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WAR AND PEACE: EUROPEAN CONFLICT PREVENTION

Lawrence Freedman, Pierre Hassner,
Dieter Senghaas, Stefano Silvestri
and Carlos Zaldivar
Edited by Nicole Gnesotto

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INTRODUCTION

Nicole Gnesotto[1]

For more than two years, wars and atrocities all too reminiscent of another epoch have set in--perhaps permanently--in the heart of Europe. Yet the Continent is for the most part focused towards its prosperity, its restored security and the extension of fundamental liberties. This coexistence of peace and war is not attributable solely to the collapse of the former Yugoslavia. In the former Soviet Union as a whole the pattern is echoed in one republic or another and threatens at any moment to spread to Russia itself, or to involve Russia and one or other of those republics.

For over forty years the communist threat and nuclear deterrence froze the march of history in Europe, under the double seal of relative stability for the whole continent and a tyranny clearly reserved for its eastern part. The explosion of political liberty in the East has ended this division and, paradoxically, introduced into the European order regional anarchy of the most traditional type. The end of the Cold War has been marked in effect by the return of real wars to Europe. And yet with this reservation, that a conflict in Sarajevo does not imply the risk of global conflagration but merely signifies that a war is raging in Sarajevo.

A security differential is now growing, from west to east and from north to south of what can be regarded as Europe from a strategic point of view: Washington is much more secure than Bonn, London or Paris, and the latter capitals are much more secure than Budapest, Kiev or Skopje. If the notion of collective security has any meaning, it is more that of a myth or a long-term objective than of a reality for Europe in 1993. The general rule today is rather the inequality of Europeans in the face of war and the diversity of reactions in the face of a given conflict, and thus the primacy of national differences over contractual or *de facto* solidarity.

The nationalism which is now feeding the new logic of European wars is not, after all, the exclusive right of the former Soviet empire. For the European Community and Western countries in general managing other people's wars has become both a common necessity and one variable, among others, in their national interests. Formerly, the collective threat gave rise to a reflex of collective response; today's different, limited risks generate minimal, divergent responses. A certain degree of nationalism in the Western partners' security policies has thus become normal once again. When added to the monetary or economic difficulties each of them is experiencing, it explains in part the failure of the Twelve, the United States and the international community in general to deal with the war in the former Yugoslavia.

It was doubtless necessary to let things take their course: just as the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence was not achieved in a day, so a certain time was necessary for the European democracies to adapt to and implement any preventive--or punitive--diplomacy worth speaking of. Neither the existing institutions nor common strategic thinking was suited to the new requirements for the management of European crises. Regarding in particular the legitimacy of the use of force, the democracies were obliged, and the process unfortunately seems far from completed, to re-learn how to escape from the narrow framework of legitimate individual or collective self-defence:

when, by whom and why may recourse to the use of force therefore be legitimate--to halt or even prevent aggression? Since de Tocqueville, it has been recognised that democracies have an almost natural difficulty in considering the use of violence: will Yugoslavia provide confirmation of their powerlessness--or of their abdication of responsibility? Can democratic Europe live side by side with, supposedly limited, pockets of barbarism at the Community's frontiers?

These are only some of the dilemmas posed daily by the new conflicts now scattered throughout Europe. An impartial observer, the Institute has brought together the views of five of the most eminent European specialists in the field of security: Pierre Hassner (Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches internationales, Paris), Dieter Senghaas (Bremen University), Carlos Zaldivar (Cabinet of the Prime Minister of Spain), Lawrence Freedman (King's College, London) and Stefano Silvestri (Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome). In chapters dealing with the new European disorder, the suppression of nationalism, the common responsibility of the Twelve in crisis prevention, the use of force and the limitation of conflicts, each contributor puts forward views which, while different one from another, are essential to the forming of any practical solution. While not giving any definitive answer to the current conflicts, nor exhausting a subject which remains the major challenge of post-communist Europe, we hope these essays nevertheless constitute an essential contribution to the creation--or survival--of a lasting order of peace and freedom in Europe.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM

Pierre Hassner[2]

It would be impossible to introduce a work dealing with European conflict prevention without evoking Raymond Aron, the author of *Peace and War*, but also of *The Century of Total War*, and again, the phrase of his which dates from 1947 and was restated, on the eve of his death, in *Les dernières années du siècle*: `peace impossible, war improbable'.

Is that expression which was valid during the Cold War decades still valid today? Have the upheavals of 1989-90 brought peace or war? The paradox is that, having emerged from the inevitably contradictory Cold War situation, Europe has found itself in one which is even more contradictory. The Cold War was described by the expression `neither peace nor war', explained by Raymond Aron's phrase which is quoted above: peace was impossible as a result of the ideological confrontation of the two blocs and war was improbable because of their state of equilibrium, which was fixed by their nuclear weapons. In the post-Cold War period, on the other hand, peace has become a little less impossible thanks to the disappearance of the ideological schism but war has become a little less improbable because of the combination of political, and economic, anarchy and nuclear proliferation. This applies even if we speak of Peace and War with capital letters, in other words of a peaceful world order and of the nuclear apocalypse.

What is already happening in fact is that, for the first time in Europe, we are living simultaneously in a state both beyond and before the Cold War, in the era of peaceful societies and in that of real wars. If the description of the Cold War was `neither peace nor war', that of the post-Cold War period is `both peace and war'.

On the one hand the former `enemy' and the former `threat' have been transformed into partners, multilateral organisations like the CSCE and UN are assuming greater importance and are supposed to organise peace at the regional and global levels, and defence organisations like NATO are setting up cooperative arrangements with their former adversaries and envisage their possible membership. On the other hand, however, for the first time since the Second World War, Europe is bloodied by a real war in the very heart of the Continent, a war which is producing hundreds of thousands of victims and millions of refugees and which has seen a country commit suicide in conditions of barbarity, a member state of the UN sliced up by its aggressors. Other wars which are also very real are raging on the eastern periphery of the Continent, on the European territory of the former Soviet Union. Collective self-defence organisations like NATO and WEU, and collective security organisations like CSCE and NATO, find themselves helpless faced with a situation where it is neither a question of preventing an attack on Western Europe nor of `keeping the peace'. This paradox lies at the heart of our subject.

But this paradox itself refers back to an even deeper one, which concerns the historical evolution of modern societies.

On the one hand this evolution has produced, in the developed West, a really miraculous change in the traditional nature of the political order between states: that order is no longer dominated by the threat or the reality of war. Whether this is an effect of democracy or the growth of bourgeois attitudes, of the rise in individualistic values or of demography, of the devaluation of the importance of territory or of heroism, the fact is that a war between France and Germany, between Sweden and Denmark or between the United States and Canada has become inconceivable. Western societies are economic rather than military societies, based on the concept of satisfaction (and frustration) rather than the ideal of sacrifice.

On the other hand, however, the development of the forms of political organisation which has led to the nation-state model is neither completed nor final. In the West, the primacy of the individual over the state and the phenomena connected with interdependence on a world scale pose the question whether the concept of the state itself is outmoded. In the East, in certain countries, the brand of nationalism which flourished in Western Europe at the beginning of the century is making rapid advances. In certain regions the process of building nation-states from the ruins of multinational empires (Austrian, Ottoman and now Soviet) is still in the ascendant, with its trail of territorial disputes, persecution of minorities, conquests and enforced migration. The traditional values of the martyred or redemptive nation, of virility expressed through violence or of religious fanaticism are thereby delivering a fierce attack on modern values.

The Cold War obscured these developments and this disparity in historical age between the different parts of the Continent. In the West, the existence and the power of the Soviet Union still gave rise to a certain sense of external threat and of the necessity for defence; moreover, the nuclear balance made it possible to live through that period under the protection of deterrence, that is to say an abstract mechanism for which the real existence of societies, which was essentially civil and private, had very little concern. In the East, Moscow's iron grip forbade the expression of national rivalries, thanks to a mixture of terror and the invocation of a common enemy. This immobility resulted in a false symmetry. On the other hand, the post-Cold War circumstances allowed each side to revert to its deeply felt tendencies--peaceful individualism and a refusal of sacrifice and of the use of force on the one side and collective passions and a refusal of good neighbourliness on the other.

Consequently, Europe's security structure now seems profoundly asymmetrical. It is neither the bipolar opposition of the two alliances nor a pan-European order of collective security and cooperation of the type dreamed of, each in his own way, by de Gaulle or Genscher, it is a Europe which is profoundly differentiated by zones which have radically different degrees of security. The image which represents the situation least badly might be that of the centre and the periphery: in the same way as the West, at a global level, at the continental level Western Europe represents the centre, whose superiority is striking--economically, ideologically, politically and even militarily (potentially or, for the time being, with the help of the United States). However, faced with troubles on its eastern and southern periphery whose consequences it fears but to which it does not quite know how to react, Western Europe finds itself hesitant and uneasy.

The most immediately tempting solution would obviously be not to react at all. If Western Europe and the rest of the Continent really live in two different worlds, the one peaceful and the other warlike, it could be concluded that the first had little to fear from the second and little to contribute to it. The important thing would be carefully to maintain the separation of the two worlds so as to avoid healthy, prosperous Europe becoming contaminated by the virus of war and famine while trying to combat it.

This thesis seems to me impossible to sustain to its conclusion, even if one confines oneself to the diplomatico-strategic dimension in its most classical and narrowest sense. But in this case there are non-negligible arguments on its side. It is a fact that the two classic mechanisms linking local conflicts and external powers--escalation and intervention--have become much more difficult to use. The two mechanisms which have generalised conflict--the interplay of diplomatico-military alliances before 1914 and the ideological confrontation of the interwar period and during the Cold War--are absent. Conversely, the primacy of individualism and the refusal to risk the lives of one's fellow citizens renders the cost of intervention much less bearable for the Western nations.

The fact remains that those nations are well and truly bound up in a network of interdependence which is more difficult to circumvent and more visible than it was in the past. If the centre can do without the periphery from the point of view of the respective advantages, of autarchy or of strategic or economic dependence, it is none the less not master of the mechanisms of contagion and interaction which are beyond the control of states and involve financial flows and their manipulation, the trade in drugs and arms, the communications revolution, the broadcasting of images and the spread of corruption and violence in a world in which states, whether they be democratic or totalitarian, developed or underdeveloped, are decreasingly in control of society. Increasingly, international relations are made up of the combination of at least three types of processes: the *interaction* of strategies (in particular diplomatic and military), the *interdependence* of interests (in particular economic) and the *interpenetration* of societies (in particular from a demographic and cultural point of view). My thesis is that this third type of relationship, which is much more diffuse and difficult to control, is assuming an increasing importance in comparison with the classic types and that it rebounds on them by giving rise to new economic turmoil and new risks of violence.

Strategic interaction or the new geopolitics

What increasingly characterises the new geopolitics is that it can be less and less understood in the form of an interplay between rational actors. Neither the limits of the system, nor the stakes and rules of interaction, nor even the nature and identity of the actors appear to be defined once and for all. What seems to govern the interaction is an undefined, ambiguous and uncontrollable process.

That does not contradict the fragmentation of the European strategic scene but it prohibits attributing to it fixed frontiers and a rigid structure. Nor does it rule out the existence of actors who have a strategy: on the contrary, Slobodan Milosevic's big advantage is that he seems to be an excellent strategist who knows, in calculating risks, how to combine audacity and prudence, violence and manipulation, and this distinguishes him from all his former Yugoslav or international opponents. However,

even he is a prisoner of the processes which he has initiated but he at least adapts his objectives accordingly.

There is nothing fundamentally new in this, but it is useful to recall it in relation to the theoretical distinctions between the rational and the irrational, or the legal distinctions between civil and inter-state wars, which are less and less useful. Civil wars turn into wars of national independence or secession and from there into inter-state wars. What for some is a policing operation is seen by others as imperialist aggression. Similarly, at a regional level the notion of `near abroad' currently employed by the Russians and regarded with suspicion by the countries in question corresponds well to the will to keep a neo-imperial *droit de regard* over the countries of the former Soviet Union, either under the guise of safeguarding the interests of Russian minorities or in the name of common strategic interests. Conversely, certain former Soviet or even Russian republics increasingly see themselves as members of a regional grouping which excludes Moscow and look to that grouping for security guarantees. That is the case for the Baltic countries or Ukraine at one extreme and the Vladivostok region at the other.

