

# STRATEGY MATTERS



**EU KEY DOCUMENTS**

# STRATEGY MATTERS



**EU KEY DOCUMENTS**

EU Institute for Security Studies

100, avenue de Suffren

75015 Paris

<http://www.iss.europa.eu>

Director: Antonio Missiroli

ISBN: 978-92-9198-244-8

QN-01-14-689-EN-C

Doi: 10.2815/41325

Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies  
and printed in Condé-sur Noireau (France) by Corlet Imprimeur

Design & formatting by J. Granger, EUISS Liaison Office, Brussels

# Strategy matters



**EU KEY DOCUMENTS**



# Contents

<b>EU strategies</b>	<b>v</b>
A very short introduction	
<b>A secure Europe in a better world</b>	<b>1</b>
European Security Strategy, December 2003	
<b>Providing security in a changing world</b>	<b>19</b>
Report on the implementation of the ESS, December 2008	
<b>Strategy for security and development in the Sahel</b>	<b>43</b>
European External Action Service, March 2011	
<b>An open, safe and secure cyberspace</b>	<b>63</b>
Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union, February 2013	
<b>EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea</b>	<b>103</b>
Foreign Affairs Council, March 2014	
<b>An open and secure global maritime domain</b>	<b>131</b>
Elements for a European Union maritime security strategy, June 2014	

<b>ANNEX: EU security-related strategies</b>	<b>155</b>
Introduction	155
I. European Union	159
II. European Defence Agency	161
III. European Commission	162

## **EU strategies**

### **A very short introduction**

Earlier this year, the EUISS published a small compendium of official documents entitled *Defence Matters*. The aim was to make available in a single, pocket-sized publication the key documents recently produced by the EU on the subject. Yet, whereas 'defence' became a focus of policy attention throughout 2013 (admittedly, after a long hiatus), 'strategy' covers a much broader domain, linked as it is to an approach to (rather than a specific area of) policy. Similarly, the spectrum of documents from which to select is much wider and more extensive – as is the relevant time frame.

Nevertheless, it seems appropriate here to offer the busy expert on the go a limited selection of the main types of 'strategic' documents released by the EU in order to highlight the developments that have occurred in this domain over the past few years while offering (in the annex) a comprehensive survey of other relevant EU 'strategies'. To these might easily be added also those other doctrinal papers – such as the December 2013 Communication on the so-called 'comprehensive approach' – which may be considered as strategic documents in disguise. But, first, a few explanatory remarks.



## EU strategies

### ***What's in a name?***

The trouble with the term 'strategy' is that it means different things to different people. The *strategos* was a civil-military official elected by ancient Athenians to assume leadership in times of war, and 'strategy' has been traditionally associated (from Sun Tzu to von Clausewitz) with military planning and the use of force in pursuit of political goals. During the Cold War, 'strategic' studies dealt mainly with military competition – conventional and nuclear – between the superpowers, and game theory soon became an integral part thereof. As both society and warfare have grown more complex since, strategies have now come to factor in a wider combination of military and non-military variables.

In business, 'strategic' approaches based on quantitative methods of analysis emerged from the development of operations research and linear programming during World War II. Since then, strategy has emerged as a key concept for business and corporations in order to survive and/or thrive in a commercial world that has become increasingly uncertain, unstable and, of course, competitive.

In politics, 'strategists' emerged first in the US, following the increasing use of television advertising in electoral campaigns in the 1960s, and their relevance has continued to grow since – and not only on the other side of the Atlantic: Europe, too, has had its own 'spin doctors' – in order to both win elections and implement legislative packages.

Yet there is also a more basic, commonsensical meaning of the term: how many times do we hear (or say) that we 'need a

strategy'? What is often meant by that is a clear objective with an action plan, an agreed roadmap, a set of guiding principles, but sometimes also just a compass, a sense of direction and/or a convincing 'narrative' in order to overcome muddling through, purely reactive behaviour and improvisation. Such calls apply also to public policy at large and, to some extent, even to EU policy proper, especially in times of accelerating changes, rising challenges and – alas – declining resources.

### ***The record***

Historically, the European Union has a mixed record in this domain. In the beginning, very few of its most successful 'strategies' were explicitly identified and labelled as such. Enlargement was driven by a short and simple article in the Rome Treaty. The single market was spearheaded by a sort of 'green paper' (the Cecchini Report) and pushed through, at least initially, by judicial action. And Schengen was a quintessential case of spill-over, both geographic and functional.

Interestingly, the one policy area where medium- to long-term 'strategies' have been repeatedly called for (and often drafted) is CFSP. The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty even introduced 'common strategies' among the foreign policy instruments at the disposal of the Union. These were meant to have a regional focus and to be public documents agreed upon unanimously whilst allowing for qualified majority voting – a unique case in the CFSP domain –

## EU strategies

in the adoption of specific 'joint actions' and 'common positions' explicitly stemming from them.

As soon as the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force, in May 1999, three such 'common strategies' were swiftly agreed: on Russia, on Ukraine, and on the Mediterranean – while a fourth one (on the Balkans) was implicitly dropped. None of them generated joint actions and, in late 2000, CFSP High Representative (HR) Javier Solana delivered a critical evaluation in which he argued *inter alia* that (a) the three common strategies brought no added value because they referred to areas where common EU policies were already well established, thus amounting to little more than inventories of existing activities; (b) in the absence of any guidelines on how to draft them, procedures ended up in lengthy negotiations in Council working groups which led, in turn, to the well-known 'Christmas tree' approach based on accumulation rather than selection of objectives, with no clear priorities; (c) the decision to make the strategies public turned them into quintessentially declaratory texts, well-suited for public diplomacy but less useful as internal working tools balancing pros and cons, evaluating EU interests and goals, and identifying areas of disagreement with partners and recipients.

### ***The breakthrough***

That lesson was quickly learned and contributed to the success of the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS). First proposed

by then German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer at an informal Council meeting held on the Greek island of Kastellòrizo at the end of the US operation Iraqi Freedom, in May 2003, the ESS started with an analysis of the new strategic context and its challenges; it continued with a specific threat assessment (the first ever made at EU level); and it ended with a set of policy recommendations. Most importantly, it was not drafted at working group or even COREPER level but within a small circle of officials and advisers around Solana. It identified priorities and called for more coherent approaches to European external action. And it helped reconcile different views both among the member states and *vis-à-vis* the Bush administration, presenting a distinct European vision at the dawn of the twenty-first century.

Yet the ESS remained a mainly declaratory text, not a 'white paper' or a blueprint for action (although it was accompanied by the first ever EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, prompted by a similar political concern but much more specific in its provisions). Tellingly, it was HR Solana himself who preferred to keep the ESS as a general 'doctrine' and resisted calls to translate it into a series of detailed action plans.

The 2003 Security Strategy was indeed the combined product of exceptional challenges (the transatlantic and intra-European divisions over Iraq) and unique opportunities (the need to mend fences and react collectively): a one-off achievement, in other words, as well as the product of a peculiar *Zeitgeist* that also

## EU strategies

generated the draft Constitutional Treaty and the operational beginnings of ESDP/CSDP.

All this became even more evident in late 2007 when, pushed by member states to review the strategy in light of the experiences made until then, Javier Solana limited the scope of the exercise to a 'report on the implementation' of the ESS. In fact, the drafting of the report was soon bogged down in complex and tiresome internal negotiations, and coincided with the initial rejection of the Lisbon Treaty by the Irish voters (June 2008), the conflict between Russia and Georgia (August), and the collapse of Lehman Brothers (September). While the report, in the end (December 2008), convincingly updated the 2003 analysis and reaffirmed the overall validity of the ESS, its arduous genesis also vindicated, in retrospect, the 2000 criticism of the convoluted methodology and unclear scope of such exercises – methodology and scope which resurfaced, at least in part, in the framing of the so-called 'strategic' partnerships between the Union and some major powers.

### ***The follow-up***

With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, in late 2009, and the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), in late 2010, the push towards a more coherent and integrated approach to foreign policy and external action has also translated into a different take on 'strategies'. On the one

hand, Article 26 TEU now calls on the European Council to 'identify the *strategic interests*' of the Union, thus raising the level at which they are defined. On the other hand, EU services have continued to produce numerous country-specific ones, while more targeted (sub-)regional as well as cross-cutting 'strategies' have gradually been elaborated and agreed upon – prompted also by the more comprehensive status, portfolio and scope of the new High Representative (and Vice-President of the Commission), Catherine Ashton.

This seems not to have happened according to any pre-planned template or agenda – all these strategies actually look slightly different in structure from one another – but rather through constant testing and learning. Tellingly, once again, the first efforts were made in areas where traditional borders (on land or at sea) appear to be almost irrelevant – thus forcing a wider approach – and where the Union was or aimed to be active through different policy instruments: notably the Sahel (2011), the Horn of Africa (2011) and the Great Lakes region (2013) – for which, respectively, a proper 'strategy' (for the Sahel) and a 'strategic framework' (for the other two) were adopted. While differences in genesis and scope between the three documents exist, they all pinpoint the saliency of Africa as a testing ground for an integrated approach by the Union and its member states.

A similar need to bring together and fine-tune various policy approaches shaped in different parts of the EU institutional system prompted the elaboration of the 2013 Cyber Security

## EU strategies

Strategy, delivered for the first time as a joint Commission Communication prepared by the EEAS and two relevant DGs (Home and Connect) through inter-service consultation, and featuring the first set of truly 'horizontal' guiding principles for a policy area that typically challenges both physical and functional boundaries.

Finally, earlier this year, a Strategy for the Gulf of Guinea (Africa again) and a Maritime Security Strategy – both to be considered as 'living documents' and followed up with action plans – have joined the extended family of post-Lisbon 'strategies' in the field of CFSP and external action.

### ***The reboot***

In sum, there is no shortage of 'strategies' within the Union, even when it comes to its external action. The latest generation includes both functional and geographic ones, with interlocking elements and mutual references (e.g. maritime security vs. the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea), and all conceived as work in progress. In fact, the persistent call – from experts, commentators and policymakers – for a new single all-encompassing EU 'strategy' (either updating the ESS, or taking a different approach) may need to be measured against the growing complexity and volatility of the global environment in which the EU is now bound to operate. This is indeed the spirit of the mandate that the December 2013 European Council has

## A very short introduction

given to the new HR: namely, to begin with an updated analysis of the overall environment – which was also, incidentally, the starting point of the 2003 ESS.

Whether this could translate into another document of a similar kind – and exactly how – is a different matter. Today, both military thinking and management theory emphasise that any successful ‘strategy’ needs to be an adaptive process where incremental decisions are taken over time following a pattern based on continuous feedback between formulation and implementation. This ‘feedback loop’ makes it almost impossible – and even potentially counterproductive – to aim at some sort of *Gesamtkonzept* from which future actions would derive naturally and consequentially. Rather, it requires a comprehensive but flexible approach aimed at building resilience and adjusting ends and means to changing circumstances.

Still, strategy matters – as a general attitude, as a systematic process, but perhaps not always (or not necessarily) as a final outcome.

**Antonio Missiroli**  
**Paris, July 2014**





## **A secure Europe in a better world**

### **European Security Strategy 2003**

Brussels, 12 December 2003

#### **Introduction**

Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history.

The creation of the European Union has been central to this development. It has transformed the relations between our states, and the lives of our citizens. European countries are committed to dealing peacefully with disputes and to co-operating through common institutions. Over this period, the progressive spread of the rule of law and democracy has seen authoritarian regimes change into secure, stable and dynamic democracies. Successive enlargements are making a reality of the vision of a united and peaceful continent.

The United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security, in particular through NATO. The end of the Cold War has left the United States in a dominant position as a military actor. However, no single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own.

Europe still faces security threats and challenges. The outbreak of conflict in the Balkans was a reminder that war has not

## A secure Europe in a better world

disappeared from our continent. Over the last decade, no region of the world has been untouched by armed conflict. Most of these conflicts have been within rather than between states, and most of the victims have been civilians.

As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world's Gross National Product (GNP), and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, the European Union is inevitably a global player. In the last decade European forces have been deployed abroad to places as distant as Afghanistan, East Timor and the DRC. The increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes us a more credible and effective actor. Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.

### **I. The security environment: global challenges and key threats**

#### ***Global Challenges***

The post-Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked. Flows of trade and investment, the development of technology and the spread of democracy have brought freedom and prosperity to many people. Others have perceived globalisation as a cause of frustration and injustice.

These developments have also increased the scope for non-state groups to play a part in international affairs. And they have increased European dependence – and so vulnerability – on an interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, information and other fields.

Since 1990, almost 4 million people have died in wars, 90% of them civilians. Over 18 million people world-wide have left their homes as a result of conflict.

In much of the developing world, poverty and disease cause untold suffering and give rise to pressing security concerns. Almost 3 billion people, half the world's population, live on less than 2 Euros a day. 45 million die every year of hunger and malnutrition. AIDS is now one of the most devastating pandemics in human history and contributes to the breakdown of societies. New diseases can spread rapidly and become global threats. Sub-Saharan Africa is poorer now than it was 10 years ago. In many cases, economic failure is linked to political problems and violent conflict.

Security is a precondition of development. Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. A number of countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty.

Competition for natural resources - notably water - which will be aggravated by global warming over the next decades, is likely to create further turbulence and migratory movements in various regions.

## A secure Europe in a better world

Energy dependence is a special concern for Europe. Europe is the world's largest importer of oil and gas. Imports account for about 50% of energy consumption today. This will rise to 70% in 2030. Most energy imports come from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa.

### ***Key Threats***

Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable. Instead, Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable.

**Terrorism:** Terrorism puts lives at risk; it imposes large costs; it seeks to undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies, and it poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe. Increasingly, terrorist movements are well-resourced, connected by electronic networks, and are willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties.

The most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to violent religious extremism. It arises out of complex causes. These include the pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is also a part of our own society.

Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism: European countries are targets and have been attacked. Logistical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the UK, Italy,

Germany, Spain and Belgium. Concerted European action is indispensable.

**Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction** is potentially the greatest threat to our security. The international treaty regimes and export control arrangements have slowed the spread of WMD and delivery systems. We are now, however, entering a new and dangerous period that raises the possibility of a WMD arms race, especially in the Middle East. Advances in the biological sciences may increase the potency of biological weapons in the coming years; attacks with chemical and radiological materials are also a serious possibility. The spread of missile technology adds a further element of instability and could put Europe at increasing risk.

The most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction. In this event, a small group would be able to inflict damage on a scale previously possible only for States and armies.

**Regional Conflicts:** Problems such as those in Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region and the Korean Peninsula impact on European interests directly and indirectly, as do conflicts nearer to home, above all in the Middle East. Violent or frozen conflicts, which also persist on our borders, threaten regional stability. They destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructures; they threaten minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights. Conflict can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure; it provides opportunities for organised crime. Regional insecurity

## A secure Europe in a better world

can fuel the demand for WMD. The most practical way to tackle the often elusive new threats will sometimes be to deal with the older problems of regional conflict.

**State Failure:** Bad governance – corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability - and civil conflict corrode States from within. In some cases, this has brought about the collapse of State institutions. Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan under the Taliban are the best known recent examples. Collapse of the State can be associated with obvious threats, such as organised crime or terrorism. State failure is an alarming phenomenon, that undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability.

**Organised Crime:** Europe is a prime target for organised crime. This internal threat to our security has an important external dimension: cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons accounts for a large part of the activities of criminal gangs. It can have links with terrorism.

Such criminal activities are often associated with weak or failing states. Revenues from drugs have fuelled the weakening of state structures in several drug-producing countries. Revenues from trade in gemstones, timber and small arms, fuel conflict in other parts of the world. All these activities undermine both the rule of law and social order itself. In extreme cases, organised crime can come to dominate the state. 90% of the heroin in Europe comes from poppies grown in Afghanistan – where the drugs trade pays for private armies. Most of it is distributed

through Balkan criminal networks which are also responsible for some 200,000 of the 700,000 women victims of the sex trade worldwide. A new dimension to organised crime which will merit further attention is the growth in maritime piracy.

Taking these different elements together – terrorism committed to maximum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime, the weakening of the state system and the privatisation of force – we could be confronted with a very radical threat indeed.

## **II. Strategic objectives**

We live in a world that holds brighter prospects but also greater threats than we have known. The future will depend partly on our actions. We need both to think globally and to act locally. To defend its security and to promote its values, the EU has three strategic objectives:

### ***Addressing the Threats***

The European Union has been active in tackling the key threats.

- It has responded after 11 September with measures that included the adoption of a European Arrest Warrant, steps to attack terrorist financing and an agreement on mutual legal



## A secure Europe in a better world

assistance with the U.S.A. The EU continues to develop cooperation in this area and to improve its defences.

- It has pursued policies against proliferation over many years. The Union has just agreed a further programme of action which foresees steps to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency, measures to tighten export controls and to deal with illegal shipments and illicit procurement. The EU is committed to achieving universal adherence to multilateral treaty regimes, as well as to strengthening the treaties and their verification provisions.
- The European Union and Member States have intervened to help deal with regional conflicts and to put failed states back on their feet, including in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and in the DRC. Restoring good government to the Balkans, fostering democracy and enabling the authorities there to tackle organised crime is one of the most effective ways of dealing with organised crime within the EU.

In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand. Nuclear activities in North Korea, nuclear risks in South Asia, and proliferation in the Middle East are all of concern to Europe.

Terrorists and criminals are now able to operate world-wide: their activities in central or south-east Asia may be a threat to European countries or their citizens. Meanwhile, global communication increases awareness in Europe of regional conflicts or humanitarian tragedies anywhere in the world.

Our traditional concept of self-defence – up to and including the Cold War – was based on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic. The risks of proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will become ever more dangerous. State failure and organised crime spread if they are neglected – as we have seen in West Africa. This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.

In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments. Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post-conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations.

## A secure Europe in a better world

### ***Building Security in our Neighbourhood***

Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe.

The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.

The importance of this is best illustrated in the Balkans. Through our concerted efforts with the US, Russia, NATO and other international partners, the stability of the region is no longer threatened by the outbreak of major conflict. The credibility of our foreign policy depends on the consolidation of our achievements there. The European perspective offers both a strategic objective and an incentive for reform.

It is not in our interest that enlargement should create new dividing lines in Europe. We need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling political problems there. We should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region.

Resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for

Europe. Without this, there will be little chance of dealing with other problems in the Middle East. The European Union must remain engaged and ready to commit resources to the problem until it is solved. The two state solution - which Europe has long supported- is now widely accepted. Implementing it will require a united and cooperative effort by the European Union, the United States, the United Nations and Russia, and the countries of the region, but above all by the Israelis and the Palestinians themselves.

The Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts. The European Union's interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process. A broader engagement with the Arab World should also be considered.

### **AN INTERNATIONAL ORDER BASED ON EFFECTIVE MULTILATERALISM**

In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective.

We are committed to upholding and developing International Law. The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council

## A secure Europe in a better world

has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority.

We want international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken.

Key institutions in the international system, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the International Financial Institutions, have extended their membership. China has joined the WTO and Russia is negotiating its entry. It should be an objective for us to widen the membership of such bodies while maintaining their high standards.

One of the core elements of the international system is the transatlantic relationship. This is not only in our bilateral interest but strengthens the international community as a whole. NATO is an important expression of this relationship.

Regional organisations also strengthen global governance. For the European Union, the strength and effectiveness of the OSCE and the Council of Europe has a particular significance. Other regional organisations such as ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the African Union make an important contribution to a more orderly world. It is a condition of a rule-based international order that law evolves in response to developments such as proliferation, terrorism and global warming. We have an interest

in further developing existing institutions such as the World Trade Organisation and in supporting new ones such as the International Criminal Court. Our own experience in Europe demonstrates that security can be increased through confidence building and arms control regimes. Such instruments can also make an important contribution to security and stability in our neighbourhood and beyond.

The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.

Trade and development policies can be powerful tools for promoting reform. As the world's largest provider of official assistance and its largest trading entity, the European Union and its Member States are well placed to pursue these goals.

Contributing to better governance through assistance programmes, conditionality and targeted trade measures remains an important feature in our policy that we should further reinforce. A world seen as offering justice and opportunity for everyone will be more secure for the European Union and its citizens.

A number of countries have placed themselves outside the bounds of international society. Some have sought isolation;

## A secure Europe in a better world

others persistently violate international norms. It is desirable that such countries should rejoin the international community, and the EU should be ready to provide assistance. Those who are unwilling to do so should understand that there is a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union.

### III. Policy implications for Europe

The European Union has made progress towards a coherent foreign policy and effective crisis management. We have instruments in place that can be used effectively, as we have demonstrated in the Balkans and beyond. But if we are to make a contribution that matches our potential, we need to be more active, more coherent and more capable. And we need to work with others.

**More active** in pursuing our strategic objectives. This applies to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities. Active policies are needed to counter the new dynamic threats. We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.

As a Union of 25 members, spending more than 160 billion Euros on defence, we should be able to sustain several operations simultaneously. We could add particular value by developing operations involving both military and civilian capabilities.

