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The European Security Strategy 2003-2008
Building on Common Interests

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This report follows on from the series of seminars organised in 2008 by the EUISS on the topic of the European Security Strategy (ESS). The publication is intended as a contribution to the debate on specific policy options generated by the December 2008 European Council, which put forward guidelines for the implementation of the ESS in the coming years.

The four seminar reports featured were written by EUISS Research Fellows Giovanni Grevi, Marcin Zaborowski, Daniel Keohane and Damien Helly respectively, with contributions to the first report (Rome seminar) by Damien Helly, Daniel Keohane and Luis Peral and to the second report (Natolin seminar) by Esra Bulut, Sabine Fischer and Kerry Longhurst who acted as rapporteurs for the Working Groups at those seminars.

The European Security Strategy 2003-2008: Building on common interests

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FOREWORD

The European Security Strategy

The European Security Strategy was adopted in December 2003, a landmark in the development of our Common Foreign and Security Policy. In December 2007, the European Council tasked Javier Solana with reviewing implementation over the last five years. His implementation report, entitled 'Providing Security in a Changing World', was presented to the European Council in December 2008. This report does not supplant the European Security Strategy, which remains fully valid, but examines how it has fared in practice, and what more needs to be done.

As Director of his Policy Unit, I was closely involved in the preparation process. During 2008, we held a series of consultations with representatives of Member States, the European Parliament and the foreign policy community around Europe. The European Commission was closely involved throughout the entire process. The programme of seminars organised by the EUISS, in Rome, Natolin, Helsinki and Paris, was also a central part of the process, which helped ensure that the review was transparent and inclusive. I am most grateful to Álvaro de Vasconcelos and his team for their work, and delighted to introduce this report, which is based on the work carried out in these seminars.

The implementation report five years on from the adoption of the ESS has come at an important moment. 2008 was a remarkable, perhaps even pivotal, year in foreign affairs, with financial turbulence on an unprecedented scale, conflict in Georgia, and a historic election in the United States. All these events are impacting on our world in decisive ways. At the same time, the European Union has grown in terms of its reach and capability. 2008 saw the largest civilian ESDP missions to date deployed to Kosovo and Georgia, and, for the first time, a naval mission, to tackle piracy off the coast of Somalia.

Moreover, there is a deeper trend at work in world affairs. As Javier Solana's report made clear, shifts in economic and political weight are gathering momentum. At the same time, globalisation has magnified the scale of the challenges we face, from climate change to failing states. These trends were already apparent in 2003, and reflected in the European Security Strategy. The vision enshrined in that document – a more capable, active and coherent European Union, able to address threats at source, and working through the multilateral system – shapes our policy. The implementation report sets out how far we have come and where we need to go in the future. It is not something EU institutions can do alone. Member States, national governments and parliaments, have a crucial role to play.

The threats and challenges that were identified in 2003 have not gone away. Proliferation in weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, organised crime and failing states continue to threaten our security. These threats have become more complex and interconnected in recent years, not least as a result of globalisation. The distinction between internal and external dimensions has become blurred. There are different issues, notably energy security and the security implications of climate change, which have increased in significance since 2003. Although these often go beyond our traditional concept of security, the impact on our well-being is real enough. The recent gas crisis between Ukraine and Russia is a case in point. Cyber attacks, used on a large scale as a political or economic weapon, have also become a more serious concern. We will address the issue of cyber security with experts and policymakers soon at a seminar hosted by the EUISS. The old phenomenon of piracy has taken on a new prominence, which, in Somalia, has disrupted humanitarian efforts and even affected world trade. The report also recognises the link between development and security and highlights our collective Responsibility to Protect, agreed at the 2005 UN World Summit.

What should be our response to this changing security environment?

Firstly, we need to increase our own capability – institutionally and on the ground. No other global player can draw on the same range of policies and instruments as Europe, from trade agreements to crisis management missions to diplomatic punch. But we need to deploy these in a more coherent way and we also need, especially in ESDP, sufficient assets and personnel to do the job. Under the French Presidency, the EU set new, ambitious goals in this field. Member States have agreed to draw up national plans to mobilise civilian experts, such as police or judges, at short notice. Within the Council Secretariat, a new integrated planning directorate will bring together expertise on both civilian and military operations. We are now focusing on expanding our mediation capacities and will soon be able to bring even more expertise to conflict resolution and crisis management.

The second aspect is our neighbourhood. We can build on the Neighbourhood Policy and Barcelona Process. 2008 saw the launch of a new Union for the Mediterranean, which will strengthen ties with our Southern neighbours, in such areas as the fight against terrorism, maritime safety, energy, water and migration. Plans for an Eastern Partnership foresee an upgrade of our relations to the East on economic links, energy security and mobility of people, among other areas. It is our intention to strengthen not only our bilateral ties to our neighbours but regional cooperation. Crises, as recent events in Gaza have shown, often defy bilateral solutions – durable peace and stability require a regional approach.

Thirdly, we have to address the deficiencies in the multilateral system. Fundamentally, there is a mismatch between legitimacy, which remains at a national level, and the global nature of the challenges that we face. Reshaping the international institutions, whose roots lie in the world order of 1945, has become a necessity. The financial crisis has brought a new urgency to this process, but also a new focus. As an essential first step in April, G20 countries will meet in London, to look at ways of improving financial regulation across the world. But, as the report emphasises, the process goes wider, to institutions such as the UN, WTO and International Criminal Court. We should be thinking about a collective EU position in this debate, and how we can be more prepared to share decisions with other players. I see an important role for think tanks and foreign policy experts to contribute to this process. New and innovative ways of thinking will be necessary. We will need to focus on issues such as global governance, sovereign responsibility and human security. Effective multilateralism remains key as only together can we face these global challenges.

Explaining our security strategy – both within Europe, and outside – and how it guides our action is essential. Our EU Special Representatives, in crisis spots around the world, have a particular role in this. This report is only the first step. To take the implementation of the European Security Strategy further we are talking to partner countries and international organisations to raise awareness of the report and our joint interest in providing security in a changing world.

Our work with regional organisations complements action at a global level, for instance in addressing the security implications of climate change. This issue will be at the heart of a conference of the EU with the ASEAN Regional Forum in March. We will continue to work with African governments in the framework of the EU-Africa Strategy in strengthening their capacities at the regional level, for better early warning, better cooperation between countries, and, where necessary, collective intervention through peacekeeping forces.

As this report stresses, public support is essential to sustaining EU engagement beyond our borders, notably when deploying Member States' personnel to ESDP missions in difficult and dangerous environments. Parliaments have an important role to play. We will need to better target our public diplomacy efforts to generate political will and public support.

The 2008 Report notes that implementation of the European Security Strategy remains work in progress. While we can draw satisfaction from much that the EU has achieved in foreign policy over the last five years, there is no room for complacency. The agenda that we face is possibly more challenging than at any time in recent memory.

