

## SEMINAR

# Lessons from EUFOR Tchad/RCA

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### Background and process

The EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) Seminar held in Paris on 18 March 2010 was convened following the endorsement by the PSC of military advice (ESDP COSDP 855) to convene a EUFOR Tchad/RCA lessons learned seminar. During its bi-annual meeting with the Political and Security Committee (PSC) on 27 November 2009, the EUISS expressed its willingness to organise the event.

The seminar had the following objectives:

- ♦ to provide further lessons for the planning, conduct and execution of future EU operations and missions and to build upon existing 'lessons identified' processes;
- ♦ to share lessons on comprehensive aspects of EU operations on the basis of analyses of relevant actions taken both at theatre and higher levels; and
- ♦ to use the EUISS as a neutral facilitator of debate on the EUFOR Tchad/RCA operation to complement on-going 'lessons learned' efforts by other EU institutions and Member States.

This event was organised with the support of the main EUFOR Tchad/RCA contributing states, concerned EU institutions including the Council General Secretariat and the European Commission, as well as former staff from EUFOR Tchad/RCA Operational Headquarters and Force Headquarters. Participants also included

non-EU partners and interlocutors and in particular the UN, NGOs and participating third states.

The event was organised along three main themes, sub-divided into three working groups:

1. Cooperation with non-EU organisations and bodies including:
  - i. EU-UN strategic planning cooperation;
  - ii. EU-UN hand-over planning lessons; and
  - iii. Cooperation between EU and non-EU contributors.
2. Operational and tactical military aspects including:
  - i. deployment and logistics;
  - ii. intelligence and operations; and
  - iii. special operations and local crisis management.
3. Politico-military, strategic and civil-military aspects including:
  - i. Crisis management procedures and operational design;
  - ii. Comprehensive approaches, civil military coordination on humanitarian aid, development and environment;
  - iii. Political achievements in the region, Chad and the Central African Republic; Public information and media.

A group of troop contributing countries - Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, and Poland - the EU Military

staff and the European Commission were all pro-active in commenting on early drafts of the seminar agenda and in identifying speakers amongst their officials. As a result, the seminar benefited from a high level of expertise from former EUFOR staff. Most Member States, by sending representatives from abroad, co-financed the seminar with the EUISS, with France

pledging 5,000 Euros.

The present EUISS report summarises debates and ideas expressed during the seminar. It does not reflect the views of the EUISS. The report will be forwarded to the PSC delegations for information and subsequently published on the EUISS website.

*Note:*

**In instances where various aspects of the same debate were discussed simultaneously in different working groups, they are gathered under a single paragraph of a sub-heading in this report.**

## 1. Cooperation with non-EU organisations and bodies

### 1.1. EU-UN strategic planning cooperation

#### 1.1.A. KEY DEBATES

Given the simultaneous interventions by both the EU and the UN in Chad and the Central African Republic, joint planning and close coordination was required between the two organisations. Effective EU-UN cooperation reached an unprecedented level with the collaboration between EUFOR Tchad/RCA and MINURCAT, displaying a marked improvement in comparison to EUFOR RD Congo. However from the outset, different sets of priorities yielded discrepancies and misunderstandings.

To begin with, the EU focused on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and the UN prioritised the security of refugees, resulting in deployment planning discrepancies. The EU planned to deploy first in the South of the Area of Operations to protect mainly IDPs, while the UN favoured an early deployment in the North where most refugees were located.

Differences in organisational structures, planning processes, 'visions' for the mission, risk assessment and protection procedures also impacted on joint planning. While the UN and MINURCAT police expected EUFOR to protect the movements of all of their staff - an 'escort' concept - EUFOR did not have the capacity to enforce this measure. EU planning was in fact based on efficient reconnaissance and rapid reaction assets: a 'security umbrella' concept.

Discrepancies in the deployment calendars of Chadian DIS police and the EUFOR military component left EUFOR as the only security force on the ground facing threats from rebel groups and bandits.

