

ISSUE

REPORT N° 31 — January 2017

Recasting EU civilian crisis management

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Reports



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PRINT ISBN 978-92-9198-610-1 ISSN 1830-9747 doi:10.2815/42543 QN-AF-17-001-EN-C

PDF ISBN 978-92-9198-611-8 ISSN 2363-264X doi:10.2815/725374 QN-AF-17-001-EN-N

Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in France by Jouve.

Graphic design by Metropolis, Lisbon.

Cover photograph: EU flag off coast of Somalia

Credit: European Union Naval Force Somalia Operation Atalanta

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FOREWORD

Back in 2003, when the first EU civilian crisis management mission was launched (in Bosnia and Herzegovina), the general expectation was that such ‘non-military’ activities would basically complement the ‘core’ business of what was then called ESDP (now CSDP) and/or reinforce existing NATO operations in the Western Balkans. Today, in 2017, the general evaluation is that EU civilian crisis management has morphed into an overarching ‘umbrella’ that goes beyond CSDP to encompass a much wider set of activities, ranging from administrative and training support to robust monitoring and executive functions on land and at sea – sometimes resembling military operations in all but name. In the CSDP domain, this evolution has occurred with only minor ‘constitutional’ amendments – from art.17 of the Amsterdam Treaty (the famous ‘Petersberg tasks’) to art.43.1 of the Lisbon Treaty – and equally limited adjustments to the internal procedures for recruiting and deploying officials to such missions.

The good news is that civilian crisis management (CCM) has proved to be a flexible and adaptable format for a whole array of very different tasks, some of which could hardly be envisaged when CSDP was first launched: subsequent ‘generations’ of missions have indeed been carried out since 2003 – some very long and others very short, some in Europe and others further afield, and all with different participating countries. On the other hand, precisely for this reason, the need for rethinking – or, better, recasting – the frame, the scope and the reach of CCM has grown significantly, in part to also take into account the parallel mandate of the Commission in fighting state fragility, and in part to take stock of the emerging role of EU Justice and Home Affairs agencies (starting with FRONTEX).

This is why the project directed by Thierry Tardy – including two dedicated workshops followed by the contributions from the participants collected in this EUISS Report – provides timely and relevant food for thought to both analysts and practitioners. It also complements the ongoing discussions and deliberations on the specifically defence/military dimension of CSDP that constitute an essential part of the implementation of the 2016 EU Global Strategy and already go beyond the usual boundaries of CSDP proper. This Report, too, goes well beyond the exclusive sphere of ‘civilian’ CSDP and encompasses a wider set of players and policies.

Feeding a more ‘strategic’ approach to all elements of crisis management is, in turn, part of the ‘core’ business of the EUISS, and the fact that this Report brings together expertise from various corners of the EU institutional ‘family’ shows how important it is to work and think across the policy board and beyond the traditional silos. May this conversation be continued and translated into better integrated action(s).

Antonio Missiroli

Paris, January 2017

INTRODUCTION

Thierry Tardy

Responding to external crises through civilian means has been a responsibility of the European Union since its very inception. During the Cold War, the European Economic Community's role in development and humanitarian aid policies *de facto* made it a crisis response actor, in implicit accordance with the then non-conceptualised 'security-development nexus'. With the end of the Cold War and the EU's aspiration to develop its own Common Foreign Policy, crisis management became prominent at a time when the EU was almost exclusively a civilian institution. In the meantime, the evolution of the inter-governmental Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – and later European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – has tended to politicise a crisis response that had remained by and large needs-driven under the Community instruments.

It is in the context of the development of ESDP in the late 1990s, that the term 'civilian crisis management' (CCM) was first coined within the EU. Initially though (in the 1998 Saint-Malo Declaration in particular), ESDP had been articulated around its military dimension, and the first policy documents only talked about 'non-military crisis management', before the term 'civilian crisis management' entered EU terminology.¹ ESDP was then first operationalised in 2003 through a civilian mission (in Bosnia and Herzegovina), and has since led to more than twenty civilian missions as compared to a dozen military operations.

In parallel, within the European Commission, 'crisis management' as a concept has always been more contested, due to its political as well as short-term connotations, at times perceived as being at odds with the Commission's long-term external action objectives and philosophy.

In 2006, the EUISS published a *Chaillot Paper* that offered one of the first comprehensive overviews of EU civilian crisis management.² It focused on the issue of the institutional coherence of EU activities, i.e. civilian ESDP and Community instruments, in a context characterised by the institutional and political uncertainty that followed the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, but also by a certain enthusiasm about ESDP in both its military and civilian dimensions.

1. A 'Presidency Report on Non-Military Crisis Management of the EU' was annexed to the December 1999 Helsinki European Council Conclusions (a document that talks about 'non-military' and 'civilian' crisis management interchangeably).

2. Agnieszka Nowak (ed.), 'Civilian crisis management: the EU way', *Chaillot Paper* no.90, EUISS, Paris, June 2006.

Ten years later, many of the questions raised in the 2006 paper are still on the agenda. Legal/institutional issues have been addressed through the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), and all the work on the Comprehensive Approach has enhanced the coherence of the EU's external action. However, issues pertaining to the objectives and impact of civilian crisis management, the degree of member states' support for the EU's role in this field, the level of local buy-in, and even the EU's internal coordination, are still very much constraints on EU policy.

Furthermore, the changes in the international security environment have raised issues that directly impact civilian crisis management and the EU's prerogatives in this field. Most specifically, recent developments in and around Europe in relation to the terrorist threat and its mutation, the resurgence of tensions with Russia, and the unprecedented migration crisis, have challenged the conceptual and practical boundaries of EU CCM. Trends that had been observed over the last two decades have been tangibly confirmed in the last couple of years, directly shaping CCM and the various types of EU responses.

The evolution of the security environment as well as of the EU's institutional setting and operations has transformed CCM in at least two ways.

First, CCM has become a broad-ranging activity that not only cuts across all forms of EU external action but also concerns the internal security agenda. Outside of the EU, CCM implies the combination of security-related activities and Commission-led programmes. Closer to the EU or even within it, security challenges such as organised crime, illegal migration or terrorism have made the traditional divide between internal and external security increasingly irrelevant and led to calls for greater interaction between different levels of EU policies.

Second, and as a consequence, the range of EU bodies that now deal with CCM goes beyond the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and European Commission Development and Humanitarian Aid Directorates to include other EC DGs such as DG HOME, DG NEAR or DG GROW as well as the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) agencies. Even within the EEAS, beyond the CSDP realm, there are units that now play a role in civilian crisis management, in conflict prevention or counter-terrorism for instance. EU Special Representatives are also part of the constellation of crisis management actors.

The 2016 EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) and subsequent Council Conclusions identify three strategic priorities for the EU: protecting the Union and its citizens; responding to external conflicts and crises; and building the capacities of partners. These priorities are to be pursued through a broad range of policy instruments that go far beyond crisis management, yet crisis management – and its civilian components – are designed to play an important role at each of the three levels.

In this context, while these various changes bring new opportunities, they also raise fresh questions about the scope of CCM, the need for each CCM actor to adapt to the

new environment and EU strategic priorities, and the quest for coherence among the various CCM policies. What are the conceptual/operational evolutions over the last five/ten years in the field of civilian crisis management (CCM)? How have EU CCM actors and policies adapted to the new environment and how can they best serve the EU's strategic priorities as identified by the EUGS? What kind of cooperation/synergies can be established between the various components of CCM, and between those actors and their military counterparts? To what degree have these developments been conceptualised and accepted from a CSDP/EC/JHA perspective? What are the current opportunities/challenges in relation to the evolution of CCM?

This EUISS Report aims to look at all these questions from various angles and perspectives. The first chapter by Thierry Tardy seeks to define CCM and explore how it has evolved in response to an ever-changing security environment. It briefly describes the three pillars of CCM, i.e. civilian CSDP, the European Commission (including Directorates that have recently acquired prerogatives in the CCM domain), and the JHA agencies. The chapter then explores a series of issues pertaining to the impact of the internal-external security nexus on CCM, the division of labour between the various CCM actors, the evolution of threats and how the parallel adaptation of CCM calls for a reappraisal of the role of states in shaping and running these new crisis management activities.

In the second chapter, Tanja Tamminen examines civilian CSDP missions, their added-value and the challenges they face. She locates CSDP missions at the juncture of member state and EU policies, a characteristic that is the source of both political weight and a certain rigidity. Within missions, the role of management structures, and the way missions are being assessed and evaluated, are analysed in relation to their impact. Finally, Tamminen takes stock of some of the key achievements of Comprehensive Approach efforts, but also emphasises the remaining gaps affecting inter-agency cooperation at mission level in a context characterised by both the security-development and internal-external security nexus.

Chapter three takes a closer look at civil-military relations as one key aspect of the evolution of CCM. Snowy Lintern examines how synergies between EU military and civilians have expanded over the last few years, as a result of both doctrinal developments and the pressing need to respond to emerging crises coherently. More specifically, the emergence of 'hybrid' threats and the magnitude of migrant flows have brought about a step-change in civilian-military synergies, as illustrated by the cooperation between the CSDP operation *Sophia* and FRONTEX in the South Mediterranean. In the future, Lintern contends, the implementation of the EU Global Strategy is likely to make more space for military action in what will however remain a fundamentally civilian organisation, therefore leading to even more frequent civil-military relations.

The fourth chapter offers an overview of the European Commission's response to crises and instability. Clément Boutillier draws on the security-development nexus and the Comprehensive Approach to present the role of long-term development policies as responses to the root causes of fragility and conflict. Through the security-development

nexus, development policy and instruments have been brought closer to crisis management while the Comprehensive Approach has created the incentives and space for cooperation between various components of the EU's broad policy response to instability. Boutillier examines how this has worked out in the context of the Sahel. Without minimising the challenges encountered, he makes the case for the increasing role of development cooperation in addressing conflicts at each stage of the conflict cycle.

The fifth chapter looks at the extent to which FRONTEX – soon to be succeeded by the new 'European Border and Coast Guard' – has become a civilian crisis management actor, and at the issues this may present. Roderick Parkes asks how the agency fits into the EU's crisis management framework, and how explicitly it is conceptualised within the EU's civilian crisis management toolbox. The chapter takes stock of the recent developments that have led FRONTEX to embrace a crisis management agenda, in cooperation with more traditional EU security actors and in a context shaped by the internal-external security nexus. But Parkes also examines some of the challenges that the recent developments – and the shift from FRONTEX to the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG) – may lead to, in terms of division of tasks and impact of the broadening of CCM on each actor's own identity and comparative advantages.

In the sixth chapter, Birgit Loeser analyses the link between counter-terrorism and civilian crisis management. As policy responses to terrorism, counter-terrorism (CT) and prevention/counter-violent extremism (P/CVE) efforts sit at the crossroads of both, the internal/external security nexus and the security/development nexus. As such, CT and P/CVE have become central components of civilian crisis management. The chapter presents the scope of EU external CT and P/CVE efforts as components of an EU civilian crisis management policy and how these efforts have evolved over time. It discusses present challenges and opportunities for linking counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation more closely with the evolving EU crisis management policy.

Finally, the last chapter is devoted to the role of civil society in CCM. Catherine Woolard looks at three levels: civil society analysis and scrutiny of EU CCM; civil society support to EU CCM; and civil society's own CCM activity. The chapter emphasises the importance of local ownership in any CM policy; it examines the conditions for cooperation between civil society and CSDP, distinguishing between normative, political and operational reasons. Challenges that hinder the implication of civil society in EU CCM are also analysed, ranging from the size and visibility of EU action (complicating the EU's outreach policy) to the difficulty of building up and sustaining local (i.e. civil society-based) buy-in to third party presence.

I. THE NEW FORMS OF CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Thierry Tardy

Civilian crisis management (CCM) has become a central part of the EU's external action and is likely to acquire even more prominence in response to the evolving threats to European security. Yet CCM remains under-conceptualised and suffers from weak visibility as well as from a certain level of scepticism about its added-value, in particular in comparison with its military counterpart.

This chapter aims to unpack the recent evolutions of CCM and the challenges ahead, and sets the scene for the subsequent chapters. It first provides some definitional elements relating to CCM and of the environment in which it operates. It then briefly describes the three pillars of CCM, i.e. CSDP, Commission activities, and the JHA agencies' emerging role. In its third section, the chapter sheds light on some of the key challenges posed to the EU in its CCM role, in terms of adapting to the environment, coordinating the EU's broader response, and examining the responsibility of member states in making CCM more effective.

Civilian crisis management's evolving conceptual framework

What is meant by civilian crisis management?

Civilian crisis management (CCM) describes a policy which involves the use of civilian assets to prevent a crisis, to respond to an ongoing crisis, to tackle the consequences of a crisis or to address the causes of instability.

As a subset or variant of crisis management, CCM is affected by the debate on how much crisis management should be about responding with a sense of urgency to the immediate manifestations of an ongoing crisis (*narrow approach*) or whether it should also include addressing longer-term causes or consequences of a given crisis (*broad approach*). In an EU context, this debate is particularly acute when considering the comparative advantages of CSDP as a security-focused and theoretically short-term crisis response mechanism compared with the positioning of the European Commission on a broader and longer-term development-focused agenda. The EU Global Strategy itself seems to make the distinction between 'short-term crisis management' and 'long-term peacebuilding', the latter being 'tied to crisis response through humanitarian aid, CSDP, sanctions and diplomacy'.¹

1. Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy/Vice President of the European Commission, 'Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy', June 2016, p.32.

The term ‘crisis management’ also carries a political significance that implicitly reflects on the type of actors or activities that are engaged. Being involved in ‘crisis management’ is not politically neutral; it inevitably implies a political agenda that is not necessarily accepted by those concerned. As a result, characterising the European Commission or FRONTEX as crisis management actors is subjective rather than purely descriptive.

This study does not aim to settle the debate and its authors may have their own respective views about definitions and what they imply for the prerogatives of the various EU actors.

This being said, given the overall multifaceted nature of EU engagement in CCM and the way CSDP has developed in practice, this study’s conceptual framework opts for a broad conception of crisis management. This choice is also justified by the fact that one of the starting points of this study is that CCM today embraces a wide range of activities carried out at different stages of crisis response, which calls for the widening of the concept and timeframe.

Another characteristic of EU civilian crisis management is that it is partly defined by default, i.e. by what it is not, in opposition to *military* crisis management. As mentioned in the introduction and for a lack of a better definition, civilian crisis management is *non-military* crisis management: it brings together all crisis management activities (including police-related) that are of a non-military nature. Such opposition is specific to the EU as one of the only international security organisations that tries to make a clear distinction between the two types of activities (although the distinction can get blurred, for example when police activities are performed by Gendarmerie-type forces, or when CSDP civilian missions are manned predominantly or exclusively by military officers). This study accepts the distinction as it reflects the current state of play yet this does not prejudge the authors’ views on the merits or limitations of the divide, or on the need to think in civilian-military terms rather than in ‘either/or’ terms. In any case, CCM cannot be analysed without looking at what the EU or other institutions do in the military domain, and how this impacts on CCM. The way EUROPOL and FRONTEX have interacted with a military operation (EUNAVFOR Med) in the South Mediterranean provides just one example of the necessity to factor in civil-military relations in the analysis of a new CCM paradigm (see chapter by Snowy Lintern).

In practice, EU CCM is about addressing various causes or effects of conflicts or state fragility through activities that include, *inter alia*, support to good governance and the rule of law, security sector reform, development and humanitarian aid, support to political and electoral processes, border and coast management, counter-terrorism, anti-corruption, etc. The objective of CCM is to assist third states and societies in strengthening their *resilience*, i.e. their ability to reform and adapt, thus withstanding and tackling by themselves the causes or effects of instability. Although CCM has a predominantly external dimension in the sense that it mainly takes place outside of the Union, one objective of this Report is also to locate CCM in a broader framework that includes the internal dimension, in line with the EUGS strategic priority of ‘Protecting Europe’. The

methods used include capacity-building, monitoring, mentoring and advising (MMA), training, direct or indirect financing of various externally- or internally-led activities, the direct provision of assistance (in the development field in particular) and, in some cases, executive mandates.

CCM in a changing security environment

CCM directly connects to two features of the evolving security environment. First, it lies at the heart of the security-development nexus, by which security is a pre-requisite to the recovery of countries in transition while a certain level of development conditions the sustainability of peace. This brings development policies into the CCM realm, and makes cooperation among the various types of CCM actors an imperative, leading to the Comprehensive Approach in the EU context.

Second, CCM has been directly impacted by the blurring of lines between internal and external security that has become even more evident in the context of the terrorist attacks on European soil and of the migrant/refugee crisis. The attacks which hit France, Belgium and Germany in 2015 and 2016 were perpetrated by European and non-European citizens who could operate freely across EU borders and were connected to external actors and causes. For its part, while the 2015-16 migrant crisis was predominantly an internal issue by way of its impact on EU member states' societies and politics (the crisis is primarily dealt with by the JHA Council), its very nature has challenged the states' prerogatives and degree of control over their borders as much as it has connected external security (war in Syria) with the internal EU environment (the massive influx of asylum-seekers and migrants).

The EUGS acknowledged the nexus by stating that 'in security terms, terrorism, hybrid threats and organised crime know no borders' and therefore calling for 'tighter institutional links between our external action and the internal area of freedom, security and justice' (p.31). Indeed, the traditional divide between internal and external security around which EU (as well as national) institutions, jurisdictions and responsibilities have been designed, is now called into question, and has proven largely ill-adapted in terms of both understanding the nature of the threats and responding to them.

The three pillars of CCM

Over the last two decades, EU CCM has been the prerogative of two sets of actors: the civilian component of CSDP, and the European Commission. In the meantime, CCM has witnessed the emergence of new types of actors, in the field of Justice and Home Affairs in particular, that have *de facto* embraced crisis management in response to the evolution of threats as well as to the increasingly prominent internal-external security nexus.

It follows that EU civilian crisis management has become a three-pillar endeavour that brings together CSDP, European Commission-led and JHA-led activities. These pillars

overlap in their evolving mandates, but are also distinct in their decision-making processes (unanimity vs. comitology or qualified-majority voting), financing modalities and resources, implementation (direct EU and member states' role vs. implementing agencies), location along the security spectrum, and distinctive experiences and comparative advantages.

CSDP civilian missions

Since 2003, the EU has launched and run 34 CSDP operations, among which 21 were civilian, making them an essential component of CSDP. Six civilian missions have been launched since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, and ten are ongoing as of December 2016 (versus six military operations, see Map 1 on p. 14), representing a total of approximately 2,000 staff (see Table 1).

With the exception of missions in Rafah (EUBAM Rafah) and in Georgia (EUMM Georgia), both mandated to monitor a contested or hazardous boundary line between two political entities, EU civilian missions are about capacity-building and strengthening the rule of law in third states undergoing a period of instability.

Existing missions support the host states in the fields of security sector reform and good governance (practically all of them), the fight against organised crime, counter-terrorism and border management (EULEX Kosovo, EUPOL Afghanistan until 2016, EUCAP Sahel Niger), anti-piracy and maritime capacity (EUCAP Nestor), and the management of illegal migration (EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUCAP Sahel Mali). This is done through monitoring, mentoring, and advising (MMA), as well as training and in some cases the provision of equipment. EULEX Kosovo is the only mission with executive powers, and also the largest in terms of number of personnel. On average, CSDP civilian missions deploy slightly less than 200 EU and local staff altogether. Within the EEAS, strategic planning of civilian missions is the responsibility of the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) while operational planning and conduct is done by the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), which also acts as the Operational Headquarters for all civilian CSDP missions. At member states level, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and its subordinate Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) ensure political guidance and control of the missions.