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Helga-Maria Schmid
Director of the Policy Unit
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In December 2007 the European Council, decided to review the implementation of the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), particularly in the light of lessons learned from missions conducted in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and possibly propose 'elements to complement it.'[1] As a contribution to that review, the EUISS set itself the task of examining European interests and strategic options in depth. Holding a strategic debate at the European level, involving different regional and thematic perspectives, is one of the key conditions to enhancing cohesion among Member States and the coherence of EU foreign policy.

This report summarises and expands on the findings of the seminars the EUISS organised throughout 2008 in Rome, Natolin and Helsinki, in a collaborative exercise involving other European research and policy centres which also benefited from the involvement of the French EU Presidency. The findings of the discussion on European security culture held in Vilnius, and of the high-level meeting on EU-NATO relations organised in Paris under the auspices of the French EU Presidency, in cooperation with the EUISS, have also informed our thinking on the strategic interests and policy options of the Union. This publication, which retains the individual seminar reports in their only slightly amended original versions, is intended to contribute to the debate on specific policy options that is now needed to flesh out the guidelines put forward in the Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy, 'Providing Security in a Changing World', of December 2008.

The first conclusion that emerged from this exercise was, unsurprisingly, the dramatic change that has occurred in the international context since 2003. From now on the EU will be operating in an increasingly 'multipolar,' less Western-dominated world. As a result, consistent engagement with world and regional powers plays a greater part in shaping a multilateral world order, and Turkey's special role in the Union's security and foreign policy must be fully acknowledged. The second finding was the confirmed validity of the 2003 Solana Document and the centrality of the concept of 'effective multilateralism' as the linking thread of EU external action. The third main conclusion was the need to correctly identify European interests – the common interests of EU countries –, to act in accordance with these and to frame strategic thinking in European terms. Finally, the need for bolder EU ambition and clearly defined priorities was expressed, together with the need to work closely with the new US administration whose promise of a sea change in America's approach to international affairs bodes well for the EU's vision of a 'better world.'

1. Brussels European Council, 14 December 2007, Presidency Conclusions, paragraph 90.

The seriousness of the economic crisis that is engulfing the world was sensed although its magnitude could not have been fully gauged at the time our conclusions were drafted. But the vital interest in sound world governance, achieved through regional and worldwide frameworks, and the multilateral approach to which the EU has reaffirmed, and the US recently renewed, its commitment as foundational principles of international action are even more crucial at times of crisis and turmoil. The shift in American strategy and its consequences for the EU and the world, which could not have been fully anticipated in the course of 2008, are discussed in a separate recently published EUISS Report, *The EU and the world in 2009: European perspectives on the new American foreign policy agenda.*

The main points outlined below, which reflect a broad consensus among European experts and practitioners, often take the form of recommendations with regard to the implementation of CFSP/ESDP, a key dimension of the broader external action of the EU to help shape a post-crisis 'better world.'

The EU's international identity. Political cohesion, solidarity and continuity, the same elements that guarantee the EU's relevance in the eyes of its citizens, are the essential building blocks for the external projection of the European Union. The implementation of the Lisbon Treaty's main dispositions on CFSP is important to enable the Union to devise a strategic approach to international challenges and above all to apply it coherently and consistently.

The uniqueness of EU soft power. The association and integration between the states of the EU are characteristics that have no historical precedent. The European social model, the principle of 'unity in diversity' and its commitment to multilateralism are factors that give it a strong power of attraction. This power of attraction, or 'soft power', is an important component of EU international action which has a bearing on security as well. It makes the Union a desirable actor, in some cases even in the event of military intervention. The EU needs to demonstrate consistency with its own values in its conduct of policy, and this applies to both its internal and external policies, in particular with regard to migration issues.

Strategic partnerships consistent with human rights. In a world of great powers, the EU must consistently pursue its interests and promote its universal values in its conduct of foreign policy. The EU needs to become better at establishing strategic partnerships with other global players and regional powers while at the same time the pursuit of effective multilateral solutions and the promotion of good governance, human rights and democracy must not be neglected. This will be a difficult but essential balancing act, one that has emerged as crucially important, notably in the strategic partnership with Russia.

EU security is human security. The European security culture, the natural conse-
quence of the Union's integration process, is based on delegitimising power poli-
tics and placing the use of force firmly under the principles and values on which
the EU is founded, notably those that concern human rights and strict compliance
with international law. Protecting civilians, in other words, exercising the 're-
sponsibility to protect', is a key objective of ESDP. In that sense, the concept of
human security where the emphasis lies on the citizen as opposed to the state, is
the most compatible with EU values and interests. The protection of human rights
must thus be a fundamental component of all ESDP missions.

ESDP is an element of EU foreign policy. The success of ESDP missions depends
not only on their military component but above all on being part of a foreign
policy initiative able to resolve the political problems that made the mission
necessary in the first place. ESDP is still constrained by major political obstacles
arising from the difficulty of the Union to define a coherent foreign policy and to
bring all the components of its external action – diplomatic, military, civilian,
development – , to bear on a given crisis. The effectiveness of the Georgia moni-
toring mission in its initial stages vividly demonstrates what the EU can achieve
when there is a clear link between an ESDP operation and a bold foreign policy
initiative.

Building a stronger ESDP. Almost 10 year after the launching of ESDP, and the
deployment of more than 20 missions, it is recognised that there is a need to bol-
ster its capacities and structures so as to adequately reflect the role ESDP plays
in international security. It is vitally important that an Operations Headquarters
be established in Brussels. More common funding and pooling, more consolidated
European defence industries are needed. Small groups of countries should work
more closely together on specific projects and share more capabilities, and a
higher proportion of defence budgets should be spent on equipment. Implement-
ing the concept of 'permanent structured cooperation' contained in the Lisbon
Treaty (if the Treaty is ratified by all Member States) may help closer cooperation
between national defence ministries. The difficulty is that the criteria for join-
ing such a defence group need to be binding in order to be meaningful, but not
so stringent as to exclude Member States willing to contribute to ESDP – as the
Chad mission shows, small countries can play a major role in giving legitimacy
and effectiveness to ESDP. The criteria should be output-based, focusing on the
future. The European Defence Agency should play a crucial role, both in coordinat-
ing existing procurement plans, and encouraging more multinational procurement
and sharing of key assets such as logistics.

