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ENLARGEMENT: A NEW NATO

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Contents

Born in 1943, William Hopkinson read History at Pembroke College Cambridge and entered the Home Civil Service in 1965. Transferring from the Treasury to the Ministry of Defence in 1986, he was appointed Head of the Defence Arms Control Unit in 1988 and Assistant Under Secretary of State (Policy) in 1993. As such he was particularly concerned with bilateral relationships with members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact. He was also responsible for European security institutions including NATO, WEU and EU matters, and for oversight of negotiations on arms control treaties.

He was Visiting Fellow in the Global Security Programme, Cambridge, 1991-1992 and on leaving Government service in 1997 he joined the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), becoming Deputy Director and Director of Studies before retiring in June 2000 to read and write. His particular concerns are: Transatlantic relations and Forceful Intervention. He is an Associate Fellow of the Royal United Services Institute and Chatham House, and a Visiting Fellow at the Centre for International Studies, Cambridge University. This *Chaillot Paper* was written while he was a senior visiting fellow at the Institute.

Preface

What is NATO for? The question, which some may find provocative, is none the less the essential one concerning the future of the Alliance – its legitimacy, its missions and its desirable or foreseeable geographical enlargement. Logically, the Allies should agree on the Alliance's future role and priorities before deciding on the next enlargement – which is due to happen in May 2002. Being an essentially political issue, however, they will tackle it quite differently, enlargement often being seen as an end in itself rather than a necessary stage in adapting NATO to the post-Cold War world. That is the approach brilliantly taken in this *Chaillot Paper* by William Hopkinson, formerly a high-ranking British civil servant, a senior visiting fellow at the Institute in spring 2001 and one of the foremost European experts on NATO and European security in general.

This paper was written before the terrorist attacks on the United States of 11 September 2001, whose true strategic impact on US policy, the Alliance and the international system in general nobody can as yet estimate. It is probable that the question of NATO enlargement will have to be rethought, in common with European security as a whole, in the light of those events. Nevertheless, the issues raised by William Hopkinson regarding the very future of NATO are no less pertinent.

Although great prudence is now essential, in a global strategic context that is highly fluid, a few observations on the possible repercussions that terrorism will have can none the less be made. Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September, NATO enlargement will have to take into account two major developments: the invoking of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, on 12 September, as an expression of transatlantic solidarity in the face of terrorism, on the one hand, and US-Russian cooperation in the fight against terrorism on the other. While it is still too soon to say exactly what impact these events will have on the future of the Alliance, certain questions have already arisen that may determine the future of NATO as well as the pace and shape of its enlargement.

For NATO, the new debate may affect the value of Article 5, as well as the area covered by the organisation or the pre-positioning of US forces. Will the resort to

Article 5 in reaction to terrorist attacks against American territory do away with, or at least relativise, the value of that article in the event of traditional military aggression against one of the European members of the Alliance? Even though not yet out in the open, this debate has nevertheless begun, especially since the policy currently being followed by Washington – one of political solidarity within the Alliance but unilateral US military action – leaves room for doubt over the degree of confidence that the Bush administration has regarding the collectiveness and effectiveness of NATO's military structures. Previously, during the war in Kosovo, the United States appeared rather irritated by the necessity to negotiate with the Allies over the strategy and planning of air strikes against the Serbs. Its use of NATO in a new anti-terrorist configuration seems to confirm this American determination to combine maximal allied political support with the greatest possible US freedom of action. Now, this will necessarily have an effect on the future of the Alliance, in particular on members' perceptions of the organisation. On the legal level, there is now a certain vagueness over what exactly NATO's area is. During the Gulf War in 1991, several European countries were reluctant to extend this beyond the North Atlantic. In the forthcoming war against terrorism, the question of whether NATO's role should be regional or global could, de facto, again become pertinent. What is more, if the fight against terrorists presupposes preventive or coercive military operations, geographic factors again become important, highlighting the importance of countries that could provide forward bases from which to attack terrorist targets. Acceptance of the pre-positioning of American forces on their territory by current or future European members of NATO could even become a precondition for future enlargement.

The events of 11 September might also have other implications for the enlargement process. Some arguments point to a halt, or at least a slowdown, in the process of NATO expansion planned for May 2002: indeed, if cooperation with Russia in the fight against terrorism becomes a priority for the Americans, it is possible that any issue that is likely to meet with objections from Moscow will be put in abeyance, in particular the question of the Baltic States' membership of NATO. Again, if anti-terrorist operations were to become NATO's priority, the enthusiasm of certain countries for quick accession to the organisation could wane.

On the other hand, there are also many arguments for a speeding up of the enlargement process: if NATO also, or above all, provides protection against terrorist threats, the number of countries interested in membership could rise. From

an American point of view, if Article 5 now covers the fight against terrorism, wider membership would make possible broader consensus and coalitions, both politically and geographically. Not only would a 'big bang' enlargement become necessary, but admission of Russia itself could become an attractive option. However, even without going as far as that, US-Russian cooperation against Osama bin Laden's networks has altered the traditional arguments: if US troops use bases in countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union, Moscow will in future find it difficult to oppose any NATO enlargement on the grounds that former USSR territory is untouchable. In the same way, no one can rule out the possibility that the new US-Russian alliance against terrorism will considerably modify Russia's perception of American policy, and of NATO itself, to the point where it transforms the present *casus belli* of enlargement into an issue of secondary importance.

Nobody doubts that coming events will lead in their turn to other considerations that have even more dramatic consequences. This institute, under the aegis of the European Council, will from now on devote the main part of its thinking to this new world in the making.

Nicole Gnesotto
Paris, October 2001

Introduction

In 2002 NATO will face difficult choices and decisions on enlargement. There are compelling arguments for further enlargement; there are also cogent reasons against any particular form of it. Whatever is done will reflect in substantial measure US domestic politics. It should also reflect the security needs and concerns of non-US members of the Alliance, aspirant countries, and EU members. Because of the lack of clarity in understanding what NATO is for, and indeed a reluctance to address that question in a thoroughly searching manner, and problems in discerning the United States's objectives, it is difficult to see what in principle would be the correct answer and, a separate matter, how the decision will go. This paper therefore sets out to explore the issues and the options, taking account of the interface with EU enlargement and the developing Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP), and of the new Administration's concept of the United States's role in the world and the other issues which it may wish to pursue in Europe.

To do that it seeks to identify the security challenges facing European states, the part which NATO may play in meeting them, and the contribution which the United States may make. In principle, decisions on enlargement should take into account what NATO is for, how the Alliance and its role should be developed, and what contributions to its ends will be made by offering membership to any particular candidate. In practice, the decision taking process is likely to be rather different. Candidates will press their own claims; certain European states will support particular countries. There will be very little discussion of the overall objectives of the exercise, if only because there is almost certainly no consensus on either side of the Atlantic about the nature of the US engagement in Europe, the Europeans' involvement in the wider world, and how NATO could assist with either. Moreover there is a paradox in as much as many candidates wish to join for reasons related to NATO's original functions, yet it is the Alliance's very development of new functions which may lead it to extend invitations to them.

The Alliance has changed its nature more than once. There was the significant development after the Cold War, culminating in the revised Strategic Concept of 1999. This moved NATO's focus away from territorial defence, principally against the Soviet Union, to a wider security role in Europe. Less noticed was the change, in the early years, between the prospectus as sold to

the US Senate and the complex US-dominated system which evolved in the early 1950s. Thus, despite the rhetoric, which sometimes implies unaltering bedrock, NATO has developed, is developing, and should continue to change, in objectives and in nature.

NATO's original fundamental purpose was to bind in the United States to help resist potential Soviet aggression against Western Europe. The core of its being was the mutual defence provisions of the Washington Treaty. Against that background the tests for admission of new members were relatively simple: would the strategic situation of members of the Alliance be improved by the new member's joining? If so, then domestic politics were likely to be of minor concern, as with the then case of Portugal, or with Greece under the colonels, or with Turkey on several occasions after it became a member. Nor was Soviet reaction likely to be of much significance: anger from Moscow was unlikely to weigh against an improvement in the Alliance's capacity to resist aggression thence.

The case is very different now. Political factors are likely to be all-important; meeting military concerns will be a desirable but very much secondary matter. Given the generally good security situation in Europe that is not unreasonable. The key questions are: what political factors will feature, and how will they be weighed? They should include such major institutional questions as whether NATO should be a regional security organisation, focusing, for example, on crisis management and cooperation with former communist states; or be a framework for the projection of Western power beyond Europe; or a supplier of military services and standards to its members and others.

For the first post-Cold War enlargement (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland), which took effect from April 1999, there were various exercises which purported to look at the military soundness of the candidate countries, and the potential impact of their joining upon the effectiveness of the Alliance. The ultimate *ratio decidendi*, however, was political. The possible financial costs, which featured prominently in the run-up to that enlargement, but hardly, if at all, in the final decisions, will not be a significant issue on this occasion either. Some of the calculations assumed that it would be necessary to put, say, Poland in the same sort of state of defence as West Germany during the Cold War. In fact such a degree of defence was not and is not necessary. There are costs in bringing Polish armed forces up to

reasonable standards, but most of those will fall to Poland, and will be spread over a long, perhaps a very long, period. The additional costs of new NATO infrastructure not otherwise required will be very modest. Nor is there a need for a general uplift in NATO capabilities to defend Poland, as opposed to the need to modernise for the new tasks which would exist whether or not Poland had joined the Alliance. For the most part, the same reasoning will apply on this occasion. There remains, however, the issue of the extent to which territorial defence of its members is a necessary and demanding Alliance function. No clear answer is to be looked for.

The core of the problem is that NATO, in present circumstances, has many functions and serves many purposes, not all of them declared or generally acknowledged, and certainly not all related to its original role. For the United States it is a tool for exerting influence in Europe, and perhaps for joining others with it in power projection elsewhere. For the Europeans generally it is a forum where they may hope to catch the United States's ear. For the EU it will be a provider of military services. For many candidates it is a club whose badge is a sign of their being in the West. For some it is a guarantor of territorial security. According to its own statements, NATO is a purveyor of security and stability to the wider Euro-Atlantic area.

In these circumstances, deciding which states should join is very complex. Even for the 1999 enlargement some members of the Alliance feared that almost any expansion would change NATO's nature, at the very least by diminishing its coherence. There was, too, a concern that any state that needed the protection of the mutual defence provisions of the Washington Treaty might pose militarily difficult problems in planning for its defence. There was a general concern that the military forces of all the candidates were weak and in desperate need of investment. Thus it came about, largely under the influence of the United States, that this enlargement was limited to three states, clearly democratic in their orientation, posing no very difficult problems of defence, and with reasonably strong Congressional support for their membership.

Nowhere stated, but nevertheless present, was the issue of Russian reactions. Those were particularly acute as regards the Baltic States, an issue which will figure also in 2002. The Russian political classes remain viscerally opposed to NATO expansion, and in particular to its extension to former territories of the USSR. Whilst not able to prevent the accession of

Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania in a formal sense, if an invitation were now extended to them, Russia could make itself difficult over other issues, whether to do with European security or, e.g., in the UN. The net result might be an overall diminution in stability in the European area. The equation is, moreover, complicated by the United States's desire to pursue missile defence (MD), another subject which is highly provocative to Russia. Despite the technical and other problems of MD, the US administration seems committed to trying to do something. If there is a chance of some trade-off with Russia, the United States may favour that over any particular form of further NATO expansion. An additional complicating factor may be that certain candidates, if admitted, may try to move the Alliance into a posture more directed against Russia than it is at present. That would then feed, and feed into, negative Russian reactions.

EU enlargement is also in the air. The processes, parties and criteria are different. Nevertheless there will be linkages, political and psychological, between the two processes. (It is possible that Russia will become less relaxed about EU enlargement as the CESDP develops; and that could be compounded by the NATO question.) Both organisations contribute, though in different ways, to European security. The linkages between the enlargement processes could include direct compensation to disappointed candidates (i.e. offering membership in one organisation to those not admitted to the other), using each where it can make the greatest contribution to stability, or simply a spreading around of the institutional (and financial) turbulence attendant upon both enlargements.

The EU has a formal list of 13 potential candidates,[1] with 12 of whom negotiations are in train. NATO has no such formal list but there are 9 known candidates.[2] In addition, in each case, there are other potential candidates from the states of former Yugoslavia. In many ways these (and Albania, a NATO candidate) are the least prepared for accession to either body. However, they are the states which above all need the support and bracing which would come from membership of either institution.

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1 Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey. Negotiations have not yet begun with the last.

2 Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia: in addition, the May 2001 Budapest Ministerial Meeting noted Croatia's possible desire to become a candidate.

None of the NATO candidates would bring immediate direct military strength to the organisation. Many are small; most are poor; all have a long way to go to produce military forces of the standard of Western Europe. Some would bring benefits of geography, either linking existing members more closely, shortening NATO's borders, or providing bases or airspace for potential Alliance operations. Their particular individual qualities are discussed more fully in Chapter Six below.

Possible reasons for expanding or not expanding NATO

At the risk of oversimplification, it is possible to list nine general arguments for NATO expansion, and nine against.

Possible reasons for expanding NATO

- It will add to the security of existing members.
- It will enhance the security of the candidate countries.
- It will enhance the security of Europe as a whole.
- It will give a badge of approval to the candidate countries.
- It may be useful as a preventative measure in the future against a resurgence of Russian power.
- It may keep the United States interested and engaged in Europe if it approves of the particular candidates.
- A number of candidates desire it very much, and the prospect gives leverage over them to improve their performance in other areas.
- NATO is the only militarily effective organisation at present. It is desirable that as many states as possible should be able to contribute through it.
- NATO procedures are becoming a global standard for armed forces even when operations are not carried out by the Alliance itself.

Possible reasons for not expanding NATO

- There is little point in the Alliance anyhow. Expansion merely serves to veil reality.

- It may annoy Russia and make it less cooperative, and so diminish security in practice.
- It may make the Alliance less cohesive and so less effective in what it can do.
- It may pose militarily impossible obligations, given how NATO is now deployed.
- It may distract from the more important question of building up the EU.
- It may reinforce further the ability of the US to intervene in European affairs.
- Expansion would make even more difficult the division into 'ins' and 'outs', when the real need is to lessen that.
- Whatever the balance of argument in any individual case, the overall process will be destabilising, and almost without end. Some candidates will be disappointed and the whole issue will then have to be revisited.
- It may cause weak economies to divert funds urgently needed for development.

Striking the balance

In practice, it is impossible to rule out further expansion of NATO; there has been reiterated mention of the open door and of future enlargement, strongly emphasised during President Bush's European visit in June 2001. The striking of the balance, therefore, comes down to considering which candidates should be admitted, and when. A number of European members are pressing hard to offer membership to new Central and Eastern states. Others, including the United Kingdom and Germany, are less enthusiastic. (Germany would probably favour a small enlargement, limited to Central Europe, and excluding the Baltic States.) The United States has made clear that it favours further enlargement, though it has not argued for any particular outcome. Gaining further quasi-client states to support its position in NATO and more generally might be attractive. There is nothing yet available to show the likelihood of any trade-off between NATO enlargement and missile defence, and such linkage may be made less likely by the recent changes which have cost the Republicans the control of the Senate.

The transatlantic relationship

Beyond the institutional aspects, there are the differing objectives of individual NATO members, many of whom see particular interests to be served by the Alliance, and underlying much of the thinking about where NATO is going is the even larger question of the transatlantic relationship and its future. The United States's views about its interests and how it should pursue them have altered; it is showing signs of turning away from Europe towards Asia, understandably from the point of view of its own security concerns. No one suggests that there should not be friendship and active cooperation between the United States and European nations individually and collectively. However, it would be wrong to assume that the form that the relationship took after the Second World War can or should continue indefinitely. The nature and objectives of the US involvement in and with Europe need to be thought about just as much as the other great questions of international affairs, arguably rather more. Europe has changed; the security environment has changed; as regards Europe at any rate, the very way in which the international system operates has changed. In those circumstances it would be very odd to argue that the transatlantic relationship must and will be as it was 40 years or even 10 years ago.

Russia

A second question that needs careful thought is how to integrate the largest, most populous but very unstable European state into European security structures. There is a case to be made that, for their own good, the Russians need to learn that they can no longer overawe their smaller neighbours whenever they feel so inclined; only then will Russia be accepted by the East Europeans as a normal partner. Admitting the Baltic States to NATO membership could thus help to normalise matters there. Such a development would, however, need to be linked to treating Russia as a genuine partner of the West. That would call for significant changes on both sides.

Russia is not a candidate for NATO (or EU) membership in the foreseeable future. Yet if NATO is a major European security organisation it must take cognisance of Russia. To some extent that has been done through the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) and Partnership for Peace (PfP) but the efforts have not been wholly successful. There is a reluctance to take

decisions jointly with Russia. The Contact Group on former Yugoslavia does something to address the question, but its area of activity is limited. NATO will need to address seriously the question of how and whether Russia could become a member, and if it cannot, why not, and what other arrangements should be made.

The Options

There are many options for enlargement but the principal ones are:

- another small enlargement, say of Slovakia and Slovenia;
- a larger one of, say, five, perhaps the above plus Bulgaria, Lithuania and Romania;
- a significant enlargement with all or almost all applicants accepted, but possibly with actual entry staggered;
- deferment with more half promises.

Anything other than accepting all candidates will lead to continuing pressure to have another enlargement soon. With an enlargement of, say, five, that pressure would be containable for five years or more. With a small enlargement the issue would certainly need to be revisited shortly. Given the problems of ratification in most states, particularly the United States, a continuing stream of enlargements would be undesirable. On the other hand, taking in all potential candidates (including certain former Yugoslav states and Albania) would result in NATO members which were in no sense ready, militarily, economically nor politically. It would present the Alliance with some potential problems in discharging its treaty obligations, and might significantly reduce its cohesion, political and military. Nevertheless, it might help address the real stability issues in Europe, and direct the Alliance towards desirable changes. (Institutionally, NATO has changed little since the Cold War, despite a reformulation of its role, and one enlargement.)

Acceptance of any Baltic country would be provocative to Russia. This would be a problem with the big enlargement. It would also apply to any medium case, which would almost certainly have to include at least one of the Baltic States. If one were admitted there would be continuing pressure for the other two, at least until they were in the EU, and possibly thereafter.

It is a nice judgement whether, if Russia is to be provoked on this, it would be better to have it all done with at once and take in the three together.

An attempt at deferment, even with further fair words to and about the aspirants, would have an adverse impact on governments and peoples in the candidate countries. Efforts at reform might fall away. It might reduce further the credibility of the Alliance for existing members. It would probably complicate EU enlargement and lead to US pressure to admit unsuitable or unprepared candidates there. Moreover, it could lead to efforts at creating new defence arrangements on purely national bases. The concern would be not so much that the states concerned would be a threat to their neighbours, though given the weakness of many of the Balkan and Central and East European states that is not altogether irrelevant, but that inappropriate priorities would be adopted and scarce resources misapplied. In either case, other US and European interests could be adversely affected.

Conclusions

The pressure from the candidates for them to join the Alliance largely continues, as does that from a number of European member states. Some years ago it might have been possible to respond to the pressures by creating different sorts of membership, as WEU did. The time for that is now past.

The entry of some candidate countries would aid the Alliance in terms of geography or the availability of infrastructure. Others would be difficult to defend if they were subject to aggression. Few would bring with them significant military assets in the near future. The necessary changes in command structures and posts resulting from any enlargement would create turbulence, and additional voices at the table would make the full North Atlantic Council less coherent. That in turn would give further weight to the need for steering by a *directoire*.