The EU should support the United Nations as it responds to threats to international peace and security. The EU is committed to reinforcing its cooperation with the UN to assist countries emerging from conflicts, and to enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis management situations.

We need to be able to act before countries around us deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise. Preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future. A European Union which takes greater responsibility and which is more active will be one which carries greater political weight.

**More Capable.** A more capable Europe is within our grasp, though it will take time to realise our full potential. Actions underway – notably the establishment of a defence agency – take us in the right direction.

To transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces, and to enable them to address the new threats, more resources for defence and more effective use of resources are necessary.

Systematic use of pooled and shared assets would reduce duplications, overheads and, in the medium-term, increase capabilities.

In almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos. We need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post crisis situations.

Stronger diplomatic capability: we need a system that combines



## A secure Europe in a better world

the resources of Member States with those of EU institutions. Dealing with problems that are more distant and more foreign requires better understanding and communication.

Common threat assessments are the best basis for common actions. This requires improved sharing of intelligence among Member States and with partners.

As we increase capabilities in the different areas, we should think in terms of a wider spectrum of missions. This might include joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. The last of these would be part of broader institution building.

The EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership between the two organisations in crisis management. This reflects our common determination to tackle the challenges of the new century.

**More Coherent.** The point of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defence Policy is that we are stronger when we act together. Over recent years we have created a number of different instruments, each of which has its own structure and rationale.

The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries.

Security is the first condition for development.

Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda. In a crisis there is no substitute for unity of command.

Better co-ordination between external action and Justice and Home Affairs policies is crucial in the fight both against terrorism and organised crime.

Greater coherence is needed not only among EU instruments but also embracing the external activities of the individual member states.

Coherent policies are also needed regionally, especially in dealing with conflict. Problems are rarely solved on a single country basis, or without regional support, as in different ways experience in both the Balkans and West Africa shows.

**Working with partners.** There are few if any problems we can deal with on our own. The threats described above are common threats, shared with all our closest partners. International cooperation is a necessity. We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors.

The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA. This is an additional reason for the EU to build up further its capabilities and increase its coherence.

We should continue to work for closer relations with Russia, a

## A secure Europe in a better world

major factor in our security and prosperity. Respect for common values will reinforce progress towards a strategic partnership.

Our history, geography and cultural ties give us links with every part of the world: our neighbours in the Middle East, our partners in Africa, in Latin America, and in Asia. These relationships are an important asset to build on. In particular we should look to develop strategic partnerships, with Japan, China, Canada and India as well as with all those who share our goals and values, and are prepared to act in their support.

### **Conclusion**

This is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the opportunities. An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.

## Providing security in a changing world

### Report on the implementation of the ESS

Brussels, 11 December 2008

#### *Executive Summary*

Five years on from adoption of the European Security Strategy, the European Union carries greater responsibilities than at any time in its history.

The EU remains an anchor of stability. Enlargement has spread democracy and prosperity across our continent. The Balkans are changing for the better. Our neighbourhood policy has created a strong framework for relations with partners to the south and east, now with a new dimension in the Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership. Since 2003, the EU has increasingly made a difference in addressing crisis and conflict, in places such as Afghanistan or Georgia.

Yet, twenty years after the Cold War, Europe faces increasingly complex threats and challenges.

Conflicts in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world remain unsolved, others have flared up even in our neighbourhood. State failure affects our security through crime, illegal immigration and, most recently, piracy. Terrorism and organised crime have

## Providing security in a changing world

evolved with new menace, including within our own societies. The Iranian nuclear programme has significantly advanced, representing a danger for stability in the region and for the whole non-proliferation system.

Globalisation has brought new opportunities. High growth in the developing world, led by China, has lifted millions out of poverty. But globalisation has also made threats more complex and interconnected. The arteries of our society - such as information systems and energy supplies - are more vulnerable. Global warming and environmental degradation is altering the face of our planet. Moreover, globalisation is accelerating shifts in power and is exposing differences in values. Recent financial turmoil has shaken developed and developing economies alike.

Europe will rise to these new challenges, as we have done in the past.

Drawing on a unique range of instruments, the EU already contributes to a more secure world. We have worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity. The EU remains the biggest donor to countries in need. Long-term engagement is required for lasting stabilisation.

Over the last decade, the European Security and Defence Policy, as an integral part of our Common Foreign and Security Policy, has grown in experience and capability, with over 20 missions deployed in response to crises, ranging from post-tsunami peace

## Report on the implementation of the ESS

building in Aceh to protecting refugees in Chad.

These achievements are the results of a distinctive European approach to foreign and security policy. But there is no room for complacency. To ensure our security and meet the expectations of our citizens, we must be ready to shape events. That means becoming more strategic in our thinking, and more effective and visible around the world. We are most successful when we operate in a timely and coherent manner, backed by the right capabilities and sustained public support.

Lasting solutions to conflict must bind together all regional players with a common stake in peace. Sovereign governments must take responsibility for the consequences of their actions and hold a shared responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

It is important that countries abide by the fundamental principles of the UN Charter and OSCE principles and commitments. We must be clear that respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states and the peaceful settlement of disputes are not negotiable. Threat or use of military force cannot be allowed to solve territorial issues - anywhere.

At a global level, Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral order. The UN stands at the apex of the international system. Everything the EU has done in the field of security has been linked to UN objectives. We have a unique moment to renew multilateralism, working with the United States and with our partners around the world. For Europe, the transatlantic

## Providing security in a changing world

partnership remains an irreplaceable foundation, based on shared history and responsibilities. The EU and NATO must deepen their strategic partnership for better co-operation in crisis management.

The EU has made substantial progress over the last five years. We are recognised as an important contributor to a better world. But, despite all that has been achieved, implementation of the ESS remains work in progress. For our full potential to be realised we need to be still *more capable, more coherent and more active*.

### **Introduction**

The European Council adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003. For the first time, it established principles and set clear objectives for advancing the EU's security interests based on our core values. It is comprehensive in its approach and remains fully relevant.

This report does not replace the ESS, but reinforces it. It gives an opportunity to examine how we have fared in practice, and what can be done to improve implementation.

### **I. Global challenges and key threats**

The ESS identified a range of threats and challenges to our security interests. Five years on, these have not gone away: some have become more significant, and all more complex.

### ***Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction***

Proliferation by both states and terrorists was identified in the ESS as 'potentially the greatest threat to EU security'. That risk has increased in the last five years, bringing the multilateral framework under pressure. While Libya has dismantled its WMD programme, Iran, and also North Korea, have yet to gain the trust of the international community. A likely revival of civil nuclear power in coming decades also poses challenges to the non-proliferation system, if not accompanied by the right safeguards.

The EU has been very active in multilateral fora, on the basis of the WMD Strategy, adopted in 2003, and at the forefront of international efforts to address Iran's nuclear programme. The Strategy emphasises prevention, by working through the UN and multilateral agreements, by acting as a key donor and by working with third countries and regional organisations to enhance their capabilities to prevent proliferation.

We should continue this approach, with political and financial action. A successful outcome to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2010, with a view in particular to strengthening the non-proliferation regime, is critical. We will endeavour to ensure that, in a balanced, effective, and concrete manner, this conference examines means to step up international efforts against proliferation, pursue disarmament and ensure the responsible development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy by countries wishing to do so.



## Providing security in a changing world

More work is also needed on specific issues, including: EU support for a multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle; countering financing of proliferation; measures on bio-safety and bio-security; containing proliferation of delivery systems, notably ballistic missiles. Negotiations should begin on a multilateral treaty banning production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

### ***Terrorism and organised crime***

Terrorism, within Europe and worldwide, remains a major threat to our livelihoods. Attacks have taken place in Madrid and London, while others have been foiled, and home-grown groups play an increasing role within our own continent. Organised crime continues to menace our societies, with trafficking in drugs, human beings, and weapons, alongside international fraud and money-laundering.

Since 2003, the EU has made progress in addressing both, with additional measures inside the Union, under the 2004 Hague Programme, and a new Strategy for the External Dimension of Justice and Home Affairs, adopted in 2005. These have made it easier to pursue investigations across borders, and co-ordinate prosecution. The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, also from 2005, is based on respect for human rights and international law. It follows a four-pronged approach: preventing radicalisation and recruitment and the factors behind them; protecting potential targets; pursuing terrorists; and responding to the aftermath of

## Report on the implementation of the ESS

an attack. While national action is central, appointment of a Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator has been an important step forward at the European level.

Within the EU, we have done much to protect our societies against terrorism. We should tighten co-ordination arrangements for handling a major terrorist incident, in particular using chemical, radiological, nuclear and bioterrorism materials, on the basis of such existing provisions as the Crisis Coordination Arrangements and the Civil Protection Mechanism. Further work on terrorist financing is required, along with an effective and comprehensive EU policy on information sharing, taking due account of protection of personal data.

We must also do more to counter radicalisation and recruitment, by addressing extremist ideology and tackling discrimination. Inter-cultural dialogue, through such fora as the Alliance of Civilisations, has an important role.

On organised crime, existing partnerships within our neighbourhood and key partners, and within the UN, should be deepened, in addressing movement of people, police and judicial cooperation. Implementation of existing UN instruments on crime is essential. We should further strengthen our counter-terrorism partnership with the United States, including in the area of data sharing and protection. Also, we should strengthen the capacity of our partners in South Asia, Africa, and our southern neighbourhood. The EU should support multilateral efforts, principally in the UN.

## Providing security in a changing world

We need to improve the way in which we bring together internal and external dimensions. Better co-ordination, transparency and flexibility are needed across different agencies, at national and European level. This was already identified in the ESS, five years ago. Progress has been slow and incomplete.

### **Cyber security**

Modern economies are heavily reliant on critical infrastructure including transport, communication and power supplies, but also the internet. The EU Strategy for a Secure Information Society, adopted in 2006 addresses internet-based crime. However, attacks against private or government IT systems in EU Member States have given this a new dimension, as a potential new economic, political and military weapon.

More work is required in this area, to explore a comprehensive EU approach, raise awareness and enhance international co-operation.

### ***Energy Security***

Concerns about energy dependence have increased over the last five years. Declining production inside Europe means that by 2030 up to 75% of our oil and gas will have to be imported. This will come from a limited number of countries, many of which face threats to stability. We are faced therefore with an array of security challenges, which involve the responsibility and solidarity of all Member States.

Our response must be an EU energy policy which combines external and internal dimensions. The joint report from the High Representative and Commission in June 2006 set out the main elements. Inside Europe, we need a more unified energy market, with greater inter-connection, particular attention to the most isolated countries and crisis mechanisms to deal with temporary disruption to supply.

Greater diversification, of fuels, sources of supply, and transit routes, is essential, as are good governance, respect for rule of law and investment in source countries. EU policy supports these objectives through engagement with Central Asia, the Caucasus and Africa, as well as through the Eastern Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean. Energy is a major factor in EU-Russia relations. Our policy should address transit routes, including through Turkey and Ukraine. With our partners, including China, India, Japan and the US, we should promote renewable energy, low-carbon technologies and energy efficiency, alongside transparent and well-regulated global markets.

### ***Climate change***

In 2003, the ESS already identified the security implications of climate change. Five years on, this has taken on a new urgency. In March 2008, the High Representative and Commission presented a report to the European Council which described climate change as a "threat multiplier". Natural disasters,

## Providing security in a changing world

environmental degradation and competition for resources exacerbate conflict, especially in situations of poverty and population growth, with humanitarian, health, political and security consequences, including greater migration. Climate change can also lead to disputes over trade routes, maritime zones and resources previously inaccessible.

We have enhanced our conflict prevention and crisis management, but need to improve analysis and early warning capabilities. The EU cannot do this alone. We must step up our work with countries most at risk by strengthening their capacity to cope.

International co-operation, with the UN and regional organisations, will be essential.

## **II. Building stability in Europe and beyond**

Within our continent, enlargement continues to be a powerful driver for stability, peace and reform.

With Turkey, negotiations started in 2005, and a number of chapters have been opened since. Progress in the Western Balkans has been continuous, if slow. Accession negotiations with Croatia are well advanced. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has obtained candidate status. Stabilisation and Association agreements have been signed with the other Western Balkan countries. Serbia is close to fulfilling all conditions for moving towards deeper relations with the EU. The

## Report on the implementation of the ESS

EU continues to play a leading role in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but, despite progress, more is required from local political leaders to overcome blockage of reforms.

We are deploying EULEX, our largest civilian ESDP mission to date, in Kosovo and will continue substantial economic support. Throughout the region, co-operation and good-neighbourly relations are indispensable.

It is in our interest that the countries on our borders are well-governed. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), launched in 2004, supports this process. In the east, all eligible countries participate except Belarus, with whom we are now taking steps in this direction.

With Ukraine, we have gone further, with a far-reaching association agreement which is close to being finalised. We will soon start negotiations with the Republic of Moldova on a similar agreement. The Black Sea Synergy has been launched to complement EU bilateral policies in this region of particular importance for Europe.

New concerns have arisen over the so-called "frozen conflicts" in our eastern neighbourhood. The situation in Georgia, concerning Abkhazia and South Ossetia, has escalated, leading to an armed conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008. The EU led the international response, through mediation between the parties, humanitarian assistance, a civilian monitoring mission, and substantial financial support. Our engagement will continue, with the EU leading the Geneva Process. A possible settlement

## Providing security in a changing world

to the Transnistrian conflict has gained impetus, through active EU participation in the 5+2 negotiation format, and the EU Border Assistance Mission.

The Mediterranean, an area of major importance and opportunity for Europe, still poses complex challenges, such as insufficient political reform and illegal migration. The EU and several Mediterranean partners, notably Israel and Morocco, are working towards deepening their bilateral relations. The ENP has reinforced reforms originally started under the Barcelona process in 1995, but regional conflict, combined with rising radicalism, continues to sow instability.

The EU has been central to efforts towards a settlement in the Middle East, through its role in the Quartet, co-operation with Israel and the Palestinian Authority, with the Arab League and other regional partners. The EU is fully engaged in the Annapolis Process towards a two-state solution, and is contributing sustained financial and budgetary support to the Palestinian Authority, and capacity-building, including through the deployment of judicial, police and border management experts on the ground. In Lebanon, Member States provide the backbone of the UNIFIL peacekeeping mission. On Iraq, the EU has supported the political process, reconstruction, and rule of law, including through the EUJUST LEX mission.

Since 2003, Iran has been a growing source of concern. The Iranian nuclear programme has been subject to successive resolutions in the UNSC and IAEA. Development of a nuclear

military capability would be a threat to EU security that cannot be accepted. The EU has led a dual-track approach, combining dialogue and increasing pressure, together with the US, China, and Russia. The High Representative has delivered a far-reaching offer for Iran to rebuild confidence and engagement with the international community. If, instead, the nuclear programme advances, the need for additional measures in support of the UN process grows. At the same time, we need to work with regional countries including the Gulf States to build regional security.

The ESS acknowledged that Europe has security interests beyond its immediate neighbourhood. In this respect, Afghanistan is a particular concern. Europe has a long-term commitment to bring stability. EU Member States make a major contribution to the NATO mission, and the EU is engaged on governance and development at all levels. The EU Police Mission is being expanded. These efforts will not succeed without full Afghan ownership, and support from neighbouring countries: in particular Pakistan, but also India, Central Asia and Iran. Indeed, improved prospects for good relations between India and Pakistan in recent years have been a positive element in the strategic balance sheet.

### **Security and development nexus**

As the ESS and the 2005 Consensus on Development have acknowledged, there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace. Threats to public



## Providing security in a changing world

health, particularly pandemics, further undermine development. Human rights are a fundamental part of the equation. In many conflict or post-conflict zones, we have to address the appalling use of sexual violence as a weapon of intimidation and terror.

Effective implementation of UNSCR 1820 on sexual violence in situations of armed conflict is essential.

Conflict is often linked to state fragility. Countries like Somalia are caught in a vicious cycle of weak governance and recurring conflict. We have sought to break this, both through development assistance and measures to ensure better security. Security Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration are a key part of post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction, and have been a focus of our missions in Guinea-Bissau or DR Congo. This is most successful when done in partnership with the international community and local stakeholders.

Ruthless exploitation of natural resources is often an underlying cause of conflict. There are increasing tensions over water and raw materials which require multilateral solutions. The Kimberley Process and Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative offer an innovative model to address this problem.

### **Piracy**

The ESS highlighted piracy as a new dimension of organised crime. It is also a result of state failure. The world economy relies on sea routes for 90% of trade. Piracy in the Indian

Ocean and the Gulf of Aden has made this issue more pressing in recent months, and affected delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia. The EU has responded, including with ATALANTA, our first maritime ESDP mission, to deter piracy off the Somali coast, alongside countries affected and other international actors, including NATO.

### **Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), Cluster Munitions and Landmines**

In 2005, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition. In the context of its implementation, the EU supports the UN Programme of Action in this field. The EU will continue to develop activities to combat threats posed by illicit SALW.

The EU has given strong support to the concept of an international Arms Trade Treaty and has decided to support the process leading towards its adoption. The EU is also a major donor to anti-mine action. It has actively supported and promoted the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines worldwide. The Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions, agreed at Dublin in May 2008, represents an important step forward in responding to the humanitarian problems caused by this type of munitions, which constitute a major concern for all EU Member States. The adoption of a protocol on this type of munitions in the UN framework involving all major military powers would be an important further step.

## Providing security in a changing world

### III. Europe in a changing world

To respond to the changing security environment we need to be more effective - among ourselves, within our neighbourhood and around the world.

#### ***A. A more effective and capable Europe***

Our capacity to address the challenges has evolved over the past five years, and must continue to do so. We must strengthen our own coherence, through better institutional co-ordination and more strategic decision-making. The provisions of the Lisbon Treaty provide a framework to achieve this.

Preventing threats from becoming sources of conflict early on must be at the heart of our approach. Peace-building and long-term poverty reduction are essential to this. Each situation requires coherent use of our instruments, including political, diplomatic, development, humanitarian, crisis response, economic and trade co-operation, and civilian and military crisis management. We should also expand our dialogue and mediation capacities. EU Special Representatives bring EU influence to bear in various conflict regions. Civil society and NGOs have a vital role to play as actors and partners. Our election monitoring missions, led by members of the European Parliament, also make an important contribution.

The success of ESDP as an integral part of our Common Foreign and Security Policy is reflected by the fact that our assistance is

## Report on the implementation of the ESS

increasingly in demand. Our Georgia mission has demonstrated what can be achieved when we act collectively with the necessary political will. But the more complex the challenges we face, the more flexible we must be. We need to prioritise our commitments, in line with resources. Battlegroups and Civilian Response Teams have enhanced our capacity to react rapidly.

Appropriate and effective command structures and headquarters capability are key. Our ability to combine civilian and military expertise from the conception of a mission, through the planning phase and into implementation must be reinforced. We are developing this aspect of ESDP by putting the appropriate administrative structures, financial mechanisms, and systems in place. There is also scope to improve training, building on the European Security and Defence College and the new European young officers exchange scheme, modelled on Erasmus.

We need to continue mainstreaming human rights issues in all activities in this field, including ESDP missions, through a people-based approach coherent with the concept of human security. The EU has recognised the role of women in building peace. Effective implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security and UNSCR 1612 on Children and Armed Conflict is essential in this context.

For civilian missions, we must be able to assemble trained personnel with a variety of skills and expertise, deploy them at short notice and sustain them in theatre over the long term. We need full interoperability between national contingents. In support of this,

## Providing security in a changing world

Member States have committed to draw up national strategies to make experts available, complemented by more deployable staff for mission support, including budgeting and procurement. The ways in which equipment is made available and procured should be made more effective to enable timely deployment of missions. For military missions, we must continue to strengthen our efforts on capabilities, as well as mutual collaboration and burden-sharing arrangements. Experience has shown the need to do more, particularly over key capabilities such as strategic airlift, helicopters, space assets, and maritime surveillance (as set out in more detail in the Declaration on the Reinforcement of Capabilities). These efforts must be supported by a competitive and robust defence industry across Europe, with greater investment in research and development. Since 2004, the European Defence Agency has successfully led this process, and should continue to do so.

### ***B. Greater engagement with our neighbourhood***

The ENP has strengthened individual bilateral relationships with the EU. This process now needs to build regional integration. The Union for the Mediterranean, launched in July 2008, provides a renewed political moment to pursue this with our southern partners, through a wide-ranging agenda, including on maritime safety, energy, water and migration. Addressing security threats like terrorism will be an important part.

## Report on the implementation of the ESS

The Eastern Partnership foresees a real step change in relations with our Eastern neighbours, with a significant upgrading of political, economic and trade relations. The goal is to strengthen the prosperity and stability of these countries, and thus the security of the EU. The proposals cover a wide range of bilateral and multilateral areas of co-operation including energy security and mobility of people.

Lasting stability in our neighbourhood will require continued effort by the EU, together with UN, OSCE, the US and Russia. Our relations with Russia have deteriorated over the conflict with Georgia. The EU expects Russia to honour its commitments in a way that will restore the necessary confidence. Our partnership should be based on respect for common values, notably human rights, democracy, and rule of law, and market economic principles as well as on common interests and objectives.