The coherence deficit. The implementation of EU strategy suffers from the Un-
ion's difficulty in defining a coherent foreign policy to back its missions and to
bring all the components of its external action to bear on a given crisis in an

effective way. Civilian missions and Community measures are often deployed in the same country, alongside ESDP military operation, which requires closer inter-institutional cooperation and also working with the EU presidency and the Member States. Plus, aside from internal coherence between the Council and the Commission, among others, the EU needs to work effectively with other organisations and countries. For example, in Afghanistan it must work with NATO and the US. One major problem is that EU structures are not designed to have a single chain-of-command. As a start, the EU should carry out more crisis management exercises to develop its internal coordination. Given the range of security challenges the EU is attempting to tackle, the Union's institutions must also further engage the private sector and NGOs. Bridging the gap between sectoral policies and agencies should also be a priority for the Union in shaping the multilateral system at large, as challenges are growing more complex and interconnected.

A common position towards NATO. The context of EU-NATO cooperation has changed in the last year. The US accepts ESDP; France intends to re-join NATO's military command; and Cypriot re-unification talks have re-started, which should facilitate Turkish cooperation with ESDP missions. However, there are still some problems in the relationship, such as a lack of military capabilities, the lack of an EU-US forum for strategic dialogue and a resurgent Russia. In general EU-NATO cooperation is too *ad hoc* and requires a more systemic approach, to work out shared strategic interests and contingency planning. The EU and NATO must also rethink their anti-terrorism policies since the 'war on terror' has failed. And the EU should develop a common position on the future evolution of NATO, and the impact of potential NATO enlargement on the EU's security and defence policy.

The neighbourhood is closer to the heart of European strategic interests. There is a clear need to have a policy of equilibrium between the East and the South, in order to build a common foreign and security policy able to integrate the specific sensibilities and interests of the Member States. At the same time the Union should accept that in the East as in the South a link needs to be established in the long term between development, democracy and security. More efforts should be made in conflict prevention and resolution in the neighbourhood, as a *sine qua non* condition for progress on both fronts of stability and democratisation. In face of the weakening of multilateral initiatives like the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and the *acquis communautaire*, the advanced status agreements negotiated with Morocco and Ukraine could give a common purpose to the project of political convergence, if they are consistent with EU principles with regard to human rights and international law. This means that Europe must be able to live up to its principles, including the free movement of people. Borders should not be perceived as just being about challenges and security threats, but as also presenting opportunities to create complex, transnational zones of administrative and cultural activity and exchange.

Conflict prevention must prevail over conflict management. Conflicts in the EU neighbourhood are live, not 'frozen'. The impact of these conflicts is extremely detrimental to the states concerned as well as in a wider regional context, deeply affecting the livelihood of their citizens. They fuel separatism and undermine sustainable development and democratic consolidation, and they also foster re-militarisation across borders. The Union needs to develop a policy designed to prevent conflict, with a particular focus on its own neighbourhood. The need for a stronger commitment was apparent throughout the year 2008, particularly in the case of Georgia. In the last five years, the EU has not been able to deliver a real policy of prevention of conflicts like the one in Georgia or to foster a real solution to the Israeli-Palestinian question.

Dealing with global challenges and avoiding securitisation. The focus of attention and debate in 2008 shifted from the types of challenges highlighted in 2003 – terrorism, proliferation, failing states and organised crime – to global challenges that transcend the purely security dimension such as climate change and energy, seen as major long-term concerns, and the new kinds of challenges posed by the unfolding financial crisis. Because the latter are of a political and social nature, a greater need arises to avert the trend towards 'securitisation,' in particular regarding policy instruments designed to deal with their consequences. However, the more traditional security field was not neglected. There is a clear need to avert further proliferation and new strategic thinking on multilateral regimes and instruments is in strong demand. Concerns exist as to the introduction of a power-politics equation in Europe by Russia. The possibility of Europe facing a world game of power politics for which it has no wish and is ill-prepared cannot be entirely discarded, even if there is a widespread conviction that the EU has no clear adversary, and that there is no new Cold War in the offing. Dealing with the situation in Afghanistan, where there is a real risk of NATO failure, was perceived as a security priority, as well as tackling the conflicts in the Neighbourhood.

Working with the new American administration. Even in an increasingly multipolar world, there is no doubt that the US will remain the most powerful country on the planet and a crucial partner for Europe. The EU must be clear on its priorities for cooperation with the new US administration, focusing on effective multilateralism, the broader Middle East and Russia. Hopes *vis-à-vis* a revived and closer direct EU-US relationship were expressed by most of the speakers at the seminars, some of whom were keen to see the EU and the US clarifying their strategic objectives on specific areas such as Afghanistan in particular. Moreover, the change of administration in the US has provided an opportunity for the EU to make a strong case for deeper American engagement in non-proliferation regimes, such as the ratification and implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Better governance for a better world. Many of the challenges that today loom large in the concerns of Europeans, like the economic and financial crisis, climate change or energy, or the need to prevent humanitarian crises, genocide and mass murder, need to be dealt with at world level. The same is true for poverty and pandemics. Globalisation is both an opportunity and a challenge. Shaping globalisation as proposed in the EU Declaration on Globalisation of December 2007 requires the contribution of other international players and this implies a clear need for the reform of international institutions in order to make them more representative and efficient. Strengthening global governance is of paramount importance for effective multilateralism and, for that reason, it must be an overriding strategic priority for the Union.

INTRODUCTION

In December 2003 the European Union adopted a common security strategy whose title, 'A secure Europe in a better world', reflected its ultimate goal. Drafted under the guidance of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, this document was meant to define the security challenges confronting the Union and to provide a common sense of purpose to the EU in shaping the international system and contributing to world peace. The rationale behind the European Security Strategy (ESS) is to support a multilateral system of world governance that can deliver international peace and security. Effective multilateralism is the guiding principle of the ESS.

Background and main issues

How the EUISS-led debates came about

Over the past five years the EU has made considerable strides in the implementation of the European Security Strategy, but a lot remains to be achieved. In particular, multilateral institutions and frameworks have come under severe strain, and their effectiveness in preventing conflict and guaranteeing peace has often been questioned. These developments affect the EU's efforts to shape an effective multilateral world order able to cope with the challenges and threats identified in the ESS, namely: international terrorism; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; regional conflicts; failed states, and organised crime. Over the same period, the goals and principles enshrined in the ESS have informed EU policymaking in wider areas, such as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), launched by the Commission in 2004. Acting on the proposal of French President Nicolas Sarkozy, the European Council decided to review its implementation, particularly in the light of lessons learned from European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions, and possibly propose 'elements to complement it'.

In the course of the preparation of the 2003 document, the EUISS provided an important contribution to the drafting process by bringing together researchers and practitioners to reflect on the priorities of EU foreign policy and identify the main challenges to peace and security confronting the Union. Throughout 2008, we engaged in a similar exercise involving the community of experts and practitioners in a debate on the implementation of the ESS and possible ways to ensure its effectiveness.