The United States is in favour of enlargement; the major European states are doubtful. No country has openly addressed enlargement as an aspect of changing the Alliance. Nevertheless, change is necessary, as is a rebalancing of the transatlantic relationship.

If the objective were to keep the Alliance as militarily taut as possible, with effective integrated military forces, the enlargement would have to be small. However, that would buy, at best, relative quiet for a couple of years. A more adventurous course would be to take the *via media*: do something, but not too much. That could indeed meet expectations for five years or so; avoid the more traumatic changes; and preserve much of the present internal functioning of NATO. Five years' quiet is not to be despised and certainly one would not wish so to afflict the Alliance that it could meet none of the objectives and purposes which it should serve. If wider issues of stability and security are to be served, and appropriate attention paid to the political driving forces, a greater enlargement would be more desirable. In any case, enlargement should be considered as an aspect of changing and updating the Alliance, not as a matter in its own right.

Taking in all, or almost all, the candidates would hasten the changes in NATO's nature. It would become inclusive rather than exclusive. The Alliance would have lessened military cohesion but, on the other hand, would acquire direct and continuing involvement in the areas, or most of them, of instability. The changes would start to recognise the evolving nature of the transatlantic relationship. There would still be much for the United States and the Europeans to do together, but the terms of trade would start to change. For those reasons, a major enlargement is likely to be a bridge too far. The United States will wish to maintain the present military arrangements; even more will it wish to retain its leverage. The likely outcome will, therefore, be a medium enlargement. That should not stop the other members thinking both about what they want from the Alliance, what they are prepared to pay for that and, above all, about the future of the transatlantic relationship.

Chapter One

EUROPEAN SECURITY

I.1 A changed situation

In the twentieth century Europe was the seat of two devastating wars which destroyed the primacy of the European powers in world affairs. Those were succeeded by a so-called Cold War, with an oppressive, odious and menacing regime occupying many of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, dividing Germany and threatening the rest of the continent. That period, which lasted some forty years, saw an unprecedented build-up of armed forces and armaments, conventional and nuclear, on the Continent. The Soviet Army, enormous in size, was deployed far forward to the Elbe. Exhausted by the two World Wars, the countries of Europe could not defend themselves against the threat, hence the involvement of the United States in European security, principally through NATO.

Behind the shield of NATO, and with the active participation of the United States, Western Europe regained its prosperity. Democracy and the rule of law became established almost everywhere there. Then, suddenly, the external threatening power collapsed. The Soviet Union dissolved; its subject and component states became free, with most of the European ones striving to become democratic market economies. The greater part remain weak, with many social and economic problems, but even the former hegemonic power, Russia, is now a democracy of sorts and is no longer a command or socialist economy. Reassertion of its hegemony is not a current prospect, nor does Russia pose any military threat to Western Europe. Its armed forces are weak, and deployed far back from the old line of confrontation. Not only is the country too weak to contemplate any significant aggression in Europe, it may not be strong enough even to hold itself together. Meanwhile Germany has united, and the process of developing the EU has proceeded apace through the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam.

In short, since the profound changes of 1989-91, the strategic situation of Europe has changed almost beyond recognition. The developments have been for the most part immensely beneficial. They have involved not only the well-being of individual states and regions but also the very meaning of security itself. That said, there have been some adverse changes. The

collapse of Yugoslavia and the ensuing civil strife might not have happened, and certainly would not have taken the form that it did, had the old-style Soviet Union continued to exist. Europe will now, for at least a generation, be confronted by instability in the Balkans. Russia itself faces major difficulties in particular in the Caucasus but also more generally. Nevertheless, the end of the old confrontation has, on balance, seen European security change very greatly for the better. For most of the inhabitants of the Continent, certainly outside the Balkans, the risks of injury, death or damage from the classic sort of problem with which international relations was concerned – war or an attack mounted from outside the country by another state – have all but disappeared. Nowadays, the idea of tanks or fleets of bombing aircraft striking at their state or its industries or inhabitants is not a present factor for most Europeans. Most of all, the threat of a devastating nuclear war affecting Europe and North America has been almost entirely removed

Part of the transformation has been a significant though not total move from military and defence-related issues to economic, developmental and societal ones, a shift which has been understood more in Europe than in the United States. Some of the differences between international and domestic security have been eroded, and international affairs now involves non-state actors such as terrorists, violent environmental or similar activists, or, in a positive sense, non-governmental organisations (NGOs). In the more fortunate and prosperous Western Europe there are transnational economic and social issues, with drugs and crime, and to some extent with immigration, both legal and illegal. In the East, especially but not only in Russia, there are much graver problems of crime and corruption, and more profound ones of making whole economies and societies work. In some areas there is a residual risk of military action, but on a much smaller scale than an East-West conflict would have involved. The collapse of some East European states cannot be ruled out, though there is no reason to think that that is imminent.

For most of the countries of the region, even in Eastern Europe, international security is now, if a military issue, something which happens abroad, and about which they mostly have a wide margin of choice as to the nature and degree of their involvement, or is to do with a new range of problems which are likely to cause serious physical (as opposed to economic or social) damage only on a very limited scale. With the possible exception of

the involvement of the United States in Asian questions such as Korea or Taiwan, most wars in which European and North American countries now engage will be elective. That is to say, the countries concerned will undertake military action because they wish to concern themselves in some matter, or (more rarely) to use force as an instrument of policy, and not because they are threatened by direct assault or invasion. Thus, for them, what states have had as a principal concern of (and reason for) their existence for some 350 years has changed.

For a small number of countries that does not hold true. Weak states in the Balkans with smouldering ethnic tensions within and without may still feel the need for classic military security, though obtaining it may not be easy, because of their very weaknesses. Likewise, the Baltic States may envisage that if relations with Russia deteriorate they may be subject to pressures, including physical ones. Even they, however, have no reason to doubt that their major problems in the coming decade, and probably longer, are not something that can be met by military preparations as such. All in all, with the partial exception of the Balkans, the problems besetting Europe are not of a kind likely to require direct military action other than assistance to the civil power.

I.2 South-Eastern Europe

Outside that area, only a few states are faced by military threats and not many more are realistically likely to be subject to them over the next twenty years. Turkey has borders with a potentially troublesome area but the risk of Iran or Syria launching a major onslaught is remote. Even if either did, Turkey's strength would hardly leave her defenceless, even before augmentation by allies. Because of the current problems with Iraq, attacks from there are more conceivable, and those could possibly include missile strikes with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Given the manifestations of Alliance solidarity with Turkey, it seems most unlikely that deterrence would fail to that degree but in this confrontation there is undoubtedly a strong Turkish interest in maintaining an Alliance guarantee. (There is also, of course, a strong US interest, in particular so long as confrontation with Iraq continues, in maintaining Turkey as a base and bastion in the area.) More difficult are Turkey's severe internal problems.

Also affecting Turkey is the tension with Greece, which is one of the important pieces of unfinished European security business. It has ameliorated lately but might easily resume. A major clash between two well-armed NATO Allies, between an EU member and a candidate, cannot be ruled out over the coming twenty years. The key to its resolution, however, lies in political developments, not armed forces. The direct engagement of European or US forces in the quarrel seems most unlikely. (The US presence may, however, have a moderating effect, and there has for some years been a peacekeeping role in Cyprus in which various European states are involved.)

In the same region, however, European and US forces have been actively involved over the last six years and more. The former state of Yugoslavia collapsed; some of its constituent parts fairly rapidly assimilated to European norms or are moving in that direction (Slovenia, Croatia). Others are not yet viable political entities (Bosnia, Macedonia). In others, principally the current Republic of Yugoslavia, there are major political and social questions to be addressed, and the final political shape and relationships of Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo have yet to be determined. Meanwhile, Albania is at best a weak state which will need a great deal of outside effort to make it viable.

Violence, interethnic or interstate and intrastate, is certainly a strong possibility for some years in this region. The vital issue is building civil societies but the involvement of external armed forces will be a necessary part of that. Military action may be needed to enforce peace; military or gendarmerie action will be require to maintain the peace; armed police forces will be required to deal with a legacy not only of ethnic strife but also of violent crime. There will be a need for outside players to keep substantial forces in the area for perhaps a generation.

Still in the same general area, Romania and Bulgaria face problems in building effective economies and in tackling crime and corruption. They also need help in reforming their armed forces. They are not subject, however, to any realistic military threat.

I.3 Central Europe

The same is true in Central Europe. No one is threatening, or is likely to threaten, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland or Slovenia with military aggression. Preparations for NATO and EU membership have helped remove by peaceful means issues of border disputes or treatment of minorities. No state in this area contemplates military action in support of national grievances. In the North, the three Baltic States – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – are not faced with a military threat at present. It is not inconceivable that if things turned out badly in Russia over the coming decades they could face, at any rate, intimidation. That would be a worst-case assumption. On any reasonable view Russia (the only potential threat) would have much to lose and nothing to gain by such a course. The already established prosperous democracies in the North – Sweden, Finland and Norway – have nothing to fear by way of aggression, now or in any realistic future scenario.

The same generally optimistic picture is even more true of Western Europe generally, subject to two particular matters: the problems of the Mediterranean area, and the threat from WMD from outside Europe.

I.4 The Mediterranean

In security terms, the Mediterranean divides into two, East and West. In the West the prosperous Northern littoral faces immigration pressures, and possibly energy supply problems from the South, whose states and societies are confronted by enormous difficulties of economic, social and political development. They are not coping with those, and there will be an impact upon Europe from the internal problems of Morocco, Algeria or Libya. That will not be an old-fashioned security matter, however; there is no military threat to Europe from this area, and the possibility of terrorist action has diminished.

The issues in the Eastern Mediterranean are more complex, and rather more threatening. Firstly, there are again major social, political and economic problems of states with growing populations and insufficient development, economic or political. Egypt may be cited as the prime example. Overlapping this is the Israel-Palestine problem and the consequent Israel-Arab

confrontation, which involves dangerous military build-ups and provocations, and, because of the links with the first set of issues, angry populations which may overturn their own governments. These aspects affect the whole Middle East, not just the Mediterranean states. Adding to them there is the confrontation with Iraq which has in the past sought, and probably in the future will again seek, to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Given the engagement of at least some European states with the problems of the Middle East, there could in principle be a threat to them from such weapons. Moreover, it is not yet clear that Iran, which also may have WMD ambitions, will successfully reintegrate in the international community as a normal state.

I.5 WMD

The spread of WMD is properly a matter of concern. There are continuing pressures for proliferation. However, at present there seems little likelihood of a significant military threat to Europe from such weapons. Any threat must be measured against the deterrent effect of US and European nuclear weapons; it must also be set against the problems of delivering WMD onto targets in Europe in an effective manner. There is little to suggest that there would be any rational grounds for, say, Iraq's striking militarily in Europe, as opposed to striking against deployed forces, or by way of a terrorist attack.

There remains, of course, the Russian nuclear arsenal, shrinking, growing obsolescent in parts, but because of the country's conventional weakness becoming more significant in Russian strategy. The threat from that needs a response. That must include deterrence, but also arms control, negotiation and détente. In all that the United States will be a significant actor.

I.6 The former Soviet Union

More generally, there are problems in Eastern Europe, and there is a great need to involve Russia, the largest country in Europe but one with a considerable potential for instability, in a constructive way in regional security. Because of its instability and size it could be a major disturber of it, possibly voluntarily, more probably involuntarily. That very possibility of distur-

bance is, of course, an argument for admitting some at least of Russia's smaller neighbours to NATO. It would help stabilise them and make clear that they now had nothing to fear from Russian threats.

Much of the present requirement is to do with building civil society in Russia. Given history, and the starting position only about a decade ago, the progress has been real, indeed almost astounding. There is still a very long way to go and outside engagement whilst the process is in train will be highly desirable. As regards external relations, there is a real need to consider how Russia can be a partner of other European nations. That must certainly include consideration of its long-term relationship with NATO.

Russia has legitimate interests but may also have concerns which others would not accept as legitimate. The objective of policy in the long term must be to anchor Russia firmly in Western values; part of that will be for it to become like other European members of the international community and accepted as such. Russia would find a significant NATO enlargement threatening, and even more, humiliating, and has signalled that, in particular, no state formerly part of the Soviet Union should be admitted. That may not be altogether rational but it will be a fact, given the views of the Russian political classes on NATO and the problems that all post-imperial powers have had in adjusting to their changed circumstances. The question is whether facing down this attitude would, in the longer term, bring greater benefits than avoiding the turbulence which would accompany an invitation to a Baltic State in the short term. In the longer term, Russia's acceptance of the demolition of its claims to draw red lines on the map of Europe might help it to become accepted by the Central and East European countries as a normal neighbour. Having been compelled to lay aside delusions about its rights, like France, Germany and Britain it would at last be post-imperial.

Matters are complicated because Russia is the main successor state of the Soviet Union, against which NATO was originally directed. NATO, the EU, and the United States have all made clear that they do not regard Russia as an adversary, and that they seek partnership. That does not necessarily mean NATO membership, even in the long term. Detailed discussions would be required to establish the implications of Russia's being invited to join the Alliance, and these would be difficult. However, it is clear that the effects would be profound for both parties. Russia would have to display a degree of transparency to which its armed forces are wholly unused (in force

planning, etc.), and to pursue democratic policies, with effective civilian control of the military, again in a sense to which its armed forces are totally unaccustomed. It would have to start to change its procedures and doctrines, and to invest in a degree of standardisation on NATO norms. Discussions on nuclear doctrine could be particularly difficult, as Russia insists on something very like NATO's former doctrines, whilst the Alliance has moved away to a much reduced reliance on nuclear weapons.

Likewise, the impact on the Alliance would be very great. Russia would not tolerate US leadership in the way that the major European members have done. Planning for Article 5 defence, except perhaps for a small number of Middle Eastern scenarios, would be very difficult, if not impossible. Exercises to reinforce Norway against external attack would become as unlikely and as impossible as ones to reinforce Germany's western border. Alliance command structures would have to include senior Russian officers. The willingness of, say, Poles to serve under Russian command would be doubtful. In short, NATO's command arrangements and headquarters would almost certainly have to be restructured. Another change would be in the drafting of communiqués, etc. on what the Alliance was for. Either NATO would become much more restricted in its messages or Russia would become engaged in a more Western-oriented way with world problems, at least those in the vicinity of Europe.

Thus, admitting Russia would change the Alliance, irrevocably, from being a collective defence body. It would be, in part, a collective security organisation; it could also remain a provider of military standards and services. In all the above there are issues which go well beyond the current NATO enlargement but bear upon what can and should be done. At the very least, and irrespective of the precise Russian reaction to enlargement, there is a need to give Russia a real voice in any organisation which purports to be the main force in European regional security questions.

Some similar considerations apply to Ukraine, except that Ukraine is unlikely to be regarded as a threat by any neighbour. The stability and independence of this state is one of the most important questions for European security. Not nearly enough progress has yet been made. Again, however, the advance from the position of only ten or twelve years ago is very significant. The problems are essentially those of governance: military threats are not the problem; pouring in money is not the solution. Ukraine

has to develop a civil society, adopt effective laws and apply them properly. Western advice and training will help.

There are other former Soviet states whose positions are very precarious, principally Moldova and Belarus. However, by size and geography they are less likely to cause general security problems, and to the extent that they do it will be because of political, social or economic collapse, not because of military aggression. (State collapse can, of course have military consequences, as has been seen in former Yugoslavia.)

I.7 Conclusion

To sum up, the general security situation in Europe is better than it has been for two generations. It is very much better than at the height of the Cold War. Very few states are subject to substantial military threat. There are relatively few interstate tensions and an almost complete acceptance that bilateral disputes should be pursued and resolved by peaceful means. There are major security issues but these are of a different kind from the classical ones.

A major source of problems requiring a military element in their resolution will be the southern Balkans. There, lack of economic development, endemic violence and the non-existence of civil society pose real problems, not only for the countries concerned but for the rest of Europe. In tackling all those issues the main outside actor will be the EU, with some assistance, possibly, from other players, especially NATO for the military aspects. Military, and to a greater extent, gendarmerie force will be essential but these must be subordinate, logically and operationally, to the civilian effort. Civil society needs to be rebuilt, or built. Once that is done economic development can take place. With economic development will come the prospect of integration into a wider Europe.

There will be other general ‘hard’ security threats but those too, with the possible and partial exceptions of threats against Turkey, will be more in the nature of terrorism than classic military problems. Ballistic missile or WMD threats do have to be considered, but they need to be analysed in a holistic way, considering the role of deterrence and the drivers behind such threats.

More generally, circumstances can change, as the events of the last twelve years have shown. Military equipment programmes often have lives of decades. In making military arrangements it is certainly necessary to be able to respond to new developments. That said, given the problems of building up significant military forces, it is hard to see whence could come a major internal or external threat to European security of the classic sort within two decades. The only country with the economic and technical resources to pose such a threat would be the United States, and it is a given that that is not something against which the Europeans need plan. Meanwhile, to have a would be pre-eminent regional security structure, one of whose major roles is to give a distant power significant influence in Europe, whilst not including the largest country in the region, obviously calls for hard thinking about appropriate relations between Russia and NATO.

Chapter Two

US OBJECTIVES AND CONCERNS

II.1 The background

The United States has a unique set of beliefs about its political history, its destiny, and the appropriate relations with the rest of the world. There have, as part of that history, been periods of isolationism. Far more important and substantive has been the continuing unilateralism. In his farewell address, George Washington urged his countrymen to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world. Thomas Jefferson, in his first inaugural, advised peace, commerce and honest friendship with all nations; entangling alliances with none.

Despite engaging more fully with Europe from the time of the First World War, these sentiments remained strong even after the Second World War. It was by no means a foregone conclusion that the United States would enter into a long-term treaty with the West European powers in 1949. That it did so can be attributed to careful preparatory work by the Europeans, especially by Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, and his work to produce the Brussels Treaty of 1948, and by the US administration itself in preparing the ground for the Washington Treaty of 1949. That Treaty itself was, moreover, carefully crafted. The vital Article 5 (see footnote [ ], page [ ]) was carefully framed so as not to make a binding commitment to resist aggression in an automatic fashion. It may in that sense be contrasted with the much firmer commitment of Article V of the (modified) Brussels Treaty.[3]

More generally, the United States has always showed great reserve about committing itself to outside restraints. In short, the United States in general, and the Congress in particular, have seen themselves as bound and as bindable by no outside authority, except when there has been specific agreement by a ratified treaty. That has implications for the US approach to international law, to treaties, and to future commitments of all sorts. Against

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[3] Article V The of modified Brussels Treaty. If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.

that background, a multiplicity of views are to be found in American political circles. Some verge on the incredible, in terms of distrust of the United Nations and other international organisations. Even in well-informed places there is more suspicion of, and adverse comment on, such bodies than there is in European or other developed nations. There is also in many quarters, and most oddly in a society permeated by lawyers, a great resistance to the constraints of international law yet, at the same time, all too frequent attempts to batten domestic legislation on other, non-US, parties.

