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COOPERATION
IN PEACEKEEPING AMONG
THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN
ARMED FORCES

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PREFACE

Cooperative security will increasingly replace the traditional balance of forces mechanisms, to the extent that multilateralism spreads as the means by which states are coping with the manifold new challenges to the prosperity and security of their citizens. The borderline between international humanitarian concerns and the definition of national interests is therefore also fading. The need to utilize military instruments for non-military purposes is indeed broadly accepted. But how these 'peacekeeping operations' should be undertaken depends on specified circumstances. In order to be effective and sustainable over time, they rely on the consent and participation of recipients as much as on institutional legitimacy.

When the Berlin wall crumbled, the fear was expressed that the reintegration of Europe might occur at the expense of Mediterranean requirements. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership launched by the EU in 1995, an essentially political endeavour, should have dispelled this notion. And yet, security cooperation is still kept waiting at its margins, clearly in need of a more confident attitude, including by Europe's Mediterranean partners.

This *Chaillot Paper*, written by a former research fellow of this Institute following a seminar on Mediterranean countries' approaches to peacekeeping held at the Institute in June 1997, seeks to demonstrate that the experience and confidence acquired by the armed forces of non-European Mediterranean nations in many peacekeeping operations can be put to good use for broader, region-wide initiatives. But, as WEU moves closer to EU, EU's approach to the Mediterranean can only be demand-driven, proactive. The considerations expressed here are submitted to a wider debate between WEU and its Mediterranean partners, in the promotion of the security dialogue that WEU has been developing with them.

Guido Lenzi
Paris, February 1999

SUMMARY

Since 1992, WEU has been developing a dialogue on security issues with countries to the south of the Mediterranean, which now number seven: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. By the early 1990s, WEU's Mediterranean partners were participating in international peacekeeping operations in many parts of the world. The main thesis of this paper is that cooperation in such operations could lead to improved military relationships across the Mediterranean.

In addition to their primary task of self-defence, armed forces in the region, as elsewhere, are required to undertake a range of new missions, some of which result from new, transnational risks. In the face of these, many of the traditional suspicions between the northern and southern Mediterranean countries are breaking down, even though some international crisis-management mechanisms and past operations are still perceived in northern Africa as instruments of Western interference or domination.

Involvement in peacekeeping operations enhances countries' prestige internationally or regionally, and has stimulated cooperative ventures, even between former adversaries. That has been the case in Europe, including countries of the former Soviet Union, Africa, Asia and the Americas. Although in the Euro-Mediterranean region there is no common culture of peacekeeping comparable to that of, say, the Nordic countries, the region includes important contributors and others that are becoming increasingly involved. A survey of WEU's Mediterranean partners' involvement in the last decade suggests that they now have considerable expertise.

For armed forces from several different countries and cultures to cooperate effectively in peacekeeping, considerable joint preparation is necessary. The strengthening of such cooperation could reinforce links between the United Nations and organizations like the Arab League, Arab Maghreb Union or Organization of African Unity. Sub-Saharan Africa seems a particularly obvious and fruitful area for cooperation between Euro-Mediterranean countries, one that could reinforce existing initiatives taken locally, by the EU, NATO, OSCE, UN, WEU, and by individual Western countries. A common approach to peacekeeping by these various organizations could enhance both North-South and South-South understanding.

Cooperation in peacekeeping by countries of the Euro-Mediterranean region has both national and international implications. At the national level, it can improve civil-military relations and the flexibility of the armed forces. Internationally, it can lead to greater confidence, remove latent hostility towards other nations or cultures and provide invaluable experience, while benefiting international organizations and adding to the legitimacy of operations.

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this paper is to show why and how participation in peacekeeping operations (PKO) could promote cooperation among the countries of the Euro-Mediterranean region, especially among the states of the WEU family and the Mediterranean partners of WEU. The term peacekeeping is used here in the traditional sense found in United Nations documents: it comprises the various forms of legitimized collective intervention aimed at avoiding the outbreak or resurgence of violent conflict between disputants.⁽¹⁾ Most of the international operations in which WEU's Mediterranean partners have participated so far have been traditional PKO. However, the involvement of Egypt, Jordan and Morocco in IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia has opened the door to new and more flexible scenarios, including the broader concept of peace support operations (PSO), which are outside the scope of this paper.

Since 1992 WEU has gradually been developing a dialogue on security and defence matters with countries of the Mediterranean region, which at the end of 1998 included Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. A number of activities have been realized and some topics have been discussed. The time may now have come to initiate an exchange of points of view between WEU countries and WEU's Mediterranean partners on the contribution of their armed forces to joint PKO ventures. Their respective experience could be of great value in highlighting possible areas of practical cooperation. By the early 1990s, the armed forces of WEU's Mediterranean partners were participating extensively in international peacekeeping and peace support missions around the world, in a radical departure from their traditional position. In this study it will be argued that, through cooperation on PKO, European and Mediterranean armed forces could forge an improved military relationship. The ultimate result of this cooperation would be a closer security culture shared by the military to the north and the south of the Mediterranean region. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) started by the EU at Barcelona in November 1995, is to date the most important attempt to create a zone of stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean region. The EMP has a political and security dimension which has not acquired great relevance up to now. In 1998 WEU's Mediterranean Group began to consider how the experience of WEU's Mediterranean dialogue could contribute to the first chapter of the EMP. Joint participation in PKO could be explored as a subject to be discussed both in the political and security chapter of the EMP and in WEU's Mediterranean dialogue.

The first chapter of this paper considers the evolution that the armed forces in the Euro-Mediterranean region have undergone in moving from their traditional functions to new tasks, and includes the crucial issue of mutual perceptions. The second chapter describes the experience of WEU's Mediterranean partners in PKO, and their increasing involvement in peacekeeping. The third chapter indicates the operational steps to be implemented and the potential actors who could be involved in any cooperative approach to peacekeeping among the Euro-Mediterranean countries. Finally, the fourth chapter analyses the external and domestic implications of national involvement in peacekeeping activities. A number of possible fields for coordinated or cooperative action for the Euro-Mediterranean countries' armed forces in the post-Cold War era are thus examined, and a new approach to North-South Mediterranean relations, based on identifying and cultivating comparative advantages, is proposed.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRADITIONAL FUNCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES: PERCEPTIONS IN THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN REGION

In the new international circumstances, armed forces are called upon to undertake a diversified range of tasks, some of which are quite different from their traditional missions. This raises the issue of the extent to which military forces can be employed in a wide range of operations that include natural or man-made disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, rescue missions, peace support, conflict prevention and crisis management. Most of these are obviously benign undertakings, such as humanitarian relief missions in the face of an earthquake or other natural disasters.⁽²⁾ As a matter of functional expediency, security and defence are increasingly becoming cooperative endeavours, from which the Euro-Mediterranean region is not and should not be excluded; nor should this be affected by distorted perceptions.

What are the particular new missions with which armed forces in the region could be entrusted? Peacetime security concerns have shifted from territorial defence to non-military tasks, such as illegal trafficking (in drugs, arms, radioactive material or immigrants), environmental problems, transit of terrorists and organized crime. In fact, in the face of these new *transnational* challenges, many of the traditional suspicions between the northern and the southern Mediterranean countries are breaking down. Current peacetime security missions include: the use of military means for conflict prevention, post-conflict peace-building and peacekeeping tasks; assistance to civil authorities after natural disasters; international assistance in the maintenance or restoration of conditions of law and order in situations where state authority has collapsed; and the provision of expertise and training in, for instance, demining or the demobilization of armed elements when fighting has ceased. Such new missions involve mainly land units but equally naval units, not only in supportive maritime tasks such as the provision of seaborne medical and other logistic and humanitarian resources where access by land is difficult,⁽³⁾ but also in more directly cooperative ventures.

Several specific possibilities for military cooperation should be mentioned. In November 1995, WEU ministers endorsed the document 'Steps to take in implementing an operation of a WEU Humanitarian Task Force (Part II)' and welcomed the work of WEU in the aftermath of the endorsement of documents in Noordwijk and Lisbon on humanitarian missions and emergency responses to humanitarian crises.⁽⁴⁾ Although designed to respond to calls from a variety of bodies, the Task Force presupposed a *leading role* for the EU. It was intended to provide, among other things, 'specialized logistic assets, such as transport, engineering and communications'. These documents provide the framework for a possible humanitarian task force for WEU's own operations or for its contribution to those of other international organizations. Similarly, joint search and rescue exercises have been planned, but not yet implemented, in the framework of the Middle East peace process's working group on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS).⁽⁵⁾ Again, at the informal meeting of NATO defence ministers in Williamsburg in November

1995, Italy proposed a Partnership for Peace (PfP) for the Mediterranean, which was to include political dialogue and specific military measures such as the exchange of military officers, seminars and courses, the exchange of military information and observers, joint exercises and joint operations in fields such as search and relief missions, the fight against illegal traffic, joint maritime control and PKO. The aim would be to adapt some components of NATO's PfP initiative for PKO and civil-military relations.⁽⁶⁾ Even UNESCO has developed a concept for the employment of military forces in non-military security issues within its Culture for Peace programme.⁽⁷⁾

Following radical developments in international relations, the need has surfaced for a military framework for civilian liaison and coordination purposes.⁽⁸⁾ In order to respond to such a variety of new situations, armed forces are becoming more flexible. Although quantitatively smaller, their need to cater for various contingencies means maintaining sufficient numbers of appropriately equipped and trained personnel.⁽⁹⁾ Furthermore, a number of paramilitary security forces, such as the Gendarmerie in Algeria, France and Morocco, the Guardia Civil in Spain and the Carabinieri in Italy are also progressively becoming involved in multinational cooperative missions.⁽¹⁰⁾