In so doing, we focused on the European interests and strategic options which we examined from a variety of geographical and thematic standpoints, for one of the main conditions for the successful implementation of the EU strategy is its ability to ensure that Member States act coherently and cohesively together. Our aim was to formulate a set of conclusions that might be useful ahead of the European Council in December 2008, and more largely to contribute to the necessary debate on the policy options to implement the document approved by the European Council. The debate on the implementation of the European Security Strategy will certainly need to take into consideration the change in American strategy, in 2009-2010, that the election of Barak Obama will bring. This will inevitably involve the revision of the Bush doctrine of pre-emption (adopted in 2002 and revised in 2006) and the calling into question of the entire concept of the war on terror.

In launching this EU-wide debate, we have touched upon several key questions. Some of them relate to the EU's internal development, others to the nature of the challenges facing the EU and the international community. Some of these key issues lie at the intersection between internal and external aspects. The EUISS set out to:

- investigate the character of the EU's foreign policy identity and its vision of the world order, and whether this fosters a distinctive security culture in tandem with a distinctive, common vision of multilateralism;
- examine how an effective multilateral agenda can operate in a multipolar context, and how global players, old and new, can be engaged in implementing it;
- investigate how the EU can reach out to others and address widening gaps in mutual perceptions;
- determine what are the shared principles and values that should guide EU foreign and security policy, and track its record in translating commitment to values and principles into concrete policies;
- suggest ways in which bilateral strategic partnerships may best be combined with support for regional integration and cooperation processes;
- determine how security challenges evolved in the last five years and how they can best be addressed through coherent and effective external action, making full use of the CFSP and the ESDP mechanisms;
- draw specific lessons from the implementation of the ESS in crisis management and the broader security field.

This report summarises and expands on the findings of the seminars the EUISS has organised, in cooperation with other European research and policy centres, in Rome, Natolin and Helsinki, leading up to a Forum on European Interests and Strategic Options in Paris which benefited from the involvement of the French

EU Presidency. The findings of the discussion on European security culture held in Vilnius, and of the high-level meeting on EU-NATO relations organised in Paris under the auspices of the French EU Presidency, in cooperation with the EUISS, have also informed our thinking on the strategic interests and policy options of the Union.[2]

The first chapter of this report sets the debate on the implementation of the ESS in the broader context of the EU's identity and performance as a global actor. From this perspective, CFSP and ESDP are regarded as important dimensions of the external projection of the Union.

2. See the full list of seminars in the Annex.

I. INCREASING THE CONSISTENCY AND COHERENCE OF EU EXTERNAL ACTION

The security culture of the European Union

The departure point of this report is that the EU has a distinctive approach to security that is coherent with its founding values and principles. This applies to internal as well as to external security. The European security culture is the natural consequence of the Union's integration process. At its core lies the delegitimisation of power politics – with peace as the major objective of EU foreign and security policy. Thus Clausewitz's famous dictum that war is a continuation of politics by other means could be rephrased as follows: for the EU, peace is the natural *component* of state policy, even and especially when by other means!

The delegitimisation of power politics

The necessity of delegitimising power politics between the European states as a means of guaranteeing lasting peace was the fundamental lesson learned by the founding fathers of the European Union after the bloody experience of the Second World War. During that period, power politics reigned supreme, and fuelled the rise of extreme nationalism. The founders of the Union made it clear that the principal aim of integration was to put a definitive end to intra-European wars. As Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida would later put it: 'A bellicose past once entangled all European nations in bloody conflicts. They drew a conclusion from that military and spiritual mobilization against one another: the imperative of developing new, supranational forms of cooperation after the Second World War. The successful history of the European Union may have confirmed Europeans in their belief that the domestication of state power demands a mutual limitation of sovereignty, on the global as well as the national state level.'[3]

As a consequence of the fact that power politics as a way of conducting relations between Member States has been discredited, the EU cannot behave unilaterally in its dealings with other states without compromising its very legitimacy and, equally, its ability to act in the international arena. Its powers of influence and

3. Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, « Europe: plaidoyer pour une politique extérieure commune », *Libération*, 2 June 2003.

persuasion, even and especially when the use of force is called for, are primarily a function of its own internal model of peace and association between states.

Peace as a natural component of state policies

For the EU, the use of military force is a last resort that can only be legitimate when all diplomatic means have been exhausted. That corresponds not only to the lessons that the Europeans have drawn from their bellicose past but also to their adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter. For the best part of its existence, up to 1989, however, Europe had to be prepared for a new world war scenario where the European continent would be at the epicentre of hostilities. And the end of the Cold War did not make war disappear, as the continent bore witness to the return of extreme nationalism in its most virulent forms. These conflicts led the EU to adopt a security and defence policy whose main objective was the protection of civilians threatened by war on the European continent, but also beyond its borders. This in no way implies a recognition that force is a legitimate means of pursuing the po-litical and economic interests of the EU – contrary to the traditional behaviour of many European states, notably in their extensive historic colonial enterprises. This vision stands in stark contrast, moreover, with a Euro-centric vision of the world.

This cornerstone of the Union's security and defence policy is supported by the majority of European citizens, and justified both their broad support to the opera-tion in Kosovo and their fierce opposition to the 2003 Iraq war. The Europeans' general reluctance to go to war and the outright rejection of 'traditional' wars, perceived as illegitimate, does not translate into a rejection of the use of military force. There is a sustained level of public support for European defence across the EU (which normally exceeds public support for other EU policies), and high levels of public support for the use of force, whether EU or national, to prevent or stop crimes against humanity. Both Bosnia and Darfur provide eloquent examples.

ESDP is an element of EU foreign policy

The Treaty on European Union put ESDP in the framework of the Union's foreign and security policy, subordinated to the aims of the promotion of peace, security and sustainable development, in Europe and in the world. This is a consequence of the fact that as the Cold War came to an end, European states no longer conceived of an existential threat to their survival. This is consistent with the EU view, enshrined in the ESS, that for the resolution of international problems, from regional con-flicts to failed states, from proliferation and terrorism to organised crime, military means are but one component, and often not the most important.
As a modern, civilian power, the EU privileges a comprehensive approach in re-

solving security problems, drawing from all the components of its international policy, not only military but also political, economic, judicial or those relating to internal security or development aid. The 2003 ESS articulates precisely this idea when it calls upon the Union to make use of the 'full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities'.[4] The effectiveness and coherence of ESDP missions is clearly linked to the diplomatic and foreign policy initiatives deployed to deal with the components of a given crisis: this was the case in Georgia where the EU monitoring mission was developed in the context of a successful diplomatic initiative to stop the war. In other cases, the lack of a coherent foreign policy explains the inadequate political achievements of a given ESDP mission.

