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Understanding African armies

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Reports

CONTENTS

List of maps

List of tables in Annex

Acknowledgements

FOREWORD

Over the past few years, a significant and growing share of CSDP missions and operations has been devoted to training and capacity-building in fragile countries and regions in Africa, from the Horn to the Great Lakes, from the Sahel to the Gulf of Guinea. While this shift in focus and emphasis reflects the challenges that the EU and the wider international community are increasingly confronted with in Africa, it is a fact that the efforts put into such activities have produced very modest results so far.

It is therefore legitimate to wonder what is going wrong, and why. Is it a problem of endurance and perseverance, as capacity-building is for the long haul and requires sustained investment and dedication? Are the European efforts too ephemeral, or not comprehensive enough, to meet their stated goals? Or is there also a more fundamental problem of approach, whereby donors (including the EU and its member states) tend to project onto their African counterparts expectations and concepts that have very little to do with African realities? Are the shared operational targets envisaged to date the most appropriate ones to address the current and foreseeable challenges affecting security in Africa and beyond?

In order to address the frustration and fatigue that is starting to wear down Europe's security efforts in Africa, it may then be useful to take a step back and look into the actual configuration of the recipients of those efforts. African armies are very different from one another, and they are also very different from European (and more generally Western) armies. Their historical roots and traditions, the way they were shaped after independence, their domestic functions and operational roles tend to vary significantly (although they are not completely unrelated to past European experiences) and, above all, cannot be reduced to a single, normative 'developmental' model – hence the need to differentiate the approaches and calibrate the actions.

This Report was planned and prepared with this in mind: to offer at the same time a bird's eye view and a qualitative analysis of what the African armies we deal with (and invest in) actually are, and what they are not; to explore what they can (and possibly should) do, and what they cannot; and to present both the regional expert and the layman, both the academic and the practitioner, with an accessible and hopefully stimulating read on a policy issue that matters a great deal for our common security in an increasingly complex, connected and contested world.

The EUISS is extremely grateful to David Chuter for initially taking the lead in this project – along with Florence Gaub – and for facilitating the involvement and input of African experts, without which this exercise would have been too euro-centric. His contribution is mostly evident in chapters I and IV, whereas Florence Gaub and other EUISS colleagues have primarily nurtured chapters II and III. Plenty of material has

been collected, selected and processed in order to achieve the desired format and style for this publication, which represents a truly collective effort.

George Lucas and Steven Spielberg used to say of their 'Star Wars' saga that those were the movies that they would have liked to watch in their youth. Similarly, we hope that this Report comes to represent the kind of book that experts and practitioners dealing with EU-Africa security relations would have liked to have read when first approaching the issue.

Antonio Missiroli

Paris, April 2016

Figure 1: Peace missions in Africa

Sources for data: EEAS; AU; UNDPKO; Réseau de recherche sur les opérations de paix

I. INTRODUCTION: HISTORY AND ORIGINS

Africa is more than just the world's second largest continent; the shared history of its billion plus citizens, living in any of its 54 states and 10 non-sovereign entities have turned it – like Europe – into a political construct, too. Over the last century alone, Africa has seen both political turmoil and unprecedented economic and human development, which have affected not only its citizens but also its neighbours and indeed the globe. Today, 23 international and regional peace missions are deployed on and offshore the continent, highlighting the enmeshment of African security with global security.

African armed forces are often at the centre of these developments; sometimes they are seen as saviours, sometimes as a source of instability – but whether productive or destructive, no African solution can ignore the relevant military institutions involved. These are often described as a simple product of the colonial era. While partly true, this is too simplistic. African forces are the result of several historical developments, even if, of course, colonialism is one.

Already during pre-colonial times, warfare was far from unknown in Africa, although it was often highly ritualised, with limited objectives and comparatively few casualties. The Zulu regiments of the late nineteenth century were very much the exception, although many societies did have regimental structures, designed for the waging of war. The Maasai, for example, had specific terms describing various forms of combat, many of them small-scale cattle raids and quarrels. Other states had low levels of militarisation, and adopted alternative approaches to warfighting. Warfare was an occupation of young males, and in most African societies professional soldiers were unknown. Almost all combat was on foot, with the exception of the two most militarily successful states: in the Ethiopian region, where horses were used, and on Lake Victoria, where the Ganda used canoes.

Although firearms were present in northeast Africa for centuries, weapons used in Sub-Saharan Africa were much more basic, consisting of spears, swords, bows and arrows, shields and clubs: firearms did not start to appear until the 1820s and 1830s. The raising of the stakes in regional warfare can be attributed to the 'destructive modernity' of the firearm. In Eastern Africa, especially, the institutionalisation of violence played a major role in state-building and the construction of identities. War facilitated internal control and discipline, binding the governed and governing together in a social contract.

Likewise, the 'colonial' period should not be identified purely with the West, or only with the colonial conquests of the period 1880-1960. The Arabs had carved out a huge colonial empire in North Africa – extending as far as present-day Morocco – by the end of the seventh century, and Arab culture, as well as Islamic law, spread progressively south. Sudan, for example, accepted Islam by negotiation rather than conflict. Likewise, there had always been extensive trade between the states of the Gulf and East Africa,

and this promoted, over time, a strong Arabic and Islamic influence that continues even today. Trade routes from West Africa across the Sahel and the Sahara have existed since ancient times, especially for slaves. Finally, Europeans arrived on the Bight of Benin as early as the sixteenth century to take advantage of the well-developed slave markets, and on the Gold and Ivory Coasts at around the same time.

There was no single military model during the colonial period either. In countries where there was a sizeable European settler population, ranging from Rhodesia in the East to Senegal in the West to Sudan in the North, substantial military or paramilitary forces were often raised and led by white officers; some were incorporated into the colonial powers' own armies and fought in the wars of the twentieth century. For example, Sierra Leone's military culture is still heavily influenced by the memory of its involvement in World War II; the *Tirailleurs sénégalais* (actually Malian and Burkinabé soldiers) are a well-known Francophone equivalent.

Such forces did not always behave well towards the population, and indeed were not expected to. In every colony there were locally recruited forces of some kind to keep order, including the notoriously brutal *Force Publique,* which enforced King Leopold II's personal rule over the Congo. In Sierra Leone, for example, the local forces were used to repress social movements and, poorly paid when paid at all, consequently behaved badly. Senegalese and Algerian-Moroccan troops were sent by the French to brutally repress the Madagascar rebellion in 1947. Yet these same forces often became the heart of the new independent states' armies and police forces. Donors were then surprised to find that these repressive traditions, and public suspicion of the security forces, lingered in some cases after independence.

Independence was also a very different phenomenon in different countries. The bulk of African states achieved independence in the 1960s, but not all in the same way. In some places it came about peacefully (in most of Francophone Africa for example). In countries where the white population was small, or closely attached to the colonial power, independence was relatively unproblematic. But in countries where there was a large settler population, and sometimes a Creole population as well, violence occurred more often, albeit as a result of a broader combination of factors. Long colonial wars were fought in Algeria (1954-62), and in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau (1960-1974) by colonial powers wishing to keep these colonies part of their own national territory (indeed white immigration there was strongly encouraged). Settler colonies themselves rebelled against independence in what is today Zimbabwe (leading to the war of 1965-80) and in the last days of the war in Algeria. Lower-level violence was a feature of a number of transitions to independence, notably in Kenya. These independence conflicts were not necessarily the end of the matter either. In Angola, for example, Portuguese withdrawal in 1975 was followed by a civil war that lasted almost thirty years, in which different foreign governments supported different factions.

Figure 2: Independence of African States

Tunisia 1956
Morocco 1956
Algeria 1962
Libya 1951
Egypt 1922
Cape Verde 1975
Mauritania 1960
Mali 1960
Niger 1960
Chad 1960
Sudan 1956
Eritrea 1993
Djibouti 1977
Senegal 1960
Burkina Faso 1960
Gambia 1965
Guinea-Bissau 1973
Guinea 1958
Côte d'Ivoire 1960
Nigeria 1960
CAR 1960
South Sudan 2011
Somalia 1960
Ethiopia 980 B. J. C.
Sierra Leone 1961
Liberia 1847
Ghana 1957
Togo 1960
Benin 1960
Cameroon 1960
Gabon 1960
Equatorial Guinea 1968
DRC 1960
Uganda 1962
Kenya 1963
Rwanda 1962
Seychelles 1976
Republic of the Congo 1960
Tanzania 1961
Burundi 1962
Angola 1975
Zambia 1964
Malawi 1964
Mauritius 1968
Namibia 1990
Zimbabwe 1980
Mozambique 1975
Madagascar 1960
Botswana 1966
Swaziland 1968
South Africa 1910
Lesotho 1966

Before 1960
1950-1959
1960-1969
1971-1979
After 1980

Foreign involvement in African militaries since independence has been almost continuous. It has followed several models, from the lingering influence of France over most of its former colonies, to the Cold War involvement by the Soviet Union (and even China), up to the many iterations of training teams and capacity-building initiatives carried out by the international community as a whole.

These very different paths to (and experiences after) independence produced varying degrees of stability. With very few exceptions, African states were created from former colonial territories, and the Cairo Declaration of 1964 enshrined the resulting – often arbitrary – borders as necessary if conflict was to be avoided. Nonetheless, the new political classes of the independent states did not universally accept these borders, leading to conflicts of both secession and aggression.

Box 1: The cases of Ethiopia, Somaliland and Sudan

Ethiopia has a history as an independent civilisation going back thousands of years (with the short parenthesis of Fascist Italy's rule between 1935 and 1941). Yet its military confrontation with Eritrea has its origins in the colonial era. Eritrea was originally an Italian colony, federated with Ethiopia by the allied powers after the Second World War, formally annexed in 1956, and only becoming independent (after a long war) in 1993. Likewise, Somaliland, a reasonably successful and stable quasi-state enjoying tacit international acceptance, declared itself independent from the rest of Somalia in 1991. It had in fact been a British protectorate, although the British presence was very small, and was only joined with the rest of Somalia (another former Italian colony) in 1960. Finally, the British decision to grant independence to their very diverse Sudanese colonies as a single entity in 1956 is the main source of the instability and conflict which continue to plague the divided and heterogeneous territory – now split, once more, into two countries.

Yet for all their arbitrariness, borders in Africa have become pragmatically important, especially for economic reasons. In some countries (the Côte d'Ivoire, for example) they have contributed to a sense of national identity. Moreover, most African militaries are given the constitutional role of defending these borders, even if, for practical reasons of geography and resources, few if any are fully capable of doing so. Indeed, the actual missions of African armies have evolved mainly by trial and error, and include, in different places, public order, gendarmerie-style operations, border policing, and even development and infrastructure tasks. They have become involved in anti-terrorist operations, and control intelligence in many countries. Finally, some have taken on roles – not necessarily by design – in peace operations in Africa and elsewhere.

African military forces today are therefore the result of more processes than just colonialism alone; in the four to five decades since independence, they have been shaped and structured by the kinds of factors described above, in different combinations at dif-

ferent times. Some have retained good relations with the former colonial powers, while others have undergone successive waves of influence from various sources. Some have never actually been involved in conflict, whereas others have fought many internal and external wars. There is therefore no single model of African militaries, any more than there is a single model of the political systems that they serve and which have dictated, to a large extent, how they have evolved.

Figure 3: Overview of countries and their armed forces

Comparison with two European countries

Belgium

Portugal

DEFENCE BUDGET
(percent of GDP 2014 ($))

- 8% to 10%
- 5% to 7,9%
- 2% to 4,9%
- 1% to 1,9%
- 0% to 0,9%
- n. k. or n. a.

ARMED FORCES

- Army
- Navy
- Air
- □ = 10,000 individuals

MAIN ORIGIN OF EQUIPMENT
Number of countries supplied

EU 31
FRANCE 19

RUSSIA 29

US 21

CHINA 7

CANADA 5
SOUTH AFRICA 5
BRAZIL 3
TURKEY 2
ISRAEL 2
UKRAINE 1
PAKISTAN 1
INDIA 1
JAPAN 1

Sources for data: *Military Balance* (IISS, 2015); *SIPRI Yearbook 2014*.