Misunderstandings with respect to logistical support continued for some time due to the difficulty for each organisation in understanding the nature of the other. Being a multinational force, EUFOR relied on Member States' logistical arrangements. On the other hand, MINURCAT - as an international force - hoped to deal with logistical aspects with the EU OHQ.

#### 1.1.B. LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

EU-UN coordination documents in various fields should be developed and used as templates for future operations, for example, those relating to strategic planning, logistics, operational support, communications, and civil-military coordination.

More frequent and systematic joint planning exercises and a stronger liaison presence need to be organised and implemented with a view to improving information sharing. The need for high quality and more secure CIS and information flows and information sharing were mentioned in this context.

Future EU-UN strategic planning cooperation will require greater numbers of permanent EU staff at all stages of an operation with, ideally, one single EU point of contact for the UN partner.

Rehatting and bridging are essential planning options both for the EU and the UN. For the EU, the 'rehatting' of a bridging force is the most efficient way of implementing a bridging concept, but it necessitates a troop commitment by Member States lasting more than 12 months. For the UN, bridging from EU operations will remain a unique means to rapidly launch international operations for two reasons. Firstly, the UN does not have at its disposal a proper stand by force (UNSSA is a commitment by action). Secondly, it is usually significantly slower than the EU when it comes to deployment and as a rule, it requires at least six months following the passage of a Security Council Resolution.

### 1.2. EU-UN hand-over planning lessons

#### 1.2.A. KEY DEBATES

There was a consensus among seminar participants that rehatting saved the mission and that the handover was a difficult process. Debates focused on the possible reasons for this.

At the strategic and political level, there were internal EU delays driven by national political interests regarding the possibility of rehatting some of the EUFOR

troops. At the UN, there were internal delays in the adoption of Resolution 1861 which was linked to the absence of the necessary political will to engage (for example, some key PKO principles were being challenged by the EUFOR experience) as well as difficulties in renegotiating an international presence in the country with the Chadian authorities.

There were also delays in bridging planning, with the late deployment of UN planning teams who sometimes lacked adequate civilian expertise. Liaison and accommodation aspects were addressed very late in the process. EU-UN communication regarding handover - particularly command handover - was conducted with mobile phones. A stronger effort should therefore be made towards early planning for the use of secured communications.

The issue of EUFOR infrastructures hand-over to MINURCAT was also discussed, with an emphasis on technical agreements and reimbursement by the UN of initial investments by the EU. More generally, the handover experience illustrated the need for clarification between the two models for an EU-UN relationship in such operations: a principal-agent relationship where the EU, whose Member States are members of the UN, would have to comply with UN standards; or a partnership whereby the EU, by bringing added value, negotiates framework arrangements with the UN.

#### 1.2.B. LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

1. Bridging is key to the UN. Any future UN Security Council Resolution providing a mandate to an EU operation should explicitly include a mandate for the UN follow-on force to plan the handover from the outset. All aspects of the handover - including identifying those troops to be rehatted and any remaining gaps in the force structure - should be considered in detail to ensure that there is a common understanding and appreciation of the handover process. It would therefore be useful in the future to prepare EU-UN arrangements on the joint financing of mission sites and infrastructure.
2. Reimbursement issues should be resolved early to avoid discouraging Members from undertaking future missions.

3. UN follow-on-force leadership (Force Commander, key staff) should be identified and recruited early to enhance smooth and seamless transition. This includes the identification of those key staff officers who should be rehatted.
4. The EU could identify potential EU lead nations for logistics in order to meet UN requests, and with a view to easing future planning cooperation.
5. The duration of a rehating phase needs to be long enough to allow planning for the deployment of additional non-EU follow-on forces.
6. Secured communications between the EU and the UN should be a matter of focus in the future.
7. The UN could also conduct an internal lessons learned exercise on the EUFOR Tchad/RCA-MINURCAT cooperation and handover.
8. More responsive and agile decision-making processes would allow more timely action on the ground.

### 1.3 EU / non-EU contributors

#### 1.3.A. KEY DEBATES

Third states played an important role in filling credibility gaps, in addition to adding to the legitimacy of the operations and the positive public opinion aspects that can be obtained by their inclusion: they provided more troops, allowed knowledge-sharing and mutual understanding dynamics. They also gave political credibility to EUFOR by sending a strong signal to regional political players.

