduce the threat of terrorism. Although in the last two years two-thirds of the known

leaders of al-Qaeda are believed to have been killed or captured, attacks ware carried out in Bali, Casablanca, Jakarta, Mombasa, Riyadh, Jerusalem, Istanbul and Baghdad. The following trends have become visible.

- In 2003, due to security measures American targets were turned into 'hard targets'. Consequently, terrorists looking for 'soft targets' increasingly turned their attention to Western targets in general (banks, synagogues, hotels etc.) with a view to killing as many Americans, Europeans and Israelis as possible.
- Due to superior intelligence and security measures after 9/11, no attacks occurred in either the United States or Europe. Instead, in these parts of the world many suspects were arrested and many violent acts were prevented. Consequently, so far all terrorist acts have taken place in Africa and Asia.
- After the war the number of terrorist acts in Iraq numbered 30-40 a day. By the end of 2003, due to increased security measures the number dropped to 20-30. However, the attacks were increasingly sophisticated and aimed at softer targets including the UN and the Red Cross.
- After the war in Iraq the struggle in Afghanistan intensified. In Afghanistan, remnants of al-Qaeda and the Taliban shifted attention to soft targets including the UN, denied foreign troops access to large parts of the country, and fought major battles against occupying troops.
- The occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq has increased the recruiting power of extremists. In addition, terrorist attacks are now being carried out by semi-autonomous al-Qaeda cells and groups inspired by Osama bin Laden.

In conclusion, the fight against terrorism has hardened, has grown more sophisticated, is focused on soft targets and has become more lethal.

The Greater Middle East

Promoting democracy has always been one of the key American foreign policy objectives. However, compared with its predecessors the Bush administration embarked on a more radical course. In 2002 President Bush's Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice argued that the United States should seize the moment by using its hegemonic

power to model the world according to American values: 'The international system has been in flux since the collapse of the Soviet power. Now it is possible – indeed probable – that that transition is coming to an end. If that is right, then . . . that is not just a period of grave danger, but of enormous opportunity . . . a period akin to 1945 to 1947, when American leadership expanded the number of free and democratic states . . . to create a new balance of power that favoured freedom.'[1]

According to the prevalent neo-conservative school of thought, America should take the opportunity to transform and reform entire regions and bring them into modernity, i.e. to impose a Western-style democracy through a combination of Wilsonian idealism and Reaganite muscularity. A consensus has emerged that the best place to start is the Greater Middle East.

One of the principal proponents of this idea is Deputy Defence Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz. Getting rid of Saddam Hussein would allow the Americans to create a free, stable and democratic Iraq that would serve as a source of inspiration to its neighbours. The so-called 'Wolfowitz doctrine' has its origins in the early 1990s. Wolfowitz was dissatisfied with Bush Snr's decision not to topple Saddam Hussein after the first Gulf War and the efforts to coerce Saddam Hussein during the 1990s. Annoyed with Hussein's cat-and-mouse game with UN inspectors during the 1990s, Wolfowitz stressed 'the power of the democratic idea' and its applicability to a part of the world known for its authoritarian regimes.[2] During his 2004 State of the Union address, President Bush again emphasised this: 'America is a nation with a mission, and that mission comes from our most basic beliefs . . . Our aim is democratic peace . . .'[3] He also argued that it was a mistake to think that democracy was not a realistic goal for the Middle East: '. . . it is mistaken, and condescending, to assume that whole cultures and great religions are incompatible with liberty and self-government. I believe that God has planted in every human heart the desire to live in freedom.'

There are several reasons why the concept of democracy is used to justify interventions. First, democracy is the key characteristic of Western society and is considered to be universally applicable. Second, an intervention to promote values such as democracy and freedom sells more easily to the public than an intervention to promote interests. Third, there is supposed to be a close link between democracy and peace. The latter is most important.

1. Quoted in F. FitzGerald, 'George Bush & The World', *The New York Review of Books,* 26 September 2002.

2. M. Dobbs, 'For Wolfowitz, a vision may be realized', *Washington Post*, 7 April 2003.

3. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 20 January 2004.

Throughout modern history, liberal democracies have abstained from war against each other. According to some scholars, 'the absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations.'[4] Others have argued that this democratic peace thesis is 'gaining the status of a "paradigm", as a growing number of observers regard it as the most compelling way of looking at international security'.[5] In testing the democratic peace proposition statistically it was found that a sphere of peace loving states did exist among liberal regimes.[6]

However, this democratic peace thesis only applies to mature democracies and those countries belonging to the Western tradition. It is therefore safe to assume that the chances of introducing Western-style democracy in Iraq and the Greater Middle East are slim. One should also not forget that fundamentalism is mainstream in the Muslim world, forming fertile ground for extremism.

Moreover, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder have observed that states that make the biggest leap, from total autocracy to extensive mass democracy, are about twice as likely to fight wars in the decade following democratisation than states that remain autocracies.[7] Former Yugoslavia, and the former Soviet republics Armenia and Azerbaijan, have found themselves at war while experimenting with varying degrees of electoral democracies. There is a striking connection between democratisation, ethnicity, nationalism, religion and war as well. In Serbia the political and military élite of the old regime, facing enormous pressure for democratisation, created a new basis for legitimacy through nationalist propaganda and military action. They won elections by exploiting the ethnic differences within the country. It is unlikely that the democratic peace thesis is at all applicable to Iraq and the Greater Middle East. Sunnis are unlikely to accept an inferior position vis-à-vis the Shias, who form the majority of the population in Iraq. Moreover, the proponents of radical Islam are likely to use the process of democratisation to get the support of a large part of the population. Consequently, as on the Balkans, due to the process of democratisation anti-Western hardliners may seize power.

4. Jack Levy, 'Domestic Politics and War', in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (eds.), *The Origin and Prevention of Major War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 88.

5. Charles Kegley and Margaret Hermann, 'A Peace Dividend? Democracies; Military Interventions and Their External Political Consequences', *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 32, no. 4, 1997, pp. 339-68, here p. 340.

6. Dean Babst, 'Elective Government: A Force for Peace', *The Wisconsin Sociologist*, vol. 3, no. 1, 1964, pp. 9-14.

7. E. D. Mansfield and J. Snyder, 'Democratization and War', *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1995, pp. 79-97.

The European Union's role as a global actor

Less than 18 months after the outpouring of European solidarity following 11 September 2001 the rhetoric coming from Washington has effectively not only killed transatlantic solidarity but caused a dangerous split in Europe as well. Defence Secretary Rumsfeld's reference to France and Germany as 'old Europe' and his comparison of Germany to Libya and Cuba were not very helpful. Although on 8 January 2003 eight European leaders publicly supported America's policy towards Iraq, the Azores summit which took place on the eve of the Iraq war revealed America's most trusted allies: the United Kingdom and Spain.

The Iraq crisis caused a deep division in Europe as well. Eight NATO members and ten EU candidates chose to side with America. Consequently, French President Jacques Chirac threatened to block the candidates' admission to the EU. Led by France, some EU member states tried to influence American policies though counterbalancing. Among other things, France's resistance to US policy towards Iraq was strong because it derived from France's opposition to a unipolar world that would marginalise French and European influence in world affairs. France used to be alone in its desire to use international institutions and ad hoc coalitions as a counterpoise to America. Others, including Germany, have now joined in. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder has called for a more integrated Europe to offset US hegemonic power. Romano Prodi has argued that the EU must develop into a superpower that stands equal to the United States. Even prime ministers of smaller 'pro-America' EU member states, including Wim Kok of the Netherlands and Göran Persson of Sweden, have argued in favour of a strong EU to balance America's power.

During the months following Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, European leaders began to realise that these divisions would not only marginalise Europe, but could also jeopardise Europe's integration process, with severe economic implications. This resulted in a new effort of reconciliation between the leaders of France, Germany and the United Kingdom at a summit in Berlin on 20 September 2003, and between the United States and Germany during the UN General Assembly on 24 September 2003.

Unease with America as a hegemonic power explains the impressive development of ESDP in 2003. As a direct consequence of Franco-German cooperation, new initiatives were taken for close European defence cooperation. On 29 April 2003 the heads of state and government of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg gathered for a summit in Brussels in an attempt to form a defence core group or a European Security and Defence Union. It was argued that American unilateralism had demonstrated that the European Union had no other choice but to develop a credible foreign, security and defence policy. They argued that the Union must be able to speak with one voice and fully play its role on the international scene. This would require a credible security and defence policy. Nevertheless, they argued that although the transatlantic relationship remained a strategic priority, a genuine partnership between the EU and NATO was a prerequisite for a more equal partnership between Europe and America.

In September 2003 Belgium's Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt announced that he would go ahead with plans to build a European military command headquarters at Tervuren near Brussels the following year despite opposition from the United Kingdom and the United States. According to Verhofstadt the headquarters was needed to execute European operations autonomously.

By the end of 2003 some of the ideas presented by France, Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium were no longer rejected by other member states, including the United Kingdom and the United States. Regarding 'Tervuren', a compromise was emerging. It was decided to form an EU operational cell at SHAPE and post NATO liaison officers to the EU military staff, which in turn should be enlarged for EU-led operations.

A number of other developments underscored the acceleration of ESDP. First, in 2003 Javier Solana the EU's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, presented a strategic concept. Solana's strategy paper is an equivalent of the US National Security Strategy.[8]It spells out Europe's interests, the threats and the way these should be dealt with. It concludes that if the EU is to make a contribution that matches its potential, it needs to be more active, more coherent and more capable. Consequently, the document calls for expeditionary capabilities to protect interests, stabilise regions and combat terrorists.

Second, the draft constitution contains far-reaching provisions for defence cooperation. To begin with, the Council of Min-

8. *A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy* (Brussels: European Council, 12 December 2003).

isters may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of member states in order to protect the Union's values and serve its interests (Article 40.5). Furthermore, member states whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions are invited to establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework (Article 40.6). Moreover, until a common defence has been established, closer cooperation shall be established as regards mutual defence. If one or more member states participating in this closer cooperation are attacked 'the other Member States shall give it aid and assistance by all means in their power, military and other, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter' (Article 40.7).

In sum, the Iraq crisis has accelerated the development of ESDP. This underscores the development of the EU as a global actor, which could even pose a counterweight to the United States. However, traditional counterbalancing will be counterproductive. It will further undermine transatlantic relations and diminish the possibilities to deal with new security risks, as with the war on terrorism. Seeking a transatlantic strategic partnership, however, is of mutual interest. A strategic partnership will benefit security cooperation, provided that the present Administration stops playing off 'new' and 'old' Europe against each other.

Transatlantic relations

A direct consequence of the far-reaching geostrategic developments of the 1990s, the neo-conservative policies of the Bush administration and the Iraq crisis, major differences in political culture have become visible between the United States and EU member states.

After the end of the Second World War, the Europeans shaped a post-modern system with some fundamental characteristics:

- mutual interference in each other's domestic affairs. As a result the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs became blurred, borders became irrelevant, and the concept of sovereignty shifted;
- the obsolescence of force as an instrument for resolving disputes. Self-imposed rules of behaviour were codified and monitored;

- security based on transparency, mutual openness, interdependency and mutual vulnerability.[9]

The absence of force as an instrument of foreign policy inside the system explains the reluctance to use force outside the system. Many Europeans strongly belief in the European entity and the Union's role in the world. Romano Prodi, the European Commission's President has argued that: 'Europe needs to project its model of society into the wider world. We are not simply here to defend our interests: we have a unique historic experience to offer. The experience of liberating people from poverty, war, oppression and intolerance. We have forged a model of development and continental integration based on the principles of democracy, freedom and solidarity and it is a model that works. A model of a consensual pooling of sovereignty in which every one of us accepts to belong to a minority.'[10]

In the United States the nature of this post-modern system is not fully understood. It is neither state nor federation. It is a distinct entity with some of the characteristics of both a state and a federation. Some of its policies are supranational. Within the World Trade Organisation the Union negotiates on behalf of all member states and agricultural policies are decided upon in Brussels. Security and defence policies, however, are developed strictly on a national basis, but can be harmonised in common positions and joint actions.

The United States does not fit into this post-modern system. Like most other countries, it is a modern state with a traditional view on sovereignty, non-interference in others' internal affairs and the role of its armed forces to protect the nation. This contributes to misperceptions about the very nature of the European 'project'.

The development of this post-modern system is a powerful explanation of transatlantic differences on fundamental issues, including the use of force. The latter is also explained by the vulnerability of Europe. War in Europe would virtually destroy Europe's social and economic infrastructures whereas, due to its geographic position and the absence of enemies in its vicinity, the United States is only vulnerable to terrorism and missile attacks.

European governments do not underestimate the threats of wars, terrorism, and rogue states, yet they are used to *managing* complex security situations. European security management

9. Robert Cooper, 'The new liberal imperialism', *The Observer*, 7 April 2002.

10. Romano Prodi, '2000-2005: Shaping the New Europe', speech to the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 15 February 2000.

aimed at preventing wars has traditionally been done through engagement, i.e. multilateralism and treaties. The emphases on multilateralism and loss of sovereignty go hand in hand. As a result of European integration, Europeans have been steadily giving up powers to Brussels. Americans, on the other hand, do not see any source of democratic legitimacy higher than the constitutional nation state. Europeans like cooperative security, based on multilateralism and the rejection of great power conflict and conventional military force as the dominant security problem. Cooperative security requires standing international organisations with domestic and international legitimacy.

Americans are instrumental multilateralists, because they use international organisations to win international support, but if support is not gained, Americans end up going it alone to support their grand strategy of primacy, which rejects the subordination of American interests to international bodies or international law. Advocates of primacy are unilateralists, requiring large armed forces to be sized and shaped to defend the nation's interests, regardless of coalition contributions.

As a result, Europeans and Americans differ fundamentally over the methods for dealing with contemporary security threats. Europeans put emphasis on 'soft security', i.e. diplomacy, incentives such as economic aid and peace support operations. Americans emphasise 'hard security', i.e. limited wars of intervention to defend interests and promote regional security.

The emergence of the EU as a post-modern system has fundamental implications for transatlantic relations. The differences in political culture are likely to shape future transatlantic relations. The rapid development of ESDP in 2003 could thus also be explained by the recognition that the EU has developed a distinct political culture.

The international system

After the publication of the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States, a debate emerged about the legitimacy of interventions. Scholars of international law do not reject pre-emption or anticipatory self-defence in all circumstances. They argue that pre-emption does not require certainty regarding time and place. Instead, they maintain that pre-emption is justified if there is a *near*

certainty that an attack is *imminent*. Prevention, which refers to fighting a winnable war now in order to avoid the risk of war later in less favourable circumstances, does not meet the criterion of near certainty, and must consequently be rejected.

Although called pre-emption, the concept mentioned in the National Security Strategy is prevention. On the one hand, throughout the Western world sovereignty is no longer considered in absolute terms. On the other hand, most West Europeans find it difficult to agree with President Bush's concepts of pre-emption.

Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz has defended the American position by arguing that it is impossible to know whether a threat is imminent: 'Were the attacks of September 11 imminent? Certainly they were imminent on September 10, although we didn't know it.'[11]

The preventive war in Iraq has undermined international law. The intervention was neither legal nor legitimate, because no weapons of mass destruction were found and no links between Saddam Hussein and international terrorism were proven. This undermined the international system, including the UN, which was sidelined during and after the crisis.

Interestingly, the Iraq crisis demonstrated America's weakness as well. The United States entered the region as a hyperpower, but will leave as a superpower. Indeed, it demonstrated that it could win wars quickly with a limited number of forces, but the Americans were unable to win the peace and concluded that large numbers of forces were needed for a long stabilisation and reconstruction phase. As its forces are tied up in South Korea, the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States will find it increasingly difficult to deal with rogue states and other crises. Hence as America's relative weakness undermines the credibility of coercive diplomacy; terrorists will consider this an incentive to increase pressure.

For that reason the United States may have no other choice but to look for an EU-US strategic partnership and accept that a strong Europe may influence its foreign policy. Moreover, the United States may have no other choice but to accept the UN as a major player and obey the rule of international law as well.

11. Paul Wolfowitz, speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 2 December 2002.

Nicole Gnesotto

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Impact sur la lutte antiterroriste

Le principal bilan de la guerre en Irak est doublement paradoxal : présentée comme un élément vital de la guerre contre le terrorisme, l'intervention américaine n'a eu aucun effet positif sur la menace terroriste internationale. En revanche, elle a permis de marquer des points en matière de lutte contre la prolifération des armes de destruction massive alors même – suprême ironie – que la présence de ces armes, invoquée comme menace directe et donc prétexte de guerre, n'a pu être prouvée en Irak. Les évolutions récentes de la Libye et de l'Iran sont sans doute imputables à des causes multiples et diverses, mais il est clair que, parmi elles, le sort de l'Irak et du régime de Saddam Hussein a joué un rôle. Le paradoxe est donc double : à partir d'une manipulation plus ou moins délibérée de la menace de prolifération irakienne inexistante, l'intervention militaire en Irak a, d'une part, conduit à une réduction des risques de prolifération avérés ailleurs ; d'autre part, c'est peut-être l'utilisation (contestée) de la force militaire contre la (prétendue) prolifération irakienne qui a conduit au relatif succès des moyens de pression diplomatiques (consensuels) contre des menaces (reconnues) en Iran et en Libye.

Pour en revenir au terrorisme lui-même, le bilan de la guerre en Irak est plutôt négatif. Aucune preuve n'a été apportée de liens entre l'Irak de Saddam Hussein et Al-Qaida avant le déclenchement de la guerre. Tout laisse en revanche à penser que ces liens existent désormais après la guerre : Ben Laden lui-même fait référence aux événements irakiens dans ses récents messages audiovisuels ; des groupes liés à Al-Qaida tentent de s'infiltrer dans le nord de l'Irak et sont suspectés d'être, entre autres commanditaires, responsables de certains actes terroristes contre la coalition. L'intervention américaine a donc créé ce qu'elle prétendait au départ vouloir détruire mais qui n'existait pas – un lien entre l'Irak et Ben Laden.

Il est difficile d'attribuer les succès remportés en 2003 dans la lutte contre le terrorisme international aux activités militaires de la coalition en Irak. De nombreux responsables présumés d'Al-Qaida ont certes été arrêtés en Afghanistan ou en Europe, mais ce fut grâce essentiellement aux moyens de lutte antiterroriste traditionnels, de police et de renseignement. En revanche, les activités terroristes de 2003 ont un lien plus ou moins direct avec l'occupation américaine de l'Irak : infiltration des réseaux Al-Qaida en Irak, attentats terroristes en Irak même, notamment contre les forces de l'ONU, déplacement géographique des attentats vers certains pays musulmans impliqués plus ou moins directement dans la guerre ou le soutien aux Etats-Unis (Turquie, Arabie saoudite, Maroc).

En outre, si le nouvel hyperterrorisme post-11 septembre est issu de l'Afghanistan sous la houlette de Ben Laden, l'intervention en Irak a pu, et peut encore être considérée comme une diversion par rapport aux priorités de la lutte antiterroriste. Ce constat est désormais devenu un leitmotiv des opposants de Georges Bush dans la campagne électorale de 2004. Il n'est certes pas sans fondement : évincé par la priorité irakienne, l'Afghanistan a retrouvé une place secondaire dans l'agenda budgétaire et militaire des Etats-Unis, ce dont ne peut que se réjouir le reste des réseaux et des talibans encore féconds dans les marges non contrôlées de ce pays. Deux ans et demi après la guerre en Afghanistan, les incertitudes sur la stabilisation politique du pays ne laissent pas en effet d'inquiéter.

S'agissant des Etats-Unis eux-mêmes face au terrorisme, le bilan post-irakien combine une certaine sanctuarisation réussie du territoire américain (en dépit ou grâce à un niveau d'alerte élevée et permanent) et un renforcement de la vulnérabilité américaine dans le monde : physiquement, sur les théâtres extérieurs, et notamment irakien ; politiquement, à cause d'une montée en puissance, dans l'ensemble du monde arabo-musulman, d'un anti-américanisme susceptible de nourrir les recrutements terroristes.

Quant au front antiterroriste, la guerre en Irak a cassé ce que l'Afghanistan avait réussi a créer : un consensus quasi unanime de la communauté internationale, et en tout cas de la communauté russo-euro-atlantique, pour lutter contre la menace terroriste y compris par des interventions militaires. Parce que l'Irak n'était pas un pays terroriste, c'est désormais la définition même de ce type de menace, ou plutôt l'utilisation qui peut en être faite, qui divise les anciens partenaires.

Au total, un an après l'Irak, la menace d'un terrorisme de type 11 septembre demeure : la défaite et l'arrestation de Saddam Hussein n'y changent rien. Si la guerre en Irak a un effet quelconque sur la lutte antiterroriste, c'est même plutôt un effet pervers : l'anti-américanisme progresse, l'Afghanistan est trop oublié, Ben Laden continue quelque part ses activités, les désaccords sur l'Irak ont affaibli simultanément la crédibilité de l'argumentaire américain, les institutions multilatérales, la cohésion des Européens. Tirant peut-être les leçons de ce piètre bilan, les Etats-Unis sont en train de modifier leur argumentaire initial : ils escamotent désormais les mauvaises ou fausses raisons avancées pour leur intervention en Irak, terrorisme et prolifération, pour ne retenir que le succès de l'opération contre une des plus sévères tyrannies de la planète. D'où le glissement idéologique, sensible dans le récent discours du président Bush, de la guerre contre la terreur à la guerre pour la liberté : «Tant que le Moyen-Orient restera un lieu de tyrannie, de désespoir et de colère, il continuera de produire des hommes et des mouvements qui menacent la sécurité des Etats-Unis et de nos amis. Aussi l'Amérique poursuit-elle une stratégie avancée de liberté dans le Grand Moyen-Orient ». Reste à espérer qu'il n'y ait pas là matière à de nouveaux malentendus entre Européens et Américains, ce qui reste à prouver.

Sur le Grand Moyen-Orient

Du Maroc à l'Afghanistan, tout inventaire de la situation un an après le début de la guerre en Irak risque d'être comme de coutume complexe, ambigu, pire pour les uns meilleur pour les autres, à l'exception de deux évidences : la détérioration continue du conflit israélo-palestinien d'une part ; l'extrême difficulté du « state building » en Irak de l'autre.

Simultanément, on ne peut être que frappé par l'extraordinaire créativité des communicateurs américains et la capacité collective de l'Amérique à produire sans cesse de nouveaux concepts. La notion de Grand Moyen-Orient est en effet devenue en quelques mois l'un des nouveaux leitmotiv de la pensée stratégique américaine, après ou avec la « guerre au terrorisme » ou le « *regime change* ». Quelles sont les fonctions de ce concept et correspond-t-il à une réalité nouvelle créée par les effets de la guerre en Irak ?

Autant de questions préalables indispensables à toute réflexion européenne sérieuse à l'égard du monde arabo-musulman.

Le thème du « Grand Moyen-Orient » remplit simultanément trois fonctions : unification de la stratégie américaine, simplification des problèmes de la région, diversion par rapport au conflit israélo-palestinien. Le Grand Moyen-Orient apparaît en effet, dans le discours américain, comme la traduction géographique du triptyque stratégique avancé avant la guerre en Irak – terrorisme, prolifération, tyrannie. Mais ce n'est plus la menace qui est mise en avant, c'est sa zone d'expérimentation et d'application ; ce n'est plus la politique qui sert de grille d'analyse aux problèmes de la région, c'est la géographie qui permet d'escamoter les racines politiques des crises. C'est bien évidemment la centralité du conflit israélo-palestinien qui est vouée à disparaître au travers de ce nouveau concept, aussi bien dans la politique américaine que pour la définition des enjeux stratégiques de la région. La démocratie, le sida, les réformes, la reconstruction, la lutte contre le terrorisme deviennent des enjeux globaux d'un terrain artificiellement unifié, permettant d'escamoter la construction de murs réels et de dépolitiser, au nom même du combat pour la démocratie, l'ensemble des conflits de la région.

Epousant plus ou moins la carte du terrorisme international, la notion de Grand Moyen-Orient permet aussi de recentrer la stratégie américaine dans la zone sur la défense et promotion de la démocratie. Tirant les leçons de l'Irak, le discours américain déplace en effet la justification de la guerre, escamotant l'argument du terrorisme (non prouvé) et de la prolifération irakienne (non trouvée) au profit de la guerre (réussie) contre la tyrannie. A ce titre, le terme de Grand Moyen-Orient doit être mis en relation avec deux autres concepts très présents dans la pensée stratégique américaine : celui du clash des civilisations – naguère théorisé par Samuel Huntington – et celui du domino démocratique – théorisé cette fois par les stratèges de la guerre en Irak. Tous deux supposaient également une certaine unification du monde arabo-musulman, le premier en mettant l'accent sur une menace potentielle, le second en promettant une possible solution. Le Grand Moyen-Orient synthétise les deux approches parce que c'est sur cette zone que la double mission de l'Amérique peut se réaliser : supprimer la menace par l'extension de la démocratie.

Dans la pratique, c'est donc l'Irak, et non le conflit israélo-palestinien, qui se retrouve en position de pivot pour l'ensemble du Grand Moyen-Orient. Or, selon que l'on a cru ou non à la théorie du domino démocratique à partir de l'Irak, l'on croira ou non à la théorie inverse du risque de déstabilisation générale à partir de l'Irak. Et l'on s'impliquera plus ou moins dans la stabilisation irakienne au détriment des autres priorités régionales. Il est donc peu probable que le thème du Grand Moyen-Orient – trop ambigu, trop simple, trop apolitique – permette de réconcilier les pays qui s'étaient divisés sur la guerre irakienne, surtout si la question israélo-palestinienne devait en faire les frais.

D'autant que les contradictions ne manquent pas : comment concilier l'objectif de révolutions politiques intérieures et celui de stabilité régionale ? Peut-on ignorer la possibilité que des processus démocratiques conduisent à des régimes autoritaires anti-occidentaux ? Jusqu'où faut-il déstabiliser des régimes qui sont aussi des alliés clés dans la lutte antiterroriste ? Peut-on nier les spécificités nationales au sein d'une zone prétendument unifiée par des problèmes communs et ignorer simultanément le bien-fondé de solutions globales multilatérales ?

D'un point de vue européen, si la notion de Grand Moyen-Orient doit donc avoir un sens et un avenir, alors elle doit au moins servir à légitimer des cadres multilatéraux de pacification de la région : le processus de Barcelone – s'agissant notamment de l'objectif de développement/démocratisation de la région ; l'idée d'une conférence internationale sur le Proche-Orient et celle d'une conférence internationale sur l'Irak, impliquant tous les pays voisins – s'agissant de l'objectif de sécurité. C'est d'ailleurs au sein de ces cadres multilatéraux de sécurité que l'implication de l'OTAN et/ou de l'Union européenne pourrait avoir un sens, comme garants des éventuels accords mutuellement agréés.

Sur le rôle mondial de l'Union

Si l'on évalue le rôle mondial d'un acteur à la lumière de la guerre irakienne, il est indéniable que la prestation de l'Union fut à peu près nulle et les Européens de l'Union totalement divisés, ceci expliquant cela. Mais, de la même façon, si l'Irak est le test déterminant

la puissance mondiale d'un Etat, la prestation de l'Amérique mérite d'être soigneusement qualifiée : indéniable sur le plan militaire, nettement plus incertaine s'agissant de l'efficacité des résultats ou de la capacité à créer du consensus international. L'un des effets majeurs de la guerre en Irak est d'ailleurs de mettre en lumière les vulnérabilités propres de l'Union et des Etats-Unis : la première inexistante parce que trop divisée, la seconde moins puissante parce que trop souveraine.

C'est dire que l'élément militaire ne peut être le seul critère de la puissance des Etats. Or, à cet égard, le bilan de l'Union européenne est loin d'être aussi négatif. Concrètement d'une part : dans les Balkans, en Afrique, en Afghanistan et même en Irak pour la phase ultérieure de reconstruction/stabilisation, le passage par l'Union est inévitable. Même les plus anti-européens des membres de l'administration américaine se voient contraints de faire appel aux contributions européennes. Sur le plan stratégique d'autre part : à l'égard de l'Iran, c'est l'intervention des Européens qui, pour l'heure, a permis d'esquisser une sortie de crise. Certes, la méthode utilisée – une initiative franco-germano-britannique – n'était pas de la PESC stricto sensu, mais, en termes d'efficacité, le résultat est indéniablement à mettre l'actif d'une conception proprement européenne de la sécurité. Enfin, sur le plan conceptuel, la stratégie de sécurité proposée collectivement par l'Union en décembre 2003 représente une contribution majeure au débat sur les règles et les principes d'un nouvel ordre international. Cette stratégie de sécurité doit certes maintenant être mise en œuvre, à partir notamment du test iranien. Mais sur le plan de l'acceptabilité internationale, peu de concepts stratégiques ont été à ce jour aussi consensuels.