TABLE 1: CSDP CIVILIAN MISSIONS AS OF DECEMBER 2016

Mission		Personnel				
Name	Date of launching (mandate until)	EU Member States	Third States	Local	Total per gender (male/female)	Total
EUBAM Rafah	Nov. 2005 (June 2017)	3	0	8	8/3	11
EUPOL COPPS Palestinian Territories	Nov. 2005 (June 2017)	58	1	44	75/28	103
EUPOL Afghanistan*	June 2007 (Dec. 2016)	103	0	117	167/53	220
EUMM Georgia	Oct. 2008 (Dec. 2018)	207	0	108	193/122	315
EULEX Kosovo	Dec. 2008 (June 2018)	400	11	354	558/207	765
EUCAP Nestor Somalia	July 2012 (Dec. 2018)	51	0	2	38/15	53
EUCAP Sahel Niger	July 2012 (July 2018)	71	0	41	87/25	112
EUBAM Libya	May 2013 (Aug. 2017)	18	0	3	17/4	21
EUAM Ukraine	Dec. 2014 (Nov. 2017)	114	4	111	147/82	229
EUCAP Sahel Mali	Jan. 2015 (Jan. 2019)	81	1	39	93/28	121
Total civilian personnel		1,106	17	827	1,383 / 567	1,950

* Mission terminated at the end of 2016


Source: European Union.

CSDP civilian missions are political instruments in the hands of member states that are relatively cheap (€225 million in 2016) and theoretically flexible. They respond to specific security needs of fragile states and have over time attested to an EU competence and comparative advantage in areas of key importance for crisis management. However, civilian missions are also confronted with a series of challenges, in relation to their objectives, capabilities and force generation processes, and long-term sustainability and impact. In addition, civilian CSDP by and large gets little attention from within the EU, or as from the member states. Only a few of them have developed a genuine interest in and expertise on the topic, while the very added-value of civilian CSDP is being questioned (see chapter by Tanja Tamminen).

In the follow-up EU Global Strategy work carried out by the EEAS in the second semester of 2016 (the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence), civilian CSDP was given some visibility through the focus on the theme of capability development (see Box 1: ‘CSDP civilian capability development’ on pp. 32-34). The review of the priority areas defined at the 2000 Feira European Council was reasserted, in order to ‘better respond to current and future security challenges related *inter alia* to irregular migration, hybrid threats, cyber, terrorism, radicalisation, organised crime and border management’.²

2. Foreign Affairs Council, ‘Council Conclusions on implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of Security and Defence’, Brussels, 14 November 2016, p.7.

MAP 1: ONGOING CSDP OPERATIONS AND MISSIONS (AS OF DECEMBER 2016)



The Commission's CCM

Although, as pointed out in the Introduction, describing the European Commission as a crisis management actor would not be unequivocally accepted, the nature of its activities at the heart of the security-development nexus does justify its inclusion in the CM constellation. Indeed the EC has traditionally played a key role in civilian crisis management through the financing of activities aiming at promoting peace and security in fragile states (see chapter by Clément Boutillier). Most of the Commission's external action financial instruments fund programmes that relate to crisis management one way or the other. This has mainly taken the form of development aid (through the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) or the European Development Fund (EDF)) that connects to crisis management through the security-development nexus (the EDF-funded African Peace Facility provides a good example). But other instruments, such as the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), the Instrument for Humanitarian Aid, the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, as well as dedicated regional instruments, have also been used to help stabilise countries at war or in transition or to respond to natural or man-made disasters. The IcSP has been particularly involved, through its short-term Article 3 activities in relation to 'Assistance in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis to prevent conflicts'. Trust Funds – such as the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund (EU-AITF), the multi-donor Trust Fund for the Central African Republic (CAR), or the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis – have also played a role.

The activities financed through those instruments aim, in a similar way as for CSDP missions, to strengthen the capacities of fragile states, through security sector reform (SSR), good governance, support to political processes and elections, capacity-building of security forces, training, etc.

Through the volume of assistance provided and a widespread presence (in EU Delegations) as opposed to the nine CSDP civilian missions, the Commission appears as an essential civilian crisis management actor (the IcSP budget alone, €327 million in 2016, is bigger than the CSDP budget, which amounted to approximately €225 million for the same year). However, the Commission's *modus operandi*, acting through implementing partners (UN agencies, NGOs, contractors, etc.) rather than through direct involvement in the delivery of programmes, makes it a crisis management *funder* more than a *doer*. While this way of proceeding may provide a solution to the staffing problem that CSDP missions face, and can to some extent 'de-politicise' crisis management, it also alters the type of political or administrative control that crisis management requires.

More recently, the Commission has been given new prerogatives in the field of counter-terrorism (DG Home) or the response to hybrid threats (DG Grow has the lead in the follow-on of the Joint Communication on hybrid threats),³ which are an integral part of civilian crisis management taking place at the nexus of internal and external security, as understood in this study.

3. Joint Communication of the HR/VP and the Commission, 'Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats. A European Union response', JOIN(2016) 18 final, Brussels, 6 April 2016.

JHA and CCM

JHA agencies have over the last decade been involved in wider EU policies at the very frontiers – conceptual and geographical – of Home Affairs, and in direct relation with a crisis management agenda, whether in relation to CSDP missions or not (see chapter by Roderick Parkes). This was conceptualised back in 2005 in various documents dealing with the ‘external dimension of the area of freedom, security and justice.’⁴ Yet recent developments have made the evolution more obvious, with JHA agencies not only playing an increasing role in the CFSP domain, but also *de facto* becoming full members of the CCM extended family (See Box 2: ‘Strengthening ties between CSDP and FSJ Actors’, pp.58-60).

JHA agencies fall under the aegis of DG Home (FRONTEX, EUROPOL, CEPOL) and DG Justice (EUROJUST): in a way, therefore, they are extensions of the European Commission. Yet, their status as ‘decentralised agencies’ with their proper mandates and governance systems makes them sufficiently distinct to be analysed as entities in their own right in the emerging triangular architecture.

Examples of JHA’s implication in crisis management include:

- EUROPOL and FRONTEX in the southern Mediterranean cooperating with EU-NAVFOR Med, or in the Aegean Sea with the NATO-led operation;
- EUROPOL in support of EULEX Kosovo by making available criminal information from EUROPOL’s database;
- FRONTEX, EUROPOL and EUROJUST cooperating with EUBAM Libya (with FRONTEX’s involvement in the recruitment of EUBAM staff and training of Libyan border officials);
- EUROPOL and EUROJUST involved in the EU counter-terrorism political dialogues in MENA countries and Turkey.

The new European Border and Coast Guard Agency will further involve JHA in crisis management outside the EU, as the Agency may under its new mandate conduct training activities and even joint operations in neighbouring third countries.⁵

These evolutions have come as a response to a need for expertise and action on issues that directly impact the EU’s internal security, i.e. manifestations of the internal-external security nexus, and the necessity to adopt a more inclusive vision of security governance.

4. Communication by the European Commission, ‘A strategy on the external dimension of the area of freedom, security and justice’, COM(2005) 491 final, Brussels, 12 October 2005.

5. See Regulation 2016/1624 on the European Border and Coast Guard, 14 September 2016, recital 40 and art.14(c).

What capabilities?

Finance aside, CCM assets consist mainly of human resources but may also require equipment (logistics, surveillance, security). Human assets include different types of experts: police officers/units, border guards, judges, prefects, prosecutors, prison officers, etc. These operators are seconded from member states (for CSDP), but may also be directly contracted by the EU entity that carries out the crisis management activity, as is the case of the European Commission, and to a lesser extent with CSDP missions.⁶ JHA agencies have their own staff, and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency will even have its own corps of 1,500 deployable border and coast guards.

In the CSDP domain (see Box 1: ‘Capabilities for Civilian CSDP’ and chapter by Tanja Tamminen), force generation is a recurrent challenge for reasons that relate to the member states’ eagerness and readiness to make available the requested resources, but also to the very modalities of human resources management and decision-making among member states.

CCM is financed through different sources, including:

- for CSDP: the EU budget (Heading 4 ‘Global Europe’) and member states (staff secondment);
- for Commission-led activities: the EU budget (Heading 4 ‘Global Europe’) and member states (European Development Fund and Trust Funds); and
- for JHA agencies: the EU budget (Heading 3 ‘Security and Citizenship’).

Rethinking CCM

The way in which CCM has evolved in recent years raises a series of questions that this Report seeks to examine. First is the issue of the nature of CCM in relation to the internal-external security nexus and what it means for the CCM actors’ respective agendas. The second question relates to the implications of these changes for the division of labour among different CM actors. Third, the evolution of threats and the parallel adaptation of CCM calls for a reappraisal of the role of states in shaping and running these new activities.

6. In the CSDP domain, capabilities are listed in the Capability Headline Goal (CHG). On this basis, the CMPD has developed a Multi-annual Civilian Capability Development Plan (CCDP) that defines a list of generic civilian tasks and aims to drive member states’ capability development. See Council of the EU, ‘Third Report on Member States’ progress in facilitating the deployment of civilian personnel to CSDP missions’, doc. 8405/2/13 REV 2, Brussels, 2 May 2013.

What strategic environment?

The EU Global Strategy states that ‘internal and external security are ever more intertwined: our security at home entails a parallel interest in peace in our neighbouring and surrounding regions. It implies a broader interest in preventing conflict, promoting human security, addressing the root causes of instability and working towards a safer world.’ (p.9)

What this means for CCM is yet to be revealed.

At the conceptual level, one consequence of the internal-external security nexus is the need to think about the space to be secured as a continuum rather than as the juxtaposition of two distinct entities. As put in the EUGS, ‘the external cannot be separated from the internal’, and security governance is increasingly about managing interdependence and ‘engaging in and with the wider world.’ (p.11)

In policy terms, the fight against terrorism or the response to hybrid threats imply that action be carried out both within and outside EU territory, and that new synergies are sought among different types of actors (police, intelligence, civil protection, military, development) that *a priori* operate either in or outside the EU. Similarly, the migrant crisis has reached such proportions that any policy response requires a combination of domestic and foreign policy decisions. The JHA agencies are partly inspired by the external dimension of the area of Freedom, Security and Justice, while talks with Turkey or CSDP operations in the Mediterranean Sea – and possibly in Libya – clearly fall within the scope of EU external action.

A dual trend of internal security actors moving outwards and external actors moving inwards can already be observed. The first move is exemplified by JHA agencies increasingly involved in activities taking place outside the EU, in coordination with CSDP missions or not (a trend further reinforced by the creation of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency), but also to some extent by the implementation of the Communication on hybrid threats and the role of the Commission in this process. Conversely, the move inwards is demonstrated by CSDP embracing tasks that have an internal security dimension (already in Kosovo since 2008 with EULEX’s mandate to fight organised crime for fear it spilled over into the EU, but more recently with EUCAP Sahel Niger or EUNAVFOR Med and their migration dimension), the debate about ‘thematic CSDP missions’ that could be dedicated to the management of migrant flows at the periphery of the EU, but also with the reference to CSDP in article 222 TFEU on the solidarity clause and in the subsequent implementing Council Decision.⁷

In parallel, while there have been repeated calls for the EU to act in a more interest-driven manner, a more EU-centric security agenda is also likely to undermine local buy-in as it differs from the host country’s own threat perceptions. In Africa, in particular, CSDP missions focusing on migration would not necessarily be perceived as the most

7. Council Decision of 24 June 2014 on the arrangements for the implementation by the Union of the solidarity clause, 2014/415/EU, OJEU L192, 1 July 2014.

appropriate or urgent response to local needs. And counter-terrorism could capture the attention of EU policymakers at the expense of equally destabilising factors on the ground that are of secondary importance for the EU. The challenge is therefore to strike the right balance between serving the EU's own security agenda and meeting the needs of the third states where it intervenes.

These new approaches and trends are largely improvised and, furthermore, they occur in an institutional and cultural environment still characterised by the separation between the two spaces. Yet they inevitably reshape CCM. As a consequence, all CCM actors have to take stock of these developments, and adapt in an organised way to the new needs, both individually and in relation to one another.

CSDP actors and the Commission are only starting to explore the meaning and consequences of the 'security continuum'. CSDP's efficacy as a response to terrorism, hybrid threats or migrant flows is yet to be demonstrated because of the external focus of CSDP (the Lisbon Treaty prohibits any role for CSDP *inside* the Union), but also as a result of a certain rigidity in its format and posture. As an example, the recent Joint Communication on countering hybrid threats largely overlooks the added-value of CSDP as a response to this particular danger. In the meantime, in the foreseeable future CSDP missions are likely to move geographically closer to the EU and therefore closer to internal security activities.

As for the Commission, it has a potentially significant role to play in response to terrorism or hybrid threats through building the resilience of EU member states, as well as that of third countries. But this role is also likely to be resisted by governments that are not keen to give up their sovereignty in this field.

The implications of CCM for JHA agencies is even more challenging. The 2014 'multi-annual Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) programme' stated that the JHA agencies had become a 'key component of the EU toolbox for emergency situations and crises management in the JHA area in coordination with all the relevant EU actors involved.'⁸ In this context, how much thought have JHA agencies given to their new role and to the implications of their joining the crisis management 'family' in terms of the nature of their mandate, their own identity and operations, or the type of interaction with other crisis management actors that this implies? Is there a specific JHA vision of security or approach to crisis management? How is an increased role in crisis management-like operations being addressed and perceived by DG Migration and Home Affairs and DG Justice, from which FRONTEX, EUROPOL and EUROJUST depend?

More generally, and in line with the priorities laid out in the EU Global Strategy, adequate consideration is still to be given to how CCM should embrace counter-terrorism, build resilience at home and in third states, link more clearly CSDP with migration policies (as is the case in Niger and Mali) and be part of a broader CFSP objective.

8. 'The new multiannual Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) programme. Common general considerations by the JHA Agencies', Valletta, 27 February 2014.

What division of labour?

A second debate relates to the division of labour between the various CCM actors. This question is not new between CSDP and the Commission in the context of the Comprehensive Approach. These actors have learnt to operate in parallel despite institutional divergences at times, and are now by and large sharing the burden of security governance. How will this balance be maintained as their mandates evolve? More specifically, the similarities between CSDP missions in the field of border management and FRONTEX's core mandate may lead to a degree of overlap between two actors receiving funding and personnel from the same source. For example, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency will be able to conduct operations in third countries in a manner similar to CSDP missions like EUBAM Rafah or EUBAM Libya. Furthermore, these will be conducted with the same type of personnel (police, border guards, etc.). How will this affect CSDP in terms of relevance or access to human resources? How will this shape the relationship between the European Commission (DG Migration and Home Affairs in particular) and a more security-focused FRONTEX that would move closer to CSDP-type activities? What will be the division of labour between these three sets of actors in the emerging 'triangular' relationship? A revamped FRONTEX with an external role may take the lead in specific border control operations at the expense of CSDP, but will member states accept the ensuing loss of control and pooling of sovereignty?

Both the Council and the Commission regularly stress the need for CSDP and Freedom, Security and Justice (FSJ) to work more closely together, in line with the 'Strengthening Ties between CSDP and FSJ' roadmap (See Box 2: 'Strengthening ties between CSDP and FSJ Actors', pp. 58-60).

This has led to, *inter alia*: informal but regular meetings of the CIVCOM and the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI) Support Group, as well as joint PSC and COSI meetings; the signature of an exchange of letters and working arrangements between the EEAS and JHA agencies (EUROPOL and FRONTEX) allowing for information exchange and regular consultations; the insertion of the CSDP/FSJ nexus in the training curricula of CEPOL and the European Security and Defence College (ESDC); or the involvement of FSJ stakeholders in the design of CSDP missions.⁹

Nevertheless, the two worlds still remain culturally and institutionally far apart, and their respective activities are largely unknown to the other side. Beyond the civilian sphere, coordination between these various civilian actors and the military – who are also going through dramatic changes in their crisis management role – is equally important.

Strategic analysis, planning and conduct of operations, and lessons learnt are areas where cross-fertilisation is needed. So far JHA agencies have not been part of the 'comprehensive approach', which has focused on the coordination of the various layers of the

9. See European External Action Service, 'Strengthening Ties between CSDP and FSJ: Road Map Implementation – Fourth annual progress report', doc. 14322/15, 19 November 2015.

EU's external action. However, the JHA agencies' involvement in CCM *de facto* puts them within the remit and scope of the comprehensive approach, with all its accompanying institutional, administrative, and political challenges. As a matter of fact, the 2016 'EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform', which is the merging and updating of two separate CSDP and Commission documents, explicitly extends the 'Comprehensive Approach' to 'all other relevant common foreign and security policy (CFSP) tools, external action instruments and freedom, security and justice actors'.¹⁰ So also does the 'Integrated Approach' as set out in the EUGS.

What political control?

Finally, the emerging triangular relationship is likely to be shaped by the degree of political control that member states want to exert over CCM and how much they want to transfer responsibilities to the EU. For the time being, CSDP is the most state-controlled and therefore politicised instrument, and member states are unlikely to even partially abandon their prerogatives in this field. In contrast, Commission-led and JHA activities are less closely scrutinised by member states. The mandate of the new European Border and Coast Guard Agency goes quite far in terms of intrusiveness in the domestic affairs of EU member states (even if the original proposal to empower the new agency to deploy its guards in a member state without its consent was eventually discarded).

The restructuring of EU CCM is shaped by a combination of the need to adapt to change, EU institutions' internal dynamics, and member states' eagerness to empower the various EU actors and facilitate cooperation processes. EU actors may display comparative advantages at a certain moment or in response to particular situations, but are also subject to member states' policy choices. In particular, the intergovernmental nature of CSDP and the associated degree of control that it gives to EU member states may influence policy preferences. Similarly, inter-institutional cooperation – or competition – is to some extent the result of member states' policies, of how they assess the comparative advantages of the various CCM agents and the merits of their integration.

In parallel, newly-emerged threats and the related internal-external security continuum tend to challenge the sovereignty of member states by weakening their ability to respond by themselves and instead requiring European solidarity and assistance. This raises the relevance of the EU as a crisis management actor, yet this is not easily accepted by member states. As an example, no EU country is willing to acknowledge that a given crisis 'clearly overwhelms the response capabilities available to it', as the Implementation Decision on article 222 TFEU on the solidary clause states. Most importantly, it is far from given that member states would necessarily want to take the EU route rather than the national one to respond to their own security challenges.

10. Joint Communication, 'Elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform', JOIN(2016) 31 final, Brussels, 5 July 2016, p.3.

What this means for civilian crisis management, its agents and their degree of autonomy *vis-à-vis* states, and the area of operation (inside and/or outside the EU), is still unclear. Crisis management is characterised by a strong correlation between the degree of sensitivity of the activity being undertaken and the control exerted by states. Yet a high degree of state control is no guarantee of long-term impact. In the emerging architecture and agenda, one key challenge is therefore to strike the right balance between state impulse and control of crisis management on the one hand, and the autonomy and effectiveness of the EU response on the other hand.

