Chaillot Papers

- 5 -

November 1992

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AFTER THE COLD WAR

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November 1992

ISSN 1017-7566

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

Since 1945, the existence of nuclear weapons has profoundly modified our thinking on strategic issues. Nowhere was that more true than in the Europe of the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War and the important progress made in the process of European integration, the roles of nuclear weapons and more generally deterrence in Europe need a new examination. Such an examination will require some analysis of the role of nuclear weapons in an eventual common defence policy for Europe.

In this *Chaillot Paper* Roberto Zadra, who joined the Institute as a research fellow from the Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, in July 1991, makes an opening contribution to this new debate. The Institute hopes that it will stimulate a wider discussion of these important issues.

John Roper
Paris, November 1992

European integration

and nuclear deterrence after the Cold War

Roberto Zadra

`It's the danger of Communist aggression ...

That's the very thing we're trying to keep from happening'

US President Harry S. Truman, 1952.

`As long as imperialism exists the threat of aggressive

wars will remain. The CPSU is doing everything to

ensure that the Soviet Armed Forces ... are prepared

at any moment to administer a crushing rebuff

to imperialist aggressors.'

Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1962.

INTRODUCTION

The present is not an easy time for those working in the field of foreign and security policy. If anyone thought that 1989 and 1990 - two years which saw the collapse of communist regimes, the liberation process in Eastern Europe and German unification - were the two most remarkable and challenging years in the history of East-West relations since the Second World War, their views must surely have changed again in 1991. After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON in 1991, an event occurred which not even the most optimistic analyst of international relations would have ever imagined: the collapse of the Soviet Union. The most important event in the history of East-West relations since 1917, it confirmed the end of an ideological bipolarity based on political, military, economic and social competition between communism and capitalism.

What does all this mean for the future of European security? Some argue that, despite the historic importance of recent events, caution is still required as a guideline for Western policy: apart from a legitimate concern regarding emergent nationalism and the risks of nuclear proliferation, it also remains unclear how far the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, still dominated, at least geographically, by Russia, will be willing and able to reform their internal and external relations to a satisfactory degree in order not to put in jeopardy what has been achieved so far. On the other hand, there is a widely held opinion which suggests that the time has come to go beyond the traditional scepticism and caution. According to this view, the West today has a rare - and possibly unique - opportunity to influence the future course of East-West history and, in order to achieve this, a Western policy of cooperation and assistance, which should include large-scale economic and humanitarian aid, is the only way to avoid the new Eastern nations once more undergoing economic and political collapse.(1)

This paper starts from the assumption that a new, credible, coherent and comprehensive Western strategic concept has not yet emerged. This is certainly the case for the *Atlantic Alliance*. In fact, the `New Strategic Concept' agreed on the occasion of the Alliance's Rome summit in November 1991 is already dated in the sense that it has been overtaken in many ways, particularly by the collapse of the Soviet Union and by recent developments in the newly created independent republics. Furthermore, even if it starts from the comprehensive premise that `security and stability have political, economic, social, and environmental elements as well as the indispensable defence dimension',(2) the new concept does not say much on how to attain this, since the Atlantic Alliance has not traditionally used non-military means to establish European security and stability. For the time being, although major changes in *force posture* have already been initiated, as a *declared policy* NATO's strategic concept remains characterised more by traditional ideas than by new thinking. This is particularly evident in the passages of the Rome document dealing with the future role of nuclear weapons: `To protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe and kept up to date where necessary, although at a significantly reduced level ... Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of any aggression incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve the peace.'(3)

However, the need to define a new strategy is important not only for the West in general and for the Atlantic Alliance: it has become even more important and urgent both for the countries committed to creating a *European Union* and for the *Western European Union* in particular. In signing the Treaty on European Union at the Maastricht summit of February 1992 - which includes in particular article J.4 on a Common Foreign and Security Policy which `shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence'[4] - the countries committed to creating a European Union have entered a new phase in which, having, at least potentially, both military and non-military instruments at their disposal, they will be able simultaneously to make use of `sticks' and `carrots' and, by doing this, deal with European security questions in a much broader strategic sense than has been done in the past.

This paper does not attempt to define a strategy for the countries committed to creating a European Union which might permanently separate them from the United States and Canada or from a wider Europe. It is the author's belief that the creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) by the European Union does not automatically suggest the demise of transatlantic consultation and cooperation, nor does it suggest the permanent exclusion from European Union of all those countries of the Old Continent which are not currently members of the EC and WEU. But, given the present circumstances with regard to European security and given the fact that the Maastricht Treaty on European Union *has* been signed - and assuming that it is ratified[5] - the following pages are intended to contribute to the discussion on the development of a new strategic concept, not so much for the West in general, but rather for the countries committed to a European Union. The main goal of any such new strategic concept must be to preserve and consolidate the present degree of security and stability for the future members of the European Union and, by doing this, to contribute to the refinement of new pan-European and global security systems.

After a brief section on the way in which thinking about security is developing, the following section then analyses the development of thinking on conflict prevention, which is a main ingredient in the attainment of security. Conflict prevention includes the nuclear and conventional elements of deterrence that have been developed in the West in order to strengthen its security against external military threats, and these elements of deterrence are critically re-examined. It is argued that, during the past forty years, the concept of deterrence has been somewhat distorted by the fact that too much attention has been paid to its nuclear component, while the feasibility of the West relying more on conventional forces as a means to prevent conflicts has been underestimated in both military doctrine and political strategy. A chapter on non-military elements of conflict prevention concludes the second section, and again it is argued that their possible effectiveness has been somewhat underestimated, if not entirely neglected, during the last forty years. In the author's view, it would be useful for the countries dedicated to creating a European Union to start from a broader approach to conflict prevention in order to define and formulate a comprehensive strategy towards neighbouring countries both in the East and in the South. The third section deals with the question of extended deterrence, an issue which is partially related to, but also different in some respects from, the earlier section on conventional and nuclear deterrence. Future scenarios with regard to the European integration

process within European Union, especially with regard to the prospects of developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy as outlined in the Maastricht document, and its implications for a new discussion on deterrence and extended deterrence, conclude the section. The author believes that, should the situation in the East continue to develop in an essentially benign way, and should a Common Foreign and Security Policy for European Union, including a common defence, emerge, then the question concerning both the conventional and nuclear forces available collectively to its member states will need to be re-examined in a much more radical way than has been done in the past.

THE EVOLVING CONCEPT OF SECURITY

What do Western nations understand by the term security and how can they do their best to preserve it? In order to answer these questions, it is useful to go back in history by looking again at the roots of the East-West confrontation, which lasted for more than forty years. These roots lie in the period immediately following World War II, when the Western and Eastern military alliances were founded in order to defend their respective territories from perceived potential aggression. It was during the late 1940s that the United States and Western Europe first identified the Soviet Union as the main threat to world peace, and a period began during which impressive amounts of strategic and theatre nuclear weapons and conventional forces were deployed on the territory of NATO Member States in Europe. At the same time Western leaders started to move away from the traditional Clausewitzian view that war is the continuation of politics by other means, and began to rely less on the possibilities of conventional weapons for the defence of their territory and accepted a greater reliance on nuclear weapons as a new, cheaper and more effective way to prevent Eastern military aggression against the Atlantic Alliance in general and Western Europe in particular. This confidence in nuclear weapons (and the consequently reduced reliance on conventional forces as a means to prevent war) was later codified in almost all public declarations which were made after subsequent official NATO meetings, especially during the 1970s and 1980s. They are still an important element in official allied thinking today: in autumn 1991, at the 50th ministerial meeting of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group in Taormina (Sicily), the allied defence ministers concluded that `nuclear weapons will continue for the foreseeable future to fulfil their essential role in the Alliance's overall strategy, since conventional forces alone cannot ensure war prevention.'[(6)]

However, independently of the extent to which Western leaders believed in either conventional forces, nuclear weapons or appropriate combinations of the two, what matters here is the fact that, despite some reference to the political and economic dimensions of security, for example in NATO's Harmel Report of 1967, German *Ostpolitik* in the 1970s and the creation of a Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975, Western security thinking has placed the emphasis mainly on military considerations.[(7)]

With the accession to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985, East-West relations started to change for the better, first slowly but with the passing of time increasingly rapidly. No wonder, therefore, that Western threat perceptions with regard to an armed attack from the East, which dated from the beginning of the Cold War and were a result of both the potential adversary's *capabilities* and of his *intentions*, have recently changed radically. That is why official NATO *language* since 1989 has referred to `risks' rather than `threats' and it is also why, at least since the dramatic but encouraging events of 1991, the latter word has almost disappeared even from Western *thinking*on East-West relations. At the same time, in parallel with changing threat perceptions and also as a result of them, a new debate on the traditional and new meanings of security has started.