The external action of the EU is grounded in its founding principles

For the Union's security policy to be legitimate, efficient and effective, it must strictly respect the principles and values on which the EU is founded, notably those that concern human rights, and in full observance of international law. This is clearly formulated in the European Union Treaty when it outlines the aims of the CSFP: 'to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter.' [5]

CSFP and ESDP must therefore take this clear commitment into account in relation to action on the international stage, because, as stated in the Lisbon Treaty: 'The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.'[6]

These principles and values must be particularly taken into consideration during extreme and exceptional situations requiring recourse to military force. The human rights dimension of the ESDP must be fully applied, as the EU fully endorses the principle of the responsibility to protect. The European Union needs to define a clear doctrine concerning the question of civilian casualties during ESDP

4. Javier Solana, 'A safer Europe in a better world', European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003.

5. See the Treaty of Amsterdam, article J.1 part V, 'Dispositions concerning a foreign common and security policy', *Official Journal* n° C 340, 10 November 1997.

6. See 'Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union', article 21 part V, *Official Journal* nº C 115, 9 May 2008.

or indeed NATO operations. There is an urgent need, in light of the rising number of civilian casualties, to contribute to a universal application of international law regarding so-called 'collateral damage' and this will imperatively involve the creation of new legislation.

The importance of preserving the Union's soft power

The association and integration between the states of the EU are characteristics that have no historical precedent. The European social model and the principle of 'unity in diversity' are factors that give it a strong power of attraction, which Joseph Nye has termed 'soft power'. The Union's ensuing defence of multilateralism causes it to be viewed by public opinion in third countries as an international public good, as an indispensable force to shape an international system based on norms and rules. This is however a view that is not shared by many of the new global players that have a more traditional perspective of multilateralism based on balance of power. The success of the European regional integration process has been the object of innumerable studies, and is the source of inspiration for regional cooperation initiatives in many parts of the world. The power of attraction of the EU facilitates its action on the international stage and makes it, in many circumstances, a desirable, most favoured actor even when it has to intervene militarily. Former colonial powers have a specific role to play in certain regions of the world with which they have a special relationship but, to be effective, they increasingly seek European legitimacy as an important component of their military operations in these countries.

Avoiding 'securitisation'

The post-September 11 international environment has posed a significant number of challenges to the founding principles and values of the Union's external action. Under the influence of the US 'war on terror', there has been a trend towards prioritising security in absolute terms, and interpreting a wide variety of international and regional issues through that sole prism. Europe has not been immune to this trend, which evolved in tandem with the priority that the United States has given to military options to the detriment of all other options. The 'securitisation' of essentially development and social questions such as migration has permeated the policy options of numerous states. Security-first options, which more often than not worsen real security problems, weaken the rule of law and open the way for laws of exception, against the liberal traditions of open societies. In the case of migration, for example, this diminishes the EU's soft power in the countries of origin of migration, while giving rise to equally 'securitised' attitudes towards foreign nationals in host countries. The war against terror concept has weakened the role of justice in the fight against terrorism and has provided authoritarian regimes with a pretext to justify their violations of human rights.

This predisposition to 'securitisation' tends to blur the remaining distinction between external and internal security, which is in contradiction with the constitutional traditions of several Member States, notably those whose democracies were at one time put in jeopardy by military intervention.

Actively promoting effective multilateralism

The European Union is not only a multilateral construct but also an active promoter of multilateral solutions to global and regional challenges. The EU conceives of multilateralism, on the strength of its own experience, not as a way to balance, to limit or even to counter the power of the most powerful international actors, but rather as the best way to deal with the problems confronting the citizens of Europe and the world, to face global challenges, and to overcome tension, conflict and threats to international peace.

The 2003 ESS defines effective multilateralism by stating that in 'a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective.'[7]

The centrality of this objective was not questioned, rather a broad consensus emerged that the concept of effective multilateralism is the linking thread of the European Union's international action. Equally, it was a matter of general agreement that while multilateralism has been far less effective than it needs to be, the unilateralist approach which is incompatible with EU principles and values has proven a total failure.

The need for a comprehensive foreign policy strategy

The trend towards 'securitisation' leads to a whole range of essential foreign policy issues being categorised under the security and defence heading, the first taking precedence over the latter. This temptation is compounded by the fact that the EU does not yet have a foreign policy strategy comparable to the ESS.

There is a clear demand for the elaboration of strategic guidelines covering the full breadth of EU foreign policy and providing a common framework to all its dimensions ranging from security and defence to foreign policy proper and all external activities of the European Commission. This has been confirmed throughout the EUISS debates. Such a document could build on the declaration on globalisation approved by the European Council in December 2007 and on a number of well thought-out documents on EU strategic priorities for different regions of

7. op. cit. in note 4.

the world, such as the guidelines governing the neighbourhood policy, the different strategic partnerships and relations with Africa (the EU Africa Strategy). Giving a strategic sense to ESDP, as the ESS provides for, is also a crucial component in such a process. Some of the new challenges emphasised by the document on the implementation of the ESS, such as energy security or the implications of climate change, need to be dealt with in a coherent and effective way with global solutions, involving a diversity of international actors, from the UN to regional organisations and from big powers to NGOs. This requires greater attention from the EU in implementing its strategy for global governance as well as the reform of multilateral institutions to make that effective.

Political implications

The debates that took place during this year reflected the conviction shared by most that the principles stated in the 2003 strategy needed to be reaffirmed. For an effective implementation of its main political goals a better definition of the present and future context within which the EU will develop its international and its security policies is necessary, considering in particular the following five aspects:

1)   *The West needs the Rest.* In 2003, the world still seemed open to western leadership; today it is clear that, in order to put into practice its strategy of effective multilateralism, the Union must abandon its perspective of Euro-American leadership, while being capable of including in a more consistent way new global players like China, India, Russia, Brazil and without neglecting the regional powers.

2)   *A fresh chance to build a multilateral world order.* In 2003, the ESS was in a sense the product of necessity as the Union had to formulate an adequate and united response to the divisions provoked by the war in Iraq. Today, the ESS should be focused on the capacity of Europeans, together with the United States and other global actors, to reform the international system so as to usher in a multilateral era. The new American President has declared his willingness to return the United States to the multilateral game. This should open up new horizons for effective multilateralism and the emergence of a multilateral world order, with a commitment to global governance at the heart of Euro-American relations.

3)   *Governance, not security, must be the top priority in the era of globalisation.* The priority questions of the European Union's international agenda, from the financial crisis to climate change, from energy to trade, relate above all to governance, global and regional, although they can also have security implications. They imply the need for a European vision of globalisation and of the best way to benefit from interdependence while managing its unwelcome consequences.

4) *Getting NATO strategy consistent with European strategy.* Crucial to the future of global security governance will be the degree of convergence between the EU and the US approaches and the way that this is reflected in NATO strategy. A convergence of the security strategies can now be envisaged. This will allow for a revision of NATO Strategy so that it is in line with European strategy, which means in particular avoiding the securitisation of political and social issues and the emergence of new bipolarities, including on the European continent.