II.2 After the Second World War

Because of its predominant size, wealth and military capacity, compared with the other advanced countries, after 1942 the United States assumed a leadership role which was new to it. It had not been the leading player in the First World War. Afterwards, its president[4] had been the leading exponent of the League of Nations but had failed to carry his country with him. The United Kingdom emerged from that War gravely weakened economically but it and France were the major diplomatic actors between the Wars, along with Germany in the later 1930s. American post-Second World War leadership was therefore new, though by the 1990s it was often felt to be a part of the natural order of things. The exercise of such a role fitted in well with the strand in American thinking that saw the United States as a shining city on a hill, a light and an example to other nations. It also fitted in well with the objective facts of US strength, European weakness (economic and in terms of diminished influence as a result of decolonisation) and the need to confront the perceived threat from the Soviet Union. Only the United States could manage the last successfully, and only it could provide the economic resources to start European post war reconstruction.

The United States is still unmatched in military power; indeed it spends more on defence than the EU members, Japan, China and Russia together.[5] In the sort of battle for which it is best prepared no adversary could prudently take it on: no other air force could fly against the USAF and hope to survive. More generally, the United States is trying to develop the capability

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4 Woodrow Wilson.

5 US $280,620 million; EU $173,319; Japan, China, Russia $104,736 at 1998 prices. SIPRI Database 2001.

to project its military power to ever greater distances, the vision being conflict conducted, largely by technical means, from the United States, safe behind a defensive shield. However, this very superiority provokes its own asymmetrical response; terrorist-type attacks against US targets can perhaps be deterred but by no means certainly, as the history of blows against embassies, barracks and ships has shown in the last few years. Moreover, US concerns to avoid casualties not only make its troops unsuitable for certain kinds of peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation but also unable sometimes readily to come to grips with an opponent even in more conventional warfighting, as the prolonged Kosovo air campaign showed.

In economic terms, the United States is no longer unmatched. In broad levels of activity it and the EU are equal,[6] and the EU's GDP will increase with enlargement. The United States may have a more flexible economy but any superiority is now limited. In political terms, on the global scene, the United States is still the leading power. In part that is because of its military strength, in part because of its economic weight. Essentially, however, it is because, despite all the inter-agency agonies of Washington, the United States can have a single policy on a question. Although Europe is a much more significant figure in aid and development than the United States,[7] the EU still has far to go in developing a coherent CFSP; it can seldom speak with unified authority on the great questions of international affairs.

In addition to its military puissance and economic weight, the United States alone amongst international players has what most nearly approaches a global role.[8] It has interests and commitments in Asia; it is engaged in European security; it is deeply committed in the Middle East. The US voice is the most important in many international organisations, political and economic. These wider obligations give it a greater sense of perspective in many instances than the European countries have. They also lead to its seeking to engage the Europeans in some of the wider concerns. Despite its

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6 2000 GDP US $9896 bn, EU $7836 bn at current (July 2001) prices and exchange rates; US $9077bn, EU $9758 bn at 1995 prices and exchange rates. OECD Statistics online.

7 In 2000, EU €9.6 bn (Europe Aid Press Release, Brussels, 21 December 2000); in FY 2000, US $5.5 bn (USAID FY 2000 Accountability Report). In addition, EU member countries have bilateral aid programmes; in 1997 they amounted to $23.7 bn.

8 The US shows little interest in Africa or development, and has, for its size, a small Development Budget, narrowly and idiosyncratically focused.

power and unilateralist tendencies, the United States can often see political advantage in being joined by others in particular actions or stances.

Partly because of its global involvement, partly because of the American way of waging war by technology and partly because of the general perception of the specialness of US territory, the United States has shown a great inclination to develop missile defences, despite the lack of a viable technology, the enormous financial costs, the vehement opposition of the Russians and the Chinese, and the grave reservations of many of its allies. Changes that have occurred in the party composition of the Senate in 2001 may slow down the impetus but the inclination of the Administration to pursue this topic may well be a complicating factor, mostly with the Russians, in any consideration of NATO enlargement.

II.3 The United States and NATO

The original American concerns with NATO are easy to define. Confronted with the prospect of Communist or Soviet aggression, the United States had a vital strategic interest in securing Europe militarily. It committed its own forces to that, though initially in rather modest numbers, and mobilised European military effort within the same framework. Part of the bargain was that the United States would have the major military commands. It thus rapidly came to dominate the military structures and much of the doctrine and strategy of the Alliance.

As NATO evolved over the years and the confrontation with the USSR continued, with the division of Europe seemingly permanent, the Alliance became an organisation in which the United States could almost always get its way if it wished. It was therefore a forum in which it felt more comfortable than those in which it might be in a minority or otherwise not able to hold sway. That was to the good, since a fundamental objective of NATO was to tie the Americans in, so as to keep the Russians out, thus serving a European need which could be met in no other way.

II.4 The current questions

It is against this background that the current US role in European security must be judged. What does the United States seek from its engagement in European security? What is it willing to do to gain that? Does it need allies to achieve it? What do the allies, or potential allies, or some of them, gain; what do they have to pay?

The US perspective

The United States stands to gain two main things from its current European involvement: firstly avoiding damage to major US interests by having a stabilising effect where things might otherwise go wrong, and, secondly, and most importantly, acquiring influence over Europeans and, to a degree, others. An example of the first is the Greek-Turkish tension, where an outbreak of fighting could have adverse repercussions on US Middle Eastern interests; a lesser example, but very real whilst European military resources remain so weak, is stabilising Bosnia or Macedonia. Until the Europeans have the capacity to cope with these unaided, as they certainly should be able to, adverse developments could suck the United States into a messy situation as well as weakening various European states.

The question of influence, as always in international affairs, is more subtle and more difficult. In part, it involves acquiring and retaining allies equipped and able to help in the pursuit of US military activities in other areas, as in the Gulf War. In part, it means being able to influence other countries in a variety of situations. The influence may be by way of gratitude for favours past, by way of expectations of favours to come, or by way of military contacts, senior officers in other countries being willing to argue for the position of the US in the light of what they have learned or gained under US tutelage. At present, it largely derives from cultivating the sense that US involvement in European affairs is a necessity. NATO is a major instrument for the exercise of influence in all these ways. Indeed, many US analysts unabashedly see the Alliance as an instrument for securing not only US influence but even leadership or hegemony, not just in NATO but by

means of it.[9] However, US hegemony, even if presented as leadership, is going to be less and less acceptable, at least to the major European powers. The end of the Cold War and the continued and continuing importance and wealth of Europe mean that the Europeans will increasingly insist that partnership means what it says.

So long as the Cold War continued, and America's own vital interests were served by containing the Soviet threat, US involvement in European security was in a sense cost free. That is, the United States served its own interests by protecting Western Europe. If it did not do that it would suffer. That the Europeans benefited was a by-product, very desirable and useful, but not something that called for the United States to do significantly more than it would in any case have had to do for its own sake. From the European side, US protection against the Soviet threat was essential. Thus, almost no cost could be too high to gain US commitment. In practice, the economic costs were modest and the political costs, except at certain difficult times when there were pressures for nuclear disarmament, were also generally tolerable. (The price exacted in the Suez crisis, where French and British interests were badly damaged by a United States which insisted on its own judgement, was not related to engagement in Europe.)

With the removal of the Soviet threat and the generally peaceful winding down of the Soviet empire, the identity of US and European interests in the former's involvement in European security is not so obvious. Harmonious relations between the Europeans individually (and the EU collectively) and the United States are clearly desirable; what price it is worth either side's paying to secure collaboration, and indeed whether collaboration can generally be secured, are now questions which need to be addressed.

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[9] For example see Thomas S. Szayna, *NATO Enlargement 2000-2015*, p. 8. '. . . the United States through its creation of NATO and its preponderant position within NATO, denationalized defense in the part of Europe outside the Soviet zone of control. This military unity that the United States imposed on the main European states . . .' and 'Presently, the United States, and the US-led alliance, has a preponderance of power in Europe . . .' Also, Kenneth N. Waltz, 'Nato Expansion: A Realist's View', *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 21, no. 2, August 2000, p. 29. 'Realists, noticing that as an Alliance NATO has lost its major function, see it simply as a means of maintaining America's grip on the foreign and military policies of European states.'

For the United States, the stationing of troops and equipment in Europe may, in the shorter term, be no more expensive than having them in the United States. Moreover, having them in Europe may serve as sensible basing to respond to crises in the Middle East, where the United States perceives that it has vital and other interests. Therefore, there is no great resource cost from any contribution such forces may make to European security. To the extent that stationed forces bring influence or leverage over European states, whether NATO members or not, and can provide structures within which extra-European deployments with allies may be framed, they bring the United States benefits going beyond their strictly military utility. Since, with the exception of relatively modest commitments in the Balkans, which are not, or at any rate should not be, beyond the capabilities of the Europeans, there is very little risk to such troops from problems in European security, and the United States has the potential for effectively cost-free gains from engagement in Europe.[10] The calculus might be different if NATO expansion were to bring an increased threat of military action in defence of new members but, on the whole, that is unlikely.

The European perspective

For the Europeans, at least for most of them, the present advantages of US involvement in European security are diminishing. Because of lack of military capability the Europeans were not prepared to deal unaided with the Balkan problems of the 1990s. They still have a long way to go in remedying their deficits but at least most are now seized of the need to do that. Meanwhile, there are no other major military problems on the horizon that are likely to affect their vital interests. However, there are other political advantages, or potential advantages, for them from the US presence.

Firstly, since the United States is often unable not to become involved in a crisis politically, it is as well that it should be unable to stand aside from the military risk: some of NATO's darkest hours (in a political sense) were in the first half of the 1990s when European troops were on the ground in Bosnia and the United States, not at risk on the ground, was pursuing its

[10] It may, however, be politically easier to cut bases abroad than in the United States when downsizing, and the political impact in the United States of even very minor casualties in any military engagement could be very severe.

own, distinctly unhelpful, policies[11]. The appeal of 'in together, out together' is substantial, and until the Europeans have greatly augmented their military strength and effectiveness they risk being discomfited by US policies when the United States is not physically present.

Secondly, NATO is one of the few international organisations in which the United States feels at ease, and which has generally commanded US domestic support. To that extent, the European allies have had the benefit of the United States's being in a forum where some pressure could be applied, and where the United States would at least have to make the attempt to reach consensus before throwing its full weight into the scales and insisting on having its way. (And in fairness, many US diplomats would truthfully say that they have expended great efforts in consultation with allies, seeking a common path, and indeed one can point to US initiatives which have failed to take off in NATO.)

To the extent that the Europeans are not able to influence the United States, either because it is becoming more unilateralist or for other reasons, this second political advantage for them from US engagement is diminished. Moreover, to be set against those benefits there are costs, partly financial in terms of support given to stationed forces; more significantly in terms of the need to conform, often, to US desires or policies. The need to conform was sometimes a consequence of the weakness of Europeans' own efforts in the security field. Sometimes, it was simply because the United States would insist on having its way, even on occasion changing its own policy which it had induced others to follow.[12] So long as a major security threat from the Soviet Union persisted, this subordination was a price worth paying. It is not now appropriate, in the present state of European security, and where US decisions can run contrary to Europeans' understanding of their own interests, and indeed of how the international system should work.

The whole transatlantic relationship will, therefore, come under review. The Europeans already have a stronger bargaining position than is often realised, so long as they do not press it too far. For America's voice in Europe to be substantially diminished would be a major disaster for US foreign policy. If

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11 Which, for example, frustrated the Vance-Owen negotiations.

12 Examples might include the verification provisions of the CW Convention; the CTBT; various things in the CFE negotiations.

that looked likely, US policy would adjust accordingly. Therefore, if the Europeans can move from their present dependence on US military assets for such matters as involvement in Macedonia or Kosovo (which, given their wealth and technical skill, they certainly can), they are in a good position to argue for proper partnership. If the United States will not yield that, it will risk losing influence even beyond what would be involved in such accommodation.

In short, the United States remains engaged in European matters for its own benefit, and must expect to pay a price for that. If it will not pay the price, in terms of being influenced, and giving its support to others' policies on occasion, then it risks having its bluff called. From the European perspective, there is no need whatsoever for US hegemony; there is no need for US leadership; it is not even clear that there is a real need for American involvement in a manner different from that of any other outside player, unless that produces leverage over the United States.

To sum up the current arguments from the European perspective for and against US engagement in European security:

For engagement

- It makes possible some leverage, however small, over the United States.
- The United States will always seek to interfere; it is therefore desirable to contain that within a wider framework.
- The Europeans cannot defend themselves against major outside aggression, and that may re-emerge as a threat.
- The Europeans cannot project power to protect their interests in the world.
- The US's hegemony is more acceptable than German or French hegemony to smaller states.
- Even Russia genuinely welcomes US engagement; there is credibility for it if it is the United States's interlocutor.
- The United States brings unique intelligence capabilities which the Europeans cannot afford to match.
- It gives a reason for both sides to work harder at a range of difficult issues going beyond security.

Against engagement

- It is no longer required; there is no significant external threat to Europe.[13]
- The Europeans must grow up militarily and politically; they will do that only after being made to stand on their own feet.
- The United States is profoundly unilateralist and will in any case pursue its own interests in its own way.
- There are profound differences in approaches to international law and international organisations which make it necessary for the Europeans to diverge from the United States.
- There is a real divergence of interests on the Middle East, Mediterranean, missile defence, etc.[14]
- Involvement with the United States will bring its own problems of terrorism, etc.
- The US approach to international affairs is reducing international security.
- Bilateral relations with the United States can be, or be made to be, damaging to prospects for EU integration.

II.5 Conclusion

The United States sees itself as a natural leader and exercises leadership when it can. This proceeds in part from its view of itself as a special, not to say unique, society, not bound by the normal rules. There are limits on the extent to which it is prepared to go to exercise the necessary arts of leadership. It would, of course, rather be sovereign and untrammelled than limited and deflected from its course by the demands of allies. On the other hand, it may be prepared to give ground on specific topics in order to maintain a general locus if the alternative is a total diminution of influence.

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13 Turkey, the one NATO member which does face some threat, is almost entirely Asiatic in geography, and it is from Asia that the threats to it come.

14 It could be argued that the differences in real interests are small, but the difference in perceived interests are undoubtedly great. It is the latter which count in policy formation.

The hegemonic and unilateralist approach is especially true of Congress, more than of some administrations, which have to face up to the realities of diplomacy. It helps explain why the United States has a tendency to do things which lose the support of potential allies. There have been occasions where it has gained support by arm-twisting which went well beyond the normal persuasion of international relations.[15]

NATO was important for the United States for the direct security benefits which it delivered. It is now more important to that country for the leverage and influence which it gives over other members of the Alliance, and over those wishing to join. US leadership is no longer indispensable for European military security. It is most certainly not necessary, or even perhaps desirable, over a wide range of other issues. For Europeans, at least for the major countries, there must be a question as to the extent to which attempts at US hegemony, not just in European military security but in other spheres, and in other areas, can now be considered appropriate, and, therefore, whether the use of NATO as an instrument for influence will continue to be acceptable. It may be so if it is a two-way channel, giving Europeans some leverage over the United States. A one-way channel will be less likely to survive.

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[15] See, for example, how it mustered the necessary votes for the admission of Israel to the UN. See also letter in *Foreign Affairs*, October 2000, p. 157. 'Thus the next phase of European-American relations will require especially wise and liberal presidential leadership in Washington . . . the next administration must be prepared to explain to Americans and to justify to a sincerely incredulous Congress how and why the post-World War II American intimidation of Europe, intended or not, must be consciously wound down. A better transatlantic equilibrium will ensure that the United States does not become an overpowerful, resented leviathan, as strong and influential as it is fragile and isolated.'

Chapter Three

NATO'S CURRENT ROLE AND FUNCTIONS

NATO's current role and functions are determined by, or ascertainable from, three things: firstly the terms of the founding document, the Washington Treaty of 1949; secondly, the documents adopted at the Washington summit of 1999 (which indicate what NATO, or its member states, agreed should be said as to its purposes); thirdly, by the actual political and security situation in which the Alliance operates.

III.1 The Washington Treaty

The first of these is a short document, of which the vital parts are Articles 4 and 5.[16] Throughout the Cold War the latter, which is concerned with collective defence, was correctly viewed as the bedrock of the Alliance. Underlying it was the great strategic objective of linking the United States to European security so as to resist Soviet aggression.[17] In dealing with the Soviet threat, NATO long pursued, as set out in the Harmel Report

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16 Article 4. The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened.
Article 5 The Parties agree that an armed attack against any one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in the exercise of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

17 Lord Ismay, NATO's first Secretary-General, famously defined the Alliance's purposes as being to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down. The last leg of that, the containment of Germany, was understandable, perhaps even necessary, as reassurance to the smaller European states at the time. Fifty years later there is no need to consider it as still relevant, with a model democratic Germany and the EU providing a political framework in which Germany is ever more willing to place its sovereignty.

of 1967,[18] a dual-track approach of deterrence and defence preparedness on the one hand and dialogue, or readiness for dialogue, on the other.

From time to time, references were made to functions falling more under Article 4; in particular it was said that NATO was the principal forum for consultation on security matters amongst its members. It is very doubtful if that was ever true; it was certainly far from that by the end of the Cold War. However, reluctant as most parties were to acknowledge the fact, the latter removed the underlying rational and *raison d'être* of the Alliance, and from the new Strategic Concept agreed at the Rome summit of 1991 more emphasis came to be placed on NATO's wider roles and interests, a turning in fact to Article 4. That did not make NATO the principal forum of consultation, at least for its members, though it did become an important focus for the newly freed states of Central and Eastern Europe.

The preamble to the Washington Treaty makes reference to safeguarding the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of the[ir] peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. The theme is picked up in Article 2, which commits the parties to strengthening their free institutions and bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which those institutions are founded. All this last is thoroughly virtuous material, referred to from time to time over the years, but was not of great practical importance before the end of the Cold War. In the first enlargement thereafter it did have an underlying role at least: Slovakia, which would have had perhaps the strongest claim of any of the applicants on military or security grounds, was rejected because of the lack of democratic credentials of its then Prime Minister, Vladimir Meciar.

Before that, from time to time NATO had affirmed itself as a community of like-minded nations, a task which became easier as democracy spread even more completely amongst its members. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, moreover, it set about reinventing itself. Attempts were made, less and less convincingly, to assert that Article 5 was still the fundamental basis of the Alliance, but new tasks were added and these manifestly increased in importance as the threat of major external aggression against almost any member of the Alliance dwindled. Moreover, there was more and more emphasis on its more general role in European security; newly independent

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18 *The Future Tasks of the Alliance*, Brussels, December 1967.

states clamoured to join. Some indeed felt threatened by external parties; more simply sought to join an organisation which marked them as accepted respectable actors with a seat at the table of the leading military organisation in Europe. In these circumstances, deciding which states could join became much more complex.

III.2 The Washington summit documents

The Fiftieth Anniversary Summit held in Washington in April 1999 produced several documents relevant to these themes (as well as a number of others). There is a considerable degree of overlap and repetition. The general theses are, however, fairly readily ascertainable. The central statement of what the Alliance is about is the 1999 Strategic Concept. This is a long document, reflecting months of negotiation and compromise. It purports to express NATO's enduring purpose and nature, and its fundamental security tasks. In doing that it identifies the central features of the new security environment, specifies the elements of the Alliance's broad approach to security, and provides guidelines for the further adaptation of its military forces.[19]

This document drew on the developments after the Strategic Concept adopted in 1991, which pointed towards a new and broader role for NATO, including the launch of Partnership for Peace (PfP),[20] the Permanent Joint Council (PJC),[21] and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).[22] The defining shift, however, came with the military engagements in the Balkans, first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo. The summit, which saw the admission of the first three post-Cold War members, was held within days of the start of the intense bombing campaign in Kosovo. With that NATO, or rather its member states, came to accept that, as a provider of military security, its role went beyond territorial defence, whether of members or non-members, and included other military operations which could contribute to European

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19 *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, Washington, April 1999, paragraph 5.