Pour en revenir à l'Irak, trois leçons méritent d'être retenues pour la consolidation d'une influence mondiale de l'Union. D'abord, qu'un minimum de convergence entre Français, Britanniques et Allemands est une condition, peut-être pas suffisante, mais certainement nécessaire : à condition toutefois qu'elle ne s'impose pas de façon autoritaire aux autres partenaires européens, mais que ces trois pays réfléchissent sérieusement, avec d'autres, aux conditions d'acceptabilité de leurs initiatives communes. Deuxièmement, il est plus urgent que jamais d'intégrer, dans la PESC, la question américaine, parce que ce ne sont ni le monde ni les crises qui divisent les Européens, c'est le type de relations qu'ils entretiennent avec l'Amérique : pour un certain

nombre de pays européens, l'idée même d'un désaccord avec Washington est un « non-starter » ; pour d'autres, ce désaccord n'est ni un objectif ni un avantage, mais, quand il existe, il doit pouvoir se dire et s'assumer comme tel. Il est donc vital pour les Européens de parler, entre eux, de l'Amérique : si celle-ci est devenue le facteur déterminant de toute évolution du système international, on voit mal en effet pourquoi les Européens devraient s'interdire des analyses et des réflexions communes sur l'évolution propre de la politique américaine. L'Amérique est sans doute le dernier tabou de la PESC ; elle en est pourtant une condition existentielle.

La dernière leçon découle de ce constat et devient l'une des questions majeures de toute politique étrangère européenne : comment influencer, si nécessaire, la politique américaine ? Comment construire une politique européenne à la fois différente et solidaire de Washington ? D'une certaine façon, la plupart des initiatives de l'Union au second semestre 2003 (stratégie de sécurité, stratégie contre la prolifération, politique à l'égard de l'Iran) peuvent être lues comme une tentative européenne commune de réponse à ce double défi de l'influence et de la différence.

Sur les relations transatlantiques

Annus horribilis pour l'ONU et l'Union, 2003 le fut donc aussi pour les relations transatlantiques. Une Europe divisée et velléitaire est sans doute la meilleure recette pour tuer l'idée même d'une alliance atlantique, beaucoup plus sûrement en tout cas que ne risquerait de le faire une Europe unie et volontaire. Ceux des Américains convaincus que la division de l'Union est dans l'intérêt de la puissance américaine devraient regarder à deux fois les résultats de l'affaire irakienne : jamais les Etats-Unis n'ont été aussi contestés sur la scène internationale, jamais les opinions publiques européennes n'ont exprimé aussi directement leur méfiance et leur refus d'un leadership américain, sans parler de la fragilité de la situation intérieure en Irak. Les coalitions ad hoc peuvent sans doute produire quelques effectifs militaires : elles ne créent aucune dynamique politique ni aucune légitimité internationale.

Reconstruire un système atlantique mutuellement bénéfique aux deux partenaires est bien évidemment une nécessité. Encore faut-il admettre que le retour à l'ancien paradigme de la guerre

froide est à la fois impossible et illusoire. C'était la menace collective qui soudait le destin des alliés, c'est désormais l'appréciation même de la menace qui est l'objet de désaccord. Ce n'est plus l'Amérique qui produit du consensus atlantique, c'est la politique américaine qui divise les Européens. Le leadership américain était légitime sur fond de protection existentielle américaine ; il est pour certains devenu contestable à cause des effets potentiellement déstabilisateurs des options stratégiques américaines. Quant à l'OTAN, elle traverse, mutatis mutandis, une crise de finalité aussi profonde que celle de l'Union européenne : sa fonction première était de coupler de façon indivisible la sécurité et le destin de l'Europe et des Etats-Unis ; c'est le principe même du couplage qui est devenu optionnel, selon les enjeux et les velléités unilatéralistes des Etats-Unis. Ce constat n'implique ni la fin de l'Alliance ni la résignation à la dérive progressive des continents. Mais il est une condition préalable à tout effort de reconstruction.

A ce titre, les leçons de l'Irak sont doubles. Les difficultés de la stabilisation post-conflit montrent d'une part les limites de la puissance américaine et de l'unilatéralisme comme doctrine de politique étrangère : le pouvoir de légitimation de l'ONU, les forces militaires et l'argent de l'Union sont devenus des conditions indispensables pour éviter l'échec de la politique américaine en Irak. Puisse la prochaine administration reconnaître cet état de fait. Les divisions et finalement l'abstention de l'Union dans la crise irakienne montrent, d'autre part, que les nations européennes ne peuvent avoir d'influence qu'ensemble, quelles que soient les prétentions nationales de chacune d'entre elles. D'une certaine façon, la politique internationale subit, tout comme la politique économique ou commerciale, les effets de la mondialisation : le cadre national, fût-il celui de la plus grande puissance du monde ou des « grandes » nations européennes, est à la fois une condition mais aussi une limite sévère à la puissance des Etats.

Chacun faisant sa catharsis propre, il est donc possible que l'Irak, après avoir divisé les alliés, redevienne un terrain de réconciliation euro-américaine et intra-européenne. Les deux doivent aller de pair : un partenariat transatlantique sans sursaut d'intégration européenne n'a pas plus de chances de se réaliser qu'une intégration européenne sans affirmation de solidarité avec les Etats-Unis. Parce qu'une Union forte et cohérente est aussi

nécessaire à la crédibilité de la puissance américaine que l'Amérique est indispensable à l'efficacité de la puissance européenne.

Sur le système international

La guerre en Irak est sans doute la première « guerre mondialisée » : du fait de son retentissement médiatique planétaire, de ses implications possibles tant sur les équilibres régionaux que sur les relations entre les Etats, et parce qu'elle a fortement déstabilisé les normes internationales et les institutions multilatérales, à commencer par l'ONU.

La guerre d'Irak confirme d'une part le rôle central de la puissance américaine dans la hiérarchie des puissances mondiales et leurs relations : en termes purement quantitatifs, le pôle américain est effectivement sans commune mesure avec les éléments de puissance des autres acteurs internationaux. Mais elle confirme d'autre part que le niveau des relations inter-étatiques n'épuise pas la question du système international : les sociétés se structurent différemment, et c'est sans doute la « rue mondiale » qui représente à cet égard le véritable contre-pouvoir à la puissance inégalée de l'Amérique. La multipolarité ne se joue peut-être pas entre des Etats, mais entre un Etat et les opinions publiques mondiales. Quant aux instruments de régulation internationale, dont l'ONU, ils restent, malgré ou à cause de la crise dans laquelle les a précipités la guerre d'Irak, une référence incontournable : pour les opposants à la guerre certes, mais aussi désormais pour le propre succès de l'Amérique elle-même.

Le système international cumule donc des éléments hétérodoxes : une puissance unipolaire empêtrée, un contre-pouvoir sociétal impuissant, une ONU marginalisée mais nécessaire. Mais ce système est loin d'être figé : d'une part, la puissance américaine n'a jamais été aussi inégalée et, simultanément, aussi illégitime aux yeux de l'opinion mondiale. D'autre part, l'ONU n'a jamais été aussi marginalisée mais, simultanément, aussi nécessaire pour reconstruire de la légitimité américaine. Il est donc possible que ces contradictions deviennent positives, et permettent de rétablir un minimum d'ordre entre le droit, les intérêts des Etats et les attentes des sociétés.

En revanche, il est difficile de prendre en considération la véritable inconnue de ce système international, c'est-à-dire l'événement lui-même : alors que la menace structurant l'ordre de la guerre froide était constante et prévisible (totalitarisme soviétique), la menace terroriste est, par définition même, imprévisible et potentiellement dévastatrice. C'est d'ailleurs en grande partie ce risque omniprésent d'un événement catastrophique incontrôlable qui nourrit le retour, dans l'ordre international, d'une dimension idéologique et religieuse qu'on aurait pu croire naguère révolue : le bien contre le mal, le Jihad contre l'Occident, la chrétienté et le monde musulman, etc. Mais c'est sans doute contre cette dimension idéologique – avec les risques d'antagonismes violents qu'elle implique entre les peuples et les cultures – que l'Union européenne apparaît le mieux à même de travailler.

Charles Grant

6

The war on terrorism

Early in 2003, perhaps the strongest argument against an invasion of Iraq was that international terrorism would draw strength from it. A US-led attack would inflame anti-American sentiment throughout the Arab world, the argument went, thereby recruiting more foot soldiers for al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Furthermore, if Iraq collapsed into chaos Saddam's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) could find their way into the hands of terrorists. The counter-argument, pushed by proponents of war, was that if Saddam remained in power, sooner or later he would link up with international terrorists and transfer his chemical, biological and nuclear capabilities to them.

One year on, both opponents and proponents of the war can claim that events have supported their arguments. The situation in Iraq itself fits with some of the predictions made by the opponents. Some al-Qaeda supporters have entered Iraq and joined forces with Iraqis who are confronting the US-led occupation. The coalition forces and those Iraqis who work for them have become terrorist targets. At the time of writing, the US-led coalition appears unable to suppress the terrorism in Iraq.

Terrorism has worsened in Afghanistan since the Iraq war. This may stem from the diversion of US military and intelligence resources to Iraq, which has made it easier for the Taliban and their supporters to make a partial comeback in the south and east of the country.

In the rest of the world, however, the Iraq war does not seem to have made much difference to the rhythm of terrorist attacks. There have, mercifully, been no successful al-Qaeda attacks on the United States or Western Europe. Al-Qaeda attacks in other parts of the world, such as those in Kenya or Turkey, have not been notably more frequent than they were before the Iraq war. Al-Qaeda does appear to have been weakened by the capture of many of its key operatives.

The fact that Saddam did not – it now appears – have much in the way of WMD means that one of the justifications for war, to prevent terrorists gaining access to his arsenals, is redundant. However, the invasion of Iraq may have had a positive impact on other countries that have been trying to develop WMD. States such as Libya, Iran and North Korea did not fear a direct US invasion after the Iraq war – they knew that the United States had its hands full – but they probably became more fearful of the wrath of the United States when they saw that it was willing to strike against perceived threats of WMD. And if invasion of these countries has not been a serious option for the United States, surgical strikes on weapons sites or leadership targets, plus covert efforts to undermine regimes, have been on the agenda of influential Republican hawks.

The invasion of Iraq may have shifted thinking in North Korea. The Pyongang regime appears reluctant to deploy atomic weapons and – despite occasional sabre-rattling – has entered into six-nation regional security talks. Libya has now placed its nuclear and chemical facilities under international supervision. It is true that Libya first approached the United States and the United Kingdom about its WMD programmes before the Iraq war, but the deposition of Saddam may have spurred Colonel Gaddafi to come clean sooner than he would otherwise have done. Italy's Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, says that Gaddafi told him that the Iraq war had influenced his decisions on WMD.

Since the Iraq war, Iran has placed its nuclear facilities under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency. I have visited Tehran to talk to people in the Iranian government about why they did so. They tend to stress that it was the European Union's diplomacy that was crucial in persuading Iran to sign the IAEA additional protocol: the EU held out the carrot of a trade and cooperation agreement. However, the United States's invasion of Iraq, which showed that Washington was serious about using force to pre-empt potential military threats, may also have had some influence on Iranian policy. Iran's pragmatic conservatives, as well as its liberal reformers, have been keen to seek a rapprochement with the United States, and know that they cannot do so while maintaining covert WMD programmes.

To the extent that such countries have been deterred from pursuing WMD programmes, the invasion of Iraq has reduced the threat of terrorism, for the more WMD that rogue regimes

possess, the greater the chance of terrorists getting their hands on those weapons.

Despite the rows and arguments over the US-led invasion of Iraq, which split the Western alliance down the middle, cooperation among governments in fighting terrorism has not suffered. The French, German and Russian intelligence services, for example, have continued to work well with the American agencies. Furthermore, the 'proliferation security initiative', a US-led scheme to intercept cargoes of WMD in ships or aircraft, has gathered momentum, with governments which opposed the Iraq war taking part. In October 2003 the interception of a shipload of nuclear components on the way to Libya finally pushed Gaddafi into coming clean about all (as far as we know) his WMD programmes.

To conclude, the Iraq war seems to have had neither a significantly positive nor a significantly negative effect on the problem of international terrorism.

The Greater Middle East

Immediately after the Iraq war, the prospects for progress on the Israel-Palestine conflict seemed to improve. Advocates of war had always said that once Saddam was removed, it would be easier to persuade Israel to become serious about peace with the Palestinians. The United States finally published the 'road map', the plan drawn up by the United States, Russia, the United Nations and the EU for establishing a Palestinian state by 2005. President Bush travelled to the Middle East to meet moderate Arab leaders, including the then Palestinian Prime Minister Abu Mazen, and he said that he would put as much energy into the Middle East peace process as Tony Blair had done for Northern Ireland.

But these hopes were soon dashed. Palestinian suicide bombing continued, Israel did nothing to implement the road map, Abu Mazen resigned, Ariel Sharon started to build a wall through the West Bank, the US administration put little pressure on the Israeli government to alter its behaviour and Bush disengaged from the problem. Europeans continued to argue that the problems of the wider Middle East could not be tackled while the Israel-Palestine conflict remained unresolved, while many Americans continued to claim that the wider Middle East had to be tackled, whatever the situation in Gaza and the West Bank.

Not all Americans take that line. Tom Friedman, a *New York Times* columnist and close observer of the Middle East, has been very critical of the US strategy. 'The Bush team . . . says nothing about the injustice of the Israeli land grab in the West Bank', he noted in one January 2004 column. 'The Bush team destroyed the Iraqi regime in three weeks and has not persuaded Israel to give up one settlement in three years. To think America can practice that sort of hypocrisy and win the war of ideas in the Arab-Muslim world is a truly dangerous fantasy.'

He is right to criticise the US administration's hypocrisy over Israel-Palestine, but in one respect it is now trying to be less hypocritical. In the past the United States has preached the virtues of democracy but given strong support to Arab regimes that have sometimes treated their own inhabitants with brutality, for example Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In 2003 the Bush team appeared to take seriously the argument that unreformed, poor and corrupt Arab regimes are a breeding ground for hatred of the United States and thus of terrorism. Bush's speeches suggest that he is now serious about trying to push Arab regimes towards economic and political reform.

The 'neo-con' tendency in Washington – which had long argued that the example of a democratic Iraq would push other Arab countries towards democracy – has won some of the internal battles within the Bush administration. Since Iraq is not yet democratic its example cannot have much impact on its neighbours. But Bush's officials say that, while in the past they seldom complained to Arab governments about their human rights records, they now insist on raising these issues. The fact that several Arab regimes – for example Morocco, Egypt and some Gulf states – are now making efforts to liberalise their political systems, at least to a moderate degree, may or may not be connected to this increased US pressure.

Without any question, the Iraq war has made America even more unpopular with most Arabs than it was already. American soft power – its ability to influence behaviour through persuasion and the force of attraction, as opposed to military or financial coercion – in the wider Middle East has waned. In some respects this makes it harder for the United States to prod Arab regimes towards reform, but decline of America's prestige with the Arab street has not prevented the Administration from increasing the pressure on Arab leaders to reform. To the extent that both 9/11

and the Iraq war made Americans think more about the problems of the region, the situation in Iraq has spurred Washington into placing a higher priority on democratisation.

The European Union's role as a global actor

In the short term, the Iraq war made a disastrous impact on the EU's role as an international actor. It split Europe into two hostile camps, one in favour of the war and one opposed. That the EU could not agree a common position on such a crucial issue greatly damaged its credibility.

In the months after the Iraq war, the wounds remained open and raw. The 29 April summit meeting in Brussels, at which the leaders of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg announced a plan for a European military headquarters, exacerbated tensions between the two camps. Those governments which had supported the war saw this move as an attempt to create a core Europe that would exclude the more Atlanticist countries and undermine NATO. The 29 April summit delighted many senior civilian officials in the Pentagon: they wanted the EU to remain split so that it could not become an effective international actor.

By the summer of 2003, however, the EU and its governments were making serious efforts to overcome their divisions. Javier Solana, the EU's High Representative for the CFSP, persuaded the member states to adopt an EU security strategy in June. The point of this exercise was to generate common thinking on the new security threats (WMD, terrorism, failed states and organised crime) and on how to deal with them. This process succeeded in getting some of the more pacifistic member states, notably Germany, to sign up to a set of principles which acknowledged that, when other methods fail, the use of force may be required to tackle WMD. The relatively robust approach of the European Security Strategy – although slightly watered down in a later version of December 2003 – helped to improve US-EU relations: it showed Washington that Europe took the new security threats seriously.

By the end of 2003 it was clear that Europe's governments, and in particular those of Britain, France and Germany, were making serious efforts to heal the intra-European wounds created by the Iraq war. France and Germany decided that they could build neither a Common Foreign and Security Policy, nor a European

Security and Defence Policy, without the help of the British. They were therefore prepared to scale down their ambitions for a military HQ. And Britain decided that it could not fulfil its ambitions in Europe without repairing the rift with France and Germany; it was therefore willing to accept the germ of an EU military planning staff.

The compromise on European military planning, while of little significance in the real world, showed that Europe's big three had understood that they needed to work together – not only to steer the EU once it had enlarged to 25 countries, but also to ensure that the EU could present a more united stance to the rest of the world. One consequence of this new approach was the visit of the British, French and German foreign ministers to Iran in October 2003. They persuaded Iran to put its nuclear facilities under international supervision, and held out the promise of a trade and cooperation agreement with the EU.

Early in 2004 there were signs of 'big three' cooperation in other areas, too. Chirac, Blair and Schröder planned a summit for February 2004 to discuss European economic reform. Such cooperation risks exacerbating the intra-European divide between big states, which sometimes behave as if they have a divine right to lead the EU, and small states, which resent the big ones taking decisions behind their backs. But it also shows that the divisions engendered by the Iraq war are starting to heal.

Transatlantic relations

The Iraq war created a transatlantic rift which remained gaping wide for around half a year and then began to diminish. Nevertheless, one year after the Iraq war transatlantic relations remain tense and fraught, if less ill-tempered than in the spring of 2003.

In the months after the Iraq war, both the Bush administration and 'Old Europe', notably the French and German governments, did plenty to maintain the rift. The Americans sought to punish France and Germany in several ways: President Bush avoided talking to Schröder and Chirac, he cancelled joint military exercises with the French and he forced a US boycott of the Paris air show. The punishments continued through to the autumn, when the Administration announced that firms from countries which had opposed the war would not be allowed to bid for contracts in Iraq.

France and Germany, too, did plenty to fuel the conflict. They refused to commit troops or treasure to the rebuilding of Iraq, and were apparently happy to see the United States foundering in its occupation of the country. However, if the United States had been prepared to accept a greater role for the UN in the running of Iraq, France and Germany would have found it harder to avoid putting resources into the country.

By early 2004, a more constructive tone was prevailing. Bush was talking to Chirac and Schröder, and appeared willing to accept a greater UN role in the management of Iraq. When Vice President Dick Cheney spoke at the Davos World Economic Forum in January 2004, his message was deliberately conciliatory. In their public statements at least, Cheney and other US officials restored the traditional American policy of welcoming, rather than opposing, European integration.

Even during the most bad-tempered months following the Iraq war, the arguments on Iraq had failed to stymie cooperation in other areas, notably economics. Officials such as Pascal Lamy, the EU Trade Commissioner, and Bob Zoellick, the US trade representative, worked hard to insulate their area from arguments on security. The breakdown at Cancun in the WTO talks in September 2003 did not stem from EU-US tension. In fact the EU and the United States had reached a common position on the crucial area of agriculture. The problem at Cancun was rather a north-south divide.

Even in many areas of security policy, cooperation remained good throughout 2003. In Afghanistan French and German forces worked well with US troops. Intelligence cooperation on terrorist threats remained strong. France and Germany worked with the United States on the proliferation security initiative.

However, despite the friendlier tone of the early months of 2004, the outlook for transatlantic relations is far from propitious. The lack of trust between Washington and Paris bodes ill for the future. Many senior figures in Washington continue to regard France as an enemy – and some figures in Paris think similarly about the Bush administration. The Iraq war worsened an already problematic Franco-American relationship, and there are few signs that a serious rapprochement is around the corner. The ability of Gaullists and hard-line Republicans to wind each other up remains undiminished – and could affect many looming transatlantic security problems.

So long as Iraq remains dangerous and unstable, the United States and the 'Old Europeans' are likely to take different views on what needs to happen there. Iran, too, may prove difficult: if the Iranians do just enough to satisfy the EU that they have abandoned their nuclear ambitions, but not enough to satisfy the United States, there may be a transatlantic rift on policy towards Iran. Last but not least, the Israel-Palestine conflict is always likely to provoke transatlantic discord. In theory, the United States and the EU are both committed to the road map. In practice, public opinion in Europe blames Israel for the lack of progress, and public opinion in the United States blames the Palestinians. This gulf in public perceptions has the potential to drive governments on the two sides of the Atlantic apart.

The international system

At the time of the Iraq war, both the US-led coalition and the French-led opposition blamed each other for undermining the role of the UN. France, Russia, Germany and other countries which refused to vote for a UN Security Council resolution on the authorisation of force were failing to uphold the UNSC, said the Bush administration; Iraq was in breach of many resolutions and needed to be coerced to comply with them. According to this argument, the United States and its allies were the true upholders of a strong UN, despite the fact that they went to war without a UNSC mandate.

But the war's critics said that the United States had weakened the UN by saying, in effect, 'pass a resolution authorising force or we will go to war anyway'. The United States had refused to give Hans Blix's UN weapons inspectors and the IAEA the time they said they needed to finish their job of locating and dismantling Iraq's supposed WMD. And then in the months after the war, the United States kept the UN role in Iraq to a minimum, forcing the British to abandon their earlier policy of giving the UN a strong role in Iraq.

Each camp said that the other was weakening the UN. And yet, a year later, there seems little doubt that the UN is in some respects stronger. All over the world the UN is perceived – for all its faults – as a source of legitimacy. The Iraq war has in some ways strengthened the UN's 'soft power'. Many people, faced with an all-powerful, unbridled global hegemon, view the UN as a very welcome alternative source of authority.

The Americans' difficulties in Iraq, and in particular their inability to win the support of the Shia spiritual leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, have forced them to ask the UN for help. President Bush wants UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to mediate between the Provisional Coalition Authority and the Ayatollah. The United States also seems ready to accept a much greater role for the UN in the governance of Iraq: it knows that the UN has a legitimacy which it lacks.

The United States did not need allies or the imprimatur of the UN to invade Iraq, but it has subsequently learned that the problems of postwar reconstruction are too great for any one country, however powerful, to handle. It needs money and peacekeepers from other countries to help with the effort, and it needs the UN to bestow legitimacy upon the the embryonic Iraqi political system. However great Bush's unilateralist instincts, he now has a strong self-interest in adopting a more multilateralist stance.

In addition to the UN, other parts of the global system of governance, for example the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court and many arms control treaties, have been weakened by America's opposition to them. But the Bush administration was creating problems for these insitutions before the Iraq war, and it has not become more hostile subsequently.

It may turn out that the 'problem' of US hegemony, if it is a problem, will generate its own self-rectifying mechanism. The more the United States deploys hard power on a unilateral or largely unilateral basis, and in an arrogant manner, as it did in Afghanistan and Iraq, the more public opinion and governments in many parts of the world come to resent US power. And the more that America's image suffers, the more its soft power diminishes. America's soft power – its ability to shape events through persuasion and diplomacy, rather than coercion – has declined greatly in the first three years of the Bush presidency. The results have been clear: long-standing allies such as Germany, Mexico and Canada refused to back the war against Iraq, and have subsequently declined to send money or soldiers to help rebuild the country.

The United States is discovering what has been rather obvious to most Europeans all along: that many of the most difficult problems it is confronting, such as terrorism, the need to rebuild rogue or failed states, and organised crime, not to mention global economic and environmental problems, cannot be solved with hard power alone.

The more the United States's soft power diminishes, the more difficult it is for the Bush administration to confront these many challenges. And now the Administration is learning to treat its allies more gently, to make better use of international agencies (such as the IAEA), to work with rather than against the UN – and even, to some extent, to win over hearts and minds around the world.

The combination of George W. Bush, the 9/11 attacks and the Iraq war destabilised the world order: American hard power surged and its soft power waned. The current level of America's hard power – the United States spends more on defence than the next ten biggest defence spenders put together – remains an extraordinary historical phenomenon. But the Administration is learning – at least to some extent – that it also needs to rebuild its soft power.

Gustav Gustenau

7

The war on terrorism

According to recent reports, there is no immediate connection detectable between the former Iraqi regime and any significant support given by it to radical Islamic groups. As a consequence, the United States has suffered a severe loss of credibility, especially since the US administration justified the war against Iraq with the continuing fight against terrorism. In this context, the overall global situation concerning international terrorism has even worsened since the end of the Iraq war in various respects. The occupation of Iraq by the United States and its allies has given al-Qaeda further motives in its fight against the United States. It has been the aim of al-Qaeda to end the US presence in Saudi Arabia and to minimise US influence on Israel/Palestine. Now that the ground war has ended, it will be crucial to block any ideological and propaganda activities by terrorist organisations and prevent the recruitment of future terrorists. Throughout 2003, the threat of terrorist attacks has also been constantly rising in Europe, which is rapidly becoming second to the United States as a main target of Islamic terrorism. The structure of al-Qaeda has gained in flexibility and has tried to adapt to counter-terrorist measures employed by the United Stats and Europe. At first, terrorist groups tend to refocus on targets that are easier to hit, i.e. countries that give terrorists more freedom of action. In order to counterbalance this threat, security measures have been increased significantly in all European states. Though not being the core target of terrorists, these countries do host US institutions, including private companies as well as international facilities. The burden for the European states is certainly significant, although a positive side effect and special dynamic is visible in terms of security sector reform as much within the member states themselves as in the European Union as a whole. From the US perspective, the fight against terrorism still seems to be rather problematic. The intended costs for the reconstruction of

Iraq alone are double the amount provided for counter-terrorism measures in 2002. The question arises whether the US administration might not be overwhelmed with the Iraq issue, as this cuts heavily into the financial and personnel resources available for counter- terrorism policy. Experts even argue that the Iraq war was not so much a continuation but rather a diversion from the main task of 'fighting terrorism'. This leads to the question of the underlying causes of such terrorism and the possible contribution of the Iraq war to its abolition. Bearing in mind the central causes of radical Islamic terrorism – such as the socio-economic consequences of globalisation and the free market economy on Islamic societies, the strong US military presence in the Gulf region, the fate of the Palestinian people and the discontent of the Arab and Muslim population with their own corrupt and authoritarian regimes, often collaborating with the United States – one will see that containment or even eradication of terrorist threats will only be attainable in the long term. In addition, they require a new and more effective approach to be conceptualised and realised on a multilateral basis. The one and only positive outcome of the Iraq war seems to be the minimisation of the possibility for terrorists to obtain WMD via state channels. While Iraq has definitively dropped out of this group of states, other countries have started to send clear signals that they are replacing secrecy by cooperation.

The Greater Middle East

Up until now, there has been neither a 'democratic domino effect' nor an escalation of conflicts in most parts of the Greater Middle East region. However, beside the still problematic situation in Iraq, positive aspects are observable that can be closely linked with the rapid military success in Iraq as well as with the dominant presence of US military power. Recent concessions made by Iran concerning the non-proliferation regime, the concessions made by Libya in terms of informing the West about its armaments programme, the reticence of Syria, the intensification of the relations between Israel and Turkey, the strong efforts in re-establishing official contacts between Egypt and Iran, etc – these are all signals, which might confirm the strategic approach of the 'neo-conservatives', that show that the road for peace is not necessarily to be found through the solution of the conflict between Israel and Palestine, but in regime

change in Baghdad. Yet, however positive these actual steps for catharsis between the states in this region might be, the primary interest of the leaders was to safeguard the authoritarian regimes. Depending on the point of view, these have either been the cause or the result of development of political deficits. The expansion of the recent successes implies deepened engagement of the coalition in Iraq, which will be of great importance to the whole region in particular during the US presidential election campaign and the efforts in 'Iraqisation'. Successful nation-building will remain the principal task for stabilising the region. Consequently this will also be an important topic for the Europeans. The fact that currently 15, soon 17 European NATO states (most of them EU members) have deployed troops in Iraq shows how unwise it is to believe that the EU, unable to agree one a coherent approach before, will now be capable of positioning itself as a central actor. This has a strong reference to Afghanistan, where nation-building has also become a long-term but indispensable task that is now being conducted by NATO. Bearing in mind that the EU covers 90 per cent of Western support in Afghanistan gives evidence of the strong European engagement. The focus of the fight against terrorism in the North-Western Territories in Pakistan – the country which next to Iran is playing a major role in the stabilisation of Afghanistan – shows that the internal and external situation in Pakistan is of crucial interest to the international community in the region and requires more attention and support. If the majority of today's security and political challenges for Europe come from the Greater Middle East region, one consequence of these apparent interdependencies is the necessity to revive the Barcelona Process from its status of 'sleeping beauty' in order to widen geographical engagement and become far more dynamic. As NATO also sees its major focus of action in this region in the future it will be necessary to align NATO efforts with the Barcelona Process in order to reach a clear division of labour between EU and NATO in the region. It will be crucial for the EU to exploit its comparative advantages in the field of soft security in this matter. The EU could furthermore play a key role if the authoritarian but cooperative states were replaced by democratic but possibly anti-Western regimes during the process of making participatory structures in the region. Avoiding anti-Western politics in the region will have to be the core task for the EU, which certainly has the best prerequisites for this aim. In this way the EU could manifest its position as an essential partner of the United States.