But what do we mean by security and what are the challenges to it? Do we fear nuclear proliferation, nuclear attacks, limited military invasions (for example, due to

border disputes), terrorism, the interruption of energy supplies, massive population movements, or what? These are fundamental questions which are still relevant after the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the traditional threat from the East. The European Community and WEU, which are dedicated to European Union, should continue to adapt their strategies and military doctrines to changes in the nature of actual or potential threats, risks and challenges facing them.

A comprehensive debate over these new threats, risks and challenges to European and global security is clearly needed. But that debate should not avoid unpleasant questions and should be specific about who could threaten the West and how - in other words it should be both *actor-oriented and action-oriented*. The West in general and the countries committed to a European Union in particular need to ask themselves what these new threats, risks and challenges are and from where they originate. However, this does not necessarily mean that such debate should be conducted in public: an explicit public statement that specific nuclear and conventional military capabilities were needed in order to counter potential threats and risks from (named) neighbouring countries and regions in the East and South could *de facto* have the boomerang effect of helping to turn such *potential* threats and risks into *real* ones. This should clearly be avoided.[8]

Finally, what is suggested here is not that everything achieved so far should be overturned. The traditional *military-oriented* approach to security has worked well in the past and will continue to make an important contribution in the future: history shows that a strong Western defence posture which included both conventional and nuclear elements successfully contributed to deterring the Soviet Union from unilaterally resolving delicate issues, for instance over Cuba or Berlin. However, even if military capabilities and doctrines were the major factor in deterring the Soviet Union in these two and other crises during the last forty years, it is not known what role was played by other non-military factors, for instance, domestic, economic and cultural ones. It certainly seems the case that as far as other new potential threats are concerned, a strong defence effort can only be one of several factors which contribute to a greater feeling that we have adequate security, and this has become even more valid in the post-Cold War period.

THE EVOLVING CONCEPT OF CONFLICT PREVENTION

Military elements of conflict prevention

In particular during the Cold War era, the international security community has habitually described and analysed traditional *military* elements of conflict prevention by using the expression and concept of *deterrence*. Some analysts have recently stressed the fact that deterrence is nothing new and that the first codification of its working principles can be found in documents written thousands of years ago.[9] Others have countered that deterrence became a matter of high priority only in the twentieth century, with the appearance of nuclear weapons after World War II: `Before nuclear weapons deterrence could not be considered the be-all and end-all, if only because it so frequently failed; after nuclear weapons, many assumed that deterrence had to become the be-all and end-all because its failure could no longer be acceptable.'[10] Independently of how far back the idea of deterrence can be traced, however, there is no doubt that major changes in the debate occurred when nuclear weapons first appeared and when, shortly after, the nuclear monopoly of the United States ended and a Mutual Assured Destruction capability characterised the new strategic relationship between the two superpowers. However, from then until the late 1980s the concept has not experienced any further significant intellectual breakthroughs, and it was only recently that new efforts to make progress on these questions were begun. Looked at from today's post-Cold War perspective, the Western postwar debate on deterrence appears narrow and mainly nuclear-orientated, and a more general, more rational concept of conflict prevention is still missing.[11] Some even felt that the idea of deterrence `degenerated into a hackneyed buzzword' and its `conceptual development never really progressed after the 1950s, so much as it travelled cyclically between the horns of old dilemmas.'[12]

Nuclear deterrence

In parallel to the wider political debate, the academic community has been divided between opponents and supporters of nuclear weapons and their possible roles. Those opposing nuclear weapons have objected that nuclear deterrence is not reliable and that it is `an extraordinarily limited theory that relies on extraordinarily broad assumptions.'[13] The more radical thinkers in this category, putting aside the important analytical distinction between what is *necessary* and what is *sufficient*,[14] have even affirmed that nuclear weapons `do not seem to have been necessary to deter major war, to cause the leaders of major countries to behave cautiously, or to determine the alliances that have been formed. Rather, it seems that things would have turned out much the same had nuclear weapons never been invented.'[15] On the other side, those who believed in the deterrent role of nuclear weapons have opposed any radical regional *reductions* of nuclear weapons and their regional or even global *elimination*, stressing that `the historical instability of conventional balances of power constitutes a most persuasive case for regarding nuclear deterrence as the best way of keeping war in Europe unthinkable as an instrument of policy.'[16]

The dispute between opponents and supporters of nuclear weapons is a characteristic of the postwar debate on security in general and on nuclear strategy in particular. To exemplify this, let us briefly recall the INF episode, one of the major examples of the allied nuclear debate which began in the second half of the 1970s, especially with NATO's double-track decision in 1979, and which ended with the signature of the INF agreement in 1987.[17] Especially during the years immediately preceding the deployment of the new systems on West European territory, countries in the West experienced a rebirth of peace movements, with hundreds of thousands of people protesting in the streets of the capitals of countries in both continents. The polarization of the debate was not very different from that in the academic world mentioned above. On the one hand peace movements opposed the double-track decision principally by pointing out the catastrophic and absurd outcome of a nuclear war, which could occur if nuclear deterrence failed, while on the other hand political leaders supporting the double-track decision stated their support for maintaining effective nuclear deterrence which, in their opinion, had guaranteed peace and security in the Western hemisphere since the end of World War II. As no compromise was possible between these two opposing views, the postwar security debate became locked into what is generally known as the classical deterrence dilemma: in order to have effective deterrence, one has always to be ready to use nuclear weapons and, by doing this, risk one's own annihilation.[18] There is no escape from this dilemma, since deterrence and credible employment options are two sides of the same coin and they are characterised more by interaction than by separation. The problem is that, especially in times of strong polarization of views over nuclear matters, the supporters of nuclear deterrence have stressed only one side of the argument and its opponents only the other.

The question now arises whether it will be possible to develop a new post-Cold War strategic concept with regard to nuclear weapons which resolves this dilemma. The answer suggested here is that this is not possible: most dilemmas with regard to nuclear weapons and nuclear doctrine are likely to remain dilemmas as long as nuclear weapons exist and as long as there is more than just one nuclear power on earth. However, one cannot exclude the possibility that the classical deterrence-defence dilemma, with its inherent risk of reciprocal nuclear annihilation, might become at least less acute in the future. This will depend mainly on the progress made towards further nuclear reductions among nuclear weapons states in general and between the United States and Russia in particular,[19] and on the success of a policy aimed at avoiding further horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation. If Western nations were to succeed in coping with both challenges, they would in the future be less exposed to the risks of nuclear annihilation resulting from the automatism of escalation and massive nuclear retaliation than they have been in the past.

There is clearly a trend towards further reductions of existing Western and Eastern nuclear stockpiles. At least since the double-track decision of 1979, NATO theatre nuclear weapons stockpiles have been repeatedly reduced, and, during the last decade, thousands of nuclear mines, air defence missiles, artillery and short-range and medium-range ground-launched nuclear missiles have already been removed from the territory of Western Europe.[20] But do the signature of the START agreement in July 1991, the subsequent nuclear arms reduction proposals made in September 1991 by Bush and Gorbachev and the announcements made by Bush and Yeltsin in June 1992 really suggest that we are proceeding towards a new chapter in human history in

which both strategic and theatre nuclear weapons have lost all their suitability as instruments of military power, and in which they are stored safely in nuclear silos like an old mare which has been put out to pasture?[21] A total abolition of nuclear weapons is still very distant, and therefore there is no answer to this question for the time being.[22] However, one should not assume that short-term arrangements and longer-term thinking are necessarily mutually exclusive. NATO's October 1991 NPG decision in Taormina to cut roughly 80 per cent of its stockpiles of theatre nuclear weapons by the elimination of all ground-launched short-range ballistic missiles and nuclear artillery, and the Pentagon announcement on 2 July 1992 that the worldwide withdrawal of American land-based or sea-launched tactical nuclear weapons had been completed[23] were indeed radical steps when compared with the more `static' period between 1945 and the late 1980s, but the fact that European-based air-delivered systems - coupled to the US strategic ones and to French and British systems - will continue to fulfil their traditional mission of conflict prevention is at least a short-term and medium-term reality which neither suggests nor excludes the possibility that the path towards complete denuclearisation will continue *ad infinitum*. However, to ask where all this will lead to in the long term is and will remain a legitimate question; there is clearly more scope for new ideas and proposals today compared with the Cold War era.[24]

