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A LASTING PEACE
IN
CENTRAL EUROPE?

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Dan Pavel and Stefan Tafrov
Edited by Ian Gambles*

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INTRODUCTION: THE EUROPEAN SECURITY-COMMUNITY

Ian Gambles[1]

Forty years ago, Karl Deutsch claimed that the North Atlantic area, Western Europe and North America, had developed a long way towards becoming a `security-community', and put forward policy proposals designed to continue and strengthen the process of development. That security-community has proved itself strong and lasting, a guarantor of peace in Western Europe. This study is about extending that community eastwards, and makes the claim that a lasting peace is already beginning to be consolidated in the area of Central and East European that was under Soviet domination during the Cold War.

What is a security-community? Deutsch defined it as a community `in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.'[2] He distinguished between `amalgamated' security-communities, states or other political units with a supreme centre of decision-making, and `pluralistic' security-communities, comprising separate governmental units; it is the latter type that has developed so effectively in the North Atlantic area.[3] The exclusion of the use of force between the states of a security-community must be not just a matter of political declaration and international law, but a real and firmly established change in the conduct of their international relations.

There is no necessary connection, either in the North Atlantic area or elsewhere, between a security-community and an international institution, treaty, or alliance. A security-community cannot be created by fiats or secretariats, nor can it be sustained by promises alone. Thus what we will in this study call *the European security-community* should not be confused with the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), or any other organisation. An international organisation must make a visible distinction between members and non-members, although the current proliferation of associates, observers and partners is an attempt to qualify or conceal that distinction. A security-community on the other hand is intangible, a community in the spirit more than in the letter. Its membership cannot be offered or denied, only acquired or lost. Its boundaries are set more by the trust and confidence between peoples than by the signatures of statesmen.

The development of this intangible community which underpins institutional ties is the result of a process of social and political learning, the creation of a sense of community through habitual cooperative behaviour among individuals, social groups, and states.[4] This process can be assisted through conscious political strategies, including the establishment and utilisation of appropriate international institutions. Scholars and practitioners of international politics have indeed long debated the nature of the relationship between the development of international institutions, the development of non-institutional ties between governments and peoples, and the consolidation of peace. All the authors in this volume believe that an appropriate mix

of institutional and non-institutional strategies is essential for expanding the European security-community eastwards.[5]

Our primary concern here is to analyse whether the necessary conditions for this consolidation of peace and security exist or are developing in the Central and East European region. These conditions include compatibility of key political values among the participants, governments that are capable of responsive and communicative international behaviour, and (what was perhaps underestimated by Deutsch) a geopolitical environment conducive to community building.[6] To put this in another way, the formation of a security-community, a zone of lasting peace, requires three levels of stability -- domestic stability, regional stability, and geopolitical stability.

Domestic stability implies a state secure in its identity and possessing effective and legitimate authority within its boundaries; it means a democratic political system in which universal human rights are respected and a reasonably open civil society can flourish; and it means an economy open to international transactions.[7] Only domestic stability of this kind can guarantee that patterns of cooperation will pervade societies in the security-community and survive successive changes of government.

Regional stability is both the final goal of a security-community and the route towards it. In an established security-community, the inevitable conflicts of interest between states are managed, and societies and political leaders are able to resolve them or at least accommodate them without threatening the certainty of the peace. In a potential or developing security-community, conflicts of interest must be manageable. Regional stability requires that societies are not so deeply inimical that lasting peace cannot develop before blood is spilled, that decision-makers are able and willing to learn practices of dispute management, and that active institutional cooperation in the region is beginning.

Geopolitical stability implies that the development of the unifying ties of an emergent security-community is viable and sustainable in its geopolitical environment. Security-communities do not exist in a world of their own, set apart from global power politics. The quality of their internal relationships does not make them into sanctuaries, nor can it give their member states immunity from the rest of the world. Whether there could ever be a global security-community is a question beyond the scope of this study, but it is certainly not a possibility in the foreseeable future. Failing that, the states system will continue to find uneasy, temporary equilibria through the operation of the balance of power, and security-communities will, willingly or not, have to seek security within it. The old-fashioned, balance of power approach to international relations has no place, however, *inside* the security-community. Of course states pursue their national interests in competition with others and more powerful states wield larger political and economic influence, but that is axiomatic. One of the distinctive features of a security-community is that the definitive repudiation of all possibility of inter-state conflict strips international politics within its boundaries of its coercive character, thereby taming the Leviathans. Now if power is balanced overall, but is not an issue within the security-community, then it follows that every state in the security-community, leaving aside those without any notable power or strategic significance, must be on the same side of the scales. This makes sense. A security-community is founded on intangibles, such as solidarity,

confidence and trust. How can one people trust another if there is any ambiguity as to whether they would be on the same side in the face of a major external threat?

A security-community is not the same as a system of collective security, or a defensive alliance based on security guarantees, but it does presuppose that the community will not shatter under external pressures, and that its members will be inclined, and over time become more and more committed, to stand together in the face of geopolitical turbulence and threat. Geopolitical stability refers to conditions in which such a development is plausible and likely, and not ruled out by the realities of power politics.

The European security-community which developed in non-communist Europe and North America in the years after the Second World War was skilfully promoted in quite favourable background conditions. They included domestic, regional, and geopolitical stability, all of which were tentative and uncertain at first, and over time became secure and certain.

Domestically, the West European and North American states have over the years come to share a broad set of political values which are an essential part of the identity of the West in the postwar era. Rejection of Nazism was the first and most solidly established, rejection of communism became firmer over time, and commitment to what the Washington Treaty called `the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law' gradually evolved from principles that were only honoured in the breach to universally shared and practised norms.[8] The strength and capacity of what were already mature states recovered quickly from the war, and their economies became stronger and more open as world trade recovered and they became the leading players in the Bretton Woods institutions and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Regionally, there were deep-seated conflicts of interest, which had exploded into two world wars, but profound war weariness in European societies created the conditions in which a far-sighted generation of political leaders could begin the process of managing these disputes into quiescence. The creation of the European Communities as the instrument of Franco-German reconciliation, the Marshall Plan for European reconstruction, the establishment of the North Atlantic Alliance, and perhaps more than anything else West Germanys turn to the future under Konrad Adenauer all contributed mightily to regional stability. The spontaneous growth of corporate and individual transnationalism in the North Atlantic area, and the slow but sure evolution of habits of intergovernmental dialogue, cooperation, and common action within NATO and the EC helped consolidate this regional stability and gave the European security-community deep roots.

Geopolitically, the European security-community grew in an era dominated by the Soviet threat and the atomic bomb. Throughout the long Cold War, the unity of the West was constantly challenged, by Soviet blandishments and bullying, by domestic and transatlantic rifts over nuclear deterrence, and by post-colonial wars elsewhere in the world. In retrospect, however, and even to many at the time, it is clear that the geopolitical conditions were peculiarly favourable to the development of the European security-community. The ideological threat of Soviet communism minimised the significance of political divisions within the North Atlantic area, and

the virtually undeniable need for a US military presence in Europe as leader of the Alliance allowed Western Europe to grow together under the aegis of an `American pacifier'.[9]

The Cold War is now over. The European security-community is still there, but must now face a new eastern question. There has always been a link between the security of the western and eastern parts of Europe. Now, as the Central and Eastern Europe states become Associate Partners of WEU, sign Association Agreements with the EU, and join NATOs Partnership for Peace, and as statesmen, businessmen, and ordinary travellers whittle away at the lingering remains of Europes Cold War division, what is to happen to that link? Can security be not just linked, but shared? Can there be a pan-European security-community?

This volume is about the expansion of the European security-community into Central and Eastern Europe.[10] All the contributors to the paper, edited by a West European in Hungary, are citizens of different states in Central and Eastern Europe, the Associate Partners of the WEU. Each has his own distinctive perspective, but together their voice is the voice of a region of Europe which has endured more than half a century of violence and insecurity, and craves the relative tranquillity of the West.

Much of the current debate about security in Central Europe revolves around the issue of institutional expansion. Although the expansion of the European security-community cannot be assured until underlying, non-institutional ties of habitual cooperation and mutual confidence firmly connect the West and the East, institutional membership can play a decisive role by providing real and symbolic assurance and triggering the growth of broader and deeper intergovernmental and intersocietal ties. The paramount importance attached to NATO, EU and WEU expansion in Central and Eastern Europe is therefore entirely rational and relevant in this context, and our paper begins with an incisive study of institutional expansion by Przemyslaw Grudzinski from Poland, who examines in particular the different perspectives and perceptions which Western and Central Europe bring to this issue. The institutional membership that Central Europe wants necessarily involves redrawing the existing lines on the map of Europe, between those who are members and those who are not, and excessive timidity in drawing those lines, he warns, could prove costly in the long run.

Attention then turns to the three groups of background conditions for the establishment of lasting peace -- domestic, regional and geopolitical stability -- and one chapter focuses on each.

Domestically, this is a time of political and economic transition, which is a troubled and risky process, not a smooth switch from a failed system to a successful one. Dan Pavel from Romania examines domestic issues in chapter 2, and argues that, despite uneven development and some still formidable challenges, the new democratic order in Central and Eastern Europe is here to stay. The development of civil society and the process of democratic consolidation in the region, he suggests, have progressed far enough to sustain those countries' participation in the European security-community.

Regionally, the collapse of the Soviet bloc left countries inexperienced in independence and unused to free cooperation facing the rediscovered tensions of a

heterogeneous and historically complex part of Europe. Pál Dunay from Hungary considers whether Central Europe is a stable region. He rejects the notion that the old quarrels of the region pose any significant threat to the European peace, and argues that a clear distinction exists between the practice of regional politics and the management of inter-state disputes in the western and central parts of Europe on the one hand, and in the turbulent eastern area on the other.

Geopolitically, the Russian question hangs over everything. Andris Ozolins from Latvia writes in a geopolitical perspective, and adds a Baltic dimension to our study, arguing strongly for a post-Cold War *Ostpolitik* which does not allow anxieties about Russia to prevent or delay the expansion of the security-community and its institutions. The establishment of a democratic, stable security-community at or near the western border of Russia or the CIS cannot be a threat to Russian security interests, he insists, and the governments and peoples of the West should, step by step, come to acknowledge the Central and East Europeans as full members of the security-community and its institutions.

Having examined the institutional context and argued that the background conditions for expanding the security-community are broadly favourable, our paper turns to focus directly on the decisive question of whether the WEU Associate Partner states are ready to take their place in a wider European zone of lasting peace. Stefan Tafrov from Bulgaria argues confidently that they are indeed ready, and that throughout Central and Eastern Europe, including the Balkans outside the conflict zone, a cooperative and peaceful approach to international politics has become an established part of national interests and national identities. The self-restraint which has been shown by the political élites of the Associate Partner states in defining their national interests and shaping their foreign policy priorities is, he claims, conditioned by the very nature of their identity in the post-communist period.

Finally, I enlarge on the themes of domestic, regional and geopolitical stability in Central and Eastern Europe, and try to pull the argument of our paper together. Even from a more critical Western perspective, the background conditions for expansion of the European security-community look distinctly favourable, and I consider prospects and strategies for achieving that common objective.

NATIONAL INTERESTS: EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS

Przemyslaw Grudzinski[11]

How can the institutions which have ensured the security of Western Europe for the last four decades and more be extended into Central Europe without drawing new lines of confrontation on the map of Europe? The contention of the authors of this *chaillot Paper* is that that task can only be accomplished against the backdrop of an expanding European security-community. A strategy for expanding the security-community would involve constructing multiple lines of communication on all possible levels between governments and between societies, dense networks of linkages and cooperation which would do justice to both the aspirations and the realities of contemporary Europe, and as a consequence actually raise the level of security on the continent. The new lines which have to be drawn in Europe need not create watertight divisions and compartments; on the contrary, they should be soft and porous, establishing better conditions for enhanced cooperation among states in line with individual correlations of national interest.

The importance of this non-institutional backdrop, however, should not blind us to the importance of institutions themselves. Membership matters, and membership of the key European security organisations -- NATO, WEU, and the EU -- is understandably high on the list of Central European aspirations. The West cannot afford to ignore what these states actually say they want, which is institutional membership, and that necessarily involves redrawing the existing lines on the map of Europe, between those who are members and those who are not.

Excessive reluctance to redraw these lines is dangerously timid, and shows the weakness of the principle of the `indivisibility of security' proclaimed in the Paris charter and repeated endlessly ever since. This doctrine hampers efforts to overcome the Cold War's legacy of division.

The doctrine was recently restated in the US `National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement':

`The aim of NATO's future expansion, however, will not be to draw a new line in Europe further east, but to expand stability, democracy, prosperity and security cooperation to an ever-broader Europe.'[12]

This and similar formulations confuse ends and means and create more problems than they solve. If NATO really is an instrument for projecting stability, democracy, prosperity and security, expanding it is not going to draw a new line in Europe. Unfortunately, the high moral tone of the principle of indivisible security has got to the point of giving legitimacy to the demands of those who claim that the new security regime should be at one and the same time both comprehensive and inclusive, equally open to all. In fact, the most probable scenario is that the new regime will be fragmentary, *ad hoc*, and exclusive: the pan-European approach is neither realistic nor

practical. Indeed if it is consistently applied, it may well lead to the abandonment of the gradualism previously regarded as essential.

There is no doubt that the European states, and the OSCE region as a whole from Vancouver to Vladivostok, will not enjoy equal access to the scarce pool of security resources. Well meant calls to avoid new walls in Europe will not change the fact that this vast space is a highly differentiated security area, one of complex and in many cases conflicting interests, where applying equal measure to Hungary and Tajikistan will serve the interests of neither.

Western and Eastern perceptions of institutional expansion

There is a fundamental difference between underlying attitudes to institutional expansion in Western and Central Europe. Understandably, the perception of enhanced security in the Western states since the end of the Cold War has weakened their commitment to an integrated defence structure and re-nationalised their security policies, whereas in Central Europe states with a long history of insecurity have now become more enthusiastic advocates of collective defence than its long-time practitioners.

The well-tried institutions of Western defence underpinning the successful security-community have suddenly found themselves overwhelmed by the consequences of their success and virtually under siege from former foes now demanding to become partners. NATO's traditional framework has been subjected to pressures from different political and geographical directions, including pressure from Central Europe for a NATO defence commitment in that region at the same time as a crisis in former Yugoslavia.

In the face of this pressure, the West has pulled back from multilateralism, and shown itself unwilling to use NATO or the WEU to engage in a decisive way in the task of management of the post-Cold War international system beyond the established perimeter of the Western security-community. There have been endless discussions of `out-of-area' activities, but in practice these discussions and resulting decisions have not yet given Central European states any reason to feel reassured about what might happen in the event of a major crisis threatening European stability. Even though there is continuing ambiguity, and uncertainty surrounding European security, the West has failed to take opportunities for preventive action, and has fallen into a reactive, *post factum* approach to policy-making which belies its purported desire to project stability.

Most current thinking concentrates on the issues of jurisdiction and the interplay and evolution of institutions. Less attention is given to the question of the vital goals these institutions must be striving for in order to respond to the needs of an evolving security system. Process and procedure are very important, but they are not ends in themselves, and they should not be allowed to dominate the issue of major goals and core functions. A list of vital objectives for the coming decade might include the following:

- managing the transition from a bipolar to a multipolar order;

- discouraging the renationalisation of defence in both Western and Central Europe;

- preventing the emergence of new hegemonic powers in Europe and new forms of satellitisation and interventionism;

- preventing local conflicts and their escalation;

- upholding international law governing both the external and internal state behaviour of states;

- preventing proliferation;

- helping `soft' states become stronger, and preventing socio-economic breakdowns which could lead to major population dislocations.

This is an extensive list of goals, and the institutions of collective defence alone cannot be expected to attain them. But their contribution would be critical. The transition from communism cannot be consolidated in the absence of a security net.

Unfortunately, attention is not focused on these goals; the trend is rather away from concerted action and towards fragmentation, as the record of Western policy towards the Yugoslav conflict shows. The ongoing renationalisation of defence policies has led to situations in which multilateral institutions are used by member states to pursue goals other than European security, while national security debates are putting a renewed accent on exclusively national interests, on the historical roots of security and foreign policies. It would be overstating the case to suggest that such disintegrative tendencies have already led to a radical change in European collective defence, but institutions have now, to a greater extent than before, become hostages to particular national outlooks. Indeed the messy nature of the evolution of the institutions they want to join adds to the worries of the prospective members from the East.

Those prospective members would, of course, nevertheless be more than happy to become part of the mess. For them the driving force is insecurity resulting from history, geography and the uncertainty over the future; it is hard to relax after two coup attempts in Moscow in less than two years, and in view of the prospects for further movement to the right as a result of the June 1996 Russian presidential elections. The Western states, comfortably protected and separated from the possibly resurgent threat by the Central-East European filter simply have a different sense of timing. They feel less the urgency of settling new institutional arrangements for European security, confident that, if the threat resurfaces, the relaxed pace of their own collective defence mechanisms could be shifted into a higher gear.

The Central Europeans see no such margin. Their determination to become an integrated part of Western political, economic and security institutions is strong, driven by a powerful sense of national interest. They are driven above all by a deeply felt insecurity resulting from the chronic inability to control the most important outcomes of European politics. In the new, multipolar era, these states are struggling

to avoid the recurrence either of a `buffer zone' situation or of domination by any single outside power.

The Central Europeans also look across the Atlantic to links with the United States. All countries of the region are staunch supporters of a significant US presence in Europe. In their view, the history of Europe in this century proves that the United States is inextricably enmeshed in European affairs. They consider a continued US presence to be vital for the continent's stability, particularly in a time of uncertainty.

The countries of the region have no illusions, however, about their relative influence on the international scene. For the major Western powers, once the threat from the Russian land mass diminished by an order of magnitude, the geostrategic importance of Central Europe became secondary, at best. No visible threat emanates from these relatively stable societies in Central Europe that could jeopardise the West's affluence and tranquillity. There are no deposits of strategically important raw materials in the area, and the volume of its trade with Western Europe and North America amounts to but a fraction of the West's total trade. Thus, despite these countries' avowed affinity to their Western cousins, they seem to be taken for granted in the geopolitical calculus of the West.

And they know it. Looking inward, however, they realise that their current pro-Western, pro-European orientation is something *not* to be taken for granted. In the minds of the politicians of the region, resolving the familiar Central European security dilemma requires strong ties to strong, multilateral institutions, and the best possible relations with all their neighbours and all points of the compass. An open, non-adversarial foreign policy like this, combining a staunchly pro-Western orientation with friendly, cooperative relations with the states of the former Soviet bloc, makes sense in the present conditions, when no potential aggressor casts too threatening a shadow on the scene. Such a policy offers the best hope that the Central Europeans will not be left out as others move to define the new European international environment.

The implication of this open policy is clear: it is not in the interests of Central European states to see a new Iron Curtain on their eastern frontiers. Rather, they perceive a need to help their eastern neighbours integrate with the rest of Europe in the longer run. Implementing this strategy, however, is far from straightforward. The long Soviet domination has left a deep residue of public suspicion towards Russia and Russian intentions, while relations with other former Soviet bloc countries are complicated by the way in which Central Europe is being sucked gradually into the internal structures of the West without any final assurance that their strategic objective of full membership in the European club can ever be attained. Central Europeans are compelled to participate in a race organised by the West, such as that implicit in the Partnership for Peace programme, for example. The self-centred behaviour, the *sacro egoismo* which this encourages makes a policy of openness towards the East even more difficult to implement in practice, however much it is espoused in theory. In order to keep its western frontiers open, Central Europe is forced to keep its eastern ones closed.

Russia, America and NATO

From a Central European point of view, each successive meeting of NATO's high-level decision-making bodies looks like another rerun of the same unending struggle on the question of timing, the majority thinking it is much too early for the critical decisions to be made, a minority stressing the need to come to an early decision. President Clinton's recent signals of commitment to eventual Central European membership were welcome, but hardly settle the matter. In some ways, the more often NATO statesmen repeat that Russia will not be given a veto on Central European membership, the less convincing the denial sounds. In reality, the evolution of Russia's policy and Western policy towards Russia is at the heart of the matter.

Russia is not at present particularly interested in Central Europe. Despite demands to be counted in and fulminations about being counted out, Russia seems much more interested and active in managing its more immediate environment -- Russian territory and the successor states of the former Soviet Union. With the exception of the intrusion of the Yugoslav civil war into Russian domestic politics, Russia's Central European policy lacks *esprit*. Although Russian spokesmen lose no opportunity to speak of Russia's security concerns in Central Europe, in practice the region attracts hardly any attention in Russian foreign policy circles.

Russian policy is one of actual passivity in the region, and declaratory activity towards the region, leaving the impression throughout Central Europe that its major aim is to prevent Central Europe's integration into European security structures. This intention is visible in the package of Russian proposals on the future system of international security in Europe, which centres on the presumption that the new Europe should be recreated as one democratic and secure entity, an all-inclusive order free from spheres of influence. The institutions of the Cold War, especially NATO, are held to have become antiquated and irrelevant, while others, like the EU and the WEU, suffer from their exclusivity. Instead, the Russians envisage a regional version of the United Nations in the form of an upgraded OSCE. The new distribution of roles and missions would relegate NATO's role to that of technical tool, while the newly empowered, two-tier OSCE would take centre stage, with a European Security Council at the top.

Implementation of such a scheme would multiply the volume of European uncertainties in a watered-down collective security environment and create dramatic new divisions while the majority of OSCE members fought their unequal status in the new hierarchy, and the great powers struggled over the European pecking order. More importantly, the dynamics of any such new Concert of Europe would be inherently less stable than even the present incomplete system. Ironically, it would make the European idea itself less attractive in Moscow, paving the way instead for the idea of a special axis between Moscow and Berlin.

Russia's persistence with such dangerous and unrealistic schemes reflects a deep anxiety about its position on Europe. Many Russian policy-makers see the European integration process as something harmful to Russian interests, tending towards the exclusion of Russia from Europe, and thus they search for ways to make the whole process hostage to their own will. Hence while Boris Yeltsin and Andrei Kozyrev have repeatedly stressed that Russia does not question the right of independent states

to protect themselves as they wish, including through joining defensive alliances, they also seek to reserve to Russia the right to judge any move to NATO expansion on its merits from the point of view of its contribution to overall European stability, taking into account the delicate balance of forces in domestic Russian politics. Such equivocation suggests that Russia's objections to the expansion of West European security institutions are more psychological than strategic.

From a Central European point of view, the unique attraction of NATO as a security organisation is that it excludes Russia but includes the United States. Yet the US attitude cannot be forecast with much greater confidence. The American mood is not isolationist, but more hesitant about engagement abroad. In the absence of a clear threat from the Soviet Union, it has become much harder for America to define an American strategy or shape an American foreign policy consensus. A `Europe First' foreign policy is on the defensive, as many Americans come to think that they have already invested too much in European prosperity and security, and that it is high time to reduce commitments and expenditure in Europe. The strategic objective of ensuring that no hostile power would control the European continent and its political, strategic and economic resources can now be considered to have been fully achieved, and Europe can at last take full responsibility for its own security. Meanwhile, current and future challenges in Asia seem to make greater demands on US attention and effort than the transformation of Europe. These deeper changes suggest that the dilution of US engagement in Europe represents more than a passing phase reflecting the leanings of the current Administration.