Given the historical background of the countries that make up the Euro-Mediterranean region, these developments in security and defence issues, and the emergence of new missions, will affect mutual perceptions. For instance, the concept of the international community having *a right to intervene*, which may imply military operations in the internal affairs of a state with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death among its inhabitants,⁽¹¹⁾ is still subject to controversial interpretations.⁽¹²⁾ The traditional principle of non-intervention is based on the concern that states who intervene may pursue their own interests and try to dominate other societies, thereby generating disputes and confrontations. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the UN Security Council has re-established itself as the supreme body legitimized to authorize the use of force.⁽¹³⁾ UNSC Resolution 688 (April 1991) represented a significant innovation in authorizing international intervention in domestic matters for humanitarian purposes, in this case Iraq's repression of its Kurdish minority.⁽¹⁴⁾ Subsequent operations in Haiti, Rwanda, Somalia and former Yugoslavia have put great emphasis on humanitarian reasons as the prime justification for intervention by external forces.⁽¹⁵⁾

In the Euro-Mediterranean region, however, there persists a divergence in perceptions of international military interventions. In general, Western countries consider them benevolent and internationally legitimized, whereas the North African countries believe that they may be, or may become, veiled attempts to establish regional hegemony, calling into question the political credibility and impartiality of such interventions. Western emphasis on the UN's peacekeeping role is considered by some Mediterranean countries as detracting from social, economic and development issues, which are perceived to be relegated to a secondary status in the UN system.⁽¹⁶⁾ A number of new crisis-management mechanisms, as well as the very concept of peace enforcement and peace support operations, have also been viewed in North African countries as potential instruments of Western interference and domination, possibly anti-Arab and/or anti-Islamic in character.⁽¹⁷⁾ Such was the case with Operation DESERT STORM, even though it involved a number of non-European Mediterranean countries (Egypt, Morocco and Syria) in the ousting of invading Iraqi

forces from Kuwait.⁽¹⁸⁾ According to this negative perception, the legitimacy of multinational military interventions is not necessarily enhanced by the participation of armed forces from different countries. Even Western involvement in peace support in Bosnia, through IFOR/SFOR, which was manifestly designed to protect *inter alia* the Muslim population, has not been sufficient to convince those who hold that particular point of view that Western and European security mechanisms are not directed against Islam.⁽¹⁹⁾ This may result basically from the fact that most of WEU's Mediterranean partners continue to consider security as a national issue, and have difficulties in overcoming their scepticism about multinational initiatives originating on the northern shores of the Mediterranean.⁽²⁰⁾

In sum, in the Euro-Mediterranean region, as elsewhere, the armed forces must still be prepared, as their constitutional and always primary task, to defend their homelands, even if they are less likely to be asked to do so. However, international military assistance to civil authorities in exceptional situations is another task that armed forces are increasingly called upon to perform: indeed, it is increasingly obvious that natural disasters, humanitarian crises and other non-military dangers to public life are matters of international concern expressed through UN activities, and such international intervention should not raise doubts concerning their legitimacy. It might be noted that the provision of humanitarian relief following natural disasters has already led to some cooperation in the Euro-Mediterranean region, not only at the North-South but also at the South-South level. For instance, Morocco and Tunisia provided technical military assistance to Algeria after the El Asnam earthquake of 1980, Morocco and Algeria supplied equipment and personnel to Tunisia during the floods in 1988, and neighbouring countries helped Egypt in the immediate aftermath of the Cairo earthquake in 1992. In all these cases, armed forces provided labour and organization in the field of construction, communications and transport.⁽²¹⁾ It should be recognized that these are novel tasks for which some armed forces have not been prepared, let alone adequately trained. International cooperation, therefore, could prove useful not only to meet international requirements, but also to promote partnerships in sharing tasks and roles, which would in turn change negative perceptions.

THE INVOLVEMENT OF WEU'S MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERS IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

The participation of the armed forces of Euro-Mediterranean countries in international PKO should in itself improve public awareness of the importance of the new functions entrusted to the armed forces. Following a discussion of how peacekeeping has become relevant for countries and regions around the world, in this chapter the experience of individual WEU Mediterranean partners in PKO is described.

Peacekeeping as an increasingly accepted international task

In the post-Cold War conditions, involvement in PKO has become a requisite for any country that wishes to acquire influence and prestige internationally or regionally. Some examples will give an idea of the amplitude of this new phenomenon. In June 1996, Russia declared its willingness to contribute 22,000 troops to a special international peacekeeping force in former Yugoslavia. In an even more significant development, despite its serious financial problems Moscow paid its \$48 million in UN annual dues while allocating another \$28 million to the UN peacekeeping budget.⁽²²⁾ Russia joined international peace-building efforts in former Yugoslavia in early 1992, proving that NATO and Russia can cooperate successfully in critical situations such as peacekeeping in Europe.

It is also noteworthy that the very process of preparation for membership of NATO and other West European organizations stimulates cooperative ventures with and between Central and East European countries. For instance, Poland has reached across an old divide to create joint peacekeeping battalions with Ukraine and Lithuania, and the Baltic States have created a Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT).⁽²³⁾ NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) has led to similar proposals to form a peacekeeping battalion. Even the Caucasian and Asian countries of PfP are eager for greater military cooperation, taking advantage of NATO and EU expertise in fields such as democratic control of the military, cooperation on scientific issues and environment and civil emergency planning, all of which are relevant to participation in PKO.

In Africa, South African armed forces are adjusting to the post-apartheid era.⁽²⁴⁾ On 18 February 1997 South African military officials announced that two battalions had been trained for multinational peacekeeping, and would be ready to contribute up to 1,000 men to any such operation. These remarks were made on the eve of a regional summit in Cape Town called by President Nelson Mandela to discuss crises in Angola, the Great Lakes region, Lesotho and Swaziland. As chairman of the twelve-member Southern African Development Community (SADC), President Mandela clearly felt that South Africa should play a prominent role in addressing these issues.⁽²⁵⁾ It must be noted, incidentally, that WEU has indicated its willingness to assist African countries through OAU in training and equipping their multinational early-warning and crisis-management units, as discussed below.

In Asia, India's claim to prominence is pursued *inter alia* through its active support of PKO.⁽²⁶⁾ In Latin America, non-aligned Argentina has also contributed to some international missions, thus creating a new, and much needed, point of convergence between the military and the government.⁽²⁷⁾ By expanding the roles of its armed forces to include international peacekeeping, Argentina has put to rest the past and contributed to a greater professionalism and capabilities of the armed forces.⁽²⁸⁾ When the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was established, in September 1993, it was headed by Dante Caputo, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina.⁽²⁹⁾

The peacekeeping experience of WEU's Mediterranean partners

In the Euro-Mediterranean region there is no common culture of peacekeeping comparable to that of, for instance, the Nordic countries. Nevertheless, countries such as Egypt, France, Italy and Jordan are important contributors to PKO, and other countries such as Algeria, Spain and Tunisia are becoming increasingly involved in peacekeeping and peace support operations. What is more significant is that, in the 1990s, European and non-European Mediterranean forces have already operated side-by-side in keeping the peace in countries like Angola, Cambodia, Haiti, Somalia and former Yugoslavia. In addition, it is important to stress that the Mediterranean area has in the past witnessed several *pecially designed* peace support missions: the first observation/mediation missions in Palestine and the Balkans; the first 'blue beret' operation after the Suez War; and the first troop contribution by a permanent member of the Security Council (the UK in Cyprus).

There have also been various 'firsts' connected with UNPROFOR and the post-Dayton IFOR/SFOR in the Balkans.⁽³⁰⁾ Egypt, Jordan and Morocco have played a very active role in IFOR/SFOR, where NATO's sixteen members and many of its partners in PfP, including Russia, are working together for the cause of peace, under the same rules of engagement and command structures. On 5 December 1995, nine days before the Dayton accords were signed, NATO formally invited fourteen non-NATO countries to contribute forces to IFOR, the largest military operation in the organization's history and its first out-of-area land operation. By the end of its mission, IFOR had received contributions from eighteen non-allied countries: fourteen participants in PfP were joined by Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia and Morocco. In fact, one of IFOR's successes has been its assimilation of non-NATO forces, whose participation was subject to two conditions: the existence of widespread support and self-financing.⁽³¹⁾ NATO's motivation for inviting external participation was political rather than operational, designed as it was to demonstrate that a significant segment of the rest of the world was committed to implementing a peace agreement in Europe.

An increasing number of military and civilian police personnel from WEU's Mediterranean partners have served or are serving in peacekeeping and observer missions abroad. The following is a compilation (by the author, and therefore unofficial) of the international involvement of WEU's Mediterranean partners. This compilation does not claim to be exhaustive, but it does at least demonstrate the considerable extent of their contribution. For instance, Jordan made the fourth largest contribution of troops to United Nations PKO in spring 1997. All seven WEU Mediterranean partners have contributed to PKO - each in a specific framework and under specific conditions - and this provision of expertise could be useful in promoting security dialogue and cooperation in the Euro-Mediterranean region.