II. CIVILIAN CSDP: RESPONDING TO CHALLENGES AND MEETING EXPECTATIONS

Tanja Tamminen

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which became the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, developed in the aftermath of the Balkan wars, which showed the limits and shortcomings of the EU when it came to preventing and managing crises in its neighbourhood. The 1998 St Malo Declaration was a turning point as for the first time France's president and the UK's prime minister together called for an EU 'capacity for autonomous action' to be developed, 'backed up by credible military forces', in order to 'respond to international crises.' This paved the way for the ESDP mechanism, initially military-focused, but which subsequently evolved also through the inclusion of civilian activities. In the Feira European Council in June 2000, police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection, were defined as the priority areas of civilian crisis management. The first police mission was sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2003 and the first rule-of-law mission to Georgia in 2004. Since then ESDP efforts in the field of conflict management and peacebuilding have been growing rapidly. Missions have been deployed with a focus on security sector reform, border management and monitoring. The EU's strategic environment is however in constant flux, putting the internal-external security nexus in the spotlight and therefore connecting CSDP with internal security needs.

This has consequences for CSDP missions that face high expectations on the one hand to fulfil their ever-widening mandates and on the other hand to respond to the requirements of the broader EU security agenda.

This chapter examines the EU's civilian CSDP missions and their recent evolution, by focusing on three series of issues. First, it looks at questions that fall mainly under the remit of the member states such as the mandates, human resources and financing of the missions. Second, the chapter examines the missions' management structures with a special focus on planning, assessment and evaluation. Finally, the ever-deepening necessity of a more integrated approach and inter-agency cooperation is highlighted.

Political responsibility and accountability

CSDP missions are a crucial instrument in the EU's Foreign and Security Policy toolbox. They are tools of the member states (as Thierry Tardy notes in the Introduction to this Report), and their main added value derives from the political capital invested in them by the states. In practice though, the centrality of member states is not always conducive to the missions' effectiveness and impact.

Member states bear the responsibility for the coherence of CSDP activities and their political impact in the host country. This responsibility extends from approving the mission's mandate to ensuring the consistent use of different EU instruments in conflict and post-conflict regions.

Decisions in the CSDP domain are made by the member states acting unanimously. Mission mandates are decided upon by the Council, which regularly defers the decision-making powers to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) which also monitors the missions' achievements by discussing their six-monthly reports. The majority of experts working in CSDP missions are seconded by the member states, from which they get their salaries. Thus member states have a duty of care to their seconded personnel abroad even though the staff is operationally accountable to the mission management.

It follows that the member states want to see the missions achieving their goals. They want a return on investment, while they also decide upon the missions' operational plans. This allows for a certain level of member states' commitment, but in the meantime it leaves little leeway for rapid changes in the mission's objectives in response to the evolving situation on the ground.

The 28 member states are not a homogenous group. Some are more active in influencing the CSDP agenda than others. Some may perceive the role and necessity of a specific mission from a different angle than the EEAS and this may lead to lengthy discussions with the EU structures on the mission extension or mandate changes. In the case of EULEX Kosovo for instance, the Brussels-based institutions would have been keener to see a less long-term mission in already stable Kosovo (thereby freeing funds for more instable regions) while many member states have been reluctant to believe in the sustainability of Kosovo's progress.

Member states' role is to make sure that the CSDP tools are used in a consistent manner and in close coordination with other EU institutions. Very often however the member states have differing views on where missions should be deployed and under which mandate. Opinions differ for instance on whether and to what extent CSDP tools should be used in Russia's neighbourhood. After the Russia-Georgia war in 2008, the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia was launched but with a very limited mandate. The EU was also criticised for not fully coordinating the Commission and CSDP efforts in the aftermath of the war. Although the CSDP Mission in Georgia is still used for monitoring, Commission assistance tools are today being extended to improve the civilian

oversight of the Georgian military. And in Ukraine, the mandate for the EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) that resulted from difficult negotiations between the member states does not correspond to the expectations of the host country.

In addition to the differences between member states, CSDP missions also reveal the power games between the Council and the EEAS. The fact that CSDP missions are political tools in the hands of the member states makes the mandate extension and restructuration processes in the PSC sometimes lengthy, unveiling the disagreements between the operational headquarters and member states. Last-minute decisions on mandate changes or extensions do not allow enough time for planning and adapting on the ground and have in some cases led to painful downsizing processes with very short notice. This may also negatively affect the wider public image of the mission.

At its best a CSDP mission can draw from the political weight of the member states. No Commission-funded project implemented by consultants and partners can have such political influence on the ground. The mission's representatives have direct access to the highest level of host country authorities. Also, Commission-funded projects do not report to the EU member states as CSDP missions do, which is a way of exerting political pressure also *vis-à-vis* the local partners. Nor do they have active service personnel as experts like CSDP missions do. However, too often the EU internal turf wars and uncertainty around the mission mandate under discussion play down the potential political impact of the mission.

Structural challenges

Planning

Despite clear limitations, since the first missions were launched in 2003 the CSDP civilian crisis management structures have improved their functionality. Major efforts have been made to address certain bottlenecks in the recruitment as well as procurement structures, notably by endowing the missions with legal personality and creating a permanent CSDP warehouse. The process of launching new missions has become smoother compared to the previous years when the Commission's strict procurement rules hindered mission activities and mobile phones and radios were not available for newcomers in the field for instance.

From 2010 onwards, each mission has been planned by the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) in a much more structured and organised manner through its dedicated 'Planning and Methodology Section'. Planning teams are systematically set up that include subject matter as well as administrative expertise. Civilian experts participating in so-called 'technical assessment missions' undertake a needs analysis, collecting facts and figures from local and international stakeholders with a view to

produce the drafts of the main operational planning documents (from CONOPS and OPLAN to the mission budget). These contain clear objectives and benchmarks for the mission. The planning teams also accompany the newly-recruited mission personnel until the interim operational capability of the new operation is reached.

In the case of seconded staff, most member states now second experts for longer periods than one year to ensure the continuity of mission activities. Partly due to the economic crisis, but also to a lack of interest, missions suffer however from a shortage of fully-qualified seconded candidates, while the mission budgets for contracted personnel are limited.

In addition, the current recruiting system based on a few Calls for Contributions (CfC) per year makes hand-over difficult. Sometimes a replacement takes months as the results of each CfC are finalised only after every interview panel decision has been approved by the Head of Mission and CPCC. This may create problems in specialised and managerial positions and affect relations with local counterparts.

Assessing

While CSDP activities have multiplied and diversified, the EEAS has been requested not only to improve the mission management structures (including above-mentioned planning processes) but also to better assess the mission activities. CPCC has in the past few years focused on improving and mainstreaming the mission reporting methods to better analyse the impact of CSDP missions on the ground. Lessons are collected after a new mission has been planned, from closed-down missions as well as after every major mandate change to build best practices.

Missions are currently being assessed with a set of benchmarks that result in exit strategies built on clear end-state logic. Even though such operational plans are criticised for being too technical and based on procedural understanding of ideal-type linear development, experience has shown that without unambiguous and achievable operational objectives, missions tend to be extended without a shared understanding of when the right time to wrap up the mission would be. The basic documents (CONOPS and OPLAN) are operationalised in the Mission Implementation Plans (MIPs) including specific benchmarks prepared jointly by the mission and its operational headquarters in Brussels. Thus the missions report on a monthly basis on their progress against the set objectives. In parallel, to complement the analysis on the mission progress, impact assessments look at what the mission has achieved (evaluation). Although the necessary methodological tools for impact assessment have been prepared, very little has been done so far.

In addition to being EU-internal and restricted, the current progress assessment suffers from other limitations. There is first the issue of how adapted the current tools are to the needs of the mission management structures. A log-frame-based benchmarking

logic focusing on improvements in the host society does not easily fit into monitoring missions (such as in Georgia), nor does it focus on mission internal efficiency (how well the mission uses its resources) or assess how well the EU instruments work together. For such questions assessment tools are still lacking.

Second is the issue of short-term imperatives vs. long-term objectives. Assessment can only focus on whether the mission ‘is doing things right’ and according to its mandate, while only the member states, based on Strategic Reviews prepared by the CMPD, can discuss the question of whether the mission is ‘doing the right things’; whether the mandate is suitable to the situation or if the situation has changed since the mandate was decided. Thus the Strategic Reviews also need a specific methodology and should be coherent in their approach.

The third type of problems relates to the rigidity of mission goals. Inflexible objectives (including clearly defined indicators) set in the Mission documents (MIP) are a useful internal tool but not the best framework of evaluation when it comes to overall impact of the mission. EU objectives do evolve and overly rigid mandates hinder the necessary adaptation of CSDP missions to a constantly changing security environment. Mission output can be measured, but the general impact assessment of a CSDP mission should be goal-free and take into account the complex environment in which the mission operates. As an example, comparing CSDP internal working plans with Commission projects (as the EU Court of Auditors did in the case of Kosovo in 2011)¹ does not do justice to the CSDP instrument as such a comparison cannot measure the mission’s political weight or its different role.

Fourth, local ownership should be an integral part of the evaluation efforts. Each CSDP mission functions in a local set-up and inevitably its personnel have only a limited understanding of the context. To persuade the local authorities to commit to the reform projects, the objectives need to be jointly agreed. The improved planning phase for missions now contributes to more inclusive processes. In Kosovo, the impact assessment structures included the host authorities when the *Compact agreement on Joint Rule of Law Objectives* was signed between the EU Office, EULEX and the Kosovo authorities in 2012. The document brought together EU objectives and Kosovo Government plans to be assessed on a yearly basis.² Similarly in Mali, Niger and Libya the CONOPS and OPLAN benchmarks were shared with the host country to ensure mutually-agreed realistically achievable aims. The watchdog role of the local civil society should not be ignored however (for more on this topic see Catherine Woollard’s chapter in this volume). Normally though, the fact that the Mission Operational Plans are restricted makes it difficult to share the mission objectives with the local NGOs for instance and thus to win the local buy-in for the reforms proposed by the mission.

1. European Court of Auditors, ‘European Union Assistance to Kosovo Related to the Rule of Law’, Special Report no.18, 2012. Available at: http://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR12_18/SR12_18_EN.PDF

2. See the first Compact Progress Report 2013 online: http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/eul/repository/docs/CPReport_2_13.pdf

Finally, the fact that agenda-setting is in the hands of the EU structures raises the question of whose objectives the missions are actually focusing on. Are EU missions genuinely planned based on local needs or are they focused on European security interests such as international terrorism and irregular migration? The missions in Africa highlight the policy objective of the European Union to strengthen the local capacity of the host countries to deal with the above-mentioned issues. The anti-piracy mission EUCAP Nestor, with a primary focus on Somalia, supports the countries in the region to build effective maritime governance over their coastline and more recently the EUCAP Sahel Niger mission was mandated to support the Nigerien government to better control and fight irregular migration. This is where the internal-external security nexus comes in. The current evolution of CSDP hints to a more self-centred EU that will increasingly push for mandates that must first and foremost serve EU interests. How this will be compatible with the local needs, and accepted by the local actors, remains to be seen.

Dedicated approaches

The security-development nexus

The EU Global Strategy published in June 2016 highlights the concern posed by fragile states breaking down in violent conflict, and then ‘threaten[ing] our shared vital interests’. Drawing on the concept of the Comprehensive Approach, the Strategy then advocates an integrated approach to crises and conflicts. The definitions of ‘comprehensive’ or ‘integrated’ crisis management vary from a narrow understanding of a need to promote synergies between civil and military actors to a larger approach pushing for coordination among all actors in crisis areas including the development agencies, and also the Justice and Home Affairs agencies. It does make sense to argue that to achieve joint objectives the member states-led and EEAS-managed instruments such as CSDP missions must be used in a comprehensive manner with the Commission assistance programmes as well as with the Justice and Home Affairs agencies.

The deepening coordination with the Commission pushes CSDP actors, already in the planning phase, to better take into account the possible synergies with (as well as potential transition opportunities offered by) Commission-led assistance programmes when the CSDP mission starts to wind down. The EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina that closed down in 2012, EUSEC RDC and EUPOL Afghanistan which closed down in 2016, and the recent downsizing of EULEX Kosovo, have been test cases in implementing such post-mission transition plans.

The security-development nexus has also created incentives for the EU to improve its Comprehensive Approach by better following regional strategies in key regions such as the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, the Western Balkans, or the Eastern Neighbourhood.

CSDP missions are closely linked on a day-to-day basis with the relevant EU Delegations: they comment on the assistance plans, bring input to the Commission-led processes and participate in coordination meetings. The Heads of EU Delegations (sometimes double-hatted as EU Special Representatives) are also in charge of the political guidance of the missions.

However, inter-institutional coordination has remained difficult. One challenge at the field level is to ensure staff acceptance of the added value of information gathering for another actor than the mission itself. This requires understanding and sharing of the EU's strategic goals across the whole spectrum of EU actors. For instance, EU activities in the Western Balkans are closely linked with the EU's enlargement process. In Kosovo, the yearly Commission Progress Reports take on board some of the comments provided by EULEX experts. Similarly, the Commission (JHA)-led visa liberalisation process is based on local institutions' assessments that themselves draw on CSDP mission experts' input. In Ukraine, the linkages between the visa liberalisation agenda and the CSDP mission are equally clear. Multiple EU-led processes usually take place simultaneously in post-conflict or fragile societies, and effective information-sharing is crucial for common situational awareness.

The internal-external security nexus

In the meantime, the European security environment has been changing rapidly, most notably with the blurring boundary between internal and external security. The sudden migration flows using the Balkans route in 2015/2016 took many EU actors by surprise and showed how difficult it was to modify the activities of a CSDP instrument (in this case EULEX Kosovo) working with a specific mandate in an *ad hoc* manner to monitor and report on the new regional context.

In the crisis management domain the nexus between internal and external security raises the issue of cooperation between CSDP missions and Justice and Home Affairs agencies. Such cooperation happens still on an *ad hoc* basis. Sporadic operationalisation has been illustrated in Kosovo where EULEX serves as a bridge between the host country and the EU Law Enforcement Agency, EUROPOL, which has not initiated direct cooperation with Kosovo due to its non-recognition by five EU states. Similarly, EULEX police officers have been serving in the UN Mission – UNMIK – to ensure information flow from Interpol both to the Kosovo Police and to EULEX. Such arrangements serve European internal security needs (information-sharing on organised crime in the Balkans and beyond is in the interest of all EU member states). However, they contribute little to the development of the host country's resilience, i.e. its capability to function and deal with external shocks on its own.

Despite the challenges, cooperation between CSDP missions and JHA agencies is bound to develop in the coming years. FRONTEX, now reinforced and renamed the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, has already entered the crisis management family and is

likely to increasingly interact with existing parallel missions. In particular, as a coordinating body FRONTEX will have a more active role when it comes to managing migration flows and the border security of the Schengen area. FRONTEX was for instance involved in the planning phase of the EU military operation in the South Mediterranean Sea (Operation *Sophia*).

The blurring of the internal-external security divide concretely means that civilian CSDP missions, as foreign and security policy tools, will be increasingly tackling security threats that would previously have been considered as 'internal', such as irregular migration, terrorism, cybercrime and border security. No matter how far in a geographical sense a mission is deployed, its implications for the EU's security environment will be carefully weighed. The missions, even if civilian and advisory by nature, feed into the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre security awareness through the Watchkeeper Capability. In this context, at both HQ and field levels, the rapid sharing of information (even if potentially sensitive) becomes more and more crucial also with partners such as the UN, the OSCE and NATO.

Conclusion

The ability of the EU to respond to evolving security threats is constantly under scrutiny, as are CSDP civilian missions. Member states' views on their merits and limitations differ in many ways, yet they are important instruments of security governance and are likely to remain so.

A lot has happened in the professionalisation of civilian CSDP over the last decade. CSDP civilian crisis management structures have matured during the past ten years; priority areas have been defined and the related policies and concepts have been fine-tuned; missions are being better planned and there has been a persuasive track-record of missions that have contributed to security-building in the EU neighbourhood.

Against this background, this article has focused on key challenges for EU civilian CSDP, ranging from the uneven commitment of member states to recruitment processes, functioning management structures and evaluation procedures. Most importantly, local buy-in and ownership emerge as inescapable ingredients of sustainable impact, and the ability of CSDP missions to generate such buy-in is therefore key.

Finally, the area where the EU can probably improve the most is that of inter-institutional cooperation. First, overlapping mandates and spheres of influence of different EU actors often lead to institutional turf wars, which hinder information-sharing across the EU institutional borders. Second, the gap between member states and the EEAS is particularly visible in the field of CSDP. The member states protect their decision-making powers while the Brussels-based institutions would prefer more operational leeway. Third, as it has never been made fully clear where the 'short-term' CSDP intervention

ends and the European Commission-funded ‘long-term’ assistance starts, overlapping activities and co-existence is an inevitable reality.

In the field, CSDP operations are nevertheless in the forefront of operationalising synergies between the various EU institutions and agencies dealing with internal and/or external security threats. The growing link between the EU’s internal and external security concerns has concrete implications for CSDP activities, including most likely deepening cooperation with the JHA Agencies in the coming years.

All in all, the challenge that the EU and CSDP missions face in a complex and fast-evolving security environment is how to manage the ever-growing information flow: how to share information in a timely manner with relevant partners as well as how to ensure effective operational as well as strategic communication.

Behind this is the issue of expectations management and how much CSDP missions can really achieve. Although a crucial part of the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy, CSDP tools, even when complemented by other EU instruments, are limited in nature and can only have an imperfect impact on the security situation of countries or regions of strategic importance to the EU.

Box 1: CSDP civilian capability development

Nina Antolovic Tovornik

Civilian capability development in a CSDP context mainly refers to human resources coming from the EU and its member states, as well as internationally contracted staff. The latter have accounted for a larger share of the staff deployed in CSDP civilian missions as member states have been increasingly resistant to second their national staff.

Numbers are not the only issue though. Police officers, magistrates, prosecutors and civilian experts not only need to be deployed in sufficient quantity, they also have to be adequately identified, trained, inducted, replaced during their absence, and reintegrated in their respective administrations once the mission is over, roughly a year after initial deployment.

The management of national resources is a member state’s responsibility, and each one has developed its own set of rules and procedures. The deployment of existing capabilities also depends on the degree of member states’ commitment to a particular mission. Even when assets are made available, pre-deployment training, national coordination and induction tend to complicate actual deployment and often delay the start of a mission.

Civilian Headline Goals

Back in 2000, at a time when the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) of the EU was being framed, drawing on the lessons of the Balkan wars, the Feira European Council identified four priority areas for civilian crisis management: (i) police; (ii) strengthening the rule of law; (iii) strengthening civilian administration; and (iv) civil protection.

Training and rapid deployment were also identified as crucial to the impact of missions. The initial target for capabilities was ambitious: 5,000 deployable officers by 2003, 1,000 of which deployable within 30 days. By December 2004, the European Council endorsed the Civilian Headline Goal, with member states committing to reach concrete results by 2008, across the whole spectrum of crisis management tasks.

Similarly to the military domain, the approach followed at the time in the civilian domain was based on agreed illustrative scenarios leading to key tasks on the basis of which member states were asked to provide information on available resources.