20 Launched at the Ministerial Meeting of the NAC, Brussels 10-11 January 1994.

21 Permanent Joint Council, bringing together Russia and the members of the Alliance, launched at the Madrid summit, 1997.

22 Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, bringing together members of the Alliance and the former members of the Warsaw Pact or their successor states: Launched at the Madrid summit of 1997.

security. Bosnia, at least in principle, involved the Alliance giving aid to a sovereign state beset by major problems. In Kosovo, NATO went a good deal further by waging war against a sovereign state, and without a UN mandate, in order to protect a part of the population of that state from its government's actions.

That caused a variety of reactions, from new members who had joined the Alliance days before the military action began, and from the Russians, who saw NATO as attacking a fellow Slav state in the interests of an insurgent party, and moreover as undermining Russia's role in European security. There were also reactions from states in the Middle East and Asia. Much of this reaction was adverse, as was some of that amongst the populations of member countries.

Despite such developments, the 1999 Strategic Concept reaffirms that NATO's essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. However, the Alliance is also committed to continuing to secure a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. Since that can be put at risk by crisis and conflict affecting the security of the Euro-Atlantic area, the Alliance not only ensures the defence of its members but contributes to peace and stability in this region.[23] In short, this part of the document takes Article 5 of the Treaty as the essential and enduring purpose of NATO, but also goes on to give very considerable weight to its wider regional role, asserting that the sense of equal security amongst its members contributes to stability in the area.

The Strategic Concept also records that the Alliance embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is permanently tied to that of Europe.[24] However, it nowhere demonstrates the latter, nor sets out argumentation for it. It does, though, assign five functions:[25]

- providing one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment based on the growth of democratic institutions, etc.;
- serving as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on members' vital interests;

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23 Ibid., para. 6.
24 Ibid., para. 7.
25 Ibid., para. 10.

- deterring and defending against any threat of aggression against a member state;
- standing ready, on a case-by-case basis, to contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management;
- providing wide-ranging partnership cooperation and dialogue.

III.3 The current political and security situation

Chapter One above gives a brief outline of the current security situation in Europe. There are a number of countries with grave political, social and economic problems. In particular, there is a continuing source of violence or potential violence in the Balkans. Turkey faces a number of internal and external threats, some of a military nature. In addition, there are a series of acute problems in the Middle East, all or almost all of which could involve violence and, elsewhere in the world, collapsing states, civil wars and humanitarian problems.

III.4 Elements of European security architecture

The EU is slowly developing its common policies, deepening its political structures and addressing the question of its own enlargement. A number of states in Central and Eastern Europe are most anxious to join but many will be faced by a delay of some years. (EU entry requires the candidate's economy and institutions to be able to conform to the extensive *acquis*; many of the candidates are as yet unable to pass that test, which cannot be cut short.) There is, therefore a continuing call for dialogue to ameliorate the sense of exclusion of such states and, indeed, to help deal with the sense of fresh division which might come from the extension of EU membership, with the Schengen emphasis on hard external EU borders, to some but not all of the European countries. That is, there is a risk of creating new divisions in Europe after the removal of the old Cold War ones, and that is as true of NATO as of EU enlargement.

The need for dialogue is the greater since so many states are finding their feet as independent entities. There are varying degrees of instability and feelings of insecurity, and a sense of wishing to have a seat at a table where issues relevant to their well-being are discussed. To some extent that has

been provided by OSCE, and for a time by PfP, and, more especially, as regards NATO, by the EAPC.

The OSCE continues to do useful work, but the original high hopes of its being a true pan-European security organisation have not been, and will not be, fulfilled. Partnership for Peace likewise has been very useful, both in preparing candidate countries for NATO membership and in enabling non-members to operate alongside NATO in Balkan engagements. However, PfP does not provide a sufficient forum for dialogue, as was acknowledged by the creation of the EAPC. That, and the special and intensified arrangements with Russia in the PJC (and, on a somewhat lesser scale, with Ukraine), could have provided a mechanism for real consultation, but in practice, that has not happened.

At its creation, PfP might have provided the basis for a sort of 'Associate Membership' which gave all the advantages of full membership except for the increasingly irrelevant Article 5 guarantee. There could have been discussions along the lines envisaged by Article 4; there could have been assimilation to NATO force planning procedures, participation in exercise and in operations, and thence in decision-taking. That development was frustrated by several factors. Firstly, the newly freed states of the Warsaw Pact wanted a badge of full membership in Western organisations. Secondly, many existing members continued to speak of Article 5 as NATO's bedrock. Thirdly, there was a great reluctance, which was to resurface in EAPC and the PJC, to let non-members really share decision-taking, even in matters which were not concerned with Article 5 or the fundamental business of the Alliance. EAPC and the other arrangements with Russia and Ukraine provided a certain locus and forums in which concerns may be aired. They will not now develop, however, into anything that could serve as a replacement for full membership for those states which are now candidates.

NATO proclaims itself as having a general stabilising and security mission in the Euro-Atlantic area, yet, despite occasional US references to ultimate Russian membership, does not see itself as admitting all states, even well behaved and well-disposed ones, into its membership. There is a paradox here. How can NATO be the principal security organisation as it claims, benefiting the whole area, and yet restrictive in membership? In part the answer is that the desire to qualify for membership has improved the

security situation, as potential members have committed themselves to the peaceful resolution of disputes and so on. In part the existence of a competent military organisation may have deterred adventurism, though the history of the Balkans over the last ten years does not altogether bear that out. Both factors have undoubtedly had some force but it may be questioned for how long they will continue to have effect. There is no great leverage over those who come to feel that they have no prospect of admission. The deterrence of those who would be aggressive may diminish if it comes to be felt that Kosovo was *sui generis*. Above all, it ill accords with many other developments in European structures to have as a predominant generator of security an organisation from which perfectly respectable democratic states may be excluded. Consultations of the sort hitherto seen in EAPC or the PJC will not be sufficient.

III.5 Russia

Under the Founding Act which established it, the PJC is meant to be the principal forum for NATO consultations with Russia in times of crisis. There was always considerable hesitation in NATO about including Russia and giving it a real voice in Alliance business: there was always the desire for NATO to have made up its mind and then as a body meet Russia at 16 (or 19) plus 1. It is perhaps understandable that the Kosovo operation went ahead without Russia's being consulted, but if for such significant matters there is no consultation, then Russia will understandably feel excluded from major European security issues. Moreover, at almost the same time, NATO adopted its revised Strategic Concept. That had taken many months, well over a year, to draft. Russia repeatedly asked to discuss it in the PJC but only once was it taken there.

On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that NATO does not in general have policies of its own: it reflects the underlying decisions of its member governments. Thus, in a crisis, NATO will form a view only after there have been extensive exchanges amongst the leading countries. To that extent, it is not surprising that there are other forums in which exchanges take place between Russia and some NATO members. The Security Council of the UN is one such; a significant one for European security is the Contact Group,[26]

[26] France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

an ad hoc body of the nations most closely involved in formulating policy for handling the Balkans crises.

The 2001 Budapest Ministerial meeting recorded a rather optimistic view of how matters were going in PJC. They may certainly have improved from the state in which they were immediately after the Kosovo campaign. It must be doubted, however, whether any matters of real substance are being addressed there, or whether NATO is yet really willing to share decision-taking, giving the Russians a real role. Despite mentions in the past by the United States of the possibility of ultimate Russian membership of the Alliance, that is probably something that the United States would not in fact welcome. As part of considering how NATO-Russian relations may develop, as will certainly be necessary in the context of decisions on enlargement, it would be desirable to face up to the consequences of past rhetoric, both about potential Russian membership, and about the purposes of the Alliance.

The 1999 Strategic Concept makes much of NATO's role in creating stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area, not least by partnership, cooperation and dialogue. It is difficult to see how it can realistically do that unless it engages meaningfully with the largest European state, and one, moreover, with major problems of stability, and possessing nuclear weapons. That must be true at any time. When Russia is perturbed by US thinking on missile defence and by the near certainty of NATO enlargement, the case for dialogue is compelling. At present, Russia is weak, and its ability to make an impact on the international scene is limited. It would be a mistake to assume that that will always be the case. Indeed, it could be argued that long-term security in Europe requires a prosperous Russia; that in turn implies a strong one. Given that, and the concerns of Russia's smaller Western neighbours, a major part of creating a secure Europe is going to be ensuring the proper integration of Russia. In a somewhat different sense, the same is true of Ukraine. This cannot all be for NATO alone, but it should give an orientation to at least part of NATO's efforts, especially given on the one hand Russia's suspicion of the Alliance, and, on the other, the pressures of those wishing to join it.

III.6 NATO's military role

More generally, NATO clearly supports peace, state-building, etc. in the sense that it is in favour of them. While it cannot effect the transformation of societies, it, better than any other organisation, can help with the provision of the necessary elements of military force to ensure entry or quell certain kinds of violent disturbance. Moreover, NATO provides a unique template or set of standards for interoperability which enable coalitions to be put together with comparative ease when they are necessary for operations outside Europe. The Gulf War of 1991 was an early example of that; those participants who were in the NATO integrated military structure were able to collaborate in a way which others were not. Paradoxically, it may well be that it is in the pursuit of security objectives outside Europe that NATO will have its future important impact and utility. After all, those, plus the Balkan sort of problems, are why the EU is developing its CESDP, which will rely on NATO procedures, whatever may happen about assets, for successful implementation.

Organised military effort is one thing at which the Alliance is relatively good. NATO may be tedious, bureaucratic and cumbersome but it is the most effective international military organisation which exists. It provides standards and procedures for its members and, through PfP, for others. Using NATO practices, it has been possible to put together packages for former Yugoslavia, under direct NATO command, and for Albania, under Italian leadership, which would not otherwise have been available. The Balkan experiences have been particularly remarkable for the number of contributions from non-members.

To assemble militarily effective coalitions, two things are necessary: consensus of political will; and interoperability of armed forces. NATO can help with the former in so far as for its members it inculcates habits of consensus seeking amongst states which have the same general political ethos. It may also be able to induce a similar approach from aspirant members. It is less likely to be able to do that with states which are not members and over which it has no leverage from their desire to join. In short, habits of consensus-building are important, but they can really only apply to those who are habitually involved in the process. To the extent that there is no discussion, and no real habit of discussion in a wider forum, e.g. the PJC, there will be limits as to what NATO can do to build political

consensus. There are, indeed, problems with policy formation even amongst members.

The other necessary element of coalition warfare is interoperability, not only of weapons and platforms but of headquarters, logistics and so on. Here is found NATO's real strength, far short of perfect though it may be. The organisation was focused for too long on the wrong sort of military activity, and has a long way to go to complete various programmes of standardisation. Nevertheless, it has learned invaluable lessons from the planning for the Bosnia and Kosovo operations. It has command and control arrangements, and the international headquarters and staffs inculcate habits of cooperation and unified systems in the different nationals serving in them. If it is necessary to assemble a group of states to conduct military operations it will be much easier to do that if they are all well acquainted with NATO procedures than starting from any other basis. Likewise, for force planning or standardisation of communications in connection with, say, CESDP, it will be easier and better to take the NATO model than to start from scratch. The requirements for extra-European intervention in terms of mobility, lift, sustainability, communications and military planning are very demanding. NATO now has considerable competence in such matters.

The Washington summit launched a Defence Capabilities Initiative which was aimed at raising the effectiveness of the contributions of the European members to the Alliance. It thus covers much the same ground as the CESDP, and, indeed, is meeting many of the same problems in implementation. Nevertheless, individual members are, in varying degrees, making the transition. They will be helped both (in some cases) by the gentle pressure which arises from consultation in the Alliance, and by participating in NATO structures, where collective experience is available.

III.7 NATO decisions

NATO is often seen as an autonomous actor, it being said that it will, e.g., bomb, or enforce something. That is not in fact the case. NATO is the creature of its members: on major issues it is they who take decisions. Even on minor ones, officials and officers may receive instructions from their national capitals.

The supreme governing authority is the North Atlantic Council (NAC), which meets at least weekly at ambassador level, and from time to time in ministerial session, with occasional summits. In practice, the most important decisions will be taken by Heads of Government, after extensive informal consultation. Arguments in the NAC are unlikely to sway the outcome very much. Moreover, the extensive informal consultation will naturally give more weight to the major players. There operates within NATO an informal *directoire*, universally known but seldom acknowledged. This has implications for how matters might be managed after any enlargement and also for the dealings of the Europeans with the United States (which is, of course, part of the *directoire*.)

III.8 US involvement

Military technical issues apart, NATO also provides two other things. Firstly, it is an international forum in which the United States feels generally comfortable. It is undoubtedly the leading state in the Alliance and can generally get its way. It therefore feels more at ease with NATO than with almost any other international organisation. Secondly, and linked with that, since the United States has always attached importance to NATO, the Alliance has provided a forum where it may have been possible for the other members to exercise a greater degree of influence on that country than would have been possible in any other. The overall impact may have been slight but it was greater than could have been achieved in any other way. Thus, to put it bluntly, a reason for binding in the United States through NATO is to moderate, to howsoever small a degree, its unilateralist tendencies.

There is still a need for the United States to be involved in a number of security matters. The first reason is the military requirement; the second is the great political weight which the United States can bring to bear, not least because of its military capacity. The United States has unmatched military strengths. The full spectrum of those is most unlikely to be necessary in any issue of European security. Within Europe, European assets should be sufficient for almost all contingencies, if present plans are maintained, but until the European states, individually and collectively, have improved their effective military strength US engagement is an invaluable, indeed, essential part of the wider security scene. For the foreseeable future, major extra-

European activity will require the involvement of the United States, and NATO provides a technical framework for the putting together of US and European forces for such activity. (Major extra-European military effort by European states alone, or in a leading position, is unlikely in the near future.)

There is a caveat to be entered here. A year or two ago the United States made much of the need for the Europeans to keep up with it technologically if they were to be able to maintain interoperability. There was a good deal in that: the Europeans did not have sufficient weaponry, sensors and so on, to conduct the new kinds of operation which were in prospect with the move from territorial defence. However, the United States is developing doctrines and modes of warfare which take it in another direction, away from being able to deal effectively with the sorts of problem most likely to confront Western nations. Overwhelming force, force protection and the ability to destroy the opposition from a distance are characteristics of US force planning. Technology is applied to those ends. It is not yet clear where its 2001 review will take the new Administration on such issues, but there is a real possibility that in some ways it may become unaffordable and inappropriate for the Europeans to strive for full interoperability with the United States. This could have implications for NATO as the provider of standard military services and procedures, in which US lines of development have hitherto played so significant a part. It would also raise more general questions about transatlantic cooperation: burden-sharing in which the division was such that the Europeans fought on the ground whilst the United States fought a stand-off war would not be acceptable.

III.9 Conclusion

NATO has undoubtedly been a major part of the security structure of Europe. It successfully deterred Soviet aggression and provided the shield behind which the European Communities and later the EU were able to develop. Its *raison d'être* must now be sought in other matters, though not excluding constraint of neighbours, deterrence of future undesirable developments, or providing utility in enabling military operations to be undertaken with more competence and skill than would otherwise be the case.

The original basis of the Alliance was the territorial defence of Western Europe and, to that end, the tying in of the United States to European security. The strategic circumstances have altered greatly, though military action is still a necessary component of achieving political objectives, ranging from humanitarian relief to protecting vital national interests. If it is to be relevant in the future, NATO will have to respond to current needs. It can sensibly do that only in the military sphere and areas closely connected with it. That should certainly include dialogue as well as military action.

The Alliance's structures and skills do not provide for extensive engagement in police work or fighting crime, nor in discussions of wider political agendas. In the military sphere it brings better capabilities than any other organisation. The question is to what ends those capabilities will be deployed. The need for territorial defence of the Allies against an overwhelming assault, and thus the commitments of Article 5 as the basis of the Alliance's being, has all but disappeared for the foreseeable future.

It is doubtful whether NATO as such will ever acquire a significant out-of-Europe role, but its common procedures will enable its members, and others who share a knowledge of those procedures, to collaborate extensively in other places, if the political will to do so exists. That may be of crucial importance for the transatlantic link: NATO can foster cooperation between the United States and European states in a forum where the United States is comfortable. The end is political, though the means are military. It may also make vital contributions to humanitarian relief or regional security issues, within Europe. Thus, in former Yugoslavia the Alliance brought a two-fold benefit: organised military effort; and involvement of the United States and Europeans together.

A key judgement on what NATO's real functions now are, or should be, hinges on an assessment of how significant various threats to European interests and European security are or might realistically become. It may well have a responsibility to deter and repel aggression, but if such aggression is most unlikely it may be hard to describe that as a profoundly important function. Such a judgement will bear on the desirability of different forms of enlargement, and whether they are likely to be stabilising or destabilising in general, and for particular candidates. NATO's real functions must be judged against the new state of affairs, accurately assessed.

Discerning the essential, and allocating resources, financial and political, to that, is what is required.

With NATO, international organisations such as the UN are able to call upon a competent executor of military operations, and one which is not purely unilateralist. For the United States, having allies who are militarily able to operate with it outside Europe will bring both military and (especially) political gains. The Europeans for their part will have to show their willingness to put effort into common interests outside Europe.

As regards CESDP, the Alliance should be a provider of services to the Europeans, who should use its procedures and, as appropriate, its other (rather limited) assets, to give themselves credibility as military actors. Resources are limited and there would be no point in scrapping what NATO can provide and starting to build anew. The Europeans will gain great benefit from collaborating there if, but only if, their use of the Alliance for their security needs is not blocked. It thus behoves all members to consider carefully before frustrating any use by part of them. As a provider of services, NATO will flourish if its potential customers, those who would use it, can get from it what they need. Its main customers will be its members, i.e. it will in a sense be a cooperative. That raises, in an acute form, the question of who its members should be.

For non-members, NATO has a variety of functions and they may benefit from association in a variety of ways. For those aspiring to join, it is, in effect, a school. Others could have their stability improved. For those who wish to contribute to various missions, whether under EU or UN auspices, the Alliance provides a framework where their efforts may be maximised, and some of their deficiencies remedied. For some who might or might not wish to join, but who have no present prospect of that, the Alliance, through the EAPC, and the special arrangements with Russia and Ukraine, can provide a seat at an important board, where security concerns can be ventilated. However, NATO will have to do better than it has so far in dialogue, particularly with Russia, if this promise is to be fulfilled.

Some of this is reflected in NATO's revised (1999) Strategic Concept. However, that is understandably cautious. It acknowledges that large-scale conventional aggression against the Alliance is highly unlikely. Quite properly, too, it notes that risks and uncertainties remain in the strategic

environment, and that a major threat could emerge in the longer term. The picture then becomes rather blacker as it points to ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes and on. Grave concerns are expressed about weapons of mass destruction and the proliferation of sophisticated conventional weapons, and the vulnerability of advanced states to information technology warfare. It is not certain that it strikes the correct balance.

