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THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES

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This *Chaillot Paper* is dedicated to two outstanding Hungarian officers, Colonel-General János Deák, Commander of the Hungarian Home Defence Forces, and Colonel-General (Retired) Kálmán Lörincz, former Commander of the Hungarian Home Defence Forces, both of whom, while I was working in the Ministry of Defence, helped me to acquire a better knowledge of and respect for the Hungarian Armed Forces.

PREFACE

From September to December 1994, for the first time in the Institute's brief existence, a researcher from a WEU Associate Partner country joined in our work.

Apart from sharing with us his considerable human, political and professional experience, during the time he spent at the Institute Rudolf Joó, a former Hungarian Deputy Minister of Defence, began work on a study of civilian control in defence matters.

Here he sets out his thoughts on the subject, starting from the successes and difficulties encountered on the path to reform that he helped promote and widening the study to a more general context. These ideas were discussed by specialists from the WEU family of countries during a meeting organised by the Institute last June.

We believe that this paper will contribute to the debate on an issue that is particularly topical in the new democracies but also merits wider consideration.

Guido Lenzi
Paris, February 1996

The democratic control of armed forces. The experience of Hungary

Rudolf Joó

`WHO GUARDS THE GUARDS ?' -- A FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION FOR DEMOCRATIC REGIMES

Political control[1] of armed forces is not a problem that has confronted only liberal democracies of the twentieth century. Even less is it an issue challenging only the democratizing societies of Central and Eastern Europe in the l990s. The crucial dilemma -- that a separate armed body established in order to protect a society might pose a threat to that same society -- goes back to antiquity. The ever-relevant question of who guards the guards was a central issue in Plato's dialogue *The Republic*, written about 2,500 years ago. Plato, in presenting what he considered to be the right order of society, described the military state as a deviation. Ancient Greece and the Roman Empire were both confronted with the dilemma `sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes?'[2] The question has remained the same over the centuries, but as armed forces and society have changed, the nature of the problem has also changed.

It was in the Middle Ages that the military started to emerge as a separate institution. The standing, peacetime army evolved in Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and was further professionalised in the nineteenth century. On the Continent, the French Revolution and then the Napoleonic wars contributed greatly to this process by, among other things, fundamentally altering the way armed conflicts were waged. They introduced the era of the nation-in-arms, in which the totality of society's human and material resources were mobilized to fight the enemy.[3] In this new era, the emerging, clearly distinguishable profile of the professional soldier, and the institutional separation of military structures, combined with fundamental changes in the nature of warfare, required a more accurate definition of the role and position of the armed forces in society.

England in the seventeenth century endured a painful political, constitutional struggle between King charles I and Parliament over who ruled the Army. In the aftermath of a bloody civil war, clearer lines of command were established. It was Parliament, especially through the Government that was formed from it, which established control of the armed forces, although the King remained nominally the Commander-in-Chief after the restoration of the monarchy in 1660.[4] A century later, the framers of the American Constitution, heavily influenced by the English radical party philosophy, cautiously drafted basic provisions concerning control over the regular army and navy that the new federal political authority had constituted. As The Federalist Papers prove, the Founders believed that regular armed forces could threaten democratic institutions in two ways: (1) the military leadership itself might attempt to take over power, and (2) a government facing electoral defeat could use the army to hold on to power by force.

The Founders succeeded in creating constitutional structures that unambiguously subordinated the armed forces to political rule, and at the same time divided central control over defence matters between the legislative and executive branches. They gave the authority to declare war, the power to raise and equip armed forces, and the making of rules and regulations for those forces, to the elected Congress. They granted to the executive (the civil government) the power to conduct war, and assigned to the President, the popularly elected head of state and supreme civil authority, the role of the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.(5)

In Europe, in the early nineteenth century, the experience of the Napoleonic wars and developments within the German states influenced Carl von Clausewitz in his philosophical conceptualization of the relationship between political and military affairs. In his classic work *On War*, he emphasized the point that `war [is] only a branch of political activity: that it is no sense autonomous . . . If war is part of policy, policy will determine its character . . . For it is policy that creates war, policy is the guiding intelligence, and war only the instrument and not vice versa.'(6) Clausewitz established the interrelationship between strategic (political) objectives and the military means, and he pointed out that military action should always be governed by political requirements, that it must be subservient to ultimate civilian goals and authority. His analysis laid down the theoretical foundations of civilian control of the military in modern states.

Currently, in the literature concerning the subject, the term `civilian control' is used interchangeably with `political control'. *Civilian* here simply indicates the pre-eminence of civilian institutions, based on popular sovereignty, in the decision-making process concerning defence and security matters. This principal requirement obviously does not mean that civilians are *per se*better decision-makers than people in uniform. In other words, it is not the quality of being a civilian that makes the difference but the quality of being a *democratically elected or appointed*civilian; of being the representative of the democratic will expressed through due democratic processes.

One of the basic tenets of representative democracy is that politicians who exercise political power are answerable to those who have elected them, and in whose name they formulate and implement policies. The military has no similar constitutional accountability *vis-à-vis* society -- in party political terms the electorate. Thus, it follows from the premise of popular sovereignty that only democratically constituted (elected) civilian authority can legitimately make policy, including defence and security policy. The civilian executive authority has the power, (and also the obligation *vis-a-vis* the electorate) to determine the size, type and composition of the armed forces; to define concepts, to presents programmes, to propose budgets, etc., for which it needs confirmation by the legislature.(7) In these activities it has to rely on military professionalism and expertise. Therefore, representatives of the military establishment can have great influence in the early stages of the decision-making process, and their input is significant throughout the whole implementation process. There they can -- and should, if needed -- express opposing or critical views in the *internal* debate on the main strategic options.

Public interest in democratic political control is especially understandable today, bearing in mind:

- the magnitude of expenditure on modern armed forces (money, men and material);

- the great concern shown by public opinion regarding the destructive power of modern high-technology weapons;

- dismay over the new threats and challenges of the post-Cold War era.

The last point reminds us of a simple fact, regarding the premise of civilian control: society *needs*the military, an effective military, to protect it against external threat. This is the `functional imperative', to use Samuel Huntington's term, that stems from the threats to society's security. It should be matched with the `societal imperative' stemming from social forces, ideologies and institutions dominant within society. `The objective . . . on the institutional level is to develop a system of civil-military relations, which will maximize military security at the least sacrifice of other social values.'[(8)] The structure and operating mechanism of state institutions should enable the government both to look after the national interest and to respond to its citizens' concerns.

Civilian control is needed essentially to prevent the military -- which is an organized body that is legally empowered to use force on behalf of the state -- from challenging the state's duly constituted political authority and dominant values. It ensures that the armed forces will not endanger the basic liberties, including popular sovereignty, that they are meant to protect. The essential guarantee, which should be built into the system, is the constitutional subordination of the military means to national policy, as defined by the legislature. However, the establishment and maintenance of civilian control is by no means a unilateral, exclusive move *to confine* the armed forces. It is, rather, a complex process of mutual accommodation, with the aim of incorporating the military into the general system of national institutions, delineating as clearly as possible its sphere of responsibility. The effort to reduce military participation in politics, and make armed forces `politically sterile and neutral' achieves its end by `militarizing the military', rendering it more professional and protecting its autonomy from unconstitutional interference from the political side.[(9)] Civil government should not intervene with professional military decisions on operational matters. In a democracy, firm constitutional guarantees protect the state -- and also the armed forces -- from two types of potential dangers: from politicians who have military ambitions, or who would like to use or misuse the military to attain political goals, and from serving military men with political ambitions.

Among Western countries, irrespective of the size, military capability, allied or neutral status of the state, there is broad consensus on the need for political supervision of the military as a critical element in the preservation of a liberal, pluralistic system. Beside that, there are many political institutions and societal conditions, which are similar or identical in most Western democracies, and which support the shared principle of civilian direction of the army. These are essentially:

- the existence of a clear legal and constitutional framework, defining the basic relationship between the state and armed forces. On the one hand, this provides an important prerequisite of the functioning of the rule of law; on the other, it reduces the risks of uncertain jurisdictional claims, which can give rise to tension among

separate parts of the political authority as well as between the political and military establishments;

- the significant role of parliament in legislating on defence and security matters, in influencing the formulation of national strategy, in contributing transparency to decisions concerning defence and security policy, in giving budget approval and in controlling spending -- using `the power of the purse' in issues related to `the power of the sword';

- the hierarchical responsibility of the military to the government through a civilian organ of public administration -- a ministry or department of defence -- that is charged, as a general rule, with the direction/supervision of its activity. In most of the liberal democracies the central organization of defence is headed by an elected civilian politician, who is assisted by a number of qualified civilians (civil servants, political appointees, advisers etc.), who work together with military officers in carrying out strategic planning and coordination tasks;

- the presence of a well trained and experienced professional military corps that is respected and funded by a civilian authority. It acknowledges the principle of civilian control, including the principle of political neutrality and non-partisanship of the armed forces;

- the civilian and uniformed defence authorities divide their responsibilities in such a way that political authority and accountability on the one hand, and military professionalism and expertise on the other, are maximised;

- the existence of a developed civil society, with a long-standing practice and tradition of democratic institutions and values that is able to resolve societal conflicts in an effective and efficient manner, and, as a part of the political culture, a nationwide consensus on the role and mission of the military;

- the presence of a strong non-governmental component within the defence community (independent academics, media experts, advisers to political parties, etc.) capable of participating in public debate on defence and security policy, presenting alternative views and programmes.

These general requirements -- societal, institutional and procedural -- constitute the *democratic model* of civilian control of the armed forces. It is obvious, however, that the everyday practice of policy-making in individual countries can and does differ from the model described above. For various reasons, the actual processes might deviate from the constitutional requirements. For example, individual personal qualities can affect the normal operation of the system differently, sometimes disrupting the mechanism or causing tensions among institutional actors. The development of civil-military relations is a dynamic process in which problems are managed *but are not solved*, in the definitive sense of the term. Even in a mature democracy, the stability of the civil-military relationship is not a given that can be taken for granted.[(10)] In this relationship, too, conflicts constantly re-emerge, which makes democratic control a permanent `issue' in society.

In Western countries there is no single solution to the problem of democratic control of the military: the legal and political arrangements vary widely. Civil-military relations therefore differ from country to country: the role of the military in France is not like that in Belgium, the Spanish military is not the same as the Danish military, etc. Beside the obvious differences in size, type and capability of the individual armed forces, the structure of the political authority that directs them is not the same either. In the parliamentary democracies, the prime minister and the cabinet form the executive branch, answerable to the elected parliament for the policy that it pursues. In the presidential system, the popularly elected head of state has, as a general rule, a large constitutional role in the definition of defence and security policy. Each model has an impact on the way in which:

- strategic choices and policy options are determined;

- implementation and management processes are built up;

- questions related to military institutional obedience and loyalty (who reports to whom, and when) are settled.

Beside specific constitutional arrangements, civil-military relations are influenced by a country's historical traditions, sociological characteristics and the evolution of the domestic and international environment. (Currently, the rapidly changing post-Cold War international environment has a direct impact on the new roles and missions of the military.[11] This change is not without *further consequences* -- in the form of unavoidable debates or even friction -- on contacts between military and civilians in individual countries).

Last but not least, the actions and behaviour of governments are shaped by personalities and informal relationships, which might also influence the balance of civil-military relations. They create differences from country to country, and very often within the same country between successive governments and from one minister of defence (and chief of staff) to another.

The following examples from Western Europe illustrate some of the difficulties that can arise in civil-military relations.

In Britain during the Falklands War, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher followed combat activity very closely. `The War Cabinet met virtually every day to decide on major political and strategic questions which of course, had a direct bearing on operations. The Cabinet also ruled on such matters as Rules of Engagement, which is a decision of *primary political nature* [emphasis added], one of the principal ways of exercising political control, especially in the period leading up to full-scale hostilities. For instance, the Cabinet had to decide itself on changing the Rules of Engagement to allow the nuclear submarine HMS *Conqueror* to sink the Argentine cruiser *Belgrano* at the outbreak of hostilities. But by and large the overall operational plan for the recapture of the Falkland Islands, which required professional decisions, was left to the military planners at the JHQ and in the theatre.'[12] The *nature* of the Gulf War differed substantially from that of the Falklands conflict, and consequently it required *another type of civil involvement* in the respective military decisions. On the other hand, the two events also demonstrated *the effects of different personalities*. While

during the Falklands campaign the Ministry of Defence in Whitehall kept a low profile compared with the major firsthand political role played by the Prime Minister, a different situation existed during Operation DESERT STORM.

As Commander of the British Forces in the Gulf, General de la Billière wrote in his memoirs that Minister of Defence Tom King maintained direct, routine telephone contact with him, as the commander in the field -- and not only via JHQ -- throughout the operation. De la Billière strove both to keep his minister adequately informed *and* respect the chain of command, requesting that the minister's decisions come to him through his superiors at JHQ.(13) In his personal account of the Gulf War, the General made another interesting comment about civil-military relations. He noted that in the Falklands campaign the civil servants of the MOD `had far smaller say in military decisions', while during the Gulf operation, in Whitehall `there was insufficient weight of military input in the decision-making.'(14) Nevertheless, de la Billière emphasised that neither the Minister nor the Cabinet attempted to influence operational activity in the field. Full responsibility was delegated to the senior general to run his campaign. `In my experience, once the politicians decide that the military are to be let loose on the campaign, they settle the level of support which they are prepared to give the operation, then stand back and allow the military to get on with it'(15)was how he summed up the way the British exercise control over the military.

