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THE CASE FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION

As 2011 gets underway, it seems an opportune time to address the question of how to go about ending conflict in the world. Sadly, both Europe's neighbourhood and Africa provide abundant examples of half-baked peace arrangements that fail to resolve the situations they are supposed to address, which quickly relapse into violence and terrible loss of life.

Despite all of this, the international community continually makes the mistake of hoping that 'this time' reason will prevail and relying on the good faith of the belligerents – until the situation has again deteriorated beyond the point where the only thing left to do is to intervene to try to avoid another crime against humanity.

Looking to Africa, it is right and indeed essential that people should be given access to the polls they have been denied for decades – provided the 'free and fair' expression of their will is subsequently respected. In the UN-supervised elections that recently took place in the Ivory Coast, the former president lost to his opponent. Refusing to step down, he abused his control of the army to maintain power thus bringing the country to the verge of another civil war.

This kind of scenario is of course nothing new. After the peace deal brokered between

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People in Juba, southern Sudan, celebrate before voting in the January 2011 independence referendum

Angola's warring factions, the MPLA (the party of incumbent President Santos) and Unita 'free and fair' UN-supervised legislative elections and the first round of presidential elections took place in 1992. The elections were held when the demobilisation and integration of the two armies were far from complete, and as a result Angola was plunged into ten more years of murderous civil war. Repeated warnings about the need to bolster the UN military presence in the wake of the elections had gone unheeded.

In the light of such dispiriting examples it is

hard to avoid the conclusion that hard lessons have not been learned, even if credit must be given to African leaders (with the notable exception of the Angolan President) for their involvement in trying to persuade the defeated former Ivorian president to accept the people's verdict. Equally, it must be acknowledged that the UN has fielded 10,000 peacekeepers, and that ECOWAS is threatening the use of force to ensure that the election's outcome is upheld. Should it come to that, as the stalled African mediation seems to suggest, it is uncertain whether a full-scale war can still be averted.

In Sudan, a decisive vote has in all likelihood upheld a two-state solution in the context of one of the intractable conflicts that have been plaguing the Sudanese for decades. Most public statements predict that partition will go ahead peacefully, and that Khartoum is resigned to the loss of South Sudan and a large portion of the country's oil fields and revenues. We are speaking however of a country where one of the worst mass slaughters in recent history has been committed by the armed forces under the authority of President Bashir, who was indicted by the International Criminal Court on a number of counts including genocide. What therefore is the basis for the international community's optimism, and for the trust placed in the good faith of Sudan's ruler? If the peace agreement is to hold and the likely partition is to go ahead peacefully, the settlement regarding the Abeyi enclave must be upheld, other border demarcation disputes that may arise must be settled peacefully, and, most importantly, the two million or so southerners living in the north must be allowed to get on with their lives, free from discrimination and violence. Furthermore, the power struggle in Juba must remain free from violence. And any negative influences on Darfur, where tensions were already rising before the vote, must equally be avoided.

It may be too late to implement a genuine prevention strategy, which many believe would have required larger numbers of peacekeepers, in particular in Abeyi. But at least the international community should unequivocally state that they are prepared to act resolutely should things go badly wrong, and the EU should make it clear that military support will be forthcoming in case of need. 'Things going badly wrong' is, sadly, very much a euphemism. Both in the Ivory Coast and the Sudan, the issue is actually preventing mass murder and genocide.

The question of how to protect civilians has been at the heart of the UN debate since the horrendous massacres that took place in the 1990s in Rwanda and Srebrenica. In both cases, as UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated in his report on the responsibility to protect, the carnage took place 'under the watch of the Security Council and United Nations peacekeepers.' And he warned that the UN and its individual members 'remain underprepared to meet their most fundamental prevention and protection responsibilities'. When prevention fails, the international community has the obligation to resort to military force to protect the civilian population. But merely concentrating on the



Soldiers return to their positions during military exercises in Nagorno-Karabakh

post-facto use of military force spells disaster in most cases.

The European Union is in a good position to implement a coherent, continent-wide strategy of prevention by linking together its various Africa programmes. Concentrating on humanitarian aid and poverty reduction assistance and, when conditions are ripe, security sector reform will certainly yield

EU's sense of international responsibility and its values as a soft power. The importance of this commitment is acutely felt in the EU's neighbourhood. Tensions in Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan are on the rise again, increasing the likelihood of a Georgia 2008-type conflict. In the Middle East, the eruption of new wars like the 2006 war in the Lebanon or the 2008-09 Gaza war cannot be ruled out.