However, it was acknowledged that in the case of Russian contribution - in the absence of a standard framework agreement - political negotiations, planning and liaising arrangements took place over an excessively long process: 9 months from the first meeting to the deployment of helicopters.

Negotiations were also made particularly difficult without a security agreement with non-EU contributors with whom it was impossible to share key operational documents (CONOPS and OPLAN).

### 1.3.B. LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

1. Rapid EU deployment should be primarily based on EU Member State contributions in the short term, given the length of the negotiation process with non-EU contributors. Non-EU contributions ought to be considered as additional, valuable contributions that enhance operations, but not as indispensable for launching an operation. In reality however, the risk of continued lack of political will with respect to Force Generation may imply that non-EU contributions will assume increased importance in the future.
2. Accession candidates should be more involved in future CSDP training exercises to be better prepared for cooperation.
3. Pre-existing legally binding crisis management agreements with the EU would be to the benefit of cooperation with non-accession countries in future crisis management. Technical protocols (logistics, medical, food services) could then be negotiated at the Operations Commander level with financial aspects in annexes.
4. Outreach to potential third-country contributors should occur earlier in the planning process.
5. Internal documents should be declassified from confidential to restricted in the interests of smooth information sharing.
6. A standard framework agreement could accelerate negotiations. The inclusion of advanced general security agreements with potential non-EU contributors may help to enhance their incorporation into EU missions.

## 2. Operational and tactical military aspects

### 2.1 Deployment and logistics for EUFOR Tchad/RCA

#### 2.1.A KEY DEBATES

The debates focused on force movements and deployment (climate constraints, logistical routes, taxes, national arrangements and standards), force support

(fuel and energy, acclimatisation, water, contracting) and infrastructure.

There was a general consensus that the logistical challenges were met, and that there was added value in having a lead nation - in this case, France - for logistics. The location of logistical coordination in the OHQ was perceived as a good decision.

However, the unavailability of local maps was as a setback. The cost of force support was deemed excessive, with the daily food costs amounting to 70 Euros a day for each soldier. The risk of the EU becoming a 'cash cow' for local partners or contractors was also discussed. Examples included one Member State having to pay 400,000 Euros in air transportation fees for the unexpected one-week extra stay of an Antonov aircraft blocked by Chadian authorities, and frequent organised banditry committed against road convoys.

#### 2.1.B LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

1. More emphasis should be placed on logistics during the pre-planning phase in order to anticipate national caveats, thereby improving coordination.
2. A small number of contributors, but with full capabilities, is the best logistical option for future operations.
3. One lead nation for logistics is preferable in order to ease EU-UN cooperation and handover.
4. The concept of a 'lead nation' for logistics needs to be deconstructed and redefined in terms of what that nation can and cannot provide.
5. An EU troop contingent to Africa must not be sent on a mission 'ad hoc' without having first met certain engineering and logistical pre-requisites. In this context, logistical mutualisation and centralisation between troop contributing countries could lead to more cost-effective future operations. This could be applied to items packaging, MCCE (although not an EU structure per se), availability of adequate military personnel during the deployment and redeployment phases, early knowledge of national caveats on the use of tactical air assets, contracting for force support and the preparation of SOFAs.

6. An Operational Mounting Cell with OHQ could be established, with the proviso that such a cell advises CJ5/CJ3 planning on logistic aspects as well as updating the logistics planners on the settings of the operations design.
7. It was also suggested that the creation of a joint EU-UN planning cell to provide visibility of planning (both EU redeployment and UN deployment) would be essential in the case of a bridging operation.
8. It was mentioned by some participants that the use of Logistic Functional Areas Services (LOG-FAS – a strategic aid planning tool) suite used as a common planning and execution tool for redeployment would allow best use of the transportation assets and host nation infrastructure.
9. SOFA templates should be updated, written in the official language of the host nation and based on lessons learned from the Chad/CAR experience. SOFA writing needs to go through various phases and involve all military branches. Therefore, detailed pre-planning assessments of the host nation's logistical capacities (water, transportation, food supply) are recommended.
10. Contracting companies should be negotiated early rather than after the launch of an operation.
11. Instances of fraud or blackmail need to be addressed early and at the theatre level.
12. Tactical air means are essential for logistics and medical support. The use of support helicopters as a key enabler should be a priority, especially for areas inaccessible by land-based transportation during the rainy season.
13. Support from the local population is key to ensuring smooth logistical support to the force (for example, drilling water was negotiated with local authorities) and smooth movements.