II. THE BUSINESS OF WAR: CAPACITIES AND CONFLICTS

As with other military organisations, African armed forces are defined first and foremost by their tasks and by the means of which they dispose to accomplish them. As we have seen, theoretically, their missions do not differ much from those of armed forces elsewhere: ensuring state security, and protecting population and territories from external threats. And, as with any effective military force, they would be expected to have a coercive capacity, a defined structure, discipline, order and efficiency to achieve these goals.

How to? – African military capacities

African armies differ greatly in terms of size and budget, ranging from a very small defence budget of a dozen of million dollars in Cape Verde or the Seychelles to a dozen or so billion in Algeria. But in global comparative terms, African militaries are small and underfunded: 0.2% of the African population serve in the armed forces – and more than half of these serve in only five countries (South Sudan, Morocco, Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt). In comparison, 0.44% of the United States, 0.48% of the French and an average 0.3% of the European population does – except that African forces operate in highly conflict-prone environments. Similarly, the African continent spends least, in absolute terms, on defence: out of the $1,776 billion of global military expenditure, African countries account for $57,403 billion – which is about 3.23% of total global spending.

As a result of these resource constraints, African military equipment, infrastructure and armament is ageing and soldiers live and work under difficult conditions. Basic equipment such as 4x4 vehicles to patrol borders and modern technological devices such as thermal imaging or night vision equipment are simply lacking; ammunition for training purposes is in short supply, as are precision weapons more generally.

However, if defence spending per capita and as a percentage of GNP is lower in Africa than in other underdeveloped regions, it has grown faster in sub-Saharan Africa than in other parts of the world, evolving from a mean of 1.24% of GDP in 2010 to 1.44% in 2014. Armoured vehicles and patrol boats have been the most common acquisition/upgrade priorities in the last five years, followed by purchases/upgrades of combat and trainer aircraft, multi-role helicopters and artillery. The most expensive procurements have been Nigeria's acquisition of offshore patrol vessels of over 1,500 tonnes equipped with helicopter hangars (PSOH) at a cost of $450 million (ordered 2012) from India, along with a century-class PSOH ordered from China worth $42 million. Most of the up-to-date material is located in higher income countries of the continent such as South Africa and Nigeria.

Unsurprisingly, acquisitions have been determined not only by resource constraints but also by the opponents' capacities – in other words, African forces have invested mostly in equipment giving them a slight tactical advantage over their enemies rather than developing a comprehensive long-term investment strategy. African forces have therefore been involved in an African arms race – but a comparatively slow one, given the financial constraints as well as limiting tactical considerations of simply 'outrunning' the next opponent.

Resource constraints have had a negative impact on African military performance as well: where the financial means for training, salaries, and the provision of adequate weapons are not in place, discipline and conduct are hard to enforce. In several African states – such as Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) or the Central African Republic (CAR) – soldiers involved in counterinsurgency operations have been accused of abuse against civilians, ranging from assault to rape. Issues with cohesion, desertion and disintegration are equally side effects of resource constraints and seriously hamper the fighting capacity of African forces. Mutinies and similar discipline issues tend also to be the result of resource constraints rather than the expression of political dissatisfaction. Soldiers have had to act at the highest political level – be it in Burkina Faso in 2011 or in Côte d'Ivoire in 2014 – to have their demands for better living and working conditions heard. Rivalries between factions or regiments which have fed several mutinies, if not conflicts, have resulted from differences in levels of resources allocated, such as between the *Red Berets* and *Green Berets* in Mali. In Burkina Faso, a combination of unequal treatment and equipment between the presidential security regiment (RSP) and regular army paved the way for a coup that led to the overthrow of President Campaoré. Paradoxically, while such mutinies seem to question state authority, they actually express the collective identity of a state body.

External deployment and peacekeeping have also contributed to unrest within the armed forces. For instance, Ghanaian troops mutinied in 1961 while taking part in a UN mission to Congo and Burundian forces did the same in 2009 over grievances related to the African Union (AU) mission to Somalia. The gap between what the UN allocates to the country and what the country then remits to its soldiers fuelled grievances among peacekeepers. The same problem can be found in African police forces involved in international peacekeeping.

The frequent lack of professionalism of African armies can also be attributed directly to military rulers – where officers are in power, they tend to weaken the military in order to avoid another coup, and abuse resources to 'buy off' the officer corps rather than follow clear funding rationales.

Figure 4: A history of external influences in Africa

COLONIAL MAP, 1914

SPANISH MOROCCO
FRENCH MOROCCO
TUNISIA
RIO DE ORO
ALGERIA
LIBYA
EGYPT
CAPE VERDE
GAMBIA
FRENCH WEST AFRICA
PORTUGUESE GUINEA
TOGOLAND
SIERRA LEONE
GOLD COAST
NIGERIA
LIBERIA
RIO MUNI
CAMEROON
FRENCH EQUATORIAL GUINEA
ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN
ERITREA
FRENCH SOMALILAND
BRITISH SOMALILAND
ETHIOPIA
ITALIAN SOMALILAND
UGANDA
KENYA
BELGIAN CONGO
BELGIAN EAST AFRICA
GERMAN EAST AFRICA
CABINDA
NYASALAND
ANGOLA
NORTHERN RHODESIA
SOUTHERN RHODESIA
MOZAMBIQUE
MADAGASCAR
WALVIS BAY
BECHUANALAND
SWAZILAND
GERMAN SOUTHWEST AFRICA
BASUTOLAND
SOUTH AFRICA

POSSESSION OF :
- Belgium
- France
- Germany
- Italy
- Portugal
- Spain
- United Kingdom
- Independent nations

PRINCIPAL NON-AFRICAN INTERVENTIONS AFTER DECOLONISATION DURING COLD WAR

LIBYA
EGYPT
CHAD
DRC
ANGOLA

MILITARY BASES OF EMERGING COUNTRIES IN AFRICA: PLANNED AND OPERATING

CHINA
INDIA
JAPAN
IRAN
CHINA
DJIBOUTI
GULF OF ADEN AND SOMALI BASIN
SOMALIA
TURKEY
SEYCHELLES
CHINA
ZIMBABWE
CHINA

UNITED KINGDOM
- 1956 EGYPT

BELGIUM
- 1964 CONGO/ZAIRE
- 1978 CONGO/ZAIRE
- 1991 CONGO/ZAIRE

FRANCE
- 1956 EGYPT
- 1965-1993 CHAD
- 1977-1978 CONGO/ZAIRE
- 1978 CONGO/ZAIRE
- 1986 CHAD

By Western nations
By Communist nations

UNITED STATES
- 1967 CONGO/ZAIRE
- 1978 CONGO/ZAIRE
- 1986 LIBYA
- 1991 CONGO/ZAIRE

CUBA
- 1975-1989 ANGOLA

Box 2: African military cooperation with the 'Global South'

African leaders no longer turn to Europe or the United States exclusively for military cooperation but also look East and West within the so-called 'Global South'. These new players share a lack of imperial or colonial history with African countries that enables them to articulate a 'Global South' discourse evoking unity, equality and solidarity.

Some states use cultural ties to forge military cooperation, such as shared language for Brazil or religion for *Turkey*. Since 2002, Turkish foreign policy has turned both East and South, including most notably support to UN missions in Africa with personnel, most notably to UNOCI, MONUC, UNMIL, UNMIS and UNAMID. Apart from allocating funds to restructure or reinforce armies and police forces, Ankara has also been organising bilateral visits of high-ranking military officials and welcoming more African students into Turkish military schools. Particular attention has been devoted to South Africa, Somalia and Sudan.

The Horn of Africa is of major interest to another key Middle East player, *Iran,* which has established bilateral links with Sudan, Eritrea and Djibouti as part of its anti-piracy activities in the region. Besides using usual official cooperation channels, Iran's presence in Africa spreads also through its proxy group, Hizbullah. Thanks to smuggling activities in countries as diverse as Somalia, Egypt or Kenya, the group has set up a robust network that seeks to counter Israeli interests in the region. As a major weapon producer, Iran has supplied African governments and militias indiscriminately.

Although France remains the most important weapons supplier in West Africa, currently the other major supplier across the continent is *China*, accounting for 25% of the total arms market in Africa and likely to rank first in small arms and light weapons. Nigeria is the first recipient of its arms trade. Building on 'mutual benefit' and 'win-win cooperation', Beijing adopts a pragmatic approach based on the principles of non-interference in domestic matters. But this growing presence has a flip side: between 800,000 and one million Chinese nationals now live in Africa, and cases of kidnapped workers in Nigeria and Sudan have exposed China's vulnerability. Beijing has thus opted for strengthening its bilateral military assistance to African countries, running training and assistance programmes for African militaries since it issued its 2006 Africa White Paper. China recently announced the establishment of military bases in the Seychelles and Djibouti, where American and French military bases are also located. With deployments in all UN missions in Africa but MINUSCA, Beijing is also the sixth-largest contributor to peacekeeping operations with approximately 11,000 military personnel sent since 2001. China also supports AU-own missions through military assistance funding.

Not in the same league as China in terms of personnel or financial contribution to UN missions, *Brazil* has nevertheless displayed increased engagement in Africa, with deployments in UNOCI, MONUSCO, UNMIL, UNMISS, UNISFA and MINURSO. Brazil, however, tends to have a symbolic presence in many UN missions while aiming at a leadership role in operations close to its particular foreign policy interests, particularly in Angola and Mozambique. This strategy originated from when Presi-

dent Ignacio Lula da Silva was first elected to office in 2003. Lula's 'pivot' to Africa was motivated by a sense of historical and moral responsibility *vis-à-vis* the Black Continent, dating back to the colonial past (Brazil today hosts one of the largest black populations worldwide, second only to Nigeria). Furthermore, Brazil is beginning to consider the South Atlantic as a new sphere of strategic interest, demonstrated *inter alia* by the recent acquisition of nuclear submarines to be deployed in the Atlantic and the arm supplies to such countries as Burkina Faso and Mauritania.

India also benefits from a positive image in Africa, dating back to its historical role in influencing anti-colonial leaders in Tanzania, Zambia, Ghana or Nigeria. There is also an important community of Indian descent of about 1.5 million in South Africa, accounting for about 3% of the country's population. Moreover, India has been the largest contributor to UN-mandated operations in Africa, with more than 30,000 personnel involved in 17 out of 22 missions since 1960; and, since its creation in 2005, the Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping (CUNPK) in Delhi has trained a hundred military officials from more than 20 African countries.

What for? – Types of conflict

Africa's wars have killed more than 7 million people and created about 19 million refugees since 1960 – not to mention the huge losses in terms of infrastructure and economic opportunities. In comparison to other continents, Africa is becoming less and less of an inter-state conflict continent, although a few have occurred. The typical conflict involving an African military force is an intra-state conflict, such as a civil war, rebellion, secession attempt, ethnic and/or religious strife or even a genocide (in Rwanda's case). The Ogaden war in 1976, the Katanga events in 1960, the Biafra conflict in 1967 and the Casamance struggles in Senegal since 1984 have all shown themselves to be localised conflicts that have not mutated into wars on a regional scale.

The most important *inter*-state conflicts took place in West Africa during the post-independence period, such as the 1973 Chad-Libya conflict or the 1993 Nigeria-Cameroon dispute over the Bakassi island claims. Water-related clashes have also been fairly common, such as the 1974 dispute between Mali and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) regarding the Agacher water well, or even the controversy between Senegal and Mauritania in May 1989. However dramatic such events may have been, independence battles have also indelibly left their mark, such as the 1975 conflict in Western Sahara where the oldest UN mission in Africa (MINURSO) has been deployed ever since. Overall, inter-state conflicts in Africa are much less frequent today than they once were – and even less violent. The Namibia-Botswana dispute over the Kasikili/Sedudu island, for instance, was dealt with peacefully. Settlement of litigious cases by the International Court of Justice has equally contributed to peaceful resolutions, including when the parties – as in the Chad-Libya controversy over the Aouzou Strip – were of comparable strength.