The European Union's role as a global actor

Why should the European Union wish to take on the role of global actor? Obviously, there exists above all a coherent wish for transformation, for an efficient structure of leadership and the appropriate instruments. As a consequence of the present geopolitical constellation, the European Union needs to redefine its relationship with the United States. Over the last year, the US-led war against Iraq and the multiple positions taken by EU states towards the American strategy have made a consistent EU position as regards probably the most important global political question not only impossible, but have also given the impression that transatlantic cleavages may have destroyed the historical opportunity to establish an EU constitutional agreement. Solving the remaining disputed points in EU constitutional negotiations – including those on ESDP – seemed beyond reach. Although the Brussels summit failed in terms of the final draft of the constitution, at least the key EU member states did succeed in finding mutual consent on the 'solidarity clause', 'enhanced cooperation' and 'closer cooperation'. Most objections in these cases were expected from the four non-aligned member states. Perhaps it was Poland and Spain's ambition to abide by the voting weights implemented in the Nice Treaty that made reaching a consensus finally impossible. These ambitions could be the result of the developing political morphology in Europe and a refusal to follow a power bloc directed by a 'Franco-German' directorate. From today's point of view, the following key elements of further CFSP and ESDP development can be observed: a core Europe that is relatively capable of acting in tendential competition with the United States, a European Security and Defence Policy that matches the arrangements with NATO (i.e. 'Berlin-plus') and a politically lame EU consisting of 25 members unwilling to give priority to European interests over national sentiments. For the smaller European partners, especially the non-aligned as well as the new EU members, the Union does not necessarily present a confident picture from a security policy point of view. During the Iraq war, the responsibility for leadership was sacrificed by the big EU member states in favour of cheap and short-term national interests. The former aim of positioning the EU as a credible and efficient actor in security and defence policy matters on the global political stage failed completely. Although progress has been made, without a common approach towards ESDP the

EU will not be able to achieve a role commensurate with its weight on the global spectrum of security policy.

The internal European balance of power needs to undergo a process of restructuring in order to generate a coherent and externally focused determination to act. This includes redefining the relationship between big and small states, 'Atlanticists' and 'Europeans', Non-Aligned and NATO members, which seems to have been disrupted. The fact that the European Security Strategy was accepted by all member states provides evidence of a crucial step in the right direction of an ambitious CFSP and ESDP. However, symptoms of the main problems remain: essential aspects have not so far been addressed or clearly spelt out. Task-sharing with NATO, the EU's role vis-à-vis the United States and the definition of binding military tasks within the spectrum of crisis response operations and above still have to be tackled. After all, the British-French agreement of 24 November 2003, which emphasises an ESDP focus on Africa and also the interpretation of structured and closer cooperation as an option for NATO members, clearly presents a complementary development of NATO and ESDP. This might become the dominant security political framework for the EU in the long term. Moreover, concentration on foreign political tasks which enjoy political consensus, not only among the EU member states but also with the United States, might be helpful in the future.

This process of redefinition of the role of the EU will be determined by Germany to a large extent. Germany will face the difficult challenge of finding the balance between an approved and reasonable role as a partner of the United States on the one hand and a supporter of French visions on the other. Finding this balance will be the precondition for harmonisation of the positions of the key EU players: Germany, the United Kingdom and France. European leadership by the 'big three' will only be recognised by the smaller states once the big actors guarantee to improve closer integration also of small partner states.

Transatlantic relations

From a historical perspective, the second half of the twentieth century should be interpreted as an exceptional period which was determined by a uniquely close US-European relationship as a con-

sequence of the Cold War. The Iraq war has accelerated the re-establishment of the normal status between the two powers, which does not a priori include this crucial form of identity of interests. While this emancipation process probably started on both sides simultaneously, the US approach, i.e. reacting first to security political challenges unilaterally and only then looking for strategic partners, may have encouraged those in Europe who pleaded for more 'autonomy'. Although Washington had made successful achievements by the end of 2003 – the capture of Saddam Hussein, concessions by Libya, recent offers of negotiations by North Korea, the positive signals from Tehran and the consensus on the new constitution in Afghanistan – developments in postwar Iraq have shown that the United States is dependent on the support of its allies. One year after the Iraq war, the limitations of the United States as the geopolitical world power have become apparent. These facts are important preconditions for a critical but objective survey of the basic principles and framework of a renewed transatlantic partnership. The key question for all European states is still defining the advantages of a renewed transatlantic partnership and the price they are willing to pay. What is the significant value of the preservation of a common political-cultural basis for continuity of the Western world, the composition of a partnership framework for cooperation between these two reciprocally most important trading partners, and finally the institutional binding of the United States to Europe as proven guarantor of European security and stability as well as an important partner in meeting the security-political challenges in Europe's neighbourhood? These are all questions that obviously still lack consensual answers. Consequently, the Europeans have to define preconditions in order to lead the security policy debate from a purely European perspective that makes it possible to define common tasks and measures accordingly. In Europe the main deficits, besides its military weakness, are missing central leadership structures such as the implementation of a coherent strategic concept. The development of both these factors is a prerequisite for a joint European establishment, not just that of single European powers, as a serious partner of the United States. This includes the extension of ESDP as an effective instrument for stabilising NATO, as well as for creating European forces to operate in cases where the United States is not able to act alone or via the Alliance. Yet, looking at the central issues such as strategic terrorism, missile defence, proliferation of WMD or pre-emptive opera-

tions there is still a huge gap between the real necessities of the population and those which are politically reasonable and the limited active conceptions of the EU. The Iraq crisis has shown that European governments often seem to be more opportune if they can raise their profile by keeping at a distance from real problems and leaving the United States to take responsibility for negative developments. The reasons for the inability to achieve a coherent European position can be found in national preferences, in a conscious standing aside from High Politics, in the proclamation of neutrality status in individual cases or in the demonstrative and unconditional acceptance of US positions by EU membership candidates. The latter provides especially clear evidence that in addition to the traditional European role in the context of 'old Europe', European security policy will remain transatlantic oriented. However, it is up to the Europeans to decide whether this is done in a hegemonic and imperial way as aspired by Washington or rather in the form of a partnership. Any attempt to create a form of strong competition with the United States would only further marginalise the European Union and cause a division of forces. Realities will not allow the Europeans to put off solving conceptual and institutional questions until a solution appears in the distant future. The fight against WMD (Iran) and terrorism (Afghanistan), as well as the stabilisation of Iraq immediately and massively, demonstrate where chances for joint transatlantic cooperation can be found – and equally Europe's role in it, either as vassal or partner.

The international system

Indisputably, the Iraq war has changed core parameters of the international system. Through United States's blatant ambition it has become obvious that the collective world supremacy pursued by the UN and the allies has been replaced by unilateral and selective US leadership. Washington has reneged on the UN system, which is based on the prohibition of violence and collective security, inasmuch as the Administration has now decided to deal with states that are suspected of supporting international terrorism with WMD or host extremist organisations as it sees fit. Military intervention and regime change seem no longer bound to a UN Security Council mandate. Although the Security Council has generally supported the tendency to view terrorist attacks like 9/11 as

military aggressions, the United States's unilateral approach vis-à-vis Iraq has led to a situation where the acceptance or non-acceptance of US leadership has become the central problem. The countermeasures taken by several powers to balance US supremacy have become evident in the discussion of NATO's role during the Iraq war. Indeed, in the interests of the credibility of the European powers – especially Germany and France – it will be highly important to make clear whether the refusal to follow the United States is simply the defence of hegemonic claims or the Europeans' qualified strategic security interests. As the latter argument presently is to be at risk in Iraq, two aims have to be achieved from the European point of view: stronger UN responsibility in the Iraq question and a stronger European voice, i.e. in the context of the European Union. In terms of formulating a new world order – either unilaterally or multilaterally – the European Union does have an important role to play. If it is in Europe's interest to be a partner based on a constructive system, it will be necessary to establish the EU as a cooperative balancing factor. This implies a precise strategic role, more coherence in policy-making and concrete strategic instruments (i.e. ESDP, policy vis-à-vis the Greater Middle East, etc.). Avoiding a hegemonic and imperial US policy is very important, as this approach nourishes enmity towards the United States, especially radical Islamic terrorism worldwide. The worst-case scenario would be a quasi-united Muslim anti-Western power bloc, which certainly would again call for US leadership in the West, being counter to the interests of both the United States and Europe.

Pierre Hassner

8

The war on terrorism

The consequences of the war in Iraq on the war on terrorism have been marginal and indirect at best. On the one hand, since the claims of Saddam Hussein's links with al-Qaeda, let alone of his involvement in 9/11, have not been substantiated and, on the other hand, there is no evidence of recent Iraqi terrorist activities abroad, one cannot see his overthrow as a victory against terrorism. On the other hand, while it has led to terrorist attacks against coalition troops, international organisations and pro-coalition Iraqis inside the country, one cannot claim that it has increased the danger of terrorism elsewhere: there has been no second 9/11 so far, and the struggle against terrorism has had quite a few important successes, like the arrest of important members of the al-Qaeda leadership. Still, there may be consequences, favourable and unfavourable, which are indirect, long-range and hence impossible to verify today. There has been an important diversion of men and resources, which may have made terrorist attacks elsewhere (e.g. in Afghanistan) easier. On the other hand, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein after that of the Taliban is likely to have brought home to all other governments the danger of helping anti-American terrorists and of even leaving themselves open to the suspicion that they are doing so. Conversely, it is likely to have increased the hatred of the United States and the West in the Muslim world at large, and hence the number of candidates for suicide attacks.

The Greater Middle East

As with terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, the effect of the war in Iraq has been greater fear of the United States and more hatred or rage against it. The use of force by the United States has gained in credibility, but the credibility of its motives, intentions

and commitments has dramatically decreased. Hence the need to distinguish between the effect of the war on governments and its effect on peoples, and between its short-term and long-term consequences. In the Greater Middle East, as elsewhere but more so, governments have, to various degrees, 'gotten the message' and started to modify their policies at least in part by clamping down on the terrorists who they once encouraged, or by renouncing their programmes for nuclear or biological warfare, or by cooperating with the United States against al-Qaeda. But by so doing they have increased the fragility and, sometimes, the unpopularity of their rule, and may have paved the way for violent anti-Western and Islamist revolutions.

It is, of course, much too early to tell. All one can say is that, for the time being, neither the explosion of rage leading to the overthrow of moderate regimes nor a new age of negotiation from a position of strength has materialised. But there are enough elements in both senses to make a categorical prediction impossible. The ease of the military victory and the absence of a heroic resistance on the part of Saddam Hussein, have increased an impression of American invincibility and of humiliating Arab impotence. But the absence of weapons of mass destruction, the failure of the coalition presence to keep order and security in Iraq, its obvious lack of political planning for the aftermath of the war and the vacillations in its policies on the future of Iraq have deprived the perspective of a Middle East led by America towards democracy of whatever reduced credibility it might have had.

However, some indications are more favourable to American policy. The failure of its attempt to secure the cooperation of Turkey, its most trusted ally, during the war, has been overcome. Directly or indirectly, the combination of force and diplomacy seems to have produced important results in the case of Libya but also, less clearly, the signalling by Iran and Syria of a willingness to make concessions. Even the armistice in Sudan can be seen as proof that American policy can be as effective in promoting peace through mediation as in waging war. Tacit or explicit cooperation with European diplomacy in the case of Iran, and with the UN in the case of Iraq, seems to be practiced by the United States, which seems to realise that force cannot always replace negotiation and that unilateral action must be complemented by collaboration with allies and the United Nations. But neither this recognition nor this skill in putting pressure at the service of politics seems to

apply to American policy towards the Palestinian issue. There, electoral considerations and sympathy in parts of the Bush administration for the hardline policy pursued by the Israeli government make for a policy which is both one-sided and passive. This could lead to disaster for all, including Israel and the United States, and makes Arab support of the American presence in Iraq all the more difficult.

The link between the situation in Iraq, American domestic politics and the broader policies of the United States is a complex one. Changes in one of the three dimensions can have repercussions on the two others. Currently the rhetoric of the Bush administration (both at home and abroad) remains defiantly unilateralist and imperial; its actual behaviour seems more accommodating. Whether, after the election, if George W. Bush is re-elected, his actions will bear the mark of the more complex diplomacy pursued by Colin Powell or of the more ideological or adventurist line of some other advisers for whom Iraq is only a beginning in a grand attempt at 'putting an end to evil' by force is anybody's guess. All one can confidently state is that the latter course, if consistently pursued, can only lead to turmoil, with consequences which will be difficult to predict let alone control. Even more modest and limited perspectives (such as, in Iraq, a Shia-led government combined with a more or less permanent residual American or NATO military presence destined to prevent persecutions of, or revolt or secession by, Sunnis and Kurds) can, depending on the context, be a positive precedent for a NATO force in the 'occupied territories' guaranteeing a peace between Israelis and Palestinians or, conversely, constitute a permanent focus for terrorism and rebellion.

The European Union's role as a global actor

This question calls only for the shortest possible answer, since the European Union's role as a global actor is almost non-existent anyway, except for economic and related matters, and since this non-existence was made even more glaringly obvious during the Iraq war by the division of European states into at least two camps. In the aftermath of the war, however, some hopeful signs have emerged: a general agreement that Europe must have its own view of security, the Solana paper which does show a coherent point of

view, distinct from but not opposed to the United States, and last but certainly not least, the rapprochement between Britain, France and Germany on defence matters and even on some diplomatic initiatives (e.g. towards Iran). As happens most of the time, failure to play an important enough role in a crisis leads to an attempt at overcoming this weakness and at preventing the recurrence of the same situation in the next confrontation. Certainly the convergence of the 'Big Three', on a line intermediary between those adopted by Britain and France during the war, goes in the right direction. But it is a long way from there to the European Union becoming a global actor, given its institutional crisis, the reluctance of some of its members to let the EU play any world role, the financial constraints which prevent a rise in defence budgets and the clear and probably durable opposition of the United States.

Transatlantic relations

Everybody recognises that transatlantic relations are facing their worst crisis since Suez and de Gaulle. This is not the place to analyse the dimensions of the crisis that make it even more significant historically, but it is necessary to mention them briefly, in order to ascertain the influence of the Iraq war upon them. Some are structural: the demise of the common Soviet enemy and the increase in the military and technological gap between the United States and its European allies. Some are due to diverging social trends: the United States becoming more religious, Europe less so, the United States keeping its attachment to full sovereignty for itself, the Europeans more favourable to supranational laws and institutions. Some are due to personalities and ideologies: the belief by George W. Bush and most of his team that America has to decide and act by itself, while welcoming the contribution of others to the implementation of its policies, the belief by French leaders that France must be seen to be independent and to offer its own alternative to American hegemony. The shock of 11 September, and its massive and unprecedented character, have wrought in the American people an attitude to terrorism and the fight against it that is both more apocalyptic and more optimistic than that of the Europeans. The former see it as global and evil, yet believe it can be eradicated, the latter see it as diverse, having to be fought but also prevented by attending to its root causes; yet they believe that one has

no choice but to live with it, while hopefully reducing its threat. The view of the world of each is coloured by greater energy on the American side and greater scepticism on the European.

All these features have been manifested and to some extent multiplied in American and European attitudes towards the war in Iraq and, even more, in their perception of each other's attitudes. Americans have tended to trust their President to accept the idea that al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and rogue states are somehow linked, while the Europeans have tended to see them as distinct and, to a great extent, separate or separable phenomena. The American government and a large percentage of the American public believe in military force as the main instrument of power and foreign policy, while the Europeans believe more in negotiation and structural change.

The war has not only increased and embittered these divergences which otherwise could have led to complementary or compatible policies. Above all, the manoeuvring before the war and the situation developing after it have given these oppositions a moral and sometimes passionate character. Americans feel they have been abandoned by Europeans in their time of need and attribute this betrayal to cowardice and greed. Europeans feel that Americans have behaved in a reckless and impulsive way, without due regard to the situation in Iraq and to the broader consequences. Americans feel the German government betrayed them for electoral reasons and the French one led them to believe falsely that it would ultimately go along with them, only, then, to fight them diplomatically in a ruthless way unbecoming of an ally. The Europeans feel they have been lied to on the matter of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and, hence, suspect ulterior motives for America's behaviour. Hence, on the matter of spreading democracy in the Middle East and the world at large they suspect either bad faith or an extreme *naïveté*, whereas the Americans see Europeans as cynical accomplices of the status quo.

Both American bellicose idealism and European comfortable pacifism appear to the more extreme exponents of the other side as both hypocritical and irresponsible.

This situation should not be seen, however, as inevitable and irreversible. Some Americans are beginning to see that European objections concerning the absence of a clear and present danger to world security from Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, and, above

all, concerning the welcome of the Iraqi people to their liberators and an easy transition to democracy were justified. Some Europeans are beginning to see that, whatever its motives, the American-led intervention has put an end to a horrible tyranny and that some good, whatever its dangers, can come from pressing Middle Eastern states for democratic reforms. A certain convergence towards new roles for the UN and NATO in Iraq is beginning to emerge. But it is very fragile, it is at the mercy of events on the ground and of the immoderate champions on each side being listened to. And, in the best case, transatlantic relations will still not return to their pre-1989 state, unless and until threats other than terrorism (perhaps, one day, China, or, perhaps, again, Russia?) start to emerge.

The international system

The international system (if the word does not suggest more coherence, rationality and functionality than our troubled, moving and unpredictable world deserves) has been affected by the war in Iraq in one immediate, undeniable way: a new situation has been created in the crucial region of the Middle East, with the United States directly and physically engaged and proclaiming its intention to restructure the whole region. Beyond that, everything depends upon the factors mentioned in the section on the Greater Middle East: the situation on the ground (a stable, democratic order, a civil war with foreign intervention, or any number of intermediate scenarios), on the immobility or overthrow of important regimes (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran), on the further descent of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict into an unsolvable tragedy or the beginning of a real 'road map' towards peace and, above all, on the character and durability of America's presence. If the United States withdraws in disgust after failing to establish order at an acceptable cost to itself or if, at the other extreme, it follows the Messianic programme of knocking out, directly or indirectly, any state presenting a potential or real threat of producing weapons of mass destruction and/or encouraging terrorism, or even any state considered to be insufficiently democratic, the international system will be radically changed. An isolationist America or a revolutionary one engaged in a permanent armed mission are both incompatible with world order.

If, however, the present mixture of success and difficulties in Iraq is any guide, the situation is likely to be more complex and contradictory. The United States will remain at the centre or at the top of the system, but it will increasingly discover or rediscover its complexities and contradictions. This evolution may well be beginning. The simple definition of the real world order as: 'All states against terrorism and those who support it' or 'The American empire, versus the Islamist threat' (Charles Krauthammer) may be giving way to a more differentiated vision where the respective priority of weapons of mass destruction, of terrorism, of regime change, varies according to geopolitical constraints and opportunities. The different treatment of members of the 'axis of evil' like Iraq and North Korea; of new nuclear states as India and Pakistan, on the one hand, Iran on the other, the ambivalence of relations with Russia (an ally in the struggle against terrorism and fundamentalism but a rival in Central Asia and in the Caucasus, and one whose democratic credentials look more and more doubtful) or with China (with whom the positive links of economic interdependence seem currently to be prevailing over strategic rivalry but with whom strains, over Taiwan, over oil, and, in the long run, over hegemony in Asia or elsewhere are likely to re-emerge at some point) are examples of this reappearance of more traditional concerns after the fixation (at least rhetorical) on terrorism.

Other actors, beginning with Europe, have a role to play in this reassessment. But if the unipolar world of 'benevolent empire' and the bipolar world of 'the West against the rest' or 'Jihad against McWorld' or 'states against terrorist movements' are illusions or nightmares, so are dreams of a Paris-Berlin-Moscow-Beijing axis. All actors have an interest in not provoking the United States, while none can accept an exclusive and perennial American hegemony. A co-management of Iraq (and perhaps, one day, of the 'occupied territories' under the leadership of the United States and the legitimation of the United Nations but with other actors trying, without servility and without provocation, to increase their share of responsibility and influence, may be a symbol and a beginning for a more positive and realistic goal concerning the next phase of the international system.

Atis Lejins

9

The war on terrorism

It is still too early to assess the results of the war in Iraq. If we look at it purely from the viewpoint whether it has or has not increased or decreased the global war against terrorism (GWAT), it would appear at this stage that GWAT is marking time and may even have been set back. The indicators for the latter interpretation were the high state of air alerts in the United States, and the devastating bombings in Saudi Arabia and Turkey. The arrests in Europe and Pakistan of al-Qaeda terrorists were the result of police and intelligence services' actions taken after 11 September, not of the war in Iraq.

The arrests of top Baath party functionaries and Saddam himself will probably not lead to any major breakthrough in GWAT, since the evidence before the war showed that their was no link between Saddam and international terrorists. Saddam was secular, branded by the fundamentalists as an 'infidel' and 'socialist', but the continuing resistance put up by Baathist elements and nationalist groups to the occupation forces could be attracting international terrorists to join the fight in Iraq as newspaper reports, citing US sources, indicate. The bombings in Iraq continue and this shows that Saddam was not the centre of resistance to the occupation.

With regard to the Chechen war, the Russian state, through its brutal actions, is breeding radical Islam terrorists, as the Moscow theatre capture demonstrated, thereby contributing to the transformation of the Chechen national cause into one of international terrorism. Nor is it yet clear who in fact, by blowing up buildings, ignited the second Chechen war or what role the Russian secret services played in the Moscow theatre hostage tragedy. No evidence has ever been put forward that Chechens fought in Afghanistan and Iraq, despite the allegations to this effect at the highest level in Russia, Britain and the United States. The Iraq war,

however, has certainly affected the governments of neighbouring states such as Syria and Iran, but it is still not known how this fits into the broader GWAT. According to reports, Syria even Iran were already cooperating with the United States before the war. With regard to WMD, it is almost certain that the toppling of Saddam played a major role in Gaddafi's decision to open up his country, but the process had already been initiated and moved forward by British diplomacy in connection with the trial and sentencing of the Lockerbie terrorists. Whether Gaddafi would have been ready to halt his WMD programme if no war had taken place is now a matter for the historians.

What is clear is that GWAT has been heavily politicised since the war in Iraq and now belongs to the realm of realpolitik among and between the powers opposing each other or collaborating with each other in international affairs, as well as in internal politics, especially on the question of why the war in Iraq was started. The jury is still out with regard to the fundamental question poised by the former SACEUR General Wesley Clark before the war, i.e. will the war decrease or increase terrorism? What is clear, however, is that unless Iraq is reconstructed quickly, a major catastrophe awaits the world.

The Greater Middle East

This is the breeding ground for past, present and future wars, including international terrorism. Nothing seems to be right in this great space except Turkey to a certain degree. The British and the French got their policy wrong after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, and then the Americans and the Russians followed in their footsteps after the Second World War. America got it right after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, but got it wrong again after turning its back in 1989 once the Russians had to withdraw from Afghanistan. The attacks of 9/11 came back as a boomerang as a result of this strategic blunder. The second blunder in Afghanistan was to begin the war against Iraq before the foundations of a rebuilt Afghanistan had been secured. Now there are two 'Muslim wars', and Northern America and Europe are overstretched in peacekeeping.

The fundamental question with regard to this great space is whether, after giving rise to international terrorism, this area will

also be the breeding ground for a 'clash of civilisations', a nightmare scenario which can no longer be dismissed as belonging solely to the comfortable world of academic dispute and discourse.

Two nations living in the area did not acquire statehood along with the rest after the conclusion of both World Wars in the last century – the Palestinians and the Kurds. The latter might get a state as a result of the war in Iraq if civil war erupts after the occupation forces are withdrawn, but then the challenge of what to do with the Kurds living in Turkey and Iran will arise. Will they be satisfied with autonomy like the Hungarians in Romania (one-third of Hungary's population) and will Iran and Turkey be satisfied with such an arrangement as Hungary is today vis-à-vis its population in Romania?

The Israel-Palestine imbroglio is, by comparison, more intractable, since the United States is perceived to have committed itself to the extent that it cannot or will not exert significant pressure on Israel, and there is no one who can do the same for the Palestinian side. Explosively irrational forces completely dominate the conflict on both sides. The bloody conflict could continue for decades but also could give rise to new dangers of an unprecedented kind in the age of global terrorism unless internal forces in both the Israeli and Palestinian camps bring about fundamental change. The Kurdish dilemma has not yet become a military conflict of the same magnitude, and so a certain room for manoeuvre and possible viable solutions can be sought before things get out of hand. The pro-Western Arab ruling élites are corrupt and ineffective, and may well be swept away by radical forces that appeal to the people. Even without bloody revolutions, democratic change need not necessarily produce pro-Western governments. A democratic Iran or Iraq (if the latter does not split into two or three states) does not mean an Iran or Iraq that is 'compliant' to, for example, the United States. As democracies of a kind (real democracy will need several decades of development), they could be even more dangerous, since they would have internal legitimacy and greater appeal in a Muslim world that feels alienated.

Turkey has the ability to be pro-Western, democratic, growth-oriented and able to exert influence and generate appeal to both Turkish and Arabic peoples in the great space. Yet it has declined the opportunity to become the centre of an Islamic association of states along the lines of the EU by wanting to join the Union,

thereby losing its appeal, and, in addition, raising dramatically the spectre of EU disintegration further.

The European Union's role as a global actor

The EU is not a global actor. It has been a decisive European actor in securing peace in Europe as the greatest peace and security organisation under the shelter of NATO, lately by acting as the centre of gravity for the newly liberated states in Central and Eastern Europe, but on the wider global stage it simply alleviates poverty and hunger in various parts of the developing world. In some cases, like the Middle East, it has been decisive from, for example, saving the Palestinian Authority from collapse, but not influencing events.

It cannot be a global actor because it has no common foreign and security policy. This became glaringly apparent during the run-up to the war in Iraq, but also afterwards. Although steps are being taken to revive the process of moving towards a CFSP (in the Balkans), and a first-ever security strategy has been adopted, the foreign ministers of the three biggest states – Britain, France and Germany – declined to take Javier Solana with them to Iran. If they had, next time Solana would have been able to travel alone to represent the EU. The foreign ministers also forgot to get the backing of the other EU member states, which they would easily have obtained. All current and future member states eagerly signed up to the security strategy and there would hardly have been any dissidence with regard to Iran. The phone calls to the 25-minus-3 foreign ministries could have been made by Solana. The reason this was not done was that the 'great powers' in the EU, for whatever reasons, did not wish to have it done this way.

The fundamental question today is not whether the EU can become a global actor, but rather whether it can survive as a unified institution. If the Union disintegrates it certainly can no longer become a global actor – Germany and France together with some small states will not be enough since Europe, once again, will be split and thereby easily manipulated.

A return to the 1930s is the biggest nightmare for the small and medium-size states. It was a strategic mistake on the part of the Germans and French to form an alliance with Russia against America during the Iraq war, just as it was for Britain to rush ahead with the 'letter of eight' without thinking of its consequences,

including for the new (and bewildered) NATO members. The French-German-Russian 'axis' was not an alliance against America (since the populations of the new EU states were also against the war) but a fall-back into old realpolitik patterns of behaviour, which historically are directed against the small and medium-size European states that lie closest to Russia.

A strong EU is of fundamental strategic interest to the states that have suffered most from a split Europe. It is only in a strong European organisation that they can exert influence. A common currency, enhanced military cooperation as initiated by France and Germany et al., and now joined by Britain, will not be enough. Other states, including the new members, will join for economic reasons and political and security reasons, i.e. the need to strengthen the Union, while, at the same time, escaping from the EU periphery. In the final analysis, there will have to be a CFSP and a mechanism for effective decision-making. There will have to be a pause in further enlargement in order to strengthen integration, which can only be done by adopting the first-ever constitution. Unless this is done the EU cannot be a global actor.

Transatlantic relations

There is no doubt that a new contract has to be reached between the European and American parts of the transatlantic community. If not, there is a possibility that common values and common economic interests will not matter any more, and a return to the situation of 'punishing France, ignoring Germany and forgiving Russia' (Cheney) will develop into a set policy that expresses itself in various shapes and forms.

Perhaps the central question is the future of NATO. Has it become a peacekeeping organisation, a security organisation with a military dimension that has no say on the fundamental questions of war and peace (Afghanistan and Iraq)? Who decides that it will do peacekeeping after a war has been finished, and what happens if the majority vote against? Non-implementation of Article 5 after 11 September may prove to be central to the future of transatlantic relations and quite possibly the United States and Europe might become separable, but not always separate, great powers, contingent upon the EU's ability to pursue further integration.

The 'new' Europeans' perception of NATO might change, and they could well adopt a policy of not putting all their eggs in one basket, i.e. the NATO basket, but also in the military dimension of the EU. The reason that Britain 'returned to Europe', i.e. joined France and Germany et al. in enhancing military cooperation (without Tervuren) is probably a realisation that putting all its eggs in one basket is not safe even for it, and that, no matter how loyal it was, it could not influence the only global superpower alone.

A split EU and a rump NATO, and the possibility thereby of regaining the Baltic states, is a scenario that is being studied by several Russian strategic studies institutes.

The basis for forging a new contract could be the security concepts of the United States and EU and adoption of policies based on both common and diverging security threats. This perhaps is not so hard as it would seem, since the shock and cost of being confronted with the chaos of rebuilding a post-Saddam Iraq after an easy military victory has influenced American policy-makers and brought America closer to the European peace mindset. The Europeans, both 'old' and 'new' must also have realised the limits of their influence and power and horrified at how easily they can fall back into past bad practices. As already referred to in the previous sections, America cannot act on its own in an increasingly dangerous world, and it is better for it to have differences and difficulties with countries that have similar values and traditions than with those who have a different world view altogether.

The international system

The international system is undergoing tremendous change, as reflected in the above sections. A new 'great game' is being played out in central Asia, with America replacing Britain, and China and India filling the void left by the decline of the Russian empire. Europe is no longer the centre of the universe and has very little to say about developments in that part of the world. The EU's influence will be felt in a number of concentric circles emanating from it into Wider Europe and its neighbourhood, including the southern shores of the Mediterranean. Apart from Russia's ambitions in the

Wider Europe, the EU will feel mounting pressures in the form of illegal immigration, drugs, organised crime and a new form of slavery – the sex trade.