We need a sustained effort to address conflicts in the Southern Caucasus, Republic of Moldova and between Israel and the Arab states. Here, as elsewhere, full engagement with the US will be key. In each case, a durable settlement must bring together all the regional players. Countries like Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have played an increasingly important role in the region, whereas this has not been the case with Iran. There is a particular opportunity to work with Turkey, including through the Alliance of Civilisations.

## Providing security in a changing world

### ***C. Partnerships for Effective Multilateralism***

The ESS called for Europe to contribute to a more effective multilateral order around the world. Since 2003, we have strengthened our partnerships in pursuit of that objective. The key partner for Europe in this and other areas is the US. Where we have worked together, the EU and US have been a formidable force for good in the world.

The UN stands at the apex of the international system. Everything the EU has done in the field of security has been linked to UN objectives. The EU works closely in key theatres, including Kosovo, Afghanistan, DRC, Sudan/Darfur, Chad and Somalia, and has improved institutional links, in line with our joint 2007 EU-UN Declaration. We support all sixteen current UN peacekeeping operations.

The EU and NATO have worked well together on the ground in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, even if formal relations have not advanced. We need to strengthen this strategic partnership in service of our shared security interests, with better operational co-operation, in full respect of the decision-making autonomy of each organisation, and continued work on military capabilities. Since 2003, we have deepened our relationship with the OSCE, especially in Georgia and Kosovo.

We have substantially expanded our relationship with China. Ties to Canada and Japan are close and longstanding. Russia remains an important partner on global issues.

There is still room to do more in our relationship with India.

## Report on the implementation of the ESS

Relations with other partners, including Brazil, South Africa and, within Europe, Norway and Switzerland, have grown in significance since 2003.

The EU is working more closely with regional organisations, and in particular the African Union. Through the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, we are supporting enhanced African capacities in crisis management, including regional stand-by forces and early warning.

We have deepened links with our Central Asia partners through the Strategy adopted in 2007, with strengthened political dialogue, and work on issues such as water, energy, rule of law and security. Elsewhere, the EU has developed engagement with ASEAN, over regional issues such as Burma, with SAARC, and Latin America. Our experience gives the EU a particular role in fostering regional integration. Where others seek to emulate us, in line with their particular circumstances, we should support them. The international system, created at the end of the Second World War, faces pressures on several fronts. Representation in the international institutions has come under question. Legitimacy and effectiveness need to be improved, and decision-making in multilateral fora made more efficient. This means sharing decisions more, and creating a greater stake for others. Faced with common problems, there is no substitute for common solutions.

Key priorities are climate change and completion of the Doha Round in the WTO. The EU is leading negotiations for a new



## Providing security in a changing world

international agreement on the former, and must use all its levers to achieve an ambitious outcome at Copenhagen in 2009. We should continue reform of the UN system, begun in 2005, and maintain the crucial role of the Security Council and its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The International Criminal Court should grow further in effectiveness, alongside broader EU efforts to strengthen international justice and human rights. We need to mould the IMF and other financial institutions to reflect modern realities. The G8 should be transformed. And we must continue our collective efforts to meet the Millennium Development Goals.

These issues cross boundaries, touching as much on domestic as foreign policy. Indeed, they demonstrate how in the twenty-first century, more than ever, sovereignty entails responsibility. With respect to core human rights, the EU should continue to advance the agreement reached at the UN World Summit in 2005, that we hold a shared responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

Maintaining public support for our global engagement is fundamental. In modern democracies, where media and public opinion are crucial to shaping policy, popular commitment is essential to sustaining our commitments abroad. We deploy police, judicial experts and soldiers in unstable zones around the world. There is an onus on governments, parliaments and EU institutions to communicate how this contributes to security at home.

## Report on the implementation of the ESS

Five years ago, the ESS set out a vision of how the EU would be a force for a fairer, safer and more united world. We have come a long way towards that. But the world around us is changing fast, with evolving threats and shifting powers. To build a secure Europe in a better world, we must do more to shape events. And we must do it now.



# Strategy for security and development in the Sahel

European External Action Service

Brussels, March 2011

## SUMMARY

This Strategy has four key themes:

- Firstly, that security and development in the Sahel cannot be separated, and that helping these countries achieve security is integral to enabling their economies to grow and poverty to be reduced.
- Secondly, that achieving security and development in the Sahel is only possible through closer regional cooperation. This is currently weaker than it needs to be, and the EU has a potential role to play in supporting it.
- Thirdly, all the states of the region will benefit from considerable capacity-building, both in areas of core government activity, including the provision of security and development cooperation.
- Fourthly, that the EU therefore has an important role to play both in encouraging economic development for the people of the Sahel and helping them achieve a more secure environment in which it can take place, and in which the interests of EU citizens are also protected.

# Strategy for security and development in the Sahel

## **1. Issues and context**

The Sahel is one of the poorest regions of the world. It faces simultaneously the challenges of extreme poverty, the effects of climate change, frequent food crises, rapid population growth, fragile governance, corruption, unresolved internal tensions, the risk of violent extremism and radicalisation, illicit trafficking and terrorist-linked security threats.

The states of the region have to face these challenges directly. The three core Sahelian states, and the focus of this Strategy, are Mauritania, Mali and Niger, though the geographical conditions – and therefore challenges – also affect parts of Burkina Faso and Chad. Many of the challenges impact on neighbouring countries, including Algeria, Libya, Morocco and even Nigeria, whose engagement is necessary to help resolve them. The current political developments in the Maghreb have consequences for the situation in the Sahel, taking into account the close relations between the countries of the two regions, a significant presence of citizens of Sahel countries in the Maghreb and the risks that arise from the proliferation of arms in the region. The problems facing the Sahel not only affect the local populations but increasingly impact directly on the interests of European citizens.

In few areas is the inter-dependence of security and development more clear. The fragility of governments impacts on the stability of the region and the ability to combat both poverty and security threats, which are on the rise. Poverty creates inherent instability

that can impact on uncontrolled migratory flows. The security threat from terrorist activity by Al-Qaida in the Maghreb (AQIM), which has found a sanctuary in Northern Mali, is focussed on Western targets and has evolved from taking money to taking life, discouraging investment in the region. AQIM resources and operational capacities are significant and growing. Deteriorating security conditions pose a challenge to development cooperation and restrict the delivery of humanitarian assistance and development aid, which in turn exacerbates the vulnerability of the region and its population.


The EU's development policy in the Sahel, drawn up in partnership with the countries concerned, is geared towards tackling the root causes of the extreme poverty and towards creating the grass-root conditions for economic opportunity and human development to flourish. But it will be hard for this policy to achieve a high impact unless security challenges are also tackled.

The problems in the Sahel are cross-border and closely intertwined. Only a regional, integrated and holistic strategy will enable us to make progress on any of the specific problems. A reinforced security and law enforcement capacity must go hand-in-hand with more robust public institutions and more accountable governments, capable of providing basic development services to the populations and of appeasing internal tensions. Development processes, promotion of good governance and improvement of the security situation need to

## Strategy for security and development in the Sahel

be carried out *in appropriate sequence and in a coordinated manner* in order to create sustainable stability in the region. This Strategy therefore proposes a framework for the coordination of the EU's current and future engagement in the region with the common objective of reinforcing security and development, thereby strengthening also the EU's own security. Building on work done up to now, the Strategy points to a number of specific actions that could be taken, drawing on all the instruments that the EU has at its disposal<sup>1</sup>. The Strategy is also intended to

### Activité d'Al Qaïda au Sahel



1. The EU has been advocating a comprehensive security and development approach to respond to the complexity of the challenges in the Sahel since 2008. A joint paper (14361/10) on the security and development in the Sahel was drafted by the Commission and the Council Secretariat General, following the options paper (COREU SEC 750/09 of 7 April 2009), and joint fact finding missions to Mauritania, Mali and Niger, at the political and technical level. Following the rapid and serious deterioration of the security situation in the Sahel and notably the kidnapping of European nationals, the Foreign Affairs Council of 25 October 2010 invited the High Representative to draw up, in association with the Commission, a strategy on the Sahel, in response to which a Joint Communication by the Commission and the HR was presented on 08 March 2011 (COM(2011)331).

encourage EU Member States and other partners with similar interests in the region to play an integrated part therein.

## **2. Challenges**

The challenges identified by the EU fact-finding missions to Mali, Mauritania and Niger (and a further visit to Algeria) are at four levels:

### **1) Governance, development and conflict resolution:**

The remote and isolated character of this sensitive region and the difficulties faced by the Sahel countries in providing protection, assistance, development and public services to local populations, the insufficiently decentralised decision making and the inequitable sharing of revenues of capital-intensive economic activities pose serious challenges. Lack of education and employment opportunities for young people contributes to tensions and makes them prone to cooperate with AQIM or organized crime for financial reasons or to be radicalized and recruited by AQIM. Weak governance, in particular in the area of justice, social exclusion and a still insufficient level of development, together with remaining internal conflicts and recurrent rebellions in regions affected by insecurity, render the Sahel countries and their populations vulnerable to the activities of AQIM and organised crime networks. The desert regions of all three countries have a history of *de facto* autonomy which



## Strategy for security and development in the Sahel

makes government control hard to exert. Corruption also hinders the effectiveness in the fight against AQIM and the development of an effective security sector. Carrying out development assistance projects has also become more dangerous.

### **2) Regional political level - challenges of coordination:**

The security threats in the Sahel – as well as their solution – are of a transnational nature, yet differ in intensity from one country to another. The sometimes differing perception of the threats and solutions by the three Sahel States and their three Maghreb neighbours (Algeria, Libya and Morocco) and the absence of a sub-regional organisation encompassing all the Sahel and Maghreb states, lead to unilateral or poorly coordinated action and hamper credible and effective regional initiatives. At the level of the international community (including the EU), coherent and systematic action linking political, security and development aspects is also insufficient.

### **3) Security and the rule of law:**

These states have insufficient operational and strategic capacities in the wider security, law enforcement and judicial sectors (military, police, justice, border management, customs) to control the territory, to ensure human security, to prevent and to respond to the various security threats, and to enforce the law (conduct investigations, trials etc.) with due respect to human rights. This is notably reflected in the insufficiency of legal frameworks

and law enforcement capacity at all levels, ineffective border management, lack of modern investigation techniques and methods of gathering, transmitting and exchanging information, as well as obsolete or inexistent equipment and infrastructure. State control of the desert regions in the North of Mali and Niger is fragile. Available resources are insufficiently used to target terrorism and illegal activities.

#### **4) Fight against and prevention of violent extremism and radicalisation:**

In the Sahel region the simultaneous interaction between various factors such as poverty, social exclusion, unmet economic needs and radical preaching bears the risk of development of extremism. The situation in Mauritania is particularly worrying in terms of risks of radicalisation and recruitment of youth by AQIM.

### ***3. Mutual interests in improving the security and development situation in the Sahel***

There is a clear and longstanding interest both for the countries of the regions and for the EU in reducing insecurity and improving development in the Sahel region. Strengthening governance and stability within the Sahel countries through the promotion of the rule of law and human rights as well as socio-economic development, in particular for the benefit of the vulnerable local populations of these countries, is crucial.

## Strategy for security and development in the Sahel

An urgent and a more recent priority is to prevent AQIM attacks in the Sahel region and its potential to carry out attacks on EU territory, to reduce and contain drug and other criminal trafficking destined for Europe, to secure lawful trade and communication links (roads, pipelines) across the Sahel, North-South and East-West, and to protect existing economic interests and create the basis for trade and EU investment. Improving security and development in Sahel has an obvious and direct impact on protecting European citizens and interests and on the EU internal security situation. It is therefore important to ensure and strengthen coherence and complementarity between internal and external aspects of EU security.

### ***4. Objectives of the Strategy***

**5/10-year perspective:** enhancing political stability, security, good governance, social cohesion in the Sahel states and economic and education opportunities, thus setting the conditions for local and national sustainable development so that the Sahel region can prosper and no longer be a potential safe haven for AQIM and criminal networks; assisting at national level in mitigating internal tensions, including the challenges posed by violent extremism on which AQIM and other criminal groups feed.

**3-year perspective:** improving access of populations in the contested zones to basic services (roads, livelihoods,

education, social services) as well as to economic and education opportunities, while improving their relations with their parent states; reducing terrorist attacks and kidnappings in the Sahel countries, limiting the capabilities of AQIM and criminal networks, improving security in the contested zones of Sahel as States' administration and services redeploy effectively and are in line with the principles of good governance, while their security capabilities to fight terrorism and criminal trafficking across the region are improved; contributing to the fight against corruption, supporting the implementation of peace settlements, raising awareness and training the local traditional elites to better understand and react to the threats of terrorism and organised crime; increasing confidence between local and state authorities.

In pursuing these objectives, the EU will need to promote and encourage actively African responsibility and ownership, particularly of the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to demonstrate focus, urgency, pragmatism and political engagement, along with flexibility and a requirement to coordinate with other players, such as the Arab League and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), as well as other bilateral and multilateral partners with an interest in the region, including the UN, the USA, Canada and Japan and the Maghreb countries (Algeria, Libya and Morocco).

## Strategy for security and development in the Sahel

### ***5. Building on and supporting existing initiatives at the national and regional and international level***

To ensure ownership, coherence, and long-term impact, the EU has to build on and support the existing political and operational initiatives for security and development in the Sahel, both at national and regional levels, and take account of other planned initiatives of the international community.

**Mali** has set up, in the framework of the national policy to fight insecurity and terrorism, the *Programme spécial pour la paix, la sécurité et le développement dans le nord du Mali* (PSPSDN) to combat insecurity and terrorism in northern Mali. In parallel, Mali's President Amadou Toumani Touré has, since 2007, intended to organise a Conference of Heads of State, for which the political conditions (political will, threat perceptions, common vision and interests) have yet to be met. In addition, Mali has initiated a new office to fight against drug trafficking.

In **Mauritania**, a comprehensive national strategy to fight terrorism is being implemented with the following components: i) doctrinal and religious, ii) cultural and academic, iii) communication, iv) political, v) justice, defence and security. A Counter Terrorism law was adopted in 2010 providing a comprehensive legal framework for the judicial fight against terrorism.

In **Niger**, while a specific strategy to fight insecurity and terrorism is still under preparation, there is a strategy and action plan for the reform of the justice system, which foresees *inter alia* the creation of a specialised chamber responsible for dealing with

terrorism and trafficking which has been established recently in the Superior Court of Niger (Tribunal de Grande Instance).

**Burkina Faso** has been relatively successful in pursuing economic development and has a role in several of the anti-terrorist activities in the region.

For the **Maghreb** countries, the advanced political dialogue and legal structures existing between these partners and the EU in the framework of European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Action Plans (for Morocco), the Roadmap (for Algeria), Association Agreements (for Algeria and Morocco) could serve as a basis to develop tailor-made and coordinated actions regarding the Sahel-Sahara region. The ongoing developments in Northern Africa, especially in Libya, should be monitored closely. Developments in Libya will determine the basis for the future co-operation in these matters.

At the initiative of Algeria and following a meeting of army chiefs of Algeria, Niger, Mali and Mauritania in August 2009, a **joint military command** was set up on 20 April 2010 in **Tamanrasset** (Algeria) to coordinate operations against terrorist groups in the Sahel, followed in September 2010 by a joint intelligence cell to monitor AQIM's activities. Although this structure has yet to produce tangible operational results, initiatives of coordinating activities among the countries of Sahel should be encouraged.

The **Joint EU-Africa Strategy**, adopted in December 2007, provides the overall platform guiding the EU relations with the continent. Mali, Mauritania and Niger are concerned by this

## Strategy for security and development in the Sahel

Strategy, which emphasises the need to promote holistic approaches to security, encompassing conflict prevention and long-term peace-building, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, linked to governance and sustainable development, with a view to addressing the root causes of conflict. The EU holds enhanced dialogue on the continental, regional and national level in the area of peace and security, good governance and democratisation. The AU will be a privileged EU partner in the implementation of the Sahel Strategy.

**ECOWAS** has developed a comprehensive regional framework for promoting good Governance, Peace and Security, based on the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework. It has also adopted a Common Position on Migration and a Strategy for the fight against drug trafficking and organised crime, completed with an Action Plan (Praia Action Plan), which provides a framework for regulatory and operational action by West Africa States. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (**UNODC**) is working with the Sahel countries on regional law enforcement cooperation, including through the Sahel judicial platform. All these strategies are supported by the EU through geographical and thematic cooperation instruments. EU's strong political relations and operational cooperation with ECOWAS, the privileged regional actor, should be beneficial to the implementation of the Sahel Strategy.

#### OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES

There are a number of more concrete difficulties to overcome: The proposed counter-terrorism cell in Mali has still to be established, while progress on the PSPSDN (Special Programme for peace, security and development in the North of Mali) lacks momentum. In Niger, the central authority to fight against terrorism has still to be established. Local authorities face challenges in adequately mobilizing and using the units which have been trained and the material that has been provided by donors. In Mali, the setting up of the security and development poles in Northern Mali should muster strong political engagement of the central authorities while benefiting from a higher level of dialogue with the local civil society, in order to consolidate trust to avoid the deployment of security agencies in the North being interpreted by local and traditional leaders as undoing the engagements under the national pact. The security of development and humanitarian aid workers in the North of Mali and Niger has become a crucial challenge. In Niger, the preparation of a long-term strategy to fight against terrorism, initiated under the transitional authorities, will have to be pursued by the incoming administration.

### **6. Building on existing EU engagement in the Sahel countries**

Current EU cooperation strategies under the European Development Fund (EDF), agreed with Mali, Mauritania, Niger and ECOWAS focus on political and economic governance,



## Strategy for security and development in the Sahel

institutional capacity building, and regional integration. The strategy with Mali focuses in particular on the economic development of the northern and Niger River inner delta regions.

Fighting terrorism, organized crime and addressing fragile states are priorities identified in the European Security Strategy,<sup>2</sup> the EU Council Conclusions on Security and Development,<sup>3</sup> the Internal Security Strategy<sup>4</sup> and the Stockholm Programme.<sup>5</sup> As outlined in the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy,<sup>6</sup> the EU's commitment is to contribute through its external action to global security and to promote the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

Combating illicit trafficking of cocaine produced in Latin America and smuggled to Europe via West Africa is a priority for the EU, which has launched important initiatives in this area. Relevant progress in exchanging information among Member States as well as with major international partners (such as the US) and in avoiding overlap of actions and programs in the region can be flagged.

EU Member States and the EU coordinate their capacity building activities and exchange operational information in the

---

2. *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>, 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, Providing Security in a Changing World [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/104630.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/104630.pdf).

3. 2831st EXTERNAL RELATIONS Council meeting, Brussels, 19-20 November 2007. [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/97157.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/97157.pdf).

4. <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st05/st05842-re02.en10.pdf>.

5. The Stockholm Programme – an open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens (2010/C 115/01).

6. <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/st14/st14469-re04.en05.pdf>.

region through the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre – Narcotics (MAOC-N) and two EU cooperation platforms in Dakar, Senegal and Accra, Ghana. Moreover, on 23 April 2010, the Council adopted the Action Oriented Paper: "Strategic and concerted action to improve cooperation in combating organized crime, especially drug trafficking, originating in West Africa",<sup>7</sup> and on 3 June 2010 the Council endorsed the European Pact to combat international drug trafficking – disrupting cocaine and heroin routes.<sup>8</sup>

## **7. Strategic Lines of Action**

The Strategy focuses primarily on the countries most affected by common security challenges: Mali, Mauritania and Niger, while being placed in a larger regional context, reaching towards Chad, the Maghreb and West Africa. The Strategy is articulated around four complementary lines of action:

- **Development, good governance and internal conflict resolution:** to contribute to the general economic and social development in the Sahel; to encourage and support the internal political dialogue in the countries of the region in order to enable sustainable home-grown solutions to remaining social, political and ethnic tensions; to enhance transparent and locally accountable governance, to promote institutional

7. Approved at the JHA Council of 10-11 May 2010.

8. [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/114889.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/114889.pdf).

## Strategy for security and development in the Sahel

capacity; re-establish and/or reinforce the administrative presence of the state, particularly in the north of Niger and Mali; to help create education and economic opportunities for local communities; to open up the regions affected by insecurity through key road and social infrastructures; and to mitigate the impact of climate change effects.

- **Political and diplomatic:** to promote a common vision and a strategy by the relevant countries, to tackle cross-border security threats and address development challenges through a sustained dialogue at the highest level; to engage with partners (including Maghreb countries, regional organisations and wider international community) on a reinforced dialogue on security and development in the Sahel.
- **Security and the rule of law:** to strengthen the capacities of the security, law enforcement and the rule of law sectors to fight threats and handle terrorism and organised crime in a more efficient and specialised manner and link them to measures of good governance in order to ensure state control.
- **Fight against and prevention of violent extremism and radicalisation:** to help enhance the resilience of societies to counter extremism; to provide basic social services, economic and employment perspectives to the marginalised social groups, in particular the youth vulnerable to radicalisation; to support the states and legitimate non-

state actors in designing and implementing strategies and activities aiming at countering these phenomena.