It is thus important to combine regional distinctions resulting from the disintegration of empires with a consideration of the balances of power and interests which do not totally coincide.

In very broad terms, in Europe one can distinguish four regional groupings whose situations from the point of view of war and peace, are clearly differentiated. Firstly, Western Europe (with the exception of one member of the Community, Greece, and another member of NATO, Turkey). While this region is not safe from terrorist attacks or even selective missile attacks (such as those of Gadaffi against Lampedusa in Italy) from Africa, the Middle East or even Serbia, the risk of a true war, in particular an invasion of its territory by Russia in the coming years, has become negligible.

However, Russia remains the other pole of the European continent from the point of view of security. Itself threatened by disintegration or civil war, it is none the less rediscovering neo-imperialist reflexes, aspirations and behaviour. Russian or ex-Soviet troops have been or are active in Transdnestr, Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Tajikistan. Implicitly or explicitly, they threaten the Baltic countries and Ukraine. They would or could make their weight felt in Central Europe (for example, in the event of a dispute with Poland) or in the Balkans (in support of Serbia). At some distant point in the future they could once again pose a threat to Western Europe.

For the years to come, however, that threat remains abstract even for Central Europe. The distinction between the former Soviet empire (or the former Warsaw Pact) and the former Soviet Union, which tends to disappear as regards the new regional balances, still seems to be valid regarding the prospects of actual war, including the use of nuclear weapons by Russia. While the most important question for the future of peace in Europe is that of the relations between Russia and Ukraine and the risk that they follow the path established between Serbia and Croatia, on the other hand it is hard to imagine a new Russian conquest of Central Europe, in particular of the Visegrad group of countries.

Moreover, the situation of the latter presents a certain paradox: the most frequently suggested solution to the real problem of the institutional and geopolitical vacuum created by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact is the enlargement of NATO to include the Visegrad countries, which are all destined to become members of the European Community, sooner and more certainly than the other countries of Central Europe. It is not a matter of criticising this suggestion, which seems to me to be in line with a number of desirable and probable developments, but rather of noting that it does not really answer the problem.

In effect the Visegrad countries are already in a sense the periphery of the West, having previously been that of the Soviet empire. Like Western Europe, they do not really have a security problem in the strict sense--that of a threat of war on their territory. Certainly, they could suffer, as they already do more than Western Europe from the economic, political and social effects of the Yugoslav conflict, or of a possible conflict between Russia and Ukraine. In the same way, Germany and Italy are more exposed to such an event than France or Britain, and the European Union more than the United States and Canada. But it is either a question of the very real problems of refugees or the impact of sanctions, or of the unequal credibility of extended deterrence in the face of an abstract threat which they share with Western Europe. Their true security problems are economic ones or are linked to the identity crisis of their societies.

On the other hand, to the south and east of the Visegrad group extend two regions within which the countries (except perhaps Estonia and Latvia, which are drawn into the Nordic orbit, and Slovenia, which is taken in tow by Austria) have few prospects of being capable of assimilation into NATO but which are themselves subject to the current reality or the immediate and ever-present threat of war: on the one hand the Balkans and on the other the European part of the former Soviet Union.

Even now, a merciless war is raging in the former Yugoslavia and in the Caucasus and a true military intervention has occurred in Transdnestr. Civil wars involving the intervention of Moscow within the Russian Federation itself or in Ukraine following its disintegration; the extension of the Yugoslav conflict to all of the Balkans, either via Macedonia or starting from the deterioration of relations between Greece and Albania, or from the atmosphere of tension and the feeling of isolation, both of which favour adventurism, which reign today in Greece and Serbia; finally, the inevitably growing factor of Islamic fundamentalism, are all unfortunately much more plausible than a hypothetical attack on the Czech Republic. There are some certainties: the Visegrad countries will find themselves inevitably dragged along in the wake of Western Europe, even if that occurs at a rather unsatisfactory pace and in rather unsatisfactory conditions; on the other hand, Russia, even if it is pacific and cooperative, cannot, because of its size and Asian dimension, occupy an analogous place within the European Community or Atlantic structures. But the greatest uncertainty reigns over the position and future institutional and geopolitical structures of the Balkans and the European former Soviet republics. No one knows whether, in the Balkans, there will be a realignment on cultural and religious bases, a reconstitution of something like a Yugoslav or Balkan grouping, a permanent `lebanonisation', the placing of one or several provinces under UN mandate, or the slide of Greece or Turkey, or both, towards regional objectives and confrontation which would be to the detriment of their integration in Europe and the West. One

does, however, know that there will not be a pure and simple extension of the Community, WEU and NATO to include all of the Balkans. Equally, no one knows what place Ukraine, a medium-sized power of considerable importance, will occupy in the future continental balance of power, what the nature of its relationships with its neighbours will be and what status its nuclear weapons will have. One knows that neither Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia nor Moldova can be excluded a priori and for evermore from Western institutions, but neither can they be integrated easily or in the foreseeable future into those organisations, which are disinclined to accept countries whose frontiers are ill-defined, which have unresolved problems of minorities and whose admission would appear to be directed against Russia.

The absence of external protecting and restraining structures, the existence of classical inter-state conflicts of an ethnic or territorial character and the dangers of instability or even bloody anarchy are factors which do not incite confidence in the peaceful future of these two regions.

Conversely, there are two factors which permit a moderation of this pessimism. On the one hand there is the relative strength of those countries which are potentially `revisionist' or `irredentist' and those in favour of the *status quo* and, on the other hand, the economic dependence of most of these countries on the West and their desire not to sacrifice their chances of integration in the West.

In the first respect it can be noted that, in terms of pure *realpolitik*, some of these countries which may aspire, for very understandable, even legitimate reasons to reunite their fellow citizens living abroad, turn out to be much smaller or militarily weaker than their neighbours. That is the case for Hungary and Albania, which it is difficult to imagine would undertake military action against Romania, Serbia or Greece, above all because they do not have the means to do so but also because their economic salvation lies in integration in Western Europe and assistance from Western Europe. The same reasoning holds for Bulgaria and, to a lesser extent, because of the psychological factors mentioned above and the temptation of preventive adventurism, Greece.

The really dangerous countries are those which were formerly dominant within supranational groupings--Serbia and Russia. These combine military superiority over their neighbours with a feeling of solidarity with their diaspora which is difficult to distinguish from a nostalgia for empire and, lastly, a potential ideological attitude of rejection of the values of the integrated West and a traditionalist, mystic or nationalist affirmation of their difference.

Finally, there exists a third category of country whose geopolitical situation, economic resources and cultural traditions present this same three-sided characteristic of being powerful, of oscillating between national-state and imperial-ethnic ideas, and of having experienced the temptation to affirm their identity in contrast with the West, but which seem to have made the opposite choice--that of Western values, economic success and peaceful modernity. Those countries are Germany and Turkey.

Both countries are heirs to two of the great empires which dominated the region. From a strictly geopolitical viewpoint, one could almost say that whereas the results of the Second World War were inverted in the 1960s in favour of Germany and Japan,

it is now the turn of those of the First World War. If the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian and German empires collapsed in 1918 and the Russian empire survived in its Soviet form, today it is the turn of its rivals to rise again: Germany's vocation might thus be to dominate Central Europe and that of Turkey to dominate the Balkans and the Caucasus, if not Central Asia. But in actual fact if the two countries are effectively in the process of quitting the narrow framework of Ataturk's state and Adenauer's republic, it is not, as far as objectives are concerned, in order to pursue a pan-Germanic or pan-Turkish dream of empire nor, regarding means, to impose their domination through force. It is rather in order to exercise economic and cultural influence on behalf of Europe and the West. But the permanence of this choice assumes that the Western organisations fulfil their role, which is to provide a stable and credible diplomatico-strategic framework in the face of the ambitions and fanaticism of those who follow another system of values. If not, Germany and Turkey will find themselves led, in opposition to their present priorities, to assume a political, and subsequently military role, which will only reinforce the suspicions of those who already see political hegemony developing behind the peaceful dynamism of these countries and their societies.

Economic interdependence, integration and fragmentation

More than at other times and in other regions, economic issues are certainly at the heart of the problem of European conflict prevention today. At the same time, economics plays a part in the general ambiguity of the post-Cold War situation, to which is added the specific dialectic of the relationships between economic, political and military factors.

On a first level, the most obvious and probably the most important, economics is inherently peaceful. In modern societies, it is above all economic values which have replaced military values. Even the nations in which traditional passions remain predominant participate to a certain extent and in any case aspire to become consumer societies and, except for a few extreme cases, such as Pol Pot's Cambodia or perhaps Milosevic's Serbia, know that they cannot in the long term live in a state of autarchy.

In the former Soviet Union, at a time when political tensions between Russia and Ukraine are rising, the two countries plus Belarus are signing an economic agreement. One can see in this the beginnings of a regional Slav bloc, but the important thing is that economic and politico-military alignments do not necessarily coincide, and that economic interdependence has a tendency to transcend the frontiers of nations and alliances.

At the same time, however, economics, the `weapon of peace', can change into a weapon of war. Even between developed countries, rising neo-mercantilism sees competition in terms of `economic warfare'. Blockade or embargo, a weapon used by the Russians against the Estonians, the Serbs against the Bosnians and the Greeks against the Macedonians, is also used by the international community, providing it with an alternative solution (sometimes apparent and sometimes real) to the painful choice between war or inaction.

A complement or substitute for the use of military force, economic sanctions are in any event its inevitable consequence: the war in the former Yugoslavia, whatever its

outcome, will have been a total economic tragedy for Bosnia-Herzegovina but will also, in varying degrees, have brought about the ruin of Croatia and Serbia. As happened after the Second World War, the Western democracies will not be able to shirk the task of rebuilding what has been destroyed and helping put the aggressors they have tried to punish and the victims they have been unable to protect back on their feet.

Yet the paradox does not end there. It can be asked whether the main effect of the successes of the European Community and liberal economics has really been to cause the countries on the eastern and southern periphery of Europe to imitate them, and thus to follow their path to integration by forming, in their turn, regional groupings based on interdependence or cooperation or whether, on the contrary, the attraction of the centre does not contribute to the disintegration of the periphery and to the conflicts which follow. Specialists on the theory of alliances have for long compared the `imitation effect' (integration in the West being imitated by the East, NATO by the Warsaw Pact and the Common Market by COMECON) with the `contrast effect' (union on one side prompting separation on the other by encouraging the various members of the peripheral organisations to try to become incorporated in the centre). The existence of the European Community unquestionably encouraged Slovenia and Croatia to detach themselves from Yugoslavia in the hope--well-founded or perhaps fallacious, at least in the short term--that they would be more easily accepted into the West European paradise if they did not have the millstone of Serbia and the underdeveloped regions of southern Yugoslavia around their necks. More generally, the wish of the most developed and dynamic regions of a number of countries to become integrated in the North or West, which they endeavour to resemble, rather than their home region, is one of the elements leading to the decomposition of multinational states, and even of some national states in the East and West, and thereby increases the risks of civil war. In any event, it indicates the strength of subnational and transnational movements which states are no longer able to control.

Social interpenetration: identity and violence

This decomposition of territorial units in the direction of both globalisation and fragmentation is probably the principal phenomenon. State actors are not disappearing; they continue to attack or react. However, the rules of economic and military interplay are deeply disrupted by the growing intrusion of non-state factors, be they movements, organisations, gangs or networks in the various senses of the word. The influence of the audio-visual media is radically changing the conduct of diplomacy, instantaneous communications are affecting monetary speculation but equally make it difficult to control or isolate societies. More directly still, as far as the wider problems of peace and war are concerned, drugs and arms trafficking and the laundering of money are beginning to form an ensemble which straddles the continents and transcends differences between various areas of international politics. The part played by drugs in the conflict in Afghanistan or Kosovo, the links between South American drugs cartels, the Sicilian Mafia and arms trafficking in Eastern Europe culminate in a tendency towards the global `Mafia-isation' of, at the same time, politics, economics and war. Reciprocally, and increasingly, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, like that in Nagorno-Karabakh, is not so much the opposition of states and regular armies as of rival bands whose clashes seem to have nothing to

distinguish them fundamentally from the wars between North American gangs or African tribes.