The 2008 CHG focused mainly on the availability of personnel. In 2007, a new Headline Goal was adopted, with new elements such as lessons learnt, synergies (between the civilian and the military and between ESDP and the Commission), or the nexus between CSDP and FSJ (see Box 2: 'Strengthening ties between CSDP and FSJ Actors', pp. 58-60). The focus on personnel and the approach via scenarios were however still prevalent. This led to the current institutions and division of labour, where civilian capability development is set up by the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) whereas the operational command belongs to the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), i.e. strategic and operational planning are, to some extent, decoupled.

The civilian capability development plan (CCDP)

In 2011, a multi-annual work programme for civilian capability development was defined and endorsed by the Council, leading to a Civilian Capability Development Plan (CCDP, doc. 12110/12) and key actions for 2012 and 2013.

The CCDP was designed to be the starting point of a lasting civilian CSDP capability development process, backed by the member states. Initially though, its structure, inspired from its military equivalent, was not properly adjusted to the civilian sphere, including in terms of feasibility. As a result, various areas such as training, lessons learnt and CSDP/FSJ cooperation followed separate – and even diverging – tracks, to become to a large extent separate from the capability process itself.

These problems were partly addressed through a series of measures, including: the creation in 2013 of a Lessons Management Group that brings together all relevant EEAS services to identify key lessons in the CSDP field; the creation in 2013 of the permanent Warehouse for civilian CSDP missions; the setting up in 2016 of the Mission Support Platform in the CPCC; and the launching in 2017 of the Goalkeeper Platform that will help streamline and rationalise recruitment, capability development, and training. In addition, capability development has now become a joint effort of the CMPD, the CPCC and other services, acknowledging that even though capability development does not equal force generation, the two cannot be tackled separately.

These various initiatives have contributed to improve the overall performance of civilian CSDP missions and the availability of resources. However, important gaps still remain, in particular in the areas of niche capabilities and rapid deployment. Furthermore, attention to individual CSDP missions now seems to prevail over a more general effort on civilian capabilities as such.

Due to the lack of resources, the implementation of the CCDP was delayed until May 2015. It eventually started with the generation of the ‘List of Generic Civilian CSDP Tasks’. The next step is the creation of the Requirements list, which identifies capabilities required to implement the generic tasks.

In 2016, the EU Global Strategy has created new opportunities to take a strategic look at civilian CSDP, and determine how priorities have changed. Council Conclusions on the implementation of the EUGS (November 2016) called for the further development of civilian capabilities, notably through the review of the priority areas of civilian CSDP missions, initially agreed at the 2000 Feira European Council, so as to enhance the ‘responsiveness of civilian crisis management to new challenges and threats’.

Beyond capability development, issues of financing civilian CSDP, strengthening synergies between the various components of the EU’s external action as well as JHA agencies, and, most importantly, the level of ambition and commitment of member states, will remain key factors of the visibility and effectiveness of civilian CSDP.

III. WHAT CIVILIAN-MILITARY SYNERGIES?

Snowy Lintern

In the last few years the synergies between the EU military and non-military – by definition ‘civilian’ – dimensions of crisis management have expanded exponentially. The two key drivers for this have been doctrinal developments and the pressing need to respond coherently to emerging crises. The doctrinal developments, notably since the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) with the increased potential and the ambition of making the EU’s external action more consistent, more effective and more strategic, led to the articulation of the Comprehensive Approach. Recently updated to the ‘Integrated Approach’, although the implications of this shift are not yet fully clear, this has sought to embed all military and civilian CSDP missions/operations into a single external policy, be that region- or country-specific. Second, the response to two crises in particular – Ukraine and migration – has led to needs-driven synergies in the response to the so-called hybrid threats and to the internal-external security nexus. Finally, some interesting elements have been mooted in the EU Global Strategy, not least a potential permanent civilian-military Headquarters available for the planning and conduct of all EU military and civilian missions and operations.

This chapter looks at the meaning of civilian-military synergies in the context of the evolution of EU crisis response. It aims at defining the term, examines some of the challenges that EU military and civilian actors face in handling crises together, and explores how civilian-military relations have evolved over the last decade.

Capability development

One key difference between military and civilian crisis management pertains to the required capabilities and the processes of capability development. Traditionally, discussion of civilian-military synergies has focused largely on complementarity of equipment and training for CSDP civilian missions and military operations. Yet this distinction has proven problematic, as the development process of military capability is primarily focused on equipment, whereas it focuses on the identification and training of experts in the civilian domain. As a result, regardless of the messaging on the need to enhance civilian-military synergies, in practice this has been hard to achieve.

In addition, the capabilities to perform CSDP tasks are, in theory, provided by the member states (art.42.1 TEU). However, in practice, a full range of military capabilities is provided by member states while on the civilian side the member states mainly supply the human resources as the EU is able to provide, through common funding, the civil equipment components of the capability.

Both capability development processes follow the same methodology: defining the needed capabilities based on a 'level of ambition', then working to develop or to encourage the development of the needed capabilities. Notwithstanding the complicated development process, military capabilities could be used in civilian missions, and civilian capabilities could be used for military operations. Examples include: civilian or military aircraft/ships/vehicles for deployment or intra-theatre transport, including the potential use of centralised 'EU' equipment from the warehouse; civilian or military satellite/aircraft/drones for air surveillance (such as the Luxembourg civil patrol aircraft provided for surveillance in Operation *Atalanta*); civilian or military personnel for force protection (i.e. civilian personnel for EUTM, or military teams to protect civilian ships); civilian or military personnel for medical tasks (i.e. medical support or medical evacuation).

The steps involved in developing this work are the identification of potential tasks within the existing Headline Goal, identifying which tasks could be potentially dual-use, identifying and resolving the decisional, legal and financial aspects, and incorporating the capabilities into active, stand-by or latent use. This work could have far-reaching consequences, impacting on the size and composition of the EU Battle Groups, and the availability of wider strategic assets (drones, strategic airlift, medical supplies, etc.). Of course, the decisional, legal and financial aspects remain the difficult part for cross-use of capabilities, but this work is timely given the broader strands of ongoing capability development.

Doctrinal developments

The EU's Comprehensive Approach (CA), as set out in the 2013 Joint Communication on 'The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises', called for a coherent political strategy for conflict prevention, preparedness and response. This approach was requested by the military within the EU for a number of years, notably as they had increasingly recognised the limitations of military action alone. Lessons from Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya all highlight that military action cannot alone deliver a sustainable solution in a crisis-stricken country. Lack of planning, and implementation, of economic and structural development, political engagement and support to democratic processes were key failures. Thus, as lessons continued to be learnt about a decade ago, EU military experts that had engaged in the so-called 'War on Terror' were seeking closer civilian and military coordinated planning and delivery of effect. EU military personnel were actively searching for practical civilian-military synergies, and the Lisbon Treaty established the structure (the EEAS) and the political will and competence (the HR/VP) to implement the Comprehensive Approach. Although the Joint Communication on the CA did not foresee an important role related to the internal-external security nexus – in fact the drafters were conscious to *exclude* internal roles – the approach itself allows a 'plug and play' role for any EU instrument or actor. The newer concept of an 'Integrated Approach' is expected to take this forward and is likely to address all actors, including the internal-external nexus, thus embedding Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and relevant Agencies into early planning and a truly coordinated response.

Furthermore, the re-write of the CSDP Crisis Management Procedures (CMP) in 2013 created a new step in CSDP planning where the framework for the CA was articulated before detailed CSDP planning commenced. This is built around the Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA), a short document written by the relevant geographic Managing Director in the EEAS that articulates what the problem is, explains why the EU should act (based on interests, values, objectives and mandates), and identifies what instruments could be available, and best suited, to act. This, in itself, greatly assists in placing CSDP military action into a broader context, and forces CSDP planners to understand and cooperate with civilian instruments (such as DG DEVCO) from the very start. Although initially the Commission had little interest in this beyond the development dimension, more and more EC services joined as they saw the utility of the exercise.

Most recently, the release of the EU Global Strategy in June 2016 has led to a series of strands of follow-up work on its implementation, three of which have the potential to make a real impact on civilian-military synergies.

First is the so-called Security and Defence Implementation Plan (SDIP), with initiatives on security and defence in what are probably the most obvious areas where enhanced civilian-military synergies are likely to take place. At the time of writing, this includes work on a civil-military level of ambition, a review of institutional structures and procedures, including the establishment of a single civilian-military headquarters, and a review of financial arrangements. The initiative to move forward with a permanent Joint Civilian-Military Planning and Conduct facility will naturally be expected to advance this topic, but it should not be forgotten that integrated civilian-military planning has been delivered at the political strategic level since the creation of the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) in 2009. The new element (dependent on the level of member states' ambition), the Permanent Joint Civilian-Military Planning and Conduct facility, should be responsible for follow-on planning and conduct of both civilian and military operations. Various options exist, but it seems logical to seek some form of integrated support staff, although current Command limitations¹ will require both a military and civilian commander.

The second strand deals with the 'Integrated Approach' that builds on the CA and aims to deliver coherent responses across both internal security and external action matters. This seeks to address the multiple dimensions of conflict and fragility and spell out the EU's approach in all stages of the crisis cycle, with a view to bringing more coherence in the overall policy framework and identifying practical ways to enhance its conflict prevention, stabilisation and peacebuilding impact through the policy instruments and resources available. EU military missions/operations will be a subset of the EU's external action, and synergies between the military and civilian components will be increasingly frequent. One current example of these synergies is provided by EUTM Somalia where funding was released by the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) budget to augment the Somali National Army's command and control capability.

1. Due to the existing constraints from member states, military personnel cannot be placed under civilian command *en bloc*, or civilians under military command. This excludes obvious key personnel such as a civilian Political Advisor (POLAD) within a military operation. Hence the need for a military *and* a civilian commander.

Third, although the Security and Defence initiatives will affect the EU institutions in Brussels, it is work on strengthening the internal-external nexus that will have (and is having) the greatest effect in-theatre. Special attention will be required to enhance EU policy responses to challenges straddling the spheres of internal and external action. This could be achieved by ensuring consistency and coherence and optimising synergies between policies and institutions across civil and military domains, and by building on ongoing work on engagement with third countries on counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism. Formulating a coherent response to migration will be equally essential.

Crisis responses

Doctrinal developments are useful enablers, but as always it is the pressing need to respond to emerging crises that genuinely and rapidly generate synergies between the military and civilian components of crisis management.

‘Hybrid’ threats

The key change resulting from the Ukraine crisis has been the recognition that hybrid warfare is being actively pursued by both state and non-state actors to influence, and at times to paralyse, decision-making within Europe. Although hybrid warfare, referred to as ‘hybrid threats’ by the EU in recognition of their dual civilian and military nature, is not new, the level of sophistication in a computerised and networked world makes it increasingly powerful. Hybrid threats are hostile actions in peacetime, which combine conventional and unconventional, military and non-military, overt and covert methods, aimed at creating confusion and ambiguity as regards their nature, origin and objective.

The EU’s response has been to seek actions to improve awareness, build resilience, and to be able to both ‘prevent and respond’, and then to recover from crisis. It envisages mechanisms that will allow better information sharing and an increased analysis capacity, as well as swift decision-making. It also proposes the establishment of a Centre to conduct research and experimentation for member states, in order to become proactive in their efforts to counter hybrid threats. Concretely the objective is to raise awareness by establishing dedicated mechanisms to exchange information between member states and coordinate the EU’s capacity to deliver Strategic Communications, starting with better situational awareness and information through the creation of a Hybrid Fusion Cell within the EEAS containing, among other experts, language specialists who can reach out to partners in order to counter misinformation more effectively. Resilience will be built-in to sectors such as cybersecurity and critical infrastructure, and business supported by protecting the financial system from illicit use. In addition, reinforcement of counter-terrorism and efforts to counter radicalisation will be established. This package of response is both civilian and military by its very nature, and the real benefit of increased cooperation with partner organisations, especially NATO, is already tangible.

Migration

While the response to hybrid threats has been systematically planned, with mitigation and coherence built-in from the start, the migration crisis has led to significantly closer civilian and military interaction without either pre-warning or pre-planning. This needs-driven activity has seen a step-change in civilian-military synergies, and the lessons and further developments are becoming increasingly clear.

As touched upon in other sections of this Report, there are three key sets of actors in the migration response ‘triangle’: Justice and Home Affairs (JHA – European Commission-led), CSDP (EEAS in direct support to member states’ decision-making), and the ‘frontline’ JHA Agencies, principally FRONTEX, EUROPOL, and EUROJUST. The strategic planning for a coherent EU response is mainly done through the EEAS and DG HOME, and the operational planning and execution of activity rests with CSDP missions/operations and the JHA Agencies. In practice, cooperation between these three sets of actors has produced tangible benefits, but also led to some problems and a range of unintended consequences.

Operation *Sophia* in the South Mediterranean is probably the highest profile CSDP operation dealing with migration, although other CSDP missions also address this in both source and transit countries. Operation *Sophia* has had the steepest learning curve on working with FRONTEX and it is worth reflecting on the current complexity of civilian-military synergies. Early engagement and understanding of each other’s structures was essential and indeed problematic; little was known of military CSDP in FRONTEX that simultaneously operates in the Mediterranean Sea, and CSDP actors knew little of FRONTEX. Both organisations were fortunate to have one or two key planners that knew the others’ role, and an early exchange of liaison officers was completed. The de-confliction (or sharing) of operating areas, tasking, knowledge of the required ‘legal finish’, information and intelligence sharing has been essential, both at the planning and execution stage. Two early constraints were identified: military understanding – at sea – of the legal requirements for evidence to prosecute smugglers was weak but quickly augmented by embarking FRONTEX personnel on EU warships; military intelligence sharing has clearly defined routes and systems that did not correspond to civilian systems, and this was mirrored by the legal (and practical) constraints of ‘police’ information sharing, especially with regard to personal data.

In this evolving context, policy development and amendments to regulations, principally for JHA Agencies, have moved rapidly, with a potential impact on civilian CSDP. FRONTEX is now authorised and enabled to plan and operate ‘technical assistance missions’ outside of the EU’s borders. This might be seen as a threat to border management CSDP missions such as EUBAM Rafah, yet that concern appears not to be shared by either the EEAS or member states. The only ‘threat’ to CSDP thus far has been an interesting preference from member states to second their national staff to FRONTEX rather than to CSDP missions. Requests for CSDP missions and FRONTEX for border expertise both draw from the same limited pool of expertise, and giving overt support to FRONTEX has

so far appeared to be of more use to member states. There are also clear advantages to the recent changes: JHA Agencies are allowed to second ‘visiting experts’ to CSDP missions/operations, and this is of mutual benefit in both source and transit countries. JHA Agencies can deliver their expertise in-theatre under the existing CSDP frameworks with the host country, CSDP missions get genuine experts, and the host country gets the training it needs. For their part, CSDP missions tend to have a broader remit than just border management, and an economy of scale can be realised by embedding JHA experts into a CSDP mission rather than creating and sustaining a separate JHA mission. Finally, the JHA Agencies’ new role calls for closer coordination of the three points of the migration response triangle, in a revisited comprehensive approach. FRONTEX external relations policy and long-term planning will have to be in-sync with EEAS and Commission priority countries, and to understand the transition strategy and timing of CSDP missions.

Conclusion

Civilian-military synergies exist, they range from capability development to joint activity, and are doctrinally supported by recent, and with hindsight very fortuitous, advances in the comprehensive (or integrated) approach.

Furthermore, while the parallel doctrinal work, even as recently as 2013, specifically excluded internal activity and actors from the sphere of civilian-military relations, the needs incurred by the internal-external security nexus have facilitated the broadening of the scope. The military in the EU, a minor component in a large civilian organisation, have been strong supporters of that approach, and naturally constitute a key actor.

The lessons from recent crises continue to seek, and drive, civilian-military synergies for practical needs. The implementation phase of the Global Strategy reflects that new dynamic, and the structural and policy changes that will be delivered as part of the implementation of the Global Strategy will further enhance what started as relatively *ad hoc* interaction. The EU military has largely ignored the oft-cited comment regarding NATO duplication; it just is not seen that way among military practitioners. The EU military is not like NATO, or even a ‘NATO-lite’, it is a small but important component of the EU’s suite of tools to deliver external action. This, by definition, means that civilian-military synergies – linking an important military role with a much larger civilian response – are only likely to grow, in part as a response to the long-term evolutions of civilian crisis management.

IV. DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

*Clément Boutillier*¹

In her opening speech at the International Forum on Peace and Security in Africa in December 2016, the High Representative and Vice-President of the European Commission, Federica Mogherini, stated that ‘sustainable security’ was a common objective for Europe and Africa. Beyond crises that need to be resolved urgently, she pointed out that both continents should focus on a long-term approach to conflicts and crises. This is all the more important given that many countries in the world are confronted with recurrent episodes of crisis and violence. In six countries out of ten, humanitarian needs in the aftermath of man-made and/or natural disasters remain acute for eight years or more. As pointed out by Thierry Tardy in his Introduction to this Report, crisis management is not limited to actions to tackle the crisis itself. One also has to look at how crisis management is sequenced and synchronised with actions and instruments addressing the longer-term causes or consequences of a crisis. The European Commission and the Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) in particular have increasingly invested in addressing the root causes of fragility in order to prevent conflicts or their recurrence. They do so by, *inter alia*, supporting legitimate institutions, security sector reform (SSR), the rule of law, human rights, peacebuilding, resilience, the delivery of social services and job creation for young people.

The main entry point to understand how short-term crisis management and longer-term development are intertwined is the security-development nexus, defined in the 2006 European Consensus on Development as follows: ‘without peace and security, development and poverty eradication are not possible, and without development and poverty eradication no sustainable peace will occur’.² Similarly, the 2011 Agenda for Change, defining the EU’s development policy, underlined that the EU ‘should ensure that its objectives in the fields of development policy, peacebuilding, conflict prevention and international security are mutually reinforcing’,³ and put the security-development nexus in the broader context of support to good governance. By bringing together various EU actors and instruments and targeting common objectives, the focus on the nexus has had a significant impact on the evolution of

1. The author would like to thank Elisabeth Pape and Krystian Spodyark from DG DEVCO as well as Thierry Tardy from the EUISS for their valuable comments and suggestions on this chapter. The content of this chapter does not reflect the official opinion of the European Commission. Responsibility for the information and views expressed in the article lies entirely with the author.

2. ‘The European Consensus on Development’, 2006. Available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ%3AC%3A2006%3A046%3A0001%3A0019%3AEN%3APDF>.

3. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change’, COM(2011) 637 final, Brussels, 13 October 2011.

policies, as illustrated by the adoption in 2013 and 2016 of the Comprehensive Approach to external conflicts and crises and of the EU-wide strategic framework for security sector reform.⁴

This chapter looks at development cooperation and how it relates to crisis management through the lens of the security-development nexus. It first provides a brief overview of the security and development nexus in the EU's work and how the policy framework has evolved as a result. Secondly, it illustrates its implementation by looking at development programmes in the Sahel. Finally, the article locates development cooperation in a broader human security agenda by examining how various European Commission programmes in the area of peace and security contribute to the strengthening of the security-development nexus.