The geopolitical centre, however, i.e. where war can take place, has moved from Europe (thanks to the EU and NATO) to the Greater Middle East and Central Asia. Both China and India will become great powers capable of challenging the United States. The loose cannon is North Korea, the one state that has the unique combination of totalitarian (Stalinist) rule, and WMD and the means to deliver them. Why the United States chose Iraq and not North Korea as its foreign policy priority is an open question and may have set the international agenda for this century.

In addition to this new setting of global power politics, three main issues, as outlined by Tony Blair in a speech during the course of the war in Iraq, will emerge to dominate the international system: global warming, relations with the Muslim world, and world poverty. Since solutions to these questions will change the course of history and affect the very existence of mankind in ways previously unknown in history, it would be ideal if the richest and most democratic part of the world could agree on their priority and basic answers to them. A reform of the United Nations, particularly in the Security Council, should be a high priority.

Janusz Onyszkiewicz

10

The war on terrorism

The attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon marked the beginning of a qualitatively new period in the development of terrorism. Until then, terrorists had used rather traditional, almost nineteenth century methods, with the use of weapons like bombs, guns and pistols. On 9/11 the international community was taken by suprise because of what seemed to be the use of entirely new, unorthodox and imaginative methods.

As a matter of fact, the novelty of the tactic used was not so absolute. After all, in the 1990s some attempts to attack the Eiffel Tower in Paris or CIA Headquarters with the use of hijacked planes, as well as blowing up bridges and underwater tunnels in New York, were thwarted by the police and other services. What was entirely new was the scale of the damage, even more the absence of traditional motives for such terrorist actions.

Until that moment, the goals of terrorists had been fairly clear. What they usually wanted was to get their colleagues out of prison, force governments to take some action or grant some political concessions (autonomy, sometimes full independence, etc.); in many cases the target was a wider public opinion, which – according to the terrorists – had to be made aware of certain issues. Therefore, at least in theory, all these matters were 'negotiable'. This is why terrorists quite often tried to limit the scale of damage, otherwise the chances for negotiations would be rather limited. Al-Qaeda's attacks were and are different. The only intention is to cause maximal damage and destruction. Post-9/11, terrorism acquired a new dimension and became an even more complex phenomenon.

The war on terrorism will look more like the war against organised crime – something which will go on forever. Therefore, it was a mistake to form the impression that this war is like so many other conflicts and can be conclusively and finally won.

Zbigniew Brzezinski is right in saying that terrorism is not an enemy – terrorism is a method, like blitzkrieg during the Second World War. So, It would be better to make it clear that the enemy is al-Qaeda, and NATO's declaration on the invocation of its famous Article 5 would mean that the involvment of the Alliance lasts only as long as al-Qaeda remains a threat. At present, we are in a legally rather strange situation of being permanently under the Article 5 commitments, without any prospect that there will be a moment when victory in the war on terrorism could be declared.

A new type of terrorism of the al-Qaeda type (hyperterrorism?) requires a completely different approach. The scale of potential damage is similar to that resulting from an interstate war. That would be even more the case if, *horribile dictu*, terrorists were able to get hold of some weapons of mass destruction. However, deterrence, which was always an important instrument of defence and security policy is not going to work, because of the elusive nature of the terrorists' structures and their unlimited ideological commitment to their cause, which makes them completely impervious to any normal (in all standard military thinking) cost-effect assessment. On top of that, military planning will be extremely difficult, because unlike in classical situations, when the list of possible military options for the potential adversary is limited and easy to determine, terrorist attacks can happen without any warning and in places that are almost impossible to predict. International cooperation will be critical in addressing this new, formidable threat. Measures taken by the European Union, however welcome and impressive, would not suffice. Much broader agreement (an anti-terrorist solidarity pact) including NATO, the EU and some other European countries (e.g. Switzerland, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania and Russia – despite a well-known and specific problem with Chechnya – as well as Japan, Australia and maybe others), should be considered.

The Greater Middle East

The main problem of the region is a well-founded concern about its lasting stability. Political turmoil and chaos could not only disrupt the energy supply for Europe, Japan and the United States (not to mention other countries) but could play havoc on financial markets and send political shockwaves around the globe. Three areas

are critical for the future of the region. The first is Palestine and Israel. To solve this long-standing problem, concerted action of 'Quartet' (United States, EU, UN and Russia) is required. But, first of all, a common approach by the United States and Europe must be worked out and jointly executed. Despite Europe's involvement in working out the 'road map', it is the United States that is making all the running, keeping Europe out. Success, which is extremely difficult to achieve anyway, will be possible only as a result of concerted action in which Europe should use all the leverage at its disposal (including financial), to influence the Arab, and in particular Palestinian, side not to repeat the intransigence shown some time ago by Yasser Arafat when Israeli Prime Minister Barak put forward a radically new offer of a deal. On the other side, it will be predominantly a US role to soften (if necessary) the Israeli position and be ready to play a role of honest broker in a jointly worked out peace arrangement that is acceptable to the Israeli people as well as to the Jewish constituency at home.

The second area of concern is Afghanistan. Although it would be unrealistic to expect that a democratic, stable system could be installed there in a matter of months, the ability of NATO to bring about reasonable governance and an acceptable degree of rule of law, with the United States and NATO forces playing a subsidiary and temporary role to Afghan authorities would affect the chances of solving the problem in the third, perhaps most critical area, Iraq.

Regardless of the reservations expressed in various countries concerning the US-led military intervention in Iraq, it is of paramount importance that the presence of the United States and so many other countries there, and their involvement in building a new, stable, prosperous and non-threatening Iraq is not suddenly and prematurely terminated. In such a case, Iraq would almost certainly be plunged into a bloody civil war and, most likely, disintegrate, with catastrophic consequences. On the other hand, a stable, cooperative Iraq respecting basic norms of internal and external conduct could serve as a model for other countries in the region. Autocratic regimes will (hopefully) be more ready to begin processes of internal political and economic reforms, defusing growing internal tensions, resulting from both ossified political systems and lack of basic freedoms as well as a deteriorating economic situation which cannot for much longer be managed with oil money, because of the demographic changes. In this process an

ever-growing role of the UN will be critical in providing legitimacy as well as an internationally acceptable framework for organising a gradual but (hopefully) speedy transfer of power to the Iraqi authorities.

Another country which should be seen as important for the changes in the region is Iran. For many years the United States has not been politically present on the Iranian scene. The EU, however has been very active and could potentially have an important role to play in fostering the process of gradual return of this country into the international community. It is a pity that the three European ministers of foreign affairs visited Iran in their national capacities rather than as a delegation of the European Union. Then their success (for which they should no doubt be saluted) would be visible proof of the increasing capacity for Europe to act together.

To stabilise the region, NATO and Europe could also explore the possibility (following the European experience) of introducing some Confidence and Security-Building Measures as a first step before proposing a regional version of the OSCE.

The European Union's role as a global actor

The main problem with Europe as a global actor is a lack of clarity as far as Europe's *finalité politique* is concerned. On the one hand we have a strong tendency to see Europe as a federal state, on the other (Tony Blair) Europe should be a superpower but *not* a 'superstate'.

Today, Europe is already a superpower in two respects. First, Europe offers a whole range of attractive models of institutions of various kinds, from political, social and financial ones to high and popular cultures. Secondly, the European economy today is even bigger then America's, and – what is of tremendous importance – in economic matters Europe speaks with one voice. So, as far as 'soft' power is concerned, Europe can easily be a global player. As far as military potential is concerned, Europe is lagging behind the United States, but this does not mean that Europe is toothless or incapable of projecting power. After all, there is no single country (with the exception of the United States), or even a coalition of countries, with military potential greater than the EU's. True, Europe is not able to wage an 'American war', i.e. a war with the minimal casualties and collateral damage that result from its

extremely high sophistication in communications, intelligence and precision-guided munitions, but let us not forget that over twenty years ago the British managed to send a whole armada to recapture the Falklands, and the French carried out some successful missions in Africa. With the planned acquisition of large aircraft carriers by Britain and France and the development of strategic airlift, these shortcomings will be to some extent reduced.

The main problem with Europe is, then, not so much its material capabilities but often a lack of political will and ability to take a common approach to various crises and contingencies. Naturally, the requirement for unanimity in forming a common foreign and security policy does not help (although it should be kept), but what Europe is lacking is clear leadership in this area. The Franco-German tandem, so successful in promoting economic and financial integration, is clearly not a solution. Iraq showed that this locomotive can sometimes lack a train. The reason in most cases will be a different approach to the role the United States would be expected to play, in other words the nature of transatlantic relations is the crux of the matter. For many countries that take an Atlanticist approach, the opinion and the position of Britain will be critical. This is why, in defence and foreign policy matters, leadership can come only from a group of countries containing not only Germany and France, but Britain as well.

Transatlantic relations

The European Security Strategy adopted last December in Brussels defines the transatlantic relationship as the 'core elements of the international system' and NATO as an 'important expression of this relationship'. But NATO is more than that. Despite the fact, that in the 'Strategy' there is no direct reference to it, NATO is (at least in many European countries) considered a bedrock of European security, especially where so-called 'hard' security is concerned.

However, NATO is not in good shape. Right after 9/11, the question 'is NATO still relevant?' was asked by many prominent politicians. The feeling is that NATO is at a crossroads. To make NATO as strong and relevant as it should be, some important issues should be addressed. First, should NATO remain predominantly a defensive alliance centred around Article 5 security

guarantees, with a robust military command structure, or should it gradually evolve towards a common security structure, therefore a more political and less military organisation, more closely resembling OSCE. The events connected with Afghanistan and Iraq considerably undermined faith in the real value of both Articles 4 and 5 of the Washington Treaty, prompting debates on the necessity to attach greater importance to national defence policies.

Hopefully, in the not too distant future, NATO will increase its military capabilities as a result of efforts by various European countries to modernise their armed forces. However, the concept that NATO should be a 'toolbox' may reduce the Alliance to the role of a technical instrument of American policy. On the contrary, NATO should be more 'Europeanised'. SACEUR should, as he is today, be an American, but it is no longer important for him to be EUCOM at the same time. After all, the most likely contingencies for NATO will be rather in the Greater Middle East, which is under CENTCOM, but NATO can be involved even further than that. In Kosovo, General Wesley Clark was in both the US and NATO chains of command, which created a lot of bad feelings among Europeans about bypassing NATO channels. So, it would be better to separate NATO command posts from national ones.

NATO should first of all remain the principal forum for transatlantic debate on all fundamental issues. Some of them are quite obvious – the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, North Korea, Iraq, the Caucasus, to name a few. There are also issues of another kind. NATO should be the central forum for discussion on sufficient (or necessary) conditions for waging a pre-emptive action, on a more comprehensive definition of aggression, under what conditions non-Article 5 missions could be carried out in the absence of an explicit UNSC mandate (would the political support of NATO and EU countries be enough?), etc.

For the future of transatlantic relations it will be very important to restore the attachment to the indivisibility of US and European security. After 9/11, the roles of the United States and Europe were dramatically reversed. Now it is the United States that is more exposed to new types of attacks. US reluctance to accept European assistance in Afghanistan and, later, the European-only intervention in Congo, were bad precedents. In future, it will be prudent to sacrifice some aspects of efficiency for the sake of keeping this basic political assumption visibly alive.

However, Europe should realise that, if the US position somewhere is diminished, if US prestige and credibility in some area are destroyed, it does not mean that the vacuum could be filled by Europe. This is not a zero-sum game. As Chancellor Helmut Kohl once said, the world does not need less of the United States, the world needs more Europe.

The international system

In his last address to the General Assembly, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that the UN '[had come] to a fork in the road. This may be a moment no less decisive than 1945 itself, when the United Nations was founded'. The reason was, that 'individual States may use force "pre-emptively" against perceived threats'. Because of that, members of the Security Council '[might] need to begin a discussion on the criteria for an early authorisation of coercive measures to address certain types of threats – for instance, terrorist groups armed with weapons of mass destruction'.

Clearly, new developments both in technology and in international behaviour, resulting from ever-growing threats from failed states as well as from non-state actors and the new nature of threats, require a very serious discussion on the adaptation of international law and procedures to the new realities. After all, pre-emptive measures are no longer a tacitly assumed but never openly admitted military option. We can find quite explicit reference to them in the latest US National Security Strategy, as well as in the French *Loi de Programmation Militaire 2003-2008*.

The United Nations will have to address some other fundamental issues as well. In the address quoted above, Kofi Annan clearly alluded to the need to reform the Security Council in order to strengthen it and restore its credibility. One measure which is under consideration is to change the composition of the Council by enlarging its membership.

It is not at all clear how the more numerous Security Council will be able to work more effectively. The main reason why the work of this institution has not been seen as satisfactory has been the voting system, with veto power granted to the five permanent members. Therefore, the only way to improve the efficiency of the decision making mechanism would be to change the system,

e.g. by introducing a 'double veto standard' (a decision is not blocked if only one of the permanent members votes against).

Unfortunately, it does not seem that these kinds of changes (enlargement of the UNSC or changing the voting system) could be easily adopted. Hence, the UNSC will remain a body which often will not be able to agree on granting a mandate in case of various contingencies.

The international transatlantic community will then be confronted with a difficult choice between remaining idle or using the support of such bodies as the European Union (Council, Commission or, perhaps, the Parliament?) and/or NATO. According to public opinion polls, such an option is generally seen as the second-best, right after the UNSC mandate.

Jiri Sedivy

11

The war on terrorism

The so-called war on terrorism and Iraq's alleged links to al-Qaeda as well as the country's implication in the 9/11 attacks were, besides the allegations concerning weapons of mass destruction (WMD), in the forefront of the US administration's prewar propaganda. While Baghdad undoubtedly did support several terrorist groups in the past, no clear evidence on its al-Qaeda-9/11 connection has been produced. Yet as one of the consequences of the invasion of Iraq, the country is now a magnet for foreign *jihad* fighters. Iraq has been transformed, as George W. Bush has put it, into 'the central battle' in the war on terrorism waged in 'the heart of its power'. In a way, a cycle of a self-fulfilling prophecy and its subsequent fulfilment has thus been completed.

Any analysis of the impact of the war in Iraq must be qualified because the event is so recent: any conclusions can only be preliminary. On the negative side, it can be assumed that Iraq has provided radical Islamic warriors with a new weapon to mobilise their ranks and attract new followers of pan-Islamic terrorism. It is still unclear, however, whether the boost in recruitment amounts to dozens or thousands of new fighters.

The global campaign against terrorists has become further militarised on the part of the United States. As a US general has put it, 'it's much better to be killing those people in Iraq than to have them come here and kill Americans.' Such an approach is dubious both conceptually and practically. Firstly, it conceptualises the campaign as a linear conventional military activity. Secondly, the 'field' *jihad* operatives in Iraq are a different class of Islamic militants from those who would stage attacks on US territory or that of its allies.

Above all, the narrow military focus distracts attention and resources from a broader, more structured dimension of the campaign in which the root causes of terrorism should be addressed

with the application of a wider spectrum of economic, political and, last but not least, culturally sensitive instruments. As Bernard Brodie has claimed, reflecting on America's strategic blunder in Vietnam, 'good strategy presumes good anthropology and sociology'.

On the positive side, the war has demonstrated to actual and potential state sponsors of terrorism that merely being suspected of harbouring or supporting terrorists can carry tough consequences for their very existence. Therefore it will be henceforth more difficult for al-Qaeda and other like-minded organisations to find a state supporter providing them with save havens for their bases and training camps, as well as potential suppliers of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Many catastrophic scenarios spelt out in the prewar debates have not materialised so far. The war has not triggered the giant wave of refugees in Iraq that used to be estimated at between 800,000 and 1.5 million. The country has not imploded into a civil war. No massive terrorist attack against the United States or its Western European allies has been staged. The Iraqi regime did not give its WMD to non-state groups in its pre-collapse agony as had been expected. Osama bin Laden's network still has a command structure and al-Qaeda has demonstrated its ability to regenerate and transform itself. Yet its room for manoeuvre has narrowed as the worldwide law enforcement and intelligence round-up – in which more than 100 countries have been involved – has brought about a less permissive operating environment on a global scale.

The fact that recent terrorist attacks have focused on 'soft' targets is a case in point. The same goes for the dramatic increase in the number of suicide attacks carried out by individuals or small groups of terrorists throughout the Greater Middle East recently, i.e. using methods that are less demanding organisationally and financially. This is not to say, however, that the network's determination to launch a spectacular terrorist attack on the territory of the United States or its allies on a similar scale to those of 9/11 has ceased to exist; in fact, the opposite is true. In Iraq proper, the coalition forces and increasingly the local people that cooperate with them are exposed to a steady barrage of terrorist and guerrilla attacks.

The Greater Middle East

The humiliating defeat of Iraq and the presence of large number of US troops in yet another Arab country have fed on the already strong perception in the Middle East that the United States and the West at large harbours an anti-Islamic bias. While the regime's destruction was a rapid affair, a profound and sustainable 'regime change' is proving to be more complicated and will be a long-term one. Yet a window of opportunity is now open in the Middle East for carrying out a model experiment on whether Arabism and Islam can be squared with a politically pluralistic and reasonably participatory system.

The future of the West's ability to stimulate and assist in a wider transformation in the region hinges on the success or failure of the experiment. Even today, one can already identify certain positive elements that may be associated with the intensive engagement in Iraq, spilling over into the wider Middle East. While still far from establishing a critical mass of a regional reform momentum, the following processes are indeed encouraging.

First of all, the potential threat posed by the Iraq regime to its neighbours has been eliminated. Second, non-proliferation has been gradually gaining ground in the region, as the cases of Iran, Libya and Pakistan witness. Third, several Arab regimes have introduced certain, though still modest, political and social reforms. For instance, Jordan has begun economic reforms and Qatar has started to reform its educational system. In Saudi Arabia, municipal elections are to be held for the first time ever. In Iran the resistance of the country's reformers to the clerical establishment's efforts to block the path of liberalisation has been growing gradually in the run-up to the February 2004 parliamentary elections. Thirdly, there have been positive shifts in intraregional relations. Iran is on the verge of re-establishing diplomatic relations with Egypt. Israel has attempted – though unsuccessfully to date – to initiate talks with Syria. And the door leading to a 'composite dialogue' that might be the first step to a peaceful solution of the fifty years' conflict between India and Pakistan has been opened, among others, by the latter's assurance that it will not allow terrorists to use Pakistani territory as a support base or a launching pad.

On the downside, as part of a change in their tactics, terrorists have begun to target US allies in the region, hoping to undermine their pro-American governments, as the recent attacks in Islamabad, Istanbul and Riyadh have demonstrated. The fact that the public approval rate of the United States in the Arab world dropped to near zero during the war serves their purpose, as does the gap between pro-American regimes and their populations, which is now immense. Furthermore, the bloody bombing in Turkey may indicate that Islamic militants have also declared war on mainstream Muslim societies.

To a certain extent the war has drawn the United States's attention and diplomatic energy away from resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Yet the issue remains the key pre-condition for any longer-term stabilisation of the Middle East, at least as important as a successful transformation of Iraq. The amplitude of the US approach to the conflict, oscillating between periods of high- and low-intensity involvement, is not helpful. And, arguably, had the United States managed to get the peace process back on track prior to the war, popular outrage against the occupation of Iraq might perhaps have been a little weaker in the Middle East and in the world at large.

What is needed now is a wider rehabilitation strategy for the region that would be developed in a concerted effort by all important intraregional stakeholders and the 'Quartet' that prepared the 'road map' – the United States, the EU, the UN and Russia. The urgent need for such a comprehensive plan flows from the fact that the Middle East is a 'security complex', a subsystem of close-knit states with such a degree of interdependence that their national securities cannot be realistically considered separately. As recent events have demonstrated, a piecemeal, gradualist approach when focusing on one problem in the region means neglecting others – thus allowing them to deteriorate – cannot bring a viable solution to the subsystem as a whole. Needless to say, the Middle East is the main neuralgic centre of gravity in the world where an explosive mix of socio-economic dysfunction and political oppression is concentrated and from which the most serious threats and risks, i.e. terrorism and WMD proliferation, emanate.

The European Union's role as a global actor

The Iraq crises has pushed Europe – 'like it or not', as Javier Solana put it nicely in the first draft of the EU's Security Strategy – a few steps further in elevating its role to one of a global actor. In the same vein, without the lessons of Iraq and the resultant necessity to respond to shifts in the United States's international behaviour and strategic outlook, the first European strategy document might not have been adopted. The EU now possesses a solid base of concepts, institutions, procedures, instruments and, indeed, good intentions to act in such a role and strive to attain 'a better world'. However, it still lacks a determined and collectively concentrated preparedness to use power.

The war and the subsequent post-conflict troubles affirm the correctness of the Union's holistic approach to the problems of today's world. If there is a collective political will to act, the Union is now predisposed to employ a spectrum of mostly 'soft' power instruments, combining diplomacy with aid and trade leverage. Moreover, the Union can lean on the legitimacy based on its unique history of multilateralist and legalistic management of power and conflict through integration.

Transatlantic relations

Such an ambitious joint project might also provide the opportunity to improve transatlantic relations, which were badly damaged by the Iraq crisis and the war itself. The scale of the damage can be accounted on three levels. Psychologically, the mutual trust among the Atlantic allies that used to be one of the most precious assets of the old Atlantic community has been seriously undermined. Institutionally, the relevant multilateral forums such as NATO and the UN were mostly by-passed – thus weakened – and relations between the United States and its European allies were bilateralised (which many in Washington view as a good thing that allows a flexible shifting and redistribution of US alliances). Technically, while the war demonstrated once again that the interoperability gap between the United States and its allies has deepened further, the

United States is now, even more than before, unwilling to allow a transfer of military technology to its allies.

Generally speaking, it should be recognised that the Iraq episode was but the visible tip of deeper and long-term processes that reshape international relations these days. In their transatlantic part the war only highlighted and, perhaps, precipitated the already existing diverging undercurrents that can be traced back to the late 1980s. The question now – more than before the war – is not how to restore the rather ramshackle house of the old Atlantic community but how to rebuild it in a form that would be compatible with the current context of global political and security environment. In that respect, the Iraq experience has underlined three points: (1) US power is not unlimited and omnipotent; (2) Europe is condemned to define and assume its role as a global actor; (3) no matter how much our political and security cultures and interests may differ, we cannot do without each other. On these assumptions, and according to the principle of 'unity in diversity', a new Atlantic bargain should be struck.

The transatlantic rift was mirrored within Europe proper. The acrimonious 'old' versus 'new' Europe quarrel lowered the common denominator for consensus at the EU Convention. And, most probably, the related accumulation of mutual animosities and suspicion contributed to the collapse of the IGC in December 2003. Despite, or possibly even because of, the crisis taking place on the CFSP level of 'high politics', an intensive effort to maintain the momentum of development on lower practical levels of the ESDP was successfully made. In 2003 the EU launched the first two military operations in its history. It completed a series of agreements with NATO that comprise the 'Berlin-plus' arrangement allowing the EU access to NATO's military capabilities. An important part of the IGC defence agenda was agreed upon on the eve of the conference, namely some of the most contested issues such as the provisions for structured cooperation and the development of EU operational planning.

The international system

In the period between 9/11 and the war in Iraq, in spring 2003 the shifts in the nature of the international system, linked to the end of the Cold War, were manifested with a new clarity and intensity. In

terms of the distribution of the traditional 'hard' power in the system, we are closer to structural unipolarity than ever before. Yet in other, softer dimensions of power, i.e. political, economic and cultural, the United States's global predominance is less convincing than in the hard military dimension. The prevalence of one dimension of US power thus constrains its unilateralist potential and freedom of action. As both the Iraq crisis and, more generally, the war on terror largely demonstrated, while the United States needs practically no partners for its military actions, it needs them in the wider, non-military management of international security.

The shift in the international distribution of power has been followed by shifts in international alliances, the United States being the principal initiator in this process. Washington redistributes its alliances geographically and functionally. In the former meaning the main focus shifts away from Europe towards the regions in the developing parts of the world from which threats emanate. In the latter aspect, unlike during the Cold War, those regional alliances are less permanent, as they are tailored to the respective missions. Furthermore, the purpose of alliances may not be just a reactive containment of threats. They may serve as a proactive vehicle for the promotion of the liberalisation of political systems not only in 'enemy' states, but in those of 'friends' as well, as we have seen in the Greater Middle East.

The selective and flexible approach to alliances and coalition building is gone at the expense of permanent organisations that were circumvented during the crisis. The UN's core function of collective security was paralysed by the key members of the Security Council. The crisis again demonstrated that the UN Charter system is normatively and procedurally detached from international reality and needs to be reformed. The alternative to a necessarily profound UN reform that would mirror both the current distribution of power in the international system and the nature of contemporary threats will be more cases of ad hoc bypassing of the Security Council. And, perhaps, some more permanent parallel structure created by a group of like-minded states led by the United States might be established in the future if reform stalls. The need for a reform is seen in the fact that the Iraq crisis inspired UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to name a high-level panel to propose collective action to meet new global challenges. Yet as the UN had become petrified before ever becoming efficient in its core security task, those efforts will only come in the long term, if at all.

The high value of stakes a number of the member states have in maintaining the status quo is the main cause for scepticism.

The strong dose of coercive interventionism and pre-emptive instincts injected into the international system's organism by the war in Iraq may work towards more restrained and cooperative behaviour by the states with some 'rogue' potential. Additionally, overall tolerance of rogue conduct, namely in terms of support for terrorism and WMD proliferation, has decreased in the system.

Now a more systematic and inclusive debate about the normative interpretation and doctrinal framing of the concepts of anticipatory self-defence/pre-emption and humanitarian intervention within international law, as well as about the related question of conditionality of state sovereignty, is needed in multilateral forums – the UN above all. While the Iraq crisis highlighted that need, the urgency of such a debate may have been harmed – at least temporarily – by the war itself. Both the United States's manipulative presentation of the threat from Iraq as vital and imminent before the war, and its shift to a humanitarian argumentation in the *post hoc* efforts to reconstruct the war's just cause served those who are reluctant to discuss those concepts. In their eyes, the unconvincing US justification of the invasion has merely confirmed their general suspicion that those concepts are but figleaves that cover US aggression and domination.

Conclusion

The year 2003 was in many respects the most difficult one in international politics at large and for transatlantic and intra-European/EU relations, in particular since the end of the Cold War at least. The depth of the crisis evoked worst-case scenarios and caused a wave of 'declinism', e.g. in terms of the 'end of the West' or of European unity. However exaggerated these and similar visions may be, they are a useful reminder of where we might eventually end up if we let emotionality win over analysis, if we do not recognise our differences soberly and identify our common interests rationally.

As we are still locked in the Iraq war/crisis loop, it is impossible to answer the crucial question of this analysis: is the world a more or less dangerous place now after the Iraq war than it was before? As pointed out above, both outputs are imaginable and possible in

each of the five areas. From this perspective, the Iraq crisis/war is the crossroads. None of the roads we embark upon from that turning point in history promises quick fixes and assured successes. The only certainty we can lean on is the fact that the future of the world depends on the future character of the relations between Europe and the United States.

Narcis Serra

12

The war on terrorism

The war in Iraq has had negative consequences for the fight against terrorism. At the very least, the war will have delayed the international community's adoption and implementation of a combined and steadfast effort to combat terrorism. I want to underline two particular consequences of the war in Iraq that are especially counterproductive for the fight against terrorism.

First of all, the war in Iraq has spawned a flawed and potentially dangerous misconception about military power. As a result of the attack on and successful defeat of the Saddam Hussein regime, many people – especially in the United States – have come to believe that the military are useful in combating terrorism and that they are the *main instrument* to be deployed in such a war, if not the only one.

There is no doubt about the fact that the US armed forces can defeat those of any country in the world, and, in all likelihood, the combined armed forces of any foreseeable alliance of countries. But powerful as they may be, the US armed forces cannot achieve victory in areas other than the military ones. Terrorism is not exclusively a military threat. Indeed, terrorism is in and of itself not the enemy, but rather an instrument which the enemy has chosen to employ in order to wage its war. Linking terrorism and 'rogue states' may have enabled Washington to label an enemy and to deploy military power, an area in which the United States is vastly superior to any other country. In so doing, the US administration has been able to show determination and decisiveness, something which may help it win the next presidential election but is not the proper way to win the war on terrorism.

In other words, the trick whereby the US administration has taken a valid instrument in wars between states – military power – and instead used it to combat terrorism has actually made it more difficult to find a solution to the problem of terrorism.

The above proposition is highlighted by the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan. In both countries, the US armed forces were quick and efficient in defeating their enemies and achieving a conventional military victory but have so far failed in the postwar stabilisation and reconstruction of those countries.

Secondly, the conquest of Iraq contributes to the self-fulfilling Huntingtonian – and American – prophecy of a clash of civilisations. Indeed, by attacking and invading Iraq, the US government has made it more likely that the United States and the Muslim/Arab world are set on a collision course. As a result of the war in Iraq, for example, 94 per cent of the respondents in a poll carried out recently by the Qatari television channel Al-Jazeera agreed with the idea that the United States is engaged in a crusade against Islam. Furthermore, results of a survey conducted last summer by the Pew Research Centre showed that resentment and outright hostility towards the United States and its foreign policy motives had increased substantially in the Arab and Muslim world. According to the survey, a majority of the population in seven out of eight predominantly Muslim countries felt threatened by the United States. Majorities in those same countries expressed the worry that Islam was being targeted, and large majorities in Indonesia, Jordan and the territories administered by the Palestinian Authority even expressed some confidence in Osama bin Laden.[1]

Moreover, the invasion of Iraq has added another item to the list of contemporary grievances of the Muslim population with regards to the West, which potentially increases the pool of recruits for international terrorist organisations.