“ **The international community cannot afford to wait for a crisis. The formidable tasks of preventive diplomacy in near-crisis situations...require sometimes expensive, often dangerous and always sustained efforts.** ”

-DAVID A. HAMBURG

dividends in terms of fostering sustainable human development and bolstering prevention and mediation capacities.

Both the African Union's broad endorsement of the responsibility to protect and the more active role taken on by regional organisations are good news for the Africans and thus for the EU, which has been a constant supporter of African-led peace initiatives. The EU's backing of the AU's and Kofi Annan's successful mediation in Kenya in the aftermath of the December 2007 elections is an example of what can and should be done. But this does not absolve it from facing up to its own responsibilities to prevent genocide and mass murder, including through direct military intervention.

A bold strategy of prevention and protection is obviously not just about averting mass murder and genocide; its wider aim – to prevent conflict and war – underpins the

Lessons must not be forgotten. On the eve of the Georgia war when everybody knew that the war was coming, nobody put any real pressure on the parties to find a peaceful solution to their differences. While no tangible pressure was put on Russia to

stop aggravating the situation, nobody made it clear to the Georgian government that going to war to bring Abkhazia and South Ossetia back into the fold would be unacceptable. A US warning, potentially more effective, was also conspicuously lacking. The EU was subsequently successful in making use of mediation and peacekeeping to prevent escalation. The same kind of resolve and unity of purpose needs to be channeled by EU institutions and member states into an effective strategy of prevention.

Concentrating on prevention in the neighbourhood and Africa through a vast, multi-pronged programme (many parts of which are already in place) is a task well-suited to a civilian power like the EU. It is one where not only tangible results are within reach – which is what effectiveness is all about – but that may yet yield significant gains in terms of the long sought-after consistency and coherence of EU foreign policy.

EUISS Annual Conference 2010: building on the civil society agenda Paris, 21-22 October 2010



Hubert Védrine speaks at the 2010 Annual Conference

The EUISS Annual Conference 2010 took place this year in Paris on 21-22 October. This year's theme centred on the changing role played by civil society in the global agenda. Its subsequent focus was on how best to capitalise on these ongoing transformations with a view to building an effective multilateral approach to global and regional problems.

The future of Sudan: challenges ahead Brussels, 9 December 2010



Rasheed Saeed Yagour chairs one of the panels

In anticipation of the independence referendum of January 2011 in Sudan, this seminar gathered key experts on Sudan to discuss the local, regional and international dimensions of Sudan's post-referendum era. It provided a number of scenarios and potential options for policy makers, and addressed the new EU strategy toward Sudan and challenges ahead for its implementation.

Non-recognition and engagement: the EU's policy toward Abkhazia

Brussels, 1-2 December 2010

Co-hosted with the European Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus and with the financial support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, this seminar explored the EU's non-recognition and engagement policy to Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the societal and economic aspects of its soft power approach. The

EU-Washington Forum 2010: giving new impetus to the EU-US agenda Washington, 8-9 November 2010



Former Senator Chuck Hagel (left) talks with Ambassador Jan Matthysen (right)

The third annual EU-Washington Forum addressed the challenge of strengthening the EU-US relationship post-Lisbon and explored options for reinvigorating the common agenda. Issues discussed at the conference included the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe, the Middle East Peace Process, disarmament and non-proliferation and the transatlantic economic partnership

event's keynote speech was given by the EU's Enlargement Commissioner, Stefan Füle. The first session covered the political and legal problems of the EU's approach toward Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the constraints and opportunities of engagement. The second and third sessions covered the economic and societal aspects of EU soft power respectively, while the final session looked at ways ahead for the EU's policy toward Georgia and the two unrecognised entities.

Beyond China-EU relations Paris, 27 October 2010



Participants of the conference at the EUISS in Paris

Co-organised with the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations and taking place in Paris on 27 October 2010, this seminar focused on the economic and regional crises facing both the EU and China, and finding a common approach for Africa. The seminar's opening remarks were provided by the CICIR Vice President, Tao Jian, and EUISS Director, Álvaro de


Vasconcelos. The first two sessions included discussions on the economic crisis and global governance; the future of the G20; and ways of dealing with some of the most serious regional crises facing both actors in the world today -- notably, Afghanistan and Iran. The seminar was concluded with a discussion on ways of finding a common approach for Africa

Security and defence in the Mediterranean Barcelona, 25 October 2010



Narcis Serra speaks at the seminar in Barcelona

Taking place at the Pedralbes Palace in Barcelona on 24 October 2010, the EU Institute for Security Studies collaborated with the Centro de Estudios y Documentación Internacionales de Barcelona (CIDOB) for this seminar. It has been organised annually since 2002 by CIDOB and the Spanish Ministry of Defence and aims to gather experts, scholars, and civil and military government officials in tackling the different challenges and threats existing in the Euromediterranean region.



European involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict Chaillot Paper - N°124 December 2010 edited by Esra Bulut-Aymat

The past year has seen new setbacks in efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, while 2011 is hailed by many as a key year for moving towards a two-state solution. This paper aspires to make a timely contribution to policy thinking

on European involvement in the conflict by focusing attention on a number of cross-cutting issues, challenges and opportunities for the EU.

A new farewell to arms: viewing disarmament in a new security environment Policy Brief - N°6 December 2010 by Jean Pascal Zanders



Advocates of disarmament have long maintained that non-conventional weapons are so destabilising to international peace and security that they should be eliminated altogether. This policy brief provides an overview of the disarmament question and examines how it is entering a new phase in a radical new context of globalisation and rapid technology diffusion.

What do Europeans want from NATO? Report N°8, November 2010 by Sven Biscop, Nicole Gnesotto, Jolyon Howarth, Daniel Keohane, Stefano Silvestri, Teija Tiilikainen coordinated by Álvaro de Vasconcelos

The future of NATO is of paramount importance for EU foreign policy. Yet no official EU perspective has been publicly formulated on NATO's 2010 strategic concept, or how it should complement the EU's foreign and security policies. This report is a contribution to the debate about NATO's future, and what that may mean for the EU.



NATO should remain predominantly a regional alliance with collective defence remaining its core business. As a military alliance, NATO must develop its missions in close collaboration with organisations with a strong civilian component like the EU or the UN. The comprehensive, strategic approach needed to confront conflict and crisis should be at the core of an EU-NATO political dialogue.



L'UE et l'Afrique : les défis de la cohérence Cahier de Chaillot - N°123 Décembre 2010 par Damien Helly


L'Afrique, depuis une décennie, est sur la voie d'une « structuration stratégique » dans tous les domaines des affaires internationales. Mais si l'Afrique change vite, les institutions changent lentement. Dans ce Cahier

de Chaillot, l'auteur examine comment l'UE relève les défis régionaux avec cohérence et à long terme.

Quelle politique pour l'UE au Zimbabwe aujourd'hui? Occasional Paper - N°87, Décembre 2010 par Vincent Darracq




Le 13 février 2009 a marqué un tournant majeur dans l'histoire contemporaine du Zimbabwe, avec l'intronisation d'un Gouvernement d'Union nationale. Dans cet Occasional Paper, l'auteur s'efforce de décrypter la politique actuelle de l'UE au regard de ce développement tout en examinant les modalités du réengagement politique et économique de l'UE au Zimbabwe.



Violence politique et paix dans le monde arabe Cahier de Chaillot - N°122, Novembre 2010 par Abdallah Saaf

L'ancien concept de « sécurité nationale arabe », que l'on croyait définitivement condamné après la disparition progressive des régimes d'obédience nationaliste arabe, perdure, voire même se renouvelle. Qu'en est-il aujourd'hui des conceptions et doctrines ? Que reste-t-il des représentations liées à la problématique de l'État postcolonial, qui avaient prévalu dans le monde arabe au cours des décennies précédentes ?

Peacebuilding in Asia: refutation or cautious engagement? Occasional Paper - N°86 November 2010 by Amaia Sánchez Cacicedo



Is there an Asian approach to peacebuilding? In this paper, the author explores what characterises the Asian approach while aiming to discern to what extent Western-dominated mainstream views of peacebuilding are applicable to Asian countries.



THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE EU: NON-STICK DIPLOMACY

For decades now, the diplomatic game in the Middle East has been summed up as: 'America plays, Europe pays'. Now that President Barack Obama has given up on direct peace talks between Israel and the Palestinian leadership, largely because of Israel's obsession with covering the ancient biblical landscape of the West Bank in concrete, might this be Europe's moment to act?

