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PARAMETERS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

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PREFACE

Professor Dieter Mahncke, the Deputy Director of the Planning Staff of the German Defence Ministry in Bonn, was a visiting fellow at the Institute for the last quarter of 1992. We were pleased to welcome him and were stimulated by his many contributions to our work. Among these was an early draft of the present paper which we encouraged him to work on and are now happy to publish for a wider audience.

The end of the Cold War has meant that very many of the concepts on which institutions and structures for security in Western Europe were based have had to be re-examined. This is a continuing process and Professor Mahncke's stimulating and provocative paper will make an important contribution to the ongoing argument.

John Roper
Paris, September 1993

Parameters of

European security[1]

Dieter Mahncke

INTRODUCTION

The changes in Europe over the past few years have been dramatic and they have led, particularly in the field of security, to a great deal of re-thinking--or at least demands for and appearances of re-thinking. Compared to the earlier East-West conflict most of the changes were considered as being positive from the Western point of view. The West was able to decrease its military readiness, decrease the numbers of its troops and arms and, at least to an extent, reduce the accompanying financial burdens.

At the same time, however, three things occurred which, in direct or indirect ways, affected security issues. First, and most obviously, it became evident that military power would continue to play a role in Europe. New conflicts flared up in Eastern and South-eastern Europe involving the extensive use of military force. At the same time old risks deriving from the continued weight of Russia and its uncertain future, as well as the presence of nuclear weapons, could not be discarded.

Second, the view became common that there might be new conflicts in which European interests would be involved, but NATO would be `either unwilling or unable' to act. For this reason, it was thought, it would be wise to develop a European capability of acting together as Europeans, i.e. a joint capability rather than the capability available from individual European states. This idea was promoted by France and Germany in particular. In the case of France this was seen as following its traditional line of trying to reduce the role of NATO and American influence, and in the case of the now united Germany (also along at least traditional West German lines) because such a framework would offer it the opportunity of possibly meeting new military responsibilities, not alone and on a national basis, but within broader European parameters. To promote this yet another phrase was coined, namely, that `a united Europe would be incomplete without a security and defence component.' But the problem with this phrase was that it presupposed a united Europe and consensus on the nature of such a union. In fact, however, this was not the case, and the conflict that broke out over the Maastricht treaty was only partially caused by the treaty itself. It derived mainly from the lack of consensus on the kind of Union to be achieved, and at the same time the debate brought the lack of consensus into the open from behind the often obfuscating phraseology of European communiqués.

The third and somewhat surprising development was that, in addition to the crisis on European integration, deep-seated political crises seemed to be emerging in most of the Western democracies. This crisis became particularly visible in Germany, France and the United States. In all of these countries a growing disaffection of the voters with traditional parties and indeed the *classe politique* became apparent. Increasing problems (social, educational, budgetary) were perceived, while political leadership seemed incapable of meeting them. Disaffected voters stayed away from the polls or began to move towards the extremes of the political spectrum. Perhaps, some argued, the disciplining force of the Cold War had suddenly been removed, but more probably these were long-term and deep-seated problems that were bound to surface sooner or later--and the Western democracies were lucky that they surfaced only after their triumph in the Cold War.

This, then, is the framework in which European and Atlantic security policies have to be developed. In view of the problems and uncertainties a rather modest and careful development would seem to be appropriate. Yet there is still talk of a European security `architecture', of a common European security and defence policy, even of a `new world order'. These were the ideas born in the short period of bliss between the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the Gulf War in February 1991, when freedom in Eastern Europe, the unification of Germany and joint international action to punish an aggressor were achieved. Old problems were suddenly and speedily resolved in sensible, creative and productive negotiations. New problems had not yet appeared and the persistence of some of the old ones was happily forgotten--for a while.

In such a situation it seems appropriate to take stock. Which security challenges now have to be met (do we need an architecture or will we have to fall back on more simple policies)? What is the state of the institutions we have at our disposal (primarily NATO, EC, WEU, CSCE) and what can they do? What do the different countries involved really want, and finally, what does all of this, taken collectively, imply for our security policies?

WHAT HAS chaNGED?

Since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the break-up of the Soviet Union it has become commonplace to remark on the dramatic changes that have taken place in Europe over the last few years. Dramatic changes have indeed taken place and to point to them seems all too self-evident. But, obviously, the problem with such remarks is that they tend to become broader and broader, generalising in a manner that glosses over differences and weakens the perception of those things which are unchanged and remain important.

Of course, there have been important and fundamental changes. As a result of the end of the Cold War--more precisely, the success of the West--the old bipolar system, which held the whole of Europe and much of the West in its grip for forty years, has collapsed. The Soviet empire in Central and Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact have been dismantled. The Central and East European states, including the three Baltic states, have become independent.

These are dramatic changes with unquestionably dramatic effects in Europe, specifically with regard to European security. The Soviet threat is gone. Europe is no longer under the threat of mutual nuclear destruction, no longer in fear that every crisis might escalate into an East-West conflict with all its potential implications. The enforced division of Europe has been lifted and Germany is reunited.

But not everything has changed. We are not on the brink of a golden age of assured peace in Europe. The concept of a new world order may be useful as a vision and as an aim, but such an order does not yet exist, nor can we be certain that it will ever be achieved.

The fundamental character of international politics has not changed. Military power continues to play a role. The geographical situation and (potential) weight of Russia are unchanged. And although there have been both formal agreements and additional political commitments to reduce at least the number of nuclear weapons, these weapons are still there and some of them will remain there for a long time to come.

In addition, new-old conflicts have appeared, conflicts of national, ethnic, cultural and religious differences all over Eastern Europe and within the former Soviet Union. Conventional military power is already playing a role, and nuclear power (in the form of deterrence), may yet play a role in dealing with them.

The conclusion is that the questions concerning European security have not really become much easier to answer since the end of the Cold War. They do need attention and creative management. Some chance of building a European security regime does exist, but it will not come about automatically. Such a security regime does not inevitably imply a grand architecture, perhaps under the auspices of the CSCE with councils, voting procedures and intervention forces. It implies rather the expansion of the Western security system eastward--a system in which military power plays only a very limited role, to a very large extent no role at all, in the relations between states. It is inconceivable that any of the West European states would go to war against each other or even threaten the use of military force. The gravest threat among West

European states today is of failure to cooperate (as in the conflicts over monetary and trade issues of the last twelve months). Harsh words may be used, and states do carry different weight, which they employ against each other. But while military power may in some complicated way contribute to the weight of states even in their relations with each other in Western Europe, military power in a direct sense plays no role in these relations. This is the real security regime in Western Europe.

Extending such a concept to all of Europe sounds visionary. Certainly it will not come about easily. But it is more realistic than, for example, a CSCE `architecture' mainly for two reasons. First, any effectively functioning CSCE *presupposes* a security regime as described above. In other words, you can only achieve an operational security system if you have already arrived at a situation where there is widespread consensus on certain basic principles, major problems have been resolved and military force has been reduced to a minimal role. Second, as long as you do not have this necessary condition a sophisticated architecture is unnecessary, possibly even undesirable, because you can do what you need to do with the available instruments of consultation, because it may lead to the dangerous illusion of having achieved a greater degree of security than is actually the case, and because it can, as the gap between the pretence and the reality becomes evident, lead to such a degree of disenchantment that public support is weakened, hopes for a long-term architecture decrease and even those instruments that are available are blunted.

Of course, a `security community' has important prerequisites. Differences of a fundamental nature must have been resolved, national goals need to be compatible, there should be a certain affinity in the culture of international relations and at least a common understanding of how differences are to be resolved. This can be by negotiation, compromise or by political pressure, but whatever measures are taken, none should ever move higher than a certain level on the scale of political and diplomatic pressure, military pressure not being considered as a usable element at all. These elements of understanding did not exist from the beginning even in Western Europe. They were created, transformed, developed.

There is little question today that this process has been successful in Western Europe, but a good case to look at in order to test the validity of the argument is the situation between Greece and Turkey. Here we have a situation in which military threats are part of the game and military force has indeed been used. On the other hand, there has not been an extensive direct war between the two countries, and one would like to think that this has had something to do with their membership of the West European and transatlantic security community.

Two arguments, however, come immediately to mind, one seeming to support the point, the other challenging it, at least to an extent. First, it could be pointed out that Turkey is not fully a part of the West European system: geographically, culturally, and institutionally. In that sense it could be regarded as an exception (although it is, of course, part of the transatlantic system). Second, it could be argued that the limitation of the conflict (and it has been limitation rather than avoidance or resolution, although limitation alone should not be despised) has been largely a result of the restraining influence of NATO and specifically the United States, rather than a security system in the sense delineated above.