Russia is at the centre of American concerns about Europe. `If anyone has had a policy of 'Moscow First',' wrote Timothy Garton-Ash, `it has been the Clinton administration. In one of those curious transatlantic role reversals that happen from time to time, the United States has played Germany to Yeltsin's Russia, while Germany has played America to east-central Europe.[13] Nothing is more characteristic of this reversal than the indirect and direct polemics between the German and US Ministers of Defence, Volker Rühe and William B. Perry, about NATO expansion. Rühe's desire for specificity, definitely bringing in the Visegrad Four by the year 2000 and definitely excluding Russia, is matched by Perry's desire to leave these thorny issues unresolved for the time being.

Russia's priority in American eyes is apparent in US policy towards the area of the former Soviet Union. The United States is willing to accept the right of Russia to manage the process of recentralisation, the right to create institutions as instruments of recentralisation, and the right to intervene militarily, within the framework of international law, in order to prevent chaos and destabilisation in the area. The lack of reaction in the United States to Russian spheres-of-influence terminology tends to confirm this rather wide mandate for Russian policy and activity in the CIS area. An important test for the effectiveness of the US approach will be whether it has the ability to help sustain Ukraine as a balancing factor in this part of Europe.

Where does this leave Central Europe? It is clear that the US blessing for Russian regional hegemony covers the territory as far west as the River Bug, but not beyond. Nor, however, is the United States yet prepared to give its blessing for the full integration of the region west of the Bug into Western security structures. This is seen as a welcome long-term outcome, but not worth the price of damage to Russian-US

relations. Unable to resolve the complex and deep-seated differences between the Russians and the Central Europeans, the US rhetoric of `keeping the walls down' in the whole of Europe seeks to please all parties.

Overshadowing everything, of course, is the nuclear issue. The United States retains a vital interest in the management of nuclear deterrence, nuclear proliferation, and nuclear arms control, and Russia remains its principal negotiating partner on these matters. From a Central European perspective, the Russian nuclear arsenal, and its probable extension as an umbrella over the CIS area, makes an American nuclear guarantee through NATO a security imperative. If Central Europe is allowed to drift between two nuclear zones, Russia will again bring up the proposal of a joint Russia-NATO nuclear guarantee for the region, already floated as an alternative to NATO expansion in Yeltsin's letter to some NATO heads of government after his visit to Warsaw in September 1993. Such a project would reintroduce the ill-fated and widely feared buffer zone model into Central Europe through the nuclear back door.

The hesitant attitude of the United States has put NATO to a difficult test. NATO is an alliance which has survived victory remarkably well, and is still badly needed in Europe. It is an important coordinating tool between the United States and Europe, an insurance policy for Germany and its neighbours that they can safely proceed with forging new networks of cooperation, and a crisis response mechanism for unforeseen situations in the east and south. The question remains, though, whether it can continue to exist if its principal mission is to be that of a hedge for Western Europe against a resurgent Russian threat. Looking ahead, it seems unlikely that a strong NATO with a strong American military presence can be sustainable in either US or German politics unless decisive steps are taken on new, relevant tasks. That new relevance must come in part from expansion into Central Europe, and the Central Europeans at least are committed to such an outcome.

European integration

The decline in US engagement is, unfortunately, not commensurate with an increase in Europe's readiness to determine its own future security structure. The Maastricht process, which theoretically envisaged a new framework of European security based on a Common Foreign and Security Policy without decisive American input, is still largely a theoretical process. A CFSP, and *a fortiori* a common European defence, are only abstract notions at present. It would take a tremendous amount of political will and political skill to realise this vision against the current of renationalisation.

For one reason or another, all the states -- and there are precious few of them -- who might conceivably lead Europe in this direction are reluctant to take on a leadership role. Germany, which by virtue of its economic and political resources would be the obvious candidate to lead, is handicapped by its history and by its current preoccupation with its eastern part. It could be said that Germany is in the process of redefining its national interest, and although there need be no suspicion that a new German identity will call into question its integration into the West, the underlying conundrum remains: how can Germany lead on the European continent without dominating it? Central Europe would be delighted to see that circle squared.

In the recent past Germany has been able to avoid falling into the historical trap of domination by develop a dual policy towards Russia and Central Europe. Whereas Russia is perceived as a crucial external factor, affecting the foundations of Germany's future from the outside, Poland and other eastern neighbours have come to be seen as `die neue Tiefe des Raumes', the subject, like Germany's other European neighbours, of quasi-domestic policy.

The conscious willingness of Central Europe to become a part of such a new European normality will depend on the ability of Germany to avoid neo-colonial temptations, and in turn on its ability to sustain an open, tolerant, civil society which is now under considerable strain. But the most important test for the rapidly improving relations between Germany and its eastern neighbours concerns Germany's role in shaping and directing European integration. Germany is no longer a weakened player on the European stage, but the most powerful actor of all, with fully restored sovereignty and enhanced national power. Germany has the capacity to promote its own vision of European institutions, and much hinges on the vision it chooses to promote.

Central Europeans view the evolution of the `widening versus deepening' debate in the European Union with unease. Along with a general acceptance of the principle of eastward expansion of the EU in the fullness of time, there has come a renewed drive to increase integration in the Carolingian core of the Community represented by the advanced Western countries (France, Germany, the Benelux countries). This group might press ahead of other member states, in a so-called multi-speed Europe, to embrace the monetary union which paves the way for political union. This would create an entirely new reality, a federated unit at the heart of Europe surrounded by second and third class states. Central Europe would inevitably gravitate into the third or even fourth of the concentric circles.

The driving force behind this vision of Europe is the German CDU/CSU, recently successful once again in national elections, and the vision is also attractive to France, one of the most reluctant to accept the principle of eastward expansion, since it perpetuates and renews the standing of France and Germany as the locomotive of the Community. The multi-speed model has many critics, but even its supporters acknowledge those implications which are the most troubling for Central Europe. Christoph Bertram wrote in *Die Welt:*

`But is this not perceived too narrowly? Besides, should there be only one nucleus or several concentric circles -- one for defence, another for currency and a third for Eastern Europe or the Mediterranean, in each case around the Franco-German axis?[14]

The probability is that, no matter what the initial assumptions are, the idea of a centre leads inevitably to the concept of peripheries of an unspecified nature. It is not difficult to foresee the enormous implications this idea will have for states not yet integrated into the European Union.

A more optimistic reading of current developments is quite possible, however. 1994 was a year of substantial progress in the integration of the Central European states into the EU and the WEU, as well as into NATO.

First came NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative of January 1994.
Despite falling short of Central Europe's expectations and causing some initial disappointment, Partnership for Peace has opened the door to more intensive military cooperation and, more importantly, set the Central Europeans on the road to NATO membership. Several countries made it explicit in their PfP presentation documents that their goal was NATO membership, and that they would utilise individual programmes as tools to prepare them for the demands of membership in the future.

Next came the granting of Associate Partner status in WEU to Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Baltic States. This gives the Central Europeans a voice at the highest council of the WEU, and offers them future opportunities, as the WEU's role grows, to demonstrate that they can be a security asset to Europe, and not just a liability, among other things by making a contribution to peacekeeping operations. Even if at the present juncture it is hard to imagine the Central European states getting the rigid security guarantees of full WEU membership without first being admitted to NATO, the opening up of WEU does represent an important step in the gradual process of opening up Western security institutions to the East.

Finally, in October 1994, the foreign ministers of the EU decided to invite ministers from associate member states -- the Central Europeans -- to meet the Council of Ministers regularly at prime ministerial level, and at the level of foreign and other departmental ministers, and to participate, in a restricted capacity, in certain EU working groups. This represents the Central Europeans' first breakthrough into the internal structures of the EU, and an opportunity to influence the course of its decision-making.

This is distinct and promising progress, progress at what is perhaps the maximum realistic pace, from the Western perspective, towards the eastward expansion of European security institutions. Looking through a Central European lens, however, this maximum represents a bare minimum necessary to assure the continuation of the Central Europeans' pro-Western strategies. Integration will not be easy to achieve, and will continue to require painful concessions and special provisions in both East and West. The biggest obstacle to quicker progress is that eastward expansion is a difficult idea to sell to the population in the West. It is unattractive from an economic standpoint, mundane from a political standpoint, and risky from a security standpoint. There is no tradition of sacrifice for the countries of the East in any of the countries of Western Europe, and there are many solid reasons for some to resist any such sacrifices. But the alternative is a return to the old European pattern of historical divisions and chronic instabilities, whereas the promise is of a greater Europe with more than 25 countries, more than 400 million people, and an unprecedented level of economic, political, and security integration. To be able to hold out such a prospect, even at the end of a long and gradual process of evolutionary integration, will not only help to quell resentment in the countries that are bound to be integrated later rather than sooner, but also help to stabilise the new democracies of Central Europe and reduce the risks of a new hegemonic arrangement in the region. The expansion of the European security-community requires the expansion of European security institutions.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND SECURITY AFTER COMMUNISM

Dan Pavel[15]

If the political will of the new European democracies to achieve integration into Western structures were the deciding factor, then all of them, without exception, would have become full members already. But, important though such determination is, it is not sufficient.

There are two main sets of reasons for this. First, there are external strategic considerations, which have a powerful impact on the decision-making process within both the Western institutions and their member states. The priority attached to these considerations is readily apparent in the current debate about NATO enlargement; it is fully discussed by Przemyslav Grudzinski, Andris Ozolins and others in this paper, and will not be dealt with here.

The second set of reasons relates to the fear of the Western countries that the *inner* logic of the pillars of their security -- NATO, the EU, and WEU -- could be spoiled by enlargement. This aspect of the enlargement debate is about the fit between the Western establishment and the Central European candidates. Are the states of Central Europe sufficiently internally stable and democratic to take their place in the European security-community now, or are their domestic politics too volatile and unsettled to allow the process of integration to run smoothly? An accurate assessment of the condition of civil society in Central Europe is essential to a thorough understanding of their security situation, and it is with this less strategic and more socio-political aspect of security-community expansion that this chapter is concerned.

Terms and Definitions

Too much of this debate is clouded by terminological confusion, so some initial clarification is needed.

First, the *geographic area* which will be examined in the following pages is post-Cold War Central Europe, comprising the nine states which enjoy the status of Associate Partners of the Western European Union. In this connection, it is worth mentioning that an important political document of the WEU, the Declaration of the Extraordinary Meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with States of Central Europe issued on 19 June 1992 at Petersberg, Germany, recognised the revival of Central Europe. Its first paragraph identifies Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia (now the Czech Republic and Slovakia), Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania as `States of Central Europe'. It is this rediscovered Central Europe with which this whole volume is concerned.

Second, what is meant by *civil society*? Together with the market economy and democracy, civil society is one of the components of the `magic trio' of panaceas for the ills of societies embarked on the road of transition from communism to liberal

democracy. More exactly, it is the sociological counterpart of the market in the economic sphere and of democracy in the political sphere.[16]

The term came to prominence in the late 1970s and early 1980s, in the context of the rise of social movements against communist regimes, most notably Solidarity in Poland and charter 77 in Czechoslovakia. Because of its very real and significant revitalisation in former Eastern Europe in this period, it functioned -- at least until the collapse of the communist regimes in the six non-Soviet member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation in 1989 -- as a kind of `idealized counter-image, an embodiment of social virtue confronting political vice: the realm of freedom versus the realm of coercion, of participation versus hierarchy, pluralism versus conformity, spontaneity versus manipulation, purity versus corruption.'[17]

Although the dismantling of communism has created favourable conditions for the rise of a series of `civil societies', including `uncivil' entities like the Mafia and `primordial' nationalist, ethnic and religious fundamentalist organisations, as well as `modern' entities such as trade unions, chambers of commerce and professional associations, the tendency to confer favourable moral connotations automatically on the term civil society still persists. This Manichean view tends to make the idea of civil society an obstacle rather than a useful tool in understanding the dynamics of Central European societies in general, and the prospects for the consolidation of their democratic development in particular.

The coexistence of opposing social forces which obstruct and facilitate democratisation indicates that there can be several civil societies within one and the same country. Unless civil society is properly understood as a complex and contradictory universe, made up of a diversity of types and sectors, statements to the effect that a `strong' civil society is a *sine qua non* for democratisation do not make too much sense. In order to avoid both ambiguity and moralistic overtones, an objective assessment of the role civil society might play in entrenching democracy and the market economy in a given society has to make clear which of the many parallel, sometimes even overlapping, civil societies have the potential to contribute to that end, and which tend to oppose it.

Democratic development is thus not merely a battle between civil society and the state. The rise of a civil society which does not contain the democratic ideal does not in itself promote the democratisation of the political system.[18] The civil society that actually exists in any country may, and usually does, contain democratic, anti-democratic and undemocratic entities. It goes without saying that only the democratic entities, those promoting and defending the democratic ideal, are able to catalyse and underpin the democratisation process.

The entities which constitute the sort of civil society needed to fit the democratising countries for membership in a security-community are those which:

- do not just preach democratic conduct to others, but practice it themselves in their internal organisation and functioning;

- accept that, however important their own role within civil society, their wider goals depend on the continuous extension of democracy through dialogue and cooperation among all existing and emerging democratic entities;

- understand that it is not the state as such which should be their target, but the anti-democratic forces within society at large that attempt to undermine political pluralism, the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and free initiative, and thereby to create favourable conditions for the establishment of a new authoritarian regime. Political leaders and parties temporarily in power should be the target of criticism when and if they give in, willingly or not, to the pressures of these anti-democratic forces.

Thirdly, consider the concept of `post-communist' civil society. Does the locution `after communism/post-communism' apply only to the geographic area formerly caged in the `Soviet bloc' or to the whole of Europe? Although the focus of this chapter is on democracy and civil society in Central Europe, the tendency to examine the problems of change and development after communism as if they existed only within the confines of the former communist states is a misleading one. As Vaclav Havel underlined, such an approach can hardly lay the foundations for building a genuinely new Europe:

`From the Czech Republic to Kazakhstan we are, and will no doubt remain for some time, "post-communist countries" and "former members of the former Warsaw Pact" . . . These formulations betray both a need to categorize us and the inability to find a key to understanding us other than the old familiar one.'[19]

Strictly speaking, communism was something that `happened' to some European countries and not to others. Directly or indirectly, however, the very existence of the former Soviet bloc affected the postwar evolution of the whole continent in important ways. Without communism there would have been no Cold War. Whatever their geographic position, all the European countries did live for more than four decades under the shadow of that `war'. Therefore, `post-communism' is experienced now, in a certain way, even by that part of Europe which succeeded in containing the expansionist ambitions of the Soviet leaders.

To accept such a standpoint is to accept that -- for the Western actors -- the evolution of events in Central Europe represents more than something going on `out there', and equally, that the role of the Western states and their institutions cannot consist in simply witnessing and assessing, from a comfortable distance, the ups and downs of `post-communist' developments in the `former communist countries'.

What is at stake is the destiny of the values, principles and practices that communism denied, and in whose name it was resisted and brought down.

Civil society in Central Europe: from demolition to reconstruction

Civil society played a crucial role in bringing about the collapse of the communist regimes as they began to weaken in their last decade. Where state and party control loosened, notably in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, the focus of the effort of

the grass-roots initiatives of the emergent civil society was the creation of a new, alternative democracy from below.[20]

Democracy from below, the grass-roots activism that inspired the ethos of Solidarity in Poland, charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, and the Hungarian Democratic Opposition was instrumental in undermining the official ideology. The repressive apparatus of the state left no room for the emergence of independent actors in the political sphere to challenge orthodoxy and generate change. Hence the agent of revolution was born outside official structures, within society itself. In creating and sustaining a civil society under communism, intellectuals offered a vision of a parallel *polis*, an alternative public life, which was a crucial psychological ingredient in producing the conditions for radical change.

Now, there is much more room for this political actor in its confrontation with the old enemy and with new ones. Since total revolution is a myth -- no revolution ever succeeded in the complete destruction of the *ancien régime* -- there are still important surviving elements of the communist regime. At the same time, transition itself has its own inconveniences, which democratic civil societies in different countries have to face.

The changes in Central Europe since 1989 challenge the ability of both policy-makers and political scientists. In a short space of time, new governments have had to try to recover a whole political and constitutional history, inaugurated by those who framed the American Constitution, which opened the way for the entrenchment of liberal democracies throughout the Western world. And this thrust for an accelerated (re)synchronisation between Central Europe and Western Europe has placed tremendous demands on civil society. As a result, civil society itself has had to take upon itself a different role.

Politicians and analysts alike have tended to measure civil society in Central European countries against formal Western standards, in terms of institutions, procedures, and rights. change at the formal level is essential in order to create space for an expanding democratic civil society. In Central Europe, human rights have been the most effective formal vehicle for enlarging the room for manoeuvre available to individual and collective actors within civil society. This function is inherent in the idea of human rights, because `the concept of rights connotes, in the first instance, entitlement: entitlement to pursue action and activity without the risk of arbitrary or unjust interference. Rights define legitimate spheres of independent action (or inaction).'[21] Despite pessimistic predictions, the reconstruction of the civic dimension of society once rights are protected can be rapid.

Yet any astute observer can discern the gap between the high level of experimentation with different democratic mechanisms and procedures, and the distorted political culture. Progress in a formal sense can be rapid, and driven forward by international pressures, but political culture cannot be changed overnight. At this deeper level, the burden of the past, with its historical traditions, traumas, and fears, is more persistent than at the institutional one.

It has been rightly observed that in Central Europe, politicians -- mainly but not only those in power -- tend to use, both internally and externally, a `double speech'. One of

the most convincing explanations of this phenomenon is offered by G.M. Tamas, whose authority on this point as a philosopher is enhanced by his role as an active participant in the political life of his country. According to Tamas, double speech is the result of a strange mixture between the authority of Western ideas, which played an important part in the 1989 changes, and the old servile habit of imitation, of immediately accepting a language not of one's own making. `Contemporary East European governments,' he observed in 1992, `are desperately trying to please what they imagine to be the Western boss. In Hungary, for instance, the government is trying to appear Social Democratic in Austria, Christian Democratic in Germany, quasi-Gaullist in France, conservative in Britain, Reaganite in the United States, and liberal in the Netherlands . . .'[22]

A similar analysis has been put forward by outstanding intellectuals from each and every country of Central Europe, for despite undeniable local variations, double speech is common in the new democracies. The communist legacy includes, *inter alia*, a solidly entrenched habit, which affects both the political world and the public, of saying one thing and doing just the opposite. Given the systemic nature of the phenomenon, it might be more useful for political analysts to focus on ways in which the temptation to resort to it could be overcome, and less on identifying which parties or countries are more prone, at any given moment, to give in to the cheap trick of double speech. Indeed, it is clear that closer relations with Western states and institutions can themselves help in the gradual cure of this `infant disease' of post-communist transition.

Combating double speech is just one of the new challenges civil society in Central Europe must face in order to consolidate and build on the formal, procedural changes that have taken place since 1989. Another, critical challenge is to succeed in the ongoing contest between civic and ethnic identity.

This lingering confusion and/or competition between `civicness' and ethnicity in many parts of the region is one of the most significant differences between civil society in Central Europe and Western civil society. The problem is especially acute where, for one reason or another, an emotional approach to politics prevails over palpable political and economic interests which, as a rule, are not defined on ethnic grounds. This is a historical, pre-communist legacy, with a strong appeal that owes much to the fact that, far from being resorbed, it was suppressed or distorted under communism. It can plausibly be argued that the fate of Central Europe largely depends on overcoming this confusion, in other words on the ability of the societies of the region to focus forces, interests, institutions, habits, and political culture on the reconstruction of civic identity.

Discussing the antagonism between the civic and ethnic orientations of the modern nation-state, Kenneth Jowitt reaches the conclusion that the `*gemeinschaft* identification' of ethnic orientation cannot but conflict with the civic one. Civic and ethnic antagonisms arise because: (1) the civic orientation is individualistic while its ethnic counterpart emphasises the importance of the collective or group; (2) the civic orientation is inherently democratic and critical towards authority while the ethnic orientation, by stressing solidarity within the group rather than the rights of the individual, is inherently more authoritarian; (3) the civic orientation is universalistic and inclusive since it implies a relationship between democratic citizens world-wide,

while the ethnic orientation is inherently exclusionist and parochial. The point is not that ethnic identity is bad, but that the civic and ethnic orientations are not only different, but also liable to conflict. The desired aim is not the elimination of ethnic identity, but the victory of the civic identity.[23]

Civil society in Central Europe has re-emerged, up to a point, as a functioning, dynamic societal body capable of taking on the new challenges of the new dispensation, but it is still going through a process of deep transformation, in different ways and at a different pace in each country of Central Europe.

Just as the vigour of civil society varied under communist rule, from a dynamic civil society in Poland and Hungary to a minimal or even absent civil society in Bulgaria and Romania, so after the collapse of communism, the anti-institutionalist idea of civil society took different courses. In Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, the former dissident movement entered politics, and became involved in elections and government, thus making civil society a partner of the state and its institutions. A series of political parties in these countries came to power immediately after 1989 as a result of their electoral appeal to the new civic identities moulded by agencies, clubs, local communities and individuals. By contrast, in Romania, Slovakia, and Bulgaria, the liberal idea of civil society remained hostile to the state, and particularly to those people within government and business who were part of the *nomenklatura* and the former secret police.

Five years later, the picture is still changing. In those countries where there was a sizeable opposition to the previous regime the intellectual dissidents who were most outspokenly `civic-minded' in their pronouncements and ideals are now sometimes discredited among local electorates, sometimes divided by the new economic and political oligarchy composed of former members of the *nomenklatura* and secret police, while in other countries, where such an opposition hardly existed, the post-communist `dissidents' can still draw some political legitimacy from their civic appeal.[24]

Thus in Poland, `one of the most striking features of the present 'ecology of transformation'' is `the virtual abandonment of the recently popular concept of civic society', which lost its transformative power, became `irrelevant, transcended by an administrative, or a corporatist state'.[25] Yet in Romania, there is a party -- the Party of Civic Alliance -- which derives its legitimacy from an explicit civic dimension. There is also a strong chance of uniting all the liberal parties, who held a congress together in May 1995, in a civic-liberal alliance. Within the main alliance of opposition parties, NGOs and civic movements -- the Democratic Convention -- civic movements such as the Civic Alliance and the Association of Former Political Prisoners play a significant role.

These differences seem to result from the fact that the `romantic' phase of the development of the democratic sections of civil society is over in countries which had an active civil society under communism, while its political potential has not yet been exhausted in the countries which were more severely repressed.