Moreover, NATO's recent further nuclear reductions should not be seen as the last possible adaptation to the new circumstances. After the implementation of the NPG decisions, Western nuclear powers and their allies will have to continue to adapt further their old Cold War plans for nuclear deterrence and defence to the new post-Cold War realities. The countries which will make up the European Union are no longer threatened by an ideological and political adversary massively armed with both conventional and nuclear weapons on their Eastern borders, a situation which made the scenario of a large-scale attack possible. Future threats to European states are more likely to come from a multiplicity of smaller and less militarily powerful countries or individuals preferring less costly low-intensity armed conflicts, including terrorism and selective military strikes in the pursuit of more limited political goals.[25] These new potential threats to Europe's security are posed by people less acquainted with the sophisticated intellectual work on deterrence done by Western and Eastern nuclear powers and their respective alliances, but, as current events in the Middle East and the Gulf are demonstrating, this does not always induce them to renounce the possibility of becoming possessors of nuclear weapons. To develop a strategy towards potential threats to European security, which are sometimes hard to identify, will not be an easy task for the West, and it will be particularly difficult, but not impossible, when considering the nuclear component of such a strategy. Both the existing instruments for the control of nuclear proliferation and the concentration on military methods of conflict prevention, including nuclear deterrence, need to be radically re-examined in the new situation.[26] Last but not least, and depending on how much one believes that a Western nuclear deterrence strategy against new potential threats will be successful and credible in the post-Cold War era, one should give greater or lesser importance to the idea of developing an anti-ballistic missile defence, as is currently proposed by the United States with the programme to develop a Global Protection System (GPS).[27]

Nuclear and conventional deterrence

At least as long ago as the early 1980s, people who were not comfortable with the basic assumptions of nuclear deterrence and with the US nuclear guarantee for the security of Western Europe began to promote the concept of *conventional deterrence*: `In its current formulation, flexible response is seen as inadequate by the strategists, unsupportable by the public, and, one must assume, increasingly incredible by the Soviets ... The traditional view is, in short, that stronger conventional forces are needed to enhance conventional deterrence and thus compensate for the declining effectiveness of nuclear deterrence.'[28] Most analysts who believed in conventional deterrence as a valuable *addition*[29] agreed that `nuclear weapons of course continue to play a role in deterring war in Europe and will do so as long as they remain available,'[30] and they therefore suggested not the substitution of all nuclear weapons by conventional ones, but increased reliance on the latter in order to strengthen deterrence as a whole.[31]

Since that time, the debate on conventional weapons and their contribution to deterrence has developed further, especially after the superiority in conventional weapons demonstrated by the United States and its allies in 1990 in Operation DESERT STORM. The Gulf war clearly showed that conventional weapons have become more precise and therefore more effective and reliable in recent years, but *how far* this strengthens reliance on the conventional component of deterrence has not yet been made clear. A prominent Gulf war commentator has suggested that `it is a legacy from this war that the immediate priority for defence ministries in all kinds of countries will be the improvement of their conventional capabilities,' although only a few pages later he adds that `modern conventional systems are today the better investments, at least at the margin', leaving it to the reader to interpret what this means in practice for the search for a new balance between conventional and nuclear weapons.[32] The Gulf experience has suggested to other commentators that the role of *nuclear* forces should be limited to the deterrence of a *nuclear* attack[33] and that the `new conventional military capability adds a powerful dimension to the ability of the United States to deter war. While it is certainly not as powerful as nuclear weapons, it is a more credible deterrent, particularly in regional conflicts vital to US national interests.'[34] French President Mitterrand has made similar statements on the subject by explicitly excluding the threat of using chemical or nuclear weapons during the Gulf war: `We must not use chemical weapons. We have conventional means that will enable us to defend the law and make it prevail in this conflict and we must not succumb to the desire to respond in like manner ... I personally rule it out. No chemical, bacteriological or nuclear weapons ... I am speaking for France.'[35]

What are the lessons which Western leaders in general and the countries dedicated to creating a European Union in particular could draw from the discussion on the search for a new balance between nuclear and conventional forces? First, the balance between the nuclear and conventional components of deterrence has never been static or rigid but has always depended on a historical process in which changing threat perceptions, cost-effectiveness analyses, technological, domestic and other factors have influenced leaders' decisions. It would therefore be quite normal were this balance to shift again, by further diminishing the role of the nuclear components of deterrence and putting more emphasis on the contribution of conventional forces to deterrence. NATO's New Strategic Concept is the most prominent recent example of

this shift towards a greater recognition of the role of conventional forces in deterrence: apart from nuclear weapons, `conventional forces contribute to war prevention by ensuring that no potential aggressor could contemplate a quick or easy victory, or territorial gains, by conventional means.'[36]

Second, as is the case with *nuclear* deterrence, *conventional* deterrence concepts are far from being perfect. Even the majority of the more radical advocates of conventional deterrence have stopped short of suggesting that complete conventional deterrence would be attainable.

Third, a number of academic and military representatives of the strategic community have frequently used the expression `*minimum deterrence*'. However, until today this term has been imprecise and has sometimes contributed more to confusion than to clarification of the debate. Most people have used the expression `minimum deterrence' only in connection with nuclear weapons of the Atlantic Alliance but without explaining it in qualitative terms,[37] while others have suggested defining minimum deterrence in connection with French and British nuclear forces only.[38]

If the European Union is to develop a common defence policy within its CFSP, its members will need to define in common their requirements for both `minimum' nuclear and conventional forces.

Fourth, the more East-West relations continue to evolve in a way that is benign for the European security environment, the more difficult it will be for the Atlantic Alliance and the members of the European Union to argue for nuclear weapons as a major element of conflict prevention. This is to a certain extent, at least for the time being, also valid with regard to the North-South dimension of European security. Massive conventional wars of attrition against Western Europe by Middle Eastern or North African countries do not seem a very realistic scenario for the future, but the control by Western nations of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and of the improvement of the range and accuracy of delivery systems in these areas will be far from easy. However, for the time being there are no major military threats from this area directed against the United States and Western Europe, and a Western `no first use' doctrine with regard to nuclear weapons could have advantages in terms of political relations between North and South; in any case it would at least do no harm to the military security of NATO and European Union member countries.[39] Irrespective of the future role of Western nuclear forces, one can conclude that the conventional components of deterrence and defence will become increasingly important.

Non-military elements of conflict prevention

As seen in the section on nuclear deterrence, both critics and supporters of the basic assumptions of NATO's double-track decision of 1979 saw an inevitable linkage between the words `*nuclear*' and `*deterrence*'. In a well-known American dictionary, deterrence is defined as being `the act of deterring, especially deterring a *nuclear* attack by the capacity or threat of retaliating'.[40] The suggestion that deterrence should not be seen only in terms of nuclear weapons,[41] but that other military capabilities can also play their role (i.e. conventional, biological, or chemical[42]weapons), enlarged the debate to a certain extent, but what is important in

the present context is that views of both nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence have basically assumed that conflict prevention is achieved by a mainly military effort.[43]

In the academic world, there have been a few original attempts to understand deterrence in a broader context and therefore one in which deterrence is not necessarily linked only to conventional, biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. In this debate, the suggestion has been made that `deterrence can be defined more generally as a state of being - the absence of war between two countries or alliances. If they are not at war, then it is reasonable to conclude that each is currently being deterred from attacking the other.'[44] Another author who has suggested that non-military means contribute to deterrence is McGeorge Bundy, who, commenting on cooperative attempts to reinforce security between East and West, states that `in the hands of the self-confident détente is an important deterrent.'[45]

To pursue this line of reasoning, and, with a little imagination, look for other applications, it is not difficult to discover that our daily private and social lives confront us permanently with situations of `*non-military deterrence*'. In fact, basically *deterrence is a very primitive thing*, since even cats and dogs can be `deterred', if we want them to respect our will by threatening voices or menacing hands. The same principle works with human beings, for instance, with children who have to be `deterred' from eating cake before lunch or, more generally, with our daily behaviour in the street, where we have to observe stop signs and traffic lights and use parking spaces in order to avoid penalties. And, coming back to the field of international relations, it becomes evident that `non-military deterrence' can be found in the fields of economic, financial, social and cultural politics (for instance, joint ventures, trade agreements, information exchanges, technology flow, sports and educational programmes and cultural exchanges). Put another way, `non-military deterrence' is both a result and also a producer of both reciprocal values and the interest which governments and individuals of one nation or alliance have in maintaining and improving their relations with others (and vice versa), and it therefore both depends on and augments the degree of interdependence which exists between them.

