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EUROPEAN SECURITY ACROSS THE MEDITERRANEAN

Roberto Aliboni

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INTRODUCTION

The Mediterranean: `centre', `frontier' or `crossroads'?

Whether the countries of the Mediterranean littoral are linked by special bonds of solidarity is and will remain a much-debated question[1]. After the Second World War, anti-imperialist and non-aligned thinking advocated such solidarity on the grounds that countries as diverse as Egypt and Italy, or Spain and Algeria, were none the less equally subject to political and economic domination by the more advanced countries of Northern Europe and North America.

This hypothesis, though not without its effect on the political positions of Mediterranean governments, has proved to be unfounded. The countries of Southern Europe have become increasingly integrated into the European Community, while the Arab countries of the Mediterranean have remained part of the Arab and Islamic world. The Mediterranean is not, therefore, a `centre', naturally destined to breed solidarity, but rather a `frontier' separating worlds that are culturally, economically and politically very far apart - the Judæo-Christian and the Islamic; the developed and the underdeveloped; the democratic and the authoritarian.

This does not mean that cooperation and security across this frontier are precluded. As the French historian Fernand Braudel pointed out, the Mediterranean is also a `crossroads'[2], open to influences and exchanges and therefore to cooperation and security as well as to conflict and tensions; a crossroads, however, which still divides different parts of the Mediterranean. This means that cooperation and security are possible but cannot be taken for granted. They require an effort of will and specific management.

A broader concept of the Mediterranean region

If the Mediterranean is considered as a frontier, the difficulty of defining the region immediately arises. Unless a purely geographic approach is taken, it is pointless to consider only the littoral countries. In order to make a politically meaningful analysis, it is necessary to include the numerous regions that skirt this frontier: the Maghreb and parts of the Arabized Sahel (chad, Mauritania); the Arab Orient; and the Gulf countries.

In principle, the Horn of Africa should also be included. Somalia is a member of the League of Arab States. Ethiopia and the Arab world have important geopolitical links[3]. In this paper, however, the Horn of Africa will not be considered, in order to limit the paper's already wide scope.

Even if the Horn of Africa is excluded, the notion derived from the consideration of the Mediterranean as a frontier goes well beyond the Mediterranean basin. Though the word Mediterranean is sometimes employed elliptically to refer to much more than the Mediterranean basin[4], it is more appropriate to refer to the `southern approaches to Western Europe' or to the `Southern Regions'.

In this report the term `Southern Regions' will be used, based on the concept of the Mediterranean as a frontier. It will include the Near East, the Middle East as far as the Gulf, and North Africa.

The Balkans

Should the Balkans also be included in this broader `Mediterranean' picture?
The Balkan region is characterized by several important features similar to
those that lie at the root of the instability from the South - persistent underdevelopment and fierce nationalism. These similarities are reinforced by a common historical and cultural background that dates from the long Muslim rule, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the colonial policies of the major European powers. Consequently, rivalries, conflicts and instability in this region are similar to those found in the areas to the south of Europe. Despite their significant Islamic heritage, however, the Balkan populations have been largely secularized by national experiences between the two World Wars and socialist regimes since then. The Balkan countries consider themselves Europeans and were treated as such by the governments of Western Europe in the policies adopted towards the region during the events of 1989-90.

Potential crises in this region would involve Western Europe, as those in the Middle East and North Africa have done, but the Balkans would not be characterized by the same anti-Western feelings. It is also difficult to imagine a connection between crises in the Balkans and those in the Southern Regions, since they stem from different political and security issues. For the purposes of this report, therefore, the Balkans will be considered a `crisis spot' quite distinct from the area to the south of Europe. The report will therefore focus on the security issues that arise at the boundary formed by the Mediterranean, which separates Europe from North Africa, the Near East and the Middle East.

The Soviet threat and tensions from the South

Since the build-up in the Brezhnev era, the presence of the USSR has no longer been of central importance in the regions to the south of Europe. After the mid-1970s, the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean Sea stopped receiving reinforcements and over the 1980s was gradually reduced in size[5]. The leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev led to extensive withdrawals from the Third World, including regions to the south of Europe.

In the past, threats arising from decolonization and nationalism in countries to the south of Europe were a cause for concern primarily because they could easily become enmeshed in the East-West confrontation and be exploited by the USSR and its allies, escalating to a higher level of threat. Southern and East-West threats were thus intertwined. Analyses tended to link threats from nationalism in the region to the threat from Communism and East-West confrontation.

Developments in the USSR make it necessary today to distinguish between these two threats. The South represents a threat in its own right, with its own capabilities and motivation. Faced with this threat, the West and the USSR may even have converging security interests. On the other hand, the Soviet presence to the south of Europe, in

particular in the Mediterranean, is to be seen as part of the European theatre, now undergoing profound transformations within the broader context of East-West détente. Such a presence must be narrowed to the Southern European Flank and separated from regional tensions.

This paper therefore examines tensions and threats from the South as distinct from the Soviet threat. The current Soviet presence on NATO's Southern Flank is not considered, as it is an issue that now only affects security on the European continent. Instead, attention will be given to the developments in East-West relations, of which the Soviet presence south of Europe is an element, as this will have a significant influence on Western security policy in the regions that lie at the focus of this analysis.

The paper is divided into two main sections that address the following questions: (1) What are the trends contributing to instability and challenges in the Southern Regions? (2) What is the rationale for European security policy in the Mediterranean and which policies should be pursued by Western Europe across the Mediterranean frontier to face such challenges and instabilities?

TRENDS IN THE SOUTHERN REGIONS

Armaments

One of the most significant trends in the 1980s was the increase and spread of conventional weapons, on the one hand, and the proliferation of systems of `unconventional' weapons on the other. The latter - nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and ballistic missiles - are the result of relatively recent tendencies towards a qualitative improvement in the military arsenals in the Southern Regions, whereas the quantitative accumulation of conventional weapons is a longstanding trend.

Within this general development, which affects the whole of the Third World, the amount of weapons accumulated in the Southern Regions and the growing importance of the armies in the region are particularly impressive, if compared with the figures for the countries lying on the northern side of the Mediterranean frontier[6]. A comparison of the increase in the total number of active armed forces between 1980 and 1990 shows an increase of 95% in the Arab Orient (83% if Israel is included) and 45% in the Maghreb (60% including Libya); in contrast there has been a decrease of 6% in the European Community countries (2% including Turkey). According to absolute figures for 1990, total active armed forces amount to 2.37 million soldiers in the European Community (3.02 including Turkey), 2.69 in the Arab Orient (2.83 including Israel) and 0.35 in the Maghreb (0.45 including Libya).

A more precise idea can be obtained by comparing the number of combat aircraft of some of the most significant European and Southern Regions countries in the middle of 1990: Egypt (475), Iraq (689), Israel (553), Libya (513), Syria (558), FRG (503), France (597), Italy (425), Spain (221), UK (538). Even more surprising is the comparison of holdings of main battle tanks: Egypt (3,190), Iraq (5,500), Israel (4,288), Libya (2,300), Syria (4,000), FRG (5,045), France (1,340), Italy (1,533), Spain (838), UK (1,330).

The interpretation of these figures is severely limited in what it reveals. On the whole European armed forces remain definitely superior. However, the figures do point to the existence of a long-term trend towards a balance of military power between North and South, especially along the Mediterranean frontier.

This trend may have stabilised in the last few years. However, its effects continue. A recent study issued by the United States Congressional Research Service reports that in 1985-1988 the Middle East received two thirds of the weapons delivered to the Third World[7]. According to the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) figures, Middle East military spending declined sharply by 15% in 1987 and by 12% from 1984 to 1987, after reaching a high level in the period 1982 to 1984. Still, in 1988 the Middle East region imported some $17.9 billion in arms, almost 38% of the entire world market[8].

As regards the proliferation of `unconventional' weapons, Israel is the only country which is assumed to possess a nuclear capability[9]. The ambitions and attempts of other countries are known. However, prior to the 1991 war in the Gulf it seemed that only Iraq was moving towards an effective nuclear capability, though this would not

be achieved for a period which (according to different reports) varies from ten years to two[10]. The countries in the region which possess chemical weapons and which are able to produce them are Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Syria and possibly Libya (the status of the Rabta chemical plant in Libya is not clear). It would, however, be the largest in the Third World to date[11]. Finally, it seems that Iran, Iraq and Syria possess biological weapons[12].

Developments related to the proliferation of ballistic missiles in the Third World are also notable. As for the Southern Regions, these developments can be summarized as follows[13]. With respect to long-range missiles (range in km is indicated in brackets) and space launch vehicles (SLV), Iraq has deployed the *Al-Abbas* (900), tested the *Tammuz 1* (2,000) and the SLV *Al-Abid* and is probably developing the *Condor 2* (1,000); Israel has tested the *Jericho 2 B* (1,500) and the SLV *Shavit*; Saudi Arabia has deployed the *DR-3* (2,200). As regards medium-range missiles, Egypt has deployed and used the *Scud B* (280) and is developing a more advanced version of the latter - the *Scud 100* -whose range and payload are not known; the *Scud B* has also been deployed and used by Iran, Iraq and Libya, whereas South Yemen and Syria have deployed it without using it; Iraq has deployed and used the *Al-Husayn* (600) and is developing the *Fahd* (500) and the *Baraq*(250); Israel has probably deployed the *Jericho 1* (480) and the *Jericho 2* (750); Libya seems to have the *Otrag* (500) and the *Al-Fatah* (480-720) under development. Finally, as for short-range missiles, Algeria, Kuwait, Libya and South Yemen deploy the *Frog 7* (70), as do Egypt, Iraq and Syria, which have also used it; Egypt deploys the *Frog 5* (50) and the *Sakr 80* (80); Iran deploys the *Oghab* (40) - which it has also used - and the *Nazeat* (130), while developing the *Shahin 2*(110-130); Iraq is developing the *Laith* (90), the *Nissan* (110) and the *Kassir* (150); Israel deploys the *Lance* (120); Syria and the two Yemens deploy the *SS 21* (120).

There is not necessarily any relationship between NBC weapons and ballistic missiles, in the sense that NBC weapons need not necessarily be delivered by ballistic missiles. So far, missiles used have carried conventional payloads. However, in the regions which concern us a considerable correlation can be noted between missile development and that of `unconventional' payloads.

