



# Y·E·S 2018

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**EUISS YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN SECURITY**

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# **EUISS Yearbook of European Security YES 2018**

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## **Disclaimer**

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# Preface

Looking back on 2017, we see a world in confusion: long-held beliefs and carefully crafted compromises are challenged, the very idea of a rules-based international order is questioned. But against this difficult international background, the European Union has emerged as a reliable force for diplomacy, dialogue and multilateralism.

Over the past year, we Europeans have left the talk of crisis behind. Internally, the process of European integration has restarted after years of stalemate; and externally, we have become a global point of reference – for international cooperation, sustainable development, free and fair trade, but also as a global security provider. We have demonstrated that cooperation is not just possible: it is the only path to preserve our interests and values.

This is the spirit of the EU Global Strategy for foreign and security policy. Two years after its launch, it remains our compass guiding us through uncertain and often chaotic times. Its main messages are even more important today than before: to turn the Global Strategy from vision to action, investing in a stronger European Union and at the same engaging even more with our partners around the world.

There is no better example than our work on security and defence. Today, security challenges always transcend borders; no single country can address them alone. And this year, we have finally managed to take fundamental steps towards a European Union of security and defence, after decades of failures.

We started by setting up a single command centre for our military training missions in Brussels. It has been operational for one year now, coordinating our military training missions in Mali, Somalia and the Central African Republic. In June 2017, the European Commission also launched a European Defence Fund to incentivise joint research on research and to support the European defence industry. Most importantly, in December 2017 the Council formally established the Permanent Structured Cooperation on defence (PESCO), finally fulfilling the potential of the Lisbon Treaty. Member States can now join forces to develop new defence capabilities and bring together existing military assets in view of their coordinated deployment.

In parallel with this internal work, we also invested heavily in cooperation with our partners – first and foremost with NATO and the United Nations, but also with regional organisations such as the G5 Sahel.

But the Global Strategy is not only about defence. Our approach to crises as the European Union has always been a comprehensive one. We are increasingly focused on conflict prevention, early warning and reconciliation. We are investing more in resilience of states and societies around us, as an investment in our own security and prosperity. We have engaged with our partners to govern migration together: at the end of 2017 we established the first ever trilateral task force of the European Union, the African Union and the United Nations, to take care in particular of thousands of people stranded in Libya's detention centres. The results we have achieved in just a few months are impres-

sive – and this is thanks to an attitude based on partnership and the constant search for win-win solutions.

We have made a clear choice: we have chosen cooperation over confrontation, and responsible engagement with the world instead of an impossible isolation from the world. We still believe that international rules are not a constraint, but a guarantee for everyone. We still believe that only multilateral diplomacy can lead to solutions that will stand the test of time.

So we will continue to engage jointly to shape the rules by which we can peacefully live together with others – by promoting cooperation instead of confrontation and by standing together to find common solutions for common problems.

The world today is more complex than ever. Power is more diffuse than it has ever been in living memory. There is a greater number of powers, and a greater number of issues that powers cannot control directly. Everything is connected, and there are no quick fixes to the great issues of our times. We are therefore grateful for the indispensable work of the EUISS in providing us with contextual knowledge, analytical insights, as well as forward-looking perspectives that help us anticipate emerging trends and make well-informed, evidence-based decisions.

The EUISS is taking up our political priorities in products like the Yearbook, and addressing knowledge gaps through innovative formats such as foresight and scenarios: in this way, the EUISS contributes to our thinking and our decision-making, helping us get the problems right – and helping us find answers.

*Federica Mogherini  
High Representative for the Union's Foreign and Security Policy  
Vice-President of the European Commission*

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# Abbreviations

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific countries
AFET	Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament
AGRI	Directorate General for Agriculture and Rural Development
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APF	African Peace Facility
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
AU	African Union
AWACS	Airborne Warning Systems
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CAR	Central African Republic
CARD	Coordination Annual Review on Defence
CATA	Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement
CBSD	Capacity Building in Support of Security and Defence
CDP	Capability Development Plan
CEAS	Common European Asylum System
CELAC	Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
CEPA	Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement
CEPOL	European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training
CERT-EU	European Union Computer Emergency Response Team
CETA	Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CMC	Central Military Commission
CONNECT	Directorate General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSIRT	Computer Incident Response Team
CySAP	Cyber Situation Awareness Project
DCFTA	Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DePoCyTE	Demand Pooling for the Cyber Defence Training and Exercise support by the private Sector
DEVCO	Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development
DG	Directorate General of the European Commission
DIGIT	Directorate General for Informatics
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EaP	Eastern Partnership
EAS	East Asia Summit

EASO	European Asylum Support Office
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC3	European Cybercrime Centre
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECFIN	Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs
ECHO	Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
ECJ	European Court of Justice
ECTC	European Counter Terrorism Centre
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDF	European Development Fund
EdF	European Defence Fund
EDIDP	European Defence Industrial Development Programme
EDIF	Enterprise Development and Innovation Facility
EDRP	European Defence Research Programme
EDTIB	European Defence Technological and Industrial Base
EEA	European Economic Area
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
EFSD	European Fund for Sustainable Development
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EIB	European Investment Bank
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EIGE	European Institute for Gender Equality
EIP	EU External Investment Plan
ELN	National Liberation Army
EMCDDA	European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
EMPL	Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion
EMSA	European Maritime Safety Agency
ENI	European Neighbourhood Instrument
ENISA	European Agency for Network and Information Security
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EOM	Election Observation Missions
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EPF	European Peace Facility
ERCC	European Response Coordination Centre
ERM	European Response Mechanism
ESA	European Space Agency
ESIFs	European Structural and Investment Funds

ETAC	European Tactical Airlift Centre
ETAF	European Air Transport Fleet
EU	European Union
EUAM	European Union Advisory Mission
EUAV	EU Aid Volunteers initiative
EUBAM	European Union Border Assistance Mission
EUCAP	European Union Capacity Building Mission
EUFOR	European Union Force
EUGS	European Union Global Strategy
EU IRU	European Union Internet Referral Unit
EUISS	European Union Institute for Security Studies
eu-LISA	European Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMM	European Union Monitoring Mission
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EUNAVFOR	European Union Naval Force
EUPOL COPPS	EU Coordination Office for Palestinian Police Support
Eurojust	European Union's Judicial Cooperation Unit
Europol	European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
EUTF	European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa
EUTM	European Union Training Mission
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FPI	Service for Foreign Policy Instruments
FRA	European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights
Frontex	European Border and Coast Guard Agency
FTA	Free trade agreement
G5	Group of Five
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross domestic product
GF	Guarantee Fund for External Action
GMES	Global Monitoring for Environment and Security programme
GNA	Government of National Accord
GNI	Gross national income
GOVSATCOM	Government Satellite Communication

HOME	Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs
HR/VP	High Representative for the Union's Foreign and Security Policy/ Vice-President of the European Commission
IBM	Integrated Border Management
ICC	International Criminal Court
IcSP	Instrument contributing to Security and Peace
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
INSC	Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation
INTA	Committee on International Trade of the European Parliament
INTCEN	European Union Intelligence and Situation Centre
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IPA II	Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance
IPSD	Implementation Plan on Security and Defence
IPv6	IP network protocol version six
JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
JUST	Directorate General for Justice and Consumers
LNA	Libyan National Army
LTR	Long Term Review of the European Defence Agency
M2TH	Multi-modal Transport Hub
MAF	Malian Armed Forces
MASFAD II	Military multi-Agent System for Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) Detection II
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MFA	Macro-Financial Assistance
MFF	Multiannual Financial Framework
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali
MMF	Multinational Multi-Role Tanker Transport Fleet
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force
MONUSCO	United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MPADs	Maritime Patrol Aircraft Detachments
MPCC	Military Planning and Conduct Capability
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCIRC	NATO Computer Incident Response Capability
NEAR	Directorate General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations



NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NIS	Network and information security
NIS Directive	Network and Information Systems Directive
OCT	Overseas Countries and Territories
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OESs	Operators of essential services
OIF	International Organisation of La Francophonie
OPCW	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSRA	Overarching Strategic Research Agenda
PADR	Preparatory Action on Defence Research
PDCA	Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement
PEGASE	Palestino – Européen de Gestion et d'Aide Socio-Economique
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
PI	Partnership Instrument
pMS	Participating Member States
PPRD East 2	Programme for Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Natural and Man-Made Disaster in the Eastern Partnership Countries
PRIMA	Mediterranean Partnership for Research and Innovation
PROGEF	Programme d'appui à la gestion des frontières
PSC	Political and Security Committee of the Council of the EU
PSO	Peace Support Operations
PYD	Kurdish Democratic Union Party
R&D	Research and Development
R&T	Research and Technology
RCC	Regional Coordination Cell
REGIO	Directorate General for Regional and Urban Policy
Reitox	European Information Network on Drugs and Drug Addiction
RPAS	Remotely Piloted Aircraft System
SAC	Stabilisation and Association Council
SatCen	Satellite Centre
SDF	Syrian Democratic Forces
SMM	Special Monitoring Mission
SOTEU	State of the European Union
SPA	Strategic Partnership Agreement
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UAE	United Arab Emirates

UCPM	Union Civil Protection Mechanism
UK	United Kingdom
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNJIM	United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNRPF	UN Regional Protection Force
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
US	United States
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSMIL	United Nations Support Mission in Libya
WEOG	Western European and Other Group
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
WTO	World Trade Organisation

## EU MEMBER STATE COUNTRY CODES

Austria	AT	Italy	IT
Belgium	BE	Latvia	LV
Bulgaria	BG	Lithuania	LT
Croatia	HR	Luxembourg	LU
Cyprus	CY	Malta	MT
Czech Republic	CZ	Netherlands	NL
Denmark	DK	Poland	PL
Estonia	EE	Portugal	PT
Finland	FI	Romania	RO
France	FR	Slovakia	SK
Germany	DE	Slovenia	SI
Greece	EL	Spain	ES
Hungary	HU	Sweden	SE
Ireland	IE	United Kingdom	UK

# Introduction

Last year's edition of the Yearbook explored the *annus horribilis* in and for Europe in 2016. In 2017, the dynamics of the Brexit negotiation process and President Donald Trump's presence in the Oval Office raised difficult questions for the European Union (EU). At the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) summit on 25 May, the president of the United States (US) took the opportunity to again call for increased European defence spending and caused some controversy when he failed to specifically refer to the US commitment to NATO's Article 5. There was also dismay following President Trump's decision to withdraw the US from the Paris Climate Agreement on 1 June 2017. Furthermore, on 16 October the EU expressed its desire to see President Trump uphold the US commitment to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and continued diplomacy with Iran.<sup>1</sup>

The war in Syria continued to be a source of instability for the Middle East and Europe, especially following the confirmed use of chemical weapons by the Syrian armed forces against civilians. In its seventh report of 7 November 2017, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the UN under the Joint Investigative Mechanism (UNJIM) concluded that Syrian forces were responsible for the use of sarin at Khan Sheikhoun on 4 April. The broader Middle East and Gulf region continued to be a source of tension following the decision by Bahrain, Comoros, Egypt, the Maldives, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Yemen to break off diplomatic relations with Qatar in early June.

North Korea continued to cause alarm by testing ballistic missiles and nuclear devices throughout 2017. While Burundi took the decision on 27 October to withdraw from the International Criminal Court's (ICC) Rome Statute, the Ethiopian parliament decided to lift the state of emergency that had lasted since October 2016. In January, Morocco re-joined the African Union (AU) after 32 years of being absent from the organisation – it had been the only African country which was not a member. Despite the political unrest in Venezuela, there were positive signs in South America when the Colombian government, the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) agreed to a temporary ceasefire from 1 October 2017 to 12 January 2018.

As far as Brexit was concerned, the UK government outlined the type of foreign, development, security and defence relationships it would like with the EU after its departure. Published on 12 September and articulated by British Prime Minister Theresa May in a speech in Florence on 22 September,<sup>2</sup> the paper on a future partnership focused on areas of commonality and explored whether existing UK cooperation in bodies such as the European Defence Agency (EDA) could continue after the UK's departure from

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1. Council of the EU, "Iran nuclear deal: EU statement on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action," October 16, 2017, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/10/16/iran-nuclear-deal-eu-jcpoa/>.

2. Theresa May, "A new era of cooperation and partnership between the UK and the EU," speech delivered as part of the Brexit negotiations, September 22, 2017, Florence, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-florence-speech-a-new-era-of-cooperation-and-partnership-between-the-uk-and-the-eu>.

the EU.<sup>3</sup> Despite a last minute delay because of domestic political dynamics in London, both the EU and UK ended the year with a joint agreement on the first phase of Article 50 negotiations on the protection of the rights of citizens, the question of the border in Northern Ireland and a financial settlement.

2017 saw a number of elections in European countries. The newly elected president of France, Emmanuel Macron, appeared to re-energise discussions about the future of the EU. Not only did President Macron run on an avowedly pro-EU electoral ticket, but he used a speech entitled *Initiative pour l'Europe* at Sorbonne University on 26 September to set out his vision for the future of Europe.<sup>4</sup> This included a call for Europe to have a common intervention force, a common defence budget and a common doctrine for action by the beginning of 2020. Prior to Angela Merkel's re-election as German chancellor for a fourth term, at an election rally on 28 May she called for 'Europeans to take their fate into their own hands' as a way of dealing with the current and future uncertainties facing the EU.<sup>5</sup>

On 1 March, the European Commission published a white paper on the future of Europe, which contained five scenarios for the EU by 2025.<sup>6</sup> In honour of the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, which had established the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community, leaders of all member states (except for the UK) signed a declaration on the future of the EU. The Rome Declaration that was signed on 25 March re-affirmed leaders' commitment to the EU and the goals of dealing with migration, upholding stability and prosperity in the neighbourhood, strengthening European defence and security, climate policy and promoting free and fair trade. In support of this declaration, the president of the European Commission's 'State of the Union' (SOTEU) speech on 13 September focused on a roadmap for 'a more united, stronger and more democratic Union'. As President Jean-Claude Juncker made clear in his speech, 'I want our Union to become a stronger global actor. In order to have more weight in the world, we must be able to take foreign policy decisions quicker'.<sup>7</sup> The president's speech also included a desire to have a fully-fledged 'European Defence Union' by 2025.

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3. UK Government, "Foreign policy, defence and development – a future partnership paper," September 12, 2017, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/foreign-policy-defence-and-development-a-future-partnership-paper>.

4. Emmanuel Macron, "Initiative pour l'Europe: Une Europe souveraine, unie, démocratique," Sorbonne University, September 26, 2017, Paris, <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/initiative-pour-l-europe-discours-d-emmanuel-macron-pour-une-europe-souveraine-unie-democratique/>.

5. Angela Merkel, "Arbeiten für die Menschen in Deutschland," excerpts from speech at Truderinger Festwoche, May 28, 2017, Truderling, <http://www.csu.de/aktuell/meldungen/mai-2017/merkel-und-seehofer-in-truderling/>.

6. European Commission, "White Paper on the Future of Europe: Reflections and Scenarios for the EU27 by 2025," *COM(2017) 2025 final*, March 1, 2017, <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/EN/COM-2017-2025-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF>.

7. Jean-Claude Juncker, "Wind in our sails," State of the Union 2017 speech, European Parliament, September 13, 2017, Brussels, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-17-3165\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-3165_en.htm).

2017 was also marked by a number of significant policy developments at the EU level. In May, High Representative of the Union for the Foreign and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) Federica Mogherini published a joint report on the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) review. May would also witness the adoption of a new consensus by EU development ministers, something which was followed up in November with a European Commission Communication on the EU's Aid for Trade Strategy. In June, the HR/VP presented her first annual report on the EU Global Strategy and, with the Commission, adopted a Joint Communication on the EU's strategic approach to resilience in the Union's external action. Additionally, the HR/VP also played a vital role in the negotiations on the attempted reunification of Cyprus. Finally, the Council of the EU (hereafter referred to as the Council) would agree to a new European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD) endowed with €4.1 billion to invest in the EU's neighbourhood.<sup>8</sup>

One of the major highlights of 2017 was an intensification of initiatives on EU security and defence. During the year, the European External Action Service (EEAS) created a Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) for certain EU missions, and the EDA began work on the trial run of the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD). Beyond this, however, 2017 was marked by the first EU-funded projects on defence research and the European Commission also presented its proposal for a European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) – an initiative designed to stimulate European defence capability development. Lastly, 2017 ended with the establishment of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) with 25 EU member states eventually agreeing to binding commitments on capability development, operations and defence spending and jointly engaging in a first wave of 17 projects designed to enhance EU member state capabilities and EU operations and missions.

In the context of broader questions about the resilience of the liberal international order, the EU persisted in making the case for multilateral institutions and global trade. By the end of 2017, the EU had completed negotiations for a Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada (which entered into force on 21 September), with a view to save EU businesses around €590 million in customs duties per year.<sup>9</sup> Likewise, on 8 December the EU finalised negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Japan, which saw the two partners – that together account for approximately a quarter of the world's gross domestic product (GDP) – engage in a deeper economic relationship.<sup>10</sup> The EU also continued its trade negotiations with Mercosur states (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay).<sup>11</sup>

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8. European Commission, "EU External Investment Plan - Factsheet," November 20, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/eu-external-investment-plan-factsheet\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/eu-external-investment-plan-factsheet_en).

9. European Commission, "EU-Canada trade agreement enters into force," September 20, 2017, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-3121\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3121_en.htm).

10. European Commission, "EU and Japan finalise Economic Partnership Agreement," December 8, 2017, <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1767>.

11. European Commission, "EU-Mercosur Association Agreement," accessed April 24, 2018, <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/eu-mercotur-association-agreement/>.

### WHAT IS THE EU'S COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY?

The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) covers 'all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence' (Article 24 TEU).

The objectives of the CFSP (Article 21.2 TEU) are to: safeguard the EU's values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity; consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law; preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders; foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty; encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade; help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development, and assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters; and promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance.

The CFSP is part of the EU's external relations, alongside activities in the areas of trade, development, humanitarian aid, etc. It is financed from Heading 4 of the EU budget, called 'Global Europe'. The CFSP budget covers expenses related to Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) civilian missions, EU Special Representatives, preparatory measures for CFSP/CSDP crisis management operations, and the management of grants in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament.

In 2017, the EU fared relatively well in economic terms and President Juncker even observed in his 2017 SOTEU speech that 'the wind is back in Europe's sails'.<sup>12</sup> However, the security environment in and around Europe remained a cause for concern. European cities were yet again targeted by jihadists, including: London (22 March and 3 June), Stockholm (7 April), Paris (20 April), Manchester (22 May), Linz (30 June), Hamburg (28 July) and Barcelona (17 August). Such attacks, although not exclusively claimed by Daesh, appeared to be related to the dynamics of the conflict in Iraq and Syria. In September, it was reported that coalition efforts against Daesh had resulted in a 79% loss of territory for the group in Iraq and a 76% loss in Syria (compared to the territory the group held in each respective country in August 2014 before the Global Coalition against Daesh began its operations).<sup>13</sup> By the end of the year, the government of Iraq an-

12. Jean-Claude Juncker, "Wind in our sails".

13. Global Coalition, "Daesh areas of influence – September 2017 update," October 27, 2017, <http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/daesh-areas-influence-september-2017-update/>.

nounced that it had defeated Daesh on Iraqi territory.<sup>14</sup> While this was welcome news, it immediately raised questions about where Daesh could spread to next and also about what European governments would do with so-called ‘returnee fighters’. It is important to register, however, that in addition to jihadists a number of extreme left- and right-wing groups carried out attacks and violent assaults, according to Europol’s report on terrorism in the EU 2017.<sup>15</sup>

## THE 2018 YEARBOOK

The aim of this 2018 Yearbook on European Security is to provide an overview of the events of 2017 involving the EU and its external action. This year’s edition of the Yearbook contains some new features such as specific accounts of the EU’s external action across the world, EU action on internal-external security, region- and issue-specific timelines and key document sources, plus a record of the work of the two EU presidencies of the Council. This year’s edition also includes an index for the first time in order to enhance readability. The familiar features of the Yearbook remain, including data on CSDP missions, information on financial instruments and EU Agencies and figures on defence spending. It should be noted that the 2018 Yearbook contains a range of innovative data visualisation schemes, but data is still presented in tabular form for readers who wish to consult the sources of data. These can be found in the statistical annexes.

The Yearbook is divided into three major parts. Part one focuses on the geographical dimension of the EU’s external action and the reader is presented with the EU’s activities in its southern and eastern neighbourhoods, as well as in the wider world. Here, information on the EU’s diplomatic, financial and security presence in the world is contextualised in light of major crises and political dynamics present in individual countries and whole regions where the EU has a sizeable presence. Part two focuses squarely on European defence by looking at the operational developments of the CSDP, European military operations, the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) and European defence cooperation. Part three looks at the way the EU worked to protect European security along the internal-external nexus. In this section of the Yearbook the reader is presented with information on the EU’s response to terrorism, migration and hybrid threats, as well as its efforts on disaster relief, space and cyber security.

This year’s edition has been a team effort. The authors thank Christian Dietrich for his creativity and ability to condense complex data into comprehensible graphics and statistical tables. John-Joseph Wilkins is thanked for editing the entire text. A word of thanks also goes to EUISS staff members including Marko Ceperkovic, Gearoid Cronin,

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14. Andrew England, “Iraq announces defeat of Isis,” *The Financial Times*, December 9, 2017, <https://www.ft.com/content/d6636416-dcf3-11e7-a8a4-0a1e63a52f9c>.

15. Europol, “European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017,” June 15, 2017, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/2017-eu-terrorism-report-142-failed-foiled-and-completed-attacks-1002-arrests-and-142-victims-died>

Florence Gaub, Gustav Lindstrom, Roderick Parkes, Eva Pejsova, Annelies Pauwels, Patryk Pawlak and Stanislav Secrieru.

Regarding data, the EUISS wishes to thank the Council, the EEAS, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and NATO for sharing data with the Yearbook team. The Institute also acknowledges the support of colleagues based in various fellow EU institutions who have provided advice and feedback on the Yearbook. Of course, all faults lie with the authors.









## EXTERNAL ACTION





# Presidencies of the Council of the EU 2017


## **MALTA: 1 JANUARY – 30 JUNE 2017**

Under the banner ‘ReUnion’, Malta started off the 2017 EU presidency of the Council with an agenda centred on asylum and migration, digital and financial markets, counter-terrorism and border security, social policy and the labour market, neighbourhood policy and the maritime sector. As the EU’s smallest member state with a population of approximately 420,000, Malta led policy on issues such as agreement on the establishment of an EU Agency for Asylum, visa liberalisation for Georgia and Ukraine, new rules and bodies (e.g. the European Public Prosecutor’s Office) to counter money-laundering and financial crimes, and an EU agreement on new anti-dumping rules in trade. More specifically, despite having a general election during its presidency period, Malta also managed to ensure early approval of the ‘Malta Declaration’ (announced on 3 February 2017). This Declaration addressed migratory pressures in the central Mediterranean by enhancing the resilience of migrant and refugee host countries such as Libya with financial contributions and the provision of expertise. Notable resources in this respect are the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) – established on 12 November 2015 under the ‘Valletta Declaration’ – and the activities of EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Operation Sophia and EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) Libya.

## **ESTONIA: 1 JULY – 31 DECEMBER 2017**

Estonia had originally been listed to hold the presidency in the first half of 2018, but following the UK’s decision to leave the EU, a revised order of presidencies was adopted by the Council on 26 July 2016, thereby bringing Estonia’s presidency forward by six months into 2017. With a population of just over 1.3 million people, and under the motto ‘Unity through Balance’, Estonia’s priorities centred on an open and innovative European economy, a safe and secure Europe, a digital Europe and the free movement of data, and an inclusive and sustainable Europe. In terms of foreign, security and defence policy, Estonia focused efforts on counter-terrorism and organised crime, the protection of EU borders and asylum policy, the Eastern Partnership, increasing defence expenditure and EU defence cooperation and strengthening the EU-NATO partnership. Under the Estonian presidency, the EU’s first table-top cyber defence exercise was held on 7 September and a high-level Digital Summit was organised on 27 September. Furthermore, Estonia oversaw the proposals for an expansion of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project, and it advanced work on a Reception Conditions Directive designed to harmonise migratory reception conditions in the EU. Estonia also managed to successfully attain agreement on enhancing the European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (eu-LISA). Finally, perhaps one of the most momentous aspects of the Estonian presidency was the joint decision by 25 member states on 11 December to initiate PESCO in defence.

FIGURE 1: EEAS ORGANISATIONAL CHART



Secretary General/  
Deputy Secretary General

Director General/  
Managing Director/  
Head of Service

Director/  
Deputy Managing Director/  
Principal Advisor


Head of Division

change in 2017

NOTE: This is a simplified version of the EEAS organizational chart that does not include all divisions of the EEAS. EU Special Representatives also report to the HR/VP. Additionally, the Special Envoys, CSDP agencies and the Activated EU Operations Centre work closely with the EEAS. This chart only reflects personnel changes that became effective in 2017. For a continuously updated version of this chart please see: [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-home-page/3602/organisation-chart-of-the-eeas\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-home-page/3602/organisation-chart-of-the-eeas_en)

Source: EEAS Organisation Chart, as of 1 December 2017.

# EEAS organisational chart








# EU Delegations

In 2017, 140 EU Delegations and Offices operated around the world, headed by 137 Heads of Delegation. The Heads of Delegation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the EU Office in Kosovo<sup>1</sup> also served as EU Special Representatives. Figure 2 shows the presence of EU Delegations around the world. In 2017, the total staff in EU Delegations numbered 5,501 (excluding those enrolled in junior professional programmes, interns and interim staff). Of this amount, 35% (1,922) came from the EEAS, with the remaining staff coming from the European Commission (3,579).

**FIGURE 2: AREAS COVERED BY EU DELEGATIONS AND OFFICES**

2017




Data: EEAS

In 2017, 15 EU Delegations housed experts or advisors working on security, defence and military issues. The EU Delegations cooperate with member states' diplomatic and consular missions: colocation agreements between the EU Delegations and at least one member state are in place in 26 countries. In four locations, the EU Delegation is hosted by a member state. So far, 36 colocation agreements have been signed with EU member states.

**FIGURE 3: HEADS OF DELEGATIONS BY STAFF TYPE**

2011-2017, %




Data: EEAS

1. This designation [applicable throughout the entirety of this publication] is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with the UNSCR 1244(1999) and the ICJ opinion on Kosovo's declaration of independence.

The Lisbon Treaty endowed the EU with legal personality and stated that ‘Union delegations in third countries and at international organisations shall represent the Union’ (Article 221.1 TFEU). It placed EU Delegations under the authority of the HR/VP and instructed them to ‘act in close cooperation with member states’ diplomatic and consular missions’ (Article 221.2 TFEU). The staff of the EU Delegations is comprised of the EEAS staff, including the personnel from diplomatic services of member states appointed as temporary agents and, in specific cases, specialised seconded national experts (Council Decision 2010/427 EU, Article 6.2, para. 3) and staff coming from the Commission, working on implementing the Union’s budget and policies outside of the EEAS remit (Council Decision 2010/427 EU, Article 5.2, para 3).

**FIGURE 4: DISTRIBUTION OF STAFF OF EU DELEGATIONS BY INSTITUTION AND TYPE OF CONTRACT**

2017



Data: EEAS

# EU partners

## EU AND AU

On 17 March, the HR/VP and the European Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development, Neven Mimica, paid a diplomatic visit to the AU in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to pledge fresh financial support for the Horn of Africa region and for the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). More precisely, the EU announced that it would provide €120 million in support to AMISOM for six months of operations through the EU's African Peace Facility (APF). The EU has provided more than €1.3 billion to AMISOM since its deployment in 2007.<sup>2</sup> On 24 May, the EU continued its cooperation with the AU through a new *aide mémoire* designed to strengthen the financial management of the AU Commission in Addis Ababa and to bring it in line with international standards. The EU has provided €2.4 billion worth of support for programmes managed by the AU Commission since 2004.<sup>3</sup>

At the fifth EU-AU Summit that took place in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, on 29-30 November, the EU and AU re-affirmed their commitment to the four strategic priorities identified in the EU-Africa Strategy (adopted in 2007), including: economic opportunities for youth, peace and security, mobility and migration, and cooperation on governance. At the Summit, a new EU External Investment Plan (EIP) was presented to EU and AU leaders, which aims to lead to €44 billion worth of investment in Africa by 2020.<sup>4</sup> In addition to boosting exchange programmes between the EU and Africa (e.g. the ERASMUS+ programme), the partners also agreed to work together to combat issues such as migrant smuggling and irregular migration. With a specific focus on Libya, the EU, AU and UN agreed to launch a joint migration task force to save and protect lives in the region, accelerate voluntary returns and to speed up resettlement for people in need of international protection.

## EU AND ASEAN

On 5-6 July 2017, the EU and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) celebrated 40 years of cooperative relations. To mark the occasion, the HR/VP visited the Philippines to co-chair the annual post-ministerial EU-ASEAN conference in Manila. At the conference, the HR/VP and 10 ASEAN ministers decided to adopt an EU-ASEAN Plan for Action for 2018-2022. The plan will focus on maritime security, humanitarian and disaster assistance and peacekeeping and crisis management cooperation. There

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2. European Commission, "EU reinforces cooperation with the African Union and announces new peace building support of €120 million," March 17, 2017, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-646\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-646_en.htm).

3. European Commission, "The European Commission and the African Union Commission renew and reinforce their agreement on measures to strengthen the financial management of the African Union Commission," May 30, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/european-commission-and-african-union-commission-renew-and-reinforce-their-agreement\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/european-commission-and-african-union-commission-renew-and-reinforce-their-agreement_en).

4. European Council, "5th African Union - EU Summit, 29-30/11/2017," accessed April 24, 2018, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2017/11/29-30/>.

is also a greater focus on security and defence cooperation in tackling terrorism and transnational crime. The EU and ASEAN ministers are working towards an EU-ASEAN FTA and a Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement (CATA) – such agreements would be the first between regional organisations.

## EU AND GCC

Relations between the EU and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) were affected by the Gulf crisis between Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the one side, and Qatar on the other which broke out in June 2017.

## EU AND LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES

The HR/VP attended the 28th Summit of the League of Arab States on 29 March in Jordan, and she used the occasion to meet with leaders from Jordan, the UAE, Kuwait and Qatar to discuss regional issues. The HR/VP also met with the Secretary General of the League of Arab States, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, in Luxembourg on 3 April to continue dialogue on issues such as Libya and Syria. Such discussions were seen as a way to enhance dialogue prior to the 5 April International Conference on Supporting the Future of Syria. Following this conference, the HR/VP held a joint meeting of the Libya Quartet – bringing together AU, EU, League of Arab States and UN representatives – in Brussels on 23 April. On 28 November, Brussels was host to the sixth meeting of the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the Permanent Representatives of the League of Arab States. At this meeting, regional challenges such as the Palestinian question, the war in Yemen, counter-terrorism, migration and Iran were discussed. The meeting took place as part of the EU-League of Arab States Strategic Dialogue that was initiated in November 2015.

## EU AND NATO

Building on the EU-NATO Joint Declaration of July 2016 and the subsequent 42 action points agreed to in December 2016, the EU and NATO endorsed a further 32 new proposals in areas such as counter-terrorism and military mobility on 5 December 2017. The new proposals relate to areas such as hybrid threats, strategic communications, resilience, maritime security, cyber, defence capability development and exercises. In July, the EU decided to make a €2 million contribution to the NATO Building Integrity Programme, which seeks to promote good governance in defence and security in alliance countries such as Montenegro and partner countries such as Georgia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>5</sup> Additionally, in September and October 2017, the two organisations

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5. EEAS, "EU-NATO cooperation – factsheet," March 5, 2018, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/28286/eu-nato-cooperation-factsheet\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/28286/eu-nato-cooperation-factsheet_en).

exercised their crisis management capacities together under the first and parallel EU-NATO exercise ‘EU PACE17/CMX17’. The parallel exercise focused on a crisis management scenario in the context of hybrid and cyber threats.

## EU AND OSCE

The EU continued to work closely with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) during 2017, especially in relation to the crisis in Ukraine. For example, in March the European Commission announced that it would support the OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Ukraine with €3 million allocated under the Instrument contributing to Security and Peace (IcSP) for satellite imagery. The funding will be channelled through the EU Satellite Centre (SatCen) whenever requested by the SMM team in Ukraine.<sup>6</sup> In 2017, Austria held the chair of the OSCE.

## EU AND UN

Cooperation between the EU and the UN during 2017 centred mainly on the crises in Libya, Syria and North Korea. Addressing the crisis in Yemen in January, the EU pledged €12 million to assist the efforts of the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) to tackle food insecurity in the country.<sup>7</sup> Speaking to the UN Security Council (UNSC) on 9 May, the HR/VP recalled that ‘EU member states contribute nearly 40 per cent of the UN budget for peacekeeping operations [...] the EU also covers half the budget of UN funds and agencies’ including the World Food Programme (WFP), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).<sup>8</sup> On 20 September, the EU and UN launched a new partnership to eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls. The ‘Spotlight Initiative’ focuses on all forms of violence and exploitation and seeks to promote gender equality. The EU announced its support for the initiative with initial funding of €500 million.<sup>9</sup> At the end of the year, the EU and UN teamed up with the AU to establish a task force to assist with the protection of people travelling along the routes through Libya and the central Mediterranean.

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6. European Commission, “EU provides further satellite imagery support to the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine,” March 24, 2017, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-729\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-729_en.htm).

7. UN News, “Yemen: EU-UN partnership to target ‘alarming’ food insecurity,” January 9, 2017, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/01/549042-yemen-eu-un-partnership-target-alarming-food-insecurity>.


8. UN News, “EU an ‘indispensable’ UN partner, working for rules-based international order, Security Council told,” March 9, 2017, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/05/556932-eu-indispensable-un-partner-working-rules-based-international-order-security>.

9. European Commission, “EU-U Spotlight Initiative to eliminate violence against women and girls,” September 20, 2017, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_MEMO-17-3222\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-3222_en.htm).

## EU VOTING IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 2017

FIGURE 5: UNSC VOTING RECORD OF VETOED OR NOT ADOPTED DRAFT RESOLUTIONS AND NON-UNANIMOUS RESOLUTIONS

2017



Data: UNSC Meetings Records

In 2017, the UNSC adopted 61 Resolutions, all except one of which were passed unanimously. During this year, the voting record of the four EU member states sitting on the UNSC – the permanent members France and the UK, in addition to non-permanent members Italy and Sweden – aligned on all 61 adopted United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR), as well as seven draft Resolutions. The majority of these proposed Resolutions sought to address issues related to the use of chemical weapons in Syria.

Following a stalemate in the 2016 election for the two non-permanent UNSC seats of the Western European and Other Group (WEOG), Italy and the Netherlands agreed to split the two-year term between them. Italy assumed the first half of the mandate on 1 January 2017 and relinquished the seat at the end of 2017. On 2 June 2017, in a special by-election, the Netherlands won the vacated WEOG seat unopposed.





# EU Special Representatives


In accordance with Article 33 TEU, the Council may, ‘on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, appoint a special representative with a mandate in relation to particular policy issues’. The Special Representatives shall ‘carry out his mandate under the authority of the High Representative’. While most EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) have a regional focus, some have thematic responsibilities.

Figure 6 shows that there were eight EUSRs as of December 2017. The mandate of the EUSR for Afghanistan, Franz-Michael Skjold Mellbin, ended on 28 February 2017, but on 21 June the HR/VP appointed a Special Envoy for Afghanistan, Roland Kobia. The HR/VP appointed Toivo Klaar as EUSR for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia on 13 November 2017, replacing Herbert Salber who took up the post on 8 July 2014.

As far as budgetary considerations are concerned, it should be noted that each EUSR finances their office, staff, equipment and the operational costs of their mission in line with the financial reference amount mentioned in the related Council Decisions and Joint Actions. Information regarding mandate terms and financial reference amounts can be found in statistical annex 1.

**FIGURE 6: EU SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES**

2017



\* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with the UNSCR 1244(1999) and the ICJ opinion on Kosovo's declaration of independence.

Data: EEAS



## SOUTHERN NEIGHBOURHOOD

### Libya

EU engagement with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) intensified during 2017. Libya continued to be a source of instability in the southern Mediterranean, with further violent clashes breaking out between rival factions and the two governments – the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) and the rival Interim Government. More people were internally displaced, and armed groups continued to operate with impunity in several parts of the country. While Daesh was driven out of Benghazi, the group's fighters continued to operate in Bani Walid, Sirte and parts of the central desert. The first half of 2017 saw an intensification of the conflict between GNA forces and the so-called Libyan National Army (LNA) that is loyal to the Interim Government in the eastern and southern parts of Libya. This coincided with further flows of migrants and asylum seekers through the country and across the Mediterranean – it is estimated that more than 200,000 people reached Europe via this route in 2017.<sup>10</sup> Additionally, towards the end of the year, the EU and the AU expressed grave concern about the conditions of migrants in Libya following reports of inhuman treatment and slave auctions.

At the start of the year, the EU announced that it would step up efforts to combat human smuggling and trafficking networks in the central Mediterranean. Under its commitment to the November 2015 'Valletta Action Plan', in January EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia began training the Libyan coast guard and navy at centres in Crete in the fields of maritime and human rights law, as well as search and rescue. At the 'Malta Summit' on 3 February, the EU pledged an additional €200 million under the EUTF in 2017 to help reduce the number of crossings and save lives, combat smugglers and traffickers, manage migration flows and assist with resettlement and voluntary returns in Egypt, Libya and Morocco.<sup>11</sup> During the summer, a new UN Special Representative for Libya and Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) took up their role and EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia seized weapons near Libya being smuggled in contravention of the UN arms embargo.<sup>12</sup> Following a meeting between EU and Libyan officials in August, the EU continued to provide new training modules to the Libyan coast guard and navy, and on 15 September, the EU allocated €17.5 million under the IcSP to counter terrorism in the MENA.<sup>13</sup> On 29 September, the EU also decided to extend sanctions imposed on members of the Interim Government.

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10. Human Rights Watch, "Country Report – Libya 2018," in *World Report 2018*, January 18, 2018, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/libya>.

11. European Council, "Malta Declaration Addressing the Central Mediterranean Route," February 3, 2017, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/02/03/malta-declaration/>.

12. Thierry Tardy, "Operation Sophia's world – changes and challenges," *EUISS Brief*, no. 32 (November 2017), <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/operation-sophias-world-%E2%80%93-changes-and-challenges>.

13. European Commission, "EU steps up efforts to prevent violent extremism and counter-terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa," September 14, 2017, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-3225\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3225_en.htm).

## Tunisia

On 28 April, the EU announced that it would provide €500 million in assistance for Tunisia over the 2017-2018 period under the Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) programme.<sup>14</sup> Throughout the year, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) provided a loan of €160 million to Tunisia to assist with the renovation of its railways.<sup>15</sup> In December, the EU donated €52.5 million to Tunisia to assist with water management.<sup>16</sup> Aside from financial resources, however, at the end of January the EU extended sanctions against 48 persons in Tunisia for the misappropriation of state funds (including the former Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali) until 31 January 2018.<sup>17</sup> Despite further judicial reforms in the country, concerns remained about the imprisonment of journalists and freedom of expression.

## Algeria

The EU and Algeria adopted their shared Partnership Priorities on 13 March focusing on political dialogue, socio-economic cooperation, energy and environment development, security dialogue and cultural relations. As part of this partnership, the EU announced a €40 million support package for Algeria's efforts to diversify its economy and to develop renewable energy.<sup>18</sup> In September, the EU welcomed Algeria's efforts to destroy its remaining stockpiles of anti-personnel mines.

## Morocco

Relations with Morocco were marked by the European Court of Justice's (ECJ) ruling at the end of 2016 that the territory of Western Sahara is not covered by the trade deal the EU has with the kingdom, leading to a series of re-negotiations. This notwithstanding, the EU continued its other activities with Morocco, such as justice reform and education (improving literacy) efforts. Despite the unresolved Western Sahara conflict, which had led to Morocco's departure from the AU in 1984, the country returned as a full member in 2017. The EU welcomed the formation of a new government in Morocco at the end of April.

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14. European Commission, "EU approves €200 million disbursement in Macro-Financial Assistance to Tunisia," October 9, 2017, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-3708\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3708_en.htm).

15. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, "EBRD supports Tunisian railway modernisation," December 21, 2017, <http://www.ebrd.com/news/2017/ebrd-supports-tunisian-railway-modernisation-.html>.

16. EU Neighbours Portal, "EU grants 100 million euros to support local development in Tunisia," December 27, 2017, <https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/south/stay-informed/news/eu-grants-100-million-euros-support-local-development-tunisia>.

17. Council of the EU, "Tunisia: Council extends freeze on the assets of 48 persons for another year," January 27, 2017, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/01/27/sanctions-tunisia/>.

18. European Commission, March 13, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/news\\_corner/news/eu-algeria-eu-adopts-%E2%82%AC40-million-projects-support-algerias-renewable-energy-public\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/news_corner/news/eu-algeria-eu-adopts-%E2%82%AC40-million-projects-support-algerias-renewable-energy-public_en).

## Egypt

Egypt was another focal point for EU external action in 2017. In July, Partnership Priorities were adopted for the coming three years. These deal with three areas in particular: economic development, joint diplomatic efforts for stability and regional stability, especially in the security sector. Egypt was struck by a number of terror attacks, perpetrated mainly by Daesh affiliate Wilayat Sinai. The Sinai region in particular was a major source of concern for the Egyptian government, with armed groups operating in the region inflicting heavy losses on government forces. These attacks led to a nation-wide state of emergency being imposed. Human rights concerns also continued in 2017: in January, the EU expressed concern about decisions to freeze the assets of human rights organisations, and, in May the EU expressed its concern about a new piece of legislation that is widely seen as a way to curtail the freedom of association.

Despite the security concerns, the EU intensified its economic partnership with Egypt. This included the decision to permit Egypt to join the Mediterranean Partnership for Research and Innovation (PRIMA) on 27 July. PRIMA seeks to promote research and innovation cooperation in the Mediterranean region with €220 million in support from the Horizon 2020 programme and €274 million from EU member states and southern Mediterranean countries.<sup>19</sup> For Egypt, PRIMA grants access to funds for water provision and agro-food projects. Furthermore, during 2017, the EBRD announced that it would provide a €24 million loan for the construction of a solar power plant in Egypt's Aswan province<sup>20</sup> and \$200 million for gas infrastructure modernisation in the country.<sup>21</sup> Additionally, under the EIP, a decision was taken to invest €4.1 billion in Egypt's public and private sectors over the 2017-2020 period.<sup>22</sup> Finally, in mid-February the EU, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and Egyptian authorities agreed to develop the Suez Canal's economic zone so as to stimulate new investment and economic opportunities in the region.<sup>23</sup>

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19. European Commission, "Partnership for Research and Innovation in the Mediterranean Area (PRIMA)," accessed April 24, 2018, <https://ec.europa.eu/research/environment/index.cfm?pg=prima>.

20. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, "EBRD finances solar power plant in Benban," September 29, 2017, <http://www.ebrd.com/news/2017/ebrd-finances-solar-power-plant-in-benban.html>.

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22. EEAS, "The EU launches in Cairo its new External Investment Plan," November 8, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/35289/eu-launches-cairo-its-new-external-investment-plan\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/35289/eu-launches-cairo-its-new-external-investment-plan_en).

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### EUROPEAN FUND FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (EFSD)

The EFSD was set up in September 2017 as one of three pillars under the EU's EIP. The EFSD, alongside the pillars on technical assistance and dialogue with the private sector, works to enhance cooperation with third countries in Africa and the eastern and southern neighbourhoods as part of the European migration agenda. An EFSD guarantee fund of €1.5 billion is expected to leverage funds from private bodies and international institutions. The EFSD is funded from the EU budget (€750 million), the European Development Fund (€400 million), and member states and financial institutions (€350 million).

## Syria

Estimates concluded that since the conflict in Syria began in 2011, more than 400,000 people have lost their lives, with 6 million people internally displaced and more than 5 million people made refugees.<sup>24</sup> In 2017, Syria continued to be marked by violence<sup>25</sup> with outside actors such as Russia, Iran and the US-led coalition still involved in the conflict. Numerous terror groups such as Daesh and the al-Qaeda affiliate Hay'et Tahrir al-Sham continued to operate in the country, as did armed groups such as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD). In April, the Syrian government was accused of using chemical weapons and nerve agents against the civilian population in Khan Sheikhoun, Idlib province – a charge confirmed in November by UNJIM. In response to these chemical attacks, on the 29 May the EU extended sanctions against the Syrian regime until 1 June 2018. In July, a further 16 individuals connected to the development and use of chemical weapons were added to the sanctions list.

The use of chemical weapons in April coincided with a major international meeting on Syria on 4-5 April. The 'Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region' conference (the so-called 'Brussels Conference') saw partners focus on the humanitarian needs of Syria and neighbouring countries with a €5.6 billion pledge of humanitarian support in 2017 – €1.3 billion of this came from the EU.<sup>26</sup> The conference was co-chaired by the HR/VP, the UN, Germany, Kuwait, Norway, Qatar and the UK and brought together 70 delegations. The conference was preceded by a Joint Communication on Syria on 3 April by the HR/VP and the European Commission, detailing how the EU plans to help end the war in Syria, promote a peaceful transition and democracy, help with reconciliation efforts, address humanitarian needs and combat extremism and sectarianism.

24. Human Rights Watch, "Country Report – Syria 2017" in *World Report 2018*, January 18, 2018, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/syria>. See also Roderick Parkes, "Out of Syria: shifting routes and returns," *EUISS Alert*, no. 8 (April 2017), <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/out-syria-shifting-routes-and-returns>.

25. Florence Gaub, "Arab wars: calculating the costs," *EUISS Brief*, no. 25 (October 2017), <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/arab-wars-calculating-costs>.

26. European Commission, "The EU to host the second Brussels Conference on supporting the future of Syria and the region," September 22, 2017, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-3421\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3421_en.htm).

As part of this work, the HR/VP met with Syrian opposition representatives at the beginning of June, and the EU announced on 19 July that it would dedicate €1.5 million under the IcSP to war crime investigations in Syria.<sup>27</sup> At the end of June, the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis adopted projects worth €275 million to support refugees in Armenia, the Balkans, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. Sanitation and healthcare programmes were identified as being of particular importance.<sup>28</sup> In September, the EU provided an additional €90 million to the Syria crisis from the EU Regional Trust Fund on Syria through UNICEF.<sup>29</sup> This support was particularly needed in light of the October escalation of air strikes in northern Syria in places such as Aleppo, Hama and Idlib which left scores of civilians dead and injured. October was a violent month as during this time the tide against Daesh started to turn following the Global Coalition's and the SDF's liberation of the city of Raqqa.

## Lebanon

By the end of 2017, EU support for Syria's neighbouring countries was ramped up following the adoption of UNSCR 2393 on 19 December 2017. This Resolution authorised cross-border humanitarian operations, and the EU announced projects worth €150 million to support refugees in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Serbia on 6 December.<sup>30</sup> In December, the EU funded projects worth €44 million in Lebanon to assist the country with sanitation projects and democratic participation.<sup>31</sup> Lebanon was the focus of much of the EU's efforts in the region (the HR/VP visited Lebanon to underline the EU's support for the country's institutions and democracy in early 2017, for instance) and in August the mandate for the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was also renewed. The EU's assistance efforts continued in the latter half of the year despite the announcement by the Lebanese prime minister on 4 November while he was in Saudi Arabia that he was to resign his post (a decision he did not eventually take).

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27. European Commission, "The EU steps up its support for investigations into war crimes and accountability in Syria," July 19, 2017, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-2069\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-2069_en.htm).

28. European Commission, "EU Syria Trust Fund: new assistance package to support Syrian refugees and host communities crosses €1 billion mark," June 20, 2017, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-1593\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1593_en.htm).

29. European Commission, "EU strengthens its Syria crisis response through additional funding to UNICEF," September 19, 2017, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-3325\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3325_en.htm).

30. European Commission, "EU Syria Trust Fund: new assistance package worth €150 million adopted to support Syrian refugees and host communities," December 6, 2017, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-5107\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5107_en.htm).

31. European Commission, "New assistance package for Lebanon: EU strongly committed to supporting the country's development and stability," December 19, 2017, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-5290\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5290_en.htm).

## Israel and Palestine<sup>32</sup>

The EU continued to focus its diplomatic efforts on the Israel-Palestine conflict during 2017. During the year, the HR/VP met a number of high-level figures from the region including Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on 6 June and the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas on two occasions. Such visits sought to highlight the EU's support for the peace process. With regard to Israel, the visits cemented the EU's economic collaboration with the country. In mid-January, Israel celebrated its 20-year anniversary of being associated with the EU Research and Innovation Programme (Horizon 2020). EU-Israel ties on research and innovation were further highlighted following a visit by the EU Commissioner for Research, Science and Innovation, Carlos Moedas, in mid-May. Yet, the EU's diplomatic visits to the region also sought to address a number of concerns including the Israeli government's issuance of settlement unit tenders throughout the year – in the first half of 2017 alone, almost 8,000 settlement units were advanced in the West Bank.<sup>33</sup> On 6 February, the EU also condemned the so-called 'Regularisation Law' that was adopted by the Israeli Knesset in order to legalise the seizure of Palestinian property rights in occupied territory.<sup>34</sup> The Union also condemned the death sentences issued in the Gaza Strip by the *de facto* authorities in Gaza on 2 March.<sup>35</sup>

Tensions ran high in July as clashes between Palestinians and Israeli security forces occurred in the West Bank. In addition to calling for calm, the EU continued to support the region with assistance during 2017, allocating €138 million in support to the Palestinian Authority to help it pay salaries, pensions and allowances.<sup>36</sup> On 24 October, the EU provided €13 million under the PEGASE (*Mecanisme Palestino-Européen de Gestion et d'Aide Socio-Economique*) mechanism to assist the East Jerusalem Hospitals network in order to provide critical health services to Palestinians. Contributions from PEGASE have totalled close to €2.3 billion since February 2008.<sup>37</sup> In October, the EU approved a

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32. This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the member states on this issue.

33. Office of the EU Representative (West Bank and Gaza Strip, UNRWA), "Six-Month Report on Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem (January - June 2017)," December 15, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/37466/six-month-report-israeli-settlements-occupied-west-bank-including-east-jerusalem-january-june\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/37466/six-month-report-israeli-settlements-occupied-west-bank-including-east-jerusalem-january-june_en).

34. EEAS, "Statement by the High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini on the 'Regularisation Law' adopted by the Israeli Knesset," February 7, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/20104/statement-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-regularisation-law-adopted\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/20104/statement-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-regularisation-law-adopted_en).

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36. EEAS, "The EU contributes €20 million to the PA's payment of July salaries and pensions," August 3, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/30695/eu-contributes-€20-million-pas-payment-july-salaries-and-pensions\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/30695/eu-contributes-€20-million-pas-payment-july-salaries-and-pensions_en).

37. EEAS, "The EU provides €13 million to East Jerusalem Hospitals," October 23, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/34338/eu-provides-€13-million-east-jerusalem-hospitals\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/34338/eu-provides-€13-million-east-jerusalem-hospitals_en).



contribution of €9.5 million to support the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).<sup>38</sup> Such payments were facilitated under the Joint Declaration on EU support to UNRWA that was signed on the 7 June. A disbursement of €82 million to the UNRWA budget for 2017 was also announced by the EU at the signing ceremony.<sup>39</sup>

2017 was also coloured by the decision of the US government to recognise Jerusalem – rather than Tel Aviv – as the capital city of Israel. The US announced that it would subsequently move its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. The HR/VP expressed grave concern about the decision and she re-affirmed the need to work towards a peaceful resolution of the Israel-Palestinian conflict.

## Iran

A shift in American policy was visible in relation to the JCPOA on Iran's nuclear activities. Following President Trump's announcement in October that he had decertified the Iran nuclear deal under US law, the EU and the governments of China, France, Germany, Russia and the UK moved to buttress the deal and attempt to persuade the US government to remain committed to the agreement. The 28 member states of the EU reaffirmed their commitment to the Iran nuclear deal, and the HR/VP stated on 16 October that: 'The European Union encourages the United States to maintain its commitment to the JCPOA and to consider the implications for the security of the United States, its partners and the region before taking further steps [...] At a time of acute nuclear threat the European Union is determined to preserve the JCPOA as a key pillar of the international non-proliferation architecture'.<sup>40</sup>

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38. EEAS, "The EU contributes an additional EUR 9.5 million in support of Palestine refugees," October 10, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/33645/eu-contributes-additional-eur-95-million-support-palestine-refugees\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/33645/eu-contributes-additional-eur-95-million-support-palestine-refugees_en).

39. EU Neighbours Portal, "EU and UNRWA sign new landmark agreement and reaffirm joint commitment to support Palestine refugees," June 7, 2017, <http://www.euneighbours.eu/en/south/stay-informed/news/eu-and-unrwa-sign-new-landmark-agreement-and-reaffirm-joint-commitment>.

40. EEAS, "Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini on the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran nuclear deal)," October 16, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/33997/remarks-federica-mogherini-implementation-joint-comprehensive-plan-action-iran-nuclear-deal\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/33997/remarks-federica-mogherini-implementation-joint-comprehensive-plan-action-iran-nuclear-deal_en).

## Yemen

Entering its second year, the conflict in Yemen continued to be the largest humanitarian crisis in the world. The year was marked by a number of bombings of civilian targets in provinces such as Saada. As a result of the conflict, 18.8 million people are thought to be in need of humanitarian or protection assistance. The EU estimates that the conflict in Yemen has led to food insecurity for some 17 million people in the country, with over 2.2 million children acutely malnourished.<sup>41</sup> Additionally, as the Council Conclusions of 3 April make clear the EU is concerned about the consequences of the war in Yemen for regional stability and how ‘the war has created the conditions for criminal and terrorist organisations like al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Daesh in Yemen and others to thrive’.<sup>42</sup> In response to the conflict, the EU, Germany and the UN held a humanitarian crisis meeting on 5 April to discuss food insecurity in the Horn of Africa region. This meeting was followed by a commitment by the EU to dedicate €116 million to the crisis in Yemen after a high-level pledging event on the humanitarian crisis in Yemen on 26 April held in Geneva,<sup>43</sup> which was co-organised by the UN, Switzerland and Sweden. Additionally, at the end of April the EU dedicated an additional €5 million in assistance to the country following a cholera outbreak that claimed the lives of over 1,000 people.<sup>44</sup> The year ended with continued concerns about the bombing of civilian targets, but the HR/VP also expressed concern about blockades in the country that were stopping the delivery of humanitarian and commercial goods to large parts of Yemen.<sup>45</sup>

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
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
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**FIGURE 7: MENA TIMELINE**

Data: EEAS, European Commission, Council of the EU



\* This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the member states on this issue.



## Horn of Africa

The EU provided support on a broader regional basis, too. On 17 March, the EU announced an additional €165 million to address the crisis in South Sudan and a drought affecting Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya.<sup>46</sup> Furthermore, in April, the EU invested €59 million in the Horn of Africa to help improve stability and alleviate migratory pressures. This financial support was directed at enhancing the work of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (€40 million), countering violent extremism in Kenya (€5 million), and assisting with sustainable development in Sudan (€10 million).<sup>47</sup> In the same month, a humanitarian crisis meeting took place between the HR/VP, Germany and the UN to discuss the food security crisis unfolding in the Horn of Africa, where it was stated that \$5.6 billion is required by humanitarian partners in 2017 to avert food insecurity in Somalia, South Sudan, north-eastern Nigeria and Yemen.<sup>48</sup> In June, the European Commission pledged a further €5 million to Yemen following a large-scale cholera outbreak in the country.<sup>49</sup> Finally, working through various UN institutions, the EU invested €30 million on 5 December to counter the poaching and trafficking of wildlife in southern and eastern Africa, and the Indian Ocean.<sup>50</sup>

## Djibouti

In Djibouti, the EU focused on improving food security and resilience. On 24 May, the European Commission's Director General of Development and International Cooperation Stefano Manservigi visited the country to sign important contracts for projects related to climate change and water and food security. Throughout the year, the EU drew on the €105 million commitment made to Djibouti over the 2014-2020 period.<sup>51</sup> In May, the EU and the government of Djibouti signed an investment programme that saw €23 million allocated to water sanitation and waste management projects in

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46. EEAS, "EU scales-up its response to famine and drought affected countries in Horn of Africa with an additional €165 million," March 19, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/23001/eu-scales-its-response-famine-and-drought-affected-countries-horn-africa-additional-eu165\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/23001/eu-scales-its-response-famine-and-drought-affected-countries-horn-africa-additional-eu165_en).

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51. EEAS, "Coopération UE-Djibouti-IGAD," November 1, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/34961/coopération-ue-djibouti-igad\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/34961/coopération-ue-djibouti-igad_en).

Balbala and the capital.<sup>52</sup> Djibouti is an important location for EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta as it hosts the operation's Maritime Patrol Aircraft Detachments (MPADs) and facilitates port visits by EUNAVFOR warships.<sup>53</sup> China officially opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti in August – joining countries such as France, Italy, Japan and the US that already maintain bases in the country.

## Eritrea

In mid-January, the EU approved €13 million in support of employment and skills development in the country under the EUTF.<sup>54</sup> However, in April the Union expressed its concern that the stalemate with regard to the Eritrean-Ethiopian border could put regional stability at risk. The announcement came in the wake of the 15th anniversary of the decision on the border delimitation by the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, which so far has not been implemented.

## Ethiopia

Towards the end of 2017, Ethiopia experienced a humanitarian crisis following a drought in the country. On 8 December, the EU announced the distribution of €15 million in emergency humanitarian aid to help drought-stricken areas. This amount took the EU's total humanitarian contributions to the country to over €91 million in 2017.<sup>55</sup> A visit by the EUSR for Human Rights, Stavros Lambrinidis, on 10 April aimed at promoting strategic engagement with Ethiopia on human rights and governance. However, violent clashes were reported in Ethiopia towards the end of 2017, and the EU expressed concern about the increasingly ethnic nature of attacks.<sup>56</sup> These acts of violence cast a shadow over the welcome news that in August, the state of emergency that had existed in the country for ten months had been lifted by the Ethiopian parliament.

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52. EEAS, "L'UE finance un nouveau projet d'assainissement liquid à Balbala, Djibouti," December 7, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/36951/lue-finance-un-nouveau-projet-dassainissement-liquide-a-balbala-djibouti\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/36951/lue-finance-un-nouveau-projet-dassainissement-liquide-a-balbala-djibouti_en).

53. EEAS, "EUNAVFOR Operation Commander meets with Djiboutian Authorities," December 22, 2017, <http://eunavfor.eu/eu-navfor-operation-commander-meets-with-djiboutian-authorities/>.

54. EEAS, "EU Trust-Fund for stability and migration in Africa – New project approved for Eritrea," January 12, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/18508/eu-trust-fund-stability-and-migration-africa-new-project-approved-eritrea\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/18508/eu-trust-fund-stability-and-migration-africa-new-project-approved-eritrea_en).

55. European Commission, "EU boosts aid in Ethiopia amid worsening humanitarian situation," December 8, 2017, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-5153\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5153_en.htm).

56. EEAS, "Statement by the spokesperson on the situation in Ethiopia," December 20, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/37695/statement-spokesperson-situation-ethiopia\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/37695/statement-spokesperson-situation-ethiopia_en).

## Kenya

The political scene in Kenya was dominated by the presidential election that took place on 8 August 2017. In advance of the election, EU representatives visited Nairobi in order to support local authorities with preparations. The EU congratulated Uhuru Kenyatta on his election as president, but the Kenyan Supreme Court ordered a re-run of the election on 1 September. The EU expressed concern at the ‘continuing efforts of both parties to interfere with and undermine the independent operation of the electoral commission’.<sup>57</sup> In order to support a fair and free election, the EU decided to prolong the Election Observation Mission (EOM) that had initially been deployed on 27 June. On 20 November, the Supreme Court validated the results of the re-run of the presidential election and the victory of President Kenyatta. Aside from the presidential elections, the EU provided assistance to Kenya to help support refugee and host communities in Turkana County in February.<sup>58</sup> In March, the EU provided €23 million in additional assistance to the area following a drought.<sup>59</sup>

## Somalia

The EU’s focus in eastern Africa during 2017 was on improving stability and assisting with migratory pressures.<sup>60</sup> Somalia remained a cause for concern during the year with continued terrorist attacks by al-Shabaab and other groups. Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Farmaajo was elected president in January and met the HR/VP on 21 February. A number of terrorist attacks took place in cities such as Mogadishu during January and February that coincided with the transition of power. Following the ‘London Conference’ on Somalia on 11 May, the EU announced that it would provide €200 million in development funding through the EUTF to tackle the root causes of destabilisation, irregular migration and forced displacement.<sup>61</sup> In March, the EU also provided €120 million of support to AMISOM.<sup>62</sup> Despite these measures, however, there was further civilian loss of life after terror attacks through April to October in Mogadishu, on a Somali army base in Puntland and on the AMISOM mission.

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57. “Joint Statement by Heads of Mission in Kenya,” *EEAS*, October 25, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/34549/joint-statement-heads-mission-kenya\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/34549/joint-statement-heads-mission-kenya_en).

58. *EEAS*, “EU helps refugees settle in northwestern Kenya,” February 9, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/20249/eu-helps-refugees-settle-northwestern-kenya\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/20249/eu-helps-refugees-settle-northwestern-kenya_en).

59. *EEAS*, “The EU has allocated another EUR 29 million in response for drought emergency,” March 8, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/22271/european-union-eu-has-allocated-another-eur-29m-response-drought-emergency\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/22271/european-union-eu-has-allocated-another-eur-29m-response-drought-emergency_en).

60. Roderick Parkes, “Out of (and inside) Africa: migration routes and their impacts,” *EUISS Brief*, no. 12 (April 2017), <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/out-and-inside-africa-migration-routes-and-their-impacts>.

61. European Commission, “The European Union steps up its support to Somalia with €200 million at the London Conference,” May 11, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/european-union-steps-its-support-somalia-eu200-million-london-conference\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/european-union-steps-its-support-somalia-eu200-million-london-conference_en).

62. European Commission, “EU reinforces cooperation with the African Union and announces new peace building support of €120 million,” March 17, 2017, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-646\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-646_en.htm).



Through its CSDP missions, the EU also played a role in capacity-building and support. Beginning in March 2017, twelve verified piracy attacks took place in the Horn of Africa and there was a continued need to support Somalian and international security providers in the country. EU Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia, EU Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) Somalia and EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta continued to counter piracy and build the capacity of Somalian authorities with regard to maritime and internal security. EUTM Somalia provided training to the Somali national army and also supported the Somali ministry of defence. EUCAP Somalia helped the Somalian authorities review nine laws and ten national policies and strategies, and it provided support to the Somaliland coast guard and Puntland state police throughout the year.<sup>63</sup>

### AFRICAN PEACE FACILITY

The APF is part of the European Development Fund (EDF) and is designed to support the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security and sustainable development on the African continent. The APF covers financial support to African-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs), the operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and initiatives under the Early Response Mechanism (ERM). In 2017, the APF-financed the AU-led peace operations such as AMISOM and the Multinational Joint Task Force for the Lake Chad Basin (MNJTF). €430 million was earmarked from the EDF for 2017-2018. Contributions from the 11th EDF account for €210 million – or roughly half of the budget of the APF. The remaining €220 million was raised from decommitted funds from the tenth EDF. The Commission Decision on the 2017-2018 APF action programme foresees a budget increase to €535 million, in line with the total estimated cost of the programme. These additional funds, however, remain conditional on the reallocation of funds decommitted from projects under the tenth EDF.

## The Sahel

The Sahel remained a major security challenge for the Union in 2017.<sup>64</sup> France's Operation Barkhane continued its counter-terrorism operations in Mali, while EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUCAP Sahel Mali, the EUTM Mali and the Regional Coordination Cell (RCC) Sahel worked to support Sahelian nations with security and capacity-building. EUTM Mali continued to train the Malian Armed Forces (MAF) in areas such as indirect fire, logistics, engineering and human rights. For its part, EUCAP Sahel Mali (which had its mandate extended for two years on 11 January 2017) assisted the Malian government

63. EEAS, "EU Common Security and Defence Policy Missions and Operations: Annual Report 2017," February 27, 2018, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/22818/mission-and-operations-annual-report\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/22818/mission-and-operations-annual-report_en).

64. Luca Raineri and Francesco Strazzari, "Jihadism in Mali and the Sahel: evolving dynamics and patterns," *EUISS Brief*, no. 21 (June 2017), <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/jihadism-mali-and-sahel-evolving-dynamics-and-patterns>.

by revising (and advising on) the country's national border policy, supporting forensic investigations and providing IT equipment. In Niger, EUCAP Sahel Niger assisted with the revision of six laws and decrees associated with the criminal and penal codes, and it donated equipment such as police vehicles to the Nigerien authorities. In July, the EU established the RCC Sahel to better coordinate the EU's CSDP efforts, and align them with the activities of the G5 Sahel countries.<sup>65</sup> The G5 Sahel force was established in February 2017 by Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger to provide security in the region. In June, the EU assigned €50 million to financially support the force so it can operate in the most fragile zones in the Sahel, and also issued a Joint Declaration of support.<sup>66</sup> These actions were buttressed by the formation of an Alliance for the Sahel in July, which was established by the EU, France and Germany.<sup>67</sup>

## Lake Chad basin and Chad

Beyond its direct military and civilian support for the region, the EU also invested in stability and economic development in the broader Lake Chad basin and Sahel regions. A total of €274.2 million was dedicated to the regions in December 2017 by the European Commission.<sup>68</sup> The Lake Chad basin region was specifically singled out with support worth €105 million for humanitarian purposes.<sup>69</sup> Chad was a focus for EU support throughout the year. In January, the EU affirmed its support for Chad in its fight against terrorism in the Sahel and against Boko Haram, and it congratulated Moussa Faki Mahamat for his election as president of the AU Commission. In April, the European Commission allocated €100 million in support for the country to provide basic social services and to help consolidate democracy.<sup>70</sup> In August, the EU welcomed the entry into force of a new criminal code in the country and it provided assistance following an outbreak of cholera during the summer. Furthermore, in September, the European Commission stated that the EU would provide €925 million between 2017-

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65. EEAS, "EU Common Security and Defence Policy Missions and Operations: Annual Report 2017," February 27, 2018, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/22818/mission-and-operations-annual-report\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/22818/mission-and-operations-annual-report_en).

66. European Commission, "Soutien en faveur de la sécurité, de la stabilisation et du développement au Sahel: le Commissaire Mimica participe à la réunion de haut niveau sur le Sahel à Paris," December 13, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/soutien-en-faveur-de-la-securite-de-la-stabilisation-et-du-developpement-au-sahel-le\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/soutien-en-faveur-de-la-securite-de-la-stabilisation-et-du-developpement-au-sahel-le_en).

67. EEAS, "Alliance for the Sahel will reinforce EU work for stability and the development of key region," July 14, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/29876/alliance-sahel-will-reinforce-eu-work-stability-and-development-key-region\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/29876/alliance-sahel-will-reinforce-eu-work-stability-and-development-key-region_en).

68. European Commission, "Fonds Fiduciaire pour l'Afrique: €274,2 millions pour soutenir la stabilité au Sahel et bassin du lac Tchad," December 13, 2017, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_MEMO-17-5232\\_fr.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-5232_fr.htm).

69. European Commission, "EU proposes €105 million in humanitarian assistance for Lake Chad region," February 24, 2017, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-343\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-343_en.htm).

70. European Commission, "European Commission announces an additional €100 million in support for Chad," April 10, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/la-commission-europeenne-annonce-100-millions-deuros-additionnels-pour-soutenir-le\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/la-commission-europeenne-annonce-100-millions-deuros-additionnels-pour-soutenir-le_en).

2021 to the country with a focus on food security, democratic governance, security, human rights and employment.<sup>71</sup>

## Burkina Faso

In Burkina Faso, the EU allocated €117 million in February towards food security and agricultural resilience.<sup>72</sup> On 29 June, the EU and Germany signed an agreement with the government of Burkina Faso to assist with the management of borders in the country. The programme (called PROGEF) is financed through the EUTF (€25 million) with Germany contributing a further €5 million.<sup>73</sup> In July, the EUSR for Human Rights visited Burkina Faso to facilitate dialogue between civil society and the authorities, and the EU dedicated €1.9 million to support senior citizens.<sup>74</sup> Additionally, the EU invested in initiatives designed to improve road infrastructure and employment in border communities.

## Cameroon

In 2017, the security threats in north-eastern Nigeria spilled over into Cameroon. On 30 September, the EU expressed concern about the tensions that had risen over a number of weeks in the west of Cameroon.<sup>75</sup> Concern was raised following mass anti-government protests that broke out on 22 September and the resulting response by government security forces. To support the work of the Cameroonian authorities, the EU announced on 28 August that €10 million would be made available to protect the populations in the extreme north of the country against the threat posed by Boko Haram.<sup>76</sup>

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71. European Commission, “L’Union européenne renforce son important soutien au Tchad,” September 7, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/lunion-europeenne-renforce-son-important-soutien-au-tchad\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/lunion-europeenne-renforce-son-important-soutien-au-tchad_en).

72. European Commission, “L’union européenne renforce son soutien au Burkina-Faso avec €117 millions pour la sécurité alimentaire,” February 27, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/lunion-europeenne-renforce-son-soutien-au-burkina-faso-avec-eu117-millions-pour-la\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/lunion-europeenne-renforce-son-soutien-au-burkina-faso-avec-eu117-millions-pour-la_en).

73. EEAS, “Programme d’appui à la gestion des frontières (PROGEF) Signature d’un accord de mise en œuvre entre les autorités Burkinabé, l’Union européenne et l’Allemagne,” June 30, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/29082/programme-dappui-a-la-gestion-des-frontieres-progef-signature-dun-accord-de-mise-en-oeuvre\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/29082/programme-dappui-a-la-gestion-des-frontieres-progef-signature-dun-accord-de-mise-en-oeuvre_en).

74. EEAS, “Le Représentant Spécial de l’Union européenne pour les Droits de l’Homme en visite au Burkina Faso,” July 21, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/30239/le-representant-special-de-lunion-europeenne-pour-les-droits-de-lhomme-en-visite-au-burkina\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/30239/le-representant-special-de-lunion-europeenne-pour-les-droits-de-lhomme-en-visite-au-burkina_en).

75. EEAS, “Statement of the spokesperson on the situation in Western Cameroon,” September 30, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/33104/statement-spokesperson-situation-western-cameroon\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/33104/statement-spokesperson-situation-western-cameroon_en).

76. EEAS, “Paix-Sécurité: Favoriser l’emploi des jeunes pour les éloigner des idéologies liées au terrorisme,” August 28, 2017 [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/31408/paix-securite-favoriser-emploi-des-jeunes-pour-les-eloigner-des-ideologies-liees-au\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/31408/paix-securite-favoriser-emploi-des-jeunes-pour-les-eloigner-des-ideologies-liees-au_en).

## Central African Republic

During 2017, the CAR benefitted from EU financial support and it was announced in June that the country would receive €382 million to support peacebuilding and socio-economic development.<sup>77</sup> Such support was needed given the security situation in the country. By February, the security situation in some parts of the CAR had deteriorated so much (in particular in the Ouaka and Haute-Kotto prefectures), that the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the AU, the International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF), the UN and the EU issued a Joint Statement demanding an end to the violence. In January, there were two attacks on the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission (MINUSCA), which claimed the lives of three blue helmets.<sup>78</sup> In May, MINUSCA sustained further attacks which claimed the lives of six soldiers and dozens of civilians.<sup>79</sup>

## Mali

In Mali, terrorist attacks against the MAF, other government entities and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) took place on 19 January, 6 March, 1 June, 19 June, 15 August and 27 October. In the attack on 19 June, one EU soldier and an EU diplomatic mission employee were among the casualties.<sup>80</sup> The EU provided a range of assistance over the course of 2017, including for improving resilience *vis-à-vis* climate change,<sup>81</sup> humanitarian aid for Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR) worth €9 million,<sup>82</sup> state building for Mali worth €71 million<sup>83</sup> and promoting national reconciliation. To sustain its civilian support to the country, the Council decided on 11 January to extend EUCAP Sahel Mali's mandate for two years

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77. European Commission, "Europe is stepping up its support for the Central African Republic with aid of EUR 382 million," June 7, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/europe-stepping-its-support-central-african-republic-aid-eur-382-million\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/europe-stepping-its-support-central-african-republic-aid-eur-382-million_en).

78. EEAS, "Statement by the Spokesperson on the attacks in the Central African Republics," January 6, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/18420/statement-spokesperson-attacks-central-african-republic\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/18420/statement-spokesperson-attacks-central-african-republic_en).

79. EEAS, "Déclaration du porte-parole sur la situation en Centrafrique," May 16, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/26214/déclaration-du-porte-parole-sur-la-situation-en-centrafrique\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/26214/déclaration-du-porte-parole-sur-la-situation-en-centrafrique_en).

80. EEAS, "EU and African partners stand together in fight against terror as EU mission in Mali suffers casualties," June 19, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/28382/eu-and-african-partners-stand-together-fight-against-terror-eu-mission-mali-suffers-casualties\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/28382/eu-and-african-partners-stand-together-fight-against-terror-eu-mission-mali-suffers-casualties_en).

81. EEAS, "L'Union européenne poursuit son appui en faveur du Mali pour renforcer sa sécurité alimentaire et sa résilience face aux effets du changement climatique," April 25, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/25058/lunion-europeenne-poursuit-son-appui-en-faveur-du-mali-pour-renforcer-sa-sécurité-alimentaire\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/25058/lunion-europeenne-poursuit-son-appui-en-faveur-du-mali-pour-renforcer-sa-sécurité-alimentaire_en).

82. European Commission, "EU steps up assistance to Mali and the Central African Republic as humanitarian needs grow," August 3, 2017, [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/eu-steps-assistance-mali-and-central-african-republic-humanitarian-needs-grow\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/eu-steps-assistance-mali-and-central-african-republic-humanitarian-needs-grow_en).

83. EEAS, "L'Union européenne continue à soutenir le Mali dans sa politique de réforme et de rétablissement de l'Etat," December 20, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/37686/lunion-europeenne-continue-à-soutenir-le-mali-dans-sa-politique-de-réforme-et-de\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/37686/lunion-europeenne-continue-à-soutenir-le-mali-dans-sa-politique-de-réforme-et-de_en).

until 14 January 2019 with a budget of €29.7 million.<sup>84</sup> Additionally, on 4 August the EU deployed a stabilisation team to the Mopti and Segou governorates to support national plans and policies by re-establishing and extending civilian administration in the regions.<sup>85</sup> In August, the EU welcomed the ceasefire announced between the Coordination of Azawad Movements and the Platform (a coalition of pro-government groups) under the Algiers Agreement, and the Council transposed UNSCR 2374 into legal acts, which allows sanctions to be imposed on any group or individual hindering peace and reconciliation in Mali.<sup>86</sup>

## Niger

In June 2017, local authorities and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) managed to successfully save 92 migrants heading to Libya who came from Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal in the Sahara in June 2017. The Nigerien and IOM efforts were financially supported by the EU.<sup>87</sup> To support Niger with basic social services and help it tackle security challenges, the EU announced on 13 December that it would dedicate €1 billion to the country over the period 2017-2020. As part of this package, the EU, in cooperation with the Nigerien government, decided to allocate €40 million to nutrition, food security and resilience. A further agreement was signed in December to dedicate €21 million in EU funds to build hybrid power plants in Agadez and Gorou Banda (the remaining €43 million will come from the French development agency).<sup>88</sup>

## Nigeria

In Nigeria, there was concern early in the year when the Nigerian air force bombed a camp of displaced people in Rann, north-eastern Nigeria.<sup>89</sup> The north-east region posed a considerable security problem in 2017, especially due to the activities of Boko Haram in the area. Borno state was struck by a bomb attack on 16 August, and a mosque was

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84. Council of the EU, “EUCAP Sahel Mali: mission extended for two years, €29.7 million budget adopted,” January 11, 2017, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/01/11/eucap-sahel-mali/>.

85. Council of the EU, “Mali: European Union supports the stabilisation in the central regions of Mopti and Segou,” August 4, 2017, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/08/04/mali-regions-mopti-segou/>.

86. *Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1775 of 28 September 2017 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Mali*, (CFSP) 2017/1775, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 251/23, <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2017/1775/oj>.

87. EEAS, “EU-supported operation rescues 92 migrants abandoned in Sahara desert,” June 15, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/28250/eu-supported-operation-rescues-92-migrants-abandoned-sahara-desert\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/28250/eu-supported-operation-rescues-92-migrants-abandoned-sahara-desert_en).

88. European Commission, “EU will support Niger with assistance of €1 billion by 2020,” December 13, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/eu-will-support-niger-assistance-eu1-billion-2020\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/eu-will-support-niger-assistance-eu1-billion-2020_en).

89. EEAS, “Statement by the spokesperson on the bombing of a camp of displaced people in Nigeria,” January 19, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/18892/statement-spokesperson-bombing-camp-displaced-people-nigeria\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/18892/statement-spokesperson-bombing-camp-displaced-people-nigeria_en).

attacked in the Mubi region on 22 November, leading to at least 50 deaths.<sup>90</sup> There was a glimmer of hope, however, as 80 girls that were kidnapped by Boko Haram (the so-called ‘Chibok Schoolgirls’) were released on 7 May after three years as hostages. Furthermore, in addition to partnering with the World Health Organisation (WHO) and UNICEF to improve health systems in Nigeria, the European Commission allocated €94.5 million to projects to support Nigeria during the June European Development Days. Financed under the EDF, the financial support is directed towards renewable energy development, the rule of law and support for youth.<sup>91</sup>

## Democratic Republic of Congo

In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), instability and conflict continued as discussions about constitutional matters in the country broke down. Following the 31 December 2016 agreement between major political forces to move towards credible elections by December 2017, in February 2017 the EU, AU, UN and OIF expressed concern that the parties had not effectively implemented the agreement. Although the election timetable was announced in November, the EU and partners stressed the need for a non-violent transition of power and full respect for the constitution.<sup>92</sup> In March, two UN human rights experts were found dead, and in May more than 65,000 people were displaced or fled to neighbouring countries.<sup>93</sup> In May, the DRC also reported an outbreak of Ebola, which led the EU to rapidly respond with aid delivered by the ‘ECHO flight’ service.<sup>94</sup> In July, the EU released a further €5 million in emergency humanitarian assistance to the 2.6 million people affected by conflict in Kasai Province. This amount was in addition to the almost €28 million dedicated to the DRC since the start of 2017.<sup>95</sup> In September, deadly clashes occurred in Kamanyola, Kivu. On 11 December, the Council extended sanctions on the DRC for a further year until 2018. The end of the year saw the continuation of violence with an attack on the 9 December on the UN Organisation

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90. EEAS, “Statement by the Spokesperson on the terrorist attacks in Mubi, North East Nigeria,” November 22, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/36019/statement-spokesperson-terrorist-attacks-mubi-north-east-nigeria\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/36019/statement-spokesperson-terrorist-attacks-mubi-north-east-nigeria_en).

91. European Commission, “EU steps up support to Nigeria for projects addressing renewable energy, the rule of law and support for youth,” June 8, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/eu-steps-support-nigeria-projects-addressing-renewable-energy-rule-law-and-support\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/eu-steps-support-nigeria-projects-addressing-renewable-energy-rule-law-and-support_en).

92. EEAS, “Statement by the Spokesperson on the publication of the election timetable of the Democratic Republic of Congo,” November 9, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/35444/statement-spokesperson-publication-election-timetable-democratic-republic-congo\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/35444/statement-spokesperson-publication-election-timetable-democratic-republic-congo_en).

93. European Commission, “Democratic Republic of Congo – ECHO Factsheet,” July 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/echo\\_factsheet\\_drc\\_en\\_2.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/echo_factsheet_drc_en_2.pdf).

94. European Commission, “European Commission transports aid workers and medical supplies to Ebola outbreak in DRC,” May 22, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/european-commission-transports-aid-workers-and-medical-supplies-ebola-outbreak-drc\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/european-commission-transports-aid-workers-and-medical-supplies-ebola-outbreak-drc_en).

95. European Commission, “More EU aid for Democratic Republic of Congo as crisis in Kasai worsens,” July 5, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/more-eu-aid-democratic-republic-congo-crisis-kasa-worsens\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/more-eu-aid-democratic-republic-congo-crisis-kasa-worsens_en).

Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) in north Kivu, leading to the deaths of 19 peacekeepers and soldiers.<sup>96</sup>

## Guinea

Living up to its commitment to develop renewable energies in Africa, the EU signed a joint declaration with Guinea in June to help boost sustainable energy usage in the country in line with the Paris Climate Agreement. By the end of the year, the EU had contributed €400 million towards Guinea's national economic and social development plan.<sup>97</sup>

## Sudan and South Sudan

The war in South Sudan continued to affect security in the wider region as fighting spilled over into the upper Nile and equatorial regions. The conflict has led to suspected war crimes and the government and military continue to be adversely affected by factionalism. The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) continued its mission of sheltering civilians and the UN Regional Protection Force (UNRPF), mandated in 2016, started to deploy in August. In October, the European Commission announced further support for Sudan with a €106 million package designed to assist with migration, health, nutrition and climate change.<sup>98</sup>

## The Gambia

The Gambia provided some grounds for optimism during the year, as the country transitioned towards peaceful democratic change. Seizing the opportunity to support The Gambia, the EU announced immediate support worth €75 million in February, and signalled its intention to provide €150 million to support state capacity-building and employment in the same month.<sup>99</sup>

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96. EEAS, "Statement by the Spokesperson on the attack on MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo," December 9, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/37220/statement-spokesperson-attack-monusco-democratic-republic-congo\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/37220/statement-spokesperson-attack-monusco-democratic-republic-congo_en).


97. European Commission, "L'Union européenne annonce 400 millions d'euros en soutien à la Guinée," November 16, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/union-europeenne-annonce-400-millions-deuros-en-soutien-la-guinee\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/union-europeenne-annonce-400-millions-deuros-en-soutien-la-guinee_en).

98. European Commission, "EU announces €106 million support package for people affected by the crises in Sudan," October 23, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/eu-announces-eu-106-million-support-package-people-affected-crises-sudan\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/eu-announces-eu-106-million-support-package-people-affected-crises-sudan_en).


99. European Commission, "EU opening a new chapter of relations with The Gambia," February 9, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/eu-opening-new-chapter-relations-gambia\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/eu-opening-new-chapter-relations-gambia_en).

**FIGURE 8: AFRICA TIMELINE**

Data: EEAS, European Commission, Council of the EU







**CORE DOCUMENTS**

“Declaration on investing in youth for accelerated inclusive growth and sustainable development,” AU-EU Summit 2017, *Council of the EU*, December 12, 2017, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31991/33454-pr-final\\_declaration\\_au\\_eu\\_summit.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31991/33454-pr-final_declaration_au_eu_summit.pdf).

“New European Consensus on Development – ‘Our world, our dignity, our future’,” Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the member states meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission, June 7, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/new-european-consensus-development-our-world-our-dignity-our-future\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/new-european-consensus-development-our-world-our-dignity-our-future_en).

European Commission and EEAS, “A Renewed Impetus of the Africa-EU Partnership,” Joint Communication by the European Commission and HR/VP to the European Parliament and the Council, *JOIN(2017) 17 final*, May 4, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/http\\_eur-lex.europa.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/http_eur-lex.europa.pdf).

European Commission, “Achieving Prosperity through Trade and Investment Updating the 2007 Joint EU Strategy on Aid for Trade,” Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, *COM(2017) 667 final*, November 13, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/com\\_2017\\_667\\_f1\\_communication\\_from\\_commission\\_to\\_inst\\_en\\_v3\\_p1\\_954389.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/com_2017_667_f1_communication_from_commission_to_inst_en_v3_p1_954389.pdf).

European Commission, “Annual report on the European Union’s humanitarian aid policies and their implementation in 2016,” Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, *COM(2017) 662 final*, November 13, 2017, <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/EN/COM-2017-662-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF>.

**EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD****Russia**

The security situation in the eastern neighbourhood was shaped by the ongoing conflict in Ukraine – the OSCE recorded 401,336 ceasefire violations in 2017.<sup>100</sup> The year was marked primarily by the reinforcing and extending of sanctions against key individuals in Russia who were held responsible for violating the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. The HR/VP took the opportunity to meet with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on a number of occasions during 2017. During a phone call with Sergei Lavrov on 3 February, the HR/VP called for the full implementation of the Minsk Agreements

100. OSCE, “2017 OSCE SMM activities in figures,” January 26, 2018, <https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/368246>.

and outlined the EU's approach to the future of Syria. The two met in person a few days later on 18 February on the margins of the 2017 Munich Security Conference. There they discussed the Ukraine crisis and the situation in Afghanistan and Libya. A further three bilateral meetings between Sergei Lavrov and the HR/VP were held on 24 April (when the HR/VP paid a rare visit to Moscow), 7 July and 19 July which centred on the Ukraine crisis and the Minsk Agreements. Finally, another bilateral meeting was held on 19 September in New York where discussions focused on Syria, North Korea and Iran.