Approaching, at different paces, the moment when their contribution to the consolidation of democracy in their respective countries will depend less on their

opposition to the state as such and more on their ability to prevent the anti-democratic sectors of civil society from taking the initiative (or to wrest it from them), those who promote liberal-democratic values are inevitably confronted with new tasks of reconstruction. That is exactly why, in assessing both existing obstacles and their sources, external observers and internal democrats alike should try to avoid oversimplification. Commenting on this temptation, Vaclav Klaus pertinently observed:

`In the West, the present problems of post-communist countries are usually thought to be entirely a consequence of activities of the advocates of the ancien regime. This is an opinion shared by a significant part of the public in the post-communist countries themselves. Unfortunately, this is not true.'[26]

Reliance on a negative vision (unity in the rejection of the communist past), without the creation of a positive consensus; unwillingness to give up the paternalism of the state, reliance on someone else to make decisions, preference for certainty at a relatively low level of affluence over the uncertainty of risk-taking in a market economy; failure to master the reform strategy (because competence to organise the transition is the scarcest resource); politicking instead of policy -- these are but some of the obstacles identified by Klaus. There are, indeed, many others. Unless the democratising elements of civil society are prepared to do battle with these objective obstacles in order to achieve a successful transition, anti-democratic forces will find it all too easy to use them as a convenient cover for their own projects.

The rather anti-political mood that has inspired both the thinking and the actions of the various organisations which constitute democratic civil society within the nine countries might itself be considered an obstacle. As Tamas wrote, the idea of civil society in Western Europe, as conceived by Locke, the philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment, Burke, Hegel and Tocqueville, was political, because in the liberal state, `where the power of the state, compared to its absolutist historical precedent, is inordinately weak', the civic order `cannot be sustained without the activity of the citizens'. In Central Europe the idea of civil society was anti-political; because of `the crushing preponderance, the all-pervasive omnipresence of the police state, central planning, capricious autocracy and the rest, the notion of civil society was pitched against the state.'[27]

The problem with the anti-political character of Central European civil society is that the consolidation of democracy does largely depend on the ability of its defenders to contribute to the entrenchment of a particular relationship between state and society based on the principles of citizenship, rights, representation and the rule of law. A liberal democratic pattern can only be established if the democratic sectors of the civil society devote their efforts to the establishment of a strong and independent judiciary, the strengthening of local government, and the development of a free and independent press willing to publicise domestic and foreign criticism of human rights abuses.

Civil society in Central Europe: towards consolidated democracy

Some Western analysts have argued that `there is every reason to suppose that post-communism is much more than a transitional stage and may well be the dominant feature of politics in the region [Central and Eastern Europe] for the foreseeable

future.'[28] In other words, though there will be some change, the post-communist countries might not become `European', fully-fledged liberal democracies fit for membership of the security-community in the near future. While there is some basis for this apprehension, we need to ask what the plausible alternatives might be.

One possible answer can be found in earlier research devoted to comparisons between the transitions from authoritarian regimes in Latin America and Southern Europe.[29] Following the suggestions of O'Donnell and Schmitter, a clear distinction between liberalisation of an authoritarian/totalitarian regime and democratisation should be made.

Liberalisation is the process of making effective certain rights that protect both individuals and social groups from arbitrary or illegal acts committed by the state or third parties. The protection of the individual is ensured through habeas corpus, the sanctity of private home and correspondence, the right to be defended in a fair trial, and freedom of movement, speech, and petition. Social groups are protected if they enjoy freedom from punishment for expressions of collective dissent from government policy, freedom from censorship of the means of communication, and freedom to associate voluntarily with other citizens. *Democratisation* refers to the processes whereby the rules and procedures of citizenship are either applied to political institutions previously governed by other principles (e.g., coercive control, social tradition, expert judgement, or administrative practice), or expanded to include persons not previously enjoying such rights and obligations (e.g. non-taxpayers, illiterates, women, youth, ethnic minorities, and foreign residents), or extended to cover issues and institutions not previously subject to citizen participation (e.g. state agencies, the military establishment, party organisations, interest associations, productive enterprises, and educational institutions).

O'Donnell and Schmitter identify two models of intermediate regimes drawn from their discussion of Latin American politics, both clearly falling short of West European liberal democracy. The term *dictablandas* (`liberalised authoritarianism') is used for situations in which `authoritarian rulers may tolerate or even promote liberalisation in belief that by opening up certain spaces for individual and group action, they can relieve various pressures and obtain needed information and support . . . without becoming accountable to the citizens for their actions or subjecting their claim to rule to fair and competitive elections.'[30] Regimes of this kind tend to respond to international pressures for democratisation by arguing that to go further than limited liberalisation would be too destabilising.

O'Donnell and Schmitter's second model is *democraduras* (`limited democracy'): `once democratization has began and its prudent advocates fear the excessive expansion of such a process or wish to keep contentious issues off the agenda of collective deliberation, they may well continue old, or even create new, restrictions on the freedoms of particular individuals or groups who are deemed insufficiently prepared or sufficiently dangerous to enjoy full citizenship status.'[31]

Looked at superficially, any of the nine Central European states seems to be either a *dictablanda* or a *democradura*. Numerous concrete indicators suggest that the achievement of Western liberal democratic standards is still lacking, in different degrees, in most of the Central European countries. As an example, consider one of

the most crucial resources the democratic sectors of civil society must resort to in order to expose and challenge non-democratic and anti-democratic forces -- the mass media. The mass media in Central Europe have undoubtedly gained much freedom since 1989. However, the tendency of élites throughout the area (in Hungary and Poland as much as in Romania and Bulgaria) to use public television as a weapon in political struggle is, perhaps, the most obvious example of limited democracy. Whatever their political colour, successive governments, including those made up of former opposition parties which denounced such attempts on the part of their political adversaries, have proved unable to resist the temptation to manipulate the most effective media. As a result, their functioning as a vehicle for unbiased information and communication with the various segments of society has been seriously affected almost everywhere.

The verdict of those who measure the democratic performance of Central Europe against Western ideals, and not against Western reality, is bound to be severe. Looked at through `the glasses of perfection', the Central European democracies seem to be at least a generation away from the day when they can join the Western security-community without spoiling it.

But a closer look at Western reality casts this conclusion into doubt. Western analysts themselves point out that the many faces of the West include `the apparently short-lived Ross Perot phenomenon in the United States, the regal presidency of the French Fifth Republic, pervasive political patronage and administrative chaos in Italy, a grossly disproportional system of representation in Britain, and arrogant governing parties, fragmented parliaments, and voter apathy at various times in most Western democracies.'[32] The strength of liberal democracy lies precisely in accommodating such variations while preserving the fundamental supremacy of the rule of law and free elections.

These observations suggest, for one thing, that when assessing the democratisation process in Central Europe, Western decision-makers and political scientists should not expect the nine to look alike. For another, they invite them to look beneath the surface of current events in any given new Central European democracy to see if there are or are not signs of incipient democratic consolidation.

Unlike liberalisation, democratisation is a complex historical process, and it is particularly important to distinguish between the period of transition and the period of democratic consolidation. Transition is a period of great political uncertainty, one especially fraught with the risk of reversion. Transition away from authoritarian rule features the drafting of methods or rules for resolving political conflicts peacefully, and may be considered to have ended when a new democracy has promulgated a new constitution and held free elections.

Although there are some slight deviations from this model, a successful transition to procedural democracy has undeniably taken place in all of the nine countries. The region has therefore clearly entered into the phase of democratic consolidation, and Western analysts are now beginning to recognise this. Earlier structural analyses whose pessimism about democratic change grew out of an obsession with `democracy's necessary and sufficient conditions' are giving way to process-oriented and action-oriented studies. Instead of treating democracy `as a particularly rare and

delicate plant that cannot be transplanted in alien soil, it is treated as a product that can be manufactured wherever there is democratic craftsmanship and the proper *zeitgeist*.'[33]

There is more than one road to consolidated democracy, and one should not expect uniformity in this phase any more than in the transitional phase. It would be strange, after all, to praise Central Europe's resistance to the Kremlin's systematic and stubborn efforts to impose uniformity on its former satellites, and to imagine that democratisation -- whose very essence is respect for diversity -- would make them identical.

The road to a consolidated democracy, i.e. to a democratic regime which is not only stable but also irreversible, will have its ups and downs, its specific sequences, in each country. What is important is the outcome. Therefore the degree to which each of the nine Associate Partner states enjoys the level of domestic stability necessary for engagement in the European security-community has to be measured against that outcome, and not against a temporary conjuncture. The more so, because -- as shown by a growing number of studies -- democratisation is neither a linear process, nor a totally rational one. It is a permanent battleground between its supporters and its adversaries.

A consolidated democracy is `one in which none of the major political actors, parties, or organised interests, forces, or institutions consider that there is any alternative to the democratic process to gain power, and no political institutions or groups have a claim to veto the action of democratically elected decision makers.'[34] Although the anti-democratic forces in each of the new Central European democracies succeed, now and then, in winning small battles and thereby postponing democratic consolidation, it is already obvious that these countries have no alternative to democracy. However disappointed public opinion may be with the economic performance of the new regimes, for the people of the nine free elections have already become the backbone of their countries' political life. In these circumstances, the prospects for those who would like to arrest democratic development to impose their will are dim.

Dictablandas and *democraduras*, therefore, are to be looked for not in Central Europe but in the area to its east. No impartial external observer could equate the political evolution of Central Europe with what is going on in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. For the time being, it is only in this south-eastern area of the Commonwealth of Independent States that referendums have been clearly preferred to free elections, and the authority of a strong ruler preferred to the rule of law. But that is the prospect waiting in the wings for almost any CIS member state.

The transition from procedural to consolidated democracy is underpinned throughout Central Europe by two strong, structural incentives. The more they complement each other, the better the prospects those countries have of becoming part of the solution rather than part of the problems facing the continent in the post-Cold War period.

The first incentive is a negative one. It has very much in common with the negative incentive which encouraged the emergence of the Western security-community -- the menace of Soviet expansionism. For the peoples of Central Europe it is the scars left

by that expansionism which play that role. In their case, over four decades of communism and Soviet domination, which brutally prevented them from resuming their earlier democratic evolution, works as a genuine antidote against the appeals of authoritarianism. The societies of the Central European countries have lived too long under totalitarian regimes to allow non-democratic governments to shape their destiny.

The other incentive, the positive one, is the prospect of integration with the West. It does not simply stem from a desire to enjoy Western living standards, but rather from a sense of belonging. To deny to any of the nine countries this sense of belonging, either by invoking `cultural-religious differences', or the difficulty for the EU or NATO of `swallowing' so many newcomers would be a risky choice, not only for the countries in question, but also for the Western countries, and indeed for the whole continent. Unfortunately, both these objections can be heard quite frequently in Western intellectual and political circles.

One of the main arguments of those who recommend `caution' is the prospect of ruining the West's security-community by bringing in outsiders, outsiders which are imperfectly democratic and have not attained in their mutual relations the predictability characteristic of Western countries. Much of this stems from a Western tendency to view Central Europe through what Vaclav Klaus calls `Sarajevo glasses'.[35] Too little attention is paid to the fact that no European country west of the former Soviet Union has a pattern of conflict even remotely as complex and explosive as that of former Yugoslavia.

As a rule, in post-Cold War Central Europe, inter-state tensions connected with minority problems stem from different approaches to ensuring the protection of ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity. Some Central European countries favour `collective rights' and ethnic autonomy. Others consider that such a solution would fuel rather than defuse latent tensions. It is to be hoped that with the adoption by the Council of Europe of the Framework Convention on minority protection these divergences over genuine European standards in this field will fade away.

Fortunately, many in the West do recognise the importance of openness to Central Europe in sustaining the momentum towards democratic consolidation. Recognising the advancement of the nine on the road to democratisation as well as their vital need for dialogue and cooperation with the Western institutions, the nine have now been admitted as full members of the Council of Europe, and Associate Partners of WEU, and have Association Agreements with the EU. Last but not least, without exception the Central European democracies actively take part in the Partnership for Peace programme, enabling them to adapt to NATO's standards and priorities.

Responsible political leaders in the West have also realised that the tendency to designate `favourite candidates' could be counterproductive. Referring, for example, to premature `nominations' for NATO membership, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher and US Secretary of Defence William Perry rightly insist, in a joint article, that `if we arbitrarily lock in advantages now for some countries, we risk discouraging reformers in countries not named and fostering complacency in countries that are. Indeed, the effect . . . could be instability in the very region whose security we seek to bolster.'[36]

Conclusion

It goes without saying that, as always, Central Europe is dependent on what the West is or is not prepared to do. At the same time, the West itself can hardly remain immune to developments further east.

At the time of writing, Russia's opposition to the eastward enlargement of NATO has intensified. As underlined by analysts from both Western and Central European countries, the main argument put forward by the Kremlin leaders against enlargement -- the supposed isolation of Russia -- is a disguise for their interest in perpetuating the *status quo*. Tomorrow, resorting to any convenient pretext and/or blackmail, the nostalgics of Russia's `natural' sphere of influence could summon the European Union and the Western European Union to revoke the status extended by them to the countries of Central Europe. In the existing circumstances, the maintenance of the *status quo* means the perpetuation of instability and uncertainty -- the main security risks confronting post-Cold War Europe.

In dealing with the states of Central Europe and their problems, Western Europe should not, perhaps, forget that the totalitarian experience suffered by their neighbours was part of the background which made possible the achievement of their own security-community. The West should also recall that behind its security-community there are over forty years of hard work and difficult compromises. The new democracies do not ask for forty years of `patience'. They only ask for the underpinning of their own efforts by those states and institutions which have mastered the `know-how' of a successful journey to a security-community. The more so, because, as Michael Sturmer has it:

`The world is too fragile a place to wait for the bad guys to test its fragility. It is better that the good guys -- those who insist on maintaining civil society on an international scale -- keep the initiative . . .'[37]

WHENCE THE THREAT TO PEACE IN EUROPE?

Pál Dunay[38]

Europe has never been a united continent. Historians have often divided it into three regions: Western, Central and Eastern Europe.[39] The frontiers between these regions marked the western and eastern perimeters of *Mitteleuropa*, including the territory of Poland and the Habsburg empire. This traditional three-way division was overshadowed by the East-West division after the end of World War II. Since bipolarity came to an end in the late 1980s Europe has remained divided, but the bipolar division has been replaced by a fragmentation which appears to recreate the three main historic regions. The frontiers of the three zones, however, are affected by the vanished bipolar order and thus cannot be precisely identified with the three historic regions.

Western Europe is woven through with multiple formal and informal ties, interconnected by treaties and by thriving economic, political and military cooperation. The level of integration and the prevalence of democracy provides stability in the region, and it is largely inconceivable that historic tensions and rivalries would re-emerge to endanger international security.[40] No state could credibly demonstrate that members of the Western security-community pose a military threat to any country in Europe, except perhaps to implement sanctions against an aggressor.

Central Europe is characterised by a certain political and socio-economic instability. This group of states is largely identical with the western peripheral states of the former East, encompassing probably ten countries: the former non-Soviet Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) member states, the three Baltic states and Slovenia. Even though the situation of these countries differs widely in many respects, there are some common elements in their international situation. They have succeeded in avoiding the military escalation of international disputes,[41] their political agenda has been dominated by non-military issues, and they all want to integrate into Western security institutions. Only the ten countries listed above seem to fit that description now, but other adjacent countries could join the zone of relative stability later. Croatia, for example, regards itself as part of this zone, but it is impossible to place a country living in the shadow of a territorial conflict liable to violent resolution in this Central group. It is also conceivable that stability could be undermined in one or more countries within the Central group, so that the number of states belonging to this zone to decrease rather than increase.

Eastern Europe consists of those former republics of the Soviet Union that belonged to the Soviet state on its dissolution and those former republics of Yugoslavia which are engaged in or exposed to violent conflicts. The common characteristics of these countries are that they are fighting local wars or have pending conflicts liable to violent escalation, military issues play a significant role on their political agenda and, since integration into Western institutions does not seem realistic in the foreseeable future, their conflict resolution culture is not determined by Western patterns.

If the above presentation of Europe's three regions is correct, and *Europa est omnis divisa in partes tres* (to paraphrase Julius Caesar), one can draw the preliminary conclusion that what we should aim at in Europe is not the unification of the old continent but a redrawing of the dividing lines.[42] The reason for not unifying Europe is not that there are forces which oppose unification, it is rather that the developments of recent years have proved that *unification is impossible.* This chapter will try to demonstrate that it is in the interest of the majority of OSCE Europe for those countries which can be integrated into the Western security-community to be integrated as soon as practicable. There are two reasons for this. First, many alleged impediments to integration are based either on pretexts or on misperceptions. Second, the integration of those states whose inclusion in the Western strategic community does not involve unacceptable security risks can itself contribute to the stabilisation of the Central European region.

Threat perceptions, strategies and doctrines in post-Cold War Europe

Western Europe

In November 1991, the North Atlantic Alliance adopted a new strategic concept reflecting the changed international environment. Participants of the Rome meeting, having taken into consideration the `radically improved strategic environment', concluded the following:

`Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The tensions that may result, as long as they remain limited, should not directly threaten the security and the territorial integrity of members of the Alliance. They could, however, lead to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security of the Alliance.'[43]

What are we to make of this? On the one hand, the observation that neither the potential sources of threat nor their origin can be identified easily is indisputable. On the other, however, the rather vague language reflects the fact that the sixteen NATO countries had no clear idea about realistic scenarios that could threaten their security. Neither was it entirely clear who the authors had in mind when they referred to the role of `outside powers' which could get involved in armed conflicts. The only power that might have been thought of was the then Soviet Union. Yet the strategic concept dealt with that country in a separate paragraph, noting that `its conventional forces are significantly larger than those of any other European State and its large nuclear arsenal comparable only with that of the United States.'[44] Thus the Soviet Union was mentioned in two capacities, as an outside power liable to become involved in armed conflicts and as a particular source of concrete military concerns. So apparently the only threat identified, albeit remote, was from the Soviet Union, and the Alliance did not foresee that any common action would be necessary if tensions in Central and Eastern Europe `remain limited', i.e. do not spill over to the territory of NATO members. This being rather unlikely, one can interpret the document as leaving the

essential function of the Alliance unchanged: to defend its members against the Soviet threat.

Such an approach carries two dangers. First, since a direct threat against the territory of the sixteen members of the Atlantic Alliance seems highly unlikely, it could result in its marginalisation; second, and more importantly, the unwillingness of NATO to get involved in `out-of-area' conflicts in Europe could give a misleading signal to the new democracies: that if they faced strategic intimidation they would have to rely on their own resources. Fortunately enough, the Alliance knows it has to cooperate with its former adversaries even if it wants to avoid being drawn into conflicts in the `East'.

The new NATO strategy seems to have misunderstood the post-Cold War European environment, and made a false assessment of potential threats. As a German analyst has written: `NATO analysed the sources of crises in Central and South Eastern Europe and on the periphery of the CIS as potential threats of a classic type . . . the same type as those in Northern Africa and Western Asia.'[45] According to Borinski the threat assessment was unrealistic, since it was highly unlikely that crises in the above areas would spill over to any member state of NATO. The war in former Yugoslavia, for example, has continued for more than four years, yet none of the neighbouring countries have become involved in this conflict and there is no sign whatsoever that it might pose a direct threat to any West European state. `Nothing was more alien from third parties, including all major European powers or security organisations, than to let themselves . . . [become] involved in these conflicts militarily, apart from a great deal of rhetorical threats and planning,' added Borinski.[46] Even though this prediction did not prove entirely correct -- international institutions, including NATO acting as a subcontractor of the United Nations, could not escape a certain, limited involvement in the Yugoslav conflict -- the horizontal escalation of the war has been prevented. There is no reason for the limited conflicts in former Yugoslavia or in the CIS to affect NATO's threat assessment.

In sum, if NATO interprets its security interests narrowly, limiting them to the territory of member states and to traditional military threats, it has no cause for concern, surrounded as it is by friendly countries that have neither the capability nor the intention to threaten NATO. It has to contemplate only the long-range power projection capacity of Russia, which does not seem threatening now but can be regarded as dangerous *in abstracto*. In the absence of a credible military threat, it is difficult to imagine what kind of eventuality NATO military planners can prepare for. Under such conditions the legitimacy of the organisation can be expected to diminish.

Eastern Europe

This area is at the opposite end of the spectrum. Whereas in Western and Central Europe military threats have remained abstract and remote, in Eastern Europe they are real. Several former Soviet republics are fighting interstate wars without much chance of resolving them peacefully. The decisive power of the region, Russia, which suffered the biggest loss in the post-Cold War realignment of international power relations, acts as a centre of gravity for those twelve countries which belonged to the Soviet Union when it was dissolved. Russia has both involved itself in conflicts on the territory of other republics of the former Soviet Union from Tajikistan to Georgia, and found it impossible to resist the temptation to use force to maintain the territorial

integrity of the Russian Federation. Three years after the dissolution of the USSR many analysts conclude that Russia is attempting to reintegrate the countries of the former Soviet Union, or, more precisely, the so-called `new abroad'.[47] The language of reintegration is inexact, however, in a community which has not disintegrated apart from the formal disintegration reflected in symbols of state sovereignty. It is better to speak of a more visible effort by an assertive Russia to tighten the community of the twelve former Soviet republics than about reintegration.

Many one-sided analyses of Russia's role in the region have been presented. A better balance is needed. On the one hand, official statements, such as the military doctrine of the Russian Federation adopted in late 1993, do recognise that the danger of aggression against Russia has decreased.[48] A fairly peaceful military posture could be developed from this. In fact, it should be acknowledged that under official military doctrine Russia has no imperialist intentions and prefers stability in the region. On the other hand, there is the practice followed by Russia. According to some analysts, elements of `a new Russian foreign policy' have begun to emerge since mid-1992.[49] After the shock of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, this new Russian foreign and security policy features a less pro-Western orientation, an insistence on recognition of Russia's special interests in the former USSR, and an assertion of the right to protect Russian minorities living outside Russia with force if necessary. From both theory and practice, then, one can conclude that states beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union need not feel threatened by Russia at present. The legitimate concerns of the world at large relate rather to Russia's military capacity, which certainly far exceeds the level required for self-defence, and Russia's domestic instability.

But does Russia fear the West? The long-standing image of a threatening West is difficult to maintain in the light of the fact that the Western powers cooperate extensively with Russia in many fields, including military security and regional conflict resolution. Attention tends to focus on `the enlargement of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the military security of the Russian Federation,' the expansion of NATO into Central Europe, which is perceived in Russia as potentially so adverse to their interests.[50]

Russia has more reason to fear the `southern threat', the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and the eventual horizontal escalation of conflicts in former Soviet republics to the territory of Russia. As wars continue in different places in the vicinity and also on the territory of Russia, notably in Chechnya, the country does not need to make any special efforts to depict the situation as deeply troubled. Russia claims exclusive rights in the management of crises in the former Soviet area, following a classic spheres of influence approach recalling the Monroe Doctrine. Russia's selective engagement in the management of conflicts from Moldova to Tajikistan via Georgia and Azerbaijan has a distinctly imperial character, but it can also be legitimately represented as peacemaking. After all, Russia is alone in being ready and willing to participate in conflict resolution in the CIS area. It is Russia or nothing; in some cases, Russia or endless killing. The real issue is how to monitor conflict management in the former Soviet area while avoiding legitimising Russian aggression.