The result of these confrontations adds to the phenomenon which Hannah Arendt judged the most significant of the twentieth century: displaced persons and refugees. Human masses without food or shelter, the victims of war and policies of ethnic cleansing, have been set in motion once more. They constitute the most desperate and destitute vanguard of the vast army of economic migrants which is pushing at the doors of Western countries.

The reaction of the latter, which are themselves the victims of an economic crisis and a crisis of identity, is first and foremost to close their doors and even to reduce their tolerance of those immigrants and exiles who have been able to enter their countries or whom they have invited in more hospitable times. This explains on the one hand the large masses of people expelled from their homes but unable to find shelter elsewhere and, on the other, an increasingly tense and violent climate within the promised lands in the West.

It is perhaps that risk of tension and of violence within regions themselves spared actual war which constitutes the most general danger for Europe. There will probably not be a generalised `Yugoslavisation', although major catastrophes, for example on the Russo-Ukrainian front, can certainly not be excluded. But whether it is a question of Hungary and Romania, Greece and Albania or even Italy, Britain, Germany or France, the danger is the increase in powerless frustration which looks for domestic scapegoats, and the increasingly brutal nature of human, political, economic and social relations.

The German writer Hans-Magnus Enzenberger recently raised the spectre of generalised civil war, at once `macroscopic' and `molecular', in which ideological, religious, ethnic and national motivation would count for little next to the fundamental phenomenon of pure, blind, suicidal hatred.[3] We have not come to that pass. Paris, even Los Angeles, is not Sarajevo and the German skinhead thugs cannot be compared to the Serbian Army or the former Soviet 14th Army. And yet, the connection between the decline in classical wars, social disintegration and the rise in uncontrolled or manipulated violence is sufficiently striking to lead one to think that, to the juxtaposition of war and peace which was mentioned at the beginning of my text must be added an equally ambiguous phenomenon--a new form of war `of every man against every man'. Let us hope that this relapse into the Hobbesian state of nature will not bring Europe the promise of an existence which is `nasty, brutish and short'.

ETHNIC CONFLICTS, OR THE REVIVAL OF NATIONALISM

Diagnosis--prognosis--treatment

Dieter Senghaas[4]

Nationalist movements do not appear on the political scene unheralded. They all stem from grievances that are neither simply short-term nor related only to the politics of the day.

Three types of ethno-nationalism

We can distinguish three kinds of background to these grievances. Like the Catalans in Spain, the Slovenes and Croats in the former Yugoslavia felt they were being exploited by the rest of the nation. For a long time the Slovenes in particular asserted, with some justice, that there was a constant flow of resources out of their relatively highly-developed region towards the less developed parts of Yugoslavia, and that this was not being acknowledged politically by the other republics. The Slovenes had long regarded their own republic as the centre of industrial wealth within Yugoslavia. Even if the level of development could not be compared to that of Western Europe, they considered it more useful to develop their ties with Western Europe as an independent country rather than remain within the Yugoslav federation.

Nationalism based on the protection of wealth is not very often seen in exactly that form and the true underlying factors are often open to differences of interpretation. Yet the question that comes up repeatedly in the more highly-developed regions of certain states is: why not get rid of the `unwanted lodgers'? For example, two years before the collapse of the former Soviet Union, Solzhenitsyn published an earnest appeal in which he asked whether Russia did not have too much political responsibility to bear, and was not economically exploited and losing its cultural identity as a result of its central position within the `Soviet Empire'? Would it not be far more sensible for Russians to reject the empire, to look after their own Russian interests directly and in fact to `rediscover' and rebuild Russia? Why continue to feed ungrateful republics? Solzhenitsyn's `Russian option' made it clear that nationalism based on the protection of wealth derives not only from economic calculations but also from concern about one's own cultural and political identity.

It is, however, more usual to find varieties of nationalism based on *resistance to penetration by foreigners* and on *discrimination* than on the protection of wealth.

When the Baltic states broke free from Moscow there were demonstrable historical and constitutional reasons for them to do so, but in the case of Estonia and Latvia the mass support for the policy of separation from the former Soviet Union seemed to be triggered by the growing risk of `Russification': the population regarded the immigrant workers from the rest of the Soviet Union (Russians, Belarussians, Ukrainians) as a very serious threat to their own identity because they believed that, as a result of this immigration, local ethnic majorities would one day become

minorities in their own country. In addition to the threat of `Russification', they perceived the threat of foreign decision-making in major policy areas, such as the siting of new industries, which was decided centrally in Moscow. The local people had been suffering the ecological after-effects of industrialization for decades, but the central authority ignored them. Lastly, linguistic policy was regarded as a highly sensitive issue, as it always is by nationalist movements, because language is perceived as the essence of cultural identity.

At the end of the 1980s the Baltic states were still the first countries whose nationalism was based on *resistance to foreign penetration*, but the message from the Baltic states soon spread like wildfire to all the other major nationalities of the former Soviet Union. `Kazakhstan for the Kazahks!' and equivalent slogans resounded in the republics. Local majorities rose up against the growing immigrant minorities, who were regarded as the bridgeheads of a distant Moscow. As a rule, seditious preparations for resistance to `foreign' penetration were followed by xenophobia and quite often by expulsion of the `foreigners', especially Russians.

While in the above two cases local majorities rose up against immigrant minorities who were perceived as overrunning them (just as the Albanian population in Kosovo is rising up against foreign (Serbian) rule), the adoption of a nationalist policy arises most usually for the third reason, namely the attempt by a minority to resist the *pressure to assimilate* exerted by the majority: the Bulgarians of Turkish origin do not want to be remodelled as `Bulgarians of the Muslim faith'; the Kurds of Eastern Anatolia do not regard themselves as `mountain Turks'; for years the Hungarians and Germans in Romania resisted attempts by the Romanian central authorities to destroy the areas they had inhabited for centuries by the elimination of their traditional village structures.

There are countless other such examples within and outside Europe. The forces of conflict that are generated by such situations generally follow a predictable logic: when attempts at cultural uniformity and assimilation on the part of the ethnic majority increase, the resistance of the minority concerned also increases. When the pressure on a minority to assimilate becomes intense, the use of force and counter-force escalates dramatically, which leads to civil war. Depending on the origin of the situation, this mobilization and counter-mobilization of forces can--as has been seen in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan--lead to open conflict, sometimes between two states.

The problem of double moral standards

Nationalism based on the protection of wealth, resistance to domination by immigrants and the refusal of minorities to assimilate is invariably a manifestation of fear for one's own survival, i.e. a means of fighting that fear. It is, however, not unusual to find that what are generally justified attempts by these nationalist movements to protect their own identity and uphold their interests are discredited by the wide gulf between the legitimate demands they make on behalf of their own ethnic group and the way they behave towards minorities in their own countries. For instance, in the Baltics it took a long time for the rights of Russian and other minorities to be regarded as a legitimate political issue. If these rights are not protected adequately and constitutionally, there is a risk that the Baltic states, like the

Balkans, will become a chronic centre of conflict in Europe; Moscow will not stand by and do nothing in the face of a flagrant disregard for the rights of Russians in the Baltics, but will threaten or even embark on military intervention. Again, for decades the Georgians felt they were under the foreign rule of the central authority in Moscow, yet this did not induce them to treat the minorities living in the Republic of Georgia properly, especially the Abkhaz and the Ossetians. Slovak nationalism successfully resisted the central authority of Prague until finally, in early 1993, the independent state of Slovakia was formed; but the Hungarians living in southern Slovakia, who after all number more than half a million, are very anxious about their future: there are many indications that they are likely to lose the few minority rights they have and few offering any hope of their protection and extension.

These and other examples show that many nationalist movements which are based on justified concerns apply double moral standards: it is clear that it is only in exceptional cases that groups exposed to discrimination and threats to their identity or even their lives (which is usually an extension of attempts to overrun them and force them to assimilate) as a result treat other ethnic groups with more care. On the contrary, as a rule the fact of having been the object of discrimination provokes behaviour that is consciously or unconsciously based on discrimination against other ethnic groups. There are all too often attempts to justify this kind of attitude by alleging that the minorities concerned are merely remote-controlled bridgeheads of the hated `central authority' (e.g., Moscow, Budapest or Belgrade); as in all such situations, there may indeed be some grains of truth in this.

An explanation of ethno-nationalism

Nationalism is not an archaic, but a modern phenomenon. The mobilisation of nationalist sentiment is not conceivable without social mobility and the consequent politicization of communities. For instance, as a rule, subsistence-level farmers who live in village communities remote from one another and are self-employed cannot easily be won over by demagogy and mobilized in support of obscure causes from a distance, especially if they are illiterate. However, the situation is quite different in an urban population that can read and write and has to work for others to make a bare living. An urban environment promotes the exchange of ideas and facilitates the formation of political organizations, which could never happen among isolated farming villages. Moreover, the drive towards modernization produces an intelligentsia whose representatives become spokesmen who can articulate unsatisfied needs and new political expectations. That is why linguistic and educational policy are usually the areas in which politicization crystallizes in nationalist conflicts. The assertion of the right to use one's own language, to have a responsible say in the educational system and an equitable amount of political participation in educational policy in general reflect the newly awakened desire for self-determination. Since it is fairly easy to deal with the question of education and to arouse emotions about it, the desire for self-determination usually manifests itself in this area before it appears in the economic domain. Eventually the desire to shape the economy to one's own ends becomes a central point of conflict in the process of politicization because the idea of either an improved standard of living or advancement within the social hierarchy is inconceivable without greater participation in economic activities.

Experience shows that ethnic groups become politicized mainly in situations where the gap between political expectations and the foreseeable opportunities for realising them widens. This is particularly true if the upward social mobility of people who have hitherto had no say in their destiny starts to falter because an increasingly acute conflict over the distribution of wealth leads to successful resistance on the part of the defenders of the *status quo* and/or because the process of cultural emancipation is stifled and the political system blocks any wider participation by those who have recently risen through the social strata. The resulting frustration creates the appropriate political, economic and cultural background for the mobilisation of ethno-nationalist sentiments. It is at that moment that political leaders who use skilful rhetoric to depict these increasingly difficult social situations (and usually exaggerate them for demagogic purposes) tend to come to the fore and take over the leadership. In most cases, a process of radicalization then follows in which, sooner or later, the original moderates, especially those political leaders who sought a compromise, are swept away by the movement of events and replaced by radicals. The latter are not afraid to include political disputes which verge on or develop into civil war in their calculations.

Economic interests quite obviously play only a minor role, if any, in the escalation of force and counter-force which result from such situations. If economic considerations determined the action taken and if they were the decisive criterion, ethno-nationalist conflicts would not be marked by the degree of bitterness, emotion and brutality that characterizes them in nearly every case. True, ethno-nationalist conflicts can be used as an instrument for achieving practical objectives such as political participation, improved welfare and cultural self-determination. But these conflicts also, often primarily, have the function of creating an identity: when communities and ethnic groups begin to crystallize into conflicting parties, they inevitably start to define their own identity. They discover their own `national' history, including self-mystifying and self-glorifying testimonials. They invent fantasies about the past and conjure up images of lost empires, often as a means of defining concrete policy objectives, whence their talk of Greater Serbia, Greater Azerbaijan, Greater Macedonia, Greater Romania and so on.

Ethno-nationalism distinguishes itself from other forms of ethnicity as a means of creating an identity. In the course of an escalating conflict, these imaginary distinctions become accentuated, as does accompanying militancy. Concentration on one's own group eventually turns into a deluded over-evaluation of it, at which point the main protagonists become totally insensitive to the costs of the conflict. When the distinctions vis-à-vis other ethnic groups are exaggerated, the conflict becomes self-related and the escalation of the conflict acquires a momentum of its own. If the conflicting parties then continue to arm themselves mentally, their emotions become even more heated and they become even more fixated on the idea of the enemy. If they also arm themselves with weapons, and if, moreover, the *raison d'être* of armed groups depends on the uninterrupted continuation of the conflict, the scene is set for civil war, characterised by a breakdown of communications between the parties in dispute, strong emotions, an unwillingness to compromise and, finally, a willingness to resort to force, instead of dialogue.