The year was marked by multiple episodes of violence in eastern Ukraine which violated the ceasefire under the Minsk Agreements. At the start of the year, a delegation from the European Parliament called on Russia and pro-Russian rebels in Ukraine to desist from using tanks, heavy weapons and rocket launchers.<sup>101</sup> The humanitarian situation was particularly bad in the Avdiivka area, with thousands of civilians and children at risk due to violence and harsh weather conditions.<sup>102</sup> Throughout the year, the EU condemned provocative statements and repression of freedoms in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, Crimea (and Sevastopol). The EU also provided €18 million in humanitarian assistance to eastern Ukraine on 20 February.<sup>103</sup> In April, the HR/VP relayed her shock at the death of an OSCE SMM monitor in a non-government controlled area in Luhansk. The EU expressed concern in September and December about the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in eastern Ukraine. On 10 September, the EU stated that it would not recognise the results of gubernatorial elections in Sevastopol and the 'elected governor' was sanctioned by the EU.<sup>104</sup> Furthermore, on 20 December the EU argued that 'the positioning of armed forces in close proximity to residential areas and firing from or towards critical infrastructure shows complete disrespect for peoples' lives'.<sup>105</sup>

Russia's broader military activities in Europe were a cause of concern during 2017 – particularly the large-scale 'Zapad 2017' exercise held in September. Russian forces undertook a number of provocative gestures by flying near the airspace of NATO members on multiple occasions. It was estimated that in 2017 NATO aircraft had been scrambled more than 780 times in response to air provocations compared to much lower num-

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101. EEAS, "Russian probing in eastern Ukraine must stop, say security and defence MEPs," February 7, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/20050/russian-probing-eastern-ukraine-must-stop-say-security-and-defence-meps\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/20050/russian-probing-eastern-ukraine-must-stop-say-security-and-defence-meps_en).

102. European Union, "Statement on Russia's ongoing aggression against Ukraine and illegal occupation of Crimea," OSCE Permanent Council no. 1132, February 2, 2017, Vienna, [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/pc\\_1132\\_eu\\_on\\_ukraine.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/pc_1132_eu_on_ukraine.pdf).

103. European Commission, "EU announces €18 million in humanitarian aid for Ukraine," February 20, 2017, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-288\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-288_en.htm).

104. *Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2163 of 20 November 2017 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine*, (CFSP) 2017/2163, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 304/51, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2017/2163/oj>.

105. EEAS, "Statement by the Spokesperson on the deterioration of the humanitarian and security situations in eastern Ukraine," December 20, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/37738/statement-spokesperson-deterioration-humanitarian-and-security-situations-eastern-ukraine\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/37738/statement-spokesperson-deterioration-humanitarian-and-security-situations-eastern-ukraine_en).

bers in previous years.<sup>106</sup> Of course, Russia's involvement in the war in Syria also served to frustrate EU-Russia relations. Despite repeated announcements in January and December of an end to military action, Russia remained involved in Syria and tensions remained high between all actors on the ground. The downing of a Syrian jet fighter in June led Moscow to claim that it would view any attack on Russian-backed forces in Syria as reason enough to target anti-Daesh coalition forces. Russia continued to develop its presence in the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia and the Asia-Pacific.<sup>107</sup>

Much of the EU's response to Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea came in the form of sanctions. During the course of 2017, the EU extended restrictive measures against Russia six times, with each extension either reinforcing sanctions or adding new persons and/or entities to the list. For example, on 26 June the EU announced a six-month prolongation of sanctions against Russia due to Moscow's failure to fully implement the Minsk Agreements. All EU member states voted unanimously to extend the sanctions on the financial, energy and defence sectors (including dual-use goods).<sup>108</sup> In July, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Rogozin was refused entry to Romanian and Hungarian airspace because he was subject to EU restrictive measures.

Russia also continued to suppress domestic freedoms, including bans and restrictions on groups such as the Jehovah's Witnesses (in April and July) and individuals such as Alexei Navalny, who had planned to run in the 2018 Russian presidential election (in December). In February, the Russian government announced that it was taking measures to decriminalise domestic violence, something which elicited condemnation from the EU. A number of human rights activists were arrested in Russia and in eastern Ukraine during the year. In March, Russian authorities cracked down on a range of anti-corruption protests and movements seeking to uphold fundamental freedoms. Further protests were held on 12 June across at least 145 towns in Russia, with the authorities arresting and detaining approximately 1,500 individuals.<sup>109</sup> In November, Vladimir Putin signed into law a mechanism that allows the ministry of justice to label foreign media operating in Russia with direct/indirect foreign funding as 'foreign agents'.

Tensions between the EU and Russia were also visible in the area of international trade. On 30 January, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) ruled in favour of the EU following illegal anti-dumping duties imposed by Russia on European light commercial

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106. Lizzie Dearden, "NATO intercepting highest number of Russian military planes since the Cold War as 780 incidents recorded in 2016," *The Independent*, April 22, 2017, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/nato-russian-planes-intercepted-eu-europe-fighter-jets-scrambled-bombers-raf-typhoons-alaska-putin-a7696561.html>.

107. For Russia's relationship with China see Michal Makocki and Nicu Popescu, "China and Russia: an Eastern partnership in the making?," *EUISS Chaillot Paper*, no. 140 (February 2017), <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/china-and-russia-eastern-partnership-making>.

108. EEAS, "EU extends sanctions in support of Ukraine's territorial integrity," June 28, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/28967/eu-extends-sanctions-support-ukraines-territorial-integrity\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/28967/eu-extends-sanctions-support-ukraines-territorial-integrity_en).

109. European Union, "EU statement on freedom of peaceful assembly in the Russian Federation," OSCE Permanent Council no. 1150, June 22, 2017, Vienna, [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/pc\\_1150\\_eu\\_on\\_foa\\_in\\_russia.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/pc_1150_eu_on_foa_in_russia.pdf).

vehicles. Then on 27 February, the WTO again confirmed that a Russian ban on pork and pig imports from the EU is illegal under international trade rules. Yet despite the strained relations between Russia and the EU during 2017, there were some areas of co-operation between the two actors, including Iran and the JCPOA, and counter-terrorism initiatives (in February, informal and technical consultations began between the EU and Russia).

## Eastern Partnership

The EU continued its support for the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. On 24 November, the fifth Eastern Partnership Summit brought together the presidents of the European Council and European Commission, the HR/VP and the leaders of all 28 EU member states and the six countries of the EaP. The Summit focused on ways of supporting EaP economies, governance, connectivity and societies – and a political commitment to the EaP countries was enshrined in a Joint Declaration.<sup>110</sup> Much of the discussions focused on visa liberalisation in Georgia and Ukraine.<sup>111</sup> The Declaration stressed the importance of the ‘20 Deliverables for 2020’ initiative that was first agreed on 15 December 2016 and revised again following the EaP ministerial meeting on 19 June.<sup>112</sup> The 20 deliverables span the priority areas of economic development and market opportunities; strengthening institutions and good governance; connectivity, energy efficiency, environment and climate change; and mobility and people-to-people contacts. To build on this work, the EaP Youth Forum was organised on 22-23 June in Warsaw, which brought together over 300 young leaders, workers and policymakers. The EaP Business Forum was held on 26-27 October in Tallinn, Estonia, with a view to promoting digital economies and innovation in the partnership countries.<sup>113</sup>

A large part of the EU’s efforts with EaP countries was to tackle anti-European propaganda by supporting the independent mass media.<sup>114</sup> Under the Estonian presidency of the Council, efforts were made to develop e-governance and cybersecurity in the EaP countries: a conference in Tallinn on 5 October saw the signing of a declaration to deepen cooperation on electronic communications and infrastructure, trust and security,

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110. “Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit,” Council of the EU, 24 November 2017, Brussels, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu//media/31758/final-statement-st14821en17.pdf>.

111. Stanislav Secieru, “The visa-free 3D effect: Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine,” *EUISS Brief*, no. 28 (October 2017), <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/visa-free-3d-effect-georgia-moldova-and-ukraine>.

112. European Commission/ EEAS, “Joint Staff Working Document: Eastern Partnership – 20 Deliverables for 2020 focusing on key priorities and tangible results,” SWD(2017) 300 final, June 9, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/swd\\_2017\\_300\\_f1\\_joint\\_staff\\_working\\_paper\\_en\\_v5\\_p1\\_940530.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/swd_2017_300_f1_joint_staff_working_paper_en_v5_p1_940530.pdf).

113. EEAS, “Eastern Partnership Business Forum promotes digital economies and innovation,” October 26, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/34592/eastern-partnership-business-forum-promotes-digital-economies-and-innovation\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/34592/eastern-partnership-business-forum-promotes-digital-economies-and-innovation_en).

114. EU Neighbours Portal, “Assistance for the sake of truth: how the EU supports the independent mass media in the Eastern Partnership countries,” September 20, 2017, <https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/east/eu-in-action/stories/assistance-sake-truth-how-eu-supports-independent-mass-media-eastern>.

e-trade, digital skills, ICT innovation and start-up ecosystems and e-health.<sup>115</sup> As part of its economic support to the EaP countries, the EU also used its financial tools to support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in countries such as Armenia,<sup>116</sup> Georgia<sup>117</sup> and Moldova.<sup>118</sup> Furthermore, in 2017 the EU also disbursed €600 million in MFA to Ukraine,<sup>119</sup> €23 million to Georgia<sup>120</sup> and €100 million to Moldova.<sup>121</sup>

Security was also a feature of the EU's cooperation with the EaP countries. For example, from 18-21 September an EU-funded international civil protection exercise took place in Moldova. 'EU MOLDEX 2017' brought together more than 600 experts, rescuers and staff from EaP countries for a simulation centred around a 7.5 magnitude earthquake near Chisinau, Moldova. The exercise was a good opportunity to test the reaction of crisis management bodies in the EaP countries, as well as the EU's own Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) and the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM). The exercise was preceded by a table top exercise in March 2017 which was organised under the EU-funded Programme for Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Natural and Man-made Disaster in the Eastern Partnership Countries' (PPRD East 2).<sup>122</sup>

## Armenia

The main focus of EU-Armenia relations in 2017 related to the EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA). CEPA focuses on ensuring a better regulatory environment, a more empowered civil society, consumer protec-

115. EEAS, "EU conference aims to bolster cybersecurity and e-Governance in Eastern Partnership countries," October 4, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/33248/eu-conference-aims-bolster-cybersecurity-and-e-governance-eastern-partnership-countries\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/33248/eu-conference-aims-bolster-cybersecurity-and-e-governance-eastern-partnership-countries_en).

116. Ami Chichakyan, "From innovation to social entrepreneurs: how EU4Business helps SME development in Armenia and how the country's entrepreneurs respond," *EU Neighbours Portal*, October 25, 2017, <https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/east/eu-in-action/stories/innovation-social-entrepreneurs-how-eu4business-helps-sme-development>.

117. EU Neighbours Portal, "With EU4Business help, Georgian companies expand their businesses," October 27, 2017, <https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/east/eu-in-action/stories/eu4business-help-georgian-companies-expand-their-businesses>.

118. EU Neighbours Portal, "Moldova working towards energy efficiency with EU support: a win-win for all involved," August 28, 2017, <https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/east/eu-in-action/stories/moldova-working-towards-energy-efficiency-eu-support-win-win-all-involved>.

119. European Commission, "EU Commission approves disbursement of €600 million in assistance to Ukraine," March 16, 2017, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-643\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-643_en.htm).

120. European Commission, "European Commission approves disbursement of EUR 23 million in assistance to Georgia," April 28, 2017, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-1113\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1113_en.htm).

121. EU Neighbours Portal, "Moldova: European Council endorses agreement on financial assistance," June 15, 2017, <https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/east/stay-informed/news/moldova-european-council-endorses-agreement-financial-assistance>.

122. EU Neighbours Portal, "Earthquake, chemical leak, floods... EU MOLDEX 2017 exercise brings together rescue teams from nine countries," October 2, 2017, <https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/east/eu-in-action/stories/earthquake-chemical-leak-floods-eu-moldex-2017-exercise-brings-together>.

tion, a healthier environment and enhanced security by fighting crime and terrorism.<sup>123</sup> In February, President of the European Council Donald Tusk hailed the finalisation of negotiations for CEPA, and on 21 March both parties initialled the agreement. On 23 May 2017, the EU and Armenia held their 17th Cooperation Council, where they discussed issues such as the EU-Armenia CEPA, an air transport agreement and the rule of law. The Cooperation Council was a good opportunity for the EU to raise its concerns about the parliamentary elections that took place on 2 April. Although international election observers stated that the process was ‘well-administered and fundamental freedoms were generally respected [...] the elections were tainted by credible information about vote-buying, and pressure on civil servants and employees of private companies’.<sup>124</sup>

Eight members of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) also visited the country at the end of May. On 25 May, the European Parliament delegation discussed the rule of law, economic cooperation and civil society freedoms with government authorities, opposition parties and civil society in Armenia. A month later, the EU issued a statement of concern about fatalities in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and called for restraint between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the region. Despite these ongoing security concerns, the EU took steps in October to support economic development in Armenia by allocating €15.2 million to aid the labour market, employability and the agricultural sector over 2017-2019.<sup>125</sup> The year ended with the conclusion of a number of important initiatives signed on 24 November at the EaP Summit, including an aviation agreement to boost travel between Armenia and the EU and the signing of CEPA (an agreement that could in time lead to discussions for visa-free travel for Armenians depending on the extent of reforms in the country).

## Azerbaijan

In Azerbaijan, the year began with a high-level visit to Baku by officials from the EEAS on 30 January. President Ilham Aliyev also visited Brussels twice in 2017, in February and November. On 8 June, over 500 business representatives from Europe and Azerbaijan met at the EU-Azerbaijan Business Forum to discuss ways to improve trade between the EU and Azerbaijan. Currently, the EU accounts for close to 50% of Azerbaijan’s total foreign trade and the Union is the largest investor in the country in the oil and non-oil sec-

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123. European Union, “The Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement between the EU and Armenia – Factsheet,” November 24, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/36140/comprehensive-enhanced-partnership-agreement-between-european-union-armenia-cepa\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/36140/comprehensive-enhanced-partnership-agreement-between-european-union-armenia-cepa_en).

124. EEAS, “Statement by the Spokesperson on the Parliamentary elections in Armenia,” April 3, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/24071/statement-spokesperson-parliamentary-elections-armenia\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/24071/statement-spokesperson-parliamentary-elections-armenia_en).

125. EEAS, “EU allocated €15.2 million for employment policy and vocational education and training (VET) reforms in Armenia: bridging VET education and employability,” October 11, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/33707/eu-allocated-€152-million-employment-policy-and-vocational-education-and-training-vet-reforms\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/33707/eu-allocated-€152-million-employment-policy-and-vocational-education-and-training-vet-reforms_en).

tors.<sup>126</sup> On 4 October, a PSC delegation visited Azerbaijan to discuss a range of political issues. In the same month, the EU welcomed the opening of a new rail corridor between Baku, Tbilisi and Kars as a major step forward in linking transport between Azerbaijan, Central Asia, Georgia, Turkey and the EU. Economic cooperation between the EU and Azerbaijan was seen as a way to offset the recent contraction of the Azerbaijani economy. However, despite increased economic cooperation, the EU expressed concern about human rights in the country: in September, the EU raised explicit concerns about the detention of journalist Mehman Aliyev.<sup>127</sup> At the start of 2017, the EU and Azerbaijan announced that they would renew their partnership by launching negotiations on a comprehensive new agreement. Reflecting efforts by Baku to enhance its economic development, the European Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Johannes Hahn, stated that the EU stands ‘ready to support the emergence of new economic and social actors to help create a diverse, strong and inclusive society in Azerbaijan’.<sup>128</sup>

## Belarus

February saw the EU prolong an arms embargo and sanctions against four individuals listed in connection with the disappearances of opposition politicians, a businessman and a journalist in 1999 and 2000 for a further year until 28 February 2018.<sup>129</sup> On 3-4 April, the EU and Belarus Coordination Group met in Minsk to discuss human rights with Belarusian authorities. The meeting followed protests in February and March in Belarus against tax levies, leading to the arrest and detention of protesters. The Coordination Group also discussed issues such as nuclear power, energy security, agriculture, education, research, trade, customs, the rule of law, among other issues. On 20 July, the fourth bilateral EU-Belarus Human Rights Dialogue took place in Brussels, an event which saw extensive discussions with government authorities and civil society groups on the human rights situation in Belarus. Despite such steps, the EU condemned a number of death sentences that were passed in Belarus during 2017 (Belarus is the only country in Europe that still applies the death penalty).<sup>130</sup> In terms of financial

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126. EEAS, “EU-Azerbaijan Business Forum,” June 8, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/27779/eu-azerbaijan-business-forum\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/27779/eu-azerbaijan-business-forum_en).

127. EEAS, “EU local statement of 6 September on the detention of Azerbaijani journalist Mehman Aliyev,” September 7, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/vienna-international-organisations/31761/eu-local-statement-6-september-detention-azerbaijani-journalist-mehman-aliyev\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/vienna-international-organisations/31761/eu-local-statement-6-september-detention-azerbaijani-journalist-mehman-aliyev_en).

128. EEAS, “EU report: Azerbaijan renews engagement and dialogue,” December 20, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/37699/eu-report-azerbaijan-renews-engagement-and-dialogue\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/37699/eu-report-azerbaijan-renews-engagement-and-dialogue_en).

129. Council of the EU, “Belarus: EU prolongs arms embargo and sanctions against 4 individuals for one year,” February 27, 2017, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/02/27/belarus-arms-embargo-sanctions/>.

130. EEAS, “Statement by the Spokesperson on two new death sentences in Belarus,” July 21, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/30248/statement-spokesperson-two-new-death-sentences-belarus\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/30248/statement-spokesperson-two-new-death-sentences-belarus_en).



support, the EU committed €6 million to support over 200 SMEs in Belarus over the next four years from 2017-2020.<sup>131</sup>

## Georgia

In Georgia, security concerns were yet again on the agenda with news in February that two crossing points along the administrative boundary line of the country's breakaway region of Abkhazia had been closed. On 9 April, 'presidential elections' were held in South Ossetia, along with a referendum over changing the name of the breakaway region. The EU yet again stated its 'firm support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognised borders'.<sup>132</sup> As part of its response, the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia carried out 4,827 patrols during 2017, and the mission's hotline for conflict prevention was activated 1,400 times.<sup>133</sup> In February, the European Parliament approved the EU's visa liberalisation scheme for Georgia, which granted Georgians visa-free travel in the Schengen zone. The country continued to enact reforms, and in December the EU-Georgia Association Council noted that within the context of the DCFTA 'Georgia's democratic institutions have been consolidated and a comprehensive legislative framework for human rights and anti-discrimination has been adopted'.<sup>134</sup> Finally, on 10 October the EU generally welcomed constitutional changes in Georgia but the EU Delegation there noted 'that a valuable opportunity has not been properly seized to build broader consensus around the amendments to the Constitution'.<sup>135</sup>

## Moldova

In Moldova, the year was characterised by uncertain relations. At the start of the year, President Igor Dodon hinted that Moldova may scrap its trade agreement with the EU in favour of partnership with Russia's Eurasian Economic Union.<sup>136</sup> President Dodon was elected on a pro-Russian ticket in 2016, but his calls to move closer to Moscow

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131. EEAS, "EU commits fresh resources to support SMEs in Belarus," September 13, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/32023/eu-commits-fresh-resources-support-smes-belarus\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/32023/eu-commits-fresh-resources-support-smes-belarus_en).

132. EEAS, "Statement by the Spokesperson on the so-called Presidential elections and the referendum on amending the name of the Georgian breakaway region of South Ossetia," April 8, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/24443/statement-spokesperson-so-called-presidential-elections-and-referendum-amending-name-georgia\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/24443/statement-spokesperson-so-called-presidential-elections-and-referendum-amending-name-georgia_en).

133. EEAS, "EU Common Security and Defence Policy Missions and Operations: Annual Report 2017," February 27, 2018, 14, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/22818/mission-and-operations-annual-report\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/22818/mission-and-operations-annual-report_en).

134. European Commission, "EU Report : Georgia successfully delivering on its reform commitments," November 10, 2017, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-4462\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-4462_en.htm).

135. EEAS, "Statement on the Constitution of Georgia," October 10, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia\\_en/33619/Statement%20on%20the%20Constitution%20of%20Georgia](https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia_en/33619/Statement%20on%20the%20Constitution%20of%20Georgia).

136. Kathrin Hille and Neil Buckley, "Moldova leader vows to scrap EU trade deal for Moscow-led bloc," *The Financial Times*, January 17, 2017, <https://www.ft.com/content/52651bb6-dcd4-11e6-86ac-f253db7791c6>.

ignored the fact that approximately 66% of Moldova's exports go to the EU; only 10% reach Russia and 6% go to Belarus.<sup>137</sup> Calls for greater cooperation with Russia by the Moldovan president also seemed to be at odds with the Moldovan government's move in May to expel five Russian diplomats from the country. On 31 March, the EU and Moldova held their third Association Council meeting, where issues such as state and energy resilience, sustainable growth and civil society relations were on the agenda. In particular, the EU pointed to the need for impartial and effective investigations into the banking fraud that was uncovered in the country in 2014.<sup>138</sup>

On 12 April, the EU agreed that it would propose €100 million in assistance and loans to the country over the 2017-2018 period, but only on the basis of strict conditionality related to the rule of law, political pluralism and electoral legislation.<sup>139</sup> These proposals were followed by instability in the country as the ruling coalition faced a political crisis in May. Questions also remained about the rule of law in Moldova following earlier changes to the electoral law. These developments prompted the EU to withhold the €100 million until it was convinced of reform – the Union eventually agreed to release the funds at the end of 2017 following the EaP Summit on 24 November.<sup>140</sup> Finally, on 20 December the EU, European Investment Bank (EIB), the EBRD and the World Bank announced a €270 million financial package to support the construction of electrical networks between Moldova and Romania. These networks are seen as vital to Moldova's attempts to diversify its electricity sources.<sup>141</sup>

## Ukraine

On 14 September, the EU prolonged sanctions against 149 persons and 38 entities responsible for 'undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine'.<sup>142</sup> The sanctions were extended for six months until 15 March

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137. European Commission, "Trade Policy - Moldova," accessed April 24, 2018, <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/moldova/>.

138. "Joint statement following the third Association Council meeting between the EU and the Republic of Moldova," *Council of the EU*, March 31, 2017, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/31/statement-eu-moldova/>.

139. Council of the EU, "Republic of Moldova: Council agrees to €100 million financial assistance," April 12, 2017, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/04/12/moldova-financial-assistance/>. See also "Statement by the HR/VP Mogherini and Commissioner Hahn on the amendments to the electoral legislation in the Republic of Moldova," *EEAS*, July 21, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/30221/statement-hrvp-mogherini-and-commissioner-hahn-amendments-electoral-legislation-republic\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/30221/statement-hrvp-mogherini-and-commissioner-hahn-amendments-electoral-legislation-republic_en).

140. EEAS, "Moldova: EU cuts budget support programme for justice reforms," October 11, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eubam-libya/33723/moldova-eu-cuts-budget-support-programme-justice-reforms\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eubam-libya/33723/moldova-eu-cuts-budget-support-programme-justice-reforms_en).

141. EEAS, "EU, EIB, EBRD and World Bank finance Republic of Moldova-Romania power link," December 20, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/37716/eu-eib-ebrd-and-world-bank-finance-republic-moldova-romania-power-link\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/37716/eu-eib-ebrd-and-world-bank-finance-republic-moldova-romania-power-link_en).

142. Council of the EU, "EU prolongs sanctions over actions against Ukraine's territorial integrity until 15 March 2018," September 14, 2017, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/09/14/ukraine-sanctions/>.

2018. The European Commission started the year by increasing its humanitarian assistance to people affected by the conflict in eastern Ukraine by €18 million. The EU has contributed close to €400 million in humanitarian assistance to Ukraine since the start of the conflict in 2014.<sup>143</sup> Additionally, on 6 July the European Commission and the EBRD signed a new agreement worth some €19.1 million to fund nuclear safety in Chernobyl and prevent radioactive material from being released in the region. Since the Chernobyl accident in 1986, the EU has contributed approximately €720 million to remedial projects.<sup>144</sup> Furthermore, the EU announced in October that the final preparations for an EU Energy Efficiency Fund for Ukraine were being undertaken – the €100 million fund is to be launched in 2018.<sup>145</sup> On 1 February, the EU and Denmark launched a €16 million anti-corruption initiative in Ukraine to help strengthen the capacity of the country's new anti-corruption initiatives.<sup>146</sup>

In July, an Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine was ratified, which entered into force on 1 September. The Agreement contains a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) element which is designed to support economic development in Ukraine. Although the DCFTA has been provisionally in place since 1 January 2016, on 1 October 2017 further trade measures entered into force that were designed to eliminate customs duties on certain agricultural and industrial products. Eurostat calculated that in the first half of 2017 alone 'trade in goods between the EU and Ukraine increased by 23%'.<sup>147</sup> The Association Agreement is designed to see Kyiv work towards the 27 areas of the EU's *acquis communautaire*. Furthermore, during the 19th EU-Ukraine Summit that took place on 13 July in advance of the ratification of the Association Agreement, the EU announced that it would dedicate €200 million towards priority areas in 2017 for the conflict-affected areas of eastern Ukraine.<sup>148</sup> This investment followed on from the €600 million loan that was released to Ukraine in March as part of the MFA to Ukraine.<sup>149</sup> On 11 June, a visa-free travel scheme for Ukrainians travelling to the EU

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143. European Commission, "EU announces €18 million in humanitarian aid for Ukraine in wake of recent violence," February 20, 2017, [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/eu-announces-18-million-humanitarian-aid-ukraine-wake-recent-violence\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/eu-announces-18-million-humanitarian-aid-ukraine-wake-recent-violence_en).

144. European Commission, "EU signs new agreement to fund nuclear safety at the Chornobyl site," July 6, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/eu-signs-new-agreement-fund-nuclear-safety-chornobyl-site\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/eu-signs-new-agreement-fund-nuclear-safety-chornobyl-site_en).

145. EU Neighbours Portal, "EU prepares launch of Energy Efficiency Fund for Ukraine," October 5, 2017, <https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/east/stay-informed/news/eu-prepares-launch-energy-efficiency-fund-ukraine>.

146. EEAS, "EU and Denmark launch Euro 16 million EU Anti-Corruption Initiative in Ukraine," February 1, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/19719/eu-and-denmark-launch-euro-16-million-eu-anti-corruption-initiative-ukraine\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/19719/eu-and-denmark-launch-euro-16-million-eu-anti-corruption-initiative-ukraine_en).

147. EEAS, "Ukraine and the EU," May 16, 2016, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/1937/ukraine-and-eu\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/1937/ukraine-and-eu_en).

148. European Commission, "EU-Ukraine Summit: Ukrainian reforms combined with European Union support delivering positive results," July 13, 2017, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-1989\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1989_en.htm).

149. European Commission, "EU Commission approves disbursement of €600 million in assistance to Ukraine," March 16, 2017, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-643\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-643_en.htm).

entered into force. The scheme covers Ukrainian citizens travelling to the EU for up to 90 days (in an 180-day period) for tourism, business, or to meet friends and family.<sup>150</sup>

## Western Balkans

Although marked by tensions, a number of countries made progress towards EU membership.<sup>151</sup> From 1-4 March, the HR/VP travelled to the region to impart the message that the EU ‘will not be complete as long as this region won’t join [...] The Balkans lie at the heart of Europe’.<sup>152</sup> At the Western Balkans Summit on 12 July in Trieste, leaders focused on the connectivity of energy and transport links between the EU and the Western Balkans, regional economic integration and people-to-people engagement. The Summit served as an opportunity to yet again confirm that the six partners from the region want to be more integrated with the EU and it sought to breathe life back into the enlargement process.<sup>153</sup> At the Summit, a Transport Community Treaty was signed between the partners in order to improve infrastructure modernisation and interconnectivity in the region, and the EU announced €194 million in grants to transport projects at the meeting.<sup>154</sup>

On 21 September, the HR/VP and European Commissioner Johannes Hahn met with the six leaders of the Western Balkans in the margins of the 72nd UN General Assembly meeting in New York. Furthermore, on 10 November the EU unveiled plans to support the independent media in the Western Balkans with an investment of €7.5 million for training, technical assistance and support for media start-ups and new media initiatives.<sup>155</sup> On 22 November, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) convicted Ratko Mladic of committing genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Following an invitation from the HR/VP, the year ended with an informal gathering of the prime ministers of the Western Balkans countries in Brussels on 18 December, mirroring a similar meeting which had occurred on 24 May.

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150. EEAS, “Visa-free travel for Ukrainians comes into force,” June 11, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/27990/visa-free-travel-ukrainians-comes-force\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/27990/visa-free-travel-ukrainians-comes-force_en).

151. Sabine Lange, Zoran Nechev, and Florian Trauner (ed.), “Resilience in the Western Balkans,” *EUISS Report*, no. 36 (September 2017), <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/resilience-western-balkans>.

152. Federica Mogherini, speech by the HR/VP at the Parliament of Montenegro, March 1, 2017, Podgorica, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/21734/high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-parliament-montenegro\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/21734/high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-parliament-montenegro_en).

153. Zoran Nechev and Florian Trauner, “Fostering resilience in the Western Balkans,” *EUISS Brief*, no. 18 (June 2017), <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/fostering-resilience-western-balkans>.

154. EEAS, “Western Balkans Summit 2017: delivering for the region,” July 12, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/29800/western-balkans-summit-2017-delivering-region\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/29800/western-balkans-summit-2017-delivering-region_en).

155. European Commission, “The EU steps up support to independent media in the Western Balkans,” November 10, 2017, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-4541\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-4541_en.htm).

## Albania

In Albania, a number of concerns were raised in March when it became evident that the opposition party had decided to boycott the parliament – timed just in advance of the parliamentary elections in the country on 25 June. The HR/VP made clear during a visit to Albania on 3 March that these boycotts would ‘*de facto* stop Albanian progress toward the EU’.<sup>156</sup> By 26 June, however, the EU congratulated political parties in Albania for coming to an agreement that allowed for ‘calm and orderly’ elections in June.<sup>157</sup> The positive developments in Albania were underlined during the meeting of the eighth EU-Albania Stabilisation and Association Committee (SAC) on 4 October, even if the EU stressed the need to make progress on justice reform and the fight against corruption and crime. After a meeting of the ninth EU-Albania SAC on 15 November, it was noted that Albania should continue with its judicial reforms and that 2018 would be a pivotal year in the country’s EU accession aspirations. The year concluded with extreme flooding in the country in December that affected approximately 21,000 people. The EU provided €190,000 and expertise to Albania in support of its disaster relief efforts.<sup>158</sup>

## Bosnia and Herzegovina

The HR/VP visited the country on 22 June to support the ‘Reform Agenda 2015-2018’ process, a document and reform plan that seeks to enhance the socio-economic and democratic foundations of the country, in line with the EU *acquis*. The EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina held their second SAC on 10 July, where discussions focused on the Reform Agenda and the country’s 2016 application to join the EU. These points were taken up by the Foreign Affairs Council on 16 October when they adopted Conclusions confirming the EU’s full support for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU accession, especially in light of the forthcoming general elections in the country in 2018. Heeding the calls of the Council, the house of representatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted amendments to its excise laws on 15 December with a view to enhance economic growth and investment flows in the country.<sup>159</sup> At the end of 2017, Bosnia and Herzegovina was in the process of finalising the European Commission’s questionnaire that it received at the end of 2016. The questionnaire is necessary for the Commission to assess the country’s EU membership prospects.

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156. EEAS, “Remarks by HR/VP Federica Mogherini following her meeting with Edi Rama, Prime Minister of Albania,” March 3, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/21965/remarks-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-following-her-meeting-edi-rama\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/21965/remarks-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-following-her-meeting-edi-rama_en).

157. “Statement by HR/VP Federica Mogherini and Commissioner Johannes Hahn on the parliamentary elections in Albania,” EEAS, June 26, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/28844/statement-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-and-commissioner-johannes-hahn\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/28844/statement-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-and-commissioner-johannes-hahn_en).

158. European Commission, “Victims of flooding in Albania receive EU support,” December 18, 2017, [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/victims-flooding-albania-receive-eu-support\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/victims-flooding-albania-receive-eu-support_en).

159. “Statement by HR/VP Federica Mogherini and Commissioner Johannes Hahn on the adoption of excise law reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” EEAS, December 15, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/37485/statement-hrvp-federica-mogherini-and-commissioner-johannes-hahn-adoption-excise-law-reform\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/37485/statement-hrvp-federica-mogherini-and-commissioner-johannes-hahn-adoption-excise-law-reform_en).

## Kosovo

As part of the EU-facilitated dialogue aimed at the normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Pristina, the HR/VP met with respective leaders on numerous occasions during 2017. At the start of the year, the so-called ‘Brussels Dialogue’ had achieved some positive results, although on 9 March Kosovo’s parliament called for a suspension of the Dialogue. Despite this setback, however, on 31 August Serbia and Kosovo agreed to the final stages of the Justice Agreement reached as part of the Dialogue. This Agreement, implemented on 17 October, allowed for the integration of Kosovo Serb judicial personnel across Kosovo (including the Mitrovica region) and the application of Kosovan law in all basic courts. In the second half of the year, the Dialogue focused on making up for lost time on the implementation of reforms.<sup>160</sup>

In mid-May, early general elections in Kosovo were announced for 11 June, and on 30 May the EU decided to deploy an EOM to Kosovo to monitor the elections following an invitation by the president of Kosovo. While the elections were generally conducted in a positive manner, the EOM did report continued shortcomings in parts of the country. Transparency continued to be an issue in Kosovo: on 27 January the EU expressed concern over the lack of transparency in the preparation of draft amendments to the Law on Radio Television of Kosovo. On 21 July, the EU cancelled €7.8 million projects in north Mitrovica designed to help construct a cultural centre and new university building because local authorities failed to remove illegal buildings in the working areas.<sup>161</sup> Throughout the year, the EU insisted on the adoption of the demarcation agreement with Montenegro, an issue which caused several scuffles involving tear gas in the Kosovan parliament. The adoption of the agreement was also tied to the matter of visa-liberalisation for Kosovo.

In August, the voting processes for the presidents of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals had to be repeated following the constitutional court’s decision to annul the previous selections in light of questions about the mechanism applied by the Kosovo Judicial Council when selecting candidates. Nevertheless, on 4 October the European Commission and the Kosovan authorities met to launch the fourth Economic Reform Programme (2018-2020) for the country. The programme is mainly designed to reduce the informal economy and to tackle employment-related issues. On 15 December, EU and Kosovan officials met in Pristina to hold discussions about how to counter terrorism and violent extremism.<sup>162</sup> The meeting was scheduled just two days after it was announced that Kosovo would become a full priority partner of Europol.

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160. EEAS, “1st meeting of the SA Committee between EU and Kosovo,” October 5, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/33372/1st-meeting-sa-committee-between-eu-and-kosovo\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/33372/1st-meeting-sa-committee-between-eu-and-kosovo_en).

161. EEAS, “EU in Kosovo cancels 7.8 million euro projects in North Mitrovica,” July 21, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/30243/eu-kosovo-cancels-78-million-euro-projects-north-mitrovica\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/30243/eu-kosovo-cancels-78-million-euro-projects-north-mitrovica_en).

162. Jelena Beslin and Marija Ignjatijevic, “Balkan foreign fighters: from Syria to Ukraine,” *EUISS Brief*, no. 20 (June 2017), <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/balkan-foreign-fighters-syria-ukraine>.

## Montenegro

Montenegro continued on its path towards EU membership. On 12 February, the European Commission released a €22.9 million grant to Montenegro to assist with environmental sustainability and economic competitiveness.<sup>163</sup> On 2 March, the HR/VP met with Prime Minister Dusko Markovic and explained how the EU saw Montenegro as the frontrunner in the EU membership process among Western Balkan states. Support for Montenegro's EU membership was increased following the eighth meeting of the SAC on 20 June and the ninth meeting of the Accession Conference with Montenegro on 21 June, which led the European Commission to report favourably on the country's accession process in July. Montenegro ended 2017 having opened 30 out of 35 chapters of its negotiations for EU accession (with three chapters already provisionally closed). It should be recalled that the country also joined NATO on 5 June as the alliance's 29th member.

## Serbia

In Serbia, the EU strove to support Belgrade in its efforts to manage thousands of refugees and asylum-seekers in the country. On 8 October, the EU announced additional humanitarian support worth €4 million to Serbia to assist with food distribution at reception centres and to protect the most vulnerable people.<sup>164</sup> As a step towards increasing security and reducing arms proliferation, on 21 July the EU supported the disposal of more than 18,000 small arms and light weapons in Serbia.<sup>165</sup> Following the fourth EU-Serbia SAC on 16 November, both parties assessed the accession strategy and Serbia's alignment with the EU *acquis*; Serbia was subsequently welcomed as a constructive player in the region. This meeting was followed by the seventh meeting of the Accession Conference on 11 December, which opened negotiations on company law (chapter 6) and external relations (chapter 30).

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
163. EEAS, "EU grants €22.9 million to Montenegro," February 13, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/29290/eu-grants-€229-million-montenegro\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/29290/eu-grants-€229-million-montenegro_en).

164. European Commission, "EU announces additional emergency aid to help refugees in Serbia," October 8, 2017, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-3730\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3730_en.htm).

165. EEAS, "EU helps destroy 18,000 small arms in Serbia," August 1, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/30595/eu-helps-destroy-18000-small-arms-serbia\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/30595/eu-helps-destroy-18000-small-arms-serbia_en).


**FIGURE 9: EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD TIMELINE**

Data: EEAS, European Commission, Council of the EU



\* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with the UNSCR 1244(1999) and the ICJ opinion on Kosovo's declaration of independence.





## The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia witnessed violent attacks against members of parliament and journalists in Skopje on 27 April, which elicited a joint response by the EU, OSCE, NATO and US on the authorities' lack of effort to prevent the attacks.<sup>166</sup> Tensions appeared to dissipate in the middle of the year with the election of Prime Minister Zoran Zaev on 1 June, and the EU voiced optimism following the 13th SAC held on 18 July. Further positive news followed in August when Bulgaria and former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia signed a bilateral 'Treaty on Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation', which helped finalise Skopje's accession to NATO and ease EU accession talks. In October, election observers announced that municipal elections in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had been conducted in a competitive environment with few shortcomings. On 29 November, the European Commission adopted the Action Programme for the country in 2017, which would see the release of €72.3 million for democracy and governance initiatives in the country.<sup>167</sup>

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"Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit," *Council of the EU*, November 24, 2017, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31758/final-statement-st14821en17.pdf>.

166. "Joint statement of the Heads of the EU Delegation, US Embassy, OSCE Mission and NATO Liaison Office in Skopje on yesterday's incidents at the Parliament," *EEAS*, May 2, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/25320/joint-statement-heads-eu-delegation-us-embassy-osce-mission-and-nato-liaison-office-skopje\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/25320/joint-statement-heads-eu-delegation-us-embassy-osce-mission-and-nato-liaison-office-skopje_en).

167. EEAS, "EU releases new 72.3 EUR million for supporting the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," December 18, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/37564/european-union-releases-new-723-eur-million-supporting-former-yugoslav-republic-macedonia\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/37564/european-union-releases-new-723-eur-million-supporting-former-yugoslav-republic-macedonia_en).

## WIDER WORLD

### United States

Relations with the US continued to take on a different tone under the presidency of Donald Trump in 2017. Diverging opinions on the Iran nuclear deal, the Paris Climate Agreement, NATO and trade led President of the European Council Donald Tusk to proclaim in January that the ‘new American administration’ was, along with China, Russia and radical Islam, making Europe’s ‘future highly unpredictable’.<sup>168</sup> A February visit by the HR/VP to Washington sought to play up the important areas of EU-US cooperation, including counter-terrorism and the Middle East peace process. Despite these efforts, in July there was concern that a draft US bill on sanctions against Russia would potentially unduly affect European business and EU energy independence. Although the proposed bill was softened in August, President Juncker explained that if ‘US sanctions specifically disadvantage EU companies trading with Russia in the energy sector the EU is prepared to take appropriate steps in responses within days’.<sup>169</sup> The end of the year saw further disagreement when President Trump announced that the US would officially recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

### Central and South America

In Central and South America, the EU continued to enhance its presence through closer economic partnerships and building resilience. The two main countries of focus for the EU for much of 2017 were Colombia and Venezuela. Positive news emerged from Colombia in February when public peace talks began between the government of Colombia and the ELN – a group designated as a terrorist organisation by the EU. 27 June marked an historic moment in Colombia’s history as the UN mission in Colombia confirmed the complete disarmament of the FARC rebel group. The peace agreement was preceded by a meeting between the HR/VP and FARC representatives in Oslo, Norway, on 13 June where the HR/VP contributed to the peace talks. Further positive news followed on 4 September when Colombia’s government and the ELN reached an agreement on a temporary ceasefire from 1 October until mid-January 2018.

The situation in Venezuela saw the EU issue a number of statements and impose sanctions against individuals suspected of infringing human rights and violating democratic principles and the rule of law. Sanctions were adopted on 13 November following a decision on 30 July by the Venezuelan authorities to hold an election on a new Constituent

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168. Donald Tusk, “United we stand, divided we fall,” letter by the president of the European Council to the 27 EU heads of state or government on the future of the EU before the Malta Summit, *European Council*, January 31, 2017, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/01/31/tusk-letter-future-europe/>.

169. EEAS, “European Commission President Juncker: New US sanctions on Russia only after consultation of allies,” August 2, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/30682/european-commission-president-juncker-new-us-sanctions-russia-only-after-consultation-allies\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/30682/european-commission-president-juncker-new-us-sanctions-russia-only-after-consultation-allies_en).

Assembly that would controversially exist in parallel to the constitutionally recognised National Assembly. On 2 August, the HR/VP publicly stated that the EU would not recognise the Constituent Assembly, especially as the Union had already condemned the violence that took place in the National Assembly on 6 July. Despite the fact that dialogue between the government of Venezuela and the opposition began in December 2017, tensions in the country remained high.

The EU maintained a high level of engagement in South America during 2017. A number of visits were made by the HR/VP to the region and long-standing relationships were celebrated. For example, in July Brazil and the EU celebrated the ten-year anniversary of their Strategic Partnership, and in November the Council agreed to launch negotiations to update the EU's Association Agreement with Chile. Furthermore, while President Trump reneged on the US' previous *rapprochement* with Cuba,<sup>170</sup> the EU focused on developing its relations with Havana. On 1 November, the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) between the EU and Cuba entered into force. The PDCA proposes to work on political dialogue, policy cooperation and trade, as well as enhance development, democracy and human rights.