Algeria

Algeria has earned well-deserved prestige in international affairs, having proved itself a helpful and innovative mediator, as well as an effective spokesman for the new economic order, and a Third World leader (i.e. Algeria chairs the so-called Group of 24, a club of developing countries). Algeria's acceptability as a mediator led to the release in 1981 of the US hostages in Iran and the resulting improvement in its relations with the United States. Early in the 1990s, Algeria, as President of the OAU, tried to develop its role in the field of conflict prevention and peacekeeping. During the last few years, Algeria has contributed to a great variety of PKO involving military, civilian police, gendarmerie and diplomats in Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Croatia and Haiti,⁽³²⁾ in a considerable break with its tradition of not deploying troops abroad.⁽³³⁾

In Africa, Algeria has been involved in the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) since its creation in June 1991.⁽³⁴⁾ From 1991 to 1993, 20 Algerian military observers participated in UNAVEM II. From 1995 to 1997, 18 military observers participated in UNAVEM III, verifying the Arusha Accords and the Lusaka Protocol implementations. In Europe, 7 Algerian civilian police participated in the UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH),⁽³⁵⁾ and 23 civilian police participated in Croatia in the UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), a mission begun in 1996. Since 1991, Algeria has also been involved in PKO in Asia (Algerian military and civilian police have participated in UNTAC (UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia)) and Latin America (in November 1990 Algerian officers participated in the UN mission supervising Haiti's electoral process, and from 1995 to 1997 members of the Algerian gendarmerie contributed to the training of the Haitian police with the UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH)).⁽³⁶⁾

Similarly, one cannot neglect the contributions by individuals such as Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun, President Chadli Benjedid's former assistant, designated Special UN Envoy for Somalia on 28 April 1992,⁽³⁷⁾ or Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, Special UN Envoy for Haiti in the early 1990s and in Iraq in 1998. In fact, the UN-sponsored negotiations in Somalia started with the recognition by Mohamed Sahnoun of the importance of clan elders in any negotiated settlement, and the organization of conferences at which they could express their opinion. However, the then UN Secretary-General did not accept this approach, and Mr Sahnoun resigned six months after his appointment.⁽³⁸⁾ In 1996 he was appointed Special Representative of the UN and the OAU for the Great Lakes region, and in the period 1996-97 he conducted the negotiations for a peaceful transition of power in Zaire.⁽³⁹⁾

Egypt

During the 1990s, Egypt contributed to a great variety of peace operations, from purely UN observer missions to the most complex operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia. Its bilateral experience of building peace and confidence with Israel is of course of the greatest significance. The 1979 Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel created the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai, an integral part of monitoring and confidence-building in the Sinai disengagement.⁽⁴⁰⁾ The successful experience in the MFO mission was one of the anchors for the broader regional peace

process. The lessons learned constitute a model for any treaty establishing confidence and security-building measures.⁽⁴¹⁾

During the 1990s, Egypt has striven to maintain a leading position in the Arab, African and Islamic worlds.⁽⁴²⁾ A measure of Egypt's success was the appointment of its two most senior diplomats, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Esmat Abdel Meguid, and Deputy Prime Minister, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to head the Arab League and the UN respectively. The UN action in Somalia was undertaken in response to Boutros Boutros-Ghali's concern that too much attention was then being paid to Europe (in former Yugoslavia), while thousands were dying of similar atrocities in Africa. Since then, Africans have realized that they must do more themselves to bring wars under control and master the necessary political will to tackle their own problems more decisively.⁽⁴³⁾

In 1994, 2,192 Egyptian troops participated in UN PKO, providing the second largest Arab contingent, surpassed only by Jordan.⁽⁴⁴⁾ In April 1995, Egypt agreed in principle to contribute to the UN's stand-by forces, with special emphasis on peacekeeping missions in Africa. In July 1995 the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Amre Moussa, asked the OSCE 'troika' for assistance in the coordination and exchange of expertise with the then recently-founded African mechanism for dispute settlement and conflict prevention in the OAU context.⁽⁴⁵⁾

During the 1990s Egypt has been heavily involved in PKO world-wide.⁽⁴⁶⁾ In Europe, Egypt is present in Bosnia, Croatia, Georgia and Macedonia. In August 1992 Egypt sent a mechanized battalion to Sarajevo, agreeing later to increase its participation by a second battalion. By May 1994 Egypt's contribution was: 10 police, 429 military and 12 observers in UNPROFOR. In 1996, a motorized infantry battalion participated in IFOR/SFOR together with 25 civilian police - increased to 34 in 1997 - in UNMIBH.⁽⁴⁷⁾ In Croatia, Egypt contributed a contingent of 4 observers plus 9 civilian police to UNTAES. By April 1995, and in accordance with UNSC Resolutions 858 of 24 August 1993, and 971 of 12 January 1995, Egypt was contributing 5 military observers to UNOMIG, the UN Observer Mission in Georgia, a contingent which was maintained at the same level in 1996 and 1997. For the time being, Egypt is contributing military observers to two additional PKO in Europe: one observer is participating in UNPREDEP, the UN Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia, and another has been detached to the UNMOP, UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka.

Africa is the continent where most of Egypt's efforts have been concentrated, in response to requests from the OAU or national governments. The following Egyptian civilian and military observers have contributed or are contributing to PKO and electoral processes: in North Africa 9 military to the MINURSO in the Western Sahara in 1994, increased to 12 in 1996 and to 18 in 1997;⁽⁴⁸⁾ in West Africa 14 military observers are participating in the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL); in the Great Lakes region 10 Egyptian military observers have been detached to the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) since 1994; and in southern Africa in 1995, 50 Egyptian police observers were detached to Namibia,⁽⁴⁹⁾ 20 military observers and 51 police observers to ONUMOZ in Mozambique, and 34 civilian observers and one diplomat to South Africa to supervise electoral processes.⁽⁵⁰⁾ In its most important military contribution to an African country, Egypt dispatched 1,675 troops to the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in 1995. Since

November 1995, the Egyptian Ambassador Mahmoud Kassem has been Chairman of the International Commission of Inquiry established by the UN Secretary-General and mandated to conduct a full investigation of alleged arms flows to former Rwandan government forces in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa.⁽⁵¹⁾

Israel

Although Israel is a relative late-comer to the field of peacekeeping, since the 1990s the leaders of the country and the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) have also actively sought to play such a role. They now view peacekeeping as an element of both foreign and national security policy, and have incorporated it firmly into Israeli military doctrine.⁽⁵²⁾ In 1994, Israel sent a medical military unit to Rwanda, the first time that Israeli military personnel contributed to a peacekeeping mission abroad. An Israeli team of military experts in earthquakes and suicide bombings carried out rescue operations following the terrorist attacks against the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in August 1998.

The peace process started by Egypt and Israel in 1977 constitutes in itself a useful experience in confidence-building and the peaceful settlement of conflicts. In addition, the IDF have a tradition of relations with two international peacekeeping forces - the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai and the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights - but less constructive contacts with the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Since 1982, the MFO in Sinai has performed its peacekeeping mission under the 1979 Peace Treaty and a 1981 Protocol to the Treaty. The MFO mandate does not include security of the border *per se* between Egypt and Israel; and anti-smuggling and anti-terrorist protection of the frontier is the responsibility of Egyptian and Israeli authorities, not the MFO.⁽⁵³⁾ An UNDOF monitors' disengagement accord was signed by Israel and Syria after the 1973 Yom Kippur war, when the Golan was seized by Israel.⁽⁵⁴⁾ However, UNIFIL has never been totally accepted by Israel.⁽⁵⁵⁾

Jordan

The Royal Jordanian Forces are considered to be among the best led, trained and motivated in the Arab world.⁽⁵⁶⁾ They participate in IFOR/SFOR and are interested in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. The effectiveness of Jordan's participation in PKO in former Yugoslavia and other parts of the world must be stressed.⁽⁵⁷⁾ In April 1994, more than 3,200 troops were participating in UN PKO, almost all of them in former Yugoslavia.⁽⁵⁸⁾ By June 1996, Jordan was one of the three countries that had signed a Memorandum of Understanding providing a UN stand-by force for emergency PKO, the others being Denmark and Ghana.⁽⁵⁹⁾ Prince El Hassan Bin Talal has more recently stated: 'We have a track record of political moderation and stability, and in participating in UN PKO around the world we have demonstrated both our willingness and ability to contribute to the security dialogue as it develops across the region, and with other regions.'⁽⁶⁰⁾

Significantly, apart from the presence of 22 Jordanian military observers plus 21 civilian police in UNAVEM III in Angola,⁽⁶¹⁾ Jordan's involvement in peacekeeping and electoral assistance operations has been concentrated in Europe. In 1992-93, the Jordanian army provided 3,478 troops to UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Croatia.⁽⁶²⁾ In

March 1995, one of UNPROFOR's three operational commands (Croatia) was headed by a Jordanian officer, Major-General Eid Kamel Al Rodan.⁽⁶³⁾ In 1996, 879 troops, including 6 observers plus 40 civilian police, were participating in UNTAES, in Croatia, and 98 Jordanian civilian police in UNMIBH, in Bosnia. According to the Royal Jordanian Special Forces' Commander, Prince Abdullah Bin Al-Hussein, Jordan also has a counter-terrorist team in Bosnia, operating under the French division.⁽⁶⁴⁾ Jordan has also been represented in a number of other missions: 87 observers participate in UNOMIG, in Georgia; 1 observer plus 2 civil police are contributing to UNPREDEP, in Macedonia; and 6 observers have been detached to the UN Military Observer Mission in Tajikistan (UNMOT).⁽⁶⁵⁾

Mauritania

Mauritania's active participation in the various UN agencies and in other international organizations has bolstered its international image. Nouakchott is also very interested in developing regional cooperation in general, with the other Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and Arab League countries, but also in sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, this country emphasizes its African status through its participation in the OAU and participates as a full member in the regional and subregional initiatives that have been undertaken in West Africa. For instance, after the suspension of the AMU institutions in 1995, Nouakchott signalled its wish for closer ties with its southern neighbours by breathing new life into the Non-Aggression and Defence Assistance Agreement signed with seven countries of West Africa.⁽⁶⁶⁾ Its diplomatic activity and cooperation with another subregional organizations such as the Senegal River Development Organization (OMVS), which includes Mali, Mauritania and Senegal, and the Sahelian Committee (CILSS) must be pointed out.⁽⁶⁷⁾

On peacekeeping issues, Mauritania's offer to participate in Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia was refused by the UN Secretary-General because of its lack of the specific equipment needed and, in general, of experience abroad.⁽⁶⁸⁾ In spite of this, Mauritania provided medical support, including a team of twelve doctors to Rwanda in 1994,⁽⁶⁹⁾ and observers to a number of West African and Sahelian countries with which Nouakchott is linked through regional organizations.