Concrete activities for each Line of Action will be further developed.

### **8. Assumptions/risks**

It is assumed that legitimate democratic institutions are maintained in the countries concerned, and that they continue to welcome EU involvement in tackling the problems they face.

There is no shortage of risks. The three greatest are the weak absorptive capacity of the state structures concerned, the fragile political consensus in some states, and therefore their difficulty in delivering outcomes, plus the physical risk of continued insecurity in several areas.

### **9. Resources**

Political action and adequate engagement of the EU are now vital. Activities identified in this Strategy should lead to the commitment of adequate resources, expertise and funding by the EU and its Member States. Contributions by third countries in support of the Strategy should be encouraged.

Within the broader financial cooperation with these countries, the resources already committed or in the pipeline which specifically contribute to the objectives of this Strategy amount to approximately €650 million (approximately €450 million in the

## Strategy for security and development in the Sahel

three Sahel countries and at the West Africa regional level and approximately €200 million in the Maghreb countries).

On the basis of the Mid-Term Review of the 10th EDF and the identification made on the ground, an additional amount of approximately €150 million may be mobilised in the three Sahel countries until the end of 10th EDF in support to the Strategy.

Moreover, funding through the Instrument for Stability (IfS) should be pursued as appropriate, taking into account the possibility to resort to the crisis response component of the Instrument for Stability to take some immediate initiatives, while long term actions through the long term component of the IfS and through EDF are being pursued.

Bilateral support from EU Member States should be geared towards supporting the objectives of this proposed EU Strategy.

Furthermore, possible actions under the Security and Rule of Law Line of Action may require additional dedicated financial and human resources. The reinforcement of EU Delegations with seconded experts from Member States may also be desirable.

When implementing the cooperation aspects of the Strategy, the EU might activate existing derogations to normal procedures for countries in situations of fragility.

The two tables below present the amounts of EU assistance to the Sahel and to the Maghreb countries under the EDF, IfS, European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), thematic programmes and budget lines.

EU assistance to the Sahel countries:

Country/region	Ongoing (in million €)		Programmed (in million €)		Proposed Additional Resources (in million €)	Total (in million €)
	Country programmes <sup>9</sup>	IIS	10 <sup>th</sup> EDF	IIS		
Niger	39.9		42.2		91,6	173,7
Mali	202		38	4	50	294
Mauritania	21.25	1.2	22		8,4	52,85
West Africa region		13.7	66	6		85,7
<b>Total</b>	<b>263.15</b>	<b>14,9</b>	<b>168,2</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>606,25</b>

EU assistance to the Maghreb countries:

Country/ region	Ongoing (in million €)	Planned (in million €)	New resources	Total
Algeria	99		N.A	99
Libya	24.5		N.A	24.5
Morocco	70		N.A	70
<b>Total</b>	<b>193.5</b>		<b>N.A</b>	<b>193.5</b>

9. 9th and 10th EDF, budget lines and thematic programmes.



## **An open, safe and secure cyberspace**

### **Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union**

JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL,  
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE  
COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS

Brussels, 7 February 2013

#### **1. INTRODUCTION**

##### **1.1. Context**

Over the last two decades, the Internet and more broadly cyberspace has had a tremendous impact on all parts of society. Our daily life, fundamental rights, social interactions and economies depend on information and communication technology working seamlessly. An open and free cyberspace has promoted political and social inclusion worldwide; it has broken down barriers between countries, communities and citizens, allowing interaction and sharing of information and ideas across the globe; it has provided a forum for freedom of expression and exercise of fundamental rights, and empowered people in their quest for democratic and more just societies - most strikingly during the Arab Spring.



## An open, safe and secure cyberspace

For cyberspace to remain open and free, the same norms, principles and values that the EU upholds offline, should also apply online. Fundamental rights, democracy and the rule of law need to be protected in cyberspace. Our freedom and prosperity increasingly depend on a robust and innovative Internet, which will continue to flourish if private sector innovation and civil society drive its growth. But freedom online requires safety and security too. Cyberspace should be protected from incidents, malicious activities and misuse; and governments have a significant role in ensuring a free and safe cyberspace. Governments have several tasks: to safeguard access and openness, to respect and protect fundamental rights online and to maintain the reliability and interoperability of the Internet. However, the private sector owns and operates significant parts of cyberspace, and so any initiative aiming to be successful in this area has to recognise its leading role.

Information and communications technology has become the backbone of our economic growth and is a critical resource which all economic sectors rely on. It now underpins the complex systems which keep our economies running in key sectors such as finance, health, energy and transport; while many business models are built on the uninterrupted availability of the Internet and the smooth functioning of information systems.

By completing the Digital Single Market, Europe could boost

its GDP by almost €500 billion a year;<sup>1</sup> an average of €1000 per person. For new connected technologies to take off, including e-payments, cloud computing or machine-to-machine communication,<sup>2</sup> citizens will need trust and confidence. Unfortunately, a 2012 Eurobarometer survey<sup>3</sup> showed that almost a third of Europeans are not confident in their ability to use the internet for banking or purchases. An overwhelming majority also said they avoid disclosing personal information online because of security concerns. Across the EU, more than one in ten Internet users has already become victim of online fraud.

Recent years have seen that while the digital world brings enormous benefits, it is also vulnerable. Cyber-security<sup>4</sup> incidents, be it intentional or accidental, are increasing at an alarming pace and could disrupt the supply of essential services we take for granted such as water, healthcare, electricity or mobile services. Threats can have different origins — including criminal, politically motivated, terrorist or state-sponsored attacks as well as natural disasters and unintentional mistakes.

---

1. [http://www.epc.eu/dsm/2/Study\\_by\\_Copenhagen.pdf](http://www.epc.eu/dsm/2/Study_by_Copenhagen.pdf)

2. For example, plants embedded with sensors to communicate to the sprinkler system when it is time for them to be watered.

3. 2012 Special Eurobarometer 390 on Cybersecurity.

4. Cyber-security commonly refers to the safeguards and actions that can be used to protect the cyber domain, both in the civilian and military fields, from those threats that are associated with or that may harm its interdependent networks and information infrastructure. Cyber-security strives to preserve the availability and integrity of the networks and infrastructure and the confidentiality of the information contained therein.

## An open, safe and secure cyberspace

The EU economy is already affected by cybercrime<sup>5</sup> activities against the private sector and individuals. Cybercriminals are using ever more sophisticated methods for intruding into information systems, stealing critical data or holding companies to ransom. The increase of economic espionage and state-sponsored activities in cyberspace poses a new category of threats for EU governments and companies.

In countries outside the EU, governments may also misuse cyberspace for surveillance and control over their own citizens. The EU can counter this situation by promoting freedom online and ensuring respect of fundamental rights online.

All these factors explain why governments across the world have started to develop cyber-security strategies and to consider cyberspace as an increasingly important international issue. The time has come for the EU to step up its actions in this area. This proposal for a Cybersecurity strategy of the European Union, put forward by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (High Representative), outlines the EU's vision in this domain, clarifies roles and responsibilities and sets out the actions required based on strong and effective protection and promotion of citizens' rights to make the EU's online environment the safest in the world.

---

5. Cybercrime commonly refers to a broad range of different criminal activities where computers and information systems are involved either as a primary tool or as a primary target. Cybercrime comprises traditional offences (e.g. fraud, forgery, and identity theft), content-related offences (e.g. on-line distribution of child pornography or incitement to racial hatred) and offences unique to computers and information systems (e.g. attacks against information systems, denial of service and malware).

## **1.2. Principles for cybersecurity**

The borderless and multi-layered Internet has become one of the most powerful instruments for global progress without governmental oversight or regulation. While the private sector should continue to play a leading role in the construction and day-to-day management of the Internet, the need for requirements for transparency, accountability and security is becoming more and more prominent. This strategy clarifies the principles that should guide cybersecurity policy in the EU and internationally.

### **The EU's core values apply as much in the digital as in the physical world**

The same laws and norms that apply in other areas of our day-to-day lives apply also in the cyber domain.

### **Protecting fundamental rights, freedom of expression, personal data and privacy**

Cybersecurity can only be sound and effective if it is based on fundamental rights and freedoms as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and EU core values. Reciprocally, individuals' rights cannot be secured without safe networks and systems. Any information sharing for the purposes of cyber security, when personal data is at stake, should be compliant with EU data protection law and take full account of the individuals' rights in this field.

## An open, safe and secure cyberspace

### **Access for all**

Limited or no access to the Internet and digital illiteracy constitute a disadvantage to citizens, given how much the digital world pervades activity within society. Everyone should be able to access the Internet and to an unhindered flow of information. The Internet's integrity and security must be guaranteed to allow safe access for all.

### **Democratic and efficient multi-stakeholder governance**

The digital world is not controlled by a single entity. There are currently several stakeholders, of which many are commercial and non-governmental entities, involved in the day-to-day management of Internet resources, protocols and standards and in the future development of the Internet. The EU reaffirms the importance of all stakeholders in the current Internet governance model and supports this multi-stakeholder governance approach.<sup>6</sup>

### **A shared responsibility to ensure security**

The growing dependency on information and communications technologies in all domains of human life has led to vulnerabilities which need to be properly defined, thoroughly analysed, remedied or reduced. All relevant actors, whether public authorities, the private sector or individual citizens, need to recognise this shared

---

6. See also COM(2009) 277, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on "Internet Governance: the next steps".

responsibility, take action to protect themselves and if necessary ensure a coordinated response to strengthen cybersecurity.

### 2. STRATEGIC PRIORITIES AND ACTIONS

The EU should safeguard an online environment providing the highest possible freedom and security for the benefit of everyone. While acknowledging that it is predominantly the task of Member States to deal with security challenges in cyberspace, this strategy proposes specific actions that can enhance the EU's overall performance. These actions are both short and long term, they include a variety of policy tools<sup>7</sup> and involve different types of actors, be it the EU institutions, Member States or industry.

The EU vision presented in this strategy is articulated in five strategic priorities, which address the challenges highlighted above:

- Achieving cyber resilience
- Drastically reducing cybercrime
- Developing cyber defence policy and capabilities related to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)
- Develop the industrial and technological resources for cybersecurity
- Establish a coherent international cyberspace policy for the European Union and promote core EU values

---

7. The actions related to information sharing, when personal data is at stake, should be compliant with EU data protection law.

# An open, safe and secure cyberspace

## 2.1. Achieving cyber resilience

To promote cyber resilience in the EU, both public authorities and the private sector must develop capabilities and cooperate effectively. Building on the positive results achieved via the activities carried out to date<sup>8</sup> further EU action can help in particular to counter cyber risks and threats having a cross-border dimension, and contribute to a coordinated response in emergency situations. This will strongly support the good functioning of the internal market and boost the internal security of the EU.

Europe will remain vulnerable without a substantial effort to enhance public and private capacities, resources and processes to prevent, detect and handle cyber security incidents. This is why the Commission has developed a policy on Network and Information Security (NIS).<sup>9</sup> The **European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA)** was established in 2004<sup>10</sup> and a new Regulation to strengthen ENISA and modernise its mandate is being negotiated by Council and Parliament.<sup>11</sup> In

8. See references in this Communication as well as in the Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment accompanying the Commission proposal for a Directive on network and information security, in particular sections 4.1.4, 5.2, Annex 2, Annex 6, Annex 8.

9. In 2001, the Commission adopted a Communication on "Network and Information Security: Proposal for A European Policy Approach" (COM(2001)298); in 2006, it adopted a Strategy for a Secure Information Society (COM(2006)251). Since 2009, the Commission has also adopted an Action Plan and a Communication on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP) (COM(2009)149, endorsed by Council Resolution 2009/C 321/01; and COM(2011)163, endorsed by Council Conclusions 10299/11).

10. Regulation (EC) No 460/2004.

11. COM(2010)521. The actions proposed in this Strategy do not entail amending the existing or future mandate of ENISA.

addition, the Framework Directive for electronic communications<sup>12</sup> requires providers of electronic communications to appropriately manage the risks to their networks and to report significant security breaches. Also, the EU data protection legislation<sup>13</sup> requires data controllers to ensure data protection requirements and safeguards, including measures related to security, and in the field of publicly available e-communication services, data controllers have to notify incidents involving a breach of personal data to the competent national authorities.

Despite progress based on voluntary commitments, there are still gaps across the EU, notably in terms of national capabilities, coordination in cases of incidents spanning across borders, and in terms of private sector involvement and preparedness. This strategy is accompanied by a proposal for legislation to notably:

- establish common minimum requirements for NIS at national level which would oblige Member States to: designate national competent authorities for NIS; set up a well- functioning CERT; and adopt a national NIS strategy and a national NIS cooperation plan. Capacity building and coordination also concern the EU institutions: a Computer Emergency Response Team responsible for the security of the IT systems of the EU institutions, agencies and bodies ("CERT-EU") was permanently established in 2012.

12. Article 13a&b of Directive 2002/21/EC.

13. Article 17 of Directive 95/46/EC; Article 4 of Directive 2002/58/EC.



## An open, safe and secure cyberspace

- set up coordinated prevention, detection, mitigation and response mechanisms, enabling information sharing and mutual assistance amongst the national NIS competent authorities. National NIS competent authorities will be asked to ensure appropriate EU- wide cooperation, notably on the basis of a Union NIS cooperation plan, designed to respond to cyber incidents with cross-border dimension. This cooperation will also build upon the progress made in the context of the "European Forum for Member States (EFMS)",<sup>14</sup> which has held productive discussions and exchanges on NIS public policy and can be integrated in the cooperation mechanism once in place.
- improve preparedness and engagement of the private sector. Since the large majority of network and information systems are privately owned and operated, improving engagement with the private sector to foster cybersecurity is crucial. The private sector should develop, at technical level, its own cyber resilience capacities and share best practices across sectors. The tools developed by industry to respond to incidents, identify causes and conduct forensic investigations should also benefit the public sector.

However, private actors still lack effective incentives to provide reliable data on the existence or impact of NIS incidents, to

---

14. The European Forum for Member States was launched via COM(2009) 149 as a platform to foster discussions among Member States public authorities regarding good policy practises on security and resilience of Critical Information Infrastructure.

## Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union

embrace a risk management culture or to invest in security solutions. The proposed legislation therefore aims at making sure that players in a number of key areas (namely energy, transport, banking, stock exchanges, and enablers of key Internet services, as well as public administrations) assess the cybersecurity risks they face, ensure networks and information systems are reliable and resilient via appropriate risk management, and share the identified information with the national NIS competent authorities. The take up of a cybersecurity culture could enhance business opportunities and competitiveness in the private sector, which could make cybersecurity a selling point.

Those entities would have to report, to the national NIS competent authorities, incidents with a significant impact on the continuity of core services and supply of goods relying on network and information systems.

National NIS competent authorities should collaborate and exchange information with other regulatory bodies, and in particular personal data protection authorities. NIS competent authorities should in turn report incidents of a suspected serious criminal nature to law enforcement authorities. The national competent authorities should also regularly publish on a dedicated website unclassified information about on-going early warnings on incidents and risks and on coordinated responses. Legal obligations should neither substitute, nor prevent, developing informal and voluntary cooperation, including between public and private sectors, to boost security levels

## An open, safe and secure cyberspace

and exchange information and best practices. In particular, the European Public-Private Partnership for Resilience (EP3R)<sup>15</sup> is a sound and valid platform at EU level and should be further developed.

The Connecting Europe Facility (CEF)<sup>16</sup> would provide financial support for key infrastructure, linking up Member States' NIS capabilities and so making it easier to cooperate across the EU.

Finally, cyber incident exercises at EU level are essential to simulate cooperation among the Member States and the private sector. The first exercise involving the Member States was carried out in 2010 ("Cyber Europe 2010") and a second exercise, involving also the private sector, took place in October 2012 ("Cyber Europe 2012"). An EU-US table top exercise was carried out in November 2011 ("Cyber Atlantic 2011"). Further exercises are planned for the coming years, including with international partners.

### THE COMMISSION WILL:

- Continue its activities, carried out by the Joint Research Centre in close coordination with Member States authorities and critical infrastructure owners and operators,

15. The European Public-Private Partnership for Resilience was launched via COM(2009) 149. This platform initiated work and fostered the cooperation between the public and the private sector on the identification of key assets, resources, functions and baseline requirements for resilience as well as cooperation needs and mechanisms to respond to large-scale disruptions affecting electronic communications.

16. <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/connecting-europe-facility>. CEF Budget line 09.03.02 – Telecommunications networks (to promote the interconnection and interoperability of national public services on-line as well as access to such networks).

on identifying NIS vulnerabilities of European critical infrastructure and encouraging the development of resilient systems.

- Launch an EU-funded pilot project<sup>17</sup> early in 2013 on **fighting botnets and malware**, to provide a framework for coordination and cooperation between EU Member States, private sector organisations such as Internet Service Providers, and international partners.

THE COMMISSION ASKS ENISA TO:

- Assist the Member States in developing strong **national cyber resilience** capabilities, notably by building expertise on security and resilience of industrial control systems, transport and energy infrastructure
- Examine in 2013 the feasibility of Computer Security Incident Response Team(s) for Industrial Control Systems (ICS-CSIRTs) for the EU.
- Continue supporting the Member States and the EU institutions in carrying out regular **pan-European cyber incident exercises** which will also constitute the operational basis for the EU participation in international cyber incident exercises.

17. CIP-ICT PSP-2012-6, 325188. It has an overall budget of 15 Million Euro, with EU funding amounting to 7.7 Million Euro.

## An open, safe and secure cyberspace

THE COMMISSION INVITES THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL TO:

- Swiftly adopt the proposal for a Directive on a **common high level of Network and Information Security (NIS)** across the Union, addressing national capabilities and preparedness, EU-level cooperation, take up of risk management practices and information sharing on NIS.

THE COMMISSION ASKS INDUSTRY TO:

- Take leadership in **investing** in a high level of cybersecurity and develop best practices and information sharing at sector level and with public authorities with the view of ensuring a strong and effective protection of assets and individuals, in particular through public-private partnerships like EP3R and Trust in Digital Life (TDL).<sup>18</sup>

### Raising awareness

Ensuring cybersecurity is a common responsibility. End users play a crucial role in ensuring the security of networks and information systems: they need to be made aware of the risks they face online and be empowered to take simple steps to guard against them.

Several initiatives have been developed in recent years and should be continued. In particular, ENISA has been involved in raising awareness through publishing reports, organising expert

<sup>18</sup>. <http://www.trustindigitallife.eu/>.

## Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union

workshops and developing public-private partnerships. Europol, Eurojust and national data protection authorities are also active in raising awareness. In October 2012, ENISA, with some Member States, piloted the "European Cybersecurity Month". Raising awareness is one of the areas the EU-US Working Group on Cybersecurity and Cybercrime<sup>19</sup> is taking forward, and is also essential in the context of the Safer Internet Programme<sup>20</sup> (focused on the safety of children online).

### THE COMMISSION ASKS ENISA TO:

- Propose in 2013 a roadmap for a "Network and Information Security driving licence" as a voluntary certification programme to promote enhanced skills and competence of IT professionals (e.g. website administrators).

### THE COMMISSION WILL:

- Organise, with the support of ENISA, a cybersecurity **championship** in 2014, where university students will compete in proposing NIS solutions.

19. This Working Group, established at the EU-US Summit in November 2010 (MEMO/10/597) is tasked with developing collaborative approaches on a wide range of cybersecurity and cybercrime issues.

20. The Safer Internet Programme funds a network of NGOs active in the field of child welfare online, a network of law enforcement bodies who exchange information and best practices related to criminal exploitation of the Internet in dissemination of child sexual abuse material and a network of researchers who gather information about uses, risks and consequences of online technologies for children's lives.

## An open, safe and secure cyberspace

THE COMMISSION INVITES THE MEMBER STATES<sup>21</sup> TO:

- Organise a yearly **cybersecurity month** with the support of ENISA and the involvement of the private sector from 2013 onwards, with the goal to raise awareness among end users. A synchronised EU-US cybersecurity month will be organised starting in 2014.
- **Step up national efforts on NIS education and training**, by introducing: training on NIS in schools by 2014; training on NIS and secure software development and personal data protection for computer science students; and NIS basic training for staff working in public administrations.

THE COMMISSION INVITES INDUSTRY TO:

- Promote cybersecurity **awareness at all levels**, both in business practices and in the interface with customers. In particular, industry should reflect on ways to make CEOs and Boards more accountable for ensuring cybersecurity.

### ***2.2. Drastically reducing cybercrime***

The more we live in a digital world, the more opportunities for cyber criminals to exploit. Cybercrime is one of the fastest growing forms of crime, with more than one million people worldwide becoming victims each day. Cybercriminals and cybercrime networks are becoming

---

21. Also with the involvement of relevant national authorities, including NIS competent authorities and data protection authorities.

increasingly sophisticated and we need to have the right operational tools and capabilities to tackle them. Cybercrimes are high-profit and low-risk, and criminals often exploit the anonymity of website domains. Cybercrime knows no borders - the global reach of the Internet means that law enforcement must adopt a coordinated and collaborative cross-border approach to respond to this growing threat.