Unjustifiable as terrorist violence is, it is mistaken not to address the deep-seated causes that generate it. Ultimately, the struggle against terrorism involves the winning of hearts and minds. And the two most powerful weapons in combating terrorism are the creation of shared-information systems among the largest possible number of states and the reduction in support for violence in areas that are the breeding ground for terrorism. While the United States has excelled at destroying governments which harbour terrorists such as the Taliban, it has failed to undertake state-building (as Carl Bildt recently called it) and to support governments in the region in addressing the root causes of terrorism. The invasion of Iraq has hindered, and possibly paralysed, the real struggle against terrorism.

1. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press surveyed 38,000 people in 44 countries during the summer and autumn of 2003, and conducted additional interviews with 16,000 people in 20 countries and the area administered by the Palestinian Authority after the end of major hostilities in Iraq.

The Greater Middle East

The far-reaching consequences of the war in the region are still subject to the unfolding of events in Iraq during the months and years to come.

For the time being, the war in Iraq and the ensuing hostility against the United States and the West has made it riskier and more difficult for Muslim and Arab regimes to wage the real war on terrorism by cooperating and sharing information with Western intelligence agencies.

The conflict in Iraq has seriously interfered with US mediation efforts in the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. The US administration has had less time to devote to this issue and less leverage on the two sides. The neo-conservative hawks within the US administration who have imposed their will on Iraq have little or no interest in pressuring Israel to earnestly negotiate with the Palestinians and they reject the creation of a Palestinian state as part of a comprehensive peace settlement. In addition, Israel has cleverly cast the Palestinian groups as another link in the network of international terrorism. The Palestinians, while still officially seeking US mediation, are less inclined to believe it is honest. The violence in Iraq and the continuing unrest in the West Bank and Gaza have fuelled hatred against the United States among the population. According to a study conducted by Dr Eyad al-Sarraj of the Gaza Community Mental Health Programme, 25 per cent of teenagers in the Gaza Strip have expressed the desire to become suicide bombers when they turn 18.

On the other hand, the demise of Saddam Hussein's regime and the presence of 130,000 US troops in Iraq have put the Syrian regime on the defensive and made it less inclined to harbour terrorist groups. They have arguably induced Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to put out feelers regarding the possible resumption of peace negotiations with Israel that were broken off in 2000.

With regards to Iran, the invasion of Iraq and intense EU diplomatic pressure (which has proven the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy and the need for a European common foreign and security policy) have prompted the Iranian regime to fully disclose its nuclear programme to the IAEA and to agree to ratify an additional protocol allowing snap inspections of Iranian nuclear sites.

Moreover, it appears that the downfall of Saddam Hussein may have played a role in inducing increased cooperation of the Libyan

regime with the IAEA over Libya's nuclear weapons programme. Likewise, the Pakistani authorities have undertaken a clampdown on the proliferation of Pakistan's nuclear technology and material to countries such as Libya, North Korea and Iran.

Additionally, some Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Morocco are vowing to implement cautious reforms that will partially open up their political processes or provide women with more rights.

Despite these positive developments, the war in Iraq has weakened the ability of most states in the region to fight Islamic terrorism and shattered the fragile international consensus which had emerged after 11 September 2001 on the need to deal with failed states that sponsor terrorism and engage in WMD programmes.

Worst of all, the ongoing violence between Israel and the Palestinians continues to generate resentment in the Arab and Muslim worlds towards the West and contributes to the maintenance of a steady supply of would-be terrorists. Although British Prime Minister Tony Blair pressed the White House to tackle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict before attacking Iraq, the Bush administration has failed to force the government of Ariel Sharon to comply with the terms of the 'road map'.

The European Union's role as a global actor

Europe faces two big challenges in trying to enhance its role as a global player: (1) the lack of political will in shaping a single and common foreign policy and (2) its inadequate military and civilian security capabilities. Enlargement of the European Union to 25 members in May 2004 and the rift caused by the war in Iraq have only aggravated the pre-existing difficulties.

The division of Europe is not the result of the unilateral US decision to attack Iraq. In fact it is a deliberate aim of many policy-makers in the current US administration. Leading members of the neo-conservative team around George Bush have believed for many years that the only way to manage Europe is to keep it divided.

We can therefore use the expression 'pre-emptive division' to describe the tactic employed by the US administration to deliberately split Europe into opposing camps. Applying this tactic has involved, among other actions:

- encouraging the publication of a letter in the *Wall Street Journal* in early 2003 where only a few existing EU member countries and many of the accession countries supported US military intervention in Iraq;
- Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld's statement, made also at the beginning of last year, about a 'new' and 'old' Europe;
- the request made to NATO, without Turkey's demand, to extend military support mechanisms in the event of a US attack on Iraq;
- the announcement by the US administration banning French and German companies from bidding on US-funded reconstruction projects in Iraq, made on the day prior to a meeting between Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder.

Partly as a result of the conflict in Iraq, the British government continues to play an ambivalent role with regards to the establishment of a European security and defence policy (ESDP). On the one hand, the Blair government does not want to be excluded from the efforts undertaken by its more pro-integration partners such as Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg, which decided in the spring of 2003 to create an independent military planning headquarters for the ESDP. But London (along with Denmark, the Netherlands and many of the accession countries) is not completely convinced that the EU's future military capability will not undermine the supremacy of NATO. The British attitude effectively results in the establishment of the maximum common denominator possible at every moment regarding a European defence. And whereas adoption of a single European currency was feasible despite the absence of the United Kingdom, the creation of an independent European defence capability requires British participation.

Transatlantic relations

Transatlantic ties must be repaired, as dialogue is necessary precisely because there are differing opinions on the two sides of the Atlantic. Disagreements do not revolve around well-known issues such as the Kyoto treaty, the death penalty or the sale of handguns. The falling-out between Europe and the United States has occurred over the shape that the new international order should

adopt in a post-Cold War era in which globalisation is a reality that requires political direction.

The strain in transatlantic relations has basically taken place at the government level. Surveys reveal that the respective public opinions are not so far apart when it comes to judging the attack on Iraq and the war on terrorism. European public opinion blames President Bush, and not US citizens, for the failure to come up with a common policy in dealing with Iraq. Almost 75 per cent of German and French respondents in the Pew Research Centre poll attribute their unfavourable opinion of the United States to their dislike for President Bush. The corresponding percentages in Italy and the United Kingdom reached 66 and 60 per cent respectively. US citizens, for their part, are split on their judgement of their Administration's policy in Iraq. The latest *New York Times*/CBS News poll indicates that 48 per cent of Americans back Bush's Iraq policy, while 46 per cent reject it. Hence the gap between European and US public opinion is not very wide.

Transatlantic relations will not get back onto a solid footing until two things happen: first of all, Europe must be able to act in a united way on the world stage and some of its leaders must be able to show real leadership when it comes to European foreign policy. Secondly, the United States needs an Administration which is not as extremist as that of George W. Bush. There will be no stable transatlantic link as long as the United States retains and practices the concept of pre-emptive war – which runs counter to the legal principles that underpin the possible international order – or belittles the concept of legitimacy with regards to international actions.

For the aforementioned reasons, it is unlikely that US-European ties will get back on the right track in the short term.

The failure to mend transatlantic ties will not only negatively impact the United States and Europe. The rest of the world also depends on the transatlantic bond as a stabilising factor in the post-Cold War international order. The new transatlantic dialogue must contribute to the process of developing a new and negotiated multilateralism.

The international system

It may well be that US unilateralism has always existed to some extent. In fact, one could argue that the Cold War era consensus between the United States and its Western allies was an exception to the prevailing isolationist or unilateralist strand that has dominated US foreign policy during much of its history since 1776. The difference is that the unilateralism practiced by the current Administration is extreme and aims at crafting an international order based on overwhelming US military power. As I have said, one of the necessary conditions for the success of the dream harboured by the neo-conservatives in the White House is the division of Europe. But another one is the weakening of the multilateral system that supports the international order. In the eyes of the neo-conservatives, the United Nations is a constraint on the unilateral use of US military power and was already deliberately weakened by the US administration (mainly by the Department of Defence) prior to the decision to invade Iraq. Since then, US efforts to undermine the United Nations have continued unabated. Fortunately, the UN Security Council did not bow to the US-British-Spanish pressure to legitimise the war on Iraq.

In any case, the damage inflicted on the United Nations is considerable, as is revealed in several surveys. According to the Pew Research Centre poll, the credibility of the United Nations has dropped sharply in 16 out of 18 countries surveyed. A majority or plurality of citizens in most of the countries surveyed believe that the Iraq war has pointed up the decreased importance of the United Nations.

On the other hand, there is increased awareness of the need to reform the way the United Nations functions, as Secretary-General Kofi Annan's appointment of a special commission on the matter has underlined.

Public opinion around the world has viewed the war in Iraq not as a way to strengthen the international order, advance democracy across the world and foster existing international law but rather as an attempt to dictate new rules set down only by the lone superpower.

The only solution is for the United States to embrace multilateralism again, to persuade the United States that its interests are best defended when it is perceived as a producer of global public goods, that is, when it employs its military capability in the service of peace and in agreement with international organisations. The United States should conduct itself in international affairs in a fashion which matches one of President John F. Kennedy's famous quotes: 'Now the trumpet summons us again, but not as a call to arms, though arms we need, not as a call to battle, though embattled we are, but rather to continue the long, twilight struggle against the common enemies of man: hunger, disease and war.'

The United States must understand that multilateralism is a constraint which fosters security rather than threaten it. Indeed, multilateralism helps to manage and mitigate risk, while unilateralism actually stokes it.

The display of enormous military power on the part of the United States, coupled with the absence of international organisations that can moderate it and also deal with the problems of the population of developing countries, unfortunately kindles the belief in many societies that the only way to combat this situation is to wage asymmetric warfare, that is, terrorism.

Alvaro Vasconcelos

13

The war on terrorism

The war in Iraq constituted a diversion from the war on terrorism. It opened a new front with no direct links to the attacks of 11 September or international terrorism. Indeed, the reverse was true: it gave radical Islamic groups new arguments to gain, in the countries where they are active, more support and recruits among resentful youths. And all this before military victory was consolidated in Afghanistan.

Two and a half years later, the error of the Bush administration's attempt to establish a new bipolarity is all the more apparent, be it through an undue linkage between terrorism and Saddam's secular tyranny or the unwillingness to distinguish between international terrorism like al-Qaeda's and what are essentially national groups. Because the threat was seen as global and combating terrorism as a war, it was not possible to adopt a strategy that took into consideration the kinds of political and social conditions that open avenues for terrorist political action and asymmetrical violence.

The overwhelming majority of UN members supported the United States in the aftermath of 11 September: the international community almost unanimously legitimated not only the pursuit of anti-terrorist action but also US leadership in that battle. The decision to ignore the majority of the members of the Security Council and attack Iraq unilaterally, and the lack of credible arguments to justify the war, significantly increased suspicions about the real aims of US foreign policy and contributed to erosion of the legitimacy of the US-led 'war on terror'. And as the notable levels of international solidarity in the immediate aftermath of 11 September were not put to good use there was a weakening of public support for US policy. Thus, serious divisions emerged within an anti-terrorist front that had widened and consolidated in the aftermath of that brutal attack. It is true that Euro-American

cooperation to combat terrorism did not diminish, and nor did the new awareness of the threat inherent in asymmetric violence disappear; however, it is also true that the political setting for transatlantic relations is more difficult, and this cannot fail to affect the efficacy of international anti-terrorist action and the involvement of many EU states in the resolution of the Iraq crisis.

The outcome of the intervention in Iraq is important for future anti-terrorist action. Iraq has already become the scene of some lethal terrorist attacks like those carried out against the UN and the Red Cross, and if it descends into chaos and disintegrates, a possibility that many analysts consider likely, it could become a new HQ for international terrorism. It is therefore in the interest of the EU and the international community in general to see a stable Iraq and a successful transition in Iraq. However, this calls for deep changes: the United States should give up its monopoly of power during the transitional period and thereby create the conditions for the EU to get involved and the UN to return to the terrain in a meaningful way.

The Greater Middle East

One of the more credible justifications for the intervention in Iraq was that democratising the country would give rise to new wave of democratisation in the Greater Middle East, a region that ranges from Morocco to Pakistan. This view is endorsed not only by the US administration but also by neo-liberals who served under Clinton. It is based on the, essentially correct, view of the American Democratic and Republican establishment that one of the causes of the anti-Americanism that feeds radical Islam arises from an identification of the United States (and indeed Europe) with dictatorial regimes. It is a strategy inspired by Samuel Huntington's theory of the 'clash of civilisations', albeit in the Orientalist guise proffered by Bernard Lewis, who, unlike Huntington who considers that Islam is incompatible with democracy, views Islam as a sick patient but one that has a capacity for recovery. A position based on a positive Huntingtonian perspective is condemned to failure, however, because it is too global and considers Islam as an undifferentiated whole, and ill-adapted to specific realities, and because it fails to consider that democracy – or its absence – is a national matter above all. To the dangers and practical limitations of an overly vol-

untaristic vision, one must add the fact that policy has not matched enunciated aims: for if the intervention in Iraq was undertaken in the name of democracy, the fight against terrorism has been undertaken in cooperation with authoritarian regimes and in connivance with their methods.

The intervention in Iraq did have the merit of raising the 'democracy issue' and showing everyone the limits of a policy of accepting and defending the authoritarian status quo and only very timidly mentioning human rights, all for fear of the Islamic alternative. However, it raised the issue in the worst possible way, as it conflated democracy with US military intervention and made life more difficult for endogenous democratic actors, who are forced to address what many see as an act of aggression and, what is worse, one that coincides with the interests of Israel. Certainly, the fact that the intervention was not preceded or accompanied by a real effort to settle the Israel-Palestine conflict – a powerful radical influence on Arab public opinion – has an enormous impact on the credibility and legitimacy of the policy of the United States and its allies in the region.

In the Mediterranean what counts in terms of democratic progress is less Iraq and more the success of the Turkish experiment with democratic Islam, and of Morocco and other countries with liberalisation. The United States and the EU in particular can play an important role in the consolidation of the Turkish process and the political transitions of the Maghreb and the Middle East (the European priorities) by rewarding steps towards democracy through positive conditionality. As far as the EU is concerned, this means accepting Turkey as an EU member state as soon as it completes its democratic reforms, as well as making the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) work by integrating into the European 'economic area' the countries of the Mediterranean that are willing to protect basic freedoms and follow the rule of law: in short, those that are willing to democratise.

The European Union's role as a global actor

If one judges the foreign policy potential of the EU in light of its nearly non-existent response to the Iraqi crisis, like many other analysts one is inexorably led to conclude that there is no meaningful common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and, what is more,

whatever is currently given that name can be reasonably expected to wither away. However tempting, this conclusion is premature. The EU obviously failed to respond to the crisis in a united and coherent way, given the paralysing effect of the disagreement with the United States. This may always be the case when such divisions occur. The crisis in Europe provides a glimpse of the great bewilderment caused by the sea change in US policy under the Bush administration, and the great difficulty Europe has in dealing with the predominant neo-conservative vision and the strong unilateral stance adopted.

The Iraq crisis also saw the emergence of a 'European public' in favour of a greater autonomous role for the EU in the international arena and the development of a defence policy. This is a public that feels that the EU should act internationally in a way that is coherent with the values it defends internally, those that make European integration possible and made power politics illegitimate. Internationally, there was also clear support for a more significant role for the EU. This was particularly true of the Mediterranean: studies show that the majority of the countries of the region support a Union defence policy: they want and need 'more Europe'. The big question is whether the inter-European crisis over Iraq is symptomatic of insurmountable divisions and foreshadows the fragmentation or permanent disabling of the EU as an international political and security actor, or whether the crisis will become a powerful stimulus for reform. The Convention and the IGC were not conclusive in this regard. They did permit important advances, namely by introducing reinforced and structured cooperation in defence matters; and yet the unanimity rule was maintained for foreign affairs, which will likely paralyse a Union of 25. Defence policy also depends on foreign policy options and it is therefore difficult to predict the lessons that states will learn from their failure to address the Iraq challenge or to foresee how they will respond to public opinion in this area.

None the less, it is important to note that foreign policy is not just about intervening in serious international crises like that over Iraq. It also involves 'soft' security and international trade issues, in which the EU will continue to play a leading role and may, ironically, come to play an important role in stabilising Iraq. But it will not be as a merely civilian power that the EU will be able to shape decisively the global order or security on the periphery.

Transatlantic relations

The Iraq war caused the deepest crisis in transatlantic relations since the Suez crisis of 1956, only this time there was not the 'cement' of a common enemy: the Soviet Union. Iraq aggravated an already existing rift over the opposition of the Bush administration to key multilateral instruments and institutions like the Kyoto Protocol and the ICC. The question that remains to be answered is this: what is the cause of this crisis and will it be resolved as in the past with a new Administration, or is this one more structural and therefore more intractable?

That the crisis involved deep differences between France and Germany, the 'motors' of European integration, and the United States automatically made it a serious one. The basis for that quarrel is primarily the different views of how to organise the world – which also reflects different views of the role of the EU – but also different political readings of and approaches to military intervention in an Arab country, and its impact on the Maghreb, the Middle East and Islamic communities in Europe. Many saw the intervention in Iraq as having a strongly negative impact on the EU policy of Southern inclusion. The crisis made it apparent that although there has been fundamental consensus regarding European security, the same cannot be said for extra-European crises and, in particular, problems in the Gulf and Middle East. This is not new; what is new is the feeling among Europeans that the United States no longer sees successful European integration as essential. European fears about the US position on the future of European integration have the most devastating consequences on transatlantic relations. This is particularly sensitive now, as the EU is enlarging to countries that have a markedly Atlanticist position.

Obviously, the rift between EU members is much less about Iraq and the consequences of intervention than about individual relations and the collective relationship with the United States. As shown by the crisis, ideological 'Atlanticism' cannot be the basis for a solid and healthy relationship with the United States. Relations can and should be rebuilt issue-by-issue. A first step is arriving at a consensus within the EU, although this does not mean that a solid convergence may not arise between the two on any number of issues, including with this Administration. Perhaps more important for the future of transatlantic relations is the

definition by EU members of a common view of relations with the United States. The Iraq war clearly revealed the bankruptcy of opposite extremes: direct opposition and uncritical alignment both failed to have any influence on the evolution of the crisis.

The best game plan appears to be 'critical involvement' with the United States, not least because it stands the best chance of winning the backing of EU member states. This presupposes that neither automatic alignment nor automatic opposition are the rule, but rather that the EU is able and willing to say 'no' in concrete circumstances without splitting apart. However, whatever the option, none will work if it is not based on a solid European convergence that allows the EU to act as a bloc. It is therefore crucial to move European policy from an amalgamating 'Atlanticism' towards a Euro-American partnership.

The international system

The war in Iraq marked the end of the first period of the post-Cold War era, which was characterised by the prevalence of multilateralism and regionalism, and a new emphasis on the duty of the international community to protect populations from grave human rights abuse after the tragic experiences in the Balkans and Rwanda. The path taken in the 1990s was to construct a new model of global governance, a new multilateralism that worked to protect human rights, even within sovereign state boundaries. It was a multilateralism that underlined the importance of regional integration and was a factor in regulating globalisation. The EU does not hold national sovereignty to be sacrosanct and was therefore in a good position to engage with this model, not least because it also has the support of its citizenry, as was made plain in the Kosovo war. It is worth remembering that the idea of humanitarian intervention was born in Europe: in 1991 François Mitterrand, then President of France, supported the idea of a military intervention in Iraq to protect the Kurds.

The debate about the international order and Iraq is not about the need to create, or not, the conditions to intervene to defend populations threatened by crimes against humanity: it is about the circumstances that justify this kind of intervention and render it legitimate. Thus, the question is what kind of international order is most able to promote international peace. During the Iraq

crisis, two proposals emerged: unipolarity, which was explicitly defended by Tony Blair, and multipolarity, which was most powerfully exemplified by France.

The war has shown that unipolarity is a transitory and unstable arrangement, as it generates counterbalancing powers and lacks the impartiality that is necessary to ensure legitimacy. A multipolar balance of power system built to counterbalance the United States would also be unstable. It is a system that would force the EU to act like a traditional superpower and recreate itself as a 'superstate'. The EU will never be a superstate, not because of current divisions but because of its very nature. It can never, nor does it want to, become a superpower to rival the United States. To pull its weight in the international system, the EU does not have to compete with the United States for global domination; rather, it must assert its own identity.

The EU will only be able to operate effectively in an international system that is based on shared norms and rules supported by strong international organisations, as the Iraq crisis has clearly demonstrated. The Union was unable to play any role in the resolution of that crisis, and as yet has been unable to contribute as it might, and should, to securing peace. The EU needs a world governed by an encompassing and effective multilateral system if it is to exert its influence. As Jean-Marie Guéhenno[1] has suggested, this system cannot be sustained under the indefinite supremacy of the United States, or with the supreme value attached to independence and sovereignty as the ultimate aim of any political entity.

1. See Jean-Marie Guéhenno, 'The Impact of Globalisation on Strategy, *Survival*, Winter 1998-99; for a discussion on multipolarity and multilateralism, see Helio Jaguaribe and Alvaro Vasconcelos (eds.), *The European Union, Mercosul and the New World Order* (London: Frank Cass, 2003).

II

Part II

American views

Ron Asmus

14

The war on terrorism

How are we doing in the war on terrorism? As Chou En-Lai is reported to have said in response to a question regarding his assessment of the French Revolution: it is still too early to tell. The defeat of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the toppling of Saddam Hussein were key steps in addressing real and potential sources of terrorism and threats to our national security. But on many other fronts progress is less clear and the overall picture is blurred.

I am a Democrat who supported the use of force in Afghanistan and in Iraq – more in spite of rather than because of President Bush. In the case of Afghanistan, the case for war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban was clear. On Iraq I was always dubious about allegations of cooperation between Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein. But I also believed that the West would have to eventually confront the Baathist regime in Iraq. While the threat posed by Saddam was not as imminent as the President suggested, I felt that a policy of containment was failing strategically and morally, and that sooner or later the West was going to have to deal with the threat he posed. Bin Laden and Hussein represented the two faces – Islamic and nationalist – of a new totalitarianism in the Greater Middle East that lies at the heart of the ideological problem we face in the war on terrorism.

To be sure, we are all better off – first and foremost the peoples of these countries – now that these rulers and their regimes are gone. That said, President Bush has this far shown a remarkable ability to potentially snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. While we won the military campaigns in both Afghanistan and Iraq, we have thus far not won the peace in either. Failure in either country would be a major strategic setback in the war on terrorism. And the opening that these interventions created for starting a new positive dynamic in the region would be lost.

Moreover, the fracturing of the West on the Iraq issue has made it much more difficult, at least in the short term, for America and Europe to come together and create the kind of stable and meaningful coalition that could start to develop the kind of long-term and more comprehensive strategies needed to truly prevail in the war on terrorism. How much progress we have made in addressing these root causes or wining the battle for the hearts and minds of these societies is very uncertain at best when one looks at the almost tsunami of anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism in the Arab world.

One bright spot across the Atlantic has been the excellent cooperation on issues of law enforcement and intelligence cooperation. This is the new front line of defence in the war on terrorism, and the fact that John Ashcroft and Otto Schilly have a better working relationship, while Colin Powell and Dominique de Villepin are on speaking terms, is therefore reassuring. Nevertheless, one cannot escape a feeling that Europe has not yet fully woken up to the challenges we face in this arena. What it will take for the EU to create its equivalent of the Department of Homeland Security? One wishes that Europe would learn from and not repeat America's lapses and mistakes. But one wonders whether the Continent may have to experience its own 9/11 before the EU truly mobilises to face this challenge.

The Greater Middle East

I was an early American voice arguing that the Greater Middle East had become *the* strategic challenge of our era, and that confronting it should be the centerpiece of a new transatlantic agenda between the United States and Europe. That argument was based on two premises. The first is that the Greater Middle East has replaced Europe as the part of the world from which the greatest threats to our security are likely to emanate for years, if not decades, to come. The second is that addressing this challenge will require the mobilisation of resources and capacities of both North America and Europe, as well as the region itself, if we are to succeed.

Two years ago this argument was dismissed by many. Today it is increasingly conventional wisdom in the United States and is picking up supporters in Europe as well. There is also a growing

realisation that our past strategies in the region have led us into a strategic dead end, and that a new Western strategy must put positive change at its core. One can debate whether the goal is best described as transformation, democratisation or modernisation, but the key point is that we realise that we need to halt and reverse a dynamic in the region that is breeding ideologies and terrorist groups who want to kill us and who increasingly may have the capacity to do so.

The American debate is further advanced than the European one. In the United States there is now a widespread recognition of the need for a paradigm shift along these lines. The real debate now is less over whether we should purse such a policy but what it should look like in practice. For while President Bush has delivered some impressive speeches arguing the need for democracy in the Greater Middle East, thus far this is a policy without the necessary programmes to back it up – a point some Democratic candidates have started to focus on.

In Europe, scepticism still reigns over how serious Washington is about this project, as well as the capacity of Middle Eastern societies to change along democratic lines. And problems in the EU integration process continue to drain European political will and vision, and inhibit broader and more ambitious policies further afield. Nevertheless, a growing number of European governments and leaders are making their own reappraisal of policy towards the Greater Middle East. Unfortunately, America and much of Europe today remain too estranged from one another for this intellectual convergence to have been translated into common frameworks and policies.

In many ways Europe has as much, if not more, at stake here as Washington. While America is often the target of first choice for terrorists from this region, Europe is not far behind. Moreover, since the Greater Middle East lies at Europe's doorstep, instability and radicalism there potentially have a far more direct impact on Europe's wellbeing. Last but not least, there is the issue of demography and the labour Europe needs to import to sustain its economy and social welfare system. Does anyone doubt that Europe would be much better off importing labour from struggling but basically healthy and reforming neighbours in the Greater Middle East as opposed to dysfunctional and failing states?

The European Union's role as a global actor

It is fundamentally in the interests of the United States to see the European Union emerge as an outward-looking, pro-Atlanticist and effective global actor. There is no part of the world with which we have more in common. If America cannot manage its relations with its closets allies on the Continent, who does it expect to win over as reliable and effective long-term partners? We will never be able to effectively tackle the problems of the Greater Middle East, or other global challenges, unless we can harness the soft and hard power of the transatlantic community. Many of the problems we face – and certainly the problems of the Greater Middle East – will require sustained and effective cooperation over years and probably decades. To think that such cooperation can be organised through ad hoc coalitions of the willing is a dangerous illusion.

The Iraq war did not only leave the transatlantic relationship fractured. It left the European Union badly divided as well. Both are bad news for the United States. To be sure, the United States would like to see the emergence of a unified European Union that is strong, outward-looking and 'transatlanticist'. Our ambivalence on European integration reflects the fears of some Americans that Washington will be confronted with an EU that is none of the above – neither effective, nor outward-looking nor pro-Atlanticist. Yet the best way to work to achieve this outcome is by working with the EU, not seeking to divide or disaggregate it. A divided Europe is a recipe for an insular and ineffective Europe, not one that can join us in tackling the major strategic issues of our era.

But if there is one myth that should be exploded in Europe it is the argument that a new European identity can be built on anti-Americanism. Habermas et al. have got it completely wrong. What the Iraq war showed was that when the transatlantic alliance fractures, the EU does not come together but divides as well, because too many countries in Europe agree with and cherish close relations to Washington. There is a symbiotic relationship between European integration and transatlantic cooperation. Any strategy of rebuilding European unity, if it is to succeed, must also include one of repairing relations with Washington.

What about the famed asymmetry in military power across the Atlantic? Won't this prevent the United States and the EU from

working together effectively in the future? Any and every American will push for Europe to spend more on defence and to narrow the gap in military capabilities across the Atlantic. The reason is simple. The United States prefers not to have to assume the lion's share of military risk by itself in major military operations. That said, the West's Achilles heel is not a shortage of military power when the United States by itself outspends the rest of the world on defence. Instead, the critical challenge we face is whether and if so how both sides of the Atlantic can combine, harness and bring to bear their soft and hard power not only to prevent future catastrophic terrorist attacks but to transform the Greater Middle East so that it no longer poses the threat it does today. And that, in turn, requires a new and common sense of strategic purpose and paradigm that brings us back together.

Transatlantic relations

Strategic cooperation between North America and Europe is, in my view, as important today in the twenty-first century as it was during the twentieth, albeit for very different reasons. Our strategic cooperation is no longer focused on resolving the strategic problem of European peace and stability. Instead, it must be focused on creating a new partnership in which the United States and Europe come together to tackle new challenges that directly affect both of our vital interests.

The Clinton administration, and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in particular, pushed for such a redefinition of the purpose of the relationship in the late 1990s during her last two years in office. At the time, Europe was not ready for such a shift, believing that the new threats were still too abstract and that the need to focus on building Europe and the EU was too pressing. Following 11 September and in the case of Afghanistan, Europe was willing to make the leap into a new more global strategic relationship with Washington, but this time it was the United States that was not ready or interested in expanding the scope of our strategic partnership.