A number of questions arise from this. A first question concerns terminology: is it appropriate to use the expression `non-military deterrence' in order to describe non-military ways of providing security? Quite clearly, *it is not:* the term deterrence as it has been used in the past refers to coercive or potentially coercive ways of preventing war, mainly in conjunction with military means, and there is no reason why this should change now, after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and of the Soviet Union and with the emergence of new democratic governments and market-oriented economies in this region. However, even if historically the term has been used in a specific way, this does not mean that one should not accept the idea put forward here that the purpose of both military and non-military means is at least in principle the same: *to contribute to improving security*. With this, another problem of terminology loses relevance, namely a distinction sometimes made between `deterrence' and `dissuasion'. While some English-speaking analysts use the word `deterrence' in a context strictly related to the threat of the use of military force, others have sometimes used the word `dissuasion' in order to refer to both military and non-military means.[46] A third group of analysts believes it has found the best solution in using both terms, referring to military factors with the former and to wider political aspects

with the latter.[47] However, what was said earlier is also valid here: the terminology may vary, but the principles are the same.

This leads to another central question: in what circumstances do non-military means for conflict prevention *fail*? There is no doubt that humanity has experienced countless situations where military deterrence did not work. Deterrence has usually failed if the deterrent has not been credible enough, and in this sense supporters of nuclear deterrence are right when they point to the hundreds of wars fought in the past and warn that conventional deterrence by itself has not sufficed to prevent outbreaks of armed conflict. However, the same is also true for non-military elements of conflict prevention, and the situations in which, for example, economic or cultural ties between states or groups of states have failed to prevent military conflicts cannot be counted in hundreds - probably not even in thousands. But the acceptance of the idea that non-military elements of conflict prevention also often fail should not lead to the erroneous conclusion that they *never* work. Non-military factors which contribute to conflict prevention, for instance the degree of interdependence which results from economic, political and cultural ties, may be less obvious and more difficult to identify or measure than military capabilities, but they do nevertheless *exist*.[48]

Both military and non-military aspects of conflict prevention are part of a cost-effectiveness analysis: `in contemplating an attack, a would-be aggressor considers two central conditions and compares them: what his world would probably be like if he went to war, and what that same world would probably be like if he remained at peace.'[49] Herein lie the reasons why Italy has not attacked Yugoslavia in order to regain the Istrian peninsula, or why Austria has not attacked Italy in order to regain South Tyrol; herein also lie the reasons why Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990 and why Serbia invaded Croatia during the early phase of the Yugoslav crisis. In this sense, limits and opportunities for both military and non-military elements of conflict prevention are like Siamese twins: both are invariably found in situations where armed conflict has occurred and in those where it has not occurred.

This leads to another question: how far can both military and non-military elements of conflict prevention be involved at the same time? In other words, how far are `sticks' and `carrots' compatible? We can address this question by focusing on the foreign policy options which are open to the countries dedicated to creating a European Union. There are three principal options: in the first option the European Union could pursue a *strategy of containment* with regard to Eastern and Southern countries or alliances, while in the second a *strategy of integration* towards these regions might be chosen; finally, a third option would be a mixed strategy which included elements of both containment and integration. While in the first case one would concentrate - mainly but not exclusively - on military factors which contribute to deterrence and defence (for instance, the deployment of conventional and/or nuclear weapons systems, local and regional anti-ballistic missile defences, higher defence budgets, explicit deterrence declarations), in the second case one would choose to strengthen mainly non-military factors which contribute to conflict prevention (for instance, through a major economic recovery programme for the East, by allocating a higher percentage of GNP in development aid for the South and by creating a new framework for dialogue, for example within a Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean). In the third case appropriate combinations of both military and non-military factors which contribute to conflict prevention and, more

generally, to the guaranteeing of security and stability, would be chosen. It seems clear that only the third option is realistic in practice, since there would always be a mixture, however slight, of military and non-military means in strategies which are either essentially containment-oriented or integration-oriented.

Western post-World War II history includes several examples of such mixed strategies of both containment and integration: one example is the French approach to Franco-German rapprochement of the late 1940s and early 1950s, when the two countries carefully began to repair their historically difficult relationship, both within a multilateral framework (i.e. within the European Communities, WEU and NATO)[50] and on a strictly bilateral level, which finally led to the Franco-German treaty of 1963.[51] A second example of such a mixed strategy can be found in the Federal Republic of Germany's special relationship with the German Democratic Republic before unification occurred in 1990. This case is very interesting because it refers more to the limits and risks than to the possibilities of having a mixed strategy of both containment and integration. If it is recalled how difficult the relations between the two states were during the decades preceding the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, it becomes clear why nobody in the West was able during those years to state with absolute certainty that a war between the two alliances in the Central Front, and therefore one in which the FRG and GDR were on opposing sides, could be totally excluded. What the FRG sought during those years was an attempt to obtain security by strengthening both military and non-military means for conflict prevention, and this policy included both elements of containment, e.g. by maintaining its forces at a state of constant military readiness within NATO, and of integration, e.g. through a simultaneous reinforcement of economic, social and cultural ties with its Eastern neighbours in general and the GDR in particular.

Coming back to the question posed above with regard to the *compatibility* of strategies of containment and of integration based on military and non-military means for conflict prevention, it may be concluded that, even if past experiences show us that they do not necessarily exclude each other, there may be situations in which it becomes difficult to improve reciprocal security by continuing to strengthen both. However, this is not to say that either military or non-military means should be given up. A Common Foreign and Security Policy for European Union will have to include a coherent and comprehensive strategy in which both military and non-military means for conflict prevention must be available. European security has in the past not been guaranteed either by `sticks' alone or by `carrots' alone, and there is no reason to assume that this would be any different in the future.

THE EVOLVING CONCEPT OF EXTENDED DETERRENCE AND THE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Extended nuclear deterrence

One of the major debates within the Atlantic Alliance since the 1950s has concerned the issue of nuclear weapons states providing security guarantees to allied non-nuclear states, a complex subject which has generally been described as extended deterrence. This section concentrates on the *nuclear* element of extended deterrence, and it analyses the relations between nuclear and non-nuclear states within an alliance and concludes with a presentation of several possible new extended nuclear deterrence scenarios for both NATO and the countries which will make up European Union. Part of the academic debate on nuclear deterrence has concentrated on the question of whether it would be possible to have *extended security guarantees based onexistential nuclear deterrence*. The concept of existential deterrence, although used in a variety of contexts by different analysts and rarely defined in precise terms,(52) holds that it is the mere *existence* of nuclear weapons and not their specific deployment which provides deterrence, and it has therefore been suggested that it does not so much matter what a nuclear weapons state *says* and *does* in order to make extended nuclear deterrence credible but that what is more important is that it *has* nuclear armaments. According to this view, it is therefore a secondary and mainly theoretical(53) problem whether nuclear weapons states have their arsenals deployed both within and outside their territories, as long as they are credibly committed politically to an integrated and cohesive `alliance' or `union'. Commenting on the role of US forces in Europe, McGeorge Bundy has suggested that `what establishes this deterrent danger is not American doctrine, and not American nuclear warheads in particular locations, but the American military presence there and the American political commitment which it represents and reinforces.'(54)

It is argued here that a distinction can be made between extended nuclear deterrence in an *existential sense* and extended nuclear deterrence in the *traditional sense*. While the first concept is a largely theoretical one, the second is generally well known in practice after forty years of allied experience with it. What precisely are the differences between the two concepts of existential and traditional extended nuclear deterrence? We can arrive at a satisfactory explanation of why the two concepts of deterrence are different by looking at the three basic features which characterize them. These three features are first, nuclear *strategy*, second, *command and control arrangements* for nuclear forces and third, the *deployment* of these forces. In the *traditional* extended nuclear deterrence model in NATO a relatively high importance was given to, first, a common nuclear strategy -Flexible Response - accepted by all allied member states with the exception of France,(55) second, a common command and control system with regard to the necessary politico-military consultation mechanisms relative to NATO nuclear forces (including, for instance, dual-key arrangements) and, third, NATO nuclear forces actually deployed on the territory of some West European allies. These three basic features would become less important, and some could disappear, within a concept of *existential* extended nuclear deterrence: it is for example conceivable that neither common politico-military

command and control provisions nor a deployment would be necessary in such a model, while common strategy including at least some general statements on the possible role of nuclear forces would in any case be required. However, it seems obvious that the traditional and existential models are extremes in theory rather than in practice: depending on how much importance was given to each of the three basic features, the form of extended deterrence would point more or less towards a traditional or towards an existential solution.