Figure 5: Armed conflicts involving African armies

1952-1970	1970-1980	1980-1990
☐ ALGERIA	☐ ✖ ANGOLA	☐ ANGOLA
⊠ BURUNDI	✖ CHAD	⊠ ☐ BURKINA FASO
⊠ CAMEROON	⊠ DRC	⊠ CAMEROON
✖ CHAD	⊠ EQUATORIAL GUINEA	✖ ☐ CHAD
▮▮ ▮▮ ⊠ ⊠ DRC	✖ ▮▮ ▯ ☐ ETHIOPIA	⊠ COMOROS
☐ ☐ ☐ EGYPT	▮▮ MADAGASCAR	✖▮▮▮▮▮▮ ▯ ☐ ETHIOPIA
⊠ ⊠ ☐ ☐ ETHIOPIA	▮▮ MOROCCO	⊠ GAMBIA
⊠ GABON	✖ MOZAMBIQUE	⊠ GHANA
⊠ GHANA	⊠ ☐ SOMALIA	⊠ KENYA
☐ MOROCCO	▮▮ ☐ SOUTH AFRICA	✖ LIBERIA
▮▮ ⊠ NIGERIA	✖ SUDAN	☐ LIBYA
☐ ☐ SOMALIA	☐ TANZANIA	▮▮ MOROCCO
▮▮ ☐ SOUTH AFRICA	⊠ ⊠ ☐ UGANDA	✖ MOZAMBIQUE
✖ SUDAN		☐ NIGERIA
		⊠ ☐ SOMALIA
		▮▮ ⊠ ☐ SOUTH AFRICA
		✖ SUDAN
		⊠ TOGO
		⊠ TUNISIA
		✖ ⊠ UGANDA

NATURE OF CONFLICTS

☐ Inter-state
▮▮ Separatist movements
✖ Civil war
▯ Non-state armed groups
⊠ Rebel movements.

Source for data: Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO).

1990-2000	2000-2010	2010-2016
✖ ⬓ **ALGERIA**	⬓ **ALGERIA**	⬓ **ALGERIA**
✖ **ANGOLA**	✖ **ANGOLA**	⬓ **CAMEROON**
✖ **BURUNDI**	✖ **BURUNDI**	⬓ **EGYPT**
☐ **CAMEROON**	✖ **CAR**	⊠ ⬓ **BURKINA-FASO**
⊠ **CAR**	✖ **CHAD**	⊠ **BURUNDI**
⊠ ⊠ **CHAD**	⊠ **CONGO**	✖ **CAR**
‖ **COMOROS**	✖ **CÔTE D'IVOIRE**	⊠ **CÔTE D'IVOIRE**
⊠ ⊠ **CONGO**	✖ ☐ **DRC**	⊠ **DRC**
⊠ ⊠ ☐ ☐ **DRC**	☐ **DJIBOUTI**	⬓ **KENYA**
⊠ **DJIBOUTI**	☐ ⬓ **ERITREA**	✖ **LIBYA**
⬓ **EGYPT**	⊠ ⬓ **ETHIOPIA**	‖ ⬓ ⊠ **MALI**
⊠ ☐ **ERITREA**	⊠ **GUINEA**	⬓ **NIGER**
☐ ‖ ⊠ ⊠ ⬓ **ETHIOPIA**	⊠ **LIBERIA**	⬓ **NIGERIA**
⊠ **GUINEA-BISSAU**	⊠ **MALI**	⬓ ✖ **SOMALIA**
⊠ **LESOTHO**	⬓ **MAURITANIA**	✖ **SOUTH SUDAN**
✖ ✖ **LIBERIA**	⊠ **NIGER**	‖ ⊠ **SUDAN**
‖ **MALI**	⊠ ⬓ **NIGERIA**	⬓ **TUNISIA**
✖ **MOZAMBIQUE**	‖ **SENEGAL**	⊠ **UGANDA**
‖ **NIGER**	✖ **SIERRA LEONE**	
☐ **NIGERIA**	✖ **SOMALIA**	
✖ **RWANDA**	✖ **SUDAN**	
‖ **SENEGAL**	⊠ **UGANDA**	
✖ **SIERRA LEONE**		
✖ ⊠ **SOMALIA**		
✖ **SUDAN**		
⊠ **TOGO**		
⊠ **UGANDA**		

NATURE OF CONFLICTS

☐ Inter-state

‖ Separatist movements

✖ Civil war

⬓ Non-state armed groups

⊠ Rebel movements.

But *intra*-state conflicts have been a constant feature in Africa. During the Cold War, the superpowers took sides with parties to the conflict; and, over the last decade, conflict patterns have further evolved in the direction of non-state armed groups and militias (such as Boko Haram, AQIM or the LRA) – often with a sectarian agenda – confronting one another or fighting against the official army. The security threats faced by African states are changing, and often exceed the scope of their capabilities and the training level of their forces, as exemplified by the operations by Islamist armed groups in northern Mali, whose army is clearly insufficiently prepared and equipped to oppose them.

Box 3: The armed struggle in Angola

Many of these armed struggles were closely connected, even intertwined, and have left their imprints on African armies today. Angola, for example, saw three separate, largely ethnically based independence movements, fighting not only the Portuguese army but also each other, as well as Angolans fighting alongside the imperial power. The MPLA, largely representing the mixed-race coastal elites, came precariously to power in Luanda mostly thanks to Cuban and Soviet support, and fought a 30 year-long civil war, primarily against the UNITA forces of Jonas Savimbi, themselves supported and supplied by the West. The military wing of the African National Congress had its training camps in Angola (not the more logical Zimbabwe, which supported the rival Pan-Africanist Congress), which thus led to South African incursions into Angola and fights between Cuban and South African troops, with members of the military wing of the ANC (also South Africans, of course) fighting alongside the MPLA. Finally, apartheid-era South Africa's war against Namibia's independence was fought partly by anti-MPLA Angolan mercenaries, as well as a number of other nationalities, aligned against the SWAPO liberation movement, itself allied with the ANC.

For various reasons – including long and often ill-defined borders, the difficulties in policing them, and the tendency by ethnic groups to straddle them - it is easy and common for African conflicts to spread into neighbouring countries. Liberia and Sierra Leone, Rwanda and Burundi, and indeed the DRC are all examples of initially localised conflicts spilling over into the adjacent region. These conflicts have also had a tendency to last comparatively longer than elsewhere; in part, this is due to the material availability of resources which can be easily traded for weapons – such as diamonds, drugs or timber – and in part to the low-cost availability of weapons (in late 1980s Mozambique, one million AK-47s were in private hands: each rifle was valued at the attractive price of 5 dollars).

But not all of Africa has been or is now equally affected by conflict. A closer look reveals that most conflicts took place in West and Central Africa. Southern Africa was more prone to conflict during the post-independence era up until the end of South Africa's apartheid system and Mozambique's civil war, both essentially linked to the process of decolonisation and the struggles that followed.

Consequently, African armies have been used most often in intra-state conflicts or regional peacekeeping operations. Therefore, the most recurrent military role applicable to them is 'dissuasive deployment', so to speak, rather than force projection proper. This can be partly explained by their lack of resources coupled with limited practice of conventional inter-state conflict.

Regional involvement in the settlement of disputes has been uneven over the decades. African-led interventions such as those of the African Union are quite rare. From the first operation, with 2,600 personnel deployed to Zaire in 1968, until the deployment of 850 Nigerians to Chad in 1979, pan-African forces performed relatively poorly. More recently, African armies have become increasingly engaged in peacekeeping, peacebuilding and post-conflict activities in a regional and multi-national context. However, their mandates have mostly encompassed non-coercive, stabilisation-related tasks rather than high-end peace-enforcement and combat ones.

Figure 6: Global Peace Index

Source for data: Vision of Humanity.

A recent and promising exception – and experience – is represented by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNTJF) assembled to fight against Boko Haram across Northern Nigeria and the Lake Chad region. The coalition, led by Nigeria, includes Chad, Niger, Cameroon and Benin. Setting it up has been a slow and complicated process, with Nigeria reluctant for some time to acknowledge that it needed help and Chad keen on gaining clout on Nigerian soil. Yet the adoption of a regional approach to counter the sect (responsible for approximately one third of all civilian killings across Africa in 2014) and the improvements made in terms of intelligence sharing and operational coordination have brought tangible results and may come to represent a precedent to build upon in the future.

III. THE BUSINESS OF POLITICS

Although created primarily for war, African armed forces have been repeatedly involved in politics too. This has taken different forms, ranging from the staging of military coups to 'self-demobilisation', from active to passive support for a political party, to the absorption of former civil war parties into their ranks. Just as African societies have undergone different types of political conflict, African military forces have too. In highly politicised environments, neutrality was and is hard to maintain for an institution nominally bound to the state only.

Coups and counter-coups

With an often superior (if not always unrivalled) capacity to exercise force, the military can at the same time uphold and contest a government's political authority. Post-colonial history has shown that African armed forces have often tried to disregard political authority whenever it played against their economic, political or strategic interests. Consequently, the potential militarisation of politics has remained a possible driver of instability, with wide-ranging implications for the way in which political power is regulated and restrained across Africa.

Starting with Egypt in 1952, Africa has seen 175 attempted coups over the last six decades, 75 of which were successful. 85% of African countries have therefore experienced at least one coup attempt in recent history. But there are exceptions. Countries like Senegal or Botswana have never experienced one; others, such as South Africa or Namibia, have experienced attempts but never saw a military regime actually seize power. Indeed, there seems to be a regional 'contagion' of coups: they are much more frequent in West Africa (averaging half of the African total), and virtually absent in Southern Africa.

Although a democratic consolidation of sorts can be observed since the 1990s, bouts of military interference (principally in the form of coups) have continued to resurface across Africa's political landscape. From the military overthrows in Mauritania (2008), Niger (2010) and Mali (2012), to the relatively recent failed ones in Burkina Faso (2015) and Burundi (2015), armed forces across the African continent continue to act as agents of destabilisation – albeit to varying degrees.

The reasons for coups are usually multifaceted. In Africa, however, they all point to the concentration of wealth within the state apparatus as a primary driver. Under conditions of economic scarcity, the state assumes the main responsibility for determining the allocation of resources and its capture becomes the key to political power. In a continent where patronage mechanisms are deeply ingrained in politics, conflicts may arise whenever there is a clash over access to state resources. When armed forces do carry out a *coup d'état*, however, they do so in difficult political and economic circumstances, and they are generally not better at governing than their civilian counterparts, including in terms of their capacity to build and maintain consensus over time.

Figure 7: Militarisation of politics

AFRICAN MILITARY COUPS SINCE 1952

Success
Failure

1952-1959 | 1960-1969 | 1970-1979 | 1980-1989 | 1990-1999 | 2000-2009 | 2010-2015

3
2
13
18
19
17
21
17
23
9
11
6
10
6

TOP 5

MAURITANIA *6 successes*
BURKINA FASO *6 successes*
GHANA *5 successes*
BENIN *5 successes*
NIGERIA *5 successes*

**MOST FAILED
COUP ATTEMPTS**
SUDAN *12 failures*
BURUNDI *8 failures*
TOGO *7 failures*
BENIN *6 failures*
GHANA *5 failures*

**THESE COUNTRIES
HAVE NEVER
EXPERIENCED
A SUCCESSFUL COUP**

MAURITANIA
SENEGAL
BURKINA FASO
GHANA
TOGO
BENIN
NIGERIA
ANGOLA
NAMIBIA
SOUTH AFRICA

SUDAN
BURUNDI
MALAWI
MOZAMBIQUE
BOTSWANA

Sources for data: *Africa Survey 2013* (Good Governance Africa); *The Guardian.*

Figure 8: Presidential coups by sub-region

Source for data: African Development Bank (2013)

That said, the degree of political meddling depends to a large extent on the socio-political environment. Whenever a government is evidently unable to deliver public goods and services and the institutionalised democratic structures are inadequate, militaries can take advantage of mounting popular grievances to overthrow the government, as was the case in Egypt (2013). But countries like Kenya, Tunisia and Senegal have enjoyed considerable political stability and, hence, comparatively sound civil-military relations.

Moreover, the distinction between *political* and *military* itself may not always be significant in certain contexts, in turn making the concept of civil-military relations one of limited usefulness. In some cases (e.g. Algeria or Egypt), in fact, the military has a disproportionate influence on state matters, while in others (e.g. Nigeria or Niger) a former military leader taking power does not necessarily entail that the military is running the country.