Both arguments are at least partially valid. But they do not invalidate the value of the restraint that has been imposed on the conflicting parties, nor do they disprove that `the system' has had something to do with it. For both parties are involved in the system and are aware of the values of the system, the advantages and the fact that dissociation would imply serious disadvantages. Showing restraint in their particular conflict, however, is a condition of their continuing participation. So, rather than being a negative example, the Turkish-Greek conflict could be seen as a positive example, for the very reason that here a fundamental conflict has been restrained and limited through association with the West European and transatlantic security system. It seems evident that part of the motivation for the East Europeans to become associated with the Western system can be found here.

How to arrive at a security regime of the kind existing in Western Europe is, however, not the immediate question (nor would it be the answer to all problems). While we are confronted by the issue of how eventually to move in the direction of such a system, more immediately we must deal with the security issues that are still part of a different system, namely the present one. These policies must meet a number of general criteria: they must deal with the existing security needs of the participants, they must not be a hindrance to progress towards a more general security regime and-- where possible--they should promote the introduction of such a regime. Policies turn on existing risks and threats, for, whatever long-term goals there may be, these are the immediate requirements for policy, and policies will primarily and often exclusively be geared to meeting these requirements. It is hence necessary to look next at existing risks and security needs.

RISKS AND chaLLENGES

In the discussion about potential risks to European security, three groups of risks are usually mentioned: first, the geopolitical location, uncertain development and continuing military power of Russia, second, the new, already visible or potential national, religious, ethnic and cultural (and power-political) conflicts in Eastern and South-eastern Europe, including parts of the former Soviet Union and third, potential extra-European threats, specifically from North Africa or the Near and Middle East.

While there is general agreement on these three groups of risks, there has been little precise analysis of exactly what risks for European security they entail and whether there are any other risks.

First of all, it seems necessary to be clear about what is meant by `European Security'. A sober look indicates that the term does not mean the security of all European states in the same way. What the term does seem to imply as far as the West Europeans (and the North Americans) are concerned is really two things: first, security for *Western* Europe, and second, the maintenance of some type of overall European stability that does not exclude conflicts, even a war as in the former Yugoslavia, but makes sure that whatever conflicts occur do not destabilise Europe to the extent of threatening *West* European security.

The primary aim of `European security' is thus to safeguard West European security. First and foremost, the Western allies want to make sure that *their* security is maintained. Beyond that they are interested in overall European stability, primarily as a favourable environment for their own security. Only in third place is there the idea of extending the type of Western security regime eastward to benefit the East Europeans, again being aware that the extension of the regime would enhance stability, which in turn enhances Western European security.

It is important to see this as it really is for two reasons. Firstly, it is not merely a selfish position, but it is realistic and advantageous for Europe as a whole. It is realistic because no state and no alliance can be expected to behave in any other way than to give its own security top priority. It is advantageous for Europe as a whole because overall European security may need the anchor of Western stability; in any case European security as a whole would be worse off if West European security were not ensured. Secondly, it is important to see the situation as it is because it has direct implications for security policy. A policy orientated toward an overall European security architecture while taking Western security for granted, or a policy seeking Western security primarily through such an architecture, can be quite different from a policy giving Western security priority and trying to move on from that basis. It is the latter approach that has so far determined Western policy, and the expression European security should not obfuscate this.

A second aspect that one needs to be clear about is what the term `security' signifies. It has become popular--as the military threat has declined and other problems such as raw material supply or migration have grown--to extend the concept beyond simply protection against a violent threat from the outside. It is self-evident that particularly raw material supply and mass-migration, but also, for example, extended terrorist

attacks from outside or cross-frontier ecological threats are, as they grow in size, ultimately part of a society's security. Nevertheless, it does not seem helpful to include everything under the term security as having to be ensured by a `security policy', for if a term means everything it no longer means anything.

One could define a threat to the security of a society or community as anything that ultimately and fundamentally threatens the autonomy (the freedom of one's own development) of that society or community (which may be a state or something more extensive, such as the European Community). Such a definition leaves room for growing international interdependence while indicating that security policy is to deal with vital threats and not such factors that for a society or community are burdensome, disadvantageous or even more than that, but not vital. Examples of this would be terrorist attacks, pollution that does not threaten the very existence of the society, migration that can be dealt with, limited loss of raw materials and markets and certainly all threats to the welfare of a society that fall short of threatening the existence of that society. The problem is, of course, how to differentiate between a vital and a less than vital threat and how to determine when something that is initially less than vital increases (or may increase) sufficiently in magnitude to become vital.

A definition of this kind implies that military force--traditionally an instrument of security policy--would come into play only in a limited and narrowly defined set of cases. It would not be limited to a reaction to opposing (aggressive) military force alone, but it would be limited to such cases where the fabric of society is vitally threatened *and* where military power can serve as a useful instrument. It is important to note that such a definition does not reduce the importance of the other problems: they are enormously important (in an everyday sense they are even more important, in the sense of requiring daily political action), but they require other instruments and other solutions. To illustrate the point with just one example, migration is not an element or a subject of security policy unless it threatens the very fabric of society, in which case military force (e.g. to stop migration at national frontiers) becomes a legitimate tool. We do not need an all-encompassing security policy; what we need is a security policy, an environmental policy, a migration policy and an awareness of interdependencies where such exist.

In the light of this it is useful to look at the three risks for (West) European security which are normally mentioned in more detail: the Russian potential, conflicts in Eastern Europe and extra-European threats. The first--the Russian potential--is obvious. Even after the split-up of the Soviet Union, Russia remains by geographical location a European power, and its existing military capability as well as future potential make it the foremost European military power. There is general agreement that there exists no threat at this stage and that a new threat would take some time to develop, thus giving the West adequate warning time. In addition, Russia is now separated from Western Europe by Poland, Belarus and Ukraine, the latter serving as a potential buffer, but also being, after Russia, the next most powerful conventional force in Europe (being permitted an army of 450,000 men under the CFE Treaty) and, at least at this stage, also possessing nuclear weapons.

There is uncertainty about how Russia and Ukraine will develop in future, and even less agreement on how much insurance the West needs to prepare for these uncertainties. Two arguments can be put forward in favour of maintaining a clearly

adequate `level of insurance'. First, military forces cannot be acquired like water at the turn of a tap: in democracies the build-up of forces requires difficult political decisions as well as time. Second, the reduced levels considered necessary can--in view of the advantages such insurance offers--be maintained at bearable cost.

There are, of course, several arguments against this. The insurance premium is being paid for a very unlikely risk, and in view of this it will be unpopular and difficult to maintain a significant level of military force in a democracy. Its maintenance, moreover, might require an artificially stimulated level of `threat awareness', with negative political implications. Here again it could be argued that the mutual reduction of forces and confidence-building measures could not only avoid such political effects but also further significantly lower the force levels and hence the required insurance. But whatever level one chooses ultimately to arrive at, there is overall agreement that this is indeed one of the risks which Western security policy has to take into consideration.[2]

The situation is much less clear with regard to potential conflicts in *Eastern* Europe. In and of themselves such conflicts do not pose an automatic threat to (West) European security. This point is evident from the fact that we have several ongoing conflicts including the war in the former Yugoslavia. Such conflicts entail no direct threat as long as they can be isolated, but they do entail two risks. The first is that there is no assurance that a conflict can indeed be kept isolated. A conflict may spread, either by an extension of the accompanying problems (nationalism, ethnic conflict, refugees) to neighbouring countries, thus involving them *or* by involving other European countries with conflicting interests, be they historic or current. Such an extension would not necessarily pose an immediate threat to European security overall, but clearly the difficulties of isolating the conflict would increase significantly and there would indeed be potential for an extension of the conflict (all the more so if the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance weakens and the policies of the members of the European Community undergoes a process of renationalisation). The second risk is that such conflicts may simply serve as bad examples gradually undermining the rules of conduct of the (West) European security community. Obviously this risk, which is difficult to determine precisely, would enhance the first, and both would be encouraged if the Western community was weakened and slid back to form a collection of national states at best only cooperating loosely with each other.

The third group or set of risks customarily mentioned comprises the so-called extra-European risks. The more immediate risks are associated with North Africa and the Near and Middle East. There are three basic types: extended military action (an attack from the south), terrorist activity and an interruption in oil supplies. Any of these threats would probably take place in a situation of political conflict that could have various causes: general dissatisfaction with the policies of Western industrialised countries, either alone or in combination with Islamic fundamentalism, a specific conflict, for instance on the question of migration, a desire to put pressure on the Western states for a specific reason, an attempt to divert attention from domestic difficulties, or other similar reasons.

Obviously, extended military action would be the most serious risk, but it is also the least likely. In present and foreseeable circumstances extended military action from any one country or group of countries would be met by superior Western force. If it

occurred, it would presumably be of relatively short duration and would end with a decisive defeat of the attacker. For this reason such action is highly unlikely although, in the case of miscalculation, not entirely impossible. But the West would be in a good position to meet such a threat.

To avoid a strong and decisive Western response it might be more rational for terrorist activity to be chosen, again for a variety of reasons, but particularly when certain limited aims are pursued. Such activities could include the well-known spectrum of bombings and kidnapping, but could also entail something much more extensive, such as a limited missile attack on some specific target. The Western response here would be much more difficult, although a limited military strike would be an obvious possibility. A crucial element in such a situation would be Western (and specifically European) political cohesion. Since the potential attacker would know this, he would probably strive to conduct his measures in a way that would enhance potential dissension.