In evaluating the importance of the three basic features for extended nuclear deterrence, it is necessary to consider how a chosen arrangement would affect *coupling* - the extent to which a non-nuclear state feels its security is assured by an allied nuclear state, and the extent to which a nuclear state feels responsible for the security of an allied non-nuclear state. It is useful to remember in this context that one of the reasons for the European request for new intermediate-range nuclear missiles in 1978-79 was the assumption that the deployment of *Pershing* II and cruise missiles would increase coupling and therefore reduce the fear of a nuclear war limited to Europe.(56) An extended nuclear deterrence arrangement rather more of the traditional sort would tend to reinforce coupling between nuclear and non-nuclear states within an alliance, while a more existential arrangement would tend to reduce this coupling effect. However, what also needs to be addressed in this context is the question of how far coupling is still needed in the post-Cold War era, and Europeans need to ask themselves how great the potential risks of a nuclear war limited to Europe are in this new era. At least for the time being, it seems clear that, with the relaxation of tensions between East and West and with the continuing outlined reductions of both strategic and theatre nuclear weapons between the United States and Russia, *both* the coupling of the US to the security of Europe *and* the potential risks of a limited nuclear war in Europe are diminishing.

A further distinction needs to be made between *transatlantic* and *intra-European* arrangements for extended nuclear deterrence: while the former refers to US nuclear forces,(57) the latter would be based on French and British nuclear forces only. Some would prefer, but without saying so clearly, to *substitute* the transatlantic extended deterrence regime by what is in their view a more credible intra-European one based on French and British nuclear forces only, since `in the United States, one can conceive that a nuclear war, if it were to be unavoidable, could be limited to Europe. France cannot hope to be able to limit a nuclear war to the Federal Republic of Germany'.(58) Another similar but also rather imprecise proposal starts from a zero-sum game assumption and suggests increasing intra-European extended nuclear deterrence in order to counterbalance the diminishing transatlantic one: `there is need for NATO-Europe to redefine its global role to provide for a more autonomous nuclear deterrent. The only purpose of such greater nuclear responsibility should be to provide a nuclear deterrent against war in Europe, which the US guarantee is increasingly failing to provide.'(59)

However, no matter which kind of solution for extended nuclear deterrence one prefers - transatlantic, intra-European or a combination of the two - the fact remains that every extended nuclear deterrence regime is subject to limitations: depending on the extent of military and political commitments of one state to another, the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence augments or diminishes.(60) In this sense the traditional - and now fortunately obsolescent - question whether the United States would risk

Washington for Berlin could never be answered with absolute certainty, and the same would be valid for future scenarios with regard to emerging threats from the South and the need to consider new transatlantic extended deterrence regimes involving Washington-Rome, Washington-Ankara or Washington-Madrid pairs. However, the credibility problem of the traditional transatlantic extended security guarantee pairs involving Washington would also be valid for intra-European solutions, in the sense that not even in these cases could towns like Athens, Barcelona or Palermo be absolutely sure that a conventional or nuclear attack against them would mean that France or the United Kingdom would risk Paris or London for them. Extended deterrence can be more or less credible, but it can only be credible in near absolute terms within the national boundaries of a nuclear power itself, thus ceasing to be *`extended'* and becoming *`central'*.

European Union and extended nuclear deterrence

This brings us to a central question with regard to the links between, on the one hand, the European integration process towards European Union and, on the other, the future of extended nuclear deterrence. The Treaty on European Union with the commitments to a Common Foreign and Security Policy signed in Maastricht in February 1992 opened up the prospect of a CFSP which `shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.'[(61)] It could be argued that in Maastricht no reference at all was made to nuclear matters; furthermore, in the final text the words `eventual', `might' and `in time' were chosen when referring to a common defence policy and common defence, and this clearly points to the facts that the Treaty was a delicate compromise between differing views and that some countries had, and still have, more difficulties than others when it comes to defining when, how and how fast to establish such a Common Foreign and Security Policy which includes defence. There is no doubt that the debate over extended nuclear deterrence is inherently linked to such discussions, and that the issue will become more or less prominent depending on the willingness of European Union member countries to proceed towards a common defence policy and a common defence.

What would a Common Foreign and Security Policy including defence mean for the future of extended nuclear deterrence within European Union? Two observations need to be made here. First, conventional and nuclear forces of European Union member countries have a double function of being able both to defend *and* to deter, and therefore European Union member countries also need to take into account that, should a CFSP including a common defence ever emerge in the future, a *common defence* would also mean having a *common deterrence*. Second, and resulting from this, while in a *partial* CFSP including a common defence policy it would be relatively easier to draw an artificial dividing line between conventional and nuclear forces available to the members of European Union, this would not be possible should a *full* CFSP including both a common defence policy and a common defence emerge in the future. In that case non-nuclear weapons states of European Union would be under the security umbrella of the two nuclear weapons states of the Union: we would have, therefore, *intra-European extended nuclear deterrence*. President Mitterrand of France recently pointed to this possibility: `Seuls deux des Douze sont détenteurs d'une force atomique. Pour leur politique nationale, ils ont une doctrine claire. Est-il

possible de concevoir une doctrine européenne? Cette question-là deviendra très vite une des questions majeures de la construction d'une défense européenne commune."[62]

In trying to answer this question, a distinction needs to be made between two intra-European extended nuclear deterrence arrangements which would become possible for European Union: a scenario based on *extended nuclear deterrence in the traditional sense*, and one based on *extended nuclear deterrence in an existential sense*. In the *first* case, if the member countries of European Union believed in the need to extend nuclear deterrence in the *traditional* sense, the three main features mentioned earlier in this section would need to be taken into consideration: a common European Union strategy including nuclear doctrine, a European Union system for politico-military consultation on decisions concerning the use of French and British nuclear systems, and the possible deployment of French and British nuclear forces on the territory of some non-nuclear weapons states of European Union. Finally, the creation of a European Union Nuclear Planning Group could become necessary in order better to define management and responsibilities over nuclear matters within the Union.

The *second* intra-European nuclear deterrence arrangement would be one in which the countries creating European Union believed that nuclear deterrence could be extended to non-nuclear members in a rather more *existential* way. In this situation, the three factors (nuclear strategy, command and control and any deployment of nuclear forces outside France and the United Kingdom), as well as the creation of a European Union Nuclear Planning Group, would become less relevant than in the traditional model described above - but not totally irrelevant. However, both the traditional and the existential models have in common the fact that in both cases a substantial political commitment by the two European nuclear weapons states to the security of European Union would be necessary in order to be perceived as sufficiently credible. Thus the question arises which of the two extended nuclear deterrence arrangements would be the better one for European Union. Despite some suggestions to the contrary,[63] the view taken here is that the *traditional* model would be the more appropriate one. French and British nuclear weapons were developed at a time when there were no viable alternatives to a security and defence policy that was mainly dominated by the nation-state, while today all the countries involved in the European Union, including France and the United Kingdom, are slowly but steadily moving away from this traditional approach. From the point of view of European integration, it increasingly makes sense to concentrate on *common* rather than on *national* burdens and responsibilities in the fields of foreign, security and defence policy, and it seems apparent that the traditional extended nuclear deterrence model provides a greater sharing of the burdens and responsibilities related to nuclear forces than the existential one.

There is a critical connection between the process of European integration towards European Union on the one hand and the fact that two members of the Union consider that their control over nuclear weapons remains an important element of their national sovereignty. In the long term, therefore, it would be a mistake if the formulation of a new nuclear strategy or the debate over the employment of nuclear systems were left to the French and British governments alone, since this could weaken or even stop the process of establishing a European Union. Since both nuclear and non-nuclear states, giving or receiving nuclear guarantees, are necessarily involved in any talk about

possible new security arrangements for European Union, a major debate about the future of extended nuclear deterrence in and for Europe will be needed, involving all countries which are preparing the Common Foreign and Security Policy of European Union. Such a debate could be facilitated by the fact that most nuclear and non-nuclear members of European Union have been members of the Atlantic Alliance, and its Nuclear Planning Group, for decades. Regular discussions within the NATO framework have been an important factor in the evolution of a *common nuclear culture* among European nuclear and non-nuclear states.