Figure 9: Governance performance

**TOP 10
BEST GOVERNANCE
PERFORMANCE**
**IBRAHIM INDEX OF AFRICAN
GOVERNANCE (2015)**

MAURITIUS ●
CAPE VERDE ●
BOTSWANA ●
SOUTH AFRICA ●
NAMIBIA ●
SEYCHELLES ●
GHANA ●
TUNISIA ●
SENEGAL ●
LESOTHO ●

▨ MILITARISED REGIME
▨ CIVIL REGIME

**HEAD OF STATE:
HOW CAME TO POWER**
● Elections
● Authoritarian transition
✦ Coup

. . . *30 other countries*

**TOP 10
WORST GOVERNANCE
PERFORMANCE**

ZIMBABWE ●
GUINEA BISSAU ✦
EQUATORIAL GUINEA ✦
DR CONGO ●
CHAD ✦
ERITREA ●
SUDAN ✦
CAR ✦
SOUTH SUDAN ●
SOMALIA ●

Scores 0-100, where 100=best   0   10   20   30   40   50   60   70   80

Sources for data: Mo Ibrahim Foundation; EUISS.

> **Box 4: Sierra Leone**
>
> After Sierra Leone gained its independence, the army was deliberately weakened and dominated by the civil power in two ways: 'ethnicisation' of recruitment and use of foreign military personnel from countries like Cuba, Guinea, Nigeria and Israel. In the 1990s alone, during the long civil war, the country experienced three different coups. The army was in such a catastrophic state that its personnel were often referred to as 'sobels': soldiers by day, rebels by night. Since they were unpaid, they behaved like outlaws to make a living. But when the British intervened in 2000, they introduced a new system: professional, regularly paid, dressed in standard uniforms, with recruitment reflecting the country's ethnic diversity, the armed forces are still supervised by foreigners, but this helps them focus on their new missions, like peacekeeping or, more recently, the campaign against Ebola. Their deployment on Sierra Leonean territory is also limited, as they are required to respond only to precise demands by the police, as stated in an *ad hoc* Memorandum. Nor can they carry weapons outside their barracks except for specific limited missions. This growing professionalisation, under the continued but decreasing oversight of the British, may help explain how Sierra Leone has remained democratic since 1996, with a transfer of power to the opposition taking place in 2007.

In certain circumstances, the idea that the military does not play a political role sounds as strange as it would have done in Europe until fairly recently. Sometimes – as in Tunisia in 2011 – the army may play a political role precisely by doing nothing. Likewise, the idea that the military serves the national interest and defends borders is often just misleading. Indeed, the army can be a potential actor sufficiently powerful to threaten the government's hold on power, or even force a head of state to step down while retaining a civilian regime (as was the case in Burkina Faso following the ousting of Compaoré in October 2015). Equally, the classic hierarchy and discipline of a military force can be seen as a threat to the hidden patrimonial and clan networks by which a country is actually governed. In such circumstances, a capable military is a very unattractive proposition, as was the case in Côte d'Ivoire under President Houphouët Boigny, who kept the army weak and subcontracted external defence to France.

While it may seem self-evident that any government would require a capable military, the need to ensure that the army does not become a political challenger means that many African leaders view the situation differently. Thus, it is common to find forces that are deliberately poorly trained, paid and equipped so as to undermine their ability to threaten political authority.

Conversely, there is almost always an independent, counter-balancing force, as has been historically the case with presidential guards. Primarily tasked with the security of the head of state, these elite military units tend to benefit not only from better training and equipment but also higher economic and social payoffs (official and unofficial). Their privileged status *vis-à-vis* peers in the regular army has often been a source of resentment,

exacerbated when recruitment is based on ethnic affiliation with the president (as was the case in CAR under President Bozizé).

Even if country comparisons are often flawed, the presence of *presidential guards* is a recurrent common denominator behind drivers of military coups. By virtue of the fact that they report directly to presidents, these 'praetorian' guards are detached from the usual military chain of command, thus creating disparities in terms of status and access to political patronage. As already mentioned, the violent confrontations opposing the *Red Berets* presidential guard to the pro-junta *Green Berets* during the 2012 coup in Mali is emblematic of the risks where military factions have conflicting political loyalties and ambitions. From as far back as Mobutu Sese Seko's rule in former Zaire, the implicit function of the presidential guard has been to act as a counterweight to the regular army, in part justified by the historical frequency of attempts by the military to forcibly remove an incumbent (usually an unelected one). Burkina Faso – a country that has been subject to recurrent military coups since its independence in 1960 (a total of four) – is a case in point: the logic behind the establishment of a presidential guard seemed justified as a means to protect the head of state from a dissenting military. This happened notably with Compaoré, who himself came to power as a result of a coup in 1987. His exasperation with a military with a track record of overthrowing previous governments prompted his determination to establish a presidential guard that could protect him against any possible aggression (and forced ousting) by the army.

Ironically, however, members of the presidential guard may also become coup perpetrators. This has actually happened whenever political dynamics shift or the president tries to dismiss commanding officers, as was the case for Mauritania in 2008. Although no clear conclusions can be drawn, power imbalances across military factions can be a source of instability, particularly when the livelihoods of specific cohorts are heavily dependent on rents derived from political patronage.

Following the ousting of Compaoré in October 2014, his presidential guard came under scrutiny and the transitional authorities set up a commission to decide its future. In response to allegations of interference with the transitional authorities – particularly their attempts to force the interim Prime Minister Zida to resign following his calls to reduce the size and pay of the 1,300-strong *Régiment de sécurité presidentielle* (RSP) – the commission recommended its dismantlement on 14 September 2015. Three days later, the RSP stormed the presidential palace and held hostage the interim President, Michel Kafondo, and several other ministers, including Zida. Shortly thereafter, Lieutenant-Colonel Mamadou Bamba announced on national television the imminent dissolution of the transitional Council for Democracy.

The developments prior to and following this infamous (and short-lived) coup attempt highlight the potential risks of jeopardising the interests of powerful military factions. The failed military coups last year in Gambia and Burundi are enlightening in this respect. In Banjul as well as Bujumbura, attempts to oust the head of state were led by high-ranking military officers that had been previously dismissed by Presidents Jammeh and Nkurunziza, respectively.

Partially related to all this are the recurrent attempts to extend presidential mandates (not an exclusively African phenomenon). In countries where citizens and armed forces alike become disgruntled with a President trying to cling on to power by changing the existing constitutional rules – as has been the case *inter alia* in Burkina Faso, Burundi, Congo-Brazzaville and the Democratic Republic of Congo – expected shifts in political power tend to prompt action by the military. Whether they come about to reject or support the incumbent's plans, the resulting clashes between opposing military factions remain a significant driving force behind future coups (and social unrest in general), particularly in countries where term limits exist but risk being abrogated.

Although pressure from regional and international players (through sanctions, suspension of development aid or even threat of intervention) is increasingly deterring or undermining attempts to overthrow incumbent governments, national and multilateral efforts to address the drivers of military coups remain insufficient for the task at hand. Although not a panacea, extending the longevity of security sector reform (SSR) programmes to allow national judiciaries to regulate the meddling of armed forces in the political process would be a first step to mitigate the destabilising consequences of highly politicised and divided militaries.

Fraught relationships

Any armed force, whether African or other, is intimately linked to its population, which it is supposed to protect, among which its soldiers are recruited and which pays the taxes that support its operation. The relationship is therefore always in place – but sometimes with a more positive aspect than in other cases.

Curiously, there is no direct correlation between military performance and civilian appreciation of the armed forces. Forces which have rarely seen combat, such as in Tunisia, tend to be seen very positively, whereas the very active Nigerian forces (which prevented the break-up of the country during the Biafra war) have a more mixed image. Where national political cultures have been strongly marked by the military as a cohesive national factor, their perception tends to be positive – as is the case in Algeria. High levels of corruption, low levels of education and lack of trust in non-military political figures (subnational authorities for instance) are all variables which play a role in the popular perception of the military. Indeed, the military may act as the 'last rampart' of trust from civilians in environments of mediocre governance, as Figures 9 and 10 show. However, a positive image does not necessarily imply a civilian desire for military rule. Across the continent, civilians disapprove of military government – thus questioning stereotypes whereby Africans prefer 'strongmen' to democratically elected leaders.

Figure 10: Level of popular trust towards the army and attitudes to military rule

HOW MUCH DO YOU TRUST THE ARMY ?	DO YOU APPROVE OF MILITARY RULE ?
SENEGAL	EGYPT
ALGERIA	MALI
NIGER	SUDAN
BURUNDI	TUNISIA
MALAWI	NIGER
TUNISIA	ALGERIA
EGYPT	TOGO
TANZANIA	MADAGASCAR
NAMIBIA	BURKINA FASO
BURKINA FASO	MEAN MILITARISED REGIME
CAPE VERDE	GUINEA
BOTSWANA	MOZAMBIQUE
ZAMBIA	SOUTH AFRICA
GHANA	MEAN
LESOTHO	TANZANIA
KENYA	NAMIBIA
MOZAMBIQUE	NIGERIA
MAURITIUS	CAMEROON
SOUTH AFRICA	LIBERIA
MEAN CIVILIAN REGIME	MEAN CIVILIAN REGIME
MEAN	ZIMBABWE
MEAN MILITARISED REGIME	LESOTHO
MALI	SENEGAL
SUDAN	MOROCCO
UGANDA	BENIN
SIERRA LEONE	BURUNDI
BENIN	SIERRA LEONE
CAMEROON	CÔTE D'IVOIRE
MADAGASCAR	CAPE VERDE
GUINEA	GHANA
ZIMBABWE	KENYA
NIGERIA	MALAWI
LIBERIA	UGANDA
MOROCCO	BOTSWANA
CÔTE D'IVOIRE	ZAMBIA
TOGO	MAURITIUS

KENYA Civil regime
SUDAN Militarised regime

Not at all (%)
Just a little (%)
Somewhat (%)
A lot (%)

Somewhat disapprove (%)
Somewhat approve (%)
Neither approve nor disapprove (%)

Source for data: AfroBarometer – R5 2011/2013.

Box 5: The influence of cultural traditions

African militaries inevitably reflect the dominant cultural traditions and mores of their societies, as all armies do. An interesting – if little known – example is the influence of beliefs in magic. All soldiers tend to be superstitious (and with good reason) but in parts of sub-Saharan Africa this extends to a widespread belief in the powers of witchcraft and sorcery. The spiritual world is not considered entirely separate from the physical one, and communication with dead ancestors is believed to be possible, as in other animist-influenced societies around the world. In Africa, these beliefs can have a genuine military significance. In the 1964 rebellion in the Congo, for example, the rebel *Simbas* made use of magical initiation rites and believed that, under certain circumstances, they were invulnerable to bullets. In this cultural context, well-armed and well-trained government forces disintegrated and ran off without a fight. Such beliefs continue to the present day. The *Mayi mayi* of the eastern DRC, who take their name from the Kiswahili word for water, believe that their troops, once anointed with magic water, will be invincible.

In part as a result of their resource constraints, African states have resorted to conscription to bolster their manpower needs. 30 out of 54 countries today have it – at least on paper, since there are significant problems with enforcement. Linked to civil registration and status, conscription is only technically possible where countries have accurate population records. By moving from universal conscription to selective and voluntary recruitment, African armies have progressively shifted towards elite, professional and smaller sets of forces. In other countries, such as Eritrea, conscription can take the shape of unlimited conscription, or even forced labour, thus potentially triggering a massive exodus.

To sum up, and to rectify widespread preconceptions and misconceptions:

- *Most African armies are proportionally smaller than their European counterparts and make do with less percentage of GDP*
- *China is today the most important weapons supplier to African military forces*
- *Most African conflicts are intra-state, not inter-state, ones*
- *Most coups and conflicts have tended to be concentrated in West Africa*
- *African populations appreciate the armed forces, but not military rule*

Figure 11: Conscription in Africa

- Conscription exists
- Selective conscription
- No conscription or not enforced

Source for data: 'Military service age and obligation', *World Factbook 2014*, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Washington.