The situation would be dramatically different if any of the actors posing the threat had developed either nuclear or biological or chemical weapons with a deterrent value. Indeed, the very development of such weapons poses the primary risk for European security as far as this region is concerned. It is in this area that possible responses must be considered and possibly made known.

The threat of cutting off oil supplies is, in fact, only likely if some deterrent capability of the above kind has been developed, since any extensive interruption would pose a significant threat to Europe and hence could be expected to be met by a correspondingly strong response. Again, such action is conceivable only in a situation of sufficiently deep political conflict and it would have to be a real and enforced interruption rather than a reduction in supply or an increase in prices. A reduction in supply or a price increase would hurt the Europeans, but probably not enough to make them feel vitally threatened. This is all the more true since a price increase or a supply reduction would significantly hurt the producers too, so that they would probably not be able to uphold that position for very long. The West would immediately seek alternative supplies elsewhere and would attempt to break up the unity of the region. Thus, as in the above case, such a move is likely only in a situation of major strife, and it would have to be very extensive in order to be seen as a vital threat to Europe.

In addition to these risks there are two specific issues in the area that might pose security-relevant questions to the Europeans. One of them is Israel. If there should be a serious threat to Israel, however unlikely this seems at the moment, with the United States being involved, the Europeans would be expected to take a stance. In the past the Europeans have been able to stand aside--only agreeing, more or less willingly, for military bases to be used for American logistical support for Israel. Unless the threat was vital, this might also be the pattern for the future.

More direct involvement might be expected in the other case, namely that of Ceuta and Melilla, the Spanish enclaves on the North African coast. Would an attack on these enclaves constitute a case for support by either NATO or WEU? If such an attack were to occur in the framework of a larger conflict it is likely that the other Europeans would be willing to accept some obligations; if it occurred as an isolated conflict the allies would possibly expect Spain to deal with it on its own.

As to potential risks from beyond the regions mentioned--Russia, Eastern Europe, North Africa and the Near and Middle East--these can probably be dismissed. There is no country or group of countries that could seriously pose a threat to Europe, nor can one think of anybody who would even want to do this. Japan is an economic competitor, not a security threat, and the necessary measures to cope with the former are quite different from those needed to meet a security threat. The only area with natural resources (apart from oil) of high value to Europe is southern Africa (and to a lesser extent North America, but both the United States and Canada are allies of the Europeans). Here the reservations already mentioned above apply: the control of natural resources is often a useful economic instrument; it has, however, only limited use in a political conflict. Of course, such control is important in the case of military conflict, but in such a case different rules apply and Western Europe would expect to have the military means to ensure necessary supplies.

It is important in this context to recognize the difference between the pursuance of political and economic interests on the one hand, and threats to West European security on the other. Western Europe obviously has important economic and political interests in many areas. However, it is unlikely that it will want to pursue such interests using military force. But even if this were the case the use of military means to achieve or maintain a specific interest does not retroactively make the previously perceived threat to such an interest a security threat. This differentiation is important because in political debate there is frequently a tendency to elevate the value of certain interests by declaring them vital for national or European security. Not every threat to something we value is automatically a threat to our security.

I would argue that the major threats to our (West European) security derive less from any of the outside threats mentioned above than from weaknesses in our capability for dealing with such threats. In other words, the threats mentioned pose a real danger to West European security only if Western Europe shows itself incapable of dealing with them. This capability--in political, economic, military and psychological terms--could be endangered primarily by three possible developments: the slowdown or standstill of the development towards European union, the renationalisation of the security policies of the countries of Western Europe, and an estrangement from North America. These risks are at least as big as, if not bigger than, those discussed earlier.

Obviously, renationalisation in Western Europe is related to European integration and the relationship with the North American democracies. If either the Atlantic relationship or the process of European integration were to decline, renationalisation would speed up (although stability or progress in one could compensate for a decline in the other). But renationalisation in and of itself and for whatever reasons (e.g. the disappearance of the Soviet threat or the reawakening of particular national interests and attitudes) would have a negative effect on European integration and probably also on Atlantic relations. It seems self-evident that a renationalised Western Europe, unified at the level of a customs union and with loose ties to North America, would be in a significantly weaker position to meet any threat to its security which it might face in the future. All of these dangers are real, all the more so because there is probably a tendency to underestimate them.

The debate about the Maastricht treaty, the Danish and French referendums, but also the treaty itself have shown that European political leaders have a range of different views on where the process is to lead. Consequently they are quite unclear about objectives and thus the European peoples do not really know where they are going and whether they want to go where they feel they are being led. Scepticism about the present process, which has become visible in most of the member states of the Community, derives only in small part from the (unfounded) fear of a potential loss of national identity; even less does it derive from a supposed fear of loss of national sovereignty. It derives primarily from uncertainty about the aims and the results of the process. It is clear to the peoples of the Community what they do not want: some type of conglomerate Europe, consisting of a multitude of overlapping structures, each difficult to discern in its functions and powers, controlled by a growing interventionist bureaucracy in Brussels with ever widening powers uncontrolled by democratic procedures, influenced only indirectly by governments which are themselves losing influence as a result of the process. Even a very benevolent view of the integration process so far would have to concede that such a view is not completely unfounded. The process has been dominated by bureaucratization, it lacks integrated political (as opposed to intergovernmental and administrative) decision-making structures and it lacks almost all elements of significant democratic control. Most importantly, there is no clear concept of how this is to look eventually. For, whatever European political leaders have done, they have not put forward anything beyond the vague expression European Union, and it is striking that in the debate on Maastricht the proponents were confined to explaining why Maastricht would not be so bad or why a rejection would be worse than reluctant acceptance, rather than arguing in favour of a positive vision. The reason for this is of course that there is no agreement on such a vision.

As far as renationalisation is concerned, such a process is already going on in Western Europe. Nationalism in the sense of `my country first' has never ceased to exist. It was, however, subdued during and immediately after World War II, when there was a widespread and sincere desire to overcome past nationalism, and this desire did indeed lead to a diminution of nationalism in Western Europe. Almost fifty years after the end of the war the ideological impetus of the immediate postwar years has diminished, and with the collapse of the Soviet empire the need for West European unity has also become less evident to many.

Nevertheless, the past decades have, fortunately, left their mark. Among the peoples of Western Europe nationalism has been overcome to a greater extent than the actions and behaviour of political leadership would sometimes lead one to believe. The ease of movement of people in Western Europe in comparison with the situation in Eastern Europe makes this clear. It would probably be impossible now to return to levels of nationalism that existed pre-1914 in Western Europe; at the very least it would require quite an effort. So what renationalisation really means in this context is a growing emphasis on particular national interests at the expense of the integration process within the Community. In other words, the main danger of renationalisation is not the restoration of a pre-1914 situation, but a standstill of the process of movement towards political union, a halt at the level of a customs union with some elements of economic union, as well as a degree of political cooperation and coordination at an intergovernmental level. Of course, such an outcome is acceptable enough, but it is a fair-weather structure. Under strain, intergovernmental cooperation on the political level might prove insufficient, while even in normal circumstances elements of

economic union alone (e.g. monetary union) would lead to severe burdens as crises which are today reflected only in the exchange rate mechanism--a buffer between the national economies--would then become conflicts between national economies themselves.

Transatlantic relations would probably suffer from all this. Transatlantic economic rivalry would be enhanced while security ties--no longer considered to be crucial--would be weakened. To many foreign observers, French policy seems clear on this: American (and British) influence on the continent, considered an obstacle to French influence, should be reduced, the American connection diminished to the level of a last resort insurance against a renewed Russian (or, in the view of some in France, German) threat. The danger here is twofold. First, the United States would probably not accept such a role and would prefer to withdraw completely (if really confronted by such a stark alternative, which would not be easily achievable in view of the weight of the United States and the quite different attitudes of most other Europeans). Second, any decisive weakening of the transatlantic bond would also weaken the Europeans, particularly if such a development did not go hand in hand with real European union. But even if European union were to occur, to weaken the transatlantic bond would be to weaken a peace structure that has not only served the participating states well in the past, but continues to function effectively and is considered a model by many outsiders. Putting this at risk would be a move that might not easily be repaired.

The conclusions to be drawn from this are obvious. When looking at (West) European security there are several uncertain risks which Europe faces. Policies to deal with them must be developed. Among those tasks which can be dealt with immediately and which in every possible case would significantly enhance Western Europe's capacity to meet any threat, there are primarily two which depend not on third parties but almost entirely on the actors themselves: the development of European Union and the maintenance of the transatlantic bond.

THE POLICIES OF THE EUROPEAN STATES

An analysis of European security problems alone is insufficient; equally important is an understanding of the aims, attitudes and policies of the European states concerned. For these attitudes will determine the approach to the problems; policies are more often the results of attitudes and objectives rather than a pure reaction to problems.