Chapter Four

COMMITMENTS AND PRESSURES ON NATO ENLARGEMENT

Since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact there has been sustained pressure from some of its former members for admission to NATO. In the early years, the Alliance was very cautious and avoided commitments but from 1994 it has accepted that enlargement will take place.[27] The first three new members were admitted at the Washington summit of 1999. It was clear then that the issue of further enlargement would not go away. A number of encouraging statements were made (on which see below) and further encouragement was given by the very name of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) agreed then. With the approach of the Prague summit of 2002, pressures have already started to mount, as in the meeting of candidate countries in Bratislava in May 2001, and President Havel's speech there.[28]

IV.1 The 1999 enlargement and its aftermath

In the run-up to the last enlargement NATO made a study[29] of the issues which covered, *inter alia*, the purposes and principles of enlargement, and what would be expected of new members. It was made clear that decisions were for NATO itself, on a case-by-case basis, with no fixed or rigid criteria. The general purpose was to build an improved security architecture for the whole of the Euro-Atlantic area, with increased stability and security for all, without recreating dividing lines. New members would have to conform to the basic principles of the UN Charter, involving democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. On joining they would have to assume the obligations of the Washington Treaty and to maintain the effectiveness of the Alliance. Moreover, they were not to close the door to further accessions.

More detailed, though not clearly defined, obligations included a respect for OSCE norms, the resolution of disputes by peaceful means, and the promotion of stability and wellbeing through economic liberty, social justice and

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27 *Declaration of the Heads of State and Government*, 11 January 1994; Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the NAC, December 1994.

28 Reported in the *Wall Street Journal Europe*, 14 May 2001.

29 *Study on NATO Enlargement*, September 1995.

environmental responsibility. New members were also to establish democratic and civilian control of their armed forces, and to devote to them adequate resources. There were also more technical requirements to pursue standardisation and interoperability.

Underlying this study was Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, which provides that the members of the Alliance may by unanimous agreement invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to it. The Washington summit of 1999 reaffirmed that the door remained open for further members.[30, 31] The Communiqué not only welcomed the participation of the three new Allies but also made specific mention of the efforts and progress of others. Romania and Slovenia, the two unsuccessful candidates then most hopeful, were mentioned first, followed by the three Baltic States. Bulgaria then received a mention for positive developments, followed by Slovakia for recent positive developments. Finally, Macedonia and Albania were mentioned in connection with their cooperation in the Kosovo crisis.

The Communiqué then went on to say that the Alliance expected to issue further invitations in [the] coming years to nations able and willing to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership. That was glossed by making it subject to NATO's determining that their inclusion would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance.

The Communiqué also welcomed the aspirations of the nine countries then interested in joining the Alliance and offered to provide practical support through the Membership Action Plan. The nations that had expressed an interest in membership would remain under active consideration. Perhaps most importantly, though still rather ambiguously, it recorded that no European democratic country whose admission would fulfil the objectives of the Treaty would be excluded from consideration, regardless of its geographic location, each being considered on is own merits. As a final piece of balancing aspirations, within and outside the Alliance, the Communiqué said that, in order to enhance overall security and stability in Europe,

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30 Membership Action Plan, 24 April 1999, para. 1.

31 Washington Summit Communiqué, 24 April 1999, para. 7.

further steps in the enlargement process should balance the security concerns of all Allies.

Another piece emanating from the summit and touching on the same ground was the Washington Declaration.[32] In paragraph 8 this confirmed that the Alliance remained open to all European democracies, regardless of geography, that were willing and able to meet the responsibilities of membership, and whose inclusion would enhance overall security and stability in Europe.

Finally in the catalogue of nicely balanced Washington commitments on further enlargement, paragraph 39 of the Strategic Concept said that the Alliance remained open to new members and furthermore expected to extend further invitations. That, as usual in these documents, was glossed: the invitees had to be willing to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership; and NATO had to determine that the inclusion would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance, strengthen its effectiveness and cohesion, and enhance overall European security and stability. No European democratic country whose admission met the objectives of the Treaty would be excluded from consideration.

The same general themes emerged at the May 2001 Budapest Ministerial Meeting. Noting the decisions taken at Washington, this repeated the Alliance's commitment to remain open to new members. It also reiterated the language about being willing and able to assume responsibilities and obligations, and about NATO's determining that their inclusion would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance and enhance overall European security and stability.[33] The NAC also recognised Croatia's declared interest in possible future NATO membership.[34]

IV.2 Questions unanswered

It may be seen from all this careful drafting that at Washington, as indeed earlier, NATO members were unclear as to what they wanted from the Alliance and on how it should develop. There was a tussle in the US

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32 *The Washington Declaration*, 23 April 1999.

33 *Final Communiqué*, Ministerial Meeting of the NAC, Budapest, 29 May 2001, para. 50.

34 Ibid., para. 55.

administration between differing views, in particular over the weight to be given to Russian objections. There were also strong ethnic lobbies, particularly for Poland. More generally, there were questions as to whether the objective should be to maintain a tight, militarily cohesive organisation for European defence; to try to apply such an organisation to extra-European roles; or to have a more inclusive approach. The 1999 Strategic Concept attempted answers to some of these but what was not publicly acknowledged was that enlargement by itself, and certainly given the likelihood of future rounds, would change the nature of the Alliance.

In 1999, NATO's Parliamentary Assembly endorsed the entirely correct thought that enlargement was a means to an end and not an end in itself. Thus, if rapid enlargement reduced the security environment of the Euro-Atlantic area, then it would be better to wait.[35]

The United States came down firmly for the first enlargement, which ensured that it happened, and made clear that it would be for only the three candidates admitted, which ensured that it would be limited to them. Amongst other members there was a spectrum of views, from those who sought a wider enlargement to those who were reluctant to see almost any change lest it weaken and dilute the Alliance, increasing its responsibilities without adding to its strengths. Indeed, some were so cautious as to think that adding any new members was likely to be weakening in as much as the coherence of the Alliance would be reduced. Much the same sort of spectrum may be expected in the run-up to Prague.

IV.3 The next enlargement

The overall views of the Bush administration, and of the newly rebalanced Senate, are not clear. In his June 2001 visit to Europe, the President said that he believed that NATO should expand and that no one should be excluded because of history or location or geography. Furthermore, he rejected any idea of a veto from outside.[36] Certainly the Administration is for enlargement, but on what scale, and over what time, is not yet known. If it takes a

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35 NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Political Committee, Sub-committee on NATO Enlargement and the New Democracies, September 1999, *NATO-Russia Relations and Next Steps for NATO Enlargement*, para. 42.

36 *The New York Times*, 16-17 June 2001.

clear line it will probably be able to impose it. If not, there will be pressure from the Scandinavian members for the admission of at least one Baltic State, and preferably more; probably also from Italy for the admission of Slovenia, and perhaps Romania. The United Kingdom will be hesitant about going for more than a minimal step, fearing to see the nature of the Alliance changed further, though admitting the argument that it must adapt to changing circumstances. Germany and France will also be reserved about further enlargement.

The great paradox is that NATO's claim to be the pre-eminent European security organisation, whose existence is vital for the stability of the Continent, confronts the fact that extending its membership to those parts of the continent most in need of stability would change the nature of the Alliance. Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Albania all desperately need stabilising. Any of them could be involved in armed conflict of some sort. Yet only one of them, Albania, is a candidate, and is probably the least likely applicant to be admitted.

A second, not dissimilar paradox, is that most of the candidates for membership are more likely to be interested in NATO as a provider of territorial integrity, its original function, than in wider security roles. Yet it is the assumption of a wider perspective which leads to their having the prospect of joining at all. The territorial integrity of the members that made up the Alliance in 1990 or 1999 will not be bettered by admitting any of the likely candidates. However, their wider security interests may well be served, and a task for the Alliance will be to ensure that new candidates understand the wider issues of stability as well as their immediate territorial issues.

There is a judgement to be made as to whether a time when the security environment is generally very benign is the moment to expand NATO. In one sense, there is no great need for its protection and engagement (leaving aside the problems of the Balkans). On the other hand, it is arguably better to have the stress and turbulence of expansion in a benign environment than when there are major alarms and excursions, and the Alliance's military and political cohesion is most needed. That, of course, could be countered if it were judged that enlargement itself would destroy the current environment.

IV.4 New dividing lines

That points up one of the major problems of NATO (as of EU) enlargement: how can the organisation grow without creating new dividing lines in Europe? If there were objective grounds of behaviour that could be the basis for decision-taking, dividing lines might be sustainable (or even useful in correcting misbehaviour). The same is true of military capability or effort, though there is an additional complication there because of the lack of military investment by certain existing members, and the invidious comparisons that could be drawn as a result. In practice, NATO will be forced to choose between candidates which are very similarly qualified, so making new divisions; or admitting a large number of the applicants; or trying to defer almost all of them.

Some candidates may well seek to establish very clear dividing lines, especially between themselves and Russia. They may wish to feel that they are entering a club from which Russia will be firmly excluded. They may indeed seek to draw the Alliance away from any idea of partnership with that country. How to involve Russia appropriately in European security structures is a difficult issue, but Russia, in one way or another, is a fundamental part of the European security scene. NATO's role vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was clear: the Alliance gave stability by balancing and deterring the latter. Deterring and balancing Russia is not what the (revised) Strategic Concept sees as the purpose of the Alliance, nor would it be stabilising if it were. Again in his June 2001 visit, President Bush called for partnership with Russia.

Some of the arguments against enlargement hinge on the need for candidates to be militarily effective. Some studies of the military effects of enlargement were undertaken before the Madrid decisions but, in the event, accorded very little weight. The determining criterion was essentially that of political judgement. The same is almost certain to be true on this occasion too. Nevertheless, some indicators of military effectiveness are examined in Chapter Six below.

In present circumstances NATO will demand of new members that they have firmly established democratic institutions, including appropriate civilian control of the military. They should also have market economies and be capable and willing to make a reasonable defence effort. What such

an effort is, of course, is a matter of judgement; moreover, not all existing members meet such criteria, and if strategic concerns required it they could and would be set aside. Again the question is, what strategic concerns would justify that?

There are rational economic grounds for the small, relatively poor, states of Central and Eastern Europe to seek admission, i.e. that there are great benefits in role specialisation, the sharing of overheads, and so on. For example, to support a small number of modern military aircraft requires the same sort of infrastructure as supporting a much larger number. The additional increment in security which a handful of such aircraft would bring is very small; it would be desirable to have aircraft and their functions provided by other, better equipped partners whilst concentrating efforts on something in which the Alliance stands in more need.[37]

IV.5 Conclusion

To sum up, there are commitments from NATO, implicit and explicit, to further enlargement. There are pressures from candidates to be admitted, either because they have some real fears for their security, as may be the case of the Baltic States, or because they seek a badge of respectability, membership of what is seen as a pre-eminent club and a first step on the way to integration in wider Western structures. (Admission to the EU will take some time even for the best qualified candidates, who largely overlap with the NATO ones.)

On the other hand, none of the candidates is ready in military terms and none is strong economically. Some are unready politically. In wider political terms, it is not clear how and why including some and excluding others would enhance stability and security. The issue of what kind of enlargement would best avoid creating new divisions, and how, has not so far been the

[37] Not that such rationality is always evident within NATO. Efforts have been made by some states to encourage the three new members to acquire sophisticated assets which would divert scarce resources from more appropriate and useful investments.

subject of open debate. There is little sign of any of the players addressing the question of what sort of organisation NATO has become, is becoming, or should become, and how enlargement should affect that.

Chapter Five

NATO AND THE EU: TWO ENLARGEMENTS

V.1 Compare and contrast

NATO and the EU are both significant parts of the European security architecture and both have in the past been necessary. The issues with which they have to contend have changed, and their ability to address those has developed. Both, though in different ways, are security organisations; the EU has contributed to security in the economic, political and social spheres, whilst NATO has been a 'hard' security organisation concerned with the provision of military capabilities and territorial defence. There has been a considerable overlap in political matters, given an overlap in membership and a common emphasis on Western liberal and democratic values. The crucial membership difference has been the involvement of the United States in the one as the leading player, and its absence from the other.[38] A further difference of considerable practical importance is Turkey's membership in NATO and the lack of any prospect of its early admission to the EU.

More fundamental still are the differences in the natures of the organisations. The EU is a unique kind of international organisation, partly supranational, partly intergovernmental. Its members are committed to an ever closer union embracing economic, social and political issues. Organisationally, too, there are significant differences. The EU is divided into 'pillars' with the supranational Commission running Pillar 1, essentially Trade and the Internal Market; Pillar 2, Foreign and Security Policy, on the other hand is intergovernmental, under the control of a council of ministers, though many of the important instruments for conducting an effective foreign policy are to be found in Pillar 1.[39] In addition, the EU has a directly elected parliament with considerable budgetary and legislative powers.

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[38] Current NATO membership is: Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.
Current EU membership: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.

[39] Pillar 3 covers Justice and Home Affairs; it is intergovernmental.

NATO, on the other hand, concerned essentially with military security, with some additional political objectives, is a purely intergovernmental organisation, run in principle by a council of ministers of member states in which formally (though not in practice) all are equal. In the last decade, it has moved from being an organisation concerned essentially with the territorial defence of its members to providing a wider variety of services to European security. Indeed, its own statements, as at the Washington summit of 1999, point to a wide stabilising role in the Euro-Atlantic area. Meanwhile, since the St-Malo Initiative of 1998,[40] picked up in Cologne and Helsinki,[41] the EU has started to assume a 'hard' security role in the military sphere, albeit at present still of very modest dimensions, and in cooperation with NATO. There are many difficult issues to be resolved about how the Common European Security and Defence Policy will evolve, and how it and the Common Foreign and Security Policy will interact with NATO and its organisation and processes. Their resolution will be affected by, as well as affecting, the future developments of NATO and the EU. An important aspect of interaction between the two organisations at a higher level will be how their approaches to enlargement complement each other, or fail to do so.

V.2 The future

The June 2001 Göteborg EU summit clearly endorsed the concept of enlargement, and sooner rather than later. It looked to the completion of negotiations for the leading candidates by 2002, with entry in 2004. However, not all EU members are eager for enlargement. Some fear the diversion of resources from their problems to those of the new members. Others fear the loss of any sense of cohesion or *finalité politique*. Others may be concerned about a diminution of their own influence. The outcome of the Irish referendum on Nice will be a complicating factor, even if it does not demonstrate a rejection by that country of the idea of enlargement. An EU enlarged to twenty or even thirty members will pose enormous problems of governance and procedure which the current arrangements will be unable to meet. Widening will necessitate deepening, as well as raising major resource

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40 UK-French summit, St-Malo 3-4 December 1998. Maartje Rutten, 'From St-Malo to Nice: European defence core documents', *Chaillot Paper* 47 (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, May 2001), pp. 8-9.

41 Ibid., pp. 41-2, 82-9.

issues. Effective management of an enlarged EU, at any rate in the areas of foreign, security and defence policies, will almost certainly require the establishment of informal *directoires*, which are likely to be very difficult for those not in them to accept.

The EU has objective criteria for enlargement, and a recognised list of candidates, accepting that when the criteria are met candidates will be admitted. As outlined in Chapter Four above, NATO's criteria are more subjective, coming down to whether the admission of a particular candidate will be accepted by the Alliance as contributing to overall stability and security in Europe.

The United States is desirous of seeing EU enlargement for the stability which it will bring to new members, and so to Europe in general. However, the political (in the sense of governance) and economic reforms which states have to make to be able to accept and implement the Community *acquis* pose a very stiff challenge for the states of Central and Eastern Europe (not to mention for Turkey). It will be some years at least before the first of them may expect to enter the EU. The candidates' efforts to reform so as to meet EU requirements will have a beneficial effect but the full benefits of EU support, in all its forms, will not be available until accession. In the meantime, being on the accepted list of candidates nevertheless conveys some sense of being accepted, the badge of approval which so many of these states seek.

V.3 The interface

All this raises the question of the interface with NATO enlargement, on at least three levels. At the highest level, should there be any necessary connection between membership of the two organisations; should there be, for example, a policy of identity of European members? At the middle level, can the ability to go forward in one area compensate for delays in another, and can one membership compensate in part for the lack of the other? Thirdly, with a range of complex problems of handling, from negotiation of accession to multiple ratifications, is there anything to be said for linking the actual processes in some way, if only as to timing?

A fourth possible level involves the interface between the evolving CESDP and NATO. The former is not concerned with territorial defence, and as such lacks attraction to some potential new NATO members. On the other hand, it is concerned, ultimately, with power projection. To that extent, successfully integrating new EU members into it would help to provide the capabilities that will in fact be required, for example, to enforce stability in the Balkans. Depending on what NATO is thought to be for, and what the objectives of its enlargement, CESDP might provide the increment to forces available for European security which otherwise could, in principle, come from certain countries' entering NATO but which might, in fact, not do so, given the candidates' motives for seeking membership of the Alliance. That is, an area of EU-NATO interface which will be affected by the enlargement decisions hinges on the relative weight to be given in practice to Article 5 and other NATO functions.

In pressing their NATO applications, many of the candidates will have in mind the protection offered by Article 5. The need for that protection will in most cases, and certainly all the cases which are likely to enjoy success, unless there is a very radical shift in Alliance thinking, be small. Nevertheless, to the extent that they are inclined to take defence seriously, some may find it easier, politically and militarily, to focus on their own territorial defence rather than on building up even the very modest mobile capabilities required at present for the CESDP. On the other hand, the costs of doing even territorial defence properly may lead others to give up on the harder end of military capabilities and offer forces for peacekeeping and similar duties. Whilst not suitable for the full range of Petersberg tasks these would be better than nothing in augmenting European security.

Bringing candidates into NATO earlier than into the EU, as well as generally being technically easier, would reinforce the Atlanticist rather than the European trends in current security thinking. Some more conservative members of the Alliance may see a virtue, if candidates are likely to be admitted in due course, in getting them as early as possible into NATO force planning procedures and habits, even if their actual contributions to Alliance defence capabilities will be small. In addition, the United States might see in that an opportunity to create a number of client states that are beholden to it by gratitude and the expectation of support with reforming their defence assets.

V.4 Linkage

Identity of membership

Those arguments, and the highest-level (i.e. necessary linkages between memberships) questions, raise issues about the long-term nature of NATO and the EU which their members are not yet prepared to address. These include such difficult matters as how inclusive each might be in the long-term (extending east to the Bug, to the Urals?); they involve, too, the even more difficult question of what each might be for in, say, twenty years' time. At this stage, for addressing questions on NATO enlargement, no view need be taken on the desirability of identity of membership. There would be advantages in that but it will not be achievable on a stable basis, even if all potential participants are willing to pursue it, for some twenty years at least.

Membership as compensation

The most interesting and relevant questions for the present lie at the middle level: can decisions on offering or withholding NATO membership be framed on the basis of parallel decisions, or likely decisions on EU membership? And is the obverse the case, i.e. should progress to EU membership take account of progress or lack of it with NATO candidature?

There is already one form of linkage, de facto. In its Copenhagen criteria,[42] the EU has set out a series of points on which it needs to be satisfied before a candidate may be accepted. These cover political matters such as human rights and the rule of law; and economic ones too. There is therefore a fair similarity between the conditions that NATO sets as necessary but not sufficient and those of the EU. If a candidate meets the EU's standards it will almost certainly meet those of NATO's public position in this political field.