IV. CURRENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES

Both external donors and African states want Africa's militaries to continue to develop, yet the resources to make this possible are often not currently available, and may not be available in the future. Some states such as Algeria and Angola have been able to use their natural resources to create militaries which are at least notionally effective, but it is clear that revenues which may fluctuate significantly from year to year are not a reliable basis for long-term planning.

It is therefore likely that African militaries will continue to vary considerably in terms of their competence and professional skills. For example, the generally good performance of the Chadian army in Mali has been much noticed. Yet this capability is the result of experience of almost continuous warfare in and around the country since independence. It would be perverse indeed to argue that African militaries should deliberately seek out conflict in order to become more capable. The problem is that donors have historically wanted the impossible: African militaries in countries and regions that are at peace, with defence budgets as small as possible, yet highly trained and ready to leap into action on request. The answer, insofar as there is one, is realistic training and frequent exercises, which – as already noted – have generally been difficult for African nations to afford, or for donors to provide properly.

Moreover, the current fashion is for multinational forces, which are of an order of magnitude more difficult to train, equip and deploy than national ones. Incidentally, this has proved a challenge even for the generally advanced and wealthy NATO countries. Nonetheless, Western policy in Africa is to create larger and more complex multinational forces. African countries have for long been troop contributors to UN peacekeeping operations, but they have seldom taken a leading role as first responders to crises. African-led missions in Mali (AFISMA) and in the Central African Republic (MISCA) point to instances where a regional economic community (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) acted as 'fire brigades' due to the sluggish international response. Moreover, the 'hybrid' missions in Darfur (UNAMID) and Somalia (AMISOM) shed light on the gradually improving capacity of African countries to contribute to stabilisation efforts.

While these interventions indicate a seemingly increasing supply of African-led responses to African crises, they also highlight the shortfalls of a project that was conceptualised at the inception of the AU – but which has taken over a decade to materialise. Indeed, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) was meant to become the guiding structure through which the AU and regional economic communities (RECs) would pool financial and military resources to anticipate, prevent and manage conflicts in the continent. But disparities in regional resources and the paucity of continent-wide funding have become major impediments to operationalising a purely African crisis-response mechanism.

Fit for purpose?

The African Standby Force (ASF) was directed by the protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU, which was signed in July 2002 and entered into force in December 2003. Since then, the ASF has made some conceptual progress but has experienced significant operational delays. Consisting of military, police and civilian components provided by the standby brigades of five different regions, the ASF is tasked not only with carrying out its rapid deployment capabilities (RDC) functions but also to conduct, observe and monitor peacekeeping missions.

The RDC is an integral part of the regional standby force brigades, which are to act as precursors to the deployment of larger missions. But resource and operational disparities will continue to undermine the ability to do so. Political differences and slow political decision-making (almost inevitable in coalition operations) are bound to impede rapid deployment, while dual commitments from some member states make it impossible to continue to deliver on resources pledged. Consequently, the ASF's voluntary contribution mechanism is somewhat reminiscent of the EU Battle Groups – which are currently operational but have yet to be deployed as a result of political stalemate and funding restrictions.

From 2008-2010, regional standby forces carried out their first joint training and capacity building cycle (AMANI AFRICA I). It was designed to evaluate the effectiveness of the ASF for an AU mandated peace support operation (PSO). At the end of 2013, an expert panel of the AU stated that the goal to test, evaluate and operationalise the RDC by 2012 was not met. At the time of writing, latest updates on the ASF issued in November 2015 announced that the ASF was to become operational sometime in early 2016 (the latest of several delays), after having carried out a second round of training exercises in South Africa to test whether it was capable of being deployed within 14 days. Both exercises were principally financed by the EU, through the African Peace Facility (APF).

Operational compatibility between regional standby brigades will determine the extent to which the ASF can be viably made operational. Funding remains a critical limiting factor and is largely dependent on the provision of funds from multilateral partners, particularly the EU. The AU will need one billion dollars to make the force fully operational and has already begun outreach efforts to secure funding. In March 2016, China donated five million US dollars' worth of non-lethal military equipment as part of efforts to boost West Africa's standby force operational capacity. Without the necessary financial resources, the operationalisation of the ASF will continue to face indeterminate delays, thereby deferring the long-awaited ability of African nations to act as first respondents to crises on the continent.

New threats, new responses?

It is not unfair to characterise both the APSA and the ASF as products of the 1990s, or, more precisely, of partially flawed (and largely Western) attempts to understand African crises of that decade and find appropriate solutions. There are real questions about

whether the philosophy behind the ASF – of rapidly deployable light multinational brigades – is necessarily appropriate to the security problems faced by Africa today. The absence of the ASF from the crises in Mali and the CAR was not questioned as it should have been, but it is not clear, in any case, how a force conceived along ASF guidelines could actually have helped in either situation. And in any event, the ASF concept as a whole is only viable if the Force itself is quickly replaced by another, from the UN or similar organisations. To manage crises involving actual combat against organisations like AQIM or Boko Haram, on the other hand, involves sophisticated technology, good intelligence and a mixture of fixed and rotary-wing airpower and highly-trained Special Forces. To manage crises like that in the CAR requires, above all, significant numbers of well-trained personnel for extended periods of time. None of these capabilities is self-evidently covered in the concepts for the ASF or the organisation of the Regional Brigades.

In other words, this raises the question of what kind of African armies are required to meet which new threats, and what kind of regional and international cooperation in this regard is needed. This goes along with the blurring of the distinction between external military and internal security issues.

To confront the rise of transnational and intra-state threats and conflicts, the AU has been promoting the idea of an African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises. However it is not operational yet and question marks remain, including about duplication with the ASF and national forces. Some argue that genuinely effective *ad hoc* regional joint forces (e.g. the MNTJF) or coordination structures (e.g. the G5 Sahel military partnership) might be the only ways to bring this idea into practical existence.

In this perspective, bilateral cooperation with external partners (European, American, but also Asian) is a central asset for African armies in order to develop the specific and quite sophisticated capabilities needed (training, mentoring, equipment as well as operational reactive cooperation when requested). International organisations or donors, including the EU, are also essential, provided they can go beyond the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) limitations on official development assistance (ODA). For instance, EUTM and EUCAP are focusing not only on rebuilding the Malian army but also on helping the army itself, the security forces and the judiciary to cope with international and transnational criminal networks.

For all the importance given to the ASF by donors and the AU, therefore, it is not surprising that African experts often wonder whether too much emphasis is being placed on it. Increasingly, African states see themselves needing not forces for stabilisation and 'peace' but rather forces capable of performing well in combat against a variety of new threats, usually internal or transnational. Where the national interests of specific countries are involved (as in the Nigerian-led coalition against Boko Haram), evidence suggests that such *ad hoc* coalitions can be formed relatively quickly, and are often effective.

V. FOOD FOR THOUGHT

So the risk is that African countries enter the third decade of the century with forces that are ill-adapted to meet their security challenges, while various donors (and African leaders themselves) may continue to regard the formation of European-style units, and an EU-style peace and security architecture, as priorities. It is already clear that for many African countries, the essential components of their military capability will be tied up in the ASF, leaving little scope for efforts to be deployed elsewhere.

Insofar as there is a way of preventing this, it probably lies less in the provision of more money or more training, but rather in a clear-sighted analysis of what the major African security problems of the next generation are likely to be. Two issues might usefully be studied further, and each might yield valuable insights and ideas for more relevant development of African military capabilities.

From defence to control?

The first is the distinction between the *defence* of territory and frontiers, and their *control*. Territorial defence is a concept that was only ever viable with mass conscript armies operating in a relatively small geographical area in Europe, and over a period of little more than one hundred years. Quite soon after the end of the Cold War, with the end of compulsory military service, the resources for territorial defence, even of small and densely populated countries, did not exist anymore. Yet it was precisely during this era that African militaries were raised and trained, by foreign experts for whom physical defence of territory and frontiers was what they themselves expected to be paramount in war.

There is a small but very important conceptual difference between defence of territory and control of territory, and a similar distinction with frontiers. Control of territory does not mean physical deployment of forces in every part of it. Rather, it means the strategic ability to ensure the monopoly of violence for the state, and to attack and destroy those who might seek to challenge it. Likewise, control of frontiers does not mean erecting physical barriers everywhere (as the Algerians have done on the Libyan border for instance) but rather the ability to control who enters your territory and under what circumstances. At one level, this means being able to stop armed groups crossing the frontiers, or ejecting them quickly if they do. At another level, though, it means surveillance, intelligence and a good police, customs and paramilitary capability against traffickers and illegal migrants. Again, it is not clear that African militaries, in their current configuration or any reasonably likely one, are optimised for these roles. Even European security apparatuses are struggling to cope with these challenges.

From territory to state?

The second issue lies in the increasingly international (or rather non-national) nature of African security problems. At one level this is just a cliché, of course, commonly accepted and theoretically included in security planning. But it is doubtful whether its full implications have been understood. Today's traffickers, for example, use very much the same routes from West Africa up to the Mediterranean that were used by their pre-colonial slave-trading predecessors. But if traffickers essentially just want to be able to pass through territories without hindrance, other groups want to capture and hold territory for themselves. This is increasingly happening along an arc extending from the Sinai in the East, out to the Atlantic Ocean. Armed radical groups, mostly (but not exclusively) of an Islamist persuasion, seek to acquire and hold physical territory. Their ideology scorns not only the frontiers set by former colonial powers, but also different visions of the state.

If we start from American historian Charles Tilly's whimsical but insightful comparison between state-making and organised crime, we can fear the beginnings of the creation of micro-states in some parts of Africa, using what we would describe as 'crime' to raise revenue, and what we would describe as militias or terrorist groups as armies. But they increasingly have the attributes of a state – territory, population and administration – and may indeed provide more effective administration than the notional state. Thus, it is possible that parts of Africa are in the process of being reconfigured, not from the outside and above, as was historically the practice, but from the inside and below. We may be seeing the rise of proto nation-states based on economic resources (including rent), ethnic identity and religious enthusiasm. The difficulty is that African military forces have often struggled to confront this kind of problem, and, with the slow and painful evolution of the ASF, they may become less able to do so.

From *ad hoc* to lasting?

This suggests two final ideas on which further reflection may be useful. First, the relatively formalised and rigid structures of the APSA may imply – wrongly – an expectation that conflict or the risk of conflict will arise in neatly delineated geographical areas. Just as a battle has been defined as 'a violent event that takes place at the junction of two or more maps', so crises in Africa tend to ignore sub-regional boundaries. Indeed, the main progenitors of such crises – transnational organised crime and extremist political groups – are quite uninterested in regional boundaries and, to some extent, in national ones as well. The system of *ad hoc* coalitions, such as the MNJTF against Boko Haram, may not only come to supplant the APSA geography in practice, but also become a better system for identifying threats and moving to counter them. Likewise, *ad hoc* coalitions of African and non-African troops are likely to continue to operate for some time.

Secondly, Africa faces significant security problems now. But these problems are not necessarily of the type foreseen in the concept of the ASF, with its discourse of ethnicity and 'genocide'. They are fearsomely complex, and not necessarily treatable through the

classic menus of preventative action, stabilisation, political settlement and security sector reform. It is hard to imagine what the political agenda for negotiation with AQIM would actually look like in the ASF framework, for example. From the identification of *ad hoc* coalitions of interested parties might flow in turn semi-permanent or even permanent force structures, designed to tackle collective problems that crossed – or even completely ignored – sub-regional boundaries.