In France, the Constitution of the Fifth Republic shares defence and security policy between the President and the Government (Prime Minister). The President of the Republic is the Commander-in-Chief (*Chef des Armées*), and he chairs the Supreme Council of National Defence (as stipulated in Article 15 of the Constitution).(16) The Prime Minister, through the MOD, is responsible for national defence (Article 21 of the Constitution and Decree 62-811 of July 1962).(17) In practice, the President retains some key areas (for instance, nuclear policy) within his exclusive personal decision, while the administration of the French Armed Forces is largely left to the Ministry of Defence, and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is charged with the implementation and coordination of security and foreign policy-making.(18) In this complex relationship constitutional provisions, personalities, separate bureaucratic interests and political kinships have their impact on the shaping of national strategy, including the choice of goals and definition of means. Generally, when the President and the Prime Minister are from the same *famille politique*, relations are expected to be less problematic than in the case of *cohabitation*, that is divided executive power, which France has experienced on two occasions during the Fifth Republic. Nevertheless, even in these periods of composite political authority, reasonable working contacts were able to produce results, as the basic consensus on actions in Bosnia, or the publication of the Defence White Paper,(19) have demonstrated in recent years. In a period of *cohabitation*, the Prime Minister's influence on security and foreign policy is strengthened, even though the President has the last word. The new democracies can learn from the French experience of democratic control of the Armed Forces, especially concerning *the practical application of the constitutional requirement for shared responsibility between the President and the Prime Minister*.

The Spanish, and more generally the Iberian evolution of civil-military relations in the last two decades, shows interesting similarities with current developments in Central and Eastern Europe, although the problems have obviously not been the same. In Spain, the establishment of democratic political control of the military was a gradual

process spread over several years after the end of the Franco regime. In the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, civilian control of the armed forces became a key issue. Among the parties in Parliament, from the *Allianza Popular* to the Communist Party, there was broad political consensus on the need to introduce civilian supremacy over the army. However, there was also consensus on the necessity for prudence and gradualism, because of the powerful political role that the military had played in the Franco regime, and because of its suspected divided loyalty towards the whole democratization process. Despite the successful transition to representative government, the adoption of the democratic constitution, and some partial personal and organizational changes in the armed forces, the pro-Franco faction of the military establishment continued to limit popular sovereignty.[20]

The failed *coup* in the Cortes of 23 February 1981, which was a challenge to the democratic regime unparalleled in Western Europe for decades, constituted a watershed in Spain's civil-military relations. Radical structural reforms introduced from 1982 to 1986, on the one hand confined the army's political ambitions and on the other satisfied some of its professional grievances. The domestic move to strengthen civilian control of the military went in parallel with Spain's membership of the West European and Euro-Atlantic structures. These were two complementary, mutually reinforcing processes, which helped Spain gradually to become similar to other Western European countries in its civil-military relations.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN FORMER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

Despite the uniformity of the Communist one-party system, the former Warsaw Pact was composed of a fairly diversified group of countries. Its member-states showed wide variations in size, cultural traditions, levels of development, geostrategic location, ethnic composition and military capabilities. After the monolithic period of the early Cold War, the differences became more noticeable from the 1960s, and have become even more apparent and significant with the profound change that has taken place in the last five years. These changes (a) produced new states, (b) re-nationalized the security and defence policy of old states after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and (c) introduced new institutions which varied considerably among those states. Despite the obvious differences, however, there are many common elements in the recent experience of the Central and East European countries. This chapter will focus on the *domestic and international legacy*, the inherited problems and dilemmas that all these nations have to face when building new civil-military relations, including democratic control of the armed forces.

Civil-military relations under a Communist regime

First, a simple observation, which will be examined in more detail in this chapter: *the Communist Party exercised neither democratic nor truly civilian control over the Army*. It did not exercise democratic control, because the Communist Party's institutions and mechanisms lacked the basic requirements of democratic control and accountability. The leading organs of the Party -- the Political Bureau and the Central Committee -- were not democratically elected; they were constituted essentially by a system of cooptation initiated from the top. In such conditions, parliaments were mere window dressing, a facade. The whole political environment lacked transparency, political responsibility and accountability. The notion of constitutional checks and balances was altogether missing from these regimes. The armed forces, like society's other institutions, were dominated by one political authority that had no legitimacy or democratic mandate whatsoever in the eyes of the overwhelming majority of the public.

The Communist legacy of civil-military relations and the Communist Party's control over the armed forces in the Warsaw Pact also varied from one member state to another. However, at least in the case of Hungary, this difference was politically much less significant than the variations between Soviet bloc countries in respect of, for instance, their internal economic and cultural policy, or their international openness.

During the last decades of Communist rule in Hungary, in pre-martial law Poland, in Czechoslovakia in the 1960s and in other countries removed from the homogeneous totalitarian model of the early Stalinist period, civil society had at least a limited opportunity to open up slowly, and autonomous circles began to gain ground. It is noteworthy, however, that these changes left civil-military relations practically untouched, and did not modify the *nature* of Communist Party control over the military. This was because the armed forces, together with the police, were typical power institutions, *pillars of the regime* in many respects. As a tool of enforcement in

the hands of the political establishment, the military was not only part of the system, but more importantly it became one of the guardians of this system, both on the domestic (national) and international (Warsaw Pact) level. Maintaining loyalty through firm rule and supervision remained a major policy objective of the parties in power.

Secondly, Communist Party control was not the same thing as genuine civilian control, at least not in the sense that the term is used in Western democracies.[21] This assertion needs further explanation. As discussed briefly in the first part of this paper, in a pluralistic democracy several quite distinct players participate in the development of the relationship between the armed forces and society. The system reflects alternative, sometimes opposing group preferences, values and demands. Consequently, defence policy, and the institutional network that plans and executes that policy, is the product of the interplay of these powerful, frequently conflicting interests. In such an environment, in the policy-making process it is relatively easy to delineate the aims and interests of various actors: the legislature; the executive, including the Ministry of Defence; the military leadership, including the Defence Staff; the different political parties and the numerous pressure groups, ranging from military industrial lobbies through pacifist groups to the various associations of active, retired or reserve officers. Despite the extreme heterogeneity of the system, as a consequence of the transparency it is relatively simple to determine what the stakes are and who represents what: who the industrial lobbyists are and who are for environmental protection; where the civilian elements of the process are and who articulates the interests of the armed forces as a specific institution.

In a one-party system the reverse is true. It is monolithic and hierarchical, and its structure seems on the surface to be relatively simple. In reality, however, there are no clear-cut dividing lines between these institutions; the policy decision-making process very often remains obscure, informal or hidden. Consequently, it is difficult to identify the respective interests of the groups involved in the decision. In the formulation of defence strategy and the military budget, the real influence of civil politicians is always unclear, as is the input of senior officers. This is one of the reasons why it is hard to describe Party direction and control as genuine civilian control, and that is why the study of this problem affords an excellent insight into the very nature of the system as a whole.

In our countries during the Communist period, both the civilian government and the military High Command were under the guidance of the single party. They were fully integrated into a monolithic system, every element of which was subordinated to the single political power. The state machinery -- the Government -- nominally implemented Communist Party policy, including defence policy. The armed forces themselves interacted with both the Party and the state, not only in their professional military duties, but also in the fulfilment of their roles in public (civilian) politics. The Party sent its political cadres to the Army, and the highest military figures were integrated, coopted into the top Party leadership (Political Bureau, Central Committee), or were promoted to high government positions (ministers, vice-ministers) within or outside the Ministry of Defence. An amalgamation of the political and military leadership occurred essentially, but not exclusively, in the 1950s, mostly involving senior Soviet, Chinese and North Korean politicians, who promoted themselves to the highest military ranks, though they had very limited or no training

or expertise in military matters. (Such military promotions took place even later. For instance in Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, at that time Secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party and responsible for the armed forces, received the rank of major-general in the 1960s, and Secretary-General of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev became a four-star general in the 1980s. There are no opinion polls or studies available that can tell us how senior officers felt about these events -- whether they considered them an honour or, much more likely, an insult to their profession.)

This was no doubt an intentional confusion of different roles. Frequently, there was absolutely no difference between the Party's leadership over the military and state leadership over the armed forces. Instead of genuine civilian direction, the armed forces in Communist countries were under a kind of apparat control, which was a hybrid rule in both the institutional and personal senses. Apparat control was sometimes reinforced by coalitions and personal cliques established across Party-armed forces-state institutional lines. The `military affairs committees' and `armed forces committees' created at various levels of the Party underlined this tendency. In such conditions, it was a real problem to identify where the (People's) Army ended, and where the Communist Party (or the state) began.[(22)] In this context the classic bureaucratic axiom that where you stand (on policy) depends on where you sit was practically meaningless. This is an important point to be emphasized when discussing the legacy of the previous regime in civil-military relations.

The blurring of distinct roles undermined not only the democratic standards, but also the armed forces, as a separate institution. It proved to be harmful to professional autonomy; it reinforced political opportunism among officers and selection on ideological criteria. Ideological conformity and party favouritism frequently eroded military discipline and morale; at the same time, reduced professionalism and obedience fed further politicization, in a vicious circle.

Communist Party direction of the armed forces was neither democratic nor truly civilian but it was real, and in most cases quite effective. The Party defined military doctrine, strategy, and the main objectives of the armed forces' development. Following the Leninist definition, `the Party controlled the guns' -- and it did so for very practical reasons, using powerful machinery for the purpose. Recent history of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and of the former Soviet Union, indicates that the Communist Parties never fully trusted the professional military. The armed forces were considered an extremely significant group in terms of power, as they were both highly organized (maybe the best organization after the Party itself), and possessed weapons. Consequently, they were perceived by some as potential rivals to the Party, especially in moments of succession crises -- a problem that the Communist regimes were never able to solve effectively during several decades of their history.

There were, in the Soviet Union for example, short periods when, exceptionally, Party control temporarily weakened because of personal fights within the political leadership, and senior military officers assumed a higher profile in demanding more influence in decision-making. This was the case for Marshal Zhukov, as Minister of Defence in 1955-57, and for Marshal Ogarkov, as Chief of Defence Staff in 1985-88, but even at these moments, senior Soviet military leaders never challenged the supreme authority of the Communist Party through an attempted military *coup*. In

other Warsaw Pact countries the situation was similar or identical, with the notable exception of the introduction of martial law in Poland in December 1981. Even in that case, however, General Jaruzelski behaved more as a national Communist leader responding to threats to his regime than as head of the officer corps seeking to impose greater military influence on society. The army acted essentially on behalf of and in the interest of the Communist Party, in conjunction with an important part of the civil nomenklatura.(23)

Despite the fact that there was no tendency towards military *coups* in Communist regimes, a robust apparatus was built up to prevent this eventuality and to maintain the unconditional loyalty of the military to the Party. The ways in which tight control was exercised included:

- monitoring the armed forces through party organs;

- overseeing the Defence Staff and subordinated units through the Main Political Department;

- checking up on the armed forces using secret police methods.

As a decisive step towards the politicization of the armed forces, a Party (civilian) structure was introduced into the military organization. Party cells were established in every unit from top to bottom. Ideological leverage was assured by permanent, compulsory political education in the form of obligatory Marxist-Leninist courses and seminars, evening `universities', etc. Party membership was a major requirement for career servicemen in the Warsaw Pact countries; it was not a matter of free choice, especially at the higher ranks. In the 1980s in East Germany and in the Soviet Union Party membership among the military reached more than 90% of the total officer corps. In other Warsaw Pact countries the ratio was generally slightly below this figure, and the percentage of Party card-holders among non-commissioned officers (NCOs) was, as a general rule, lower in the WP countries.(24)

The second most important channel of Party influence was the Main Political Department (or the Main Political Administration, as it was called in some countries). The MPD was a legacy of the commissar system, originally developed by Trotsky's revolutionary Red Army in 1918-19, to ensure the loyalty of military officers charged with operational command tasks.(25) As was the case with many other Soviet institutions, the MPD was copied in detail and introduced by the people's armies established at the end of the 1940s in the satellite countries.

From that time until 1990, the year of decisive change, the Main Political Departments continued to operate and evolve. They became hybrid institutions: their units were introduced at various levels in the armed forces, and at the same time they were directly linked with the Party's leading organs -- the Central Committee and the Political Bureau. They were involved in every major policy question, and especially in matters of indoctrination and the thought-control process.(26)Despite its inclusion in the structure of the armed forces, and despite the fact that its political officers as a rule wore uniforms, the MPD and its network remained an alien body within the military and was viewed with great suspicion. Very often the professional military considered the activity of political officers a useless exercise, diverting time and energy from the

real duty, or simply violating the privacy of servicemen. Commanders worried about unity of command, because political officers were quite often outside their control. On occasion, their presence developed into a system of dual command, which obviously became a constant point of contention.

Beside their domestic functions, both the Party organization within the armed forces and the Main Political Department also had international ideological functions. The political education they provided had to deepen `proletarian internationalism' among the Soviet military and other armies of the Warsaw Pact, painting a very dark (and usually very primitive) picture of the aggressive, colonialist, and neo-colonialist nature of capitalist armies in practice,(27) In practice, `internationalism' meant subordination of the national interest to geopolitical considerations imposed by the Soviet Union. It curtailed to a minimum national autonomy in defence planning and military thinking, leaving a heavy legacy for the new regimes. All these internal and international reasons explain why in the early 1990s, when the first freely elected governments in Central and Eastern Europe decided to abolish the Main Political Departments, the step was explicitly welcomed by the overwhelming majority of professional soldiers.