The security dilemma and a pathological inability to learn from experience

Once the conflict has reached the stage described above, what is aptly described in international political analysis as a `security dilemma' occurs between communities and ethnic groups: no one knows for sure what anyone else's real intentions are; everyone assumes the worst; as those concerned see their situation, security can only be guaranteed by self-assertion and self-help, and the degree of self-assertion is perceived as a function of military power which can be mobilised. And as is the case at an international level, conflicts between ethnic groups also lead to an arms race. In the event of actual war, the winner is the one with the stronger forces.

This logic of escalation, leading to an inability to take a critical look at the real situation, on the one hand, and the affirmation of power on the other, have led to the irrational exacerbation of ethno-nationalist conflicts which is frequently observed in Europe and elsewhere in the world. The spokesmen of such groups close their minds to `reason'; they are totally insensible to notions of cost or sacrifice; they guilelessly accept the idea of militancy or even terrorist force; for them the end justifies the means, even if those means include things as disgusting as instructions systematically to rape women, or `ethnic cleansing'.

There is a tragic side to politics motivated by ethno-nationalism: if they are to escape the feeling of powerlessness and of being discriminated against, communities, and therefore ethnic groups, need more effective means of self-determination. That includes drawing a line between themselves and other ethnic groups, which is a typical feature of ethno-politics, if the other groups threaten to overrun them or force them to assimilate. This drawing of lines makes it possible to mobilize forces in a restricted geographical area at the cost of communications on a wider scale, especially with other ethnic groups. It leads to an internal concentration of power which becomes the basis for organizational networks and their strategic use. This exclusive concentration on the group's interests is functional in terms of the desire for self-assertion. After all, no group wants to be the victim of cultural levelling. The obverse of this process, however, is the danger of self-encapsulation and the resulting pathological inability to learn. It often turns into a desire to exercise power which ends up as an obsession with power. This pathological inability to learn, in combination with an obsession with power, can then give rise to those excesses that have rightly brought discredit on the politics of nationalism and the consequent arrogance and aggression. The end product of what began as justified complaints and concerns is then to be found not in new forms and formulas for coexistence between majorities and minorities and ethnic groups in general but, at worst, the barbarization of politics that we have been witnessing every day since the end of June 1991 in the former Yugoslavia.

To a detached observer, ethno-nationalism appears to act as a fundamental and uncontrollable element in the escalation of conflicts: everything conspires to make the conflict more acute, to follow its course to victory or defeat, and every last reserve of strength is mobilized to that end, as though it were a question of all or nothing. And since, as the policy of ethnic cleansing shows, the basic right to exist is often at stake, the fears of minorities are not misplaced but make it appear to them that there is no alternative to the use of all available force. Relentless pursuit of the conflict by all parties then becomes the general rule.

Ways out of the danger

Is there any way out of this situation of political bestialization, which unscrupulous seekers of power see as their great opportunity?

Past experience and a look at the present do not offer much hope: the conflict in Northern Ireland, which is basically centuries old, has remained as bitter as ever since the late 1960s and there are no signs of it coming to an end. The civil war in Lebanon lasted some fifteen years, even though that country was once known as the `Switzerland of the Middle East' because of its peaceful coexistence with others. There are striking parallels between the current conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and historically comparable examples of confrontation in the Balkans. The notion of an unending or protracted conflict has become established for such cases. Generally, the various forces are in a position where neither party can win or lose. At best they will become exhausted and the conflict will simply `bleed to death'. While outside intervention seems advisable, it is difficult to persuade the international community to undertake adventures that will potentially be very costly in lives and money. What would help would be a fundamental change in the basic parameters of the conflict. But as can be seen in other conflicts, escalation of a conflict constrains people to be loyal to their own ethnic party. Politics is reduced to the friend-enemy concept. Any half-tones, grey areas, scruples or doubts are regarded as expressions of betrayal. The effect of this is to discourage those forces that would normally be prepared to stand up to the warmongers and make their voices heard.

The first lesson to be drawn from such protracted conflicts is an inescapable one: in an incipient conflict, the dynamics of escalation will take over unless early, preventive political intervention measures are taken, whether by nationals or foreigners, or by regional or international organizations whose responsibilities include the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Assuming that early attempts are made to defuse an ethno-nationalist conflict, what should be done to make the outlook for de-escalation look constructive in practical terms? As we said earlier, there are concrete causes, concerns and grievances underlying such conflicts, and if they are not resolved the risk of escalation will always remain.

In the case of nationalism based on the protection of wealth, the idea of *separation* becomes attractive in multi-ethnic states, where separatism could lead to a viable state structure. A less drastic step would be to establish *regional autonomy* within the conventional state structure, a solution chosen in Catalonia in Spain after many decades and offering some prospect of success. Within the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Croatia tried to build up a confederalist structure based on the principles of extensive decentralization and subsidiarity. After the failure of a number of moves in this direction, because other republics making up the former Yugoslavia did not join in, they took the not unreasonable step of declaring their independence.

A genuine, i.e. not just symbolic, *democratization* which established the rights of the majority could offer a constructive prospect for ethno-nationalism arising from the fear felt by a majority group of being swamped by a superimposed minority. But

democratization of this kind can easily lead to the minority being made the scapegoat for every failure or mistake, and to the absence of something that is in the long term necessary to successful coexistence: formal legal protection of that minority.

The only constructive approach to ethno-nationalism born of a minority's fear that it will be forcibly assimilated by the politics and culture of a majority is formal *protection of the rights of minorities*. The minimum measures required include the active protection of minorities, aimed not only at tolerance but at the active promotion of their identity; far-reaching cultural autonomy with regard to language, education and the media; special rights of participation in the political system, e.g. through provisions on proportional representation, rights of veto and blocking clauses; guarantees of procedural and legal protection. Generous protective measures, which should be set out in the respective constitutions, are needed to prevent minorities from ending up in a psychologically distressing situation and eventually seeking political refuge in ethno-radicalism. It would also be useful to give these measures international backing, for instance through the Council of Europe or the CSCE. If supranational organizations with the appropriate legal powers of protection were set up, the governments could be required to report to them; all the parties to a conflict, especially of course the ethnic groups concerned, could use these organizations as appeal bodies and forums for handling conflicts.

Widening the political horizon is the foundation for any practical action directed at resolving problems and is the opposite of the zero-sum mentality and autistic approach that can generally be observed in ethno-nationalist conflicts. In order to widen the political horizon and resolve problems on this basis, it can be of overriding importance to set new, higher aims. Participation in the process of European integration can be regarded as one such aim. Working towards such higher aims would divert productive energies from a destructive vicious circle so that they could be used to open new political perspectives. This could lead to the constructive resolution of conflicts, especially if it was combined with advantages for all concerned.

It is thus not a foregone conclusion that attempts to settle ethno-nationalist conflicts peacefully will be futile, but these efforts are likely to be successful only if they are made in the early stages of a crisis and effective measures are taken to stem the forces of ethno-radicalism. The well-known saying that life punishes the latecomer, quoted in connection with the international political upheavals of 1989-90, is particularly relevant to the constructive handling of ethnic conflicts. Europe and the world have for months been witnessing the horrific consequences of ignoring this maxim in the former Yugoslavia, and at present there is no end in sight to the horror.

THE CONDITIONS FOR PEACE

Carlos Zaldivar[5]

The following are some thoughts on possible diplomatic action and initiatives to prevent potential conflicts in present-day Europe developing into open crises. From a positive viewpoint, they attempt to outline a European strategy for the stabilisation of the Old Continent.

The degree of stability and prosperity in Europe in the 1990s will depend on the answers to questions such as these: How can we combine processes for conserving and, in some cases, restoring national identities with processes leading to the development of transnational bodies? To what extent will the latter be uniform or heterogeneous? Who will they include, and when? And finally, how can we ensure that the changes in these areas are brought about peacefully and predictably? Matters relating to national self-determination, supranational integration, the maintenance or alteration of frontiers, the recognition of the rights of minorities and relations between European states will be affected by, and will in turn affect, the democratic and social nature of those states and the competitiveness of their economies, and all of this will affect Europe's relations, and those of its individual member states, with the rest of the world. I emphasise this interdependence to underline the fact that a European foreign policy designed to achieve stability for the Continent, must envisage action and initiatives in a wide range of subject areas and political spheres.

To be precise, I believe that we should be focusing our attention on the following matters at the present time: (1) ratification (and subsequent application) of the Maastricht treaty, (2) stabilisation of the European Monetary System, (3) halting the carnage in the former Yugoslavia, (4) opening up markets to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and (5) stimulating economic growth. I believe that such matters are of vital importance because European history is approaching a fork in the path it is following: depending on the solutions applied to these problems, the European historical process will be projected along one or other of two very different paths. Referring to this type of situation, Confucius said that there are times in our lives when we reach a crossroads, where one step in the wrong direction can divert us for ever from our objectives. Europe has reached one of these crossroads, and the way in which the problems I have listed are approached will set the course for the future. What lends them relevance is not the individual significance of each solution, but the fact that a positive result in any one tends to foster positive results in others, and the process is self-perpetuating. The same is true of negative results.

For example, if the Maastricht treaty suffers another set-back, this will increase the probability that more EMS currencies will be subjected to further heavy speculation and will abandon it. With the EMS in crisis and without a treaty, competitive devaluations could multiply and have implications for the single European market in agricultural goods or for the unhindered movement of capital. All of this, in addition to calling into question the construction of the Community, would hamper a healthy and sustained relaunch of the economy. Neither would it facilitate the opening up of Community markets to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, or reaching an agreement within the GATT--quite the reverse, in fact. First, it would make the

economic transformation and democratic stabilisation of those countries more difficult. Secondly, it would complicate relations with the United States and would reduce even further the prospects for economic growth. Both phenomena would have a negative effect on intra-Community relations and would hinder progress in matters as wide-ranging as the negotiations on enlarging the Community and the maintenance of a common position as regards the war in the former Yugoslavia. Differences of this nature between Europeans would spur on the belligerents to continue the fighting, thereby increasing the probability that the war would extend throughout the Balkans. Needless to say this would make it more difficult for Russia to transform its economy and to build a democracy. The result would be more horror, more refugees and more passion. Such an atmosphere, coupled with an unfavourable economic situation, would nurture racist and xenophobic tendencies and would create the worst possible environment in which to devise a constructive approach to migratory movements at a time when these are on the increase. Germany would become even more sought-after as a place of asylum and source of finance and would, as a result, receive more criticism from other quarters. Its leaders would encounter increasing difficulty in reconciling their commitments within the Community with national demands and interests.

I have, of course, painted a very bleak picture; but it is not the result of supposing that every single problem will turn out badly. Even if only one or two problems turn sour, this will increase the likelihood of others following suit. The end result would be a Europe in which the construction of the Community would take a step backwards, encouraging tendencies to alter frontiers and displace people rather than respecting existing frontiers and making them more easily penetrable. None of this would improve Europe's ability to compete with the United States and Japan, and this could lead to the social dimension of the European states being jeopardized. Without Maastricht there would probably be no Schengen treaty on frontier controls. If the war in the Balkans spread, this would set Greece against Turkey, bringing crisis to NATO; it would put Russia and the United States in opposite camps, calling into question their new relationship; and it would aggravate the differences between Community states. The Muslim aspect of the conflict would also have repercussions on France and Spain's relations with the Maghreb. The European Community would not be exporting peace and prosperity but would, instead, be importing instability and social problems.

I am not playing the role of Cassandra. I am merely as convinced that the historical process can develop in a very negative sense as I am that it can develop in a positive and hopeful sense. If we add one or two positive aspects to the process--let us say the Treaty on European Union comes into force and the peace plan for the former Yugoslavia is accepted by all of the belligerent parties--we would be in a better position to expect and to foster economic growth and to overcome monetary problems, and this in turn would make room for solutions to the problems of trade with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. By taking this path, Europe would consolidate its stability by intensifying and extending to the EFTA countries the experience of sharing sovereignty as represented by the European Union; together with the UN, the European Union would have an aid and monitoring role in the Balkans establishing--once the slaughter and ethnic cleansing have been stopped--new bases for coexistence, and a common European foreign policy could develop constructive links with neighbouring countries and regions such as Russia, the

Maghreb or Turkey. I do not think I need describe the social and economic consequences of this rosy picture. Once again, I stress that if Europe demonstrates an ability to achieve positive solutions, in the short term, to some of the principal problems which we are today facing, the door to an attractive future could be opened.