The strategic implications of these developments have been accorded different assessments. At the regional level both stabilizing[14] and destabilizing[15] effects of nuclear weapons have been asserted. Some Arab authors[16] attribute a deterrent function to Arab chemical weapons and ballistic missiles with relation to Israel's assumed nuclear capabilities. This deterrent function can be actually recognized in relation to specific cases and goals. On this point Navias underlines that `While the Arab States, including Syria, have publicly linked the possession of chemical capabilities to Israel's nuclear arsenal, the main role of chemical weapons could be to ensure intra-war deterrence in a conflict with Israel'[17]. One similar effect could be ascribed to missiles with conventional payloads, both from the point of view of deterrence (preventing a conflict between two adversaries who perceive one another to be equally capable of retaliation) and from the point of view of `compellence' (inducing moderation during a conflict, especially in relation to the capability of attacks on a civil population). Finally, the possession by Syria of conventional missiles is generally regarded as a factor which insures `crisis stability' between Syria and Israel[18].

Despite the existence of cases in which NBC weapons and ballistic missiles (whatever their payload - NBC or conventional) may have a stabilizing or a deterrent effect on conflicts, it remains the case that in the recent Iran-Iraq war they were largely employed in very traditional ways: conventional missiles were employed to terrorize populations in the cities and chemical weapons were employed against both military personnel and civilians with tactical aims, but also to terrorize, exactly as they had been during the First World War and in colonial conflicts in Libya and elsewhere. Deterrence makes war irrational but not impossible. It makes it less probable when a shared `rationality' exists or arises. This is what has happened in the East-West context. It is not certain that the same is true in the North-South context. Again, Navias points out that `Many developing countries face extremely unpredictable strategic environments in which their ignorance of enemy intentions and capabilities is matched only by the certainty of their foes' implacability and, in some cases, willingness to suffer immense casualties'[19].

One is led to think that, beyond specific situations of deterrence, those who see the growing level of armaments in the Southern Regions as a determinant of conflict primarily among regional actors are right. So much so that one has to relate this tendency to the fact that the regional environment continues to be inherently unstable for political reasons and that this instability is apparently increasing.

Regional nationalism

Broadly speaking, one can say that democratic institutions are very feeble and often absent in the Southern Regions, though with differences from country to country. This is another fundamental factor of instability in these regions. The absence or feebleness of democracy makes domestic consensus behind governments and regimes remain weak. In order to obviate this weakness the governments and the regimes adopt pan-Arab or Islamic foreign policies - policies asserting Arab or Islamic interests rather than national interests. As well as policies intended to assert their own national interests, they assert policies of `regional' nationalism. Competition in asserting such policies increases intra-regional competition among countries and regimes and makes their relations, within the Southern Regions and in the wider international circle, very conflictual. The process that has just been broadly outlined needs to be examined more closely.

The regimes in the Southern Regions are not fully representative governments: whether religious or secular, they are dictatorships or absolute monarchies and are always supported by efficient secret police. If in certain countries there are more checks on authority at specific times, these are instituted at the will of their rulers rather than by real constitutional guarantees. Consequently, the consensus within these regimes is based to a significant degree on their capacity to pursue `regional' objectives that are firmly rooted in the collective identity, i.e. objectives that arouse, reinforce and satisfy a popular sense of national, religious and cultural belonging. Foreign policy is used to alleviate internal tensions and create consensus for the leadership[20].

Given the overwhelming importance of religion to the identity of the local populations, religious regimes enjoy a stronger legitimacy. But even in such regimes -

as is the case of Saudi Arabia and Iran - internal legitimacy is largely the result of a religious role at the international level, i.e. in foreign policy. Saudi Arabia fulfils this role by protecting holy places and by defending and financing Islam in the world (by building mosques, financing Islamic institutions and brotherhoods, etc.). The revolutionary Iranian government fulfilled a similar role by waging an eight-year holy war in which, despite the atrocities inflicted on it, the population was easily mobilized.

The great majority of the people in the Southern Regions consider a regime - whether secular or religious - to be legitimate if it guarantees the autonomy, dignity (and in many cases the superiority) of their ethnic and religious culture in the world. Consensus does not necessarily entail aggressive and bellicose policies towards the West and other `infidels', such as that of revolutionary Iran, nor is it necessarily tied to policies of `separate' development with respect to the West. It is, however, strongly conditioned by the capacity of a regime to assert its place in the world, to affirm the `just' national and cultural rights of its people, and to protect them from foreign intrusion.

This basic platform of cultural assertiveness and fierce autonomy manages to reconcile religious, national, secular and even Westernized public opinion in the Southern Regions. It is this which gives rise to the widespread and inexorable commitment of populations in the Southern Regions to claims on Palestine, including Jerusalem. They see these issues as symbolic of humiliation at the hands of the West from the point of view of both their cultural identity and their `regional' sense of nationhood.

Thus, if regimes in the Southern Regions are to gain legitimacy and broaden the base of their support, the reconciliation of religious and secular opinion through a basic platform of a `regional' nationalism is crucial. This was the pan-Arab platform of Gamal Abdel Nasser at the time he assumed power with the support of the Muslim Brotherhood, it was the Islamic platform of Khomeini and it is today the neo-pan-Arab platform adopted by Saddam Hussein.

In conclusion, `regional' nationalism serves an essentially utilitarian purpose: it is used by regimes to gain consensus. A policy, or at least a rhetoric, of `regional' nationalism is crucial to the survival of these regimes because truly democratic alternatives for achieving consensus do not exist.

By setting in motion `regional' nationalism the regimes may reinforce consensus domestically, but they weaken the stability of international relations within the Southern Regions (and even beyond). To assert this kind of nationalism they must necessarily intrude into other countries' affairs and compete with other regimes for the `regional' leadership.

One can seriously doubt whether this struggle among regional countries will stop. With the end of the Iran-Iraq war, it seemed that a tendency towards collaboration and association among Arab countries might be possible. In addition to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) established in 1981 by Gulf Arab monarchies, the Union of the Arab Maghreb (UAM) and the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) were formed at almost the same time in 1989.

The UAM comprises Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia i.e. the Arab Maghreb in its broadest sense. Progress in the UAM has proved to be slow and difficult, particularly because of the political crisis that has meanwhile developed in Algeria, the key member of the Union. Nevertheless, the experiment is continuing.

That is not the case, however, of the ACC, which comprises Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and North Yemen (which has subsequently been united with South Yemen). It had seemed that this association would consolidate the alliance of secular regimes that grew out of the Iran-Iraq war, and that it would lead to Iraq becoming one of the pro-Western countries. The occupation of Kuwait has killed the ACC and weakened the GCC.

The process of stabilization that these tendencies towards association and cooperation seemed to herald is now in question. The Iraq-Kuwait crisis has revealed the great potential that `regional' nationalism has for conflict. Unexpected moves such as the *rapprochement* between Egypt and Syria (despite a bitter and longstanding confrontation) are indicative of the fragility of the internal and external equilibriums of the Southern Regions. The countries of the Southern Regions, in particular the Arab ones, react to the slightest hint of change in the regional equilibrium, even if their specific interests are not directly affected. This happens for various reasons.

(i) As has been mentioned, the adoption by a country of policies based on `regional' nationalism sets off a wave of regional activism which undermines the internal consensus of the other regimes, particularly those in countries such as Egypt, Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia whose legitimacy is tightly intertwined with pan-Arabism or Islamism (depending on the country) and their capacity to uphold their respective `just' causes.

(ii) The pursuit of national territorial interests upsets the balance of power with respect to the `regional' *status quo* and is not tolerated by any regime - regardless of whether it is involved in a crisis. This explains the *rapprochement* between Egypt and Syria and their rapid assistance to Saudi Arabia in the Kuwait crisis.

(iii) Competing ideologies, such as those of the Syrian and Iraqi Baath parties, lead to rivalries even if there are no real national interests at stake. This is demonstrated, for instance, by the Iraqi support of the Lebanese Christians led by General Aoun against Syria.

(iv) There is a clash of ideology between secular and religious regimes. The latter support attempts by religious opposition groups to bring down ruling secular regimes, which in turn feel justified not only in ensuring their own security but also in `modernizing' countries led by religious monarchies (e.g. Egypt's military intervention in the Yemen war; Algeria and Morocco; and now Iraq and Kuwait).

In conclusion, politics in the Southern Regions are characterized by a marked tendency towards conflict and competition in which alliances and balances of power prevail over policies of institutional association and economic integration. More specific national interests (such as territorial disputes) or ideological conflicts combine with and are exacerbated by the `regional' competition stirred by `regional' nationalism. Growing rearmament in the Southern Regions is explained by insecurity

with respect to Israel but more so by insecurity stirred by `regional' nationalism (in addition to more traditional national claims).

As mentioned earlier, `regional' nationalism derives from the necessity of regimes to generate consensus domestically in the absence of democratic institutions. In this sense, at the heart of the instability of the Southern Regions there lies the fact that democracy is feeble or non-existent. As long as democracy is absent or feeble, therefore, instability in the Southern Regions will remain an inherent tendency.

Israeli nationalism

The importance of the role of nationalism in the Southern Regions isconfirmed by the evolution of Israeli policy. The Labour Party and other political movements in Israel that derive from early immigration and Western democratic ideologies have been weakened by changes in the social and ethnic composition of more recent immigration, and by the inability to resolve the dilemma posed by the Arab territories occupied in 1967, i.e. whether to maintain them for security purposes or give them up to avoid conflicts and attempt a peaceful settlement.

The ethnic and social changes in Israel have worked to the advantage of right wing nationalists, who succeeded not only in gaining power in the mid-1970s and retaining it since then, but also in asserting their leadership over the Labour Party in their `condominium regime'. Though the motives of the Israeli right wing are complex, one can say that it aims at the annexation of the Occupied Territories for historical and national reasons which outweigh security. In other words, even if the Occupied Territories proved to be of no strategic value, it would still pursue its aim.