This was certainly the hope of 26 former European leaders and senior officials when they wrote a letter on 2 December 2010 calling on the EU to 'take a more active role in resolving the conflict and put its stated position into effect'. Addressed to Herman Van Rompuy, president of the European Council, and Catherine Ashton, the EU's foreign-policy supremo, the letter's seven turgid pages can be boiled down to the idea that Europe must impose a 'price tag' for Israeli policies that undermine the prospect of a peace with Palestinians.

But how? The 26 make some underwhelming suggestions: exclude goods produced in settlements from preferential trade deals (easier said than done); refer the question to the UN if America's indirect diplomacy yields no results by April 2011 (wrong target; the problem is not lack of mediation, but lack of political will and trust among the parties); eventually cut back support to the Palestinian Authority to make Israel 'shoulder its obligations as the occupying power' (Palestinians would thus pay the 'price tag'); and no 'enhancement or upgrading' of EU-Israel relations while settlements continue to expand (meaningless, given that relations are just about as tight as can be).

The 26 are wrong to imply that the question of Palestine can be resolved just by applying greater pressure. If only it were so easy. Take one conundrum: even if an Israeli government could be browbeaten into signing a deal with Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president, could its terms be imposed on Hamas, the radical Islamist

group that runs the Gaza Strip? Probably not. And Hamas retains the ability to act as a violent spoiler.

Europeans should devise a better way forward, based more on terms of incentives for peace, and less on penalties for the lack of it. They should set out a European 'roadmap' for peace: a graduated series of incentives that they are willing to offer both sides for progress, culminating with the prospect of NATO and EU membership if and when they reach a final peace deal.

effect would be greatly enhanced if Arab states were to issue a parallel roadmap.

Another objection is that neither Israel nor the Palestinians want to join European clubs. For many in Israel, NATO, which comes with a mutual-defence clause and an American nuclear guarantee, would be more attractive than the EU, with its vast *acquis* and provisions for the free movement of peoples. Palestinians, for their part, may be keener on integration with the Arab world than with Europe. In the end, membership would be for Israelis and

Palestinians to decide. Yet making the offer has value in itself. It would be a declaration of goodwill by Europe. And it would blunt Israeli suspicion that European criticism of its policies stems from pro-Arab bias, even anti-Semitism.

A third objection argues that neither Israel nor Palestine qualify as 'European'. Yet Israel is as democratic and European in outlook as Malta, Cyprus or indeed Turkey, a candidate for membership. In terms of defence capability

and technological know-how, Israel's contribution would be disproportionate to its size. What of the Palestinians? They count as a justifiable exception. They are, on the whole, the most democratic, dynamic and globalised people in the Arab world. NATO has promised eventual membership to Georgia, and the EU is offering all the small states of the Balkans, including predominantly Muslim lands such as Albania and Kosovo, a 'European perspective'. Would it be such a big deal to do the same for Palestinians if it helps cement peace? And even if Europe is a predominantly Christian club, who could really object to the inclusion of Jerusalem?

There is, in all this, a question of historical justice. Zionism was born in Europe in response to European anti-Semitism; the contours of Israel and Palestine were carved out by the British Empire. The embrace of the European family would be an act of atonement.



Rafael Ben-Ari/Cham/NEWS/COM/SIPA

If there is to be peace, a way has to be found to resolve the status of Jerusalem as the capital of two states

Such a move would complement existing initiatives, and help revive both the Bush-era roadmap of 2003 and the Arab peace initiative of the previous year, both now semi-forgotten. It would help Israelis and Palestinians focus on what they have to gain, not just what they might lose, in a compromise. By default, a succession of promises becomes a succession of penalties for those who do not move along the road to peace.

There would be many objections to a European roadmap. One is that it will not work. Certainly, after a century of conflict between Arab and Jew in the Promised Land one should not expect quick solutions. But a European roadmap would help shape the framework for peace in the medium and long term, and support peace-makers on both sides. Two small states emerging from a partition of the Holy Land should feel less insecure if they were integrated into the Euro-Atlantic community. In my view, the



EAST ASIA: TIME TO STEP UP THE EU'S POLITICAL PRESENCE

Many questions are being raised about peace and stability in East Asia following the recent security developments in the region. It is an area that generates more than a quarter of the EU's trade with the world. Yet events in 2010 signalled a worsening of relations between China and some of its neighbours, as well as between China and the US; last year witnessed the crisis on the Korean peninsula, the Sino-Japanese spat over the Senkaku/Diaoyou islands and rising tensions over territorial disputes in the South China Sea. A growing number of East Asian countries seem anxious about having to go it alone alongside a powerful and increasingly assertive China. As a result, its leaders are urging the US to commit more fully into the region's outstanding disputes and fledgling institutions.