Let us return, then, to today's problems and see what can be done in each case. I will begin with the Maastricht treaty. After the favourable Danish and British decisions, the fate of the treaty now depends on the German *Bundesverfassungsgericht* (Federal Constitutional Court). The probability that it will eventually be approved is high. So, too, may the length of time it takes. If the result is a `Yes', we will be in the `forward with Maastricht' phase.

How do we go `forward with Maastricht'? If the treaty is ratified, will this be enough to relaunch it and set it in motion? No, it will not, because obstacles will still remain. Some lie in public opinion, others in the markets. Let us take the markets first. If the EMS crisis is repeated and intensified, the markets will in a way be vetoing the application of the treaty in one of its most fundamental aspects. How can we prevent this? We must adapt the system to the new relationship between the markets and the member states in financial matters. In recent years the member states have liberalised and greatly deregulated capital movements and financial operations. A continuous, world-wide market has been made possible through telecommunications. So far, this has produced instability and recession rather than security and growth. If this situation continues, it could have the same result as other monetary crises: restricting the movement of capital once again. This would block the prospects for monetary union and weaken the single market. One proposal for stabilizing the EMS is to replace it with a `small monetary union' between Germany, France and the Benelux countries. These countries would establish fixed and irrevocable parities between their currencies and the remaining countries would once again be free to dictate their own exchange rate policies and would no longer receive transfers to facilitate the process of Monetary Union. When the economies of the countries outside the `small monetary union' reached appropriate levels of stability and competitiveness, they could join it. There are a number of problems associated with this approach: it is not compatible with the Maastricht treaty; it would make it much more difficult for some countries to stabilise their economies; it would deprive the single market of exchange rate stability. In short, it is much the same as `burying Maastricht'. There is a need, however, to modify the EMS further, with a view to making its exchange rate mechanism even more flexible, maintaining wide bands and contemplating realignments which take account of actual exchange rates, but without permitting competitive devaluations. It seems to me that a `blander' European monetary system is somewhat preferable to a `small monetary union', not only because it is easier to reconcile with the Treaty on European Union but also because it is more convenient for the functioning of the single market, for the re-entry of the United Kingdom and Italy into an exchange rate mechanism and also for the entry of other European countries who are not yet members of the European Community.

I said earlier that there would be obstacles to applying the Maastricht treaty from the point of view of public opinion. I think such obstacles are of two types: some are fuelled by the unfavourable situation of the European economies. These obstacles will disappear when the economy improves, and I will discuss this later. The others may prove to be more persistent, because they are due to the perception that the Maastricht

treaty threatens national identities and weakens the democratic nature of government institutions. It may be thought that this is an exaggeration, or that it would not happen if the European Parliament had more power, but neither of these possibilities resolves the matter. There are many different preferences throughout Europe and we cannot standardise them all. What is needed is a method of construction which will provide sufficiently acceptable results. The problem is not to resolve the debate about whether the European Union should develop towards a federal or confederal structure. What is required is to develop the provisions of the treaty so that their application gains legitimacy. For this to happen, people need to feel more involved in the process than they have to date. I do not believe that there is a universal formula for attaining this. In each country the forces in favour of the construction of Europe must know how to promote it. Europe will be constructed through trial and error, faith and hope. Rather than preaching to the converted, I believe it is now time to convince the reluctant sceptics. Clearly, this requires not words, but deeds. In any event, whatever action is taken must be at the grass roots of society.

As regards Yugoslavia, it is my view that we must maintain a firm stand and take a long-term view; or rather, take a long-term view so as to be able to maintain a firm stand. The objective is to re-establish order in the region, which will permit the peoples of the area to live together. In other words, we must put an end to the succession of unilateral acts which have followed the anarchic disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. This cannot be achieved by military intervention in the conflict to change the relative strengths of the belligerents. Nor can it be achieved by occupying the country. We must persuade the belligerents--by exerting pressure, of course--to accept a ceasefire and a plan, such as that currently proposed, for peaceful coexistence, and in order to implement it we will have to get involved on the ground. We will have to put a stop to the war between Serbs, Croats and Muslims, setting mutually acceptable borders. We will have to recognize the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia and give guarantees in relation to it. We will have to resolve the questions of Kosovo and Krajina. It may be that this can be achieved by offering autonomy to the Albanians in one and to the Serbs in the other and relating this to control of communications through Krajina by the Croats and control of the corridor in northern Bosnia by the Serbs. We will have to de-fuse Greek-Turkish tensions and reach a general agreement on security and cooperation among all of the states in that region, which may possibly also provide an opportunity to make progress in settling the problem of Cyprus. Such an agreement will have to take account of diplomatic recognition, arms control measures and guarantees for ethnic minorities. It is my belief that if the European Community continues with its mediation and humanitarian aid role in this conflict, it will be in a position to promote an initiative and associate with it Russia, Turkey and the United States. All of which will be essential if it is to succeed. This is, naturally, quite a challenge. On numerous occasions throughout history, conflicts in the Balkans have confronted the principal European powers. What is being proposed now is that, for the first time, united action by Europe should succeed in achieving peace in the Balkans. For this to happen, the European Community must stand firm in its efforts to provide humanitarian aid and mediation between the warring factions, while using all its resources to apply pressure, including military pressure if this is useful, until a ceasefire is respected and a plan for peaceful coexistence accepted.

For decades Western and Eastern Europe have developed separately. The Bosnian drama underlines the fact that this situation cannot continue. One way or another, both parts of Europe will have to tread a common path in the coming years. Seen from the comfort of the West or from the newly-gained freedom of the East, this will not be easy. We have to learn to think in terms of a global Europe again. The Germans themselves find it difficult to think as a unified people. In their political dealings, the Spanish of the Mediterranean will have to take account of the problems of the Poles of the Baltic, and vice versa. This is another great challenge which must be resolved as we go forward; one step at a time.

If the countries of Central and Eastern Europe do not overcome the problems posed by their economic reform and political transformation, the countries of Western Europe will be less able to solve theirs. However, it is also true to say that if the countries of Central and Eastern Europe place all their hopes in EC aid, they will never overcome their problems. In this matter of Central Europe it seems to me that mists and myths abound, when what is needed is clarity and action. Let us take, for instance, the question of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe joining the European Community. Let us make it quite clear that they will be most welcome as soon as they are in a position to join. Meanwhile, what is important is to fashion a closer, multilateral relationship between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the European Community, a relationship based on dialogue and political cooperation, trade agreements and financial arrangements. This is action, action so serious that, in some cases, it is not easy to implement; for example, when it is a matter of agreeing to imports (steel or agricultural) which have an adverse effect on sectors which are undergoing restructuring; when financial resources are scarce and they have to be distributed not only to the East, but also to the South. When the economies of the European Community countries are in better order, such problems will be easier to solve. It goes without saying that the reverse is also true. Consequently, clear policies must be established. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have to grow more than the Community, otherwise we will be creating a new division of Europe with disastrous consequences, in the medium term. In order to grow, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe need to export and their balance of trade with the European Community must be positive, rather than favourable to the European Community, as is the situation at present. This seems to me to be elementary for Community trade policy. In order to make its application viable, reducing the corresponding trade barriers, it must be accompanied by an equitable sharing of the burden which it implies among states. The most likely effect will be that those most affected will be the weakest. In the financial field, the European Community must take a balanced view in the distribution of its resources. Trans-European networks (railways, roads, telecommunications, gas pipelines, etc.) must connect with the eastern and southern limits of Europe. And in order for these delicate arrangements to operate, permanent dialogue is required. There are signs that EC policy has generated some frustration among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe; and there are signs that the domestic political vicissitudes of these countries and their complaints irritate sectors of public opinion in the Community. This can either be overcome or it can poison the relationship. The best therapy is to talk, and to talk frankly. The first united Europe we have to create is the global European dialogue.

Finally, we come to the point concerning relaunching the economy. This is where the self-perpetuating effect is easy to appreciate. If the economy shows evidence of modest growth, this will make it easier to stabilise the EMS and give trade facilities to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe; public opinion will look on Maastricht more generously and the resources available to exert influence--by pressure and persuasion--on the Yugoslav conflict may even be increased as a result. All of this will reduce uncertainty and economic prospects will improve even further. However, the reverse is also true and it does not seem that it will be easy to achieve structured growth in a short time. What can be done to improve the economy? The classic reply is well known: not much. We could add to this reply: an effort to coordinate economic policies. In Europe the kingpin is the German economy, which is in recession. A reduction in interest rates by the Bundesbank would help to ride out the recession and would assist in relaunching other European economies. But in order for this to have any impact, the Germans must be specific about how they are going to pay the costs of unification. In other words, what will be their fiscal and incomes policy in the coming years. Neither the `solidarity pact' nor the metalworkers' strikes have done this. After Germany comes France, where the prospects for growth are also uncertain. The new government has announced tax increases and reductions in spending to reduce the budget deficit. They have put their trust in maintaining low interest rates in the long term and hope that this will neutralise the depressive effects of the adjustment. The action being taken by the United Kingdom is the opposite of this. They have relaxed monetary policy and ceased to be concerned about the value of sterling. They are starting to come out of recession, leaving for later anti-inflationary and monetarist policies. In Italy, the political chaos makes any economic policy uncertain. Spain is striving to adhere to orthodox discipline and advance along the road to monetary union. In short, there is little evidence of any coordination within the Community. But even if there were, growth would not be immediate. And if the British model were widely followed, competitive devaluations would have the result of making any growth short-lived. There is, then, no obvious solution in sight. This is to be expected; we do not have a sufficient understanding of how the economy works. Consequently, we will have to take a risk and decide whether to continue with the European plan and not threaten painful orthodoxy, or forget both the orthodoxy and the European plan until better times return. There are two scenarios for Europe in the remainder of the 1990s: in the first, we will gradually return to strong, balanced growth (such as that experienced in the 1970s), which will enable us to create stable employment and go on to monetary union; in the other, each member state will seek immediate growth, sowing for the second half of the decade the seeds of volatile exchange rates and inflationary tensions which will make progress with the European plan very difficult. It is a considerable gamble. The direction for Europe is clear.

In conclusion, I repeat: Europe is at a crossroads. Within its boundaries there are many causes of conflict: national and ethnic tensions, economic divisions, appealing combinations of influences, rearmament processes and the arrival of large numbers of immigrants and refugees. At the same time, Europe is a seedbed of potential cooperation that includes a single market which could eventually encompass the whole Continent, an expanding European Union seeking a common currency and a common foreign policy, newly emerging democracies, new markets opening up, and so on. The countries of the Community have a particular responsibility to ensure that they choose the right path, because of all I have said so far and because of the influence they can exercise in three other fundamental, but independent, areas: the

widening of the European Union to include the EFTA countries, the creation of a joint immigration policy and *rapprochement* between Russia and Europe. It is now more appropriate than ever that the countries of the Community should harmonize their foreign policy, including policies on the rights of minorities and the recognition of states, on trade and human rights, on tied economic aid, on political cooperation with others, on recourse to threats of force and on maintaining its moderating and persuasive powers. It seems to me that this need is so real and so pressing that it cannot be met by negotiating a series of principles and then establishing the institutions to implement them. The necessary harmonisation must be the result of a search for common solutions to the five problems I have raised, based on the situation which prevails today. If, thus determined, the countries of the Community succeed in channelling the development of Europe along the positive path, the rest will follow as a bonus. If they are unable to prevent Europe travelling along the diverging path, we will have other matters to occupy our thoughts in the coming years.