Central Europe

Military planners in Central Europe, unlike their Western counterparts, do not have to worry about the absence of a credible threat. Their problems are different. The military security situation of Central Europe has a number of paradoxical features. It is frequently suggested that security has diminished in the region, in so far as while they were under the `protective umbrella' of the Soviet Union no one dared challenge the Central European countries militarily. But of course it was the Soviet Union that posed the biggest threat to the security of the region by imposing a regime on these nations they did not choose themselves. All international military conflicts in Central Europe between 1953 and 1968 involved the Soviet Union.

Since the end of the East-West conflict, countries of the region have identified two sources of military risk. First, the re-emergence of revanchism in the Soviet Union and later Russia; second, the military escalation of low intensity political conflicts within the region. The level of the former concern has changed several times. It reached its peak during the August 1991 Moscow coup. The dissolution of the Soviet Union put the Central Europeans at ease temporarily as Russia, the core of the power of the Soviet Union, was geographically separated from most Central European countries. Later, as Russia has started to pursue an imperialist policy and to implement it forcefully in the near abroad, fear of the Russian desire to be recognised as a great power in its former sphere of influence in Central Europe has increased. In general the Central Europeans do not perceive a concrete military threat but rather an abstract danger with a military component. The real fear is that the West will give in, and recognise certain special Russian prerogatives in Central European affairs. This would certainly be contrary to the interests of the Central European states, which all want to find their place in the future as close to the West and as far from the East as possible.

The strength of this threat perception is hard to pin down. One analyst has observed:

`It is easy to get the impression that different threats are presented to different audiences, depending on the circumstances. One day the audience is confronted with a vision of domestic anarchy and foreign aggression. Another day the same politicians describe their country as exceptionally stable and surrounded by peaceful neighbours . . . the latter vision is usually presented to Western bankers and investors; the former to security experts.'[51]

If the primary purpose of presenting such a gloomy picture of the security situation of the region was to attract the attention of the West, get support to modernise the defence sector of the Central European countries, and win security guarantees from Western security institutions, the attempt has failed. Indeed, this sort of presentation has contributed to an impression prevalent in Western thinking that the region east of the Elbe is inherently unstable.

The idea of a `security vacuum' in Central Europe has had similarly damaging consequences. If one assumes that the collapse of the WTO resulted in a security vacuum that had not existed before, this implies that the Eastern bloc provided security for its members. Such an assumption is certainly false since, as was mentioned above, for most members of the WTO it meant they were deprived of their

right to self-determination. The notion of a security vacuum also appears to imply that the situation is temporary; sooner or later some new order will succeed, some great power will fill the vacuum.[52] But this is a purely semantic argument. In reality, there is no security vacuum, only a failure of adaptation and decision-making. Most states of the region were deprived of the experience of formulating independent security and defence policies for decades, and are consequently finding the already difficult challenge of adapting to post-Cold War circumstances further aggravated. Problems such as the shortage of modern, adequate military equipment have been exacerbated by the fact that no state of the former WTO had experience in national strategic-military planning.[53]

Thus the Central Europeans face multiple security problems, and under the new conditions have hardly any chance of solving them without external support. This means integration or at least close cooperation with those states and institutions that possess the necessary equipment and knowledge to facilitate solutions. The new Central European establishments which have come to power following the revolutions of 1989 understand this much very clearly. But what they have not recognised is the `Catch 22' situation they are up against. The more instability there is in and around a country, and hence the greater its need to integrate in security institutions and seek security guarantees, the less likely it is that its quest for integration will be successful. Stability is in effect a precondition of integration.

As the countries of Central Europe have similar threat perceptions, it is not surprising that their defence policies, as reflected in their defence doctrines and official pronouncements, have some common features. They all declare that no country is regarded as their enemy and that their military preparations are not directed against any country. Consequently, they are committed to the idea of a *tous azimuts* defence posture that would allow them to counter aggression from any direction. This official position is maintained in spite of the fact that *tous azimuts* is well known to be a weak defence doctrine. It is probable, however, that in the classified part of the defence doctrines and strategic plans, sources of military threats are identified more specifically, including countries of priority concern. All the Central Europeans declare that they will continue to respect their obligations not to possess weapons of mass destruction. They are all committed to decreasing the size of their armed forces, while improving their effectiveness by increasing mobility. The procurement of defensive weaponry, such as air defence, takes priority.

The two other Slavic republics of the former Soviet Union, Belarus and Ukraine, attract the attention of countries to their west both in their own right and as countries which connect and separate Russia with and from Central Europe. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, both former Soviet republics tried to consolidate their independent status in international relations. This was reflected in the military doctrine of Belarus adopted in late 1992, which declared neutrality as one of the principles of the country's international relations. Similarly, it was expressed in the early attempts of Ukraine to keep a distance from Moscow and open up to the countries to its west.

These efforts were thwarted. Members of the Belarussian leadership questioned whether the country could afford to maintain a national army strong enough to repulse any likely threat, and whether the military industry of Belarus could function without

close cooperation with its Russian partners. A further constraint on the freedom of action of Belarus is that Russian strategic forces will be stationed on its territory until the turn of the century. Ukraine's return to a closer relationship with Russia took place later and was due to somewhat different reasons. Independence in security affairs might have been maintained, despite Western hostility to the idea of a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent, but the Moscow-centric attitude of some major Western powers, in particular that of the United States in 1992-93, sent a clear message to the leadership in Kiev. Dependence on Russia in economic affairs, most spectacularly in the supply of energy, has become obvious. Furthermore, following the elections in 1994 the new Ukrainian leadership, including the President, are well aware that their coming to power was partly due to their conciliatory attitude towards Moscow.

This survey of threat assessments and perceptions in Europe's three regions prepares us for the main subject of this chapter: the perceived threat to the stability of Western Europe posed by the integration of Central Europe into the European security-community and its institutions.

The `threat' posed by Central Europe

Few security risks, real or perceived, are to be found in the integrated western part of Europe. The whole area is remarkably stable, posing no military threat to any country either inside or outside the group of states. Although two members of NATO -- Greece and Turkey -- have been involved in a long-running conflict over Cyprus and other territorial issues, and although certain historical pretensions are resurfacing in Greece and in Italy in the wake of Macedonian and Slovenian statehood, no one seems particularly worried about any of this. These countries have stable market economies and established democratic political institutions, their military strategy is not offensive, and they are integrated in international institutions like NATO and the EU. They form the core of a security-community which serves as centre of gravity for countries adjacent to that region.

In contrast, the region east of the Elbe has been regarded as unstable since the end of bipolarity. Two sources of instability have been mentioned particularly frequently: ethnic conflicts and territorial claims. It is true that the Cold War order merely suppressed ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe as inconsistent with the declared internationalist values of the so-called socialist countries, and did not tackle their root causes. Thus, there was some reason to fear that these conflicts might reappear on the international scene when the forced cohesion of the WTO bloc broke down. Territorial claims were also unimaginable during the East-West conflict, which froze the territorial *status quo*. The fact that state borders (e.g. the borders of Hungary and Poland) were imposed on many countries of Central Europe by outside powers also gave grounds for concern.

Nationalism and ethnic conflict

Nationalism had a positive function in the Central European revolutions of 1989.[54] It was used against foreign political and military domination, against the empire of the Soviet Union, even though by that time the Soviet empire was not resisting the Central European nations' drive for independence. Nationalism was also a reaction to the internationalist ideology of the communist movement, and played a mobilising

role that aided the new leadership of countries of the region in building parliamentary democracy under very severe economic conditions. There was a need for an ideology which could be easily understood by broad strata of the populace and around which a consensus could be built. Nationalism, and nothing else, could meet these requirements.

If nationalism served such positive aims in Central Europe, the question is why the world at large has been so concerned about its re-emergence. Nationalism can take different forms, of course, from benign patriotism to malign chauvinism. The worries of the West arose because it did not have an extensive knowledge of the politics of each country, could not judge what form nationalism would take, and was alarmed by the frequently harsh rhetoric of newly elected and inexperienced political leaders. To establish the extent to which regional nationalism carries a real danger of ethnic conflict, three factors have to be taken into consideration.

First, the nationalism of ethnic minority groups which form the majority in another country carries more severe risks than the nationalism of groups which cannot count on the effective support of a nation represented by a state. Hence, ethnic conflicts involving, for example, the gypsy population of a country do not pose a direct threat to stability and security and are more a matter of human rights. But conflicts involving, say, Russians in other CIS countries or Hungarians in Transylvania do have security relevance and can endanger the fragile stability of the region.

Second, there is a significant difference between minorities dispersed over a large geographical area, mixed with other, in most cases majority groups, and minorities settled in separable entities in the vicinity of the mother nation. Whereas the former case is not susceptible to territorial solution by secession, the latter may stir the dreams of nationalist politicians. That is why an increasing number of analysts, including the author, are of the opinion that the risks of serious ethnic conflict associated with the approximately two million Hungarians in Transylvania have been significantly overestimated.

Third, the former Eastern bloc cannot be treated as a unit. What we have experienced since the end of the Cold War is that though ethnic conflicts characterise both the former non-Soviet WTO area and the former Soviet Union, and dominate the security agenda of each, there is a fundamental difference between the two in the management of ethnic conflict. Despite the intolerant rhetoric in Central Europe concerning minorities and ethnic issues, conflicts have remained exclusively political in the former non-Soviet WTO area, with no danger of military escalation.[55] In the former Soviet Union, in contrast, ethnic conflicts have almost automatically escalated into military conflicts.

It is also worth noting that Hungary, the Central European country where the statements of senior politicians gave most grounds for concern between 1990 and 1994, voted at its second democratic elections for a government which obviously does not want to endanger its most important foreign policy priority, Western integration, by making destabilising statements concerning minorities. Although Hungary is a natural *demandeur*, a country with more than three million ethnic brethren in minority status in neighbouring countries and only a tiny percentage of minorities in its own

population, ethnic rivalry has never even remotely threatened to escalate to military conflict since the end of the Cold War.

Territorial claims

The other most frequently mentioned source of instability in the Central European region is the re-emergence of territorial claims. If there are states which explicitly or implicitly lay claim to the territory of other states, we have to ask whether any of them would consider the use of force to attain their objectives, or whether they would rely exclusively on peaceful means. Study of official statements confirms that no state in Central Europe has gone so far as to say that it wants to change borders by force, but a certain ambivalence has been noticeable concerning peaceful border revisions. Most countries declare that they have no territorial claims whatsoever. Poland has emphasised that it `considers its borders to be immutable and has no territorial claims against its neighbours.'[56] In the Czech Republic, the only issue that gives ground for certain limited concerns from time to time has been the Sudeten German problem. In this respect the Czech leadership, setting an example others might be well advised to follow, is careful to emphasise the distinction between the position of neighbouring countries and that of non-state actors: `[w]ith regard to the demands of the Sudeten German association, the Czech government will not allow any change in the legally determined frontier for purposes of restitution.'[57] The other successor state of Czechoslovakia, the Slovak Republic, has some concerns about possible territorial claims by Hungary, but has been ready to proclaim that for its part it `has no territorial claims on any nation's territory.'[58]

The Romanian leadership faces a complex situation. While it could formulate demands on Bessarabia, and some forces would certainly be willing to do that, it could also itself be the object of territorial claims. The Romanian leadership has emphasised that Romania and Moldova are two independent states, but their sensitivities can be felt nevertheless. As state secretary of the Defence Ministry, Ioan Pascu emphasised:

`The Helsinki document stipulates that borders are not to be modified through the use of force; such changes are permitted only if the parties involved agree to them. The first such modification, in fact, already took place when Germany was permitted to reunify in October 1990. Other such territorial transformations, however, also took place. Former federal states -- particularly the USSR and Czechoslovakia -- have disintegrated. These processes were, at first, generally peaceful because existing internal borders were maintained and became, automatically, international borders . . . However, Yugoslavia is a special case. Not only has that country broken down violently; internal warfare, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, has further created a dangerous precedent. With the conflict raging on, an increasing number of voices are advocating territorial changes since no other solutions seem in sight. Were such territorial shifts completed, a powerful legal precedent contradicting the Helsinki Final Act would be created, by which other (provoked or unprovoked) conflicts could be "solved" in the future.'[59]

It is worth analysing the position of the Romanian politician, among other reasons because it can be assumed to represent a mainstream view in Bucharest. His clear rejection of the revision of borders by threat or use of force helps allay concerns about

the military escalation of territorial disputes, but at the same time there is a readiness to contemplate peaceful, negotiated border changes. This reflects the realism of Romanian politics on the issue. Their approach leaves the door open for an eventual unification of Romania and Moldova if the latter also finds this acceptable, without running the risk of a territorial challenge from Hungary.

The first post-communist government of Hungary failed to give clear-cut guarantees that it would not seek to revise borders by peaceful means, and sometimes used an unfortunate, intolerant rhetoric that alarmed the leaders of Romania, Slovakia and Yugoslavia. On several occasions, Prime Minister Antall reiterated that he would like to be the premier of 15 million Hungarians in spirit.[60] On one occasion he specifically mentioned that Vojvodina belonged to Yugoslavia and not to Serbia; thus if the federation dissolved, the status of Vojvodina could be subject to reconsideration.[61] The security policy concept adopted by the Hungarian Parliament in early 1993 by consensus of the six parties is studiously ambiguous:

`we reject both the alteration *by force* of existing borders and artificial alteration of the ethnic consistency of the population by any means, not only in the Carpathian Basin but in the whole Central and Eastern European region.'[62]

Hungary has nevertheless now concluded two treaties with neighbouring states dealing with the territorial issue. The treaty of 6 December 1991 with Ukraine states that both parties mutually respect each other's borders and have no territorial claims either at present or in the future, which means borders cannot be revised either by peaceful or non-peaceful means.[63] The treaty was ratified by the Ukrainian Parliament on 1 July 1992, and, after heated debate, in the Hungarian Parliament in May 1993.

The government formed following the 1994 parliamentary elections went further and completed the more difficult negotiations leading to a treaty with Slovakia, signed in Paris in March 1995, which also confirms the permanence of the existing international border. Even though it may take longer to conclude the outstanding, and most problematic treaty, with Romania, senior politicians and official documents have on a number of occasions reiterated Hungary's willingness to settle this matter. The Foreign Ministry declared officially that:

`*[a]part from recognition of existing borders and mutual renunciation of territorial claims, the basic treaties* should contain recognition, guarantees and political assertion of the rights of national minorities living in each other's countries, in line with the norms of the Council of Europe and the CSCE.'[64]

The Stability Pact

The different cooperation frameworks developed by the West to engage the former East in most cases aim at developing cooperation *between* the West and the East. Arrangements of this type include the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the Associated Partner status offered by the WEU, and NATO's Partnership for Peace. No specific programme has been developed to tackle potential sources of conflict between the countries of Central Europe: the ethnic rivalries and territorial claims which were regarded by the West as most severely endangering security in Europe.

The so-called `Balladur plan' aimed to fill the gap. The original initiative was met with mixed reactions in Central Europe, as it explicitly referred to the possibility of `minor border modifications' and `collective minority rights', two ideas disliked by many countries that have significant minorities and borders imposed by unequal peace treaties. Within a year of the May 1994 inaugural conference of the Stability Pact, the nine Central European countries (the six former non-Soviet members of the WTO and the three Baltic states) invited to participate were expected to conclude bilateral or regional treaties regulating *inter alia* good-neighbourly relations `including questions related to frontiers and minorities'.[65] The EU expressed `its readiness to play the role of moderator in the bilateral talks at the request of the interested parties'.[66] Some Eastern countries wanted to abandon the process, but the EU made it clear that such a step would jeopardise the offending state's prospects for integration into European institutions.

Two regional `round tables' were formed under the auspices of the document, one for the Baltic region and one for the other Central European countries. The most important purpose of the whole exercise, however, was to regulate minority and border problems bilaterally. States reluctant to hold high-profile talks on these issues announced their unwillingness to conclude the so-called basic treaties in the framework of the Stability Pact. Hungary, in contrast, favoured the involvement of the EU in the bilateral talks in the hope it could thereby achieve a more satisfactory outcome concerning the rights of the Hungarian minorities in Slovakia and Romania.

The purpose of the exercise was nothing less than the `final resolution' of ethnic and territorial problems, confirming the current borders in order to close the issue once and for all. But the Pact is likely to have more impact on the territorial issue than on the issue of minority rights. No new enforcement or monitoring measures have been created to guarantee the observation of the minority rights set out in the bilateral agreements. In this most sensitive area of European stability, there has been no breakthrough, and the final result of the conference falls far short of the original expectations and ambitions of its initiator. Indeed the high-profile interest in the Stability Pact in certain cases proved counterproductive, merely drawing attention to the gap between some neighbouring states concerning the treatment of minorities. Nevertheless, the Pact is on the whole a positive development, a contribution to dialogue and improved relations between the neighbouring countries of the region.[67]

It is one of the main arguments of this paper that the dangers created by territorial and minority issues in Central Europe are exclusively political. Military escalation has been and will continue to be confined to the two former federations, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. That is why, though it is not irrelevant to initiate a programme to eliminate ethnic and territorial conflict sources, it is doubtful whether it made sense to focus the Pact on the nine countries of Central Europe. Regulating these issues in Central Europe by treaty cannot further eliminate a military risk that did not exist in the first place.

The danger of territorial claims and ethnic conflicts has been frequently mentioned as an obstacle to the security integration of Central Europe with the West. In light of the above, this argument sounds more convincing for Eastern than for Central Europe.

The renationalisation of defence

There is a third commonly expressed concern: the danger of (re)nationalisation of security and defence policies in the region. Renationalisation has been a fact since the dissolution of the WTO, itself a development few deplore, with the exception of hard-line communists and Russian great power nationalists. After ridding themselves of an alliance of subjugation, it is understandable that the Central European countries did not want to rush into another integrated structure that could threaten a similar arrangement. When the failure to introduce an effective collective security system in Europe became evident soon after the end of the East-West conflict, the Central European countries had two possibilities: to rely on their own resources in military affairs or to try to accede to a Western security organisation. As the latter attempt met with no early success, nationalisation of security was unavoidable in Central Europe. Even though nationalisation carries certain dangers, whether they remain abstract or become real depends on two factors: the content of national military concepts and strategies, and the transparency of military plans. As long as political relations are normal, and military plans are defensive and mutually transparent, there is no reason to be worried about the mere fact of nationalisation. The danger of nationalisation is another myth that is cited in analyses of European security. A country with a nationalised defence policy based on peaceful intentions and without offensive military capabilities is certainly preferable to a denationalised offensive military bloc.

This issue can be looked at from another angle. If it is true that territorial claims and conflicts over minorities do not threaten the stability of Central Europe, which is not the case in Eastern Europe, defence policies and capabilities acquire great importance in the security integration of these countries. If they are not only willing to integrate but ready to take concrete steps to achieve this, nationalised defence policies may prove a hindrance to integration and have to be reconsidered. No country opted for nationalisation willingly, however, and the Central European states would all be ready to give it up in exchange for participation in Western security institutions. Even if this is deferred, the West has the opportunity to influence the security and defence policies of these countries by acting as a centre of gravity, a focal point for the development of security policies and defence instruments. The armed forces in Central European countries want to modernise in the direction of the organisation the countries of the region want to join, namely NATO. Unfortunately, modernisation requires investment in the defence sector, and no resources are likely to be made available for this purpose in the current fiscal climate in the region. Nevertheless, renationalised defence policies can evolve gradually in the right direction if Western security institutions remain supportive.

Conclusion: the relevance of military security in the new Europe

Let us not belittle the importance of military issues in the new Europe. It is a fact that for certain countries in Eastern Europe and for some successor states of former Yugoslavia military issues are the decisive ones. But military questions are not decisive either for Western or for Central Europe. The West can feel relieved it does not have to devote too much energy and extensive resources to provide for its own defence. Central Europe faces serious problems, but not ones stemming from severe imminent military threats.

This chapter has argued for differentiation between Central Europe and Eastern Europe. The former political East is not a single entity, and should not be treated as such. There is no chance for the unification of Europe in the foreseeable future either from the Atlantic to the Urals or from Vancouver to Vladivostok. The years that have passed since the revolutions in Central Europe have demonstrated that there is no basis for establishing collective security in practice, whether global or regional.

In this chapter the shared conviction of most experts and politicians has been stated that the countries belonging to the Euro-Atlantic community are stable domestically, and face no major external challenges, let alone threats. Beyond the economic performance of the West European states, their integration and their stability contribute to the gravitational pull of the Western community. It is no surprise that the new democracies regard the western part of the continent as a centre of gravity.

The `approach' of Central Europe has begun but it would be difficult to predict when, under what conditions, and in what sequence this will lead to their integration into the West European order. During the early years of the post-Cold War era an almost exclusive emphasis was put on institutional aspects. It is much more important, however, to concentrate on the underlying factors fostering, and those impeding the process of defining the new boundaries of integrated Europe. The desire of the Central European countries to integrate is a reflection of their commitment to modernisation. Their attitude to tackling certain (but alas, not all) issues of international relations has already been affected by their commitment to meeting Western expectations and reaching the standards of post-industrial democracies.

The integration of Central Europe into Western security institutions is part of the region's broader goals. The fact that countries of the region are not threatened militarily and that their stability has been endangered much more by internal factors since the end of the East-West conflict does not mean that their integration is unnecessary. It is necessary for two crucial reasons. First, because belonging to the `family of Western democracies' in the field of security can send a message to the world at large that economic cooperation with the Central European countries does not carry unacceptable political risk. At the moment this may be the single most important reason. Second, because the security integration of a part of the former East is an insurance policy, a policy whose real value will be proven only if things go wrong.

For those parts of Central and Eastern Europe which cannot be integrated into Western security institutions, either in the first group or in the foreseeable future, a different policy has to be developed. For those states that can be integrated later it has to be made clear that it depends on them when they can join. For those whose integration seems impossible an alternative programme has to be developed, to sweeten the bitter pill. This, indeed, is the crucial challenge for the future of security in Europe, the challenge of developing cooperative rather than confrontational relations between the countries which participate in integration and the countries which do not.

LIMITS AND OPPORTUNITIES AT THE EASTERN EDGE

Andris Ozolins[68]

How far can the eastward expansion of the European security-community go? This chapter focuses on the possibility of the Baltic states' membership of the institutions of the European security-community, and examines the role of Russia in the dynamics of expansion.

The imperative of expansion

The current period of transition in the international system offers an opportunity for new, constructive solutions to national and international problems, especially from the perspective of the Central and East European countries, which suffered most from the artificial stability created by the Cold War world order. Most of these states, including the Baltic states, believe that the only way to escape the insecurity and instability still present in the region is to achieve full political, economic and military integration into the West European order and its institutions, in order to become established members of the European security-community.