While China's rise provides neighbouring countries with abundant economic opportunities, its increasing assertiveness is raising security concerns in the US – the guarantor of East Asia's stability through its Cold War alliances – and among its allies in the region. Indications abound that China may intend to challenge US leadership in East Asia. One of the key strategic challenges for the region's leaders in the years ahead will be finding out how to accommodate China's ascendancy into a regional security order built around the US system of alliances.

While changing power relations in East Asia complicate matters for the EU, so too do the recent security developments. East Asia is home to some of the Union's major trading partners: China is foremost among these, ranking second only to the US (EU-China trade has risen dramatically in recent years and amounted to a massive €296 billion in 2009), while the EU is China's most important trading partner. Japan is the EU's sixth largest trading partner (€92 billion in 2009); South Korea is the EU's eighth largest trading partner (€53 billion in 2009), while the EU has become South Korea's second-largest export destination. To boot, the EU and South Korea signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on 6 October 2010 – the most ambitious bilateral trade agreement ever negotiated by the EU and the first with an Asian country. In addition to trade, East Asia has also been receiving increasing stocks of European Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs). In this context of growing economic interdependence between the EU and East Asia, any turbulence and/or instability in the region, particularly among the

region's major powers, would have a direct bearing on the EU's socio-economic welfare. The question now is: should the EU step up its political presence in the region? And if so, what form should this enhanced involvement take?

Although the EU is not perceived as a fully-fledged political actor in the region, the Union and its Member States have been involved in East Asia's security since the 1990s. It is a member of the multilateral security activities of the Asia Regional Forum (ARF) and the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP),

the return of Hong Kong to China. The United Kingdom does however remain a member of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), a military consultation agreement between Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore, while France also maintains an operational military presence in the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific. And EU member states do sometimes become enmeshed in East Asia's military balance – though quite inadvertently – through the sale of arms and weapons systems: the East Asian region has recently emerged as one of the world's largest developing markets for European arms sales. As these sales are mainly guided by market forces, concerns for the region's military balance are pretty much left in Washington's hands.

For the foreseeable future then, the US will likely remain the true guarantor of stability in East Asia. Yet all this raises the question: for how long can the EU continue to free ride on US military involvement in the area, and given that it is one of the region's most important trading partners, for how long can it shy away from a more serious commitment to regional security? It seems an opportune time for EU policy makers to step up the Union's

political presence in the region and make it an important part of the strategic guidelines of EU foreign policy.

Three elements would give political backing to the EU's burgeoning economic presence in East Asia: (i) prioritise support for regionalism, including plans for an East Asian community; (ii) further political dialogues with East Asia's major powers (China, Japan, South Korea) and regional groupings (ASEAN), including support for confidence building measures and joint multilateral initiatives; (iii) beef up EU presence in the region through the EEAS, but also consider a more punctual involvement such as appointing a Special Envoy for the Korean Peninsula whose mandate should include preparations for contingency plans in case the current status quo changes.

Despite the fact that the EU needs to consult closely with the US, it should seek a more autonomous role. This way it can promote its expanding economic interests alongside its fundamental values. Furthermore, the region's policymakers are becoming increasingly interested in the EU model of interstate relations, in particular its experience in reconciling former foes. It would do well to capitalise on this.



Catherine Ashton greets China's Vice Premier Wang Qishan in Brussels

and with the establishment of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996, a 'track-two' has been initiated which includes a multilateral security dialogue on various levels between the EU and East Asia. Through the European Commission, the EU has also been a member of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) since 1997. Moreover, the EU has successfully contributed to peace and security in the region; it assisted in the establishment of democratic governments in Cambodia and East Timor and ensured the implementation of the peace agreement between the government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement.

But the EU is essentially a soft power in East Asia. It is committed to supporting the protection of human rights and the spreading of democracy, good governance, and the rule of law. The European Commission has built global partnerships and alliances with East Asian countries in international fora to help address the challenges of the globalisation process and to address non-traditional security issues such as the environment/climate change, migration, and terrorism. In terms of hard power, EU member states have no permanent military forces in East Asia. The last permanent military forces left after

Yves Loghe/AP/SIPA