At this point, however, it is necessary to recall the sometimes complex reality that had existed in the region prior to 1990. In the Hungarian People's Army, for example, the sociologists who carried out the first valuable studies on social stratification within the military, or on the armed forces' image in society, worked as part of the Main Political Department. It is odd, too, that the musicians of the Gypsy Orchestra of the People's Army, designed to carry out so-called `cultural tasks' within the armed forces, were also attached to the MPD. The Polish People's Army produced an even stranger case, directly subordinating the Army chaplaincy to the Main Political Directorate. The MPD, responsible for an aggressively atheist indoctrination programme, which went under the name of `forming a scientific world outlook', apparently did not see any contradiction in coordinating simultaneously the activity of the Army chaplains.(28) The incorporation of these otherwise useful functions into the Main Political Departments demonstrated unambiguously the perversion of the system. That does not, however, alter the overall assessment that the MPD as a whole was counterproductive from both democratic political and professional military points of view.(29)

After the systemic change, the other institution that was fundamentally reorganized in 1990 was military counter-intelligence. During the Communist period it was another alien body within the Army because in most cases it was subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior and its main task consisted in monitoring Party loyalty and combating the ideological `internal enemy', `the anti-socialist forces'. The general experience was that both officers in units and the military leadership accepted the abolition of this organ without resistance and valued its restructuring on the grounds of the real security needs and national interests of the individual countries.

The paramilitary units that are peculiar to the armed forces of the Communist Parties demonstrated another aspect of the composite nature of the military within the Soviet bloc. Their official names varied from country to country: `People's Militia' (ORMO) in Poland, `Worker's Militia' in Hungary (established after the failure of the 1956 revolution), `Patriotic Guard' in Romania, `Territorial Defence Units' in Yugoslavia --

almost every Communist Party had its very special bodyguard. From the Party's perspective, they served a dual purpose: on the one hand they contributed to the militarization of society, as part of the general oppressive structure; on the other, their establishment was designed to exert a kind of counterbalance to the regular armed forces by separating those bearing arms into competing units. In the hand of the top Party leadership, they frequently served as an instrument of `divide and rule', and were used as an additional guarantor of the survival of the regime.(30) Both society and regular armed forces gained when the militias were abolished at the beginning of the 1990s.

The legacy of the past and the difficulties of change

Civil-military relations mirror the society and the political regime in which they are built up. Currently, in Central and Eastern Europe they reflect *a transitory society and political system* in which old and new elements coexist. Old and new laws, institutions and policy-making mechanisms, each designed to serve a very different power structure, frequently exist side-by-side. The same is true for the political culture of the respective countries, which is not less important and which also contains a mixture of old and new elements, as far as political reflexes, the inclination for tolerance and the ability to compromise are concerned. Sometimes in the Central and East European countries there is no motivation for compromise. Participants in the political process tend to view events in terms of a zero-sum game: the civil side's gain is the military' loss, and vice versa. In this perception, compromise is a sign of weakness and not a natural part of the political process.

In a country that respects the principle of the rule of law, constitutional-legal regulations are key elements. They are necessary although not sufficient conditions for the successful implementation of democratic political control of the military, which is why institutional arrangements must be complemented by educational programmes aimed at raising the level of political culture. Society's fundamental consent to how both civilians and uniformed servicemen should comply with laws and political rules concerning defence and security is needed. In a democratic learning process, all of society, including the military, assimilate the respective principles and regulations. Through consensus on shared values, *control by containment* can gradually be transformed into *control by conviction*, which is the *ultimate guarantor of democratic functioning*.

Nor, in speaking of the political culture in civil-military relations, should pre-Communist historical traditions be forgotten. In a region where national political developments in the inter-war period were decisively influenced by leading military personalities -- although quite different personalities in different countries, like General Pilsudski, Admiral Horthy or General Antonescu -- the concept of civilian control of the armed forces is not based on a long, organic democratic development. Thus, the specific national historical background should also be taken into consideration in the on-going educational process.

In the last five years, every country in Central and Eastern Europe has listed the principle of civilian control of the military as a policy objective. The reasons for that are clear: democratic institutions are still fragile, they are more vulnerable than mature democracies when confronting challenges such as crises of government,

economic depression, the escalation of violence or the abuse of power. This is why the establishment of the democratic direction of the armed forces has been a part of the transformation process, which has varied considerably in speed and depth from country to country.

Democratic control removes the temptation for the armed forces to intervene in party politics, taking sides or enhancing their position. The rule of law should therefore include clear norms, strong institutions and mechanisms that delineate unambiguously the limits of authority of the various actors, and also preclude any amalgamation of roles, and consequently ideological and political aspects must be eliminated from the activities of the military. Being neutral and non-partisan, the military officer can serve several successive governments. He serves the state, and the duly constituted (elected or appointed) state authority, and not just one segment of the political establishment. In this respect, his position is very similar to that of civil servants in a pluralistic regime. The experience of restructuring previous central and local organs of government indicates that the establishment of a party-neutral public administration is another crucial and difficult task during this period of transformation. Within a defence ministry, which employs -- or should employ -- both military personnel and civil servants, the difficulties of change are compounded, compared with those faced by other, purely civilian state agencies.

If democracy is not a perfect system, that which exists in the period of transition towards democracy in Central and Eastern Europe is even less so. Currently, the gap between political objectives and societal reality is still considerable in most countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Civilian control as a major innovative idea has had to confront a series of obstacles from the moment that democratically elected governments took office.

Difficulties of change on the civilian side

Firstly, there was virtually no civilian expertise on defence and security matters. Because of the previous excessive concern for military secrecy, these issues were simply excluded from public debate. As a consequence, especially at the outset, very few parliamentarians, civil servants, academic researchers or journalists had any knowledge of these questions.(31) This was true not only for the former opposition -- the new parties which, as a general rule, constituted governments after the first free elections: the ex-Communists and their successor parties, with their political allies, have had no specific defence professional competence, or experience of policy-making in a democratic political setting either, as the impressive number of political blunders and administrative mismanagement after their returning to office in the arc of countries from the Baltic to the Black Sea have demonstrated. As they lacked a basic knowledge of defence matters, however, it would have been hard to expect that a real partnership could be established with senior officers, and supervision and management properly carried out. Pushing `civilianization' at any price in such conditions could be very counterproductive.

Nevertheless, very often there has been misunderstanding in this respect. The basic knowledge of politicians and civil servants in defence policy issues mentioned above should not be confused with professional military expertise: the requirements are not

the same in both cases. Civilians in MODs are not supposed to perform operational command tasks; obviously they do not substitute for professional servicemen.

As for the civil servants concerned, in the defence ministries of strong democracies, `the overwhelming majority of them have not been selected with an eye to their qualification as experts in defence policy; rather they are primarily either administrators (frequently with legal training) or technicians.'[32]

Secondly, in some countries of the former Warsaw Pact, for example Czechoslovakia, for various reasons of recent or more distant history, the civil population harboured explicit anti-military feelings.[33] Nor were a number of intellectuals who had participated in opposition movements and consequently went to influential government positions totally exempt from that prejudice. This fact hampered the development of healthy civil-military relations, especially at the initial stage, though its political relevance has proved short-term.

Thirdly, the concept of civilian control and political neutrality has not always been correctly understood by the (civilian) politicians of the new democracies. Legitimate efforts to curtail Party control and eliminate Communist ideology from military institutions has sometimes coincided with the propagation of democratic liberal world views (or versions of them), which has been seen by a number of officers as a new indoctrination process. On occasion, attempts at political screening (lustration) and other personnel changes have been the subject of heated debates in parliaments or in the media on whether they have served the interest of general democratic consolidation, or rather the position of one segment of the political class or of one or two parties in office.

Difficulties on the military side

Firstly, the military has had no experience of working with civilians in top positions within an MOD or parliament. In defence ministries, prior to the systemic change, civilians were employed almost exclusively in the technical assistance category, in modest, low-paid jobs. With the arrival of a civilian minister and some top civilian aides, the respective positions have been altered drastically. Built-in reflexes acquired in the previous regime explain, however, why, on the military side, there was some reluctance to accept the changed situation.

Secondly, as a general rule, throughout the region the armed forces had a positive attitude towards democratic transition. Nevertheless, because of their previous relative isolation within society, the military perhaps had more difficulty than many other groups in adapting to the new, practical day-to-day conditions of a pluralistic democracy and a market economy. In many respects the military formed a closed society within a closed society. However, at this point also, we should not ignore the variety of internal situations which existed in Warsaw Pact member states. In Hungary, in pre-martial law Poland and in Czechoslovakia during the 1960s, civil society had at least a limited opportunity to open up slowly. Because of its strict internal regulations, and its direct dependence on Soviet strategic considerations, the armed forces could not follow society's narrow path to liberalization. Consequently, in the changed societal and political context of the early 1990s, for the military, leaving their insular sub-society, it was harder to accommodate to the conditions of pluralism,

for instance open media criticism and public debates, which *inter alia* challenged defence policy. It was not easy to adjust to the demands of the new economic environment, to think in terms of the real costs in defining the defence budget and defence spending. In the region as a whole, this was not an easy process for civil society either.

Thirdly, until the end of the 1980s, military servicemen could not take advantage from the limited, but on occasion steadily increasing (as in Hungary and Poland) personal contacts with the West and opportunities offered by tourism. Even in the late stage of the bloc-to-bloc confrontation, `Eastern' serving officers -- with the obvious exception of military attachés and intelligence officials -- were largely unfamiliar with the reality of society and armed forces in the West. This was, of course, not their fault, but the consequences have been felt until the present time. Unfamiliarity, lack of firsthand experience, combined with the extreme scarcity of those speaking Western languages, led to a certain fear of the unknown which, as a psychological barrier, has had its impact. It has limited, at least to some extent, the dynamism of the reorientation of professional contacts in the direction of the Western European and Euro-Atlantic communities.[(34)]

Most of the civilians taking office in defence ministries in the early 1990s, by contrast, knew better the reality of Western countries and the current trends in their security and foreign policies. This led again to some differences in perception between civilians and military officers working together.

In listing the problems that have hampered the smooth development of civil-military relations, worsening budgetary conditions should not be omitted. In almost all countries of the former Warsaw Pact, the last five years have been characterized by a considerable military force reduction and shrinking defence expenditure. These facts are only partly due to the changed threat perception in those countries. The general economic imbalance and inadequate financial means to fund military installations and salaries played a significant role in the cuts. Some armies have faced the problem of massive lay-offs. In other cases, for instance in Hungary, a relatively large number of well-trained young officers left the armed forces and entered the private sector, where incomes are four to five times better those in the armed forces. The reduction in personnel in the armed forces and resources that are inadequate to maintain technical equipments frequently figured in the professional grievances voiced by the military leadership. Officers have felt that they are not understood and that their interests are not taken into consideration. On occasion -- even if indirectly and in closed debates -- senior military leaders have accused the new political establishment of incorrect threat assessments, or insensitivity to the real national security needs.

The evolution of civil-military relations has also depended to a large extent on the special characteristics of ex-Communist countries and armed forces. The Soviet Union/Russia has represented a very special case in this respect. Because of its size, capability, former internal and international role, the military of the ex-Soviet superpower possessed a weight and status within society that had no equal in Central and Eastern Europe. Consequently, the attitude of this force to the painful process of Soviet/Russian disintegration and transformation has been and will remain a decisive factor in the general political evolution.

Among the small and medium-sized nations of the former Warsaw Pact, the position of the Polish Armed Forces should be distinguished. Leaving aside the defunct GDR, Poland had the second largest military in the Soviet bloc. To this fact should be added a traditionally strong *esprit de corps* among Polish officers and the popularity that these armed forces gained through centuries at critical moments when the nation was fighting for independence. Even though during the Cold War it was used to serve the Communist regime's needs, the military continues to command the respect of the Polish population.

The Czech Republic and Slovakia provide further examples of the complexity of the military transformation process. In their case the effort to reform defence policy went in parallel with the process of founding a state and creating a brand new national army and defence ministry.

The progress of change

Despite all the difficulties and national specificities mentioned above, military reform, including the idea of democratic political control, has nevertheless made progress in the region.

The role of parliaments

The institution where this progress was first noticeable was parliament itself. The legislatures of the individual countries have gradually begun to resemble their Western counterparts in their daily functioning. In national assemblies, defence committees (or armed forces committees) have been established, where in most cases there are heated debates when military budgets are discussed, or when reports are required from MODs or from defence staffs. However, currently these committees do not yet have authority comparable to that of many analogous Western institutions: very often they lack basic information, or appropriate financial and human resources (for instance, a necessary number of experts or advisers assisting parliamentarians or their party groups, in their legislating or supervising activity). Thus, on average, in the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, parliamentary checking of several decisive areas of defence policy is still rather weak.[35]

The other major field in which the role of parliaments has been crucial is legislation in defence matters. The transformation needs a clear legal and constitutional framework that defines the role of the armed forces, their size, structure, strategic requirements and defence priorities. Initially, military doctrines (or defence concepts, as they are sometimes called) provided this missing framework. In the period 1991-93 most of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe adopted a new defence concept, as a sign of fundamental re-thinking of their military situation in the quickly changing international environment. (Countries like the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic re-defined their basic principles of security and defence for a second time as their joint federal state disintegrated. Poland did the same for reasons essentially related to its domestic politics.)

The balance between the different parts of government

The second major area demanding legal regulation in the former Warsaw Pact countries was the relationship between the state and the armed forces. Because of its special significance, the new or revised constitutions and, in some instances, the more detailed defence legislation, dealt with this issue.