Important changes in Arab policy, such as Egypt's signing of the Camp David Agreements and, more recently, the PLO's significant change of course brought about by the *intifada*, have been prevented from leading to further progress by Israeli nationalism (which in turn has reasons to consider the PLO's changes too belated and reversible). When such progress becomes possible, it will alter the rules for achieving Arab consensus. It would be more difficult for radical forces, committed to `regional' nationalism, to exert pressure on regimes and leaders who would recognize Israel and accept a solution to the Palestinian question limited to the Occupied Territories. In the wake of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait these pressures have been exerted on the PLO, and they have succeeded in aligning the latter on the pan-Arab side.

The interaction of the two nationalisms makes progress difficult. Israeli nationalism therefore contributes, as does pan-Arabism, to the tensions, instability and unmanageable situation in the region.

Tendencies to democratization

As stated above, regimes in the Southern Regions are often extremely authoritative and have blatant disregard for human rights, individual liberty and freedom of association. Israel is an exception, though the continued occupation and subjugation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip detracts from its democratic regime.

There have, however, been some steps towards democracy[21] in several countries of the Southern Regions - Egypt and Morocco, and, more recently, Algeria, Tunisia and Jordan - where freedom of expression is permitted to a greater or lesser extent. A policy of tolerance has been adopted towards moderate religious elements, and the most severe forms of repression have been softened or eliminated. But these developments are not irreversible.

The elections in Jordan and Algeria have led to a considerable increase in the representation of religious elements. One of the most important recent developments in the Southern Regions is, in fact, the inclusion of religious elements in governmental circles, within which they often hold some form of power. What the outcome of this development will be is not yet clear; each case is different. If moderate religious elements succeed in emerging as a force distinct from the extremists this will favour the trend towards greater democracy; so will the ability of those currently in power to facilitate the separation of moderate from radical religious elements. If this very difficult process of separation is not achieved, radical religious forces could come to power, replacing a secular tyranny with a religious one (as has been the case in Iran); alternatively, if democratization does fail, the ruling secular regimes could revert to tyranny.

The above observations have been made with respect to the possible evolution of secular regimes. The question arises whether a similar process of integration with secular elements would be possible in countries ruled by religious moderates. This has in fact occurred in Morocco and Kuwait (the latter, however, maintains - as do the other Gulf monarchies - an unacceptable regime of discrimination regarding the immigrant majority). It is doubtful that this could occur in Saudi Arabia, which is a `moderate' country from the point of view of its relationship with the West, but not from that of religion. Increasing democratization in the region could be perceived by the Saudi monarchy as a serious destabilizing element, which it would not allow to take hold. As in the past, it would use the authority and means at its disposal to support orthodox religious groups abroad and their opposition against the secular regimes, in the Southern Regions as well as in Europe - in Turkey and in the Balkans. Though `moderate' and pro-Western, the Saudis must therefore be considered an obstacle, or at least a complicating factor, in what is in any case a difficult road to democratization in the countries of the Southern Regions.

Another possible evolution could be the ascendancy of nationalist elements in the process of democratization. The latter may bring about some sort of coalescing of secular nationalism and religious extremism - a phenomenon which arises whenever the sense of political and cultural humiliation intensifies and leads to the formation of an alliance against the West. This development would impede the emergence of moderate religious elements.

Despite these difficulties, there is a trend towards democratization. Its success is accompanied and conditioned by the emergence of religious moderates. It must be stressed that the emergence of this trend is a reaction to the significant risk of destabilization to which moderate regimes were exposed as a result of the Iran-Iraq war. This war, therefore, has led to a resurgence of pan-Arab nationalism. But it has also led to the emergence of religious moderates and an awareness on the part of

many regimes of the need to integrate this element within the broader framework of democratization.

Though relatively feeble, the tendency to democratization is of the greatest importance for the future stability of the Southern Regions. Only in this way would the countries of the Southern Regions gain a more solid consensus and increased stability.

Economic and social development

The Mediterranean is characterized by significant economic disparity between North and South and by the persisting underdevelopment on its southern shores.

A comprehensive study by the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) on the economy of the Mediterranean illustrates various aspects of this disparity: the countries on the northern shore of the Mediterranean have an industrial output four times that of the countries to the south; northern Mediterranean countries have long achieved self-sufficiency in agriculture, while southern Mediterranean countries, `despite attempts at agricultural reform and nation-wide modernization, are constrained by the lack of equipment and by demographic pressures increasingly resulting in insufficient productivity and a structural deficit of food'[22]. This disparity would be much more marked if southern Mediterranean countries were compared to *all* EC countries, rather than only southern EC countries, as is the case in the UNEP report.

In addition to structural factors, the disparity has increased as a result of the recession generally felt by all Arab countries following the drop in oil prices in 1979. The consequences of this recession, together with high public, and in particular military spending, have increased the international debt of southern Mediterranean countries to levels that are difficult to manage, resulting in difficult and painful policies of adjustment in these countries.

All of this is complicated by marked demographic pressures, making it more difficult to pursue economic development, creating increasing social problems, and increasing the disparity of income with respect to the countries on the northern shores. The latter, on the other hand, are experiencing a significant decline in demographic rates. According to the UNEP report cited above, in 1980 northern Mediterranean countries constituted 56% of the entire Mediterranean population; in 2020 they will account for less than one third. If the entire EC is considered, the disparity with respect to southern Mediterranean countries is less pronounced: it is predicted that in 2025, the population will reach 326 million in the EC and 349 million in southern Mediterranean countries (1988 figures are 324 and 184 million respectively).

With respect to trade[23], the Mediterranean depends on the EC for 48-49% of its total trade; conversely, the Mediterranean only accounts for 4% of total EC trade. Similarly, the Persian Gulf depends on the EC for 30% of its trade, but accounts for only 2% of total EC trade. Not only are trade balances of Southern Regions countries mostly negative, but they also show a tendency to increase their deficit, and even those (such as OPEC and Gulf countries) with positive trade balances show a strong tendency to decline. This results in high debt: in 1987 the Mediterranean countries

accounted for 16.3% of international debt (more than the share of Sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe), as opposed to 15.3% in 1984; while the Mediterranean debt increased, that of Latin America decreased during the same period, from 42,7% to 37.3%.

It must be stressed that the EC's Mediterranean policy - the only scheme for cooperation in the Mediterranean to be implemented systematically for a long period of time - has not prevented this worsening of the situation. In a comparison of donors, a Commission report has pointed out the inadequacies of the EC's financial aid to the Mediterranean: from 1979 to 1987, the share of the EC and its member states accounted for only 17% of total net official aid to southern Mediterranean countries; the US accounted for 31% and OPEC countries represented 28% of the total[24].

Preferential trade relations, which are particularly important for the Maghreb, have become less effective over the years, and with the entrance of Greece, Portugal and Spain into the EC, trade cooperation between the EC and the Mediterranean has lost ground. This resulted in the 1988 requests for EC membership by Cyprus, Malta, Morocco and Turkey[25].

If the net effects of aid flows from the EC and its member states to the Mediterranean countries are not as positive as expected, it must be stressed that the latter are not without considerable responsibility. In general, Mediterranean countries have adopted policies which have hindered their own development and which have prevented cooperation programmes from yielding better results. Their own policies have hindered or eliminated normal market forces; ruined agriculture; introduced protectionism, artificial exchange rates and inward-looking policies of industrialization; and have not devoted adequate attention to marketing. Today, those Mediterranean countries which most obstinately applied state socialism to their economies have made a turnabout and, with the assistance of the IMF and the World Bank, are now implementing policies of adjustment and restructuring aimed at reintroducing private property and initiative and the rules of a free market.

Migration

Whatever the past responsibilities and future prospects for collaboration, the fact remains that the economic disparity between North and South is increasing. This disparity, together with sharp demographic differentials, has resulted in a strong South-North migratory pressure in the Mediterranean[26].

Such pressure gives rise to two types of problem: accommodating the influx of people in the European labour market, and accommodating rising levels of racial and cultural pluralism within EC countries. The latter problem is complicated by the need to establish, by 1992, common policies regarding the free movement of persons in EC countries, starting from very different national views and policies.

The capacity of the European labour market to absorb immigrants appears limited[27]. Its limitations appear even more marked given the flow of refugees and emigrants from Eastern Europe in unexpected numbers[28]. These migrations, together with strong currents of immigration from Africa, Southern Asia, and South-East Asia are destined to compete with immigration from the southern shores of the Mediterranean.

The labour market, however, cannot be considered solely in quantitative terms. It is also significantly influenced by social, political and technological factors[29]. Protectionist immigration policies could be adopted to respond to the high rate of unemployment among young people in the EC, although such policies may have little effect given the segmentation of the labour market and the unwillingness of EC youth to undertake the unskilled jobs for which immigrants are competing. Furthermore, the need for labour in Western Europe could be reduced by policies aimed at technological innovation and `tertiarization' of an economy somewhat in decline. These would result in a reduced requirement for migrant workers.

Independent of the more or less favourable capacity of the labour market, two different but convergent factors have emerged in recent years. In countries in which Islamic communities are already established[30], principally France, Germany and the United Kingdom, a determination to restrict emigration has emerged. In the past, these countries have implemented policies of integration to a greater or lesser extent. Nevertheless, they have all found themselves faced with Islamic communities that wish to affirm their own identity and reject policies of assimilation. Thus, public opinion and governments in these countries now call for a restrictive policy towards further migratory flows. Countries such as Portugal, Spain and Italy, traditionally `sending' countries and therefore new to the phenomenon of immigration, are reacting with increasing intolerance. The Italian government which, prompted by political forces, had set out a `liberal' policy, is now reconsidering. In Spain and Portugal, the prospect of uncontrolled immigration is considered tantamount to a threat, both economic and - above all - cultural.

The picture of persistent underdevelopment compounded by strong pressure towards migration highlights an alarming prospect for future relations across the Mediterranean frontier.

Glaring inequalities between `rich' and `poor' countries, as well as between individuals together with the lack of social and individual well-being in the Southern Regions, are at the root of radicalism, both in the political and religious spheres.

The persistent inability to resolve these economic and social problems means that consensus in the regimes in the Southern Regions will remain weak and fragile. Because of this weakness the regimes will continue to make use of `regional' nationalism. To sustain the goals of `regional' nationalism and nationalism proper they will continue to divert resources towards military expenditure. As a result they will make the achievement of basic conditions for consensus - economic and social development, and a more equitable distribution of income and resources - more difficult or unlikely.

On the other hand, migration cannot be regarded as a solution to the long-term economic development of the Southern Regions and in the short and medium terms it will encounter limitations and create tensions in relations of the Southern Regions with the European countries.