The belief that an eastward expansion policy would strengthen European security is supported by a three-level analysis of the current continental dynamics -- West-West, East-East, and East-West.[69]

The West-West level is characterised by a challenge of coherence. Western countries have begun to reassess their interests in a new set of circumstances. One group of nations finds itself more worried about developments in the East, while others are more absorbed in events on Europe's southern periphery. In the Yugoslav war, too, different Western countries have very different perspectives on the conflict. The `under-the-table' activities of the Western countries are thus often aimed in different directions, creating tension and, ultimately, a split among allies. It has even been argued that a threatening and hostile `East' was a precondition for the very existence of `the West', and that its shared civilisation, system of values and political institutions will not be enough to sustain the political unity of the West in the new international environment.

The East-East level is characterised by a challenge of conflict resolution and dispute management. The end of the Cold War has opened the door to numerous potential sources of conflict that were artificially suppressed under the Soviet system. As Jeffrey Simon comments, many Western countries view Central and Eastern Europe as a security nightmare, shot through with religious, political, economic and ethnic hatred.[70] Pál Dunay has shown in his chapter that most of these fears are groundless, and that Central and Eastern Europe is successfully managing and controlling regional issues. Nevertheless, the violent disintegration of parts of the former Yugoslav and Soviet federations means that the East-East challenge remains at the top of the European security agenda.

The East-West level is characterised by a challenge of cooperation. How can the immense improvement in international relations in Europe made possible when the Iron Curtain fell and Soviet armed forces withdrew from Central and Eastern Europe be consolidated? The fragile security situation of a vulnerable and underdeveloped region, only recently liberated from Soviet domination and inadequately grounded in international structures was characterised as early as 1991 by the Czechoslovak president, Vaclav Havel, as a security vacuum. While many analysts query some of the implications of the metaphor, most agree with the core of Havel's phrase and believe that peace in Europe does depend on the functional and institutional integration of the region into European security structures.

For the security vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe will not last long. If the countries of the region do not achieve a reliable security shield in the near future, they may fall under external domination, in which case the successor regimes would probably be hostile to the West. In that event, the East's victory over communism and the West's victory in the Cold War will have been short-lived. Resources which were invested in achieving these victories would be lost, the Central and East European states would partly or fully lose their newly won sovereignty and the West would be faced with a new East-West conflict.

The challenges of the West-West and East-East levels can only be met at the East-West level. Successful East-West cooperation and integration can give new purpose and identity to the West, and settle potential sources of conflict in the East. The expansion of the European security-community and its supporting institutions is the appropriate and only viable multi-level strategy.

Participation in Western institutions should not be seen as a prize for achieved stability and democracy, but rather a means of reaching these objectives. The transition to democracy, liberalism and free-market economic policies will be at risk if the Central and East European countries remain uncertain about their security and have to live with the threat of being drawn into external conflicts or even subjected to military attack. In this connection it is worth remembering some German history. The inclusion of Germany in the Council of Europe, the Western European Union, NATO, the European Community and other postwar organisations was a result of wise policy after World War II which, in stark contrast to the exclusionary policies adopted after World War I, helped to ensure Germany's development along the path of democracy and liberalism and in a similar sense that of Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey.

Furthermore, the leading Western countries bear some moral responsibility for the half century of damage visited upon many European nations by the Yalta agreement and other deals with the Soviet Union. In the eyes of many Central and East Europeans, only open policies today can expiate this and create conditions for fruitful cooperation in future.

This is not to deny the legitimate difficulties that early expansion would involve. It will remain difficult to convince those politicians and peoples who are sceptical about expansion, particularly about the necessity of expanding the scope of the Washington Treaty and the Brussels Treaty at a time when they can see no real threats to the security of NATO member countries, nor indeed any immediate, direct threats to the

security of Central and Eastern Europe. Many feel that such steps would reduce rather than increase the security level in Europe.

The institutions of the security-community could themselves suffer from premature expansion. The absorption into NATO of new countries which are incompatible in terms of military organisation, structure and equipment would weaken NATO's integrated military structure, and a similar argument can be made with respect to the possible inclusion of Central and East European nations in the EU's multi-faceted system of economic integration. New member states would not be economically, technically or financially prepared to carry out their obligations *vis-à-vis* the Alliance or the Union. The Alliance and Union, for their part, would lose much of their military and economic (and, therefore, political) unity, and find it difficult to meet their own obligations and reach their own goals -- all this at a time when the Western nations would be hard pressed to find the financial resources needed to overcome these problems.

So agreement among Western nations on the possible participation of new nations in their security structures is not to be expected. There are legitimate arguments against moving too quickly, as well as good reasons for urgency. The difficulties can be overcome only if the political will exists on both sides, and this can only come about if multiple human contacts and institutional and non-institutional links are established between East and West. These ties between governments and peoples, alongside the development of democracy and stability in the region, can be the major catalyst for integration at the level of high politics. This conclusion is borne out by the Baltic experience.

The position of the Baltic states

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are small countries located next to a great power, one which has over the last two centuries tried to dominate the region. The Baltic states, like all of Central Europe, were fully independent states before World War II, and members of the League of Nations. But Baltic independence lasted for a scant twenty years before the secret agreements of the late 1930s and early 1940s led not just to the limited encroachment upon sovereignty which was the fate of a number of other countries, but to its complete loss, with no chance of re-establishing even partial independence after the war.

The region's geopolitical situation, the experience of history, and the political rhetoric of leading contemporary politicians in Russia all combine to put security concerns at the top of the political agenda in the Baltic states. In security terms, their strategic goal has been to assume a position in the European security structure which would secure their statehood on a permanent basis.

Between 1989 and 1991, when Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were waging their battle for restored independence, the idea of Baltic neutrality was widespread and popular. Soon after independence was regained, however, the idea of neutrality was abandoned in all three nations as it was considered inappropriate to Baltic security requirements. Formal neutrality would have involved a commitment that the Baltic states would never join alliances or allow foreign forces on their territory, and was not seen as a satisfactory basis for security. In addition, there was growing uncertainty, and not just

in the Baltic region, about what exactly neutrality meant in an age when East-West confrontation had diminished so sharply. But the deciding factor in rejecting neutrality was the historical memory of the events which had led to the demise of Baltic independence in 1940 -- a time when Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were all pursuing policies of neutrality.

In the place of neutrality, all three Baltic states have preferred a strategy of counter-alliance, seeking integration into an alliance or community of larger states in order to strengthen their position in relations with Russia. Since August 1991, when the formal independence of the three republics was achieved, their goal has been full political, economic and military integration into the West European order and institutions. An implicit, sometimes vaguely formulated, but overriding concern behind the policy of integration has been to establish as close a cooperation with the West as possible in order to counterbalance Russia's influence.

In order to seek opportunities to broaden their security, the Balts first and foremost turned to two key elements in the European security architecture -- the Atlantic Alliance and the overall process of European integration as manifested in the EU and WEU.

The Atlantic Alliance is widely regarded in the former `Eastern Europe' as the most successful of all security organisations, and this view is shared in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. By the beginning of 1992, all three Baltic states had informally expressed a firm interest in joining NATO. Two possibilities were considered -- full membership, or, failing that, some form of security guarantee of their independence.

But the West and NATO were far less enthusiastic about these ideas than were Baltic politicians. Although some NATO officials (such as General Sir Brian Kenny, who visited the Baltics in 1992 while serving as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe) foresaw eventual NATO membership for the Baltic states, they were always careful to add that this would not occur as rapidly as many Balts hoped[71]. The late NATO Secretary-General Manfred Wörner said during a March 1992 visit to Latvia that `although we don't exclude future membership . . . it is not on the agenda.'[72]

NATO has not changed this position with respect to the Baltic states, and even in the latter months of 1994, when NATO expansion was again high on the international agenda, the Baltic states were hardly mentioned at all. As recently as the beginning of 1995, senior NATO diplomats and officials made it very clear that extending NATO membership into the former Soviet Union, including the Baltics, was almost inconceivable for the next decade or more.[73]

At one stage the Baltics had similar difficulties with the European Union. After agreements on trade, commercial and economic cooperation (signed in May 1992) came into effect on 1 February 1993, the Balts felt that the time was ripe to begin negotiating association agreements with the EC. In June 1993, meeting under the aegis of the Baltic States Council in Jurmala, Latvia, the presidents of all three Baltic states signed a statement calling on EC member countries to start negotiations concerning EU Association Agreements for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.[74] The European Council responded with a resolution charging the EC Commission with the task of preparing proposals for a free trade agreement with the Baltic states. The

refusal to start negotiations on Association Agreements decided at the EC's Copenhagen summit in June 1993 was never fully explained and was felt as a painful defeat by Baltic policy-makers and analysts, especially given the fact that the EC had concluded association agreements with Romania and Bulgaria at the beginning of the year.

These events show that after their initial successes,[75] the Balts learned in the second half of 1992 and throughout 1993 that there would be no more quick victories in the international arena, and that the goals set by Baltic politicians in terms of high politics would not be reached as easily. This is true to a degree for the region as a whole, but the position of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania is made peculiarly difficult by several special complicating factors.

First, there is the vexed matter of the `Russian veto'. This is much more pertinent to the Baltics than it is to the other Central and East European countries. The desire of the West not to provoke Russia (which some commentators in the Baltics have characterised as a policy of appeasement) takes on a considerably different tone when it involves the Baltic states because on a *de facto* level, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, unlike the satellite states, were part of the Soviet Union. Moreover, and also unlike most of the other states of Central Europe,[76] the Baltic republics have shared borders with the Russia Federation. Some researchers also believe that the Baltic states are strategically important to Russia because of their location on the south-eastern shore of the Baltic Sea. This not only offers access to the sea via six ice-free ports, but also means that the shore is uncomfortably close to Russia's second city, St Petersburg. Furthermore, the only road which leads to Russia's heavy militarised Kaliningrad enclave passes through Lithuania.

The extreme concentration of military forces in the Kaliningrad enclave, sandwiched between Lithuania and Poland, is one of the most important sources of insecurity in the region since the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic states was completed in 1994. On 13 November 1994 the Baltic Assembly, which consists of representatives of the three Baltic parliaments, adopted a resolution calling for demilitarisation of Kaliningrad and stating that the demilitarisation of the region was `a necessary element in the process of security in Central Europe and Europe in general.'[77]

Secondly, there is the minority question, one of the most complex in Central and Eastern Europe. A historic feature of the region lying east of Germany and west and south of Russia is the presence of numerous ethnic minorities. But from the Western viewpoint, Estonia and Latvia are faced with more than merely delicate ethnic relations between the indigenous population and some other ethnic group; in their case, the ethnic group in question is the Russians, whose defence has been undertaken by Russia, a country which is still a crucial factor in European security. The proportion of Russians in the Baltic states is indeed sizeable, especially in Estonia (30% of the total population) and Latvia (33%).

It is important to understand, however, that these are not historical minorities in the Baltic republics, but rather the result of a planned, systematic action which began along with the annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1940. During the 1940s, the pre-war Latvian population was reduced by about 35% by death, Soviet or Nazi

deportation, or flight to the West. Estonia and Lithuania suffered similarly. Vacated dwellings where occupied by soldiers and workers transferred from the Soviet Union. Since the Soviet occupation, the Russian-speaking population in Latvia has grown from 12% to 42%, in Estonia from 8% to 35% and in Lithuania from 2.5% to 12%.

This Baltic experience does not exactly facilitate inter-ethnic harmony, but there is also no basis for the charges from Moscow that `mass violations of human rights' and `discrimination against ethnic Russians' are occurring. This has been shown by rapporteurs from the Council of Europe, by fact-finding missions from the United Nations and by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. Swedish former Prime Minister Carl Bildt has written in *Foreign Affairs* that `given the brutal history of occupation and deportation, the smoothness of relations between native Estonians or Latvians and Russian immigrants is surprising.'[78] This observation has been confirmed by authoritative public opinion polls. For instance, results published by the RFE/RL Research Report show that more than 60% of Latvian residents, including both ethnic Latvians and Russian speakers, view inter-ethnic relations in Latvia as good or normal, while only one third of the population views them as poor.[79]

Thirdly, Estonia and Latvia have border disputes with Russia. Territorial disputes and conflicts throughout the world have always been among those which last longest and are most difficult to resolve. The unresolved territorial disputes between Estonia and Russia and between Latvia and Russia will continue to create uncertainty in relations among these countries for some years to come.

Almost immediately after the second occupation of Estonia, in September 1944, the puppet government installed by the Soviet authorities proceeded to carve up Estonia's territory, attaching the trans-Narva part of the Viru district and most of Petseri district to the oblasts of Leningrad and Pskov respectively. Both territories became component parts of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. On 15 January 1947, the Supreme Council issued a decree taking over some 2,449 square miles of Estonian territory, amounting to some 5% of Estonia's pre-war area and including approximately 6% of the country's population. Latvia suffered smaller losses. About 746 square miles were lost, containing approximately 52,000 Latvian inhabitants. This amounted to approximately 2% of the pre-war territory and population.

In the 1990s, the matter of lost territory has reappeared on the agendas of Estonian and Latvian politicians. Although the problem of the `Eastern territories' is not high on the order of business in either country (especially Latvia), formal claims against Moscow have been made, and the question is still very sensitive. One might agree with the majority of Western commentators, who argue that these claims are unwise both in political and practical terms, but there is reason to believe that this question will remain on the agenda but at a low level at least until such time as Estonia and Latvia abandon it as part of a wider political settlement.

Fourthly, unlike the nominally sovereign countries of the Warsaw Pact, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had no national military forces at all for half a century. There were no defence ministries or military academies and, hence there is now no experienced military and political élite to deal with defence and security matters. All that has to be built from scratch in the Baltic states, and at a time of economic

transition and reconstruction. This compounds the political difficulties that distinguish the Baltic states from the other Central and East Europeans, and leaves them very far from a realistic prospect of integration into NATO.

Finally, it must be noted that some of the Central European countries are strategically important to the West in that they provide a buffer zone in the eventuality of a land attack on Western Europe. The Baltic states are much less important in terms of strategic defence considerations. Moreover, the Baltic states are difficult to defend against aggression, and even if the Baltic states were members of NATO, any NATO defensive operation in the Baltics would be extremely problematic.

Taken together, these conditions mean that the situation in the Baltics, in comparison to that of Central Europe, is much more difficult, and makes them significantly less attractive to the West as a partner in institutions of shared security. In addition one has to take into account that the politicians of Central Europe have greater financial and other resources at their disposal than do their Baltic counterparts, and they have had more time and experience to equip them to lobby Western countries for membership of Western security organisations.

Functional integration

The Baltic countries now recognise that fast, treaty-based integration into Western Europe is simply not on the cards for the time being. The unlikelihood of achieving early institutional integration has led them to seek an approach to the West, and an opening to the European security-community, through gradual, functional integration.[80]

Speaking at a conference, Latvian Prime Minister Valdis Birkavs summed up the Baltic situation perfectly:

`The real situation is that because of objective circumstances, we cannot receive firm security guarantees which would immediately solve all our problems . . . We will have to resolve our security problems thread by thread, weaving together our own security blanket, instead of purchasing one ready-made.'[81]

Birkavs said the `threads' of the system might include foreign policy and military cooperation with such organisations as NATO, the EU, WEU, the then CSCE and individual countries. In fact the Prime Minister chose a picturesque way of describing gradual, functional integration, which over time might lead to *de jure* integration.

Functional integration is beginning to gather pace, much of it in the guise of preparatory work for institutional integration. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the WEU Forum of Consultation, NATO's Partnership for Peace project, Associate Partner status in WEU, the Pact on Stability in Europe, free trade and Association Agreements with the EU -- all these have been milestones on the slow road to the integration of the Baltic republics into the European security-community.

Partnership for Peace is particularly important. Baltic officials were initially reluctant to accept NATO's proposal, which came at the end of 1993 after Russia's elections,

but after the NATO summit in January 1994, mainstream politicians welcomed the PfP as the maximum which NATO could offer the Baltic states.[82] The newly created Baltic defence ministries, facing the awesome task of re-establishing their national armed services after a fifty-year gap, have been understandably enthusiastic about the prospect of practical cooperation in the framework of Partnership for Peace, including the build-up and development of defence systems and their supervision in the Western tradition. Moreover, as Prime Minister Birkavs has remarked, a geographical expansion of NATO which excluded the Baltic countries would probably be a worse option for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. It might create a sharp change in Russian foreign policy to the detriment of the Baltic states, and estrange the Baltics from the group of six Central European countries whose company they need to keep to have the best chance of integration into European economic and security structures.[83] In a similar vein Estonian Foreign minister Juri Luik warned of a `grey zone of security' for countries not admitted in the first stage of NATO expansion. `Any expansion of NATO,' in his judgement, `should enhance the security of the continent as a whole, not just help a few while relegating others to the waiting room.'[84]

Of course the PfP is just one of several initiatives which will serve to strengthen the functional basis for Baltic security integration. Relations between WEU and the Baltic states, and the EU and the Baltic states, also provide important avenues for development.

WEU, in contrast to NATO, has gone further in adopting the principle of differentiation in relations with its former adversaries. Thus the NACC, which was established by NATO, includes all Central and East European states and pays particular attention to the problems of Russia and the CIS. WEU chooses to concentrate cooperation and consultation efforts on the countries of Central Europe and the Baltic states. occasionly the idea has been expressed that a `reduced European version of the NACC' conflicts with the idea of an undivided European security space, and could have dangerous consequences. But from the perspective of the Baltics, which are eager to be included in a redefined West but conscious of the simultaneous need to define Russia's place in the new European security order, this objection makes no sense. The different policies adopted by NATO and WEU are complementary, not contradictory, and lead to an interlocking, not `interblocking' relationship between the two organisations.

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania attach considerable importance to their acceptance as WEU Associate Partner countries on 9 May 1994. This status permits them to participate on a regular basis in meetings of the WEU Council, and to have an equal voice in the Council's political discussions. Associate Partner countries receive regular information about WEU activities and have contacts with WEU's Planning Cell. They can also participate in WEU peacekeeping, humanitarian and rescue operations. All this helps build more solid foundations for Baltic integration into the European security-community.

The Baltic countries received Associated Partner status along with the six Central European nations, but only after some WEU member countries had expressed doubts as to whether they should receive associate status in WEU before they had achieved a similar status in the European Union. WEU's positive resolution of the matter, granting Associate Partnership conditional on the signature of EU association

agreements in due course, was extremely important to the Baltic countries. As WEU ministers declared after their meetings, the purpose of the partnership agreements is `to prepare the Eastern Europeans for their integration and eventual accession to the European Union, opening up in turn the perspective of membership in the WEU.'[85] In effect, the WEU's action meant that the future eastern border of the EU had been delineated for the first time, and Associate Partnership in WEU, despite its relative institutional weakness, positions and prepares the Baltic states well for eventual NATO and EU membership.

Significant progress in 1994-95 was also achieved in terms of Baltic relations with the European Union. Free trade agreements between the EU and the three Baltic states were signed in Brussels on 18 July 1994 and came into force on 1 January 1995. This was sooner than had been expected, and opened the door to the next step in integration with the EU -- negotiations on an association agreement. The free trade agreements will facilitate economic ties with the EU, including trade relations with EU member states; the importance of the agreements is apparent from the fact that Latvian trade with the European Community was lower in 1993 than in 1992. The agreements also protected earlier free trade agreements with the EFTA nations which joined the EU in 1995. The integrative effect of the EU agreements will grow over time and, from a security perspective, they offer the Balts an opportunity to increase their economic independence from Russia and interdependence with the West.

The EU Association Agreements signed on 12 June 1995 bring Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania closer to the Central European nations, which already have similar agreements with the EU, and will help neutralise Russia's contention that its `near abroad' includes the Baltic states. They will also help Baltic integration into Europe's political and economic systems, allowing them to participate in the structured dialogue, in the development of a common foreign and security policy, and in cooperation in juridical and domestic matters.

The Baltic states have worked hard to keep up with the pace of Central Europe's approach to the West. In its first `transition report' on the shift from centrally planned to market economies throughout the former Soviet bloc, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) highlighted a growing split between the Central European countries and the Baltics on the one hand, all quick to adopt macro-economic stabilisation and micro-economic adjustment policies, and the former Soviet republics on the other.[86] According to the report, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, the Baltic states and Slovenia have made most progress to date. The decline in production which followed market reforms and the collapse of the Comecon markets is over in those countries; they have begun to make considerable advances in cutting inflation and achieving economic growth.[87]

A free trade zone including Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania has been established, and free trade agreements have been signed with the Nordic countries. As a result, trade with the CIS currently makes up less than 50% of the Baltic states' annual trade. Russia's stake in Baltic trade in 1994 was 13.9% of imports to and 23.2% of exports from Estonia; 23.6% and 27.8% for Latvia; and 29% and 40% for Lithuania.[88] These figures can be compared with 1990, when trade with the twelve republics of the USSR made up more than 90% of all trade. During his visit to Latvia at the beginning of 1995, EU Commissioner Hans van den Broek welcomed regional cooperation in

the Baltics and stressed that it would be `beneficial also to the further integration process into the EU.'[89] Indeed, political, economic and military cooperation among the Baltic states is far better than before the Second World War. The trilateral agreement signed at the beginning of 1995 by the three Baltic defence ministers builds upon previous defence agreements and obliges each defence ministry to develop yearly Baltic cooperation.[90] For the first time in Baltic history a joint military unit of the three states, the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (Baltbat), has been established and is now undergoing training.

All this demonstrates that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania made steady and significant progress towards integration into the institutions of the European security-community in 1994-95. This movement confirms that arguments against the expansion of European security institutions can be overcome gradually, by step-by-step integration, given the will and opportunity to do so. Greater steps yet in this direction might be taken, were it not for the fact that Western political will is so decisively influenced by a negative attitude in Russia.

Russia

Baltic politicians have chosen a policy of counter-alliance and integration in order to counterbalance Russia's influence in the region. A glance at a map of Europe might suggest that such a policy is short-sighted and doomed to failure. Even if the Baltic states achieve their goal of integration, they will still because of their geographical situation be a province of the European Union (or a province of a province made up of the Nordic countries) and a frontier zone of NATO. If, however, they manage to establish good-neighbourly relations with Russia, which in turn becomes integrated into European institutions and becomes part of the European security-community, then the Baltic republics could occupy a relatively central, safe and economically advantageous place in Europe. Yet for Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians, long experience with their Russian neighbour, together with recent developments in the CIS area, especially events in Chechnya, dictate that this vision of the future seems analogous to Gorbachev's utopia of a `common European home' -- desirable but unrealistic.

Russia's integration in Europe, whether we desire it or not, is not realistic because, as Konrad Adenauer once somewhat cynically said, Russia is too big, too poor, and too Asiatic. Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev has described his country's situation more diplomatically: `It is more difficult for an elephant like Russia to get through the door than for a small poodle.'[91] It seems that all interested parties understand this and are planning for a different kind of development. The EU, although willing to cooperate, has not included Russia in a pre-accession strategy. Russia, for its part, is looking for a special relationship with NATO that goes beyond the structure of Partnership for Peace but does not lead to NATO membership.

Russia has passed through its `romantic period' of 1991-93, and is again advancing arguments about its special interests throughout the former Soviet Union and seeking rights to place Russian peacekeeping missions in it.[92] The term `sphere of influence' has appeared with increasing frequency in Russia's domestic political debates, and not only in relation to the territory of the former Soviet Union.