### Strong and effective legislation

The EU and the Member States need strong and effective legislation to tackle cybercrime. The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, also known as the Budapest Convention, is a binding international treaty that provides an effective framework for the adoption of national legislation.

The EU has already adopted legislation on cybercrime including a Directive on combating the sexual exploitation of children online and child pornography.<sup>22</sup> The EU is also about to agree on a Directive on attacks against information systems, especially through the use of botnets.

#### THE COMMISSION WILL:

- Ensure swift transposition and implementation of the cybercrime related directives.
- Urge those Member States that have not yet ratified the **Council of Europe's Budapest Convention on Cybercrime** to ratify and implement its provisions as early as possible.

22. Directive 2011/93/EU replacing Council Framework decision 2004/68/JHA.



## An open, safe and secure cyberspace

### Enhanced operational capability to combat cybercrime

The evolution of cybercrime techniques has accelerated rapidly: law enforcement agencies cannot combat cybercrime with outdated operational tools. Currently, not all EU Member States have the operational capability they need to effectively respond to cybercrime. All Member States need effective national cybercrime units.

#### THE COMMISSION WILL:

- Through its funding programmes,<sup>23</sup> support the Member States to **identify gaps and strengthen their capability** to investigate and combat cybercrime. The Commission will furthermore support bodies that make the link between research/academia, law enforcement practitioners and the private sector, similar to the on-going work carried out by the Commission-funded Cybercrime Centres of Excellence already set up in some Member States.
- Together with the Member States, coordinate efforts to identify best practices and best available techniques including with the support of JRC to fight cybercrime (e.g. with respect to the development and use of forensic tools or to threat analysis).
- Work closely with the recently launched European Cybercrime Centre (EC3), within Europol and with Eurojust

23. For 2013, under the Prevention and Fight against Crime Programme (ISEC). After 2013, under the Internal Security Fund (new Instrument under MFF).

to align such policy approaches with best practices on the operational side.

### Improved coordination at EU level

The EU can complement the work of Member States by facilitating a coordinated and collaborative approach, bringing together law enforcement and judicial authorities and public and private stakeholders from the EU and beyond.

#### THE COMMISSION WILL:

- Support the recently launched **European Cybercrime Centre (EC3)** as the European focal point in the fight against cybercrime. The EC3 will provide analysis and intelligence, support investigations, provide high level forensics, facilitate cooperation, create channels for information sharing between the competent authorities in the Member States, the private sector and other stakeholders, and gradually serve as a voice for the law enforcement community.<sup>24</sup>
- Support efforts to increase accountability of registrars of domain names and ensure accuracy of information on website ownership notably on the basis of the Law Enforcement Recommendations for the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), in compliance with Union law, including the rules on data protection.

24. On 28 March 2012, the European Commission adopted a Communication "Tackling Crime in a Digital Age: Establishing a European Cybercrime Centre".

## An open, safe and secure cyberspace

- Build on recent legislation to continue strengthening the EU's efforts to tackle child sexual abuse online. The Commission has adopted a European Strategy for a Better Internet for Children<sup>25</sup> and has, together with EU and non-EU countries, launched a **Global Alliance against Child Sexual Abuse Online**.<sup>26</sup> The Alliance is a vehicle for further actions from the Member States supported by the Commission and the EC3.

THE COMMISSION ASKS EUROPOL (EC3) TO:

- Initially focus its analytical and operational support to Member States' cybercrime investigations, to help dismantle and disrupt cybercrime networks primarily in the areas of child sexual abuse, payment fraud, botnets and intrusion.
- On a regular basis produce strategic and operational reports on trends and emerging threats to identify priorities and target investigative action by cybercrime teams in the Member States.

THE COMMISSION ASKS THE EUROPEAN POLICE COLLEGE (CEPOL) IN COOPERATION WITH EUROPOL TO:

- Coordinate the design and planning of training courses to equip law enforcement with the knowledge and expertise to effectively tackle cybercrime.

25. COM(2012) 196 final.

26. Council Conclusions on a Global Alliance against Child Sexual Abuse Online (EU-US Joint Statement) of 7th and 8th June 2012 and Declaration on the launch of the Global Alliance against Child Sexual Abuse Online ([http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_MEMO-12-944\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-944_en.htm)).

THE COMMISSION ASKS THE EUROJUST TO:

- Identify the main obstacles to judicial cooperation on cybercrime investigations and to coordination between Member States and with third countries and support the investigation and prosecution of cybercrime both at the operational and strategic level as well as training activities in the field.

THE COMMISSION ASKS EUROJUST AND EUROPOL (EC3) TO:

- Co-operate closely, *inter alia* through the exchange of information, in order to increase their effectiveness in combating cybercrime, in accordance with their respective mandates and competence.

### **2.3. Developing cyber defence policy and capabilities related to the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)**

Cybersecurity efforts in the EU also involve the cyber defence dimension. To increase the resilience of the communication and information systems supporting Member States' defence and national security interests, cyber defence capability development should concentrate on detection, response and recovery from sophisticated cyber threats.

Given that threats are multifaceted, synergies between civilian and military approaches in protecting critical cyber assets should

## An open, safe and secure cyberspace

be enhanced. These efforts should be supported by research and development, and closer cooperation between governments, private sector and academia in the EU. To avoid duplications, the EU will explore possibilities on how the EU and NATO can complement their efforts to heighten the resilience of critical governmental, defence and other information infrastructures on which the members of both organisations depend.

THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE WILL FOCUS ON THE FOLLOWING KEY ACTIVITIES AND INVITE THE MEMBER STATES AND THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY TO COLLABORATE

- Assess operational EU cyber defence requirements and promote the development of EU cyber defence and promote the development of EU cyber defence capabilities and technologies to address all aspects of capability development — including doctrine, leadership, organisation, personnel, training, technology, infrastructure, logistics and interoperability;
- Develop the EU cyber defence policy framework to protect networks within CSDP missions and operations, including dynamic risk management, improved threat analysis and information sharing. Improve Cyber Defence Training & Exercise Opportunities for the military in the European and multinational context including the integration of Cyber Defence elements in existing exercise catalogues;

- Promote dialogue and coordination between civilian and military actors in the EU — with particular emphasis on the exchange of good practices, information exchange and early warning, incident response, risk assessment, awareness raising and establishing cybersecurity as a priority;
- Ensure dialogue with international partners, including NATO, other international organisations and multinational Centres of Excellences, to ensure effective defence capabilities, identify areas for cooperation and avoid duplication of efforts.

### ***2.4. Develop industrial and technological resources for cybersecurity***

Europe has excellent research and development capacities, but many of the global leaders providing innovative ICT products and services are located outside the EU. There is a risk that Europe not only becomes excessively dependent on ICT produced elsewhere, but also on security solutions developed outside its frontiers. It is key to ensure that hardware and software components produced in the EU and in third countries that are used in critical services and infrastructure and increasingly in mobile devices are trustworthy, secure and guarantee the protection of personal data.

## An open, safe and secure cyberspace

### **Promoting a Single Market for cybersecurity products**

A high level of security can only be ensured if all in the value chain (e.g. equipment manufacturers, software developers, information society services providers) make security a priority. It seems<sup>27</sup> however that many players still regard security as little more than an additional burden and there is limited demand for security solutions. There need to be appropriate cybersecurity performance requirements implemented across the whole value chain for ICT products used in Europe. The private sector needs incentives to ensure a high level of cybersecurity; for example, labels indicating adequate cybersecurity performance will enable companies with a good cybersecurity performance and track record to make it a selling point and get a competitive edge. Also, the obligations set out in the proposed NIS Directive would significantly contribute to step up business competitiveness in the sectors covered.

A Europe-wide market demand for highly secure products should also be stimulated. First, this strategy aims to increase cooperation and transparency about security in ICT products. It calls for the establishment of a platform, bringing together relevant European public and private stakeholders, to identify good cybersecurity practices across the value chain and create the favourable market conditions for the development and adoption of secure ICT solutions. A prime focus should be to

---

27. See the Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment accompanying the Commission proposal for a Directive on network and information security, Section 4.1.5.2.

create incentives to carry out appropriate risk management and adopt security standards and solutions, as well as possibly establish voluntary EU-wide certification schemes building on existing schemes in the EU and internationally. The Commission will promote the adoption of coherent approaches among the Member States to avoid disparities causing locational disadvantages for businesses.

Second, the Commission will support the development of security standards and assist with EU-wide voluntary certification schemes in the area of cloud computing, while taking in due account the need to ensure data protection. Work should focus on the security of the supply chain, in particular in critical economic sectors (Industrial Control Systems, energy and transport infrastructure). Such work should build on the on-going standardisation work of the European Standardisation Organisations (CEN, CENELEC and ETSI),<sup>28</sup> of the Cybersecurity Coordination Group (CSCG) as well as on the expertise of ENISA, the Commission and other relevant players.

#### THE COMMISSION WILL:

- Launch in 2013 a public-private **platform on NIS solutions** to develop incentives for the adoption of secure ICT solutions and the take-up of good cybersecurity performance to be applied to ICT products used in Europe.

28. Particularly under the Smart Grids Standard M/490 for the first set of standards for a smart grid and reference architecture.



## An open, safe and secure cyberspace

- Propose in 2014 recommendations to ensure cybersecurity across the ICT value chain, drawing on the work of this platform.
- Examine how major providers of ICT hardware and software could inform national competent authorities on detected vulnerabilities that could have significant security-implications.

### THE COMMISSION ASKS ENISA TO:

- Develop, in cooperation with relevant national competent authorities, relevant stakeholders, International and European standardisation bodies and the European Commission Joint Research Centre, technical guidelines and recommendations for the adoption of NIS standards and good practices in the public and private sectors.

### THE COMMISSION INVITES PUBLIC AND PRIVATE STAKEHOLDERS TO:

- Stimulate the development and adoption of industry-led security standards, technical norms and security-by-design and privacy-by-design principles by ICT product manufacturers and service providers, including cloud providers; new generations of software and hardware should be equipped with stronger, embedded and user-friendly security features.
- Develop industry-led standards for companies' performance on cybersecurity and improve the information available to

the public by developing security labels or kite marks helping the consumer navigate the market.

### **Fostering R&D investments and innovation**

R&D can support a strong industrial policy, promote a trustworthy European ICT industry, boost the internal market and reduce European dependence on foreign technologies. R&D should fill the technology gaps in ICT security, prepare for the next generation of security challenges, take into account the constant evolution of user needs and reap the benefits of dual use technologies. It should also continue supporting the development of cryptography. This has to be complemented by efforts to translate R&D results into commercial solutions by providing the necessary incentives and putting in place the appropriate policy conditions.

The EU should make the best of the Horizon 2020<sup>29</sup> Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, to be launched in 2014. The Commission's proposal contains specific objectives for trustworthy ICT as well as for combating cyber-crime, which are in line with this strategy. Horizon 2020 will support security research related to emerging ICT technologies; provide solutions for end-to-end secure ICT systems, services and applications; provide the incentives for the implementation and adoption of

29. Horizon 2020 is the financial instrument implementing the Innovation Union, a Europe 2020 flagship initiative aimed at securing Europe's global competitiveness. Running from 2014 to 2020, the EU's new Framework Programme for research and innovation will be part of the drive to create new growth and jobs in Europe.

## An open, safe and secure cyberspace

existing solutions; and address interoperability among network and information systems. Specific attention will be drawn at EU level to optimising and better coordinating various funding programmes (Horizon 2020, Internal Security Fund, EDA research including European Framework Cooperation).

### THE COMMISSION WILL:

- Use Horizon 2020 to address a range of areas in ICT privacy and security, from R&D to innovation and deployment. Horizon 2020 will also develop tools and instruments to fight criminal and terrorist activities targeting the cyber environment.
- Establish mechanisms for better coordination of the research agendas of the European Union institutions and the Member States, and incentivise the Member States to invest more in R&D.

### THE COMMISSION INVITES THE MEMBER STATES TO:

- Develop, by the end of 2013, good practices to use the purchasing power of public administrations (such as via public procurement) to stimulate the development and deployment of security features in ICT products and services.
- Promote early involvement of industry and academia in developing and coordinating solutions. This should be done by making the most of Europe's Industrial Base and associated R&D technological innovations, and be

coordinated between the research agendas of civilian and military organisations.

THE COMMISSION ASKS EUROPOL AND ENISA TO:

- Identify emerging trends and needs in view of evolving cybercrime and cybersecurity patterns so as to develop adequate digital forensic tools and technologies.

THE COMMISSION INVITES PUBLIC AND PRIVATE STAKEHOLDERS TO:

- Develop, in cooperation with the insurance sector, **harmonised metrics for calculating risk premiums**, that would enable companies that have made investments in security to benefit from lower risk premiums.

### ***2.5. Establish a coherent international cyberspace policy for the European Union and promote EU core values***

Preserving open, free and secure cyberspace is a global challenge, which the EU should address together with the relevant international partners and organisations, the private sector and civil society.

In its international cyberspace policy, the EU will seek to promote openness and freedom of the Internet, encourage efforts to develop norms of behaviour and apply existing international laws in cyberspace. The EU will also work towards closing the digital divide, and will actively participate in international efforts to build

## An open, safe and secure cyberspace

cybersecurity capacity. The EU international engagement in cyber issues will be guided by the EU's core values of human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and the respect for fundamental rights.

### **Mainstreaming cyberspace issues into EU external relations and Common Foreign and Security Policy**

The Commission, the High Representative and the Member States should articulate a coherent EU international cyberspace policy, which will be aimed at increased engagement and stronger relations with key international partners and organisations, as well as with civil society and private sector. EU consultations with international partners on cyber issues should be designed, coordinated and implemented to add value to existing bilateral dialogues between the EU's Member States and third countries. The EU will place a renewed emphasis on dialogue with third countries, with a special focus on like-minded partners that share EU values. It will promote achieving a high level of data protection, including for transfer to a third country of personal data. To address global challenges in cyberspace, the EU will seek closer cooperation with organisations that are active in this field such as the Council of Europe, OECD, UN, OSCE, NATO, AU, ASEAN and OAS. At bilateral level, cooperation with the United States is particularly important and will be further developed, notably in the context of the EU-US Working Group on Cyber-Security and Cyber-Crime.

## Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union

One of the major elements of the EU international cyber policy will be to promote cyberspace as an area of freedom and fundamental rights. Expanding access to the Internet should advance democratic reform and its promotion worldwide. Increased global connectivity should not be accompanied by censorship or mass surveillance. The EU should promote corporate social responsibility,<sup>30</sup> and launch international initiatives to improve global coordination in this field.

The responsibility for a more secure cyberspace lies with all players of the global information society, from citizens to governments. The EU supports the efforts to define norms of behaviour in cyberspace that all stakeholders should adhere to. Just as the EU expects citizens to respect civic duties, social responsibilities and laws online, so should states abide by norms and existing laws. On matters of international security, the EU encourages the development of confidence building measures in cybersecurity, to increase transparency and reduce the risk of misperceptions in state behaviour.

The EU does not call for the creation of new international legal instruments for cyber issues.

The legal obligations enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights should be also respected online. The EU will focus on how to ensure that these measures are enforced also in cyberspace.

---

30. *A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility*; COM(2011) 681 final.

## An open, safe and secure cyberspace

To address cybercrime, the Budapest Convention is an instrument open for adoption by third countries. It provides a model for drafting national cybercrime legislation and a basis for international co-operation in this field.

If armed conflicts extend to cyberspace, International Humanitarian Law and, as appropriate, Human Rights law will apply to the case at hand.

### **Developing capacity building on cybersecurity and resilient information infrastructures in third countries**

The smooth functioning of the underlying infrastructures that provide and facilitate communication services will benefit from increased international cooperation. This includes exchanging best practices, sharing information, early warning joint incident management exercises, and so on. The EU will contribute towards this goal by intensifying the on-going international efforts to strengthen Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP) cooperation networks involving governments and the private sector.

Not all parts of the world benefit from the positive effects of the Internet, due to a lack of open, secure, interoperable and reliable access. The European Union will therefore continue to support countries' efforts in their quest to develop the access and use of the Internet for their people, to ensure its integrity and security and to effectively fight cybercrime.

## Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union

IN COOPERATION WITH THE MEMBER STATES, THE COMMISSION AND THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE WILL:

- Work towards a coherent EU International cyberspace policy to increase engagement with key international partners and organisations, to mainstream cyber issues into CFSP, and to improve coordination of global cyber issues;
- Support the development of norms of behaviour and confidence building measures in cybersecurity. Facilitate dialogues on how to apply existing international law in cyberspace and promote the Budapest Convention to address cybercrime;
- Support the promotion and protection of fundamental rights, including access to information and freedom of expression, focusing on: a) developing new public guidelines on freedom of expression online and offline; b) monitoring the export of products or services that might be used for censorship or mass surveillance online; c) developing measures and tools to expand Internet access, openness and resilience to address censorship or mass surveillance by communication technology; d) empowering stakeholders to use communication technology to promote fundamental rights;
- Engage with international partners and organisations, the private sector and civil society to support global capacity-building in third countries to improve access to information and to an open Internet, to prevent and counter cyber



## An open, safe and secure cyberspace

threats, including accidental events, cybercrime and cyber terrorism, and to develop donor coordination for steering capacity-building efforts;

- Utilise different EU aid instruments for cybersecurity capacity building, including assisting the training of law enforcement, judicial and technical personnel to address cyber threats; as well as supporting the creation of relevant national policies, strategies and institutions in third countries;
- Increase policy coordination and information sharing through the international Critical Information Infrastructure Protection networks such as the Meridian network, cooperation among NIS competent authorities and others.


### 3. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Cyber incidents do not stop at borders in the interconnected digital economy and society. All actors, from NIS competent authorities, CERTs and law enforcement to industry, must take responsibility both nationally and at EU-level and work together to strengthen cybersecurity. As different legal frameworks and jurisdictions may be involved, a key challenge for the EU is to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the many actors involved.

Given the complexity of the issue and the diverse range of actors involved, centralised, European supervision is not the answer. National governments are best placed to organise the prevention and response to cyber incidents and attacks

# Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union

and to establish contacts and networks with the private sector and the general public across their established policy streams and legal frameworks. At the same time, due to the potential or actual borderless nature of the risks, an effective national response would often require EU-level involvement. To address cybersecurity in a comprehensive fashion, activities should span across three key pillars— NIS, law enforcement, and defence— which also operate within different legal frameworks:



### 3.1. Coordination between NIS competent authorities/ CERTs, law enforcement and defence

#### National level

Member States should have, either already today or as a result of this strategy, structures to deal with cyber resilience, cybercrime and defence; and they should reach the required level of capability to deal with cyber incidents. However, given that a number of entities may have operational responsibilities over

## An open, safe and secure cyberspace

different dimensions of cybersecurity, and given the importance of involving the private sector, coordination at national level should be optimised across ministries. Member States should set out in their national cybersecurity strategies the roles and responsibilities of their various national entities.

Information sharing between national entities and with the private sector should be encouraged, to enable the Member States and the private sector to maintain an overall view of different threats and get a better understanding of new trends and techniques used both to commit cyber-attacks and react to them more swiftly. By establishing national NIS cooperation plans to be activated in the case of cyber incidents, the Member States should be able to clearly allocate roles and responsibilities and optimise response actions.

### **EU level**

Just as at national level, there are at EU level a number of actors dealing with cybersecurity. In particular, the ENISA, Europol/EC3 and the EDA are three agencies active from the perspective of NIS, law enforcement and defence respectively. These agencies have Management Boards where the Member States are represented, and offer platforms for coordination at EU level.

Coordination and collaboration will be encouraged among ENISA, Europol/EC3 and EDA in a number of areas where they are jointly involved, notably in terms of trends analysis, risk assessment, training and sharing of best practices. They should

collaborate while preserving their specificities. These agencies together with CERT-EU, the Commission and the Member States should support the development of a trusted community of technical and policy experts in this field.

Informal channels for coordination and collaboration will be complemented by more structural links. EU military staff and the EDA cyber defence project team can be used as the vector for coordination in defence. The Programme Board of Europol/ EC3 will bring together among others the EUROJUST, CEPOL, the Member States,<sup>31</sup> ENISA and the Commission, and offer the chance to share their distinct know-how and to make sure EC3's actions are carried out in partnership, recognising the added expertise and respecting the mandates of all stakeholders. The new mandate of ENISA should make it possible to increase its links with Europol and to reinforce links with industry stakeholders. Most importantly, the Commission's legislative proposal on NIS would establish a cooperation framework via a network of national NIS competent authorities and address information sharing between NIS and law enforcement authorities.

### **International**

The Commission and the High Representative ensure, together with the Member States, coordinated international action in the field of cybersecurity. In so doing, the Commission and the

---

31. via representation within the EU Cybercrime Task Force, which is made up of the heads of the EU cybercrime Units of the Member States.

## An open, safe and secure cyberspace

High Representative will uphold EU core values and promote a peaceful, open and transparent use of cyber technologies. The Commission, the High Representative and the Member States engage in policy dialogue with international partners and with international organisations such as Council of Europe, OECD, OSCE, NATO and UN.