Finally, some considerations are necessary with regard to the medium-term and long-term perspectives for transatlantic and intra-European regimes of extended nuclear deterrence for European Union member countries.(64) The starting point for these considerations is the assumption that the countries who are members of European Union have a common perception with regard to potential or actual threats and risks from the East or from the South, and that they believe in the need for nuclear deterrence as a way to counter these threats and risks. Should this not be the case in the post-Cold War era,(65) a division within European Union member countries would probably become unavoidable and, consequently, no common European Union extended nuclear deterrence arrangements would result. However, assuming that a consensus among the countries dedicated to creating European Union in favour of a continuation of nuclear deterrence continues to exist, two alternatives are possible in the long term: a mixed transatlantic/intra-European form of nuclear deterrence and a purely intra-European extended nuclear deterrence solution.(66)

Another question related to this now arises: should these two transatlantic and intra-European extended nuclear deterrence arrangements be of the traditional or of the existential type? It is obviously not possible to predict the future, however, given that the *degree* of integration within the countries dedicated to creating European Union is likely to be more profound than the transatlantic intergovernmental cooperation within NATO,(67) and given the fact that the more substantive transatlantic and intra-European cultural, economic, political and military integration becomes, the greater the credibility of either type of extended nuclear deterrence regime will be (and vice versa), then from the six possible models outlined in Table 1 only those which assume a traditional intra-European extended deterrence model seem likely. As suggested earlier, an intra-European extended nuclear deterrence solution for European Union would need to be of the more traditional type, where both nuclear and non-nuclear member countries decide together - at least to a certain extent - nuclear strategy, a system of command and control and, improbable though it may seem in the new situation, the deployment of nuclear forces on the territory of European Union non-nuclear weapons states. Any purely existential intra-European solution which does not deal with these three key issues in sufficient detail seems incompatible with the process of developing a European Union common foreign and security policy which includes defence.

Table 1

Transatlantic and intra-European extended nuclear deterrence models

	Transatlantic	Intra-European
(1)	Traditional	Traditional
(2)	Traditional	Existential
(3)	Existential	Traditional
(4)	Existential	Existential
(5)	-	Traditional
(6)	-	Existential

For a transatlantic regime of extended nuclear deterrence both traditional and existential developments seem possible, and these also depend on the type and the number of nuclear weapons which the United States continues to maintain in Europe. The more the trend towards further reductions of US nuclear weapons in Europe continues, the greater is the probability that transatlantic extended nuclear deterrence will become rather more existential in nature.

CONCLUSIONS

`And I can't forget, I can't forget, I can't forget,
but I don't remember what'
(Leonard Cohen)

It has been suggested in this paper that the agreements reached by Western governments during the Cold War period with regard to the role of nuclear weapons in Europe need critical re-examination in today's new situation, and that a new dialogue between leaders of both nuclear and non-nuclear countries over nuclear employment and deployment options is needed.

However, it may be asked how this could be implemented and in which institutional framework. The suggestion here is that a double effort by the countries who will be members of European Union needs to be made. On the one hand, there will be a continuing need to consult over the future of *transatlantic* security guarantees, including the various possible extended *transatlantic* nuclear deterrence options, and the appropriate institutional forum for such discussions will for the time being continue to be the Atlantic Alliance and its Nuclear Planning Group. On the other hand, since the future pace of European integration and the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy also depend on the degree of consultation over both transatlantic and intra-European nuclear matters among nuclear and non-nuclear members of the Union, an *intra-European* debate over the role of *European* nuclear weapons and their future roles will become equally necessary, and the most appropriate institution in which such a debate could begin is Western European Union. It goes without saying that both the transatlantic and the intra-European debates over the future role of nuclear weapons in Europe need to take place in parallel and with the greatest possible degree of transparency by all decision-makers from NATO, the EC and WEU member countries, since this would be the only way to avoid the re-emergence of reciprocal suspicions which could again undermine the evolutionary process that has worked so well on bilateral and multilateral levels during the last forty years. However, for the time being an initial *European* view on the future role of nuclear weapons for European security should come from the Nine, `because they form the core of both NATO and the EC, the only two institutions concerned with European security enjoying substantial histories, major bureaucracies, massive budgets, and a deep level of commitment from all their members.'[(68)]

One last general comment on nuclear deterrence needs to be made. Those who believe that they have squared the circle of defence with the concept of nuclear deterrence are mistaken. The fact that deterrence became so important in security matters only after 1945, with the qualitative change in the nature of war resulting from the advent of nuclear weapons, does not mean that its working principles did not previously exist. In its widest interpretation, it is possible to say that deterrence in its various forms has existed since the earth was first inhabited by animal life, certainly long before *Homo sapiens* evolved. However, given the fact that the word was used in a specific way during a specific period - the Cold War - it would not make sense to change the terminology now that the Cold War has come to an end. But, for the future shape of policy and strategy, a distinction between *deterrence* and *conflict prevention* could be made: the first would still be useful in association with strictly military means (in

association with nuclear and conventional forces), while the second would cover the whole range of military and non-military ways of guaranteeing security. Deterrence would thus be an integral and important part - but only a part -of the broader concept of conflict prevention.(69)

The fact that both *military* and *non-military* forms of conflict prevention work in some cases and fail in others is a sign that *neither of them is perfect*. However, it would be wrong to conclude that it is unnecessary to have both: giving up either the `stick' or the `carrot' would not widen but rather reduce the range of policy options for the prevention of wars and other conflicts. Before Maastricht, the Nine and the Twelve were totally separated in the sense that Western European Union had been dealing mainly with military security, while the European Community had been dealing mainly with non-military aspects of security. However, strategy requires not an occasion but a permanent reference to both military and non-military means of conflict prevention. Therefore, since military and non-military factors are both means to the same end (security), and since the countries dedicated to creating a European Union are currently developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy, what has been said in this paper is a strong argument for a full implementation of what has been outlined as only a possibility in Article J.4 of the Maastricht treaty with regard to a common defence policy and a common defence.

Finally, what has been said here should not be understood as an advocacy for a new `European superpower', nor as an argument against a renewed transatlantic relationship. One step towards closer integration within one group of countries does not automatically exclude further steps in a similar direction also being undertaken within other groups of states. That is why the prospect of a European Union with a Common Foreign and Security Policy does not exclude similar processes towards closer consultation and common action and - why not - towards a deeper integration within other institutions and negotiating forums, i.e. within the Atlantic Alliance, the CSCE or the United Nations.(70) Because of this the traditional and sometimes over-stressed distinction between `Atlanticists' and `Europeanists' becomes somewhat artificial and less relevant: to be in favour of European integration within a European Union with a Common Foreign and Security Policy does not necessarily mean that one has to be an anti-Atlanticist in order to achieve this; similarly, to promote the transatlantic partnership does not necessarily rule out belief in an integrated Europe. This might appear obvious to some, but it has unfortunately been, and continues to be, less so for others.

1. See, for instance, the Washington and Lisbon conferences on a stronger Western coordination of economic and humanitarian aid to the new republics of the former Soviet Union, and the criticism made shortly after these events by the former US President Richard Nixon that more help should be given by the West.

2. *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, NATO Press Communiqué, 7-8 November 1991, p. 6.

3. Ibid., p. 10.

4. Treaty on European Union, Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy, Article J.4.

5. Despite the Danish referendum of June 1992, which rejected ratification of the Treaty, the eleven other countries have decided to continue on their path towards ratification, leaving it open to the Danes to reconsider their position at the end of this process.

6. NATO Nuclear Planning Group, Final Communiqué, 18 October 1991.

7. See, for example, Uwe Nerlich, `Einige nichtmilitärische Bedingungen europäischer Sicherheit', *Europa Archiv*, 19/1991, p. 547: `Bis in die sechziger Jahre hinein ist der Begriff Sicherheit in seiner doppelten Bedeutung verstanden worden: Er hatte die Dimension politischer Ordnung und militärischen Schutzes. Der Harmel-Bericht von 1967 war ein letzter Versuch, diese beiden Aufgaben zu verklammern.'