On 8 September 1994, in Denmark, Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev announced that Russia would react sharply if any of the former Soviet republics, including the Baltic republics, tried to join NATO. Explaining this statement, Grachev said that despite the fact that Russian troops had now largely left the Baltics, he agreed with Russian President Boris Yeltsin's claim that the entire territory of the former Soviet Union, including Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, remained firmly within Russia's sphere of influence.[93] At the beginning of 1995 Moscow revealed, in statements by Russian first deputy defence minister Kokoshin, that it still planned to include the Baltics in a joint CIS air defence system.

The Baltic states feel threatened by this kind of discourse. The main threat is of a potentially aggressive Russia with an expansionist foreign policy based in nationalist/Slavophile sentiments, a Russia governed by a mixture of Russian chauvinists and former communists. Another type of threat is of extensive civil unrest or civil wars in Russia and neighbouring countries. The results of Russia's 1993 elections, and especially the development of events in Moldova, Transcaucasus and Central Asia, show that Baltic fears are not unjustified and that their aspirations to become members of European security institutions are firmly founded in a rational understanding of the national interest.

The whole issue of expanding the European security-community and its institutions eastwards is, in one sense, a question about the type of *Ostpolitik* the Western community should have in the post-Cold War period. Policy towards Russia is the centrepiece of that *Ostpolitik*, for Russia is not only the most powerful nation in the region, but also a nuclear power and, in European terms, a military superpower. It is therefore understandable that at each stage of eastward expansion, the West pays close attention to the impact on Russia, and Moscow's likely response to any move. Most Western politicians are inclined to step very gingerly where *Ostpolitik* is concerned, for fear that Russia might be provoked into unpredictable, aggressive actions.

Some analysts see a comparison between Russia as the loser of the Cold War and Germany as the loser of both World Wars. Gregory Treverton, for example, draws a comparison with the peace conditions imposed on Germany following each of the two wars. The victors of World War I were merciless in their approach to the losers: borders were changed and territory annexed, and Germany felt isolated and condemned. After the Second World War, the Western allies, having learned from bitter experience and facing a new, Soviet threat, took less than ten years to integrate Germany fully into Western political, economic and military structures. It was the latter, more generous and less suspicious course which helped to ensure democracy and economic well-being in Germany.[94]

The lesson for the winners of the Cold War appears obvious. Integrating the enormous Eurasian entity called Russia into Western structures is virtually impossible, but the consequences of Russia's feeling defeated, humbled and isolated are incalculable and probably dangerous. Therefore Western *Ostpolitik* has been driven by the perceived imperative of the relationship with Russia, the need to accommodate and include Russia rather than punish and isolate her. And the effect of that *Ostpolitik* has been to reduce the chances of Central and Eastern Europe becoming integrated into the European security-community.

But it is impossible to isolate Russia. Russia can only isolate itself. Never before has the world been so open and cooperative with Russia, and there is a danger in going too far in the direction of accommodation. The West must not subordinate strategically important decisions to the interests and imperialist nostalgia of Russia's reactionaries. The establishment of a democratic, stable security-community at or near the western border of Russia or the CIS cannot be a threat to Russian security interests. The expansion of a zone of stability and well-being west of Russia would, indeed, only serve to strengthen Russia in tackling her own complex problems.

Sadly, the Western democracies have been very cautious, and the `Russian card' has trumped all the Central and East European cards in Western policy-making. The reason for this has to do with the hierarchy of interests in the West. As Dieter Mahncke observed in 1993:

`First and foremost, the Western allies want to make sure that their security is maintained. Beyond that they are interested in overall European stability, primarily as a favourable environment for their own security. Only in the third place is there the idea of extending the type of Western security regime eastward to benefit the East Europeans, again being aware that the extension of the regime would enhance stability, which in turn enhances Western European security.'[95]

Conclusion

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, like other small states, have very limited influence in the international system. They have not only had to enter an international order which was determined without their participation, but they also have very few opportunities to modify this order, which includes Europe's security structures, in a direction which is favourable to them.

Nevertheless, the Baltic states have been successful in proving that they are worthy of acceptance as a component part of the wider European security-community.

First of all, the tempo of economic and political reform in the Baltic republics proves that these countries and their citizens are prepared to undertake these reforms, no matter how painful they might be, thus confirming that the area is economically, culturally and politically capable of integrating into Europe.

Secondly, the course of relations between the Baltic states and Russia has demonstrated that the Balts are ready to resolve any and all problems through peaceful and determined negotiation and to accept sometimes painful tactical compromises. They have shown that they are able to limit their national ambitions in the cause of European peace and that therefore they can be not just consumers but also suppliers of security.

Thirdly, in just a few years Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have developed successful and far-sighted sub-regional cooperation at the inter-Baltic and to some extent also the Baltic-Nordic level. Within these alliances there are no fundamental contradictions or conflicts. Baltic trade has become more balanced, and political and economic cooperation among the three Baltic nations, and with the Nordic countries, have

expanded. Cooperation in cultural, education, ecological and other spheres is increasing, and military cooperation is also developing gradually.

Sub-regional cooperation, however, cannot offer a solution to Baltic security concerns. The range and weight of these problems mean that the solution must be sought at a different level. That is why the most significant foreign policy issue in the Baltic republics is integration into Europe.

The expansion of the European security-community cannot be a process controlled unilaterally by the Western countries, still less by the states of Central Europe. Neither can it be a swift and sudden process. Gradually, step by step, the identity of that group of nations which are on the road to full integration into Western economic, political and security structures is becoming evident. Simultaneously, a group of former Soviet republics is congregating around the Russian nucleus. The Baltic republics have show very clearly that they belong to the first of these groups.

INTERESTS AND IDENTITIES
IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

Stefan Tafrov[96]

Two types of interconnection underpin the existence of a security-community –

- the objective and the subjective. The objective interconnections are the networks of official and unofficial contacts among member countries, their economic interdependence, the common values and culture they share, and the geopolitical environment in which they must survive together. The subjective interconnections are the perceptions and self-perceptions of the member societies; a security-community in the Deutschian sense can emerge only when attitudes in the societies involved have evolved to the point where they reliably generate responsible behaviour and policies from their élites, particularly their political élites.

Although the concept itself does not form a key part of Deutsch's theory of security-community, the idea of the *national interest* engages both the objective and the subjective aspects of the theory, and is therefore of paramount importance when discussing the possibility of the extension of the European security-community eastward. The national interest is objective in that its basic element is the very survival of the nation and its welfare, but it is subjectively determined by the perceptions of public opinion and the political classes. The Deutschian theory of security-community is in fact based on the assumption that the national interests of the different countries forming a security-community necessarily include an awareness of the legitimate interests of the other member countries. War becomes unimaginable because it is perceived as both an impracticable and immoral way to advance the national interest. The idea that peace and development are a common interest and somehow a synthesis of the different national interests of the security-community members is fundamental.

This dialectic of national and collective interest, national and European interest, was the central element in the construction of a European security-community in the non-communist part of Europe after the Second World War. A common European interest in the peaceful resolution of disputes grew organically from the objective and subjective development of the different West European nations' national interests.

Also implicit in the Deutschian vision, and requiring further articulation in the context of eastward expansion, is the idea that a pluralistic security-community is possible only when it respects the separate identities of its members. The preservation of the nation's cultural and political identity represents the very core of its perceived national interest, regardless of its size. A stable pluralistic security-community is possible only when the national identities of its members are protected. In concrete terms, this means that none of the countries involved considers its identity to be menaced by the compromises needed to achieve lasting peace with other countries. Since a security-community exists in the minds of peoples, it is very important for the member states to know where the threshold of acceptable compromise lies, beyond which the national identity and hence the vital national interest of a country is at stake. One of

the reasons the European security-community was made possible was the fact that none of its members tried to impose on the others its own version of the traumatic and divided European past, or its own foreign policy agenda. Instead the essentials of a common European agenda have emerged, combining the most critical elements of the respective national agendas: the containment of communism yesterday, the making of Europe today.

For the European security-community cannot be characterised solely as a mosaic of well-preserved national identities. The vital ingredient is a sense of common identity perceived as a natural continuation and in fact as part of the national identity. During the Cold War, what underpinned the common European identity was not only the sense of sharing the values of democracy and the open society but also the perception of common success when compared to the social, economic and political realities behind the Iron Curtain, which served as a counter-model.

Double identity in Central and Eastern Europe

Whether Central and Eastern Europe has a `European future', and can fit into an expanded security-community under the new post-Cold War conditions, depends in large measure on the development of the `double identities' which shape the domestic and foreign policy agendas and the articulation of national interests in the nine WEU Associate Partner states. The concept of double identity refers to the two distinct components of the national identity in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe which determine the nation's self-perception and strongly influence the government's foreign policy. These two components of identity are the *traditional* identity, dating from the pre-Second World War period when these countries were part of the unstable balance of power system before and after the Versailles settlement, and second, the *post-communist* identity, which is centred around the urgent need for political and economic reconstruction in the wake of failed communist experiment. This double identity, manifest throughout the region, is substantially what differentiates the Central and East European states from their Western neighbours.

The main thesis of this chapter is that the interaction of these two identities, if properly managed as it has been for the five years following the fall of the Berlin wall, is leading towards a new, European common identity. In particular, this process of development of identity, which is essential to participation in the security-community, is making important strides forward in south-eastern Europe, including the Balkans, where post-communist countries like Bulgaria and Romania are bringing stability to the whole area and limiting the negative effect of the war in ex-Yugoslavia for the peninsula as a whole. The sobering effect on the other Central European and especially Balkan countries of what has been happening in Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia represents an essential element of the regional context in which the process of security-community expansion is taking place. For instead of rising regional turmoil fuelled by competition among the Great Powers, the overall Balkan situation is characterised by the absence of well-defined conflicting interests among major powers, and by the progressive extension of a network of improving bilateral relations between neighbouring countries which have set aside historical rivalries.

Traditional identity: the faces of nationalism

It has become commonplace to assert that since the end of the Cold War the destructive forces of nationalism have made a comeback. The horrors of Bosnia are presented as an irrefutable proof of the vigour of the old evil. In fact developments in the nine WEU Associate Partner states offer a much more nuanced picture, which highlights the simplistic nature of this easy extrapolation of what is an essentially local, ex-Yugoslav case, a unique combination of badly managed historical ingredients.

An increased degree of national awareness leading to some renationalisation of foreign policies across Europe is an undeniable post-Cold war phenomenon. It affects the entire continent and not only its Central and Eastern parts. Apprehensions about a disruptive `return to history', i.e. to the post-Versailles system of balance of power, with all its rivalries among major and smaller powers, have proved unjustified. Unified Germany has not become a revanchist power seeking to dominate the continent at the expense of other powers, and it is very unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future. Instead, the process of European integration within the EU, which remains vital for the preservation of the European security-community, is continuing through a better and more realistic articulation of the national interests of the member states. For even though the notion of national interest may be playing an increasingly important role in European international politics, each different national interest is, in the perception of the population in each country, closely associated with the European interest, especially where security issues are concerned.

Throughout Central and Eastern Europe the communist era was a period of frustration for national sentiments under what was widely regarded as alien (Russian) rule. Even the local communist parties, although internationalist in ideology, had sought in different moments and forms to gain some legitimacy by promoting nationalistic policies and using a rhetoric of nationalism. As a rule they began to do this as soon as the accumulation of their failures, (stagnating economies and falling living standards, exacerbated by higher expectations among the population due to increased contacts with the West since détente) had utterly undermined the communist parties' capability for mass mobilisation of the population of East European countries. A return to some of the elements of traditional national identity was the only way for communist *nomenklatura* to regain some degree of legitimacy. This return could not be complete, however, since that would mean the re-establishment of national independence, thus undermining the very basis of Soviet domination of the region, which was at that time a geopolitical impossibility.

On regaining their independence after the collapse of the Soviet empire, the Central and East European countries have faced the need to articulate new foreign policies to solve the regional problems communism and the Cold War had frozen. An important part of their recovered traditional identity was some highly emotional issues involving territories and minorities. These have been widely perceived as mishandled by the Communist parties previously in power, which had not allowed open public debate on them. In reaction to the frustrations of the period of Soviet domination, a dangerous self-identification re-emerged, a mythical self-identification of each nation as a brave old one harassed by its perfidious neighbours and victimised by the intrigues of the Great Powers. The negative element in such self-identification is very strong. Thus,

Romanians tend to perceive themselves as permanently threatened by revanchist Hungarians and aggressive Russians; Bulgarians as abused by the Serbs, with the help of the unjust Great Powers; the Poles feel squeezed between the Russians and the Germans, and so on. Resentment against attempts at forcible Russification throughout the communist period is widely shared (most notably in the three Baltic states). Indeed a number of historical events, from the Congress of Berlin to the conference in Yalta, the Munich diktat and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact have been a perpetual source of frustration for the Central and East European nations. It is against this background that the various national causes of the region have in some ways come to consist in a constant search to right historical wrongs.

Although public discourse in the nine countries is pervaded by these images and stereotypes, it is in substantially lesser degree than one might have expected after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Political forces with a nationalist message have been present but their role has never been decisive -- even in cases where they have been part of ruling coalitions. In electoral terms old-fashioned nationalism has been much less successful than expected. National foreign policy agendas have been only marginally affected by what in the pre-communist period had been seen as a `national objective' -- usually the return of territory or, vice versa, its defence at any price. In many cases a nationalist rhetoric is deployed, but not carried through into corresponding foreign policy.

The two Balkan countries, Romania and Bulgaria, are cases in point.[97] In contrast to other communist countries, the Ceausescu dictatorship made considerable use of national feelings. While until the late 1970s this tactic did produce the mass mobilisation effect badly needed by the dictator in order to give some legitimacy to his regime, the excesses of the later period undermined the attractiveness of the chauvinist platitudes repeated constantly in official propaganda. The boredom of those years is certainly one of the reasons why in post-communist Romania the nationalistic discourse is not prevailing internally and even less so as far as the country's foreign policy is concerned.

In the case of Bulgaria, a distinct but related pattern can be discerned. The campaign for forceful assimilation of the country's 8%-strong Turkish community initiated in 1984 by the regime of the dictator Todor Zhivkov was designed to divert the attention of the public from the accumulated failures of the communist system and in particular the poor state of the country's economy. It was also meant to keep Bulgaria away from the winds of change bringing in Mikhail Gorbachev's *perestroika*. This ill-conceived nationalistic campaign dismayed and outraged the majority of the Bulgarian people, who regard tolerance towards ethnic minorities as an essential feature of the Bulgarian national identity. Public resentment against Zhivkov's campaign helped the emergence of a structured opposition to communist rule. After the fall of the regime, the democratic forces not only restored the full civil rights of the Bulgarian Turks but also articulated a firm rejection of extreme nationalism as an intrinsic element of the emerging political culture. This posture has not only had a positive effect on bilateral relations with Turkey, which have improved dramatically, but has also shaped Bulgaria's very reasonable behaviour towards the newly independent Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

It is crucial to differentiate between nationalism in its extreme, combative form, and the moderate nationalism which is understandably and necessarily prevalent in the newly liberated Central and East European countries. Societies in transition need cohesion, and strengthened national identity is a natural way to provide it. It is important, both for the nine WEU Associate Partner countries and for the European institutions, to know and respect national sensitivities on issues of weighty symbolic significance for the respective nations. Propaganda wars between governments on questions such as differing interpretations of historical events or personalities should be -- and as a rule have been -- avoided, and not permitted to have any significant impact on the conduct of foreign policy.

Post-communist identity: the imperative of self-restraint

The self-restraint which has been shown by the political élites of the nine countries in identifying their national interests and shaping their foreign policy priorities is conditioned by the very nature of the post-communist period. Post-communist societies face the formidable task of rebuilding their economies, political systems and institutions. Modernisation is a difficult process in any circumstances, involving profound changes of social values, mechanisms and practices. It is even more problematic when it has to overcome the disastrous consequences of an ill-conceived attempt at the accelerated, coercive modernisation of essentially rural societies (except the Czech Republic). After all, in historical terms the communist experiment was essentially a misguided programme of modernisation.[98]

It is the need to overcome the consequences of the communist experiment in all fields which defines the core of the post-communist identity. Initial optimistic expectations about the duration of the process of transition have had to be revised, for the gap between the Eastern and the Western part of the continent has turned out to be wider that previously reckoned. This material gap means that any attempt at disproportionately assertive conduct of foreign policy in the region is quite unsustainable. Austerity budgeting is the rule throughout the region, which has had to submit to the tight anti-inflationary discipline required by the International Monetary Fund and other international financial institutions. Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria all have large foreign debts, and all nine WEU Associate Partner states share the problems of an outdated industrial base.

What is even more important is that this objective lack of resources is a subjective reality experienced on an everyday basis by the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. This makes life difficult for extreme nationalists, who find it hard to persuade their fellow citizens of the virtues of a vigorously `national' agenda. In addition, unfavourable demographic trends across the region are producing increasingly ageing populations, much less concerned with national causes than with the quality and accessibility of social and health services. Concern over rising crime is another issue which has proved to have a tremendous consensus-building potential in societies in transition.

All these features of the post-communist identity shared by the nine countries shape the main characteristics of the foreign policies they have been implementing. Their ineluctable top priority is the need to ensure favourable external conditions for the

painful processes of internal transformation. Undisturbed development is the essence of the national interest.

Models and counter-models: the end of clientèlism

It would be mistaken to concentrate exclusively on the inward-looking aspects of the double identities of Central and East European countries. Their reluctance to engage in conflictual relationships with neighbours for internal reasons is matched and strengthened by the powerful impact of European integration after the disintegration of the Soviet empire. The European security-community provides the framework of what is perceived by the nine peoples as an undeniable success story, a highway to peace and prosperity. It is not surprising, then, that the aspiration to share in this successful model has become a nearly unanimous national objective for all the nine countries. The citizens of each can see the benefits of European political, economic and security integration, comparing their own country with countries of the same area which had a similar level of development up until the communist era: the Baltics with the Scandinavians, the Poles, the Czechs and the Hungarians with the Austrians and the Germans, the Bulgarians and the Romanians with the neighbouring Greeks and Mediterranean nations like Spain and Portugal. Regardless of changes of government, efforts to join the institutions of European integration, above all the European Union, have been at the top of the foreign policy agendas of the nine countries.

Among the binding conditions which the nine have to fulfil in order to attain this top priority foreign policy objective is the Western requirement for self-restraint in regard to sensitive regional issues.[99] This is historically unprecedented. The Central and Eastern part of Europe has traditionally been a theatre of rivalry among the Great Powers of Europe. The eve of the so-called `battle for the neutral powers' saw the most heated moment of this competition, a competition among the Great Powers to use the small powers against other Great Powers; and among the small powers to get the help of the Great Powers against their own rivals, the whole process ending with conquests and losses of territories and populations. This client system was strengthened by the Versailles peace settlement, which made Germany a natural pole of attraction for smaller `revanchist' powers like Hungary and Bulgaria, while France and Britain played the same role for `anti-revanchist' powers like Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Greece.

During the Cold War, thanks in part to the Soviet threat and the Euro-Atlantic partnership, the system evolved profoundly and the West European security-community emerged with the institutional backing of the European Community, WEU, NATO and the Council of Europe. The unification of Germany and the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a common enemy posed the biggest challenge yet to the security-community the West Europeans had built, and European-minded moderate politicians in the nine countries anxiously followed the subsequent process of re-nationalisation that was taking place in the West. It was a source of great relief to the Central and East Europeans when they realised that this process would not go too far, and certainly not to the point of re-establishing the client system.

The critical juncture in this respect was the initial handling of the Yugoslav crisis, when it appeared that France and the UK favoured the unity of the federation while Germany was sympathising with the aspirations for independence of Croatia and

Slovenia.[100] The recognition of the Yugoslav successor states by the EC on 15 January 1992 in Lisbon may still arouse different interpretations, but it has had at least one great merit: it demonstrated the ability of the major European players to compromise, and not to engage in an old-fashioned competition for some illusory `influence' eastward. Indeed the apprehension that the German act, dictated more by pressure from German public opinion than by elaborate geopolitical considerations, meant some kind of *Drang nach Suden* proved unfounded. France and Britain for their part turned out to be much less pro-Serbian than might have been expected, given their close alliance with the country throughout both World Wars.

The client system cannot be re-established, thanks to the resistance of the West European security-community, which even without the straitjacket of the Cold War has been proving remarkably solidly rooted in the political culture (and culture *tout court*) of Western Europe. Politicians who might put it in jeopardy are nowhere to be seen.

The real problem of the nine states is not the excess of interest towards them from the West which once produced the client system, but rather what they perceive as a lack of interest. The major West European powers' reluctance to compete among themselves for influence in Central and Eastern Europe means that while they are unlikely to arouse and exploit conflicts among regional players they are also less capable of or indeed interested in solving them. The neutrality of the EU in the conflict in former Yugoslavia has proved its limited ability to influence the resolution of an existing conflict. Negative incentives to potential regional troublemakers, such as threats of punitive measures like military retaliation or economic sanctions, are quite ineffective because they are not credible. Positive incentives, like the lure of Western political and economic success, are much more powerful instruments for the expansion of the European security-community eastward than any possible sanctions against over-selfish, over-assertive regional players.

This is the context in which the aspirations of the nine countries for membership of the core European organisations -- EU, WEU and NATO -- should be assessed. These are the institutional embodiments of the European security-community, its material articulation. They are about civic freedoms, democracy, economic success, and self-restraint in foreign policy. Based on legally binding treaties, they discipline their members and make them more responsible players in international politics. Seen in this perspective, the aspirations of the nine candidates become easier to understand.

The hidden successes of the Balkans: the path to lasting reconciliation

The real test for a possible eastward expansion of the European security-community is the Balkans. The war in Bosnia and Croatia has revived the cliché damning the peninsula as the powder keg of Europe, a region beyond the pale. But developments in the region should not be reduced only to simmering and raging conflicts. This narrow thinking tends to overlook the seeds of lasting peace which have been sown elsewhere in the Balkans over the past few years. The facts are that the gloomy scenario of a chain reaction to the war in Croatia and Bosnia has simply not materialised and is most unlikely to do so. Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Greece, Turkey and also the former Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Macedonia have manifested various degrees of self-restraint in the face of the ongoing conflict (with

the exception of the Greek blockade of Macedonia). None of these countries has sought to gain anything -- territories, influence or benefits of any kind -- from the war in former Yugoslavia. Their behaviour has been dictated by a firm determination not to become involved either militarily or in any other way. Historic and religious preferences towards some of the Yugoslav successor states (in Bulgaria for the ethnically close Macedonia, Greece for the traditional Balkan ally Serbia, Turkey for the Muslims in Bosnia) could not jeopardise the core of what can be described as a remarkably reasonable, truly European approach.

Apart from the three states involved in the conflict in former Yugoslavia, all the other Balkan countries have formulated their foreign policies on the basis of national interests perceived and defined in such a way as to include the European interest. This is especially true of the three new democracies -- Romania, Bulgaria and Albania -- whose foreign policy agendas are conditioned by their post-communist, and not their traditional pre-war identities. They lack both the resources and the willingness to pursue highly assertive foreign policies in the region.