## 2.2 Intelligence and operations

### 2.2.A KEY DEBATES

Current EU intelligence structures, mostly based on National Intelligence Cells (NICs) and focusing on strategic rather than tactical intelligence, did not allow the operation to proceed based on a common, comprehensive and detailed understanding of the area from the outset. Brussels structures and diplomatic representations had limited knowledge of field dynamics, thus raising the issue of information and intelligence sharing between theatre and political levels. In this context, the possibility of an independent EU intelligence agency in the future was flagged.

EUFOR's intelligence structures had limited human intelligence (despite useful input from the EU Special Representative's team at FHQ level) and imagery intelligence but no signal intelligence resources. The FHQ suffered from a high turnover of intelligence personnel. Coordination with AMIS and UNAMID was deemed sub-optimal as well as politically sensitive with respect to relations with Sudan. Similarly, direct intelligence gathering from the local population proved difficult due to the force's neutral status.

Debates focused on the added value of intelligence to inform foreign policy decisions, strategic and operational planning, logistics, situational awareness and the measurement of the operation's impact. The example of some states transporting excessive quantities of ammunition to the theatre was used to illustrate how this logistical assumption was based on an inappropriate threat assessment. Another example was the doubtful use of quantitative measurements to determine IDP "returns" that ignored local complexities.

Intelligence was a key to informing the EU's political relationship with the Chadian government and local governance structures. Given the evolving nature of security threats, statistical data collection aimed at identifying local spoilers would have improved situational awareness. Some early analysis distinguishing the diversity of spoilers (including the Janjaweed, Chadian army, local thugs, and the Sudanese army crossing the border) and comparing their responsibility in the context of ongoing insecurity would have better informed EU's relationship with Chadian interlocutors.

### 2.2.B LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

1. The careful monitoring of threats should begin

as early as possible during the pre-planning phase. It is the key to ensuring adequate planning and logistics, given the volatile and changing nature of the security situation in an area of operation.

2. Early outreach during the pre-planning phase to other actors and stakeholders (international organisations, global powers such as the USA, Russia or China, NGOs, academics, European and non-European national intelligence agencies and contact points in the areas of interest) is necessary to maximise the use of intelligence and information sources, information sharing and exchange, including the use of open data collection software.
3. Intelligence sharing and flows should be improved - as is the case with Atalanta - by the implementation of a 'plug and play' philosophy towards the use of Brussels intelligence-sharing structures (SITCEN, EUMS and SATCEN).
4. Cooperation among and input from National Intelligence Cells (NICs) needs to be prepared earlier in the process through early coordination meetings and the strengthening of intelligence capacities at the EU level. One possible option is having a greater number of national intelligence staff seconded to both OHQ and FHQ.
5. Medium-long air reconnaissance capabilities ought to be mobilised in the future.

## 2.3 Special operations and local crisis management

### 2.3.A KEY DEBATES

There was a consensus that the Special Operations Forces (SOF) were an important part of the initial deployment of EUFOR as an "Initial Entry Force". SOFs were useful for special reconnaissance as an entry force - for example to map roads - and in cases of local crisis management. SOFs also showed EUFOR presence and provided situational awareness at an early stage while leaving a relatively small logistical footprint.

Local crisis management dealt with a mix of security threats: attacks on camps, civilian, UN personnel or facilities by non-governmental armed groups, and

banditry and criminality by governmental or para-governmental groups or militia. Debates arose regarding the difficulty to have detailed public information about local crisis situations. There was some divergence on the interpretation and reporting of facts related to the attack of Tama villages by Zaghawa armed groups early November 2008 in the area of Birak. EUFOR intervened on 11 November.