The security-development nexus

The 2003 EU Security Strategy (ESS) highlighted that security is a precondition of development and, in turn, development is a powerful tool to encourage reform in partner countries. Europe had started to face new threats, characterised in the ESS as 'more diverse, less visible and less predictable' and combining terrorism, regional conflicts, weak state governance and organised crime outside its borders, including in many countries supported by the EU's development aid. At around the same time, a consensus emerged among donors to prioritise support to Fragile and Conflict Affected States (FCAS) when it became clear that those states were lagging behind in meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Today, more than 50% of EU development assistance is directed to FCAS. But reducing poverty, the main objective of EU development policy (as stated in art. 208 TFEU), also requires adapting development interventions to the specificities of FCAS. This is all the more important given that 43% of the poor in the world lived in FCAS in 2015 as compared to only 20% in 2005. It is estimated that this percentage will rise to 62% in 2030.⁵

One striking feature of FCAS is that the state has generally limited capacity, authority and/or legitimacy to achieve peace and sustainable development, and the authorities have to deal with many priorities simultaneously. Building institutions and taking specific actions to improve trust between state and society often come first. In such circumstances, security is a predominant concern of the population. FCAS are also exposed to various factors of fragility, spanning economic (e.g. youth unemployment), environmental (e.g. exposition to natural disasters and epidemics), political (e.g. corruption, lack of political inclusiveness), security (e.g. crime) and societal (e.g. inequalities) aspects. Yet each situation is specific. Therefore, evaluations of EU development coopera-

4. See Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, 'The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises', JOIN(2013) 30 final, Brussels, 11 December 2013 and Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, 'Elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform', JOIN(2016) 31 final, Strasbourg, 5 July 2016.

5. OECD, 'States of Fragility 2015: Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions', p. 21. Available at <http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance-peace/publications/documentuploads/SOF2015.pdf>

tion programmes in FCAS usually mention the need for a thorough analysis of conflict dynamics and of factors of resilience to inform the design of interventions and to avoid ‘doing harm’. The ability of development partners to adapt to changes in the context of interventions and the necessity for increased local ownership are also emphasised.

The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, adopted as part of the outcome of the Busan High-Level Forum on aid effectiveness in 2011 with strong support from the EU, listed five peacebuilding and statebuilding goals for the delivery of development assistance in FCAS: legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations, and revenues and services. In Somalia for example, the EU, the Somali authorities and other international actors adopted in 2013 the Somali Compact setting out the country’s statebuilding and peacebuilding priorities and a commitment from partners to support these objectives. In line with the New Deal, the EU has also increasingly used budget support, through State-Building Contracts, to assist partner countries in transition to carry out vital state functions and deliver basic social services. State-Building Contracts have been used in countries such as the Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Mali and Afghanistan. They have proved a flexible instrument to support short-term aims such as stabilisation and crisis management while taking into account longer-term statebuilding and peacebuilding objectives.

The EU has a wide range of instruments available in FCAS such as conflict prevention, humanitarian assistance, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations, political dialogue or development cooperation. However, although the security-development nexus provides an added value compared to traditional development approaches, it also leads to issues of coordination, complementarity and coherence between development, humanitarian and security actors which have separate mandates and roles. In line with the Agenda for Change, the Comprehensive Approach to external conflicts and crises has been developed in part to improve the articulation of EU instruments and highlights the role development cooperation can play at various stages of the conflict cycle.

The EU’s involvement in FCAS starts with developing a shared analysis that is crucial because the link between security and development is always context-specific and determines the choice, sequencing and coordination of the most appropriate tools. It also calls for the definition of a common strategic vision setting the direction for the EU’s engagement; a focus on prevention to preserve lives, to save costs and to protect the EU’s interests; the mobilisation of the different strengths and capacities of the EU; and a long-term commitment, acknowledging that addressing fragility and building resilient societies is a process that takes time.

The implementation of the Comprehensive Approach has facilitated the development of specific tools shared between the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission. As part of its focus on prevention and shared analysis, the EU has reinforced its capacity to understand fragility and anticipate crises. The Early Warning System for instance aims at identifying risks of emergence or escalation of violence

and conflicts across a variety of indicators, notably in countries and regions and on thematic priorities, where the EU has particular interests and leverage. The exercise can trigger increased attention, intensified monitoring or appropriate preventive action in the selected countries, regions and thematic areas across the EU. Guidance on conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity has also been issued in order to maximise the impact of the EU's actions and manage the risks of intervening in inherently volatile situations.

More generally, the security-development nexus and the Comprehensive Approach have stimulated dialogue and mutual learning. As an example, relevant Commission services, including DG DEVCO, regularly participate in the CSDP Lessons Learned Working Group and in CSDP pre-deployment trainings. Informal inter-service coordination mechanisms at Headquarters level have also been established such as the Horn of Africa Coordination Platform, the Sahel Task Force and the Security Sector Reform Task Force. Development policy and instruments have also moved closer to crisis management in the field. When conflict prevention is not possible or successful and a crisis breaks out, crisis management actors can benefit from the experience and accumulated knowledge of development actors, especially in gaining a good understanding of the governance and security context. In turn, after a crisis, the success of the transition from crisis management towards longer-term support depends to a large extent on the cooperation and regular communication between crisis management and development actors.

Security and Development in the Sahel

Recent regional strategies such as the Sahel Strategy, the Horn of Africa Strategy and the EU Sahel and Horn of Africa Regional Action Plans 2015-2020 have helped formulate the Comprehensive Approach. They also illustrate how it is implemented in practice and can offer a testing ground for its continuous improvement. One objective of the Sahel Regional Action Plan 2015-2020⁶ is indeed to 'establish bridges between the various EU initiatives and activities' in order to meet the objectives of the Strategy. They include the fight against extreme poverty, addressing fragile governance, the fight against illicit trafficking, transnational organised crime and the prevention of violent extremism and radicalisation. In the spirit of the Comprehensive Approach, the Action Plan emphasises the need for shared assessments. Although the situation in the countries covered by the Strategy and the Action Plan (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger) varies from one to the other, these countries are all considered fragile with relatively low development indicators. In this context, development cooperation is one of the main instruments of the Strategy in addition to other EU actions being undertaken by the EEAS, member states and the EU Special Representatives.

A closer look at development programmes in Niger illustrates how development cooperation can contribute to the Sahel Regional Strategy. The bilateral envelope of the

6. See Council of the European Union, 'EU Sahel Strategy: Regional Action Plan 2015-2020', Brussels, 20 April 2015. Available at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/04/20-council-conclusions-sahel-regional-plan/>

European Development Fund (EDF) in Niger (€596 million between 2014 and 2020) focuses on four areas with one spanning security, good governance and peace consolidation and another one focusing on the opening-up of regions affected by insecurity and the risk of conflicts. Support can take the form of projects on resilience and conflict prevention, for instance by helping young people to access employment, or support to the national security forces. As noted in the recent SSR Communication, ‘insecurity and instability are frequently generated or aggravated by a lack of effective and accountable security systems.’⁷ EU assistance can also take the form of budget support. A State-Building Contract was signed with the government of Niger in 2016. One indicator used to follow-up on this Contract and the disbursement of funds will be the adoption in Niger of a strategic framework to address security challenges, which is also an objective of the civilian CSDP mission, EUCAP Sahel Niger. Budget support goes together with technical assistance to help Niger define its security strategy. For instance, it will provide assistance to conduct studies on the security needs of the population. Last but not least, the Sahel Window of the EU Emergency Trust Fund also provides support to development and security. The objective of the programme AJUSEN⁸ in Niger, for example, is to reinforce cooperation between internal security forces and the judiciary in order to fight organised crime and protect victims of human trafficking, to strengthen the capacity of security forces to manage borders and to engage with border authorities in the neighbouring countries.

The broader human security agenda

Better linking crisis management with long-term development actions remains nevertheless a challenge for the implementation of the Comprehensive Approach, even though the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) can be used to prepare the ground for longer-term assistance. The Communication on the Comprehensive Approach emphasised that programming of development assistance should be flexible enough to adapt to the volatile environment of FCAS. The seven-year programming period of development instruments facilitates the ownership of EU development assistance by partner countries. It also guarantees reliable and predictable development flows. But it is usually difficult to adapt programming to an evolving conflict situation. The establishment of EU Trust Funds, including the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), is a response to this challenge as such funds aim to deliver development assistance more flexibly. Thus, several projects of the EUTF have been designed as a result of a direct cooperation between DG DEVCO (in Headquarters), EU Delegations and CSDP missions operating in the same area. The PARSEC Mopti-Gao programme to strengthen security in Northern Mali and improve the management of border areas is an example of such a collaborative process.

7. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘Elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform’, JOIN(2016) 31 final, Strasbourg, 5 July 2016.

8. Appui à la justice et à la sécurité au Niger pour lutter contre la criminalité organisée, les trafics illicites et la traite des êtres humains.

The Communication on the Security Sector Reform adopted in July 2016, which brings under a single policy framework all EU actors and instruments implementing SSR, is another attempt to operationalise the Comprehensive Approach. EU external action instruments' programmes and CSDP missions sometimes have a narrow focus on specific parts of the security and justice system and have not always been linked strategically enough.⁹ In parallel to the SSR Communication, a legislative proposal to amend the IcSP was presented in July 2016¹⁰ to extend the EU's assistance to the military of partner countries, under exceptional and clearly defined circumstances, to achieve sustainable development. The proposal highlights that the military can play an important role in preventing violence and can contribute to setting the conditions of peace. It follows up on the gaps in the EU's support to partners' security sector outlined in the Joint Communication on Capacity Building in support of Security and Development (CBSD) of April 2015.

In sum, not only has the security-development nexus influenced policymaking, most notably with the adoption of the Comprehensive Approach, but it also impacts on the scale and content of the programmes funded by the European Commission in the area of peace and security.

Between 2001 and 2009, Commission support to justice and security system reform (JSSR) has risen from €14 million to €174 million,¹¹ while support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding (CPPB) has risen from €120 million to €854 million.¹² Over the same period, 105 countries benefited from security-related interventions, with 85% of the funding concentrated in 23 countries. In more general terms, over 10% of EU development cooperation was programmed in support of conflict prevention, conflict resolution, peace and security-related activities. This support covers a wide range of actions from improving conflict-resolution mechanisms at community level in Nigeria to contributing to the Reconstruction Trust Fund in Afghanistan, preventing human rights abuses, financing African Union-led Peace Support Operations (PSO) under the African Peace Facility (APF) and anti-piracy actions. The APF in particular provides substantial financial assistance to African PSOs such as AMISOM in Somalia, MISCA in the Central African Republic (2013-2014) and the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) for the fight against Boko Haram. It also supports dialogue on peace and security as well as the operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).

Peace and security is now acknowledged as a building block of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Progress will be monitored through a dedicated goal – Sustainable Development Goal 16 – on peace, justice and strong institutions. The Official Develop-

9. See European Commission, 'Lessons drawn from past interventions and stakeholders' views', Joint Staff Working Document' (2016) 221 final.

10. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) no. 230/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing an instrument contributing to stability and peace', COM(2016) 447 final, Strasbourg, 5 July 2016.

11. 'Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Justice and Security System Reform', Final Report, November 2011, p.7. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/reports/2011/1295_vol1_en.pdf

12. 'Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace-building', Final Report, October 2011, p.26. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/documents/thematic_evaluation_of_ec_support_to_pb_and_conflict_prevention_2011_en.pdf

ment Assistance (ODA) Reporting Directives in the field of peace and security have also been recently revised by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD to provide greater clarity on the eligibility of activities involving security actors as well as activities preventing violent extremism.

In 2006, an EUISS *Chaillot Paper* on civilian crisis management¹³ identified the ‘little support’ provided to governance as one of the main weaknesses of the EU’s long-term support to crisis management. In the current 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework, the EU has programmed actions in the governance sector in at least 69 countries around the world while there are rule-of-law programmes foreseen or ongoing in 38 countries and programmes with a clear security component in 16 countries. In 2014 alone, the EU has committed €2.26 billion for the sector of governance and civil society and a significant part of these allocations was channelled to improve the security and justice sectors in partner countries.¹⁴ Building effective, inclusive and accountable institutions to deal with fragility, conflict and violence is well-integrated in EU development policy and programmes on the ground, placing human security at the heart of this effort.

Development cooperation instruments support national security systems that aim at achieving human security not only in crisis or post-conflict situations but also to prevent crises where day-to-day violence is pervasive. The OECD State of fragility report 2016¹⁵ pointed out that development financing needs to take better account of interpersonal violence as the leading source of human insecurity. The report even contends that armed conflict is not the main cause of violent death globally, as ‘of the 37 countries most affected by lethal violence in 2012, 65% were not emerging from or recently affected by conflicts’. Central America and the Caribbean are affected by staggering homicide rates, often related to drugs trafficking. The action plan agreed between the EU and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) at the EU-CELAC Summit in 2015 has prioritised citizen security, which has become a major concern despite economic progress and the reduction of poverty. In the same vein, the Cooperation Programme on Drugs Policies with the EU (COPOLAD) running from 2010 until 2019, aims at helping Latin American Countries to tackle this issue by consolidating national observatories, building capacities to reduce drugs demand (prevention, treatment) or by reducing supply (law enforcement).

From a human security perspective, trust between the population and security actors and the state’s ability to deliver on security are key for state legitimacy. The perception of the state largely depends on the way populations and security actors interact in everyday life. Beyond security, development cooperation supports institutions and governance to improve the delivery of other basic services such as education, health, water and sanitation that are also crucial for stabilisation and peace in the long run.

13. Catriona Gourlay, ‘Community Instruments for civilian crisis management’, in Agnieszka Nowak (ed.), ‘Civilian Crisis Management: the EU Way’, *Chaillot Paper* no.90, EUISS, Paris, June 2006, p.65.

14. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘Annual Report on the EU’s development and external assistance policies and their implementation in 2014’, COM(2015)578 final, Brussels, 24 November 2015. Available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0578>.

15. OECD, ‘States of Fragility 2016 (Highlights)’, p. 37. Available at: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/Fragile-States-highlights-2016.pdf>.

Conclusion

Anchoring EU security-related actions in the wider governance and statebuilding framework and a better sequencing between short-term crisis management activities (CSDP missions), mid-term instruments (e.g. IcSP) and long-term development programmes remain significant challenges and offer scope for improvement.¹⁶ Past experiences also show that long-term development and peace need to be at the core of the EU's response from the onset of a conflict or crisis. The 2016 EU Global Strategy calls for supporting society and state resilience and for developing 'the dual – security and development – nature of the [EU] engagement' to deal with specific challenges posed by conflicts and crises. It also highlights the need to make full use of the EU's potential. The role of development cooperation in addressing conflicts at each stage of the conflict cycle for long-term development and sustainable peace will therefore continue to grow.

16. See European Commission, 'Lessons drawn from past interventions and stakeholders' views', Joint Staff Working Document' (2016) 221 final.

V. FRONTEX AS CRISIS MANAGER

Roderick Parkes

Any attempt by member governments to reform the EU's institutions and to break down policy silos is potentially perilous, but especially when carried out in conditions of urgency. Since 2013 the EU-28 has experienced a severe migration crisis, leading to a thorough shakeup of EU activities at home and abroad. FRONTEX, the EU's Agency for Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States, has been a focus for reform and was upgraded in September 2016 to become the 'European Border and Coast Guard'. It gained new powers to manage the EU's land and sea borders, as well as to act overseas, for instance helping neighbouring countries manage their borders and coordinating expulsion operations.¹ This reform takes it into territory occupied by other EU players and policy tools.

One such field is crisis management. The FRONTEX reform was explicitly advertised as a bid to improve Europe's crisis-management capacity.² The term 'crisis management' has a very specific meaning for the EU. Until now 'crises' have been events occurring outside the Union, in trouble spots such as Afghanistan or Mali, and in situations of shaky governance such as Kosovo or Ukraine. They were addressed there by CSDP missions with help from the EU's broader foreign policy apparatus. FRONTEX, as a Home Affairs agency, has had only a peripheral role in the work of these civilian and military missions, its interaction being limited to sharing expertise and gathering information. The FRONTEX reform thus raises questions about the evolution of the EU's crisis-management toolbox.

But FRONTEX is not, in fact, such a newcomer to this field. True, the border agency is only now being talked about in official terms as an 'international crisis manager', but it has long been active abroad. It has carried out tasks not wholly dissimilar to CSDP's civilian missions, as well as more recently linking up to a NATO military initiative against people-smuggling. In short, the EU has two apparatuses for international crisis management in the field of migration, one run by CSDP, the other by FRONTEX. The two formats are increasingly in competition for budgets and mandates. Creating a clearer conceptual and geographic distinction between them might be the best means to combine the two toolboxes and to break down silos.

1. See Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC.

2. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 'A European Border and Coast Guard and effective management of Europe's external borders', COM/2015/673 final, Strasbourg, 15 December 2015.

CSDP missions vs. FRONTEX operations: spot the difference?

During the migration crisis, EU leaders renewed discussions about how to integrate FRONTEX into the EU's international crisis-management toolbox. They spoke of better linking the EU's 'internal' apparatus to its 'external' dimension. The choice of language was understandable: FRONTEX is an agency for internal security, CSDP for external, and the frontier between the two realms is eroded by problems like the refugee flows from the Syrian conflict or the ISIS-inspired terror attacks on Paris. But in fact, this depiction of an 'internal' and an 'external' apparatus has never been entirely accurate. FRONTEX's work is not confined to the home sphere. It has long acted internationally. In the Western Balkans, FRONTEX has set up a risk-analysis network with local border forces; in Eastern Europe, it has taught authorities about the workings of the EU's border system; in Transnistria, it has participated in a Commission-run border mission to build capacity and to fight customs fraud. These activities illustrate that border management today is inherently international: the EU shares its borders with other countries, and can best manage the flow of goods and persons by working with them.

Indeed, the EU's borderlands – its 'pre-frontiers', in official language – can now be considered to stretch far to the East and South, towards the very source of the flow. The EU's neighbours straddle significant migration routes from Afghanistan and Bangladesh, Guinea and Eritrea. When FRONTEX cooperates with nearby Libya or Algeria on migration, it therefore needs to address their own neighbours – Chad or Niger. FRONTEX has set up information-sharing networks to monitor this extended zone, reaching south to Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo and east to the countries bordering Russia. There are even signs it may undertake activities of a more operational nature, too. Under its new mandate, FRONTEX is permitted to set up an operation in any country which shares a border with the EU. States under consideration are those sharing the EU's sea and land borders – states like Turkey or the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) which bore the brunt of the 2016 migration flows. But application to *air* borders is not ruled out, meaning that, in theory at least, FRONTEX may now operate in any state which has air-links to the EU – that is, almost any state in the world.

At a time when FRONTEX is expanding outwards, CSDP missions appear to be reaching in the opposite direction, gravitating towards the EU. In 2013/14, security sector reform (SSR) missions were set up in Libya and Ukraine, as instability swept into the neighbourhood. Some member states have even called for CSDP missions on the very territory of the EU, following terror attacks here and acute pressures at migrant-processing centres. CSDP missions are, of course, strictly delimited to the external sphere. But in 2016, when humanitarian aid was delivered to refugee camps in Greece, the EU set a precedent for the use of external policies within its frontiers. Already, Article 222 TFEU, the EU's Solidarity Clause, potentially erodes the limits placed on CSDP. (The clause, when triggered, would oblige member states to use all means to respond to a terror attack or other disaster in the EU, including military means). In recent debates about the issue, EU governments have stressed that CSDP missions can be deployed only outside the EU, albeit recognising that the CSDP framework could be useful for internal security. Likewise, civil-military formats under the

purview of CSDP – such as the European Gendarmerie Force (EUROGENDFOR) – might be used to respond to emergencies in the EU. (The EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism applies not just outside the Union, but inside too, potentially blurring this demarcation).