THE POLITICS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION WITHIN EUROPE

Lawrence Freedman[6]

Europe still remains divided along the line of the old Iron Curtain, to some extent even in Germany, but in a manner that reveals the legacy of history rather than differences of ideology. On the eastern side of the line there is no longer a cumbersome monolith but instead geographical divisions which reflect variations of ethnicity and religion, economic philosophy and pre-communist political traditions. Post-communist Europe is weak, some parts of it chronically so, and the prospects for improvement are patchy. The current gloom should not blind us to areas of real achievement--but this is a part of the world in which countries are extremely interdependent, so that it is hard for one country to maintain high standards of economic and political performance when those around it are failing. Unfortunately, interdependence within the region is not matched by any institutional bodies within which it might be organized. The dominant tendency at the moment is anarchic.

There is currently a feeling of relief in Western states following the end of the great confrontation with communism and the removal, for the time being, of a mortal threat to their own societies. Yet this is combined with a sense of guilt about some of the awful things that are happening in countries which recently seemed to be on the verge of joining the liberal-capitalist world and now risk sinking back into a mire of poverty, authoritarianism and routine violence. They also have misgivings about the ability of their own societies to isolate themselves from the consequences.

The developing European security system involves the interaction of local and regional balances of power, mediated through a complex institutional structure. Both the local and regional balances reflect the vacuum left by the fragmentation of the Soviet bloc and the evaporation of the Communist Party. Locally, it is natural that the vacuum is often filled by those who wish to exploit nationalist sentiment rather than a particular ideology. Western style modernizers and liberals are to be found, especially in the more central European states, but their position is vulnerable to the political backlash from economic upheaval. In a part of the world in which states contain a number of nations and nations are spread over a number of states, and in which the principles of self-determination and sovereignty continually clash, any political creed based on nationality is unavoidably conflictual. The relationship between the various nationalities in particular areas will depend on such factors as the demographic composition of individual states and the degree of intermingling of the different groups, the quality of the constitutional arrangements and of the political leadership, and such matters as the relative position and treatment of any group which straddles internationally recognized borders.

The manner in which a given local balance interacts with the regional balance of power will reflect the degree of interest of the stronger states. The geopolitics of Europe are still evolving, following the collapse of the Soviet bloc. Five countries have the capacity to play significant roles in the European balance--France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Italy is in a strategically sensitive

position but for the next few years will be inhibited by its internal weakness. In varying degrees, this is true for the other states. Of the five countries mentioned above, only two are directly implicated by the tumult in post- communist Europe, though again this is a matter of degree. 25 million Russian nationals are spread throughout the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Russia feels exposed to disruption in its immediate neighbourhood. Germany also feels exposed--both economically and because of the prospect of a massive influx of refugees from the East. For reasons of history, neither Russia nor Germany is well placed to intervene militarily in potential trouble spots, but Russia is more prepared to do so than Germany. Moscow is coming to doubt the utility of multinational organizations in helping it meet pressing security problems. It is concluding that if it needs to act it will probably have to do so unilaterally.

Germany had hoped to use its economic strength, and that of its main partners, as the critical method of leverage to shape the policies of post-communist states. The economic slowdown in the West and Germany's own burden of unification have reduced the potential of economic largesse as a way of exerting influence. Yet, if military intervention were to become necessary then Germany would rely on its allies to act. Thus an effective German policy is highly dependent upon Germany's ability to persuade its partners to share its concerns over developments to the East. Success here has been limited because none of Germany's key allies is prepared to give sufficiently high priority to the stabilisation of the East. Germany's readiness to export the costs of unification by sustaining high interest rates is proving to be counter-productive, in that it is generating irritation amongst its partners and undermining the cohesion and economic strength of the European Community. Germany's partners see the Community (and NATO) as helpful in inhibiting any German propensity to act alone in the East, yet they do not accept the corollary of this, which should be a readiness to play a much more active part themselves.

Britain, France and the United States are all reluctant interveners, fearful of `quagmires', and are becoming consumed by a sense of historic gloom over the long-term prospects for much of post-communist Europe. So long as these countries do not feel directly threatened by developments in Eastern Europe they are likely to wish to continue to limit their liabilities. Even when, as in the former Yugoslavia, humanitarian pressures oblige them to intervene, they set strict limits on both the scope and purposes of this intervention.

One of the most interesting and difficult questions for those attempting to forecast the future course of European geopolitics (a somewhat thankless occupation in recent years) is whether there will come a point when the reluctant interveners recognize that they have direct strategic interests at stake in an unfolding conflict. It is possible to develop a variety of scenarios in which this could happen--ranging from Russian action on behalf of its nationals in the Baltics to Greek and/or Turkish involvement in the Balkans. The danger is that reluctance to intervene when the conflicts seem remote will make these conflicts far more difficult to control should they spread.

These points have been well illustrated in Bosnia. As the conflict there has worsened, the debate in the West on the principles and practicalities of intervention to prevent further horrors has intensified. There never were any easy options for the West in Bosnia: now there are very few practical ones either. The specific features of the strife

within the former Yugoslavia only provide part of the explanation as to why consideration of intervention has become so vexatious. Involvement in any conflict which does not involve a direct threat is likely to generate contradictory pressures which will combine to produce unsatisfactory results.

The character of military intervention

By military intervention I mean the use of armed force to influence the character and course of a developing conflict which is neither taking place upon nor directly threatening national territory, and does not relate to any specific obligations to allies. The conflict may be developing within one particular state or involve a number. Its stage of development may be early or quite mature, and the type of conflict range from only sporadic fighting to large-scale battles. It is distinguished from the many other contingencies for which armed forces prepare mainly in that it has no strategic imperative. Neither the state contemplating intervention nor its allies are directly at risk. There may be interests at stake but they are not truly vital.

The balance of interests

Thus the defining feature of military intervention is that it is a matter of choice rather than compulsion. Staying out is as much an option as going in. The decision will therefore involve a balance of interests, in which the consequences of deciding either way must be set against each other.

Because the interests involved are less than vital they may appear vague and indirect. However, over time they may grow in importance, and much of what I have to say relates to the difficulty of assessing the true threat such conflicts pose to the interests of a given state while they are at a relatively early stage. A number of types of interest can be identified, including:

- concern over human suffering;

- violation of basic international norms;

- the credibility of international institutions;

- fear of the cumulative effects of disorder, such as economic breakdown, refugee flows, agitation and even terrorism among expatriate groups, and the spread of the conflict to hitherto peaceful neighbouring countries.

The first three of these are not bounded geographically but the fourth is, and so by being confined to Europe, this chapter explicitly addresses potential cases in which the consequences of disorder would be relatively serious. By and large the presumption is that the likely contingencies involve the post-communist belt of countries from the Baltics through to the Balkans. However, in terms of the security perception of a number of Mediterranean members of NATO, account must also be taken of events in North Africa.

Military intervention raises special problems of justification precisely because there is such a large element of choice. Prior to a decision to intervene the interests in staying

out will appear self-evident. Intervention costs money and, more important, puts lives at risk. Because these lives are being put at risk in defence of something other than the state there are inevitably awkward questions as to their value as against the possibly abstract and speculative interests which are said to justify the intervention.

On the other hand, once a decision to intervene has been made the balance of interests tends to swing much further in favour of *continued* intervention, because then the credibility of the intervener and, probably, the legitimating institution--CSCE, EC, UN, NATO--has been invoked. Reputation, or saving face, becomes an additional interest. Non-intervention can also have an effect on reputation, and could so encourage others subsequently to disregard the non-intervener's concerns when pursuing their own particular quarrels. However, the impact of a decision to admit failure and withdraw is likely to be far more significant than that of holding back in the first place.

The last aspect which requires clarification is the emphasis on the *politics* of military intervention. The use of armed force is a highly political activity, especially in the Clausewitzian sense of being geared towards a clearly defined objective. It is notable that senior military officers, contemplating a drawn out and inconclusive involvement in Bosnia, yearn for a precisely defined aim against which they can plan and judge success, the achievement of which will indicate when their task has been accomplished.

The aspiration is understandable but misplaced. By definition such conflicts are unlikely to have clear-cut, let alone happy endings. Most conflicts can be understood as power struggles, with one group seeking to improve its position vis-a-vis another group or groups. The use of force swings the local balance of power in one direction--in Bosnia at the moment against the Muslims. Any external interference, whether it be in setting rules for the conduct of the conflict, easing suffering, brokering a settlement or intervening on one side, will influence the balance of power. When that external interference ceases there will always be a tendency for local factors to dominate once again. Thus intervention has to be recognized, not as being directed towards a specific end, but as being part of a process, though undoubtedly a process with defined stages.

This in itself indicates that there is unlikely to be coincidence between the interests of the external and the local actors. External actors tend to see their task as one of persuading the local actors to accommodate their quarrel to the needs of the wider community. For this reason the exercise is often described as crisis *management*.

Crisis management is one of those terms left over from the Cold War, when it was possible for it to have a specific and useful meaning. Then, any confrontation involving one of the superpowers carried a risk of utter disaster and so it was accepted that everything possible had to be done to keep any clash of interests within reasonable limits. As most crises occurred away from superpower territory, those interests connected with the matter which prompted the crisis in the first place were likely to be secondary to that of preventing the destruction of superpower territory. There was a bias in favour of compromise, often much to the frustration of local parties, which felt that their own disputes were as a result left in a state of suspended animation.

If you know that something is going to be managed then by definition it is not a crisis. Take away the risk of mutual destruction and the bias towards an enforced external compromise is eased and the indigenous dynamics are liable to be more important. Talking of a crisis in such situations can encourage the complacent belief that all that is needed to solve matters is the application of a set of techniques. Sometimes this becomes folk wisdom, such as the idea of leaving a `golden bridge' which allows your enemy to escape. The need to help your opponent `save face' was invoked in 1990 during the Gulf conflict, as if it had been proven during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. In practice, though, concentrating on how you help an enemy save face can mean that you lose face yourself, for face can only be saved through non-trivial concessions.

Stability or instability

The idea of crisis management assumes that the system tends to stability. This assumption lay behind many of the ideas for a new post-Cold War security order which were generated in 1990 and still linger on as part of the credo of certain multinational institutions. These ideas are reflected in words like architecture, pillar, construction, foundation--and stability itself--which all convey the notion of durable structures that can withstand occasion upsurges of hot-headedness in immature states. My own preference all along has been for metaphors of movement--agility, flexibility, versatility--for they capture better the dynamic and generally unstable situation in which we find ourselves now.

There is general agreement that the key security challenges involve those states which have emerged from the wreckage of European communism. A total security policy must involve measures to help these states develop sustainable economies, democratic institutions and open societies. My concern is with the consequences of those instances in which this effort falters. Inevitably some of these instances will be isolated and containable. Others could be large-scale and widespread in their ramifications. Much depends on what happens in Russia and Ukraine, but the tolerance of the European system to major upheavals in either country should not be considered to be high. Even smaller-scale ructions can become dangerous if they show signs of threatening the equilibrium of a number of countries.

If one starts with the assumption that the European region in its present condition is tending towards instability, then one begins to see intervention in a different light. The interest in the prevention of disorder assumes greater importance because there can be less confidence that, left alone, most conflicts will peter out as the belligerents become exhausted. Whether or not this is the case in a given conflict is a matter for careful analysis rather than simply the application of a gloomy disposition, but it becomes an important factor in assessing the risks of non-intervention as opposed to those of involvement.

As intervention is a matter of choice, a key factor in the decision-making is liable to be the choices being made by other states, especially those closer to the events causing concern or those able to deploy significant power. At the moment there are elements of a functioning collective security system but without the automaticity which such a system requires and, one suspects, will never achieve. So long as states have a choice as to whether or not to contribute to intervention then one can only expect a few of the potential test cases to be picked up.

The coordination of these choices is critical to the politics of intervention, as has been made clear in 1993 with the transatlantic arguments over the appropriate response to the unfolding Bosnian tragedy. This is not an area where states wish to be left out on a limb: they will certainly not rush in without carefully considering the risks, but neither will they wish to display undue caution. It is notable that despite the reluctance of most major powers to commit forces to deal with the tougher conflicts, the two states which are most committed, constitutionally and historically, to passivity--Japan and Germany--are both struggling against these traditional constraints and edging towards a more activist posture. No state likes to be seen to be shirking its obligations out of cowardice when others are accepting onerous burdens.