Debates showed that EU operations, especially in the event of serious security deterioration, tread a fine line between pressures from the host government and monitoring and expectations by civil society, the media, academia and the international community at large. Managing expectations, in that context, is a key challenge for EU public information and press offices.

Another critical moment for the operation was the attack on Goz Beida in June 2008. In that case, information from an NGO about rebels who had gathered on the other side of the Chadian-Sudanese border helped the force to adjust its reaction.

Cooperation with the DIS, once it was up and running, was satisfactory. The seminar confirmed that EUFOR Tchad/RCA was mostly confronted with banditry-like threats in Eastern Chad, and the need for a comprehensive approach to human insecurity and security sector development was raised very clearly. EUFOR arrested around 100 suspects but found it difficult to receive any follow-on cooperation from the almost inexistent justice and penitentiary structures, despite the European Commission's support of justice sector reform in Chad.

### 2.3.B LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

1. SOF should always be considered as a force multiplier for future EU operations. The SOF was efficient as an entry force to gather intelligence and provide situational awareness through reconnaissance activities. But to reach its potential, SOF will require autonomous air assets.
2. Better situational awareness will be essential for future operations. Debates indicated that a number of local crises could probably have been anticipated and therefore averted by more efficient situational awareness on the ground.
3. The suggestion was made to create the position of Permanent Special Operations Adviser within

Brussels structures to strengthen the EU's special operations planning capacity.

## 3. Politico-military, strategic and civil-military aspects

### 3.1 Crisis Management Procedures and Operational Design

#### 3.1.A KEY DEBATES

There was a general consensus that crisis management procedures were sound but not sufficient to plan optimal cooperation with non-EU organisations. Debates focused on the pros and cons of the 'end date' method. An end-state was defined by the military planners, but it was left for the UN follow-on force to reach it. Military planners had to reconcile contradictory expectations from a diverse range of actors - the Chadian government, the UN, EU Member States in their variety of interests - by designing the operation on the basis of their "military judgement" and what they saw as an "achievable end".

Discussions also touched upon the discrepancies between threats assessment during the planning process, focusing on the most dangerous threat to the force (rebels and Janjaweed) and situational awareness conducted by the entry force and subsequently by other troops, focusing on the most likely threats (banditry and criminality).

Q&A sessions facilitated the exchange of views on the length of the force generation process (described as a "chicken and egg problem") which was attributed to the difficulty in reaching a consensus among the 27 Member States and to the lack of precision in the operational design.

#### 3.1.B LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

1. The current structure needs to be improved. It lends itself to a succession of handovers for planning (CMPD to MAP to EUMS-OPS to OHQ) that is not conducive to efficiency. Furthermore, it does not instil confidence among the early planning staff and those who form part of the opera-



tion, and it does not allow the required continuity that an OHQ function demands. CMPD and DAC should assist in this context.

2. More permanent and effective staff dedicated to planning is needed to avoid the gap that exists before an OHQ is established and to bring in the corporate knowledge that an OHQ requires. Whether or not this staff should be part of a permanent structure, how this structure should be named and where this structure should be located were issues discussed during the seminar.
3. It was also mentioned that a skeleton archiving structure in Brussels is necessary to assist in maintaining the 'institutional memory' of EU operations.
4. An 'end date' method is politically preferable despite the 'end state' method being militarily sound. The two approaches are mutually exclusive to some extent, especially when considering that operations are planned for only 12 months.
5. The concept and the objective of the 'end state' method needs to be unpacked and translated into realistic planning scenarios. This ought to be done at the politico-military level and appears to be particularly important for addressing increasingly complex crises involving a wide range of military and civilian actors and for which there is usually no quick solution.
6. Work on the 'end state' concept could also be linked to a more sophisticated, in-depth approach to the bridging concept.
7. A lack of strategic reserves would be an unnecessary risk in the future.