It is not just the geographic distinctions between CSDP and FRONTEX activities which are becoming blurred, but the conceptual ones too. CSDP policy-planners have effectively trademarked the distinct label and methodology of ‘European crisis management’ for themselves. But FRONTEX has long been performing a role in this field, albeit without the official label and attendant UN-derived methodology. Already in 2006, during a previous EU migration crisis when Spain and the Canaries were hit by migration from West Africa, FRONTEX supported member state operations in the waters off Mauritania and Senegal, helping to detect and deflect migrant vessels there. FRONTEX was able to do so on the basis of a bilateral agreement between Spain and the two African states. Similarly, during the 2012 Euro football tournament in Ukraine and Poland, FRONTEX provided technical support to Ukrainian airports and coordinated member state personnel operating along the Ukrainian-Polish border under an EU-Ukraine cooperation agreement. Such activities may not have been ‘crisis management’ in the official sense, but they can certainly be seen as crisis-driven.

As FRONTEX gradually hones and refines its methods of crisis management, CSDP policy-planners have been broadening theirs. Since around 2013, the EU’s ‘comprehensive approach’ to crisis and conflict has linked CSDP missions to a fuller repertoire of foreign policy tools, from diplomacy through to development support. The idea now is to apply this toolbox to all stages in the crisis cycle – not just to classic stabilisation tasks, but also to upstream prevention and downstream development work, in an ‘integrated approach’. By broadening their range of activities in this way, CSDP missions are moving into FRONTEX territory, which runs from upstream crisis-warning to downstream capacity-building. CSDP methods are, moreover, being developed specifically for border-control tasks. Not only has the EU created civilian missions in the field of border management as part of its crisis response, the EU’s military planners are also including border matters in their ‘illustrative scenarios’ for action.

This all indicates that long-standing silos in the EU’s approach to migration control and crisis management are breaking down. In an optimistic scenario, this might allow the EU to carefully combine the best of the CSDP and FRONTEX toolboxes when dealing with problems like mass population movements. But there are risks here too – and events could well drive the EU response. Terms like ‘crisis management’ are proving elastic, and the EU could react to migration flows in almost any way and almost anywhere, all while maintaining the headline label of ‘managing a crisis’ or ‘addressing the nexus between internal and external security’. Any integrated toolbox instead needs to address conceptual questions like: *whose* crisis and *whose* security is the EU addressing – its own or that of the stricken third countries? Even if events do not dictate policy, moreover, material interests might. Member states have finite funds to spend on crisis management and few trained border experts to second abroad. The two models of international crisis management are increasingly in competition for these resources.

How the migration crisis raised the coordination stakes

Between the beginning of 2013 and the end of 2016, more than 2.7 million people took irregular routes across the EU's land and sea borders. These people were no respecters of the way the EU has divided up the world either conceptually or geographically. They did, however, subject the EU to a near-existential political crisis, as voter unrest grew. EU leaders reacted to events with a taboo-busting reorganisation of the EU's policy repertoire. This created new interactions between CSDP and FRONTEX where before only a gradual blurring of boundaries had existed.

First, and most obviously, CSDP missions have now been drawn centrally into migration management. Since 2005, CSDP missions have been involved in border-management tasks (EUBAM Rafah tackled tensions at the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip). But their work was subtly different to today. A decade ago, the goal was to improve standards in states where poor border management was at the very root of local political instability. Only since 2013 have both civilian and military CSDP missions moved away from this kind of state-building at source and begun to focus on migration flows and smuggling networks further down the route to the EU. In 2013, the EU established a small civilian mission in Libya, with the task of building up that country's capacity to manage migration flows from West Africa and the Middle East. In 2015, the EU created a field office in Agadez under the aegis of EUCAP Sahel Niger to tackle people-smuggling networks across the region. And in mid-2015, the EU established Operation *Sophia*, a naval mission mandated to break smuggling networks that reached far back from the Libyan coast into Africa. Since the end of 2016, the mission has tentatively begun training Libyan coastguards.

The second outcome of this reshuffle was the coming-of-age of FRONTEX as a genuinely important international actor in its own right, one capable of exercising crisis-management functions not just at home but also abroad. In 2015, Syrian refugees dramatically altered their path into the EU, abandoning the route through Libya and the Central Mediterranean, and beating a path through Turkey and the Balkans. As the EU sought to manage a massive and seemingly-permanent flow of refugees, FRONTEX's powers were rapidly overhauled and a new legal basis adopted. Under this new status FRONTEX will have a permanent staff of 1,000 by 2020; will maintain a standing force of 1,500 experts to be deployable within three days; will have greater scope to purchase its own hardware; and will carry out assessments of the border vulnerabilities of its member states. The reforms leave FRONTEX exceptionally well resourced, with its personnel growing to the size almost of the staff at the External Action Service's headquarters. FRONTEX has also gained power to use these resources abroad, via liaison officers, expulsions work and joint border operations in third states.

These recent developments have increased exponentially the need for coordination between the new CSDP missions and FRONTEX. When EUBAM Libya was set up in 2013, FRONTEX was only marginally involved: it helped select national experts to go to Libya and, on a single occasion, trained Libyan border guards flown to the agency's head-

quarters in Warsaw. In the case of EUCAP Sahel Niger, the interaction became a little more systematic, not least when FRONTEX decided to send a liaison officer to Niger (although it was not immediately clear what role this person would play *vis-à-vis* the CSDP field office there, let alone the EU Delegation in Niamey or member state migration liaison officers). But the real qualitative shift came with Operation *Sophia*: when the CSDP mission's remit was expanded to help train Libyan border guards, it effectively covered tasks similar to those entrusted earlier to EUBAM Libya. In contrast to that 2013 mission, however, FRONTEX would now have a prime role to play. FRONTEX officials were to help train Libyan border guards in Brussels, as well as supplying to the Libyan authorities a selection of the agency's border mapping tools, notably METEO, which monitors weather patterns.

These new interactions have highlighted disparities between FRONTEX and CSDP in their methods and goals. These became clear when in 2014 FRONTEX began running its own maritime operation, Triton, close to European shores in the Central Mediterranean. For each example of good cooperation with Operation *Sophia* (FRONTEX liaison officers helping the Operation to identify smugglers or disembark migrants), there are examples of tensions. FRONTEX regularly passes on information to *Sophia* about the location of stricken vessels; yet the Operation's vessels do not always tell FRONTEX how they act upon this – or even if they need the information given their access to military satellite capabilities. Many such operational problems derive from broader strategic and philosophical differences. The issue is not just that naval personnel are trained in destruction, FRONTEX in interdiction. While CSDP missions like Operation *Sophia* tend to engage civil society, for example, FRONTEX views efforts by NGOs to pick up and disembark irregular migrants as criminal. Thus as Operation *Sophia* moves closer to North African shores, FRONTEX fears that it effectively offers cover to NGOs carrying out rescues in Libyan waters.

The EU's existing framework for managing FRONTEX-CSDP relations has proven too weak to absorb these new pressures. Coordination efforts began as many as 15 years ago, in 2001, with the terrorist attacks on the US and the subsequent international intervention in Afghanistan. These events made clear to Europeans that many of their internal security problems arose in situations of bad government abroad, and that the solution might well lie in judicial and policing reforms at source. The EU drew up plans to involve Home Affairs agencies in CSDP missions. Yet the follow-up has been gradual and largely confined to CSDP-EUROPOL relations and to such undemanding activities as information-sharing between EULEX Kosovo and EUROPOL's local Regional Support Officers. The reform has not kept pace with a fast-changing strategic environment: the EU is no longer dealing primarily with police reform in far-off Afghanistan so much as with the management of thousands of irregular Afghan migrants at its own borders. This requires CSDP and Home Affairs activities to be combined in drastic new ways.

In 2011, a Roadmap on 'Strengthening Ties between CSDP and FSJ Actors' (see Box 2 on pp. 58-60) was adopted, prescribing 27 actions to involve Home Affairs agencies like FRONTEX in the work of CSDP missions. Its drafters took a pragmatic line, choosing

to avoid dogmatic strategic or operational discussions between Home Affairs and CSDP officials. The approach was rather to shift mind-sets, trying to ensure that CSDP and Home Affairs policy-planners had access to the same situational awareness, information flows, planning, decision-making and training. The hope was to have a positive spill-over effect on strategic and operational coherence: the EU, by exposing its policy-planners to the same information, would slowly emerge as a ‘coherent security actor’ across the domestic and international spheres. Thus, although the Roadmap did discuss embedding personnel from EUROJUST, FRONTEX or EUROPOL in CSDP missions, this would be so that they might access information on the ground, rather than perform hands-on operational tasks. The drafters did not, perhaps, foresee the explosive growth in FRONTEX’s capabilities and its potential to perform such tasks independently of CSDP.

The new drivers of crisis-management coordination

FRONTEX has traditionally resisted being pushed into new tasks. Its management worry that the agency cannot live up to popular expectations. Yet the new European Border and Coast Guard is finding itself propelled into the field of international crisis management, in far-off places, by massive increases to its budget and capabilities. Its basic material advantages compared to CSDP missions could well shape the EU’s overall crisis-management approach across Africa and Central Asia. Indeed member states may reach for FRONTEX and its assets, when the crisis at hand would in fact be best addressed by the CSDP toolbox.

Member states are often reluctant to commit manpower and hardware to foreign operations of any kind. It does not help that military CSDP operations are funded principally by intergovernmental means (the ‘costs lie where they fall’ principle). So when member states do commit resources to a CSDP military mission, it tends to be as a symbolic act in itself. By consequence, the mandate of many CSDP missions, and their eventual exit strategy, is often retro-fitted to match the resources being pledged or withdrawn. This can undermine their effective deployment. By contrast, FRONTEX’s approach to deploying its assets is becoming more responsive to the situation on the ground. This has not always been the case, and it too has fallen foul of politicking by member states. But FRONTEX’s new mandate gives it stronger powers to assess border weaknesses and employ resources following a needs-based analysis. It helps, too, that FRONTEX operations are funded from the EU budget, meaning that a member state which seconds personnel to an operation will be compensated.

Over the years, CSDP missions have dealt with everything from election-monitoring to piracy, usually with an underlying state-building element. This broad range of activities ought to be a selling point when it comes to migration management. Irregular migration is a symptom of a deeper malaise in the international system, and CSDP missions can get at the root causes. Indeed, even when CSDP missions undertake narrow border tasks, such as in Libya or Niger, their goals have gone beyond merely stemming mi-

gration: for example a CSDP training mission will also identify the next generation of reform-minded leaders. Yet, CSDP missions are rarely given the time and investment to achieve their goals. Their selling point to member states is precisely that they are limited in time and space. Here too, the FRONTEX approach may seem the more attractive to member states, even if not the most effective. FRONTEX's ambitions tend to be narrower. The Agency will only ever promise to achieve some kind of containment or deflection effect, not to resolve the drivers of migration. But FRONTEX has the resources to go on stemming and deflecting almost indefinitely.

The growth of criminal networks and migration flows anyway mean that crisis management missions should no longer be isolated dots but webs of activities capable of tracing problems across borders. CSDP planners are trying to adapt accordingly, joining up their scattering of missions across the Sahel. But as the missions link up, member states worry that this will dilute the effect of each hub, drawing them away from their narrow original mandate and creating new challenges for civil-military coordination. FRONTEX, by contrast, can readily link up its operations and liaison officers by tapping into an existing web of Home Affairs policies across Africa and Eastern Europe. The Commission's DG NEAR already cooperates closely with EU Home Affairs agencies CEPOL, EUROPOL and EUROJUST across MENA states, often using long-established Interpol frameworks to weave them all together. FRONTEX and the other Home Affairs agencies also have well-oiled methods to deal with inter-agency and international coordination, having developed 'fusion centres', 'joint interdiction teams', and the recent 'hotspot' coordination system for migrant-processing in Greece and Italy.

FRONTEX enjoys some other basic attributes, which might make it the expedient option over the long term in handling a migration crisis overseas. It is, for instance, attractive because it is effectively a 'post-Brexit player': FRONTEX scarcely has any dealings with the UK due to the UK's absence from the EU's border-free area, Schengen. By contrast, CSDP can expect a serious shakeup following the UK's exit from the EU: the UK may not always contribute to CSDP missions, but it is clearly an important player in the external security domain and provides command-and-control assets to missions. Then there is the question of accountability. A FRONTEX operation overseas may seem an expedient option for member states because responsibility is centred more around the Commission, and FRONTEX is subject to more robust oversight when operating inside the EU rather than out. (Similar considerations may tempt member states to deploy CSDP-type missions inside the EU: if they ever came to fruition, CSDP formats inside the EU would likely be freer of parliamentary scrutiny than a FRONTEX or EUROPOL operation).

Finally, FRONTEX may find itself drawn more into the field of overseas crisis management due to its attractiveness to international partners. Over the years, CSDP missions have been able to play a useful back-up role to other international partners, often taking over from the UN or NATO. Today, however, international relations are tense, old partners are pursuing their own distinct crisis-management goals and EU citizens expect the Union to undertake overseas activities which are more nakedly Eurocentric – or EU-

centric. FRONTEX may prove better able to navigate this international situation and cooperate with host countries and international partners. It is a natural complement to other regional border forces, like that currently being discussed between Chad, the Central African Republic and Sudan. As a seemingly neutral expert body, it has been able to hook up with the OSCE and expand its capacity-building activities as far as Mongolia. It also cooperates with NATO's Aegean Initiative, with NATO providing it with intelligence on migrant-smuggling off the Turkish coast.

This all suggests that European crisis management is not immune to the more general 'agencification' of EU external action. For member states, it is increasingly tempting to send abroad a technical Commission-run EU agency to carry out crisis tasks: FRONTEX tends to perform a narrow set of functions in a narrow kind of way – in contrast to the more political and ambitious CSDP missions. Moreover, as FRONTEX, and other Home Affairs agencies, move into this field they are tugging with them a second row of EU agencies – such as SATCEN or the European Maritime Safety Agency, which have contracts to provide FRONTEX or EUROPOL with technical support and increase the range of this kind of response. Furthermore, whereas the overseas operations of these specialist agencies are viewed as rather political inside the European Union, with NGOs always watching out for signs that the EU is 'externalising' its border and crime controls to third countries, beyond the EU they are generally perceived as neutral and technocratic. This makes them quite easy to put in place. By contrast, CSDP missions are viewed as rather more political overseas, and their presence may be further politicised by countries like Russia or Turkey.

The real challenge of coherence

The EU started the process of bringing coherence to its international policies some years ago. The goal has been to integrate two major strands of work: the 'external dimension' of its internal policies, and the Common Foreign and Security Policy with its security component, the CSDP. When the EU talks about linking FRONTEX and CSDP, therefore, it is really talking about this bigger process. FRONTEX is a creature of the 'external dimension', while CSDP forms part of CFSP. FRONTEX leverages access to the Schengen Area in order to spread EU border standards abroad, thus protecting the internal market and allowing freight to continue crossing freely. This work is more developmental and regulatory in nature, as well as being generally Commission-led. CSDP, by contrast, uses national resources to address acute and often distant international crises. Its work tends to be more political.

Coordination between the two strands has already proved perilous. It can involve making the EU's development work more political or deploying CFSP tools in countries where long-term regulatory approximation has been the goal. Breaking down silos in this way is in principle a good thing, but it can fall prey to expedience and the EU may, for instance, be tempted to use its huge market power for narrow political goals. EU

leaders have already faced these dilemmas during the course of the migration crisis when setting up Trust Funds and releasing the joint statement with Turkey in March 2016. They have had to work hard to ensure that they do not use Commission-run development spending and humanitarian aid as brute leverage to stem the flows abroad. They are facing similar questions about how to use FRONTEX, with its considerable leverage, resources and norm-spreading powers, and CSDP missions with their more political and acute functions.

The basic principle guiding the EU's migration crisis-management efforts probably needs to be to place CSDP missions as close to the source of the crisis as possible, and FRONTEX as close to the EU as possible. CSDP continues to be the best tool to quell pressures in trouble-spots, whilst FRONTEX concentrates on long-term capacity-building at home. That does preclude using the two toolboxes in various combinations. Close to source, a FRONTEX liaison officer might be embedded in a CSDP mission. This would permit FRONTEX to take over long-term capacity-building tasks when the initial mission is wound down. Near to the EU, CSDP staff and capabilities might help FRONTEX manage short-term civil-protection or basic migrant-processing pressures. And along the migration route into the EU, CSDP missions might export to third countries the FRONTEX 'hotspot' model, the administrative setup created in Greece and Italy which brings together border, asylum, customs and police forces. Or CSDP staff might assess the risks posed to FRONTEX-run migrant-processing centres or coordinate transport for vulnerable populations.

There is a risk, however, that these two toolboxes will be used in 'reverse order' – that FRONTEX will take over border activities close to the source of the problem in Africa or Asia, while CSDP missions will be used to plug gaps in the EU's own borders. As FRONTEX's power to operate far from the EU grows, member states may view it as the prime vehicle for undertaking civilian border-management tasks close to source. The Agency brings considerable leverage and regulatory know-how, as well as offering a comfortable berth for their precious civilian experts. Meanwhile, as member states look to deploy their assets as close to home as possible, they may confer to CSDP missions border tasks at the EU perimeter or even inside it. Already, there are concerns about the first of these missions, Operation *Sophia*. By remilitarising EU border controls, the Operation runs the risk of leading to their 'de-professionalisation'. If FRONTEX now takes over civilian crisis management close to source, this too might represent a kind of de-professionalisation of that field.

During the migration crisis, EU leaders have talked about addressing the 'root causes' of the problem. The root cause abroad is political instability, primarily requiring a CSDP response. The root causes at home are regulatory weaknesses, requiring a FRONTEX response.

Box 2: Strengthening ties between CSDP and FSJ

Michel Savary

Threats to European security such as terrorism, organised crime, irregular migration, and hybrid tactics, are no longer – if they ever were – confined by the borders of the EU. The resulting nexus between internal and external security impacts directly on policy responses and the extent to which internal and external tools have to be coordinated or made to work together. This is particularly the case between CSDP instruments, which in line with the TEU operate outside of the Union, and the Freedom, Security and Justice (FSJ) agencies,¹ which are mandated to deal with internal issues.

The need to strengthen ties between CSDP and the FSJ domain was identified in the Civilian Headline Goal 2010, and linkages began to be established between the two areas from that moment on.

In this context, a Roadmap on ‘Strengthening Ties between CSDP and FSJ Actors’² was established in December 2011 on the basis of a Working Paper presented jointly to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI). The Roadmap identified 12 priority lines of action.

Four progress reports on the implementation of the Road Map have since been presented to member states in the Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) and the COSI support group.

The priority of the Roadmap has been to develop cooperation and coordination mechanisms between CSDP on the one hand, and EUROPOL, FRONTEX, EUROJUST and CEPOL, as well as EUROGENDFOR and INTERPOL on the other hand. This has entailed, *inter alia*, an administrative arrangement on sharing classified information between the EEAS and EUROPOL and FRONTEX, a working arrangement between the EEAS and FRONTEX, and an exchange of letters on enhancing cooperation between the EEAS and EUROPOL and INTERPOL.