Within the European Community there are three major actors: Great Britain, France and Germany. This does not mean that the other countries are unimportant; initiatives and personalities from these countries frequently bring movement into events. But as a rule the other members tend to react to or side with one of the three main actors.

The most important actor at the moment is probably France, because France has the clearest concept of its own aims and because it has an active rather than a reactive policy.

To an outside observer, a significant, perhaps determining element of French policy towards the European Community appears to be the use of the Community as a base for the enhancement of French resources and influence. In other words, it is to give France the political and economic base which it otherwise lacks as a medium-sized nation-state, so as to be able to play a global role commensurate with its assessment of itself. This implies that within the Community itself France is to be pre-eminent, not as just any member of the Community but as France, a world power. Such an approach has a long tradition and would seem to be shared by practically all the political parties in France, but perhaps not necessarily by the population as a whole, where the readiness to be European and French (in the sense, for example, of being German and Bavarian) may be greater.

A consequence of this approach is to view the Community as being based primarily on intergovernmental cooperation, i.e. even in the long run it would maintain an inter-state character, though resting on some formal structures, regularity and a certain `tradition' or `ritual' of cooperation. In addition, it seems that France favours supranational elements in areas where Germany is strong (e.g. monetary union), where it feels a need to balance (and control) German strength by participation, and in areas where French national resources are insufficient and hence an interest in broadening the base for French activity exists (e.g. in the field of aerospace). In both intergovernmental and supranational cooperation France intends to rely--with some justification--on the quality of its diplomats, their integration into the French national system and hence readiness constantly to bear French national interests in mind even without specific orders from Paris, and on the carefully guarded French predominance in the European Commission, its administration in Brussels and in many other of the European institutions.

A further element of this approach is the aim of reduction of American influence in Europe. Rational as well as irrational factors go into this position. The United States presence in Europe--both in terms of forces and in terms of political and military structures, i.e. NATO--and the close American ties with most of the other European countries are seen as rivalling, indeed preventing the French quest for pre-eminence. In a formal sense it is argued that it is `American hegemony' in Europe that is keeping

the Europeans from safeguarding their own interests and from achieving their objective of European unity.

From the debate preceding the referendum on the Maastricht treaty in September 1992, the impression emerged that the transformation of the European Community into a real European federation (with significant loss of national sovereignty) is in fact not an aim of French policy. For Germany, on the other hand it (still) is. In view of this, Franco-German cooperation as the motor of European union is one of those fashionable phrases, often repeated, but seldom looked at more closely. It is true that Germany and France, working together, can achieve a great deal provided they have the same objective. It is untrue, however, that without Franco-German cooperation no progress can be made in the area of European integration. Clearly, this belief is favourable for France, because it thereby gains a quasi-veto, and it has a self-binding effect on German policy. Yet if other European countries moved ahead in the process of integration France and Germany could find themselves needing to participate even though the initial move was not based on Franco-German cooperation.

Turning to Britain, the situation is not much more encouraging as far as European integration is concerned. If the central element for French policy is *pre-eminence*, for Britain it is *independence*. Still to an extent isolated from the continent with a much smaller exchange of people (students and tourists, for example, which is a little surprising considering that English is the first foreign language for all the other Community members) the development of European attitudes among the population in general seems much less advanced than in the other states. In a paradoxical way this means that political leadership and the public find themselves much closer together in their attitudes than is probably the case in France. In comparison to the British public, however, British political leaders on occasion appear relatively more progressive in their attitudes towards European integration.

One of the crucial factors determining British attitudes seems to be that the United Kingdom is a centralised country without a written constitution. Supreme, indeed practically absolute power is vested in parliament, and many Britons apparently find it difficult to understand both the concepts of federalism and subsidiarity, the strict and clear limitation of power at the centre and maintenance of the core of authority at the base or periphery. In addition, British traditions favour a gradual, evolutionary development within the unwritten but strictly observed limits of established customs, rather than the idea of change through `constitutional engineering', which is so much more well-known on the Continent. The British share with most Europeans an uneasiness about giving up to some unknown extent control over their own destiny to unclear bureaucratic structures in Brussels--and they cannot be blamed for it because, while the powers of the Brussels bureaucracy *have* grown, Europe's political leaders have *not* put forward a concept of what shape this Europe is eventually to take, what powers the centre will have and how it is to be democratically controlled.

Finally, in contrast to France, there is the high value Britain attaches to the transatlantic bond, which in the British view remains vital for (Western) Europe's safety and well-being. Besides, it has worked and the costs are bearable, so why put it at risk? Of course, emotional elements come into play as well (`the English-speaking peoples of the Atlantic', the naval powers, the role as a balancer of power from outside, assumed by Britain for centuries, then passed on to the United States). Nor

should the direct national interest be neglected: in the Atlantic arena Britain has possessed a special relationship with the leading power and has drawn advantages from this.

Rather than by a single element such as pre-eminence or independence, Germany's policy toward Europe is characterised by a conglomerate of motives. It is a mixture of an idealistic vision of a federal `United States of Europe', concrete economic interests and a bad conscience about the period from 1933 to 1945 which still exists (although few of the leading politicians in Germany today were old enough to have been involved). The economic motives are clear: Germany has thus far greatly benefited from the Economic Community. Hence, there is in general a very positive attitude towards the Community and its further development. This attitude may have been hurt somewhat by the plans to create a common currency (`esperanto money', as one German politician has called it), because there is a strong attachment to the German mark, which is so to speak the logo of German success and the sound foundation on which millions of travel-happy Germans plan their vacations every year.

Although it is difficult to tell (and even more difficult to prove), positive feelings towards a united Europe may also have been hurt by anti-German statements in other European countries; these were very evident on the occasion of the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia and before the French referendum (when Maastricht was referred to as being necessary in order to `tie down' the Germans), as well as during the monetary crisis in October 1992 in Britain and Italy. If we were only dealing with historically founded concerns this would be entirely understandable, and indeed German politicians as well as the press have reacted to such concerns, even when they seemed excessive, with understanding and restraint. The potential problem is that two other factors have come in: jealousy at German economic success (and then even unification to boot!) and the attempt to use `the German past' in today's diplomacy to exert pressure on Germany or at least to weaken its position. Certainly, these factors will be less effective as a new generation of German political leaders emerges, but seen in conjunction with a renaissance of nationalism, not only in Eastern but in Western Europe as well, this may very well have the effect of strengthening nationalism in Germany too. Whatever the effect of such nationalism--which would probably be more comparable to nationalism in France today than to that of Germany after 1933 or to that of European countries before 1914--one effect would certainly be a changing attitude to European integration. But once Germany gave up its concept--however vague--of real integration in Europe and limited itself to integration only in such areas that directly and specifically benefited Germany, favouring at most intergovernmental cooperation in all other respects, the idea of European union would probably be off the agenda of European politics. It is hard to believe that any of the other countries could salvage it: Italy and the Benelux countries, equal to Germany in terms of the sincerity of their conviction about European integration, would be too weak, Spain and Portugal too new to the process, Ireland, Denmark and Greece too much on the periphery.

Of course, such a development would have extensive repercussions in Eastern Europe (where a certain disenchantment with the Community has already set in, although interest in membership remains high). The countries of Eastern Europe would not necessarily receive less financial and technical assistance from the Community, nor would their access to the Community market or even their chance of adhesion to the

Community necessarily be diminished. The Community would, however, be decisively weakened in its own role of a political model through which the more virulent nationalism and minority problems in Eastern Europe might be alleviated. In other words, the Community would be less in a position to cope with the problems while at the same time this very fact might well exacerbate the problems.

A specific difficulty of German policy in the past has been a penchant for straddling the gap between French positions on the one hand and British or American positions on the other. There are many examples of this, and Germany has been accused of not being able to make up its mind, of trying to be everybody's best friend, and hence of not being able to pursue a clear policy consistent with its own convictions. From a German point of view, however, the German position is understandable. On the one hand there is the conviction that United States involvement in Europe is essential for the maintenance of European security and stability, and often enough Germany holds positions that are closer to those of Britain or the United States than to those of France (for instance on NATO or trade liberalisation). But on the other hand there is the high emotional value which Germany attaches to its relationship with France. Franco-German reconciliation is considered one of the prime postwar achievements and in fact questioning the Franco-German relationship has become something of a taboo in the German political landscape.

Yet this straddling position has created difficulties. German policy aims have appeared unclear to some, others have felt that Germany was seeking a common policy with France at the expense of the `right' policy, and frequently none of Germany's partners has really been satisfied. But Germany's policies have had their advantages too. They have prevented an isolation of France and have perhaps contributed to bringing France a little closer to NATO again. The agreement on the Franco-German EuroCorps [now referred to as the European Corps] is regarded as a case in point.