Economic and social tendencies thus seem to add to the picture of instability that emerges from the previous examination of political and military factors.

The USSR and the East-West dimension

To conclude this analysis of the trends in the Southern Regions which influence West European security, some consideration must be given to the changing role of the USSR and the East-West dimension in these regions.

The USSR is withdrawing from its `internationalist duties' in the Third World. This is a consequence of sweeping domestic changes, i.e. the objective difficulty of sustaining costly commitments abroad, on the one hand, and the `new thinking' and de-ideologization of its policy, on the other. In the medium term, a return to `internationalism' (albeit within the limits permitted by a declining economy) cannot be excluded, should conservative forces prevail.

The Middle East and North Africa are no exception to this trend. Soviet support to its main allies has definitely weakened. Deliveries of military equipment have either stopped or decreased. The number of experts and military advisers is also decreasing, with exceptions - like Iraq - probably dictated by contractual obligations and the necessity of running down foreign reserves. One cannot help but think that important developments in the countries formerly supported by the USSR - such as the union of South and North Yemen, Syria's *rapprochement* with Egypt and the startling changes in Algeria's policies - may have been significantly influenced by Soviet withdrawals.

These changes have a strong impact on regional perceptions. Developments such as the *rapprochement* between Israel and the USSR, the re-establishment of full relations between East European countries and Israel, the new Soviet policies on Jewish emigration to Israel and the resumption of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Saudi Arabia, have been resented in many regional, particularly Arab, circles. These developments are seen as a turnabout which would enable the United States to act in the Southern Regions without constraints. Arab people would become isolated and their aspirations would be frustrated.

These reactions could exacerbate nationalist trends at work in the Southern Regions and facilitate the coalescing of religious and nationalist forces. Paradoxically, the low Soviet profile may as a result contribute to instability and so demand increased Western intervention for crisis management and the protection of general and local interests. The previous East-West relationship, despite its inherent friction, offered stability. In regions in which anti-American and anti-Western sentiment is so widespread, the easing of that relationship may make the West more vulnerable than it was in the past.

In conclusion, for the foreseeable future, the role of the USSR in the Southern Regions will be reduced, though not eliminated. This means the West will have to assume greater responsibility and become more committed. An increased hostility towards the West in the Southern Regions could give the USSR more room for diplomatic activity and reinforce its regional role in the longer term, particularly if the West fails to take on its increased responsibility and proves unable to resolve crises. The low Soviet profile in the Iraq-Kuwait crisis, which is today dictated by a mixture of economic constraints and international cooperation, may tomorrow help to restore old-style relations with some regional powers.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

European interests

The examination of the main trends at work in the Southern Regions, made in the previous section, leads to the conclusion that in these regions there is a situation of chronic instability. Broadly speaking, it is evident that this instability cannot but have an impact on European security. However, one has to determine more precisely what are the characteristics of the European security problem across the Mediterranean frontier. In other words, what is the rationale for European security policies in this area? This will allow the identification of policies that are to be pursued by the Europeans in the Mediterranean in order to assure their security.

In order to define the rationale for European security policies in the Mediterranean, one has first of all to identify what European interests are at stake in the area. The following main interests can be identified.

(i) The Southern Regions include major oil and gas producers, the countries surrounding the Persian Gulf having the largest oil reserves in the world. At the same time Western Europe is a major world consumer of hydrocarbons. Furthermore, the stability of this region affects not only the availability of energy supplies but also the stability of the world economy as a whole. Oil shocks, no matter how well they are managed, are extremely detrimental to the world economy and are therefore of particular importance to an entity as highly integrated in the international economy as the European Community.

(ii) After the increase in the price of oil at the beginning of the 1970s, the Middle Eastern and North African markets became increasingly important to Western economies, in particular to European ones. This has not only been true of the major oil-producing countries; minor producers - like Egypt - and those countries of the region which do not produce oil, have also benefited from the increase of oil wealth through the greater opportunities for migration and exports to the `rich' countries in the region, and from more investment from the latter. At the beginning of the 1980s the slowdown of the boom which had lasted throughout the previous decade had also brought about a contraction of the Southern Regions' markets. As has already been said, these markets are now more or less heavily indebted and are undergoing sharp economic adjustments. None the less, one should not overlook the fact that almost all of the countries in the region are middle-income economies with good potential for development.

To the importance of the regional economies as markets must be added the fact that Arab finance has become highly integrated in the Western financial markets. In other words, the Southern Regions (with the notable exception of Iran, for the time being) are in general relatively well integrated into the international Western economy and play a role in it, even if this is only because of oil and finance.

(iii) Regardless of the flow of hydrocarbons and their products, the Mediterranean Sea, together with the Red Sea, plays a crucial role in international, particularly

European, shipping. Thus, security and freedom of navigation is a special concern in these waters.

(iv) The Mediterranean basin is a particularly important environmental asset, both as a marine body and as a cultural area. Particularly intense international cooperation is needed to ensure its conservation. The conservation of this environmental asset is primarily the interest and the responsibility of the riparian countries, among which the EC countries are prominent.

(v) Besides these interests in maintaining an economic and `civilian' access to the region and its countries, is there any European interest in maintaining a strategic or geopolitical access to the Southern Regions? A good part of European history is marked by the existence or the perception of such an interest in strategic access - which includes the right to introduce military force at will. Today, the situation seems different, at least to the extent that European and American interests are able to be separated. This point deserves specific discussion.

There are two main reasons for the need for strategic access to the Southern Regions. First, these regions, particularly the northern part of the Gulf, contain the largest oil and hydrocarbons reserves in the world. Access to these resources is an important strategic factor even for countries which do not depend on Southern Regions oil for their energy requirements. Second, the central position of the Southern Regions in relation to the three continental landmasses of Europe, Asia and Africa, as well as the proximity of these to Western Europe and the USSR, continue to be important strategic and political factors even at a time when the effect of distance has been drastically reduced by technology. Strategic access is, therefore, a requirement for powers with global reach and interests, like the USA. It is less of a requirement for European countries.

All the debate on the issue of the Western presence outside the NATO area shows that while the USA has the aim of maintaining its strategic access to the Southern Regions, Europeans have the more limited aim of assuring general conditions of security and stability in the area.

Policies towards Israel are indicative of these different attitudes. Both the USA and West European countries share the goal of assuring Israel's continued existence. However, for a number of reasons including its strategic interests, the USA gives Israel an absolute priority which is not shared by the Europeans. By accepting the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians, the West European countries,in particular those of the EC, have demonstrated their interest in balancing regional interests for the sake of overall stability and their own security.

The same argument goes beyond the Arab-Israeli dispute. For the political and religious reasons discussed earlier, the requirement of the West to have strategic access is perceived by the countries in the region as an intrusion. In the interests of domestic stability, even regimes in the region friendly to the West need to criticise the West as being intrusive. This creates a contradiction: access is made difficult by instability, but by intruding into the area for the sake of its geopolitical interests the West increases instability and thus makes access even more difficult. For this reason

US positions on strategic access are sometimes seen by the Europeans as a source of insecurity.

In conclusion, European countries' interests in the Southern Regions are centred on stability and cooperation, which are seen by them as the basic factors affecting security across the Mediterranean.

A broader notion of security for the Mediterranean

Instability and conflicts, therefore, present threats to European security in the Southern Regions, so that the goal of European security policies should be to attain stability and cooperation. However, instability and conflicts across the Mediterranean frontier cannot generally be considered as `threats' in the narrow, military sense of the word. The character of such instabilities and conflicts must be clarified in order to work out how European security policies towards the region should be formulated.

The earlier discussion of the build-up of armaments in the Southern Regions pointed out serious risks of instability and conflict. These risks, however, seem to affect the countries in the Southern Regions themselves more directly than the countries of Western Europe. In other words, the growing arsenals in the Southern Regions are mainly intended for use in South-South armed conflict rather than in military attacks on the countries on the northern side of the Mediterranean frontier.

This is not to exclude the possibility of military attacks, like the one launched by Libya against the Italian islet of Lampedusa in 1986, nor other forms of violence, particularly low-level violence and terrorism. However, the impact, feasibility and probability of such actions must be considered limited, and the military threats they imply are not likely to be sufficiently serious to necessitate a full military response.

The present risks of discord in North-South Mediterranean relations can only very partially be ascribed to military factors. European security across the Mediterranean frontier is not primarily challenged by the military strength and power projection capabilities of the Southern Regions.

What is at stake in the Mediterranean is a cultural and social balance that is definitely more complex and comprehensive than the military one. Europeans are frightened by the growing military capabilities of the Southern Regions, but equally so by the growing immigration from these regions. Migration, like terrorism and religious tensions, is a consequence of profound social and cultural unrest to which as much attention must be paid as to military factors in order to achieve security.

European security policy regarding the Southern Regions should be multi-dimensional, as a number of factors - political, cultural and economic - are more important than military ones. Given the complexity both of the situation in the Southern Regions and of relations between those regions and Europe, one has to adopt a broader notion of security, and include the notion of `challenges' or `tensions' from the South in addition to talking of `threats'.

The peculiar character of Mediterranean security and the importance of non-military factors in it should not, however, lead the Europeans to overlook the fact that, limited

as it may be, there is also a military dimension. It has been said that the build-up of armaments in the Southern Regions is more likely to lead to conflicts among the countries of the region than between them and the northern countries. However, it should not be forgotten that growing South-South conflicts in the Southern Regions do involve Western countries, because of the Western requirement to ensure either uninterrupted strategic access or `civilian' access. Interventions have become increasingly impressive, from the small units sent to Lebanon between the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s to the fleets and the hundreds of thousands of combat troops sent to the Gulf from the summer of 1990 on. As noted above, the Soviet withdrawal from the Southern Regions contributes to increasing responsibility, costs and intervention on the part of Western countries.

On the other hand, one cannot talk of a threat from the South as the result of an effective capability of projecting military power on the part of the Southern Regions countries against Europe. One has to point out, however, the strong tendency towards a change in the overall military balance in favour of the Southern Regions countries as discussed above (pp. 5-10). This tendency might be reinforced by the arms reduction contemplated by the CFE Treaty signed in Paris on 19 November 1990, and by the negotiations on troop reductions (CFE 1(a)) also envisaged at the end of the same month. If the latter succeed and East-West détente continues, a negotiation on the elimination or reduction of SNF (or sub-strategic arms) will follow. The result of this additional negotiation would also further change the military balance between Western Europe and the Southern Regions and would add a qualitative element to this general trend.