The EU also actively supported resilience in South American countries in the face of natural disasters. In January, the EU deployed a UCPM team to assist Chile with the worst wildfires experienced by the country in 50 years:<sup>171</sup> 177 firemen from France, Portugal and Spain were dispatched to fight the flames.<sup>172</sup> Following the devastating effects of Hurricane Matthew in 2016, in February 2017 the EU committed to help the 135,000 victims of the hurricane with a contribution of €35 million for humanitarian aid and development assistance to Haiti.<sup>173</sup> In March, the EU was yet again called upon to provide assistance to Peru following floods in the country, and Guatemala benefited from EU support after it experienced flooding in December. A month later in April, the European Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development, Neven Mimica, announced two aid packages for Haiti: the first, €18.5 million to help with the aftermath of Hurricane Matthew; and the second, €45 million to assist with road construction.<sup>174</sup> In May, the EU announced a package of €14.3 million in funding to support Central and South American countries deal with natural disasters and resilience.

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170. Lorena Ruano, "Cuba and Trump: the Power of Symbols," *EUISS Brief*, no. 21 (July 2017), <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/cuba-and-trump-power-symbols>.

171. European Commission, "EU deploys team of 187 to fight Chile's worst wildfires in 50 years," February 3, 2017, [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/eu-deploys-187-experts-fight-chiles-worst-wildfires-50-years\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/eu-deploys-187-experts-fight-chiles-worst-wildfires-50-years_en).

172. European Commission, "Commissioner Stylianides welcomes EU firefighters returning from Chile," February 14, 2017, [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/commissioner-stylianides-welcomes-eu-firefighters-returning-chile\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/commissioner-stylianides-welcomes-eu-firefighters-returning-chile_en).

173. European Commission, "EU increases its post hurricane Matthew support to Haiti with an extra €35 million," February 8, 2017, [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/eu-adds-35-million-post-hurricane-matthew-aid-haiti\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/eu-adds-35-million-post-hurricane-matthew-aid-haiti_en). See also Gerlad Stang, "Haiti: what resilience for the least resilient," *EUISS Alert*, no.16 (May 2017), <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/haiti-what-resilience-least-resilient>.

174. European Commission, "The EU increases its support for Haiti," April 21, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/european-union-increases-its-support-haiti\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/european-union-increases-its-support-haiti_en).

Since 1994, the European Commission has provided over €1 billion in humanitarian assistance to the regions.<sup>175</sup>

Natural disasters continued to plague South America in the latter half of 2017. In September, the Caribbean was yet again hit by a natural disaster, Hurricane Irma, and the EU activated both the Copernicus satellite system and the UCPM to assist populations in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. It also mobilised €2 million to deal with water and sanitation, health and logistics for the affected islands.<sup>176</sup> Furthermore, in response to Hurricane Maria which hit Dominica on 19 September, the European Commission deployed personnel to the island and provided €250,000 in emergency assistance.<sup>177</sup> In November, the EU announced that it would invest €300 million in the Caribbean to assist with resilience to natural disasters and climate change.<sup>178</sup>

Finally, the EU continued to support Central and South American countries with social and economic development.<sup>179</sup> In July, high-level visits by EU officials to countries such as Colombia and Costa Rica advanced cooperation on sustainable development, and these visits sought to build on the European Commission's announcement in May that it would dedicate €37 million towards environmental sustainability and climate change mitigation and adaptation on the South American continent.<sup>180</sup> The EU-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Summit in El Salvador in October addressed democratic governance, violence and organised crime and impunity and corruption in the region.<sup>181</sup> In December, the EU announced that it would provide €20 million for a programme designed to foster cooperation between Belize, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama on criminal investigations and prosecutions related to crime and narcotics trafficking.<sup>182</sup>

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175. European Commission, "New EU aid for natural disasters in Latin America and the Caribbean," May 24, 2017, [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/new-eu-aid-natural-disasters-latin-america-and-caribbean\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/new-eu-aid-natural-disasters-latin-america-and-caribbean_en).

176. European Commission, "EU mobilises further assistance of €2 million for Hurricane Irma hit islands," September 11, 2017, [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/eu-mobilises-further-assistance-2-million-hurricane-irma-hit-islands\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/eu-mobilises-further-assistance-2-million-hurricane-irma-hit-islands_en).

177. European Commission, "EU announces €250 000 in humanitarian aid for Dominica," September 26, 2017, [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/eu-announces-250-000-humanitarian-aid-dominica\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/eu-announces-250-000-humanitarian-aid-dominica_en).

178. European Commission, "EU supports recovery and resilience in the Caribbean region with €300 million," November 21, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/eu-supports-recovery-and-resilience-caribbean-region-eu300-million\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/eu-supports-recovery-and-resilience-caribbean-region-eu300-million_en).

179. José Luengo-Cabrera, "The economic impact of violence in LAC: implications for the EU," *EUISS Brief*, no. 16 (May 2017), <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/economic-impact-violence-lac-implications-eu>.


180. European Commission, "The EU confirms its commitment for the implementation of a regional programme to fight climate change in Latin America," May 3, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/european-union-confirms-its-commitment-implementation-regional-programme-fight\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/european-union-confirms-its-commitment-implementation-regional-programme-fight_en).


181. Lorena Ruano, "Towards San Salvador: where Europe meets Latin America," *EUISS Brief*, no. 15 (May 2017), <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/towards-san-salvador-where-europe-meets-latin-america>. See also Michele Dos Ramos, "Citizen security in Latin America," *EUISS Alert*, no. 14 (May 2017), <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/citizen-security-latin-america>.

182. European Commission, "The EU supports Central America in the fight against organised crime," December 3, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/eu-supports-central-america-fight-against-organised-crime\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/eu-supports-central-america-fight-against-organised-crime_en).

**FIGURE 10: AMERICAS TIMELINE**

Data: EEAS, European Commission, Council of the EU





## ASEAN

2017 marked the 40-year anniversary of EU-ASEAN relations. As its ‘partner in integration’ and the engine of a wider regional cooperative security architecture, the EU maintains privileged ties with ASEAN. Under the chairmanship of the Philippines, parties vowed to strengthen political and security cooperation with a view to working towards a fully-fledged Strategic Partnership. Concretely, the new ASEAN-EU Plan of Action (2018-2022) proposes to further bi-regional cooperation in the field of maritime security, counter-terrorism and transnational crime, disarmament and non-proliferation and crisis prevention.<sup>183</sup> On 5-6 October, parties held the fourth ASEAN-EU high-level dialogue on maritime security cooperation, which proposed joint projects on functional security issues, such as marine scientific research, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and maritime connectivity. On 14 November, President of the European Council Donald Tusk was invited for the first time to join the East Asia Summit (EAS), the region’s only summit-level gathering that includes extra-regional powers (the US, Russia, India and Australia), and to which Brussels aspires membership.

## ASEM

On 20-21 November, European foreign ministers met with their Asian counterparts at the 13th Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in Nay Pyi Taw. They tackled a number of issues including steps to improve people-to-people relations and connectivity, but the discussions were dominated by the Rohingya refugee crisis in Myanmar/Burma.

## Indo-Pacific and South-East Asia

The EU also provided humanitarian assistance to a number of countries in Asia and it engaged in preventive diplomacy in the region.<sup>184</sup> In August, the EU directly supported 25,000 flood-affected people in north-eastern India<sup>185</sup> and a further 35,000 in Nepal.<sup>186</sup> In November, communities in Vietnam benefitted from EU humanitarian support, following the effects of Typhoon Damrey. The EU also launched a €108 million programme in December in Vietnam to assist rural communities access sustainable ener-

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183. “ASEAN-EU Plan of Action 2018-2022,” *EEAS*, August 6, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/30781/asean-eu-plan-action-2018-2022\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/30781/asean-eu-plan-action-2018-2022_en).

184. Guy Banim and Eva Pejsova (ed.), “Prevention better than cure: the EU’s quiet diplomacy in Asia,” *EUISS Report*, no. 33 (June 2017), <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/prevention-better-curethe-eu%E2%80%99s-quiet-diplomacy-asia>.

185. European Commission, “EU brings relief to the victims of floods in north-eastern India,” August 17, 2017, [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/european-union-brings-relief-victims-floods-north-eastern-india\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/european-union-brings-relief-victims-floods-north-eastern-india_en).

186. European Commission, “EU brings relief to the victims of floods and landslides in Nepal,” August 25, 2017, [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/eu-brings-relief-victims-floods-and-landslides-nepal\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/eu-brings-relief-victims-floods-and-landslides-nepal_en).



gy.<sup>187</sup> In December, the EU supported the 11,000 people affected by a series of eruptions of Mount Agung in Bali with €100,000,<sup>188</sup> and €570,000 was provided to the victims of Typhoon Tembin in the Philippines.<sup>189</sup> In South-East Asia, the Commission provided €25 million in November for a regional programme designed to ensure safe labour migration for women migrant workers and girls.<sup>190</sup> On 17 November, an inaugural high-level EU-ASEAN dialogue on sustainable development was convened in Bangkok to promote the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals.

## India

At the bilateral level, the EU continued to enhance links with its Asian Strategic Partners. For example, during the 14th EU-India Summit in New Delhi on 6 October, the two partners pledged to enhance their Strategic Partnership on trade, investment, climate change and migration. The year was marked by a number of high-level visits by dignitaries and heads of state and government from India to the EU and vice-versa. In April, the HR/VP visited India and discussed issues such as counter-terrorism and maritime security with Indian counterparts. In May, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited a number of EU countries including France, Germany and Spain. During his time in the EU, Prime Minister Modi expressed a keen wish to develop stronger cooperation in the fields of economics, science and defence. Discussions also focused on a potential future trade and investment agreement between the EU and India. These areas of cooperation were underlined in the Joint Declaration signed by the EU and India following the 14th bilateral summit.<sup>191</sup>

## Myanmar/Burma

One of the other major crises in Asia occurred in Myanmar/Burma, with thousands of Rohingya people fleeing the north-western Rakhine region to Bangladesh as refugees. Following a visit by Christos Stylianides, European Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management, to the country on 12-14 May, the EU dedicated €12 million

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187. European Commission, “Supporting sustainable energy in rural areas of Vietnam,” December 1, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/supporting-sustainable-energy-rural-areas-vietnam\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/supporting-sustainable-energy-rural-areas-vietnam_en).

188. European Commission, “Victims of Mount Agung eruptions in Bali received EU support,” December 13, 2017, [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/victims-mount-agung-eruptions-bali-receive-eu-support\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/victims-mount-agung-eruptions-bali-receive-eu-support_en).

189. European Commission, “Philippines: €570,000 in EU humanitarian aid to victims of typhoon Tembin,” December 28, 2017, [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/philippines-eu-provides-570-000-humanitarian-aid-victims-typhoon-tembin\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/philippines-eu-provides-570-000-humanitarian-aid-victims-typhoon-tembin_en).

190. European Commission, “EU protecting the rights and safety of women migrant workers in South East Asia with €25 million,” November 24, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/eu-protecting-rights-and-safety-women-migrant-workers-south-east-asia-eu25-million\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/eu-protecting-rights-and-safety-women-migrant-workers-south-east-asia-eu25-million_en).

191. “Joint Statement 14th India-EU Summit,” *European Commission*, October 6, 2017, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_STATEMENT-17-3743\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-17-3743_en.htm).

to assist the most vulnerable communities.<sup>192</sup> In the same month, the political and refugee crisis was made worse by Cyclone Mora and the damage it inflicted on Bangladesh and Myanmar/Burma. To deal with this natural disaster, the EU provided €1.5 million in humanitarian assistance to affected communities.<sup>193</sup> In September, the EU called for access to Rakhine State following an intensification in violence on 25 August that cut off humanitarian assistance to 3,000-5,000 people.<sup>194</sup> This call was followed on 23 October with a pledge of €30 million in EU assistance following the ‘Pledging Conference on the Rohingya Refugee Crisis’ organised in Geneva. Overall, the EU dedicated €51 million to Bangladesh and Myanmar/Burma to help refugees in 2017.<sup>195</sup>

## South China Sea

Another major security concern with implications for Europe was the volatile situation in the South China Sea. Lasting tensions between China and several South-East Asian claimants over overlapping sovereignty claims, the build-up of artificial islands and the progressive militarisation of regional waters was at the centre of East Asia’s strategic preoccupations. More importantly, straddling some of the world’s most important sea lines of communication the South China Sea dispute poses a threat to international trade, freedom of navigation and the global rules-based order. The EU holds a principled position of neutrality and non-intervention, while promoting the respect of international law and peaceful settlement of disputes in its relations with the parties involved. At the same time, several EU member states with a strategic interest and presence in the region (with France at the forefront) regularly exercise the right to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. On 19-30 April 2017, for example, the French naval mission *Jeanne d’Arc* passed through the South China Sea, with selected EU member state representatives on board.<sup>196</sup>

## China

EU-China relations continued to evolve in 2017. On 19 April, the HR/VP co-chaired the seventh EU-China Strategic Dialogue in Beijing where topics discussed included:

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192. European Commission, “Commissioner Stylianides announces new EU aid during visit to Myanmar/Burma,” May 12, 2017, [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/commissioner-stylianides-announces-new-eu-aid-during-visit-myanmarburma\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/commissioner-stylianides-announces-new-eu-aid-during-visit-myanmarburma_en).

193. European Commission, “EU provides €1.5 million to victims of Tropical Cyclone Mora in Bangladesh and Myanmar,” July 6, 2017, [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/eu-provides-15-million-victims-tropical-cyclone-mora-bangladesh-and-myanmar\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/eu-provides-15-million-victims-tropical-cyclone-mora-bangladesh-and-myanmar_en).

194. European Commission, “Commissioner Stylianides calls for humanitarian access to Rakhine State,” September 5, 2017, [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/commissioner-stylianides-calls-humanitarian-access-rakhine-state\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/commissioner-stylianides-calls-humanitarian-access-rakhine-state_en).

195. European Commission, “Rohingya Crisis: Commissioner Stylianides visits Bangladesh and reaffirms EU humanitarian support,” October 31, 2017, [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/rohingya-crisis-commissioner-stylianides-visits-bangladesh-and-reaffirms-eu-humanitarian\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/rohingya-crisis-commissioner-stylianides-visits-bangladesh-and-reaffirms-eu-humanitarian_en).

196. Embassy of France in Australia, “The mission ‘Jeanne d’Arc 2017’,” April 5, 2017, <https://au.ambafrance.org/The-mission-Jeanne-d-Arc-2017>.

China's role in the UNSC, the use of chemical weapons in Syria, tensions on the Korean peninsula, instability in Afghanistan, the Iran nuclear deal and climate governance.<sup>197</sup> The 19th EU-China Summit on 2 June focused on issues such as climate change, business relations, competition policy, regional and global challenges, investment, customs, energy, research and innovation and other issues. In particular, the EU and China discussed security challenges such as North Korea's activities, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Syria and Myanmar/Burma. The second meeting of the EU-China Connectivity Platform, that took place during the Summit, discussed the principles for better transport connections between the Union and China based on the TEN-Ts framework and the 'Belt and Road Initiative' (BRI).<sup>198</sup> On maritime-related matters, 2017 was designated the EU-China 'Blue Year' as a way to enhance dialogue on ocean governance, blue growth and future EU-China cooperation. The Blue Year initiative began after the third EU-China high-level dialogue on ocean affairs that took place on 2 March. Finally, the EU and China discussed a host of trade-related issues at the Summit and signed a memorandum of understanding on state aid control.

## Japan

The EU's relations with Japan were characterised by the historic EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) that was initialled during the 24th EU-Japan Summit on 6 July and finalised on 8 December. As President Juncker remarked at the time, the 'EU and Japan send a powerful message in defence of open, fair and rules-based trade'.<sup>199</sup> In addition to the EPA, the EU and Japan were negotiating a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) that seeks to enhance relations between the two actors in the fields of cybercrime, crisis management, climate resilience and energy security.<sup>200</sup> The SPA foresees a joint committee to coordinate the partnership in order to find common solutions to security challenges faced by the EU and Japan. A delegation from the European Parliament's subcommittee on security and defence supported the SPA negotiation process by visiting Japan on 22-25 May to discuss Japan's defence reforms with representatives from the Japanese parliament, government, industry and think tanks.<sup>201</sup> In addition to the EPA, the EU and Japan cooperated through science diplomacy, and on 30 September they organised the eighth EU-Japan Science Policy Forum in Kyoto, Japan.

197. "Remarks by the High Representative Mogherini following the seventh EU-China Strategic Dialogue," *EEAS*, April 19, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/24821/remarks-high-representative-mogherini-following-7th-eu-china-strategic-dialogue\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/24821/remarks-high-representative-mogherini-following-7th-eu-china-strategic-dialogue_en).

198. For more on the BRI see Michal Makocki, "China's Road: into Eastern Europe," *EUISS Brief*, no. 4 (February 2017), <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/chinas-road-eastern-europe> and Plamen Tonchev, "China's Road: into the Western Balkans," *EUISS Brief*, no. 3 (February 2017), <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/chinas-road-western-balkans>.

199. European Commission, "EU and Japan finalise Economic Partnership Agreement," December 8, 2017, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-5142\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5142_en.htm).

200. The EU and Japan concluded their negotiations on the SPA on 25 April 2018. At the time of writing, the agreement is undergoing ratification processes on both sides.

201. EEAS, "Security and defence MEPs visit Japan," May 18, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/26504/security-and-defence-meps-visit-japan\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/26504/security-and-defence-meps-visit-japan_en).

## North Korea

The principal security concern in the Asia-Pacific during 2017 was North Korea's military activities.<sup>202</sup> On 12 February, at a time when Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was visiting the US, North Korea fired a Pukguksong-2 intermediate-range ballistic missile in the country's first missile test since the inauguration of President Trump. On 6 March, North Korea yet again launched medium range missiles (Scud-ER), but this time during a joint US-South Korean military exercise (Foal Eagle). More worryingly, on 2 September Pyongyang tested an advanced nuclear device, the 6th and largest nuclear test by North Korea so far. In response to North Korea's actions during the year, the EU tightened sanctions against Pyongyang on nine separate occasions. The sanctions target individuals and entities which support the regime's nuclear activities. A total ban on EU investment in all economic sectors in North Korea was also introduced.<sup>203</sup>

## Afghanistan and Central Asia

In Central Asia the EU focused its efforts on supporting stability in Afghanistan. On 24 July, the EU published a Joint Communication detailing the EU's strategy on Afghanistan with a focus on the reconciliation processes, capacity-building of the Afghan authorities, civilian aspects of Security Sector Reform, electoral reform, fighting corruption, human rights protection, as well as a host of economic development and security objectives.<sup>204</sup> The Joint Communication signalled another positive step following the February signing of the EU-Afghanistan Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development and the appointment in June of an EU Special Envoy to Afghanistan, Roland Kobia. More broadly in Central Asia, the EU pledged €23 million in February to improve the rule of law and rural development in Kyrgyzstan.<sup>205</sup> A delegation from the European Commission visited Tajikistan in April in order to discuss the remediation of the legacy of Soviet-era uranium mining. The Commission also committed €21.5 million in July to boost agricultural development in Uzbekistan.<sup>206</sup>

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202. Ramon Pacheco Pardo, "DPRK: game, reset and match?," *EUISS Alert*, no. 23 (July 2017), <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/dprk-game-reset-and-match>.

203. Council of the EU, "EU restrictive measures against North Korea," accessed April 24, 2018, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/history-north-korea/>.

204. European Commission and EEAS, "Elements for an EU Strategy on Afghanistan," Joint Communication of the Commission and the HR/VP to the European Parliament and the Council, *JOIN(2017) 31 final*, July 24, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/30280/joint-communication-european-parliament-and-council-elements-eu-strategy-afghanistan\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/30280/joint-communication-european-parliament-and-council-elements-eu-strategy-afghanistan_en).

205. European Commission, "EU supporting Rule of Law and Rural Development in the Kyrgyz Republic with €23 million," February 16, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/eu-supporting-rule-law-and-rural-development-kyrgyz-republic-eu23-million\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/eu-supporting-rule-law-and-rural-development-kyrgyz-republic-eu23-million_en).

206. European Commission, "EU signs agreement of EUR 21.5 million to boost agriculture development in Uzbekistan," July 17, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/eu-signs-agreement-eur-215-million-boost-agriculture-development-uzbekistan\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/eu-signs-agreement-eur-215-million-boost-agriculture-development-uzbekistan_en).

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“Work Plan 2017-2018 of the EU-China Roadmap on Energy Cooperation,” *European Commission*, June 2, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/workplan\\_2017-2018\\_of\\_the\\_eu-china\\_roadmap\\_on\\_energy\\_cooperation.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/workplan_2017-2018_of_the_eu-china_roadmap_on_energy_cooperation.pdf).

“ASEAN-EU Plan of Action 2018-2022,” *EEAS*, August 6, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/30781/asean-eu-plan-action-2018-2022\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/30781/asean-eu-plan-action-2018-2022_en).

“India-EU Joint Statement on Cooperation in Combating Terrorism,” *Council of the EU*, October 6, 2017, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/23516/eu-india-joint-declaration-on-counter-terrorism.pdf>.

“EU-India Joint Statement on Clean Energy and Climate Change,” *Council of the EU*, October 6, 2017, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/23517/eu-india-joint-declaration-climate-and-energy.pdf>.

**FIGURE 11: ASIA TIMELINE**

Data: EEAS, European Commission, Council of the EU

**AZERBAIJAN**

7 Feb


Following a visit of Azerbaijan's president to Brussels, the EU and Azerbaijan open negotiations for a new comprehensive agreement to replace the 1999 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.


**BANGLADESH**

15 Feb

Second EU-Bangladesh Diplomatic Consultations in Brussels conclude with agreement to launch an information and awareness campaign on the risks of irregular migration.

- Mandates
- Statements/measures
- Economic/development assistance
- Restrictive measures
- Dialogue/meetings










# Restrictive measures

Sanctions, called ‘restrictive measures’ in EU parlance, are CFSP instruments imposed against target governments, commercial entities and individuals to penalise a policy or course of action that contravenes international law and/or political norms. The Union applies restrictive measures in pursuit of the objectives of EU external action as outlined in Article 21 TEU.

The EU applies the following types of restrictive measures: diplomatic sanctions; suspensions of cooperation with a third country; boycotts of sporting or cultural events; trade sanctions (general or specific trade sanctions, arms embargoes); financial sanctions (freezing of funds and assets or economic resources, prohibition on financial transactions, restrictions on export credits or investment); flight bans; and restrictions on admission. Prompted by the need to mitigate the unintended negative consequences of comprehensive sanctions (such as large-scale trade or oil embargoes) on civilian populations, EU states have increasingly shifted their sanctions policy to a system of ‘targeted’ or ‘smart’ sanctions such as asset freezes or travel bans. These specifically target commercial entities (both private and state-owned) or top-level individuals engaged in the activities that are to be penalised.

**FIGURE 12: COUNTRIES SUBJECT TO EU RESTRICTIVE MEASURES**

2017



Data: EUISS, EU Sanctions Map

Since 1996, the EU has maintained protections against the potential extra-territorial effects of US sanctions against third states on EU entities conducting business in these

countries, including Cuba, Iran and Libya.<sup>207</sup> EU legislation in this matter also enables member states to take the steps they consider necessary to protect the interests of their natural and legal persons if subjected to the extra-territorial application of restrictions by a third country.<sup>208</sup>

As of December 2017, the EU has 42 sanctions regimes in place extending to 32 countries. In 2017, EU bodies adopted 199 legal acts on restrictive measures.

## Russia/Ukraine

There are three sanction regimes in force against Russia and Ukraine as a result of the crisis in the latter. Sanctions have been imposed on: Ukrainian officials from the Yanukovych era; Crimea-based targets; and individuals, companies and parts of the Russian state apparatus. Sanctions include diplomatic measures, asset freezes and travel restrictions, and economic and financial restrictions. On 3 March 2017, restrictive measures ‘directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine’ were extended until 6 March 2018 (one person was removed from the listing, while the assets of 15 persons remain frozen for the misappropriation of Ukrainian public funds).

*Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/381*<sup>209</sup>

On 13 March, the Council extended individual travel bans and asset freezes for persons and associated entities engaged in ‘actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine’ until 15 September 2017 (two persons were removed from the listings).

*Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/445*<sup>210</sup>

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207. *Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 protecting against the effects of the extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom*, (EC) No 2271/96, *Official Journal of the European Communities* L 309/1 (1996): 1-6, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/1996/2271/2014-02-20>.

208. *Joint Action of 22 November 1996 adopted by the Council on the basis of Articles J.3 and K.3 of the Treaty on European Union concerning measures protecting against the effects of the extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom (96/668/CFSP)*, (96/668/CFSP), *Official Journal of the European Communities* L 309/7 (1996): 7, [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/joint\\_action/1996/668/oj](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/joint_action/1996/668/oj).

209. *Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/381 of 3 March 2017 amending Decision 2014/119/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine*, (CFSP) 2017/381, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 58/34 (2017): 34-35, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32017D0381>.

210. *Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/445 of 13 March 2017 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine*, (CFSP) 2017/445, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 67/88 (2017): 88-120, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017D0445>.

On 19 June, the Council reiterated its condemnation of the ‘illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol’ by Russia and reaffirmed its commitment to fully implement its non-recognition policy, renewing the related sanctions regime until 23 June 2018.

*Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/445*<sup>211</sup>

On 28 June, following an assessment of the progress on implementing the Minsk Agreements, the Council prolonged economic restrictive measures until 31 January 2018.

*Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1148*<sup>212</sup>

On 4 August, the Council added three individuals and three entities to the existing sanctions framework covering actions undermining the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The new listings targeted persons and companies involved in the supply of key components to infrastructure projects, particularly in the energy sector. Equipment such as gas turbines is considered to facilitate the creation of an independent power supply for Crimea and Sevastopol, thereby entrenching the separation of the peninsula from Ukraine.

*Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1418*<sup>213</sup>

On 14 September, in view of continued activities ‘undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine’, the corresponding sanctions regime was extended until 15 March 2018 (listings were amended to reflect the passing of three individuals and the merger of three entities covered by the measures; the entities in question have been replaced by the single entity that emerged from this consolidation).

*Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1561*<sup>214</sup>

On 20 November, following gubernatorial elections in Sevastopol on 10 September that were held together with regional and local elections in Russia, the Council added the individual elected as ‘governor of Sevastopol’ to the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures for ‘undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine’. As an extension of its policy to not recognise

211. *Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/445 of 13 March 2017 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine*, (CFSP) 2017/445, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 67/88 (2017): 88-120, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017D0445>.

212. *Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1148 of 28 June 2017 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine*, (CFSP) 2017/1148, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 166/35 (2017): 35, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017D1148>.

213. *Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1418 of 4 August 2017 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine*, (CFSP) 2017/1418, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 203 I/5 (2017): 5-8, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017D1418>.

214. *Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1561 of 14 September 2017 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine*, (CFSP) 2017/1561, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 237/72 (2017): 72-85, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017D1561>.

the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by Russia, the EU does not recognise the elections organised on the Crimean peninsula or their outcomes.

*Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2163*<sup>215</sup>

On 21 December, renewed appraisal of the status of the Minsk Agreements prompted the Council to prolong economic sanctions in response to ‘Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine’ until 31 July 2018.

*Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2426*<sup>216</sup>

By the end of 2017, travel bans and asset freezes imposed under these measures were in effect for 150 persons and 38 entities.

## North Korea

EU restrictive measures against North Korea trace back to a common position<sup>217</sup> adopted by the Council in November 2006, in the wake of North Korea’s first proclaimed test of a nuclear device on 9 October 2006. The EU’s first round of sanctions against North Korea focused on transposing UNSC sanctions. In addition, the EU decided to unilaterally extend the reach of arms export restrictions to the full scope of the EU Common List of Military Equipment, as a demonstration of its commitment to defending international non-proliferation norms. This dual approach, combining support for UNSC-led joint international efforts to hold North Korea’s leadership accountable for its destabilising actions and further-reaching autonomous measures, has since informed EU sanctions policy towards North Korea. All EU measures are conceived in ways so as to shield the civilian population from adverse consequences, including through exceptions on humanitarian grounds.

2017 marked a year of unprecedented activity: on nine separate occasions the Council adopted measures to significantly expand the gamut of sanctions in reaction to North Korea’s sixth nuclear test and 24 missile launches, the largest number of missiles North Korea had test-fired in a single year to date.<sup>218</sup>

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215. *Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2163 of 20 November 2017 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine*, (CFSP) 2017/2163, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 304/51 (2017): 51-52, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1524732685992&uri=CELEX:32017D2163>.

216. *Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2426 of 21 December 2017 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine*, (CFSP) 2017/2426, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 343/77 (2017): 77, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017D2426>.

217. Council of the European Union, “Common position concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” 2006/795/CFSP, Brussels, November 20, 2006, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32006E0795>.

218. CSIS Missile Defense Project, “North Korean Missile Launches & Nuclear Tests: 1984-Present,” November 29, 2017, <https://missilethreat.csis.org/north-korea-missile-launches-1984-present/>.

On 27 February, the Council established the legislative basis for transposing UNSCR 2321, adopted on 30 November 2016 in response to North Korea's fifth nuclear test on 9 September. The set of measures encompassed restrictions on the trade in coal, iron and iron ore and a complete ban on importing copper, nickel, silver and zinc originating from North Korea. The ban also applies to the transfer of cultural objects, such as statues, from North Korea, and the supply of new helicopters and vessels to North Korea. Further controls in the transport and financial sectors restrict North Korea's official financial footprint in the EU to a minimum, regulating the use of real estate property by North Korea and limiting diplomatic entities and representatives to a single bank account within the EU. Moreover, the measures position member states to take additional action to halt the teaching and training of North Korean nationals in areas that could lead to knowledge transfers which facilitate advancements of North Korea's nuclear and missile programmes. In the same vein, the measures allow for member states to suspend scientific and technological cooperation with groups and individuals supported by North Korea. On 8 December 2016, the Council had already transposed an asset freeze and travel restrictions for an additional 11 persons and 10 entities identified in UNSCR 2321.

*Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/345*<sup>219</sup>

*Council Regulation (EU) 2017/330*<sup>220</sup>

On 6 April, the Council expanded the scope of the EU's autonomous sanctions, extending an existing investment ban to North Korea's conventional arms-related industry, metallurgy and metalworking and aerospace sectors. New prohibitions also apply to the provision of computer- and data-related services, and certain services in the chemical, mining and refining industries. Asset freezes and travel bans were amended to include four additional individuals involved in North Korea's efforts in developing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. The measures were adopted after North Korea's

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219. *Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/345 of 27 February 2017 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, (CFSP) 2017/345, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 50/59 (2017): 59-65, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017D0345>.

220. *Council Regulation (EU) 2017/330 of 27 February 2017 amending Regulation (EC) No 329/2007 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, (EU) 2017/330, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 50/1 (2017): 1-8, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017R0330>.

failed test launch of a new intermediate-range ballistic missile on 5 April, one day before the 2017 US-China Summit.<sup>221</sup>

*Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/666*<sup>222</sup>

*Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/667*<sup>223</sup>

*Council Regulation (EU) 2017/658*<sup>224</sup>

On 8 June, the Council transposed the listing of 14 persons and four entities named in UNSCR 2356, adopted on 2 June, for their support to North Korea's endeavours in building nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.

*Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2017/975*<sup>225</sup>

On 10 August, the Council took action to facilitate the entry into force of the asset freeze and travel restrictions foreseen under UNSCR 2371, adopted on 5 August. Nine persons and four entities were added to the listings in light of North Korea's continued missile testing activities, including the firing of its first intercontinental ballistic missiles on 4 July and 28 July.

*Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2017/1459*<sup>226</sup>

On 14 September, the Council moved to effectuate the macroeconomic measures put forward by UNSCR 2371 that had not yet been transposed on 10 August. Stepping up existing sanctions, the EU introduced a complete ban on coal iron, iron ore, seafood, lead and lead ore from North Korea. The additional measures crack down on North Korea's illicit arms transfers and restrict its access to financial markets and resources through international joint ventures. Beyond the scope of UNSCR 2371, EU member states agreed to grant no new work authorisations to North Korean nationals to curtail

221. CSIS Missile Defense Project, "Hwasong-12," May 16, 2017, <https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hwasong-12/>.

222. *Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/666 of 6 April 2017 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, (CFSP) 2017/666, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 94/42 (2017): 42-44, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017D0666>.

223. *Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/667 of 6 April 2017 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, (CFSP) 2017/667, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 94/45 (2017): 45-46, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2017/667/oj>.

224. *Council Regulation (EU) 2017/658 of 6 April 2017 amending Regulation (EC) No 329/2007 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, (EU) 2017/658, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 94/3 (2017): 3-8, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/658/oj>.

225. *Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2017/975 of 8 June 2017 implementing Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, (CFSP) 2017/975, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 146/145 (2017): 145-149, [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec\\_impl/2017/975/oj](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2017/975/oj).

226. *Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2017/1459 of 10 August 2017 implementing Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, (CFSP) 2017/1459, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 208/38 (2017): 38-41, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017D1459>.

cash flows suspected of supplying liquidity to North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.

*Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1562*<sup>227</sup>

*Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1548*<sup>228</sup>

On 15 September, the Council, in a partial transposition of UNSCR 2375, imposed an asset freeze on North Korea's Propaganda and Agitation Department, the Central Military Commission (CMC) and the Organisation and Guidance Department. Financial and travel restrictions were also extended to one individual serving on the CMC. The UNSC adopted Resolution 2375 on 11 September in response to North Korea's test of an advanced nuclear device on 2 September. North Korea's sixth nuclear test – involving what Pyongyang claims to have been a thermonuclear device – was its largest in yield to date.<sup>229</sup>

*Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2017/1573*<sup>230</sup>

*Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1568*<sup>231</sup>

On 10 October, the Council, in line with UNSCR 2375, reinforced trade restrictions *vis-à-vis* North Korea, including through a complete ban on exporting natural gas liquids to, and importing textiles from, North Korea, as well as restrictions on the sale of refined petroleum products and crude oil. The measures followed the targeted sanctions already put in place on 15 September.

*Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1838*<sup>232</sup>

*Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1836*<sup>233</sup>

227. *Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1562 of 14 September 2017 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, (CFSP) 2017/1562, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 237/86 (2017): 86-88, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017D1562>.

228. *Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1548 of 14 September 2017 amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1509 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, (EU) 2017/1548, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 237/39 (2017): 39-43, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017R1548>.

229. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "North Korean Nuclear Capabilities, 2018," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist* 74, no.1, 2018, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2017.1413062>.

230. *Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2017/1573 of 15 September 2017 implementing Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, (CFSP) 2017/1573, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 238/51 (2017): 51-51, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017D1573>.

231. *Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1568 of 15 September 2017 implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1509 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, (EU) 2017/1568, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 238/10 (2017): 10-11, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1524737476057&uri=CELEX:32017R1568>.

232. *Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1838 of 10 October 2017 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, (CFSP) 2017/1838, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 261/17 (2017): 17-21, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2017/1838/oj>.

233. *Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1836 of 10 October 2017 amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1509 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, (EU) 2017/1836, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 261/1 (2017): 1-15, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1836/oj>.

On 16 October, the Council stepped up autonomous measures, expanding an existing ban on EU investments to cover all sectors of North Korea's economy. Tightened restrictions also applied to exports of refined petroleum products and crude oil to North Korea, with prior limitations on sale converted into an outright ban. Moreover, the measures significantly lower the ceiling for permissible remittance transfers of North Korean nationals working in EU member states. Asset freezes and travel restrictions were amended to include three additional individuals and six entities.

*Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1860*<sup>234</sup>

*Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1858*<sup>235</sup>

*Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1859*<sup>236</sup>

On 18 October, the Council concurred with the addition of four new vessels to sanction lists by the UNSC Committee.

*Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2017/1909*<sup>237</sup>

*Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1897*<sup>238</sup>

By the end of 2017, autonomous EU measures comprised travel bans and asset freezes for 41 individuals and 10 entities, in addition to 63 persons and 53 entities designated by UNSC Resolutions.

## Syria

On 20 March, the Council decided to add four high-ranking Syrian military officials to existing sanction lists over their role in the use of chemical weapons against the civilian population, including the attacks in Talmenes (on 21 April 2014), Qmenas (on 16 March 2015) and Sarmin (on 16 March 2015). The new asset freezes and travel restrictions are based on the findings of the UNJIM, as laid out in its fourth report of 21

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234. *Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1860 of 16 October 2017 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, (CFSP) 2017/1860, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 265 I/8 (2017): 8-12, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2017/1860/oj>.

235. *Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1858 of 16 October 2017 amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1509 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, (EU) 2017/1858, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 265 I/1 (2017): 1-4, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1858/oj>.

236. *Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1859 of 16 October 2017 implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1509 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, (EU) 2017/1859, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 265 I/5 (2017): 5-7, [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg\\_impl/2017/1859/oj](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2017/1859/oj).

237. *Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2017/1909 of 18 October 2017 implementing Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, (CFSP) 2017/1909, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 269/44 (2017): 44-45, [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec\\_impl/2017/1909/oj](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2017/1909/oj).

238. *Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1897 of 18 October 2017 implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1509 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, (EU) 2017/1897, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 269/1 (2017): 1-2, [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg\\_impl/2017/1897/oj](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2017/1897/oj).



October 2016.<sup>239</sup> In a unilateral push, the additional EU measures came after attempts to impose sanctions within the setting of the UNSC failed. Repeated moves to penalise individuals responsible for the use of chemical weapons had been blocked by China and Russia. The umbrella framework under which the measures are implemented was authorised until 1 June 2017.

*Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/480*<sup>240</sup>

*Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2017/485*<sup>241</sup>

On 29 May, the Council prolonged the regime of restrictive measures put in place by the EU in response to atrocities committed in the context of the civil war in Syria until 1 June 2018. The Council also extended economic and trade restrictions to three newly appointed ministers, who assumed responsibility for the justice, economy and foreign trade, and administrative development portfolios in March 2017. The package in its current form consists of an oil embargo, investment restrictions, the freezing of funds of certain influential individuals or entities, and export restrictions on equipment and technology used for internal repression and domestic surveillance.

*Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/917*<sup>242</sup>

*Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/907*<sup>243</sup>

On 17 July, the Council expanded existing asset freezes and travel restriction to include 16 additional individuals in view of the Syrian regime's use of chemical weapons and its role in their proliferation.

*Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2017/1341*<sup>244</sup>

*Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1327*<sup>245</sup>

239. UN Press Service, "Security Council Considers Fourth Report by Joint Investigative Mechanism," October 27, 2016, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/dc3668.doc.htm>.

240. *Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/480 of 20 March 2017 implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria*, (EU) 2017/480, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 75/12 (2017): 12-14, [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg\\_impl/2017/480/oj](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2017/480/oj).

241. *Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2017/485 of 20 March 2017 implementing Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria*, (CFSP) 2017/485, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 75/24 (2017): 24-26, [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec\\_impl/2017/485/oj](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2017/485/oj).

242. *Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/917 of 29 May 2017 amending Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria*, (CFSP) 2017/917, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 139/62 (2017): 62-69, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2017/917/oj>.

243. *Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/907 of 29 May 2017 implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria*, (EU) 2017/907, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 139/15 (2017): 15-22, [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg\\_impl/2017/907/oj](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2017/907/oj).

244. *Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2017/1341 of 17 July 2017 implementing Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria*, (CFSP) 2017/1341, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 185/56 (2017): 56-59, [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec\\_impl/2017/1341/oj](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2017/1341/oj).

245. *Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1327 of 17 July 2017 implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria*, (EU) 2017/1327, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 185/20 (2017): 20-23, [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg\\_impl/2017/1327/oj](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2017/1327/oj).

With the addition of eight high-ranking military officers and eight scientists deemed responsible for the use and development of chemical weapons on 17 July, EU sanction lists on Syria designated 255 persons and 67 entities by the end of 2017.

## Venezuela

On 13 November, following repeated expressions of concern about the deteriorating political situation in Venezuela, the Council put in place concrete sanctions and a framework decision to allow for swift reactions to developments in Venezuela's political crisis as they unfold. On previous occasions, the Council had already stated its non-recognition of the Constituent Assembly elected on 30 July 2017 due to concerns over its representativeness, and had expressed doubts about the legitimacy of the regional elections held on 15 October 2017. In addition to an immediately applicable export ban on arms and equipment used for internal repression, the Council introduced a framework to facilitate the flexible expansion or suspension of sanctions. While opting not to designate any individuals on 13 November, the Council extended the outlined asset freeze and travel restrictions to seven government officials on 22 January 2018 in light of the continuously worsening political conditions.

*Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2074*<sup>246</sup>

*Council Regulation (EU) 2017/2063*<sup>247</sup>

*Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/90*<sup>248</sup>

*Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/88*<sup>249</sup>

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246. *Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2074 of 13 November 2017 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela*, (CFSP) 2017/2074, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 295/60 (2017): 60-68, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2017/2074/oj>.

247. *Council Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 of 13 November 2017 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela*, (EU) 2017/2063, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 295/21 (2017): 21-37, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/2063/oj>.

248. *Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/90 of 22 January 2018 amending Decision (CFSP) 2017/2074 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela*, (CFSP) 2018/90, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 16 I/14 (2018): 14-16, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2018/90/oj>.

249. *Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/88 of 22 January 2018 implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela*, (EU) 2018/88, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 16 I/6 (2018): 6-8, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/88/oj>.






# Geographic instruments

The EU's external policies are implemented through specific external- and security-related thematic instruments and agencies. These instruments enable the EU to play a role in economic and development activities, humanitarian aid, and political, security and defence affairs. Most of these 'tools' are established in accordance with the priorities and limits of the EU treaties and the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), a budgetary plan that translates EU priorities into financial terms and sets the maximum annual amounts which the EU may spend in different areas.

**FIGURE 14: MFF HEADING 4 OVERVIEW**

2014-2020, € million



Data: European Commission, DG BUDGET

In order to facilitate an overview of EU policies and priorities in this domain, instruments that touch upon external action have been grouped in a single section of the EU budget: Heading 4, 'Global Europe'. Figure 14 provides an overview of the budgets of Heading 4 instruments, the goals, programmes and scope of which are detailed in the ensuing pages. The CFSP is addressed separately from the other Heading 4 instruments (see *Introduction*). The EDF is reviewed here as an additional financial instrument,

although it is funded outside of the EU budget. All projections in this chapter are expressed in 2014 terms.<sup>250</sup>

This chapter also indicates which European Commission service (and Directorate General (DG)) manages each of the thematic and geographic instruments. In particular, the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) differs from any other service as it is the only one under the direct authority of HR/VP Federica Mogherini in her capacity as Vice-President of the European Commission. The FPI's staff in Brussels and in the EU Delegations works in close contact with the EEAS, as well as with other European Commission services. In addition to the IcSP and the Partnership Instrument (PI), which are both described in this chapter, the FPI also implements the CFSP budget.