8. In some recent articles the authors fall into this trap of legitimising nuclear deterrence because of potential risks and threats. See Thomas Durrell-Young, `NATO's sub-strategic nuclear forces and strategy: where do we go from here?', Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1992, p. 7; see also George Quester, `The future of nuclear deterrence', *Survival*, Spring 1992, p. 88. For a distinction between risks and threats see François Heisbourg, `The future of the Atlantic Alliance: Whither NATO, whether NATO?', *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 1992, pp. 129-130.

9. A recent article dates the concept of deterrence back to the Hammurabi Code, `the most ancient penal code in the world (3000 B.C.)'. See Jean-Louis Gergorin, `Deterrence in the post-Cold War Era', *Adelphi Paper* 266 (London: Brassey's for the IISS, 1992), p. 3.

10. Richard K. Betts, `The Concept of Deterrence in the Postwar Era' *Security Studies*, Autumn 1991, p. 25. See also R. J. Overy, `Air Power and the Origins of Deterrence Theory before 1939', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, March 1992, pp. 73 f.

11. See, for instance, Colin S. Gray, `The Definitions and Assumptions of Deterrence: Questions of Theory and Practice', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, December 1990, pp. 6, 13; Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, `Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies', *World Politics*, January 1989, p. 145; Edward Rhodes, `Nuclear Weapons and Credibility: deterrence theory beyond rationality', *Review of International Studies*, vol. 14, no. 1, 1988, p. 47.

12. Richard K. Betts, op. cit. in note 10, p. 35.

13. Philip Bobbitt, `The History and Future of Nuclear Strategy', *Democracy and Deterrence*(London: MacMillan Press, 1988), p. 7. See also Keith Payne and Lawrence Fink, `Deterrence without defence: gambling on perfection', *Strategic Review*, Winter 1989, pp. 25-40.

14. While one could agree that nuclear weapons may not have been sufficient to avoid war, it is difficult to share the view that they were not necessary for its avoidance.

15. John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), p. 4. However, later in his book the author becomes less radical with regard to what he says in the introduction. See also op. cit., pp. 218-219.

16. Laurence Martin, `The Nuclear Element in European Security', *European Strategy Group Paper 1990*, pp. 41-42. For this view see also Karl Kaiser, `From Nuclear Deterrence to Graduated Conflict Control', *Survival*, November/December 1990, pp. 483 f.; Michael Quinlan, `Nuclear Weapons and the Abolition of War', *International Affairs*, vol. 67, no. 2, 1991, pp. 293 f.; Edward Rhodes, `Nuclear Weapons and Credibility: deterrence theory beyond rationality', *Review of International Studies*, vol. 14, no. 1, 1988, pp. 57-58.

17. The beginning of the INF episode can be traced back to before 1979, for example to Helmut Schmidt's speech given in 1977 at the IISS. See Helmut Schmidt, `The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture', *Survival*, January/February 1978, pp. 2-10.

18. However, other dilemmas with regard to nuclear weapons apart from this one exist, and they can be found, for instance, in the debates over deterrence by denial and by punishment, or on the question of how and when land-based nuclear weapons could actually be used (for example, does one use them or lose them?).

19. At the US-Russian summit held in June 1992 in Washington, US President George Bush and his Russian counterpart Boris Yeltsin decided to reduce further their respective nuclear arsenals down to about 3,500 warheads each within a period of approximately ten years.

20. See, on the question of an emerging post-nuclear era, Edward N. Luttwak, `An Emerging Post-Nuclear Era?', *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1988, pp. 5-18 and Pierre Lellouche, *Le nouveau monde. De l'ordre de Yalta au désordre des nations* (Paris: Grasset, 1992), pp. 79-115. See also Kurt Campbell, Ashton Carter, Steven Miller and charles Zraket, `Soviet Nuclear Fission: Control of the Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating Soviet Union', *CSIA Studies in International Security*, November 1991, on different US policy options with regard to the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union; and Roberto Zadra, `Strategy and Theatre Nuclear Weapons Modernization in Western Europe', *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 10, no. 2, 1991, pp. 141 ff.

21. See, for instance, William Arkin, Damion Durrant and Hans Kristensen, `Nuclear Weapons headed for the Trash', *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, December 1991,

especially page 15, where the authors comment on the September 1991 US arms reduction initiative, saying `Whether he intended it or not, Bush has taken steps that mean the beginning of the end for nuclear weapons.'

22. Robert McNamara has recently suggested that `insofar as it is achievable, we should seek to return to a non-nuclear world.' *International Herald Tribune,* 15 October 1992.

23. See Nuclear Planning Group, press release, 18 October 1991, and *Atlantic News,* 8 July 1992.

24. For example, the recent proposal on the long-term elimination of *ballistic* missiles. See Alton Frye, `Zero Ballistic Missiles', *Foreign Policy,* Fall 1992, pp. 3 ff.

25. See Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of war* (New York: Free Press, 1991), especially pp. 192-227. The author concludes that `in the future people will probably look back upon the twentieth century as a period of mighty empires, vast armies, and incredible fighting machines that have crumbled into dust ... As war between states exits through oneside of history's revolving door, low-intensity conflict among different organisations will enter through the other' (p. 224).

26. See Lewis Dunn, `Containing Nuclear Proliferation', *Adelphi Paper* 263 (London: Brassey's for the IISS, 1991), pp. 59 ff.

27. GPS was formerly known as GPALS (Global Protection Against Limited Strikes). See Ivo Daalder, *Strategic Defences in the 1990s. Criteria for Deployment,* (London: MacMillan, 1991), pp. 5 ff. See also Frédéric Bozo, `Une doctrine nucléaire européenne: pour quoi faire et comment?', *Politique Etrangère*, Eté 1992, pp. 419-421.

28. Samuel P. Huntington, `Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe', in Steven E. Miller and Sean M. Lynn-Jones (eds.), *Conventional and American Defence Policy,* Revised Edition (Harvard: MIT Press, 1989), p. 249. See also John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983); James R. Golden, `Conventional Deterrence: Conclusions and Policy Implications' in Golden, Clark and Arlinghaus (eds.), *Conventional Deterrence: Alternatives for European Defense* (Massachusetts/Toronto: Lexington Books, 1984).

29. During the annual meetings of END (European Nuclear Disarmament), supporters of peace movements put forward the suggestion that conventional deterrence should not be a *complement*to nuclear deterrence but a *substitute* for it. This view was not, however, shared by the majority of the academic community, who favoured a greater role for the conventional component of deterrence.

30. John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 13.

31. In the debate on chances and limits for conventional deterrence an important analytical distinction between a blitzkrieg and a war of attrition was made: ` ...

deterrence is likely to fail when a potential attacker thinks he can launch a successful blitzkrieg. The attrition strategy, on the other hand, can promise at best a delayed success at a high cost and may very well fail to produce a decisive victory'; see Mearsheimer 1983, p. 30.

32. McGeorge Bundy, `Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf', *Foreign Affairs*, Autumn 1991, pp. 88, 94.

33. For an example, see a recent RAND project on arms control in which the authors suggest `reductions in all nuclear weapons to minimum deterrent levels on the part of all nuclear powers, including those of Britain and France. The residual purpose of nuclear weapons would be simply and solely to deter their use by others', Lynn Davis, Christophe Bertram, Ivo Daalder, Richard Darilek, Ian Davidson, Hilmar Linnenkamp, John Roper and Michael Wills, *An arms control strategy for CSCE, Helsinki 1992* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1992), p. 27.

34. William J. Perry, `Desert Storm and Deterrence', in *Foreign Affairs*, Autumn 1991, p. 66. The author also suggests that `the new military capability can also serve as a credible deterrent to a regional power's use of chemical weapons.'

35. Interview given by M. François Mitterrand and reported in *Speeches and Statements*(London: French Embassy), 7 February 1991, pp. 1 and 3.

36. *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, NATO Press Communiqué, 7 November 1991, p. 10.

37. Carl Kaysen, Robert McNamara and George W. Rathjens, `Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War', *Foreign Affairs*, Autumn 1991, pp. 106-107. The authors conclude that `although we have no quarrel with (estimates on how much is enough - RZ), nor with most of the other discussions of minimum deterrence in the last three decades, the size of the force required for the purpose depends on the size of others' nuclear forces' (p. 107). Quinlan is even less concrete, when he refers to `nuclear weapons in smaller but still significant numbers.' See Michael Quinlan, op. cit. in note 16, p. 293.