In these constitutions an attempt was also made to define the delicate balance between different parts of government in relation to the armed forces. The new stipulations covered the frequently sensitive relationship between the Government (Prime Minister) and the President (who is generally designated Commander-in-Chief, and, as such, has direct access to the military High Command).[(36)] This situation can be complicated; on occasions, it might lead to a political struggle for more responsibility and influence, especially if the government and the head of state belong to different political factions and have quite different policies on defence.

However, the constitutions have been written in fairly general terms, which has led to ambiguities and even to open conflicts of interpretation. This has happened in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia in the last three years. In all five cases the subordination of the armed forces to the President and to the Government (through the MOD) needed to be more clearly defined.

In Poland, the question of power-sharing between President and Cabinet in defence and security policy was raised soon after the democratically elected President Lech Walesa took office at the end of 1990. In the ensuing constitutional debate, Walesa pushed for more presidential prerogatives in the area of security and defence policy. Conflicting views on presidential and defence ministerial authority led to the resignation of the first civilian minister, Jan Parys, and the fall of Olszewski's government in 1992. The adoption by the Sejm, on 1 August 1992, of Poland's `Little Constitution' legally clarified the President's powers in its Section 3, Articles 33 and 35. Nevertheless, several unresolved extra-constitutional, political problems remained, for instance the detailed procedure for nominating the Minister of Defence.

Control of the military became an especially sensitive issue and source of conflict between President and Cabinet after the electoral victory of the former Communists and their allies in 1993. Walesa has wanted to prevent the growth of leftist influence within the armed forces. The tension with Waldemar Pawlak's government led to a new crisis in late 1994, and resulted in the fall of the Cabinet in early 1995.[(37)]

The military élite, representing a powerful and popular national institution, tried to exploit the situation in order to maintain its bargaining position in successive periods of crisis. It was able gradually to enlarge its room for manuvre, and increased its leverage on political processes. The Defence Staff supported President Walesa's effort to personalize civilian control as Supreme Commander, leaving routine administrative tasks to the Ministry of Defence. Within the MOD, the authority of the Chief of Defence Staff, Tadeusz Wilecki, has been extended through organizational changes. (For instance, the politically sensitive Military Counter-Intelligence, which was detached from the Defence Staff in 1992, was returned to it in 1994.) The process provoked heated debate in Parliament about the effectiveness of ministerial political control, and led to speculation in the media about who is really in charge in the MOD:

the civilian minister, Wojciech Okonski, or the Chief of Defence Staff, General Tadeusz Wilecki.(38)

The Czech Republic is one of the countries that has made the most progress in establishing democratic control of the armed forces. However, it is not immune from the problems of gaps in the legislative framework, and an unclear division of responsibility between the President, the Government (Minister of Defence) and Chief of Defence Staff. As far as constitutional ambiguity is concerned, the President's authority, as defined by the operative basic law, is weaker than that of the federal president before 1992. As Commander-in-Chief, for instance, he promotes generals but these decisions have to be approved by the Prime Minister. In particular, the President's power to employ the armed forces during an emergency needs to be legally clarified in the future.(39)

In practice, the everyday management of defence matters is controlled through the Prime Minister via the Ministry of Defence. However, in recent years the imprecise delineation of competence has from time to time strained relations between the Presidential Office, the MOD and the Defence Staff, and has left substantial room for bureaucratic battles. Among other things, it resulted in tensions between former Defence Minister Antonin Baudis and his Chief of Defence Staff, Karel Pezl, who had, on the other hand, close relations with President Vaclav Havel.(40)Though the primacy of the minister generally was not questioned, the conflict adversely affected the normal functioning of Czech defence management for some time.

In 1992-93, in the discussion of the post of `Inspector-General of the Armed Forces' the Cabinet opposed the Parliament and, in some respects, the President. The need for a civilian Inspector-General of the military (the term as used here indicates an *ombudsman* for human rights issues, acting under the auspices of the National Assembly) was voted by the Czechoslovak Parliament in December 1990. This new institution was aimed at reinforcing parliamentary control over the armed forces at a time when the Government's direction in this area was still weak.

A change in the approach to this institution was expressed in the parliamentary speech of Prime Minister Klaus in September 1993, when he insisted that the Inspector-General had to be incorporated in the Ministry of Defence, and that from the legislature's side the Committee on Defence and Security should continue to be the main agent of supervision. After long discussions, which involved both party-political considerations and a struggle for power between institutions, the post of Inspector-General was introduced into the structures of the Czech MOD, and has consequently been subordinated to the defence minister.(41)

The question of civilians in defence ministries

As can also be seen from the above examples, the presence of civilians in defence ministries is another major, no less problematic aspect of introducing democratic political control.

In Western democracies, a defence ministry is a civilian-led, specialized government body headed by a civilian minister who is responsible for the management of defence matters. In most cases the High Command is an integral part of the ministry, but

military operational tasks are separated from public administrative ones in the internal structure. In Western Europe, in defence ministries, as a general rule uniformed military officers and NCOs work together with career civil servants, who impartially serve whichever government is elected to office. This system, which is deeply rooted, for instance, in the British tradition of public administration, is different from the US model, where the number of political appointees, brought in by each new President, is considerably higher.

The presence of civilians in the a defence ministry is not an end in itself. Their introduction into the MOD structure is not a mere democratic requirement: it also has its practical advantages. Civil servants who have had previous experience in other branches of public administration prior to coming to an MOD (for instance, Foreign Affairs, Interior or Justice) generally prove to be better communicators, having more technical skills in inter-agency cooperation.

In a pluralistic setting, there is a permanent competition among national institutions for status and resources. It is in the interests of the armed forces to have an MOD that can successfully communicate with Parliament, the Ministry of Finance, various NGOs, or with the public as a whole, when it wants to obtain their support. Western experience shows that civilian economists, sociologists and legal and media experts who also have the necessary knowledge of defence matters can be effective advocates for the MOD/armed forces.

In the former Warsaw Pact countries after 1990, civilian defence ministers were appointed first by the new East German Government, then by Hungary, followed by Czechoslovakia and Poland. In the three `Visegrad' countries, the early stage of `civilianization' went in parallel with the in-depth reorganization of defence ministries. For instance, the Polish MOD began to build two separate components: a civilian-administrative and a military. Under the Mazowiecki government, a civilian vice-minister became responsible for defence and security policy, the other taking charge of the Central Education Board. Shortly after that, in the Czech and Slovak Republic the first civilian was appointed Minister of Defence in April 1991, the civilian-administrative part of the reformed Ministry of Defence consisted of three main departments: Strategic Planning, Economic Management, and Social Affairs and Human resources.[(42)] Currently, civilian ministers head the MODs in several Central and East European countries.

Throughout the area civilians have also been nominated to various influential positions within defence ministries. However, five years after the `systemic change', the process of `civilianising' ministries is on the whole falling short of the initial hopes of those politicians who wanted a more dynamic transformation of defence management.

The reasons for this situation are various, and mostly specific to each country. There are, however, common features, for example the shortage of civilian experts, as noted earlier. Another obstacle has been the fragmented and unstable domestic political landscape. The fragile nature of the new democracies has been expressed in frequent government and personnel changes. The Visegrad countries, widely considered to be among the most advanced in their reforms, in the area of civil-military relations among others, provide a practical illustration of this. Between 1990 and 1994, Poland

had five ministers of defence; the Czech Republic and Slovakia, with the previous joint federal state included, also had five defence ministers. In Hungary, one government was in office in this period, and only one person occupied the post of Defence Minister, but personnel changes were more frequent at the lower levels (state secretary, deputy state secretary). The list of countries facing the same dilemma can also be extended to the Baltic states, to south-eastern Europe and to the nations of the CIS. Short-lived governments and frequent personnel switches among politicians and civil servants -- which are not comparable in their effects to the frequent changes of government that occur in some mature democracies, such as Italy or Belgium -- can have negative consequences for establishing democratic political control. First, civilians are prevented from getting more fully acquainted with defence matters.

Second, the image the military have of civilian politics suffers: politicians are seen as very temporary creatures, whose impact on defence policy is, after all, negligible. Last but not least, democracy itself is discredited. To some, the division of power can be seen as equating to weak government, pluralism as synonymous with disorder.

This trend is potentially dangerous in the current situation in some of the former Warsaw Pact countries that face economic decline and social instability, sometimes combined with worsening ethnic problems. In countries with a weak civil society, a fragmented political party system and a lack of effective government, the armed forces might be drawn into the political arena, or could be used as a tool in the political struggle. In spite of the disinclination of the military to become involved in *coups*, there are countries in the former `political East' where extremist politicians of the radical Left or Right can manipulate the armed forces, reinforcing their position in this institution, misusing the officer corps against rival political factions, strikers, or national minorities, indeed against any group that opposes their values or interests. With an increasing part of society in economic difficulty, the desire for order and prosperity could also lead a growing segment of society to look for a `strong man', a saviour in uniform. This is not a concrete and imminent danger, *but it remains a potential threat.*[(43)]

De-politicization of the armed forces

Another area of balanced civil-military relations -- the de-politicization of the armed forces and the separation of the military from the structures of the former one-party system -- has on the whole been a success story. De-politicization has meant, among other things: abolishing the Communist Parties' monopoly and privileges within the armed forces; disbanding Party organizations and committees in the military and eliminating the posts of full-time Party workers in the armed forces; forbidding all discrimination within the armed forces, based on political or ideological criteria, directed against religious believers and non-Communists.[(44)]

These fundamental changes, which have put an end to Party-armed forces symbiosis and affecting the armed forces as a whole, has gone relatively smoothly. In some countries, such as Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland, the process was initiated, or at least endorsed at an early stage, at the beginning of 1990, by the reform wing of the politically bankrupt Communist Parties themselves, and gathered speed after the first free elections. There are various testimonies from different countries that the vast

majority of professional servicemen, freed from ideological constraints, supported this reform.[45]

THE PROCESS OF TRANSFORMATION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND DEMOCRATIC CONTROL IN HUNGARY

The change of basic parameters and the restructuring of the armed forces

In Hungary, similarly to Poland, democracy came about through a gradual evolution, a progressive rejection of the system by an increasingly emancipated society. The process reached its culminating point in the talks that began in 1989 between the emerging democratic opposition and the ruling Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP). The `National Round-Table' dialogue prepared the terrain for genuine multiparty elections and led to some major political decisions that directly or indirectly affected the armed forces. Several of the demands of the nascent opposition concerning national defence -- for instance the de-communizing of the armed forces, the disbanding of the Workers' Militia or the departure of Soviet troops from Hungarian territory -- had already been formulated in 1987-88. At the outset, even the reform wing of the HSWP strictly opposed such ideas, but with the momentum of events gradually endorsed them, and even implemented some of them. (For instance, the dismantling of the very unpopular Workers' Militia took place not long before the spring 1990 elections. The step was obviously also motivated by the hope that it would increase the electoral chances of the transformed and renamed Hungarian Socialist Party.)

Following the first free elections in Hungary in more than forty years, a three-party (Hungarian Democratic Forum, Independent Smallholder Party, Christian Democratic People's Party) centre-right coalition government took office in 1990, having obtained 60% of the votes. With this event, the process of systemic change -- political democratization, establishment of the rule of law, privatization and `marketization' -- entered a decisive phase.

The Hungarian Cabinet established in 1990 *was the only one in the former Eastern bloc to last till the end of its four-year parliamentary mandate*. This fact, despite many domestic problems, has demonstrated a certain political stability. In 1994, notwithstanding the Socialist Party's absolute victory in the elections, a two-party coalition government was formed with the Left-liberal Alliance of Free Democrats. The two parties together obtained more than two-thirds of the votes cast in the spring 1994 elections. Compared with 1990, the shift, though politically important, was not considered by the victors as a new `systemic' change, but only as a routine change of government.

Since 1990, for the Armed Forces as for other national institutions, the major alteration in the domestic environment has been accompanied by equally significant changes in the international context. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and then the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from its territory in June 1991, Hungary regained its sovereignty in a military sense as well. The former Hungarian People's Army, like the other `fraternal armed forces' in Central Europe, was totally integrated into the WP military structure, and was subordinated to Soviet geostrategic considerations -- in practice to the Soviet Eastern Forces Group's war plans. With the

dismantling of the Eastern military bloc, Hungary's bridgehead role of confronting NATO's south-eastern flank ended. (As a matter of fact, the country's significance as a Soviet military support zone and transit route had already diminished with East-West *détente* in the late 1980s.)[46]

As part of the tectonic changes in its close neighbourhood, Hungary witnessed the disintegration of three multi-ethnic states with which it shared a common border: Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Between 1991 and 1993 the number of its neighbours increased from five to seven, and five of the seven countries are new or re-defined states. Hungary has a common border with three successor states of former Yugoslavia: Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia, which makes for a unique and quite uncomfortable geopolitical position on the European continent. The war that broke out on Hungary's southern borders between South-Slavs has affected Hungary seriously and most directly. Especially during its initial phase, the conflict meant frequent violations of Hungarian airspace and borders by the Yugoslav Army, and in 1992-93 it resulted in the arrival in Hungary of some 60,000 refugees -- mostly ethnic Croatians but, increasingly, Bosnian Muslims and Krajina Serbs as well. Various practices of `ethnic cleansing' threatened some segments of the 400,000-strong ethnic Hungarian community living mainly in Serbia (Vojvodina), but also in other adjacent ex-Yugoslav republics.[47] (Hungary's sensitivity to this issue is heightened by the fact that one-third of the entire ethnic Hungarian population is made up of minorities living in adjacent countries.)