On 15 December, the Commission published the results of a mid-term review, evaluating whether the EU's instruments for financing external action still meet their intended purpose.<sup>251</sup> While the report concluded that no amendments were necessary at this time to adjust the instruments, it provided instrument-specific feedback for improving their implementation during the remainder of the current financing period.

## DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION INSTRUMENT (DCI)



3,168 million

**Budget:** €3.17 billion (2017); €19.66 billion (2014-2020)

**DG:** DEVCO

**Goal:** to reduce and, in the long term, to eradicate poverty by fostering sustainable economic, social and environmental development; consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, good governance, human rights and relevant principles of international law.

**Programmes and scope:** geographic and thematic programmes, and the Pan-African Programme. Geographic programmes aim at supporting development cooperation with developing countries (as identified in the DCI Regulation referenced below). Thematic programmes are composed of two sections that address development-related 'Global Public Goods and Challenges' and support 'Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities in partner countries (as identified in the DCI Regulation). The Pan-African Programme supports the strategic partnership with Africa, and covers activities of a trans-regional, continental or global nature in and with Africa. Geographic


250. Note on methodology: figures for 2017 and previous years are given as presented in the adopted budgets and reflect prices in then-year euros. MFF totals per instrument, which comprise appropriations for the entire timeframe covered by the MFF (2014-2020), are based on the original projections and given in 2013 prices. These aggregate estimates are not adjusted to reflect differences between the estimated and approved budgets for the years 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017.

251. European Commission, "Mid-term review report of the External Financing Instruments," December 15, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/mid-term-review-report-external-financing-instruments\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/mid-term-review-report-external-financing-instruments_en).

programmes cover 47 countries. Thematic programmes are intended for all developing countries, including those covered by the ENI and EDF.

**FIGURE 15: DCI DISTRIBUTION PER PROGRAMME**

2017 and MFF (2014-2020)



Data: DG BUDGET, DG DEVCO

## Reference documents

Regulation (EU) No 233/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation for the period 2014-2020, Regulation (EU) No 233/2014, Official Journal of the European Union L77/44 (2014): 44-76, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/233/oj>.

“External Evaluation of the Development Co-operation Instrument (2014 - mid 2017),” European Commission, June 30, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/draft-evaluation-report-external-financing-instruments-development-cooperation-instrument-dci\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/draft-evaluation-report-external-financing-instruments-development-cooperation-instrument-dci_en).

## EUROPEAN INSTRUMENT FOR DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (EIDHR)

189 million

**Budget:** €189 million (2017); €1.33 billion (2014-2020)

**DG:** DEVCO and FPI

**Goal:** to assist in the development and consolidation of democracy, the rule of law, respect for all human rights and uphold fundamental freedoms by supporting and enhancing participatory and representative democracy, strengthening the overall democratic cycle, and enhancing respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms in third countries.

**Programmes and scope:** strategy papers setting out the Union's plan of action for assistance, also containing priority areas selected for financing by the Union, specific objectives, expected results and performance indicators; annual action programmes, individual and support measures, and special measures. EIDHR covers civil society organisations at local, national and international levels, as well as human rights defenders and victims of repression and abuse. Civil society organisations receive 90% of the funding (€1.2 billion, 2014-2020) and 10% goes toward international organisations (€133.3 million, 2014-2020).

### Reference documents

*Regulation (EU) No 235/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a financing instrument for democracy and human rights worldwide*, Regulation (EU) No 235/2014, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 77/85 (2014): 85-94, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/235/oj>.

"External Evaluation of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (2014 - mid 2017)," *European Commission*, June 30, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation-european-instrument-democracy-and-human-rights-eidhr-2014-2020-draft-evaluation-report-1\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation-european-instrument-democracy-and-human-rights-eidhr-2014-2020-draft-evaluation-report-1_en).

Note: EIDHR replaced the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights of 2000-2006.

## EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD INSTRUMENT (ENI)

2,440 million

**Budget:** €2.44 billion (2017); €15.43 billion (2014-2020)

**DG:** NEAR

**Goal:** to develop the special relationship founded on cooperation, peace and security, mutual accountability and a shared commitment to the universal values of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights with partner countries; to promote en-



hanced political cooperation, deep and sustainable democracy and progressive economic integration.

**Programmes and scope:** bilateral, multi-country and cross-border cooperation programmes, covering, *inter alia*, human rights, good governance and the rule of law, institutional cooperation and capacity development, support to civil society actors and their role in reform processes and democratic transitions, sustainable and inclusive economic development, development of social sectors, in particular for the youth. It also covers trade and private-sector development, agriculture and rural development, sustainable management of natural resources, the energy sector, transport and infrastructure, education and skills development, mobility and migration management, confidence-building and other measures contributing to the prevention and settlement of conflicts. ENI covers 16 partner countries, separated into ENI South and ENI East. ENI South countries are: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria (currently suspended) and Tunisia. ENI East countries are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

**FIGURE 16: ENI PARTNER COUNTRIES**

2017



\* Currently suspended.

\*\* This designation [applicable throughout the entirety of this publication] shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the member states on this issue.

Data: European Commission, DG NEAR

## Reference documents

*Regulation (EU) No 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument*, Regulation (EU) No 232/2014, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 77/27 (2014): 27-43, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/232/oj>.

“External Evaluation of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) (2014 - mid 2017),” *European Commission*, June 30, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation-european-neighbourhood-instrument-draft-report\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation-european-neighbourhood-instrument-draft-report_en).

Note: the ENI replaced the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), as set out in the 2007-2013 MFF.

## EU AID VOLUNTEERS INITIATIVE (EUAV)

22 million

**Budget:** €22 million (2017); €147.9 million (2014-2020)

**DG:** ECHO

**Goal:** to contribute to strengthening the Union’s capacity to provide needs-based humanitarian aid; strengthen the capacity and resilience of vulnerable or disaster-affected communities in third countries, particularly by means of disaster preparedness, and disaster risk reduction, and by enhancing the link between relief, rehabilitation and development.

**Programmes and scope:** framework for joint contributions from European volunteers to support humanitarian aid in third countries that applies to: selection, training and deployment of the EUAV; actions inside and outside the Union aimed at building the hosting organisations’ capacity for humanitarian aid in third countries. The EUAV is open to the participation of: citizens and sending organisations from acceding, candidate, potential candidates and partner countries of the ENP; citizens and sending organisations from European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries which are members of the European Economic Area (EEA); and citizens and sending organisations from other European countries.

In December 2017, the results of an interim evaluation assessing the implementation of the EUAV in the period from mid-2014 to mid-2017 were published. Findings of the report commissioned by DG ECHO highlighted the potential for more formalised coordination with EU development actors, particularly as regards the implementation of the EU’s Joint Strategic Approach to Resilience. The report points to room for further alignment with regular humanitarian assistance and the opportunities of recognising the EUAV as ‘integrated instrument of the EU humanitarian system’. Efforts in this direction could include creating a Knowledge Management System that leverages the lessons and experience gained through the EUAV.

## Reference documents

*Regulation (EU) No 375/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 establishing the European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps (‘EU Aid Volunteers initiative’)*, Regulation (EU) No 375/2014, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 122/1 (2014): 1-17, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/375/oj>.

“Interim Evaluation of the Implementation of the EU Aid Volunteers Initiative,” *European Commission*, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/echo/sites/echo-site/files/01201\\_finalreport\\_euav\\_interimevaluation\\_271127\\_bookshop\\_pdfvolume\\_01.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/echo/sites/echo-site/files/01201_finalreport_euav_interimevaluation_271127_bookshop_pdfvolume_01.pdf).

## EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND (EDF)

**Budget:** €30.5 billion (2014-2020)

**DG:** DEVCO (and ECHO)

**Goal:** created in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome and launched in 1959, the EDF is the EU’s main instrument for providing development aid to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and to Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs).

Programmes: funding for cooperation activities in the fields of economic development, social and human development as well as regional cooperation and integration.

### FIGURE 17: EDF FUNDING ALLOCATION

2014-2020, € million



Data: The Council

## Reference documents

*Council Regulation (EU) 2015/322 of 2 March 2015 on the implementation of the 11th European Development Fund*, Regulation (EU) 2015/322, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 58/1 (2015): 1-16, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2015/322/oj>.

“External Evaluation of the 11th European Development Fund (EDF) (2014 – mid 2017),” *European Commission*, June 30, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/draft-evaluation-report-external-financing-instruments-11th-european-development-fund-edf\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/draft-evaluation-report-external-financing-instruments-11th-european-development-fund-edf_en).

Note: the EDF is not part of the MFF but covers the same time period (2014-2020). It is financed by direct contributions from EU member states according to a special key and is governed by its own financial rules.

## GUARANTEE FUND FOR EXTERNAL ACTIONS (GF)

241 million

**Budget:** €240.5 million (2017); €1.19 billion (2014-2020)

**DG:** ECFIN

**Goal:** to repay the Communities' creditors in the event of default by the beneficiary of a loan granted or guaranteed by the Communities or of a loan guarantee issued by the EIB for which the Communities provide a guarantee.

**Programmes and scope:** operations related to the goal are carried out for the benefit of a third country or for the purpose of financing projects in third countries outside the scope of the Regulation governing the GF. The DG for Economic and Financial Affairs is responsible for the management of the GF, while the EIB is entrusted with the financial management of the GF's operations. The GF covers operations in third countries or projects executed in third countries. The constituting Regulation of the GF was slated to undergo several revisions in 2017, based on an interinstitutional understanding reached by the European Parliament and the Council. According to the compromise text, the amendments will:

- temporarily leave the EIB in charge of managing the GF;
- call for an independent evaluation in 2019 to assess the merits of transferring management of the GF, in whole or in part, to the Commission;
- cap GF assets at 10% of the Union's outstanding capital liabilities (the '10% threshold');
- introduce regular reviews to ensure the adequacy of the funding floor for the GF, currently set at 9% of the Union's outstanding capital liabilities (the '9% target'), and the 10% threshold.

Emerging from interinstitutional negotiations, the amendment was signed into law by the presidents of the Parliament and the Council on 14 March 2018 and entered into force on 8 April 2018.

### Reference document:

*Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 of 25 May 2009 establishing a Guarantee Fund for external actions (Codified version)*, Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 145/10 (2009): 10-14, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2009/480/oj>.

*Regulation (EU) 2018/409 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2018 amending Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 establishing a Guarantee Fund for external actions*, Regulation (EU) 2018/409, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 76/1 (2018): 1-2, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/409/oj>.

## INSTRUMENT CONTRIBUTING TO STABILITY AND PEACE (ICSP)

273 million


**Budget:** €273.3 million (2017); €2.34 billion (2014-2020)

**DG:** FPI (crisis situations), DEVCO (stable situations)

**Goal:** to provide direct subsidiary support for the Union's external policies by increasing the efficiency and coherence of the EU's actions in areas of crisis response, conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness, and in addressing global and trans-regional threats.

**FIGURE 18: ICSP-FUNDED PROJECTS BY THEME**

projects started in 2016 and 2017




Data: European Commission, FPI

**Programmes and scope:** assistance in response to a crisis or emerging crisis, assistance for conflict prevention, peace building and crisis preparedness, assistance in addressing global, trans-regional, and emerging threats, through thematic strategy papers and multiannual indicative programmes, including exceptional assistance measures and in-

terim response programmes. From 2012 to 2017, 238 projects have been implemented across 66 fragile, developing, emerging, in-transition, industrialised, candidate or potential candidate countries.

**FIGURE 19: ICSP-FUNDED PROJECTS BY REGION**

projets started in 2016 and 2017, € million




Data: European Commission, FPI

On 16 December 2017, an amendment entered into force which expanded the IcSP mandate. The new provisions allow for the financing of capacity building of military actors in support of sustainable development and security for development, where the same objectives cannot be met by non-military actors. In particular, the measures facilitate actions to strengthen the military’s ability to engage in development and human security-oriented tasks, like the (re-) construction of civil infrastructure and demining. Other measures of EU support include supply of equipment and infrastructure to assist the military in building transport and communication capabilities, water supply and sanitation. Training and mentoring activities are equally eligible to receive funding. EU assistance under the new Regulation cannot, however, be appropriated to finance regular military spending, the procurement of arms, ammunitions or other lethal equipment, and the provision of combat training. An additional €100 billion has been allocated to the IcSP to support these new measures in the period 2018-2020.

**FIGURE 20: ICSP DISTRIBUTION PER REGULATION**

€ billion



\* By definition, the distribution to Art. 3 (crisis response component) is not pre-determined.

Data: European Commission, FPI

## Reference documents

*Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing an instrument contributing to stability and peace, Regulation (EU) No 230/2014, Official Journal of the European Union L 77/1 (2014): 1-10, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/230/oj>.*

“External Evaluation of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (2014 - mid 2017),” *European Commission*, June 30, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/mid-term-evaluation-instrument-contributing-stability-and-peace-icsp-draft-report\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/mid-term-evaluation-instrument-contributing-stability-and-peace-icsp-draft-report_en).

*Regulation (EU) 2017/2306 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 amending Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 establishing an instrument contributing to stability and peace, Regulation (EU) 2017/2306, Official Journal of the European Union L 335/6 (2017): 6-10, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/2306/oj>.*

Note: the IcSP replaced the Instrument for Stability (IfS), as set out in the 2007-2013 MFF.

## INSTRUMENT FOR HUMANITARIAN AID

945 million

**Budget:** €945.4 million (2017); €6.62 billion (2014-2020)

**DG:** ECHO

**Goal:** to provide assistance, relief and protection to people outside the EU that are victims of natural or man-made disasters, while promoting the fundamental humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence.

**Programmes and scope:** established following Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996, the instrument financing humanitarian aid aims to provide emergency assistance and support to victims of natural disasters, outbreaks of fighting or other comparable circumstances. The Instrument can be activated at the request of a wide range of actors, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The measures, which cannot last longer than six months, are grant-financed and cover issues from supplying items during emergencies to the improvement of the Instrument’s own implementation process. In this framework, the Director of European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Directorate General (ECHO) is in charge of primary emergency

humanitarian actions. Third countries and NGOs headquartered either in EU member states or third countries requesting aid are eligible.

Reference document:

*Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid*, Regulation (EC) No 1257/96, *Official Journal of the European Communities* L 163/1 (1996): 1-6, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/1996/1257/oj>.

Note: the humanitarian aid component accounts for about three quarters of DG ECHO's budget for 2017.

## INSTRUMENT FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY COOPERATION (INSC)

62 million

**Budget:** €62.3 million (2017); €225.3 million (2014-2020)

**DG:** DEVCO

**Goal:** to support the promotion of high-level nuclear safety, radiation protection, and the application of efficient and effective safeguards of nuclear material in third countries.

**Programmes and scope:** annual action programmes drawn up on the basis of a strategy paper and multiannual indicative programmes. The action programmes specify the objectives to be pursued, the fields of intervention, the measures and projects envisaged, the expected results, the management procedures and the total amount of financing planned. They also are set out for each third country or region and specify details concerning the implementation of cooperation provided. In the event of unforeseen needs, circumstances or commitments, the Commission may adopt special measures not provided for in the indicative programming documents. Cooperation may cover all third countries worldwide; priority is given to accession countries and countries in the European neighbourhood area. A regional approach is favoured for countries in other regions.

Reference documents:

*Council Regulation (Euratom) No 237/2014 of 13 December 2013 establishing an Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation*, Regulation (Euratom) No 237/2014, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 77/109 (2014): 109-116, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/237/oj>.

“External Evaluation of the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (2014 - mid 2017),” *European Commission*, June 30, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation-instrument-nuclear-safety-cooperation-insc-draft-report\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation-instrument-nuclear-safety-cooperation-insc-draft-report_en).



## INSTRUMENT FOR PRE-ACCESSION ASSISTANCE (IPA II)

2,115 million

**Budget:** €2.11 billion (2017); €11.7 billion (2014-2020)


**DG:** NEAR (also AGRI, REGIO, EMPL)

**Goal:** to support beneficiaries in adopting and implementing the political, institutional, legal, administrative, social and economic reforms required in order to comply with the Union's values and to progressively align to the Union's rules, standards, policies and practices, with a view to Union membership.

**Programmes and scope:** provision of assistance on the basis of country or multi-country indicative strategy papers (known simply as 'strategy papers'), established for the duration of the Union's 2014-2020 MFF. These strategy papers define the priorities for action and are adopted in accordance with the framework for assistance, taking relevant national strategies into account. The strategy papers include the indicative allocation of Union funds per policy area, broken down per year, and allow for addressing emerging needs. These strategy papers also include indicators for assessing progress. IPA II covers Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

**FIGURE 21: IPA II BENEFICIARY COUNTRIES**

2017, € million



Data: European Commission, DG NEAR

Reference documents

Regulation (EU) No 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing an Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II), Regulation (EU) No 231/2014, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 77/11 (2014): 11-26, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/231/oj>.

“External Evaluation of the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II) (2014 - mid 2017),” *European Commission*, June 30, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation-instrument-pre-accession-assistance-ipa-ii-draft-report\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation-instrument-pre-accession-assistance-ipa-ii-draft-report_en).

Note: IPA II is the successor to the first IPA, as set out in the 2007-2013 MFF.

## MACRO-FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE (MFA)




**Budget:** €45.8 million (2017); €564.6 million (2014-2020)

**DG:** ECFIN

**Goal:** to address exceptional external financing needs of countries that are geographically, economically and politically close to the EU; to strengthen macroeconomic and financial stability in candidate, potential candidate countries, and in countries in the European neighbourhood, while encouraging the implementation of appropriate structural reforms.

### FIGURE 22: MACRO-FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

2017, € million



Data: European Commission

**Programmes and scope:** in 2017, the second and last instalment of a 2014 MFA operation, comprising €23 million in grants and loans, was disbursed to Georgia. Completing its 2014 MFA programme, Tunisia received the third tranche of €100 million in loans. In addition, the first tranche of €200 million in loans was issued to Tunisia following the signing of the memorandum of understanding for a new MFA programme, approved by the European Parliament and Council in 2016. A second instalment of €600

million in loans was extended to Ukraine under its 2015 MFA programme. Initiating the country's second MFA operation, approved in 2016, a first disbursement of loans worth €100 million was cleared for Jordan. A new €100 million package of grants and loans, to be disbursed in three instalments, was approved for Moldova. Further MFA operations are currently under consideration for Georgia, with €45 million proposed in grants and loans, and for Ukraine, with the Commission preparing a proposal for early 2018. Eligibility extends to candidate and potential candidate countries, ENP countries, and other third countries with geographical, economic, and political proximity to the EU, including: Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Georgia, Jordan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Serbia, Tunisia and Ukraine.

### Reference document:

European Commission, "Implementation of macro-financial assistance to third countries in 2016," Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, COM(2017) 321 final, June 16, 2017, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2017:321:FIN>.

## PARTNERSHIP INSTRUMENT (PI)

134 million

**Budget:** €133.7 million (2017); € 954.8 million (2014-2020)


**DG:** FPI

**Goal:** to support measures that respond to objectives arising from the Union's bilateral, regional or multilateral relationships with third countries; address challenges of global concern and ensure an adequate follow-up to decisions taken at a multilateral level. The PI promotes, develops and consolidates, *inter alia*, the principles of democracy, equality, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.

**Programmes and scope:** programmes are organised around four key objectives. The PI supports the Union's bilateral, regional and inter-regional cooperation partnership strategies to fight climate change and promote the environmental standards of the EU. Implementation of the international dimension of 'Europe 2020' policies and objectives is another PI goal. The PI also seeks to improve access to partner-country markets and boost trade, investment and business opportunities for EU companies, while eliminating barriers to market access and investment by means of economic partnerships, business and regulatory cooperation. Lastly, the PI also enhances understanding and visibility of the EU and its role in the world by means of public diplomacy, people-to-people contacts, cooperation in educational and academic matters, think tank cooperation and outreach activities. All third countries, regions and territories may be eligible for cooperation under the PI. Emphasis is placed on countries of strategic interest to the EU.

**FIGURE 23: PI FINANCIAL ALLOCATION PER REGION**

2014-2020, € million



\* The remaining difference to the MFF allocations is accounted for by reserve and operational support funds.

Data: European Commission, FPI

Reference documents

Regulation (EU) No 234/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a Partnership Instrument for cooperation with third countries, Regulation (EU) No 234/2014, Official Journal of the European Union L 77/77 (2014): 77-84, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/234/oj>.

“External Evaluation of the Partnership Instrument (2014 - mid 2017),” European Commission, June 30, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/mid-term-evaluation-partnership-instrument-pi-draft-report\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/mid-term-evaluation-partnership-instrument-pi-draft-report_en).

Note: the PI replaced the Industrialised Countries Instrument (ICI/ICI+), as set out in the 2007-2013 MFF.

**UNION CIVIL PROTECTION MECHANISM (UCPM)**

21 million


**Budget:** €20.7 million (2017); €144.7 million (2014-2020)

**DG:** ECHO

**Goal:** to respond to overwhelming natural and man-made disasters, both inside and outside Europe. As the operational hub of the UCPM, the ERCC functions as primarily as a coordinating entity under the Mechanism for the EU’s disaster response. Operating within DG ECHO, the ERCC’s main tasks include: civil protection, cooperation and development of EU emergency response capacity; coordi-

**FIGURE 24: UCPM ACTIVATIONS**

2014-2017



Data: DG ECHO

nation of civil protection and humanitarian aid; and enhancement of crisis response coordination at the European level.

**Programmes and scope:** the ERCC collects and analyses real-time information on disasters, monitors hazards, prepares plans for the deployment of experts, teams and equipment, works with member states to map available assets and coordinates the EU's disaster response efforts. The ERCC ensures cooperation and coherence of EU action at an inter-institutional level, focusing on coordination mechanisms with the EEAS, the Council and member states. It acts as the central contact point upon invocation of the Solidarity Clause (Article 222 TFEU). The ERCC monitors disasters around the globe. In addition to EU member states, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia and Turkey are part of the ERCC.

Based on the findings of a special report by the European Court of Auditors and a Commission Interim Evaluation released in 2017, the Commission in November 2017 proposed a set of amendments to the UCPM that are currently under evaluation by the Council. The new proposal, among other measures, foresees the creation of resCEU, a new EU civil protection response reserve, comprised of member states assets managed by the EU. resCEU is designed to ensure the collective ability to respond to several simultaneously occurring contingencies, offering support capacities to overwhelmed member states. The Commission also announced plans to establish a European Civil Protection Knowledge Network as a platform for joint EU exercises and best-practice sharing.

## Reference documents

*Decision No 1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism Text with EEA relevance*, Decision No 1313/2013/EU, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 347/924 (2013): 924-947, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2013/1313/oj>.

European Commission, "Proposal for a DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Decision No 1313/2013/EU on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism," *COM/2017/0772 final*, November 23, 2017, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52017PC0772>.

"Interim evaluation of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, 2014-2016," *European Commission*, August 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/echo/sites/echo-site/files/ucpm\\_final\\_report.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/echo/sites/echo-site/files/ucpm_final_report.pdf).

Note: the UCPM replaced the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC), which was active from 2001-2013.





# EUROPEAN DEFENCE







# Year in review

2017 was an important year for the development of common European defence. Two major initiatives were advanced including the European Defence Fund (EdF) and PESCO. As part of the work on the EdF, on 31 May a delegation agreement was signed between the European Commission and the EDA as a way to coordinate the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) – the PADR being the preparatory defence research portion of the EdF designed to lead to a European Defence Research Programme (EDRP). Through this delegation agreement the EDA became the implementing agency and it set about issuing the first ever call for proposals for defence research under the PADR/EdF on 7 June with a total budget allocation of €25 million for 2017.<sup>1</sup> Following this call, the EDA received 24 project submissions including consortia with approximately 190 entities (prime firms, SMEs and research institutes). The first call for proposals focused on three areas of importance for EU defence: force protection and soldier systems, strategic technology foresight and naval situational awareness.<sup>2</sup> On 7 June, the European Commission also published its proposed draft Regulation on the EDIDP. The EDIDP is designed to roll out over the 2019-2020 period with a potential budget of €500 million and prepare the ground for annual defence capability development funding after 2020.

## PERMANENT STRUCTURED COOPERATION

On 13 November, and in line with Articles 42.6 and 46 of the TEU, ministers from 23 member states notified the Council and the HR/VP of their intention to embark on PESCO. Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden initially notified the HR/VP of their intention. They were joined by Ireland and Portugal on 7 December. For the time being, Denmark, Malta and the UK are non-PESCO members. On 16-17 November, member state experts convened at the EDA to discuss and assess identified PESCO project proposals. Co-chaired by the EDA and the EU Military Staff (EUMS), the task of the meeting was to assess the close to 50 proposals received from EU member states and to select the first phase of PESCO projects based on an assessment methodology that would identify their individual value-added to the CSDP. By the end of 2017, 17 specific PESCO projects were identified including a European Medical Command, military mobility, maritime autonomous systems for mine countermeasures, harbour and maritime surveillance and protection, cyber rapid response teams and an EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core.<sup>3</sup> In particular, the specific project on military mobility would

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1. European Defence Agency, “2017 calls for proposals published for PA on Defence Research,” June 7, 2017, <https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-news/2017/06/07/2017-calls-for-proposals-published-for-pa-on-defence-research>.

2. European Defence Agency, “24 proposals received, some 190 entities bid for 2017 Preparatory Action calls,” October 9, 2017, <https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-news/2017/10/09/24-proposals-received-some-190-entities-bid-for-2017-preparatory-action-calls>.

3. Council of the EU, “PESCO first collaborative projects – overview,” April 25, 2018, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/32079/pesco-overview-of-first-collaborative-of-projects-for-press.pdf>.

even be supported by a Joint Communication focusing on the legal and regulatory hurdles hindering the free movement of military equipment and personnel across Europe.<sup>4</sup>

PESCO was born of an intensive year of preparation and work by the EU member states and EU institutions such as the EEAS and EDA. On 31 January, and in response to the December 2016 European Council, the EEAS drafted and circulated a ‘Food for Thought’ paper on PESCO which detailed options in relation to governance and the binding commitments. Following the 6 March European Council meeting, the EEAS and EDA drafted and circulated a questionnaire on PESCO among EU member states. At this stage, governments and ministries were asked to reflect on commitments and possible collaborative projects. This questionnaire was followed up by a scoping paper that was written by the EEAS in June and a high-level conference in Prague saw the president of the European Commission call for the awakening of the ‘sleeping beauty of defence’. This event was swiftly followed on 22 June with the European Council calling for PESCO to be launched. On 21 July, the governments of France, Germany, Italy and Spain then wrote to the HR/VP calling for an ‘inclusive and ambitious’ PESCO to be launched before the end of the year. After several months of dealing with the fine print of the official PESCO notification between July and November, 13 November saw 23 member states sign up to PESCO before then officially launching permanent structured cooperation on defence on 11 December along with Ireland and Portugal. Thus, taking total PESCO members up to 25.

### WHAT IS PERMANENT STRUCTURED COOPERATION?

PESCO is an ‘ambitious, binding and inclusive’ framework aimed at incentivising cooperation among EU member states in the field of defence capability development and operations. Accordingly, the 25 member states that have joined PESCO have accepted 20 commitments and are part of a first phase of 17 PESCO projects spanning operational and capability cooperative packages. The aim of PESCO is to raise defence spending in a concerted manner, develop military capabilities jointly, and make their military assets available for operations. Joining PESCO is voluntary. Activities carried out in the framework of PESCO can have either a capability or an operational dimension. Both commitments and projects will be the object of regular assessment by the HR/VP with the support of the EDA and the EEAS (especially the EUMS) – together, the so-called ‘PESCO Secretariat’.\*

\* Daniel Fiott, Antonio Missiroli, and Thierry Tardy, “Permanent Structured Cooperation: What’s in a Name?,” *EUISS Chaillot Paper*, no. 142 (November 2017), <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/permanent-structured-cooperation-what%E2%80%99s-name>.

4. European Commission and EEAS, “Improving Military Mobility in the European Union,” Joint Communication by the European Commission and HR/VP to the European Parliament and the Council, JOIN(2017) 41 final, November 10, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/joint\\_communication\\_to\\_the\\_european\\_parliament\\_and\\_the\\_council\\_-\\_improving\\_military\\_mobility\\_in\\_the\\_european\\_union.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/joint_communication_to_the_european_parliament_and_the_council_-_improving_military_mobility_in_the_european_union.pdf). See also Daniel Fiott, “Towards a military mobility?,” *EUISS Brief*, no. 31, <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/towards-military-mobility>.

## DEFENCE INVESTMENT

PESCO is based on 20 binding commitments that the participating member states (pMS) strive to achieve on a yearly basis. PESCO binding commitment 1 states that the pMS subscribe to ‘regularly increase defence budgets in real terms’. As Figure 27 shows, based on data from the IISS<sup>5</sup> the 25 member states of PESCO spent \$182.9 billion in 2017. This is a 7.7% (or \$12.8 billion) increase on spending compared to 2015, when the PESCO-25 invested \$170.1 billion. The EU-28’s defence spending between 2015 and 2017 increased by 6.1% or \$14 billion. Overall, it is estimated by the IISS that the EU-28 spent \$244 billion on defence in 2017 compared to \$232 billion in 2016. According to data sourced from NATO, the EU member states within the alliance increased their collective defence spending by an estimated 6% or \$13 billion. NATO calculates EU-NATO-22 total defence expenditure at \$230 billion in 2017 compared to \$219 billion in 2016.<sup>6</sup>

As far as defence spending as a share of GDP goes, the IISS calculates that between 2015 and 2017 the EU-28 experienced an average 4.9% increase and in 2017 the total average EU-28 share of spending as a percentage of GDP stood at 1.29%. Over this same period, the IISS data shows that the PESCO-25 saw an average 5.7% increase in defence spending as a share of GDP, although the average share over this three-year period stood at 1.26%. According to NATO estimations, the 22 EU members of the alliance increased their average GDP share by 6.2% and in 2017 the estimated average stood at a total of 1.38%.

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5. IISS data taken from the Military Balance 2018. All figures are in current prices of the respective years. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2018* (London: Routledge, 2018), <https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military-s-balance>.

6. NATO, “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2010-2017),” March 15, 2018, [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2018\\_03/20180315\\_180315-pr2018-16-en.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_03/20180315_180315-pr2018-16-en.pdf).

## PESCO DEFENCE INVESTMENT COMMITMENTS

### ANNEX

List of ambitious and binding common commitments undertaken by participating Member States in the five areas set out by Article 2 of Protocol 10

[...] Based on the collective benchmarks identified in 2007, participating Member States subscribe to the following commitments:

1. Regularly increasing defence budgets in real terms, in order to reach agreed objectives.
2. Successive medium-term increase in defence investment expenditure to 20% of total defence spending (collective benchmark) in order to fill strategic capability gaps by participating in defence capabilities projects in accordance with CDP and Coordinated Annual Review (CARD).
4. Increasing the share of expenditure allocated to defence research and technology with a view to nearing the 2% of total defence spending (collective benchmark) [...].\*

\* Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States, (CFSP) 2017/2315, Official Journal of the European Union L 331/57 (2017): 57-77, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017D2315>.


Collectively, therefore, the EU-28 and PESCO-25 are already meeting PESCO's binding commitment 1 and this is even reflected in certain national defence spending records (see statistical annex 2). In fact, according to IISS figures, 23 out of 28 EU member states are meeting the objective of regularly increasing defence budgets (at least over the three-year period under examination here). Of the 22 EU member states in NATO, the alliance estimates that 20 countries are meeting PESCO binding commitment 1, but only three countries (Estonia, Greece and the UK) met the NATO '2% of GDP' target in 2017. IISS data tells a similar story, but unlike NATO it lists only Estonia and Greece as having met the NATO '2% of GDP' target.

Defence spending in the EU-28 also takes on regional characteristics. According to IISS data for 2017, Eastern Europe<sup>7</sup> witnessed the largest increase in defence spending over the 2015-2017 period with a 13.2% rise (from \$16.9 billion in 2015 to \$19.1 billion in 2017). 5 out of the 6 countries classified as Eastern European increased national defence spending over the three-year period.

7. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.

**FIGURE 25: DEFENCE SPENDING OF EU MEMBER STATES**

2015-2017



Data: IISS, NATO

In Northern Europe<sup>8</sup> there was a 9.6% spending increase (from \$13.5 billion in 2015 to \$14.8 billion in 2017) and all 6 of the countries classified as Northern European

8. Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Sweden.

increased national spending. Southern Europe<sup>9</sup> experienced a 1.1% uptick in spending (from \$43.3 billion in 2015 to \$43.7 billion in 2017) with 5 out of the 8 countries classified as Southern European increasing their respective national spending. Western Europe<sup>10</sup> experienced a 1% increase in defence spending from 2015 to 2017 (from \$158.2 billion in 2015 to \$159.8 billion in 2017). According to IISS calculations, only 1 country out of 8 in Western Europe failed to increase their national defence spending over the 2015-2017 period.

#### NOTE ON METHODOLOGY

The data in this section derive from the IISS and NATO. All data in this section relates to current prices in the reporting years and figures are rounded. Data from the IISS is available for all EU-28 member states and PESCO-25 countries, but NATO data only relates to the 22 EU member states that are also members of the alliance. All data used in this section can be consulted in statistical annex 2. US dollars are used instead of euros to maintain compatibility between IISS and NATO figures. Each organisation has a different methodology for collecting and harmonising datasets. For NATO, the figures for 2017 are estimates and defence data reported to NATO by alliance members includes pensions (with the exception of Bulgaria).\* For the IISS, official budgetary documentation and correspondence with national governments forms the basis for assessment.\*\*

\* Further information on NATO's defence expenditure methodology can be accessed here: [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2018\\_03/20180315\\_180315-pr2018-16-en.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_03/20180315_180315-pr2018-16-en.pdf)

\*\* Further information on the IISS' defence expenditure methodology can be consulted in *The Military Balance 2018* on pages 509-516. See: <https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military%20balance/issues/the-military-balance-2018-545f/mb2018-11-explanatory-notes-8750>.

In terms of global spending in 2017, IISS figures show that the EU-28 still represented one of the largest sources of defence spending with \$244 billion. The US was the world's largest defence spender in 2017 with \$602.8 billion, a 2.2% increase on the \$589.6 billion Washington spent in 2015. China spent an estimated \$150.5 billion on defence in 2017, which represents a 5.7% increase on the \$142.2 billion spent by Beijing in 2015. The \$76.7 billion spent by Saudi Arabia in 2017 is a 6.3% decrease on the \$81.9 billion Riyadh in 2015. In India, defence spending reached \$52.5 billion in 2017, which accounted for a 17.1% increase on the \$44.8 billion spent by New Delhi in 2015. Japan's defence spending increased by 11.8% from 2015-2017, with Tokyo investing \$46 billion in defence in 2017 compared to \$41 billion in 2015. Russia's overall defence spending fell by 12.7% over the same period, as the \$45.6 billion spent in 2017 failed to match the \$52.2 billion invested in 2015. In 2017, Brazil spent \$29.4 billion on defence, meaning a 24.3% increase in spending when compared to \$23.7 billion in 2015.

9. Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain.


10. Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and the UK.

# CSDP missions and operations

The EU continued to deploy a number of military missions/operations and civilian missions in 2017. As of December 2017, there were 16 ongoing CSDP missions and operations – 6 military missions/operations and 10 civilian missions (see Figure 28 below). A total number of 2,685 personnel were deployed as part of CSDP military missions and operations and 1,878 were deployed with civilian missions (see statistical annex 3 for specific data).

**FIGURE 26: CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS**

as of December 2017




Data: EEAS

The six military missions/operations were deployed to a number of countries and regions including the Mediterranean Sea, the Horn of Africa, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mali, the Central African Republic and Somalia. Most significantly, 8 June 2017 saw the activation of the EU’s ‘first ever command centre for military training and advi-

sory missions’, called the MPCC.<sup>11</sup> The MPCC was established in tandem with a ‘Joint Support Coordination Cell’ to ensure cooperation with civilian counterparts in the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC).<sup>12</sup> In the Sahel, the EU established a civilian-military ‘Regional Coordination Cell’ to support the *G5 Force Conjointe* countries (Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania and Niger) with their activities. Military missions and operations saw their mandates extended by the Council. For example, on 4 July EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia’s mandate was extended until 31 December 2018. On 25 July, the Council amended the operation’s mandate to include surveillance and intelligence tasks in relation to illegal crude oil and other illicit exports in the central Mediterranean.<sup>13</sup>

**FIGURE 27: CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS**

personnel breakdown, as of December 2017



Data: EEAS

11. EEAS, “EU Common Security and Defence Policy Missions and Operations: Annual Report 2017,” February 27, 2018, 4, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/22818/mission-and-operations-annual-report\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/22818/mission-and-operations-annual-report_en).

12. Thierry Tardy, “MPCC: towards an EU military command?,” *EUISS Brief*, no. 17 (June 2017), <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/mpcc-towards-eu-military-command>.

13. Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1385 of 25 July 2017 amending Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 on a European Union military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED operation SOPHIA), (CFSP) 2017/1385, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 194/61 (2017): 61-62, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017D1385>.



## WHAT IS THE EU'S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY?

The CSDP is an integral part of the CFSP. It aims to provide the Union with an operational capacity for peacekeeping and peacemaking missions and operations, conflict prevention and the strengthening of international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. The operational – and most visible – part of the CSDP has taken the form of 35 military missions/operations and civilian missions\* deployed since 2003. Since the release of the EU Global Strategy and the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence (IPSD), the Council defined a new level of ambition for EU security and defence based on the need to: i) respond to external conflicts and crises; ii) build the capacities of partners; and iii) protect the Union and its citizens.

On this basis, the types of possible CSDP civilian missions and military missions/operations are listed as: joint crisis management operations in situations of high security risk in the regions surrounding the EU; joint stabilisation operations, including air and special operations; civilian and military rapid response, including military rapid response operations, *inter alia*, using the EU Battlegroups as a whole or within a mission-tailored force package; substitution/executive civilian missions; air security operations including close air support and air surveillance; maritime security or surveillance operations, including longer term in the vicinity of Europe; civilian capacity-building and Security Sector Reform missions (monitoring, mentoring and advising, training), *inter alia*, on police, the rule of law, border management, counter-terrorism, resilience, response to hybrid threats, and civil administration as well as civilian monitoring missions; and military capacity building through advisory, training and mentoring missions, including robust force protection if necessary, as well as military monitoring/observation missions.

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\* Please note that EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine are included in this total even though the mission is not managed by CSDP structures.

The ten civilian missions were deployed to a host of countries and regions, including Georgia, Iraq, Kosovo, Libya, Mali, Moldova, Niger, the Palestinian Territories, Somalia and Ukraine. Most significantly, on 16 October the EU launched a new civilian mission to Iraq to assist with the civilian aspects of the Iraqi National Security Strategy.<sup>14</sup> Based in Baghdad, the EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) to Iraq is tasked with providing expertise on counter-terrorism strategies, organised crime and the protection of cultural goods and heritage. Furthermore, in a positive development for EUBAM Libya, the mission established a light footprint in Tripoli following a Council Decision on 17 July after months of being solely based in Tunis. The mission has been tasked with supporting

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14. Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1869 of 16 October 2017 on the European Union Advisory Mission in support of Security Sector Reform in Iraq (EUAM Iraq), (CFSP) 2017/1869, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 266/12 (2017): 12-18, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32017D1869>.

the Libyan ministry of interior with law enforcement.<sup>15</sup> Other civilian missions had their mandate extended and/or amended in 2017. For example, EUCAP Sahel Mali's mandate was amended on 11 January to allow the mission to better meet the needs of the Malian government.<sup>16</sup>

## CAPACITY BUILDING

In a keynote speech at a conference organised by the EEAS and the EUISS on 14 December 2017, the HR/VP announced the establishment of a new 'European Peace Facility' (EPF). This new initiative is designed to equip the EU with the means and resources to live up to its security and defence ambitions.<sup>17</sup> The announcement of an EPF followed the adoption of the proposal on Capacity Building in support of Security and Development (CBSD) on 7 December. To this end, CBSD was added as a new type of assistance under the IcSP and it is designed to assist military actors perform development and human security-related tasks under specific conditions. €100 million is being added to the IcSP for 2018-2020 to accommodate CBSD.<sup>18</sup>

## FINANCING THE CSDP

Treaty provisions (Article 41.2 TEU) ban the financing of military missions and operations from the EU budget. As a consequence, the greatest share of expenses arising from military operations is supported by the member states on a 'costs lie where they fall' basis. In parallel, some common costs for operations such as transport, lodging, fuel and associated costs are financed by member states through a mechanism called Athena that is replenished according to a key based on gross national income (GNI). Currently six active CSDP military missions and operations benefit from funding under the Athena Mechanism including the three EUTMs to the CAR, Mali and Somalia, EUFOR Althea to Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUNAVFOR Atalanta to the Horn of Africa and EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia in the central Mediterranean. The Athena Council Decision was revised in 2015 ((CFSP) 2015/528 (27 March 2015)), and a renewed revision is currently under way. The 2017 Athena budget was approximately €61 million in commitments compared with approximately €70 million in commitments in 2016.

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15. Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1342 of 17 July 2017 amending and extending Decision 2013/233/CFSP on the European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya), (CFSP) 2017/1342, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 185/60 (2017): 60-62, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017D1342>.

16. Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/50 of 11 January 2017 amending Decision 2014/219/CFSP on the European Union CSDP Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali), (CFSP) 2017/50, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 7/18 (2017): 18-19, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017D0050>.

17. EEAS, "Time to be Bold," December 14, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/37504/time-eu-be-bold-mogherini-outlines-elements-real-work-start-now-eu-security-and-defence\\_ro](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/37504/time-eu-be-bold-mogherini-outlines-elements-real-work-start-now-eu-security-and-defence_ro).


18. European Commission, "Stepping up support for security and sustainable development in partner countries," December 7, 2017, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-5125\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5125_en.htm).

## EU BATTLEGROUPS

Battlegroups are rapidly deployable expeditionary forces of around 1,500 personnel that can deploy for stand-alone operations or be used in the initial phase of larger operations. In line with the military Headline Goal 2010 and the follow-on EU Civilian and Military Capability Development beyond 2010, which place an emphasis on rapid response and deployability, Battlegroups are employable across the full range of tasks listed in Article 43.1 TEU. Battlegroups have been operational since 2007, yet they have never been deployed. They are on standby in six-month rotational semesters (see statistical annex 5 for full details).