5) *Coherence and consistency as twin drivers of EU external action.* Two general driving principles of the Union's international action were strongly reaffirmed during the debates: that of consistency with its values, and the pressing need to ensure the coherence of EU external activities as a whole – those pertaining to external relations, security, justice and home affairs, economic and development policies. The twin drivers of coherence and consistency should ideally apply to the states of the Union, so as to ensure fully concerted and effective action on the part of the European Union. This underlines the urgency of implementing the Lisbon Treaty and its provisions on EU foreign and security policy.

On the basis of the debates, and reflecting European public opinion on this issue, we can formulate six main conclusions in this respect:

- Strict adherence to values and principles is in order, generating policy-consistency and coherence between the varieties of actors in all aspects of EU external action.
- The effectiveness of ESDP missions is dependent not only on their military component but above all on this being integrated into a clear foreign policy posture able to deal with the political problems that made the mission necessary in the first place.
- There is a strong demand for more robust international action from the European Union. This includes clear support for the development of ESDP, perceived as a priority for the cooperation between the states of the Union and an area where progress is not only possible but necessary.
- The European Union is a desired partner for third countries, especially in its neighbourhood but also beyond. This desire is manifested by the readiness shown by many states in the neighbourhood to cooperate in the EU's international initiatives, including defence-related ones, a readiness that Europe should be prepared to take on board.
- There is a strong need not just for consistency and coherence, principles and values; in a world of global powers guided by political interests, it is necessary for the Union to precisely define its interests and pursue them strategically.

- The change in American policy should be seen as a window of opportunity for the European Union to advance its international agenda. Europe needs to spell out the vision of what it expects from the new American administration and build with it a shared vision of a new global and European order.

II. SEMINAR REPORTS

1. THE EU AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: RULES, POWER AND PRIORITIES

The European Security Strategy: a critical review

The nature of the strategic debate launched in December 2007 was the subject of broad agreement, although there were different nuances of opinion regarding the scope and ultimate purpose of the exercise. It was stressed that the parameters of the review of the implementation of the ESS had been set by the European Council and that the reach and ambition of the ongoing process needed to be framed in that context. Some participants argued that the door should be left open for further developments and additions in the light of the momentous changes in the international system (see below). Many felt that not only the implementation of the ESS document but also the analysis of the global transformations affecting its background, and of the consequent challenges, needed careful consideration. No conclusion was drawn as to whether that would impact on the text of the ESS as such.

With regard to the important events taking place in the course of 2008 and 2009, many noted the timeliness of this process. The upcoming US presidential elections, the recent change of leadership in Moscow, and the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty provided a window of opportunity for the EU to contribute new ideas and influence developments. The strategic debate at EU level can also have an impact on the process leading to the formulation of a new NATO strategic concept.

It was pointed out that there is a pressing need for strategic thinking, that such thinking should be framed in European terms, with a view to identifying common interests, and that much focus should be put on the implementation of strategic guidelines. With a view to implementation, the basic requirements of priority-setting and coherence were emphasised. First, the EU cannot realistically aim to intervene everywhere at all times and some ranking of priorities was essential to channel resources and determine the degree of the EU's involvement. Second, coherence should be fostered not only between different policies, but also between what the EU does and the principles and values that it claims to represent and support at the global level.

Many insisted that the EU needed to be given the appropriate instruments and pro-cedures to implement its strategic objectives. A number of participants stressed that the full implementation of the new provisions of the Lisbon Treaty concerning CFSP and external action at large would be crucial to enable the EU to shape and implement an effective security strategy.

The shifting geopolitical context: challenges ahead

It was noted that the biggest systemic change compared to 2003 consisted of the shift of economic and political power from the West to emerging countries. A new international order is being defined and the EU needs to contribute to this evolu-tion with new ideas and policy innovation. Some described the international system shaping up as 'multipolar' and maintained that the biggest challenge for the EU would be to manage emerging multipolarity through multilateral structures and ini-tiatives. In this context, it was stressed that the EU needs to get better at shaping strategic partnerships with major global players. The list of threats and challenges included in the ESS was considered still relevant but it was argued that the shift in the underlying geopolitical paradigm needed to be better reflected in the EU's policies.

In particular, it was argued that the liberal internationalist vision underpinning the EU's strategic posture was seriously challenged by the mutual interplay of economic globalisation and geopolitical considerations. Globalisation shapes geopolitics in three main ways, namely via the rapid growth of new economic powers, the compe-tition for energy and raw materials, and the huge transfer of financial resources from the West to new economic centres. Conversely, geopolitics is transforming globalisation, as political considerations inform economic and energy strategies. Politics and economics are increasingly intertwined and require a joint strategic approach.

The growing competition of ideas, narratives and political models challenged, ac-cording to some participants, the international legitimacy of the EU and of the West at large, thereby affecting the pursuit of its priorities. In addition to the distinction between democratic and authoritarian regimes, many emphasised the distinction between countries prepared to share sovereignty to enter multilateral arrangements and those holding an absolute notion of sovereignty, and thus not inclined to subscribe to international rules. In this respect, the big question was what would be the prevailing trend. The answer has considerable implications for the EU, which is based on the very principle of sharing sovereignty.

The EU: redefining its role as an international actor

Three main sets of issues were addressed in this context. First, given the changing strategic landscape, some argued that the EU needed to equip itself to play simultaneously at different levels, namely interest-based bargaining and multilateral cooperation. One speaker described the challenge for the EU as 'becoming more like the others' but the question was raised as to whether the EU is both willing and able to do that and play power politics. Another participant felt that the EU should not frame relationships in confrontational terms, as that would not be consistent with the very nature of the European project. Playing different roles with different partners and on different policy issues would also carry implications for the way in which the EU is perceived by others.

Second, with reference to the EU's much-discussed 'transformational' power, the point was made that EU's power 'begins at home' – soft power is a function of the political and strategic culture of the EU and of the attractiveness of its model. The EU can influence transformation and reform in other countries either directly, through enlargement, or by default. The latter form of influence would crucially depend on the internal features of the Union, and on its political cohesion. It was stressed in this context that cohesion and solidarity are precious assets for the external projection of the EU, and that Member States should strive to shape a common front *vis-à-vis* third countries.

Third, and related to this, many felt that the EU needed to organise itself more effectively if it wanted to help shape the international order at large. From this standpoint, the problem of the disconnection between EU policies was highlighted, with an emphasis on the link between internal and external policies such as migration and integration, neighbourhood, state capacity-building, as well as border controls. At the national level, the priorities and perceptions of different ministries on EU-relevant policy matters were considered still difficult to reconcile in a coherent vision. At the European level, coherence needed to be enhanced between different 'pillars' and within each institution in terms of both policy measures and effective use of financial resources. Participants agreed that devising and implementing the European Security Strategy crucially required cohesion, consensus-building, coherence and continuity.