THE ROLE AND POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES

Many European observers and policy-makers find it difficult to assess correctly the role and policy of the United States in Europe because of the specific combination of--in Robert Osgood's classical phrase--ideals and self-interest: Europeans often either tend to overestimate the idealistic elements in American policy, which usually leads them to conclude that this policy is naive, or they ignore these elements altogether, hence having on occasion to invent motives for American policies that are actually wholly or in part motivated by idealistic considerations.

United States policy towards Europe since the end of World War II has been characterised by remarkable continuity. In fact, despite European speculation after every election of a new American President, there has not been a single significant change in this policy in almost five decades. Obviously, this does not mean that such a change might not occur in the future. It does imply, however, that the policy rests on a very firm base and that, if it did change, this would hardly occur on flimsy grounds, but rather as a result of a basic reassessment strongly, perhaps decisively, influenced by European attitudes and actions.

Four major factors have determined the American role and policy in Europe. First, after two late and costly involvements in European conflicts in 1917 and 1941 (and the neo-isolationist withdrawal from Europe in 1919), there was the decision to remain involved and to assist in ensuring stability and the avoidance of yet another conflict. Considering the cost of earlier American involvement in the two world wars this was self-interest, but it also contained idealistic elements and certainly represented a turning away from the 1919 position and any idea of a `fortress America' weathering future storms alone.

Second, there was the growing rivalry with the Soviet Union and American acceptance of the role of the `balancer of power' in Europe. Britain had played this role up to 1914, but (symbolically, if you will) the torch was passed to the United States in 1947, when Britain found itself no longer able to cope with the conflict in Greece and asked the United States to step in. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan in 1947 and then the creation of NATO in 1949 were the visible instruments of the new American role.

The third factor is closely related to this, namely the decision to stabilise the West European democracies politically and economically and to commit American forces to their protection. Again, ideals and self-interest were both present. There was the ideal of helping democracy (with a long tradition among American intellectuals, visible in 1823 in Greece, 1848 in Hungary and in Woodrow Wilson's `14 Points' in 1917), but there was clearly also the interest of `beefing up' Western defences against an expansionist Soviet Union. The conflict was about Europe and at its centre about Germany, which was both the booty and the battleground. Both sides felt that they could not allow the other to gain complete control, because losing Germany could mean losing Europe, and losing Europe would mean losing the conflict.

The division of Germany and of Europe was the inevitable result. The extent and format of American involvement were, however, neither clear nor predetermined. What was clear was the American decision to be involved; the extent (large-scale and long-term presence of American troops) and format (peace time NATO integration) were developed in response to the conflict and in response to European (initially particularly French but later also German) wishes. As the avoidance of war through deterrence became the credo for a Europe for which any extensive war would mean mass destruction, a significant and visible American presence including nuclear weapons and quasi-automatic involvement through peace time integration became essential.

The defence of Western Europe and the maintenance of security in Europe became practically an exclusive Atlantic domain when the European Defence Community was rejected by the French National Assembly in 1954. From this moment onward security issues were dealt with on a transatlantic level, while the advocates of West European integration decided to try a more functional approach and--successfully-- concentrated on European economic integration. Thus, while in the security arena the accent was on dependence and cooperation with the United States, in the economic domain Western Europe increasingly became a rival to the United States. In the period of the Cold War this economic rivalry was held in check to some extent by interdependence in the security field: European dependence on American protection and American dependence on the Alliance, i.e. American interest in keeping the Western Alliance intact as a factor in its relationship with the Soviet Union. Shortly after the end of the Cold War, however, it became evident that both Americans and Europeans were less ready to restrain themselves, in the interests of transatlantic cohesion, in the economic realm. The implication of this is that anybody interested in weakening this cohesion may use economic rivalry as an instrument, and anyone interested in maintaining the relationship will have to pay more attention than hitherto to its economic aspects.

American policy has--and this is the fourth characteristic element of that policy--since the end of the Second World War supported West European integration. Indeed, one of the provisions of the Marshall Plan was that the Europeans coordinate their economies (which initially led to the founding of the OEEC), and despite later economic problems (e.g. the `Chicken War') basic American support for European integration continued to be provided. American motives were fourfold. First, close political and economic cooperation, preferably integration (indeed, preferably union) would help to overcome old national rivalries--at least in Western Europe--which had twice led to war and the need for American military intervention. Second, this would enhance stability, make Western Europe a reliable partner for the United States and a strong ally vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Third, there was the--correct--belief that economies of scale would make Western Europe a better economic partner which would benefit both sides despite the inevitable rivalries. Finally, a strong Western Europe was also seen as a potential global partner, ready to bear a share of the burden of maintaining peace and stability, not only in Europe but also worldwide. This does not mean that there was no ambivalence at all in American attitudes and policies (most noticeably during the time of Henry Kissinger). The United States was aware that it was encouraging an economic rival, and it occasionly used European dependence in the security field to gain points in the economic arena. But on the whole support for European union prevailed: the political objective seemed worth the

disadvantages. In summary, the United States wanted to prevent further Soviet expansion in Europe, it wanted to create strong allies who would be resistant to Soviet moves and who would bear most of the burden in Europe and part of it worldwide and, finally, the United States wanted to build up a strong and (mutually) beneficial economic partnership.

Obviously, all of this also led to the establishment of an American sphere of influence and pre-eminence in Europe. It was a natural result of American strength and European dependence, and the stronger American involvement was, specifically with regard to defence and the nuclear commitment, the more the United States wanted to ensure that it had a strong, even a decisive voice.

But this was influence, not dominance--certainly not dominance in the sense that the United States could simply dictate and the Europeans had to follow. There were conflicts in the past--on economic as well as on political and military issues--and as a rule compromises were found, sometimes more to the liking of the Americans, sometimes more to that of the Europeans. There is, however, no case in which the Europeans were forced to follow American policy contrary to their own convictions on issues which were central to European interests (or national interests of the Europeans). While there is some cultural anti-Americanism in all European countries, the complaint about American dominance or even hegemony has been primarily a French complaint which France has tried to `Europeanise'. Although all other European states have had occasion to be dissatisfied with American policy (and some members of NATO's integrated command structure, for example, have complained about disproportionate American influence), none of these states has ever widened and generalised this to imply an overall hegemony. All states pursue what they consider to be their national interests and all states exert their powers of persuasion as well as the influence and pressure they have at their disposal to bring other states to adopt the same or similar policies. France does this, Britain does this, and so do others. In the case of the United States, however (and of Germany, it might be added; see the question of recognition of Slovenia and Croatia), lamenting about hegemony, dominance and `strong-arming' seems to be considered a useful additional diplomatic tool. But it is no more than that: a diplomatic instrument that should not be confused with reality.

Putting American influence in Europe into proper perspective (here only in terms of magnitude, not content; if the latter were taken into consideration it would be difficult to deny that American influence in Europe since World War II has, on the whole, been beneficial for Europe) does not imply, of course, that Europeans should not acquire a bigger (i.e. a more effective) voice in the transatlantic relationship. But two points need to be made on this. First, it is not a desperate necessity in the sense of throwing off an unbearably oppressive burden, and second, such an enhanced European role depends primarily on the Europeans themselves. Lamenting about American hegemony alone--particularly when unjustified--is not sufficient to ensure a more effective voice. Such a `bigger voice', a voice that will be heard and respected, depends on two factors only: the persuasiveness of the positions taken and the unity of the Europeans. These are both important, although they are by no means the same. Convincing arguments can carry weight even where there is little power to back them up--and often enough Europeans have thus successfully upheld their positions. More weight through unity is something which presumably goes beyond this, with the

creation of a capability to exert a measure of influence that ensures the maintenance of specifically European interests regardless of how convincing they seem to other partners. At the very least it is assumed that more weight through unity will make the American partner listen more attentively and pay greater heed to specific European interests.

Speaking with one voice requires unity on a fairly regular basis and also on difficult and controversial issues. The intergovernmental procedure for a Common Foreign and Security Policy foreseen in the Maastricht treaty has three important drawbacks in this respect. First of all, there is no assurance that a common policy will actually come about, particularly on controversial issues (so to some extent it is a fair-weather procedure), secondly, the United States will regard it as normal diplomatic procedure to play on European differences and to try and influence the decision-making process whenever the results can be expected to have an effect on American interests, and thirdly, the common positions arrived at after difficult intra-European negotiations are likely to be highly inflexible and hence not very suitable for further negotiation with the United States (e.g. in the framework of NATO or GATT; it is for this reason that the United States has shown some scepticism about WEU meetings to develop common European positions before NATO meetings). Two things may be said about the latter drawback. On the one hand, if common European positions, accompanied by relative inflexibility, were the result of real and significant European unity, this would be a price that Europeans and probably even Americans would be willing to pay. On the other hand, `real and significant European unity' would mean that either other than traditional intergovernmental procedures for arriving at common positions had been developed, or that the intergovernmental process was so strongly based on a developing common political culture, and hence common attitudes, that the procedure would have taken on more the character of intra-cabinet discussions rather than intergovernmental negotiations (a less likely, but not impossible development). In either case, the common European positions would then be less inflexible than one might have feared.