**FIGURE 28: EU BATTLEGROUP ROSTER**

offers and commitments per semester, 2016-2020



\* BE, DE, ES, FR, LU, FI as Framework Nations of Eurocorps offer to provide the core of the force headquarters for the EUBGs in the second semester of 2016.  
 \*\* BE, DE, ES, FR, LU, FI as Framework Nations of Eurocorps offer to provide the core of the force headquarters for the EUBGs in the first semester of 2017. IT serves as framework nation under the Defence Cooperation Initiative (DECI).  
 \*\*\* IT serves as Framework Nation under the Defence Cooperation Initiative (DECI).  
 \*\*\*\* BE and IT participation is pending a political decision.  
 \*\*\*\*\* Pending a political decision by the UK to serve as Framework Nation. LT participation is pending a confirmation of the UK as a Framework Nation.  
 \*\*\*\*\* HR, IE, NL, SE and IT participation is pending a political decision.

Data: EEAS




# CSDP agencies and bodies

Alongside the EEAS and operations *per se*, CSDP is supported by various Agencies such as the EDA, SatCen, the ESDC and the EUISS.

The budgets of these Agencies are replenished directly by member states, as presented in the table below (from 2015 to 2017 in then-year prices).

**FIGURE 29: BUDGET OF CSDP AGENCIES**

legal basis and budgets 2015-2017, € million



Data: Agency budgets

## EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY (EDA)

31.0 million

**Budget: €31.0 million (2017)**

**Headquarters:** Brussels, Belgium

Set up in 2004 as an agency of the Council of the European Union, the EDA supports its 27 member states – all EU countries except Denmark – in the improvement of their defence capabilities through European cooperation. Acting as an enabler and facilitator for ministries of defence that look to engage in collaborative capability projects, the Agency has become a central hub for European defence cooperation. Its expertise and networks cover the whole spectrum of defence cooperation including harmonising requirements; research and innovation; training and exercises; and strengthening

the European defence industry. It is the place where member states can jointly develop capabilities.

Based in Brussels with some 150 staff, the EDA is a small, flexible and efficient agency working on an 'à la carte' basis where member states can decide on a case-by-case basis whether or not to participate in agency projects depending on their strategic priorities, operational requirements, or their interest in a specific project. The EDA can leverage a network of more than 2,500 national member state experts. In 2017, the Agency managed 97 *ad hoc* Research and Technology (R&T) and Capability projects, 14 R&T and Capability Programmes, 3 Joint Procurement Arrangements, and more than 190 other activities related to capability development, R&T and industry.

The Agency works closely together with a number of EU institutions, international organisations and third countries. Several Administrative Arrangements have been concluded with international organisations (the European Space Agency (ESA) and Organisation for Joint Armament Co-operation (OCCAR)) and third countries (Norway, Serbia, Switzerland and Ukraine).

In May 2017, following the EDA's Long Term Review, member states agreed to further reinforce the Agency's mission as the: i) main intergovernmental prioritisation instrument at EU level in support of defence capability development; ii) preferred cooperation forum and management support structure at EU level for participating member states to engage in technology and capability development activities; iii) interface coordinating military views in wider EU policies to the benefit of the defence community and a central operator with regard to EU funded defence-related activities.

The EDA coordinates the Capability Development Plan (CDP) – the next review of which is due in June 2018 – and acts as the secretariat for CARD and for PESCO together with the EEAS/EUMS. It also plays a key role in the EdF, especially in the implementation of the PADR.

## Reference document

*Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1835 of 12 October 2015 defining the statute, seat and operational rules of the European Defence Agency, (CFSP) 2015/1835, Official Journal of the European Union L 266/55 (2015): 55-74, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2015/1835/oj>.*

European Defence Agency, "Long Term Review of the Agency - Conclusions and Recommendations," May 18, 2017, <https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/documents/ltr-conclusions-and-recommendations.pdf>.

## EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES (EUISS)

5.3 million

**Budget:** €5.3 million (2017)

**Headquarters:** Paris, France

The EUISS is the Union's agency dealing with the analysis of foreign, security and defence policy issues. The Institute was set up in January 2002 as an autonomous agency under the CFSP to foster a common security culture for the EU, support the elaboration and projection of its foreign policy, and enrich the strategic debate inside and outside Europe. Based in Paris, the Institute also has a Liaison Office in Brussels.

The Institute organises conferences, seminars and task forces which are intended to enhance the Union's analytical capacity and facilitate the shaping of common approaches. They bring together EU officials, national experts, academics, decision-makers, media and civil society representatives from the EU member states, as well as the rest of the world. The Institute's flagship publications include this *Yearbook on European Security* and in-depth studies called *Chaillot Papers*. The Institute also publishes Briefs on topics and regions at the core of the Union's work as they relate to foreign, security and defence policy developments. Over the course of 2017, the Institute produced 13 report- and book-length publications, alongside 63 Briefs and other analytic pieces.

The Institute is funded by the EU member states according to a GNI-based formula. It is governed by a Board that includes all 28 member states and is chaired by the HR/VP, which lays down its budgetary and administrative rules and approves its work programme. The PSC exercises political supervision – without prejudice to the intellectual independence and operational autonomy of the EUISS.

### Reference document

*Council Decision 2014/75/CFSP of 10 February 2014 on the European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2014/75/CFSP, Official Journal of the European Union L 41/13 (2014): 13-17, [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2014/75\(1\)/oj](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2014/75(1)/oj).*

## EUROPEAN UNION SATELLITE CENTRE (SATCEN)

18.7 million

**Budget:** €18.7 million (2017)

**Headquarters:** Torrejón de Ardoz, Spain

SatCen was founded in 1992 and incorporated as an agency into the EU on 1 January 2002. It supports decision-making of the EU in the field of the CFSP and CSDP through

the provision of products and services resulting from the exploitation of space assets and collateral data. Satellite imagery are provided for activities in relation to EU crisis management operations, arms control, non-proliferation and treaty verification, counter-terrorism, counter-crime, humanitarian aid, contingency planning of peacekeeping missions and general surveillance.

SatCen's Director reports to a Board chaired by the HR/VP and composed of the 28 EU member states, as well as one Commission delegate. Based in Torrejón near Madrid, it also has an office in Brussels. Under the supervision of the PSC and the operational direction of the HR/VP, SatCen responds to requests from different users such as the EEAS, member states, the European Commission, third states and international organisations (UN, NATO, *etc.*).

SatCen cooperates with national and international institutions in the field of space. It participates in the Copernicus programme (formerly 'Global Monitoring for Environment and Security programme' (GMES)) and works closely with the EDA, the European Commission and the ESA, as well as other institutions and international organisations. Since 2016, SatCen maintains a formal cooperation partnership with the EDA and an Administrative Arrangement with the EUISS that provides for a structured relationship and mutually beneficial cooperation.

## Reference document

*Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/2112 of 1 December 2016 amending Decision 2014/401/CFSP on the European Union Satellite Centre, (CFSP) 2016/2112, Official Journal of the European Union L 327/78 (2016): 78, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2016/2112/oj>.*

## EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE COLLEGE (ESDC)

0.7 million

**Budget:** €0.7 million (2017)

**Headquarters:** Brussels, Belgium

The ESDC was established in 2005 with the aim of providing education and training at the EU level in the CSDP. The ESDC also gives the CSDP a training and education instrument which promotes a European security culture. The ESDC is a network college that brings together national civilian and military educational and research institutions in Europe. Member states and Union institutions bear all costs related to their own respective participation in the ESDC.

EU member states participate in the effort on a voluntary basis. The training audience includes civil servants, diplomats, police officers and military personnel from the member states and EU institutions involved in the CSDP. Partner countries and other international organisations are also invited to participate in most ESDC courses. Since its



creation, the ESDC has developed into the main provider of training and education in CSDP as part of the larger CFSP framework.

In 2017, the ESDC organised 95 training activities, including the 13th CSDP High-Level Course and several CSDP Orientation Courses, pre-deployment training for missions and operations, as well as several thematic courses on Security Sector Reform, hybrid and cyber threats. To assist with the implementation of the EU Global Strategy, it also provided support to EU partnerships through CSDP training activities with partner countries and organisations, in particular with EaP countries, Stabilisation and Association Process partners, China, South America and ASEAN countries. The ESDC also coordinates the activities run under the European Initiative for the exchange of military young officers. In 2017, the CSDP Doctoral School was developed, bringing together 39 institutions from member states to highlight research in the area of the CSDP.


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
*Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/2382 of 21 December 2016 establishing a European Security and Defence College (ESDC) and repealing Decision 2013/189/CFSP, (CFSP) 2016/2382, Official Journal of the European Union L 352/60 (2016): 60-73, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2016/2382/oj>.*





# Military exercises

**FIGURE 30: SELECT MILITARY EXERCISES**  
with participation of two or more EU member states, 2017









Data: NATO, national ministries of defence and respective services of the armed forces, open-source reporting

# European Defence Technological and Industrial Base

## INVENTORY MODERNISATION

A number of European governments announced procurement contracts to replace current inventories of armoured vehicles. On 26 January, Romania ordered its fifth batch of 8x8 Piranha III wheeled armoured vehicles from General Dynamics European Land Systems as part of its military modernisation programme. On 21 April, France placed an order for 319 Griffon and 20 Jaguar armoured vehicles from a French consortium composed of Nexter Systems, Renault Trucks Defence and Thales.<sup>19</sup> Placing an order with the same consortium, on 22 June the Belgian government officially announced its plan to replace its current inventory over the 2025-2030 timeframe with 60 Jaguar and 417 Griffon armoured vehicles in an estimated €1.1 billion deal.<sup>20</sup> For its part, the Slovak government announced on 17 May that it approved the acquisition of 404 4x4 light armoured vehicles and 81 8x8 armoured vehicles over the 2018-2029 period.<sup>21</sup>

The Finnish government announced a number of contracts designed to modernise its land defences. In mid-May, Finland received 20 Leopard 2A6 tanks from the Netherlands as part of a €200 million deal running from 2015 to 2019 that will see Finland acquire 100 Leopard tanks in total.<sup>22</sup> On 26 April, the German parliament approved a €777.7 million contract to modernise 104 Leopard 2 main battle tanks over the 2017-2023 period.<sup>23</sup> In early July, the German government announced that Rheinmetall and Krauss-Maffei Wegmann had won a €94 million contract to upgrade 246 boxer armoured vehicles from 2018 to 2023.<sup>24</sup>

With regard to artillery, on 6 February the Estonian government announced that it planned to purchase 12 used 155mm K9 Thunder self-propelled howitzers from South Korea to replace its existing FH-70 howitzers. Estonia would join Finland in purchas-

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19. Pierre Tran, "Nexter secures bulk of work in new French military vehicle order," *Defense News*, April 26, 2017, <https://www.defensenews.com/land/2017/04/26/nexter-secures-bulk-of-work-in-new-french-military-vehicle-order>.

20. James Bingham, "Belgium to procure French Scorpion vehicles," *IHS Jane's Defence Weekly*, June 26, 2017, <http://www.janes.com/article/71758/belgium-to-procure-french-scorpion-vehicles>.

21. "Army to buy new armoured vehicles," *The Slovak Spectator*, May 17, 2017, <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20535579/army-to-buy-new-armoured-vehicles.html>.

22. Dylan Malyasov, "First Leopard 2A- tanks Finland acquired from the Netherlands have arrived," *Defence Blog*, May 16, 2015, <http://defence-blog.com/army/first-leopard-2a6-tanks-finland-acquired-from-the-netherlands-have-arrived.html>.

23. Dylan Malyasov, "Rheinmetall to modernise Bundeswehr's fleet of Leopard main battle tanks," *Defence Blog*, September 27, 2017, <http://defence-blog.com/army/rheinmetall-to-modernise-bundeswehrs-fleet-of-leopard-main-battle-tanks.html>.

24. Rheinmetall, "Rheinmetall to modernise the Bundeswehr's Boxer command vehicles," July 4, 2017, [https://www.rheinmetall.com/en/rheinmetall\\_ag/press/news/latest\\_news/index\\_11968.php](https://www.rheinmetall.com/en/rheinmetall_ag/press/news/latest_news/index_11968.php).

ing the same howitzers, with Finland investing an estimated €146 million in 48 units.<sup>25</sup> The Danish government confirmed on 14 March that it would acquire 15 8x8 CAESER mobile self-propelled howitzers from Nexter Systems – the contract includes an option to buy 6 more if required. Deliveries are expected in 2020 under a contract worth approximately €38 million.<sup>26</sup> On 25 April, the German government officially published a tender for an estimated €245 million to supply the Bundeswehr with 120,000 new rifles. The guns will replace the German army's G36 assault rifles from 2019 to 2026. Finally, on 8 June the Portuguese government authorised the procurement of 8 SHORAD mobile short-range air defence missile systems. The missile system will be delivered over the 2017-2026 period and the contract is worth some €32 million.<sup>27</sup>

With a view to upgrading its subsurface capabilities, the UK government placed a €1.6 billion order with BAE Systems for the sixth Astute-class nuclear-powered submarine on 19 April.<sup>28</sup> Furthermore, in a bid to bolster its sea-based missile defence the UK government announced a €616 million contract with MBDA which would include the acquisition of the latest Common Anti-Air Modular missile for the Royal Navy's Type 23 and Type 26 warships.<sup>29</sup> On 26 April, the German parliament approved a €123.6 million modernisation programme for the US-German developed Rolling Airframe Missile naval defence system.<sup>30</sup>

In 2017 many European countries looked to replace and/or modernise a number of air assets. On 20 February, the Polish government officially issued a request for proposals for 16 new military helicopters for its special forces – by 30 March, Airbus helicopters and Lockheed Martin had officially responded to the request. On 6 March, the German government confirmed that it had approved the acquisition of 3 Northrup Grumman MQ-43 Triton unmanned aerial systems. 17 March saw the Belgian government formally begin the procurement process to replace its current fleet of 54 F-16 Fighting Falcons. The Belgian government is looking to acquire 34 new multirole aircraft to be brought online before 2030. On 26 April, the Bulgarian government officially announced that it would acquire 8 Gripen fighters (C/D variant) from Saab in order to replace its MiG-29

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25. Jaroslaw Adamowski, "Estonia joins Finland in howitzer procurement," *Defense News*, February 6, 2017, <https://www.defensenews.com/land/2017/02/06/estonia-joins-finland-in-howitzer-procurement/>.

26. Tatra, "Denmark to purchase CAESAR howitzers on the Tatra chassis," March 18, 2017, <http://www.tatratrucks.com/about-the-company/press-and-media/news/denmark-to-purchase-caesar-howitzers-on-the-tatra-chassis/>.

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28. Defense World, "UK MoD awards BAE Systems with EURO 1.4 billion Astute Class Submarine Contract," April 20, 2017, [http://www.defenseworld.net/news/19053/UK\\_MoD\\_Awards\\_BAE\\_Systems\\_With\\_EURO\\_1\\_4\\_Billion\\_Astute\\_Class\\_Submarine\\_Contract#.WrOk9pWGOkw](http://www.defenseworld.net/news/19053/UK_MoD_Awards_BAE_Systems_With_EURO_1_4_Billion_Astute_Class_Submarine_Contract#.WrOk9pWGOkw).

29. MBDA, "MBDA awarded £323 million deal for next batch of CAMM air defence missiles for UK armed forces," April 21, 2017, <http://www.mbda-systems.com/press-releases/mbda-awarded-323-million-deal-for-next-batch-of-camm-air-defence-missiles-for-uk-armed-forces/>.

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'Fulcrum' fighters.<sup>31</sup> In a bid to modernise its air assets, in early February the German parliament approved a €135.9 million contract with Airbus Helicopters to retrofit 26 CH-53GS/GE transport helicopters over a four-year period.<sup>32</sup> Furthermore, the German parliament also approved the modernisation of NATO's early warning and control force on 26 April. The modernisation investment is designed to ensure that NATO's Airborne Warning Systems (AWACS) is operational until 2035.

## EUROPEAN COLLABORATION

A number of important collaborative programmes were launched by European governments in 2017. On 3 February, the German and Norwegian governments signed a strategic naval partnership that will see Norway procure 4 Type 212NG diesel-powered submarines from ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems to replace their current fleet of 6 Ula-class vessels.<sup>33</sup> On 28 March, France and the UK signed an agreement to update their respective cruise and anti-ship missile systems. MBDA has since been contracted to begin an initial three-year development phase, worth an estimated €100 million, and will work to replace each country's Storm Shadow/SCALP EG long-range air-launched cruise missile, France's Exocet anti-ship missile and the UK's Harpoon anti-ship missile by 2030.<sup>34</sup>

2017 also saw a number of European defence firms fully acquire or buy larger stakes in non-EU producers. For example, on 23 January Saab bought an additional 10% stake in Brazilian aeronautics group Akaer on top of the 15% it already held in the company.<sup>35</sup> On 7 March, Leonardo acquired US infrared technology company Daylight Solutions for €8.7 million.<sup>36</sup> Furthermore, in mid-May Fincantieri announced its €79.5 million acquisition of a two-thirds stake in French shipbuilder STX.<sup>37</sup> A number of European firms also offloaded business. On 28 February, Airbus completed its sale of its defence

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31. Tsvetelia Tsolova and Angel Krasimirov, "Bulgaria opts for Swedish Gripen combat jets," *Defense News*, April 26, 2017, <https://www.defensenews.com/air/2017/04/26/bulgaria-opts-for-swedish-gripen-combat-jets/>.

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electronics business to the private equity firm KKR for approximately €1 billion.<sup>38</sup> On 1 June, Safran completed the €2.4 billion sale of its identity and security activities to private equity firm Advent International.<sup>39</sup>

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38. Airbus, "Airbus completes divestment of its Defence Electronics unit to KKR," March 1, 2017, <http://www.airbus.com/newsroom/press-releases/en/2017/03/airbus-completes-divestment-of-its-defence-electronics-unit-to-kkr.html>.

39. Safran, "Completion of the sale of Safran's identity and security activities," May 31, 2017, <https://www.safran-group.com/media/completion-sale-safrans-identity-and-security-activities-20170531>.

# EDA initiatives

2017 saw the launch of new EU defence initiatives that are designed to enhance collaborative capability planning, development and acquisition: CARD, PESCO and the EdF. The Agency was involved in the preparation of all of these initiatives. In October 2017, as the ‘CARD secretariat’ (together with the EUMS) the EDA launched a trial run and began bilateral dialogues with member states in order to collect information on defence plans (including spending) that are to be assessed in a final report to ministers in November 2018. During the second half of 2017, the EDA and the EEAS/EUMS – in their capacity as ‘PESCO secretariat’ – worked with PESCO member states to identify, assess and consolidate possible PESCO projects.

## CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT PLAN REVIEW

Throughout 2017, the EDA worked with member states and other stakeholders (EUMC, EUMS) to deliver an updated set of CDP priorities – which should be finalised by June 2018. The EDA’s work on the CDP is all the more important as these priorities will guide the work and outcome of CARD, PESCO and EdF. Also related to capability prioritisation, the EDA provided member states with a first Overarching Strategic Research Agenda (OSRA) outlining the R&T areas in which a European cooperative approach would make sense to support the development of the defence capabilities of the future.

## DEFENCE RESEARCH

The EDA continued the implementation of the EU’s Pilot Project on defence research and, based on a Delegation Agreement signed with the European Commission in May 2017, started the implementation of the PADR, for which the first calls for proposals on three distinct topics were launched in June 2017. The evaluation of the received proposals was concluded before the end of the year with the first grant agreement signed on 20 December 2017. At the same time, the EDA continued to pursue cooperative defence R&T through *ad hoc* projects. In 2017, some 27 new projects were negotiated with a total value of €98 million, which brings the total value of *ad hoc* projects managed by the EDA since its creation in 2004 to €1 billion.

## MILITARY MOBILITY

In September 2017, the EDA set up a dedicated *ad hoc* working group on ‘Cross-Border Military Transportation within Europe’ which, in early 2018, produced a roadmap identifying a series of operational measures to tackle physical, procedural or regulatory barriers which hamper military mobility. To fulfil this task, the EDA worked closely with all EU member states (including Denmark, though not an EDA member) and in full coordination with the EEAS, the Commission and the EUMS, as well as in close liaison with – and involvement of – multinational stakeholders, notably NATO and third countries such as Canada, Norway, Switzerland and the US. The EDA’s roadmap eventually

served as the basis for the ‘Action Plan on Military Mobility’ that the HR/VP Federica Mogherini and the European Commission presented to the heads of state and government on 22 March 2018. In 2017, the EDA also continued its work in the framework of the Multimodal Transport Hub (M2TH) and Diplomatic Clearance projects.

## **CYBER DEFENCE**

In 2017, the EDA concluded a study on the establishment of a cyber defence training and education platform which eventually led to a decision in early 2018 to establish such a platform within the ESDC. The platform will act as virtual coordination platform linking and coordinating existing and emerging cyber training facilities in EU member states. The EDA’s Cyber Ranges Federation Project moved to the implementation phase and the development of a Strategic Research Agenda on Cyber also made good progress, as did the Cyber Situation Awareness Project (CySAP), the Military multi-Agent System for APT Detection II (MASFAD II) and the Demand Pooling for the Cyber Defence Training and Exercise support by the private Sector (DePoCyTE) project. In September 2017, the Agency helped facilitate the EU’s first-ever cyber defence exercise (‘EU CYBRID 2017’) in Tallinn, Estonia, between EU defence ministers.

## **EUROPEAN AIR FLEETS COOPERATION**

On 8 June 2017, the European Tactical Airlift Centre (ETAC) was opened in Zaragoza, Spain, as the permanent home of the European Air Transport Fleet (ETAF). ETAF was created by the Agency in 2011 with 20 participating nations as a way to improve the EU’s airlift capacities. The opening of ETAC marked a significant step forward in European defence cooperation as it provides member states with a permanent operational base for joint advanced tactical airlift training. The ETAC opening is also the largest transfer of a project, created and developed by the EDA, to one of its member states on a permanent basis.

There were also developments in the Air-to-Air Refuelling domain in 2017 when Germany and Norway announced that they would join the Netherlands and Luxembourg in the Multinational Multi-Role Tanker Transport Fleet, a project initiated by the EDA in 2012. The official signing ceremony took place on 25 September. Since then, Belgium has also joined the project (in February 2018), meaning that the number of Airbus A330 MRTT aircraft ordered will increase to eight. Delivery of the first aircraft is planned for 2020.

## CORE DOCUMENTS

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
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
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European Commission and EEAS, “Improving Military Mobility in the European Union,” Joint Communication by the European Commission and HR/VP to the European Parliament and the Council, *JOIN(2017) 41 final*, November 10, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/joint\\_communication\\_to\\_the\\_european\\_parliament\\_and\\_the\\_council\\_-\\_improving\\_military\\_mobility\\_in\\_the\\_european\\_union.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/joint_communication_to_the_european_parliament_and_the_council_-_improving_military_mobility_in_the_european_union.pdf).

**FIGURE 31: EUROPEAN DEFENCE TIMELINE 2017**

Data: EEAS, EDA, European Commission, the Council











# EUROPEAN SECURITY





## MIGRATION

The year began with a stock-taking exercise by the European Commission on the progress achieved by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). Operational since late 2016, Frontex has undertaken steps to: establish a 1,500-strong Rapid Reaction Pool for border interventions, collect data on member state border capacities, put in place 690 returns monitors, escorts and specialists, devise a complaint mechanism to ensure respect for fundamental rights, and sign operational cooperation status agreements for third countries. Frontex estimates that almost 185,000 irregular migrants arrived to Europe in 2017, mainly through the central Mediterranean route. The main sources of origin include West Africa, the Horn of Africa, as well as Syria and Iraq, and Bangladesh.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, the Council of the EU adopted a Commission proposal recommending that five Schengen states (Austria, Denmark, Germany, Norway and Sweden) prolong internal border controls for a maximum of three months from February 2017. On 2 March, the HR/VP and Commission presented their third progress report on the partnership framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration. Following this, on 7 March the Council adopted a new Regulation (2017/458) to reinforce systematic identity checks for all persons crossing EU external borders against relevant databases, including EU citizens and non-EU citizen family members.

The EU dedicated additional financial resources to deal with migration towards the end of 2017.<sup>2</sup> For example, on 16 March the Commission launched a €34 million project to encourage some 230,000 refugee children to attend school in Turkey. Under the Maltese presidency, the Commission published a Communication on 12 April on the protection of children in migration,<sup>3</sup> and a €90 million programme under the EUTF to support the protection of migrants in Libya was adopted.<sup>4</sup> 13 June saw the Commission publish four progress reports on measures taken under the European Agenda for Migration. The reports assessed member states' performance in relation to the EU refugee relocation scheme, the implementation of the EU-Turkey statement, the operationalisation of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency and the Partnership Framework on Migration. On the 4 July the European Commission proposed an action plan on measures to support Italy with migratory pressures emanating from the central Mediterranean.

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1. Roderick Parkes and Annelies Pauwels, "The EU migration crisis – getting the numbers right," *EUISS Brief*, no. 9 (April 2017), <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/eu-migration-crisis-%E2%80%93-getting-numbers-right>.

2. For a comprehensive overview of the EU migration crisis see Roderick Parkes, "Nobody Move! Myths of the EU Migration Crisis," *EUISS Chaillot Paper*, no. 143 (December 2017), <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/nobody-move-myths-eu-migration-crisis>.

3. European Commission, "The protection of children in migration," Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, *COM(2017) 211 final*, April 12, 2017, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52017DC0211>.

4. European Commission, "EU Trust Fund for Africa adopts 90 million euro programme on protection of migrants and improved migration management in Libya," April 12, 2017, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-951\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-951_en.htm).

On 6 December, the EU adopted three new programmes under the EUTF to assist with migration protection and reintegration in North Africa (€10 million), the dismantling of criminal networks operating in North Africa (€15 million) and legal empowerment for migrants (€4.58 million).<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, on 14 December the HR/VP announced €100 million in assistance to support the work of the IOM and the UNHCR following a meeting of the AU-EU-UN task force.<sup>6</sup> This joint task force was established on 4 December in Addis Ababa to protect migrants and refugees (particularly in Libya) and to assist with resettlements and voluntary returns to countries of origin. The task force is supported by the IOM.

## COUNTER-TERRORISM

The EU was subject to a number of terrorist attacks in 2017. As a result, the EU was engaged with counter-terrorism policies and strategies throughout the year. For example, on 7 March the Council adopted a new Directive (2017/541) that criminalises travelling for the purposes of terrorism. The Directive combats terrorism by outlawing the organisation and facilitation of travel for terrorist purposes, training for terrorist purposes and providing or collecting funds for terrorist activities. Furthermore, as part of its efforts on gun control, the Council adopted a Directive (2017/853) on 25 April that amended existing controls on the acquisition and possession of weapons. The amendments seek to enhance the traceability of firearms, strengthen measures for deactivating, reactivating or converting firearms, tighten rules for acquisition and possession of the most dangerous firearms and ban the civilian use of the most dangerous semi-automatic weapons. Following an investigation led by the Spanish national police, June saw Europol's involvement in the arrests of six individuals accused of working for Daesh.<sup>7</sup> In its June 'EU Terrorism Report 2017', Europol recorded a total of 142 failed, foiled and completed terror attacks took place in the EU in 2016, while 142 victims had died and 1,002 terror-related arrests were made.<sup>8</sup>

On 19 June, the Council of the EU adopted Conclusions on an EU External Action on Counter-Terrorism, in which it agreed to strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation

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5. European Commission, "EU Trust Fund for Africa: new programmes adopted to reinforce protection of migrants and fight against smugglers and traffickers," December 6, 2017, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-5144\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5144_en.htm).

6. EEAS, "Remarks by Federica Mogherini following the meeting at political level of the EU, AU and the UN task force," December 14, 2017, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/37424/remarks-federica-mogherini-following-meeting-political-level-european-union-african-union\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/37424/remarks-federica-mogherini-following-meeting-political-level-european-union-african-union_en).

7. Europol, "Six arrested accused of belonging to the terrorist group Islamic State," June 28, 2017, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/six-arrested-accused-of-belonging-to-terrorist-group-islamic-state>.

8. Europol, "2017 EU terrorism report: 142 failed, foiled and completed attacks, 1002 arrests and 142 victims died," June 15, 2017, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/2017-eu-terrorism-report-142-failed-foiled-and-completed-attacks-1002-arrests-and-142-victims-died>.

with its partners at the bilateral, regional and multilateral levels.<sup>9</sup> As part of its strategy of combating terrorism and violent extremism beyond EU borders, on 14 September the EU adopted a new programme to strengthen state actors' counter-terrorism capacities and to address the underlying factors that contribute to violent extremism. The new programme was endowed with €17.5 million under the IcSP, with an immediate focus on the Middle East and North Africa. On 10 October, the EEAS and European Union's Judicial Cooperation Unit (Eurojust) entered into an information exchange agreement with a particular focus on counter-terrorism, cybercrime, illegal immigrant smuggling and human trafficking. A few days later on 18 October, the European Commission presented its counter-terrorism package including steps to protect public spaces, deprive terrorists of the means to act and reinforce the EU's external action on counter-terrorism.

With a view to strengthening the Security Union, on 8 December EU justice ministers agreed on the general approaches to European Commission proposals to extend the European Criminal Records Information System to third-country nationals so as to allow for faster responses to criminal and terrorist activities in the EU, and for the mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation orders in order to cut off criminals from their financial means.<sup>10</sup> These measures were followed on 12 December with the European Commission announcing that an upgraded EU system of security, border and migration information exchange would be put in place. The information and data exchange system is designed to allow border guards and police officers timely access to information by creating a European data search portal, a biometric matching service and rapid third-country national identity checks.<sup>11</sup>

## HYBRID THREATS

On 19 July, the HR/VP and the European Commission launched their report on the implementation of the 2016 'Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats – A European Union Response'.<sup>12</sup> The July report built on the April 2016 Joint Communication on Countering Hybrid Threats which specified how the EU can assist member states build their resilience. Furthermore, on 2 October the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki was officially inaugurated. A Finnish initiative,

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9. Council of the European Union, "Council Conclusions on EU External Action on Counter-terrorism," June 19, 2017, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/23999/st10384en17-conclusions-on-eu-external-action-on-counter-terrorism.pdf>.

10. European Commission, "Security Union: Council paves way to improve the tools available to judicial and policy authorities to fight terrorism and cross-border crime," December 8, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/security-union-council-paves-way-improve-tools-available-judicial-and-police-authorities-fight\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/security-union-council-paves-way-improve-tools-available-judicial-and-police-authorities-fight_en).

11. European Commission, "Security Union: Commission closes information gaps to better protect EU citizens," December 12, 2017, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-5202\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5202_en.htm).

12. European Commission and EEAS, "Implementation of the Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats – a European Union Response," Joint Communication by the European Commission and HR/VP to the European Parliament and the Council, *JOIN(2017) 30 final*, July 19, 2017, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017JC0030&from=EN>.


at the time of writing the Centre of Excellence is supported by 13 nations (Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the US) and cooperates with the EU and NATO.

## DISASTER RELIEF

In 2017, the European Commission played a crisis management role by reacting to natural disasters such as forest fires and Hurricane Ophelia. During the year, the EU activated the ECPM a number of times, providing aircraft, satellite imagery, equipment and personnel to France (in July), Ireland (October), Italy (July and October), Portugal (in June, August and October), Spain (October) and the UK (October). Furthermore, on 14 September the European Parliament approved nearly €1.2 billion in financial assistance to support reconstruction in Italy following the 2016 and 2017 earthquakes. The assistance was made available through the EU Solidarity Fund.<sup>13</sup> As Figure 32 below shows, the UCPM was activated on a number of occasions in Europe and across the world in 2017.

**FIGURE 32: UNION CIVIL PROTECTION MECHANISM**

Type and number of activations, 2017



Data: DG ECHO

13. European Parliament, "Earthquakes in Italy: €1.2 billion in EU aid approved," August 30, 2017, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20170828IPR82509/earthquakes-in-italy-EU1-2bn-in-eu-aid-approved>.

## SPACE CAPACITIES

The EU further developed its space capacities for the purposes of economic and societal development and security. On 24 January, the HR/VP spoke at the ninth Annual Conference on European Space Policy and highlighted the contributions of space infrastructure to the EU's overall security. In a historic milestone for the Copernicus programme, in May the service was extended to cover security applications such as border surveillance, maritime surveillance and support for the EU's external action. Agencies such as Frontex, SatCen and the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) have been using the service since May.

On 7 March, the Sentinel-2B satellite was launched in support of the Copernicus environmental monitoring systems, providing high-resolution optical imaging. On 13 October, the Sentinel-5 Precursor satellite was launched as part of the EU's Copernicus programme in order to help monitor atmospheric data. Many of the EU's member states and close partners requested Copernicus services during 2017. For example, on 25 August the Copernicus Emergency Management Service was activated at the request of the US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to provide satellite mapping and damage assessment for areas affected by Hurricane Harvey. Likewise, from 5 to 12 September, France, the Netherlands, the UK and the ERCC activated the Copernicus emergency mapping service to provide situational awareness in aid of Caribbean islands affected by Hurricane Irma. FEMA would again request the Copernicus service on 12 September for its disaster relief efforts in the Caribbean region.<sup>14</sup>

The EU's global positioning system, Galileo, also saw further progress when four more Galileo navigation satellites (No. 19-22) were launched on an Ariane 5 rocket. The Galileo system is currently comprised of 22 satellites.

### CORE DOCUMENTS

European Commission and EEAS, "Implementation of the Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats – A European Union Response," Joint Report by the European Commission and HR/VP to the European Parliament and the Council, *JOIN(2017) 30 final*, July 19, 2017, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017JC0030&from=EN>.

European Commission, "Proposal for a Regulation on establishing a framework for interoperability between EU information systems (police and judicial cooperation, asylum and migration)," *COM(2017) 794 final*, December 12, 2017, <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/EN/COM-2017-794-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF>.

14. European Commission, "Copernicus EMS is mapping the impact of Hurricane IRMA over the Caribbean Islands," September 12, 2017, <http://emergency.copernicus.eu/mapping/ems/copernicus-ems-mapping-impact-hurricane-irma-over-caribbean-islands..>

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European Commission, “Action Plan to Support the Protection of Public Spaces,” Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, *COM(2017) 612 final*, October 18, 2017, <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/EN/COM-2017-612-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF>.

European Commission, “Action Plan to Enhance Preparedness against CBRN Security Risks,” Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, *COM(2017) 610 final*, October 18, 2017, <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/EN/COM-2017-610-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF>.



Several large-scale cyber incidents that took place in 2017 emphasised the importance of building state and societal resilience in cyberspace. In May and June 2017, in two world-wide waves, the WannaCry and NotPetya attacks highlighted the disruptive potential of ransomware. The indiscriminate dissemination of malicious software encrypting hard drives and preventing users from accessing their data incapacitated data-dependent service providers in numerous sectors, including healthcare, food processing, transportation and logistics. As a consequence, in the UK alone 20,000 medical appointments had to be cancelled and five hospitals needed to divert ambulances because of the difficulties caused by ransomware infections in retrieving and processing patient data.<sup>15</sup> By posing a threat to the physical wellbeing of patients, the attack marked a critical escalation of aggression in peace-time cyber operations.

2017 also witnessed the disclosure of additional details about the tactics and tools used in cyber-enabled operations aimed at influencing the democratic processes and undermining the legitimacy of their outcomes. Practices employed by foreign agents ranged from micro-targeting voters through advertisements on social media<sup>16</sup> to creating and amplifying outright fabricated or only loosely fact-based news stories to manipulate voters.<sup>17</sup> Posing as ‘concerned patriots’, foreign agents remotely organised rallies for controversial causes, leveraging the global reach of social media platforms with the intention to reinforce electoral, political and popular divides.<sup>18</sup> With cyber-based efforts to interfere in elections escalating to the real-life mobilisation of voters, EU member states – several of which held major elections in 2017 – found themselves on a steep learning curve in ensuring the integrity of voting and freedom in the preceding opinion-forming processes.<sup>19</sup>

On the diplomatic front, the 2016/2017 instalment of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (UNGGE), tasked – among other issues – with developing norms for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, concluded its work without reaching a new agreement.<sup>20</sup> Efforts to broker a common understanding collapsed over

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15. Alex Hern, “WannaCry, Petya, NotPetya: how ransomware hit the big time in 2017,” *The Guardian*, December 30, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/dec/30/wannacry-petya-notpetya-ransomware>.

16. Nick Penzenstadler, Brad Heath and Jessica Guynn, “We read every one of the 3,517 Facebook ads bought by Russians. Here’s what we found,” *USA Today*, May 11, 2018, <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/05/11/what-we-found-facebook-ads-russians-accused-election-meddling/602319002/>.

17. Colin Stretch, “Extremist Content and Russian Disinformation Online: Working with Tech to Find Solutions,” testimony of the general counsel of Facebook, Hearing before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, October 31, 2017, <https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/extremist-content-and-russian-disinformation-online-working-with-tech-to-find-solutions>.

18. Reports on these developments were first published by the Daily Beast: Ben Collins et al. “Exclusive: Russians Appear to Use Facebook to Push Trump Rallies in 17 U.S. Cities,” *The Daily Beast*, September 20, 2017, <https://www.thedailybeast.com/russians-appear-to-use-facebook-to-push-pro-trump-flash-mobs-in-florida?ref=scroll>.

19. National-level elections in 2017 took place in the Netherlands, Bulgaria, France, the UK, Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovenia.

20. For additional analysis see: Jakob Bund and Patryk Pawlak, “Minilateralism and norms in cyberspace,” *EUISS Alert*, no. 25 (September 2017), <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/minilateralism-and-norms-cyberspace>.

political differences related to countermeasures, the right to self-defence and the applicability of international humanitarian law in cyberspace.<sup>21</sup>

Against this background, 2017 saw the rollout of several new EU legislative initiatives and significant strategic realignments. Revisiting the cybersecurity strategy adopted by the EU in 2013, on 13 September the Commission proposed a comprehensive reform package to meet the challenges of a persistently changing environment. The organising element within the reform package is the Joint Communication on ‘Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU’.<sup>22</sup> On 20 November, the Council lent support to the Joint Communication and on 12 December approved a detailed action plan to facilitate its implementation.<sup>23</sup> The Joint Communication outlines three lines of action along the eponymous streams *Resilience*, *Deterrence* and *Defence* – although the Communication envisions strengthened cyber defences principally as a function of international cooperation. These respective lines of action draw on and link together the remaining proposals and assessments released as part of the reform package. (All of which are covered in greater detail in the overview of the Joint Communication that follows). Unless stated otherwise, the initiatives and documents referred to hereafter were published or proposed alongside the Joint Communication on 13 September. As proposals, they only mark the beginning of a process, legislative or otherwise, and carry no statutory force. Alongside the cybersecurity package, the Commission released a staff working document on 13 September that assesses the original 2013 EU cybersecurity strategy against the backdrop of the evolved threat landscape.

## RESILIENCE

In preparation for the 9 May deadline for member states to incorporate the Network and Information Systems Directive (referred to as NIS Directive) – the EU’s first cybersecurity law – into national legislation, the Commission published additional documentation to ensure its harmonious transposition and assist national authorities in identifying best practices, including the effective designation of operators of essential services (OESs). The NIS Directive requires national authorities to identify OESs that are entrusted with managing critical parts of national infrastructure. These OESs are obliged

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21. Michael Schmitt and Liis Vihul, “International Cyber Law Politicized: The UN GGE’s Failure to Advance Cyber Norms,” *Just Security*, June 30, 2017, <https://www.justsecurity.org/42768/international-cyber-law-politicized-gges-failure-advance-cyber-norms/>.

22. European Commission and EEAS, “Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building Strong Cybersecurity for the EU,” Joint Communication by the European Commission and HR/VP to the European Parliament and the Council, *JOIN(COM) 450 final*, September 13, 2017, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017JC0450&from=EN>.

23. Council of the European Union, “Council Conclusions on the Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU,” *14435/17*, November 20, 2017, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31666/st14435en17.pdf>; Council of the European Union, “Action Plan for implementation of the Council Conclusions on the Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU,” *15748/17*, December 12, 2017, <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15748-2017-INIT/en/pdf>.

to conduct a comprehensive risk assessment and take the precautionary measures necessary to ensure they can continue operations if their security is compromised. Security incidents of ‘substantial impact’ (which threaten to significantly affect the provision of services) must be reported to the responsible national authority. After a public consultation period in the second half of 2017, on 30 January 2018 the Commission issued the final version of its Implementing Regulation for the NIS Directive. The Regulation further defines the circumstances under which an incident would be considered as having substantial impact and specifies the parameters for their assessment.

In support of a single cybersecurity market, the Commission proposed an EU-wide cybersecurity certification framework as part of the reform package. Envisioned as a voluntary framework to encourage and reward security-by-design principles, the system is designed to score products and services against industry standards based on the security needs required by their intended use. By introducing the possibility of a security screening at the EU-level, the framework seeks to reduce the costs incurred by vendors through parallel certification processes in individual member states that follow different procedures.

To facilitate the coordinated implementation of the NIS Directive and the certification framework, the Commission further proposed an expanded mandate for the European Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), transforming the Agency into a permanent EU cybersecurity body. The plan puts ENISA in charge of the computer incident response teams (CSIRT) secretariat and would have the Agency coordinate information exchanges between national CSIRTs, the EU Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-EU), Europol and the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN). In this role of enhancing interoperability and situational awareness, ENISA would also be tasked with establishing industry-specific information sharing and analyses centres and with organising an annual EU-wide cybersecurity exercise. As part of these new responsibilities, ENISA would become the point agency for coordinating responses to large-scale, cross-border cyber incidents. Along the same lines, on 20 December EU institutions in an inter-institutional arrangement clarified the role and responsibilities of the permanent CERT-EU to ensure a coordinated reaction to cyber attacks targeting EU bodies.<sup>24</sup> To fulfil its significantly extended mandate, ENISA would also be endowed with additional resources. In its current form, the proposal increases the number of staff by 50% and plans to raise the budget to €23 million over four years, more than twice the level of funding currently available to the Agency.<sup>25</sup>

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24. Arrangement between the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank, the European Court of Auditors, the European External Action Service, the European Economic and Social Committee, the European Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank on the Organisation and Operation of a Computer Emergency Response Team for the Union’s Institutions, Bodies and Agencies (CERT-EU), *Official Journal of the European Union* C 12/1, [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1524239890666&uri=CELEX:32018Q0113\(01\)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1524239890666&uri=CELEX:32018Q0113(01)).