Along with growing South-South instability, the equalization of military forces between the countries of the Southern Regions and Europe means that European countries, in addition to developing policies of cooperation with the countries of the Southern Regions, need a series of `insurance' policies to guarantee their own security. This will involve policies which will re-shape and improve the power projection capabilities of European countries as well as arms control and confidence and security- building measures for the region. Such policies are not based on the assumption of a direct threat but on continued tension. They are designed to protect European countries from a situation of potential conflict less serious and intense than that which used to prevail in the East-West context, but on the other hand more probable and persistent.

European security policies in the Mediterranean

As a conclusion to this discussion of the rationale for European security policies in the Mediterranean, the main principles of the latter can be outlined.

First and most important, European security in the Mediterranean should be based on the implementation of *policies of cooperation* with the countries of the Southern Regions destined to contribute to the elimination of the social and economic causes of instability; to the reinforcement of democratization; and to the restoration of an inter-cultural dialogue.

Second, it should be based on the implementation of an appropriate combination of policies related to *military security*. On the one hand, measures aimed at increasing

confidence and security and reducing and controlling armaments should be negotiated; on the other, appropriate European military force structures should exist as an insurance policy.

Third, the implementation of these policies must be related to appropriate *institutions*. The institutional framework chosen should allow for the development of a coherent European approach without putting Atlantic cohesion in question.

An outline of what is being done and what might be done to put the principles described above into practice is given below.

Cooperation for development - Among policies of cooperation, bilateral and multilateral policies for economic cooperation and aid have a primary role. Up till now the results of these policies have not been entirely satisfactory.

As already mentioned, most of the Mediterranean countries are following policies of adjustment with the assistance of the IMF and the World Bank. The general orientation in the Southern Regions is towards liberalization and a market economy. Economic reforms and adjustment in the economies of the Southern Regions should now allow a more efficient use of the resources coming from Northern countries and the opportunities of economic and commercial cooperation they offer. To match these efforts on the part of the Southern Regions countries, efforts from the Western, especially European, countries should be increased and improved.

A policy aimed at considerably increasing international aid has been proposed by the Italian government. At the end of 1989, the Italian Foreign Minister suggested that the EC countries should commit themselves to transferring 1% of their GNP in official development assistance (ODA) by allocating 0.50% to the less-developed countries, 0.25% to the Eastern European countries and 0.25% to the Mediterranean countries[31].

The Italian proposal did not necessarily link this increase in aid to a substantial upgrading in the role of the EC in dispensing aid and other financial resources. Apart from the financial cooperation provided by the member countries at the bilateral level, the EC role in this field has so far been limited. Indeed, policy on ODA, unlike commercial policy, is not a competence covered by the EC Treaties. The EC manages limited funds within different Association Agreements , while the European Investment Bank (EIB) operates special programmes for productive investment in the Mediterranean countries, and these too are limited.

The advantage of the EC in managing development cooperation is that its policy can fully integrate commercial and financial cooperation in combination with other kinds of economic cooperation. Furthermore, EC cooperation policy is felt by Southern Regions partners as less politically intrusive than bilateral policies. An increase in aid by the EC countries coupled with a greater use of multilateral aid policies conducted through the EC Commission would therefore be desirable.

At the end of December 1990 the European Council approved the proposal submitted by the Commission for a new EC Mediterranean policy, to be implemented in the first five years of the 1990s[32]. Besides proposals directed at improving commercial

relations and implementing more efficient forms of industrial, scientific and technological cooperation, the twelve members of the EC allocated more financial resources to the Mediterranean countries. Financial support in the five years 1992-96 will be 2.7 times greater than in the present five-year period. The improvement of financial cooperation will be the main instrument in the next set of association agreements between the EC and the Mediterranean countries. This is not to say that there will be a change in the relative roles of bilateral and EC aid in the Mediterranean. None the less, it must be considered a very significant and positive change.

The establishment of a multilateral Mediterranean development bank has also been proposed by the Italian government. However, the above-mentioned proposals for a new EC Mediterranean policy seem directed at cooperating with programmes led by the IMF and the World Bank, rather than at implementing an entirely independent European role. In recent years the World Bank has evolved a special competence for the Mediterranean in conjunction with increased attention to the environmental dimension of investments. Special attention to the environment is also included in the new EC Mediterranean policy. On the whole, it seems that there is a tendency towards the development of synergies between the EC and the World Bank and IMF. In view of this the establishment of a Mediterranean development bank could appear as a duplication.

The proposal for a Mediterranean development bank, however, has also been given further support by the establishment of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development for investment in the Eastern European countries and the USSR. More generally speaking, the various proposals now being discussed for renewed financial cooperation with the Mediterranean countries are influenced by the concern to prevent a Mediterranean perception that it is competing with Eastern Europe for European development funds. A diversion of funds towards the East would actually be detrimental to European security in the Mediterranean. So would any perception that the East European countries might be accorded preferential treatment. In this sense, the establishment of a new regional development bank in the Mediterranean, in addition to the EIB and the World Bank, would be seen as having a political impact beyond any purely financial considerations.

Migration - The importance of successful development cooperation with the countries of the Southern Regions lies in the contribution it would make to eliminating economic underdevelopment as a cause for social and political instability. More specifically, its importance would lie in making possible a trade-off between more development and employment in the South and less migration to the North. Though not mentioned openly, this trade-off is among the main reasons for the Italian-Spanish proposal for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM), which was put forward on 24 September 1990 on the occasion of the CSCE follow-up conference on the Mediterranean ecosystems in Palma de Mallorca. The same approach lies behind the structures for Western Mediterranean cooperation set in motion in Rome, on 10 October 1990, by the `Group of Nine', i.e. the four south-western countries of the EC (France, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and the five UAM countries, to which Malta belongs as an associate member.

However, as stated elsewhere in this report, there is no line of agreement on migration among EC countries. The need to reach a common policy regarding the free movement of persons within the Community will lead EC countries to align their immigration policies; these will tend to be closer to a restrictive policy than to a liberal one.

The policy will be more directed towards bringing workers into the EC than towards encouraging the establishment or integration of individuals and their families. Within the framework of the so-called `Europe of citizens', a policy of quantitative and qualitative limitation will certainly be accompanied by more definite social and political guarantees for those who find their way into the EC. Nevertheless, immigration policy will be primarily restrictive and not integrative and there will tend to be fewer immigrants than those which current trends would otherwise bring to Europe.

Such a restrictive policy will not, however, resolve the problem. Many people will feel compelled to emigrate and will do so through clandestine channels. The common EC policy with respect to immigration will thus be accompanied by increased police controls. The countries of Southern Europe - as Mrs Thatcher pointed out in her speech to the College of Europe in Bruges on 28 September 1988 - will be more exposed to migration from the Mediterranean. Thus, they will have to make particular efforts in order to implement EC restrictive policies and will have to deal with growing levels of intolerance and public disorder. It is probably also for this reason that proposals like the CSCM and initiatives like the `Group of Nine' are put forward by the southern members of the EC.

It is evident that the problem of migration cannot be solved by police measures alone. In the short term, the EC will inevitably be induced to adopt restrictive policies, albeit accompanied by human, economic and social guarantees to migrants. In the medium term, however, the optimal policy would be that, now being suggested by the southern European members of the EC, of linking a successful development cooperation on the part of the EC to a reduction of migration from the Southern Regions.

The conclusion is that cooperation for development is important to stability not only in the Southern Regions, but also in Western Europe. The trade-off between stability and development is at the heart of European security in the Mediterranean. This concept has been neatly expressed by a Spanish official: `The historic Helsinki compromise consisted in making progress through a trade-off between human rights and security matters. The CSCM is expected to achieve a trade-off between stability and economic advantages'[33].

Democratization and inter-cultural relations - As regards democratization in the Southern Regions, Western Europe can only act indirectly. Western Europe cannot participate in the political process which would lead to democracy. However, it can prevent the perception of European and Western attitudes from becoming a factor which reinforces radicals and weakens moderates. In this sense, the analysis made above suggests that two main objectives should be pursued. First, there should be an improvement in inter-cultural relations. Second, intrusive policies should be altered or discontinued.

Today, differences of culture lie at the root of many conflicts. In the societies of the Southern Regions people are conscious and proud of the heritage of their civilization. The gap between this consciousness and the substantial political and economic weakness of their societies within the international context has brought about an acute sense of frustration, most of which is directed against the West. The dominance of the latter is widely perceived as intrusive and an attempt to impose Western values. This frustration and the situation of material backwardness which breeds such frustration are important factors in the present rise of religious and political radicalism, terrorism and persistent anti-Western sentiments. These developments have in turn led to strong reactions in the West and in Western Europe against Islam and people from the Southern Regions. They are now fostering xenophobia and racism.

This process is taking place in a situation where mutual cultural images have been fundamentally distorted. Such distorted images tend to be projected by active minorities, whereas majorities in the populations of both Western Europe and the Southern Regions are interested in cultural integration and mutual tolerance. Consequently, the main goal of cultural policies should be the very traditional one of making the knowledge of respective civilizations available through information, exchanges, education and institutions. When coming to this conclusion, one cannot help being struck by the modest aims and random nature of official policies for cultural exchanges between the two worlds. Basic policies for cultural exchanges should, therefore, be reinforced. Private institutions should have an important role in these exchanges. They should be encouraged by official incentives if necessary.

The second goal for improving cultural understanding requires the policies of the dominant West, perceived as intrusive, to be corrected or discontinued. These policies contribute to the strengthening of radical forces in the Southern Regions and the weakening of moderate ones. They create the conditions that give rise to the present strong inter-cultural tensions.

As mentioned earlier, although Western Europe, unlike the United States, is not interested in obtaining strategic access to the Southern Regions, there are other forms of intrusion which involve Western Europe. The imposition of mass consumption culture as a result of certain policies of cooperation is seen as one such intrusion. Given the importance that cooperation policies seem bound to have in achieving security across the Mediterranean, great attention should be paid to this aspect in the management of aid and other policies of economic assistance.