### 3.2 Comprehensive approach, civ-mil coordination on humanitarian aid, development and environment

#### 3.2.A KEY DEBATES

Debates centred on four main topics:

- Lessons from EUFOR's cooperation with civil-

ians;

- Lessons from EUFOR's impact on development, the humanitarian situation, the environment and local governance;
- Lessons for future cooperation; and
- EU and UN civil-military coordination practices.

It was underlined by some participants that a comprehensive approach with EUFOR would involve civilian actors from the development field and not humanitarian actors, since the latter's strict mandate prevents them from engaging in any sort of 'common approach' with a military force.

Relations between EUFOR and the humanitarian community were generally very good, despite the initial strong scepticism that many sections of the latter displayed towards the mission's stated purpose, and the concern with regard to the mission's likely impact.

EUFOR Tchad/RCA set new benchmarks for civil-military cooperation. Strong channels of communication were established with the humanitarian community through weekly security briefings that promoted an integrative approach whereby all NGOs were welcomed to the table. This facilitated high level of information-sharing on security concerns, as well as exchanges on the potential impact of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and the risks associated with IDP returns.

The mission was also praised by staff on the ground for its ability to manage a rather diversified humanitarian community which had very different expectations and modes of interacting with EUFOR. However, humanitarian actors regretted the lack of continuity between EUFOR and MINURCAT practices that came with the discontinuation of weekly coordination meetings.

The use of QIPs - although limited in scale by EUFOR - nurtured debates between EUFOR and the humanitarian community on the one hand, but they were also the source of minor disagreements between the OHQ and FHQ levels. The number of QIPs remained very limited and the humanitarian space seems to have been respected overall.

Civil-military cooperation in the Linking Relief, Reconstruction and Development (LRRD) field went smoothly although not as developed as it was with the

humanitarian actors. This was illustrated by the debates on EUFOR's role vis-à-vis IDPs and refugees. The use of data regarding IDPs and refugee "returns" was highly politically sensitive and subject to potential controversy. While there was coordination through weekly meetings with the humanitarian community, relations within the LRRD nexus could be described as 'peer processes' in which the military - keen to respect the mandate of other agencies - kept some distance. How wide this distance should be in order to maximise the efficiency of the EU's comprehensive approach was not discussed in depth. It was acknowledged however that EUFOR experienced a conceptual gap on the IDPs/refugees question due to its political implications.

It was noted that the operation improved its relationship with the local population through a learning process and progressive immersion in the local environment. As a result, outreach practices developed at the FHQ level were praised by some NGOs. However, NGOs regretted EUFOR's inadequate understanding of the context, particularly the security situation and the conditions that would need to be created for long-term IDP returns.

Debates showed that a diversity of accounts regarding EUFOR Tchad/RCA have been published by EU institutions, academics, NGOs and the media. It was noted that there is no unanimous assessment of the operation because of a lack of universal open evidence-based data on the security situation, the evolution of development indicators and data on refugees and IDP returns. Therefore, measuring the impact and success of future operations will be a challenge.

### 3.2.B LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

1. Relations with the humanitarian community ought to be established from the beginning with early deployment of CIMIC units in the field. This would contribute to the fulfilment of a civilian or military crisis management mandate.
2. Threats assessments should also include systematic and in-depth consultations with long-term civilian actors in the field.
3. Templates of coordination agreements between EUFOR and humanitarian actors should be used in future operations.
4. FHQ public outreach practices deserve in-depth study so that they can be translated into easily transferable best practice for future operations.
5. Although the EU CIMIC concept has been reviewed and agreed upon, common EU guidelines for CIMIC and civil military relations should be established.
6. In addition to military and political EU bodies, the liaison role of ECHO should be maintained if not strengthened, along with the support of existing coordination mechanisms such as OCHA civil-military coordination officers.
7. The EU-UN bridging concept combining a police and a military component began to yield some successful results in initiating steps towards security sector reform through training, and logistically supporting the Département Intégré de Sécurité. Any engagement in the area of EU-UN bridging by the international community should be long term and would depend on the continuation of the joint police and military presence. This long term factor needs to be taken into account during the pre-planning of a future EU bridging operation.
8. Deeper planning work is required on the measurement of an operation's impact through the identification of a series of measurable indicators and benchmarks against which future operations would be better equipped to provide quantitative assessments. This being said, short operations of 12 months leave very limited space for statistical data collection and it should be expected that measuring the impact of bridging on short operations will remain more an art than a science.
9. The EU should sharpen its comprehensive approach methodology on mass displacement (IDPs and refugees) and civilian protection, issues that arise during most complex crises. This could be done through more systematic joint training for and planning exercises by military, civilian (development) and political experts.