25. Mar Negreiro, “ENISA and a New Cybersecurity Act,” *European Parliamentary Research Service*, January 16, 2018, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/614643/EPRS\\_BRI\(2017\)614643\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/614643/EPRS_BRI(2017)614643_EN.pdf).

Building on the proposed new mandate for ENISA, the Commission put forward recommendations for ensuring a coordinated response to large-scale, cross-border cybersecurity incidents. The blueprint complements existing EU crisis management mechanisms, adding procedures for a cybersecurity dimension, as a major cyber incident could provide the basis for member states to invoke the EU ‘Solidarity Clause’ (Article 222 TFEU). Provisions in the blueprint foresee for EU institutions to develop an EU Cybersecurity Crisis Response Framework in collaboration with member states. As the blueprint’s institutional backbone, the framework would mainstream the communication channels and coordinate the responsibilities for the EU’s incident response. Regular testing through exercises is designed to ensure the adequacy of the framework in addressing the challenges of an evolving threat environment. Additional suggestions include replicating the emergency support structures of the UCPM for cybersecurity by setting up a Cybersecurity Emergency Response Fund that would allow member states to request EU crisis management assistance in the event of a serious cyber incident.

In recognition of the investment needs required for developing the next generation of digital technologies – drawing on artificial intelligence, quantum computing and blockchain – and in support of the Public-Private Partnership on Cybersecurity established in 2016, the Commission recommended the creation of a network of cybersecurity competence centres. The network would bring together research efforts at existing and future national cybersecurity facilities under the auspices of a new European Cybersecurity Research and Competence Centre. To be set up in 2018, the network would begin operating in a pilot phase under Horizon 2020, the EU’s framework programme for research and innovation, with an initial funding line of €50 million. Among other tasks, the competence network would provide technical support in the implementation of the cybersecurity certification framework, with one key aspect being the development of a European capacity to assess the encryption standards used in products and services offered in the Digital Single Market. In time, the Commission proposal suggests the scope of the competence network and the EU Centre’s work could be expanded to include a cyber defence component, given the dual-use nature of many technologies. Any plans to extend research activities to cyber defence and resilience would be carried out in close coordination with the EDA and ENISA.

With Europe facing an estimated skills gap of 350,000 cybersecurity professionals by 2022,<sup>26</sup> a crucial aspect of the work of the European Cybersecurity Research and Competence Centre and ENISA will be to identify ways to accelerate cybersecurity education and training. Together with member states, the private sector and civil society initiatives, on 1 December 2016, the EU formed the Digital Skills and Jobs Coalition, which aims to train one million young currently unemployed people by 2020 to fill vacancies in the digital job market. Raising cybersecurity awareness more generally, the Commission also advocates for making the issue a regular component of curricula outside of the cybersecurity discipline.

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26. Center for Cyber Safety and Education, “2017 Global Information Security Workforce Study - Europe,” 2017, <https://iamcybersafe.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Europe-GISWS-Report.pdf>.

## DETERRENCE

The EU's approach to deterrence focuses on increasing the chances of getting caught for cyber criminals and state and non-state attackers, and on imposing clear costs and consequences on their actions. In particular, the EU seeks to strengthen institutional and technical capabilities for identifying malicious actors by reinforcing the expertise housed inside Europol's cybercrime unit and by encouraging the quick adoption of version six of the IP network protocol (IPv6). To this end, on 9 September the Commission awarded a tender to a consortium of firms for the development a framework to assist public administrations of member states in an accelerated and uniform adoption of IPv6 across the EU.<sup>27</sup> Allowing for the direct attribution of a single IP address to every individual user, IPv6 facilitates a more targeted approach in investigating malicious behaviour online by narrowing tracking efforts to specific suspected users. On 25 July, one year on from the start of its 'No More Ransom' initiative, Europol took stock of the campaign's efficacy in curtailing the damages caused by ransomware. Launched jointly with the Dutch police and the cybersecurity firms McAfee and Kaspersky Lab, the initiative in its first year provided tools that facilitated the decryption of 28,000 devices, saving victims an estimated amount of €8 million in ransom payments.<sup>28</sup>

To support law enforcement in the investigation and prosecution of cybercrimes, the Commission, following an endorsement by the European Council in its Conclusions from June 2017, took preparatory steps to facilitate cross-border access to electronic evidence.<sup>29</sup> To the same end, on 18 October, the Commission issued its conclusions on the role of encryption in criminal investigations alongside a set of proposed measures to assist law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities in addressing the use of encryption by criminals.<sup>30</sup> Among others, the measures include strengthening Europol's decryption capabilities within the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3), developing a toolbox of alternative investigative techniques and setting up a regular dialogue with industry and civil society representatives (facilitated through the EU Internet Forum). In an effort to crack down on a particularly prevalent strand of criminal online activity, the Commission laid out a proposal for a Directive on the Combatting of Fraud and

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27. European Commission, "Contract award notice - Study on implementation of the ISA2 programme action 2016.10 – IPv6 framework for European governments – SMART 2016/0099," 2017/S 173-353637, September 9 2017, <http://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:353637-2017:TEXT:EN:HTML&tabId=1>.

28. Europol, "Over 28 000 Devices Decrypted and 100+ Global Partners - No More Ransom Celebrates its First Year," July 25, 2017, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/over-28-000-devices-decrypted-and-100-global-partners-%E2%80%93-no-more-ransom-celebrates-its-first-year>.

29. On 17 April 2018, the Commission put forth a proposal for a new Regulation and Directive that would create European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters, see: European Commission, "E-evidence - cross-border access to electronic evidence," accessed April 30, 2018, [https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-and-fundamental-rights/criminal-justice/e-evidence\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-and-fundamental-rights/criminal-justice/e-evidence_en).

30. European Commission, "Eleventh Progress Report towards an Effective and Genuine Security Union," Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, COM(2017) 608 final, October 18, 2017, [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-security/20171018\\_eleventh\\_progress\\_report\\_towards\\_an\\_effective\\_and\\_genuine\\_security\\_union\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-security/20171018_eleventh_progress_report_towards_an_effective_and_genuine_security_union_en.pdf).

Counterfeiting of Non-cash Means of Payment to rein in the fraudulent use of credit card details and other electronic means of payment.

Looking beyond cybercrime, the 2017 Joint Communication emphasises the importance of punitive measures that seek to influence the strategic calculus of state and non-state actors and raise deterrence levels by associating clear costs with malicious behaviour. In this vein, the Communication highlights the steps taken towards a Framework for a Joint EU Diplomatic Response to Malicious Cyber Activities (also referred to as the ‘Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox’).<sup>31</sup> Development of the toolbox – which will span a wide spectrum of possible responses, including sanctions – was approved by the Council on 19 June. Efforts to implement the framework are ongoing in collaboration with member states.

Following a deterrence-by-denial approach through improved defences, Commission services have been liaising with member states, the EEAS, the EDA and other institutional bodies with the purpose of setting up a cyber defence training and education platform. The mechanism is expected to begin initial operations by 1 September 2018 and will reach full operational capability in April 2019.<sup>32</sup>

## DEFENCE AND STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON CYBERSECURITY

The EU identifies robust alliances and partnerships with third countries as key to preventing and deterring cyber attacks. In this spirit, the Joint Communication announced plans for a strategic framework for conflict prevention and stability in cyberspace that would inform the EU’s bilateral, regional, multi-stakeholder and multilateral engagements. On a bilateral level, the EU in 2017 held cybersecurity dialogues with a wide range of its strategic partners, including China, India, Japan, South Korea and the US.

As reiterated in the 2017 Joint Communication, the EU ‘strongly promotes the position that international law, and in particular the UN Charter, applies in cyberspace’<sup>33</sup> and understands this interpretation as a fundamental contribution to stability of international relations in cyberspace. In addition, the EU ‘endorses the voluntary non-binding

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31. Erica Moret and Patryk Pawlak, “The EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox: towards a cyber sanctions regime?,” *EUISS Brief*, no. 24 (July 2017), <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/eu-cyber-diplomacy-toolbox-towards-cyber-sanctions-regime>.

32. On 6 February 2018, EU member states decided to set up the platform for education, training, evaluation and exercise (ETEE) in the field of cyber security/defence under the aegis of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC), see: EEAS, “ESDC: Cyber platform for education, training, evaluation and exercise (ETEE),” February 14, 2018, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/39848/esdc-cyber-platform-education-training-evaluation-and-exercise-ete\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/39848/esdc-cyber-platform-education-training-evaluation-and-exercise-ete_en).

33. European Commission and EEAS, “Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building Strong Cybersecurity for the EU,” Joint Communication by the European Commission and HR/VP to the European Parliament and the Council, *JOIN(COM) 450 final*, September 13, 2017, 18 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017JC0450&from=EN>.

norms, rules and principles of responsible State behaviour that have been articulated by the UN Group of Governmental Experts' and 'encourages the development and implementation of regional confidence building measures, both in the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and other regions'.<sup>34</sup>

In a shared digital environment that undergirds a global economy, strengthening cyber defences constitutes a common interest. Accordingly, since 2013 the EU has invested in assisting third countries in cybersecurity capacity building as a regular component of the Union's development cooperation. The 2017 Joint Communication foresees a further formalisation of these efforts with the establishment of an EU Cyber Capacity Building Network, comprising the EEAS, member state cyber authorities, relevant EU agencies and Commission services, academia and civil society representatives. The primary geographic focus for capacity-building initiatives will be the EU's neighbourhood, in addition to developing countries that are undergoing connectivity at a rapid pace and consequently find themselves confronted with new sets of threats. To streamline these efforts, a set of EU Cyber Capacity Building Guidelines are under development.

In 2017, the EU held its first table-top cyber defence exercise, called 'EU CYBRID 2017', at an EU defence ministerial in Tallinn on 7 September. The exercise simulated a cyber attack against an EU-led military operation, targeting both the operational headquarters and maritime assets under its command. The objective of the exercise was to draw attention to the challenges decision-making processes might face when supporting network and information systems are placed under duress, and to derive guidance from this experience for handling similar scenarios in the future.<sup>35</sup>

2017 also saw the first defence-related research project on cyber conflict – initiated by the Croatian ministry of defence in partnership with the EDA – being awarded co-funding under the ESIFs (European Structural and Investment Funds). Worth €7.1 million in total, the project will receive ESIF funding to cover 80% of its costs.<sup>36</sup> On the planning side, the Council, upon approving the establishment of PESCO on 11 December, identified the first phase of collaborative projects.<sup>37</sup> Among the 17 listed projects, two have a dedicated cyber focus, namely the Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information

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34. *Ibid.*, 18.

35. European Defence Agency, "First Cyber Exercise at EU Ministerial Level Focuses on Strategic Decision-making," September 7, 2017, <https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-news/2017/09/07/first-cyber-exercise-at-eu-ministerial-level-focuses-on-strategic-decision-making>.

36. European Defence Agency, "First Fully Fledged Defence Project Gets ESIF Funding," October 18, 2017, <https://eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-news/2017/10/18/first-fully-fledged-defence-project-gets-esif-funding>.

37. "Declaration on PESCO projects by member states participating in PESCO," December 10, 2017, *Council of the EU*, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu//media/32020/draft-pesco-declaration-clean-10122017.pdf>.

Sharing Platform, and the Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security.<sup>38</sup>

Based on their Joint Declaration of 8 June 2016, the EU and NATO have begun work on enhancing interoperability by ensuring coherence between their cyber defence requirements and standards. Endeavours to improve interoperability between the two organisations also extend to non-technical domains in the form of training and exercises. Both institutions already benefit from technical cybersecurity information sharing between the CERT-EU and the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC).<sup>39</sup>

## SELECT EU LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES WITH CYBERSECURITY IMPLICATIONS

On 28 September 2016, the Commission issued a proposal to ‘modernise EU export controls, including the introduction of controls on the export on critical cyber-surveillance technologies that could cause violations of human rights or be misused against the EU’s own security.’<sup>40</sup> Legislative work on the proposal began in October 2016. After initially being rejected, the report by the Committee for International Trade (INTA) – responsible for the file within the European Parliament – was tabled for first reading in plenary on 19 December 2017. Following the plenary debate and adoption in a partial vote on 17 January 2018, the matter was referred back to INTA to prepare interinstitutional negotiations.<sup>41</sup>

On 13 September 2017, the Commission presented a proposal for a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments in the EU.<sup>42</sup> The mechanism is intended to protect critical technologies from foreign acquisitions, including in areas related to cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, robotics and semiconductors, on grounds of security

38. The 17 collaborative PESCO projects were formally adopted by the Council on 6 March 2018. *Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/340 of 6 March 2018 establishing the list of projects to be developed under PESCO*, (CFSP) 2018/340, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 65/24 (2018): 24-27, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2018/340/oj>.

39. EEAS, “EU and NATO Increase Information Sharing on Cyber Incidents,” February 10, 2016, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/5254/eu-and-nato-increase-information-sharing-cyber-incidents\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/5254/eu-and-nato-increase-information-sharing-cyber-incidents_en).

40. European Commission, “Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering, technical assistance and transit of dual-use items (recast),” *COM(2016) 616 final*, September 28, 2016, <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/?fuseaction=list&coteId=1&year=2016&number=616&version=ALL&language=en>.

41. European Parliament/ Legislative Observatory, “2016/0295(COD) - 17/01/2018 Text Adopted by Parliament, Partial Vote at 1st Reading/Single Reading,” January 17, 2018, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/summary.do?id=1519340&tr=d&l=en>. Progress on the file can be tracked via: European Parliament/ Legislative Observatory, “Union Regime for the Control of Exports, Transfer, Brokering, Technical Assistance and Transit of Dual-use Items. Recast,” *2016/0295(COD)*, accessed April 30, 2018, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2016/0295\(OLP\)#tab-0](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2016/0295(OLP)#tab-0).

42. European Commission, “Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a framework for screening of foreign direct investments into the European Union,” *COM(2017) 487 final*, September 13, 2017, <https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/EN/COM-2017-487-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF>.



and public order. Particularly relevant with regard to foreign acquisitions of strategic EU technologies are provisions in the proposal that would allow for the mechanism to be activated if foreign investments in one member state could adversely affect the security or public order of another. The proposal also envisions screenings for foreign investments directed to projects of Union interest, including research conducted under Horizon 2020 and technologies related to space (Galileo), transport (Trans-European Networks for Transport, TEN-T), energy (TEN-E) and telecommunications. The legislative proposal was referred to INTA on 18 January 2018.<sup>43</sup> As of 2017, 12 member states, in one variation or another, had investment screening procedures in place at the national level.<sup>44</sup>

### Core documents

European Commission and EEAS, “Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building Strong Cybersecurity for the EU,” Joint Communication by the European Commission and HR/VP to the European Parliament and the Council, *JOIN(COM) 450 final*, September 13, 2017, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017JC0450&from=EN>.

European Commission, “Proposal for a Regulation on ENISA, the ‘EU Cybersecurity Agency’, and repealing Regulation (EU) 526/2013, and on Information and Communication Technology cybersecurity certification (‘Cybersecurity Act’),” *COM(2017) 477 final*, September 13, 2017, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2017:477:FIN>.

“Final report on the Evaluation of the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA),” *European Commission*, September 19, 2017, <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/final-report-evaluation-european-union-agency-network-and-information-security-enisa>.

European Commission, “Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/413/JHA,” *COM(2017)489*, September 13, 2017, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2017%3A489%3AFIN>.

43. Progress on the file can be tracked via: European Parliament/ Legislative Observatory, “Procedure File 2017/0224(COD) - Screening of Foreign Direct Investments into the European Union,” accessed April 30, 2018, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil-mobile/fiche-procedure/2017/0224\(COD\)](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil-mobile/fiche-procedure/2017/0224(COD)).

44. Gisela Grieger, “Foreign Direct Investment Screening: A Debate in Light of China-EU FDI Flows,” *European Parliamentary Research Service*, May 17, 2017, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS\\_BRI%282017%29603941](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI%282017%29603941).

*Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/1584 of 13 September 2017 on coordinated response to large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises*, (EU) 2017/1584, *Official Journal of the European Union* L239/36 (2017): 36-58, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32017H1584>.

European Commission, “Making the most of NIS – towards the effective implementation of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union,” Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, *COM(2017) 476 final/2*, October 4, 2017, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1505297631636&uri=COM:2017:476:FIN>.

*Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/151 of 30 January 2018 laying down rules for application of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards further specification of the elements to be taken into account by digital service providers for managing the risks posed to the security of network and information systems and of the parameters for determining whether an incident has a substantial impact*, (EU) 2018/151, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 26/49 (2018): 48-51, [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg\\_impl/2018/151/oj](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2018/151/oj).

European Commission, “Commission Staff Working Document - Assessment of the EU 2013 Cybersecurity Strategy,” *SWD(2017)295/F1*, September 13, 2017, <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/?fuseaction=list&coteId=10102&year=2017&number=295&version=ALL>.

European Commission, “REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL assessing the extent to which the Member States have taken the necessary measures in order to comply with Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks against information systems and replacing Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA,” *COM(2017) 474 final*, September 13, 2017, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1505307728824&uri=COM:2017:474:FIN>.


# JHA agencies and other bodies

The EU has set up a number of decentralised Agencies endowed with a security-related mandate to carry out specific legal, technical or scientific tasks. The large majority of these Agencies are placed within the area of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and depend on the European Commission's DG for Migration and Home Affairs and DG Justice and Consumers. In addition, this group includes the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), which shares association with the DG for Informatics and the DG for Communications Networks, Content and Technology.

With the exception of ENISA, the expenditure ceilings of these Agencies are laid down under Heading 3 ('Security and Citizenship') of the MFF. Appropriations for ENISA fall under Heading 1a ('Competitiveness for Growth and Employment').

**FIGURE 33: APPROPRIATIONS FOR JHA AGENCIES AND OTHER AGENCIES ENTRUSTED WITH SECURITY-RELATED TASKS**

2017, current € million



Data: Agency budgets

## EUROPEAN AGENCY FOR THE OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF LARGE-SCALE IT SYSTEMS IN THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE (EU-LISA)

153.3 million

**Budget:** €153.3 million (2017); €574.1 million (2014-2020)

**DG:** HOME

**Headquarters:** Tallinn, Estonia

**Goal:** to support the implementation of the EU's border management, asylum and migration policies by fulfilling the operational management tasks for the EU asylum fingerprint database (EURODAC), the Visa Information System (VIS) and the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II).

**Tasks:** the Agency must keep all IT systems under its responsibility functioning 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to facilitate the continuous exchange of data between national authorities using them. eu-LISA is also mandated to ensure that it applies the highest levels of information security and data protection to the information entrusted to it, and that personal information is treated fairly, lawfully and correctly, in full compliance with the relevant data protection principles and legislation in force.

Based on recommendations from the 2016 external evaluation of eu-LISA, on 29 June 2017, the Commission issued a proposal for a limited expansion of the Agency's mandate. The revision is designed to improve the interoperability of systems under eu-LISA's supervision, including through advice and *ad hoc* assistance to member states in accessing the platforms. The proposal would also task eu-LISA with the development, implementation and operational management of three foreseen information-processing systems, namely the Entry/Exit System (EES), collecting entry and exit information of non-EU nationals crossing external EU borders; the extension of the European Criminal Records Information System to third-country nationals and stateless persons (ECRIS-TCN), further facilitating the exchange of information on convicted non-EU nationals between member states; and the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS), which allows for advance checks of visa-exempt third-country nationals travelling to the Schengen area.

## Reference documents

*Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 establishing a European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice*, (EU) No 1077/2011, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 286/1 (2011): 1-17, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2011/1077/oj>.

European Commission, "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice, and amending Regulation (EC) 1987/2006 and Council Decision 2007/533/JHA and repealing Regulation (EU) 1077/2011," *COM(2017) 352 final*, June 29, 2017, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2017:0352:FIN>.

European Commission, "On the functioning of the European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (eu-LISA)," Report from the European Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, *COM(2017) 346 final*, June 29, 2017, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52017DC0346>.

## EUROPEAN ASYLUM SUPPORT OFFICE (EASO)

73.0 million

**Budget:** €73 million (2017); €109.3 million (2014-2020)

**DG:** HOME

**Headquarters:** Valletta, Malta

**Goal:** to contribute to the implementation of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) by facilitating, coordinating and strengthening practical cooperation among member states on the various aspects of asylum.

**Tasks:** EASO acts as a centre of expertise on asylum. The agency also provides practical and technical support to member states and the European Commission; operational support to member states subject to particular pressure on their asylum and reception systems, including the coordination of asylum support teams composed of national asylum experts; and evidence-based input for EU policymaking and legislation in all areas having a direct or indirect impact on asylum. On 22 November 2017, EASO and the Italian government signed a Hosting Arrangement to set up an operational office in Rome. Negotiations on a similar arrangement are underway with Greece.

**Mandate under revision:** in May 2016, the European Commission adopted a proposal to strengthen EASO's role with a view to improve the implementation and functioning of the CEAS. The proposal, which aims to develop EASO into the European Union Asylum Agency (EUAA), would boost the agency's role in technical and operational support; information collection and analysis, including on countries of origin; and coordination of practical cooperation to enhance convergence of asylum practices across Europe. In December 2017, the Estonian presidency reached an agreement with the European Parliament on the text for the founding Regulation of the EUAA. At the time of writing, formal approval by the Council was still pending.

## Reference documents

*Regulation (EU) No 439/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 establishing a European Asylum Support Office, (EU) No 439/2010, Official Journal of the European Union L 132/11 (2010): 11-28, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2010/439/oj>.*

European Commission, "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Union Agency for Asylum and repealing Regulation (EU) No 439/2010," *COM(2016) 271 final*, May 4, 2016, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2016:0271:FIN>.

## EUROPEAN BORDER AND COAST GUARD AGENCY (FRONTEX)

280.6 m

**Budget:** €280.6 million (2017); €626.4 million (2014-2020)

**DG:** HOME

**Headquarters:** Warsaw, Poland

**Goal:** to promote, coordinate and develop European border management in line with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the concept of Integrated Border Management (IBM).

**Tasks:** Frontex monitors migratory flows, carries out risk analysis regarding all aspects of IBM and provides support at hotspot areas. Frontex also assists member states in the return of persons subject to a removal order to their country of origin. In 2017, the Agency assisted member states in the return of 14,189 migrants in 341 return operations. This marks an increase of 47% in operations and of 32% in terms of persons returned compared to 2016. Frontex-coordinated operations carried out 9% of all effective returns by member states in 2017. The number of illegal border crossings detected at the EU's external borders in 2017 dropped by 60% to 204,719. By the end of 2017, 2,082 people had been readmitted to Turkey from Greece since the EU-Turkey Statement went into effect on 20 March 2016.

The Agency also coordinates and organises joint operations and rapid border interventions to assist member states at the EU's external borders. Frontex currently runs Operation Triton in the central Mediterranean Sea and Operation Poseidon along the Greek maritime borders with Turkey, which are tasked with search and rescue. Operations Hera, Indalo and Minerva in the western Mediterranean support the Spanish authorities with border surveillance, search and rescue activities and the detection of forged documents, stolen cars and inflow of illegal substances. In addition, the Agency operates in coordination with NATO's operation in the Aegean Sea and the EU's military operation in the central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR Med Sophia) in the fight against human trafficking and migrant smuggling.

## Reference document

*Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC, (EU) 2016/1624, Official Journal of the European Union L 251/1 (2016): 1-76, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/1624/oj>.*

## EUROPEAN INSTITUTE FOR GENDER EQUALITY (EIGE)

7.7 million

**Budget:** €7.7 million (2017); €54 million (2014-2020)

**DG:** JUST

**Headquarters:** Vilnius, Lithuania

**Goal:** to contribute to and strengthen the promotion of gender equality, including gender mainstreaming in all EU policies and the resulting national policies, and the fight

against discrimination based on sex, as well as to raise EU citizens' awareness of gender equality by providing technical assistance to the Commission and the authorities of the member states.

**Tasks:** EIGE represents a knowledge centre and the front-runner in developing reliable evidence, collecting knowledge, developing methods and tools and sharing useful experiences and expertise on gender equality and gender mainstreaming.

### Reference document

*Regulation (EC) No 1922/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on establishing a European Institute for Gender Equality, (EC) No 1922/2006, Official Journal of the European Union L 403/9 (2006): 9-17, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2006/1922/oj>.*

## EUROPEAN MONITORING CENTRE FOR DRUGS AND DRUG ADDICTION (EMCDDA)

16.2 million

**Budget:** €16.2 million (2017); €104.4 million (2014-2020)

**DG:** HOME

**Headquarters:** Lisbon, Portugal

**Goal:** to provide the EU and its member states with factual, objective, reliable and comparable information at European level concerning drugs and drug addiction and their consequences.

**Tasks:** the EMCDDA provides a factual overview of European drug problems. The agency offers policymakers data for drawing up drug laws and strategies. It also helps professionals working in the field pinpoint best practice and new areas of research. The Centre relies on the European Information Network on Drugs and Drug Addiction (Reitox) for the majority of its data. This network, managed by the Centre and composed of a focal point in each of the EU member states, Norway and at the European Commission, contributes to the EMCDDA's core business of collecting and reporting information on drug-related risks across Europe. One of the agency's key tasks is to detect new drugs appearing on the European market. In cooperation with Europol, the European Medicines Agency, the European Commission and EU member states, it carries out early-warning and risk assessment activities that may pave the way for legal controls.

### Reference document

*Regulation (EC) No 1920/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (recast), (EC) No 1920/2006, Official Journal of the European Union L 376/1 (2006): 1-13, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2006/1920/oj>.*

## EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING (CEPOL)

10.5 million

**Budget:** €10.5 million (2017); €62.1 million (2014-2020)

**DG:** HOME

**Headquarters:** Budapest, Hungary

**Goal:** to foster European and international law enforcement cooperation through training.

**Tasks:** the Agency provides training and learning opportunities to senior police officers and serves as a forum for exchanging knowledge and best practices on issues vital to the security of the European Union and its citizens (including on serious and organised crime, terrorism, public order and CSDP preparedness). CEPOL maintains cooperation and working arrangements with 12 third countries and various international organisations, including the OSCE and INTERPOL.

Since 1 July 2016, CEPOL operates under an extended mandate, which allows the Agency to expand its police trainings to include a wider target group of law enforcement officials (including customs, borders security officers, and prosecutors). CEPOL is also attributed with a number of new tasks, such as those related to assessing EU initiatives in defined fields, building the capacity of third countries, providing multiannual Strategic Training Needs Assessments and promoting mutual recognition of training among EU member states.

### Reference document

*Regulation (EU) 2015/2219 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) and replacing and repealing Council Decision 2005/681/JHA, (EU) 2015/2219, Official Journal of the European Union L 319/1 (2015): 1-20, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2015/2219/oj>.*

## EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION (EUROPOL)

114.6 million

**Budget:** €114.6 million (2017); €656.6 million (2014-2020)

**DG:** HOME

**Headquarters:** The Hague, The Netherlands



**Goal:** to support and strengthen law enforcement authorities throughout the EU in preventing and combating organised crime, terrorism and other forms of serious crime.

**Tasks:** Europol serves as a centre for law enforcement expertise and assists national authorities by exchanging information and providing intelligence analyses and threats assessments. In May 2016, the European Parliament adopted a new Regulation for Europol, which took effect on 1 May 2017. This Regulation enhances the Agency's mandate to ensure that it is fully equipped to counter the increase in cross-border crimes and terrorist threats. In particular, the extended mandate will facilitate the setting up of specialised units and improve Europol's ability to act as the EU's information hub in the fight against terrorism and serious organised crime. It also includes clear rules for existing units or centres such as the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) and the European Union Internet Referral Unit (EU IRU), both hosted at Europol.

### Reference document

*Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and replacing and repealing Council Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA, (EU) 2016/794, Official Journal of the European Union L 135/53 (2016): 53-114, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/794/oj>.*

## EU AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (FRA)

22.9 million

**Budget:** €22.9 million (2017); €151.1 million (2014-2020)

**DG:** JUST

**Headquarters:** Vienna, Austria

**Goal:** to provide independent, evidence-based advice to EU and national decision-makers, thereby helping to make debates, policies and legislation on fundamental rights better informed and targeted.

**Tasks:** FRA advises EU institutions and national governments on fundamental rights, particularly in the areas of discrimination, access to justice, racism and xenophobia, data protection, victims' rights and children's rights. The Agency aims to help promote and protect fundamental rights more effectively across the EU. To do this, it consults and cooperates with its partners on collecting and analysing information and data through socio-legal research, providing assistance and expert advice and communicating and raising awareness of rights.

## Reference document

*Council Regulation (EC) No 168/2007 of 15 February 2007 establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, (EC) No 168/2007, Official Journal of the European Union L 53/1 (2007): 1-17, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2007/168/oj>.*

# EU AGENCY FOR NETWORK AND INFORMATION SECURITY (ENISA)

11.2 million

**Budget:** €11.2 million (2017), €70.6 million (2014-2020)

**DG:** CONNECT and DIGIT

**Headquarters:** Heraklion, Greece

**Goal:** to develop deep expertise in NIS, support the Union in the development of NIS policies, assist the Union and member states in meeting the requirements of EU legal acts in the area of NIS, assist the Union and member states in strengthening their NIS posture and incident response, promote public-private sector cooperation.

**Tasks:** the Regulation specifying ENISA's mandate sets forth five lines of action. Expertise: provide information on crucial developments in the field of network and information security. Policy: assist EU institutions and member states in the implementation of EU policies and law. Capacity: organise trainings and awareness-raising campaigns to promote best practices throughout the EU. Community: strengthen cooperation between stakeholders of the European network and information security community, including in the private sector. In this vein, ENISA is tasked with supporting national Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) and every two years organises an EU-wide exercise, 'Cyber Europe', to improve crisis preparedness. So far, ENISA has held four editions of the exercise, with the next one scheduled to take place in 2018. Enabling: improve stakeholder engagement, including with member states, other EU entities and outside of the EU at the international level.

## Reference documents

*Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 concerning the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 Text with EEA relevance, (EU) No 526/2013, Official Journal of the European Union L 165/41 (2013): 41-58, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/526/oj>.*

“Final report on the Evaluation of the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA),” European Commission, September 19, 2017, <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/final-report-evaluation-european-union-agency-network-and-information-security-enisa>.

European Commission, “Proposal for a Regulation on ENISA, the ‘EU Cybersecurity Agency’, and repealing Regulation (EU) 526/2013, and on Information and Communication Technology cybersecurity certification (‘Cybersecurity Act’),” *COM(2017) 477 final*, September 13, 2017, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2017:477:FIN>.

## EUROPEAN UNION’S JUDICIAL COOPERATION UNIT (EUROJUST)



**Budget:** €47.9 million (2017); €247.2 million (2014-2020)

**DG:** JUST

**Headquarters:** The Hague, The Netherlands

**Goal:** to improve the co-ordination of investigations and prosecutions among the competent judicial authorities of the EU member states when they deal with serious cross-border and organised crime.

**Tasks:** EUROJUST improves co-operation between the competent authorities, in particular by facilitating the execution of international mutual legal assistance and the implementation of European Arrest Warrants. EUROJUST also supports the relevant authorities in order to improve the effectiveness of investigations and prosecutions.

## Reference documents

Council Decision of 28 February 2002 setting up EUROJUST with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime (2002/187/JHA), 2002/187/JHA, *Official Journal of the European Communities* L 63/1 (2002): 1-13, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2002/187/oj>.

For information purposes only, the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union has prepared a consolidated version of the EUROJUST Council Decision that reflects changes instrumented through two subsequent amendments in 2003 and 2008: <http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/doclibrary/Eurojust-framework/ejdecision/Consolidated%20version%20of%20the%20Eurojust%20Council%20Decision/Eurojust-Council-Decision-2009Consolidated-EN.pdf>.





# ANNEX





# Statistical Annex

TABLE 1: AREAS COVERED BY EU DELEGATIONS AND OFFICES

2017

GEOGRAPHIC AREAS COVERED			
Afghanistan	Eritrea	Mauritania	Sudan
Albania	Ethiopia	Mauritius	Swaziland
Algeria	Fiji	Mexico	Switzerland
Angola	the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	Moldova	Syria
Argentina	Gabon	Mongolia	Taiwan
Armenia	Georgia	Montenegro	Tajikistan
Australia	Ghana	Morocco	Tanzania
Azerbaijan	Guatemala	Mozambique	Thailand
Bangladesh	Guinea	Myanmar	The Gambia
Barbados	Guinea Bissau	Namibia	Togo
Belarus	Guyana	Nepal	Trinidad and Tobago
Benin	Haiti	New Zealand	Tunisia
Bolivia	Honduras	Nicaragua	Turkey
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Hong Kong	Niger	Turkmenistan
Botswana	Iceland	Nigeria	Uganda
Brazil	India	Norway	Ukraine
Burkina Faso	Indonesia	Pakistan	United Arab Emirates
Burundi	Iran	Palestine	United States of America
Cambodia	Iraq	Panama	Uruguay
Cameroon	Israel	Papua New Guinea	Uzbekistan
Canada	Jamaica	Paraguay	Venezuela
Cape Verde	Japan	Peru	Vietnam
Central African Republic	Jordan	Philippines	Yemen
Chad	Kazakhstan	Republic of Congo	Zambia
Chile	Kenya	Serbia	Zimbabwe
China	Kosovo	Russia	
Colombia	Kyrgyzstan	Rwanda	
Costa Rica	Laos	Saudi Arabia	
Côte d'Ivoire	Lebanon	Senegal	
Cuba	Lesotho	Sierra Leone	
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Liberia	Singapore	
Djibouti	Libya	Solomon Islands	
Dominican Republic	Macao	Somalia	
East Timor	Madagascar	South Africa	
Ecuador	Malawi	South Korea	
Egypt	Malaysia	South Sudan	
El Salvador	Mali	Sri Lanka	

**INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS (LOCATIONS)**

AU (Addis Ababa)	Council of Europe (Strasbourg)	OECD & UN (Paris)	UN, IAEA & OSCE (Vienna)
ASEAN (Jakarta)	FAO (Rome)	UN (New York)	UN & WTO (Geneva)

**TABLE 2: HEADS OF DELEGATIONS BY STAFF TYPE**

2011-2017, %

STAFF TYPE/YEAR	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Officials	79	67	57	54	53	55	56
Diplomats	21	33	43	46	47	45	44

**TABLE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF STAFF OF EU DELEGATIONS BY INSTITUTION AND TYPE OF CONTRACT**

2017

INSTITUTION/ CONTRACT TYPE	Seconded national experts	Local agents	Contract agents	Assistants	Administrators	TOTAL
EEAS	62	1,056	228	180	396	<b>1,922</b>
Commission	29	2,016	939	96	499	<b>3,579</b>
Total	91	3,072	1,167	276	895	<b>5,501</b>



**TABLE 4: UNSC VOTING RECORD OF VETOED OR NOT ADOPTED DRAFT RESOLUTIONS AND NON-UNANIMOUS RESOLUTIONS**

2017

Status	p	p	p	p	p	np	np	np	np	np	np	np	np	np	np
EU membership				EU	EU	EU	EU								
DOCUMENT & DATE/COUNTRY	China	Russia	United States	France	United Kingdom	Italy	Sweden	Bolivia	Egypt	Ethiopia	Japan	Kazakhstan	Senegal	Ukraine	Uruguay
<b>S/RES/2393 (2017) on the situation in the Middle East (renewed authorization for cross-border and cross-conflict-line humanitarian access to Syria)</b>															
19/12/17	a	a	y	y	y	y	y	a	y	y	y	y	y	y	y
<b>Draft resolution S/2017/1060 on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question (reaffirmation of Jerusalem as final status issue)</b>															
18/12/17	y	y	n	y	y	y	y	y	y	y	y	y	y	y	y
<b>Draft resolution S/2017/970 on the situation in the Middle East (extension of the UNJIM mandate for Syria)</b>															
17/11/17	a	n	y	y	y	y	y	n	y	y	y	y	y	y	y
<b>Draft resolution S/2017/968 on the situation in the Middle East (extension of the UNJIM mandate for Syria)</b>															
16/11/17	y	y	n	n	n	n	n	y	a	a	a	y	a	n	n
<b>Draft resolution S/2017/962 on the situation in the Middle East (extension of the UNJIM mandate for Syria)</b>															
16/11/17	a	n	y	y	y	y	y	n	a	y	y	y	y	y	y
<b>S/RES/2385 (2017) on the situation in Somalia (extension of arms embargoes on Somalia and Eritrea)</b>															
14/11/17	a	a	y	y	y	y	y	a	a	y	y	y	y	y	y
<b>Draft resolution S/2017/884 on the situation in the Middle East (extension of the UNJIM mandate for Syria)</b>															
24/10/17	a	n	y	y	y	y	y	n	y	y	y	a	y	y	y
<b>Draft resolution S/2017/315 on the situation in the Middle East (condemnation of chemical weapons use in Syria)</b>															
12/4/17	a	n	y	y	y	y	y	n	y	a	y	a	y	y	y
<b>Draft resolution S/2017/172 on the situation in the Middle East (proposed sanctions for use of chemical weapons in Syria)</b>															
28/2/17	n	n	y	y	y	y	y	n	a	a	y	a	y	y	y

Key: p = permanent UNSC member, np = non-permanent UNSC member, a = abstention, y = yes vote, n = no vote

**TABLE 5: EU SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES**

2017

AREA/THEME	NAME	FINANCIAL AMOUNT OF REFERENCE	START OF FINANCIAL AMOUNT OF REFERENCE	END OF FINANCIAL AMOUNT OF REFERENCE	END OF MANDATE
		€ million			
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Lars-Gunnar Wigemark	7.7	01/03/17	30/06/18	30/06/18
Central Asia	Peter Burian	1.2	01/03/17	30/06/18	30/06/18
Horn of Africa	Alexander Rondos	3.4	01/03/17	30/06/18	30/06/18
Human Rights	Stavros Lambrinidis	0.9	01/03/17	28/02/18	28/02/19
Kosovo	Nataliya Apostolova	3.6	01/03/17	30/06/18	30/06/18
Middle East Peace Process	Fernando Gentilini	1.8	01/03/17	30/06/18	30/06/18
Sahel	Angel Losada Fernandez	1.8	01/03/17	30/06/18	30/06/18
South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia	Toivo Klaar	3.0	01/03/17	30/06/18	30/06/18

**TABLE 6: EU RESTRICTIVE MEASURES**

in force in 2017

TARGET/TYPE	Embargo on arms, related material and military services	Freezing of funds and economic assets	Embargo on dual-use goods	Financial restrictions (incl. on investments and prohibitions to satisfy claims)	Restricted services and access to transportation infrastructure for vessels and aircrafts	Inspections of cargo suspected of carrying prohibited items	Restrictions on admission (travel ban for certain individuals)	Restrictions on services and equipment used for internal repression	Ban on trade in energy products and/or related technology and services	Ban on trade in luxury products (incl. precious metals and diamonds)	Export restrictions on telecommunications equipment	Other restrictions (incl. on training and education)	Ban on trade in nuclear materials and/or related technology and services	Ban on trade in raw materials and/or related technology and services
Afghanistan	•	•					•							
Belarus	•	•					•	•						
Bosnia and Herzegovina*							•							

TARGET/TYPE	Embargo on arms, related material and military services	Freezing of funds and economic assets	Embargo on dual-use goods	Financial restrictions (incl. on investments and prohibitions to satisfy claims)	Restricted services and access to transportation infrastructure for vessels and aircrafts	Inspections of cargo suspected of carrying prohibited items	Restrictions on admission (travel ban for certain individuals)	Restrictions on services and equipment used for internal repression	Ban on trade in energy products and/or related technology and services	Ban on trade in luxury products (incl. precious metals and diamonds)	Export restrictions on telecommunications equipment	Other restrictions (incl. on training and education)	Ban on trade in nuclear materials and/or related technology and services	Ban on trade in raw materials and/or related technology and services
Burundi		•		•			•							
Central African Republic	•	•					•	•						
China	•													
Democratic Republic of Congo	•	•					•	•						
Egypt		•												
Eritrea	•	•				•	•							
Guinea		•					•							
Guinea-Bissau*		•					•							
Haiti				•										
Iran**	•	•	•	•		•	•	•			•		•	•
Iraq***	•	•		•					•					
Lebanon	•	•					•							
Libya	•	•		•	•	•	•	•				•		
Mali		•					•							
Moldova							•							
Montenegro				•										
Myanmar	•							•						
North Korea	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		•	•		•	•	•
Russia	•		•	•					•			•		
Serbia				•										
Somalia	•	•				•	•					•		•
South Sudan	•	•					•							
Sudan	•	•					•							

TARGET/TYPE	Embargo on arms, related material and military services	Freezing of funds and economic assets	Embargo on dual-use goods	Financial restrictions (incl. on investments and prohibitions to satisfy claims)	Restricted services and access to transportation infrastructure for vessels and aircrafts	Inspections of cargo suspected of carrying prohibited items	Restrictions on admission (travel ban for certain individuals)	Restrictions on services and equipment used for internal repression	Ban on trade in energy products and/or related technology and services	Ban on trade in luxury products (incl. precious metals and diamonds)	Export restrictions on telecommunications equipment	Other restrictions (incl. on training and education)	Ban on trade in nuclear materials and/or related technology and services	Ban on trade in raw materials and/or related technology and services
Syria***	•	•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		
Tunisia		•												
Ukraine*		•		•			•		•			•	•	•
United States****														
Venezuela	•	•					•	•			•			
Yemen	•	•				•	•							
Zimbabwe	•	•					•	•						
Specific measures to combat terrorism *****		•												
Persons and entities associated with Daesh and al-Qaeda	•	•		•			•							

\* Includes measures targeting actions and actors jeopardising national reconciliation processes, the internal stability or territorial integrity of the listed country.

\*\* This listing only reflects restrictive measures related to human rights violations and proliferations concerns that remain in force after the JCPOA Implementation Day (16 January 2016).

\*\*\* Export restrictions include cultural property.

\*\*\*\* The EU has maintained protection against certain effects of sanctions applied by the US for EU entities carrying out business in Cuba, Iran and Libya since 1996.

\*\*\*\*\* Listings refer to specific measures to combat terrorism under Common Position 2001/931 (CSDP). Additional measures are aimed at persons and entities associated with Daesh and al-Qaeda.