The EU makes other demands, and the hard fact is that there is little flexibility to speed up EU membership. If a candidate's economy and state structures are not able to conform to the *acquis* then admission would be

[42] Agreed at the 1993 EU summit. See 'Enlargement: Accession Criteria' at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.htm.

damaging for that state, other members, and the EU. The admission of Greece in 1981 illustrates the point. The Commission recommended against admission; the Council of Ministers overrode that on political grounds. In the event, and after a considerable period, membership has consolidated and stabilised Greek life, but the experience was painful for Greece, and no less so for its partners. Greece, at the time of its accession, was much more fully developed as a modern European country than most of the current candidates, certainly more than those in whose favour some special discretion might be thought necessary on wider grounds.[43]

The argumentation for special discretion might well run the other way. NATO criteria are inherently and in practice subjective; 1997 saw political judgement exercised and 2002 will undoubtedly see the same. Admitting a small country to Alliance membership might very well reduce the strains upon it, in resource and security terms, as well as conveying a message internally and internationally. Such a decision, especially as regards a country not in immediate danger of suffering military aggression, would be almost cost-free for the other members of NATO. At worst there would be a marginal further erosion of Alliance cohesion; at best, the Alliance might be saved the strain and expense of having to go to the rescue of a non-member whose feebleness threatened security and stability in the area. Such a decision might well be justified in any event, irrespective of what, if anything, were happening on EU membership. That said, close involvement with NATO will not, of itself, stabilise a failing state (as the case of Macedonia illustrates.) Stabilisation requires the building of civil society. All that can be said is that NATO membership would ensure continuing engagement of an organisation capable of bringing military and some degree of political power to bear.

An additional factor tipping the scales could be the mitigation of any new division arising from a decision on EU membership; for example, if country *x* had the prospect of earlier adherence to the EU than similarly placed, and perhaps neighbouring, country *y*, then if the impact on NATO would be

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43 Quite apart from any more general political arguments, this means that the intermittent (US) pressure on Turkey's behalf cannot bear useful fruit. It will be a long time before Turkey can meet the general criteria; meanwhile its efforts to exert leverage over the EU's use of NATO's assets will tend to drive the former to develop more of its own, rather than speed up its entry.

small, there could be a case for offering membership to *y*. The number of instances where such argumentation might apply will be few.

The most obvious cases at first sight might be the Baltic States, but for them EU membership (towards which all are making reasonable progress) would raise fewer external problems than NATO accession. Compensating for any delay in EU accession by giving NATO membership to one of them seems unlikely. The obverse is likely to be argued, that they should be given as speedy as possible an entry to the EU if NATO membership is delayed. Another twist to all this, given the sensitivities of NATO membership for them, could be a demonstration that in principle both organisations are open, with decisions in 2002 on, say, Estonia joining the EU and Lithuania NATO, without prejudice to later developments.

A second area where avoidance of new dividing lines might, in theory, be required would be Romania and Bulgaria. However, both are likely to be a considerable way from EU membership and the mitigation of new divisions on one of them joining the Community should not be necessary. Any problem over divisions on NATO accession would have to be addressed in that context alone.

Linkage of process

As to the third level of potential connection, that of process, the NATO Summit is already set for November 2002. The EU machinery is also in train; the Göteborg summit made clear that the aim should be to complete the negotiations for those who were able to do so by the end of 2002 with a view to accessions in early 2004. The number of EU candidates who will be ready for accession on the above timetable will be small. They will probably include Estonia, possibly Slovenia; politically it will be very difficult not to include Poland in the first round. Since US views are likely to be crucial for the NATO decisions, and since the US position remains unclear, except that there will be decisions at the 2002 summit to extend invitations to at least some candidate or candidates, there is little prospect at present of thinking about any harmonisation of processes.

A final issue which links EU and NATO enlargement is whether the United States has moderated its concern about EU expansion giving an informal

security guarantee to new members without the United States having had a chance to consider that through a NATO application. Rather less has been heard about this than a few years ago. The United States may sensibly have concluded that so far as it is concerned the existence or not of the formal Article 5 commitment is not the determining factor. Firstly, it could hardly ignore aggression against, say, Latvia, or Sweden, on the grounds that if Article 5 does not apply then there is nothing to be done. Nor could it have done so as regards, say, Poland before it became a member of NATO. Secondly, Article 5 commits the United States to considering how to respond and to consulting with allies on that. That would happen, without any commitment as to the precise nature of the response, whether or not the attack were on an ally or a non-ally. Since EU enlargement is in general running behind that of NATO it may be that this question is now all but dead, although it could re-emerge as part of the thinking on the treatment of the Baltic States. However, if there were no (significant) NATO enlargement for many years, and meanwhile both EU enlargement and the development of CESDP progressed, then it might once more become relevant.

V.5 Those not admitted

Irrespective of enlargement, the handling of Russia and Ukraine is of paramount importance for the long-term security and stability of Europe. Following decisions on NATO enlargement, there will probably be many bruised feelings and some increased tensions; in particular, Russian reactions may make more difficult its relations with the EU. At the Budapest NATO Ministerial meeting in May this year the Alliance affirmed its commitment to a strong, stable and enduring partnership with Russia. President Bush, in his June 2001 visit to Europe, including his meeting with President Putin, in general terms struck a conciliatory note about working with Russia, though he possibly undermined much of the good of that by his insistence on pressing ahead with missile defence. The EU Presidency Conclusions of its Göteborg summit noted steps it would take to improve relations with Russia, including cooperation on political and security matters.

Incorporating the Balkans effectively into wider European society and structure, and aiding political social and economic development, is scarcely less important. The long-term hope for the region must depend on success-

ful engagement by the EU, although NATO may have an important short-term role in holding the ring militarily, and in deterring adventurism. The EU is focusing on that region, even if not with all the effort which would be desirable. NATO is also engaged, and may become more so, in Macedonia.

The decisions taken by the EU and NATO in the next year, though possibly reinforcing in the sense that they will make similar demands for economic and political development, are unlikely to have a direct impact in settling the policies of the other organisation towards enlargement. Where there should be a joint effort is after the decisions have been taken to deal with those who are disappointed, or who were not candidates. Decisions on enlargement will almost certainly lead to a large and urgent agenda of future work for those not brought in to one or the other organisation. The overlap of membership between the two organisations should enable a reasonable degree of coherence in their approaches to those not invited to join, but in practice such is the Russian view of NATO, and so varied the economic and political instruments available to the EU, that the outcome of the next two years' work on enlargement will probably not see much integration of their efforts.

Chapter Six

THE CANDIDATES

There are nine confirmed candidates for NATO membership,[44] and a tenth state, Croatia, is considering the possibility of becoming one. All the candidates except Slovenia were in the Warsaw Pact, either as existing states or as part of others, the three Baltic States at that time being in the USSR, and Slovakia a part of Czechoslovakia. All are poor by West European standards, though some bear comparison with Turkey. Their armed forces are either very small and weak, or otherwise in need of reform. Nevertheless, in a number of them reforms, political, economic and military, are under way. Some would be able to make useful contributions to deployable forces within a short period. Some can at present make available infrastructure, airspace or transit rights, either to help deal with potential trouble spots or for other NATO purposes. A useful analysis of the candidates' strengths and weaknesses, with tables of comparison with NATO and non NATO countries, is in Thomas S. Szayna,[45] especially Chapter 4, from which the figures relating to candidates in the following paragraphs are taken.

It would be possible to look at the countries individually, say in alphabetical order. However, at the risk of making irrelevant linkages, or 'situating the appreciation',[46] here they have been grouped. In part, that reflects geography, and in the case of the Baltic States geography and history are crucial factors in the decision-making process; in part it reflects the state of progress towards NATO's desired standards. Those considered together below may not be dealt with in the same ways in the decisions on membership, but if there are differences they will have to be explained and defended.

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44 Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.

45 Thomas S. Szayna, *NATO Enlargement 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping*, RAND, 2001.

46 British military humour: as opposed to making an appreciation of the situation, i.e. making the calculation of an answer to a problem fit the desired outcome.

VI.1 Slovenia and Slovakia

On almost any resource test Slovenia and Slovakia (which have populations of, respectively, just under 2 and 5.5 million) come out the best. They have per capita GDP figures greater than Turkey's; Slovenia spends less than the desired proportion of GDP on defence (1.5 per cent as opposed to 2 per cent) but in expenditure per man, and in defence expenditure per capita of population, is ahead of several current NATO members. Slovakia spends 2 per cent of GDP on defence; its expenditure per man is lower than that of any current member of NATO[47] but is higher than for any other candidate (except Slovenia). The same is true of defence expenditure per capita of population.

These two candidates have had net positive GDP growth over the last decade, and the trend seems likely to continue. They have also made good progress with political and social development. In both areas they have received good evaluations from the EU for their progress towards the Copenhagen criteria.[48]

As regards political progress, Slovenia is judged to fulfil the criteria, as is Slovakia. On the economic side, both can be regarded as functioning market economies, with the former able to cope with competitive pressures within the near term, and the latter in the medium one. On a non-EU point, civilian control of the military, Slovakia has made rather less progress than may be thought desirable. In part that may reflect the rather greater seriousness of the Slovakian military as compared to that of many others in Central and Eastern Europe.

On the strategic plane, Slovak membership would shorten NATO's borders, making a compact block on the East. Slovenia would lengthen the border, but give a bridge between Italy and Hungary, and might provide additional operating areas in case of further trouble in former Yugoslavia. Neither would draw NATO into areas of difficulty where it would not otherwise be engaged.

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47 Except Iceland.

48 References to progress on meeting the criteria for all states in this chapter are taken from the November 2000 reports.

Taking these military, political and economic factors together, both come out high in prima facie suitability for membership. Slovenia appears to meet all the criteria set by NATO as to what is expected of a candidate. Slovakia has some economic shortfall, and some military too, but geography tells in its favour. All in all, looking at these two countries specifically (as opposed to the repercussions on others, or questions of internal coherence arising from an increase in numbers) NATO would have something to gain and nothing to lose by their admission.

VI.2 The Baltic States

The Baltic States differ amongst themselves in many ways, though not generally in military or strategic matters. Given their common history since 1940, and Russian concerns over NATO membership for them, they need to be examined together.

The overall assessment must be that in terms of political and economic progress they are qualified candidates. They would never be able to add much militarily to the Alliance; moreover, their territories are small and would be difficult to defend in any case involving external aggression. Russian reactions would probably be most acute in the case of Estonia, and least acute in the case of Lithuania. All would be likely to be suspicious of Russia, and to tend to take an anti-Russian line once within the Alliance.

Estonia

The closest of the three to metropolitan Russia, its border only about 150 km from St Petersburg, Estonia would politically look to be a good candidate for membership. The EU judges it to continue to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria, both political and economic. Like Slovenia, it should be able to deal with competitive pressure and market forces in the near term.

However, in GDP per capita it is behind Slovenia and Slovakia, and its per capita defence expenditure is very small. Its expenditure per man is ahead of that of the other candidates except Slovenia, but that reflects the small size of its armed forces. Strategically it would add weight to NATO only if the Alliance wished to deploy forces far forward against Russia (which, of

course, it does not). Politically there would be attractions in taking this small democratic state into NATO but there are no significant military gains to be looked for, but rather the potential for real strategic complications, which in a less benign security environment could bring military complications.

Latvia

The picture is rather similar for its neighbour to the South, Latvia. It fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria and is judged capable of being able to cope with competitive pressure in the medium term. Its population is 2.4 million against Estonia's 1.4 million but its GDP per head is about a fifth less. Its military expenditure per man is about the same as Slovakia's but per capita of population is very small (only $19). It has borders with Russia and Belarus and would be contiguous to no NATO country unless Lithuania (or Estonia) joined. All in all, the assessment must be as for Estonia: politically attractive, but no military advantage and possible strategic complications.

Lithuania

Lithuania is the most populous of the three Baltic States, 3.6 million. Its GDP per capita at $2,900, is just ahead of Latvia's. It fulfils the EU's political criteria and on the economic front should be able to cope on the usual test in the medium term. However, its per capita military expenditure is very low ($34), although the per man expenditure is ahead of Slovakia and Latvia, and just behind Estonia.

Lithuania has borders with Poland (a NATO member), Belarus, Latvia, and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. Were it to enter the Alliance the enclave would be entirely surrounded by NATO territory; it will, in any case, present major problems in the coming years;[49] Lithuanian accession to NATO might exacerbate those.

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[49] There will have to be detailed negotiations once any of its neighbours, including Poland, comes into the EU, on such things as border formalities. These may be a useful education for the Russians.

On the other hand, Lithuania is the furthest of the Baltic States from Russia proper. Its border with Poland makes its defence easier than that of the other two Baltic States. Its joining would extend the Alliance's borders but not in such a way as necessarily to embroil NATO further in major troubles. Being contiguous to Poland, reinforcement in time of stress would be easier. Given the potential instability in both the enclave and Belarus, integrating it in NATO might add to stability in the area, though Russian reactions might pull the other way and EU membership is really more relevant in that respect.

VI.3 Bulgaria and Romania

Because of their post-Second World War history, Bulgaria and Romania had late starts in adjustment after the revolutions of 1989. Romania got away well, particularly considering the nature of its communist regime. It saw itself, and was seen by some others, as a potential candidate for the first enlargement. These states could, if stable themselves, be useful poles of stability in a troubled area. Both have borders with Serbia; Bulgaria also has them with Greece and Turkey and with Macedonia. Romania has a border with Hungary (a NATO member) and with Moldova (once part of Romania and now a failing state) and Ukraine.

Bulgaria's population is 7.8 million; Romania's 22.4. The latter is big enough to be a significant player in the area if its political and economic development can be assured. It is there that these two states face major problems. As regards the political assessment, Bulgaria continues to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria, as does Romania. However, the two are at the bottom of the league of candidates as regards GDP per head, above only Albania. The EU's assessment is that Bulgaria has made progress towards becoming a market economy but is not yet able to cope in the medium term with market pressures. For Romania the judgement is worse: it cannot yet be regarded as a functioning market economy. Defence expenditure in both countries, on per capita of population and per man, is low.

Closer integration of Romania and Bulgaria might help with NATO's Balkan missions. If their economies can be sorted out, both countries could be expected to add to NATO's deployable military assets in due course. Given its size, Romania in particular should be able to do that. However, its

economy is a long way from being reformed, and in relative terms the country has gone backwards since 1997. Both countries have provided invaluable help to NATO with its operations in the Balkans, and as members of the Alliance could be expected to continue to provide, operating space and in due course infrastructure to help with what is clearly Europe's major trouble spot.

Admitting Romania would give NATO a new border with Ukraine (and Moldova). Moldova is certainly not capable of any threatening military action, though its collapse could lead to outside intervention. There is no suggestion that Ukraine would entertain any thought of aggression, though it clearly suffers from major problems. NATO would therefore be extending itself into new and troubled areas by admitting Romania but it is not clear that that would have any actual impact on what the Alliance might be called upon to do. On the other hand, South-Eastern Europe would be a solid NATO block, except for Albania and former Yugoslavia.

VI.4 Macedonia

A poor and fragile state, threatened with collapse, and where NATO is already involved, Macedonia is not a current EU candidate, though the EU is assisting it to move towards democracy. With a population of just over 2 million Macedonia has, or perhaps had before its current difficulties, a GDP per capita slightly above those of Romania and Bulgaria. Given its current problems the country is clearly going to be a long-term consumer rather than a producer of security. The question is whether NATO would find it more effective to have this consumer inside rather than outside, on the likely assumption that Alliance members will have to provide military forces there for some years.

VI.5 Albania

The assessment is much as for Macedonia above, except that Albania has already collapsed once. The are large ethnic Albanian populations in Macedonia and in Kosovo, and the Albanian constitution looks to a unified Greater Albania. Albania is at present supported by the international community; without that support it would collapse. Its population is just

under 3.5 million, its GDP per capita the lowest of all the candidates. It borders on Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro, as well as Greece. It is therefore in a troubled area. It, too, for many years will be a consumer of security. As it is already a candidate, the question of pursuing stability by admitting it is already on the table, though the country in no sense measures up to the stated criteria.

VI.6 Croatia

Though not yet a candidate for NATO membership, Croatia is considering the matter. Its population is 4.6 million; its GDP $2.07 bn; and its military expenditure 8.3% of GDP sustains a force of some 51,000.[50] It has had a share in the troubles of former Yugoslavia, and for much of that time an unpleasant regime, for which it was long kept out of PfP. It is now stabilising politically and economically. Its proximity to Western Europe, and its border with Slovenia and Hungary, mean that it would consolidate NATO lands around the still troubled parts of the Balkans. Its joining should not introduce any troubles with which NATO is not already involved. If economic reform persists, and there is no regression in political terms, it could add a small but useful increment to NATO's military assets.

[50] *L'année strategique 2001* (Paris: Edition Michalon, 2000).

Chapter Seven

THE OPTIONS FOR NATO ENLARGEMENT

What it is sensible and appropriate to do on NATO enlargement should, in principle, hinge on what NATO is for, and how its purpose will be affected, for good or ill, by any particular option. In addition, one should pay attention to what is the objective of any particular country's being invited into the Alliance, either on its own or with others.

Matters are, of course complicated by the fact that NATO serves, or could serve, different purposes for different countries. Many of those wishing to join desire, more than anything, a badge of membership in a respectable organisation. Some, in addition, seek the protection of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. For the United States, NATO is a means of asserting a leadership if not a controlling role in Europe. For some smaller European countries it may be a way of preventing too much dominance by larger European states. For EU members, and for others too, it should be a provider of military services to enable European countries to undertake military tasks which they could not do on their own. In principle, NATO should remain for all members the guarantor of territorial integrity, though in practice this is a dormant if not dead issue for most. With such a variety of interests to be served there will be a wide range of views about enlargement amongst existing NATO members.

With such a multiplicity of functions and individual national objectives there is no simple test to apply to any applicant for membership. In deliberating on what should be done it is nevertheless desirable to form a view of the various considerations, some of which may be entirely compatible, even if not all are. If this be done, objectives to be served in enlarging NATO might include:

- strengthening and consolidating US leadership in Europe;
- strengthening and consolidating NATO as an organisation;
- increasing the stability and security of particular states, either potential or current members, or even non-members;
- increasing the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area as a whole;
- helping construct security architecture with the EU and its CESDP, etc.

VII.1 Approaches

One comprehensive line of approach, looking at NATO itself, would be to insist that it should enlarge if, but only if, its core functions, as stated for example in the Washington Summit Documents, were furthered. That might be by way of bringing strategic benefits which made its members safer or, if the Alliance is viewed rather as a provider of wider stabilising services, if it were able to provide them better or with less effort. It would be possible to develop that last test to say that it should take in a candidate if so doing stabilises that state even if it does not strengthen NATO (provided that it would not materially weaken it). The rationale would be that there would be less likelihood of trouble in the Euro-Atlantic area, and so less chance of NATO's being called upon to sort out a problem. On that line of argument, candidates would be admitted unless doing so would be destabilising to a greater degree than their admission were stabilising. Such would be a very big step forward from the 1999 language as set out in Chapter Four above.

After all the statements at and since the last enlargement, NATO will have to address the issue in 2002. Agreement to deferment would be difficult to obtain, and would put matters back only by a year or two, so that by 2004 the Alliance would, after the build up of even greater pressures than there are now, have to tackle the issue, with less room for manoeuvre.