Despite the `indivisibility of security' proclaimed by various pan-European and universal documents, one of the lasting features of the post-Cold War international environment is the fragmentation of the European security landscape. In the early 1990s, Hungary, like other countries of Central Europe, and not for the first time in its history, found that it belonged to the grey area of Europe, *inter alia* from a security point of view. Located on the border between the stable and unstable parts of Europe, it has belonged more to the zone of stability as far as its own domestic situation is concerned but has bordered a zone of open conflicts (in ex-Yugoslavia, and in the area of the former Soviet Union), and has had no protection, no security guarantees from any existing *effectively functioning* international security frameworks, like NATO or WEU.

From the end of the bipolar security structure to the present time, it has remained uncertain what new international system will take its place. This, in addition to the domestic need for consolidation of the new democratic institutions, explains why Hungary and other Central European countries see the lasting solution to their security problems in their gradual integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Having regained its full sovereignty, along with the inevitable re-nationalization of its foreign and military policy, Hungary has placed a high priority on achieving this integration.[48]

Combined with the fundamental change in the security environment, the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy has changed the basic parameters of Hungarian security and defence policy, and has also had major consequences on civil-military relations. In re-establishing full sovereignty over its national territory, the Hungarian Government and legislature took the first major step towards regaining civilian control over their own armed forces. Later on other steps followed that shaped the

role of the forces within society, adapting their function, size, internal organization and command structure to the new domestic and external realities. All the transformations that have occurred in the last five years have had their impact on the balance of civil-military relations.

In the changed context, the country's geopolitical position was reassessed and its main goals re-defined. Following a new threat analysis, and also considering the *scarcity of available resources*, the reforms introduced into the Hungarian Armed Forces since 1990 have aimed at creating smaller but more modern and better prepared forces that are capable of protecting the country and carrying out new missions (for instance peacekeeping), if the country is asked to perform such tasks.

By the beginning of 1995 the Hungarian Home Defence Forces (the official name which replaced the `People's Army' in 1990) had been reduced from 143,000 in 1990 to 88,000. Of these, the total number of career officers, NCOs and conscripts fell from 111,000 in 1990 to 69,000 in 1995.

As a sign of the new thinking in national defence, the previous concentration of forces in Western Hungary (close to the Austrian border) was replaced by a more balanced geographic distribution of military units throughout the country. In 1992 the armed forces went through a major reorganization: brigades of a new type were created and airmobile units were formed. A new feature of the structure has been the gradual introduction of territorial defence units, with the participation of reserve conscripts, along the lines of the Swiss and Austrian local militias. For a more effective participation in future multinational missions, a Training Centre of International Peacekeeping was established in Budapest in early 1994.

There have been very limited funds available for technical modernization; in 1993 the Air Force acquired 28 MiG-29s, as a partial repayment by Moscow of the former Soviet Union's $1.7 billion foreign trade debt to Hungary. In the same year, Parliament voted an extra Forint1.1 billion (*c*. $1 million) to acquire an IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) system, which was the first major purchase by the Hungarian Armed Forces from the West. Both events provoked debate in Parliament and in the media. The opponents to the MiG-29 acquisition emphasized the potential danger that the step might represent continued dependence on military technology from Russia. The IFF deal was concluded with a US firm. Its critics questioned the MOD concerning the criteria used to select the winner in the international tender, which had raised considerable interest among other international competitors.[(49)] The Hungarian Socialist Party/Alliance of Free Democrats coalition that came to office in July 1994 initiated further reorganization of the armed forces. It implemented new cuts in manpower, and decided to reduce the number of middle-level commands and military districts.

As part of a long-term (10-year) reform proposed by the Government in spring 1995, the size of the forces should be cut to 58,000 by the end of 1998 (a new cut of one-third compared with the 1995 level) reducing the number of career officers to 9,400, NCOs 10,800, conscripts 27,900 and civilian employees 9,900. In the early 1990s, despite a political debate on some elements of the cuts implemented, there was a basic consensus among the six parties represented in Parliament about the *inevitability* of a substantial force reduction. By mid-1995 this consensus had been broken: the four

parties in opposition rejected any further sizable reduction. They criticised the reform proposed by the cabinet as `fiscalist restrictive' and `budget-driven', lacking the elements of long-term professional conceptual planning.(50)

As a first step in reducing personnel, the MOD decided to make 2,600 civilian employees redundant in 1995. The Trade Union of Civilian Employees of Defence (HODOSZ) brought legal action against the Minister before the Labour Court of Budapest, because `he overlooked his obligation to consult with the trade union prior to his decision'. HODOSZ won its case, and the Court condemned the MOD for `non-respect of obligation'.(51) In connection with the modified (decreased) defence budget for 1995, the Trade Union of Career Soldiers (KÉSZ) joined its civilian partner union in condemning the way the MOD had acted: `We cannot speak about civilian control, while two ministers [defence and finance] decide the annual budget of the Armed Forces. This way they simply call into question the constitutional role of the Parliament.'(52)

In Hungary's current budgetary situation, realist critics do not question the *need* for further cuts in defence spending, but in general they reject the magnitude of cuts proposed by the Government, especially the way the reduction was announced and has been managed so far. As a matter of fact, during the last five years the overall military restructuring has had the considerable handicap of being carried out in deteriorating economic conditions. Since 1990, the percentage of GDP spent on defence has steadily decreased, from 2.50% in 1990 to 1.52% in 1994.(53)

Because of this trend, there has been a growing concern, expressed in the Parliamentary Defence Committee's debates, and in various experts' evaluations in 1994-95. It is feared that further cuts in the real value of defence expenditure would result in a budget that was not adequate to ensure the defence of the country, and might also discredit the proclaimed political will for military integration with the countries of the Western security systems, where 2-2.5% of GDP is considered a minimum.

Legislation in defence matters

Since 1990, in a political environment in which great emphasis has been placed on the rule of law, the clarity and coherence of the legal framework have become very important. To some foreign observers it has seemed that the Hungarian Parliament has passed new laws at breathtaking speed. However, from an insider's point of view, it was not fast enough to eradicate completely the contradictions between the old and new systems. In the defence area, too, Hungary still has to work with some elements of the old, only partly reshaped legal framework. These vestiges have threatened to undermine the legitimacy of the system, weakening its capacity to function as a regulatory mechanism of the state. Given the requirement for effective civilian control, this situation could be especially critical in the area of national defence. Consequently, any legal moves aimed at closing the gap between the new political proposals and the old laws, which are still operative, would contribute to greater legal coherence and a more consolidated democratic environment. Among the various new legal regulations related to the armed forces, three documents (the Defence Concept, the Defence Act and, later on in this chapter, the draft Service Law) will be briefly

surveyed, each having its own particular significance in the *nascent* political control of the military.

The Defence Concept

In April 1993, after a preparatory debate lasting several months, Parliament adopted a document entitled `The basic principles of national defence of the Republic of Hungary'[(54)] (also referred to simply as `The Defence Concept', and sometimes, using a more outdated term, `The Military Doctrine'). The Defence Concept followed the adoption by Parliament of the `National Security Principles'.[(55)] This sequence, and the reference in the Preamble to the previously adopted Security Policy Concept, underlined the primacy of diplomatic means in the Hungarian approach to security matters.

The document reflected an unusually large consensus among the six parties in the National Assembly, three of whom were at that time in the Government and three in the opposition. In fact the text did not affect *direct* party interests. Its wording on the basic policy options was general enough to be acceptable to every parliamentary party. The discussion preceding the adoption of the document dealt with essentially technical issues: for instance, how to avoid two extremes in the formulation -- meaningless generalities on the one hand, and evanescent details of daily politics on the other. Relatively few genuine political differences were expressed in the debate. The Hungarian Socialist Party delegates wanted to emphasize more the importance of the then CSCE and less that of the Western security frameworks (WEU, NATO). The Young Democrats (FIDESZ) argued that the individual rights of soldiers should be emphasised more in the draft text; other parties wanted to leave this issue to the Service Law in preparation.

The Defence Concept states that the Hungarian Armed Forces have exclusively defensive functions. The country has no preconceived idea of an enemy: it does not expect a traditional large-scale attack from any direction. However, it cannot ignore on-going military conflicts in the region, which involve mostly irregular forces. The eventual escalation of these conflicts, and their geographic spread, poses a potential military threat, a new type of challenge to the country. The paper then goes on to define the priorities of the *strategy* and *system* of national defence. In The Defence Concept it is pointed out (Article 16) that, ultimately, Hungary's security will be determined by membership of NATO and the Western European Union. However, this may be a long way off. Meanwhile, security is more likely to be strengthened as the country develops closer relations with these institutions and their individual member states, as well as with neighbouring states in the region. Such cooperation will enable Hungary to adapt better to the international standards of the developed armies, in every field.

The Defence Act

On 7 December 1993, Parliament adopted quasi-unanimously (with one `no' vote and one abstention) the new Defence Act (Act CX of 1993 on National Defence).[(56)] A previous six-party consensus on principles, reached in October 1993 during the preparatory talks held in the Ministry of Defence, helped the adoption process, although even with this consensus roughly 400 amendments were proposed to the

draft by individual MPs, and more than forty were actually adopted in the final version of the Draft Law.

In the detailed issues covered by the Defence Act, it was extremely difficult to reach multiparty agreement. The document, which replaced the much amended 1977 Law on National Defence, covers almost the whole domain of civilian control over the military. It stipulates a complex system of checks and balances whereby the Cabinet, Parliament and the President of the Republic all individually have a say in matters of defence policy. In this sharing of power and competence, all parties, both in government and in opposition, were closely and directly involved.

Paradoxically, the adoption of a consensual political text at the end of 1993 was facilitated by a previous legal-political debate in which the Prime Minister (and the MOD) and the President of the Republic had opposing views on the question of control. The confrontation was highlighted by the fact that Prime Minister József Antall and Defence Minister Lajos Für were leading members of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, which dominated the governing coalition. On the other hand, President Árpád Göncz represented the strongest opposition party, the radical-liberal Alliance of Free Democrats.

The key issue of who ultimately controls the Hungarian Armed Forces showed a remarkable similarity with other Central European `government (MOD) versus president' debates. Here, too, constitutional ambiguity on the issue of authority was at the heart of the dispute, which was sharpened later on by party-political differences. Antall's and Für's argument was based primarily on the fact that, by the terms of the Constitution, Hungary is a *parliamentary democracy* in which the Government (Prime Minister and MOD) is *responsible* to Parliament for the conduct of overall policy, including that of defence, yet it cannot be responsible for the implementation of policy if it does not possess the necessary tools giving direct control over the armed forces. Göncz's argument was based essentially on his responsibility as Supreme Commander who can have a critical role in national defence, especially in times of crisis. Departing from this constitutional stipulation, Göncz regularly asked for reports from the High Command. This situation on the one hand confused the military leadership -- to whom should it report and when? On the other hand, especially in 1991-92, the military benefited from the unclear circumstances of civilian control and increased its independence *vis-a-vis* the political establishment as a whole.

In 1991 the Constitutional Court was consulted in the dispute and ruled in September of that year in favour of the Government (MOD). It gave to the Ministry of Defence a legal argument to reinforce its direct control over the High Command/General Staff.[57] The drafters of the Defence Law in 1993 incorporated the main aspects of the Court's 1991 ruling.

According to the Defence Act, Parliament plays a primary role in defining the priorities of defence policy. The National Assembly decides the defence budget, the manning level of the armed forces, the balance between the services, and the main directions for the development of military technology. In accordance with the Constitution, it has the power to declare a state of emergency. Tied to this are details of how Parliament can create the National Defence Council (sometimes referred to in other countries as the `War Cabinet').

The Act made the armed forces directly subordinate to the MOD, which has administrative responsibilities over the armed forces. At the same time it strengthened the constitutional position of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, in the event of an emergency. The MOD must execute the defence policy that the Cabinet has defined and Parliament has approved. The Act also stipulated that the political authority will not interfere with the military chain of command, which is coordinated from above by the Defence Staff. On the other hand, it is the duty of the military High Command to communicate to the political decision-makers the armed forces' requirements.

The additional powers of the Cabinet contained in this Act are important when it comes to the question of `partial mobilisation' in an emergency. The Act stipulates that in the event of surprise air or ground attack, immediate actions have to be taken by the Cabinet, simultaneously keeping the key constitutional actors such as Parliament and the President informed. The opposition finally gave up its reservation on enlargement of the Government's authority at this point. Previously, fears had been expressed that the Government might misuse the extended power that it is given by the concept of `partial mobilisation', and that this could lead to a weakening of parliamentary control. Finally, the inclusion of guarantees (for instance, the Government is obliged simultaneously to inform the Head of State and the President of the Assembly of any actions taken) neutralized the initial objections.

As a whole, the adoption of the Defence Act of 1993 constituted an important milestone in the process of establishing civilian control over the military in Hungary. It contributed to the clarification of the respective spheres of authority of the National Assembly, the President and the Government. Obviously, it did not solve all the legal problems that might arise in such a complex relationship. A new Constitution is currently being prepared by Parliament, and this might add to further legal development in this regard. However, it should be borne in mind that the problems of power-sharing in Hungary and elsewhere in Central Europe that have been described are only partly legal-constitutional. They are also, probably above all, *political.* Consequently, no magic solutions can be expected from constitutional texts alone.

The Parliamentary Defence Committee and civilian control

The Committee currently has 19 members: 9 from the Socialist Party, 4 from the Alliance of Free Democrats (thus, 13 from the Government side); 2 from the Hungarian Democratic Forum, 2 from the Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party, 1 from the Christian-Democratic People's Party and 1 from the Independent Smallholder Party (thus, 6 from the opposition).[58] Seven parliamentarians served in the previous Defence Committee of the Assembly, among them the current chairman (from the Alliance of Free Democrats), and one of the two vice-chairmen of the Committee (from the Socialist Party, the other being from the Young Democrats), assuring in this way a type of personal continuity in parliamentary control of defence matters. Another element of continuity of civilian control is that former Minister of Defence, Lajos Für, who held the office in the period 1990-94, is currently a member of the Committee on behalf of the Hungarian Democratic Forum.