### 3.3 Political achievements in the region, in Chad and CAR; Public information and media

#### 3.3.A KEY DEBATES

The banditry-like security threats in Eastern Chad - which are of an internal Chadian political nature - had not been placed at the forefront in the planning process which instead focused primarily on rebel attacks. There was debate on whether or not de-linking the security crisis in the East from internal Chadian politics and governance was a deliberate decision made during the planning phase, and whether it was appropriate. Political ambiguities therefore appeared to be a challenge for the follow-on international presence in its negotiations with the Chadian government.

In various panels, debates focused on the issue of unclear political direction and representation throughout the operation, due to a multitude of political authorities and to the absence of clear common foreign policy objectives. The perception of non-EU participants was that EU had two primary objectives: at the FHQ level the aim was a swift withdrawal, while at OHQ level the aim was a smooth transition to the follow-on force.

Public opinion in each Troop Contributing Country (TCC) was significant and played an important role. For instance, the deployment of the Austrian contingent was almost blocked by a very strong media campaign. At the theatre and OHQ levels, a large-scale media policy was conducted with around 440 journalists invited to the operation.

Obviously the operation was not a game changer at the national or regional level nor a transformer of the root causes of the crisis in the area of operation. Its mandate was deliberately kept delimited and precise. The link between insecurity in Eastern Chad and internal political dialogue in N'Djamena was deliberately left unaddressed in the mandate. However, the result was that an ambiguous political message was conveyed to the political opposition in Chad.

Some participants nonetheless stated that, despite the lack of a political mandate, EUFOR and MINURCAT had a very significant political impact on Chad: it had some value in putting the country on the political map and in stimulating numerous ministerial visits. It also signalled to the parties - in particular to the political opposition - that the EU was serious about making a contribution to the humanitarian and security situation in the East.

Other participants were more circumspect, suggesting that the operation missed the opportunity to have a significant impact on essential issues in Chad, for example, a change in governance structures, the delivery of public services, the distribution of wealth or transparency in oil revenues. The recent Sudanese-Chadian rapprochement was seen as a positive but rather unsustainable improvement. It was agreed that expectations management has worked rather well and that the EU, by not setting the bar too high, had avoided failing to meet ambitious political objectives. This choice was criticised by some participants who considered that the operation mandate lacked a minimal political component.

The EU's investment is about to collapse if MINURCAT's mandate is not prolonged. One year after the hand-over to the UN follow-on force, some participants questioned the EU's political commitment to maintain an international force to protect civilians in the area.

#### 3.3.B LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

1. Public information regarding European troop deployment must be dealt with both at EU and national levels and requires adequate coordination between the diplomatic and military services of Member States in the formulation of media statements.
2. Strong coordination and liaison among public information structures will be essential in the case of EU-UN cooperation and bridging.
3. Engaging the media with press conferences, interviews with the Operation Commander as appropriate, visits to the theatre of operations and press releases will remain vital components of a media strategy.
4. The EU needs to develop a 'perceptions management' strategy as early as possible with the objective of shaping external perceptions rather than trying to change them.
5. There should be a systematic effort to present facts truthfully, despite political constraints.
6. A clearer foreign policy concept needs to underpin future EU operations. This would have avoided the political ambiguity which prevailed in the inter-

national community's relationship with the Chadian leadership.

7. Political strategies, designed and updated at theatre level in coordination with the whole range of EU actors (Member states, Special Representatives and Presidency envoys, EUFOR political advisers, European Commission, with the PSC being the decision-making body) were described as an absolute requirement for providing the operations with clear foreign policy guidance.