The security-community in Western Europe emerged as a result of lasting bilateral reconciliation between traditional rivals and occasion enemies, the most spectacular instance being that between France and Germany. Very similar processes are taking place in the Balkans, and in some cases the process has gone so far and so deep that it can be considered to be concluded.

Romania entertains good relations with all Balkan countries. The serious problems it has inherited concern countries bordering the area such as Hungary, because of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. Both are post-communist countries seeking integration into the core European organisations and hence have a strong positive incentive to overcome inherited suspicion. Even at this stage war between them seems out of the question, and once the bilateral treaty in the framework of the Pact for Stability in Europe is signed and ratified, the reconciliation process will acquire an important legal dimension.

Immediately after the fall of communism, Bulgaria restored the rights of ethnic Turks, and its relations with this neighbouring country have been steadily improving ever since. There are no important contentious issues between the two countries which are likely to undermine the existing mutual confidence. Relations with Greece had been improving since the re-establishment of the Greek democracy in 1974, and the end of communism gave them a new impetus. Greece is the second largest investor in Bulgaria after Germany. Differences over the recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Greek blockade of that republic have not deeply affected bilateral relations, and the degree of mutual confidence remains high. In January 1992 Bulgaria became the first country in the world to recognise the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as an independent state, in a gesture of great symbolic and practical value. The message was one of a break with a tradition of secular rivalries among Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and the former Ottoman empire for control of Macedonia. The Bulgarian move was motivated by the understanding that the coming into existence of the new Balkan state not only fulfils the right of its citizens to self-determination, but also brings stability to the whole region, making any potential aspirations for control of this territory much more problematic because

they would be in clear breach of international law. The management of the different versions of local history in Bulgaria and Macedonia has also been satisfactory.

Despite the horrors of the war in former Yugoslavia, then, it is clear that the Balkans are not the powder keg they used to be. The war has been limited to Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia. Its sobering effect on the other Balkan countries is significant, and has helped to promote the process of security integration among them. Romania, Bulgaria and also Albania have been pursuing stable foreign policy agendas conditioned by the double identity pattern common to the other post-communist countries.

Conclusion

Karl Deutsch listed three essential conditions for the success of a pluralistic security-community: the compatibility of major values relevant to political decision-making; the capacity of the participating states to respond to each other's needs, messages, and actions quickly, adequately, and without resort to violence; and mutual predictability of behaviour. The dialectic of the double identities -- traditional pre-war, and post-communist -- with the second being more decisive in shaping the foreign policy agendas of the nine WEU Associate Partner states, creates a favourable context for the fulfilment of all three conditions.

The success of the process of security integration in Central and Eastern Europe is favoured by a functioning pluralistic security-community in the Western part of the continent which has survived the end of the Cold War intact. The area is most unlikely to become once again a theatre of rivalry among the major European powers, encouraging and exploiting local nationalisms; and conversely, the forces of militant nationalism are finding it difficult to get substantial support from any of the Great Powers.

Throughout Central and Eastern Europe, including the Balkans, national interests have come to include the European interest, and the dynamic of double identity is creating a network of historical reconciliation. These are the solid foundations on which the European security-community is expanding to the east.

CONCLUSIONS: PROSPECTS FOR THE EXPANSION OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY-COMMUNITY

Ian Gambles

The goal of this *chaillot Paper* has been to present a Central and East European perspective on the prospects for bringing their own region into the zone of lasting peace which we call the European security-community. The five authors whose essays form the core of the paper can obviously speak only for themselves, not for their governments or their compatriots, and still less for the four WEU Associate Partner states not represented here. Nevertheless, the degree of unanimity among them is striking, and the differences remarkably slight -- little more than differences in emphasis. Consider three main points of agreement.

First, all concur in the rejection of pan-Europeanism as a basis for national security. While they may be content to see the OSCE maintain and expand its role as a forum for pan-European dialogue and a guardian of rights and principles across the continent, they place no faith in it as a collective security arrangement. Vain experiments to create a Eurasian space from Vancouver to Vladivostok, mistaking a convenient Cold War fiction for a lasting political reality, distract energy from the task of expanding the security-community into the Central European space.[101] While not opposed to active engagement with Russia and the other states of the CIS, they are determined, for very obvious historical and political reasons, to separate their own destiny from them. The concern about drawing new dividing lines on the map of Europe is, for the most part, a Western concern, which they do not share.

Second, all are confident that the regions 'return to Europe, the ongoing transformation of Central and Eastern Europe into an area of stable democracies that share the values and practices of the West, is irreversible. They insist in particular that the 'Yugoslav disease is not contagious, and there is in what they write a strong undercurrent of frustration and irritation with the idea that the European identity of the Associate Partners is somehow shallower than in the West, an idea which looks uncomfortably like a Western pretext for keeping them at a distance.

Third, our authors follow the majority in their countries in seeing integration with Western Europe as the foundation of the future security of Central and Eastern Europe, and argue that the prospect of integration is already working to modify policies and politics in the region. There is no interest in a Central European *Sonderweg*, a special security arrangement which they know would be at best a security vacuum, at worst a fulfilment of someone elses manifest destiny. Central and East Europeans perceive, with some accuracy, a zone of security and a zone of insecurity in Europe; they want to be recognised and included as participants in the peace, as members of the European security-community, and that aspiration is the centrepiece of their foreign policy agendas.

This shared aspiration makes sense. The foundations of the long peace in Europe since the Second World War were threefold -- a security-community in Western

Europe and North America, Soviet domination in Central and Eastern Europe, and a nuclear stand-off between the two. The disappearance of the second factor, and the increasing irrelevance of the third -- both of which were in any event perceived in Central and Eastern Europe as sources of insecurity -- leave the European security-community as the main bulwark of the European peace. Naturally, the Central and East Europeans want to be part of it.

In this concluding chapter, I consider how realistic that aspiration is. As explained in the introduction, membership of the security-community cannot be awarded by fiat; it can only be progressively acquired by developing and consolidating the essential background conditions, namely domestic, regional, and geopolitical stability. Do these background conditions exist, and if not, could they? Is the eastward expansion of the European security-community a viable proposition?

The Central and East European inheritance

Trying to answer these questions involves grappling with the implications of the Central and East European inheritance. The whole region emerged only yesterday from a double subjection, to the geopolitical empire of the Soviet Union and to the socio-political empire of the Communist Party. The legacy of this generation and a half of subjection is of exceptional significance throughout the region, and will continue to influence the political culture of the Central and East European states in important ways for some time to come. For despite the thoroughness and swiftness of the eviction of Communist governments once their lack of legitimacy was exposed, there has been no categorical, anguished rupture with the past such as was seen in the post-Fascist reconstructions after the Second World War. The true extent of the legacy of Soviet-Communist domination will be impossible to assess properly for many years, and differs considerably from one state to another. Two tentative general observations can already be made, however.

First, as far as the internal affairs of the Associate Partner states are concerned, one of the most burdensome aspects of this legacy is a set of socio-political and socio-economic problems which sound distinctly familiar to West European ears and are sure to hamper the process of integration underpinning the security-community. Most important are the problems of obsolescence and inefficiency in industrial and agricultural production, leading to shrinking GDP in the short term and structural unemployment in the long term as the pressures of the market take effect. The bitterness generated by the EUs reluctance to open export markets to Central and East European steel, textiles and agricultural produce is only the beginning. The EU states continued reliance on expensive protectionism in precisely those areas may foster imitative policies in Central and East European states (to the detriment of their already difficult fiscal positions), but it will certainly not foster fellow-feeling across Europe. Welfare dependency and -- at first sight, surprisingly -- political apathy are two other Communist legacies (although well-known in Western Europe too), which tend to produce an inward-looking political culture, eroding social cohesion and sapping the confidence and resources of state and society to engage with a wider community.

Second, the period of Soviet-Communist domination has left a legacy of inexperience and immaturity in foreign affairs. In most respects, most Central and East European

states have not had the chance to formulate and implement independent foreign policies since the war. Whatever latitude was allowed in internal affairs, foreign policy was made in Moscow. This has not by any means led to universally bad post-revolutionary foreign policies; indeed, the easy temptations of confusing a constructive reassertion of autonomy with a destructive reassertion of nationalism have for the most part been avoided, as Stefan Tafrov convincingly argues in his chapter with skill and responsibility. Far from falling into a sort of adolescent posturing, states have been so anxious to avoid a `loose cannon on the deck' label which might harm their prospects of integration into Western institutions that they have often seemed to slip the other way. This can lead to the rather unreal kind of conformity expressed in the emollient rhetoric of official communiqués, which can conceal real and legitimate conflicts of interest.

There are thus inherited difficulties to be overcome. To assess whether in the course of time they really can be overcome and the nine Associate Partner states brought into an expanded European security-community, a zone of lasting peace stretching from the Atlantic to the borders of Russia, we need to consider the three background conditions in more detail, and weigh the arguments put forward by our contributors from the region.

- First, domestic stability. Can these states, despite their unhappy political, social and economic inheritance, sustain a political system that is sufficiently stable, and an economy and society sufficiently open, to give the ties that bind the security-community time enough to be woven?

- Second, regional stability. Can they overcome the dissensions of a heterogeneous region and import home-grown networks and practices of international cooperation, rather than simmering strife, into the security-community?

- Third, geopolitical stability. Can Central and Eastern Europes vulnerability to the vagaries of great power politics be reduced? Does their proximity to Russia permit these states to be anchored in the West, and accepted as reliable members of the European security-community?

Domestic stability

Social stability and openness obviously vary from country to country, and analysis is made much more difficult by the lack of an autonomous political history more than five years old. It is therefore all the more important to avoid the pitfalls of over-interpreting short-term phenomena, or falling back on vague typologies drawn from the politics of the period of domination or from conceptions of national character.

There are two common mistakes to which such over-generalising on slender evidence leads. Trying to draw up a `league table' of the Central and East European states tends to over-emphasise starting-points at the expense of ongoing processes of transformation. To take just one example, it is not clear whether the strength of the second economy in Hungary, and the smoothness of the transition from the comparatively benign Kadar regime, justify an assumption that Hungary can remain at or near the top of a league table. The extent of socio-economic disengagement from the state, and the comfortable continuity of officialdom and the *classe politique* may

turn out to be long-term liabilities in Hungarys `return to Europe'. A close observation and study of each individual case is needed, and even then it may simply be too early to draw long-term conclusions.

A second common mistake is to look at the region as if it contained a built-in slope from West to East, a downward slide from the heights of German prosperity and rationality to the depths of Russian turbulence and Asiatic barbarism.[102] Apart from smacking slightly of unwarranted cultural supremacism, the concept of a slope is also misleading. Although Poland and the Czech Republic have done much to justify their leading position in the race for integration, the progress of state-building in Lithuania and in Slovenia, for example, deserve more attention than they tend to get because of the explicit or implicit acceptance of the slope metaphor.

With these caveats in mind, it is nevertheless interesting to realise how many important generalisations it is still possible to make with considerable confidence about the internal situation in the Central and East European states.[103]

- All are securely established as states. Barring outside intervention, all have a robust sense of identity and the potential to maintain their independence. In this they are like the states of Western Europe, and unlike their neighbours in the CIS, which are leaning more or less willingly into the Russian orbit, and their neighbours in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia, which are lost in shifting identities and armed chaos.

- All their democracies are almost as secure as any democracy in Western Europe. The anti-democratic right exists, of course, but has been conspicuously unsuccessful in finding any significant constituency in what ought to be fertile territory for it -- growing economic insecurity and inequity combined with unresolved ethnic and religious hostility. The left, particularly in Romania, still has regressive centralist and monopolist tendencies, but its models are essentially social democratic, and there is no longer any significant legitimating alternative of anti-democratic socialism to justify deviating from the democratic norms the left has adopted. Parliamentary government can sometimes seem outmoded both in the East and in the West, but there is as much or more reason to expect its eventual replacement to emerge in the United States or Italy as there is in Poland or Estonia.

- All seem irrevocably committed to economic openness. The costs of transition are high, but in no case does the move to capitalism seem to be in jeopardy. In no case are the anticipated fiscal and balance of payments problems, or the problems of high inflation and unemployment, likely to get so out of control as to endanger political stability. All identify the EU as the locus of prosperity, and seek to emulate its generally conservative principles of economic and monetary management. There is no autarkic alternative available to orthodoxy; the pursuit of macroeconomic convergence, and the facilitation of foreign investment and domestic enterprise, are tenets of policy commanding cross-party support throughout the region.

Consolidating open, democratic societies in Central and Eastern Europe will depend on further political development, grounding the formal transformation of institutions

and procedures in a democratic political culture and a vigorous civil society. Dan Pavel demonstrates in his chapter that this will not be an automatic or uniform process, and many would argue that the obstacles to a thoroughgoing socio-political modernisation in the region along West European lines are even more formidable than he suggests.[104] The electoral advance of former Communists in many of the Associate Partner states, for example, does not foreshadow a return to Communist policies or practices. It does, however, indicate a significant element of continuity in the governing élites, interest groups, social classes and political expectations antedating the revolutions and shaped in the period of Soviet-Communist domination.

It will hardly be possible to consider the Central and East European states as permanent members of the European security-community until they have lain for longer on the democratic map, been drawn more comprehensively into the world economy, and at least partly closed the gulf, real and perceived, which divides them from the West Europeans. The consolidation of the expanded security-community will necessarily be gradual, and it is very unlikely that any radical upheavals in state or society will interrupt this process of assimilation and community-building.

Regional stability

The essence of security-community is cooperation and confidence, and the Central and East European states cannot be absorbed into the security-community unless they have established solid practices of cooperation to deal with the conflicts of interest arising within this heterogeneous region. That does not mean that all such conflicts of interest must be resolved before the Central and East Europeans can be considered fully part of the security-community. The whole concept of community in Europe was created not out of unity but out of division, out of a need for lasting reconciliation between France and Germany, whose struggles had done more damage than those of the Central and East Europeans could ever do.

The fact is that border issues and minority issues of the kind that pepper the map of Europe are rarely susceptible to solution or resolution. Methods such as population transfer or border changes tend only to transfer the problem to the next generation. More drastic expedients such as ethnic cleansing or wars of conquest may or may not prove more effective, but they are morally unacceptable. There are, in fact, no *solutions* to these questions. Only attrition works. Through a long process of accommodation and a respectful dialogue founded in a mutual interest in and commitment to peace, both state parties and the people affected come to view the issue as a thing of the past, no longer requiring a solution.

Whether an ethnic or territorial dispute debars a state from a security-community depends not only on how dangerous it is to peace but also how dangerous it is perceived to be, which depends in turn on how it is managed. In general, regional leaders have recognised the futility and danger of a confrontational approach to international issues of this kind, and are inclining towards pragmatic and peaceful techniques of dispute management. The critical norm of the security-community -- the absolute commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes -- has already begun to take firm hold in Central Europe.

As an illustration of this trend, it is worth considering how remarkable it is, in historical perspective, that so little stands between Poland and the security-community. Despite the arbitrary and brutal way in which the borders and peoples of Poland have been pushed hither and thither over so many years, potential tensions at Poland's western and eastern borders have been so carefully handled that military conflict is difficult to imagine.[105] Western alarmism over the implications of the birth of Slovakia appears to have been exaggerated too, as the Czech, Hungarian, and Slovak establishments are on the whole taking a constructive approach and discouraging nationalistic rhetoric. The decision by Hungary and Slovakia to refer their Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam dispute to the International Court of Justice sets a good precedent, although celebration would be premature until the Court has ruled and both sides have accepted the verdict. The only poorly managed dispute, which therefore constitutes the most serious obstacle of this kind to the expansion of the security-community, is the Transylvanian question, on which Bucharest, not helped by a lingering Hungarian superiority complex and vestiges of 'Trianonism, remains extremely defensive, and reluctant to disown even the excesses of ethnic politics at Cluj. But even this case should respond to responsible management by both sides, and it does not contradict the general rule that the Yugoslav disease is not, as was at first assumed, contagious. Ethnic and territorial issues among the Central and East European states can be contained and managed well enough to permit their incorporation into the European security-community.

The realities of power politics also tend to discourage confrontation and encourage conciliatory strategies for the long term. It is, after all, hard to imagine what form a war among the Central and East European states would take. No state has armed forces sufficiently well trained, led, organised or equipped to conduct a war by itself. In what Stefan Tafrov rightly identifies as a crucial change from the past, no outside power has any interest in provoking or underwriting a military campaign in the region. Indeed outside powers might even intervene under UN authority against any aggressor, so a decisive victory is all but out of the question. As the prospects for an effective use of force are so poor, and since there is no reason to believe they will improve, the incentives are high for accepting the normative framework offered by the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and the Stability Pact, and getting on with a quiet process of reconciliation.

Building a security-community is not just about suppressing sources of conflict, though: it is also about the development of cooperation. In this area too, the Central and East European states are hampered by misconceptions and inexperience. The misconceptions are in part those of the West, where there is still a tendency to overlook the fact that the only ties that bound the former eastern bloc were those of subjugation, and all that those countries now have in common as a group is their struggle to leave that past behind. In part the misconceptions are their own, because they see cooperation too much as a means to an end, a tiresome precondition for negotiating their passage to the Western havens of prosperity and security -- the EU and NATO. Both Western and Eastern misconceptions were responsible for the demise of the Visegrad Group; the West tended to see it as a convenient way of packaging totally different countries together, and the East as an antechamber to the EU and NATO, which the Czechs decided, after the division of Czechoslovakia, was more of a hindrance than a help to their own applications.[106]

It is probably only through trial and error, by experimenting with geographical and issue-based forums, forums within the region and forums extending east, west, south, and north beyond the region, that the most useful correlations will be identified. What matters most is to give substance to the forms of cooperation; the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), an accelerating programme of tariff reductions which was the most concrete achievement of the Visegrad Group, is a prime example of what is required, and the growing trilateralism in the Baltic states discussed by Andris Ozolins also represents notable progress. Multinational exercises within the framework of NATOs Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme may themselves make a substantive contribution to regional cooperation, by developing security cooperation among the regions isolated and impoverished armed forces.

These processes take time, and it takes time too for the changes they bring to be acknowledged as established features of international relations in Europe. Pál Dunays chapter makes a compelling case that the management of potential ethnic and territorial disputes in the central part of Europe already differs fundamentally from the pattern established in the eastern part of the continent and in former Yugoslavia, but many in the West remain cautious. More time is needed to allow disputes artificially suppressed under Soviet domination to be openly recognised and managed into quiescence, and more time is needed for experiments in regional cooperation to take root and for the habit of international consultation to grow. But this is needed more to build mutual confidence in the region, and to build Western confidence in the region, than actually to avert any impending conflict. Peace among the Central and East European states, barring outside intervention, is in fact already sufficiently well established that they could become part of the wider European security-community.

Geopolitical stability

Each state in Central and Eastern Europe may in time develop the social and political stability and openness necessary for its participation in a security-community, and the region as a whole may succeed in consolidating its commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, but Central and Eastern Europe will still remain out in the cold unless its attachment to the West can survive the rigours of its geopolitical environment. This is the biggest area of uncertainty, a geopolitical uncertainty which stems directly from the fact that Pál Dunays `central zone' of Europe perceives itself to be in the middle, caught between a potential threatening east and an equivocating west.

At the root of these geopolitical difficulties is a major discontinuity between Western Europe and its eastern neighbours, a political, economic and cultural gap wide enough to put the possibility of a security-community spanning it in some doubt. Part of the gap is a direct result of the period of Soviet-communist domination, when the countries of the European security-community and the Central and East Europeans really were in opposite camps. It may be a mistake simply to project the severe but temporary cleavage which the Iron Curtain represented back into the past or forward into the future. But there remains a nagging anxiety, in capitals east and west, that the gap between them does indeed have a longer history and a greater role in the future than an analysis looking only at the Cold War division might suggest. Andris Ozolins quotes Adenauers dismissal of Russia from Europe as `too Asiatic', but an earlier

leader in *Mitteleuropa*, Metternich, set the continental divide much further west -- `Bei Pressburg fängt Asien an.'[107]

This gap, distinct enough in reality, wider yet in perception, matters because of Russia. Central and Eastern Europe is notoriously prone to becoming a literal or metaphorical battlefield of the great powers, and no one can be sure that Russia will not sooner or later seek to challenge the incorporation of a region so recently part of its empire into a West/Central European bloc whose natural leader is perceived to be Germany. This latent Russian threat, however large or small one chooses to paint it, would not itself impede the expansion of the European security-community -- indeed it did much to strengthen it during the Cold War -- were it not for the fracture between western and central Europe which puts their solidarity in the event of a crisis in doubt. The gap and the threat each feed off the other.

The Russian threat, in fact, is easily exaggerated. The whole Russian establishment seems reconciled to the permanent disintegration of the Warsaw Pact. Troop withdrawals were completed with a minimum of trouble, and good government-to-government relations have been a priority. Beyond the rhetorical excesses of Vladimir Zhirinovsky, there is no reason to believe Russia has any ambitions to bring Central and Eastern Europe back within its sphere. Indeed, as Przemyslaw Grudzinski points out in his chapter, Russias foreign policy priorities lie elsewhere, and Central Europe is very low on its list. Russia is driven not by revanchism but by the anxieties of a declining great power unwilling to relinquish its great power status.

The situation of the Baltic States, as Andris Ozolins shows, is distinct, and more problematic. Even under Stalin, the Kremlin never thought of the satellite states as part of Russia (except, of course, for those parts of historic Poland and Romania which were taken into the Soviet Union and remain part of Russia, Belarus and Moldova today); but the Baltic States were part of Greater Russia, and their loss cannot simply be accepted in Moscow as part of the loss of a disowned ideological hegemony. Thus the Baltic states, though in many ways closer to a West European identity than, say, Romania or Bulgaria, face a tougher problem of geopolitical stability because the West fears Russian claims too much to risk getting too close. The blunt words of the chairman of the NATO Military Committee in 1991 -- `in an emergency situation NATO can offer only political support to the Baltic states' -- will remain true for quite some time.[108]

Still, the shadow of Russian military potential looms over the whole region, not just the Baltics. Even after the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and massive post-Cold War defence cuts, the Russian Army is by far the largest in Europe. In addition, Russia will be the worlds second nuclear power for the foreseeable future. The impact of this military overhang on security-community formation in Central and Eastern Europe cannot, unfortunately, be neutralised by expressions of goodwill or international commitments from the Russians, nor by the current political uselessness of nuclear weapons. Russia is so politically volatile, engaged in such a variety of conflicts within the area of the former Soviet Union, and exposed to such a range of sources of conflict in Asia that its membership in the European security-community cannot even be contemplated. Russia does not at present pose a threat to Central and Eastern Europe apart from the Baltic States, but it poses a latent threat against which the Central and East European states must seek security.