Morocco

Morocco has traditionally used its armed forces as a diplomatic instrument in bilateral accords. It was on that basis that it sent forces to Egypt in 1967 and to the Golan Heights in 1973.⁽⁷⁰⁾ In 1986 Moroccan forces were present in the United Arab Emirates (up to 2,000 troops and police in 1996) and 1,500 troops were dispatched to Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War in 1990-91, again on the basis of a bilateral agreement. Morocco is also trying to increase its diplomatic influence, especially as a mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict.⁽⁷¹⁾

In 1995, a number of initiatives reflected Morocco's interest in peacekeeping cooperation with European institutions. Rabat has proposed consultation mechanisms between European and Mediterranean countries specifically on peacekeeping issues. As a concrete step forward, in December 1995 Morocco undertook to send a contingent of 1,400 troops to the 52,000-strong IFOR in Bosnia.⁽⁷²⁾ Furthermore, Morocco has established an operational brigade-size military force in constant

readiness for deployment abroad, in the framework of humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping and security enforcement tasks, and specifically trained to be interoperable.⁽⁷³⁾

The other geographic area in which Morocco has developed a peacekeeping role has been Africa.⁽⁷⁴⁾ Rabat has contributed to UNAVEM in Angola, and in 1993 sent 1,000 troops and 60 civilians to Somalia.⁽⁷⁵⁾ Morocco's African initiatives must be considered in the light of the continuing dispute with the Polisario Front over the Western Sahara, although the dispute is on the way to a solution under the auspices of the UN.

Tunisia

Tunisia is evidently determined to play a role in international security cooperation through specific diplomatic and peacekeeping efforts. During the 1990s, Tunisia has contributed to a considerable variety of peace operations on four continents: Europe (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia), Asia (Cambodia),⁽⁷⁶⁾ America (Haiti)⁽⁷⁷⁾ and Africa, in Angola, Namibia,⁽⁷⁸⁾ Rwanda, Somalia and the Western Sahara. Tunisian contributions in Europe have been to observer missions and police tasks as well as in humanitarian assistance support.⁽⁷⁹⁾ By May 1994, 12 Tunisian observers had participated in UNPROFOR, and by 1996, 7 civilian police were participating in the IPTF (UNMIBH) in Bosnia and 23 in UNTAES in Croatia.⁽⁸⁰⁾

Tunisia's contribution to conflict prevention and PKO in Africa constitutes one of the most important chapters of its foreign policy. Having adopted a non-intervention position during the Gulf conflict, in 1992 Tunis dispatched a military unit and a medical team to the US-led force in Somalia. In May 1994, Tunisia had 40 troops attached to UNAMIR in Rwanda. Finally, in 1996, 9 Tunisian observers participated in MINURSO, in the Western Sahara.⁽⁸¹⁾ When it held the Presidency of the OAU, Tunisia took initiatives in the field of peacekeeping in addition to the participation of its armed forces in sub-Saharan Africa.⁽⁸²⁾ Finally, two Tunisian diplomats, Youssef Mahmoud and Hedi Annabi, deal with specific peacekeeping issues affecting Africa at the UN headquarters in New York.⁽⁸³⁾

PEACEKEEPING AS A POTENTIAL INSTRUMENT OF COOPERATION AMONG THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES: OPERATIONAL OPTIONS AND ACTORS

The politically complex and operationally multifaceted responsibilities that peacekeeping involves present formidable challenges. There are a number of technical and operational problems (such as command, communications and interoperability between armies with very different doctrines) for the effective coordination of forces, which may hamper joint participation in PKO. Sometimes, peacekeeping forces cannot be used to good effect because of complicated decision-making procedures. At the tactical level, interoperability remains one of the most central issues. The need to establish coherent command and control mechanisms, interoperable communications and shared, protected strategic intelligence among a complex group of forces from different countries and cultures is the first problem. In addition, even when potential contributors to PKO are well coordinated, disciplined and organized, the requirements of operational flexibility and political sensitivity, not to mention appropriate training and equipment, are indispensable, particularly in conditions of civil unrest. The need for common rules of engagement is an additional problem. States in general, and Euro-Mediterranean countries in particular, therefore need to explore and establish together new avenues of cooperation in this field.

The simultaneous and diversified participation of armed forces from several countries, regions and cultures can be mutually enriching, but it must be prepared and rehearsed in advance, even at the bilateral level. The exchange of experiences and expertise will constitute the very first step in putting together these complex cooperative enterprises.⁽⁸⁴⁾ Euro-Mediterranean armed forces may have to go through a number of preliminary steps, such as attendance of representatives from the respective armed forces in common PKO courses at national defence academies and at international formative bodies, as well as participation in joint peacekeeping exercises.

Both Mediterranean and European governments have consistently stressed the need to preserve the overall UN role in peacekeeping projects, which are sustainable over time to the extent that they are not perceived as an interference in domestic affairs or in the tasks of regional organizations. The strengthening of PKO cooperation between the Euro-Mediterranean countries, in a framework involving not only the riparian countries, could reinforce dormant Euro-Arab relations but also give new impetus to the links between the UN and regional and subregional institutions like the Arab League or the Arab Maghreb Union.⁽⁸⁵⁾ At the operational level, it must be stressed that, in contrast to the possible difficulties of mixing land forces of Mediterranean origin, the special conditions of the maritime environment as a physical link and common space, as well as the particular nature of naval units as self-contained and non-intrusive instruments of solidarity and mutual assistance, are in themselves conducive to multinational cooperation, particularly for non-sensitive security issues such as rescue missions in the aftermath of major accidents, natural or man-made disasters, control of illicit traffic or environmental protection.⁽⁸⁶⁾

Turning to more specific proposals, peacekeeping in sub-Saharan Africa could be one area of cooperation. The common contribution of troops and military equipment in international military operations for crisis prevention, peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance in sub-Saharan Africa seems to be a particularly attractive area for cooperation between the Euro-Mediterranean countries which could assist OAU's efforts. The goal could therefore be to produce peacekeeping forces in the Euro-Mediterranean region that are able to operate in other regions where conflicts remain unresolved, and thus improve international confidence.

Since 1991, the North African members of OAU have been particularly active in promoting the early warning and crisis management capabilities of the Organization. In fact the UN encourages regional security arrangements, such as OAU, to give substance to the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. However, international peacekeeping in most of the African conflicts would require the provision of substantial material and personnel, include civil as well as military tasks, and be intended to stimulate and supplement local efforts. The weaknesses of sub-Saharan Africa in this respect are illustrated by a number of examples: it took the UN more than six months to send UNAVEM III to Angola, because of the lack of adequately equipped African troops; in Liberia, it took six years for the forces of the ECOMOG (ECOWAS Monitoring Group) to achieve a negotiated settlement of the conflict.⁽⁸⁷⁾ There is clearly a need to develop a more capable African force that could at least help provide safe havens and protect the delivery of humanitarian aid, overcoming the basic problems that beset African peacekeepers: outside South Africa and Egypt, there is no brigade-level communications system, nor do African countries have aircraft capable of transporting peacekeepers and their vehicles quickly enough. To overcome these problems, Euro-Mediterranean countries with experience in peacekeeping, some of which have extensive knowledge of sub-Saharan politics and a willingness to commit themselves to such a type of operations, could provide assistance to potential African troop-contributing countries, with training, preparation of multinational units, and the provision of specialized and heavy equipment.⁽⁸⁸⁾

A joint Euro-Mediterranean effort to plan and implement specific actions which could mobilize African capabilities in the management of crises in sub-Saharan Africa would presumably be well received by Mediterranean and African countries alike. The joint planning of such initiatives between countries to the north and south of the Mediterranean, in conjunction with the OAU and other subregional bodies, would help prevent any possible misperception of their scope and purpose. In fact, most of WEU's Mediterranean partners, both within the UN framework and bilaterally, are already deeply involved in sub-Saharan Africa, through diplomatic efforts and specific PKO. The North African countries have a keen interest in the OAU's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, which was approved by the Cairo OAU summit of June 1993.⁽⁸⁹⁾ European countries have also expressed their interest in peacekeeping in Africa. In 1994, within WEU, a joint UK-French initiative on African peacekeeping was launched, aimed at encouraging African nations to improve their peacekeeping capabilities and assist the OAU peacekeeping role. On 4 December 1995, the General Affairs Council of the EU requested WEU to draw up and implement specific measures that could help mobilize African capabilities in UN forces. In August 1996, a WEU fact-finding mission on PKO in Africa visited Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi and Tanzania in order to take forward this initiative.⁽⁹⁰⁾ Cooperation between the EU and WEU was stressed in the EU

Council's joint position of 2 June 1997, in which the EU asked WEU to be prepared to respond to a military operation for the settlement of disputes in Africa.

A cooperative approach could be established between all the countries involved in WEU - Full Members, Associate Members, Observers or Associate Partners - and WEU's Mediterranean partners, assuming that Arab member countries of the OAU may want to appear more as contributors than as potential beneficiaries of such initiatives.⁽⁹¹⁾ Eventually, this framework could be enlarged to include other countries and regions. For instance, the Fourth Euro-Latin American Forum indicated PKO, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, as an important area of cooperation for international peace and security.⁽⁹²⁾ The OSCE could be also involved in developing conflict prevention, preventive diplomacy and PKO in sub-Saharan Africa: in July 1995, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Amr Moussa, proposed statutory procedures for consultation between the OAU and OSCE Secretariats, or meetings between the respective military and civil officers to exchange experiences on peacekeeping matters. During the tragic humanitarian crisis in the Great Lakes region in 1996, a Multinational Force that did not include any contribution by WEU's Mediterranean partners was planned under Canadian leadership on the basis of UNSC Resolutions 1078 and 1080; it was finally not sent to the region due to significant changes in the situation of refugees in the field.