Annexes

TABLE 1: OVERVIEW OF ARMIES' CHARACTERISTICS

Country	GDP 2014 ($)	Defence budget 2014 ($)	defence % GDP 2014	Capabilities	Army	Navy	Air
Belgium	*528,000,000,000*	*5,040,000,000*	*0.95%*	*30,700*	*11,300*	*1,500*	*6,000*
Portugal	*228,000,000,000*	*2,630,000,000*	*1.15%*	*34,600*	*17,900*	*9,850*	*6,850*
Algeria	228,000,000,000	12,000,000,000	5.26%	130,000	110,000	6,000	14,000
Angola	131,000,000,000	6,850,000,000	5.23%	107,000	100,000	1,000	6,000
Benin	9,240,000,000	86,000,000	0.93%	6,950	6,500	200	250
Botswana	16,300,000,000	346,000,000	2.12%	9,000	8,500	n.a.*	500
Burkina Faso	13,400,000,000	164,000,000	1.22%	11,200	6,400	n.a.	600
Burundi	3,040,000,000	61,000,000	2.01%	20,000	20,000	n.a.	n.a.
Cameroon	32,200,000,000	410,000,000	1.27%	14,200	12,500	1,300	400
Cape Verde	1,980,000,000	12,000,000	0.61%	1,200	1,000	100	100
CAR	1,730,000,000	72,000,000	4.16%	7,150	7,000	150	n.a.
Chad	15,800,000,000	273,000,000	1.73%	25,350	17-20,000 (restructuration)	n.a.	350
Côte d'Ivoire	16,700,000,000	812,000,000	4.86%	25,000	23,000	1,000	1,000
Djibouti	1,580,000,000	n.a.	0.00%	10,450	8,000	200	250
DRC	32,700,000,000	456,000,000	1.39%	134,250	103,000	6,700	2,550
Egypt	285,000,000,000	5,450,000,000	1.91%	438,500	310,000	18,500	30,000
Equatorial Guinea	15,400,000,000	n.a.	0.00%	1,320	1,100	120	100
Eritrea	38,600,000,000	78,000,000	0.20%	201,750	200,000	1,400	350
Ethiopia	49,900,000,000	375,000,000	0.75%	138,000	135,000	n.a.	3,000
Gabon	20,700,000,000	183,000,000	0.88%	4,700	3,200	500	1,000
Gambia	918,000,000	n.a.	0.00%	800	n.a.	70	n.a.
Ghana	35,500,000,000	277,000,000	0.78%	15,500	11,500	2,000	2,000
Guinea	6,770,000,000	n.a.	n.a.	9,700	8,500	400	800
Guinea Bissau	1,110,000,000	26,000,000	2.34%	4,450	4,000	350	100
Kenya	62,700,000,000	1,040,000,000	1.66%	24,120	20,000	1,600	2,500

Lesotho	2,460,000,000	54,000,000	2.20%	2,000	2,000	n.a.	110
Liberia	2,070,000,000	24,000,000	1.16%	2,050	2,000	50	n.a.
Libya	49,300,000,000	4,660,000,000	9.45%	7,000	7,000	n.a.	n.a.
Madagascar	11,200,000,000	74,000,000	0.66%	13,500	12,500	500	500
Malawi	4,410,000,000	42,000,000	0.95%	5,300	5,300	220	200
Mali	12,000,000,000	365,000,000	3.04%	4,000	4,000	n.a.	n.a.
Mauritania	4,290,000,000	149,000,000	3.47%	15,850	15,000	600	250
Mauritius	12,700,000,000	84,000,000	0.66%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Morocco	113,000,000,000	3,860,000,000	3.42%	195,800	175,000	7,800	13,000
Mozambique	16,600,000,000	35,000,000	0.21%	11,200	9,500	200	1,000
Namibia	12,000,000,000	410,000,000	3.42%	9,200	9,000	200	n.a.
Niger	8,290,000,000	32,600,000	0.39%	5,300	5,200	n.a.	100
Nigeria	594,000,000,000	2,250,000,000	0.38%	80,000	62,000	8,000	10,000
Republic of Congo	14,100,000,000	720,000,000	5.11%	10,000	8,000	800	1,200
Rwanda	8,000,000,000	81,000,000	1.01%	33,000	32,000	n.a.	1,000
Senegal	15,900,000,000	254,000,000	1.60%	13,600	11,900	950	750
Seychelles	1,420,000,000	12,000,000	0.85%	420	200	200	20
Sierra Leone	5,410,000,000	15,000,000	0.28%	10,500	10,500	n.a.	n.a.
Somalia	n.a.;	n.a.	n.a.	11,000	11,000	n.a.	n.a.
South Africa	341,000,000,000	4,010,000,000	1.18%	62,100	37,150	6,250	10,650
South Sudan	11,900,000,000	1,040,000,000	8.74%	185,000	185,000	n.a.	n.a.
Sudan	70,000,000,000	n.a.	0.00%	244,300	240,000	1,300	3,000
Tanzania	36,600,000,000	396,000,000	1.08%	27,000	23,000	1,000	3,000
Togo	4,840,000,000	89,000,000	1.84%	8,550	8,100	200	250
Tunisia	49,100,000,000	911,000,000	1.86%	35,800	5,000	4,800	4,000
Uganda	26,100,000,000	405,000,000	1.55%	45,000	45,000	n.a.	n.a.
Zambia	25,600,000,000	422,000,000	1.65%	15,100	13,500	1,600	n.a.
Zimbabwe	13,700,000,000	368,000,000	2.69%	29,000	25,000	4,000	n.a.

Sources for data: *Military Balance* (IISS, 2015); *SIPRI Yearbook 2014*
* n.a. = not available/not applicable

TABLE 2: MILITARISATION OF POLITICS

Country	HDI 2014 (UNDP, 2015)	rank HDI 2014 (UNDP, 2015)	Ibrahim Index of African Governance (/100) (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2015)	Link of head of state to the military (such as military training)
Algeria	0.736	83	52.9	Military training (Morocco)
Angola	0.532	149	40.8	Military training with MPLA guerrilla forces
Benin	0.480	166	58.8	No military training
Botswana	0.698	106	74.2	Military training (United Kingdom)
Burkina Faso	0.402	183	52.2	No military training
Burundi	0.400	184	45.8	Military training (guerilla)
Cameroon	0.512	153	45.9	No military training
Cape Verde	0.646	122	74.5	No military training
CAR	0.350	187	24.9	No military training for acting president but previous presidents, Michel Djotodia and François Bozizé, had military training.
Chad	0.392	185	32.8	Military training (Chad, France)
Côte d'Ivoire	0.462	172	48.3	No military training
Democratic Republic of the Congo	0.433	176	33.9	Military training (Tanzania), Commandant of Kadogos (child soldiers)
Djibouti	0.470	168	45.9	No military training, rose through ranks of the police
Egypt	0.690	108	51.3	Military training (Egypt, United Kingdom, United States)
Equatorial Guinea	0.587	138	35.5	Military training (Spain)
Eritrea	0.391	186	29.9	Military training (guerilla)
Ethiopia	0.442	174	48.6	No military training
Gabon	0.684	110	52.2	No military training
Gambia	0.441	175	50.5	Military training (Senegal, United States)
Ghana	0.579	140	67.3	No military training
Guinea	0.411	182	43.7	No military training
Guinea Bissau	0.420	178	35.7	No military training
Kenya	0.548	145	58.8	No military training

Lesotho	0.497	161	61.1	No military training
Liberia	0.430	177	50.7	No military training
Libya	0.724	94	35.5	n.a.*
Madagascar	0.510	154	49.1	No military training
Malawi	0.445	173	56.7	No military training
Mali	0.419	179	48.7	No military training
Mauritania	0.506	156	43	Military training (Morocco, Algeria)
Mauritius	0.777	63	79.9	No military training
Morocco	0.628	126	57.6	No military training
Mozambique	0.416	180	52.3	Military training (Tanzania)
Namibia	0.628	126	70.4	No military training
Niger	0.348	188	48.4	No military training
Nigeria	0.514	152	44.9	Military training (Nigeria)
Republic of Congo	0.591	136	42.8	Military training (Algeria, France)
Rwanda	0.483	163	60.7	Former Commander of the RPF forces during Rwandan civil war
Senegal	0.466	170	62.4	No military training
Seychelles	0.772	64	70.3	n.a.
Sierra Leone	0.413	181	51	No military training
Somalia	..	..	8.5	No military training
South Africa	0.666	116	73	No military training but ANC involvement
South Sudan	0.467	169	19.9	Military training (Sudan, United States)
Sudan	0.479	167	28.3	Military training (Egypt)
Tanzania	0.521	151	56.7	No military training
Togo	0.484	162	48.4	No military training
Tunisia	0.721	96	66.9	No military training
Uganda	0.483	163	54.6	Military training with guerilla (Mozambique)
Zambia	0.586	139	59.5	Military training (Zambia)
Zimbabwe	0.509	155	40.4	Military training (guerilla)

TABLE 3: AFRICAN MILITARY COUPS SINCE 1952

NB: A military *coup d'état*, for the purposes of this annex, is defined as a forceful seizure of executive authority and office by a dissident/opposition faction with the support/impetus of military officers.

Date	Country	Outcome	Date	Country	Outcome
Jul-52	Egypt	Success	Oct-69	Somalia	Success
Nov-58	Sudan	Success	Dec-69	Benin	Success
Mar-59	Sudan	Failure	Mar-70	Sudan	Failure
May-59	Sudan	Failure	Aug-70	Togo	Failure
Nov-59	Sudan	Failure	Jan-71	Uganda	Success
Sep-60	Congo (DRC)	Success	Jul-71	Morocco	Failure
Dec-60	Ethiopia	Failure	Jul-71	Sudan	Failure
Aug-62	Ghana	Failure	Jan-72	Ghana	Success
Jan-63	Togo	Success	Feb-72	Benin	Failure
Oct-63	Benin	Success	Aug-72	Morocco	Failure
Jan-64	Tanzania	Failure	Oct-72	Benin	Success
Feb-64	Gabon	Failure	Jul-73	Rwanda	Success
Jun-65	Algeria	Success	Mar-74	Uganda	Failure
Oct-65	Burundi	Failure	Sep-74	Ethiopia	Success
Nov-65	Congo (DRC)	Success	Nov-74	CAR	Failure
Dec-65	Benin	Success	Nov-74	Ethiopia	Success
Jan-66	Burkina-Faso	Success	Dec-74	Madagascar	Failure
Jan-66	CAR	Success	Apr-75	Chad	Success
Feb-66	Ghana	Success	Jul-75	Nigeria	Success
Jul-66	Burundi	Failure	Sep-75	Sudan	Failure
Jul-66	Nigeria	Success	Sep-75	Uganda	Failure
Nov-66	Togo	Failure	Jul-76	Sudan	Failure
Nov-66	Burundi	Success	Jul-76	Nigeria	Success
Dec-66	Sudan	Failure	Nov-76	Burundi	Success
Jan-67	Togo	Success	Jan-77	Benin	Failure
Apr-67	Ghana	Failure	Feb-77	Ethiopia	Failure
Dec-67	Algeria	Failure	Feb-77	Sudan	Failure
Dec-67	Benin	Success	Feb-77	Ethiopia	Success
Nov-68	Mali	Success	May-77	Algeria	Failure
Mar-69	Equatorial Guinea	Failure	May-77	Ghana	Failure
Apr-69	CAR	Failure	Feb-78	Mali	Failure
May-69	Sudan	Success	Jul-78	Ghana	Success
Aug-69	Mali	Failure	Jul-78	Mauritania	Success
Sep-69	Libya	Success	Apr-79	Mauritania	Success