The politics of forming coalitions is therefore critical to intervention. Once negotiations over the form of intervention begin, many other issues and interests inevitably intrude, as favours have to be traded. The issue soon becomes larger than the immediate crisis. The choice of sponsoring institution has important implications for the general organization of international politics. Hence the enthusiasm, which must now be regretted, with which the European Community addressed the Yugoslav crisis in June 1991, seeing in it an opportunity to demonstrate the Community's growing competence in dealing with regional problems and to make the point that it was possible to act without the United States.

In practice, as we have now discovered, it is still difficult to imagine that any substantial operation can be conducted without the United States. If the United States chooses not to be involved then sufficient capabilities to deal with the most serious capabilities may not be generated. Critical areas (in which the United States lends its weight even though it does not devote combat troops) may be intelligence and logistics.

For the moment, too, it is hard to intervene without the approval of the UN, and every speech and action tends to reinforce this hypothesis. The legitimacy of intervention is seen to derive from a Security Council resolution. This may have made us too dependent upon an institution whose historic moment may be quite short, especially if internal political developments in either the Russian Federation or China start to turn those countries into contributors to the world's problems rather than to their solutions. There may in future be less certainty that the Security Council will sanction such actions. It is difficult to see how it can be replaced, for the CSCE would face the same fundamental problems but would be less capable of overcoming them, while the other institutions are all more exclusive and would be seen to be acting in a more self-interested manner.

It will always be difficult for external actors to assess a particular conflict objectively. Whatever the strength of power and feeling on the ground, particular outcomes have to be assessed against international law and prevailing beliefs about human and minority rights and the inviolability of boundaries, as well as the precedents being set for comparable conflicts. To come back again to the example of the former Yugoslavia, the desirability of holding the old federation together was assessed in the summer of 1991, in the context of the impending fragmentation of the Soviet Union, which it was at that time hoped to avoid.

Ends and means

Often, as in the former Yugoslavia, the problem is often less a matter of a lack of political objectives as of a confusion, especially when a conflict is complex and multi-faceted. It is important therefore to distinguish between those objectives which can be achieved through military means and those which cannot. The results of the military action will always be dependent upon the quality of effort in the political sphere, including restoring the local economy and creating credible political institutions. The statement that there are no military solutions to political problems is misleading, in that it suggests that military action is irrelevant to the quality of a political solution. A military solution can never be sufficient: at best it can create conditions for a favourable political solution. However, the very fact that military force has had to be employed means that some parties whose consent may be essential to the viability of a political solution will feel bitter and cheated and therefore withhold that consent. If a stage has been reached where military action has become necessary, it must be assumed that satisfactory solutions based on harmony, justice and consensus are no longer possible. The options will *all* involve a degree of coercion: the question is who is coercing whom, and for what?

The final general point concerns the relationship between military intervention and non-military forms of coercion, which include everything from the denial of diplomatic recognition, cultural sanctions, including exclusion from international sporting events, expulsion from international institutions, arms embargoes and trade boycotts (more or less comprehensive and more or less enforced) to severed communications of all types. It is wrong to assume that such measures are inherently ineffectual, either singly or collectively. Moreover, it is often difficult to forge an international coalition without passing through the various stages of applying pressure in which the use of force inevitably appears under the heading of `last resort'.

However, it is worth bearing in mind some of the awkward characteristics of the type of conflict which has started to become familiar in Europe over the past few years. First, the time taken for the non-violent measures listed in the previous paragraph to take effect is such that the target state or group can hope to adjust and to improve its position on the ground before it is forced to seek a settlement. The dynamics of these conflicts mean that time is always of the essence, and non- violent sanctions often waste time. Second, if non-violent sanctions have an effect it is often because they cause real distress and suffering to the target people, probably by depriving them of medical supplies and food. Third, if force is going to be applied as a `last resort' then this will probably be too late anyway, because the option will have become decreasingly attractive as the local situation deteriorates.

This highlights the most perplexing aspect of intervention. I have described it as being characterised by the element of choice. As this choice involves consideration of the costs and dangers of intervention as against the interests at stake in a developing conflict, then there will be a natural temptation to confine intervention to a level proportionate to those interests, which may be marginal. Yet, as I have also indicated, the interests at stake in intervention increase at the time of intervention, because then wider issues of credibility become attached.

In so far as the typical conflict reflects an unstable political situation, the basic objective of an intervention will be to stabilize the situation. The later the intervention, the more difficult will be the task of stabilization. The ideal intervention is therefore early, prior to chronic deterioration. To avoid interventions which are damaging, it is best to intervene--on a modest scale--before the need has become desperate.

It may, however, be as difficult to have a marginal intervention as it is to have a marginal pregnancy. There is a logic in the initial move that must be recognized. Though the first step may be non-military, small-scale and non-controversial, any determination to act in any way to influence the course of a conflict towards a particular outcome creates a stake in that outcome. Many of the problems of the past two years can be traced to the inevitable tension between the level of action proportionate to perceived national and international interests and the level proportionate to the logic of the conflict itself.

Objectives have been set for military intervention as a result of exaggerated expectations for non-military forms of coercion. Thus the UN Security Council will make demands which it then discovers it cannot enforce via trade embargoes and diplomatic isolation. It must either abandon its initial position (with a consequent loss of authority) or consider escalation. The prudent military planner, therefore, will start work as soon as an explicit international commitment to a particular outcome for a particular conflict has been made, even though the possibility of military enforcement is being excluded at the time.

The final set of points which I wish to make concerns the means of intervention. I have already mentioned the non-military means and their importance in both providing the environment in which military action takes place and as complements to any military action. I have also indicated that limited means are not necessarily sufficient to support limited interests, nor to ensure only limited risks. There may be a perception that military intervention is an unwanted burden that should be kept as light as possible lest protest develop over risking the lives of `our boys' for a set of `ungrateful' foreigners who are all `brigands' anyway. Unfortunately a token action is likely to result only in a futile intervention.

Military action itself can come in a variety of forms, ranging from enforcing a blockade to clearing the skies of aircraft engaged in prohibited activities, providing humanitarian relief and taking and defending territory. The same conflict may include varying types of military operation at varying levels of intensity, as can be seen in Bosnia. High intensity warfare, of the DESERT STORM variety, will be rare. However, elements of high-intensity warfare may be involved whenever there is a possibility of a direct clash involving regular forces. The logistics problems--at least to theatre--are likely to centre on the volume of supplies rather than the risks of interdiction *en route* to the theatre of operations.

There is a distinction to be made here between symbolic and substantive intervention. When states decide on intervention they naturally hope that the very act of so deciding will influence the likely target in a constructive manner. In this sense all intervention is to some extent a form of political signalling. Part of the difficulty is that it is not only the belligerents who receive the signals. The form of intervention chosen will

therefore be expected to convince a domestic audience, or allies, that something is being done, or conversely to reassure them that not too much is being done.

There sometimes seems to be a belief that the mere act of using military force conveys determination, that it symbolises resolve and deep concern. However, if the symbol has no substance--if, for example, the deployment is well away from the area of any likely hostilities and has extremely restricted rules of engagement--then it is most likely that a lack of resolve will be perceived rather than the opposite.

These conflicts are less likely to be linked to classic aggression and more to do with some fracture in the local political system. With both types, however, physical control over territory is the key, but in the latter case the relationship between contending forces and the local population is likely to be much more complex. The precise objectives to which military planners like to work are hard to define and so it becomes difficult to establish the boundaries of military liability.

Conflicts reflecting a struggle for local political power will be determined by the balance of strength on the ground. Because the critical issues revolve around local territorial control, strategies which ignore this may be of only slight consequence. Air strikes by themselves are an unreliable means of influencing this balance. There may be cases when punitive actions, designed to coerce an adversary, may be effective. However, their credibility is weakened if they can not be backed by credible forms of direct escalation. `What is my next step if this one fails to produce results?' is normally an essential question.

*Simply because the West has superior air power, it is very tempting to concentrate on measures such as `no-fly' zones, as in Iraq and Bosnia. While these are not without some practical significance, in reality the main struggle for power goes on beneath the no-fly zones on the ground--where there has been less success in establishing `no-artillery' zones and `no-ethnic cleansing' zones.

In assessing the likely course of a conflict, with or without external intervention, it is as well to remember that desperate struggles may lead to desperate measures, which these days seem likely to involve forms of environmental warfare. This has been seen with oil spills and the firing of wells in the Gulf, an attempt to open a dam in Croatia and threats of emptying a chemical plant into a river in Bosnia.

Lastly, I would argue that the awe in which Western military power is held should not be underestimated. While it is foolish to assume that an enemy will melt away as soon as the West flexes its muscles, in the absence of another superpower from which to derive support the possibilities of a country in the East surviving a straight fight with the West are recognized to be low.

Because any military intervention involves a major act of political will it is sometimes discussed simply in political terms, whereas it is essential to consider the operational aspects from the start. These operational aspects, however, must be based on a realistic assessment of the opponent. Best-case planning, based on optimistic assumptions, can soon lead to disaster when the enemy appears better prepared and more resilient than assumed. On the other hand worst-case planning, in which the opponent is given excessive credit, can turn into an excuse for inaction.

Conclusion

The basic message must be that military intervention within Europe is a matter in which we should not dabble. Either the intervention should be undertaken on a serious basis, with full knowledge of the possible implications, or not at all. Half-hearted measures result in the worst of both worlds. The West's performance in Bosnia, and before that Croatia, has only served to highlight the gap between the stated objectives of the international community and its readiness to act to achieve them.

Let me sum up in the form of eight propositions which reflect the vexing and perplexing nature of this sort of security challenge:

I. The use of force to create stable conditions requires a close connection with a credible political negotiating process, which should also be used to ensure a smooth withdrawal of the intervening forces.

II. *However*, any success in stabilizing a situation may require a long-term military commitment--since the removal of troops may trigger a recurrence of instability.

III. Intervention is most likely to be successful when it is undertaken in a decisive manner, at an early stage in a conflict.

IV. *However*, successful intervention will require the formation of a coalition effort. It may be an unfortunate law of international affairs, especially in the media age, that the point at which opinion can be mobilized to manage a localised crisis comes after the point at which the crisis can be readily managed.

V. The longer a conflict is allowed to fester, the more likely it is that intervention will be focused on preventing its spread or on humanitarian missions.

VI. *However*, humanitarian intervention cannot be politically innocent, as the civilian populations of opposing sides are rarely equally at risk.

VII. The unintended consequences of any intervention will always be as great if not greater than the intended consequences.

VIII. *However*, staying out is a form of intervention.

THE RAMIFICATIONS OF WAR

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The restructuring of the international political and security order which began in 1989 is still at a very early stage. Any prediction or analysis of future policy patterns and choices is based on many uncertain assumptions. One thing is certain, however: although after more than forty years the Cold War has finally ended, new conflicts and wars are erupting, compromising the security and well-being of the peoples of Europe. The global threat from the East is fading away, Western Europe is no longer the venue for full-scale military confrontation, a region frozen strategically and politically, but other risks and crises are emerging, both from the East and from the South.

Domestic instability, civil wars, international conflicts and terrorism are the issues which command the attention of the intelligence and defence establishments. The disappearance of the single major threat has been partially offset by the advent of many smaller `risks'. Still, no major, new, obvious, direct military threats endanger Western security as they did in the past. Threats from the South or from the East are of a different and lower order. The question now is how to implement crisis management--whether, and if so how to intervene with military forces--more than how to defend one's own territory.

The transition from a defensive and deterrent posture to one of crisis management is not easy or self-evident. It requires a deep change in political perception and the re-shaping of existing international decision-making and operational structures. But first it requires a clearer identification of common priorities, and this will be much harder than the former recognition of the existence of an overwhelming common threat.

In practical terms, the biggest political divide is between those who accept the necessity for greater political, economic and military commitment to reduce and manage ongoing crises, and those who hope to avoid new military responsibilities and are convinced that it may be possible to isolate European trouble spots and stop the epidemic at the borders of Western Europe. The first group speaks of peacemaking and peace enforcement, while the second prefers not to go beyond peacekeeping and humanitarian aid. Yet the distinction between these options is slowly disappearing under the pressure of events.