The imbalance in the flow of information across the Mediterranean leads to a further perception of intrusion. Since the media of the Southern Regions are underdeveloped compared to those of Western Europe, the flow of information is almost entirely one-way[34]. This makes a powerful contribution to the feeling that cultural models are being imposed, thus making cooperation policies and inter-cultural relations appear intrusive.

The most sensitive issue, however, concerns the notion of human rights. Though the gap is less wide than generally felt within the context of the present cultural conflict, a gap does exist between notions of human rights in the two worlds. The *Italian-Spanish Non-Paper on CSCM*[35], which presents the rationale for launching a CSCM, underscores this point. It says that `The lack of shared cultural values is one of the

major traits of the countries of the CSCM'. In his paper on the CSCM[36], José Luis Buhigas says, however, that the CSCM should `reach a common definition of human rights' and that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights should act as the `common denominator' between the two sides of the CSCM. Likewise, the new Mediterranean policy approved by the EC links cooperation to the respect for human rights by the Mediterranean recipient countries. Obvious as they may appear to Europeans, these principles may be perceived as intrusive in the highly sensitive situation in the Southern Regions. Probably for this reason, the previously mentioned Italian-Spanish proposal on the CSCM sets out this policy conclusion: `Eventually, however, as in the CSCE process, a proper balance should emerge between the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms'.

Western Europe should pay due attention to the sense of cultural intrusion resulting from its economic and information policies and adopt the necessary corrective measures in implementing them. On the other hand, it cannot renounce a firmness in relation to the respect of human rights and settle for less than the implementation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The policy guideline suggested by the Italian-Spanish proposal for a CSCM seems inadequate, as does the comparison it makes with the CSCE process. Principles of non- interference have prevailed only formally in the CSCE. The West pressed for the respect of human rights until the communist regimes agreed to respect them, with the exception of some regimes - like Romania - which indeed appealed to non- interference principles. European policies intended to support democratization have to be cautious in many respects, but cannot afford to have dual standards on human rights. As in the CSCE, in the medium or long term European firmness will reinforce elements struggling for democratization.

The Palestinian question - The successful implementation of these policies of cooperation in assuring stability and security in the Mediterranean is not an easy task. In any case, it will be strongly affected by the progress or lack of progress in solving the Palestinian question. As stated above, this question plays a central role in the instability of the Southern Regions and in the growth of anti-Western sentiment there. If a solution to the Palestinian question is not found, the positive benefits expected from policies of cooperation will fail to be achieved.

It is true that even progress in the Palestinian question cannot be expected to bring about immediate stability. In the short term, the establishment of a Palestinian state in the Occupied Territories might lead to new conflicts rather than increased stability. In the medium term, however, it would lay the foundation for stability in the region because it would give rise to a constellation of regimes having greater assurance of domestic consensus and less vulnerable to pressure to adopt pan-Arab policies, which national leaders feel compelled to adopt to satisfy public opinion and save face.

It is not the purpose of this paper to deal with the Palestinian question and the Arab-Israeli dispute. It must, however, be stressed that the solution of the Palestinian question - as the most important and significant crisis in the Southern Regions, is an important condition for the effectiveness of any other West European policy directed at stability and security across the Mediterranean frontier.

This is not to say that the solution of the Palestinian question must necessarily

precede the introduction of comprehensive schemes for Mediterranean security, such as the CSCM. Though there is one approach which argues that an international conference to establish peaceful conditions in the Middle East - centred on the Palestinian question - should precede the organisation of a CSCM, the CSCM could itself subsequently facilitate the process. The above-mentioned Italian-Spanish proposal argues that, as shown by the CSCE process, `the principle of inviolability of frontiers is not a hindrance, but a prerequisite for change'. In practice this means that the implementation of cooperation policies and of policies for resolving the Palestinian question could proceed in parallel. In any case, cooperation policies without any attempt to solve the Palestinian question will ultimately be ineffective and even counterproductive.

Security, confidence and arms control - Security policies should be designed in the light of two factors. First, they must reassure West European countries with respect to threats possibly resulting from the build-up of arms in the Southern Regions. Though this build-up is likely to give rise to conflicts mostly in the Southern Regions, West European countries cannot exclude being attacked from the South nor ignore the erosion of the present military balance. Second, South-South conflicts in the Southern Regions have already involved West European countries and will probably continue to do so in the near future. Both factors have an impact on military policies at the national level and on Western and European military alliances.

At the national level this impact has already been felt. Several European countries have set up special forces for rapid intervention abroad, though not necessarily southward. Missions have been redesigned, particularly by the Italian and the Spanish Chiefs of Staff. In Southern Europe the deployment of national forces on the ground is being modified and the naval and air components of the armed forces are assuming greater importance[37].

It is worth noting that the new missions largely concern contingencies related to interposition, rescue and protection of civilians and peacekeeping operations. They are in other words contingencies such as those which emerged throughout the 1980s, and which are typical of a complex situation in which new forms of tension prevail over traditional threats.

Besides direct military measures, cooperative policies on confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) and the reduction and control of armaments are of the utmost importance in order to prevent current tensions from becoming more substantial and direct threats. These policies concern primarily naval and `unconventional' armaments, i.e. NBC weapons and ballistic missiles.

As far as naval armaments are concerned, as a consequence of the CFE treaty (and of CFE 1(a) if negotiated), there will be mounting pressure for the inclusion of these armaments in future negotiations[38]. Despite the longstanding US reluctance to include naval arms in negotiations, progress in East-West detente, coupled with shrinking defence budgets and the closing of US bases abroad[39], may lead to a change in the situation. There is a significant debate under way and many proposals have been put forward (eliminating all nuclear arms from the sea, including SLCMs, with the sole exception of SLBMs[40]; including the carriers in the *ad hoc* negotiations on land-based naval aviation which will follow the CFE Treaty of 19 November

1990[(41)]; eliminating or reducing the number of attack submarines[(42)]). A significant sign is that in April 1990 the US accepted, within the Vienna negotiations, a proposal from the USSR, Norway and Denmark that independent naval activities (i.e. those not linked to combined air and land activities, which are already limited by the 1986 Stockholm Document) be regulated as a CSBM.

Naval arms control and related naval CSBMs have an inherent global dimension. Like the other regions in the world, the Mediterranean is not more nor less affected by the current debate. But any naval CSBMs or arms control policies that were eventually adopted would also have an impact on the Mediterranean. For example, the elimination or the reduction of nuclear weapons at sea might facilitate the creation of nuclear free zones in the area.

Naval arms reduction and control are likely to be limited by the political tasks given to navies, especially at regional level. Even if in the near future the US decides to accord the Mediterranean a lower priority for military deployment than that assigned so far, these political tasks will be taken over by West European navies, particularly those of Southern Europe. It would therefore be difficult for naval arms control and reductions to go as far as to prevent Western countries and their alliances from pursuing regional missions. Indeed, arms control taken beyond this limit would make it difficult or even impossible to pursue effective defence policies.

In the Mediterranean the fact that France and Italy as well as the US have bilateral agreements with the USSR on the prevention of incidents at sea - a CSBM-like measure - means that these have acquired a specific regional dimension[(43)]. While the possibility that more CSBMs will be agreed cannot be excluded, the limit mentioned above on naval arms control would also apply to the introduction of further CSBMs, although it may be less constraining.

In conclusion, there are at least two conditions for the implementation of a regional arms control scheme: first, progress towards naval disarmament and control at a global level; second, the achievement of political conditions in the region creating a situation permitting the use of naval forces for political purposes. It is not clear whether the second condition can be met at present in the Mediterranean, as the political conditions required for disarmament do not yet exist in the Mediterranean, both because of instability in the Southern Regions and because of the existence of unresolved conflicts, particularly that between the Arabs and Israel. Any attempt at disarmament would be resisted by the Western powers because of their need to have defence policies to protect themselves from instability in the Southern Regions, and by Israel and its Arab rivals because of their mutual distrust which is aggravated by the absence of normal political relations.

The Italian-Spanish proposal for a CSCM stresses the importance of `gradually increasing confidence, through increased transparency and information on each other's intentions', thus making an explicit reference to the necessity of adopting CSBMs within the CSCM process. On the other hand, it says that `Arms control in the CSCM is not for today'. It implies, however, that `confidence building ... is a prerequisite for disarmament'. Unfortunately, in a region such as the Mediterranean, confidence- building without the achievement of appropriate political conditions would be ineffectual.

In sum, the scope for naval CSBMs, disarmament and arms control seems limited. The same is true of disarmament and arms control measures for both conventional and `unconventional' weapons, as the discussion of the Arab-Israeli case above makes clear. In their study on the prospects of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in the field of ballistic missiles, Navias and Howlett[44] confirm difficulties in the implementation of arms control measures, even independent of political conditions. According to these authors the most that can be expected from the MTCR is a `braking process', so that the risk of proliferation in a more or less distant future would not be eliminated nor significantly contained by such measures.

Finally, it must be stressed that no set of military policies or arms control for the Mediterranean will be effective without more stringent constraints on arms exports. Many of the difficulties related to armaments in the Southern Regions are the result of ineffective national controls on arms exports and the lack of multilateral agreements. A European multilateral policy on arms exports is therefore needed as one of the most important dimensions of its security policy regarding the Southern Regions.

Institutions - As for institutions, there are two different types to be considered: first, the European and Western institutions directed at implementing the policies previously discussed; second, the multilateral institutions including both northern and southern partners in the Mediterranean.

The complexity of the Mediterranean security situation requires integrated multilateral institutions. Extending the areas of competence of European Community institutions to include military, security and foreign policies would foster European security in the Mediterranean and make the European role in North-South Mediterranean security institutions more effective.

Today, cooperation policies are managed by the EC, but with considerable limitations, as aid policies remain mostly bilateral. Following decisions made by the European Council in Rome in December 1990[45], immigration and related questions, such as visas, refugees etc., will fall within the EC's area of competence along with the implementation of the free movement of persons within the EC in 1993. Inter-cultural relations, on the other hand, will remain largely national responsibilities for a long while yet.