A great deal has been written about the American role in Europe: the United States as a necessary participant to assure the balance of power vis-à-vis Russia, the United States as pacifier in intra-European relations, easing relations between bigger and smaller states or between the bigger states themselves, deriving from these two functions the United States as a stabiliser of the European security order, but, finally, also as a `last resort' ally à la 1917 or 1941. As the Soviet threat has receded the function of the United States as a balancing element *vis-à-vis* Russia is looked upon as declining in importance and, indeed, at least some Europeans have shown themselves prepared to let it decline to the level of last resort ally. The functions of pacifier and contributor to overall stability, on the other hand, tend to be neglected, the former because it is both difficult to ascertain precisely and hardly flattering to the Europeans, the latter because it, too, is difficult to define precisely, but in addition, whatever the American role may be, it is considered that it is well taken care of in the framework of the CSCE.

What, then, should be the future role of the United States in Europe? There are various possibilities. The first would be no special role at all, i.e. a reduction and gradual elimination of the role of the United States as a `European power'. This is an

extreme position, and the only advocates for this are to be found on the fringes of the political spectrum on both sides of the Atlantic.

But not too far from this is the position that the United States should take on a significantly reduced role, and there is support for this both in the United States and in Europe, particularly in some circles in France. According to this concept NATO would be reduced to a classical alliance with political commitments but without any substance to bolster these. The United States would be a last resort ally to be called in only when European stability is disrupted to such an extent that the Europeans can no longer deal with the situation by themselves. This does not mean that the United States would not continue to be an actor in Europe; it would, for example, together with Canada, continue to participate in the CSCE. But the United States would act in traditional international relations terms without the type of involvement of the past forty years, i.e. without the power base furnished by NATO and the acceptance by the Europeans of the United States as a European power, a power which the Europeans themselves have granted an important role in European affairs.

Assuming that an unchanged role as opposed to no role is not being considered either in the United States or in Europe, and is thus unlikely, the alternative to the last resort ally is a continuing but changed role, probably at a reduced level. The obvious question is what exactly this level would be. It is not easily defined, but it would have to be something that could be called significant, for anything below that would most probably dwindle to a minimal `last resort' and then perhaps to `no role'.

In broad terms the reasons for maintaining a *significant* American role are threefold. First, many of the old functions persist: the American contribution to stability in Europe remains significant, its pacifier function (which is also a stabilising factor) may become even more important as Western and Eastern Europe move closer together, and risks for European security remain, both with regard to the uncertainties in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and with regard to risks from outside Europe. In confronting global problems, close cooperation with the United States (which does not mean following American leadership blindly) is likely to be beneficial to European interests.

Second, the European Community may become a political union and an important military power, but at the moment it is neither. In these circumstances it would seem wise to avoid the risk of not having the Americans present when they are needed. For--and this would be the third reason for upholding an American presence--it is improbable that the United States would accept the role of last resort ally, in which its help was requested whenever the Europeans could no longer help themselves. It is precisely this role which the United States rejected in the late 1940s and early 1950s. `Help' is not a service which the United States will readily offer whenever the Europeans call for it, but otherwise keep away from European affairs. The Europeans cannot have it both ways. Help and involvement go hand in hand and in fact most Europeans understand this, particularly since American involvement has not been an unbearable burden in the past and would become even less so if and when the Europeans united. If, however, they do not come together they will need the United States to an even greater extent.

If the large majority of Europeans remain convinced that a continuing political involvement and military presence of the United States in Europe are in the interests of Europe, it becomes crucial to determine how such involvement can be maintained in future. There is a tendency in Europe to take the American presence for granted, to assume that the Americans will stay as long as the Europeans will have them. However, American presence depends on the American assessment of American interests--and on how the American public views these. As in Europe, there is in the United States a widespread perception that with the disappearance of the Soviet threat the American task has been accomplished and that it is now time correspondingly to eliminate the costly and burdensome American military and even political involvement. Many Americans are willing to go along with a European desire to establish a European defence, regardless of whether such a defence actually exists or is even likely to come about within the foreseeable future.

For those Americans and Europeans convinced of the need to maintain American involvement the task of convincing Europeans *and* Americans of this need looms large. The reform of NATO or the redefinition of the American role in Europe should thus not concentrate merely on the reduction of the American role and an enhancement of the European position, but equally on the definition of a *continuing* and significant American political and military involvement in Europe, a definition which is sufficient to justify the American role to both the European and the American public. This would require a reaffirmation of American interests in Europe, a confirmation of European interest in the American role, agreement on the format of this role and, finally, public support for this role on both sides of the Atlantic.

What are the American interests in Europe? First and foremost is the interest in stability, i.e. the interest in maintaining an orderly, predictable and preferably peaceful set of relations between the European states, including a balance of power, to ensure that no single state could upset this order. Obviously, this is the interest of a great power, for orderly relations of such a nature as a rule favour the great power and its exercise of influence. But the fact that this is an American interest does not mean that it is not also a European interest. Closely connected with this, but less important, are American economic interests in Europe. Here, too, stability and free trade policies favour the United States as an economic power, but both of these elements are also in the interests of the Europeans.

A third American interest is the position of the United States in Europe as a contributing factor to American world power. This encompasses influence but also allies; American power is enhanced by the fact that most of the democracies and economically important countries in Europe are closely associated with the United States. Even for a great power it is useful to have allies, particularly allies that are politically stable, share the same fundamental values and are organised within a functioning and politically active alliance system. In the past the United States has exercised a leadership role within this system, generally to the benefit of its allies, even if there was not always agreement on every aspect or in every case. Whether this system, in which the Unites States has the strongest influence, has to be changed, and in what manner, is the subject of a continuing debate.

Compared to this, the advantages the United States derives from being able to use American bases in Europe as staging areas for military intervention seem less

important. Advantages do exist, and they may serve (though more in the United States than in Europe) as an argument for maintaining an American presence in Europe, but compared to the other interests they are minor.

From the American standpoint the maintenance of extensive United States involvement has, in general terms, three prerequisites: first, a significant degree of influence, particularly where risks are involved (e.g. in the military and specifically the nuclear field, where it is unlikely that the United States would be willing to accept the role of last resort ally), second, concrete advantages (e.g. in the economic domain, where it is unlikely that the United States would be willing to contribute in political and military terms while being at a disadvantage economically), and third, constructive European participation.

Constructive participation means that the Europeans must `get their own act together'. This implies primarily three things: a functioning European Community, a capability to contribute decisively to the resolution of specifically European problems (e.g. extension of the EC, assistance to Eastern Europe, control of the migration problem) and real contributions to global issues, be they in the area of trade, development aid, environmental issues or threats to global peace. A `functioning European Community' does not necessarily imply real political union; it does mean, however, more than a fair-weather institution, a collection of nation-states with procedures of intergovernmental negotiation, coordination and cooperation that function only when there are immediate economic benefits to all; more, also, than a bureaucracy without direct democratic control.

Furthermore, a functioning Community is expected to be a constructive partner rather than a defensive `fortress Europe', a Community which has vision, which can take on responsibility and which can take the initiative when necessary. While today this applies to some member states, in some areas, at some times, none of it applies to the Community as a whole in situations where the combined weight of all the members of the Community is called for. Taking on responsibility, however, does *not* in the first instance mean a joint European capability to deploy military forces globally for peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions. It has become something of a custom in Europe today to think of `responsibility' in these terms, but not all problems in the world are also European (or American) problems or require military means for their resolution. Responsibility may imply military force, but these are the rare cases. Considerably more demanding, in intellectual terms, is responsibility in contributing to the control and resolution of problems such as over-population, poverty, environmental issues (where Europeans and Americans bear a prime responsibility) and providing political stability. Intellectual, economic and human resources required here are of a magnitude which ultimately only the Europeans and Americans (and Japanese) together can muster (and, it may be added, some of the problems which today seem to require military intervention would not exist, or would certainly be less intractable, if there had not first been an extensive export of arms into the respective areas).

Finally, such European-American cooperation will function consistently only if the sometimes hidden, but more often open anti-Americanism is overcome rather rapidly. This anti-Americanism has many components: European romanticism and anti-modernism, the difficulties of having to be grateful for American help, American

influence in Europe, but mainly jealousy of the American role of leadership, a role which the Europeans have not been able to take on for themselves.

If the European nations can get their own act together, if they show themselves willing and capable of contributing to the solution of the world's (and Europe's) major problems, and if they can meet the Americans on a basis appropriate to their own contribution (which ideally would be equality) European-American cooperation should pose no insurmountable problems.

THE INSTITUTIONS

There is no lack of institutions concerned with European security: NATO, EC, WEU, CSCE, and even the UN. The first four are exclusively concerned with European security, while the United Nations is deeply involved in the most prominent current European security issue, in the former Yugoslavia.