Among other peacekeeping initiatives intended for sub-Saharan Africa, the US-sponsored African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and its subsequent African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) project, approved by President Clinton on 28 September 1996, and the trilateral accord signed by the United States, the United Kingdom and France in May 1997,⁽⁹³⁾ should be mentioned. The ACRI resulted from an American wish to provide a force capable of preventing a recurrence of human rights tragedies like that in Rwanda. Initially, the US diplomatic effort to gain acceptance for it in Europe and Africa ran into some opposition from France and South Africa. In addition, the US Congress was sceptical of training African forces as a possible component of a UN standing force: most members of Congress opposed any UN involvement in the ACRI. Finally, the US-UK-France accord of May 1997 was designed to reinforce African peacekeeping instruments and especially to enhance the training of Africans in PKO. In parallel, WEU is continuing to address the issue of African peacekeeping: its Planning Cell is studying the matter, and WEU observers have attended military exercises in sub-Saharan Africa.⁽⁹⁴⁾

In his 'Arab national reconciliation' initiative of 22 March 1993, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, Esmat Abdel Meguid, spoke of the need to consider the creation of Arab peacekeeping forces. The political difficulties of the Arab League and its limited capacity for conflict prevention make it hard for it to establish cooperative initiatives in peacekeeping.⁽⁹⁵⁾ However, the door should be left open to greater involvement and cooperation with Western institutions. In 1996, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Amr Moussa, observed that the participation of troops from Arab countries such as Egypt in peacekeeping in former Yugoslavia could serve as a model for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in crisis-management situations in other regions, and pave the way for security cooperation in other areas.⁽⁹⁶⁾

Cooperation in training for peacekeeping has also been mentioned in meetings of the senior officials who deal with the political and security aspects of the Euro-

Mediterranean partnership process initiated with the EU's Barcelona Declaration of 28 November 1995. The 'Barcelona process' is the most serious attempt by the fifteen EU countries and their twelve Mediterranean partners to partake in the construction of a new Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). In fact, of the various efforts to establish intra-Mediterranean cooperative frameworks that have been attempted over the years, the EMP is the most multilateral, comprehensive and ambitious. Nevertheless, military aspects were left aside. Since 1996, the twenty-seven senior officials have, however, very gradually developed common thinking on an inventory of 'partnership-building measures', and have lately started to mention confidence-building measures including possible cooperative arrangements on peacekeeping, and suggested cooperation in the training of peacekeepers, mutual assistance in prevention management and response to natural and man-made disasters, air/sea search and rescue operations, etc.⁽⁹⁷⁾ In October 1997, the senior officials approved the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean system of disaster mitigation and management of natural and man-made disasters, the first measure agreed in the Action Plan for the Political and Security Partnership. It includes a pilot programme and budgetary commitments. Coordination and mutual assistance among the various national bodies that deal with civil protection will prove particularly useful, given the number of major disasters that occur in the Euro-Mediterranean region.

Furthermore, the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group, one of five set up in the framework of the Middle East peace process, has explored a number of CBMs on issues such as maritime measures, communication networks and exchanges of military information.⁽⁹⁸⁾ For instance, the CBMs included in the ACRS agenda contributed positively to the October 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty, because the communication, notification, and maritime arrangements first studied in ACRS were then included in the treaty.⁽⁹⁹⁾ Also in 1994, participants in the ACRS working group considered the draft of a Prevention of Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA), as a naval CBM. Multilateralism can contribute to new understandings about how to organize regional, and even bilateral, relations in more cooperative ways. For the time being, even if the Middle East peace process needs substantial regional and international support and pragmatism to survive, the experience of the ACRS working group remains as a very useful common reflection on operational CBMs adapted to the countries involved.

Through its Mediterranean initiative, NATO too is developing working relationships with its Mediterranean partners on these issues. Its Mediterranean dialogue takes a two-fold approach: political discussions at least twice a year, and specific activities in the fields of information and scientific affairs, and in more specialized areas, such as attendance at peacekeeping courses at NATO schools. The meeting of NATO foreign ministers of 10 December 1996 added emergency planning, including military involvement in civil protection. The NATO summit of July 1998 established the relevant joint planning, which could reinforce cooperation with third countries, such as Russia, Ukraine and possibly Mediterranean partners. The possibility of joint peacekeeping activities with NATO's Mediterranean partners, floated at the North Atlantic Assembly in 1994,⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ is already a reality in Bosnia and a potential instrument of cooperation in the framework of NATO's Mediterranean initiative.⁽¹⁰¹⁾ NATO's Mediterranean dialogue also includes prospects for regional and international peacekeeping⁽¹⁰²⁾ with both civilian and military personnel attending peacekeeping courses at the NATO Defence College, Rome and at the NATO School in

Oberammergau. Other courses offered to the Mediterranean partners by these two NATO teaching bodies deal with civil emergency planning (civil protection, medical evacuation, rescue missions) and responsibilities of military forces in protection of the environment. For the time being, NATO's direct involvement on the ground in military action in Bosnia and its efforts since 1995 to associate Muslim countries with the search for a peace settlement could, if sustained, contribute significantly to the improvement of the Alliance's image in the Arab world, and therefore facilitate institutional dialogue.⁽¹⁰³⁾

Finally, WEU too is involving its Mediterranean partners in a security dialogue as it develops its peacekeeping capability. The Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992 stated that 'military units of WEU member States, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.'⁽¹⁰⁴⁾ The Amsterdam Treaty has now included these tasks in the new Article 17 of the TEU. Although it is for the moment unable to provide deterrent measures or firm security guarantees, WEU does appear to be perfectly suited to playing a role in disaster relief, conflict prevention and crisis management, including possible peacekeeping and peace-building activities, either autonomously or as mandated by the EU, the OSCE or the UN. With respect to the Mediterranean, WEU has declared its readiness to offer expertise in response to requests from the EU, in order to supplement the political and security chapter of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.⁽¹⁰⁵⁾ During 1998, under the Italian presidency, WEU's Mediterranean Group began a study of the possible contribution of WEU to the Barcelona process in the light of the possible integration of WEU into the EU.

The WEU Council's decision of 10 March 1998 to extend the WEU Mediterranean dialogue to include Jordan, the major provider of peacekeepers in the Mediterranean basin, could stimulate further examination of this potential area for cooperation. In fact, WEU could play a very useful role in implementing certain measures within Chapter I of the Barcelona Declaration. For instance, WEU could contribute to the development of shared concepts on crisis management and peacekeeping, or in promoting exchanges of views and experiences on the participation of armed forces in humanitarian tasks.⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ WEU could also contribute to Mediterranean security by cooperating with its Mediterranean partners in humanitarian demining. In fact, a number of WEU's Mediterranean partners have expressed their interest in cooperating with European countries on this particular issue, which has been included in the agendas of the WEU and NATO security dialogues as well as in that of the twenty-seven senior officials of the Barcelona process.⁽¹⁰⁷⁾

A common approach to peacekeeping may enable these various organizations, all of which have included peacekeeping in their Mediterranean initiatives, to adopt a more decisive approach in terms of cooperative security. It could initially include the organization of joint seminars, joint training programmes and the exchange of experts at different levels. Pending specific CBMs which may be approved in the Barcelona process, some concrete advances in the different Mediterranean security dialogues can already be seen. In December 1997, WEU invited observers from its Mediterranean partner countries to the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejon. In April 1998 the NATO Defence College started the first series of courses attended by Mediterranean officers. Even limited initiatives such as these could contribute to enhancing understanding

(both North-South and South-South) of mutual security concerns and WEU's and NATO's new interest in the region, and offer opportunities for professional and personal networking among senior military officers and civilian defence officials. The gradual strengthening of these dialogues could eventually lead to other forms of cooperation in, for instance, crisis management, early warning, training and specific regional peacekeeping.

An additional (although much more modest) multilateral framework of European forces is already available: EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR.⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ After the announcement of their creation, North African countries voiced concerns about their real purpose, shrouded as it appeared to be in vague political indications that were interpreted as a lack of transparency. A subsequent information campaign has led to a new, more accurate perception of the purely cooperative role of these forces. Involving such multinational units with WEU's Mediterranean partners' armed forces in PKO preparation and execution could help to convince the North African countries that Western security alliances in general, and the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) of which the European forces are a component, are not directed against them. The European forces have been established with the aim of achieving interoperability, in order to carry out the new types of international missions. In fact, though set up by Mediterranean members of WEU and NATO (France, Italy, Portugal and Spain), these forces are open to all WEU member countries, and are available to operate anywhere they might be needed, and not exclusively in the Mediterranean region.⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ European multinational forces continue to be created, (for instance, Hungary, Italy and Slovenia established the Multinational Land Force (MLF) in 1998),⁽¹¹⁰⁾ the employment of which will be established in conjunction with the states and organizations which may benefit from them.

The member states of EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR have said that they are prepared to implement actions in cooperation with other Mediterranean countries. In a declaration issued in 1997, they stated: 'The Governments of Spain, France, Italy and Portugal have emphasized they are prepared to implement actions of cooperation within the framework of EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR with Mediterranean countries, particularly those which maintain a dialogue with the Western European Union.' They also affirmed that the aim of those two European forces was 'to promote stability throughout the Mediterranean Basin. The setting up of transparency- and confidence-building mechanisms should enable the gradual establishment of a genuine security partnership between the riparian States of the Mediterranean and, in this framework, to prepare and facilitate participation of those countries' forces, in conjunction with EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR, in some operations provided for in the Petersberg Declaration.'⁽¹¹¹⁾ Ways could therefore be explored of involving WEU's Mediterranean partners' armed forces in EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR missions, in joint operations concerning humanitarian tasks, assistance to populations in times of crisis, or other emergency situations such as search and rescue, evacuation, maritime policing, protection of sea lines and merchant shipping, logistic and medical support, or minesweeping. WEU ministers expressly welcomed 'the readiness of the member nations of EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR to develop cooperative actions with those countries.'⁽¹¹²⁾

PROSPECTS FOR COOPERATIVE PEACEKEEPING BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION

A cooperative approach to peacekeeping issues by the countries to the north and south of the Mediterranean should also address the implications at the national and international level. After a consideration of how participation in PKO would affect the military in the countries of the Euro-Mediterranean region, a number of operational lessons are indicated below.

National implications

At the national level, an improved awareness of the importance of civil-military relations could result from the participation of national armed forces in international peacekeeping. Cooperation involving different nations and regions could highlight and promote a re-evaluation of the new roles that armies can play in their respective societies. For instance, Spanish security cooperation in a number of peacekeeping ventures around the world has helped to improve the public's perception of the armed forces. Participation in international cooperation for confidence-building purposes in general, and PKO in particular, can help armed forces, especially their leaders, to appreciate the additional functions they are likely to have as a consequence of the new international context.