### **3.2. *EU support in case of a major cyber incident or attack***

Major cyber incidents or attacks are likely to have an impact on EU governments, business and individuals. As a result of this strategy, and in particular the proposed directive on NIS, the prevention, detection and response to cyber incidents should improve and Member States and the Commission should keep each other more closely informed about major cyber incidents or attacks. However, the response mechanisms will differ depending on the nature, magnitude and cross-border implications of the incident.

If the incident has a serious impact on the business continuity, the NIS directive proposes that national or Union NIS cooperation plans be triggered, depending on the cross-border nature of the incident. The network of NIS competent authorities would be used in that context to share information and support. This would enable preservation and/or restoration of affected networks and services.

## Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union

If the incident seems to relate to a crime, Europol/EC3 should be informed so that they – together with the law enforcement authorities from the affected countries – can launch an investigation, preserve the evidence, identify the perpetrators and ultimately make sure they are prosecuted.

If the incident seems to relate to cyber espionage or a state-sponsored attack, or has national security implications, national security and defence authorities will alert their relevant counterparts, so that they know they are under attack and can defend themselves. Early warning mechanisms will then be activated and, if required, so will crisis management or other procedures. A particularly serious cyber incident or attack could constitute sufficient ground for a Member State to invoke the EU Solidarity Clause (Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union).

If the incident seems having compromised personal data, the national Data Protection Authorities or the national regulatory authority pursuant to Directive 2002/58/EC should be involved.

Finally, the handling of cyber incidents and attacks will benefit from contact networks and support from international partners. This may include technical mitigation, criminal investigation, or activation of crisis management response mechanisms.

#### **4. CONCLUSION AND FOLLOW-UP**

This proposed cybersecurity strategy of the European Union, put forward by the Commission and the High Representative of the

## An open, safe and secure cyberspace

Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, outlines the EU's vision and the actions required, based on strongly protecting and promoting citizens' rights, to make the EU's online environment the safest in the world.<sup>32</sup>

This vision can only be realised through a true partnership, between many actors, to take responsibility and meet the challenges ahead.

The Commission and the High Representative therefore invite the Council and the European Parliament to endorse the strategy and to help deliver the outlined actions. Strong support and commitment is also needed from the private sector and civil society, who are key actors to enhance our level of security and safeguard citizens' rights.

The time to act is now. The Commission and the High Representative are determined to work together with all actors to deliver the security needed for Europe. To ensure that the strategy is being implemented promptly and assessed in the face of possible developments, they will gather together all relevant parties in a high-level conference and assess progress in 12 months.

---

32. The financing of the Strategy will occur within the foreseen amounts for each of the relevant policy areas (CEF, Horizon 2020, Internal Security Fund, CFSP and External Cooperation, notably the Instrument for Stability) as set out in the Commission's proposal for the Multi-Annual Financial Framework 2014-2020 (subject to the approval of the Budget Authority and the final amounts of the adopted MFF for 2014-2020). With regard to the need to ensure overall compatibility with the number of posts available to decentralised agencies and the sub-ceiling for decentralised agencies in each expenditure heading in the next MFF, the agencies (CEPOL, EDA ENISA, EUROJUST and EUROPOL/EC3) which are requested by this Communication to take on new tasks will be encouraged to do so in so far as the actual capacity of the agency to absorb growing resources has been established and all possibilities for redeployment have been identified.

## EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea

### Foreign Affairs Council

Brussels, 17 March 2014

#### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

States bordering the Gulf of Guinea coastline face many of the challenges familiar to countries throughout Africa. But the recent increased focus on threats emanating from the lack of control over the coastal waters and the weak control over access and security along the coast itself pose a particular challenge to the states of the region.<sup>1</sup> The consequences include growth in criminal and terrorist activity, which also pose a growing threat to the European Union (EU).

During the Summit of Gulf of Guinea Heads of State in Yaoundé on 24-25 June 2013, member states of the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) showed their determination to face these challenges through a common regional approach: the 'Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against Ships and Illicit Activity in West and Central Africa', in line with UN Security Council resolutions 2018 and 2039. The EU should support African leadership and the implementation of the Code.

---

1. Including the many neighbouring landlocked countries whose supplies depend on coastal economic activities.



## EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea

This EU Strategy reviews the overall scale of the threat and the risks posed to the coastal states and the EU. It defines potential actions that the EU, through a comprehensive approach in support of the action of the region itself and in coordination with international partners, can take to help those states and regional organisations tackle the problem.

### **Scope**

The geographic scope of this Strategy covers the 6.000 km coastline from Senegal to Angola including the islands of Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe, covering two geographical, political and economic regions: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), both of which are affiliated to the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) and the African Union (AU).

### **Threats**

The threats take various forms, are often interlinked across borders and can, collectively, lead to contagious criminal activity and linkages with terrorist networks, putting at risk the stability of states and reducing their chances of successful economic development or of reducing poverty, to which the EU is committed. The main threats include:

- a) illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, illicit dumping

- of waste, and piracy and armed robbery at sea,<sup>2</sup> including kidnap
- b) trafficking of human beings, narcotics, arms and counterfeit goods, and smuggling of migrants
  - c) oil theft (“illegal bunkering”), and criminal acts in ports.

### ***Shared African and European interests***

The EU's overriding objective is to help the states of the region to achieve peace, security and prosperity through the successful and legitimate development of their economies and their institutions, in line with the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA); building political consensus, enabling and respecting African ownership and synchronising existing programmes in a comprehensive approach to regional development and security. The EU's commitment to address poverty and support economic development is enshrined in the Cotonou Agreement. Experience in dealing with insecurity elsewhere in Africa, particularly in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel and the Great Lakes, suggests that early preventive action, in close coordination with the countries of the region and African regional bodies, is much more cost-effective than a later cure. That experience has also demonstrated the value of integrating all aspects for greater cumulative effect; political, good-governance/anti-corruption, security, institutional, economic, and development.

---

2. International law differentiates between “piracy” – incidents which take place in international waters – and “armed robbery at sea” – incidents which take place in territorial waters.

## EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea

The EU and the countries of the region have major common economic, developmental, commercial and security interests. The region has a long coast line, and is rich in resources which are crucial both for local employment and consumption, and for trade with Europe. Maritime trade to and from the Gulf of Guinea is largely conducted by the EU. There is an average of 30 EU flagged or owned vessels at any one time in the Gulf of Guinea. The sustainability of all maritime resources, including fisheries, is a key concern for local communities as well as European customers. Secure global shipping lanes are necessary for commerce and trouble-free fishing.

The EU is also committed to supporting the sustainable exploitation of natural resources in the region, including hydrocarbons. Europe imports about half of its energy needs, of which nearly 10% of its oil and 4% of its natural gas come from the Gulf of Guinea. Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon are significant suppliers of crude oil, and Nigeria of natural gas. The region's proximity to Europe with easy sea access gives it a comparative advantage over the Middle East for our oil needs and Europe remains a primary export market for other regional products, including forestry, agricultural and mineral resources.<sup>3</sup> Narcotics and other illegal goods trafficked along the coast and across land borders are increasingly damaging local communities and fuel problems in Europe.

---

3. Examples include iron ore (Nigeria, Gabon and Cameroon), diamonds (Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone), manganese (Gabon), bauxite (Guinea), cobalt and timber (Cameroon) and cocoa (Ghana, Ivory Coast).

Yet the region is an increasing magnet for European investment, not only in the natural resources but in the consumer goods and services sectors, including mobile telephony. That combines with a growing importance as a potential market for exports as the region's economic growth accelerates. All this makes for a growing mutual interest in a partnership to promote growth and jobs by ensuring security and stability. It is equally in the EU's interests to promote stability in the Gulf of Guinea to protect the EU's own citizens from the threats of drugs, terrorism, piracy and armed robbery, and other forms of crime emanating from the region.

Given the significant shared interests, the EU wants to build on the regional momentum that was created at the Yaoundé Summit of June 2013 and provide appropriate support to regional organisations (ECOWAS, ECCAS, GGC) as well as to individual states to help them design effective strategies to tackle the challenges and implement them in a coordinated manner, in accordance with the Code of Conduct.

### ***Response***

The EU can mitigate the risks identified above by helping states to strengthen their maritime capabilities, the rule of law and effective governance across the region, including improvements in maritime administration and law enforcement through multiagency cooperation by police, navy, military, coastguard, customs and immigration services.

## EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea

As maritime boundaries are still not fully delineated and inherently hard to police and entirely permeable, strengthening cooperation between the coastal states and nascent regional coordination mechanisms is an essential starting point. The EU can also support countries in the region to deliver on their international obligations as flag and coastal states.

It is therefore proposed that the EU and its Member States, working in coordination with local and international partners, adopt a comprehensive approach focusing on four specific objectives:

1. Building a common understanding of the scale of the threat in the Gulf of Guinea and the need to address it among the countries in the region and the international community.
2. Helping governments of the region build robust institutions, maritime administrations and multiagency capabilities to ensure maritime awareness, security and the rule of law along the coast.
3. Supporting prosperous economies in this region in line with national and regional development strategies, to create employment and assist vulnerable communities to build resilience and resist criminal or violent activities.
4. Strengthening cooperation structures between the countries of the region and the regional organisations to take the necessary actions to mitigate the threats at sea and on land.

## THE NATURE AND EVOLUTION OF THE THREAT

Over the last decade, West and Central African states have experienced a mix of dynamic economic growth together with a strengthening of governance in some countries and a weakening of it in others. Some of the countries are securely on the path to middle income status, while others still have a way to go to reduce poverty in line with the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). Yet, both could be threatened by growing instability and criminal activity in the Gulf of Guinea; and instability or economic disruption there will have a direct impact on the EU itself.

**Organised crime** in the forms of trafficking of drugs, human beings, arms, rough diamonds, counterfeit medicines, illegal waste,<sup>4</sup> cybercrime and related money-laundering often take place in the interface between the porous land and sea borders in the Gulf of Guinea. Trafficking routes often overlap with areas of instability and crisis, and with terrorism in the Sahel and northern Nigeria. Trafficking of drugs, particularly cocaine, and arms<sup>5</sup> has played a significant role in weakening governance institutions in several countries of West Africa, most notably in Guinea Bissau. In some cases this activity has become an extra source of revenue for terrorist groups in the Sahel. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates the value of cocaine shipped from West Africa to Europe in

---

4. Examples of illegal waste include herbicides and pesticides, oil spill, untreated industrial wastes including nuclear and aerosol contaminants.

5. 5-7 million Small Arms and Light Weapons are estimated by UNODC to be in circulation in the Gulf of Guinea region.

## EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea

2011 alone, as USD 1.25 billion, and the bulk of illegal migrants, whether trafficked or not, are bound for Europe. Other illegal trafficking involves cocoa, cotton, timber, cashew nuts, gold and diamonds.<sup>6</sup>

**Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea** is a second threat. Over the last decade, of the 551 attacks and attempted attacks that have been reported, most took place in national jurisdictions, while fewer than 20% took place in international waters, with the largest number occurring off the coasts of Nigeria. In 2013, according to the International Maritime Bureau Piracy reporting Center, of 234 reported incidents worldwide, 30 took place off the coast of Nigeria, including 2 hijackings.<sup>7</sup> These attacks occur mainly when ships are moored, bound for, or leaving offshore oil platforms, storage vessels and ports. However, latest assessments are that the risk of attack could shift further from the coast. The unpredictable use of violence against crews, including use of guns, and the hijacking of tankers for fuel theft or “petro-piracy”, are worrying trends.

**Oil theft** or illegal “bunkering” of oil was recently estimated to lose Nigeria around 100,000 barrels a day, which is then re-sold on the black market. Oil is generally stolen from on-shore pipelines and transported in small, difficult to track barges. Tugs ferrying oil workers to rigs have also been targeted by pirates and armed

6. Diamonds have contributed to the fuelling of conflict in the region, which led to the establishment of the Kimberley Process (KP) Certificate Scheme to stop conflict diamonds reaching international markets.

7. To be compared with 13 incidents including 2 hijackings off the coast of Somalia recorded in 2013.

bandits. These activities cost governments revenue, increase commercial security costs and discourage further investment. The security of the petroleum and petrochemical industry is important not just in Nigeria (at the epicentre up to now), but increasingly further afield, off the coast of Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Gabon, Chad, Liberia and Angola.<sup>8</sup> Oil spills linked to oil theft often also exacerbate the damage to coastal environments and therefore fishing and agricultural livelihoods.

**Illegal fishing:** Fishing remains an important industry in many countries in the Gulf of Guinea, supporting about 7% of the working population of Ghana; contributing from 25 to 30% of Senegal's exports; and 25-40% of government revenue in Guinea Bissau according to the World Bank and Food and Agriculture Organisation.<sup>9</sup> Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing (IUU) in the Gulf of Guinea is costing coastal states around USD 350 million a year, and is posing a serious environmental threat to fish stocks and the potential overall collapse of the fishing industry. Total estimated catches in the Gulf of Guinea coastline are believed to be up to 40% higher than reported. Significant resources, revenue, nutrition<sup>10</sup> and livelihoods are lost as a result. The IUU fishing threat to sustainable fish stock levels

8. European Parliament report Aug 2011, PE 433.768: "The Effects of Oil Companies' Activities on the Environment, Health and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa" focuses on lessons from Angola and Nigeria.

9. World Bank West Africa Regional Fisheries project report 2008; FAO Fishery Country Profiles 2007.

10. According to the Food and Agriculture Organisation fish provides up to 50% of the required animal protein intake for several countries.



## EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea

not only threatens local trade, markets and jobs but also has wider ramifications for Europe and beyond through increasing migration pressures as the development and prosperity of coastal communities decline.

**Unemployment** in countries in the Gulf of Guinea is estimated at around 40% with levels of youth unemployment at over 60%. There are insufficient economic opportunities in the formal, legal economy for young people. In addition, food insecurity in the countryside has encouraged migration from rural areas to cities, leading to rapid urban population growth, stretching already struggling social and economic infrastructure and creating tensions amongst urban populations. Such a high level of unemployment encourages young people into criminal activity simply to make a living, so that they become foot-soldiers for pirate and criminal gangs, or leads them into illegal migration in very dangerous conditions.

### WHAT HAS BEEN DONE

The responses to these threats in recent years have included a range of initiatives at international, regional and national levels:

- Two **UN Security Council resolutions** on Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Gulf of Guinea<sup>11</sup> initiated by Benin and Togo, set out the need for adopting “a comprehensive approach led by the countries of the region to counter the threat of

11. UNSCR (2011) 2018 and (2012) 2039 emphasised the importance of supporting partner countries and regional organisations, through providing training, advice, equipment and resources where appropriate, so that they can increasingly prevent or manage crises by themselves.

piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea and their underlying causes”; and the need to build on “existing national, regional and extra-regional initiatives to enhance maritime safety and security in the Gulf of Guinea”. Both resolutions focus on promoting the maintenance of peace and stability in general in the Gulf of Guinea region and encourage international partners to enhance the counter-piracy capabilities of regional states and organisations in order to enable them to prevent and counter piracy and armed robbery effectively.

- **Regional Organisations ECOWAS and ECCAS** have adopted policies and launched specific actions, mainly as a result of both increasing international pressure and international support, including for ECOWAS a comprehensive Conflict Prevention Framework in 2008 addressing *inter alia* cross border and maritime security issues, a landmark Praia Plan to address the growing drugs problem, and a Counter Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan. ECOWAS is developing an ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy (EIMS) and a draft version is due to be agreed by Heads of State in 2014. ECCAS has an Integrated Strategy for Maritime Security since 2008 and set up the CRESMAC (Regional Centre for Maritime Security in Central Africa).

## EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea

- **The Summit of Gulf of Guinea Heads of State** held in Yaoundé on 24-25 June 2013 has led to:
  - a) The Adoption of a 'Code of Conduct Concerning the Prevention and Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships, and Illegal Maritime Activities in West and Central Africa' which will be reviewed in 3 years.<sup>12</sup>
  - b) The Adoption of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the ECCAS, ECOWAS and GGC Heads on Maritime Safety and Security in West and Central Africa, setting out the establishment of an experts group to prepare a follow-up action plan for implementation of the Code of Conduct.
  - c) Decision to locate the Intra-regional Coordination Centre (as outlined in the MoU) in Douala, Cameroon. This will be the regions' mechanism to oversee implementation.
  - d) Since the Yaoundé Summit, ECOWAS, ECCAS and the GGC are working to set up an interregional working group to establish the details of implementation and how this should be funded. Part of this work will be signing agreements between regional States for joint patrols, for

---

12. The Code is inspired by the IMO Djibouti Code of Conduct for the Western Indian Ocean. Its main features are a particular emphasis on information sharing and coordination, facilitated by a designated national contact point in each State, and a number of regional transnational and trans-regional maritime security coordination centres; and clear engagement by States to declare their exclusive economic zones and enforce their own laws, including on fishing, piracy and armed robbery at sea, environmental protection, waste dumping and mineral resources including oil. The Code is kept under ECCAS, ECOWAS and GGC auspices for greater African ownership. The Code is non-binding for now.

example, Benin, Togo and Nigeria have signed a “Zone E” Agreement under the EIMS. In addition, the group will determine the role and structure of the Intra-regional Coordination Centre in Douala.

- The **African Union** adopted an African Integrated Maritime Security Strategy (2050 AIM Strategy) in January 2014.
- The **International Maritime Organisation** (IMO) is conducting an ongoing programme of table top exercises aimed at promoting the development of national maritime security committees pursuant to the Yaounde Code of Conduct. In addition to the ongoing work of its own committees on maritime security the IMO adopted in late 2013 a Resolution on the Gulf of Guinea.<sup>13</sup>
- **Individual countries** in the Gulf of Guinea have begun to increase resources and develop strategies in partnership to address organised crime both offshore and on land such as the joint patrols (Operation Prosperity) by the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Republic of Benin.
- **EU Member States** have increased their support by implementing or reinforcing bilateral and regional programmes. Their support is already very substantial, notably as regards capacity building of key institutions and

---

13. The Resolution on the prevention and suppression of piracy, armed robbery against ships and illicit maritime activity in the Gulf of Guinea covers all the IMO's activities in the region and how it intends to strengthen its cooperation with MOWCA – e.g. through establishing a subregional integrated coastguard network in West & Central Africa, and address threats and challenges onshore and offshore in a holistic, comprehensive manner.

## EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea

services.<sup>14</sup>

- The **European Union** is addressing illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing through the implementation of the IUU Regulation and through EU Fishery Partnership Agreements with many of the coastal countries of West and Central Africa. These help to regulate fishing, including by EU vessels, and support development and improved governance in the fishing sector.
- The EU continues to support the socio-economic development of the Gulf of Guinea countries, through their bilateral and regional cooperation. The support provided is consistent with the national development policies of the beneficiary countries and integrates the regional dimension. The support includes at the same time state building and reinforcement, economic growth and poverty reduction in all its aspects.
- The EU “Critical Maritime Routes” programme (CRIMGO) is beginning to reinforce regional and international initiatives against piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea.<sup>15</sup> Its main components are: (a) setting-up a regional maritime security and safety training function, (b) starting a regional maritime information-sharing function, (c) improving coast guard work (maritime law enforcement), and (d)

---

14. For example France maintains a permanent naval presence in the Gulf of Guinea with its mission “CORYMBE”, implemented in 2011 the “ASECMAR” project, dedicated to the reinforcement of maritime security administrations in the region.

15. In Benin, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe and Togo.

developing a joint operational coordination capacity through common exercises or pilot operations. Its continuous review procedures will facilitate any necessary adaptation.

- **Other international partners** such as the United States<sup>16</sup> (US), Brazil, China, India, South Africa, have set up bilateral programmes for policy formulation, coordination and institutional capacity building.
- The **G8++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea Group** (G8++FOGG), of which the EU is a member, has been established to better co-ordinate the maritime capacity building efforts of international partners in the Gulf of Guinea. It focuses on the importance of African ownership; the link between economic development and security; the importance of coordination and exchange of information; and the need for a comprehensive response including governance and justice.

In terms of defining the strategic requirements and necessary policies, much work has therefore been done. Implementation, however, has been severely limited by resource constraints, and the gap with the level of further investment needed to reverse the rising trend of organised crime, remains wide.

## THE WAY FORWARD

The Yaoundé Summit signalled a firm commitment from individual states and the regional organisations to work together and with

16. In particular the US AFRICOM "African Partnership Station" (APS).

## EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea

international partners to develop regional maritime security in its widest sense. Follow-up to this Summit is therefore a useful starting point for the EU's approach. This strategy should also be seen in the context of the future EU Maritime Security Strategy,<sup>17</sup> which promotes a similar cross-sectoral<sup>18</sup> approach to establish opportunities for cooperation. The EU's approach should be based on three principles:

- partnership with the countries of the Gulf of Guinea and close coordination with their regional organisations and other international organisations active in the region (ECOWAS, ECCAS, GGC, Maritime Organisation for West and Central Africa (MOWCA), plus UN Offices for Central and for West Africa and on Drugs and Crime, (UNOCA, UNOWA and UNODC), and international organisations including the AU, UN agencies such as International Maritime Organisation (IMO), as well as INTERPOL, World Customs Organisation (WCO) and others);
- a comprehensive approach to the problems, ensuring that security, development and governance issues are integrated into a single strategic framework;
- applying the lessons learnt from our strategies in other regions of Africa, especially in the Horn of Africa.