Since the end of the Cold War the United Nations, no longer hampered by the East-West conflict, has gained a more prominent role. The Iraq war, the war in the former Yugoslavia and the crisis in Somalia have shown that where there is agreement between the major powers it is an instrument that can be used. This was true even before the end of the Cold War for peacekeeping missions, where there has been extensive UN activity. It now seems conceivable that it will also be used more extensively for peace enforcement activities. However, the effectiveness of this instrument should not be over-estimated. All actions will continue to rest on agreement between at least the major powers. Even after the end of the East-West conflict this is not something that can be taken for granted. Certainly, no European state would want to be forced to rely primarily or solely on the UN for the maintenance of its security. The UN is an instrument that can be and should be used where appropriate and possible, but it is not the primary instrument for ensuring West European security, nor perhaps even overall European stability.

A similar judgement can be made about the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It has performed an enormously important function in bringing the Cold War to an end, and it continues to perform important tasks: in providing a forum for the newly independent East European states, in offering Russia an active part in European security matters and ensuring that Russia is not isolated and, finally, in providing a framework for the gradual growth of understanding between European states leading, hopefully, towards a larger security community.

But since the Yugoslav crisis the CSCE has lost much of its prestige; indeed, it is not altogether unthinkable that it may have served its purpose, Helsinki 1992 basically concluding successfully what was started in Helsinki twenty years earlier. Of course such an early demise is not inevitable. With its `consensus minus one' ruling and its first moves towards institutionalisation, one perspective at least has been opened. Yet at the moment the available structures offer fewer possibilities than those of the United Nations, while at the same time the increase in the number of countries in CSCE to more than 50 introduces many of the drawbacks the UN already has.

This leaves NATO, the European Community and Western European Union.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is an amazingly effective organisation that not only ensured a European-Atlantic defence capability during the Cold War (including such complex issues as extended deterrence), but proved itself--as early as the London Conference in June 1990--capable of rapidly adjusting to changing circumstances. It showed itself ready to cooperate when the Soviet Union began to change, it quickly provided a structure for cooperation through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as first the Warsaw Pact and then the Soviet Union broke apart, and it speedily began to change both its military strategy and structures to

adapt to new potential challenges. Finally, the Alliance is showing itself prepared to act `out of area' when called upon by the United Nations. By any standards this has been an impressive performance, from 1949 to 1989 as well as thereafter.

Of course, NATO has significant advantages for the performance of these tasks. It includes all the states which are essential for the maintenance of West European security, there is a clear, specific common interest and an extensive, functioning organisation which provides for political coordination (on a daily basis) as well as an integrated military structure including command and control, functioning headquarters, common procedures, and armed forces that have worked together for a long period, know each other and have repeatedly practised joint action. In this respect there is no organisation that can compete with NATO and, indeed, the most extensive and effective *European* defence cooperation at present takes place within NATO. Finally, all West Europeans, with the possible exception of France, are on the whole satisfied with the Alliance and all East Europeans would like to join.

What, then, are the disadvantages or shortcomings of the Alliance? There are three. The first is the non-participation of France in NATO's integrated military command structure since 1966, although France continues to be a member of the Alliance. In itself this is not particularly serious. A certain degree of coordination between France and NATO is possible and has in fact taken place throughout the past decades. The more critical problem has been France's basically anti-NATO policy, which aims at reducing the Alliance to, at best, a classical treaty of assistance, significantly diminishing American military involvement in Europe. This policy has been pursued persistently in the past and, although so far France has found no allies in this respect, it is disruptive.

Towards the end of 1992 there were indications that the then French defence minister Pierre Joxe was willing to make some moves to bring France closer to NATO, announcing in September that France would consider returning to the Defence Planning and Military Committees. This position has been maintained by his successor, François Léotard. Perhaps even more important, there was the agreement on the EuroCorps between France, Germany and SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) in December, in which France accepted that the EuroCorps could be deployed under NATO command for defence according to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as well as for peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations and humanitarian actions in support of collective security institutions. However, planning for such activities is to be undertaken on a case by case basis, and in all cases, including NATO employment under Article 5, France reserves the right of decision on whether or not the EuroCorps is to be used (while the obligations of German forces assigned to NATO remain unchanged).

It is difficult to assess at this stage what these moves mean and how much agreement there is on them across the political spectrum in France. They may indicate a changing, or at least a more relaxed attitude, but there are also indications that France may in fact be aiming at a revision of NATO which would limit the Defence Planning and Military Committees to the traditional function of defence according to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, while all other decisions would be taken in the North Atlantic Council, where France is a full participant.

The second issue is the question of American pre-eminence. This has rested on superior power, but is not reflected in the NATO political structure. It *is* reflected in the military structure. changing the first, the political aspect, depends--as has been outlined earlier--on the Europeans themselves: on the unity, the weight and the intellectual input they themselves can produce. It is not a question of changing the treaty: influence is not set down in treaty clauses, and can thus not be negotiated.

By contrast military command structures *can* be renegotiated and changed to give Europeans more influence. If this is deemed necessary it should be done on the basis of a study and allow for flexible solutions rather than concentrating solely on an American holding the post of SACEUR. Whether it is wise to replace the American SACEUR by a European commander on a rotating basis would have to be studied. There may be advantages, but there are also disadvantages, in particular with regard to American public support for United States military involvement in Europe.

The third possible drawback is that the Europeans are limited in their capacity to act militarily by themselves, as Europeans and outside the NATO framework. But one should be precise about this. Strictly speaking it applies only to Germany; all other NATO members have national command structures and can employ their forces by national decision. By contrast, Germany has structural (which it is working to overcome), constitutional and political difficulties. But the real problem from a European point of view is that the Europeans as a group so far have no adequate structure for coordinating specifically European efforts outside NATO, although they are beginning to set one up within the framework of WEU.

In what circumstances would the need for such coordination arise? The much-quoted phrase that Europe needs this capability for such instances where NATO is either unwilling or unable to act is at least partially misleading, for there is in fact no conceivable instance where NATO could not act but the Europeans could. NATO capabilities are by definition superior to those of the Europeans alone, and this will remain so even if and when the Europeans develop their own capabilities. So it comes down to cases where NATO *will not* act: either because the United States is against such action or because it is not against such action but prefers to let the Europeans act without American participation. Again, the first case is difficult to envisage, because it would create an undesirable situation from a European standpoint (and hence would be controversial in European councils, thus making the probability of European consensus even less likely), and also because in present circumstances the Europeans do not have the capability of significant joint action without the structures and procedures of NATO.

Thus the most likely case would be one in which there was agreement on the action by all, but for some--most probably political--reason it would be preferable for the action to be European, i.e. without American participation. There would, however, probably be American political support, and possibly also logistical (e.g. transport) or other (e.g. intelligence) support. In any case the Europeans would be able to use NATO facilities. (Yet another possibility would lie somewhere in between, i.e. the United States would not be in favour of such action, but would not veto it. In this case there would be no American support, but possibly the United States would have to accept the use of some NATO facilities by the Europeans).

The build-up of a European capacity to act alone could thus be motivated by the following four cases: when the United States is generally supportive but chooses not to participate, when the United States is disinterested, when the United States is against such action or, finally, in the event of an American withdrawal from Europe altogether.

This is where Western European Union comes in. Using it as an instrument for the creation of such a capability makes sense in two circumstances: first, if any or all of the above cases are considered probable and hence a real need for such a capability exists and, second, if a real European Union comes about which will then also demand an independent and certainly a jointly organised defence capability. While the first circumstance does not seem to be immediately pressing with regard to at least some of the four cases given above, there is general agreement on the part of the Europeans and the United States that it might be useful to prepare at least for such cases where action is required but, for whatever reasons, it is believed that it should be taken under European responsibility alone. As to the second circumstance, European Union, this does seem somewhat premature--and the Maastricht agreement on it is correspondingly vague and non-committal--but it may nevertheless be useful to be prepared for a European collective military capability if and when union comes about. Since military capability is not something that can be set up overnight, and a joint capability requires procedures, structures and regular practice, early preparation makes sense.

Even the problem of coming to a joint decision (i.e. the decision to send soldiers into action on a European level) can, at least theoretically, be overcome. Normally (and eventually in a European Union) such decisions are taken by governments, responsible to the electorates, and within clear and transparent political structures. This seems a long way off for a European Union, but such decisions could also be taken on an intergovernmental basis, as is presently foreseen in WEU. That means, however, that whenever there is disagreement joint action cannot be taken (at least not by all members as a unit, although a system of abstentions and non-participation would be possible). In principle this is no different from NATO except that in the past NATO has had a very limited defensive task and there has been consensus on it. In a European environment this may become more difficult, but it is conceivable that as the Community grows together in other areas it will become easier.