Military policies are not included in the EC. As for the WEU, it relies upon NATO for military information and advice. In principle, the members of WEU could set up an integrated military command for non-NATO operations in the Southern Regions (or elsewhere in the Third World). However, there is at present no agreement on such a development; all that WEU members have been able to agree upon is some operational coordination during the two successive crises in the Gulf. NATO, on the other hand, has a recognized competence for the defence of its members in the East-West context, but it has no established competence outside the area identified by the Treaty, i.e. although an attack across the Mediterranean would be covered, NATO has no competence in the Southern Regions nor, more generally, in the Third World.

Finally, there is no supranational or multilateral institution in which joint European foreign policy decisions can be made in order to give different non-military and

military policies a coherent direction, since European Political Cooperation is still a purely intergovernmental institution based largely on declaratory policy.

The Intergovernmental Conference on European Political Union was set in motion by the 1990 European Council in Rome which confirmed the decision - already included in the Single European Act - to develop a common EC security and foreign policy. The terms set out by the European Council in order to attain such a goal are rather vague, however. How to introduce security and military competences into the Political Union is still particularly controversial.

The debate[46] about European military structures centres around two main questions: first, the necessity of maintaining the relationship with the United States; second, the necessity of maintaining both flexibility in foreign policy-making and effectiveness in the EC decision-making process.

As regards the longstanding debate on the European pillar of the Alliance, present developments should enable the Europeans to come to some conclusion. The Americans have always been wary of the fact that a more autonomous Europe would exclude them from its decision-making process and would then present the USA with unchangeable political and military decisions, which would have to be negotiated much like the present debate in GATT on the Common Agricultural Policy. With the new situation of détente in Europe and crisis in the Southern Regions, the view of the American administration is changing markedly. In numerous declarations President Bush has made clear the American interest in a more integrated and more responsible Europe within the Alliance. For this reason, the gap between the different European attitudes on the development of a European security policy should narrow. It should be possible to find a compromise between the concerns of those governments - like the British and Italian - which have always been afraid that an independent European security evolution would put in jeopardy the relationship with the USA within the Atlantic Alliance, and the positions of those countries - like France, Greece and Spain - that maintain more or less open reservations about their link with NATO and would prefer a form of European military integration which was distinct from the Atlantic one.

All the European countries to a greater or lesser extent have reservations about the Alliance enlarging its competences to cover `out-of-area' operations. In general the perception of European countries about security in the Mediterranean - and more generally `out-of-area' - tends to give more importance, if not prominence, to non-military rather than military factors. American and European interests in the Mediterranean do not always completely overlap. Therefore, for the time being, it would seem preferable that the future development of European military integration - as a pillar inside the Alliance - is not linked to the extension of NATO competences to `out-of-area' contingencies.

While there is an area in which there is agreement among the Europeans as to how to develop a European security identity, this is counterbalanced by an area in which agreement is more difficult. How and to what extent military and security decisions should be made is the heart of the problem. There is a fundamental reluctance on the part of the members of the EC to surrender an element of sovereignty as important as

military and security policy. However, there are also substantive and objective difficulties.

When it comes to decision-making on security issues and perception of the threat, there are considerable differences among the present EC members. If the EC adopted the same voting procedure on security issues as that employed on matters in which it is presently competent - using a qualified majority - the result would be either disruption or paralysis. This problem would be exacerbated by an enlargement of membership to include additional neutral European countries.

In order to provide a basis for the debate on the question of security and military integration within the EC, two proposals were put forward before the European Council in Rome in December 1990[47]: an Italian one[48] and a French-German proposal included in a joint letter sent by chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand to the Presidency of the EC. The Italian proposal, which advocated a direct integration of the WEU into the EC, has raised questions concerning the automatic security guarantee provided by Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty. Apart from this, the two proposals are very similar. Although they do not say how the EC should vote, they suggest an important guideline for flexibility to be built into the EC's integrated security policy. The European Council should select, by unanimous decision, a number of foreign and security issues which the member states want to tackle together. Once it had been decided unanimously that issues would be a matter of Community responsibility, the EC Council of Ministers would decide by qualified majority voting in implementing policies in these areas. Such a mechanism should prevent the system from running too readily into internal conflicts or inaction, and should incorporate flexibility and effectiveness.

It should be noted that the Conclusions of the Italian Presidency following the 1990 Rome European Council gives an indication of what such security issues should be, by mentioning arms control, disarmament, peacekeeping within the UN, CSCE, military industrial cooperation, non proliferation and arms exports. It is also worth noting that, in setting out the principles for including foreign and security policies in the EC's sphere of competence, the Conclusions[49] make a clear distinction between security and defence policies. They define the scope of security policy; what will be negotiated within the Intergovernmental Conference directed at establishing European Political Union is a common security policy rather than a defence policy.

The distinction between security and defence, and the priority given to security, are in line with the aim of achieving both flexibility and effectiveness, as previously mentioned. They are also in line with the approach to the Mediterranean security policy suggested by the present paper. It should be pointed out, however, that this perspective does not rule out the risks of the frustrations arising from `variable geometry' in the EC institutional setting, nor the possibility of a narrower political union with a limited number of members in contrast to the larger, more comprehensive economic and monetary union.

In conclusion, the European countries seem to be on a path which will lead to the incorporation of security (and in a more distant future maybe also defence) competences within the EC. At the same time, there is a delicate debate on an institutional solution which leaves some flexibility in foreign policy decision-making

without compromising EC decision-making effectiveness. On the other hand, they are reluctant - if not hostile - to enlarging NATO's area of competence to the `out-of-area' and, in particular, to the Southern Regions.

North-South relations in the Mediterranean have so far been organised on a mainly intergovernmental basis, though the EC has carried out its own programme of economic cooperation and has combined its action with that of its member governments.

Intergovernmental attempts at organising regional relations in the Mediterranean have not been very successful. The Euro-Arab Dialogue never seriously began. CSCE was given a Mediterranean dimension, but the Mediterranean non-participating countries were excluded from the decision-making mechanism of the CSCE in order to prevent North-South issues from complicating East-West negotiations in the European context.

Today, East-West détente in Europe and the success of CSCE itself allow the Europeans to look at problems of Mediterranean security on their own merit - independent of East-West tensions and threats.

As a result, the Italian-Spanish initiative for establishing a CSCM - as a process quite separate from the CSCE - makes sense. The CSCM proposal underscores the complexity of the Mediterranean situation and aptly calls for an approach to the region which integrates security and cooperation aspects. It suggests starting with economic and political cooperation as a preliminary to reaching understanding on security and military aspects. Despite the drawbacks and shortcomings discussed earlier, this approach seems consistent with the rationale and the requirements of Mediterranean security.

It is true, as pointed out by the French government[50] , that resolving the Gulf and the Palestinian crises is a prerequisite for the development of an institution like the CSCM. None the less, it remains the kind of institution which is required in order to provide a cooperative structure for security in the Mediterranean. Consequently, while optimal political conditions and a more integrated EC may lie some way in the future, the idea of introducing a comprehensive approach like the CSCM should not be abandoned. Similarly, while a more comprehensive Mediterranean scheme of cooperation would be ideal, one should not in the meantime neglect more pragmatic and partial undertakings like the `Group of Nine' in the Western Mediterranean.

1. R. Aliboni, `The Mediterranean Dimension', in W. Wallace (ed.), *The Dynamics of European Integration* (London & New York: Francis Pinter Publishers, 1990), pp. 155-167.

2. *Civiltà e imperi del Mediterraneo nell'età di Filippo II* (Torino: Einaudi, 1953).

3. C. Clapham, `Ethiopia and Somalia', in *Conflicts in Africa*, *Adelphi Paper 93* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972), pp. 1-24.

4. It must be noted that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) proposed by the Italian and Spanish governments in Palma de Mallorca on 24 September 1990 actually refers to a very wide notion of `Mediterranean' which includes the Balkans, the Black Sea countries and also - according to declarations made by the Italian Foreign Minister -the Central European countries involved in the `Pentagonale' understanding. See *Italian-Spanish Non-Paper on CSCM* (Rome: Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 17 September 1990).

5. Annual ship-days fell to 13,500 in 1989 after peaking at 20,600 in 1973. See M. Cremasco, *The US Military Presence in the Mediterranean Area in a Post-CFE Situation*, a paper presented at the meeting of the European Strategy Group, Paris, September 1990, Appendix A; see also G. McCormick, `Soviet Strategic Aims and Capabilities in the Mediterranean: Part II', in *Prospects for Security in the Mediterranean*, *Adelphi Paper 229* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Spring 1988), and N.B. Dismukes, K.G. Weiss, *Mare Mosso: The Mediterranean Theater*, Professional Paper no. 423, (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, November 1984).

6. Figures related to regular armed forces personnel, aircraft and tanks are taken from *The Military Balance 1980-1981* (London: IISS, 1980) and *The Military Balance 1990-1991* (London: IISS, 1990). The armed forces of Mauritania (Maghreb) and Kuwait and Lebanon (Arab Orient) have not been considered, nor aircraft in store (Israel 102; FRG 20; Italy 80; UK 319), nor those in service with naval aviation (FRG 118, France 100, Italy 16, Spain 23, UK 45). A detailed comparison of forces on the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean is made by S. Silvestri in his `Nuove concezioni del modello difensivo italiano', in *Rivista Militare* (Rome: Centro Militare di Studi Strategici, 1990), pp. 52-54.

7. R.F. Grimmet, *Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major Supplier, 1981-1988* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, August 1989), p. 9.

8. *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1988* (Washington, D.C.: ACDA, June 1989), pp. 3 and 6-8.

9. L. Spector, *The Undeclared Bomb* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988.

10. Speculation about Iraqi nuclear capabilities has been revived by the occupation of Kuwait. See, inter alia, G. Millhollin, `Signs Are It's Too Late to Block Iraq's Bomb', *International Herald Tribune*, 28 November 1990; and M. Wines et al., `Shopping for

the Bomb: Iraq's Web of Deception', *International Herald Tribune*, 24-25 December 1990. The state of the debate is summarized by W. Safire, `Iraq's Bomb: Take Cover in Early '93', *International Herald Tribune*, 28 December 1990.

11. J.P. Robinson, *Chemical Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East*, a paper presented to the Meeting of the Institute for East-West Security Studies on `Regional Arms Transfers and Arms Control in the Middle East', Wiston House, England, 7-9 February 1990.