Moreover, multinational military cooperation contributes to an improved professional ethic and civilian control, simply as a result of operating in close contact with armed forces and civilians from other regions and cultures, as well as with non-governmental organizations, in peace-building aid and assistance tasks. An additional positive side-effect of such joint participation in PKO is the implicit re-training of armed forces, which will lead to greater flexibility and capabilities. The natural spin-off of participation in peacekeeping would be that armed forces would gain in prestige and in the trust placed in them by national civil societies.

International implications

Multinational cooperation in PKO, even where it does not in itself achieve wider cooperation on security and defence issues, would at least contribute to greater confidence and transparency between officials, military and other members of the strategic community. Armed forces with different backgrounds and concerns would learn to cooperate in unfamiliar terrain: the experience acquired in other regions with other actors would produce beneficial returns. For instance, Indian and Pakistani forces, despite their mutual suspicion on the Indian subcontinent, forged a surprising degree of camaraderie and goodwill in Somalia and Namibia, while Argentinians and Britons have worked together in Cyprus.⁽¹¹³⁾

These indirect practical effects will in the end erode some of the initial obstacles to multilateral cooperation in the military field. Some opponents to cooperation in peacekeeping with countries having very different military cultures believe that the aim of PKO is to maintain the *status quo* in power relations, with international

legitimation. However, several experiences of joint participation in peacekeeping have shown that they have in general contributed to the efficiency of the armed forces concerned and to the reinforcement of cooperative links between them. Peacekeeping provides them with an opportunity to establish together the crisis management requirements, train their staffs jointly in operational procedures and gain invaluable experience. And this applies in both directions: for instance, NATO's partners in IFOR/SFOR have discovered the usefulness of the experience in their daily operations; similarly, in addition to improved force interoperability, NATO itself has benefited from its partners' peacekeeping experience.

The challenges of peacekeeping contingencies will, however, require continual updating and ever more sophisticated interactions between the different armed forces, as well as between civil and military authorities. The participation of military, police, diplomatic and civil personnel from different countries and regions is a useful instrument for enhancing the international credibility and political standing of the states involved. Furthermore, the legitimacy of a multinational operation is increased if participation is as varied as possible. Finally, although specific PKOs have been and will remain difficult to mount, as well as costly, their success in containing tensions and creating conditions for negotiations has advanced and will continue to advance the cause of crisis management.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The use of military means to pursue humanitarian and peacekeeping tasks is now included in the military doctrines and foreign policies of the Euro-Mediterranean countries, and some of them have attributed high priority to these matters. The increasing involvement of individual nations as responsible members of the international community has already spurred leaders of Euro-Mediterranean countries to become involved in PKO, thereby increasing their credibility in international affairs. Given that PKO are very flexible in nature, states can choose whether to make only a limited contribution or participate in a significant manner. In addition, the fact that regional and subregional organizations are called upon, by the UN itself according to Chapter VIII of its Charter, to undertake the security of their own region, should stimulate the creation of additional international instruments for the promotion of confidence and cooperation, including the building up of regional or subregional peacekeeping forces. It has also been argued that even the European multinational forces mentioned earlier, which were created to demonstrate European solidarity in conflict prevention, could contribute to the establishment of cooperative links with WEU's Mediterranean partners, and thereby to the promotion of mutual confidence. The difficult political conditions in some parts of the Mediterranean region should not prevent European organizations and individual countries around the Mediterranean from exploring ways and means of addressing together the multiple requirements of crisis management and conflict prevention.

The maritime environment could be a useful area for cooperation among the navies of riparian countries, in controlling sea lanes against illicit traffic of people, drugs and arms, and other transnational risks that cannot be dealt with by any individual country alone. The many diverse, diffuse and complex security risks of today that are unconnected with territorial defence present a strong case for greater exchanges of information and multinational cooperation. Combining the practical contributions of the countries most concerned at the maritime level would not necessarily provoke national objections. No one any longer disputes that non-traditional security risks erode the authority of the state, but also, most importantly, affect the interests and livelihood of individual citizens. The role of navies appears particularly suited to confronting those risks. Exchanges of views on such challenges are already taking place among several Euro-Mediterranean countries, and cooperation against their effects is emerging.

Apart from demonstrating that WEU countries and its Mediterranean partners are capable of operating effectively side by side in various crisis prevention, damage limitation and peacekeeping tasks, cooperation would provide the added opportunity to stimulate networking among the UN, other international organizations, individual states and humanitarian agencies. In particular WEU's Mediterranean partners who are promoting the creation of OAU peacekeeping forces, and the European institutions, which are increasingly willing to assist, should come together for the purposes of planning and implementing specific cooperative initiatives.

At the institutional level, any hesitation in the implementation of a step-by-step process of cooperation in peacekeeping is attributable more to a persistent lack of political will than to structural shortcomings. International organizations such as the

UN, WEU, NATO, OSCE, the EU and, potentially, OAU and the Arab League all have mutually-reinforcing instruments ready to be used in planning and building up effective peacekeeping cooperation. Among Euro-Mediterranean countries, progress will result from political will eventually following, if not anticipating, events that most obviously need to be addressed multilaterally. For the time being, the growing involvement of WEU's Mediterranean partners in UN peacekeeping operations (and peace support operations such as IFOR/SFOR) will gradually erode the political barriers, misperceptions and misunderstandings that still needlessly obstruct Euro-Mediterranean relations in the field of cooperative security.

FOOTNOTES

1. On definitions of 'peacekeeping' and PKO, see Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992 (New York: United Nations, 1992); Mats Berdal, 'Whither UN Peacekeeping?', *Adelphi Paper* 281, October 1993, p. 3; and Michael C. Williams, 'Civil-Military Relations and Peacekeeping', *Adelphi Paper* 321, August 1998, p. 84.
2. Thomas G. Weiss and Kurt M. Campbell, 'Military humanitarianism', *Survival*, vol. XXXIII, no. 5, September/October 1991, p. 460.
3. Michael Pugh, 'Maritime Peace Support Operations in the Mediterranean', *Mediterranean Politics*, vol. 2, no. 3, Winter 1997, p. 7.
4. On 15 May 1995, in Lisbon, the WEU Council had endorsed a document on 'Emergency Responses to Humanitarian Crises: A Role for a WEU Humanitarian Task Force'.
5. See a reference to the ACRS activities in Rodrigo de Rato, Rapporteur, 'Cooperation and security in the Mediterranean' (Brussels: NAA, Political Committee, Sub-Committee on the Southern Region, November 1994), p. 16, and Dalia Dassa Kaye, 'Madrid's Forgotten Forum: The Middle East Multilateral', *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1997, p. 174. A specific naval rescue exercise involving eight Arab countries, Israel and Canada was scheduled by the end of March 1995 but it was not implemented because of the intervening negative political conditions of the Middle Eastern peace process: 'Le Maroc dément toute participation a des manoeuvres navales avec Israel', *Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb* (Casablanca), 22 February 1995, p. 1.
6. See S. Larrabee, J. Green, I. Lesser, and M. Zanini, 'NATO's Mediterranean Initiative' (RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1998), p. 83.
7. *From Partial Insecurity to Global Security* (Paris: UNESCO, 1997), esp. pp. 103, 159.
8. For instance, *Israel Defence Forces-IDF Liaison Unit (IDFLU), A New Concept of Military Liaison. From Planning to Implementation*, 2nd edn (Jerusalem: IDF, July 1995).
9. See Torsten Stein, 'Military Assistance to the Civil Authorities in Democracies: Problems, Issue, and Solutions from a German Perspective', in NATO Defence College (ed.), *Military Assistance to the Civil Authorities in Democracies: Case Studies and Perspectives* (Frankfurt am Main: Europäischer Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1997), pp. 55-6.
10. For instance, the Spanish Civil Guard has contributed to the creation of the unified Mozambican armed and security forces. The Algerian Gendarmerie is involved in

training the Haitian police forces and in protecting the process of democratization in this Caribbean country. The Spanish Civil Guard and other similar European security bodies have been engaged in the WEU-led Police and Customs Mission on the Danube.

11. P. Tavernier, *Les Casques Bleus* (Paris: PUF, 1996), pp. 99-100.

12. See for example the article 'L'Organisation des Nations-Unies et le droit d'ingérence', *El Djeich* (Algerian Armed Forces Review), May 1997, pp. 21-5, and B. Lia, 'Islamist perceptions of the UN and its peacekeeping missions', *International Peacekeeping*, Summer 1998, pp. 38-63.

13. David N. Gibbs, 'Is Peacekeeping a New Form of Imperialism?', *International Peacekeeping*, Spring 1997, pp. 122-8.

14. Foreign troops were deployed under the terms of a UN mandate that overcame the conventional boundaries of state sovereignty. See T.G. Weiss and K.M. Campbell, 'Military humanitarianism' *Survival*, vol. XXXIII, no. 5, September/October 1991, p. 451.

15. Adam Roberts, 'Humanitarian Action in War', *Adelphi Paper* 305, December 1996, pp. 19-21.

16. M.R. Berdal, *op. cit.* in note 1, pp. 74-5.

17. While the northern Mediterranean countries appear insensitive to the debate on humanitarian intervention versus national sovereignty, the southern Mediterranean partners remain very sensitive to anything they may perceive as external interference. See *Peacekeeping & International Relations*, vol. 25, no. 3, May/June 1996, p. 1.

18. Gareth M. Winrow, 'Security in the Mediterranean: NATO and the development of a dialogue between North and South', paper presented at the International Studies Association (ISA) Convention, Toronto, 18-22 March 1997, p. 44.

19. See one Arab/Muslim negative perception of the Bosnian conflict in Ali Hillal Dessouki, 'The impact on relations between the Islamic world and Western Europe', in Mathias Jopp (ed.), 'The implications of the Yugoslav crisis for Western Europe's foreign relations', *Chaillot Paper* 17 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, October 1994), pp. 82-91.

20. Abdenour Benantar, 'L'avenir de la région méditerranéenne: trois scénarios', in Nourredine Abdi (ed.), *Aire régionale méditerranéenne* (Cachan: LIRESS-CNRS-ENS Cachan, Cahier no. 3, 1995), p. 28.