The EU will take an integrated approach to governance issues and all security risks and challenges on land and sea, addressing

---

17. Expected adoption in June 2014.

18. Between civil society, private, public, including military and law enforcement sectors.

all aspects of transnational organised crime in the maritime domain as set out in the Code of Conduct signed in Yaoundé, tackling the underlying causes, and promoting regional peace, security, stability, good governance and development. Supporting border management, the rule of law, reforming legal and security frameworks, ensuring access to justice and human rights, fighting corruption and organised crime including illegal migration, are essential components of the long-term work ahead. Economic governance is also key, such as better management and societal participation in the exploitation of natural resources, including oil, fisheries and others.

Another important element will be to build on existing successful EU actions, learning the lessons of the EU Sahel and Horn of Africa strategies. While there are differences between the situations in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea, certain lessons are still relevant: effective combination of naval patrols and merchant industry self-protection measures to repress and deter piracy and armed robbery at sea; importance of information-sharing and cooperation between the International Community and regional governments and the private sector; the key role of political dialogue on security and conflict prevention; the central issue of good governance; the relevance of the comprehensive approach, but also of the need to carefully plan the many instruments; and – from the Sahel Strategy – the mutually reinforcing effect of actions in the fields of development, security, peacebuilding and conflict prevention.



## EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea

It will also be necessary, as elsewhere, to work at national, regional and international levels with individual or groups of States which have the political will to act – and encouraging others to join – to prioritise and maximise the complementarity of actions for greater effectiveness.

Bearing that in mind, and avoiding any overlap with already existing Member States' projects in the region, the EU approach will focus on the following four objectives:

**Objective 1** – *Building a common understanding of the scale of the threat in the Gulf of Guinea and the need to address it among the countries in the region and the international community.* The aim is to develop a sound, factual basis for policy-making and action, promote a sense of ownership among African countries, and encourage the political will to tackle the problems. It will also enable the EU to judge better the cost and benefit of actions proposed.

Cooperation with key stakeholders in countries and regional organisations, including civil society organisations, United Nations agencies, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) and the private sector, will make it possible to define a comprehensive picture of the scale of the threat, identify opportunities and agree priorities. Possible action:

- improve data collection (many maritime incidents often still go unreported) and information sharing;

- develop analytical tools to better understand the political economy in environments affected by transnational criminal activities. This analysis should help political and development actors identify entry points to mobilise the necessary political will to tackle existing threats;
- identify geographic and thematic priority zones to focus the EU response, including in cooperation with other international actors;
- address the wider drivers of instability according to the level of risk using tools such as the Conflict Early Warning System and Conflict Risk Assessments, political economy analysis, and EU Human Rights strategies;
- ensure alignment of thematic (security, trafficking of drugs and human beings, smuggling of migrants, and counter-terrorism) and geographical policies/strategies;
- maintain close links and organised consultations with the private sector, notably shipping companies, industrial, artisanal fisheries and mining sectors, to ensure their perspectives are taken into account by governments;
- support dialogue with civil society, industry and governments to better understand the local context. In parallel, also support dialogue with international partners active in the region (like the US and China) to better coordinate efforts and avoid duplication.

## EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea

**Objective 2** – *Helping regional governments put in place the institutions and capabilities to ensure security and the rule of law.*

Resilient national and regional institutions able to counter the threats on a sustainable basis are essential for an effective, multiagency fight against organised criminal networks. These institutions need to have the will to counter criminality, the mandate and resources to do so, as well as the technical capability, including in specialist areas. The EU has the experience and resources to help build local capacity, and should encourage the necessary political support through political dialogue.

The institutions include:

- regional Institutions and mechanisms, in particular the Intra-regional Coordination Centre (as outlined in the MoU signed by the ECCAS, ECOWAS and GGC Heads on Maritime Safety and Security in West and Central Africa) to which the EU can offer technical assistance and support;
- political institutions (for example parliaments, election management bodies, political parties) that can provide other institutions with a mandate to intervene and an appropriate legal framework to do so;
- security institutions (for example internal security forces, coastguards, port authorities, customs authorities and military – land, sea and air forces, all with associated intelligence gathering functions) that can conduct surveillance operations and where necessary, intervene to protect trade routes, oil

installations and disrupt illegal activities such as drug and human trafficking and smuggling of migrants. A suitable legal framework and political accountability need to be in place to ensure clear responsibilities in relation to serious crimes on land or sea. Capacity reinforcement is needed in specific areas where they are weakest (for example countering piracy at sea, or detecting drugs);

- rule of law institutions (for example police, courts and prisons, including specialised tribunals for example in the areas of customs or fishing) that can **a)** enable suspects to be investigated, tried and suitably punished according to law and with respect for human rights standards; **b)** facilitate access to justice and human rights protection (also for victims of human trafficking); to promote judiciary and home affairs reform. Some key dimensions here are the independence and protection of judges and investigating magistrates, forensic capacity to provide evidence in court and reduce the use of illegal interrogation methods;
- economic and environmental management institutions: national authorities need to reduce corruption where it exists, prevent money-laundering through national financial institutions, avoid corrupt or incompetent management of natural resources contracts, and ensure sound environmental management by commercial operations;
- oversight institutions and civil society (for example auditor general, ombudsman, anti-corruption institutions, media,

## EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea

NGOs, think tanks, community groups) that can encourage good governance and rule of law to counter the enabling space for organised criminal networks to operate in.

The EU should seek to engage with the local communities, civil society and media to help citizens hold these institutions accountable.

### ***Possible action:***

- to improve the rule of law through strengthening national law enforcement agencies and the judiciary; improving sea and land capacity; supporting enhanced interagency and regional coordination in the fight against drugs and organised crime including security and legal cooperation, data sharing, and cross-border anti-trafficking joint actions;<sup>19</sup> supporting the implementation of the 2050 Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy and improving monitoring and reporting of maritime security breaches, including collection of evidence for prosecution. Such support should take account of previous experience. The use of all EU instruments (including CSDP), should be explored as part of a comprehensive approach;
- to improve economic and environmental governance through development or enforcement of legal frameworks for fishing and offshore mineral exploitation, including fish licensing systems; working with international organisations, Regional

---

19. For example the Intra-Regional Coordination Centre between ECOWAS, ECCAS and GGC on Maritime Safety and Security.

Fisheries Management Organisations, and other key bodies in ensuring respect for international law and regional norms; working with the private sector – including oil and maritime industry to promote corporate responsibility actions and consultation with civil society and local communities;

- to support closer coordination and increased synergies and coherence between the EU and its Member States and the countries in the region.

**Objective 3** – *Supporting the development of prosperous economies in the coastal countries, enabling them to provide basic services, employment opportunities and poverty reduction for their citizens.*

Many States of the Gulf of Guinea are fragile Least Developed Countries (LDCs), with low key development indicators such as life expectancy, health and literacy. Widespread poverty, poor governance and under-development can facilitate the emergence of criminal activities. Generating legitimate and sustainable jobs for young people could help tackle some of the underlying causes feeding insecurity in many Gulf of Guinea countries.

EU development policy, including the EU's Agenda for Change, prioritises assistance to the poorest countries, particularly fragile states. Key issues addressed in the Agenda for Change include good governance, inclusive and sustainable growth, agriculture, food security, clean energy, and improving resilience to the consequences of climate change. In terms of nutrition, trade,

## EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea

economic development and employment, the importance for the region of improvements to the management of the fisheries sector, notably artisanal coastal fishing, is evident.<sup>20</sup>

### **Possible action**

- continue and extend the ongoing work to improve regulation and management of key industries in Gulf of Guinea countries including fishing and extractives;
- support the development of secure and modern infrastructures, including ports;
- increase community participation in local economic development and support communities through expansion of access to energy and basic services;
- engage with Gulf of Guinea countries, Regional Fisheries Management Organisations, International Organisations and other key stakeholders to improve regulation and management of fisheries and extractive industries;
- promote a stronger and sustained focus on job creation.

**Objective 4** – *Strengthening cooperation structures between the countries of the region to ensure effective action across borders at sea and on land.*

The importance of information sharing and cooperation among a

---

20. For the EU there are also considerable potential gains from strengthening local capacities to conserve and manage fish stocks, in the form of improved perspectives for EU fishing fleets and increased security of maritime routes due to better local surveillance.

wide range of agencies and actors, public and private,<sup>21</sup> makes it essential to build strong planning and coordination among them, notably with the key regional organisations; ECOWAS, ECCAS and GGC. The broader coordinating role of the African Union has proven its value in the Horn of Africa and is increasingly appreciated by the regional organisations in the Gulf of Guinea. EU cooperation needs to support the integration and coordination of effort.

**Possible Action:**

- improve planning, coordination and communication amongst regional partners; help regional organisations work more collaboratively in follow-up to the Yaoundé Summit;
- identify where active partners like the US, Russia, Canada, Japan, Australia, China, Brazil, as well as the UN, World Bank, and other multi-lateral organisations/institutions can have a positive impact, including the Gulf of Guinea in our political dialogue with these partners;
- EU Political Dialogues with the States and the Regional Organisations and other regional bodies should regularly assess the security at sea and on land as well as the development situation, trends and needs;

---

21. An example of the commitment of the private sector is the Maritime Trade Information Sharing Centre for the Gulf of Guinea. This initiative focuses on the creation of an affordable, sustainable and enduring regional maritime information sharing center and complements regional and national initiatives to counter maritime crime by providing a real-time connection with industry and passing information which will assist with delivering a targeted response, appreciated by the regional organisations in the Gulf of Guinea. EU cooperation needs to support this integration and coordination of effort.



## EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea

- support ECOWAS, ECCAS, GGC and the African Union in their efforts to coordinate internally, with their Member States and with each other, and with external partners, including where possible through the secondment of EU experts/ advisers from various professional fields with expertise in security;
- harness EU experience of having successfully contributed to the work of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, to support the coordination and cooperation efforts of ECOWAS, ECCAS and the GGC.

### CONCLUSIONS

Although some promising steps have been taken nationally, regionally and internationally, the scale, variety and shifting nature of criminal activities and the complexity of the underlying problems require much more attention at national, regional and international levels. Actions in the region, within the framework of this Strategy, are consistent with and complementary to national poverty reduction policies and regional initiatives, as well as in synergy with actions implemented through the Fisheries Partnership Agreements and actions implementing the IUU Regulation. It is clear that activity across the different objectives as set out in this framework can be mutually reinforcing and complementary.

It will be important however to coordinate all these different initiatives both in the region and amongst the EU and its

Member States as well as the international community. Our level of ambition, albeit broad and encompassing the full range of economic, social, governance, security and development challenges, is the right approach at this stage.

It will be wise to concentrate where the EU can have the most effect. Post-Yaoundé there is an opportunity to lever support to the regional African-led coordinating platforms that are developing. Ultimately, this strategic framework will allow us to better judge and plan the EU's work with its partners in the Gulf of Guinea in a more coherent way. Increasing the EU's focus now on coordinating better will have significant effects on security, investor confidence, prosperity, livelihoods, the environment, and energy supplies.



## **An open and secure global maritime domain**

### **Elements for a European Union maritime security strategy**

JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT  
AND THE COUNCIL

Brussels, 6 June 2014

#### ***I. Introduction***

Europe's maritime interests are fundamentally linked to the well-being, prosperity and security of its citizens and communities. Some 90% of the EU's external trade and 40% of its internal trade is transported by sea. The EU is the third largest importer and the fifth global producer of fisheries and aquaculture. More than 400 million passengers pass through EU ports each year. It depends on open, safe seas and oceans for free trade, transport, tourism, ecological diversity, and for economic development. Failing to protect against a wide array of maritime threats and risks may result in the seas and oceans becoming arenas for international conflicts, terrorism or organised crime.

It is against this backdrop that the European Union is under pressure to do more, to act quicker and with fewer resources, by strengthening cooperation between different sectors and national authorities. As the internal and external dimensions of maritime security are increasingly interlinked, a shared unity of purpose

## An open and secure global maritime domain

and effort by all involved is necessary to achieve coherence between sector-specific and national policies and to enable civil and military authorities to react effectively together. The European Union Naval Force Somalia (EUNAVFOR) — Operation Atalanta combined with the EU's substantial cooperation assistance has shown the effectiveness of a joined-up approach.

In December 2013, the European Council stressed the importance of safeguarding the EU's strategic maritime security interests against a broad range of risks and threats. In terms of specific goals, the EU's Limassol Declaration of 2012 stressed the 'importance of improved maritime governance including increased cooperation'.<sup>1</sup> An EU maritime security strategy could lay the groundwork for the EU to contribute to rules-based good governance at sea, be it in territorial waters or on the high seas. An EU maritime security strategy would facilitate a strategic, cross-sectoral approach to maritime security.<sup>2</sup> EU coordination and the development of further synergies with and amongst Member States, and cooperation with international partners should be the starting point in line with existing treaties and legislation, as well as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the cornerstone of that approach.

Such a strategy would not seek to create new structures, programmes or legislation, but would strive to build upon and

---

1. By European ministers responsible for the Integrated Maritime Policy.

2. 'Cross-sectoral' refers to actions or cooperation between different marine or maritime functions (e.g. maritime safety, marine environment protection, fisheries control, customs, border control, law enforcement and defence).

## Elements for a European Union maritime security strategy

strengthen existing achievements. Consistency with existing EU policies should be ensured.<sup>3</sup>

Cooperation with existing intergovernmental and international initiatives should be strengthened.<sup>4</sup> Finally, the development of a coordinated approach to maritime security would also enhance the growth and jobs potential of our seas as set out in the EU's growth strategy — Europe 2020.<sup>5</sup>

### ***II. Maritime security interests***

The key strategic maritime security interests of the EU are:

- The prevention of conflicts, the preservation of peace and the strengthening of international security through engagement with international partners. This promotes international maritime cooperation and the rule of law, facilitates maritime trade and contributes to sustainable development.
- The protection of the EU against maritime security threats including the protection of critical maritime infrastructure such as ports and terminals, off-shore installations, underwater pipelines, telecommunications cables, scientific research and innovation projects and other economic activities at sea.

3. For example: Regulation (EC) No 725/2004 on enhancing ship and port facility security; Directive 2005/65/EC on enhancing port security and Regulation (EC) No 324/2008 on procedures for conducting Commission inspections in the field of maritime transport security.

4. Such as the European Union Coast Guard Functions Forum, the International Maritime Organisation or the Chiefs of European Navies (CHENs) Forum.

5. COM(2010) 2020 final.

## An open and secure global maritime domain

- Effective control of the Union's maritime external borders to prevent illegal activities.
- The protection of the global EU supply chain, the freedom of navigation, right of innocent passage of ships flying the flags of EU Member States and the safety and security of their seafarers and passengers.
- The prevention of illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing.

### ***III. Maritime security threats***

Maritime security threats are multifaceted, pose a risk to European citizens and are detrimental to the EU's strategic interests. These maritime security threats have a range of impacts across several policy sectors. Social, economic and environmental phenomena such as climate change and the degradation of marine ecosystems and depletion of natural resources impacting on EU Member States' and other countries' coastal areas, seas and on the oceans have direct and indirect consequences for maritime security. The following maritime security threats have been identified:

- Territorial maritime disputes, acts of aggression and armed conflict between States.
- The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats.
- Maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea.
- Terrorism and other intentional unlawful acts against

## Elements for a European Union maritime security strategy

ships, cargo and passengers, ports and port facilities and critical maritime infrastructure, including cyber-attacks on information systems.

- Cross-border and organised crime including seaborne trafficking of arms, narcotics and human beings, as well as IUU fishing.
- Potential consequences to the environment of illegal discharges or accidental marine pollution.
- Potential impacts of natural disasters, extreme events and climate change on the maritime transport system and in particular on the maritime infrastructure.
- Conditions at sea and in the coastal zone that weaken the potential for growth and jobs in the marine and maritime sectors.

### ***IV. Purpose of this strategy***

Given the complexity of existing political instruments and the myriad of actors and legislation involved at national and EU levels, this strategy should be inclusive, comprehensive and build upon existing achievements.

A good example is the EU's comprehensive approach to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia. This requires multilateral action integrating civil and defence cooperation; capacity building and the development of partnerships; financial and judicial investigation; and local, regional and international diplomatic efforts and political commitments as well as research and



## An open and secure global maritime domain

innovation and cooperation with industry.

The purpose of this strategy is to facilitate a cross-sectoral approach to maritime security. This would be achieved by pursuing the following four strategic objectives:

### **a. Make best use of existing capabilities at national and European level**

Each Member State has, over time, developed its own systems, structures and approach to its maritime security, with no single method for success. These efforts are supported by EU agencies such as the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC) as well as the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (Frontex) and the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA), which have developed sector-specific systems and capabilities for maritime surveillance. To ensure an optimal response to threats, this strategy should support the relevant authorities and agencies at all levels in their efforts to enhance the efficiency of maritime security and to facilitate cross-sectoral and cross-border cooperation among maritime security stakeholders.

### **b. Promote effective and credible partnerships in the global maritime domain**

Given the genuinely international nature of sea links, global supply chains and shipping, the EU's strategic maritime interests

## Elements for a European Union maritime security strategy

are best safeguarded by partnerships with other stakeholders or international organisations. The Union's capacity to cooperate with international partners has a direct impact on its ability to safeguard its interests. The strategy should position the EU as a credible, reliable and effective partner in the global maritime domain, ready and able to take on its international responsibilities.

### **c. Promote cost efficiency**

At a time when public spending is under pressure and resources are limited, this strategy should result in a cost-efficient approach to maritime security. The EU's maritime security is largely organised around national systems and sector-specific approaches that potentially render operations more expensive and less efficient. Maritime operations should be made more efficient by improving cross-sectoral cooperation, enabling better communication between national and EU-systems, creating effective civil-military interfaces and by translating results from research and technological development into policy.

### **d. Enhance solidarity among Member States**

A single seaborne terrorist attack or the disruption of one or more of the major shipping lanes could have a catastrophic impact on several Member States, the EU as a whole or third countries. Preventing, detecting and responding to incidents require the cooperation of all maritime security stakeholders.

## An open and secure global maritime domain

A lack of agreement on maritime zones, such as the delimitation of exclusive economic zones, could present an additional threat in certain areas, such as the Mediterranean Sea.

This strategy should aim to foster mutual support between Member States and to allow for joint contingency planning, risk management, conflict prevention and crisis response and crisis management.

### ***V. Organising the EU response: building and improving on existing achievements***

A strategy seeking to achieve better maritime governance should have four cornerstone principles:

- *A cross-sectoral approach*: all partners from civilian and military authorities (law enforcement, border control, customs and fisheries inspection, environmental authorities, shipping supervision, research and innovation, navies) to industry (shipping, private security, communication technology, capability support, social partners) need to cooperate better.
- *Functional integrity*: there should be no change of mandate, responsibilities or competences for each stakeholder. The focus should instead be on which specific functions or tasks can better be achieved by working together with other stakeholders.
- *Maritime multilateralism*: a key principle when dealing with complex issues requiring an international response and

## Elements for a European Union maritime security strategy

cooperation in the maritime domain is multilateralism. The EU is stronger, and its interests are best protected, when speaking with one voice to international partners.

- *Respect for rules and principles*: the EU promotes respect for international law, human rights and democracy, and full compliance with UNCLOS and the goals enshrined therein as the key elements for rules-based good governance at sea.

These four principles are applied in five areas of better cooperation.

### a. External action

The EU external action in support of maritime security and governance ranges from political dialogues with international partners to supporting maritime capacity building and military operations to deter piracy and armed robbery at sea. The EU could improve the way and the degree in which it capitalises on the best practices of internal policies related to maritime security aspects in order to promote better ocean governance. This could be used for example when supporting partner countries to raise the standards of their ports and port facilities and ship security to meet the requirements laid down in the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and the requirements of the Maritime Labour Convention and the Seafarers' Identity Documents Convention of the International Labour Organisation to ensure the safety and security of seafarers.

## An open and secure global maritime domain

The success of EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta in deterring piracy off the coast of Somalia combined with the substantial cooperation assistance provided by the EU, both on land and at sea, has contributed to the reduction of the underlying causes of maritime insecurity. This should be analysed to identify the lessons that can be applied elsewhere. Another model which has produced positive results in the fight against piracy in South East Asia — and that has seen the involvement of individual EU Member States — is the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). These examples demonstrate the value of cooperate action in the field of maritime security.

### *Regional aspects*

Some maritime zones or areas within the global maritime domain are, because of their strategic value or potential for crisis or instability, of particular importance to the EU and its Member States.

The Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the global network of shipping lanes to and from Asia, Africa and the Americas are of critical importance.