Eventually we recovered and came together around a common strategy in Afghanistan, but somewhere between Kabul and Baghdad we truly lost each other, leading to a transatlantic train wreck.

There undoubtedly is a great book to be written on the crack-up of transatlantic relations over Iraq. But there can be little doubt that the fracturing of the Atlantic Alliance over the war constituted a strategic setback in the global war on terrorism, one with far-reaching implications. While one can differ over which side of the Atlantic is more to blame, both sides are paying a heavy price and will in all likelihood continue to pay a price for many years to come.

It is, in my view, still possible to put the transatlantic relationship back together. In many ways we are condemned to doing so. The deep disagreements of recent years have not altered the fact that we live in an increasingly dangerous world with common problems. The latter have not gone away while we have quarrelled over Iraq: in some ways, they have got worse. And when it comes to the Greater Middle East, there is little doubt that Americans and Europeans will end up on the ground together in the region attempting to solve an array of conflicts in the years ahead. The open question is whether we will do so as a result of common strategic and policy decisions or be pulled in by events on the ground on an ad hoc basis, arguing bitterly among ourselves the entire way. We are far more likely to succeed if we choose the former and not the latter course.

One need only sketch out the long and growing list of problems that the incoming Administration will have to face in the US-European relationship. In the Greater Middle East we will still face serious challenges in Afghanistan and Iraq; the question of Iran's future; and the Middle East Peace Process. Major instability in Pakistan or Saudi Arabia may unfold as well.

Closer to home, we face the issue of Turkey's relations with the EU. Russia is drifting in the wrong authoritarian direction, as is Ukraine. The Black Sea region cries out for a new approach and trends in the Balkans are worrisome as well. The EU is badly divided and America's relations with the two most important powers on the Continent – France and Germany – need repair. Where are the modern-day Dean Achesons now that we need them?

The international system

Our increasingly open and integrated world holds tremendous potential – for both good and evil. After a decade of reaping the peace dividend of the Cold War's end, we are heading into a new era where we once again face very real national security challenges and threats. Students of contemporary European history know that the twentieth century started out on a very optimistic note with its own version of globalisation at the time. Scholars predicted that war had become all but impossible, given the growing economic interdependence among nations. A short time later Europe plunged itself into the first of two destructive world wars and the century became the bloodiest mankind had known.

Are we up to the challenge of constructing a global system with the capacity to ensure that we successfully confront the new challenges of our era? Four years into the twenty-first century, the signals are mixed at best. And the reasons are not only tied to the emergence of a new kind of totalitarianism in the Greater Middle East capable of inflicting tremendous damage to modern civilisation through acts of catastrophic terrorism. Equally worrying is the failure of the great democracies of America and Europe to come together to jointly deal with the major strategic issues of our day. For the truth is that while there are many key bilateral and other relationships that make the world go around, there will be no effective multilateral global system if the relationship across the Atlantic is not repaired.

Esther Brimmer

15

The war on terrorism

The very terminology betrays the debate. The label 'war' or 'fight' provides insights into the analyst's perception and context for understanding the issue and the impact of the war in Iraq. The 'fight' against terrorism is a campaign with many similarities to law enforcement, but complemented by military and diplomatic components. The war in Iraq has affected the anti-terrorism campaign in four ways. It has diverted senior-level political attention from anti-terrorism work in Afghanistan, clouded the debate about the role of military force in the fight against terrorism and made the issue of how to detain and try suspects more salient; but it has also increased political interest in law enforcement cooperation.

The war in Iraq has created several ironies. The first is that the Iraq war drew significant senior level attention in the US government away from the anti-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan, which was the source of the 11 September attacks. Only a year earlier fighting al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan had been the Bush administration's highest priority. Yet in its annual budget request to the US Congress submitted in late 2002, the Administration included no funds for activities in Afghanistan. Funds were only provided after congressional action.

The second irony is that the war in Iraq recast perceptions of the role of military force in the anti-terrorism campaign by providing a problematic example of pre-emption. The controversy about pre-emption drowned out the evolving but subtle arguments about the use of force against terrorists or in defence of human rights. After the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, United Nations member states and the wider international community were appalled and immediately condemned international terrorism. For years the global body had been unable to build a consensus on the issue, ensnared by the perception that

one person's terrorist was another's freedom fighter. That conundrum collapsed with the Twin Towers. Most UN member states agreed that certain terrorist actions were beyond the pale. The Security Council passed Resolution 1368, which labelled these attacks 'like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to international peace and security'. Even China and Russia were willing to countenance US military operations in Central Asia. The Bush administration implied that the war in Iraq would advance the fight against terrorism. The war in Iraq was sold by many of its advocates as a pre-emptive action against a hostile leader who could supply terrorists with weapons of mass destruction and against whom conventional diplomatic constraints were futile. Yet the combination of the notion of pre-emption and the action in Iraq was such a significant challenge to the international system that these policies undermined the consensus for using force against international terrorism that had emerged during the war in Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, through both military action and law enforcement cooperation, states have found hundreds of suspects. How to deal with them is still a difficult issue. International opinion was already inflamed by the Bush administration's refusal to admit that the Geneva Conventions apply to the people detained under US custody at Guantanamo Bay. Most of the people were caught in Afghanistan and held for suspected connections with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The US State Department's Legal Adviser, William Taft IV, argued that 'the US has been at war with al-Qaeda and its supporters' since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.[1] The Iraq war raised the spectre of additional prisoners, and it led to the capture of Saddam Hussein, whom the United States is holding as a prisoner of war. Thus, the third irony is that the people held in the Administration's 'war' on terrorism are not accorded prisoner of war status while a former head of state with no clear connections to al-Qaeda or the 11 September terrorist attack is being held as prisoner of war, ostensibly for his 'participation in the continuing resistance in Iraq'.[2]

The final irony is that the Iraq war illuminated cooperation among governments on legal affairs in the anti-terrorism campaign. Trying to overcome the harsh transatlantic cacophony, French, German, American and other officials who disagreed about Iraq heralded their cooperation on law enforcement. This was a way to demonstrate that diplomatic cooperation had not

1. William Taft, 'Guantanamo detention is legal and essential', *Financial Times*, 12 January 2004, p. 13.

2. Ibid.

withered completely. Connections between professionals in the United States Justice Department and European interior ministries were celebrated by political leaders who otherwise would not pay as much attention to the mechanisms of legal cooperation at the technical level.

The Greater Middle East

The Iraq war has opened a new conversation about the future of the Greater Middle East among policy-makers in the 'West', between the 'West' and people in the Middle East, and even within some countries in the region. For too long many Western policy-makers resisted talking about human rights and democracy in the region. More narrowly defined strategic political, military and energy interests were given primacy. In contrast, American neo-conservatives advocated war in Iraq to advance democracy. The notion was to create a new state that was more democratic and could serve as the catalyst for change in the region. While a new democracy has not yet emerged, the fall of Saddam's regime has occasioned a debate not only about Iraq's future but also about the nature of governments in the area, even among those who did not support the war itself.

The war has also increased the tendency to see the region as the 'Greater Middle East' rather than as separate areas such as the Maghreb, the Levant and Central Asia. Increasingly, policy-makers outside the region are envisioning the region as a whole facing interconnected problems such as reconciling Islam and modernisation, enhancing economic development and diversification, and generating employment to accommodate the population bulge.

However, the Iraq war has also reinforced the Bush administration's tendency to classify countries as friends or enemies ('you are with us or against us'). Supporters of the anti-terrorism campaign and the Iraq war tend to escape close scrutiny of their domestic affairs, especially if their opponents use terrorist tactics. Therefore, the Bush administration has not been sufficiently critical of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's policies that have exacerbated the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This reticence is particularly unfortunate at a time when the Israeli-Palestinian problem is even more salient. Some people draw parallels between this crisis and the

situation in Iraq, charging that both are examples of 'Western' occupation of Arab lands. It will be harder for the United States to find long-term partners for peace in the region if the degree of anti-terrorist fervour is the only criterion.

The European Union's role as a global actor

The Iraq war has had two very different effects on the development of the European Union's role as a global actor, spurring constructive work on the strategic military side while exacerbating political divisions. The transatlantic controversies about how to deal with weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and other threats encouraged the European Council to examine these issues more deeply and to forge an EU perspective. The result was the European Security Strategy adopted at the December 2003 European Council and based on Javier Solana's June document 'A Secure Europe in a Better World'. The EU also fielded a small military operation to Bunia, Congo to stabilise the conflict until a UN mission could be deployed. The EU acted not only because the situation in Congo was dire, but because some EU member states wanted to demonstrate that force could be used in support of the United Nations instead of against its wishes as the United States had been accused of doing in Iraq. The Iraq war encouraged European leaders to be even more active diplomatically with the other country in the region suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction, Iran. The result was the British-French-German mission to Iran on behalf of the EU that produced an agreement with Tehran.

Yet these advances in strategic military engagement by the EU were overshadowed by deepening political divisions. The Iraq war added another layer of mistrust among EU member states, in particular between France and Germany on one hand and Spain and accession state Poland on the other. While the former two opposed the Bush administration's actions, the latter two supported them. The disagreement about the use of force and President Chirac's criticism of Central and East European states which signed the 'Vilnius 10' letter supporting the United States heightened tensions that spilled over into other aspects of EU life, including the Intergovernmental Conference. The residual distrust probably was a factor in the failure of the member states to

adopt the draft constitution at their December 2003 summit. Led by Poland and Spain, some EU countries fought against giving the largest countries more power under the draft constitution's new voting system.

While the constitution may be still be adopted in whole or in part, the delay means that the EU will not have a new EU foreign minister soon. That official could have helped shape and express an EU perspective on international affairs. Moreover, the many EU members' budget constraints have only worsened, making increased defence expenditures difficult.

Transatlantic relations

Transatlantic relations have been deeply affected by the disagreement about the war in Iraq. Although the Bush administration charged that countries were either 'for us or against us', there are many shades of support and opposition. For example, some Europeans and Americans who opposed the war would have supported military action if the Bush administration had made a different and more coherent case. While the Euro-Atlantic region has weathered many political storms, the latest is among the most serious. The most important effects on transatlantic relations include:

- *souring of relations among allied heads of state*. Relations remain cool between President Bush and his counterparts President Chirac and Chancellor Schröder. Moreover, some senior American officials believe that France, Germany, and 'Old Europe' in general, do not support the official US strategic outlook. The antiwar policy did lead to an important shift, creating greater distance between the US and German policies. Departing from practice, Berlin maintained a position of open opposition to Washington on an issue straining the Atlantic Alliance. A poll by the respected German Marshall Fund suggested that after the Iraq crisis the German public felt greater strategic solidarity with Europe than with the United States.
- *straining the British bridge*. The war has reduced the United Kingdom's ability to smooth the ripples between Washington and Continental Europe. After receiving political backlash at home and little thanks for his strong support of President Bush, Prime Minister Tony Blair is likely to look for opportunities to

demonstrate his commitment to Europe. However, his domestic unpopularity means that he is unlikely to push a controversial topic like joining the eurozone soon. Instead, the United Kingdom has shown renewed interest in deepening EU security and defence measures and changed its position to support a small EU planning cell. The United Kingdom has also become more actively involved in EU diplomatic missions, such as the one to Tehran.

- *heightened sensitivities*. The splits within Europe reinforced existing cleavages, such as those between large and small states. Some Europeans fear that outsiders will exploit these divisions. Therefore, increased strategic disagreements among Europeans could make some European leaders even more inclined to view American critiques of the EU as attempts to undermine European unity.
- *narrowed international agenda*. The war drained political attention away from US-European cooperation on issues other than Iraq, anti-terrorism, and the Greater Middle East. Political perspective could be regained somewhat once sovereignty is restored in Iraq and a greater international presence is re-established.
- *less attention to human rights*. The Bush administration's tendency not to criticise its partners in the anti-terrorism campaign meant that it muted US criticism of the Russian government's actions in Chechnya.

Concerted action by senior leaders could ameliorate each of these situations, but personalities do not account for all the problems. Both the United States and Europe are re-examining their strategic outlooks. Discordant rates of change will continue to strain the transatlantic relationship.

The international system

While it will take years to discern the full impact of the Iraq war on the international system, some elements are already evident. First, the military dominance of the United States and its intentions have become a more controversial international issue, with some publics describing US strength as a threat and some leaders recal-

culating the likelihood of US military action against them. Libya provides an intriguing example. While the need to modernise the Libyan economy was a driving factor in Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's recent decisions to renounce certain weapons programmes and to arrange payments for the Lockerbie victims' families, he may have also been worried that the United States might place greater military pressure on him.

Yet there are two ways to interpret US military strength. The Iraq war demonstrated the Bush administration's willingness to use force, but the war has also been a great strain on resources, which could make the threat of using military force seem less credible in other situations. Furthermore, the financial costs of supporting troops and reconstruction in Iraq will keep the US budget in deficit for years to come, possibly weakening the long-term health of the world's most dynamic economy. Meanwhile, concerned by the United States's use of force, Europeans and others have been more assertive diplomatically as an alterative way to effect change internationally.

The war in Iraq has fuelled the debate about the United States's role in the world. By waging the Iraq war without deep international support, the Administration gave many the impression that it considers the United States to be above international norms, compounding the sense created by the defence of pre-emption, 'unsigning' the accord creating the International Criminal Court, and rejecting the Kyoto climate change treaty. However, the United States is less likely to get support for its initiatives if it ignores or undermines even its allies' priority projects.

The Iraq war has led to a new exploration of the relations among 'Western' countries and Islamic, and especially Arab, society in particular. This is a decades-long endeavour, but represents a potentially fruitful change. Choices made in the next few years will influence the trajectory of the dialogue towards either a new positive engagement or deepening distrust.

The Iraq war has also strained the United Nations Security Council, calling into question its ability to deal with new threats. In response the Secretary-General has appointed a High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change. The Iraq war has cracked the international system, which was already struggling to address mass terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The question for the coming years is not just how to

repair the system, but how to reconfigure it. Institutional change is required not simply for the organisations themselves, but because leaders realise that they need viable ways to work together to meet transnational threats. As a result of the Iraq war, states will endeavour to adjust their mechanisms for cooperation, thereby accelerating change in NATO, the EU and the UN.

James Dobbins

16

The war on terrorism

Although the Iraqi regime seems to have maintained intermittent contact with al-Qaeda, no conclusive evidence of Iraqi complicity with or support for that terrorist network has emerged. Al-Qaeda would not seem, therefore, to have suffered any direct loss from the fall of Saddam Hussein. In some respects, indeed, it may have reaped advantages. Recruitment possibilities among the disaffected populations of the regions may have been increased. American forces are tied down in Iraq and consequently fewer are available for other missions. American stabilisation and reconstruction operations in Iraq increase the accessibility of American targets and the exposure of US troops to terrorist attack.

Striking at states that support terrorism is integral to the Bush administration's post-9/11 strategy. Saddam's may not have been the most complicit of such regimes, but it was the most vulnerable. American action in Iraq, following so closely on its invasion of Afghanistan, seems to have given pause to other states, such as Syria, Iran or Libya, which have shown a predilection toward terrorist methods and connections in the past. Recent Iranian and Libyan concessions regarding their respective nuclear programmes give substance to this linkage and support to the American administration's contention that pre-emptive action in Iraq could have a deterrent effect elsewhere.

This deterrent effect could be undermined, however, by the difficulties the United States has encountered in stabilising and reconstructing both Iraq and Afghanistan. In the short term, US forces are so heavily committed to these efforts as to make major new commitments elsewhere unlikely. In the long term, regime change as a response to state-supported terrorism can remain a credible strategy only if the United States demonstrates the capacity not just to take down odious regimes, but to build up better ones in their place.

In sum, the direct effect of the Iraq war on the campaign against global terrorism has probably been neutral or negative, but the indirect effect, that on the attitude of other potential state sponsors, has probably been positive and may remain so, provided that a broadly representative, moderate, and democratising successor regime emerges in Iraq.

The Greater Middle East

The removal of Saddam Hussein's regime has reduced the threat to Israel. A more secure Israel may eventually prove a more accommodating one in negotiations with its Palestinian and Syrian neighbours. This is at least a reasonable hope.

Successive US administrations have declined to identify the Arab-Israeli conflict as the root cause of global terrorism, but recognise it to be a contributing factor in the recruitment of terrorists and the hostility toward America throughout the Middle East. American soldiers are and will remain exposed to daily contact with the Muslim population in Iraq. The cooperation of that population will be essential to the ultimate success of America's nation-building mission there. This exposure and consequent vulnerability of American troops in Iraq, combined with the need to secure the support of that population for Iraq's democratic transformation, provides additional incentive for active American engagement in the Middle East Peace Process.

The emergence of a moderate stable and democratising regime in Iraq would likely exercise a benign influence on the political development of the region as a whole. This effect will occur only gradually, however, and only if the American-led nation-building effort in that country succeeds.

If, on the other hand, the United States and its partners fail to promote the emergence of a stable, moderate and democratising regime in Iraq, the region as a whole is likely to become more turbulent, Israel to become less secure and the United States to become more wary of active engagement in the region.

In sum, the effect of the Iraq war on the Greater Middle East will depend principally on the success or failure of American-led nation-building efforts there.

The European Union's role as a global actor

Iraq can certainly be counted among Europe's failures. The European Union played no role whatsoever in forestalling the American invasion or in liberating Iraq from a brutal dictatorship. Today it is playing no significant role in Iraq's reconstruction and political transformation.

Historically, the process of European integration has proved able to draw strength from its failures as well as its successes. German unification, a success, sparked the Maastricht Treaty, monetary union and Community enlargement. Civil war in Yugoslavia, a failure, spurred the development of European institutions for security and defence. Disappointing European military performance in the Kosovo air campaign, another failure, spurred development of the European Rapid Reaction Corps. The EU now has yet another opportunity to draw strength and direction from a failure, this one in Iraq.

No institutional fix, however, will overcome policy differences between the United States and the United Kingdom on the one hand and France and Germany on the other. No system of weighted voting could have brought Paris and Berlin to support the invasion of Iraq or Britain to oppose it. On matters of national and international security, when Washington, London, Paris and Berlin cannot agree, none of our various institutions works effectively – not the UN, not NATO and not the EU. We saw this in the early 1990s with respect to Yugoslavia, and we saw it again last year with Iraq. On the other hand, when the major Atlantic and European powers agree on basic goals, then institutional conflicts fall away and all our organisations play constructive and mutually reinforcing roles, as they have in the Balkans for half a decade.

Trying to construct Europe as a counterweight to the United States has proved as unproductive as has trying to drive wedges between 'old' and the 'new' Europe. Neither strategy has yielded positive results over the past year. Europe remains divided on Iraq. The United States remains deprived of substantial European assistance in stabilising and reconstructing that country. It is clear that the EU can play no constructive role in Iraq except in partnership with the United States. It should be equally clear that the United States is unlikely to achieve its goals in the region without

such a partnership. It took half a decade of painful experience to learn this lesson in the Balkans. One can only hope it will be absorbed more quickly in the Greater Middle East.

In sum, the effect of the Iraq war on the European Union as a global actor will depend upon its ability to overcome internal divisions and play a role commensurate with its interests, ambitions and capabilities in the shaping of that country and region's future.

Transatlantic relations

No enumeration of flags or contingents can disguise the fact that the United States has failed to secure substantial support from its European allies for its intervention in Iraq. Only Britain has made a major effort, and even that effort appears modest by comparison with the Balkans operations of the late 1990s. In Bosnia and Kosovo the British (and French and German) contingents were almost as numerous as the American. In Iraq, the American contingent is twelve times bigger than the British, while the British contingent is more numerous than all the other European contingents put together. At the end of the 1990s America's European allies had 50,000 troops committed to NATO operations in the Balkans. Today they have less than 20,000 deployed in Iraq.

A comparison of economic assistance figures yields similar results. In the Balkans the United States bore 20 per cent of the economic reconstruction burden. In Iraq, the American share is closer to 90 per cent.

These current realities, as much as last year's harsh rhetoric and bruised feelings, reveal the reality of today's transatlantic relationship. Yes, Europe and America have common values and common interests and are cooperating on a range of other issues. But on the largest issue of the day, and one that affects both sides equally, Europe is largely standing aside while the United States makes all the decisions and bears most of the costs.

Europe has stood aside before when America engaged, most notably in Vietnam. But that was a Europe with only regional aspirations. Today's Europe has the desire, and to a limited but real degree the capacity, for global engagement. Iraq is therefore a test, in a way that Vietnam was not, as to whether a more united Europe with a more global vision can become, as has so long been argued,

a natural partner for the United States. At present Europe and America are both failing this test.

Some in the United States tend to regard European unification, particularly on security and defence, as a Franco-German plot to limit American influence. The current impasse over Iraq naturally feeds this perception. So far, Tony Blair has been able to prevent an open transatlantic breach on the further development of European institutions for security and defence, but only by cashing in many of the chips he had garnered though his stalwart support of American policy in Iraq. Over time, as America's costs and casualties in Iraq mount, the paucity of European participation there will make the task of bridging this transatlantic divide ever more difficult.

In sum, the effect of the Iraq war on transatlantic relations has been and will remain negative as long as Europe, NATO and the international community as a whole remain divided over the management of the war's consequences.

The international system

The United States and Europe together represent roughly 50 per cent of the world's wealth and 75 per cent of its effective military power. Not surprisingly, when they disagree, the international system is blocked.

This is not a problem susceptible to organisational reform. Expanding the UN Security Council or altering the veto mechanism would in no way overcome the consequences of such a transatlantic difference. In 1999 Russia and China could block a Security Council resolution authorising the use of force to halt genocide in Kosovo, but they could not significantly undermine the legitimacy of the NATO action, or undercut the broad international support it received. This was because the United States and Europe, NATO and the EU acting together, carried sufficient weight and embodied sufficient legitimacy to outweigh the formal failure to receive a UN Security Council endorsement of their efforts to liberate Kosovo. Conversely, America's recent success in securing a unanimous UN Security Council endorsement of its reconstruction efforts in Iraq has neither disguised nor compensated for a continued transatlantic rift on the subject. In the first

instance, the absence of a Security Council resolution on Kosovo in no way hindered the efficacy of NATO and EU action. In the second instance, the fact of such a vote on Iraq has in no way increased European commitments or expanded the UN's role there.

Only the development of a genuinely common vision of where to go on Iraq on the part of the United States and its principal European allies will lead to a larger European contribution and the definition of appropriate roles for NATO, the European Union and the United Nations.

The UN Security Council's inability last year to either stem or endorse the invasion of Iraq should be seen not as a failure of the UN system, but of French and American diplomacy. After all, the rest of the Council and most of the world would have been willing to support any resolution that those two governments could have agreed upon. The international system was poised to work, if only its leading members could agree. Of course, France and America have disagreed before but without such dire consequences. In this instance, American diplomacy had driven France and Germany together on the issue, providing Paris with the backing it felt necessary to stand fast in bucking American pressures and threatening to veto a Security Council resolution that otherwise might have passed.

The appropriate lesson to be drawn from this experience for Americans is that the United States may, when necessary, be able to isolate and override opposition from any one major European ally, but it cannot expect to successfully disregard the strongly held views of two at the same time without paying a severe price. For Europeans, the lesson is that common European security policies cannot be built in opposition to the United States.

In conclusion, therefore, if American and European political leaders internalise these lessons and act upon them, the international system will resume working effectively. If not, then not.

William Drozdiak

17

The war on terrorism

The consequences of the war in Iraq on the war against terrorism have been almost entirely negative. Even though the toppling of Saddam Hussein is cause for great celebration – especially given the discovery of 300,000 mass graves that underscored his heinous reputation as the 'Pol Pot of the Middle East' – the insecurity and instability that now prevails in Iraq could actually magnify the risks of terrorism, particularly if that country is soon plunged into greater chaos and eventual civil war. If Iraq should break into Sunni, Shia and Kurdish fragments, the dangers of regional wars will grow and the risks will increase that more failed states resulting from this chaos could serve as a refuge and incubator for other terrorist movements. Already there are signs that young Arab radicals have been flocking to Iraq – probably across the Syrian border – to foment attacks on the American occupation force. Even if the American troops were to begin to withdraw and hand over control to local Iraqi authorities later this year, it is hard to see how the Iraqis will be able to contain the potential wellsprings for future violence and terrorism springing from Iraqi soil.

The war in Iraq compelled American forces to shift their focus from the pursuit of Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda organisation. As a result, this distraction has slowed, if not undermined, efforts to eradicate the single biggest terrorist threat facing the United States and its interests in the Greater Middle East. The invasion of Iraq also deflected Western attention from the need to help President Hamid Karzai extend his authority throughout Afghanistan, establish a greater sense of order and faith in the country's development, and banish the lingering presence of Taliban forces. Most of all, the failure to find arsenals of weapons of mass destruction within Iraq has vindicated those critics who doubted the risks of any strategic threat against the West posed by Hussein's regime. The most damaging long-term impact could be

to the credibility of the United States and other allied governments who made the case for urgent war on the false assumptions that Saddam Hussein's regime was linked to al-Qaeda and possessed the capability to launch terror attacks using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons against Western targets. In the future, it will be harder to persuade public opinion about the true gravity of homeland security threats in the wake of what must be considered one of the worst intelligence failures in American history.

The Greater Middle East

In many respects, the future challenges for the Greater Middle East are just emerging following the war in Iraq. President George W. Bush has vowed to create a new culture of democracy in the region by transforming Iraq into an example of peace, order and prosperity for the rest of the Arab world. Yet given the pressures of an election year that already are driving the US government to contemplate an early withdrawal, it is hard to be optimistic that the United States will stay deeply involved in a long-term project that National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice says will require substantial American commitments of troops and treasure for at least a generation.

In Europe, as throughout the Arab world, many people believe that the key to establishing peace and stability in the Greater Middle East is to find a lasting solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There is no question that this continuing crisis remains one of the most serious sources of instability in the region, particularly given the large numbers of Palestinian refugees that have burdened neighbouring states like Lebanon, Jordan and Syria for more than two generations. However, for too long Arab governments have tried to use the Israeli-Palestinian problem as a scapegoat for their own failures in eradicating corruption, building democracy, encouraging dynamic economic growth and taking other bold measures that would deal with many of the intractable problems of their societies. Indeed, in many cases, from Egypt to Algeria to Saudi Arabia, the United States and its European allies have been reluctant to promote democratic reforms out of the hypocritical fear that these changes might remove authoritarian forces from power who are perceived as compliant with Western

interests if not those of their own people. If anything, Iraq has shown that the United States and its European allies can no longer continue making an exception out of the Greater Middle East when it comes to normal human aspirations for greater freedom in political and economic life. While democracy cannot be rushed, nor can it be equated solely with free elections, the days when these 'double standards' would apply to the Middle East must come to an end.

If, by some inspired policy-making and good luck, the United States and the European Union could combine forces to implement effective joint measures that would build democratic institutions, improve education, and expand trade and investment possibilities with countries from Morocco to Afghanistan, this could serve as a way to revitalise the transatlantic partnership in the post-Cold War era and defuse what in the wake of the 9/11 attacks have clearly become the biggest security challenges to Western interests. How the transatlantic alliance deals with the gamut of problems throughout the Greater Middle East, from unchecked immigration and unemployed youth to the cultivation of religious tolerance, democratic institutions and market-based economies, will dictate much of the course of history in the twenty-first century.

The European Union's role as a global actor

The Iraq war left the European Union looking more divided than ever on the eve of a massive 'big bang' expansion that will enlarge its membership from 15 to 25 nations. While Britain, France, Italy and incoming countries such as Poland and the Baltic states generally supported the United States's invasion of Iraq, France and Germany were staunchly opposed even at the cost of provoking the worst crisis with Washington since the 1956 Suez crisis. A year later, the EU seems to have learned some lessons from that debacle and is struggling to project a more coherent voice on the world stage. The strategic vision crafted by Javier Solana, the EU's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, in the paper 'A secure Europe in a better world', was unanimously endorsed by all EU heads of state and government. It spells out in clear and simple terms how the EU, which will soon encompass 450 million citizens

and generate more than one-quarter of global economic activity, can use its strengths and influence for the cause of greater peace and prosperity around the globe.

Indeed, the prospect of membership of the European Union has served as a powerful force for expanding stability across the Continent. Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Lithuania have been prodded into resolving lingering grievances among ethnic minorities in order to meet EU democracy criteria for membership. Cyprus, which will join on 1 May 2004, is being pushed by that approaching deadline to resolve a three-decade conflict between its Greek and Turkish communities. More than ever before, Turkey now seems willing to play a more constructive role in helping to settle the Cyprus problem – growing out of Turkey's invasion of the island in 1974 – largely because it wants to be perceived as a 'good European citizen' to enhance its own candidacy for EU membership and promote negotiations to that end.

Even in the area where Europe is most criticised – power projection – the Union has made some progress over the past year. Despite the growing preponderance of the United States as the world's dominant military superpower, the European Union has developed its own tools of power that are not to be dismissed lightly. Even though European countries cannot project tanks, troops and firepower half a globe away in the manner of the United States, the Union has played an effective role in preventing or stabilising conflicts in Macedonia, Liberia and Congo. European troops are likely to assume full control of the Balkan zone later this year, and already provide much of the outside peacekeeping forces present in Afghanistan. When the United States turns over control of Iraq to local authorities by 1 July this year, European forces will undoubtedly supply a large number of the troops that may be dispatched under United Nations mandate, and perhaps under American-led NATO command.