Thus, whatever arguments may be put forward against this procedure there are also arguments in favour of it. In fact, there is only one problem (or perhaps two, depending on how ambitious the concept pursued is). The key problem is French NATO policy. It originally seemed that France would like to limit the Alliance to defence under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, thus significantly reducing its role in the changed circumstances that characterise the situation in Europe since the end of the Cold War. This position changed at the Oslo and Brussels ministerial meetings of the North Atlantic Council when France, along with the 15 other members of the Alliance, accepted NATO's role in peacekeeping. There is none the less concern by some that one of the motives for bolstering WEU would be to weaken NATO and the American position in Europe (which France would then strive to replace by French leadership, some observers would add). This fear has influenced some other countries attached to the development of WEU and it seems that it would be a task of French diplomacy to disprove such concerns. Without this problem, WEU could easily be

fitted into the overall NATO military framework: this would strengthen NATO, it would provide a European alternative, it would enhance the European voice and it would quasi-automatically develop into `European armed forces' as European union came about.

This, possibly, is where a second problem lies. So long as European Union in the real sense of the word does not come about the usefulness of WEU will remain limited, i.e. it will remain an intergovernmental structure with forces that can only be used when there is consensus (or agreement with abstentions). Unless NATO action was taken (which also requires consensus) the participating states would have to resort to national means. This may be an acceptable position for France, which relies primarily on national means anyway and could use WEU to augment its own resources by those of its European allies wherever possible, regarding the Atlantic Alliance only as a last resort against a major threat. For Germany, which does not have the same type of national military independence and, of course, is not a nuclear power, this is not a very good alternative to NATO, and, in fact, all other Europeans continue to see in the Atlantic Alliance the primary instrument for ensuring their security. This would still be true even if a real European Union were developed. Even then the Alliance would make sense, although it would then be an alliance between two major partners (and possibly some others). But European union is the prerequisite. Europeans will demand in vain to be treated as one as long as they are twelve, they will demand in vain to be treated as a major power as long as they are a dozen medium-sized and small powers. They will not be treated as an equal until they *are* equal.

A great deal thus depends upon whether European Union comes about or not. If not, most European states will want to continue to rely first and foremost on NATO, which includes significant American participation, using other institutions and instruments such as WEU, CSCE or the UN only where and whenever they are useful.

CONCLUSIONS

European security cannot be maintained unless domestic stability is assured in the Western democracies. Domestic stability will not be assured unless these democracies succeed in dealing with the problems confronting them. None of these problems is purely national. Dealing with each one of them will thus require both national action and international cooperation. Among the most important are the crisis of the political party system, budgetary imbalance, mass migration and environmental damage, but issues such as international trade relations and the security of nuclear power plants, as well as overpopulation and starvation in the Third World, have domestic effects in all of the democracies.

Assuming that these issues are dealt with, there are four areas which have a determining effect on European security. The first two, the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community/Union, will determine the capability of the democracies to deal with security problems; the other two, Eastern Europe and the string of countries from Morocco to Afghanistan, pose some of the problems to be resolved.

NATO must remain the central element of West European security. It has proven itself capable and adaptable. A concept for the reform of NATO after the end of the Cold War has been developed and is being carried through. Anybody calling for an additional reform should be precise about what is meant. Rather than further reform, what seems necessary at the moment is clarity about the purposes of the Alliance and the American and European roles in it. That implies three elements: first, that the importance of significant American involvement must be reaffirmed; second, that the European role depends on the *European* input as opposed to the input of fourteen individual European member states; and thirdly, that a widening of the functions of the Alliance (cooperation with Eastern Europe, out-of-area activities) requires an understanding of the political and economic implications; that is to say, it will no longer be possible to look at the Alliance only in strictly military terms. Moreover, if the Alliance extends its functions it will be necessary to make sure, first, that its core task of military protection of its members is not neglected and, second, that there is consensus among Western publics on these functions. The Alliance was created to safeguard against a Soviet attack. This function enjoyed extensive support among the population of the member states. It cannot be assumed that this support will automatically be extended to new functions of the Alliance. Such new functions will have to be determined and explained, for without the support of the peoples of the Alliance they have no foundation.

If the European input to NATO is to be increased and indeed if European room for independent action is to be extended and the European role is to be enhanced, the European Community will have to be developed into something that comes much closer to a union than is at present foreseen. It may sometimes seem to be wise policy to move without stating your aim clearly, to take each step at its own value without being certain about where the road you are on is leading. But this policy is really only wise if in fact you *do* know where you are going. As far as the process of European integration is concerned, this does not seem to be the case today. National governments pursuing national interests may feel that they are aware of the direction and the implications of each step, but as far as European integration is concerned we

seem to be moving rather aimlessly, taking each step individually and hoping that in the end we will be somewhere near our target. That, however, is uncertain. It is uncertain--and perhaps unlikely--because of the contradictory national policies being pursued under European cover, and it is risky because, at best, there is hope only that many individual and contradictory policies will somehow all come together in the end.

The Community has thus reached a decision point. The functional approach, pursued since the collapse of the European Defence Community in 1954, in which only certain sectors are integrated in varying degrees (in the end somehow forming an integrated whole), has served its purpose. It is no longer feasible. The Maastricht treaty marks not the beginning of a new era but rather the end of the old one. What is required now is a `great debate' on what we have achieved and where we are going. The peoples of Europe must come to terms with the road on which they have started: they must know where it is leading and why they are on it. And they will have to decide whether they want to continue on this road. To make this decision the alternatives and the consequences, one way or the other, will have to be put forward and discussed.

It is possible for the Community to take a big step forward. For this a new treaty is required. In it all the powers and functions of the European Commission in Brussels should be precisely defined. Everything that is not explicitly defined must remain within the exclusive authority of the member states. This would clarify one of the major concerns of the Europeans.

In a second section the treaty would foresee areas in which the members of the Community would commit themselves to intergovernmental cooperation. That is, while maintaining ultimate national authority in these areas they would commit themselves to consultation and negotiation with the aim of achieving a common Community policy.

Subject to formal agreement and ratification procedures in national parliaments these `segments of authority' could be changed, i.e. elements could be transferred from the intergovernmental level to the Commission level (or the other way round) and elements from the (by far the largest) national level to either of the other two (or the other way round). Depending on the levels concerned, one could choose that unanimity be required or, for example, a three-quarters majority. To reassure the states, unanimity could be required when transferring national authority to either the intergovernmental or the Commission level, while for the reverse procedure a three-quarters majority (or even less) could be sufficient.

It is important not to make the mistake of regarding the Commission as the `highest' level, superior to the others. This would not be the case. The Commission would be much more of a `service institution' performing those tasks which the member states, from which the Commission derives its authority, attribute to it.

One could very well say that, apart from the question of clarity, that is hardly any different from the existing situation. However, there would be two decisive advantages. First, for the European peoples there would be transparency and reassurance. Second, once such clarity had been achieved, the Commission could be transformed into a `real government', formed from within the European Parliament by

normal parliamentary party procedures, elected by the Parliament and fully responsible to the Parliament. The crucial difference between it and a `normal' government would be that the Commission would have limited and carefully circumscribed powers derived only from the national member states. The gain would be that the Commission and all its powers would then be democratically controlled by a directly elected Parliament. A possible additional advantage would be that the member states could gradually extend the authority of the Commission, allowing it naturally to grow into something like a `European government'; this would not be an inevitable development, however.

The decisions on foreign and security policy would initially remain, as at present, on the intergovernmental level. The available instruments--NATO and WEU--would be the same. However, should the Community develop towards more common decision-making, it would be possible gradually to transfer components of foreign and security policy to the Commission, giving the European security (and, perhaps later, defence) component that type of political structure which would ensure a decision-making process adequate to the task.

A solid Atlantic Alliance and a revitalised Europe would be a sound basis for dealing with the other problems. Top priority must go to Eastern Europe, where economic growth is a prerequisite to the stabilisation of the new democracies, and the assurance of democracy is one of the bases of West European security and stability in all of Europe. Tying in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the continuation of the disarmament process form essential parts of this process. All of them are easier to arrive at if the Western democracies can move from a solid basis. A neglected problem is the safety of nuclear power plants all over Eastern Europe, which is not a security problem in the narrower sense, but a crucial problem none the less.

As to potential security problems outside Europe, the non-proliferation of conventional weapons should rank high on the list. Three Western democracies--France, Great Britain and the United States--are today among the five major arms exporters worldwide (Germany is a distant sixth as far as exports to developing countries are concerned). It is only a question of time before public opinion in Western countries begins to resent the fact that Western soldiers have to be sent to fight aggressors that have previously been armed by Western arms manufacturers.

The time available for dealing with these problems is not unlimited; nor, as the crises in Western democracies seem to indicate, is the patience of the people. Political leadership is needed to define the problems and to offer solutions.

1. The following analysis reflects the author's strictly personal views. It was written during a period spent by the author, as a Visiting Fellow, at the Institute for Security Studies of WEU.

2. The relationship of this risk to other, specifically non-military factors is obvious. Any risk coming from Russia is likely to be reduced by economic development and democratic stabilisation. But, while they very significantly contribute to security, the elements of these policies (economic aid, transfer of know-how, diplomacy and so forth) do not traditionally fall into the realm of what is termed security policy.