There are five general approaches which could in theory be adopted at this stage to NATO enlargement, of which only the first four are realistic:

- admit all or almost all the candidates, omitting only those against which there is some very specific objection, such as gross human rights abuses;
- admit, say, the five best qualified, undertaking to keep the others under active review;
- admit, say, the two best qualified candidates, undertaking to keep the others under review;
- establish a sort of rolling programme, rather along the lines of the EU. There would be a list of known candidates who would be admitted as they met relatively clear criteria;

- try to build up 'Associate Membership', but not progressing with full membership. This would give everything except formal Article 5 cover.[51]

VII.2 Closing the door

The 'Associate Membership' approach would amount to signalling a closing of the door. After all the hints and half promises, reiterated as recently as the May 2001 Budapest Ministerial, and given what President Bush said in June 2001, it is likely to prove politically impossible to avoid further admissions to full membership. Too much has been said about the door remaining open and the Alliance expecting to take in new members for it to be possible to close the lists now. The question is, therefore, which and when, and what about those not admitted on the next occasion?

If the next admission were a substantial one it might just be possible to indicate that the door was closing, that NATO was, as regards membership, approaching its final position. That in itself would be very divisive indeed for any disappointed candidates. It would certainly lead to tensions and might be destabilising. NATO members could be expected to be asked questions about how this organisation with a mission of enhancing stability and security across the Euro-Atlantic area reconciled that with the exclusion, on an apparently permanent basis, of some states in that area. There would also be the issue of whether this implied a similar limitation on EU enlargement. If it were claimed that it did not, that would raise other questions about longer-term EU-NATO relations. Nevertheless, the judgement might be that those complications were preferable to, on the one hand, the continuing pressure for admissions, and on the other the dilution of coherence, possible mounting strategic complications, and the continuing organisational upheaval which yet further admissions would entail.

At some stage, of course, NATO will, if it is still in existence as an active body, have to address the issue of how far its membership could extend. In principle, it must extend as far as the present candidates, or they would not be accepted as such. If Romania can be a candidate why not Moldova; if at

[51] This would go outside the provisions of the Washington Treaty but would build upon PfP, MAP, etc.

some future date Moldova became a part of Romania, by then a member, would it enter NATO automatically as East Germany did? At present such questions are hypothetical. They may not always be so. The great issues, of course, will be whether, in principle, Russia and Ukraine could ever be eligible. That leads back to both the objectives of NATO, and to those of its members, and to what sort of organisation it should be. To defer answering such questions there may be a presumption in favour of going as slowly as possible with enlargement. On the other hand, there are significant pressures in other directions.

If the next enlargement were either a medium (perhaps five) or a small (say, two) one the problems involved in any attempt to close the door would still apply, and obviously the smaller the enlargement, the greater the difficulty. There would be more, or many more, disappointed candidates. The divisions between successful and unsuccessful would be more acute, especially as many of the disappointed would be those who had received encouraging mentions over the years since the Madrid summit of 1997. These would see others not only as having overtaken them but as having established a permanent superiority in the European order. The incentive for continued reform and cooperation would be removed.

Without an attempt to close the door, and with a small or medium enlargement, NATO will be faced with something very like the present state of affairs: that is, continuing pressure from a list of candidates and the need at successive summits to consider which may be admitted, and what can be said to the others. With such limited enlargements and an attempt to end the enlargement process, European diplomacy would be distracted for years by the pressures to revoke its stance and open the door again. In short, if NATO were unable to accept a considerable enlargement in 2002, either by way of full acceptance of candidates or by a sort of promissory note, making clear that membership would be granted to named states when they had met certain ascertainable criteria, it would be faced with the same sort of continuing pressure which has been around since at the latest 1994, and which has intensified since about 1996. It would also face increased cynicism and lessening collaboration in PfP, EAPC and the MAP.[52] In the

[52] The MAP was designed to put in place a programme of activities to assist countries aspiring to membership with their preparations. Candidates draw up an annual national programme, setting objectives and targets. The programme forms the basis for the Alliance's keeping track of progress and providing feedback.

light of all that, it will not be feasible to try to close the door, unless almost all current candidates are taken in. Such an attempt would in itself be destabilising, and would be unlikely to command general support amongst existing members.[53] Even if there is a big enlargement, and especially if it is by way of promissory note, pressures will remain, though they should be more containable.

VII.3 Arguments pro and con different kinds of enlargement

Admitting all or almost all the candidates

A major enlargement would dispose for a considerable time of continuing pressure for further movement. It would also have dealt once and for all (or at any rate for a long time) with the provocation to Russia from NATO enlargement; one great confrontation, with suitable exchanges of views and compromises in other areas, might make for a better continuing relationship than two-yearly surges of tension over whether such-and-such a state should be invited to enter the Alliance. A similar train of argument would apply to domestic political processes, problems with ratification, and so on. In short, after such a major enlargement, the Alliance should be able to concentrate on its own (changed) business rather than on what its membership should be.

A sizeable enlargement would bring into the military structures of the Alliance as many European states (except Russia and Ukraine) as could reasonably be expected to make any significant contribution to peacekeeping, humanitarian and other tasks in the foreseeable future. Admittedly, their resources could also be made available to NATO through PfP, but having the countries in the structures and subject to the direct encouragement and support of NATO's procedures could be expected to enhance their performances more speedily even than the MAP would. Perhaps more importantly, as full members the politically strengthening and stabilising effect of membership might help some countries whose civil societies lacked very firm foundations.

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[53] To block all further expansion requires, of course, only one dissentient voice. However, an alliance in which a significant political wish of most members was blocked continually would not be an effective instrument for managing security.

It is not altogether clear, however, how such processes would work. Peer pressure in ministerial meetings is one mechanism. Senior military to military pressure is another, but it is at least questionable whether the political development of existing members has been much aided by NATO. All in all, it may be that NATO's greatest leverage is over candidates rather than those who are in. The important exception is where membership removes or reduces significant outside pressure, thus allowing proper internal development.

Such an enlargement would enhance the Alliance's political legitimacy through its inclusiveness. Considering the objectives of individual members, most smaller European states would probably favour this course as meeting their concerns to have other weaker states under NATO's care. There would be a spread to the East and the South, so meeting the anxieties that enlargement was too focused in one area. It is more difficult to judge how far the objectives of the United States and the larger European states (which, of course, differ) would be met by this sort of enlargement, the rationale for which would be political rather than military. To the extent that the Alliance became more a political than a military-directing body, the grip and control exercised by the US-dominated military structures would be diminished. On the other hand, the common military standards, the provision of military services, which should be the Europeans' main concern with NATO, should be capable of being preserved, though without an American emphasis on high-intensity warfare. Future EU members would start to move to being able to make a contribution towards CESDP. On balance, even if there were a number of grateful new members, such an enlargement might diminish somewhat the United States's ability to lead the Alliance, whilst helping the future development of the EU.

However, there would be some very considerable disadvantages. There could be strains over states still left out, who would see their exclusion as permanent, or very nearly so. Even those not currently seeking membership might feel that the West had rejected them or, as might be the case if one of the former 'neutrals' now in the EU changed its mind about NATO membership, that they were required for no good reason to remain less than full members of the European security structure. Russia might take very grave umbrage indeed at a major enlargement; that might impact upon its relations not only with the United States and NATO but also with the EU. It might try once more to create its own bloc or zone of influence, with the distraction

which that would cause to the weak neighbours which it sought to influence. A major issue could be Ukraine whose independence and stability should be of first-rate importance for European security.

Moreover, following an extensive enlargement, the loss of cohesion in the Alliance, in terms of political and military direction, could be severe. Conceivably, too, the Alliance would have taken on military tasks which it was not in a position to address successfully, whatever its cohesion[54].

The degradation of cohesion could come in three ways. Firstly, it could result from simple lack of common military skills amongst new members. Modern military operations, conducted at a high tempo and requiring complicated logistic support, make great demands on military staffs. The necessary skills are not easily acquired. At the tactical level, problems of communications (technical and linguistic) could imperil operations, as could divergences of doctrine. Those problems are not insuperable but there would be at least a time before the enlarged Alliance could usefully draw on the range of armed forces in principle available to it, though existing members should be able to function as effectively as before. Meanwhile committees and structures would have to function with members who might not be up to their jobs.

The second area of loss of cohesion is that which arises simply from an increase in the number of voices at the table. In theory, NATO proceeds by consensus. Achieving that will be difficult in the absence of a major external threat, even without enlargement. The sorts of intervention in which NATO may engage will always be painful and potentially divisive. The problems would be greater with a sizeable enlargement because a number of new members would not be very interested in NATO's new and foreseeable tasks[55]. That said, because of habits of working, and an informal *directoire*, NATO at present manages to reach consensus amongst a considerable

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54 The obvious case would be Article 5 defence of the Baltic States. Whether this would in practice be so difficult may be debated. After all, the Alliance successfully safeguarded Northern Norway without stationed forces and against a much greater concentration of potentially hostile forces than anything now available against these countries.

55 Many of the new members are likely to be interested in Article 5 territorial defence rather than force projection and generating stability in remote places. Even those who would in principle support such objectives will be limited in terms of military capacity for some time.

number; it may be able to do so at a greater one, provided that the necessary will and approach are present.

That leads on to the third sort of loss of cohesion: many of the candidates lack political stability internally, and have not built up habits of cooperation internationally. They may indeed acquire such habits, but those are less likely to be inculcated in the present relatively safe state of Europe than they were in the longer-standing members during the Cold War when there was an overriding imperative to hang together.

The problem of additional military tasks would be the need to be able to address suitable Article 5 arrangements for a number of candidates, some at least of which are ill-placed to defend themselves. In the present benign security climate the difficulties would not be insuperable, but the situation could change.

A medium enlargement

In the case of the Alliance taking in some five new members the general arguments reflect, with a degree of diminution, those in the first case above. All the candidates who could be described as in any sense ready would be included in such a number; a reasonable proportion of the applicants would be satisfied; it would be possible to argue that enlargement was clearly something to which NATO was committed; depending on the choice of candidates, it could be said either that no invidious distinctions had been drawn, or that useful precedents had been set, and weight given to appropriate special factors. On the downside, the impact of bringing in candidates who are a long way militarily from NATO standards would dilute military cohesion but if the candidates were small the impact would not be too great. Several candidates could be found which did not pose grave military problems for the Alliance. Bringing in only, say, five new members should enable the choice to include only ones reasonably likely to be politically stable, and overall NATO cohesion should probably be sustainable. Finally, bringing in such a number of new members could mean that the next enlargement could be put off for some time. Institutionally, that would be welcome to NATO and to certain members. Any states which felt that they had only narrowly missed being accepted on this occasion would, of course,

feel discouraged, but the process would clearly have been shown to be capable of moving forward in a significant way.

The overall balance of argument on this option could be influenced significantly by the candidates selected, and their relationships with others. Slovenia and Slovakia would pose no very great military problems; they would not seem likely to raise inordinate problems of cohesion; there are no close neighbours or analogues which would feel discriminated against in being left out; and there would be no particular provocation to Russia. The main difficulties would arise with the others who might make up such an enlargement. The choice might be between Bulgaria and Romania plus Lithuania, or all three Baltic States.

A small enlargement

This would cause least institutional upset, and impose fewer burdens on the Alliance. Assuming that it did not include one or more of the Baltic States, it could be made more or less acceptable to Russia. It would demonstrate at least cost that NATO's door did indeed remain open. Its great drawbacks would be two. Firstly, the question of enlargement would not go away; NATO would have to go through the same series of difficulties within, say, two years. Secondly, it does not help with clarifying how NATO should function as a general stabilising force within the Euro-Atlantic area. Its boundaries would move, but only to take in two members which probably had no particular security problems. There would be generated no sense of an organisation becoming truly inclusive. Admission of the two most likely candidates, Slovakia and Slovenia, would do little to cope with instabilities and insecurities in the areas most at risk, though there would be some gain to NATO from the use of their territories and their armed forces could make useful additions to NATO's strength in the fairly near future.

A variation on this would be to add one Baltic State, to make the point. That would change the chemistry of the enlargement with Russia, and since the whole issue of new members would have to be revisited within a couple of years, mean that there was almost continuous contention over the Baltic issue.

A small enlargement would, in the short term, leave the Alliance substantially unchanged. It would have the benefit of caution, as little short-term upheaval as possible; however, it would store up problems for the future whilst hardly helping to meet the claims about the Alliance's role made in the Strategic Concept. There would be no real increment to European security or stability, but no weakening of existing capabilities. Many existing members would be disappointed.

A rolling programme

The concept here is that NATO would acknowledge that a named list of candidates would be admitted when they were ready. The test of having to be clear at the time that overall stability and security would be enhanced, or the Alliance's objectives aided, would, in principle, be put aside. The analogy would be with the process for EU expansion. One difference is that the EU *acquis* at any time is known, and it is possible to make reasonably objective judgements as to whether a state can operate it. Security, stability, and even the Alliance's objectives, are less easily grasped and defined, and this approach is not easily squared with the wording of the Washington Treaty.

A second problem, related to the last point, is the difficulty of binding states, and in particular legislatures where their ratification is required, in advance. The US Senate in particular is exceedingly jealous of its independence and its right to take decisions ad hoc. There is no difference in the principle: EU admissions will require ratification in just the same way as NATO ones. The involvement of the US Senate, however, means that it would in practice be more difficult for the Alliance to give a forward promise. There might also be the question of adding new candidates in future, and that issue might present itself sooner rather than later.

If the problem of the Senate could be overcome the issues of coherence would remain. Structures and headquarters would constantly have to be reorganised. Russia would be faced with several humiliations as various states joined in the teeth of its objections. The bringing up of the candidates' armed forces to a common standard would be more protracted than if there were a single major intake, and probably more than if there were a medium sized one.

VII.4 Impact on security

The impact on security of the various options will depend on the timeframe, and upon the reactions to them. They cannot be considered as cut and dried, as it were mechanistic possibilities. A crucial question is the role that NATO actually plays in European security, as opposed to what it says that it does. A second factor would be how long the effective projection of military power in and around Europe will be dependent on US assets made available through NATO.

Lack of coherence, military or political, is unlikely to have any immediate adverse impact on the territorial integrity of NATO members or almost any other European state. The United States would almost certainly ensure the protection of Turkey whatever the state of NATO. In the longer-term, ten years or more, the absence of a coherent NATO could give rise to some risks if some hostile power decided to build up threatening forces. However, there are few such potential candidates for that.

More difficult in the short term, politically and militarily, would be ensuring sufficient grip in the Balkans to deal with the problems of former Yugoslavia and Albania. European political and military cohesion might not be sufficient in the next two years if the United States were not in some degree engaged. Taking a slightly longer perspective, however, the prospect of having to stand on their own feet might well be necessary and sufficient to sort out the Europeans, or at any rate the leading players, into a state where they could grip the situation.

VII.5 Conclusions

Against that analysis, none of the options for NATO enlargement looks so destabilising that it should be ruled out. The least disturbing in the short term, a small enlargement, would leave NATO pretty much as it is for the immediate future. It would contribute nothing to adjusting the transatlantic relationship to new conditions. Depending on the form of a medium enlargement, Russia could be very difficult, and if one or more Baltic States were included NATO might have vulnerable members. Their vulnerability would be not so much to direct attack, which would remain unlikely, as to destabilisation.

With the right mix of new members, a medium enlargement might increase stability in the Balkans, at least in the medium term, without diminishing it in the short term.

A big enlargement would put strains on Alliance cohesion, political and military. There would be a greater risk of failing to grip a future Kosovo type problem. Nevertheless, the damage which could arise in the short term to existing members would be very small. Without some radical special measures Russia would be uncooperative to say the least. On the other hand, in the longer term, the inclusive nature of the Alliance, and the ruling out of a Russian veto, would send a positive signal, and ensure that most European states were able to play a role in the prime Euro-Atlantic provider of common military standards, and in the security to be derived thence.

Chapter Eight

THE WAY FORWARD

Consideration of the way forward may be divided into what is *likely* to be done at NATO's 2002 summit, and what *should* be done. The second part of that raises the question of according to whose formula and interests should the matter be decided. Should it be, for example, for the interests of the Alliance as it now is, for Europe as a whole, or for a majority of the potential participants? The decision will be taken by the existing members of NATO. A strong body of support from major states will be necessary for success. Any candidate blocked by the United States will not succeed; any candidate supported by the United States will almost certainly be invited in. In theory, any member can veto enlargement. If the United States is relatively indifferent, one or two major dissentient voices may be sufficient to block a candidature. (In practice, Iceland or Luxembourg could not do so, and other smaller states only with difficulty.)

The issue of what should be done raises too, of course, the questions of what the Alliance is, or should be, for. Is it a mechanism to bind together the United States and Europe; is it a means of power projection; is it a regional security organisation? Is there a risk if Europe loses its present main organisation for territorial defence in changing NATO through enlargement? Leaving aside such questions, enlargement would seem to offer net gains to all the candidates, considered individually. The closer engagement of the Alliance in helping with military reform, their presence in the NAC, and the possible direct support to them in any case of challenge to their sovereignty would all represent gains. The arguments against any admission would therefore amount either to claiming that the Euro-Atlantic area would somehow be destabilised by it, or else, and perhaps a precursor to that, that NATO, or the interests of some of its members, would be undermined.

It is difficult to see (Russian reactions apart) why the enlargement of NATO would be destabilising, if NATO were not fundamentally changed. It might be unnecessary, or make no positive contribution, but it is not clear why it would have a negative effect. The core of the argument against an enlargement must be that NATO itself, or the situation of some current member, would change in a way which had an adverse impact on security or, at any rate, in a way which a current member found unacceptable for some reason.

It is, therefore, necessary to ask what present contribution to European security would be taken away by an enlarged NATO. (There is the argument that the possibility of qualifying for entrance provides an incentive for reform, and that once in the incentive would be removed. That is true, but only up to a point: if hope fades, so does the incentive. Moreover, peer pressure can do quite a lot to ensure reform once a candidate is in.)

VIII.1 Current views

The Central and East European candidates will press for a big enlargement, seeking to get under the umbrella whist the security situation is benign. A handful might recognise that they are not truly ready and be prepared to acquiesce in some delay provided that it is clear that the door remains open and that any candidates taken in ahead of them are manifestly in a more prepared state. The question on the Baltic States is whether Russia would be so difficult or even unstable that European security would be lessened by admission.

Those states admitted in 1999 are in strong support of further enlargement, as are the Scandinavian members of the Alliance, who look particularly to the admission of the Baltic States. If it were simply a matter of counting votes by member states, a substantial enlargement would be on the cards. However, as noted above, NATO does not operate like that.

The United States has a very strong interest in preserving those aspects of NATO which give it major influence in European affairs. The possible impact of different forms of enlargement on these are discussed below; meanwhile we await authoritative indications of where the United States stands. Some US officials appear to be thinking in terms of an enlargement of two or three, probably including a Baltic State; pressures are building up in other quarters in Washington in favour of a big or medium big enlargement.

So far as its own security is concerned, the United States could perfectly well do with no enlargement. Equally, its direct security would not be prejudiced by a large one. US armed forces would be able to cope alone with whatever military contingency threatened the United States. To have allies able to fight alongside it outside Europe is politically desirable, which

points to keeping NATO structures effective and coherent, but it is not a military necessity. The greater current utility of the Alliance to the United States is in influence. It will consider whether that will be increased or diminished by any particular form of enlargement, though it is unlikely to voice its conclusions openly, at any rate in full. That, linked to domestic politics, will probably push the United States towards a medium enlargement.

The major European states are likely to be cautious. They may well argue for a small enlargement and settle, if the United States pushes, for a medium one. The United States might support them, wishing to perpetuate current NATO structures and functioning, yet seeking to acquire client states. Its judgement might be tempered by considerations of how to handle Russia, and by the desire to avoid entangling the Alliance more deeply in the worst trouble spots and thus committing itself yet more deeply to Europe. The United States may also wish to preserve military coherence with a view to forming coalitions, under US command, for interventions outside Europe, or within such turbulent regions as the Balkans.