Date	Country	Outcome	Date	Country	Outcome
May-79	Ghana	Failure	Mar-88	Benin	Failure
Jun-79	Ghana	Success	Oct-88	Zambia	Failure
Aug-79	Equatorial Guinea	Success	May-89	Ethiopia	Failure
Sep-79	CAR	Success	Jun-89	Sudan	Success
Jan-80	Mauritania	Success	Jul-89	Madagascar	Failure
Apr-80	Liberia	Success	Apr-90	Nigeria	Success
May-80	Uganda	Success	May-90	Madagascar	Failure
Jun-80	Tanzania	Failure	Jun-90	Zambia	Failure
Oct-80	Zambia	Failure	Sep-90	Sudan	Failure
Nov-80	Burkina-Faso	Success	Nov-90	Mauritania	Failure
Nov-80	Guinea Bissau	Success	Jan-91	Djibouti	Failure
Mar-81	Mauritania	Failure	May-91	Lesotho	Success
Apr-81	Equatorial Guinea	Failure	Jul-91	Mali	Failure
Jul-81	Gambia	Failure	Aug-91	Togo	Failure
Sep-81	CAR	Success	Oct-91	Togo	Failure
Nov-81	Seychelles	Failure	Nov-91	Togo	Failure
Feb-82	Mauritania	Failure	Dec-91	Togo	Failure
Aug-82	Kenya	Failure	Jan-92	Algeria	Success
Aug-82	Seychelles	Failure	Mar-92	Burundi	Failure
Nov-82	Burkina-Faso	Success	Apr-92	Sierra Leone	Success
Mar-83	CAR	Failure	May-92	Benin	Failure
May-83	Equatorial Guinea	Failure	Jul-92	Madagascar	Failure
Aug-83	Burkina-Faso	Success	Jul-93	Burundi	Failure
Dec-83	Nigeria	Success	Oct-93	Libya	Failure
Apr-84	Cameroon	Failure	Apr-94	Burundi	Failure
Apr-84	Cameroon	Failure	Jul-94	Gambia	Success
Jun-84	Swaziland	Failure	Aug-94	Lesotho	Failure
Dec-84	Mauritania	Success	Sep-94	Ghana	Failure
Apr-85	Sudan	Success	Sep-94	Ghana	Success
Jul-85	Uganda	Success	Nov-94	Gambia	Failure
Sep-85	Sudan	Failure	Jan-95	Gambia	Failure
Jan-86	Lesotho	Success	Nov-95	Benin	Failure
Jul-86	Equatorial Guinea	Failure	Jul-96	Burundi	Success
Nov-86	Togo	Failure	Nov-96	CAR	Failure
Sep-87	Burundi	Success	Nov-95	Benin	Failure
Nov-87	Burkina-Faso	Success	Jul-96	Burundi	Success
Nov-87	Tunisia	Success	Nov-96	CAR	Failure

Date	Country	Outcome	Date	Country	Outcome
Oct-97	Zambia	Failure	Nov-10	Madagascar	Failure
May-99	Guinea Bissau	Success	Feb-11	Congo (DRC)	Failure
Dec-99	Côte d'Ivoire	Success	Mar-12	Mali	Success
Dec-00	Djibouti	Failure	Apr-12	Mali	Failure
Apr-01	Burundi	Failure	Apr-12	Guinea Bissau	Success
Jul-01	Burundi	Failure	Mar-13	Benin	Failure
Dec-01	Guinea Bissau	Failure	Mar-13	CAR	Success
Jun-03	Mauritania	Failure	Jul-13	Egypt	Success
Sep-03	Guinea Bissau	Success	Dec-13	South Sudan	Failure
Mar-04	Congo (DRC)	Failure	Aug-14	Lesotho	Failure
Jun-04	Congo (DRC)	Failure	Nov-14	Burkina-Faso	Success
Feb-05	Togo	Success	Dec-14	Gambia	Failure
Aug-05	Mauritania	Success	May-15	Burundi	Failure
May-08	Sudan	Failure	Jun-15	Lesotho	Failure
Aug-08	Mauritania	Success	Sep-15	Burkina-Faso	Failure
Nov-08	Guinea Bissau	Failure	Nov-14	Burkina-Faso	Success
Dec-08	Guinea	Success	Dec-14	Gambia	Failure
Feb-09	Equatorial Guinea	Failure	May-15	Burundi	Failure
Mar-09	Madagascar	Success	Jun-15	Lesotho	Failure
Feb-10	Niger	Success	Sep-15	Burkina-Faso	Failure

Sources for data: Good Governance Africa, *Africa Survey 2013;* EUISS

TABLE 4: THE ARMY AND THE PEOPLE - LEVELS OF TRUST IN THE ARMY

Data indicating respondents' responses to question on how much they trust the army in a survey conducted by Afrobarometer

Country	Not at all (%)	Just a little (%)	Somewhat (%)	A lot (%)
Algeria	2.8	7.8	37.6	51.8
Benin	12.1	28.2	28.4	31.4
Botswana	8.7	16.3	26.6	48.4
Burkina Faso	9.1	14.7	23.6	52.6
Burundi	3.9	8.8	33.2	54.1
Cameroon	18.7	21.6	26.1	33.5
Cape Verde	11.5	13.3	40.2	34.9
Côte d'Ivoire	24	30.7	24.1	21.2
Egypt	5.9	9.6	17.9	66.6
Ghana	10.6	16.5	27.1	45.8
Guinea	21.9	21.1	17.2	39.8
Kenya	9.1	18.9	27.2	44.8
Lesotho	19.2	8.6	15.3	56.8
Liberia	20.6	30.3	21.4	27.8
Madagascar	16.3	25.7	45.6	12.3
Malawi	5.9	8.4	15.9	69.8
Mali	15.4	16.1	16.7	51.8
Mauritius	7	22.3	47	23.7
Morocco	23.9	28.1	23.8	24.2
Mozambique	13.6	15.3	19.7	51.5
Namibia	7.1	16.3	27.3	49.4
Niger	5.3	6.6	16.4	71.8
Nigeria	19.1	31.4	33.8	15.6
Senegal	3.2	4	9.8	83
Sierra Leone	15.2	20.8	28.2	35.8
South Africa	9.7	20.7	36.5	33.1
Sudan	14.6	17.8	27.1	40.5
Swaziland	21	22.1	26.6	30.2
Tanzania	4.3	12.9	31.2	51.6
Togo	35.8	19.5	21.2	23.5
Tunisia	7.4	7	25.1	60.5
Uganda	9.9	22.7	28.3	39
Zambia	8.4	16.8	22.2	52.6
Zimbabwe	19.6	24.6	30.3	25.5
MEAN	12.7	17.6	26.4	43.1
civil countries	13	17.3	25.3	44.3
military countries	12.25	18.1	28.1	41.4

Source for data: AfroBarometer - R5 2011/2013

TABLE 5: THE ARMY AND THE PEOPLE – ATTITUDES TO MILITARY RULE

Data indicating respondents' responses to question on how they would react if the army seized power in a survey conducted by Afrobarometer

Country	Somewhat disapprove (%)	Neither approve nor disapprove (%)	Somewhat approve (%)
Algeria	53.7	26.3	19.9
Benin	81.4	7.9	10.8
Botswana	91.2	1.1	7.7
Burkina Faso	65.8	8.5	25.8
Burundi	83.8	4.3	11.9
Cameroon	79.8	4.1	16.1
Cape Verde	84.6	5.7	9.7
Côte d'Ivoire	85.5	2.6	11.8
Egypt	35.2	11.5	53.4
Ghana	86.6	2.7	10.7
Guinea	71.9	5.5	22.5
Kenya	85.8	4.8	9.3
Lesotho	84.1	1.1	14.8
Liberia	81.3	1.4	17.3
Madagascar	58.9	17.4	23.7
Malawi	87.7	2.1	10.2
Mali	57.1	5.8	37.1
Mauritius	97.6	1.1	1.3
Morocco	78.3	13.8	7.9
Mozambique	70.1	10.3	19.5
Namibia	78.1	6.8	15.1
Niger	56.9	10.1	32.9
Nigeria	77.9	7.8	14.3
Senegal	83.1	3.5	13.4
Sierra Leone	82.8	7.8	9.4
South Africa	71.9	12.4	15.7
Sudan	55.5	9.9	34.7
Tanzania	79.5	1.7	18.7
Togo	64.4	5.2	30.5
Tunisia	58.9	6.2	35
Uganda	89.8	1.6	8.5
Zambia	96.4	0.7	3
Zimbabwe	80.4	5.4	14.3
MEAN	77.4	6.1	16.5
civil countries	79.9	4.5	15.5
military countries	69.8	9.4	20.8

Source for data: AfroBarometer - R5 2011/2013

TABLE 6: DATES WHEN COUNTRIES GAINED INDEPENDENCE
AND DATES OF SECESSIONIST ATTEMPTS

Countries	Gained independence	Secessionist attempts and claims
Algeria	1962	2001 (Kabylia)
Angola	1975	1975 (Cabinda)
Benin	1960	
Botswana	1966	
Burkina Faso	1960	
Burundi	1962	1972 (Martyazo)
Cameroon	1960	1995 (Southern Cameroon); 2006 (Ambazonia)
Cape Verde	1975	
CAR	1960	2013 (Northern part)
Chad	1960	
Côte d'Ivoire	1960	
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1960	1960 (Katanga); 1960 (South Kasai); 2003-2009 (Kivu)
Djibouti	1977	
Egypt	1922	
Equatorial Guinea	1968	1998 (Bioko Island)
Eritrea	1993	
Ethiopia	980 b.J.C;	1993 (Oromia); 1993 (Eritrea), 1984 (Ogaden)
Gabon	1960	
Gambia	1965	
Ghana	1957	
Guinea	1958	
Guinea Bissau	1973	
Kenya	1963	1998 (Mombassa Republic)
Lesotho	1966	
Liberia	1847	
Libya	1951	2012 (Benghazi)
Madagascar	1960	
Malawi	1964	2014 (North Malawi)
Mali	1960	1963, 1990, 2006, 2012 (Azawad)
Mauritania	1960	
Mauritius	1968	
Morocco	1956	1975 (Western Sahara)
Mozambique	1975	
Namibia	1990	1994-1999 (Caprivi)
Niger	1960	

Nigeria	1960	1967-1970 (Biafra); 1999 (Biafra); since 2003 (Boko Haram insurgency); 2006 (Bakassi)
Republic of Congo	1960	1969 (Kongo Kingdom)
Rwanda	1962	
Senegal	1960	Since 1982 (Casamance)
Seychelles	1976	
Sierra Leone	1961	
Somalia	1960	1991 (Somaliland); 1998 (Puntland)
South Africa	1910	1977 (Bophuthatswana); 1981 (Ciskei); 1976 (Transkei); 1979 (Venda)
South Sudan	2011	
Sudan	1956	Since 2003 (Darfur); 2005 (South Kordfan, Blue Nile) 2006 (Eastern Sudan); 2011 (South Sudan); 2011 (Jubaland)
Tanzania	1961	1959 (Sultanate of M'Simbati); 1964 (Zanzibar)
Togo	1960	
Tunisia	1956	
Uganda	1962	1963 (Kingdom of Rwenzururu)
Zambia	1964	2011-2013 (Barotseland)
Zimbabwe	1980	2010 (Matabeleland)

TABLE 7: MAJOR ARMED CONFLICTS INVOLVING AFRICAN ARMIES

Date	State(s)	Opposing force
1963	Algeria	Morocco
1991	Algeria	Takfir wa'l Hijra
1992-1997	Algeria	Islamic Salvation Army (AIS)
1992-2007	Algeria	MIA
1998-2003	Algeria	GIA, AQIM (1999)
1999-2009	Algeria	GSPC
2004-2008	Algeria	AQIM
1991	Angola	FLEC–R
2002	Angola	FLEC–FAC, FLEC–R
2004	Angola	FLEC–FAC
2007	Angola	FLEC–FAC
2009	Angola	FLEC–FAC
1975-1979	Angola	FNLA, UNITA, South Africa
1990-1995	Angola	UNITA
1994-1988	Angola	FLEC–FAC
1996-1998	Angola	FLEC–FAC, FLEC–R
1998-2002	Angola	UNITA
1975-1990	Angola (supported by Cuba, SWAPO)	UNITA, South Africa
1985	Burkina Faso	Mali
1987	Burkina Faso	Popular Front
1965	Burundi	Military faction (forces loyal to Gervais Nyangoma)
1997	Burundi	Frolina
1991-1992	Burundi	Palipehutu
1994-2003	Burundi	CNDD, CNDD–FDD
1997-2006, 2008	Burundi	Palipehutu–FNL
1984	Cameroon	Military faction (forces of Ibrahim Saleh)
1960-1961	Cameroon	UPC
1996	Cameroon, Nigeria	Nigeria
2001	Central African Republic	Military faction (forces of André Kolingba)
2002	Central African Republic	Forces of François Bozize
2006	Central African Republic	UFDR
2009	Central African Republic	CPJP
1996 - 1997	Central African Republic	Military faction (forces of Cyriac Souke)
2004-2007	Central African Republic (supported by Chad)	UFDR, APRD, CPJP, MLCJ