21. In the wake of the earthquake that struck Cairo in 1992 and the floods that in 1994 destroyed numerous villages in Upper Egypt, the army provided most of the emergency help. See Moheb Zaki, *Civil Society & Democratization in Egypt, 1981-1994* (Cairo: Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung The Ibn Khaldoun Centre, 1995), p. 130.

22. See Michael Croft, 'Russia's Peacekeeping Policy, Part II. Differences in Approach and Obstacles', *Peacekeeping & International Relations*, vol. 25, no. 5, September/October 1996, p. 6, and Pavel K. Baev, *The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles* (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 1996), p. 156.
23. Originating through an MOU signed during the Nordic-Baltic defence ministers seminar in Visby on 2-3 June 1994, BALTBAT aims to create a peacekeeping battalion consisting of soldiers from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. A modified MOU was signed in Copenhagen on 11 September 1994, to include the United Kingdom. The United States, Germany, France and The Netherlands have since become part of the project. See the address by Ambassador Donald J. McConnell, NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs to the WEU Assembly Colloquium 'Implications of NATO Enlargement', Athens, 11 March 1997, p. 6.
24. David Silverberg, 'The Morning After the Honeymoon. South Africa Defence Adjusts To Its New Realities', *US Armed Forces Journal International*, January 1997, pp. 48-52.
25. See *Jane's Sentinel Pointer*, April 1997, p. 11. The SADC's objectives are given in Anatole N. Ayissi, 'Agenda pour la diplomatie préventive en Afrique', *Cahier Sécurité et Stratégie* 54 (Brussels: Institut Royal Supérieur de Défense, September 1997), pp. 25-6.
26. Alan Bullion, 'India and UN Peacekeeping Operations', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 4, no. 1, Spring 1997, p. 98.
27. Deborah L. Norden, 'Keeping the Peace, Outside and In: Argentina's UN Missions', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 2, no. 3, Autumn 1995, p. 330.
28. See Lieutenant-General Martin Balza (Argentine Chief of the General Staff), 'The Argentine Army in the 21st Century', *RUSI Journal*, February 1997, pp. 14-16.
29. Mr Caputo had served as Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Haiti since 11 December 1992. On 13 January 1993, the Organization of American States (OAS) appointed Mr Caputo as its special envoy. See *The Blue Helmets*, 3rd edn (New York: UNDP, 1996), p. 634.
30. M. Pugh, op. cit. in note 3, p. 3.
31. See the address by General W. Carter on 'Reality and future of PKO' given at the European Session of Advanced Defence Studies organized by the Centro Alti Studi Difesa and the Institute for Security Studies of WEU, Rome, September 1996.
32. See Ministère de la Défense Nationale, 'L'expérience algérienne relative aux missions de maintien de la paix de l'ONU: Cambodge, Angola et Haïti' (Algiers, Ministry of Defence, 21 June 1997); and Mohamed Tefiani, 'Le maintien de la paix. Approches nationales et internationales des pays euro-méditerranéens' (Algiers, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 1997).

33. In the past, Algeria was the country in the region that most strongly resisted any policy of alliances, even implicit, which it saw as a form of dependence incompatible with its nationalist policy and non-alignment. See Fernanda Faria and Alvaro Vasconcelos, 'Security in northern Africa: ambiguity and reality', *Chaillot Paper 25* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, September 1996), p. 40.

34. In December 1988, Algeria had verified the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. See UNDPI, *op. cit.* in note 29, p. 235.

35. Algeria also participated, as Jordan and Tunisia, in the humanitarian assistance programme led by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. *Ibid.*, p. 500.

36. In September 1996 the UNSMIIH comprised 270 international police - from Algeria (15), Canada, Djibouti, France, Mali, Russia and Togo - as well as 1,250 Canadian and Pakistani peacekeepers. See *International Peacekeeping News*, vol. 2, no. 4, September/October 1996, p. 13.

37. After the Security Council confirmed the appointment of a Special Representative for Somalia in April 1992, Mr Sahnoun officially began his mission as head of UNOSOM. See Mohamed Sahnoun, *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities* (Washington, DC: Institute for Peace Press, 1994), p. vii.

38. Brahim Benbrahim, 'Les dimensions stratégiques et humanitaires dans les relations maroco-africaines: l'action du Maroc en Somalie', in Abdallah Saaf (ed.), *Le Maroc et l'Afrique après l'indépendance* (Rabat: Institut des Etudes Africaines, 1996), p. 130.

39. See 'Mohamed Sahnoun. L'Algérien qui fait la paix en Afrique', *Courrier International*, 13-19 March 1997, p. 16.

40. M. Pugh, *op. cit.* in note 3, p. 4.

41. The MFO was funded primarily by the two Treaty Parties themselves; the MFO budget of \$51 million was provided in equal measure by the three Fund-Contributing States, Egypt, Israel and the US, with smaller financial donations by Germany, Japan and Switzerland.

42. In the 1990s, Egypt has had military advisers in Oman, Saudi Arabia and Zaire. Egypt has also donated heavy weapons to the Bosnian army. See *International Peacekeeping News*, vol. 2, no. 4, September/October 1996, p. 18.

43. See Editorial in *Peacekeeping & International Relations*, vol. 24, no. 4, July/August 1995, p. 1.

44. Fernanda Faria and Alvaro Vasconcelos, *op. cit.* in note 33, p. 29.

45. See *L'Egypte et le mécanisme du règlement des litiges inter-africains* (Cairo: Ministry of Information, 1995) pp. 14-16, and A.N. Ayissi, *op. cit.* in note 25, pp. 43-4.

46. Egyptian contributions to PKO have been concentrated in Europe and Africa. However, the presence of Egypt's civilian police in UNTAC, Cambodia, must also be stressed. See UNDPI, *op. cit.* in note 29, p. 481.

47. *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 4, no. 1, Spring 1997, p. 143.

48. Egypt and Tunisia are the two northern African contributors to MINURSO. See UNDPI, *op. cit.* in note 29, pp. 282-3.

49. Egypt has been involved in UNTAG and in the UNTAG civilian police (CIVPOL) since 1989. Tunisia is the other north African country that contributes to the Namibian process of independence and normalization. *Ibid.*, pp. 203 and 213.

50. Egypt has also been involved in UNAVEM II and III in Angola. *Ibid.*, pp. 254 and 265.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 372.

52. See IDF Liaison Unit, *op. cit.* in note 8.

53. The Sinai has been a smuggling corridor as well as a military one. See 'Practical Technology in Service of Peacekeeping', UNIDIR meeting of experts on 'The Training of Peacekeepers in Disarmament Operations', Malta, 16-19 October 1995.

54. *International Peacekeeping News*, vol. 2, no. 4, September/October 1996, p. 23.

55. Nitzza Nachmias, 'The Impossible Peacekeeping Mission: UNIFIL', *Peacekeeping and International Relations*, vol. 25, no. 5, September/October 1996, pp. 14-15.

56. See the current and future roles and structures of the Royal Jordanian Special Forces in Rupert Pengelley, 'Jordan Hones Its Regional Security Blade', *Jane's International Defense Review*, 11/1996, pp. 31-5; and James Bruce, 'Jordan: Waiting for the helping hands', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, vol. 23, no. 26, 1 July 1995, p. 19. On the specific role played by King Hussein, see Moshe Zak, *Hussein: The Peacekeeper* (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press (in Hebrew), 1996).

57. Mohammad K. Shiyab, 'A Jordanian Viewpoint', in Thomas Scheben (ed.), *Security Structures in the Eastern Mediterranean Region and the Near East* (Cairo: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Dar El Kotob, 1997), p. 53.

58. Fernanda Faria and Alvaro Vasconcelos, *op. cit.* in note 33, p. 29.

59. In comparison, by 31 October 1995, 47 countries had expressed their will to do so. See 'Ghana third to sign UN standby agreement', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 12 June 1996, p. 27, and P. Tavernier, *op. cit.* in note 11, p. 97.

60. 'Future Prospects for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East', *RUSI Journal*, February 1997, p. 3.

61. UNDPI, *op. cit.* in note 29, p. 265.

62. Rupert Pengelley, op. cit. in note 56, p. 31. Together with Algeria and Tunisia, Jordan has also supported the UNHCR's humanitarian assistance programme in former Yugoslavia. See UNDPI, op. cit. in note 29, p. 500.

63. UNDPI, *ibid.*, p. 489.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 31. This document states: 'This is a 50-team which is one of a very few of its type in Yugoslavia.'

65. Since May 1996, Brigadier-General Hasan Abaza, a Jordanian officer, has been the Chief Military Observer of UNMOT. See UNDPI, op. cit. in note 29, p. 606, and *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 4, no. 1, Spring 1997, pp. 143-5.

66. In December 1995, Morocco requested Algeria, in its capacity as AMU chairman, to suspend the Union's activities in protest against Algeria's stance on the Western Sahara issue.

67. The CILSS involves nine West African countries which cooperate against drought in the Sahel. See Jean-Dominique Geslin, 'Que devient le CILSS?', *Jeune Afrique*, no. 1942, 31 March-6 April 1998, pp. 110-11.

68. See B. Benbrahim, op. cit. in note 38, p. 129.

69. Nouakchott sent this medical team under the umbrella of Operation TURQUOISE, launched on 23 June 1994. See UNDPI, op. cit. in note 29, p. 352 and *Africa Confidential*, vol. 35, no. 19, 23 September 1994, p. 6.

70. Assia Bensalah Alaoui, 'Proche-Orient: le Roi médiateur', *Géopolitique*, no. 57, 1997, p. 145, and Fernanda Faria and Alvaro Vasconcelos, op. cit. in note 33, pp. 37 and 39.

71. The Moroccan King played host to the first secret meeting between the Egyptians and Israelis in 1977, which led to the peace agreement between the two countries. See *Foreign Report*, no. 2464, 18 September 1997, p. 2.

72. See a technical article on the Moroccan motorized infantry battalion sent to Bosnia produced by Yves Debay, 'Le contingent marocain de l'IFOR en Bosnie', *Raids*, no. 125, October 1996, pp. 26-31. See also B. Benbrahim, op. cit. in note 38, p. 129.