In strategic terms, the end of the Warsaw Pact, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the rapid decline in the conventional and nuclear threats reduce the prospect of the traditional strategic worst cases: total (or global) war, and a war in the Central European theatre between the two superpowers. Simultaneously, the growing number of European wars and conflicts and their increasing intensity are precipitating the fragmentation of the European security system. For about 45 years, peace in Europe (on Cold War conditions) was increasingly interconnected: in the interests of maintaining a strategic balance no war was allowed (with rare and irrelevant exceptions). Today, no major West European country can identify a single, evident, direct military threat to its own national security or survival as a result of the ongoing wars in Europe.

This prospect could change rapidly, for instance if there were a deterioration of the political situation in Russia, or if a major confrontation erupted between two great European (possibly nuclear) powers, like Russia and Ukraine, or even if there were a proliferation of nuclear, chemical and other high-technology weaponry in countries outside Europe. The present European feeling of security is challenged by many `latent' threats from the East and South--not yet fully developed but with enormous destabilizing potential--stemming from population growth rates, economic differentials, nuclear and chemical weapons proliferation and religious and nationalistic assertiveness. Yet for the time being, this seems to make the concept of limited (or local, or small) wars possible once again, and this could be used to justify a policy of containment, possibly linked to non-intervention or even neglect.

The issue is far from clear, however. The new situation challenges the traditional strategic assumptions and gives new meaning to old definitions. The very concept of `limited' war is becoming open to many differing interpretations and is rapidly evolving: ultimately, it may very well force the Europeans to view the ongoing conflicts and related risks with much greater anxiety and concern. It will certainly necessitate a reappraisal of crisis management strategies and the options of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement.

In the traditional sense, the term limited war implies that one or all of the protagonists imposes limits on the specific objectives, weapons or tactics available to them (e.g. nuclear or chemical weapons, or the massive bombing of civilian targets). It means that the war will be limited by non-operational considerations. In the American jargon a `limited' war was any military conflict in which nuclear weapons were not used. More recently, however, other constraints have become very important, for instance the desirability of not killing civilians, the avoidance of casualties among its forces and a swift conclusion of the operation. It is an evolution that conforms with the theories of Clausewitz, according to whom all wars could rightly be called `limited' because no combatant can ignore the limits set by his own interests and established behaviour.

A different meaning of the concept of `limited' war derives from the acceptance of the important limitations imposed on military strategy by the existence of nuclear weapons. André Beaufre has described the importance and scope of `indirect strategy', saying that it aims at exploiting all the small margins of manoeuvre that are left open by nuclear deterrence, to attain significant successes notwithstanding the constraints imposed on the actual use of military force. In the present European circumstances, the deterrent role of nuclear weapons seems relevant, applicable only to global relations, while the possibilities for using conventional military forces increase dramatically.

The traditional (mainly Soviet) description `local war' is not a reference to the intensity of the conflict, which may escalate up the highest ladder, but indicates that the war in question is limited geographically to a given region or operational theatre. For example, Soviet strategists used to say that battlefield nuclear weapons could very well be used from the start, in a relatively uninhibited way, in a local war scenario confined to a European operational theatre. This theory has been discarded lately by the Soviets, but it may reappear outside Europe, either because more countries possess

nuclear weapons or because some form of `discriminate' strategy is conceived to deal with these potential nuclear threats.

Strategists of the Napoleonic wars called the operations of irregular and partisan forces, either independent or integrated with those of regular forces, `small wars', but this form of partisan war was generally thought to be defensive in nature (basically a fight by the population against an invading army to disrupt lines of communications, logistics, control of the territory, deployment and concentration schemes, etc.). On the contrary, practically all the ongoing European wars are being fought by a combination of regular and irregular forces conducting offensive as well as defensive operations.

In sum, Europe is experiencing local wars of a new type which combine many features of all these past definitions and create a completely new situation. The wars in the former Yugoslavia, for instance, are neither limited nor localised and fall outside the definition of the older theory of small wars. Traditional, legally binding international laws of war are violated daily, while the limitations imposed on the conflict by the United Nations are not accepted by the warring parties nor efficiently enforced by international organizations. Finally, the military intensity of the conflicts does not derive from any kind of accepted constraint (self-imposed or otherwise) but from the sheer availability of military hardware. Within these objective limits, therefore, the Yugoslav conflict has many of the features of a global, all-out European war.

The supposition that the Yugoslav quagmire will remain localised is questionable too. Already the war has spread from Croatian territory to Bosnia-Herzegovina and back, and could easily widen to draw in Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria, Turkey and Greece on one side and Vojvodina, Hungary and Romania on the other side, escalating to the level of a fully-fledged Balkan war with all the interlinked consequences and risks that would inevitably follow from it (involving directly all the major European powers, including Russia and Ukraine).

The scenario of the many conflicts between Caucasian states is very similar, with the added complication that these conflicts immediately bring in Russia and Turkey and are increasingly connected with the Middle East. In the latter region, military operations against Iraq (and before that, the Iran-Iraq and Arab-Israeli wars) have already reached a very high level of conventional military intensity and of internationalization, while getting close to the use of such non-conventional military means as chemical or even nuclear weapons.

Reciprocally, the very important ability of the two nuclear, military superpowers to `freeze' situations is waning rapidly. In 1973, the Yom Kippur war came to a standstill when the confrontation escalated from its regional level to one involving the superpowers. The high risks inherent in the balance of terror at the same time offered a relatively cheap and efficient way to enforce peace and to manage the reduction of the military intensity of smaller wars. The relative decline of Soviet power, coupled with a sharp drop in Russia's international influence and ambitions, while apparently increasing the global leverage of the United States as the only remaining true superpower, is in reality increasing the costs of each specific instance of crisis management (and at the same time it is reducing the chance of achieving the level of domestic consensus needed to support them).

No government of the United States (or of any West European power), when confronted with the issue of intervening in a distant conflict, can now rely on the almost automatic support of public opinion that was forthcoming in a situation of clear and all-pervading rivalry between the two superpowers. Each decision on intervention should now be made on the basis of the operation's risks and costs, thus becoming more a matter of contingent political choice (and domestic dissent) than being based on the, mostly bi-partisan, international and security consensus.

In reacting to this new situation, Western governments have generally accorded greater importance to domestic than to international priorities. Practically all national defence budgets have been reduced sharply, even if the military forces needed for safe and effective peace enforcement operations are almost as expensive and demand as high a level of technology as those which were needed for the maintenance of the old balance of forces in Europe. Moreover, the Yugoslav conflict clearly demonstrated the primacy of domestic considerations over the obvious need for a common international approach, which, when finally agreed upon, was likely to be an effective and weak compromise between the different national positions.

The only effective way to deal, albeit incompletely, with this problem has been through the increasing use of the existing international organizations and multilateral crisis management mechanisms. This does not mean to say that the UN, the CSCE, NATO or the EC and WEU have shown the ability and the capacity to manage these crises. On the contrary, the only relative success so far has come from the Gulf War against Iraq, where their role was very much subordinate to the American one. The Yugoslav civil war seems now to confirm the same pattern, with the added drawback that the American leadership seems to be acting in a much more weak and ineffective way than it did against Iraq. At the same time, however, multinational crisis management has proved its worth for coalition building and the preservation of a modicum of Western unity of purpose and action. It is an instrument of limited operational efficiency but of immense political utility in the avoidance of any further fragmentation of the Western alliance and the inordinate aggravation of crises.

Multinational instruments are not, however, all-powerful. Attempts to preserve the unity of the Western world have to take account of the structural inconsistency between the military and economic regimes. The United States is militarily dominant, while Japan and the European Community (including Germany) are economically the most important, and international organizations do not have the power to reconcile this inconsistency. Their decision-making processes are based on consensus, and this results in clear limitations whenever significant conflicts of interest arise. Even NATO has required a general rethinking of its military structure and political reality. While the military restructuring is already progressing (with the formation of multilateral forces and a redefinition of the command structure) the political rethinking is less advanced. The substantial withdrawal of American forces from Western Europe, the deep cuts in the theatre nuclear arsenal and the establishment of institutional ties with the countries of the former Warsaw Pact may lead to different kinds of alliances.

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Alliance, to give one which is much more integrated (and possibly supranational) than the present one. Moreover, it requires a clearer identification of common allied priorities--previously, the existence of an overwhelming common threat was easy to recognise.

The European Union will have both the political ambition and the constitutional structure needed to undertake these challenging security roles. It may combine both, with a new-style NATO and a more pronounced European autonomy. Progress towards the Union is relatively sluggish, however, and its completion may come too late to have any effect on the security scenario of the next decade.

The situation is paradoxical. The increase in importance of multinational organizations goes hand in hand with the growing power of the protagonists of national decision-making. National governments are bound to work through international institutions and with multinational means but they also have greater freedom of choice than those institutions. They can pick their preferred options among many, they can favour one international organization rather than another, and they retain the right to participate in multinational operations only if and when *ad hoc* decisions are taken. Yet these advocates of national decision-making are running out of ideological and political support. They are no more the absolute rulers they once were. They acknowledge their limits but they are not yet ready to surrender their remaining prerogatives. The force, the ambition, the political vision are absent and will not be re-acquired. This paradox can have important negative effects, decreasing the overall ability of the system to manage crises and to deter war. It may generate widespread strategic inertia.

Difficult questions therefore arise. Should the Western powers (or Western Europe) manage every major crisis, or only some of them (those more directly affecting their interests)? Moreover, should they aim at containing crises, keeping and eventually enforcing peace with military means, or could they limit themselves to the use of economic and political instruments while trying to isolate and contain the spread of the conflict to other regions? Should they aim at `resolving' crises, making peace through the use of a wider range of civilian as well as military means, or should they accept the inevitable and wait for crises to burn out at their own pace, possibly incidentally attempting to limit some of the more obvious and terrible human costs in human suffering?

There do not yet appear to be any clear answer to these questions. At the same time, however, the absence of clear-cut choices and strategies favours the strengthening of old-fashioned nationalistic approaches, not only inside the former Communist countries but in the West as well. International law and security need common values and regulations even more than, and more urgently than common means, which cannot develop consistently in a situation of differing perceptions and national priorities.

Moreover, it is increasingly apparent that the distinctions traditionally drawn between peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace- enforcing actions are becoming blurred. The Agenda for Peace submitted by the UN Secretary General to the Security Council in June 1992 demonstrates the need for a coherent approach ranging from preventive diplomacy to post-conflict peace-building and necessarily encompassing all the

different kinds and levels of international commitment and actions. The Yugoslav conflict is proving in a dramatic fashion that it is impossible to manage this kind of crisis efficiently if a fully credible strategy which considers the option of decisive military escalation based on available forces has not been developed. The absence, to date, of such an option has contributed to the failure of all attempts to end the crisis, and has diminished the overall credibility of the international community, thereby worsening the conflict instead of resolving it or merely containing it.

Past experience suggests that the answer to some of these questions may be very simple indeed, at least on a rational level. The only one that would remain unanswered is the first: should all crises be tackled or only some of them? It is unlikely that all crises will have the same importance and priority, and affect the interests of the same international actors. Inevitably, some crises will get more attention than others because of their impact on vital interests (as in the Gulf), because of their proximity (as in the former Yugoslavia), or because they appeal to new cultural and humanitarian priorities (as in Somalia). The problem is that if a crisis reaches this degree of severity, then it should be managed with full force and commitment in order to ensure that any intervention does not backfire.

Failure to resolve the crisis in Yugoslavia today could easily rule out the possibility of multilateral action in the future, while at the same time aggravating the problem within Western alliances and institutions. It would force Western Europe to fight a rearguard battle against mounting troubles coming from the East and South, as well as greater migratory pressures, while at the same time reducing the ability of the European institutions to manage these problems and to forge consensus among their members. It would be a major defeat for the international order and have dire consequences.

In the end, the only possible answer to these questions is that it is by no means necessary to get involved in all developing crises and conflicts, but that, once there is involvement, the ensuing responsibilities should be accepted and carried out fully. Any major war is bound, almost inevitably, to have serious ramifications that are more difficult and painful to deal with than the original cause of the war, especially because they will have been strengthened by any earlier failure to put them down.

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