The Defence Committee also includes two retired generals, now parliamentarians, one from the Alliance of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party, and the other from the

Socialist Party. Both had already retired from service when their names were put on the electoral list of their parties, and subsequently took their seats in the Assembly.

Since 1990, the Defence Committee has become a real, functioning institution, in contrast to the `window-dressing' organisation of the same name that existed under the Communist system. As a new democratic institution, however, especially at the outset, it had some of the typical difficulties of the emerging pluralist order. Most of the Committee members lacked both parliamentary and defence expertise; nor did they have experience in developing channels of communication between the legislative and executive branches. For instance, it was not clear which kind of information parliamentarians can or should require from the Ministry of Defence. There were no regulations on how classified data should be treated in such cases. How should parliamentarians' legitimate demands for access to information be reconciled with the no less legitimate requirement to protect the same information? How can issues be debated without violating fundamental needs for military secrecy?

In recent years there have been several leaks from closed sessions of the Defence Committee, and these also appeared in the media. In a recent extreme case, documents containing classified data issued by the MOD were found in National Assembly dustbins. (In the latter case the fault, in the mailing procedure of the MOD, was also revealed (admitted) by the investigators.)[(59)]

Budgetary limitations have constituted another problem. Parliamentarians have frequently lacked the necessary financial and professional technical assistance from which their counterparts in established, affluent democracies very often benefit in order to perform their duties correctly.

In spite of these problems, the increasing activity of the Defence Committee should be acknowledged. Parliamentarians have acquired increasing domestic and international expertise. Increasingly, party political differences have been articulated in connection with defence policies. The Committee has been especially active in the area of budget decisions and the control of expenditure. It has listened to regular reports from representatives of the Defence Staff and to briefings from top officials of the Defence and Foreign Ministries and from military intelligence and counter-intelligence. Senior individuals in the MOD and the High Command have regularly been interviewed before confirmation of official nominations to appointments.

Projects to help the ailing Hungarian defence industry, in the form of restructuring, privatization or conversion, have frequently been discussed by the Committee. Despite the fact that the output of the defence industry as a percentage of GDP in Hungary has been less than in Poland or former Czechoslovakia, its fight to survive in the general context of shrinking markets has been a standing issue for the Defence Committee. Insiders have also noted lobbying of members of the Committee by industrial interests, both Hungarian and non-Hungarian.

Questions related to morale and discipline within the armed forces have figured frequently, with heated debates, on the Defence Committee's agenda. Since 1990, a number of criminal offences, major breaches of discipline (such as the abuse of power by superiors and bullying of recruits by older soldiers) have come to light as a consequence of greater transparency in the armed forces. MOD and Defence Staff

officials and military prosecutors have briefed the Committee on the facts, and measures taken for improvement discussed in sessions open to the media. Among the political parties, the Young Democrats in particular have been active in revealing cases of criminal abuse, and in promoting the protection of individual rights in the armed forces.

On some occasions, the Defence Committee has initiated investigations concerning financial scandals in the armed forces, which have not been infrequent in the last five years. In the early 1990s, one of the best known of such scandals in Hungary was the case of the `petrol colonels'. It involved some senior military persons from the economic management of the armed forces, who were accused -- and later found guilty by a court -- of corruption and criminal abuse of their supervision of the Army's fuel supplies. Opposition parliamentarians and the press strongly attacked the `serious negligences' that were revealed in the monitoring system of the MOD and the High Command in this area. The material damage caused by the thefts was considerable. Far greater, however, was the moral and political harm caused by these acts in the period 1992-93, when both the MOD and military leadership were endeavouring to gain public and parliamentary support for a defence budget more suited to their real needs.(60)

changes of personnel have become another issue of heated debate in the Defence Committee, especially since the arrival of the new administration in summer 1994. Several parliamentarians from both opposition and government have criticised what they call the `remilitarization process' in the Ministry of Defence. chairman of the Defence Committee Imre Mécs of the Alliance of Free Democrats, in coalition with the Socialists in government, has also condemned the `de-civilianization' and what he has termed `deficiencies' in the civilian direction exercised by the MOD over the military. He has called for `an improved relationship between the Ministry and the Armed Forces.'(61) Comparing the current domestic situation with that in Western countries Mécs stated, `The executive should control military matters, but this is not done with the necessary effectiveness, so the National Assembly's Defence Committee has to reinforce its supervision in this domain.'(62) (In essence, the Committee chairman's views coincide with every credible Hungarian and international analysis concerning recent trends in the country's defence management. However, Mécs probably confuses the MOD's responsibility with that of Parliament. Both institutions have distinct roles in democratic control. Consequently, the legislature can `reinforce its supervision in this domain', but *it cannot substitute* for the executive's functions. The MOD's `deficiencies' have to be corrected where they have appeared -- in the Ministry itself.)

Organizational and personnel changes in the Ministry of Defence since 1990

Before 1990, within the Hungarian MOD the authority and responsibilities of Minister of Defence and supreme military commander were merged in the hands of one person. The Minister was simultaneously a member of the (civilian) government *and* the highest ranking uniformed officer; as a rule, in the Warsaw Pact model, his first deputy always served as Chief of Defence Staff.

In March 1990, the reform-minded Communist government decided to split the MOD by merging the Defence Staff with a newly created High Command of the Hungarian

Armed Forces. The declared intention of this action was to isolate the armed forces from party-political influences, especially in view of the approaching free elections. The separation however was `too successful': it made it very difficult for the Government to reach the Defence Staff, and the armed forces as whole, with its policy decisions.(63) In practical terms, the division has led to a much scaled-down Ministry of Defence and a very large military High Command, which initially reported *first* to the President of the Republic, and *second* to the Government (via the MOD). The split left the new democratically elected Government a poisoned legacy, because of the ambiguousness of *ultimate control* over the military and because of its bureaucratic irrationality (there was a duplication of several functions; for instance, in the area of defence economy, international military contacts). In May 1990, the first civilian Minister of Defence, Lajos Für, inherited a numerically and organizationally weak Ministry. The ambition of the new administration was *first*, to transform this remnant of the *military* Ministry into a Ministry of Defence in line with the model found in Western countries, and *second*, to re-integrate the Defence Staff into the Ministry, also in accordance with the primary goal.

The realisation of the first aim meant essentially the *reinforcement* -- in both organizational and personnel terms -- *of the civilian-administrative component* of the MOD. The reform sought a Ministry of Defence, headed by a civilian politician, that implements the decisions of the Government with respect to the armed forces through the specific military activities of the (re-incorporated) Chief of Defence Staff. The Defence Act adopted in December 1993 laid the legal grounds for the re-integration of the Defence Staff into the MOD. The preparatory work started in January 1994,(64) but was stopped in July of the same year, when the change of administration occurred.

In the model adopted in the early 1990s, the MOD is the locus of `the very essence of civil-military relations of any society, and the core of the relationship between armed forces and society.'(65) This is the crucial point at which the military meet elected politicians (the minister and the `political state secretary' in the case of Hungary) and civil servants (from desk officers to the `administrative state secretary' and deputy state secretaries).

The organizational structure that had been developed by mid-1994 tried to take into account the experiences of several Western countries on the one hand and the consequences of the previous division of the MOD on the other. The process of restructuring progressed slowly, but it involved civilians in increasing numbers. Some of them had party affiliation with the centre-right coalition government in office; this was mostly the case of appointments to vice-ministerial (state secretary, deputy state secretary, chief of ministerial cabinet) positions. However, the majority of civilians (economists, lawyers, sociologists) entering the Ministry between 1990 and 1994 were party-neutral, or had even former Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party membership (as was the case of three or four choices for relatively influential positions within the MOD). Professional training and personal ability were the essential qualifications in the `civilianization' process in the MOD after the political change. Nevertheless, the leadership of the MOD between 1990 and 1994 failed to make a clear policy decision on whether it wanted to follow the non-partisan `civil servant' (for instance, British) or the `political appointee' (for instance, US) model in the `civilianization' of the Ministry. A substantial ambiguity remained in this regard,

which proved to be prejudicial to the success of the experiment in this first, critical period.

The Hungarian Socialist Party-Alliance of Free Democrats coalition that took office after the May 1994 electoral victory appointed a Socialist, retired colonel György Keleti, as Minister of Defence. The new Minister had already worked in the Ministry from 1977 to 1992, essentially in the area of the press and public information. He was kept on as an MOD spokesman after the changes of 1990, and voluntarily resigned from his post in 1992, complaining primarily about a `conflict of personalities' between him and former political state secretary Ernö Raffay, who was his immediate superior between 1990 and 1993.

Keleti, although he retired from the Army in 1992, did not become a civilian in the eyes of his fellow politicians when he returned to the MOD in 1994. More important maybe, he has continued to be seen as `a colonel from the bureaucracy' by professional soldiers. Nevertheless, the new Minister had the advantage of fifteen years' previous MOD experience. He knew the military networks well, and chose his top aides and deputies primarily from this circle.

With the arrival of the new administration, relatively few changes were made in the organizational structure of the Ministry developed by 1994: a new (fourth) deputy state secretary post was created, which involved an insignificant redistribution of the supervised areas, with a regrouping of the departments belonging to each deputy state secretary. Much more substantial were the personnel changes, including all vice-ministerial posts and the overwhelming majority of the head of department and head of section positions. With two exceptions (the political state secretary and one deputy state secretary) active or retired two or three-star generals were nominated to the vice-ministerial -- administrative state secretary and deputy state secretary -- posts. (Among them was retired Lieutenant-General László Borsits, ex-Chief of Defence Staff, who had served for long periods in important positions during the Warsaw Pact era.) With two civilian exceptions, the posts of head of department and head of section were left to colonels. A civilian economist was replaced by a colonel as Head of Department of Defence Resource Management; a civilian sociologist was dismissed from his post in favour of another colonel as Head of Department for Public Relations and Cultural Affairs. The process has continued at a lower level, involving most recently the Chief of Protocol. (The key posts currently occupied by civilians are indicated on the organisational diagram.)

These personnel changes have their significance not only, and even not primarily in the classic dichotomy of civil-military relations. This `re-militarization' of the MOD has signalled a very clear message of political-ideological *restitutio in integrum* in defence management.

As the case of General Borsits and many other returnees proves, the de-civilianization process has necessarily implied the reactivation of an `old-boy network' that has -- with very few exceptions -- a strong pre-1990 political mentality.

This development obviously provoked adverse reactions at home (essentially from the political opposition, the media and some defence intellectuals) and abroad, serious concern being voiced about the direction of events and the *effectiveness* of civilian

control of the Hungarian military. Typical of Western opinion was the following assessment by the Washington-based think-tank, the Potomac Foundation: `Instead of having civilians run the Ministry of Defense, as was the case during the Antall administration, the management of that Ministry passed into hands of the uniformed military and former Communist functionaries. This, if the PfP principles are to be taken seriously, will not satisfy the requirements set by NATO for members of that body.'[66] (In a recent comparative study, a Czech expert on civil-military relations has analysed the similarities in the re-militarization trends in the Polish, Hungarian and Bulgarian MODs after the 1993 and 1994 electoral victories of the post-Communist parties and their allies.[67])

In Hungary, beside the parliamentary reactions already mentioned, think-tanks and defence intellectuals turned their attention to the risks that `the neglect of civilian control' implies from both the domestic democratic and external diplomatic points of view.[68] Even within the Government, key officials in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs seem not to be satisfied with the current state of civilian control in Hungary in the light of Euro-Atlantic requirements.[69]

Restoration of the prestige of the military and the tribulations of the draft Service Law

(the law concerning the legal status of the soldier)

Ivan Volgyes, in his study of the military and political socialization of uniformed officers in Communist Hungary, reminds us an important historical point: `The Hungarian military was for centuries the most highly regarded stratum of Hungarian society . . . Although the military to some extent offered a chance for upward mobility in the interwar period (1918-39), by and large the officer stratum remained the domain of the traditional nobility. The army officer enjoyed high social status, had separate and prestigious institutions, was *ipso facto* a gentleman.'[70] Several facts of recent history have caused a dramatic loss of prestige for the military in Hungarian society, including the humiliation suffered in 1945 for being on the losing side, but more importantly Soviet occupation and the subsequent total subordination to Soviet interests.

In the case of the Hungarian People's Army, its low rating outside the service, and poor morale within, were due essentially to the fact that this army, as an institution, had become highly politicized. Despite the respectable professional performance of many servicemen, and in spite of the fact that most of them became indifferent, or even immune to the official indoctrination attempts (the 1956 revolution had several senior military heroes), society was alienated from this army. For reasons; as an institution, it represented a policy which was alien to Hungarian traditions and interests, and it even performed an internal security role on behalf of this policy, as a `guardian of the regime'.[71] The other reason for its alienation was the excessive secrecy imposed by Warsaw Pact rules, which confined career soldiers (and often also their families) to a kind of closed, insular sub-society. The internal life of the armed forces usually functioned according to a very different set of standards: military officers and NCOs, even until very recently, were subjected to unjustified and professionally unreasonable restrictions on their individual rights. For four decades,

these features diminished the appeal of the military profession, despite some social advantages, such as relatively high salaries.