In parallel, a triangular relationship between the EEAS, FSJ agencies and the European Commission has been established, characterised by: trilateral meetings between the EEAS, the Commission, and EUROPOL and FRONTEX; the participation of the EEAS in the establishment of FSJ agencies work programmes; and regular staff talks.

1. ‘FSJ’ and ‘JHA’ agencies are terms used interchangeably.

2. European External Action Service, ‘Strengthening Ties between CSDP and FSJ Actors’, Doc. 18173/11, Brussels, 5 December 2011.

The INTCEN and the SATCEN are also involved in the emerging cooperation. Terrorist threat assessments and other counter-terrorism-related products are provided by INTCEN to COSI and the Working Party on Terrorism (TWP), which then brief the PSC with intelligence-based assessments on foreign and security policy matters. INTCEN and FRONTEX have also started to share their non-classified analytical products and situation reports, which are then distributed within the EEAS. EU agencies are also regularly invited to the PSC, and informal joint meetings of PSC/COSI take place once per Council Presidency. A service level agreement between the SATCEN and FRONTEX also allows for the provision of Satellite products by SATCEN to FRONTEX.

In the area of training, CSDP/FSJ courses have been institutionalised and the CSDP/FSJ nexus has been streamlined in various courses of both the European Police College (CEPOL) and the European Security and Defence College (ESDC). Links between the ESDC and relevant agencies such as CEPOL, FRONTEX, and EUROPOL have been strengthened and development of joint training activities has been encouraged.

As for civilian CSDP missions, the revision of the ‘visiting experts’ guidelines now allows for the participation of FSJ experts from agencies in the conduct of CSDP missions. In the same vein, EU Delegations where Counter Terrorism/Security and Defence experts, European Migration Liaison Officers (EMLO) or EU agencies liaison officers (such as FRONTEX) are deployed, and CSDP missions should further contribute to situational awareness and to the exchange of information among EU actors.

Additionally, the new legal frameworks of JHA agencies such as EUROPOL (that will enter into force in 2017), as well as the 2016 regulation of the new European Border and Coast Guard Agency, will increase the external activities of these new actors of crisis management.

In 2016, the EU Global Strategy stressed the necessity for CSDP and JHA agencies to work together, by stating that ‘CSDP missions and operations can work alongside the European Border and Coast Guard and EU specialised agencies to enhance border protection and maritime security in order to save more lives, fight cross-border crime and disrupt smuggling networks.’ In this context characterised by rapidly evolving challenges, an EEAS Food-for-Thought Paper titled ‘From strengthening ties between CSDP/FSJ actors towards more security in Europe’³ was produced in July 2016. Its aim is to draw the attention of member states to concrete actions in three specific areas:

Improving situational awareness and exchanging information within the EU

- through better information-sharing between field level and the geographical desks and crisis management structures, as well as through the systematic collection, within CSDP operations and missions, and analysis, of crime-related information and criminal intelligence.

3. CMPD Food-for-Thought Paper, ‘From strengthening ties between CSDP/FSJ actors towards more security in Europe’, Doc. 10934/16, Brussels, 5 July 2016.

Operationalising the internal/external security nexus

- through improving structured coordination between the actors responsible for internal and external policies, including in the field of systematic information-sharing, mutual consultations in their respective planning and decision-making processes, and institutionalisation of CSDP/FSJ training courses.

Civil-military convergence and synergies

- through closer cooperation between military CSDP operations and FSJ agencies such as EUROPOL and FRONTEX, especially when those military operations have a mandate which contains law enforcement activities.

The document clearly makes the link between internal and external security considerations by looking at CSDP missions in terms of ‘return on investment’ for EU security.

Three strategic priorities were identified in the EUGS: (i) responding to external conflicts and crises; (ii) building the capacities of partners; and (iii) protecting the Union and its citizens. The Council Conclusions on ‘Implementing the Global Strategy in the area of security and defence’ of November 2016 further stated that ‘Protecting the Union and its citizens covers the contribution that the EU and its Member States can make from a security and defence perspective, notably through CSDP in line with the Treaty, to tackle challenges and threats that have an impact on the security of the Union and its citizens, along the nexus of internal and external security, in cooperation with Freedom, Security and Justice (FSJ) actors’.

Indeed, the emergence of the internal-external security nexus highlights the necessity of bringing CSDP and FSJ actors closer together, as one new priority of the Comprehensive Approach and the quest for EU strategic coherence and impact.

VI. COUNTER-TERRORISM AS A CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT ACTIVITY

Birgit Loeser

As policy responses to terrorism, counter-terrorism (CT) and prevention/counter-violent extremism (P/CVE) efforts sit at the crossroads of both the internal/external security nexus and the security/development nexus. As such, CT and P/CVE are central components of civilian crisis management. Within the EU, these interlinkages have been identified and developed only gradually, but are now firmly embedded in the latest policy initiatives such as the ‘Security Union’ and the ‘Global Strategy’.

The origins of contemporary policies against terrorist activities in the Arab world, Africa and the West can be traced to the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States. The way terrorism has evolved over the past two decades has shaped national and international approaches to countering the phenomenon. The EU issued its first policy documents on terrorism in 2001/2002, but it was only after the Madrid and London bombings in 2004 and 2005 that it embarked on a proper Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Ten years after, counter-terrorism policies have become more complex, because of the global scale of terrorism, but also as a result of the increase in radicalisation and violent extremism. This has led to the formulation of a strategy on what is now known as ‘countering/preventing violent extremism’ (C/PVE), which requires a whole-of-government approach in the true sense of where security and development meet, at local and regional level.

There is also an ever-growing internal/external security nexus in countering international terrorism that obliges EU bodies as well as member states to work with third countries, for example in the field of information exchange, aviation security or sanctions. A process that was originally constrained by a rather narrow ‘stove-pipe’ approach has gradually evolved towards a more integrated approach of the various EU policies and actors that see CT as part of the EU’s broader civilian crisis management efforts.

This chapter presents the scope of EU external CT and P/CVE efforts as components of an EU civilian crisis management policy and how these efforts have evolved over time. It discusses present challenges and opportunities for further linking up counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation initiatives with the evolving EU crisis management policy.

Early engagement in countering terrorism

Conceptually, the EU follows a strict ‘rule of law’ approach in the fight against terrorism as terrorism is considered as a crime, which, as such, has to be criminalised, investigated, prosecuted and penalised in accordance with police and justice regulations as well as international legislative standards. The first EU policy documents on counter-terrorism adopted after the 9/11 events – the 2001 Action Plan and the 2002 Framework Decision – provided for the harmonisation of national legislation with regard to the criminalisation of preparatory activities such as travelling for terrorist purposes, and financing and training for terrorist purposes.

The 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings laid the ground for tackling international terrorism more comprehensively: the post of ‘EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator’ (EU CTC) was created in 2004 with the task to ‘co-ordinate the work of the Council in combating terrorism’. Subsequently, a ‘European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy’ was adopted in November 2005, with the definition of four ‘strands of work’:¹

- *Prevent* people turning to terrorism by tackling the factors and root causes which can lead to radicalisation and recruitment in Europe and internationally;
- *Protect* citizens and infrastructure and reduce our vulnerability to attack, including through improved security of borders, transport and critical infrastructure;
- *Disrupt*, i.e. pursue and investigate terrorists across our borders and globally: impede planning, travel, and communications; disrupt support networks; cut off funding and access to attack materials, and bring terrorists to justice;
- *Respond*, i.e. prepare ourselves [...] to manage and minimise the consequences of a terrorist attack, by improving capabilities to deal with: the aftermath, the co-ordination of the response and the needs of victims.’

The Strategy recognises member states’ ‘primary responsibility’ for combating terrorism and delivering on those four work-strands, but also spells out where the EU can add value in four main ways: (i) strengthening national capabilities; (ii) facilitating European cooperation (including the fostering of police and justice cooperation); (iii) developing collective capability (including making best use of EU bodies such as EUROPOL, EUROJUST, FRONTEX and the EU Situation Centre); and (iv) promoting international partnership with international organisations and with ‘key partners’ with a view to build capacity on counter-terrorism.

Implementation led to three lines of action in the area of external relations in the period between 2005 and 2015.

1. Council of the European Union, ‘The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy’, doc.14469/4/05 REV 4, Brussels, 30 November 2005.

First, political outreach through the establishment of dedicated counter-terrorism ‘Political Dialogues’ with the US, Canada and Australia, Pakistan, India, the Gulf countries, notably the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Turkey and Russia.

Second, multilateral cooperation focusing on advocacy, policy shaping, and institution building. Examples are the adoption of the 2006 UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Council of Europe Convention of 2005, work with the G7 Roma/Lyon Group on CT best practices and later (since 2010) with the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF).

Third, the programming of European Commission-funded capacity building assistance focusing mainly on the promotion of the rule of law and law enforcement, judicial cooperation, protection of human rights and measures to counter radicalisation and recruitments. The main sources of funding are the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) and the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI). Examples include the Criminal Justice Support Package for Pakistan (€1.8 million), the STRIVE (Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism) programme (€2 million) for the Horn of Africa and the CT Sahel project (€8.7 million). At these various levels, external CT activities were initially disconnected from the internal CT efforts. And there was very little link to CSDP as the geographic focus differed. Two structural changes paved the way for a more integrated approach.

First, the creation in 2010 of the European External Action Service (EEAS), which is *inter alia* co-responsible for programming external assistance together with the European Commission, has allowed for the linking of CT activities more systematically with the EU’s external action objectives (as per art.208 TEU).

Second, with the breaking up under the Lisbon Treaty of the Justice and Home Affairs pillar, the area of ‘freedom, security and justice’, including the fight against terrorism, became a ‘shared competence’ between member states and European institutions. As a result, initiatives to foster cooperation and to harmonise legislation could be accelerated, and the need to link better the internal counter-terrorism activities, mainly driven by the EU CTC and European Commission DG HOME, and the external dimension (EEAS, including CSDP, DG DEVCO and DG NEAR) of EU policies became more apparent.

The internal/external security nexus

The EU approach to CT changed dramatically against the background of developments unfolding as a result of the ‘Arab Spring’ and its destabilising effects on Libya, the Maghreb and Sahel region, but also in Syria and Iraq and the emergence of Daesh. In this context, a number of specific factors directly impacted on the internal security of the European Union.

First, the so-called ‘foreign fighter’ phenomenon whereby hundreds of young Europeans, but also people from the Western Balkans, the Maghreb, and Central Asia, made their way to Syria and Iraq to fight and help establish the Daesh-declared ‘caliphate’. From an EU perspective, countering this threat called for tighter monitoring of people’s movements between countries and reinforced aviation security measures, including discussions on a Passenger Name Record (PNR) and negotiations with third countries on better police and justice cooperation.

Second, the fact that international terrorist groups not only control a vast geographic area, but also have resources in the form of money (including from captured banks, ‘kidnapping for ransom’, oil smuggling and donations), industries (e.g. oil production) and military equipment, meant that a correspondingly broad and far-reaching response was needed. This led to the EU’s 2015 regional strategy for Syria, Iraq, and Daesh.²

Third, the extensive use by Daesh of social media networks as an instrument of propaganda and incitement to commit acts of terrorism has called for intensified counter-radicalisation measures and counter-narratives.

All of these factors have highlighted the need for the EU to link internal and external security policies more effectively. Already in June 2011, the Council called on the EU CTC ‘to support, in close cooperation with the Member States, the EEAS and the Commission, coordination and coherence between internal and external Counter-terrorism policies and to foster better communication between the Union and third countries’.³ And in June 2014, the European Council provided ‘strategic guidelines’ for the freedom, security and justice sector to help strengthen ‘most urgently’ Europe’s ‘resilience’, i.e. the EU’s ability to tackle threats to its internal security.⁴

In the meantime, two civilian CSDP missions were launched with counter-terrorism-related mandates. First, in June 2012, EUAVSEC South Sudan was established to help secure Juba Airport as a means to counter the risk of the airport being used to divert flights for terrorist attacks. Second, EUCAP Sahel Niger was launched in August 2012 with the mandate to help fight terrorism through enhancing Niger’s police and justice sectors, in close cooperation with the ‘CT Sahel’ project run by the European Commission.

The attacks on 7 January 2015 on the *Charlie Hebdo* magazine in Paris and, the day after, on a Jewish supermarket, both conducted by jihadi-inspired Islamists, came as a wake-up call for a new approach to external and internal counter-terrorism. This led to the adoption by Foreign Ministers of Council conclusions defining concrete measures that explicitly factor in both the internal/external security and security/development nexus:⁵

2. See Council of the European Union, ‘Council conclusions on the EU Regional Strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the ISIL/Daesh threat’, doc.7267/15, 16 March 2015.

3. Council of the European Union, ‘Council conclusions on enhancing the links between internal and external aspects of counter-terrorism’, Luxembourg, 9-10 June 2011.

4. Council of the European Union, Conclusions, Brussels, 26-27 June 2014.

5. ‘Council Conclusions on Counter-terrorism’, Brussels, 9 February 2015.

- a focus on the MENA region and Turkey with ‘targeted and upgraded’ CT Political Dialogues that would help establish ‘Action Plans’ for effective operational cooperation and assistance to capacity building;
- closer cooperation with Western Balkans countries;
- the establishment of a network of CT experts in selected EU Delegations, including and mainly in the MENA region and Turkey, but also in Nigeria, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia;
- the combating of illicit accumulation and trafficking of small arms in the Southern Neighbourhood;
- reinforced relations with the UN and a more active role in the GCTF, including its newly-created institutes;⁶
- the commitment to ‘develop frameworks for information exchange and ways for the EU agencies [JHA bodies such as EUROPOL, EUROJUST, FRONTEX and the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)] to engage more strategically with the countries in the region to strengthen law enforcement and judicial cooperation’;
- reinforced strategic communications and outreach to the Arab world.

The April 2015 European Commission Communication on ‘The European Agenda on Security’ similarly acknowledges the need for synergies at all levels of the EU’s policy response so as to respond to the ‘instability in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood’ and the ‘changing forms of radicalisation, violence and terrorism’ that are ‘increasingly cross-border and cross-sectorial in nature’. The document stresses the need to bring together all internal and external dimensions of security and to ‘further reinforce links between Justice and Home Affairs and Common Security and Defence Policy.’

All these provisions are a clear hint at the need to see CT and CVE through the civilian crisis management lens and pave the way for closer cooperation of EU actors. In 2015, for example, the EU CTC as well as the JHA Agencies such as EUROPOL, EUROJUST, CEPOL, the RAN and FRONTEX played a key role in the EEAS-led Counter-terrorism dialogues with Tunisia, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel. Also, the RAN was involved in assisting Lebanon, Jordan and Tunisia, and CEPOL has recently provided CT-related training in Jordan and Turkey. Institutionally, this led in late 2015 to the EEAS team working on CT from the Global and Multilateral Affairs moving to the Conflict Prevention and Security Policy Directorate that reports to the same Deputy Secretary General as the CSDP structures and INTCEN do.

6. The International Institute for Justice and Rule of Law (IJ) in Malta, the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) in Geneva and the CVE Centre of Excellence ‘Hedayah’ in Abu Dhabi.

New challenges and new opportunities

The attacks in November 2015 in Paris and those in Brussels in March 2016, brought yet another dynamic: Europe's citizens now feel under threat and governments are under pressure to take more visible action against international terror. And while military action against Daesh has shown some results, concerns about returning foreign fighters and the associated risks, including regarding radicalisation and retaliation, have become ever more prominent. This is now being addressed by a new counter-terrorism initiative at EU level, with the appointment of Sir Julian King as Commissioner in charge of the 'Security Union', as well as in the June 2016 'Global Strategy'.

Both initiatives revolve around the same building blocks of 'an integrated approach to conflicts and crises' and the need to build resilience of states and societies both within the EU and in third states, in a context of the internal/external security nexus.

EU institutions have for long been acting each within their own remit, be it inside the EU or in countries at risk of conflict. Both the security/development and internal/external security nexus are direct challenges to these dichotomies. Furthermore, conflict prevention, which encompasses the building of resilience, has become a key priority of EU external action.

CT and P/CVE are topical in this regard as they address good governance and the rule of law as preconditions for societies dealing effectively with the terrorist threat. The lack of good governance is not only a driver of radicalisation but also one root cause of migration and as such links the two main challenges for Europe.

Against this background, opportunities to operationalise both the internal/external and the security/development nexus, and to further develop synergies between CT and civilian crisis management, are emerging.

First, although Julian King formally is Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs, his mandate encompasses the coordination of all work-strands that contribute to the securing of Europe. His status of Commissioner lends him greater power than the EU CTC has had in the past. King convenes on a monthly basis a Task Force bringing together all EU entities dealing with internal and external security, including *inter alia* the EU CTC, the EEAS and its CSDP structures, the SITCEN/INTCEN, European Commission services as well as JHA agencies. Concrete results have yet to emerge, but the regular meetings seem to help improve inter-service coordination that was lacking in the past. They increase information flow and should lead over time to increased synergies and focus, facilitating better links between EU action and strategies.

Second, the adoption by the UN General Assembly of the Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism in July 2016 gives the 'international community' a roadmap for the 'soft end' of counter-terrorism, i.e. the prevention of radicalisation. The Action Plan requests the development of national and regional prevention strategies worldwide, and

many countries and regions will require EU assistance with the EU often being the main donor. The implementation of these strategies will require significant resource mobilisation as the counter-radicalisation measures extend into all parts of society – push-and-pull factors can include poverty, but also social and economic exclusion, the lack of political freedom and human rights and/or education. This potentially represents an opportunity for the EU but also a challenge. For example, support to the health and education system is not automatically P/CVE-driven. At times such a label could even be counter-productive and ‘do harm’ even though P/CVE was recently defined as compatible with official development assistance (ODA) principles and as such ODA eligible.⁷ A joint approach by all competent EU services to these questions is needed as they will shape EU priorities and external action.

Third, while some CSDP missions – such as EUAVSEC South Sudan and EUCAP Sahel Niger, but also in the military domain EUTM Mali and EUTM Somalia – have bridged the link between the EU’s external action and counter-terrorism in the true sense of the ‘comprehensive approach’, the potential for CSDP missions to do more in this regard is much bigger. This is particularly true when their mandate relates to Security Sector Reform (SSR). CSDP could then include tasks related to counter-terrorism, be it in the area of Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising (advocacy) or training (capacity-building). Governments and societies have to put terrorism and radicalisation at the top of their agendas, national laws have to be put in place to comply with relevant UNSC Resolutions and Conventions, law enforcement personnel need to be trained. Civilian CSDP missions are particularly well suited for such tasks due to their distinct methodology, i.e. the recourse to active service personnel such as judges, prosecutors and police officers doing the actual mentoring, advising and training. Current discussions on a ‘regionalisation’ of CSDP missions in the Sahel are going in the right direction and will ensure closer cooperation with the CT experts posted there.

Conclusion

The rule-of-law approach and focus on countries in crisis/conflict that characterise EU counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation/violent extremism efforts have made them components of the broader ‘civilian crisis management’ activity. Both policies sit at the crossroads of the internal/external security and security/development nexus.