Transatlantic relations

The bitter nature of the transatlantic quarrels over Iraq during the course of the past year convinced governments on both sides of the ocean that tensions had gone too far. Already, there are signs that governments are eagerly seeking ways to heal the breach in relations. In the United States, as President George W. Bush seeks

re-election he is showing a new willingness to reach out to the European allies and offer to work more closely through multilateral institutions such as the United Nations. In some ways, Bush may feel he has no other choice. Pentagon planners are badly stretched in meeting troop requirements in Iraq and have appealed for greater help from the allies after belatedly recognising that the United States cannot fight on two fronts – in Iraq and Afghanistan – and still maintain security commitments in other parts of the world. In addition, the White House wants to refute criticism from opposition Democrats that Bush has squandered the sympathy of the allies and the world at large through policies that smack of arrogant unilateralism. By this summer, when the sixtieth anniversary of D-Day is celebrated on the cliffs of Normandy and NATO and G-8 summits take centre stage, Bush will undoubtedly be striving to project an image of greater harmony with his European peers.

Yet in some respects, the aftermath of the Iraq war has made it clear that the political and security relationship across the Atlantic has been permanently changed since the events of 9/11 in ways that no President – be he Republican or Democrat – can affect. For much of the Cold War, Europe straddled the front line, exposed to the constant dangers of becoming the primary nuclear battlefield between the United States and the Soviet Union. Now the roles seem reversed. Europe in many ways is more secure than at any time in its history: Russia is becoming integrated into European political and economic life, the Balkan wars have subsided and the perennial conflicts that made every generation of French and German youths prepare to go into battles across the Rhine now seem unthinkable. The United States, in contrast, now looks more vulnerable than ever before. The devastating attacks on the Pentagon and the Twin Towers proved that Americans can no longer hunker down in a fortress protected by two oceans and a vast continental land mass. While Europeans profess to understand the threat of terrorism, having lived through bombings and assassination campaigns waged by the IRA, the Red Brigades and the Red Army Faction, they still do not grasp the scope of the trauma that Americans have felt since the 9/11 attacks.

Ironically, while Europe and the United States struggle to find a new modus vivendi in their security relationship, the web of transatlantic economic ties has become more inextricable than ever. Despite the political strains evident over the past year, trade and investment have soared to such an extent in this age of

globalisation that they now reach close to $3 trillion. Millions of Americans and Europeans owe their livelihoods to employers on the other side of the ocean. Transnational companies such as DaimlerChrysler, BP Amoco, Siemens and General Electric now reach deeply into American and European markets, so much so that their business interests defy national allegiance. Indeed, these economic trends could form the foundation for a new transatlantic partnership in the twenty-first century, since they affect so directly the daily lives of citizens in Europe and America.

The international system

The war in Iraq inflicted one of the biggest blows to the legitimacy of the international system, in particular the United Nations. The decision by the United States to launch an invasion of a sovereign country in the absence of UN Security Council approval – despite the incessant flouting of UN resolutions by Saddam Hussein's regime – has eroded the UN's authority and even called into question the future survival of its institutions. Lately, events have inspired some hope that the UN's reputation may recover – the United States, having woefully underestimated the reconstruction tasks in Iraq, is now appealing for the UN and the larger international community to assume a greater role in providing political stability, defusing the risks of civil war, writing off bad debts and restoring economic vitality to the oil-rich land of Mesopotamia.

But the US move to go back to the UN for help in Iraq does not vindicate the international system. There is widespread discontent with the composition of the UN Security Council, as seen in the ever louder demands from influential regional powers such as India, Brazil and Japan to break into the ranks of the five permanent powers – the United States, Britain, France, China and Russia – that were established at the end of the Second World War. The crisis over Iraq triggered the decision by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to appoint a blue ribbon panel to recommend urgent reforms that would ensure the UN's continuing relevance. But whether any of those reforms will be adopted by an organisation that requires unanimity in order to make changes seems highly dubious.

On the other hand, it is easy to overlook progress that has been achieved with the help of the United Nations in ways that do make the headlines. Some UN bodies are working well: the World Trade Organisation and the International Atomic Energy Agency, while not without faults, are coping with difficult tasks. On the peacekeeping front, several protracted conflicts are close to being resolved: a truce has brought peace to Sudan for the first time in more than a generation, India and Pakistan are talking about a direct settlement of the Kashmir dispute, Libya has vowed to abandon its nuclear weapons programme, and even the long-festering Cyprus problem may finally be solved ahead of the country's scheduled entry into the European Union. Even the number of democracies in the world has already doubled in the past two decades, regardless of whether Iraq and Afghanistan prove to be lasting successes. What will truly test the United Nations – and the international system in general – will be to strengthen these fledgling democracies so that they do not lapse into future failed states that will bedevil the international order of the twenty-first century.

Philip H. Gordon

18

The war on terrorism

Regime change in Iraq was supposed to be a contribution to the war on terrorism in three distinct ways. First, by removing a state sponsor of terrorism that allegedly had links to al-Qaeda and might supply such organisations with weapons of mass destruction; second by sending a message to other potential state supporters of terrorism and thus deterring them from doing so; and third by taking a first step toward the democratisation of the Middle East, which in the long run would help dry up the sources of terrorism.

At this point, it appears that the first effect was minor at best, because Saddam does not appear to have had the links with al-Qaeda that many in the Bush administration alleged. The Iraqi regime no doubt had a record of support for terrorism, of which its announced incentives for Palestinian suicide bombers was an egregious recent example. But if the primary target of the 'war on terrorism' was meant to be the 'terrorists of global reach' that could and would conduct massive attacks against the United States, then removing Saddam was a minor contribution at best. In that sense, if anything the war in Iraq was a significant distraction from the war on terror: it diverted massive military, intelligence and financial assets away from missions on which they would have been better deployed. As regards the *direct* threat from global terrorism, the United States would have been better off focusing on the stabilisation of Afghanistan and the hunt for al-Qaeda than on the invasion and occupation of Iraq.

As for the deterrent effect on terrorism, the record is so far mixed. The Bush doctrine of using or threatening force against rogue regimes – strongly reinforced by the sight of Saddam Hussein being pulled out of a hole by the US military – may well have had a salutary effect on the leaders of terrorism-supporting states. But it can also be argued that the costly American occupation of Iraq actually makes military threats against other regimes

less rather than more credible. US diplomacy is discredited and the US military is overstretched by its occupation duties in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iran, three times as populous as Iraq and historically averse to American intervention – leaders must feel reasonably confident that the United States will not soon seriously contemplate an 'Operation *Iranian Freedom*' followed by a US occupation. Nor, tragically, has the invasion of Iraq led Palestinian militant groups to abandon terror tactics out of fear of US power. Almost by definition, non-state terrorist actors like al-Qaeda itself will not be deterred by regime change in Iraq, though they could be inspired by it.

If regime change in Iraq is really to make a major contribution to the war on terrorism, then, it will have to be through the third mechanism – the transformation of the Middle East. And on that it is really too soon to say. It is possible that Iraq will, within a few years, emerge as a relatively humane, stable, semi-democracy, with legitimate institutions and a real prospect for future prosperity and freedom. If so, that would certainly take some of the thunder away from the Islamic extremists who exploited arguments that the United States was causing Muslim suffering by imposing sanctions on Iraq and leaving a ruthless, secular dictator in place. If that enormous political challenge cannot be met, however, and Iraq requires indefinite American occupation – or, worse, disintegrates into violence among its rival ethnic groups – the invasion will have proved not only unnecessary but counter-productive, at least where the war on terrorism is concerned.

The Greater Middle East

The Iraq war's effect on the Greater Middle East will similarly depend almost entirely on the outcome of the political process in Iraq. If Iraq does manage to develop into a relatively stable and prosperous democracy, it could serve as a model and inspiration for other democrats in the region. It could prove that Arabs are capable of democracy and development if only they are given the chance.

The problem, however, is that building a stable democracy in Iraq will be an enormously difficult task. In the best of circumstances it will take years or decades to achieve and even if successful the positive effect on the rest of the Middle East is still far from

guaranteed. Iraq's lack of democratic traditions or institutions, the legacy of decades of dictatorship, rival ethnic and religious groups, and unevenly distributed natural resources are not a good recipe for democracy or stability. There is a risk, then, that without an indefinite international military presence, the country will eventually revert to authoritarian leadership of one form or another, or perhaps worse, to violent struggles among rival tribes or ethnic groups. Even if things work out better than that, the positive effect on the rest of the Middle East will be far from automatic. In Turkey, other than Israel the region's most successful experiment with democracy, it has taken over 80 years to progress to the current democratic order, which still faces challenges from ethnic separatism, Islamism and a powerful military establishment. And even Turkey's impressive degree of success has not spilled over to the rest of the Islamic world.

Strong proponents of the Iraq war would argue that even if Iraqi stability proves elusive, the war will still have had a positive effect on the region through the message it sent to dictatorships elsewhere – at a minimum regarding their WMD programmes. Just as the case with the war on terrorism, however, the evidence on this is mixed. The demonstration effect of attacking Iraq because of its unwillingness to verifiably disarm probably will serve as a deterrent to states like Iran, Syria and Libya, which will have to think twice before defying the United States by producing WMD.

But just as is the case for the war on terrorism, the effect of the Iraq war on WMD cuts both ways. Indeed, whereas the Bush administration claims that the Iraq war contributed to Libya's decision to abandon its WMD programmes – and possibly also to Iranian and Syrian restraint in this area – that effect is still unclear. Some of the regional progress on WMD in fact seems more to be the result of regional leaders' desperate desire to overcome international isolation than of fear of a US attack. Certainly Libya's WMD decision is the result of a process that began well before Bush took office. After long negotiations with the Clinton administration, Gaddafi handed over the suspected Lockerbie bombers in 1999 in an attempt to get UN sanctions on Libya lifted. Similarly, Iran seems to have agreed to suspend uranium enrichment – in a deal with British, French and German leaders last autumn – because of the credible threat of EU trade and diplomatic sanctions.

On balance, regime change in Iraq is probably a positive step for the Greater Middle East, because at least it removes a long-standing threat to regional stability and at least gives a chance to political progress in Iraq. But the genuine political transformation of the region will require decades of difficult and coordinated engagement by the United States and its partners, not just the removal of one bad regime.

The European Union's role as a global actor

The Iraq war was a major setback to the European Union's quest to emerge as a global actor. The war revealed the deep divisions among European states regarding the use of force in international relations, the role of the UN and, most importantly, the best way to deal with American power. It also revealed the lack of a strong institutional mechanism for uniting various European national views and policies – the member states made policy on Iraq individually. The EU's status as a global actor should perhaps not be judged by its performance on Iraq – perhaps the most difficult test imaginable – and in a number of other ways the Union is making progress toward a Common Foreign and Security Policy. But the Iraq war was a sharp reminder of how far away the EU remains from having the ability to play as a major, unified actor on the world stage.

It is important to note that the real factor of division among EU members (and prospective members) on Iraq was less the question of Iraq itself than the question of how to deal with the United States. Most European publics, and governments for that matter, agreed with the basic European consensus that Iraq was a problem but that it was best dealt with through containment, and that the UN weapons inspection process should be given a chance to work. The difference among them was that leaders of most EU countries – indeed all except France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg – seemed to conclude that supporting US leadership and maintaining good relations with Washington was more important than opposing the war in Iraq.

Given the importance of American power and leadership on almost every issue in the world today, overcoming this structural difference among EU members will be difficult. EU member states' interests and perspectives on most important international issues are in fact quite similar. But France and to a lesser extent

Germany seem to believe that the EU must have and sometimes use the option of building up Europe's autonomy and opposing US power. Britain, Spain, Italy and the new Central and East European members seem to believe that a strong transatlantic link must be preserved at almost any cost. So long as this fundamental difference persists – and there is little reason to believe it will disappear anytime soon – any EU attempt to stand up to the United States on a major strategic issue seems likely to lead only to major divisions within the Union. It will also encourage the United States to deal with European member states bilaterally rather than with the EU itself.

Transatlantic relations

It is an understatement to say that the Iraq war did enormous damage to transatlantic relations. The war confirmed each side's worst stereotypes of the other: many Americans saw Europeans as pacifists unwilling to takes issues of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction seriously, and many Europeans saw Americans as trigger-happy, unilateralist and militaristic. While most European governments ended up supporting the United States, most European publics did not, and certainly the relationships between Washington and the two EU capitals that most strongly opposed the war – Paris and Berlin – deteriorated to levels not seen in the postwar period.

The question is whether this deep setback to the Atlantic Alliance is permanent – the result of powerful structural trends – or merely the latest in a long line of sometimes very serious transatlantic crises that will be followed by a restoration of transatlantic cooperation. There is certainly some evidence that the problem is structural and the damage potentially enduring. Not only did the United States and some European governments disagree on Iraq, but the gap in public opinion on both sides was wide. The end of the Cold War means that Europeans and Americans no longer feel the same degree of vulnerability to a common threat. Rising US power has left the United States more responsible than Europe for maintaining world order, and has left many Americans feeling that they no longer need allies to achieve their strategic goals. Having been the victim of such devastation on 11 September 2001 and feeling more insecure since at least the

Cuban missile crisis, the United States is not prepared to subordinate its perceived security interests to relations with even long-standing allies. So no one should believe that the problems in the Alliance will be easy to fix.

At the same time, the Iraq crisis was made more severe than it needed to be by the particular personalities and policies of both sides, and this sort of clash among allies is unlikely to be repeated. Iraq was in many ways a *sui generis* case – there are not many other serious candidates for US-led preventive war. Whether or not a different US administration would have gone to war against Iraq we will never know, but it seems certain that Bush's political priorities and approach to relations with allies makes the transatlantic gap seem wider – perhaps much wider – than it really is. Moreover, the 'lessons' of Iraq, though different on both sides of the Atlantic, should push the two sides closer together. The Americans learned (or should have learned) how hard it is to replace a malevolent regime with something both more just and more stable, and that doing so in opposition to key democratic allies is even more difficult and costly. They also learned that US power and conviction alone are not enough to convince allies to follow along – sometimes diplomacy and compromise may also be necessary. The Europeans learned (or should have learned) that the result of efforts to oppose the United States on international strategic issues – especially when the United States has a plausible case for action – is not a unified EU standing up to America, but a divided EU that has little effect.

It is thus not impossible to imagine the EU and America overcoming their differences and working constructively together, even on Iraq. Elsewhere in the war on terrorism they are already doing so – judicial and intelligence cooperation is good, and in Afghanistan US and European forces are working successfully side by side. Eighteen months ago any NATO role at all in Afghanistan seemed highly unlikely; today NATO, including with French troops, is leading the international security force there. NATO has also agreed to set up a rapid-reaction Response Force – again including French participation – that could be used for out-of-area missions, including against terrorist targets. And in Iraq itself, signs of transatlantic cooperation are already starting to emerge. A large number of EU states, of course, are already part of the US-led coalition, and are providing troops and money for Iraq. But even opponents of the war like France and Germany have

started to send signals that they could play a greater and more cooperative role as conditions change. Both are now committed to substantial debt relief and considering training missions for Iraqi police and security forces, and both have stated their openness to a NATO role in Iraq. If sovereignty is transferred to an Iraqi government on schedule in the summer of 2004, and if the UN takes on a greater role in the country, the conditions will be in place for France and Germany to actively participate in the reconstruction of Iraq – and for both sides to put the crisis of 2003 behind them.

The international system

The Iraq war was a setback to the international system and world order as much as it was a setback to transatlantic relations. The UN Security Council was shown to have returned to the paralysis that characterised it during the Cold War. France, Germany, Russia, and other members of the Security Council were unwilling to back up resolutions with force, and the US ended up leading a war in Iraq without a direct mandate. Thus the hope that the Security Council could play a primary role as an arbiter of international peace and security – as it did in the first Gulf War in 1990-91 – proved unfounded. And the lesson for many Americans was that if the UN system could not enforce rules and deal with threats, and if NATO was also unwilling to do so, the United States had little choice but to act on its own.

The United States has a strong case that in a world of mass terrorism and weapons of mass destruction proliferation, the old rules of world order – non-intervention in internal affairs or a requirement for Security Council approval – do not work very well. The role played by the Security Council in the first Gulf War, in fact, was more the exception than the rule – the UN had never really played a major role in global security before then because of the Cold War, and it never really did afterwards either. In Kosovo in 1999, even most Europeans agreed that there were certain goals – such as preventing a humanitarian disaster – that mattered more than UN approval, so they intervened without a UN mandate. When inaction can lead to devastation on a massive scale, it is hard to see how a vulnerable great power like the United States will accept not to act simply because the Security Council – made up of less threatened and even undemocratic states – does not agree.

Europeans are right, of course, to worry that accepting this principle could easily turn into a blank cheque that the United States – or other powers – could abuse. If not the Security Council – or at least NATO – than who should decide if intervention is justified? If the United States can act not only against imminent threats but against even emerging potential threats, why can't Russia (against Chechnya) or India (against Pakistan) or China (against Taiwan) or Israel (against Syria)? Many Americans have been too blithe about assuming that because 'America has always stood for freedom' or because 'America is good', the world should accept that American decisions on preventive war will always be sound.

What is urgently required is a serious dialogue, among not only Americans and Europeans but also among all the world's major players, on new rules and the basis for legitimacy of military intervention. The answer to the question of when force is legitimate has to be somewhere between the Europeans' 'only when the UN says so' and the Americans' 'whenever we say so'.

John Hulsman

19

The war on terrorism

Predictably, the consequences have been greater than those regularly asserted by most European decision-makers, and less than American policy-makers would claim. First, it must be made clear that there was little direct link between al-Qaeda and the tyranny of Saddam Hussein, for the simple reason that they espoused very different ideologies. Al-Qaeda is looking to re-establish the religious unity of Islam around a caliphate (presumably led by Osama bin Laden). Baathism, the ideology of Saddam's regime, was secular, socialist, and pan-Arab. It is hard to think of any real points of common belief that would bind this motley twosome together over the long term. While both had America as an enemy, and while there doubtless was some contact between Ansar al-Islam (the local Iraqi group affiliated with al-Qaeda) and Saddam's regime, the contacts were cursory at best. Thus the suggestion, so often asserted, that Saddam and al-Qaeda somehow were in collusion with one another, simply does not stand up to scrutiny. As such, in this way Iraq has not significantly furthered the war against al-Qaeda

Of course, there is the danger of a negative link between Iraq and the war on terror. If the United States leaves behind an Iraqi government that is not deemed legitimate by the people of Iraq, for example if exiles dominate any such polity (remember that Ahmed Chalabi was last in Baghdad when the Dodgers were in Brooklyn in the 1950s), the United States will have fallen into the imperial trap. A government without legitimacy might require the Bush administration to stay in Iraq indefinitely, which would be a huge recruiting tool for al-Qaeda, proving its claim that America indeed consisted of 'crusader imperialists'.

Another, American withdrawal followed by the inevitable collapse of such a government, would strengthen al-Qaeda by illustrating that American power was in decline, as it simply didn't have the staying power to successfully provide a more pluralistic

alternative in the region. Either way, working with the grain of history, dealing with Iraqi elites (like them or not) who have local legitimacy and not imposing foreign solutions on Iraq, is the critical task for Ambassador Paul Bremer. As T. E. Lawrence said when asked by an American reporter why he was using Arabs to build a rickety bridge, rather than world-class British engineers, 'Better they build it badly than the British build it well. For it is their way, their culture, and our time here is short.' This should be the mantra for the American occupation of Iraq, for without such a philosophy there is little doubt that al-Qaeda will be energised by American political failure.

However, there has been a positive aspect to the war on terror as well. Rogue states such as Syria and especially Libya have changed their overall strategic behaviour, partly as a result of America's military success in Iraq. There is little doubt that Colonel Gaddafi acted to comply with international efforts to strip him of WMD programmes for a number of reasons. There is no doubt that Libya's economic malaise and Gaddafi's desire to secure the succession for his son played a role. However, there is also little doubt that Libya feared it might be next in America's cross-hairs after Iraq; reportedly, Gaddafi was obsessed with the photos of a chastened Saddam after his arrest. If rogue states such as Libya, formerly a breeding ground for international terrorists such as the Abu Nidal group and Black September change their ways, al-Qaeda will find it much harder to operate.

The Greater Middle East

Again, there has been more progress here than most Franco-German politicians will admit, but far less than Bush stalwarts proclaim. There is little doubt that the Bush foreign policy has ushered in a new era in the Middle East, changing previous geopolitical calculations. As stated earlier, Libya, due to fears of regime change in Tripoli stimulated by the successful military campaign in Iraq, as well as reasons of succession and its need for American foreign direct investment to rescue its sclerotic oil industry, has acquiesced to American demands to halt plans for building a nuclear capability. This in turn has led to a general diplomatic thaw between the West and Colonel Gaddafi. The fact that Iran is bordered by Amer-

ican protectorates in both Iraq and Afghanistan played a part in Tehran feeling genuine pressure to come to terms with the EU over its nuclear programme, even if the agreement is seriously flawed. In addition, Syria, desperately eager to avoid isolation, economic collapse, as well as a wrathful United States perched nearby in Baghdad, has openly been looking to begin back-channel negotiations with Israel and the United States over the Golan Heights and (in the case of America) the improvement of relations. These important shifts have been to a great extent brought about by America's successful military campaign in Iraq and its aftermath.

However, there has certainly not been the seismic shift in the region so confidently predicted by American neo-conservatives. Neo-conservatives in the Bush administration must be disappointed that the long hoped-for series of democratic revolutions in the Middle East have not come to pass. The effort to artificially transplant democratic ideals to foreign, and frequently hostile, soil is rightfully rooted in the notion that liberal democracy is the best and most just form of government. However, one cannot force an individual, much less a region, to be free. As Samuel Huntington has pointed out, 'to intrude from outside is either imperialism or colonialism, each of which violates American values'.

But to pursue the dream that democracy is likely to spread throughout the Middle East from the success of building a more pluralised Iraq (a loose confederation, allowing for the ethnic inclusion in the central government of largely autonomous Shias, Kurds, and Sunnis is probably the best-case scenario) is to ignore certain realities. I order to function properly, any regime, and none more so than a democracy, must legitimise itself in the eyes of its people. The growth of a viable democratic structure is an organic process, intimately connected with local culture and tradition. It arises from the bottom up; it can almost never be successfully imposed from the top down.

Further, such a neo-conservative strategy (while being only one strand comprising the Bush administration's overall foreign policy) ignores a dirty little secret at the heart of problems in the Middle East. The simple fact remains that it is precisely the corrupt, anti-democratic, unrepresentative regimes of Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia that are the most pro-American. It is instead the Arab 'street' that is far more virulently opposed to Washington. At present, an expansion of democracy in

the Middle East would lead to more anti-American outcomes in the region. This is the circle that the neo-conservatives in the Bush administration simply cannot square.

So again, on both sides of the Atlantic, the utopian arguments that preceded the war in Iraq – that it would change everything in the region or nothing – have not come to pass.

The European Union's role as a global actor

The war in Iraq made plain what I have been saying for a long time – when it comes to politico-military matters the emperor is simply wearing no clothes. Despite all its grand pronouncements, over Iraq the EU showed itself to be a political and military pygmy. Nor should the standard, quasi-religious EU refrain at any evidence of its impotence be accepted; failure over Iraq will not galvanise Brussels into successful efforts to become more coherent, as though national interests of its member states could be abolished. If anything, the events in Europe since Iraq have further illustrated continued European strategic incoherence.

Any 'Euro-topians' who believed that states do not remain the key actors in the international system as realism would dictate, particularly over matters of war and peace, received a rude awakening over Iraq. Based on differing national interests, the true diplomatic story of the Iraq crisis was not Europe versus the United States . . . but Europe versus Europe. Most of the governments in Central and Eastern Europe, Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom supported the Bush administration's call for regime change, with France and Germany forming an opposing pole against such an endeavour. In the end, however, both European positions had little to do with how they assessed Saddam Hussein and the threat he might or might not pose: instead, European stances had everything to do with how Europeans felt about American power in the post-11 September era. The split amongst Europeans over this seminal question remains the key (and underreported) story of the crisis. Without it being resolved in one way or another, the question of the *raison d'être* of the EU in the post-11 September era cannot be answered.

While many problems have arisen since the failure of the EU to coherently address the Iraq crisis, making a mockery of its galvanising effect to propel European unity (the Stability Pact

debacle, anaemic European growth, the failure of European states (with the exception of the United Kingdom and France) to spend an adequate amount of money on defence), none has loomed so large as the EU's constitutional failure. For functionalism, putting off making broad strategic choices and instead proceeding incrementally until trends become clearer and unanimity can be attained, no longer serves the interests of the union. Broad, significant existential questions remain. What is the purpose of the EU? How much integration is welcomed by the member states? Is it designed to challenge or complement the United States? What will be its ultimate political structure and can it derive genuine democratic legitimacy? These must now be answered if Brussels is to retain any measure of coherence. The failure to really begin this process through the adoption of a commonly agreed constitution belies an EU that matters only peripherally in the international system. Remember, while many people in Washington got Prime Ministers Blair and Aznar on the phone (and even Chancellor Schröder and President Chirac), I can attest to the fact that no one in Washington asked for the number of Javier Solana. The Iraq crisis has hopefully made this reality clear.

Transatlantic relations

As the fabulously successful twelve-step programme pioneered by Alcoholics Anonymous has conclusively demonstrated, one cannot tackle a crisis until acknowledging the reality of a genuine problem. Throughout the 1990s, mutual exchanges of pleasantries and the vague rhetoric of a 'Europe whole and free' obscured the fact that the transatlantic relationship was increasingly in crisis, with a significant portion of the European political elite viewing the United States as part of the problem in international politics, rather than as part of the solution to global problems.

In the past several years, there have been genuine policy differences between the United States and its European allies over: the 'banana war'; genetically modified foods; the American Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) tax; Europe's refusal to substantially reform the CAP and the repercussions this holds for the Doha global free trade round; the moral justness of the death penalty; whether Cuba, Syria and Iran should be engaged or isolated; Iraq; the Israeli-Palestinian crisis; the role international institutions

should play in the global arena; when states ought to be allowed to use military force; ideological divisions between American realists, neo-conservatives and European Wilsonians; the Kyoto Protocol; the International Criminal Court; American steel tariffs; National Missile Defence and the US abrogation of the ABM Treaty; the military debate within NATO regarding burden-sharing and power-sharing; American unilateralism; Turkey's role in the West; widely varying global threat assessments; the efficacy of nation-building; and how to organise an economy for best societal effect, to name a number. This incomplete list should make it crystal clear to the most complacent of analysts that drift in the transatlantic relationship is about far more than carping, black leather-clad, ineffectual Europeans ranting about American dominance from the safety of a Parisian café. It is a bitter truth that in the run-up to the Iraq war, polling in Europe consistently showed a majority of the public more worried about unfettered American power than about Saddam. The drift, which began far before the Iraq crisis illuminated the problem for all to see, is at least partly centred on fundamental philosophical and structural differences among people on both sides of the Atlantic with very different views of how the world should be ordered.

However, not only did America go from strength to strength in the 1990s, Europe has conspicuously failed to emerge as a coherent power in its own right, in relative economic, political and military terms. This sense of a resurgent and increasingly unfettered America, coupled with an introverted, increasingly marginalised Europe, does much to explain not only the differences in policy across the Atlantic, but also the increased virulence some Europeans feel toward American policies. In the end, such differences are equal parts philosophy and power: it is not just that European Gaullists feel American international policies are merely wrong; increasingly, they feel they have no power to affect them, even at the margins. This change in political psychology does much to explain both the rise of anti-American Gaullism in parts of Europe and the increasing drift in the transatlantic relationship.

However, Gaullism is not the only European view of America after Iraq. Even among those who don't necessarily approve of the US policy regarding Saddam, some are starting to question the wisdom of the recalcitrant Franco-German position. For at present, President Chirac and Chancellor Schröder have less influence over the sole remaining superpower than does my intern. (Some in

the Administration read what he researches and says; the same is not true of French and German missives.) The very lack of European unity that hamstrings Gaullist efforts to challenge the United States presents America with a unique opportunity. If Europe is more about diversity than uniformity, if the concept of a unified 'Europe' has yet to really exist, then a general American transatlantic foreign policy based on cherry-picking – engaging coalitions of willing European states on a case-by-case basis – becomes entirely possible. Such a stance is palpably in America's interests, as it provides a method of managing transatlantic drift while remaining engaged with a continent that will rarely be wholly for, or wholly against, specific American foreign policy initiatives. Such a sensible middle course steers between the Scylla of not caring about bringing along allies and the Charybdis of allowing a perpetually divided Europe to scupper all American diplomatic and military initiatives.

The international system

Unlike the First and Second World Wars and the end of the Cold War, victory in Iraq has not changed the fundamental nature of the international system. Before, during, and after the war, the United States remained the sole superpower, if not one with unlimited power. Iraq, for all the drama of the diplomatic crisis preceding the war, the lightning-quick American military victory, and the painful post-conflict efforts to establish a more pluralist and stable country, has not changed (in terms of polarity) the basic contours of the world. But what it may end up doing, if we are lucky, is to highlight what was already there.

What then is the nature of the third millennium? Samuel Huntington rightly diagnoses the post-Cold War era as being unimultipolar. It is this structural characterisation that is primarily causing the diagnostic problem that analysts have had in describing America's role in the post-11 September order. The United States does not fit naturally into the multipolar world of European Wilsonians or the unipolar world of American neo-conservatives. This elusive reality is precisely what confronts the United States today. Presently, America is *primus inter pares*; chairman of the board of all power indices, be they military, economic, political, cultural or diplomatic. In focusing on the chairman's role,

neo-conservatives miss the salient fact that there are other members of the board who need to be engaged in each case. In focusing on the board members, Wilsonians miss the key point that the United States is always chairman.