#### 4. Conclusions and follow-up

It was the first time the EUISS conveyed a comprehensive, diverse and large scale lessons learned seminar on an ESDP operation. The numerous attendance and strong input from member states has shown that the EUISS is the appropriate forum for similar events in the future, which could also be used for pre-planning, brainstorming and assessment meetings such as the technical workshop on Eastern Chad held at the Institute in January 2009 in cooperation with EUFOR Tchad/RCA's OHQ. Similar lessons learned seminars should be organised more systematically after each military and civilian crisis management operation.

However, some participants were sceptical as to whether lessons learned exercises lead to lessons implementation in the future, since they are often disconnected from the political decision-making level. Nonetheless, it is to be hoped that the 18 March debates were successful in connecting the operational and political levels about lessons learned and will inspire further work to implement those lessons that have already been learnt.

The concluding session highlighted a number of ideas for the future of CSDP. First, future EU operations will

need strong evidence of and guarantees that the host government fully accepts and understands its rationale and its purpose. It was reported that in the case of Chad, the objectives related to the improvement of human security and human rights, and the change in the country's international image, were not fully understood and accepted by the government. In the future, such challenges should be addressed by in-depth foreign policy consultations with the host government and the design of a detailed political strategy at the EU level. By doing so, the EU will capitalise on striking a fair balance between the efficiency and legitimacy of its future operations.

Second, one participant inquired as to whether CSDP operations on the African continent will in the future be led or initiated by a nation other than France, which was the lead nation for logistics and the main contributor and planner of the EUFOR Tchad/RCA operation. There was no clear answer to this question. However - and this is the third and final lesson - EUFOR Tchad/RCA was cited as an example of what permanent structured cooperations could look like in the future. Fourth, it was confirmed that strategic planning requires more permanent staff and structures.

As for EU-UN cooperation, bridging will remain a key concept for joint planning. Structural differences between the two organisations would be addressed by having more systematic joint exercises, training and exchanges.

Finally, certain challenges addressed by EUFOR and MINURCAT, such as building airport infrastructure and logistical facilities, could also be tackled through long-term development and security policies in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, in that case, meeting the requirements of the local population - as opposed to those of the military force - would need to become the primary objective of such long-term measures that would be implemented in partnership with local authorities.

## ANNEX: Glossary of Terms and Acronyms

AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
Bridging concept	Where one military force intervenes first and paves the way for a hand-over to another military force
CAR	Central African Republic
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
CIS	Communication and Information Systems
CJ5/CJ3	Planning / Operations
CMPD	Crisis Management Planning Directorate
CONOPS	Concept of Operation
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DAC	Deployable Augmentees Cadre
DIS	Département Intégré de Sécurité
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid Department
End date method	determining a date on which an operation will be terminated
End state method	determining/defining a given situation at which point it should be decided that an operation needs to be terminated
Escort concept	the provision of military escorts to humanitarian aid staff, convoys or UN personnel
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EUFOR	European Force
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EUMS-OPS	European Union Military Staff Operations Centre
FHQ	Force Headquarters
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
LOGFAS	Logistic Functional Areas Services
LRRD	Linking Relief, Reconstruction and Development
MAP (EUMS)	Military Assessment and Planning branch

MCCE	Multinational Coordination Centre Europe
MINURCAT	Mission des Nations Unies en République de Centrafrique et au Tchad
NIC	National Intelligence Cell
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHQ	Operational Headquarters
OPLAN	Operation Plan
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
PSC	Political and Security Committee
QIP	Quick Impact Project
Rehatting concept	Refers to troops belonging to a bridging force or already deployed on the ground. It describes the process of troops moving from one chain of authority (for instance EU) to another (for instance UN), and therefore changing insignia, hats and/or uniforms.
SATCEN	Satellite Centre
Security umbrella concept	Consists of providing security to humanitarian aid staff, convoys or UN personnel by using flexible and rapidly movable security assets such as air transportation facilities
SITCEN	Situation Centre
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOFA	Status of Force Agreement
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
UNAMID	United Nations Assistance Mission in Darfur
UNSAS	United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System