12. J.S. McCain III, `Proliferation in the 1990s: Implication for US Policy and Force Planning', *Strategic Review*, Summer 1989, pp.9-20.

13. M. Navias, `Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World', *Adelphi Paper 252* (London: IISS, Summer 1990), pp. 29-31. See also A. Karp, `Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World' in *SIPRI Yearbook 1989: World Armaments and Disarmament* (London & New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 287-317.

14. K. Waltz, `The Spread of Nuclear Weapons', *Adelphi Paper 171* (London: IISS, 1981), whose argument is that `more may be better'.

15. M. Brzoska and T. Ohlson (eds.), *Arms Transfers to the Third World 1971-1985*, (Oxford: SIPRI, Oxford University Press, 1987).

16. A.E. Hillal Dessouki, `Unconventional Weapons and Regional Stability in the Middle East', a paper presented at the Meeting of the Institute for East-West Security Studies on `Regional Arms Transfers and Arms Control in the Middle East', Wiston House, England, 7-9 February 1990. See also `The changing Political and Strategic Landscape in the Middle East', a paper presented at the Heads of Institutes Meeting, Wiston House, England, November 1989; E. Ezz, `The Chemical Weapons Convention: Particular Concerns of Developing Countries', a paper presented to the 39th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, Cambridge, Ma., July 1989; Y. Sayigh, `The Middle East Strategic Balance', *Middle East International*, 25 May and 22 June 1990, pp. 15-16. The latter developed a wider argument on the consequences, including rearmament, of the `pervasive sense of insecurity' of the less-developed countries: `Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries', *Adelphi Paper 251* (London: IISS, Summer 1990).

17. M. Navias, op. cit., p. 40.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 36-38. See also M. Heller, `Ballistic Missiles and Chemical Weapons in the Middle East', a paper presented at the Meeting of the Institute for East-West Security Studies on `Regional Arms Transfers and Arms Control in the Middle East', Wiston House, England, 7-9 February 1990.

19. M. Navias, op. cit., p. 71. A case in point is the remark attributed to president Saddam Hussein of Iraq that the United States should not send forces to the Gulf because `yours is a society which cannot accept 10,000 dead in one battle', reported by J. Hoagland, ` "We have no opinion": A Wilful Blind Eye to Iraq', *International Herald Tribune*, 15-16 September 1990.

20. A. Dawisha, `Arab Regimes: Legitimacy and Foreign Policy', in A. Dawisha and I.W. Zartman (eds.), *Beyond Coercion. The Durability of the Arab State* (London, New York & Sidney: Croom Helm, 1988), pp. 260-275; I. Harik, `The Origins of the Arab System', in G. Salamé (ed.), *The Foundations of the Arab State* (London, New York & Sidney: Croom Helm, 1988), pp. 19-46.

21. A. Roussillon, `Islam, Islamisme et démocratie', *Peuples Méditerranéens*, 41-42, 1988, pp. 303-315; M.S. Ashmawi, *L'Islamisme contre l'Islam* (Paris: La Découverte, 1988); L. Layne (ed.), *Elections in the Middle East* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987).

22. Michel Grenon and Michel Batisse (eds.), UNEP, *Futures for the Mediterranean Basin: The Blue Plan* (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

23. The figures that follow are taken from R. Aliboni, `The Mediterranean Scenario: Economy and Security in the Regions South of the EC', *The International Spectator*, XX, 2, April-June 1990, pp. 138-154.

24. EC Commission, *Bilan de la politique méditerranéenne de la Communauté (1975-1988)*(Brussels, 1989), a paper presented by E. Rhein, a member of the Commission's staff, at the meeting of the Aspen Institute Italia on `Mediterranean World's Crossroads: A Medium Term Strategy for Cooperation', Marseilles, 10-12 December 1989.

25. On the evolution of EC Mediterranean commercial preferences see G.N. Yannopoulos, `Trade Effects from the Extension of Custom Unions on Third Countries: A Case Study of the Spanish Accession to the EC', *Applied Economics*, 19, 1987,pp. 39-50 and A. Tovias, `Les effets extérieurs des politiques internes des Communautés Européennes sur les pays tiers: le cas des pays méditerranéens', *Revue d'intégration européenne*, 1, 12, 1988, pp. 51-70.

26. A. Golini and C. Bonifazi, `Recenti tendenze e prospettive in tema di evoluzione demografica', and L. Alberti and G.C. Blangiardo, `Le dinamiche demografiche della sponda sud del Mediterraneo e del Vicino Oriente', in *Abitare il pianeta. Futuro demografico, migrazioni e tensioni etniche* (Torino: Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1989), pp. 79-105 and pp. 461-483 respectively.

27. M. Livi Bacci, *Demographic Trends: Consequences on the Labour Market*, a paper presented at the meeting on `Mediterranean World's Crossroads: The Approach to Mediterranean Development', Aspen Institute Italia, Barcelona, 21-23 June 1987.

28. F. Heisbourg, *The Pace of Reform in the East and European Stability*, a paper presented at the 10th anniversary Conference of the Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, Lisbon, 7-10 November 1990.

29. The hypotheses that follow are discussed by A. Golini, *La società europea in transizione: le trasformazioni della popolazione in Europa e sue relazioni con il mercato del lavoro e le migrazioni internazionali*, a paper presented at the `Foro di Dialogo Italo-Tedesco', Bad Neuenahr, 18-19 October 1989.

30. F. Dassetto and A. Bastenier, *Europa, nuova frontiera dell'Islam* (Rome: Edizioni del Lavoro, 1988).

31. G. De Michelis, `Nuove strategie per la cooperazione alle soglie del 1992', *Cooperazione*, XV, 92, February 1990, pp. 7-8.

32. The Commission put forward a first proposal in 1989; see the Brussels communication *Redirecting the Community's Mediterranean Policy*. This proposal is now being negotiated by the member countries; see *Europe*, 23 May, 21 June, 9 November and 20 December 1990.

33. J.L. Buhigas, *Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Méditerranée*, unpublished. Dr Buhigas is a political counsellor to the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs. His paper can be considered the basis on which the CSCM was subsequently elaborated jointly by the Spanish and Italian governments.

34. H. Kandil, `The Media and Arab Integration', in G. Luciani and G. Salamé (eds.), *The Politics of Arab Integration* (London, New York & Sidney: Croom Helm, 1988), pp. 54-72.

35. See Note 4 above.

36. J.L. Buhigas, op. cit.

37. For the Italian military model see M. Cremasco (ed.), *Lo strumento militare italiano*(Milano: Franco Angeli for the Istituto Affari Internazionali, 1986) and S. Silvestri, op. cit.; for the Spanish military model see R. Bardaji, *La Defensa Española: las opciones de cambio*, Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos, Madrid, 1990; also J.C. Snyder, *Defending the Fringe. NATO, the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf*, SAIS Papers in International Affairs (Boulder, Colo. & London: Westview Press, 1987).

38. M. Cremasco, *The US Military Presence in the Mediterranean Area in a Post-CFE Situation*, to be published in 1991 by the European Strategy Group as an ESG occasion Paper.

39. In 1990 the decision was made that the closing of the bases in Greece and Spain would be followed by that of seventeen other bases in the Mediterranean. For a general examination of the Mediterranean bases issue see T. Veremis and Y. Valinakis (eds.), *US Bases in the Mediterranean: The Cases of Greece and Spain* (Athens: Hellenic Foundation for Defence and Foreign Policy, 1989).

40. In April 1989 the US Navy made the decision to withdraw the more obsolete tactical nuclear weapons from its ships. The proposal related to SLCMs was made by Ambassador Paul Nitze and Admiral William Crowe. See J. Eberle, *Naval Weapons and the Implications for Arms Control*, a paper presented at the conference `INF at Sea? - Naval Arms Control Conference', London, 18 May 1989; I.H. Daalder and T. Zimmermann,`Banning Nuclear Weapons at Sea: A Neglected Strategy', *Arms Control Today*, 9, 18, November 1988.

41. J. Eberle, `Naval Arms Control', *Naval Forces*, 1, 1990.

42. J.L. Lacy, *Beyond Regional Approaches to Naval Arms Control*, a paper presented at the IAI-Rand Corporation meeting, Rome, 24-25 September 1990.

43. V.J. Borawsky, `Superpower Cooperation for Risk Reduction at Sea', *Naval Forces*, 1, 1990.

44. M. Navias and D. Howlett, `Problems of Control', in M. Navias, op. cit., ch. 3.

45. European Council, Rome, 14-15 December 1990; *Presidential Conclusions.*

46. See R. Seidemann (ed.), *Auf dem Weg zu einer westeuropäischen Sicherheitspolitik* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag-Gesellschaft, 1989); L. Caligaris (ed.), *La difesa europea: proposte e sfide*(Milano: Edizioni de Comunità, 1990); M. Clarke and R. Hague (eds.), *European Defence Cooperation: America, Britain and NATO* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990); I. Gambles, `Prospects for West European Security Cooperation', *Adelphi Paper 244* (London: IISS, 1989); A. Cahen, *The Western European Union and NATO*, London, 1989; C. Layton, *A Step beyond Fear: Building a European Security Community*, Federal Trust for Education and Research, London, 1989. More specifically on European commitment towards the Southern Regions: G. Edwards, `Multilateral Coordination of Out-of-Area Activities', in J.I. Coffey and G. Bonvicini (eds.), *The Atlantic Alliance and the Middle East* (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1989); W. Van Eekelen, `WEU and the Gulf Crisis', *Survival*, 32, 6, November-December 1990, pp. 519-532; R. Aliboni, Regional Security and European Security', in F. Cerutti and R. Ragionieri (eds.), *Rethinking European Security* (New York & London: Crane Russack Taylor & Francis, 1990); *European Security and the Mediterranean*, Assembly of the Western European Union, document 1073, 14 October 1986.

47. *Le Monde*, 9-10 December 1990.

48. `Italian Foreign Minister Proposes Military Dimension for EC', *The Financial Times*, 19 September 1990.

49. Op. cit., Part 1, para. 2.

50. Differences of opinion between France, Italy and Spain over priorities in their Mediterranean initiatives emerged at the Rome ministerial meeting of 10 October 1990, at which the `Group of Nine' was launched. See M.-P. Subtil, `Création d'une structure permanente de coopération en Méditerranée occidentale', *Le Monde*, 12 October 1990, p. 9.