Even in an established democracy, military service requires the acceptance by the individual of a number of personal restrictions. The soldier's freedom, however, should be limited only to the extent required by his mission. The limitations must be codified, and they should not lead to abuse of power by superiors or to any subjective limitation of individual rights. In a democratic state the soldier has to be a citizen-soldier, a *Staatsbürger* in Uniform, to use the widespread German term.

In Hungary, even now the legal status of military personnel is laid down by the still operative, much amended, law of 1971. Since 1990, there has been no doubt of the need to redefine the status of members of the Hungarian Armed Forces, in line with the requirement for a modern defence on the one hand, and respect for basic civil and human rights on the other. The law in preparation is also viewed as an instrument which might help to restore the professional and social prestige of the military and remove them from their previous legal and societal ghetto. Work on the draft `Law concerning the legal status of the soldier' lasted more than two years. The various previous versions of the text included input from a large number of legal and military experts and representatives of both the High Command and soldiers' associations.

In practice, several important questions have had to be answered, beginning with how the protection of individual rights can be reconciled with the demands of military discipline and effectiveness.(72) Commanders have justifiably expressed reservations when they have heard excessive rhetoric on the need for `democratic armed forces' (as opposed to `armed forces in a democracy'). On the other hand, some military leaders have approached the idea of the protection of the soldier's interests with old-fashioned prejudices. In fact, civilian politicians have not produced any ready-made recipe for settling this issue either. Are military trade unions (of the German and Dutch type) viable solutions, or would some other procedures (for instance a control and protection mechanism within the MODs, which has been introduced in several Latin, Mediterranean countries) perhaps better serve the soldiers' interests?(73) The Hungarian draft Service Law legalized the military trade unions that already existed *de facto*, but it also incorporated some other arrangements from international experience in this area.

In early 1994, during the inter-ministerial coordination of the Draft Law, the opposition of the Ministry of Finance delayed approval. In the end a compromise formula was found for the provisions with budgetary consequences (articles related to servicemen's pay, pension, etc.). Finally, in February that year, the Cabinet passed the Draft Law to the Assembly for consideration.(74) The latter, because of its overloaded agenda and the approaching electoral period of spring 1994, left the text to the newly elected and reconstituted Assembly, which took office in July 1994.

The new Government withdrew the Draft Law, emphasizing the need for renewed consultation and revision, a move that was related partly to the fiscal implications of the Draft Law for the already strained state budget. A new round of consultation has started and the revised Draft Law was to be submitted to the Assembly by the end of 1995.

Besides the *de-politicization* of the Hungarian military and the restoration of its national identity, since 1990 most of the efforts aiming at restoring the prestige of the military profession have been directed towards the development of a legal-political culture that accepts the idea of the `citizen in uniform'. As part of these efforts, a `Department of Human Services' has been set up within the Defence Staff. Working contacts have been established with the nascent soldiers' associations, and more transparency and openness have been introduced into the life of the armed forces. The process has been helped by the media on occasion, and by some new grass-roots organizations such as the `Circle of Friends of Home Defence' which brings together academics, representatives of the world of culture and other public figures who also want to contribute to a better understanding of the evolving armed forces.

Since 1990, the re-designed system of military education and research on defence matters have focused more attention on the problems of the armed forces' image and prestige within society. However, among academic institutions, these issues seem to interest almost exclusively military colleges and study groups. Hungary still lacks a teaching institution or educational programme comparable to the French Institute for Higher Defence Studies (IHEDN), a course where civilians (who outnumber their military colleagues) are trained to be non-military experts on defence. Both the previous and current administration have failed to present a reasonable strategy for educating civilians in defence matters.

Last but not least, the prestige of the armed forces inevitably implies material elements, too. The current general economic recession and budget restrictions have, for some categories of career soldiers, reduced the real value of military salaries compared with the period prior to 1990. Given this aspect of the evolution, prudence is called for when talking of the *restoration* of the prestige of uniformed servicemen.

CONCLUSIONS -- SOME POLICY PROPOSALS

In the West, adjusting to post-Cold War conditions presents major challenges to society, including the military. The end of the bipolar confrontation has drastically altered the threat environment, and as a consequence the whole security and defence system is now in a process of change: armed forces are being reduced in size and restructured; foreign bases are being closed; military priorities, programmes and commitments are being redefined; Western security structures (WEU and NATO) are seeking new missions in a new world. All this has had a significant impact on civil-military relations.

However, these challenges are scarcely comparable with the problems that the new democracies and the democratizing states of the former Eastern bloc are facing. In their case, the fundamental change in the international environment has coincided with a profound systemic change in their internal conditions. Thus, the reforms in civil-military relations under way have to address both the after-effects of the Cold War -- including the inevitable re-nationalization of defence policies after the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact -- *and* the heavy burden of the legacy of the former anti-democratic, inefficient system.

This is a historically unprecedented challenge, with many risks, and success is far from guaranteed for all the countries that have engaged in the process. It is no accident that the countries -- the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, for instance -- that have progressed most in the general construction of the institutional underpinning of democratic government and a market economy, are also those in the vanguard regarding democratic control of the military.

Paradoxically, these are the same countries where there has been most controversial political debate and in which there is much public criticism of the course followed in this domain. On the one hand, this proves that the first step in establishing civilian control is the realisation that there are problems with civilian control. On the other, it reflects a relatively developed capacity to articulate political problems, which unavoidably implies dissent in the process of the birth of the new regime. The problems of Czechs, Hungarians, Poles and others in this field are *real*, but *the progress they have made is real too.*

A lack of political debate on these issues is not a sign of the healthy development of civil-military relations. Well packaged diplomatic niceties in approaches to Western institutions cannot be a substitute for real reforms. In some ex-Warsaw Pact countries old reflexes still persist; sometimes exercises in constitutional window-dressing are attempted in an effort to cover up political-societal reality, something that has not changed too much since Communist times.

Success or failure in establishing *effective* democratic control of the military in Central and Eastern Europe could have a direct influence on the outcome of the democratization process in the region, and on the future of the security of this large zone adjacent to Western Europe. Furthermore, failure to respect democratic principles and constitutional order in that area would constitute, at least indirectly, a risk to the democratic structure and political stability of the West. Consequently, it is

in the interest of the countries of EU/WEU and NATO to present to Central and Eastern Europe practical examples *which work*. This is the most convincing way in which they can project their democratic ideals to that region, as part of their cultural and political identity,[(75)] and as a result create a larger area of shared values on the European continent. In so doing, they will not only help the consolidation of democracy in the former East, but also lessen the potential risk of their own destabilization from outside.

The two major political initiatives of recent years in this area -- the establishment of an Associate Partner relationship with WEU and the NATO Partnership for Peace -- include clear references to fundamental democratic principles. The `Document on a status of association with WEU' contained in the Kirchberg Declaration emphasized that `an enhanced status based on stability of institutions, guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law . . . should contribute to security and stability in Europe . . .'[(76)] The Partnership for Peace Framework Document is even more explicit concerning civilian control, requiring states subscribing to the document `to cooperate with [NATO] in . . . (b) ensuring democratic control of defence forces.'[(77)] When building bilateral relations with Central and Eastern Europe in the last five years, the member states of WEU and NATO, and also Western NGOs (foundations, independent research groups), have focused on various aspects of defence management in a democracy. This issue was included in the bilateral cooperation of defence ministries of the former `East' and `West', and in individual programmes of bilateral military contacts. The problem of civilian control has been addressed in the curriculum of academic institutions like the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. It has been included in the research activities of the Institute for Security Studies of WEU, Paris, and the Centre for European Security Studies, University of Groningen, the Netherlands. As an illustration of cooperation between NGOs, in Hungary for instance, conferences, workshops, and seminars sponsored jointly with Western foundations and think-tanks, like the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung and the Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (Germany), the Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale (France), and the Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies (UK), have contributed to the promotion of this crucial element of democratic thinking and policy-making.

Any future programme aimed at developing civilian control of the military in WEU's Associate Partner countries:

- should be based on the results and experience of the on-going programmes mentioned above;

- should note that the establishment of democratic control is not an event, but a process; and that the countries of the former Warsaw Pact are in general at the beginning of that process;

- must be better suited to the specific conditions in individual countries; even within Central Europe, the problems are not everywhere the same, so that solutions suggested should not be uniform either;

- has to avoid wasteful duplication and overlap; a better coordination of efforts would also be required on the part of Western institutions.

In addition to the promotion of principles, in future more attention should be focused on the specific institutional arrangements of democratic defence management, in other words how the ministries of defence are organized, how relationships between Parliament, the MOD and the High Command are developed, how defence budgets are worked out, and how security strategies are formulated.

Western legal expertise can usefully contribute to the clarification of constitutional and legal points in order to establish greater clarity with regard to institutional responsibilities and prevent endless disputes over interpretation. This remains a high priority in the transformation process.

Each Western country can make its considerable expertise available to the new democracies, for example, Britain's model of how to build a strong civilian-administrative component in the MOD; France's legal and political experience, in the sharing of tasks and authority between the main constitutional actors in security and defence policy; Germany's special institutions that promote the individual rights of the soldiers, like the *Wehrbeauftragter* (the Parliamentary speaker for soldiers' rights) and the concept of *Innere Führung* (leadership and civic education in the armed forces); the experience of Spain and Portugal in the in-depth transformation of the relationship between MOD and High Command during their transition to democracy; and US expertise in military planning, programming and budgeting, including the interrelationship of the executive and legislative branches in these important areas.

Western models cannot and should not be *copied* by the new democracies, because they do not fit in with their historical and sociological realities, which are different. However, everyday practice demonstrates that these experiences can be usefully studied and taken into consideration when developing new civil-military relations in Central and Eastern Europe.

If they wish to participate more extensively in this process, the challenges and opportunities for the nations of the Western European Union are great. More frequent, better coordinated exchange of views, and joint projects between those involved in practice and academics concerning these issues would create new links and mutually beneficial common networks on both sides. They would also provide better opportunities for Associate Partners to reach the required compatibility with WEU standards in all respects.

1. In this paper, a broad definition of the term `control' is used. Depending on the context, either or both of the usual meanings will be intended: `1. to check, test or verify; 2. a: to exercise restraining or directing influence over; REGULATE; b: to have power over: RULE.' (*Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary*, l986, p. 285).

2. `But who is to guard the guards themselves?', Juvenal, *Omnia Romae*, vi, 347.

3. General Sir John Winthrop Hackett, `The military in the service of the state,' in *Soldiers and Statesmen* (Washington: US Air Force Academy, l973) p. 124.

4. Richard Cohen, `The UK system of high command', lecture at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, l995, pp. 5-6.

5. For a detailed discussion, see Richard H. Kohn, *The constitution and national security in the US military under the Constitution of the United States, l789-1989* (New York: New York University Press, l991), pp. 78-87; Thomas Peter Glakas, `Congress, the power of the purse, the committee system and the executive', manuscript of lecture at the George C. Marshall European Center of Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, l995.

6. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, l976), pp. 606-7.

7. For a detailed discussion, see Kenneth W. Kemp and charles Hudlin, `Civil supremacy over the military; its nature and its limits', *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 19, no. 1, Fall l992, pp. 8-9; Thomas Peter Glakas, op. cit.

8. Samuel P. Huntington, *The soldier and the state* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, l957), pp. 2-3.

9. Ibid., pp. 83-4; and Douglas Bland, `Protecting the military in democracies: a neglected dimension of civil-military relations', paper presented at the l994 international research seminar on democratic and civil control over military forces, NATO Defence College, Rome.

10. Peter M.E. Volten, `On analyzing civil-military relations', research outline manuscript, Centre for European Security Studies, University of Groningen, l994, p. 4.

11. Joseph S. Nye, `Civil-military relations and the consolidation of democracy', Conference Report. International Forum for Democratic Studies, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Washington, l995, p. 20.

12. Richard Cohen, op. cit., p. 14.

13. General Sir Peter de la Billière, *Storm Command* (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1992), pp. 20-23.

14. Ibid., p. 77.

15. Ibid., p. 103.

16. Constitution of 4 October 1958, in `La politique de défense de la France. Textes et documents', presentation by Dominique David, Paris, 1989, p. 29.

17. Ibid., pp. 30, 38-9.

18. For a detailed discussion, see David Yost, `Mitterrand and defense and security policy' French Politics and Society, vol. 9, nos. 3-4, Summer/Fall l991, pp. 146-7; Williem T. Johnsen and Thomas-Durell Young, `French policy toward NATO: enhanced selectivity, vice rapprochement', US Army War College, l994, pp. 4-5.

19. *Livre Blanc sur la Défense* (Paris: Ministère de la Défense, 1994).

20. See Carolyn P. Boyd and James M. Boyden, `The armed forces and the transition to democracy in Spain', in Thomas D. Lancaster and Gary Prevost (eds.), *Politics and change in Spain* (New York and London: Praeger Publishers, l985), pp. 104-5.

21. Chris Donnelly, `Military-civil relations in post-Communist systems: common problems', in John K. Skogan (ed.), `Civil-military relations in the post-Communist states in Eastern and Central Europe', Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, l993, pp. 7-8.

22. See Martin Edmonds, *Central Organizations of Defence* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, l985), p. 15; Anton Bebler, `Die "zivil-militärischen Beziehungen" in europäischen sozialistischen Ländern', *Österreichische Militär Zeitschrift*, no. 6, 1989, pp. 497-506.

23. Antony Z. Kaminski, `Civil-military relations in post-Communist Poland' in `Civil-military relations in the post-Communist states', op. cit., p. 79.