The United Kingdom was in a sense the founding force in NATO; it has enjoyed a number of highly influential posts, civil and military, and its ends have, in general, been well served by affairs as they are. If left to itself, the UK government, or at any rate many of its advisers, would feel that they knew what should be done: no move at this stage, but if a move is inevitable, the smallest one possible. Their concern would be to preserve a NATO with which they are familiar and which they believe embodies the most important aspect of the transatlantic relationship for Europe as a whole. The United Kingdom will, nevertheless, almost certainly acquiesce in whatever commends itself to the United States. That is on the unstated basis that at the end of the day, in nearly all circumstances, the United Kingdom is prepared to follow the US lead. That was necessary during the Cold War. The St-Malo initiative shows that it is now recognised as not sufficient, though it may still often be judged desirable.

Germany and France will probably share the United Kingdom's general wish to move as little as possible. Germany was an enthusiastic supporter of the last enlargement but is now much more cautious. When all is said and done, it will probably be content to support the admission of Slovenia and Slovakia. It will put particular weight upon not offending Russia, and it

would support a Baltic candidate only if there were a wider programme for addressing the Russian issue. However, Germany will not wish to have a breach with the United States. France may be prepared to differ from the United States more openly. It has no great public desire to see NATO enlargement, but would certainly not wish to be seen to be blocking the accession of particular candidates. Both countries would probably acquiesce in a medium enlargement.

VIII.2 Scales of enlargement

A major enlargement

A major enlargement would bring in candidates who are certainly not ready militarily, economically, and probably not politically. It would move NATO from being an organisation of 19 members, 16 of whom had collaborated closely for many years, to one of around 30, almost half of whom would have come from the Warsaw Pact or former Yugoslavia. Most would be poor, many weak, some unstable. The NAC would become more like the EAPC, and less of a decision taking forum even than at present. Military headquarters would include officers who did not fully understand NATO procedures; planning for Article 5 operations, if taken seriously, would be taxing. On the other hand, NATO would have signalled its inclusiveness, and the recurring problem of enlargement would be resolved for perhaps ten years or more. Such a large step is unlikely to commend itself to the United States, nor to the major European players.

A medium enlargement

A medium enlargement would play well with those coming in; with those admitted last time; be a sufficient gesture for the future; and still leave the general functioning of the Alliance unchanged. Those left out would not, in general be major political influences or, if they were, there would be mitigating factors, e.g. EU membership in early prospect for Estonia. Such a course would meet the implicit promises about further enlargement, and so take away for some time a great deal of the pressure for something to be done. It would almost certainly secure a number of grateful client states, thus strengthening US influence and the United States's ability to steer an

Alliance of 24 would not seem likely to be very different from its ability to manage one of 19, though its general ability to get is way may already be diminishing: Kosovo may be the first and last war of the Alliance as such. By not taking in the most unstable or threatened countries, the United States would avoid committing itself to deeper actual entanglement on the ground, and none of the serious candidates for a medium enlargement has difficult bilateral issues that it would be likely to pursue through NATO. On the other hand, the new members would be less interested in the sort of war-fighting capability which the United States sees as militarily essential, and none of those coming in would be ambitious to play a major role in diplomatic or military matters outside their immediate areas. (The first post-Cold War enlargement has shown the great difficulty of getting indigent new members to address seriously the necessary investment.) All would be dependent on EU help with economic and social reform.

A small enlargement

A small enlargement of, say, Slovenia and Slovakia would leave more unsatisfied candidates, and mean that the issues had to be revisited again quite soon. The result of trying for a small one might be a medium enlargement in two phases, two years apart, with a speedy repetition of the problems of ratification and reorganisation. The small enlargement option might appeal to the United States only if it feared that the coherence and utility of the Alliance would be seriously prejudiced by a medium one. The balance of advantage for the United States, as between medium and small, would seem to be in going for the former.

VIII.3 What is likely to be done

A medium enlargement of about five states, say Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and one Baltic country, probably Lithuania, would be great enough to be significant. It would bring in two well-qualified candidates who would either immediately or soon be a source of net strength and gain to the Alliance in the roles which it declared for itself. It would also demonstrate that there was no veto on the Baltic States, without being so provocative to Russia as bringing in Estonia, which is so near to St Petersburg, at

this stage. Such an enlargement would discharge political debts to Romania and Bulgaria for their good support of NATO operations in the Balkans.

Those two countries are in or adjacent to the Balkans and could potentially be a useful source of stability there. Romania's armed forces in particular could be a valuable supplement to the Alliance's military assets. However, their reform is progressing only very slowly. There is concern about the levels of corruption and lack of good governance in the two states in question. It is taking Romania far longer than had been hoped to get to grips with such issues, and with sorting out its economy. Granting entry now would remove some incentives for reform. Given that Romania saw itself as a strong contender in 1999, rejection now could have a souring effect internally and in the views of the political classes towards the Alliance. Moreover, if either Bulgaria or Romania, but not the other, were invited into NATO, the impact would be divisive. Only if there were some objective deficiency affecting the unsuccessful candidate which was clearly seen and accepted as such could the adverse effects of that be mitigated.

Choosing only one of the Baltic States at this stage would cause bitter disappointment to the unsuccessful (as would, a fortiori, choosing two.) However, it could be presented more positively. Firstly, they have a much earlier prospect of EU membership than Bulgaria or Romania. Secondly, the choice of even one would demonstrate that there was no veto on their becoming members. That should be a welcome boost for all three.

A variant on this medium option would be the admission of Slovenia, Slovakia and the three Baltic States. This would dispose of the problem connected with the latter in one go (with its positive and negative consequences), and be widely acceptable to the smaller North European states. It would, however, be seen as doing little for the unstable area of South-Eastern Europe. Moreover, the Baltic States are small and, in classic military terms, vulnerable. They would bring little by way of military assets to the Alliance; nor are they well placed to be a pole of stability in their area. On the other hand, their small size means that economic and social reform can speed ahead, and there is absolutely no doubt about their firm orientation to the West and desire for NATO membership.

On balance, the best medium-sized enlargement package would seem to be Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Lithuania. Estonia and Latvia

would still have the prospect of fairly early admission to the EU; meanwhile, it would have been made clear that there was no general block on the Baltic States. NATO's eastern and southern frontiers would be consolidated, and Bulgaria and Romania would be on their way to actual incorporation in Western institutions. Some current members of NATO would be disappointed that only one of the three Baltic candidates had made it but the southern members should welcome two new entrants there.

With either of these medium options the Alliance would jog on much as before, though there would be a modest strengthening of a European approach to security and, as new members began to make a military contribution, less emphasis on US doctrines of warfighting. NATO's transformation, necessary and already in train, and the changes in the transatlantic relationship which that will entail, would not be much accelerated; they could even be retarded, which some would see as an advantage. Many candidates would be satisfied. The pressure for the next enlargement would be contained, perhaps for five years or more. The United States would see the essential nature of the Alliance as unchanged, and its position in European structures much as before. All in all, the statesmen of NATO would feel moderately satisfied that they had resolved a tricky issue well. It may be regarded as the most likely course in practice.

The next most likely outcome is a small enlargement of two, Slovenia and Slovakia. This could be extended to a Baltic State, perhaps Lithuania, just to demonstrate that there is no veto there, though there are arguments against a small enlargement which raised but did not dispose of the Baltic issue. The impact on NATO as an institution would be slight. There would be little loss of cohesion. Some military benefits would flow quite shortly. However, there would be little wider benefit to security and stability, and the whole process (including the Baltic dimension) would have to be gone through two years later, perhaps under even greater pressure. When that happened, if Lithuania had been admitted, the other two Baltic States would then demand their entry. Romania, and probably Bulgaria, assuming that reform had not been derailed, would demand their long delayed justice, as they saw it. The whole process would have to be gone through again, with no sense that it could be put aside for any length of time. All in all, a small enlargement makes no satisfactory progress towards a longer-term resolution of the issues facing the Alliance, whilst storing up short-term trouble.

VIII.4 What should be done

All the above has been based on the assumption that the fundamental questions on NATO's purpose or purposes will not be opened up, at least in public. However, after the Cold War all the elements of European security have changed. Europe itself has advanced a great deal politically (as well as economically). Russia, too, has evolved. In those circumstances it is necessary and appropriate that NATO should undergo radical scrutiny. Following a period of genuine uncertainty in the early 1990s, the Alliance has been in search of a role for some eight or nine years. That is not to say that it has no role, simply that it could not simply inherit one from the past. Different parties will perceive different roles. The United States will see in NATO a useful tool for asserting its influence in Europe; the countries of the EU, a ready-made mechanism for putting together a collective military effort to give them a product which they could not obtain individually; the weak countries of Central and Eastern Europe, recognition and protection for themselves.

Many of those that argue for the status quo take great pleasure in pointing out how the Alliance has transformed. One might say that so it should have done, with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. It would, however, be truer to say, in fact, that NATO has prescribed new roles for itself after its old functions all but disappeared. With that disappeared the need to focus on resisting any major external aggression, and also, possibly, the need to bind in the United States as tightly as possible. If that is not the case, it at any rate needs to be demonstrated.

There have, indeed, been advances since the new Strategic Concept of 1991, but NATO still appears very much the same organisation that it was then. The nature of US engagement in Europe is still treated as if nothing fundamental had changed. There is, therefore, a strong case for thinking about NATO's present necessary functions before deciding on the most appropriate form of enlargement. Indeed, instead of being examined in isolation, enlargement should be regarded as part of the process of transforming the Alliance. It should also be used to advance the broader goals of European security and integration.

There are two basic functions now to be performed: that of a pan-European security organisation concerned with, in so far as they fall within its

competencies, security issues affecting the whole region; and the setting of military standards and provision of services relevant to the needs of its members, enabling them to undertake, with partners, within or without the area, the military tasks which they cannot readily perform on a national basis. In the first, the objective should be to make Europe more secure by strengthening, directly and indirectly, the weaker and more unstable countries. The approach would, therefore, need to be inclusive rather than exclusive, though it would be necessary to appreciate the potential problems of importing instability into NATO. In the second function NATO would not be the authorising and controlling political body: rather it would be the provider of the necessary tools. These two functions are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

In the light of the above it may be that, although, as suggested above, it may be the most likely outcome, a medium enlargement would not be the best course. It would not substantially speed up the transformation of the Alliance, and would leave the question of those not invited to join to be addressed in the coming years. New dividing lines would be created, and there would be no assurance that the ultimate aim would be the integration of the excluded into the wider European security community. Furthermore, a closer examination of the interests of the major West European countries indicates that a divergence from any US preference for a medium or small enlargement may be appropriate. NATO is already changing. With a major enlargement, change would become manifest and irreversible. NATO would largely cease being a collective defence organisation one of whose main purposes was territorial defence, but it could continue to serve the other two needs, indeed, it would serve the first rather better.

VIII.5 The defence dimension

A legitimate question is whether the need for collective defence could be allowed to be overtaken, as would happen with a major enlargement. There is no significant external military threat to Europe of the classic military kind. The re-emergence of such a threat would be a matter of decades rather than years. Meanwhile the need for classic Article 5 operations on the sort of scale for which NATO has hitherto planned is most unlikely. Dealing with the sort of threat that one failing Balkan state might pose to another does not require the preservation of the Alliance in its current form.

The United Kingdom and France are the world's second two military powers. There is no military threat in or to Europe with which the Europeans should not be able to cope. Not until they have to stand on their own feet will they do so, however, and until then they are likely to have to deal with their problems in a way determined elsewhere. There is a case for American engagement in Europe, viewed from the European perspective: it is that of influencing the United States. How much influence the Europeans can wield depends upon two factors: the weight of their efforts, and the receptiveness of the United States. These are connected but different. Not until their efforts have weight will they have an impact; that impact may not be decisive, in which case they will have to do their own thing in their own way, which is how the United States itself would generally approach the world.

There is also the issue of Europe in the wider world. If it is difficult for the European states to focus effectively on military issues in their own area, the possibility of their being serious military players in the wider world is even more of a problem. Yet if they are to defend their interests, and discharge their responsibilities, they will need to do so. NATO procedures and standards will be necessary to do that by enabling the creation of coalitions of the willing. However, wider European engagement must be matched by a rebalancing of the transatlantic relationship. That, in turn, will mean conducting military operations using NATO procedures but almost certainly not under NATO control and direction. Enlargement should not make the creation of coalitions more difficult, even though it will make any direction by the NAC less likely.

In the fullness of time, the Europeans will need to be able to act alone outside Europe in some types of intervention. On other occasions it will be necessary or desirable for them to act with the United States. The European armed forces will certainly need to be able to engage in high-intensity conflict. However, that will not necessarily mean following the United States in all its evolutions in military thinking and equipment. There may be problems with any further widening of the transatlantic gap in doctrine and capabilities but some of the American developments seem likely to be undesirable for many probable kinds of conflict, and unnecessary for almost all. The Europeans cannot afford, and should not attempt, to follow every US lead. Whatever other changes come about in NATO, this issue is likely to be a source of difficulty in future.

VIII.6 Leadership

The Europeans are not good at getting their act together in diplomatic or military matters, and the EU has a long way to go in developing its common policies. However, in the present benign environment, none of that exposes Europe to vital threat, and perhaps even more importantly, in present circumstances, the major European countries have no interest in bolstering US leadership or dominance in Europe. US engagement in Europe was certainly necessary in the Cold War, but nowadays there is no need for Europeans to follow automatically the preferences of a power, however well disposed, which has its own interests and legitimately wishes to pursue them.

On NATO enlargement the Europeans should decide what serves their interests rather than those of the United States, which will properly and understandably pursue its own interests. So should the Europeans. That does not imply transatlantic hostility. Jefferson's 'peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations . . .' is entirely appropriate, as is his ' . . . entangling alliances with none' in the context of a state on another continent and with different interests. The democratic, liberal states of Europe and North America will share many values and many interests but not on each occasion need or be able to follow the same policy. The objective should surely be polite cooperation in an equal partnership, and more especially outside Europe than within. That could certainly utilise the military services of an enlarged NATO but does not need the present US-led structures.

In the early 1990s the Europeans, to their shame, were not up to dealing with the turmoil in the Balkans, though it must be said that US policies at some stages frustrated what progress the Europeans might have made. US involvement in Kosovo was highly useful but came late and reluctantly, was not elegantly executed (the delay of the entry of ground forces that were held back so US elements could participate in the first wave), and has been the subject of misunderstanding. The Europeans could not have conducted the air campaign which the United States did; however, the United States insisted on that sort of campaign because it was the one which they could and would do. It was not necessarily the campaign best calculated to attain the objectives of the intervention. The Europeans lack certain weapons systems, and do not have enough of others, and they should certainly put

that right. None of that, however, makes the case for continued US engagement in its past form.

At bottom, the United Kingdom, France and Germany share a common interest, though domestic politics in each of them may get in the way of their being able to follow it. The common interest is, or should be, the development of effective European policies, serving European ends. These would include, but not be confined to, the CFSP and CESDP. The development of European security structures, of which the enlargement of NATO is part, should enable Europeans to develop their own capacity to formulate and pursue their own policies. To what would that point in the context of NATO enlargement: which enlargement of NATO would best secure European ends, bearing in mind that NATO provides, in its role of standardiser of procedures and its planning and headquarters functions, things which the Europeans cannot at present readily do in EU machinery?

VIII.7 Conclusions

There is a strong argument that the best option for European security in all its senses, taking account of the medium and long term as well the immediate, is to take in all the current candidates and Croatia too. That would bring in the trouble spots and potential trouble spots, so NATO would be able to help grip them before they deteriorated further. Membership would not of itself solve the problems, but it would give NATO a status for being on the ground in, say, Macedonia, and for being part of the strong counselling effort to the government of that country. There would be a significant process of 'socialisation' of the new members and their political and military élites. The United States would not feel able to walk away from the trouble at that stage, and so would be entangled in the issues whilst the Europeans built up their capabilities. The candidates would have no cause for complaint. The utility of NATO as a provider of military standards and services should not be impeded, though if the changes were followed through in its headquarters, they might be less useful than national ones for operational planning.

Great efforts need, in any case, to be made with Russia and Ukraine, and the United States's engaging hard there would be most desirable. With a major enlargement, more effective engagement would be imperative but it should

in fact be easier than in the case of a medium enlargement, as there could be discussion of the long-term relationship of NATO with Russia, not excluding membership, as the Rubicon of inclusivity (as opposed to territorial defensive effectiveness) would have been passed. At any rate, a big enlargement would dispose of the Baltic question, which would not keep coming back to trouble both the Alliance and Russia. At the very least, the PJC should be invigorated, if the Russians will let it, to be a place where the Russian have a real say in European security. Better still, there should be a proper exchange with the Russians, without commitment to any particular outcome, on the implications for all parties of Russia's being invited to join the Alliance. At the same time hard thinking, in the EU and between the EU and the United States, should be done on Ukraine, and on the problems of the other non-members.

In any case, the European states seriously involved in CESDP will need to concentrate on, and put real resources and effort into, being militarily effective and ensuring that there are working command structures and standardisation, in other words on preserving and developing those aspects of NATO which are useful for European security needs.

At 29 or so the NAC would become a less effective forum, which would give impetus to developing other channels for policy determination. Its use to the United States as a mechanism for influence, and the use of the Alliance as a forum where policy was purportedly made, would be diminished. Most of the new members would not be expected to be major contributors of military forces in the near future, certainly not ones appropriate for high-intensity warfighting. However, over time, as forces suitable for the security needs of Europe were provided by members old and new, the US contribution to forces in Europe would no longer justify an American SACEUR; that change would not be immediate, but it should come within five years.

That raises a question, to answer which it may be useful to try a thought experiment: could NATO exist without the United States? The easy answer is no. The better but more complex one is, not in its present form. At the end of the day the United States can almost always get its way in NATO. It can insist, as in Kosovo, on a campaign being planned and executed as it wishes. Great military potential, and the very significant communication and intelligence assets that the United States brings, were essential to deal with

the Soviet threat. Looking at the current and prospective threats to Europe, US assets are not essential, other than in the short term, useful though they may be. The Europeans can and should provide what is needed. Without the United States the remaining members of NATO might not be able to agree on a campaign strategy; some campaigns might therefore have to remain unfought. However, if France and Britain, or another significant grouping, were agreed, a successful campaign could be waged against most conceivable opponents, provided that the Europeans put sufficient resources into their armed forces. NATO, as such, even at present, does not take the grand political decisions, though it does as noted above give the United States influence, even control, of European military activities. NATO without the United States as the predominant member would have a role, and could be made to function, as a provider of military services of the sort required for the security interests of European nations.

VIII.8 Final thoughts

NATO's enlargement should be seen as part of its transformation. Much rhetoric is directed to preserving the Alliance. It should indeed be preserved, but not, as it were, in amber. If it is worth keeping it is because it can meet the present needs of its members. It is to be hoped that the members can agree on their common needs. Enlargement for its own sake is not what is required. Enlargement to keep NATO as a useful tool for European security, and to apply it to that end, should be the objective.

NATO has been the prime manifestation of the transatlantic relationship. That may or may not be appropriate in the future. What is essential is that that relationship be examined and made anew to meet present circumstances. That too will be part of NATO's transformation.