73. This force would be ready for action beyond the country's borders, whenever required, under the auspices of either the UN or NATO, in accordance with the spirit and the letter of the 1996 Constitution. See the briefing given by Divisional General Abdelhak El Kadiri to a WEU Assembly delegation in WEU Assembly Document 1543, 'Security in the Mediterranean region', Report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr de Lipkowski, Rapporteur, 4 November 1996, Appendix III, p. 38.

74. Morocco has also contributed civilian police to the UNTAC in Cambodia. See UNDPI, op. cit. in note 29, p. 481.

75. Morocco has contributed to UNOSOM I together with Egypt and Jordan, and to UNOSOM II together with Egypt and Tunisia. Ibid., pp. 291 and 317, B. Benbrahim, op. cit. in note 38, p. 128, and Fernanda Faria and Alvaro Vasconcelos, op. cit. in note 33, p. 37.

76. In 1991 Tunisian and Algerian military liaison officers contributed to the UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC). Since 1991, Tunisia has also contributed military and civilian police to UNTAC. Colonel-Major Abdelaziz Skik, Director of the Tunisian National Defence Institute, led the Tunisian military contingent in Cambodia. See UNDPI, op. cit. in note 29, pp. 452 and 481.

77. Tunisia and Algeria are the two northern African contributors to UNMIH. Ibid., p. 618.

78. In 1989, Tunisia and Egypt participated in the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), a political operation involving civilian, police and military in Namibia. Tunisia contributed to the UNTAG civilian police contingent: CIVPOL. Ibid., pp. 203 and 213.

79. Tunisia supported the UNHCR in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ibid., p. 500.

80. *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 4, no. 1, Spring 1997, p. 143.

81. Tunisian and Egypt are the two north African contributors to MINURSO. See UNDPI, op. cit. in note 29, pp. 282-3.

82. See the article by Ambassador Ahmed Ounaes, 'Les opérations du Maintien de la Paix des Nations Unies en Afrique', *Etudes Internationales* (Tunis), no. 58, March 1996, pp. 94-104.

83. Mahmoud Mestiri, former Tunisian Minister of Foreign Affairs, has spent two years in mediating between the Afghan factions as the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy. He resigned for reasons of ill health on 28 May 1996. See *Le Monde*, 30 May 1996.

84. WEU countries that have bilateral military agreements with WEU's Mediterranean partners could take advantage of these links to make progress on peacekeeping doctrinal and operational issues.

85. The UN has already cooperated with the Arab League in recent years, for instance in Somalia.

86. M. Pugh, op. cit. in note 3, p. 8.

87. ECOWAS is the Economic Community Organization of West African States. See Charles King, 'Ending Civil Wars', *Adelphi Paper* 308, 1997, p. 58.

88. See Background Paper to the European Conference on Conflict Prevention in Africa, Amsterdam, 27-28 February 1997, p. 27.

89. See the document in *Etudes Internationales* (Tunis), no. 52, 3/1994, p. 78, and Ministry of Information, Cairo, op. cit. in note 45, pp. 14-16. See also Winrich K. Yhne, Guido Lenzi and Alvaro Vasconcelos, 'WEU's role in crisis management and conflict resolution in sub-Saharan Africa', *Chaillot Paper* 22 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, December 1995), p. 6.

90. Carlos Echeverr'a, 'La UEO y el mantenimiento de la paz en Africa', *Política Exterior*, no. 57, May-June 1997, p. 177.

91. See Guido Lenzi, 'WEU's role in sub-Saharan Africa', op. cit. in note 89, p. 48.

92. The Forum was organized by the Institute for Strategic and International Studies (IEEI), Lisbon, and by the Roberto Simonsen Institute of Sao Paulo in Lisbon in November 1996. See *Fourth Euro-Latin American Forum Report, Reinforcing the Partnership Europe-Mercosul* (Lisbon: IEEI, 1996), p. 37.

93. See also 'An African answer to African wars', *The Economist*, 18 October 1997, p. 55; *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 4, no. 1, Spring 1997, pp. 140-1; and Roy May and Gerry Cleaver, 'African Peacekeeping: Still dependent?', *International Peacekeeping*, Summer 1997, pp. 1-21.

94. In 1997, WEU sent observers to the multinational exercise NANGBETO 97, and in 1998 to the multinational exercise GUIDIMAKHA 98, both of which were based on humanitarian and peacekeeping scenarios. The latter comes within the framework of the US-French-British initiative on training for peacekeeping activities. See WEU Council of Ministers, *Rhodes Declaration*, Rhodes, 12 May 1998, point 52.

95. Among its few experiences, the Arab League between April 1975 and October 1976 created an Arab Deterrence Force, composed mostly of Syrian troops for separating the parties in conflict in the Lebanese civil war. See P. Tavernier, op. cit. in note 11, p. 50.

96. See Lipkowski Report, op. cit. in note 73, p. 15.

97. At the East-West level, CSBMs have been particularly useful in constructing new forms of military and civilian relationships to replace the psychological divisions and mutual misperceptions of the Cold War era. See Carlos Echeverr'a, 'Euro-Mediterranean Political Relations: Confidence- and Security-Building Measures', *Occasional Papers* 97.7 (Athens: ELIAMEP, 1997), p. 3.

98. The ACRS was set up following the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference. The group is composed of twelve Arab countries (Syria is not represented) and Israel. It has held several meetings but as yet achieved no concrete results; currently the work of this working group is interrupted.

99. Dalia Dassa Kaye, op. cit. in note 5, pp. 174-5.

100. Bruce George, *Continental Drift* (Brussels: NAA, Political Committee, November 1994), p. 24. In 1996, Pedro Moya defined the possibility of developing courses on peacekeeping at the NATO Defence College, Rome and at the SHAPE School in Oberammergau attended by civilian and military representatives from the dialogue partner countries. See Pedro Moya, *Cooperation of Security in the Mediterranean: NATO and EU contributions* (Brussels: NAA Civilian Affairs Committee, November 1996), pp. 1-9.

101. Jette Nordam, 'The Mediterranean dialogue: Dispelling misconceptions and building confidence', *NATO Review*, July-August 1997, p. 29; Gareth M. Winrow, op. cit. in note 18, p. 7; and S. Larrabee, J. Green, I. Lesser and M. Zanini, *NATO's Mediterranean Initiative* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998).

102. Pedro Moya, op. cit. in note 100, p. 3.

103. Pedro Moya, *Frameworks for Cooperation in the Mediterranean* (Brussels: NAA, Civilian Affairs Committee, October 1995), p. 17.

104. See WEU Council of Ministers, *Petersberg Declaration*, Bonn, 19 June 1992, Part II, para. 4.

105. See the paragraphs dedicated to the Mediterranean dialogue in three WEU Ministerial Declarations: Ostend (November 1996), Paris (May 97) and Rome (November 1998).

106. The WEU Institute for Security Studies organized two specific seminars on these matters during 1997: 'National and international approaches to peacekeeping among the Euro-Mediterranean countries' (26-27 June 1997), and 'Civil-military cooperation in humanitarian crises: the role of the EU and WEU' (4-5 December 1997).

107. The Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission has been developed as a centre of excellence in support of humanitarian demining. JRC's contribution includes mine field survey by air and space-borne systems and the design and development as well as management of Geographical Information Systems for all mine detection.

108. Created on 15 May 1995 in Lisbon by the French, Italian and Spanish Foreign and Defence Ministers, and later joined by their Portuguese colleagues, the European forces are composed by a non-standing, pre-configured, multinational maritime force having air-sea and amphibious capabilities, known as the European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR), and a multinational division-level land force, known as the European (Rapid Deployment) Force (EUROFOR).

109. Roberto Aliboni, 'Confidence-Building, Conflict Prevention and Arms Control in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership', *Perceptions*, December 1997-February 1998, p. 76.

110. The MLF 'could be made available to WEU for Petersberg-type missions on the basis of a unanimous decision by these three countries, within its framework of

employment established in their agreements.' See WEU Council of Ministers, *Rhodes Declaration*, Rhodes, 12 May 1998, point 37.

111. Declaration issued by the foreign affairs and defence ministers of the Member States of the European forces (Paris: 13 May 1997).

112. WEU Council of Ministers, *Paris Declaration*, 13 May 1997, point 41.

113. See A. Bullion, *op. cit.* in note 26, p. 104, and M. Pugh, *op. cit.* in note 3, p. 9.

ABBREVIATIONS

ACRF	African Crisis Response Force
ACRI	African Crisis Response Initiative
ACRS	Arms Control and Regional Security
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
CBM	Confidence-Building Measure
CILSS	Sahelian Committee
CSBM	Confidence and Security-Building Measure
ECOWAS	Economic Community Organization of West African States
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
EU	European Union
EUROFOR	European (Rapid Deployment) Force
EUROMARFOR	European Maritime Force
IDF	Israeli Defence Forces
IFOR	Implementation Force
INCSEA	Prevention of Incidents at Sea Agreement
IPTF	International Police Task Force
JRC	Joint Research Centre (European Commission)
MFO	Multinational Force and Observers
MINURSO	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MLF	Multinational Land Force
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OMVS	Senegal River Development Organization
ONUMOZ	UN Operation in Mozambique
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation
PSO	Peace Support Operation
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SFOR	Stabilization Force
UNAMIC UN	Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNAMIR UN	Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAVEM UN	Angola Verification Mission
UNDOF UN	Disengagement Observer Force
UNDP/UN	Department of Public Information
UNESCO UN	Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNIFIL UN	Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMIBH UN	Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina
UNMIH UN	Mission in Haiti
UNMOP UN	Mission of Observers in Prevlaka
UNMOT UN	Military Observer Mission in Tajikistan
UNOMIG UN	Observer Mission in Georgia
UNOMIL UN	Observer Mission in Liberia

UNOSOM UN	Operation in Somalia
UNPREDEP UN	Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia
UNPROFOR	UN Protection Force (in former Yugoslavia)
UNSMIH	UN Support Mission in Haiti
UNTAC	UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAES	UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium
UNTAG	UN Transition Assistance Group
WEU	Western European Union