38. Florian Gerster and Michael Hennes, `Minimalabschreckung durch die Kernwaffen Englands und Frankreichs', *Europäische Wehrkunde*, August 1990, pp. 442 f. Gray uses the terms `overdeterrence' and `underdeterrence' in his analysis of the requirements for minimum deterrence; see Colin S. Gray, `The Definitions and Assumptions of Deterrence: Questions of Theory and Practice', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, December 1990, p. 13. See also Michael Mazarr, `Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War', *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer 1992, pp. 194-196.

39. Several authors have recently suggested a `No First Use' doctrine. See `What Future for Nuclear Forces in International Security?', Report of the CNSN-IFRI Workshop, 27-28 February 1992, Paris, p. 5. Lewis Dunn proposes an `assured nuclear second use' in order to strengthen the credibility of deterrence against new potential threats; see Lewis Dunn, `Containing Nuclear Proliferation', *Adelphi Paper* 263, Winter 1991, p. 60. See also Marisol Touraine, `Le nucléaire après la guerre froide', *Politique Etrangère*, Eté 1992, p. 402.

40. *The Random House Dictionary of the English Language*, Second Edition (New York: Random House, 1987), p. 542. See also a somewhat wider definition in *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, 1973, where deterrence is defined as `preventing by fear', p. 533 (emphasis in text added).

41. See Colin S. Gray, `The Definitions and Assumptions of Deterrence: Questions of Theory and Practice', *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, December 1990, p. 4: `It should not be assumed ... that deterrence has to mean nuclear deterrence. In truth there is only deterrence, just as there is only strategy (and not nuclear strategy).'

42. For example, with regard to the region of the Middle East and the Gulf, chemical weapons are sometimes seen as the poor man's deterrent.

43. However, this is not to say that, in the Cold War period, there were no other attempts to reinforce security through *non-military* means: German *Ostpolitik* and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) are probably the two most prominent examples.

44. John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), p. 246.

45. McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival. Choices about the Bomb for the first Fifty Years*(New York: Random House, 1988), p. 601.

46. See, for instance, *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, Third Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), pp. 533, 579: `deterrence' is defined as `preventing by fear', while `dissuasion' is more softly explained as `advice or exhortation against something'. *The Random House Dictionary of the English Language*, Second Edition (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 542, 570, states that `dissuade' means `to *deter* by advice or persuasion; persuade not to do something' (emphasis added).

47. This has been the case in some Italian thinking. Some English-speaking analysts have on occasions used `deterrence' and `dissuasion' as synonyms; for instance, see Lawrence Freedman, `General deterrence and the balance of power', *Review of International Studies*, April 1988, p. 200. It is worth noting that in his speech on European integration and security, Jacques Delors used the word `dissuasion' with regard to *economic sanctions*; see Jacques Delors, `European Integration and Security', *Survival*, March/April 1991, p. 102.

48. John Mueller goes very far in this, saying that `indeed, it seems likely that the vast majority of wars that never happen, including most of those that haven't taken place in the developed world since 1945, are caused largely by factors that have little or nothing to do with military considerations.' See John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War*(New York: Basic Books, 1989), p. 247.

49. Ibid.

50. The three European Communities were the European Coal and Steel Community (1951), the European Atomic Energy Community (1957) and the European Economic Community (1957). In their first decade in particular, they were used partially as an

instrument of foreign policy in the sense of containment: they included constraints on German behaviour. A similar stance for controlling Germany through elements of both containment and integration was worked out within WEU, especially with the four Protocols added in 1954 to the Brussels Treaty, which had been signed in 1948: these four Protocols provided *inter alia* for ceilings to the size of the armed forces of the member states (with special limitations for Germany worked out in a supplementary Protocol) and intrusive arms control inspections (not only but especially for Germany).

51. Since that time, more than fifty Franco-German summits have been held.

52. Michael Howard affirms that Bernard Brodie formulated the term `existential deterrence', but McGeorge Bundy also lays claim to it. However, both have used the term in different contexts. See Michael Howard, `Brodie, Wohlstetter and American nuclear strategy', *Survival*, Summer 1992, pp. 110-111. See also McGeorge Bundy, `Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf', *Foreign Affairs*, Autumn 1991, p. 84.

53. Freedman suggests that `the extent of the cover provided by the US nuclear umbrella remains insoluble in analytical terms', but `deterring aggression by the Warsaw Pact ... has turned out to be easier in practice than it ought to be in theory.' Lawrence Freedman, `The Evolution and Future of Extended Nuclear Deterrence', *Adelphi Paper* 236 (London: Brassey's for the IISS, 1989), p. 19. See also Michael J. Mazarr, `Beyond Counterforce', *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 9, no. 2, 1990, pp. 154-155.

54. McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival. Choices about the Bomb in the first fifty years*(New York: Random House, 1988), p. 599.

55. In the late 1960s the previous doctrine of Massive Retaliation was officially replaced by that of Flexible Response, which had finally been accepted by all other NATO member countries.

56. See Roberto Zadra, `European NATO-countries and the INF negotiations', *The International Spectator*, vol. XXV, no. 1, 1990, pp. 70-73.

57. In this section an analytical distinction is made between transatlantic and intra-European extended nuclear deterrence arrangements. The transatlantic model discussed here, however, does not refer to existing NATO arrangements which, in addition to US nuclear forces, also include British ones.

58. Florian Gerster and Michael Hennes, `Minimalabschreckung durch die Kernwaffen Englands und Frankreichs', *Europäische Wehrkunde*, August 1990, p. 443 (author's translation).

59. Marco Carnovale, `Why NATO-Europe needs a Nuclear Trigger', *Orbis*, Spring 1991, p. 227.

60. Credibility is understood here as being the result of perceptions by both the members of an alliance and by its adversaries; they obviously influence each other, at least to a certain extent.

61. Article J.4 of the Treaty on European Union, Title V, Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy. See also Elfriede Regelsberger, `Gemeinsame Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik nach Maastricht - Minimalreformen in neuer Entwicklungsperspektive', *Integration*, no. 2, 1992, pp. 87 f.

62. Address given by the President of the French Republic at the opening of the National Encounters for Europe, Palais des Congrès, Paris, 10 January 1992. The first official reaction to Mitterrand's initiative that West European defence ministers made in public was at a colloquy organised by the French Ministry of Defence in Paris, 29 September - 1 October 1992.

63. Frédéric Bozo, for example, believes in a `vocation européenne de la dissuasion française', but `une dissuasion elargie de facto plutot que de jure'; see Frédéric Bozo, `La France, l'OTAN et l'avenir de la dissuasion en Europe', *Politique Etrangère*, Eté 1991, pp. 516, 518. See also Frédéric Bozo, `Une doctrine nucléaire européenne: pour que faire et comment?', *Politique Etrangère*, Eté 1992, p. 414.

64. This section does not consider the possibility of extending nuclear deterrence to countries which are not members of European Union. Walter Slocombe, for example, has made the suggestion that `the United States and its West European allies must, in their own long-run interest, now find a credible way to extend security protection, backed ultimately by a nuclear guarantee, to the East.' See Walter B. Slocombe, `The Continued Need for Extended Deterrence', *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 1991, p. 165. However, in his essay, the author does not even raise the difficult questions with regard to the credibility of such a nuclear security guarantee extended to the East and with regard to the costs and risks associated with this. Which country of the Atlantic Alliance would be ready to risk his own population becoming involved in a nuclear conflict because of, for example, an ultimate security guarantee to the Baltic states or to Romania?

65. See what was said earlier on the post-Cold War changes with regard to actual or potential risks and threats and with regard to the changing nature of conflict.

66. It is obvious that, as long as France and the United Kingdom remain nuclear powers within European Union, a purely transatlantic extended nuclear deterrence solution for the Nine/Twelve would not be a realistic scenario.

67. This is, however, at present not true with regard to nuclear matters.

68. Ian Gambles, `European security integration in the 1990s', *Chaillot Paper* 3 (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, November 1991), p. 17.

69. In this sense, the statement that `deterrence may be necessary, but it is certainly not sufficient' remains valid. See Raymond L. Garthoff, `changing Realities, changing Perceptions: Deterrence and US Security after the Cold War', *The Brookings Review*, Autumn 1990, p. 17.

70**.** Since the attainment of `security' and the attainment of `integration' are not static but dynamic processes, it is even conceivable that a `Transatlantic Union' could replace NATO at some time in the future.