In this, America finds itself in a peculiarly similar structural position to post-Waterloo Britain. It stands to reason that many of the policies and precepts that successfully guided British statesmen in the nineteenth century ought to have special relevance for America at the dawn of the twenty-first. (1) Having just defeated an aspiring revolutionary hegemon (Napoleon and the USSR respectively), foreign policy should be primarily directed at stopping the appearance of another. (2) The ordering power should only get directly militarily involved if a threat develops at the global or regional level, and threatens the maintenance of a favourable status quo. There is no need for a hyperactive foreign policy. Due to the concept of imperial overstretch, there is indeed much to recommend against such a course of action. (3) An emerging threat from a possible hegemon can be defined with some precision: that of a rival uniting either major section of the Eurasian landmass. Pursuing balance-of-power politics, allying the preeminent power with the second greatest regional power or powers against the emerging threat, should always be the diplomatic gambit of choice. (4) Given the uni-multipolar structure of the world, it follows that behaving 'multilaterally where possible, unilaterally where necessary' should be the standard modus operandi in foreign policy. Coalitions, when they are entered into, should be of the willing, and limited to specific, tangible foreign policy goals. (5) Given unchallenged economic dominance, policies furthering the opening of the international commons (free trade, open sea lanes, suppression of piracy/terrorism) benefit the ordering power both directly and by providing benefits for other countries, who are then more likely to support the ordering power's leading global position. (6) A dominant cultural position should be taken advantage of by the ordering power, directly co-opting élites throughout the world by exposure to the power's cultural norms, as well as setting normative standards for the global discourse. If America were to learn the lessons of history, now that Iraq has illuminated the structural order of the international system, the world might indeed be a better place.

Catherine McArdle Kelleher[1]

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The war on terrorism

In many respect, the war on terror was the first casualty of the decision to launch the war against Iraq. At the most obvious level, this action further confused what was already a definitional muddle about the nature of the terror war. Was the attack against Iraq an extension to this war? A core part of that war? Or something in-between? The situation was made even more difficult by Bush administration claims of direct links between Iraq and al-Qaeda that led to a popular belief in the United States that somehow Saddam Hussein had been involved in the attacks of 9/11. Only in the autumn of 2003 were there clear presidential statements that such linkages did not exist; Vice President Cheney continued the confusion until well into January 2004.

This confusion thus led increasingly led to a conflation of the war in Iraq and the war on terrorism. President Bush's proclaimed willingness to deal in the Iraq context with radical Islamic terrorists from elsewhere (the 'bring 'em on' speech) actually preceded a late 2003 increase in the pattern of violent attacks that could be credibly attributed to such groups. Political attention focused understandably on the events of combat and resistance; the post-conflict situation in Afghanistan and the worldwide terrorist networks received far less press comment and public analysis.

The real costs came, however, in the diversion of American attention and forces from defence against terrorists to the more pressing operational requirements in Iraq. In Washington, the pace of organising for the new tasks of homeland security was slowed significantly. Two years after 9/11, officials in New York and other cities thought at risk complained about the meagre flow of resources and the failure even to begin the protection of critical infrastructure components. The tasks at the federal level were still left hanging beyond those outlined in the restrictive and questionable Patriot Act regulations passed in the immediate

1. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the US Navy or of the United States government as a whole.

aftermath of 9/11. Most visible evidence of the confusion and neglect was to be found in the largely unfinished business of organising the new Homeland Security Department. Only one example: the troubling points of overlapping responsibility between the Pentagon and the new cabinet department have still not been fully clarified.

More importantly, important skills and personnel at home and abroad were applied in the first instance to the continuing conflict in Iraq. This was true for key military and military police units as well as for civilian specialists in reconstruction and political reconstitution. Even the search for Osama bin Laden seemed to be given lower priority, not to mention the clean-up of remaining Taliban hiding places within Afghanistan.

The Greater Middle East

The historical impact of the war in Iraq on the political and military balance in the Greater Middle East is still an open question. The debate in Washington now is far more muted than before. The projections of the neo-conservatives in the Bush administration about a new wave of democracy in the Middle East seem far more questionable after the widespread Iraqi criticism and conflict over political reconstruction. The establishment of Iraq as a model democracy to hearten dissidents elsewhere or perhaps to deter other regimes from further repressive practices seems a vision with little chance of even medium-term realisation.

More telling is the demonstrated willingness of the United States, the preponderant military power, to wage a war of choice in pursuit of political goals in the Middle East. The purported intention during the last campaign days to wheel on Syria, the reported disregard of borders, and the critical disengagement from Saudi Arabia – all represent dramatic departures from past US foreign policy, in substance and in style. The impact of US actions on the Arab 'street' have been weighed and found by Bush officials to be of second-order importance, at least in the short and medium term

Much of the final historical judgment will depend on how the continuing conflicts in Iraq end and what the political assessment is of the stability and the democratic nature of the post-Saddam

regime. Domestic criticism in the United States is now more vocal concerned not only with rationales and costs but also about the failure to articulate an overall vision of the way forward. Critics in Europe and elsewhere are far more damning in their assessment of the follies of trying to impose democracy or to ignore the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the root cause of future problems and unrest. The Bush administration, however, believes it has laid down a strong marker on the goals sought by the United States and the degree of national prestige and treasure that will be devoted to the pursuit of these goals.

A crucial test of Bush's resolve will come in the effort to persuade NATO to become involved in the next stages of normalisation in Iraq. There will certainly be a bid to have NATO assume direct responsibility for the sector now assigned to the Poles; a NATO force (practically, a coalition of willing NATO powers) will no longer just provide support but also enforce order and foster political evolution. The NATO mandate will in turn probably require UN concurrence, if not as a formal resolution then a Kosovo-type blessing. At least equally difficult will be the proposed extension of a NATO PfP-like arrangement to the Middle East, the Bush Greater Middle East Initiative, which foresees a framework that will include Israel and at least some Arab states.

The European Union's role as a global actor

The year since the Iraq war began has seen great division and debate over the EU's present and potential role as a global actor. The stakes involved are now clearer, particularly for the big European powers, Britain, France, and Germany. But so too are the fundamental fissures that divide Europe and its 'big three', separate the goals of 'new' and 'old' Europe, and dictate divergent short-term tactics and long-term strategies that the EU should pursue towards its own further integration and towards the United States.

For the integration process, this is nothing new. Every great debate in the Union's history has seen similar divisions and a zigzag, active-quiet pattern in European diplomacy. Emotions have run higher than normal at some points – the failure to agree on the EU Constitution, for example. Fears about what further enlargement might mean and the desire to pre-empt the risks of

too much or too little change forced by the new members have also plumbed new political depths. But these developments have run in parallel with emerging consensus on the European strategy paper developed by Javier Solana, the re-emergence of Franco-British-German security talks and the solution of a myriad trade and border issues. These may in themselves be of lesser importance perhaps, but still reveal the fundamental across-the–board commitment to a European global role.

What form that will take will require further debate and undoubtedly more zig and more zag after expansion as all states wrestle with the new modes of negotiation and decision-making. There will also be scepticism from Washington, whoever the President. Consensus strategies in the trade field are one model, but the Doha Round test still lies ahead. Another model might be one that stresses the new consensus statements on Russia and its stance in negotiation with the EU and on its domestic actions. Common actions in Macedonia or in the Congo seem limited steps that pale in comparison to what is needed in the future. A single European foreign service, common embassies, EU seats at the IMF and World Bank tables are for the distant future but most are convinced that the process of creating the ESDP framework is at least under way.

What is emerging, too, is an ad hoc network (or is it, as Julian Lindley-French argues, a cobweb) of extra-European involvement in basic security issues. In Iraq, Britain, Poland, Italy and Spain are active players; in seeking an end to an Iranian nuclear programme, the lead was taken by Britain, France, and Germany. On Libya, it is the United States and the United Kingdom, but backed through the new ad hoc coalition under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) that involved Germany and Italy at least in the stopping of a shipload of centrifuges. Britain's role in Europe is key, and how Blair or a successor will play that card is perhaps the critical question in the short term.

Transatlantic relations

Transatlantic relations are the area most directly affected by the decision to attack Iraq; the fallout for the Alliance and for each allied capital has been enormous. The transatlantic alliance, *pace*

pious myth, has always been wracked by disputes. But perhaps only the bitter outcome of the Suez crisis in 1956 can rival the sense of conflict and frustration felt in capitals at the height of the debate over Iraq.

Almost all involved are now attempting to bridge or moderate the divisions that have appeared, and to find new areas for public cooperation and moderation. German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer's comments at the Wehrkunde meeting in February perhaps best summed up the new mood on both sides of the Atlantic: to paraphrase, 'you were and still are wrong, but let's move forward'. This will be difficult, given the persistence of resentment about the diplomatic showdown at the UN and the daily challenges arising from Iraq. Moreover, mobilised anti-Americanism in Europe is at an all-time high since 1949 and anti-European feeling is moderating but has not disappeared in parts of the United States. But other motives – elections, clear requirements, even the fundamental understanding of the need for cooperative action in Washington, DC and in Brussels –will take priority and lead capitals to restore much, if not all, of the *status quo ante* within the year.

The deeper crisis, however, will remain below the surface, awaiting the next crisis flash-point. In part, this is the necessary consequences of the failure, since 1991, to critically re-examine the premises and expectations of alliance and alliance membership. If NATO is not just a toolbox for emergencies, what is it, especially after expansion? If it is not a forum for thoroughgoing consultation and cooperative action on some, if not all, of the critical security issues, what is it? How will the gap between the capabilities of the United States and those of most alliance members be bridged – or do these even need to be?

NATO is already transformed and bears little resemblance to the sleepy organisation or the glacial policy debate forum of, say, the 1980s. Evolution is taking place – the impact of an evolved PfP, the new roles and mechanisms evolving from taking action in the Balkans and now in Afghanistan, even the dawning recognition, on all sides, of the role of niche capabilities within the traditional military planning process. The question now is how will this cumulate into more coherent policy implementation and planning structures, and how much can be left to the unforeseeable decisions made by not yet elected governments on both sides of the Atlantic?

The international system

For the international system, the war in Iraq, along with the events of 9/11, marks the end of the first transition phase after the end of the Cold War in 1989-91. The initial dreams of a renewed United Nations, of the effortless expansion of the stability and peaceful prosperity of Europe progressively to other regions, of resetting of international organisations to different goals and different responsibilities – are now decisively ended. The conflicts of the past decade stand in sharp relief, the return to small- and large-scale violence, however targeted, now seems again the expected. Ethnic hatreds flare up continuously, and the weapons at hand – machetes to nuclear missiles – seem to be gaining, or at least not losing, utility in the eyes of an impressive group of countries and non-state actors

The philosophical debate, though, remains focused on the same question that has fascinated the West since 1991, or perhaps even since 1945: the relationship between power and legitimacy. Without a UN mandate, is the use of force justified? What are the limits of action in the name of national security? What kind of UN can give legitimacy to national or international action in the twenty-first century? What is the present operational definition of sovereignty in an era in which human and civil rights are granted the highest priority by many; in which the risk of nuclear proliferation appears to justify direct intervention not only into passage on the high seas (as in the PSI) but into domestic courts and scientific endeavours; in which the evolving doctrine of humanitarian intervention suggests new standards for sovereign political behaviour towards those within the sovereign's border?

In the 1990s, the favourite tool of analysts was the design of new international architectures in which to enmesh the powers and to guide the pursuit of both peace and privilege. Whether theoretical or actual, the institution-building exercise no longer seems adequate to the challenges, given what we believe to be the sources of terrorism, the rise of new technological risks and the proliferation of technologically empowered non-state actors. Focus on the intersection of the rise of terrorist threats and the proliferation of WMD, and strategies to deter/defend against this is only one approach to the challenges that seem destined to continue at least in the medium term.

As the Berlin Wall fell, more than one sage was heard to say that we would soon yearn for the frozen stalemate and relative predictability of the late Cold War stand-off. We are not yet there, and the relative gains in the transparency and openness, the individual rights and freedoms enjoyed by many more people since 1989-91 will for now more than tip the balance in another direction. But the dominant pattern of the first years of the twenty-first century suggests few easy answers and no surety that even the most fundamental reforms now dreamed about – at the state or international level – will suffice to secure stability, let alone peace.

Andrew Moravcsik

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Underlying the American decision to go to war in Afghanistan and Iraq was a neo-conservative credo professed in the Anglo-American world by the likes of Robert Kagan, William Kristol and Charles Krauthammer. It goes as follows: in the unipolar world of the post-Cold War era, the United States possesses predominant military power, which can be used cost-effectively to capture terrorists, reshape alliances, and, above all, spread democracy. Like any country enjoying a preponderance of military power, the United States has a tendency and a responsibility to use it. Multilateral institutions are useful only in so far as they compliment these geopolitical realities.

Europe, so the argument continues, can wield little global influence outside of its own peaceful Kantian 'paradise'.[1] The only chance for Europe to wield influence is to imitate the United States and build up a substantial military force. Conservatives encourage the Europeans to do this through NATO, fearing that the EU will become a military rival. Most Europeans also advocate a military build-up – rather paradoxically, since few consider themselves neo-conservatives. Laurent Fabius, the former French Prime Minister, believes that the lesson of Iraq is that Europe 'was unable to make its voice heard in the US because it was divided and lacked a unified defence'.[2]

Events of the past three years have tested this neo-conservative doctrine. And what have we learned? One basic premise – the predominance of US military power, and the resulting temptation to use it – has proven quite correct. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States prevailed militarily. Yet despite its pre-eminence in classical military matters, the United States is increasingly frustrated abroad. Few lessons of the past two years are agreed by everyone, but one is: 'It is harder to wage peace than to wage war'. The fiscal, military, political and diplomatic costs of using military force are far higher than anyone imagined. In the words of Harvard University President and former Treasury Secretary

1. Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Knopf, 2003).

2. Cited in Andrew Moravcsik, 'How Europe can Win without an Army,' *Financial Times*, 3 April 2003. All cited publications by the present author are available at www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~moravcs/.

Lawrence Summers: 'The central paradox confronting the United States is this: American power is at its zenith and American influence is at its nadir.'[3]

This is the basic perspective from which I will consider the lessons we might learn from recent world politics in five areas: fighting terrorism, managing the Greater Middle East, the European Union's role as a global actor, transatlantic relations and the nature of the international system.

The war on terrorism

Military responses to terrorism, while sometimes necessary, are insufficient. Most agree that intervention in Afghanistan after 9/11 was legitimate and, in the short term, effective. The level of sustained Western cooperation in Afghanistan – as in the first Gulf War, which was similarly viewed as a legitimate response to aggression – remains higher than in any other Western 'out-of-area' action since the end of the Second World War. In Iraq, however, the rhetorical equation of combating al-Qaeda terrorism, countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and promoting human rights behind US unilateral pre-emption now seems expensive, divisive, ineffective and inaccurate.

The splashy capture of Saddam Hussein cannot belie the fact that terrorist activity directed at the United States in Iraq and elsewhere has increased. US occupation of Iraq has re-energised recruiting of terrorists, and the country itself has become a magnet for terrorists using increasingly high concentrations of explosives. In a year since the start of the war the combined total of American dead (around 500) and Iraqi dead (uncounted but surely many times that) surpass the number who died on 9/11. Should the United States achieve anything short of a successful transition to stable democracy in Iraq – a possibility that appears distant and unlikely – it is likely to leave a failed or fragmented state behind. Such states (e.g. Lebanon, Afghanistan, Somalia) are the primary breeding grounds for global terrorism. The demonstration effect of Iraq on potential proliferators like North Korea, Iran and Libya remains unclear, but surely it is not the only force for accommodation. So it is hard to conclude that the war in Iraq, as opposed to the war in Afghanistan, has done much to support the war on terrorism.

3. Lawrence H. Summers, 'Europe and America in the 21st century', Lecture at London School of Economics, London, 13 November 2003; available at: http://www.president.harvard.edu/speeches/2003/lse.html.

The Greater Middle East

With the collapse of arguments based on non-proliferation or terrorism, the assurance of a peaceful transformation of Iraq to democracy – and the long-term democratic transformation of the Middle East – has become the primary justification for war in Iraq. Many have noted the irony: an Administration that came into office priding itself on its realist rejection of the quixotic nation-building associated with the Democratic party is now cast in the role of the Wilsonian idealist.

Trumpeting human rights and democracy makes for compelling domestic political rhetoric. So it is hardly surprising that the contention that Saddam Hussein is a 'bad guy', and that we would all be better off if Iraq were a democracy, has garnered considerable support among those in the liberal centre of the American political spectrum. Yet eventually one must deliver on the ground.

The failure to do so is, in part, a sad testament to the bureaucratic politics of the Bush administration. We now know that the US government belief that such a project of reform could easily be achieved rested on inadequate, indeed *deliberately* inadequate, pre-war planning.[4] This overconfidence stemmed above all from a quite conscious ideological construction of world politics trumpeted by David Flum, Richard Perle and others as the true lesson of Iraq.[5] As Prof. John Mearsheimer has observed, the Bush administration aim of democratising the Middle East is grounded in the assumption that Islamic militants hate us *for what we are*.[6] If one holds this view, then the only solution is to *make them like us* – that is, a Wilsonian sort of imperialism aimed at of democratising the Middle East, by force if necessary, and re-educating its populace. The underlying premise of the Bush policy lies in a 'clash of civilisations'.[7] Once one takes this extreme view, US policy failure becomes a difficult thing to explain, and the search for scapegoats follows. Some centrist supporters of the war, such as Thomas Friedman of the *New York Times*, are now compelled to explain its failure by criticising European allies more vociferously than does the Administration – as if the absence of another 30,000 European troops were the real problem in Iraq.

Soberer analysis, according to Mearsheimer, reveals that the tension between the West (particularly the United States) and

4. James Fallows, 'Blind into Baghdad', *Atlantic Monthly*, January-February 2004; available at http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2004/01/media-preview/fallows.htm.

5. David Frum and Richard Perle, *An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror* (New York: Random House, 2003).

6. John Mearsheimer, 'The Role of Containment in the Post-Cold War World', Conference for the George Kennan Centennial, Princeton University, February 2004.

7. This despite the fact that Samuel Huntington, who coined the phrase, has been notable in his unwillingness to publicly support the war in Iraq.

most members of the Islamic world is not primarily about what the West or Islam *is*, but *what each side has done*. They hate us not because of who we are, but *because of our policies*. It is the stationing of US troops in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, traditional US support for repressive regimes in the region, regular US intervention in the Middle East over half a century, US oil interests and perceived US support for an apparently neo-colonialist policy of the current Israeli government in the West Bank that triggers strong Islamic antipathy. This explains why the United States, Israel and moderate Arab states, but not the countries of Western Europe and Japan, are the target of Islamic terrorism. If so, then the US goal – an easier goal to achieve, all things considered – ought to be to extricate itself delicately from such controversial diplomatic and military commitments in the region. On balance, the Iraq crisis – and particularly the current, albeit easily foreseeable, fear of the Bush administration with regard to democratising Iraq – suggests that the latter view has merit.

Yet the difficulty of reconstruction and reform in Iraq also highlights, above all, a fundamental weakness of the United States that is independent of the party in power. In contrast to its swift and effective military establishment, the US foreign policy apparatus finds it extremely difficult to deploy effective 'civilian power' in world politics. Limited by Congress, the United States provides relatively modest amounts of civilian foreign aid, as a percentage of GDP, with aid heavily concentrated on a few strategic countries. It also provides it, studies show, in a remarkably inefficient manner, in large part due to its wariness of multilateral institutions and the related tendency to impose parochial political conditions. US processes of trade policy-making are similarly constrained by cumbersome checks and balances. When President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan, the linchpin of US strategy in the region, recently arrived in Washington and asked, above all, for one key type of political assistance, a modest textile quota, President Bush rebuffed him outright. He had to, because electoral and Congressional politics demanded it. The US defence establishment resists peacekeeping missions, leading to the outsourcing of police duties referred to by critics as 'imperialism lite'. The United States finds it relatively difficult to share intelligence and influence with, let alone trust and bolster, international monitoring efforts. And, above all, the United States has wilfully manoeuvred itself into a

position where it cannot credibly employ international institutions to legitimate and muster support for its policies.

Were the US government to swiftly embrace the view that it is US policies, not the essence of Western identity, that engender hostility in the Islamic world, and recognise its own weaknesses in manipulating civilian power, it would at a stroke create the basis for steady Western cooperation to manage the Middle East. Such cooperation would bring Americans and Europeans together. This raises the question of the EU's role in such cooperation, to which we now turn.

The European Union's role as a global actor

European policy during the year preceding Iraq was characterised by a remarkable lack of seriousness. No European government devoted even modest financial or political capital to the construction of a realistic policy alternative to a US invasion. 'Old European' policy remained almost entirely rhetorical. Moving forward, the nagging question remains: how is the West to combat terrorism, proliferation and Islamic extremism? If Europe is to eschew regional isolation and step into a global role, it must choose among – or a mix among – two options: a European military build-up and the further development of 'civilian power'.[8]

The policy response most widely advocated on both sides of the Atlantic is to establish a more unified European military with the sort of high-intensity capabilities employed by NATO in Kosovo. Such a force would, it is argued, make Europe self-sufficient in dealing with immediate security threats, project European power abroad, provide respectable support for the United States, bolster European pride, and increase European influence with the United States. Depending on their politics and political culture, European commentators differ on whether such power should be deployed inside or outside of NATO, and on whether, more broadly, it should be deployed as an adjunct, alternative or counterweight to US power – but there is remarkable agreement in Europe that something should be done to increase Europe's military power vis-à-vis the United States.

No doubt an EU military wing would make for 'feel-good' politics in Europe. European publics will feel that something is being

8. For a more detailed exposition, see Andrew Moravcsik, 'Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain', *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2003.

done to balance unipolar America. The French, British and Germans could all stay on board, as Gerhard Schröder, Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac and Javier Solana could push their candidates (or themselves) for the job of future EU 'foreign minister'.

As a serious strategy for global influence, however, a European military build-up would do nothing to alter US-European relations or transform the Middle East. It is unlikely that Europeans will spend the money, or approve the wrenching industrial and political upheavals, necessary to create a serious high-intensity force. Nor are they likely to agree on conditions for its use. Even if the fiscal and political barriers were overcome, the force would have few if any plausible scenarios for autonomous action. The future Yugoslavia's will be in Chechnya, Algeria, Morocco, Iran or Pakistan – unsavoury spots for intervention, particularly without American back-up. And even if deployed somewhere, such a force would have no impact on US policy. The US military does not want or need high-intensity assistance. The United States does desire peacekeepers, but the Europeans already possess more than they are prepared to use.

Even more importantly, militarisation betrays European ideals and interests. Over the past year, European governments and publics have argued passionately that the US preference for hyper-military responses to terrorist threats has been short-sighted and ineffectual. European critics reject Kagan's celebrated but anachronistically narrow concept of international power, whereby the citizens of military superpowers are admirable Martians and all others parochial Venusians. Such objections are deeply grounded in an admirable European idealism about the potential efficacy of non-military foreign policy instruments. And yet now, after Washington both ignored and confirmed European warnings by invading Iraq without clear multilateral support and plummeting into a quagmire of nation-building, Europeans are hankering for a larger army. Kagan must be pleased: he has converted a continent!

Underlying it all, the real problem is that European defence schemes distract Europe from its true comparative advantage in world politics: the cultivation of civilian and quasi-military power. Europe is the 'Quiet Superpower': it possesses five instruments that, taken in total, constitute an influence over peace and war as great as that of the United States.

First, *trade policy*. EU accession is perhaps the single most powerful policy instrument for peace and security in the world today. In 10-15 potential member states, authoritarian, intolerant or corrupt governments have recently lost elections to democratic, market-oriented coalitions held together by the promise of eventual EU membership. This is a decade-long record of democratisation that the United States, with all its military might, cannot match. This could be replicated in Turkey through EU accession and elsewhere through assertive use of trade arrangements, since the EU is the major trading partner of every country in the Middle East, including Israel.

Second, *aid*. Europeans provide more than 70 per cent of all civilian development assistance in the world today. This is four times more than the United States contributes and is far more equitably and efficiently disbursed, often by multilateral organisations. When the shooting stops in Palestine, Kosovo, Afghanistan, it is the Europeans who are called on to rebuild, reconstruct and reform.

Third, *peacekeeping and policing*. European troops, generally under multilateral auspices, help keep the peace in trouble spots as disparate as Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire and Afghanistan. EU members and applicants contribute ten times as many peacekeeping troops as the United States. The aftermath in Iraq shows how costly peacekeeping can be: it has sapped US military capability and undermined public support for internationalist policies.

Fourth, *monitoring by international institutions*. International inspections, supported by Europe, can help build the global trust that is needed to manage serious crises. The Iraq crisis might have developed very differently if the Europeans had cared enough to offer the option of sending, say, ten times as many weapons inspectors to Iraq, ten months earlier.

Last, *multilateral legitimation*. In the world today, multilateral legitimacy is the basis of 'soft power' – the power to attract rather than compel.[9] The Iraq crisis has demonstrated the extraordinary effect of multilateral institutions on global opinion. In country after country, polls have shown that a second United Nations Security Council resolution would have given public opinion a 30-40 per cent swing in favour of military action. In countries like Chile, Mexico and, above all, Turkey, failure to pass a second resolution was decisive in undermining support for the United States.

9. Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004).

Trade, aid, peacekeeping, monitoring and multilateral legitimation are Europe's real sources of global influence. Even modest progress on difficult civilian tasks – like tightening ties with Turkey, developing EU flexibility on the Israeli-Palestinian question, establishing a multinational coercive inspection force for WMD, or cutting agricultural subsidies – would do more, euro-for-euro, to promote world peace and security than construction of a 'Euro-force'. They would also do more for European integration. Whereas the EU's involvement in defence policy is minor, and this is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, no one can deny its powerful, sometimes predominant, role in managing trade, aid, and European policy toward multilateral organisations.

Transatlantic relations

What does this mean for the transatlantic alliance? Any successful alliance must be built on the basis of *complementarity* – that is, a division of labour based on comparative advantage.[10] The central policy issue is how to make such specialisation satisfactory for each partner and efficient for the alliance as a whole. The European comparative advantage – and its only hope of influence with the United States – is to provide what the United States does not have, namely assertive and efficient civilian power. Rather than carping about US military power, or hankering after it, Europe would do better to invest its political and budgetary capital in a distinctive complement to it.

Many Europeans worry that in a Western alliance where the United States is the dominant military partner and Europe the dominant civilian partner, they will be disadvantaged. How often one hears the homily: 'American does the cooking, and Europe does the cleaning'. Yet this metaphor is misleading. In fact, a European focus on civilian and low-intensity military power would strengthen Europe's influence vis-à-vis the United States – and thereby strengthen the Western alliance. Were European countries, singly or collectively, to explicitly condition their provision of civilian power – trade, aid, peacekeepers, monitoring and multilateral legitimacy – on US self-restraint, Europe might get its way more often, and without a bigger army. This would be good for the

10. For an elaboration, see Moravcsik, op. cit. in note 8.

West and the world as well, for without trade, aid, peacekeeping, monitoring and legitimacy, no amount of unilateral military can stabilise an unruly world.

The international system

My years of government service are behind me, and I am now a professor of political science. Thus it is fitting that I close not with a *tour d'horizon* of major global issues, but by reflecting on what the foregoing analysis of the last two years in world politics teaches us about world politics in general. The lesson is clear: military preeminence does not have the decisive positive impact on global politics that neo-conservatives ascribe to it. It is far more costly to enforce a *Pax Americana* than to wage war American-style. In fiscal terms, even the current inadequate commitment is costly. The West is relearning the lesson learned in the process of decolonisation half a century ago, namely that military force alone cannot create stable government and trusty allies in the developing world. The use of non-military power resources like trade, aid, peacekeeping, monitoring and multilateral legitimation was critical to Western victory in the Cold War — and it is all the more true with respect to current threats posed by terrorism, WMD, and rogue states.[11] Any viable Western strategy must be grounded in this fundamental premise.

11. Joseph S. Nye, op.cit. in note 9.

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Abbreviations

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile (Treaty)
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CENTCOM	Central Command
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy (PESC in French)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union (UE in French)
EUCOM	European Command
G-8	Group of Eight leading industrialised nations/democracies
GWAT	Global War Against Terrorism
HQ	Headquarters
HR-CFSP	High Representative for the CFSP
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICC	International Criminal Court
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
IRA	Irish Republican Army
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (OTAN in French)
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PfP	Partnership for Peace
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
UN	United Nations (ONU in French)
UNSC	UN Security Council
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organisation

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The war on Iraq was without any doubt the main international event in the security arena in 2003. In 2004, the ramifications of the war are taking centre stage as policy-makers gauge the future of Iraq, the Middle East, transatlantic relations and the role of international organisations.

This *Chaillot Paper* takes stock of the consequences of the Iraqi war one year after the initiation of the military campaign in March 2003. Rather than provide a definitive or conclusive verdict on the implications of the war, its objective is to offer a number of viewpoints concerning developments in its aftermath. Given the divergences that the war created, not only between the United States and Europe but also within the EU, we invited a wide spectrum of authors to participate in this project in order to get as representative a picture as possible. To do so, twenty-one authors from Europe and the United States were asked to respond to five questions covering different aspects of international relations. Respondents were asked to give their views on the consequences of the war in Iraq on:

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