Current institutional but also contextual circumstances are leading the EU to look again at these various links and how best to take advantage of the variety of instruments at its disposal to operationalise the Comprehensive Approach. The moment therefore seems timely to embark on a review of civilian crisis management that includes a wider range of actors, such as those involved in counter-terrorism. Opportunities for that are

7. In February 2016, OECD-DAC reporting directives for official development assistance (ODA) on peace and security were updated. Among others, programmes focusing on security expenditure management, the role of civil society in the security sector, legislation on child soldiers, security sector reform, civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and conflict resolution, and control of small arms and light weapons are ODA eligible. So is security sector reform that improves democratic governance and civilian control.

wide open, notably in the context of the discussions on a 'Security Union' and the implementation of the EU Global Strategy, both of which call for more effective policies to protect Europe and its citizens.

VII. CIVIL SOCIETY AND CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Catherine Woollard

The role of civil society is essential to civilian crisis management (CCM), both from an international and local perspective. Civil society is an actor and a recipient of crisis management and plays a key role in the process of making any form of third-party intervention accountable. As such it has entered into a relationship with the EU that is characterised by some degree of cooperation as well as by diverging agendas.

This chapter explores the relationship between civil society and EU CCM. It first provides an overview of the involvement of civil society in CCM. It then focuses on the main pillar of CCM – civilian CSDP – to explore reasons for cooperation with civil society, which lie in efficiency, transparency, accountability and the link with the wider population, as well as on some of the challenges encountered.

Civil society matters

The definition of civil society used in this chapter is broad-ranging, it encompasses not-for-profit organisations (NGOs, foundations and related organisations), think tanks and research institutes/academia but stops short of incorporating the business sector and trade associations. It also includes local civil society in the countries where EU CCM takes place and European civil society working in Brussels and in member states. The role of civil society can be loosely divided into three main areas: civil society analysis and scrutiny of EU CCM; civil society support to EU CCM; and civil society's own CCM activity.

First, academic institutions and individual researchers have paid some attention to EU CCM, although military crisis management has been of more interest. In addition to the more neutral academic work on CCM, NGOs, in exercising their watchdog function, have attempted to scrutinise CCM, including monitoring, critique, and recommendations for change. This type of work has been carried out in Brussels and in-country. There are also organisations that operate in the space between academia and advocacy. Civil society also provides analysis to different CCM stakeholders. For example, member states commission or use civil society analysis for their policy work on CCM. They also organise briefings by civil society, including for the PSC.

Second, civil society provides support with the aim of improving the effectiveness of EU CCM, including in training of staff carrying out CCM activities and the development

of training materials. Civilian CSDP training courses, such as those organised by the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) or by the Europe's New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (ENTRI) network, often involve sessions delivered by civil society. And in the JHA domain, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) has commissioned civil society to prepare and review a large body of training material.

Third, civil society organisations can be CCM actors themselves (although few would embrace the term), in that they are active in responding to conflict, fragility and security threats (usually defined in terms of human security) in all the contexts in which the EU is using CCM. That may be in the form of development projects, which have increasingly integrated a conflict dimension, peacebuilding – a relatively new and expanding sector of NGO activity – or to a smaller extent in JHA/border activities, such as search and rescue missions in the Mediterranean.

Civil society's crisis management work takes place in parallel to, in concert or in coordination with the EU. Civil society can also serve as a proxy or a substitute for the EU, in particular in non-recognised entities which the EU may struggle to access such as Somaliland or Nagorno-Karabakh. In the latter, the EU supported a consortium of NGOs to work on conflict during a period when it was largely denied access to the territory. Also, certain interpretations of the comprehensive approach, particularly those used by NATO, involve bringing together institutions and civil society actors present within the same operational context to pursue common objectives or even within the same frameworks. However, NGOs and especially the humanitarian sector tend to reject this definition of the comprehensive approach due to its perceived impact on their independence.

In this context, one of the questions underlying the analysis below is how the EU and civil society can work together when they have (at least some) common objectives, without compromising civil society's independence.

The new security environment

Changes in the security environment that pose a particular challenge to civil society's implication in CCM or to its ability to cooperate with the EU on crisis management are many. The EU's Global Strategy (EUGS), and the background papers that preceded it, set out the EU's analysis of the security context. Many of the threats identified are not new – they also appeared in the EU Security Strategy of 2003 and/or in the updated version of it from 2008. However, there is no doubt that the EU's perception of certain threats, their acuteness and proximity to Europe, and the nature of the EU's response are changing.

The extent to which migration is viewed as a crisis and/or as a security threat is one of the major shifts of the last decade. The EU's response to migration and to refugee protection is also changing, generally towards a more restrictive and security-focused ap-

proach. The relationship between civil society and the EU on migration has become extremely tense as a result of how the ‘refugee crisis’ has been presented and handled. On the one hand, civil society is concerned that the EU is dispensing with its commitments to human rights; on the other hand, EU institutions tend to view civil society as naïve and uncompromising. It is likely that this tension will spill over into CCM – indeed, the hostility generated by the March 2016 EU-Turkey Refugee Deal and more recently by the June 2016 New Migration Partnership Framework shows that this is already happening.

In addition, civil society working on conflict has tended to reject the CCM framing, using instead concepts drawn from the conflict transformation approach.¹ It sees tackling conflict as a long-term endeavour which involves identifying and addressing the root causes of conflict, which are likely to include societal grievances and injustice. As development work has evolved, it has also come increasingly to focus on long-term institutional reform and good governance, as well as provision of rights as routes out of poverty. Short-term crisis response is seen as the domain of the humanitarian sector or of security agencies, with a transition or handover occurring at some stage. The need to invest in prevention of crisis and conflict is a common belief across civil society.

This said, these approaches are challenged by ongoing protracted crises, particularly in the region around Europe, which need to be addressed and where prevention has failed (or was not tried) with furthermore no sign of moving into a post-crisis phase. As well as demanding new types of response from civil society, these crises – particularly the war in Syria and the ‘refugee crisis’ – are absorbing resources that would otherwise be available for long-term preventive/development action. Despite recognition of the importance of tackling ‘root causes’ the investment in doing so is decreasing or may be framed counterproductively. For example, while EU plans to invest funding in the root causes of migration are welcome, civil society is concerned about the definition of ‘root causes’ to be used. Civil society sees the root causes of forced migration as conflict, persecution, repression, poverty and – increasingly – environmental degradation. Yet, there are indications that the EU’s focus is more on shorter-term proximate causes such as smuggling and absence of border management and that funding will thus be used to strengthen security and border agencies in countries of origin and transit, including through diversion of funds from development.

In addition, one trend within broader EU crisis management that may have a negative effect on relations with civil society is the momentum towards military crisis management. For policy to become practice, financial and human resources are required. Yet the elements of the EUGS where resources are being mobilised are in the area of military crisis management, with the ‘Security and Defence Implementation Plan’. The Brexit vote – and the UK’s eventual withdrawal from the EU – will also remove one of the main obstacles to development of more effective EU military action. Civil society is divided on the effectiveness of military responses to crisis and conflict. While academics

1. See John Paul Lederach, *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation* (Intercourse, PA: Good Books, 2003); see also <https://www.transcend.org/galtung/papers.php>.

and think-tank researchers working on CSDP have tended to be strong proponents of military action, and have consequently advocated for strengthening EU military power, most NGOs are sceptical of military responses, believing them to be ineffective or indeed more likely to cause conflict than to resolve it.

Civil society and civilian CSDP

CSDP is an area of EU activity where cooperation with civil society has been limited, both in absolute terms and compared to other EU activities in third countries. There is little research as to why that is the case but reasons can be suggested. First, as CSDP is intergovernmental, there is no treaty obligation to consult civil society and to be open to European citizens as is the case for European Commission activity in third countries. Second, the CSDP structures, both civilian and military, have been dominated by staff with a military background and training who were less likely to have experience of working with civil society than their counterparts in development assistance and humanitarian affairs. (Although in recent years the development of the comprehensive approach and the use of civilian advisers in military operations have led to a greater openness to civil society on the part of military personnel.)

From 2009 onwards, new types of formal and informal cooperation between CSDP staff and civil society have developed. This has been the case with the incorporation of relations with civil society in the job descriptions of CSDP staff (in Brussels and in CSDP missions), the creation of positions solely focused on working with civil society (EU-LEX Kosovo, EUMM Georgia, EUCAP Sahel), the establishment of consultation mechanisms (EUCAP Niger) and opportunities for civil society to provide input into the planning, operation and evaluation of CSDP missions and policies (particularly through the Civil Society Dialogue Network, managed by the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office - EPLO).

Preliminary thinking on the benefits of such cooperation and on lessons learned thus far is presented below.² The focus is on civilian CSDP although some of the issues discussed apply equally to military CSDP.

The reasons for establishing cooperation between civil society and civilian CSDP are grouped into three categories.

First, from an operational perspective it can be to the advantage of CSDP to develop a working relationship with civil society. International and particularly local NGOs often have information on the situation in the countries where CSDP missions are deployed which may not be available to the CSDP personnel, such as on the movement of armed groups. Civil society can also serve as a bridge to the wider population, with which the

2. The analysis is based on discussions in more than twenty events bringing together CSDP staff members and civil society, meetings with staff members, up to and including heads of mission, from all previous and current CSDP missions, and field visits to CSDP missions in Kosovo, Georgia, Niger and the DRC.

mission may have an interest in communicating, particularly in a country such as Kosovo, with a small, interlinked population. The prominence of EULEX Kosovo when first deployed, given its scale, ambition and executive mandate, meant that popular support was essential. This role is less important where the missions are small-scale or have narrow mandates and do not necessarily seek broad popular support, as is the case in Niger, or was the case in Moldova, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), or Guinea Bissau. Finally, the tasks carried out by civilian CSDP missions may require civil society support, especially in order to ensure long-term sustainability of a mission's achievements after it has closed down. Thus, cooperation with civil society may be part of the mission's exit strategy, whereby it is hoped that civil society will take on the tasks of the mission once it has withdrawn.

Similarly, whenever the CSDP missions have focused on institutional reform (rule of law, SSR, police, administration) they have been part of a state-building or democratisation strategy (although this language is rarely used due to sensitivities in host governments or in EU member states). In order to achieve long-term transformative democratic change, many would argue that civil society development and involvement are essential.

Second, civil society itself makes the argument that CSDP missions – along with other EU activity in third countries – should be accountable to local populations, who may be the ultimate beneficiaries of EU external action. This argument leads to the development of accountability mechanisms to allow local civil society to scrutinise mission activity and provide input into it, including complaints mechanisms. Where there has been support, that has led to formal accountability mechanisms (EULEX Kosovo) and to regular meetings between senior staff and local civil society (EUMM Georgia). However, mission staff and member states, and host country governments may not easily accept this role for civil society. For some, CSDP is primarily about the strategic interests of the EU and/or its member states, and missions should therefore be accountable to the member states and not to local populations.

Third, some EU member states with a strong tradition of openness to civil society have demanded that CSDP missions engage with civil society. In some cases, member states have also facilitated contact between civil society and missions by organising meetings in-country during visits or requesting briefings from civil society and inviting CSDP staff to participate. They have also invited civil society to deliver sessions at training seminars for mission staff. Other member states are more hostile towards civil society, however, and have consistently opposed a more participatory approach to CSDP, including rejecting a broadening of evaluation methods for CSDP missions.

Well-intentioned attempts to establish cooperation between civil society and civilian CSDP have sometimes foundered, leading to tense and even conflictual relationships. The challenges of cooperating with civil society are multiple and may vary significantly, depending on the nature of the mission and on the level and nature of development of civil society in the country concerned, as well as its freedom to operate.

Challenges can occur when the mission is small or not prominent. Civil society may thus not be aware of the mission's activities. Attempts to set up dialogue between the mission and local civil society or to gather civil society input into mission activities may not work. It is more likely that international NGOs and (European) academics have an interest in the mission and are willing to engage whereas it is usually of more use and interest for the mission to engage with local civil society and researchers.

Most importantly, tension or open conflict between the mission and civil society can result from a general resentment among civil society about the presence of international actors or unrealistic expectations about the role that the mission is able to play. There were periods at the start of the mission's mandate when the relationship between EU-LEX Kosovo and Kosovar civil society fitted this pattern, although in recent years the situation has significantly improved. The behaviour of mission staff can also be a contributory factor, as can gender dynamics, tensions between a mission's stated and actual mandate, and lack of capacity (time, skills, and ability to engage) on the side of the mission or of civil society.

In this context, there are models of cooperation that work better than others. Formally contracting civil society to carry out activities, such as analysis, training or evaluation has the advantage of allowing for an open discussion of, and agreement on the terms of cooperation, although it also has the disadvantage of pushing civil society into a dependent relationship.

In any case, it is important to accept that civil society is almost always divided. Officials often bemoan the fact that civil society does not speak with 'one voice' but to ask it to do so is to misunderstand the nature of civil society, which is composed of groups with different interests and views. It follows that mechanisms that allow civil society to express different views are advisable.

Conclusion

Cooperation with civil society has the potential to contribute to the effectiveness of EU action, whether or not one agrees with the principle that the EU should be accountable to local populations. Cooperation between the Commission and civil society is well-established and there have been promising developments in cooperation with CSDP staff and decision-makers in Brussels, as well as in certain countries where missions have been deployed.

However, when looking at CCM more broadly, including the Commission security/development and JHA border dimensions, the prospects for cooperation between civil society and the EU appear to be threatened by recent developments, including the permeation of external affairs and border matters with the EU's politics of migration.

In this complex environment, the extent to which the interaction between the EU and civil society will develop further remains a challenge, as both sides tend to focus on their own agendas and priorities when it comes to providing responses to a situation of increasingly protracted crises.

CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A NEW PARADIGM?

Thierry Tardy

The speed of the evolution of the security environment and the magnitude of the difficulties the EU currently faces pose a number of challenges for civilian crisis management (CCM). As is the case for any security instrument, EU CCM has to build up its short-term efficacy and long-term relevance in an era characterised by the multifaceted nature of threats, the increasingly overlapping nature of internal and external security, and the interdependence between security and development.

What, in this context, should be the level of ambition for the EU? How should CCM evolve so as to contribute to the ‘security of our Union’, the EUGS’s top priority? If tomorrow’s security challenges are linked to terrorism and radicalisation, state fragility and bad governance, transnational organised crime and the continuous flow of illegal migrants to Europe, then what kind of policies, institutions, capabilities, funding and political oversight mechanisms are required in the next 10-15 years?

These questions are relevant to each of the three branches of EU CCM as presented in this study. Civilian CSDP, the European Commission and JHA agencies must constantly revisit their mandates, capabilities and comparative advantages as individual CM actors, as well as combining tactical responses and strategic vision. This furthermore requires the deepening of their cooperation and synergies in the spirit of the Comprehensive Approach so as to maximise effectiveness and impact. And this can only happen if institutions and member states push and pull in the same direction and with a certain degree of determination.

What all this may mean in practice is yet to be unpacked as many questions remain to be answered and obstacles to be overcome. The debate takes place at a key moment in the development of the EU’s security policy. On the one hand, there are factors of difficulty or uncertainty that impede the formation of a more effective EU CCM policy in the three sectors identified in this Report.

First is the issue of whether EU institutions can indeed adapt, i.e. overcome legal or administrative rigidities and institutional conservatism, operationalise the security/development nexus and the internal/external security nexus, and design policies that produce an impact both inside and outside the EU area. Second, CCM is confronted with the challenge of intra- and interinstitutional cooperation (among the three pillars of EU CCM and beyond) and the question of whether and how such cooperation can prevail over competition dynamics and the persistence of fragmented ‘stove-piped’ policies. Third, no significant change is possible without sustained member state backing, which

has so far proved to be elusive, and that is furthermore likely to be called into question at a time when the EU is suffering from a broad trust deficit and member states may be tempted by national retrenchment.

On the other hand, the current situation can also be seen as conducive to positive developments, for at least three sets of reasons: first, the security environment has reached such a dangerous level of volatility that passivity or non-adaptation are non-options. If, as stated in the foreword to the EUGS, 'the crises within and beyond our borders are affecting directly our citizens' lives', then 18 years after the birth of ESDP the time has come for the EU and its member states to move CSDP from infancy to maturity.

Second, the predominantly non-military nature of threats to the EU's security *de facto* makes civilian crisis management a central component of the response, regardless of the difficulties simultaneously encountered. With threats to Europe taking the form of terrorism at the heart of the cities of its member states, networks of migrant smugglers operating at the EU's periphery, transnational organised crime, cyber or hybrid attacks, and under-development as a breeding ground for radicalisation, then the main responsibility for the response is likely to lie with civilian actors, be they police, border or coast guards, judicial bodies, counter-terrorism experts, security sector reform or development agencies. CCM is therefore *a priori* of the utmost relevance to the evolving security agenda and its resilience-building dimension.

Third, the momentum created by the Global Strategy puts EU member states and institutions in a situation where taking concerted action finally appears feasible. Despite real difficulties relating to its timing and probable weak visibility beyond EU circles, the EUGS creates a window of opportunity which can help reform and adapt the EU CCM apparatus.

The combination of these three parameters provides opportunities for a new CCM paradigm to emerge, and for the EU to play a central role in shaping it.

Annexes

ABBREVIATIONS

APF	African Peace Facility
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
AU	African Union
CA	Comprehensive Approach
CAR	Central African Republic
CBSD	Capacity-Building for Security and Development
CCDP	Civilian capability development plan
CCM	Civilian crisis management
CELAC	Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
CEPOL	European Police College
CfC	Calls for Contributions
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CHG	Civilian Headline Goal
CIVCOM	Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CMP	Crisis Management Procedures
CMPD	Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
COPOLAD	Cooperation Programme on Drugs Policies
COSI	Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CT	Counter-terrorism
CTC	Counter-Terrorism Coordinator
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DG	Directorate General

DG DEVCO	Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EASO	European Asylum Support Office
EBCG	European Border and Coast Guard Agency
EC	European Commission
EDF	European Development Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EIDHR	European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights
EMLO	European Migration Liaison Officers
ENI	European Neighbourhood Instrument
ESDC	European Security and Defence College
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EUAM	EU Assistance Mission (Ukraine)
EUBAM	European Union Border Assistance Mission
EUGS	European Union Global Strategy
EULEX	EU Rule of Law mission (Kosovo)
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMM	European Union Monitoring Mission (Georgia)
EUPM	European Union Police Mission
EUROJUST	The EU's Judicial Cooperation Unit
EUROPOL	European Police Office
EUROSUR	European Border Surveillance System
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
EUTF	EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa
EUTM	European Union Training Mission
FCAS	Fragile and Conflict Affected States

FRONTEX	European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the EU member states
FSJ	Freedom, Security and Justice
GCTF	Global Counter-Terrorism Forum
HG	Headline Goal
HR/VP	High Representative / Vice-President (of the European Commission)
IcSP	Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
INTCEN	Intelligence Centre
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
JSSR	Justice and security sector reform
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MIP	Mission Implementation Plan
MMA	monitoring, mentoring, and advising
MNJTF	Multi-National Joint Task Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPLAN	Operational Plan
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
P/CVE	prevention/counter-violent extremism
PFCA	Political Framework for Crisis Approach
PSC	Political and Security Committee
PSO	Peace Support Operation
SATCEN	Satellite Centre
SDIP	Security and Defence Implementation Plan
SSR	Security sector reform

TEU	Treaty on the European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UN	United Nations
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

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