Multilateralism under pressure

The assessment of the effectiveness of multilateral frameworks and initiatives was mixed. It was emphasised that the focus should shift from the concept of effective multilateralism to the concrete measures needed to make multilateralism work in

specific organisations and on priority issues. From an EU standpoint, effective multilateralism is about delivering solutions in a cooperative fashion. However, some speakers noted that this distinctive European approach was not necessarily shared by other major global players, who regarded multilateralism as a means to balance US power. The challenge lies in engaging global players at the level of both discourse and practice to consolidate the multilateral order. In this respect, however, it was remarked that the EU preached effective multilateralism but its Member States were not prepared to devise a common approach to the reform of international organisations, thereby undermining their own policy.

According to various speakers, the effectiveness and legitimacy of multilateral organisations were affected not only by shifting power structures but by internal shortcomings as well. Reference was made in particular to a deficit of account-ability, which made it difficult to allocate responsibility, a deficit of human and financial resources in the face of an expanding policy agenda, and a deficit of confidentiality, with leaks hampering frank exchanges on sensitive matters. Mul-tilateral institutions also suffered from introspection, with achieving a common position often considered as tantamount to accomplishing a policy, and from the constraints of the minimum common denominator compromise.

It was also noted that 'disaggregating' problems between different international organisations with different competences and cultures challenged the quest for comprehensive responses to complex and interconnected challenges. One speaker argued that, ultimately, the nation state remained the most effective actor in international politics but it was broadly agreed that this was not a sustainable solution and that the shortcomings of multilateral cooperation should provide the trigger for re-launching multilateral engagement and not for rolling it back.

Turning to specific international organisations, the centrality of the UN to inter-national peace and security was restated by many. Disappointment with the new Human Rights Council was balanced by new hopes with regard to the activities of the Peacebuilding Commission. The success of the WTO in integrating China into a framework of common binding rules was highlighted, as well as the progress made in the preparation of the upcoming talks on climate change, with a strong EU lead-ership role. On the other hand, it was felt that non-proliferation and disarmament regimes had been seriously strained and were weaker now than in 2003, which called for stronger investment in their consolidation.

Implementing effective multilateralism

The contribution of the EU to an effective multilateral approach was considered critical in addressing, among others, the challenge of reconciling the security and development agendas in crisis areas, the threat of WMD proliferation and the

promotion of human rights in third countries, notably in the neighbourhood of the Union.

Security and development

The ESS acknowledged that security and development go hand-in-hand in building peace and stability. As such, participants felt that the document was still relevant, although much remained to be done for the EU to implement a comprehensive approach to crisis management, prevention and stabilisation. Some progress has been achieved with more joint assessment and fact-finding missions and with the focus on security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) – bridge-building policy areas at the junction of security and development. Likewise, various speakers noted the joined-up effort of the EU in establishing a joint strategy with the African Union (AU) and the setting up of a double-hatted position heading the EU representation to the AU. In this connection, it was argued that the establishment of the External Action Service would enhance coherence from planning to implementation.

However, various challenges were highlighted which still hampered progress in this direction. First, it was remarked that 'cultural differences' and reluctance to engage between the security and development communities still prevented effective cooperation. Second, it was stressed that training was a problem for both security and development practitioners, since both groups needed to be made more sensitive to respective requirements. Third, the EU needed to clarify whose security it wanted to guarantee primarily, whether that of the state, of individuals or of communities, as different policy recipes would follow. Fourth, and related, the concept of ownership needed to be 'unpacked' in implementing the security-development nexus, as EU perspectives may not fit with those of local actors. Fifth, 'context-sensitivity' was considered essential to devise the best approaches in a flexible way, and the rigidity of traditional EU assistance programmes was questioned. Sixth, various speakers noted that more work was required to reconcile the security and development agendas not only in Africa but also in other regions, such as Kosovo, the frozen conflicts in the Eastern neighbourhood, and in the Palestinian territories.

Many participants argued that coherence needed to be promoted not only between different policy areas but between different actors on the ground as well. It was recalled that EU Member States often took a leading role, for example in Africa, but coordination between the national level and the EU level left scope for improvement. Little coordination within the EU also undermined coordination with other international organisations, chiefly the UN. All agreed that the EU and the UN would gain very much from enhancing cooperation but their different structures and procedures made that difficult.

Policy implications and recommendations
- ▪ The EU needs to generate more civilian capabilities for conflict prevention, management and post-conflict stabilisation, and include a wide range of expertise in future formats. Training should be a priority and the interaction between the security and development communities should start at this level.
- ▪ Various Member States have accumulated relevant experience and developed distinctive approaches, which should be addressed with a view to generating convergence at EU level. The activities of Member States in the field should be much more closely connected with those of the EU.
- ▪ Lines of command and responsibility should be further clarified and consolidated at EU level to maximise coordination. There is a question of overall authority in the field and the UN model of integrated missions, with the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) in charge of coordination, could offer interesting insights.
- ▪ The EU and the UN should work more closely together on identifying and learning lessons from operational experience, as a basis for further cooperation. Better synergies should also be sought with NATO where the three organisations operate in the field.
- ▪ The EU should devise clear strategic priorities guiding its intervention in conflicts or crises. Policy coordination cannot substitute for a clear sense of the political purposes of the mission and of its ultimate objectives. At a broader level, the scope for EU participation in international interventions was explored and the question was put as to whether the EU needed to identify its own niches or to implement a more ambitious approach cutting across all the dimensions of such interventions.

Non-proliferation and disarmament

The ESS singles out WMD proliferation as 'potentially the greatest threat' to European security. The EU's common interests and strategic options have largely been identified in the domain of non-proliferation. There is a consensus on the fact that, since the spread of WMD is a global problem, it can only be dealt with through multilateral regimes and action, and the EU/Member States are the main supporters and funders of these arrangements. That said, there is reason for concern when looking at the progressive weakening of multilateral regimes and notably at the challenge posed by the Iranian nuclear programme. While the EU has taken a proactive role on the Iranian dossier, it has been absent from other key issues such as North Korea or the implications of the US-India nuclear deal.

There was a broad agreement on the fact that the ESS sections on non-proliferation did not require amendment, although some felt that the mention of the possible terrorist use of WMD needed clarification. The EU's WMD strategy also proved a viable document and a good framework for action. Speakers underlined that

more focus needed to be put on implementation. Moreover, the upcoming change of administration in the US provided an opportunity for the EU to make a strong case for a deeper American engagement in non-proliferation regimes, such as the ratification and implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Policy implications and recommendations

- The EU should enhance its commitment to engage third countries in joining and implementing non-proliferation regimes, as it helped to do with respect to the Chemical Weapons Convention.
- The EU should take a stronger profile in the arms control debate and target specific issues where Member States' positions converge, such as averting the spread of ballistic missiles.
- Given the limited resources available, the EU should keep a clear sense of its priorities. At the same time, the resources dedicated to this important dossier should be expanded.
- Coordination should be enhanced across all the policy domains which impact on non-proliferation, such as energy policy and also cooperation agreements and security sector reform.