**TABLE 7: MFF HEADING 4 OVERVIEW**

2014-2020, € million

INSTRUMENT/YEAR	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	TOTAL
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)	2,341	2,446	2,630	3,168	2,988	3,180	3,275	<b>19,662</b>
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)	2,192	2,036	2,187	2,440	2,243	2,358	2,447	<b>15,433</b>
Instrument for Pre-accession assistance (IPA II)	1,578	1,572	1,662	2,115	1,704	1,738	1,771	<b>11,699</b>
Humanitarian aid	920	929	1,109	945	959	979	981	<b>6,622</b>
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)	314	321	327	327	341	347	354	<b>2,339</b>
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)	318	320	327	273	341	347	354	<b>2,339</b>
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)	184	182	186	189	194	198	202	<b>1,333</b>
Guarantee Fund for External Actions (GF)	58	144	257	241	178	160	85	<b>1,193</b>
Partnership Instrument (PI)	119	119	126	134	144	155	163	<b>955</b>
Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA)	60	78	80	46	82	84	84	<b>565</b>
Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC)	31	61	72	62	33	34	33	<b>225</b>
Decentralised Agencies	20	20	20	20	22	23	23	<b>154</b>
European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps (EUAV)	13	15	18	22	26	27	27	<b>148</b>
Union Civil Protection Mechanism	20	17	18	21	21	22	21	<b>145</b>

INSTRUMENT/YEAR	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	TOTAL
Other	156	149	151	159	163	166	167	<b>1,167</b>

Note on methodology: figures for 2017 and previous years are given as presented in the adopted budgets and reflect prices in then-year euros. MFF totals per instrument, which comprise appropriations for the entire timeframe covered by the MFF (2014-2020), are based on the original projections and given in 2013 prices. These aggregate estimates are not adjusted to reflect differences between the estimated and approved budgets for the years 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017.

**TABLE 8: DCI DISTRIBUTION PER PROGRAMME**

2017 and MFF (2014-2020), € million

PROGRAMME TYPE	PROGRAMME	2017 COMMITMENT	MFF ALLOCATION (2014-2020)
Geographic	South Asia		3,813.00
	North and South-East Asia	771.72	2,870.00
	Latin America	333.35	2,500.00
	Central Asia	128.81	1,072.00
	Middle East	66.50	545.00
	Other countries*	298.45	251.00
	Unallocated	:	758.00
Thematic	Global Public Goods and Challenges	1,008.35	5,101.00
	Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities	255.24	1,907.00
	Erasmus+ (DCI contribution)	108.92	:
Pan-African	Pan-African Programme	109.20	845.00
Support expenditure	Support expenditure	84.99	:

\* 2017 commitments exceed MFF allocations based on distribution of previously unallocated funds: Afghanistan (€238.68 million) and South Africa (€59.77 million).

: = data not available

**TABLE 9: ICSP-FUNDED PROJECTS BY THEME**

projects started in 2016 and 2017

THEME/YEAR	2016	2017	2016	2017
	<i>Funding (€ million)</i>		<i>Number of projects</i>	
Assistance to migrants and host populations	31	14	7	4
Children	4.5	5.8	1	5
Confidence building	45.5	38.1	19	22

Countering violent extremism/counter terrorism	:	2.6	:	2
Culture	3.7	2.1	3	2
Early warning and mainstreaming conflict sensitivity	0.2	2.5	1	1
Economic recovery/livelihoods	17.6	0.7	5	1
Electoral assistance	:	5.7	:	2
Humanitarian mine action; small arms and light weapons	6.9	7.9	5	3
Mainstreaming human rights	7.9	7.9	4	3
Natural disaster preparedness and response	18	:	2	:
Natural resources and conflict	4.4	:	4	:
Reconstruction and rehabilitation	2.4	1	2	1
Rule of law/legal and judicial development	4.5	:	1	:
Security sector reform	34.9	26.7	6	7
Transitional justice	9	:	2	:
Women, peace and security and gender mainstreaming	1.3	:	2	:
Unspecified or cross-listed	16.7	39.7	4	17

**TABLE 10: ICSP-FUNDED PROJECTS BY REGION**

projets started in 2016 and 2017, € million

REGION	COUNTRY/AREA	FUNDING
Americas	Colombia, Guatemala	10.192
Asia	Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar/Burma, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka	30.182
Europe and the Caucasus	Belgium*, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine	18.406
MENA	Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia	38.610
Sub-Saharan Africa	Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Sudan, The Gambia	47.094
	Global and multi-country projects	10.216

\* Financing the provision of expertise and tools to support Recovery and Peace Building Assessments and Post-Disaster Needs Assessments.

**TABLE 11: ICSP DISTRIBUTION PER REGULATION**

€ billion

REGULATION	2014-2020 (AUTHORISED)	2017 (AUTHORISED)
Art. 3: Assistance in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis to prevent conflicts (~70% of the 2014-2020 financial envelope)*	1,637.0	170.2
Art. 4: Assistance for conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness (9% of the 2014-2020 financial envelope)	211.0	29.0
Art. 5: Assistance in addressing global and trans-regional threats and emerging threats (funding share not explicitly specified)	491.0	64.9

\* By definition, the distribution to Article 3 (crisis response component) is not pre-determined.

**TABLE 12: IPA II BENEFICIARY COUNTRIES**

2017, € million

TYPE	COUNTRY	FUNDING
EU candidate countries	Albania	92.9
	the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	94.9
	Montenegro	39.5
	Serbia	215.4
	Turkey	636.4
Potential EU candidate countries	Kosovo	91.9
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	43.7
Other	Multi-country programmes	410.4

**TABLE 13: MACRO-FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE**

2017, € million

COUNTRY	FUNDING	FUNDING TYPE	STATUS
Georgia	10	Grant	Proposed
Georgia	35	Loan	Proposed
Georgia	10	Grant	Disbursed
Georgia	13	Loan	Disbursed
Jordan	100	Loan	Outstanding
Jordan	100	Loan	Disbursed
Moldova	40	Grant	Approved
Moldova	60	Loan	Approved
Tunisia	300	Loan	Outstanding
Tunisia	300	Loan	Disbursed



COUNTRY	FUNDING	FUNDING TYPE	STATUS
Ukraine	600	Loan	Outstanding
Ukraine	600	Loan	Disbursed

**TABLE 14: PI FINANCIAL ALLOCATION PER REGION**

2017, € million

OBJECTIVE/REGION	Americas	Asia and the Pacific	Gulf countries	Russia, Central Asia and the Arctic	TOTAL
Academic cooperation, public diplomacy and outreach (Art. 1.2(d))	62	70	8	33	<b>173</b>
Europe 2020 Strategy (Art. 1.2(b))	60	68	3	10	<b>141</b>
Global challenges and policy support (Art. 1.2(a))	126	142	12	51	<b>331</b>
Market access, trade, investment and business opportunities (Art. 1.2(c))	80	120	4	25	<b>229</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>328</b>	<b>400</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>874*</b>

\* The remaining difference to the MFF allocations is accounted for by reserve and operational support funds.

**TABLE 15: DEFENCE SPENDING OF EU MEMBER STATES**

2015-2017

Publisher	MILITARY EXPENDITURE 2017 (CURRENT \$ BILLION)						MILITARY EXPENDITURE (% OF GDP)					
	IISS	IISS	IISS	NATO	NATO	NATO	IISS	IISS	IISS	NATO	NATO	NATO
Country/year	2015	2016	2017	2015	2016	2017	2015	2016	2017	2015	2016	2017
AT	2.667	2.888	2.985	:	:	:	0.71	0.75	0.73	:	:	:
BE	4.01	3.861	4.254	4.202	4.315	4.458	0.88	0.83	0.87	0.92	0.92	0.9
BG	0.56	0.671	0.676	0.633	0.671	0.871	1.12	1.28	1.21	1.26	1.26	1.53
HR	0.641	0.591	0.657	0.669	0.623	0.69	1.31	1.17	1.23	1.37	1.23	1.26
CY	0.328	0.335	0.397	:	:	:	1.68	1.69	1.88	:	:	:
CZ	1.78	1.955	2.205	1.921	1.866	2.249	0.95	1	1.05	1.03	0.96	1.05
DK	3.516	3.514	3.807	3.364	3.593	3.802	1.17	1.15	1.17	1.12	1.17	1.17
EE	0.467	0.498	0.543	0.463	0.497	0.538	2.07	2.14	2.11	2.05	2.13	2.08
FI	3.074	3.1	3.191	:	:	:	1.32	1.3	1.27	:	:	:

Publisher	MILITARY EXPENDITURE 2017 (CURRENT \$ BILLION)						MILITARY EXPENDITURE (% OF GDP)					
	IISS	IISS	IISS	NATO	NATO	NATO	IISS	IISS	IISS	NATO	NATO	NATO
Country/year	2015	2016	2017	2015	2016	2017	2015	2016	2017	2015	2016	2017
FR	46.626	46.784	48.64	43.474	44.191	45.927	1.92	1.9	1.89	1.79	1.79	1.79
DE	36.589	37.943	41.734	39.813	41.59	45.472	1.08	1.09	1.14	1.18	1.2	1.24
EL	4.733	4.598	4.725	4.517	4.635	4.737	2.43	2.36	2.31	2.31	2.41	2.36
HU	1.07	1.061	1.265	1.132	1.289	1.464	0.88	0.85	0.96	0.92	1.02	1.06
IE	0.998	0.994	1.039	:	:	:	0.34	0.33	0.32	:	:	:
IT	21.495	22.112	22.859	19.566	22.373	23.369	1.18	1.19	1.19	1.01	1.12	1.12
LV	0.283	0.407	0.507	0.281	0.403	0.529	1.05	1.47	1.68	1.04	1.46	1.75
LT	0.471	0.637	0.816	0.471	0.636	0.814	1.14	1.49	1.75	1.14	1.49	1.73
LU	0.214	0.235	0.294	0.249	0.236	0.288	0.37	0.39	0.46	0.43	0.4	0.46
MT	0.056	0.058	0.064	:	:	:	0.54	0.53	0.54	:	:	:
NL	8.877	9.121	10.1	8.669	9.108	9.765	1.17	1.17	1.23	1.12	1.15	1.15
PL	10.128	9.101	9.837	10.596	9.405	10.337	2.12	1.94	1.93	2.22	2	1.99
PT	2.502	2.443	2.445	2.644	2.615	2.824	1.26	1.19	1.15	1.33	1.28	1.31
RO	2.481	2.763	4.041	2.581	2.633	3.658	1.4	1.47	1.97	1.45	1.41	1.8
SK	0.884	0.974	1.116	0.986	1.003	1.129	1.01	1.09	1.17	1.13	1.12	1.19
SI	0.444	0.446	0.474	0.401	0.449	0.478	1.03	1	0.99	0.93	1	0.98
ES	13.05	9.975	12.112	11.09	9.971	12.074	1.09	0.81	0.93	0.93	0.81	0.92
SE	5.723	5.738	5.962	:	:	:	1.15	1.12	1.1	:	:	:
UK	58.243	52.577	50.721	59.492	56.964	55.237	2.03	2	1.98	2.06	2.15	2.12
<b>EU-28 total/ average</b>	<b>231.910</b>	<b>225.380</b>	<b>237.466</b>	:	:	:	<b>1.23</b>	<b>1.24</b>	<b>1.29</b>	:	:	:
<b>EU-NATO-22 total/average</b>	:	:	:	<b>217.214</b>	<b>219.066</b>	<b>230.710</b>	<b>1.30</b>	<b>1.32</b>	<b>1.38</b>	<b>1.31</b>	<b>1.34</b>	<b>1.41</b>
<b>PESCO-25 total/average</b>	<b>170.095</b>	<b>169.231</b>	<b>182.874</b>	:	:	:	<b>1.23</b>	<b>1.24</b>	<b>1.30</b>	:	:	:

**TABLE 16: CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS**

as of December 2017

COUNTRY/ REGION	MISSION/OPERATION	TYPE	END OF MANDATE	Financial arrangement		
				€ million	START	END
	Military			Common costs		
Bosnia and Herzegovina	EUFOR ALTHEA	Military	08/11/18	14.00	:	:
Mali	EUTM Mali	Military	18/05/18	33.00	5/1/16	5/1/18

COUNTRY/ REGION	MISSION/OPERATION	TYPE	END OF MANDATE	€ million	Financial arrangement	
				FUNDING	START	END
Somalia	EUTM Somalia	Military	31/12/18	13.50	1/1/17	12/31/17
Central African Republic	EUTM RCA	Military	20/09/18	4.20	1/1/17	12/31/17
	EUNAVFOR Somalia (Operation Atalanta)	Military	31/12/18	5.90	1/1/17	12/31/17
	EUNAVFOR MED (Operation Sophia)	Military	31/12/18	6.00	7/1/17	12/1/18
	<b>Civilian</b>			<b>Budget</b>		
Kosovo	EULEX Kosovo	Civilian	14/06/18	49.60	6/1/17	6/1/18
Ukraine	EUAM Ukraine	Civilian	31/05/19	31.90	12/1/17	5/1/19
Georgia	EUMM Georgia	Civilian	14/12/18	19.90	12/1/17	12/1/18
Palestine	EUBAM Rafah	Civilian	30/06/18	1.98	7/1/17	6/1/18
Iraq	EUAM Iraq	Civilian	17/10/18	14.00	10/1/17	10/1/18
Palestine	EUPOL COPPS Palestinian Territories	Civilian	30/06/18	12.30	7/1/17	6/1/18
Somalia	EUCAP Somalia	Civilian	31/12/18	27.00	3/1/18	12/1/18
Niger	EUCAP Sahel Niger	Civilian	15/07/18	31.00	7/1/17	7/1/18
Libya	EUBAM Libya	Civilian	31/12/18	31.20	8/1/17	12/1/18
Mali	EUCAP Sahel Mali	Civilian	14/01/19	28.45	1/1/18	1/1/19

Personnel							
COUNTRY/ REGION	MISSION/OPERATION	MEMBER STATES	THIRD STATES	LOCAL	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
Bosnia and Herzegovina	EUFOR ALTHEA	356	186	:	:	:	<b>542</b>
Mali	EUTM Mali	506	10	:	:	:	<b>516</b>
Somalia	EUTM Somalia	166	6	:	:	:	<b>172</b>
Central African Republic	EUTM RCA	129	44	:	:	:	<b>173</b>
	EUNAVFOR Somalia (Operation Atalanta)	359	18	:	:	:	<b>377</b>
	EUNAVFOR MED (Operation Sophia)	905	0	:	:	:	<b>905</b>
Kosovo	EULEX Kosovo	406	13	346	562	203	<b>765</b>
Ukraine	EUAM Ukraine	131	3	127	172	89	<b>261</b>
Georgia	EUMM Georgia	207	0	112	195	123	<b>318</b>
Palestine	EUBAM Rafah	8	0	8	10	6	<b>16</b>
Iraq	EUAM Iraq	23	0	0	20	3	<b>23</b>
Palestine	EUPOL COPPS Palestinian Territories	47	1	44	65	27	<b>92</b>

COUNTRY/ REGION	MISSION/OPERATION	MEMBER STATES	THIRD STATES	Personnel			TOTAL
				LOCAL	MALE	FEMALE	
Somalia	EUCAP Somalia	82	0	13	70	25	95
Niger	EUCAP Sahel Niger	97	0	42	107	32	139
Libya	EUBAM Libya	23	0	4	21	6	27
Mali	EUCAP Sahel Mali	100	1	41	113	29	142

**TABLE 17: EU BATTLEGROUP ROSTER**

offers and commitments per semester, 2016-2020

YEAR	SEMESTER	ROTATION	LEAD	OPERATIONAL HQ	PARTICIPATING MEMBER STATES	NOTES
2016	Jan-Jun	First	PL	PL	PL, CZ, HU, SK, Ukraine	
2016	Jan-Jun	Second	EL	EL	EL, BG, CY, RO, Ukraine	
2016	Jul-Dec	First	UK	UK	UK, FI, IE, LT, LV, SE, Ukraine	BE, DE, ES, FR, LU, FI as Framework Nations of Eurocorps offer to provide the core of the force headquarters for the EUBGs in the second semester of 2016.
2016	Jul-Dec	Second	DE	DE	DE, AT, CZ, IE, HR, LU, NL	
2017	Jan-Jun	First	IT	IT	IT, AT, HR, HU, SI	BE, DE, ES, FR, LU, FI as Framework Nations of Eurocorps offer to provide the core of the force headquarters for the EUBGs in the first semester of 2017. IT serves as framework nation under the Defence Cooperation Initiative (DECI).
2017	Jan-Jun	Second	FR	FR	FR, BE	
2017	Jul-Dec	First	ES	FR	ES, IT, PT	IT serves as Framework Nation under the Defence Cooperation Initiative (DECI).
2017	Jul-Dec	Second	IT	IT	IT, AT, HR, HU, SI	
2018	Jan-Jun	First	EL	EL	EL, BG, CY, RO, Ukraine	

YEAR	SEMESTER	ROTATION	LEAD	OPERATIONAL HQ	PARTICIPATING MEMBER STATES	NOTES
2018	Jan-Jun	Second	Benelux	UK	NL, AT, BE, LU	
2018	Jul-Dec	First	:	:		
2018	Jul-Dec	Second	Benelux	UK	NL, AT, BE, DE, LU	
2019	Jan-Jun	First	ES	FR	ES, IT, PT	BE and IT participation is pending a political decision.
2019	Jan-Jun	Second	FR	FR	FR, BE	
2019	Jul-Dec	First	PL	PL	PL, CZ, HU, SK	Pending a political decision by the UK to serve as Framework Nation. LT participation is pending a confirmation of the UK as a Framework Nation.
2019	Jul-Dec	Second	UK	UK	UK, LT	
2020	Jan-Jun	First	EL	EL	EL, BG, CY, RO, Serbia, Ukraine	
2020	Jan-Jun	Second	:	:		
2020	Jul-Dec	First	DE	:	DE, AT, CZ, FI, HR, IE, NL, SE	HR, IE, NL, SE and IT participation is pending a political decision.
2020	Jul-Dec	Second	IT	IT	IT, EL, ES	
2021	Jan-Jun	First	:	:		
2021	Jan-Jun	Second	:	:		

**TABLE 18: BUDGET OF CSDP AGENCIES**

legal basis and budgets 2015-2017, € million

AGENCY	LEGAL BASIS/YEAR	2015	2016	2017
European Defence Agency (EDA)	Council Decision 2015/1835/CFSP	30.22	30.53	31.00
EU Satellite Centre (SatCen)	Council Decision 2016/2112/CFSP	17.98	17.38	18.74
European Security and Defence College (ESDC)*	Council Decision 2016/2382/CFSP	0.54	0.63	0.70
EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)**	Council Decision 2014/75/CFSP	5.25	5.22	5.26

\* Member States and EU institutions bear all costs related to their participation in the ESDC.

\*\* As of 2015, the EUISS presents a consolidated budget which also includes costs related to the EUISS Pension Fund.

**TABLE 19: SELECT MILITARY EXERCISES**

with participation of two or more EU member states, 2017

EXERCISE	LOCATION	DOMAIN	START DATE	END DATE	PARTICIPANTS	NUMBER OF EU MEMBER STATE PARTICIPANTS	NUMBER OF THIRD COUNTRY PARTICIPANTS
Bison Drawsko 17	Drawsko Pomorskie, Poland	Land	16/01/2017	24/02/2017	Canada, EE, DE, NL, PL, United States	4	2
Sea Shield 17	Black Sea	Sea	01/02/2017	11/02/2017	BG, Canada, EL, RO, ES, Turkey, Ukraine, United States	4	4
Noble Jump I (alert exercise)	Home bases	Joint/other	01/02/2017	01/04/2017	Albania, BG, DE, NL, Norway, PL, RO, ES, UK, United States	7	3
Dynamic Guard 17-1	North Atlantic	Sea	06/02/2017	12/02/2017	BE, DE, Norway	2	1
Northern Griffin 17	Lapland, Finland	Joint/other (special operations forces)	20/02/2017	17/03/2017	EE, FI, PL, SE, United States	4	1
Platinum Eagle 17-1	Smârdan, Romania	Joint (land, maritime)	20/02/2017	01/03/2017	BG, FYROM, Montenegro, Serbia, RO, SI, Ukraine, United States	3	5
Dynamic Front II	Grafenwoehr, Germany	Land	26/02/2017	10/03/2017	CZ, FR, DE, IT, LT, RO, Turkey, UK, United States	7	2
Poseidon 17	Black Sea	Sea	05/03/2017	13/03/2017	BG, DE, EL, PL, RO, ES, Turkey	6	1
Allied Spirit VI	Hohenfels, Germany	Land	08/03/2017	31/03/2017	Canada, the CZ, EE, FR, DE, HU, IT, LV, Macedonia, NL, SI, United States	9	3
Dynamic Manta 17	Ionian Sea	Sea	13/03/2017	25/03/2017	Canada, FR, DE, EL, IT, Norway, ES, Turkey, UK, United States	6	4
Joint Warrior 17-1	Multiple locations, UK	Joint (air, land, maritime)	26/03/2017	07/04/2017	BE, Canada, DK, EE, FR, DE, NL, New Zealand, Norway, PL, ES, SE, UK, United States	10	4
Frisian Flag 17	Leeuwarden, Netherlands	Air	27/03/2017	07/04/2017	BE, FR, DE, NL, PT, UK, United States	6	1

EXERCISE	LOCATION	DOMAIN	START DATE	END DATE	PARTICIPANTS	NUMBER OF EU MEMBER STATE PARTICIPANTS	NUMBER OF THIRD COUNTRY PARTICIPANTS
Noble Jump II (deployment exercise)	Bulgaria, Greece and Romania	Joint/other	01/04/2017	17/06/2017	Albania, BG, DE, NL, Norway, PL, RO, ES, UK, United States	7	3
Alligator Dagger 17-1	Gulf of Aden	Sea	05/04/2017	20/04/2017	FR, UK, United States	2	1
Resolute Castle 17*	Multiple locations, Romania	Land	14/04/2017	30/09/2017	RO, UK, United States	2	1
Summer Shield XIV	Adazi, Latvia	Land	17/04/2017	30/04/2017	BG, Canada, EE, LV, LT, LU, RO, SK, SE, UK, United States	9	2
Combined Resolve VIII	Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels, Germany	Land	19/04/2017	16/06/2017	Albania, FI, HU, Kosovo, LT, FYROM, RO, SI, Ukraine, United States	5	5
Steadfast Armour 17	Ramstein, Germany	Land	24/04/2017	28/04/2017	FR, DE, NL, ES, United States	4	1
Ramstein Alloy 4 (17-1)	Šiauliai, Lithuania	Air	24/04/2017	25/04/2017	DE, LT, NL, Norway, PL, United States	4	2
Platinum Eagle 17-II	Babadag, Romania	Joint (land, maritime)	24/04/2017	04/05/2017	Azerbaijan, BG, Canada, Montenegro, RO, Ukraine, United States	2	5
Locked Shields 2017	Tallinn, Estonia and participants' home bases	Cyber	24/04/2017	28/04/2017	<i>Inter alia</i> : CZ, EE, FI, Georgia, LT, NL, PL, SE, UK, United States	:	:
Saber Junction 17	Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels, Germany	Land	25/04/2017	19/05/2017	Albania, BG, Georgia, IT, Kosovo, LT, FYROM, PL, RO, SI, Ukraine, UK, United States	7	6
Fire Blade 17 (EDA-led)	Pápa, Hungary	Air	01/05/2017	11/05/2017	AT, BE, DE, SI, HU	5	:
Quick Lion (EU Battlegroup 2017-2 exercise)	Zaragoza, Spain	Land	02/05/2017	12/05/2017	IT, PT, ES	3	:
Flaming Sword	Multiple locations, Lithuania	Joint/other (special operations forces)	02/05/2017	19/05/2017	DK, EE, Georgia, LV, Norway, PL, PT, Ukraine, United States	5	4

EXERCISE	LOCATION	DOMAIN	START DATE	END DATE	PARTICIPANTS	NUMBER OF EU MEMBER STATE PARTICIPANTS	NUMBER OF THIRD COUNTRY PARTICIPANTS
Kevadtorm 17 ('Spring Storm')	Estonia	Land	08/05/2017	25/05/2017	BE, Canada, DK, EE, FI, FR, Georgia, DE, LV, LT, NL, PL, ES, SE, Ukraine, UK, United States	13	4
Red Griffin/ Colibri 50	Multiple locations, Germany	Land	08/05/2017	19/05/2017	FR, DE, NL, United States	3	1
Mare Aperto 17 ('Open Sea')	Mediterranean Sea	Sea	08/05/2017	18/05/2017	Canada, FR, IT, PL, PT, ES, Turkey	5	2
Baltic Fortress 17	Baltic Sea	Sea	17/05/2017	19/05/2017	BE, EE, LV, LT	4	:
Artic Challenge 17 (ACE)	Finland, Norway and Sweden	Air	22/05/2017	02/06/2017	BE, Canada, FI, FR, DE, NL, Norway, ES, SE, Switzerland, UK, United States	8	4
Load Diffuser 17	Pápa, Hungary	Air	22/05/2017	09/06/2017	HR, CZ, HU, SK, SI, UK, United States	6	1
Saber Strike17	Baltic States and Poland	Land	28/05/2017	24/06/2017	BE, Canada, HR, DK, EE, FI, FR, DE, IT, LV, LT, LU, NL, Norway, PL, PT, SI, SK, UK, United States	17	3
Flaming Thunder 17	Pabrade, Lithuania	Land	29/05/2017	04/06/2017	DE, LV, LT, NL, PL,	5	:
Maple 50	Canada	Air	29/05/2017	23/06/2017	Canada, FR, Singapore, UK, United States	2	3
Spanish Minex 17	Balearic Sea	Sea	29/05/2017	08/06/2017	FR, DE, EL, IT, PL, ES, Turkey	6	1
BALTOPS 17	Baltic Sea	Sea	01/06/2017	16/06/2017	BE, DK, EE, FI, FR, DE, LV, LT, NL, Norway, PL, SE, UK, United States	12	2
Adriatic Strike 17	Multiple locations, Slovenia	Joint/other	04/06/2017	10/06/2017	AT, BE, Canada, HR, CZ, DK, FR, FYROM, DE, HU, IT, LV, LT, Montenegro, NL, PL, RO, SK, SI, United States	16	4
Orion 17	Beja, Portugal	Land	05/06/2017	20/06/2017	PT, ES, United States	2	1



EXERCISE	LOCATION	DOMAIN	START DATE	END DATE	PARTICIPANTS	NUMBER OF EU MEMBER STATE PARTICIPANTS	NUMBER OF THIRD COUNTRY PARTICIPANTS
Iron Wolf 17-I	Rukla and Pabrade, Lithuania	Land	12/06/2017	23/06/2017	BE, HR, DE, LT, NL, Norway, PL, PT, RO, UK, United States	9	2
Black Swan 17*	Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania	Land (special operations forces)	26/06/2017	22/07/2017	BG, HR, FYROM, HU, RO, SI, United States	5	2
Brave Warrior 17*	Multiple locations, Hungary	Land	26/06/2017	23/07/2017	CZ, HU, PL, SK, RO, United States	5	1
Szentes Axe 17*	Gyor, Hungary	Land	26/06/2017	07/07/2017	DE, HU, SI, UK, United States	4	1
Dynamic Mongoose	North Atlantic	Sea	26/06/2017	08/07/2017	Canada, DK, FR, DE, Iceland, NL, Norway, PL, UK, United States	6	4
Ramstein Alloy 5 (17-2)	Latvia	Air	27/06/2017	28/06/2017	FI, DE, LT, Norway, PL, ES, United States	5	2
Baltic Ghost 17**	Stuttgart, Germany	Cyber	27/06/2017	29/06/2017	EE, LV, LT, United States	3	1
Getica Saber 17*	Cincu, Romania	Land	10/07/2017	15/07/2017	Armenia, HR, Montenegro, RO, Ukraine, United States	2	4
Precise Response 17	Suffield, Canada	Land	10/07/2017	28/07/2017	AT, BE, Canada, DK, FR, DE, IT, NL, Norway, UK, United States	8	3
Sea Breeze 17* (United States-Ukraine-led)	Black Sea	Sea	10/07/2017	22/07/2017	BE, BG, Canada, FR, Georgia, EL, IT, LT, Moldova, Norway, PL, RO, SE, Turkey, Ukraine, UK, United States	10	7
Sarmis 17	Carpathians, Romania	Land	11/07/2017	22/07/2017	BG, RO, UK	3	:
Saber Guardian 17 (air, land)	Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania	Joint/other	11/07/2017	20/07/2017	Armenia, BG, CZ, DE, HR, Georgia, EL, HU, LT, FYROM, Moldova, Montenegro, NL, PL, RO, Serbia, SK, SI, Turkey, Ukraine, UK, United States	13	9

EXERCISE	LOCATION	DOMAIN	START DATE	END DATE	PARTICIPANTS	NUMBER OF EU MEMBER STATE PARTICIPANTS	NUMBER OF THIRD COUNTRY PARTICIPANTS
Tobruq Legacy 17*	Czech Republic, Lithuania and Romania	Air	12/07/2017	22/07/2017	<i>Inter alia:</i> CZ, LV, LT, PL, RO, UK, United States	:	:
Swift Response 17-I*	Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania	Joint (air, land)	13/07/2017	23/07/2017	BG, Canada, EL, IT, PT, United States	4	2
Breeze 17 (Bulgaria-led)	Black Sea	Sea	14/07/2017	23/07/2017	BG, EL, IT, PL, RO, Turkey, UK, United States	6	2
Eagle Sentinel 17*	Novo Selo, Bulgaria	Joint (air, land)	17/07/2017	20/07/2017	BG, Georgia, EL, United States	2	2
Noble Partner 17	Vaziani and Camp Norio, Georgia	Land	30/07/2017	12/08/2017	Georgia, Armenia, DE, SI, Turkey, Ukraine, UK, United States	3	5
Saxon Warrior 17	North Atlantic	Sea	01/08/2017	10/08/2017	DE, Norway, SE, UK, United States	3	2
BALTRON Squadron Exercise 17-2	Baltic Sea	Sea	07/08/2017	11/08/2017	DE, LV, LT	3	:
Open Spirit 17	Baltic Sea	Sea	18/08/2017	31/08/2017	BE, Canada, EE, FR, DE, LV, LT, Norway, PL, UK,	8	2
Ample Strike 17	Multiple locations, Czech Republic	Joint (air, land)	23/08/2017	12/09/2017	Canada, HR, CZ, DK, EE, FI, FR, DE, HU, IT, LV, LT, NL, PL, SK, SI, UK, United States	16	2
Agile Spirit 17	Akhaltsikhe, Georgia	Land	03/09/2017	11/09/2017	Azerbaijan, BG, Georgia, LV, Ukraine, United States	2	4
Rapid Trident 17	Yavoriv, Ukraine	Land	08/09/2017	23/09/2017	BG, Canada, EE, IT, Georgia, LT, Moldova, Norway, PL, RO, Turkey, Ukraine, UK, United States	7	6
Dynamic Monarch 17	Mediterranean Sea	Sea	08/09/2017	22/09/2017	Canada, FR, IT, Norway, PL, ES, Turkey, UK, United States	5	4

EXERCISE	LOCATION	DOMAIN	START DATE	END DATE	PARTICIPANTS	NUMBER OF EU MEMBER STATE PARTICIPANTS	NUMBER OF THIRD COUNTRY PARTICIPANTS
Northern Coasts 17	Baltic Sea	Sea	08/09/2017	21/09/2017	BE, Canada, HR, DK, EE, FI, FR, DE, LV, LT, NL, Norway, PL, PT, SE, ES, United States	14	3
Cooperative Security 17	Allensteig, Austria	Land	10/09/2017	16/09/2017	AT, HR, CZ, HU, SK, SI	6	:
Northern Frog 17	Tapa, Estonia	Land	11/09/2017	12/09/2017	Canada, EE, FR, IT, LV, UK	5	1
Brilliant Arrow 17 (NRF 2018 Air Component Command combat readiness certification)	Germany and Netherlands	Air	11/09/2017	22/09/2017	DE, EL, PL, Turkey	3	1
Aurora 17	Sweden	Joint/other	11/09/2017	29/09/2017	DK, EE, FI, FR, LV, LT, Norway, SE, United States	7	2
SERPENTEX 17	Corsica, France	Joint/other	11/09/2017	29/09/2017	BE, Canada, CZ, FR, DE, IT, NL, Norway, SI, UK, United States	8	3
Dragon 17	Poland	Joint (air, land, maritime)	20/09/2017	29/09/2017	BG, Georgia, DE, IT, LV, LT, PL, RO, SK, Ukraine, UK, United States	9	3
Formidable Shield 17	Western Isles of Scotland, UK	Sea	24/09/2017	17/10/2017	BE, Canada, DK, FR, DE, IT, NL, ES, UK, United States	8	2
Engineer Thunder 17	Pabrade, Lithuania	Land	25/09/2017	29/09/2017	DE, LT, NL, Norway, United States	3	2
Ramstein Alloy 6 (17-3)	Ämari, Estonia	Air	26/09/2017	27/09/2017	BE, EE, DE, LT, PL, United States	5	1
EU Parallel and Coordinated Exercise (PACE17)**	Multiple locations	Joint/other	28/09/2017	04/10/2017	EEAS, EU-28	28	:
Brilliant Mariner 17 (NRF 2018 Maritime Component Command combat readiness certification)	Mediterranean Sea	Sea	29/09/2017	13/10/2017	Canada, DK, FR, EL, DE, IT, NL, Norway, PT, ES, Turkey, UK	9	3

EXERCISE	LOCATION	DOMAIN	START DATE	END DATE	PARTICIPANTS	NUMBER OF EU MEMBER STATE PARTICIPANTS	NUMBER OF THIRD COUNTRY PARTICIPANTS
Joint Warrior 17-II	Scotland, UK	Joint (air, land, maritime)	01/10/2017	12/10/2017	BE, Canada, DK, EE, FR, DE, IT, LV, LT, NL, Norway, ES, UK, United States	13	1
Northern Challenge 17	Keflavík, Iceland	Joint/other (explosive ordnance disposal exercise)	01/10/2017	13/10/2017	<i>Inter alia</i> : BE, Canada, FI, FR, DE, Iceland, NL, Norway, PL, UK, United States	:	:
Baltic Shield 17	Baltic Sea	Sea	02/10/2017	06/10/2017	EE, FI	2	:
Swift Response 17-II	Hohenfels, Germany	Joint (air, land)	02/10/2017	20/10/2017	Bosnia-Herzegovina, FR, IT, LT, NL, PL, ES, UK, United States	7	2
NATO Crisis Management Exercise (CMX17)**	Multiple locations	Joint/other	04/10/2017	11/10/2017	FI, NATO-29, SE, NATO: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT)	24	7
Brilliant Ledger 17 (NRF 2018 Land Component Command combat readiness certification)	Bellinzago Novarese, Italy	Land	05/10/2017	12/10/2017	Albania, BG, Canada, EE, FR, DE, EL, HU, IT, LV, NL, SI, ES, Turkey, UK, United States	12	4
Brilliant Sword 2017 (NRF 2018 Special Operations Component Command combat readiness certification)	Minorca, Spain	Joint/other	05/10/2017	12/10/2017	BG, Canada, DK, EE, IT, NL, PL, PT, RO, ES, United States	9	2
Hunter 17	Pabrade, Lithuania	Land	06/10/2017	15/10/2017	DE, LT, Norway	2	1
Ruska 17 ('Autumn Colours')	Finland and Sweden	Air	09/10/2017	13/10/2017	FI, SE	2	:

EXERCISE	LOCATION	DOMAIN	START DATE	END DATE	PARTICIPANTS	NUMBER OF EU MEMBER STATE PARTICIPANTS	NUMBER OF THIRD COUNTRY PARTICIPANTS
Slovak Shield 17	Slovakia	Land	10/10/2017	19/10/2017	CZ, SK, United States	2	1
Quick Response	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Land	11/10/2017	15/10/2017	EU, AT, Bosnia and Herzegovina, HU, Turkey, UK	3	2
Vital Sword 17	Wildflecken, Germany	Land	13/10/2017	09/11/2017	CZ, DE, NL, PL, RO	5	:
Silver Arrow 17	Adazi, Latvia	Land	16/10/2017	29/10/2017	Albania, Canada, EE, DE, IT, LV, PL, SI, ES, UK, United States	8	3
Steadfast Noon 17	Belgium and Germany	Air	16/10/2017	05/11/2017	BE, CZ, DE, IT, NL, PL, United States	6	1
Cold Igloo 17	Belgium and Germany	Air	17/10/2017	26/10/2017	BE, CZ, IT, NL, PL, Turkey, United States	5	2
Iron Wolf 17-II	Rukla and Pabrade, Lithuania	Land	18/10/2017	31/10/2017	BE, CZ, DK, EE, DE, LT, LU, NL, Norway, PL, SI, United States	10	2
Bold Alligator 17	Jacksonville, United States and North Atlantic	Joint (land, maritime)	18/10/2017	30/10/2017	Brazil, Canada, FR, DE, Mexico, NL, Norway, ES, UK, United States	5	5
Clever Ferret 17	Várpalota, Hungary	Land	28/10/2017	10/11/2017	HU, IT, SI	3	:
Allied Spirit VII	Grafenwoehr, Germany	Land	30/10/2017	22/11/2017	BG, CZ, DK, FR, DE, IT, LT, PL, PT, SI, ES, UK, United States	12	1
Blue Flag 2017	Israel	Air	06/11/2017	18/11/2017	FR, DE, EL, India, Israel, IT, PL, United States	5	3
Doğu Akdeniz 2017 ('Eastern Mediterranean')	Mediterranean Sea	Sea	07/11/2017	16/11/2017	BG, RO, Turkey, UK, United States	3	2

EXERCISE	LOCATION	DOMAIN	START DATE	END DATE	PARTICIPANTS	NUMBER OF EU MEMBER STATE PARTICIPANTS	NUMBER OF THIRD COUNTRY PARTICIPANTS
Trident Javelin (NATO command and control exercise)	Multiple locations	Joint/other	08/11/2017	17/11/2017	NATO: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFC Brunssum), Allied Land Command (LANDCOM), Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM), Allied Air Command (AIRCOM) and NATO Special Operation Forces	:	:
Quick Lion (EU Battlegroup 2018-1 exercise)	Bergen, Germany	Land	11/11/2017	20/11/2017	AT, BE, DE, LU, NL	5	:
Brave Lion 17	Oksbøl, Denmark	Land	13/11/2017	24/11/2017	DK, LT, UK	3	:
Pohjoinen 17 ('North')	Rovajärvi, Finland	Land	13/11/2017	24/11/2017	FI, Norway, SE	2	1
RECCEX 17	Multiple locations, Finland	Land	17/11/2017	24/11/2017	DK, FI, Norway, SE, UK	4	1
Niriis 17	Aegean Sea	Sea	17/11/2017	25/11/2017	BG, EL, Israel, IT, Turkey, UK, United States	4	3
Nusret 17	Aegean Sea	Sea	25/11/2017	03/12/2017	BG, EL, IT, Turkey, UK	4	1
NATO Cyber Coalition 2017	Tartu, Estonia and home bases of participating countries	Cyber	28/11/2017	30/11/2017	EU, Albania, BE, BG, Canada, HR, CZ, DK, EE, FR, DE, EL, IT, LV, LT, LU, Montenegro, NL, Norway, PL, PT, RO, SK, SI, ES, Turkey, UK, United States	21	6
Ramstein Guard 2017 I-XII (air component of the NATO Electronic Warfare Force Integration Programme)	Multiple locations	Joint/other	:	:	BE, BG, CZ, DK, EE, EL, HU, IT, LV, LT, NL, Norway, PL, PT, RO, SI, ES, Turkey	16	2

EXERCISE	LOCATION	DOMAIN	START DATE	END DATE	PARTICIPANTS	NUMBER OF EU MEMBER STATE PARTICIPANTS	NUMBER OF THIRD COUNTRY PARTICIPANTS
EU CYBRID 2017 (table-top exercise; supported by the EDA, EEAS and ENISA)**	Tallinn, Estonia	Cyber	:	:	EU-28	28	:

Note on methodology: records here are focused on field exercises and do not generally account for stand-alone command post exercises. A few exceptions have been made to include command post or planning exercises of particular significance.

\* A number of Black Sea Region exercises were held concurrently with Saber Guardian 17 (SG17), contributing to or facilitating SG17 components.

\*\* Planning or table-top exercise, here included for its significance.

Key: NRF = NATO Response Force

## TABLE 20: UNION CIVIL PROTECTION MECHANISM

Type and number of activations, 2017

REQUEST/COUNTRY	Consular support	Disaster preparedness mission	Earthquake	Environmental accident	Epidemic	Flood	Forest fire	Population displacement	Tropical cyclone	TOTAL
Albania						1	1			2
Armenia				1						1
Bangladesh					1			1		2
Bhutan		1								1
Bulgaria							1			1
Chile							1			1
Dominica									1	1
France							1			1
Georgia							3			3
Greece				1			1			2
Italy							4			4

REQUEST/ COUNTRY	Consular support	Disaster preparedness mission	Earthquake	Environmental accident	Epidemic	Flood	Forest fire	Population displacement	Tropical cyclone	TOTAL
Jordan		1								1
Mexico			1							1
Montenegro							2			2
Netherlands	1									1
Peru						1				1
Portugal							4			4
Tunisia							1			1
Uganda					1					1
United States	1									1







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*'Looking back on 2017, we see a world in confusion: long-held beliefs and carefully crafted compromises are challenged, the very idea of a rules-based international order is questioned. But against this difficult international background, the European Union has emerged as a reliable force for diplomacy, dialogue and multilateralism.'*

Federica Mogherini  
High Representative for the Union's Foreign and Security Policy  
Vice-President of the European Commission

The EUISS Yearbook of European Security (YES) 2018 is the Institute's annual publication compiling key information and data related to the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in 2017. YES 2018 opens with a preface by Federica Mogherini, High Representative for the Union's Foreign and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP). While the HR/VP recognises that 'the very idea of a rules-based international order is questioned', the EU 'has emerged as a reliable force for diplomacy, dialogue and multilateralism'. YES 2018 provides an account of the EU's engagement with the world through evidence-based, data-rich chapters that are designed to inform policymakers and officials, experts and academics and think tank representatives about the progress made by the EU and the challenges it faced in 2017.

All of the familiar features of the YES are present in this edition including details about the organisational aspects of the European External Action Service (EEAS), EU partners, restrictive measures, geographic instruments, CSDP missions and operations, EU agencies and bodies and the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base. However, this year's version of the Yearbook includes new features including: an overview of the work programmes of the presidencies of the Council of the EU as they relate to foreign, security and defence policy; narratives of the EU's engagement with select countries and regions in its southern and eastern neighbourhoods and the wider world; an overview of new EU defence initiatives such as Permanent Structured Cooperation; and a new chapter on European security that focuses on the internal-external nexus and cybersecurity. Furthermore, to improve the readability of the 2018 Yearbook there are a host of informative data visualisations and for the first time the Yearbook includes a statistical annex for data and an index for reference purposes.