24. In Czechoslovakia, according to Stefan Sarvas's and M. Vlachová's paper `Shift from totalitarian military to post-totalitarian one: endeavour of regaining legitimacy', manuscript, 1994, p. 11, 82% of officers and 51% of NCOs were members of the Communist Party. Thomas S. Szayna and James B. Steinberg in their conference report (Civil-military relations and national security thinking in Czechloslovakia, RAND, l992, p. 17) give another figure: 94% of all Czechoslovak Army commanders were Communist Party members. For Poland, Dale R. Herspring puts at 85% Party card holders among career officers, and 99% in East Germany. See Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes (eds.), *Civil-military relations in Communist systems*(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 132-3.

25. R. Craig Nation, *Black earth, red star. A history of Soviet security policy* (London: Ithaca, l992), pp. 18-19.

26. For a detailed presentation of the case of Hungary, see Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, op. cit., pp. 145-64.

27. In a textbook designed for high schools, and more specifically military education, published in Hungary in 1986, the *capitalist army* is defined as a `concrete or dissuasive instrument of the fight against the quantitative and qualitative development of the socialist world system . . . Its objective is to annihilate all progressive social systems, nascent or emerging progressive movements, if needed by military means. In order to achieve their goals, the developed capitalist countries created aggressive military blocs, among those primarily NATO is seen as the main threat to universal peace. There is no region on earth where peoples and movements fighting for socialism and social progress, are not threatened by aggression.' See György Keleti, `A bevonulókkal szembeni követelmények' (Requirements for conscripts) in Domonkos, Keleti, Ligárt and Nagy (eds.), *Honvédelmi ismeretek* (*Knowledge on Defence*) (Budapest: Tankönyvkiadó, l986), p. 76.

28. George C. Malcher, *Poland's politicized Army* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), pp. 227-9.

29. For this reason, it is more than surprising to read a Western scholar's conclusion in the previously cited book, published in 1978: `On balance, the Main Political Administration has probably made a positive contribution to military efficiency', Timothy J. Colton, `A participatory model', in Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes (eds.), op. cit., p. 59. In the early l990s, the societies and armies concerned themselves seemed to make a very different assessment of the professional `efficiency' of the MPD.

30. Samuel P. Huntington, op. cit., p. 82.

31. Chris Donnelly, op. cit. p. 7; Peter M.E. Volten, `On analysing civil-military relations', a research outline, manuscript, Centre for European Security Studies, University of Groningen, l994, p. 8.

32. Dieter Mahncke, `The role of civilian experts within the defence community', a paper presented at the `1994 international research seminar on Euro-Atlantic security, democratic and civil control over military forces', NATO Defence College, Rome, p. 13.

33. Thomas S. Szayna and James B. Steinberg cite the case of Czechoslovakia in op. cit., pp. 7-9. According to the same report, we can, however, see an increase in popularity of the military in the Czechoslovak popular perception since the `velvet revolution'. Ibid, p. 9.; Analysing the growing defence awareness expressed in recent polls, Stefan Sarvas and M. Vlachová (op. cit., pp. 12-14) establish an interesting interrelationship between political orientation of respondents and their support for defence needs.

34. This feature has changed since l990 with the gradual opening and cultural Westernization of society, which has also moved the armed forces further from their self-contained and strictly closed organization. See Anton Bebler, `The evolution of civil-military relations in Central and Eastern Europe', *NATO Review*, August l994, p. 30.

35. For a more detailed discussion see Jeffrey Simon, `Central European civil-military relations and NATO expansion', National Defense University, Washington, *MacNair Paper* 39, April l995, pp. 153-7.

36. Conference papers presented by a number of Central and East European authors (see Daniela Geisbacherova, `Civil-military relations and the process of democratization in the Slovak Republic', p. 2; Sorin Enculescu, `Parliamentary control on the armed forces in Romania', p. 5. Manuscripts, Centre for European Security Studies, University of Groningen l994; and Yevgeni Alexandrov, `Rights and duties of the soldier -- citizen in uniform in Bulgaria', paper presented at the 1994 NATO Defence College conference, Rome, p. 2) properly point out the role of the President, as Supreme Commander, in the establishment of civilian control. Two remarks are necessary, however: (1) The President, as Commander-in-Chief, alone does not equate to civilian control. (An article published in *NATO Review*, October l994, quotes a senior Ukrainian officer who describes democratic accountability in the Ukrainian Armed Forces thus: `The President is Commander-in-Chief of our armed forces. The President is a democratically elected civilian. Therefore, we have democratic, civil control of the armed forces.' *NATO Review*, October l994, p. 22.); (2) The President can only be an *effective* component of democratic control if his constitutional powers are clearly defined (which is not the case in most Central and East European countries).

37. For a detailed discussion, see for instance Louisa Vinton, `Defense Ministry shake-up in Poland', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 28 February 1992; Louisa Vinton, `Poland's "Little Constitution" clarifies Walesa's powers', *RFL/RL Research Report* vol. 1, no. 35, 4 September 1992; `Political drama in Warsaw: uncivil relations', *ISSN Newsbrief*, February 1995, vol. 15, no. 2; and Jeffrey Simon, op. cit., pp. 40-72.

38. See for instance Miroslaw Cielemecki, `Panstwo w panstwe' (State within the state), *Wprost*, 11 June 1995, pp. 26-9.

39. For a detailed discussion see Pavel Mates, `The Czech Constitution', *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 10, 5 March 1993, pp. 53-7; Jeffrey Simon, op. cit., pp. 129-36.

40. Stefan Sarvas, `Civil-military relations in the Czech Republic: a case study', manuscript, Centre for European Security Studies, University of Groningen, 1995, p. 15.

41. Ibid., p. 14.

42. Thomas S. Szayna and James B. Steinberg, op. cit., pp. 19-20. See also Paber J. Podbielski, `Polish Defense and Security after the Warsaw Pact', Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1991, pp. 4-6.

43. This concern is expressed in various articles and papers. See, for instance, Jacob W. Kipp, `Civil-military relations in Central and Eastern Europe', *Military Review*, December 1992, pp. 32-3; Elena Poptodorova, `Civil-military relations and civilian oversight of the military leadership in Bulgaria', manuscript, Center for European Security Studies, University of Groningen, 1994, p. 10.

44. For a detailed discussion, see Anton Bebler, op. cit., pp. 28-30.

45. Antoni Kurylowicz, `The role and meaning of civil-military relations in the Polish Armed Forces', in `Civil-military relations in the post-communist states . . .', op. cit., pp. 82-5; Dale Hersping, `"Refolution" in Eastern Europe: The Polish, Czech, Slovak and Hungarian Militaries', *European Security*, vol. 3, no. 4 (Winter 1994), pp. 664-90; M. Mae Johnson, op. cit., pp. 20-21.

46. For a detailed discussion see Tibor Köszegvári, `The country's defence policy and the opportunities for our integration into the new European security system' in `Army and security policy in Hungary', *Defence Studies* no. 2, 1993, pp. 43-7; Sophia Clément, `Security and defence in Central and Eastern Europe', document prepared for WEU Assembly symposium by the WEU Institute for Security Studies, Berlin, 31 March-2 April 1992, pp. 37-8.

47. For a detailed discussion of the changing Hungarian threat perception see Iván Bába, `Irányváltás a magyar külpolitikában', (Orientation change in Hungarian foreign policy), *Windsor Klub Füzetek* no. 2, December 1994, Budapest; Joseph C. Kun, `In search of guarantees: Hungary's quest for security', *Potomac Papers*, September 1993; George Schöpflin, `Hungary and its neighbours', *Chaillot Paper* 7 (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, May 1993), pp. 18-21; László Valki, `Nouvel environnement européen et stabilité de l'Europe centrale', *Politique Étrangère*, 1991, vol. 56, no. 1.

48. See László J. Kiss, `New Foreign Policy: Hungary', in Hanspeter Neuhold, Peter Havlik and Arnold Suppan (eds.), *Political and economic transformation in East-Central Europe* (Boulder, CO and Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 248-54; Iván Bába, op. cit.; Joseph C. Kun, op. cit.

49. For more details see Alfred A. Reisch, `The Hungarian Army in transition', *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 10, 5 March 1993, p. 47; Alfred A. Reisch, `Hungary acquires MiG-29s from Russia', *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 33, 20 August 1993, pp. 49-53.

50. `Csökkentik a honvédségi létszámot' (Cuts in military personnel), *Népszabadság*, 11 July 1995, p. 4; *Magyar Nemzet*, 4 May 1995, p. 5. See also `Commanders' consultation', Hungarian Office of NATO/WEU, *Information newslttr*, no. 6, March 1995; Matthias Rüb, `Ungarns ungemütliche Randlage', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 31 March 1995, p. 17.

51. `Pert vesztett a miniszter' (Minister lost the case) *Népszabadság*, 11 July 1995, p. 1.

52. `Nem beszélhetünk civil kontrollról' (We cannot speak about civilian control), *Magyar Nemzet*, 13 June 1995, p. 6.

53. `National Defence '93/94', Ministry of Defence, Budapest, 1994, p. 20; Ferenc Gazdag and János Szabó, `Facts and conflicts in the development of the Hungarian

Defence Forces' civilian control', manuscript, Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies, Budapest, p. 2. See also Dale Herspring, op. cit., pp. 682-4.

54. `The basic principles of national defence of the Republic in Hungary', *Fact Sheets on Hungary*, no. 9, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Budapest, 1993.

55. `Basic principles of the security policy of the Republic of Hungary', *European Security*, vol. 3, no. 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 352-8.

56. `Az 1993. évi CX törvény a honvédelemröl' (Law CX of 1993 on national defence), *Magyar Közlöny*, no. 186, 24 December 1993.

57. For a detailed discussion see Alfred A. Reisch, `The Hungarian Army in transition', op. cit., pp. 49-50; see also János Matus's panel discussion remarks in `Civil-military relations in the post-Communist states in Eastern and Central Europe', a conference report, edited by John K. Skogan, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1993, pp. 96-7.

58. A Honvédelmi Bizottság. A Magyar Országgyülés kiadványa. (Defence Committee. Publication of the National Assembly), Budapest, 1994.

59. `Megvan a titoksértés felelöse' (Responsible for violation of secret is found), *Magyar Nemzet*, 14 June 1995, p. 5.

60. Für Lajos honvédelmi miniszter és Lörincz Kálmán vezérezredes nyilatkozik az Állami Számvevöszék vizsgálatának eredményei kapcsán (Interview with Minister Für and Colonel General Lörincz on outcomes of current investigations), MTV1, *Hét*, 12 April 1992; Szabó Iréne, `Vannak felelösök, lesz felelöségre vonás!' (Those Responsible are found, disciplinary action will be taken) *Népszava*, 14 April 1992.

61. Interview with Imre Mécs, chairman of Defence Committee, in *Magyar Nemzet*, 10 July 1995, p. 9.

62. `Erösiteni a civil kontrollt' (Civilian control should be strengthened), *Magyar Hirlap*, 17 March 1995, p. 8.

63. Ferenc Gazdag and János Szabó, op. cit., p. 16.

64. `A honvédelem négy éve. 1990-94' (Four years in national defence. 1990-94), Budapest, Ministry of Defence, 1994, p. 187.

65. Martin Edmonds, *Central organizations of defence* (Boulder, CO and Oxford: Westview Press, 1985), p. 2.

66. *Potomac Update* `Partnership and security in Central Europe' (Washington: Potomac Foundation, October 1994), p. 3.

67. Stefan Sarvas, `The Professional Corps in Central and Eastern Europe and Politics', manuscript, Centre for European Security Studies, University of Groningen, 1995, pp. 5-6.

68. Among numerous articles see *Magyar Hirlap*, 17 March 1995, p. 8; *Heti Világgazdaság*, 12 November 1994, pp. 103-4; *Népszabadság*, 24 September 1994, p. 9; *Magyar Hirlap*, 5 July 1995, p. 3. A position paper issued by the Batthyány Foundation, a Budapest-based think-tank, including opposition intellectuals, has also to be cited: `Hungary and NATO', *Batthyány viewpoint*, Budapest 1995, p. 2.

69. See the interview with Foreign Minister László Kovács, *Magyar Nemzet*, 29 July 1995, p. 7. Kovács distinguishes several areas where Hungary's compatibility with Western institutions already exists, and some others, including civilian control of the military, where `further efforts should be made'.

70. Ivan Volgyes, op. cit., pp. 146-7.

71. Ferenc Gazdag and János Szabó, op. cit., p. 1.

72. `A társadalom és a fegyveres erök' (Civil society and armed forces), Zrinyi Miklós Military Academy, Hanns Seidel Foundation, Batthyány Lajos Foundation, Budapest, 1993; Szabó János, `A civil kontroll elmélete és elvárásrendszere' (The theory and the requirements of civilian control), *Magyar Honvéd*, 21 April 1995, pp. 10-11; and `Academics, politicians and the subject of reform', Hungarian Centre for NATO/WEU, *Information newslttr* no. 5, February 1995.

73. For the French solution to the protection of the soldier's interests, see `Le Conseil supérieur de la fonction militaire', a speech by Contrôleur-Général des Armées Bonnetête to the Collège Interarmées de Défense, Paris, 14 January 1994.

74. `A katonák jogállásáról szóló törvényjavaslat' (Draft Law on the Legal Status of Soldiers), no. 15414, Magyar Országgyülés (National Assembly), 17 February 1994.

75. Luc Stainier, `Common interests, values and criteria for action' in Laurence Martin and John Roper (eds.), *Towards a common defence policy*, A study by the European Strategy Group and the Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, Paris, 1995, p. 17.

76. The Kirchberg Declaration of the WEU Council of Ministers, 9 May 1994, Part II, p. 2.

77. Partnership for Peace: Framework Document, Brussels, 10 January 1994, para. 3.