The waters surrounding the African continent, including the Gulf of Guinea, must receive increased attention and an internationally coordinated approach.<sup>6</sup> Increasing levels of piracy

---

6. Cf. the 'Elements for the EU's Strategic Response to the Challenges in the Gulf of Guinea', JOIN (2013)31 final, 18.12.2013.

## Elements for a European Union maritime security strategy

and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea underline the need for coordinated EU action, including the linking of existing and future EU capacity building assistance to the actions taken by the states in the region.

The Gulf of Aden has become an important area for cooperation, due to the presence of international partners protecting vulnerable shipping and fighting piracy. The EU's presence in the Gulf of Aden through EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta, combined with the extensive support provided by other EU cooperation instruments, has a positive effect on other policy areas and fosters better civil-military cooperation. The success of Operation Atalanta combined with the longer-term cooperation actions should be preserved to ensure that any future resurgence of piracy is avoided.

The EU supports the development of the 2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy and stands ready to cooperate with the African Union and its Member States on maritime matters.

East and Southeast Asia's maritime areas contain a multitude of challenges. Strong but unevenly distributed economic development, a growing population and competing claims on territory and maritime resources create a potent mix of disputes, instability and crises.

The opening of possible transport routes through the Arctic and the exploitation of its natural and mineral resources will pose

## An open and secure global maritime domain

particular environmental challenges which must be managed with the utmost care, and cooperation with partners will be paramount.<sup>7</sup>

### *Areas of better cooperation*

#### *The Union*

- should ensure a coordinated approach on maritime security issues in international fora such as the G8, the UN, IMO, ILO, NATO, the African Union and its sub- regional organizations, the Union for the Mediterranean, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), INTERPOL and with third countries.
- should plan, on a regular basis, 'EU-flagged' maritime exercises with third countries in the context of a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operation or EU exercise, in order to improve the visibility of the EU in the global maritime domain.
- should seek to strengthen and support EU regional responses in other maritime piracy affected areas around the world, notably by making best possible use of initiatives under Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as well as reinforcing the preparation for future maritime contingencies through wider external action.

---

7. Maintaining good international cooperation in the Arctic region and supporting the region's stability has been identified as a strategic interest of the European Union. Cf. the Joint Communication on developing an EU policy towards the Arctic region, JOIN(2012) 19 final dated 26.6.2012.

## Elements for a European Union maritime security strategy

- should, building on existing EU cooperation, conduct maritime security capacity building activities with third countries and regional organisations in order to continue improving 1) maritime governance and rule of law, including criminal justice and maritime law enforcement; 2) port and maritime transport security to international agreed standards; 3) capabilities to manage their own borders; and 4) to combat IUU fishing.
- should support third countries in establishing and upgrading their capabilities for Search and Rescue in line with international obligations.
- should endeavour to improve information-sharing arrangements with international partners, including neighbouring countries as promoted by the EU in the wider Indian Ocean region.

### **b. Maritime awareness, surveillance and information sharing**

Access to timely and accurate information and intelligence is crucial for the establishment of a common maritime awareness 'picture' which in turns leads to better operations and a more efficient use of scarce resources. Progress has already been made through a number of EU systems serving different policy areas and in some cases going beyond one sector.

These systems include: SafeSeaNet, a Union maritime traffic monitoring and information system for EU-waters, managed



## An open and secure global maritime domain

by EMSA, to ensure the implementation of EU legislation; the Common Emergency and Information System (CECIS) facilitating communication during maritime incidents and disasters managed by the Commission's Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO); the Vessel Monitoring System, managed by EFCA and Member States, supporting the Common Fisheries Policy; the Maritime Surveillance network (MARSUR) managed by EDA supporting the Common Foreign and Security Policy; the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)<sup>8</sup> improving the situational awareness and reaction capability of Member States and of the EU Border Agency Frontex at the external borders; additionally the Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE) for the EU maritime domain currently being jointly developed by the EU and EU/EEA Member States will further enhance and create an interoperability framework between national and EU systems using in particular a common data model.

Maritime surveillance is still largely organised along sectoral and national lines. This may result in a suboptimal use of available surveillance capabilities. EU Member States' authorities are supported by EU-sectoral systems and approaches. Exemplary solutions for improving civil-military cooperation at national and European level have been developed in the framework of EUROSUR. Civilian and military authorities are required to share

---

8. Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of 22 October 2013 establishing EUROSUR, OJ L295/11 of 6.11.2013.

## Elements for a European Union maritime security strategy

information on incidents and patrols via the national coordination centres for border surveillance as well as intelligence via national situational pictures and to coordinate their activities when responding to threats at the external borders.

In line with the objectives of the EU maritime security strategy, the European Earth Observation programme Copernicus is already developing a comprehensive approach for a more coordinated use of space systems and remote sensing technologies and their derived applications for cross-sectoral maritime surveillance services.

Space and air-based surveillance technologies enable observation of areas difficult to access as well as contribute to improved detection and tracking of small vessels used for drug smuggling, piracy and migration. Since 2013 Frontex, EMSA and the EU Satellite Centre (EUSC) are establishing a service for the combined application of surveillance tools, including ship reporting systems, satellite imagery and manned surveillance planes. Earth Observation components of this service will be supported under Copernicus as of 2014.

Maritime awareness, surveillance and information sharing should be supported by research and innovation activities in order to improve and enhance its effectiveness.

### *Areas of better cooperation*

- The Member States should be invited to ensure that by the end of 2014 all civilian and military authorities with

## An open and secure global maritime domain

responsibility for maritime border surveillance share information via the EUROSUR national situational pictures and cooperate via the EUROSUR national coordination centres on a regular basis.

- The Commission and the High Representative, in coordination with the Member States, should continue to improve civil-military and cross-border cooperation and the interoperability of systems for maritime surveillance and maritime security, with a view to establishing comprehensive 'maritime awareness' to improve early warning and facilitate a timely response.
- The Commission and the High Representative should ensure a consistent approach within the ongoing work by EDA, EFCA, EMSA, ESA, EUSC, Frontex, as well as the Earth Observation programme (Copernicus) and GALILEO/EGNOS (European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service), with a view to supporting maritime surveillance in the EU and the global maritime domain and the conduct of CSDP missions.

### **c. Capability development and capacity building**

A consistent approach is required to develop necessary and cost effective capacities. This should include the further engagement of public and private actors including social partners, and build on existing achievements. The European border management agency Frontex coordinates the use of resources and personnel

## Elements for a European Union maritime security strategy

provided by border authorities of different Member States in joint operations. The improved capacity to respond to terrorist attacks on vessels in EU waters and the sharing of best practices as developed by the ATLAS Network of special police intervention units from Member States, demonstrate other examples of capacity building.

The 'Pooling and Sharing' initiative advocated by the EDA is aiming to pool and share a greater level of military capabilities among EU Member States and contributes to the better use of scarce (military) capabilities. This improves the effectiveness, sustainability, interoperability and cost efficiency of these capabilities.

### *Areas of better cooperation*

- The Commission and the High Representative should identify capability areas and technologies that could benefit from harmonisation for improved interoperability and develop technical roadmaps, mapping the process and milestones to achieve this.
- The Commission, in coordination with the High Representative, should explore the added value of EU-owned, managed or leased dual-use capabilities in an area of critical capability such as maritime surveillance for the benefit of Member States.<sup>9</sup>

9. In close conformity with the approach set out in the Commission Communication on Defence, COM(2013) 542 final.

## An open and secure global maritime domain

- The Commission should explore how closer cooperation between and with national authorities carrying out maritime surveillance activities can contribute to strengthening border control, maritime law enforcement and Search and Rescue within the existing concept of Integrated Border Management.
- Existing legislation on the security of ports, port facilities and ships within the EU/under EU flag should be fully applied and, where appropriate, be upgraded or further developed. The Commission and Member States shall promote greater sharing of best practices, risk analysis and threat information, in cooperation with social partners acting in the ports and maritime transport sectors where necessary.
- The Commission, in coordination with Member States, should coordinate their research efforts to develop their knowledge base, technologies and other means to increase their capacities for prediction, surveillance and risk mitigation.

### **d. Risk management, protection of critical maritime infrastructure and crisis response**

Whilst the main aims remain risk mitigation and the prevention of incidents, the protection of the EU's marine environmental status, its critical maritime infrastructure and its capacity for crisis response depend on a high degree of preparation, anticipation and responsiveness. A set of interlocking actions is already in

## Elements for a European Union maritime security strategy

place but the EU can improve its responsiveness. This can be achieved by building on existing capabilities and arrangements such as the Ship and Port Facility Security legislation which lays down the minimum security requirements for ships, ports and government agencies. Private sector engagement is also a key success factor in this regard.

EU customs authorities conduct security risk assessment of incoming cargo before the cargo is loaded on a vessel in a foreign state. The Commission Communication on risk management and the security of the supply chain stresses the importance of further cross-sectoral cooperation.<sup>10</sup> It calls for increased risk management capacity to monitor the risks associated with cargo movements by strengthening the EU risk management framework including the comprehensive advance cargo information systems and the reliance on Authorised Economic Operators to ensure uninterrupted trade.

Another example is the Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model developed by Frontex, which allows for faster identification and response to challenges faced at the external sea borders.

As part of the protection of vessels at sea, the use of privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASPs) has increased. Several nations have set national rules governing the use and conduct of PCASPs. It is desirable to aim for a common, binding standard for the PCASPs on board EU-flagged vessels.

---

10. The Commission has been requested by the Council to elaborate the communication on risk management, COM(2012) 793 final, into a Strategy and Action Plan in 2014.

## An open and secure global maritime domain

### *Areas of better cooperation*

- The Commission and the High Representative, in a coordinated approach with Member States, should pursue a shared and comprehensive approach to maritime security risk management to achieve a common risk analysis. This would help to identify areas of maritime security interest in the global maritime domain and facilitate the change from a patrol-driven to an intelligence-driven approach.
- The Commission and the High Representative should take initiatives on enhanced civil-military and cross-border cooperation for maritime crisis response and contingency planning in relation to defined security threats.
- Member States and relevant stakeholders should assess the resilience of maritime transport to natural disasters and climate change, and take appropriate actions, and share best practices in order to mitigate the related risks.
- The Commission should consider proposing EU requirements governing the use of PCASPs to ensure a common standard for security companies from Member States and on board EU-flagged vessels. The EU should seek mandatory standards for PCASPs at the international level via the IMO.
- The Commission undertakes to ensure complementarity and coherence of legislation and measures to improve maritime security and the security of the supply chain.

## Elements for a European Union maritime security strategy

### **e. Maritime security research and innovation, education and training**

Innovative technologies and processes are contributing to the improved efficiency, sustainability and effectiveness of operations. Socio-economic research and innovation can help reduce situations leading to social conflicts or maritime crime. Maritime security research could benefit from a clear vision of cross-sectoral needs and dual use capabilities.

Research and knowledge development innovation, as well as education and training, can contribute to achieving the goals set in the Blue Growth agenda.<sup>11</sup> The EU's Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Development (FP7), and in particular, its security research theme, already yielded extensive results. These results should be better used in policy development and to achieve market uptake, exploiting also synergies with the programmes of Member States and the European Structural and Investment Funds. The Commission will continue to support the research and development (R&D) activities related to maritime security.

A maritime security strategy needs global research and development partners. Horizon 2020 is open for international partners. The Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the Commission has established cooperative relations with international R&D partners for specific maritime surveillance related research activities.

---

11. COM(2012) 494 final.



## An open and secure global maritime domain

### *Areas of better cooperation*

- The Commission, the High Representative and Member States should seek to bring together available maritime security-related training courses in a common Maritime Training Calendar and consider opening up these courses to third countries in order to agree minimum common training standards.
- The Commission and the High Representative should establish a joint civil-military agenda for maritime security research (incl. dual use capabilities) to avoid duplication and improve effectiveness of the research efforts, in coordination with Member States.
- The Commission and the High Representative should establish, in close cooperation with industry stakeholders, including social partners, a network for knowledge and competence development in the field of maritime security which includes research institutes and centres for postgraduate studies and provide support to the Maritime Labour Academy of the International Labour Organisation.
- The Commission, in close coordination with Member States and other relevant actors, should continue its efforts to improve the operational and technical ability of the Union and the national authorities to better detect and track small vessels.

### ***VI. Conclusions and follow-up***

Improving EU maritime security cooperation is an enormous, yet vitally important undertaking. The EU needs cross-sectoral cooperation to strengthen the response to maritime security threats. This involves many and diverse partners at national, EU and international level. This is a long-term process, building on existing working methods and achievements, which will be more of an evolution rather than a revolution.

The EU's maritime security will be fundamentally strengthened if the duty of sincere cooperation is taken as a guiding principle. It will be further strengthened by partnerships between all maritime security stakeholders, at EU level and between and within Member States. This should also include industry, social partners and civil society.

The increasing security role of the EU should be in line with worldwide developments. Strong support and commitment are also needed from the private sector and research establishments which are key players in enhancing maritime security and safeguarding the EU's strategic maritime interests. Specific action plans for better cooperation should be drawn up for each area identified.

The Commission and the High Representative will work together with the Council on the areas identified to draw up a more detailed roadmap. Mainstreaming maritime security into EU policies is in this regard crucial for turning policy objectives into achievements.



## **ANNEX: EU security-related strategies**

### **Introduction**

The EU's external action is developed on the basis of strategies drafted by either institutions or agencies, according to their respective area of competence. These strategies can include *inter alia* action plans, pre-defined targets, budgetary allocations or simple recommendations. They can be agreed upon by EU member states, individual institutions (particularly the Council and the Commission) and agencies, as well as by third parties, including states, governmental organisations, or private parties. Strategies may be released under different titles, may vary in terminology, and normally include all policies and documents of relevant strategic importance – the key common element being that they provide an action plan in their specific field. Beyond the strategies reproduced in this publication, this annex presents a list of other strategies and/or 'strategy' papers – listed in either chronological or thematic order – that define the Union's external policies and actions in areas linked to security, political and economic development, and aid proper.

Further security-related strategies are formulated by the Council with a view to addressing challenges such as Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), mine action, counter-terrorism or human rights. These strategies

## Annex: EU security-related strategies

provide area-specific recommendations and action plans to ensure efficient and coherent responses to threats.

Listed separately are Council or Commission strategic frameworks: these delineate overarching thematic or regional environments in which strategies are to be implemented.

In the related areas of defence industry cooperation, competitiveness, and research and technology, both the European Defence Agency and the European Commission have also released strategies that serve as guidelines for the defence sector.

The EU's external dimension is of course not only limited to security and defence issues: the European Commission has adopted several strategies and released other strategically significant papers pertaining to external action, particularly in such fields as economic cooperation, financial assistance, and development aid.

Macro-regional strategies focus on addressing common challenges faced by a defined geographical area which have repercussions for member states and third countries located in the same area. The latter thereby benefit from strengthened cooperation contributing to the achievement of economic, social and territorial cohesion. These strategies consist of an integrated framework endorsed by the European Council, which may be supported by – among others – the European Structural and Investment Funds.

Sea basin strategies are developed according to the EU's maritime policy of promoting growth and developing strategies that harness the strengths and address the weaknesses of each large sea region in the EU: from the challenge of climate change in the Arctic to the Atlantic's renewable energy potential, from problems of sea and ocean pollution to maritime safety.

The Commission, through its EuropeAid Directorate-General, also designs EU development policies and delivers aid through programmes and projects across the world. EuropeAid's action is tailored to fit the region or country being helped, and includes regional strategies.

The framework provided so far by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) aims at bringing Europe and its neighbours closer, to their mutual benefit and interest. Through its strategies, the ENP supports political and economic reforms in sixteen of Europe's neighbouring countries as a means of promoting peace, stability and economic prosperity in the whole region. It is designed to give greater emphasis than previously to bilateral relations between the EU and each neighbouring country. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, relevant Communications are jointly presented by the Commission and the High Representative.

Finally, Country Strategy Papers – up to 137 so far, from Afghanistan to Zambia – containing national reform programmes and national targets relating to EU-wide headline targets are also

## Annex: EU security-related strategies

agreed upon between the EU and individual countries. These agreements operate within the framework of the multiannual European Development Fund, and explain how the government of the signatory country intends to meet them and overcome obstacles to growth.

*Philip Worré*

*EUISS Documentation & Research Officer*

## **LIST OF EU SECURITY-RELATED STRATEGIES**

### **I. European Union**

- EU Strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 10 December 2003
- EU Counter-terrorism Strategy, December 2005
- EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition, 13 January 2006
- EU Strategy against the proliferation of WMD: Monitoring and enhancing consistent implementation, 11-12 December 2006
- Guidelines on European Community Mine Action 2008-2013, 24 November 2008 [replaces EC Mine Action Strategy 2002-2004 and the EC Mine Action Strategy 2005-2007]
- Internal Security Strategy for the European Union, 23 February 2010
- EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, 25 June 2012



## Annex: EU security-related strategies

- EU Drugs Strategy (2013-2020), 7 December 2012
- Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, 7 February 2013
- Afghanistan: European Union Strategy 2014-16, 23 June 2014

### ***Strategic Frameworks***

- A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, 14 November 2011
- EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, 25 June 2012
- A Strategic Framework for the Great Lakes Region, 19 June 2013

## II. European Defence Agency

### II. European Defence Agency

- European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) strategy, May 2007
- European Armaments Cooperation (EAC) strategy, October 2008
- European Defence Research & Technology (EDRT) strategy, 10 November 2008
- Capability Development Plan (CDP), 2008 (for 2008-2012, updates: '2013-2018' and '2025 and beyond')

## Annex: EU security-related strategies

### III. European Commission

#### a. Defence

- A Strategy for a Stronger and More Competitive European Defence Industry, 5 December 2007

#### b. Macro-Regional Strategies

- EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, 10 June 2009
- EU Strategy for the Danube Region, 13 April 2011
- Communication on the EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian region, 17 June 2014
- [EU Strategy for the Alpine Region (est. mid-2015)]

#### c. Sea Basin Regional Strategies

- EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region, 17 June 2014
- Atlantic Action Plan (Action Plan for a Maritime Strategy in the Atlantic area), 13 May 2013
- Arctic Ocean, 20 November 2008 (Updates on action in 2009, 2012 and 2014)
- EU strategy for the Baltic Sea region (cf. macro-regional strategy), 1 December 2009
- Black Sea Synergy, 14 February 2008
- Mediterranean Sea basin (within framework of integrated maritime policy) - Strategy to improve maritime governance in the Mediterranean, November 2009
- North Sea [no specific strategy]

#### d. Regional Strategies

##### *Africa*

- Central Africa
- West Africa
- Eastern and southern Africa and Indian Ocean
- Southern Africa development Community

##### *Pacific*

- Pacific region

##### *Caribbean*

- Caribbean region

##### *Asia*

- Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships (2001)
- Regional Programming for Asia: Strategy Document 2007-2013
- Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia for the period 2007-2013

##### *America*

- Regional Strategy for Latin America 2007-2013
- Regional Strategy for Central America 2007-2013
- Regional Strategy for Mercosur 2007-2013
- Regional Strategy for CAN 2007-2013

## Annex: EU security-related strategies

### **e. ENP Strategy Papers – jointly presented by the Commission and the High Representative**

- Neighbourhood: a new framework for relations with our Eastern and Southern neighbours, 11 March 2003
- European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, 12 May 2004
- Communication to the Commission: implementing and promoting the European Neighbourhood Policy, 22 November 2005
- More information on strengthening the ENP, 2006
- Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy, 4 December 2006
- Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2007, 2008
- Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2008, 2009
- Taking stock of the European Neighbourhood Policy, 2010
- A medium-term programme for a renewed European Neighbourhood Policy 2011-2014
- Partnership of Democracy and Shared Prosperity Report, 2011
- A new response to a changing neighbourhood, 25 May 2011
- Eastern Partnership Roadmap 2012-13: multilateral dimension, 15 May 2012

### III. European Commission

- Eastern Partnership Roadmap 2012-13: bilateral dimension, 15 May 2012
  - Eastern Partnership: a roadmap to the autumn 2013 Summit, 15 May 2012
  - Delivering on a new European Neighbourhood Policy, 15 May 2012
  - European Neighbourhood Policy: working towards a stronger partnership, 20 March 2013
  - Neighbourhood at the crossroads – taking stock of a year of challenges, 27 March 2014
- f. **Other**
- Europe 2020: a European strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, 3 March 2010
  - An EU strategy on adaptation to climate change, 16 April 2013

*The elaboration of a strategic vision for the EU started in 2003 when Javier Solana decided to come forward with a fully-fledged EU security strategy which was later updated in 2008.*

*Today we face new challenges in a much more complex and uncertain world. Hence the need to elaborate a new strategy that could embody a common vision among all 28 member states of what our common interests and goals in the field of foreign and security policy should be and how such a strategy could nurture a sense of common ownership and solidarity.*

*This collection shows how the EU has tried in recent years to handle some of the main regional and thematic issues we face today: a most useful contribution to what remains a major challenge for the EU common foreign and security policy.*

Pierre Vimont,  
Executive Secretary-General  
European External Action Service