2012-2013	Central African Republic (supported by France, Belgium, United Kingdom, Morocco)	Anti-balaka
2012-2013	Central African Republic (supported by South African FOMAC (Chad, Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon)	Seleka (UFDR, CPSK, CPJP, FDPC)
1987	Chad	CDR
1991	Chad	MDD, Military faction (forces of Maldoum Bada Abbas)
1994	Chad	CNR, CSNPD, FNT
2008	Chad	AN
1966-1970	Chad	Frolinat
1971-1972	Chad	First Liberation Army, Second Liberation Army
1976-1982	Chad	FAN, FAP, FAT
1983-1986	Chad	GUNT
1989-1990	Chad	Islamic Legion, Revolutionary Forces of 1 April, MO-SANAT, MPS
1992, 1993	Chad	CNR, CSNPD, FNT, MDD
1997-1998	Chad	FARF, MDD
1999-2002	Chad	MDJT
2005-2006-2007	Chad	RAFD, FUCD, UFDD
1983	Chad, Nigeria	Nigeria
1989	Comoros	Presidential guard
1997	Comoros	MPA/Republic of Anjouan
1997	Congo	Cobras, Cocoyes
2002	Congo	Ntsiloulous
1993-1994	Congo	Cobras, Ninjas
1998, 1999	Congo	Cocoyes, Ninjas, Ntsiloulous
2002	Cote D'Ivoire	MJP, MPCI, MPIGO
2003	Cote D'Ivoire	MJP, MPIGO
2004	Cote D'Ivoire	FN
2010-2011	Cote d'Ivoire	RPI, Forces nouvelles (FN), Force Licorne (France)
1996-1998	Democratic Republic of Congo	Rwanda, Uganda
2012-2013	Democratic Republic of Congo	M23 rebellion
1998-2003	Democratic Republic of Congo (supported by Angola, Chad, Namibia, Zimbabwe)	MLC, RCD, RCD–ML, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe
1967	Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)	Opposition militias
1998	Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)	MLC, RCD

1960-1962	Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)	State of Katanga
1960-1962	Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)	Independent Mining State of South Kasai
1964-1965	Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)	CNL
1977-1978	Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)	FLNC
1996-1997	Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)	AFDL
1999-2001	Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)	MLC, RCD, RCD–ML
2004-2009	Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)	CNDP
2007-2008	Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)	BDK
2008	Djibouti	Eritrea
1991-1994, 1999	Djibouti	FRUD
1956	Egypt	France, Israel, United Kingdom
1952-1953	Egypt	United Kingdom
1993-1998	Egypt	al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya
1967	Egypt, Jordan, Syria	Israel
1979	Equatorial Guinea	Military faction (forces of Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo)
1997, 1999, 2003	Eritrea	EIJM – AS
1998-2000	Eritrea	Ethiopia
1960	Ethiopia	Military faction (forces of Mengistu Neway)
1976	Ethiopia	EPRP, TPLF
1977	Ethiopia	EDU, EPRP
1978	Ethiopia	EDU, TPLF
1996	Ethiopia	ARDUF
1964-1974	Ethiopia	ELF, EPLF, TPLF
1975-1976	Ethiopia	ALF
1976-1983	Ethiopia	WSLF
1977-2008	Ethiopia	OLF
1979-1982, 1988	Ethiopia	TPLF
1981-1991	Ethiopia	EPLF

1983-1987	Ethiopia	EPDM, EPRP, TPLF
1989-1991	Ethiopia	ALF
1990-1991	Ethiopia	EPRDF, 1989 Military faction (forces of Amsha Desta and Merid Negusie)
1994-2008	Ethiopia	ONLF
1995-1999	Ethiopia	al-Itahad al-Islami
1960, 1964, 1973, 1983, 1987	Ethiopia, Somalia	Somalia
1964	Gabon	Military faction (forces loyal to Léon M'Ba)
1981	Gambia	NRC
1966	Ghana	NLC
1981	Ghana	Military faction (forces of Jerry John Rawlings)
1983	Ghana	Military faction (forces of Ekow Dennis and Edward Adjei-Ampofo)
2000-2001	Guinea	RFDG
1962-1974	Guinea-Bissau	Portugal
1998-1999	Guinea-Bissau	Military Junta for the Consolidation of Democracy, Peace and Justice
1982	Kenya	Military faction (forces of Hezekiah Ochuka)
1998	Lesotho	Military faction
1980	Liberia	Military faction (forces of Samuel Doe)
1989-1995	Liberia	NPFL, INPFL
2000-2003	Liberia	LURD, MODEL
1987	Libya	Chad
2011	Libya	NTC (National Transitional Council), international coalition (NATO - France, United Kingdom, United States, Turkey, Canada, Belgium, Italy)
2014-ongoing	Libya	Libyan parliament, Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries, ISIL
1971	Madagascar	Monima
1990	Mali	MPA
1994	Mali	FIAA
2007-2008	Mali	ATNM
2011, 2012	Mali	MNLA, AQIM, MUJAO, Ansar Dine
2012-2015	Mali	MNLA, AQIM, MOJWA, Ansar Dine, Ansar al-Sharia, Al-Mourabitoun, Boko Haram, Macina Liberation Front
1975-1978	Mauritania	Polisario
2010-2011	Mauritania	AQIM, Armed Islamic Group (GIA), Movement for Oneness and Jihad (MUJAO)
1971	Morocco	Military faction (forces of Mohamed Madbouh)

1975-1989	Morocco	Polisario
1965-1975	Mozambique	Portugal
1977-1992	Mozambique	Renamo
1966-1989	Namibia	South Africa, PLAN
1994	Niger	CRA
1996	Niger	FDR
1997	Niger	FARS
1997	Niger	UFRA
1991-1992	Niger	FLAA
2007-2008	Niger	MNJ
1966	Nigeria	Military faction (forces of Patrick Nzeogwu)
2004	Nigeria	Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa
2004	Nigeria	NDPVF
1967-1970	Nigeria	Republic of Biafra
1990-1994	Rwanda	FPR
1997-2002	Rwanda	FDLR
1990-2003	Senegal	MFDC
2000	Sierra Leone	RUF, WSB
1991-1996	Sierra Leone	RUF
1997-1999	Sierra Leone	AFRC, Kamajors, RUF
1978	Somalia	Military faction (forces of Abdulaahi Yusuf)
1982	Somalia	SSDF
2002	Somalia	SRRC
1983-1984	Somalia	SNM, SSDF
1986-1988	Somalia	SNM
1989-1991	Somalia	SNM, SPM, SSDF, USC, USC/SNA
1992-1996	Somalia	USC/SNA
2001-2002	Somalia	SRRC
2009-present	Somalia	Al-Shabaab, Hizbul Islam
2006-2009	Somalia (supported by Ethiopia, AU)	UIC, OLF, ARS, Al-Shabaab, Ras Kamboni Brigades, Jabhatul Islamiya, Muaskar Anole
1966-1988	South Africa	SWAPO, Angola
1981-1988	South Africa	ANC
2013-ongoing	South Sudan (supported by Uganda)	SPLM-IO, SSLM, Nuer White Army
1971	Sudan	Sudanese Communist Party
1976	Sudan	Islamic Charter Front
1984	Sudan	SPLM/A
2005	Sudan	SLM/A
2006	Sudan	NRF, SLM/A, SLM/A – MM

2007	Sudan	JEM, SLM/A - Unity
2008	Sudan	JEM, SLM/A, SLM/A–Unity
1963-1972	Sudan	Anya Nya Movement
1983-present	Sudan	Various rebel groups (SPLM/A)
1985-2002	Sudan	SPLM/A
2003-2004	Sudan	JEM, SLM/A, SPLM/A
2011-2012	Sudan	Republic of South Sudan
1978-1979	Tanzania, Uganda	Uganda
1986	Togo	MTD
1991	Togo	Military faction (forces loyal to Gnassingbe Eyadema)
1961	Tunisia	France
1980	Tunisia	Résistance Armée Tunisienne
1971	Uganda	Military faction (forces of Idi Amin)
1972	Uganda	Kikosi Maalum
1974	Uganda	Military faction (forces of Charles Arube)
1978	Uganda	Military faction (Mbarara-based troops)
1979	Uganda	Fronasa, Kikosi Maalum, UNLA
1982	Uganda	NRA, UFM, UNRF
1983	Uganda	NRA, UNRF
1986	Uganda	HSM, NRA, UPDA
1987	Uganda	HSM, UPA
1988	Uganda	Lord's Army, LRA UPA
1992	Uganda	UPA
1980-1981	Uganda	FUNA, NRA, UNRF
1984-1985	Uganda	NRA
1989-1991	Uganda	LRA, UPA
1994-1995, 2003-2006	Uganda	LRA
1996-2007	Uganda	ADF, LRA, WNBF

Sources for data: Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO); EUISS

TABLE 8: GLOBAL PEACE INDEX SCORES

Country	2014	Country	2014
Algeria	2.131	Libya	2.819
Angola	2.02	Madagascar	1.911
Benin	1.958	Malawi	1.814
Botswana	1.597	Mali	2.31
Burkina Faso	1.994	Mauritania	2.262
Burundi	2.323	Mauritius	1.503
Cameroon	2.349	Morocco	2.002
CAR	3.332	Mozambique	1.976
Chad	2.429	Namibia	1.784
Côte d'Ivoire	2.133	Niger	2.32
Democratic Republic of the Congo	3.085	Nigeria	2.91
		Rwanda	2.42
Djibouti	2.113	Senegal	1.805
Egypt	2.382	Sierra Leone	1.864
Equatorial Guinea	1.987	Somalia	3.307
Eritrea	2.309	South Africa	2.376
Ethiopia	2.234	South Sudan	3.383
Gabon	1.904	Sudan	3.295
Ghana	1.84	Tanzania	1.903
Guinea	2.214	Togo	1.944
Guinea Bissau	2.235	Tunisia	1.952
Kenya	2.342	Uganda	2.179
Lesotho	1.891	Zambia	1.846
Liberia	1.963	Zimbabwe	2.294

NB: Figures indicate scores out of 5

Source for data: *Vision of Humanity*

TABLE 9: PEACE MISSIONS IN AFRICA

European Union (EU)				African Union (AU) and African regional organisations				United Nations (UN)			
Operations	Country	Personnel (end of 2015)	Since	Operations (led and authorised)	Country	Personnel (authorised)	Since	Operations	Country	Personnel (June 2015)	Since
EUNAVFOR Atalanta	Somalia (Horn of Africa)	674	2008	AMISOM	Somalia	22,100	2007	MINURSO	Morocco/Western Sahara	210	1991
EUTM Somalia	Somalia (Horn of Africa)	176	2010	MNJTF-Boko Haram	Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Cameroon, Benin	8,700	2015	MINUSCA	CAR	10,806	2014
EUTM Mali	Mali	539	2013	Regional Task Force-LRA	CAR-DRC-South Sudan-Uganda	5,000	2012	MINUSMA	Mali	10,207	2013
EUMAM CAR	CAR	70	2015	ECOMIB	Guinea Bissau	750	2012	MONUSCO	Democratic Republic of the Congo	19,784	2010
EUNAVFOR Med	Mediterranean sea	1,408	2015	UNAMID	Sudan	17554	2008	UNISFA	Sudan	4,366	2011
EUCAP Nestor	Somalia (Horn of Africa)	43	2012					UNMIL	Liberia	5,934	2003
EUCAP Sahel Niger	Niger	47	2014					UNMISS	South Sudan	12,523	2011
EUCAP Sahel Mali	Mali	73	2014					UNOCI	Côte d'Ivoire	6,913	2004
EUBAM Libya	Libya	3	2013								
EUSEC RD Congo	Democratic Republic of the Congo	10	2005								
Total		3,043		Total		54,104		Total		70,743	

Sources for data: EEAS; AU; UNDPKO; Réseau de recherche sur les opérations de paix

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ABBREVIATIONS

AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission to Mali
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ANC	African National Congress
APF	African Peace Facility
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
AQIM	al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
CAR	Central African Republic
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MISCA	African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (*Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine*)
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (*Mission de l'Organisation des Nations unies en République démocratique du Congo*)
MONUSCO	United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (*Mission de l'Organisation des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo)*
MPLA	The People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSO	Peace Support Operation
RDC	Rapid Deployment Capabilities
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
RSP	*Régiment de Sécurité Présidentielle*

SSR	Security Sector Reform
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organisation
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur
UNISFA	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

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