This is the reason why so much of the debate about the relationship between the West and the Central and East Europeans has revolved around the issue of NATO membership, for the Central and East Europeans perceive, quite correctly, that the denial of NATO membership reflects the lack of solidarity which the West feels with them in the face of the latent threat from Russia. Perhaps they overlook the extent to which that is due not to the timidity of statesmen but to the gap between peoples. British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd expressed the problem well:

`Are the US Congress, the House of Commons, the French [National] Assembly, the Bundestag solemnly ready to guarantee with the lives of their citizens the frontiers of, say, Slovakia? If not, or if not yet, then it would be a deceit to pretend otherwise.'[109]

When, speaking of the same example, US Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright says that `the security of Slovakia is a matter of direct and material interest to the United States,' it is well understood everywhere, especially in Slovakia, that such carefully chosen words do not constitute a security guarantee, and that a big gap still divides them from the security-community in the North Atlantic area.[110]

The preoccupation with NATO membership is understandable, but unfortunate. In the long run it is not the critical issue in determining the geopolitical stability of the region and its integration into the European security-community. NATO is itself in a period of transition, developing into an organisation designed to wield much less military might in a much wider range of contingencies, focused less on deterrence and more on intervention. The Central and East Europeans want to become part of an `old NATO' of heavy armour facing east, a NATO which is no longer there.[111] Provided NATO can succeed in remaining politically and militarily operational, the gradual integration of Central and Eastern Europe into the security-community will do more to put them on the western side in any confrontation with Russia than endless petitions for institutional membership and security guarantees.[112]

The geopolitical difficulties of the region will take time to overcome. But the long-term effects of the events of 1989 should put the western and central zones of Europe on the same side. For Central and Eastern Europe constitutes the spoils of war. This is an ugly way of putting it, and not to be commended to Western politicians rightly concerned to avoid the humiliation and alienation of Russia, but it is true none the less. The end of the Cold War was partly about the defeat of a global ideology, but it was also partly about the defeat of a great power, and the peace settlement inevitably involves a geopolitical adjustment to take into account the new balance of power. As every chapter in this paper makes abundantly clear, the Associate Partner states want to be out of the Russian sphere; they want to be part of the West European and North Atlantic order. In due course, since Russia no longer has the power to hold them, and does not even seem to wish to do so, the geopolitical adjustment they so much desire can be accomplished.[113]

A lasting peace in Central Europe?

There are, then, no insuperable obstacles to the eastward expansion of the European security-community to include the Associate Partner states. Nor, however, is there

anything inevitable about it. The concept of a `security vacuum' in Central and Eastern Europe may be accurate in acknowledging the absence of any security-providing structure in the region, but it is misleading if the inference is made that the security vacuum must and will somehow be filled. International politics does not necessarily abhor a vacuum. The current regional power structure, with small, diverse, and relatively weak independent states floating between Russia and the West without any permanent and binding associations with either or with each other, could continue indefinitely. It is, however, the common conviction of the authors of this volume that such an outcome must be avoided: the Central and East European states can and should become part of an expanded European security-community.

These states are within reach of the levels of domestic stability enjoyed in Western Europe, and are pursuing policies geared to attaining the same level of pacification and cooperation in inter-state relations. Geopolitically, they are more vulnerable, and it will take time to build the level of West-Central European solidarity needed to shore up the expansion of the security-community.

That time necessary to expand the European security-community can nevertheless be measured in years and decades rather than in generations and centuries. `Integration,' Karl Deutsch stressed, `is a matter of fact, not of time . . . several of our historical cases showed that large numbers of people changed their political outlook, and acquired new political loyalties, in a very short time.'[114] For Western readers, one of the most striking things in this paper will be Stefan Tafrovs claim that the principal features of a security-community are already present *in the Balkans* outside the war zone. Although undoubtedly an optimistic view of the trend of events in south-eastern Europe, this claim has substance and plausibility because the development of a genuine European identity is the only available way forward, to security as much as to economic prosperity and political stability, from the dilemmas of Central and Eastern Europe after communism.

The need for time to pass and the short-term difficulties of integration should not be used as an excuse for inertia. Building a security-community is a *process*, requiring not just a formal compatibility in values and systems between states but a sustained practice of intergovernmental cooperation and an organic network of transnational transactions.

`The kind of sense of community that is relevant for integration . . . [is] a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of "we-feeling", trust, and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutually successful predictions of behaviour, and of cooperative action in accordance with it -- in short, a matter of a perpetual dynamic process of mutual attention, communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness in the process of decision-making. "Peaceful change" could not be assured without this kind of relationship.'[115]

The challenge is to drive that process forward, which will require a combination of strategies. In particular, there needs to be:

- a strategy for setting the limits of the geopolitical space within which the expansion of the security-community can occur, avoiding any unnecessary alienation or exclusion of Russia but extending the purview of the West, and in

due course the boundaries of Western institutions, to include at least the Associate Partner states;

- a capacity-building strategy, to help the states of the region emerge from the period of political and economic transition as strong, legitimate, socially authoritative and accountable states, rather than as weak clients of the international financial institutions and supplicants at the feet of the West;

- a community-building strategy, to narrow the gap dividing the West Europeans from their eastern neighbours, and to let functional integration weave its invisible web of intergovernmental and intersocietal cooperation and community. Professional and business contacts, and individual mobility, tend to defy government influence, but it would at least behove Eastern and Western governments alike to work harder at taking down the `paper curtain' of tariff and non-tariff barriers to the movement of goods and people which is retarding the spontaneous growth of these critical ties.

Expanding the European security-community eastwards will not be easy, and there will be many disputes and pitfalls along the way. States will move towards a lasting peace by traversing `a fairly broad zone of transition rather than a narrow threshold.'[116] A successful transition will require positive effort on the part of both the existing members of the security-community and the Central and East European states and peoples who seek to join it. Peace in Europe is not a benefit that the West can bestow or withhold. The Central and East Europeans are in every way at the centre of the process, and it is absolutely essential to listen to and understand their viewpoint. This *chaillot Paper* has, we hope, made a modest contribution to putting that perspective across.

1. Ian Gambles compiled and edited this *chaillot Paper* while he was Visiting Lecturer in International Relations at the Budapest University of Economic Sciences. He now works at Her Majesty's Treasury, London.

2. Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 5.

3. Ibid., p. 7.

4. Ibid., p. 37.

5. Obviously institutional and non-institutional approaches are not alternatives. The theory of integration as a path to security, from David Mitrany to Ernst Haas and beyond, confirms that institutional growth and community development are mutually reinforcing processes. Those who believe, with Immanuel Kant and Michael Doyle, that achieving security depends primarily on the constitutional structure and political culture of states, do not seek to deny the facilitating role of institutions: `peace', Kant wrote, `must be established'. Equally, classic idealist internationalism has moved on from the *naïvetés* of the early twentieth century to embrace new ideas, notably the theory of regimes and the ideas of transnationalism and neo-medievalism, which acknowledge that international cooperation and intersocietal integration have a life of their own, and do not necessarily depend on institutionalisation. Deutschs original concept retains its strength in the midst of all this theoretical evolution, as its utilisation by such a radical modern writer in security studies as Barry Buzan amply demonstrates.

6. Ibid., p. 66.

7. This goes further than Deutsch, who rejected the idea that only democracies could be part of a security-community. Times have changed. The final end of authoritarian regimes in Spain, Portugal and Greece and the fall of totalitarian regimes in the East have made the reappearance of non-democratic governance incompatible with the main values of the European security-community. Ibid., p. 10.

8. The North Atlantic Treaty, *NATO Basic Documents* (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1976), p. 12.

9. Josef Joffe, `Europes American Pacifier', *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1984.

10. `Central Europe' and `Central and Eastern Europe' are not precisely defined terms, and mean different things to different people. Each author in this paper has a distinct interpretation and usage, and no attempt has been made to impose uniformity. In general, both these terms are used throughout the paper to refer to the nine Associate Partner states of WEU, with which we are primarily concerned.

11. Przemyslaw Grudzinski is a professor at the Institute of History, Polish Academy of Sciences and was previously a Vice-Minister of National Defence (Policy) in Warsaw.

12. `A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement', The White House, July 1994, p. 22.

13. Timothy Garton-Ash, `Germany's Choice', *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 1994, p. 77.

14. Christoph Bertram, `Welches Europa soll's denn sein?', *Die Zeit*, 9 September 1994, p. 1.

15. Dan Pavel is a lecturer at the Department of History and Political Sciences, University of Cluj.

16. Gordon White, `Civil Society, Democratization and Development (I): Clearing the Analytical Ground', *Democratization*, vol. 1, no. 3, Autumn 1994, pp. 375-90.

17. Ibid., pp. 376-7.

18. Jean-Francois Bayart, `Civil Society in Africa', in Patrick chabal (ed.), *Political Domination in Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 118.

19. Vaclav Havel, `A Call for Sacrifice. The Co-Responsibility of the West', *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1994, pp. 2-3.

20. Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Reinventing Politics. Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel* (New York: Free Press, 1992), p. 171.

21. David Held, `Democracy, the Nation-State and the Global System', in Held (ed.), *Political Theory Today* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), pp. 68-9.

22. G.M. Tamas, `Socialism, Capitalism, and Modernity', *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 3, no. 3, July 1992, p. 69.

23. Kenneth Jowitt, `Collective rights vs. individual rights', in Romanian-American Symposium on Inter-Ethnic Relations, Bucharest, June 17-18, 1991, pp. 7-8.

24. For the debates on the fate of the former dissident intellectuals who promoted the values of civil society, see Adam Michnik, `An Embarrassing Anniversary', *New York Review of Books*, 10 June 1993; Theodor Draper, `A New History of the Velvet Revolution', *New York Review of Books*, 14 January 1993; Tony Judt, `Misjudgment of Paris: French Illusions and the Eastern Europe that Never Was', *Times Literary Supplement*, 15 May 1992; and Vladimir Tismaneanu, `New York Review, Times Literary Supplement and the Velvet Counter-revolution', *Common Knowledge*, Spring 1994.

25. Ioanna I. Mizgala, `The Ecology of Transformation: The Impact of the Corporatist State on the Formation and Development of the Party System in Poland, 1989-1993', *East European Politics and Societies*, vol. 8, no. 2, Spring 1994.

26. Vaclav Klaus, `The Radical Transformation of Czech Society and its European Context' (Address at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 7 March 1994), p. 2.

27. G.M. Tamas,`The legacy of dissent. How civil society has been seduced by the cult of privacy', in *Times Literary Supplement*, 14 May 1993.

28. George Schöpflin, `Post-Communism: the Problems of Democratic Construction', *Daedalus*, vol. 23, no. 3 (Summer 1994), p. 127.

29. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Lawrence Whitehead (eds.), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Prospects for Democracy* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986 -- four volumes), and Geoffrey Pridham (ed.), *Securing Democracy. Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe* (London and New York: Routledge, 1990).

30. O'Donnell and Schmitter, op. cit., vol. IV, p. 9.

31. Ibid.

32. Bennett Kovrig, `Creating Coherence: Collective Contributions to the Political Integration of Central and Eastern Europe', in John R. Lampe & Daniel N. Nelson (eds.), *East European Security Reconsidered* (The Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 1993), p. 185.

33. Doh Chull Shin, `On the Third Wave of Democratization. A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory and Research', *World Politics* 47, October 1994, p. 141.

34. Juan Linz, `Transitions to Democracy', *Washington Monthly* 13 (Summer 1990), p. 158.

35. Vaclav Klaus, `So far, so good', *The Economist*, 10 September 1994, p. 33.

36. Warren Christopher and William Perry, `Foreign Policy Hamstrung', *New York Times*, 13 February 1995.

37. Michael Sturmer, `Clausewitz and the Return of History at the End of the 20th Century', in Armand Clesse et al. (eds.), *The International System After the Collapse of the East-West Order* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), p. 268.

38. Pál Dunay is Associate Professor of International Law at the Eötvös Lorand University, Budapest, and Deputy Director of the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs.

39. Jenô Szûcs, `Three Historical Regions of Europe: An Outline', in J. Keane (ed.), *Civil Society and the State* (London and New York: Verso, 1993 [1981]), pp. 291-332.

40. The relationship of Greece and Turkey, situated on the periphery of the `political West' is an exception.

41. Slovenia is a special case in this respect, as its independent statehood was born in violence. Following recognition, its situation seems to have stabilized.

42. Similarly Christoph Bertram, `Let's Be Clear: Not One Europe but a New West and a New East', *International Herald Tribune,* 12 July 1994, p. 6.

43. `The Alliance's New Strategic Concept', agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the NAC in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, *NATO Review,* vol. 39, no. 6, p. 26, para. 10.

44. Ibid., para. 11.

45. Philipp Borinski, `Die neue NATO-Strategie. Perspektiven militärischer Sicherheitspolitik in Europa', *HSFK Report,* no. 1, 1993, p. 29.

46. Ibid.

47. The `new abroad' is not identical with the `near abroad', as the former does not cover the three Baltic states. This might be a reflection of the fact that the West, and in particular the Scandinavian countries, has well-defined interests in that area and consequently any attempt at reintegration would create tensions. This may be the reason Russia was reluctantly prepared to complete the withdrawal of its ground troops from the area.

48. For an extensive summary see `Grundbestimmungen der Militärdoktrin der Russländischen Föderation, am 18. November 1993 veröffentlicht', *Europa Archiv,* vol. 49, no. 1, 10 January 1994, pp. D31-46. For the reference see p. D33.

49. F. Stephen Larrabee, *East-European Security After the Cold War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993), p. 162.

50. `Grundbestimmungen', p. D34.

51. Jan Zielonka, `Security in Central Europe', *Adelphi Paper* 272, Autumn 1992, pp. 33-4.

52. This argument was put forward by László Valki in a paper written in 1990. Even though I regard the language of security vacuum as misleading, I think Valki's observation was correct. Something will have to happen to those countries which have been left in limbo since the end of the East-West conflict. László Valki, `Vanishing Threat Perceptions and New Uncertainties in Central Europe', in Valki (ed.), *changing Threat Perceptions and Military Doctrines* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), p. 92.

53. The Soviet Union/Russia and Romania are exceptions, since they had national defence planning during the years of East-West confrontation.

54. For a more detailed treatment of these issues see my `Adversaries All Around? (Re)nationalization of Security and Defence policies in Central and Eastern Europe', *Clingendael Paper,* January 1994, pp. 7-11 and 29-35.

55. Yugoslavia, which has witnessed bloody ethnic conflict since 1991, was a non-aligned country in the period of East-West conflict, and never part of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.

56. Tenets of the Polish Security Policy, Warsaw, 2 November 1992, p. 5.

57. Comments of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Josef Zieleniec, on the foreign policy of the Czech Republic, at the 8th session of the chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, Prague, 24 June 1993, p. 6.

58. Emil Kuchár, `Slovakia: Looking West and East', in Jan Geert Siccama and Theo van den Doel (eds.), *Restructuring Armed Forces in East and West* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), p. 104.

59. Ioan Pascu, `Romania and the Yugoslav Conflict', *European Security,* vol. 3, no. 1, Spring 1994, p. 156 (emphasis added).

60. The population of the Republic of Hungary is approximately 10.6 million and an additional 3.2-3.5 million ethnic Hungarians live in neighbouring countries. For more details see George Schöpflin, `Hungary and its Neighbours', *chaillot Paper* 7 (Paris: Institute of Security Studies of WEU, May 1993), p. 37.

61. The statement, according to press reports, was made in the course of a meeting between Prime Minister Antall and Italian President Francesco Cossiga in the summer of 1991. No Hungarian official was subsequently ready to deny the statement.

62. Basic Principles of the Security Policy of the Republic of Hungary (1993), *Fact Sheets on Hungary,* no. 4, para. 8, p. 4 (emphasis added).

63. Szerzôdés a jószomszédság és az együttmûködés alapjairól a Magyar Köztársaság és Ukrajna között [Treaty on the foundations of good-neighbourliness and cooperation between the Republic of Hungary and Ukraine], Article 2, para. 2.

64. Statement by the Spokesman of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *Press Release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary,* 13 September 1994, p. 1.

65. Concluding Document of the Inaugural Conference for a Pact on Stability in Europe (1994), point 1.5.

66. Ibid., point 2.4.

67. This aspect was emphasized by the Essen European Council meeting. See Presidency Conclusions, 9-10 December 1994, SN 300/94 XII. Intra-regional cooperation and promotion of *bon voisinage*.

68. Andris Ozolins is a research associate at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs and lectures at the Department of Political Science, University of Latvia.

69. The three-level framework is drawn from M. Andersen and M. Skak, `The New Western Ostpolitik: challenges, Current State and Issues', Paper for the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Leiden, 2-8 April 1993.

70. Jeffrey Simon, `Does Eastern Europe Belong in NATO?', *Orbis*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1993, p. 21.

71. *The Baltic Observer*, 3-9 March 1992.

72. Ibid., 20-26 March 1992.

73. *International Herald Tribune*, 10 February 1995.

74. `Current Latvia', Special Information Supplement issued by the Information and Press Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Latvia, March 1994.

75. In Baltic policy concerning international institutions such as the OSCE, NATO and WEU, emphasis was initially put on the need to regain independence and international recognition, to establish diplomatic contacts, and to represent Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in international forums. The Balts succeeded in their efforts to re-establish independence and gain international recognition, and this happened perhaps more easily and rapidly than had been expected.

76. Except of course for Poland's border with the Kaliningrad enclave.

77. *The Baltic Observer*, 24-30 November 1994.

78. Carl Bildt, `The Baltic Litmus Test', *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1994, p. 81.

79. R. Rose and W. Malay, `Conflict or Compromise in the Baltic States', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 15 July 1994.

80. `International functional integration brings states together over time by the gradual extension of inter-state cooperation, through conscious decision or spillover, from one issue to another.' Ian Gambles, `European Security Integration in the 1990's, *chaillot Paper* 3 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, 1991), p. 23.

81. V. Birkavs, `Latvijas drosiba cela uz 21. gadsimtu' (Latvian security on the road to the 21st century), *Diena*, 9 March 1994.

82. At first, Estonian President Lennart Meri was quoted as saying: `The Russian elections compel us to see the PfP proposal as nothing more than an empty bottle of chanel perfume: empty, but nice to look at.' *The Baltic Observer*, 24 December 1993 - 6 January 1994. But in fact Estonia became the fourth country to sign the official documents of accession to the Partnership for Peace programme and Lithuania was the second (after Romania).

83. *Diena*, 9 March 1994.

84. *The Baltic Observer*, 9-15 March 1995.

85. Ibid., 12-18 May 1994.

86. *Financial Times*, 20 October 1994.

87. *International Herald Tribune*, 20 October 1994.

88. *The Baltic Observer*, 2-8 February 1995.

89. Ibid., 16-22 February 1995.

90. A. Lejins, `Security in the Baltic states: goals and constraints', paper delivered at the Saekerhetspolitiskt symposium, Karlberg, 20 March 1994.

91. *International Herald Tribune*, 12 July 1994.

92. See, for example, a speech by Kozyrev distributed to representatives at the Council of Europe and reprinted in *Moscow News*, 25 September 1994.

93. *The Baltic Observer*, 15-21 September 1994.

94. Gregory F. Treverton, `Finding an Analogy for Tomorrow', *Orbis*, Winter 1993, pp. 1-2.

95. D. Mahncke, `Parameters of European Security', *chaillot Paper* 10 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, 1993), p. 7.

96. Stefan Tafrov was formerly First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in the UDF Government and is currently Ambassador of Bulgaria to the Court of St James's. The views expressed here are his own.

97. Christopher Cviic, *Remaking the Balkans* (London: Pinter for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991).

98. George Schöpflin, *Politics in Eastern Europe 1945-1992* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).

99. *Security for Europe Project - Final Report* (Providence, Rhode Island: Center for Foreign Policy Development of the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University, December 1993).

100. Nicole Gnesotto, `Lessons of Yugoslavia', *chaillot Paper* 14 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, 1994).

101. László Valki, `A Future Security Architecture for Europe?', *International Security and East-Central Europe* (Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre for Security Studies, occasion Papers, 1993).

102. This harmful perspective also prejudices Western attitudes to the European states of the CIS on Russias borders -- Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine. These states, especially Ukraine, are of great importance for European security, and any successes the Associate Partner states have in achieving integration with the West tend to bring to the fore the difficult issue of the place of Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine in Europe. Certainly a lasting peace in Central and Eastern Europe cannot harm them any more than it can harm Russia, but whether they can themselves become part of it is another question, which this paper makes no attempt to address.

103. The term `Central and East European states' in this chapter applies to the nine Associate Partners of WEU, plus Slovenia. Slovenia is in a very similar position to the nine, and is an equally good candidate for membership in the European security-community. Its anomalous position in regard to European integration is only temporary, and negotiations with the EU are now under way. Slovenias rather undeserved place in the slow lane reflects some unfortunate bilateral difficulties with Italy, and a general anxiety among Italys allies about bringing the Yugoslav war another step closer to integrated Europe.

104. See also Bennett Kovrig, `Creating Coherence: Collective Contributions to the Political Integration of Central and Eastern Europe', in John R. Lampe and Daniel N. Nelson (eds.), *East European Security Reconsidered* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1993), p. 185.

105. `Polands eastern border is not a "border in fire". Despite grudges, historical wrongs, a difficult history and still persisting bias, no chain of hatred has been built along this border.' Henryk Szlajfer, `A View of Central and East European Security from Warsaw', in charles L. Barry (ed.), *The Search for Peace in Europe* (Fort Lesley J. McNair: National Defence University Press, 1993), p. 161.

106. `La déclaration de Visegrad est avant tout une profession de foi démocratique et européenne', comments Amaya Bloch-Lainé in a useful analysis of regional cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe, so often initiated as a means to integration with the West and not as an end in itself. The Pentagonale-Hexagonale-Central European Initiative was also conceived in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, he argues, as `une antichambre à lintégration dans la CEE'. Amaya Bloch-Lainé, `LEurope Centrale en Quête de Sécurité', *Les Cahiers du CREST* 9, January 1993 (Paris: CREST, 1993), pp. 47 ff., 62.

107. `Asia begins at Bratislava'. Kovrig, op. cit., pp. 157 ff.

108. General Eide, quoted from the *Baltic Observer* in Peter Vares and Mare Haab, `The Baltic states: quo vadis?', in Regina Cowen-Karp, *Central and Eastern Europe: The challenge of Transition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1993) p. 287.

109. Quoted in David White, `Scramble for seats on mystery ride', *Financial Times,* 10 January 1994.

110. Transcript of news conference in Bratislava, *European Wireless File*, 12 January 1994.

111. White, op. cit.

112. *Early* NATO expansion may be neither advisable nor necessary, even from a Central and East European standpoint, as a strategy for dealing with the Russian problem. Michael Brown argues convincingly that critics of a wait-and-see strategy `underestimate the problems associated with expansion in a low-threat environment and overestimate the problems associated with expansion in a high-threat environment.' Michael E. Brown, `The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion', *Survival*, Spring 1995, p. 48.

113. Christoph Bertram, `Lets Be Clear: Not One Europe but a New West and a New East', *International Herald Tribune*, 12 July 1994, sets this stall out very clearly.

114. Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 6, 13.

115. Ibid., p. 36.

116. Ibid., p. 33.