Human rights

Some participants felt that the EU needed to improve its performance in promoting human rights in third countries. It was argued that the tools and procedures to implement human rights policies have not much improved since 2003 and some felt that funding was not commensurate with policy ambitions. More broadly, many speakers pointed at the growing tension among EU foreign policy priorities between the normative agenda of human rights and democracy promotion and economic or energy concerns.

The point was made that positive conditionality was not consistently applied and led to a perception of double standards. It was also emphasised that the share of assistance going through the governments of third countries was growing, while more focus needed to be put on how to involve civil society actors. The practice of negative conditionality by way of sanctions was not regarded as an effective means of promoting democracy and human rights.

Participants noted that the expansion of democracy and freedom around the world is stalling, although some felt that the picture is not black and white as there are both 'illiberal' democracies and relatively 'liberal' authoritarian regimes. The rise of powers not subscribing to the human rights agenda made things more complicated for the EU in regions such as Central Asia and Africa. Some felt that the EU needed to engage regional organisations and democratic actors such as India, South Africa and Brazil in the promotion of human rights. It was argued, however, that the democratic nature of domestic political regimes did not necessarily guarantee that democracy promotion would be a foreign policy priority for these countries.

The respect of human rights and international humanitarian law in the context of crisis management operations was addressed and EU practice in this regard was positively assessed. Legal shortcomings were identified concerning the protection of human rights in the course of ESDP operations, notably regarding the access to redress and compensation in case of their violation, but it was noted that the EU and its Member States sought to abide by the highest standards. Counter-terrorist policies also needed to fully respect human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Policy implications and recommendations
- The values upheld by the EU constitute the real 'added value' of its foreign policy compared to other actors. Much thought needs to go into defining the balance between the legitimate pursuit of European interests and the enhanced promotion of human rights and democracy.
- The promotion of human rights and democracy should be better mainstreamed across other external policies. The EU needs a sort of 'Consensus on democracy' along the lines of the 'Consensus on development'.
- If it wants to make a difference, the EU should allocate more resources to these policy objectives, while policies and incentives should be better fine-tuned depending on the specific political circumstances of recipient countries. In this context, there was a need to avoid excessive dependence on local governments and further involve civil society in reform processes.
- Relevant EU policy documents should include a clear commitment to the respect of the highest standards of human rights and international humanitarian law in conflict and crisis management situations.

Conclusions

Strategic thinking needs to be framed in European terms, with a view to identifying common interests and implementing them effectively. The ESS guidelines remain valid but the convergence of Member States around key objectives should be enhanced and priorities should be more clearly indicated.

Political cohesion, solidarity, consensus and continuity are the essential building blocks for the external projection of the Union. The implementation of the Lisbon Treaty is important to enable the Union to devise a strategic approach and above all to apply it consistently.[8]

The EU needs to improve policy coordination and consistency, including between its internal and external policies. Bridging the gap between sectoral policies and

8. The discussion took place before the Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty.

organisations should also be a priority for the Union in shaping the multilateral system at large, as challenges are growing more complex and interconnected.

In a more competitive international environment, the EU has to pursue a 'multi-level' foreign policy that includes both defending its interests and promoting its values. This is going to be a difficult but essential balancing act. The EU needs to become better at establishing strategic partnerships with other global actors. On the other hand, the EU cannot and should not neglect those aspects that make it a distinctive international actor, namely the pursuit of effective multilateral solutions and the promotion of human rights, good governance and democracy.

2.   A COMMON APPROACH TO THE NEIGHBOURHOOD

Values and interests in EU policy towards the neighbours

The panellists agreed that EU foreign policy has to be a mix of both values and interests. It was also argued that a value-driven foreign policy is particularly important in guiding relations with close neighbours not least because the more similar the neighbours are, the more likely it is that our relations with them are consensual. For example, the EU's relations with the European Economic Area (EEA) states are particularly close while our relations with Russia are increasingly problematic.

ENP countries are advised to align themselves with CFSP declarations and most of them do so. The three ENP states that enjoy an advanced status *vis-à-vis* the EU – Morocco, Israel and Ukraine – are also the closest in terms of their values to the EU. At the same time, the EU continues to stress both values and interests in its dealings with Moscow even though Russia has moved further away from the EU's set of values in recent years. There is no doubt, however, that the EU needs to work closely with Russia especially in those areas where the EU has considerable interests such as energy, economy and conflicts in the former Soviet republics.

Revision of the implementation of the ESS/EU PRTs in Afghanistan

It was declared that Poland supports the process of revising the ESS. It was argued that the document produced in 2003 should be fine-tuned to better reflect the current environment of the EU and its increased membership. Such a reflection should also be used to reconsider relations between NATO and the EU.

The implementation of the ESS and the capacity of the EU to act externally are crucial tests – an example could be the EU presence in Afghanistan. In this context a proposal was put on the table to create five EU Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan in order to aid the country's civilian capacities and to allow those Member States whose contributions to ISAF are limited by caveats to engage in other areas. The involvement of the European Gendarmerie Force could be considered in this context.

Relations with Eastern neighbours

The EU's Relations with its Eastern neighbours occupied a considerable share of this panel's discussion due to two reasons: (1) the conference coincided with the presentation of the Polish-Swedish proposal for an 'EU Eastern Partnership'; (2) the presence of the Deputy Minister from Ukraine on the panel.

There was some divergence of views regarding general approaches towards ENP countries. Some participants argued that the EU needs to pursue a common and undiversified approach towards the Southern and Eastern members, whilst others argued for a clearer distinction between European Neighbours (East) and the Neighbours of Europe (South). It was argued in this context that the Eastern ENP states may join the EU at some point, while the Southerners would not. However, there was a consensus that in the framework of the current ENP all states should be treated equally. Solidarity among the ENP states was also called for by proponents of both sides of the argument.

Ukraine clearly sees itself as a frontrunner among the ENP states. Ukraine is, however, dissatisfied with the ENP and it wants to move beyond the ENP's 'narrow format'. Ukraine welcomed the idea of the Polish-Swedish Eastern Partnership. This, however, was not without reservations, especially concerning the absence of any reference in the proposal to Kiev's aspiration to join the EU. Still, however, it was argued that Ukraine sees the proposal as an opportunity to draw a clear line between the European neighbours and the Neighbours of Europe and that the proposal moves away from the notion that ENP is an alternative to enlargement.

Relations with Belarus were also a matter for discussion. The EU policy of sanctions was criticised as inconsistent and counter-productive. It was argued that it was inconsistent that the EU had lifted its sanctions against Cuba, but had maintained them *vis-à-vis* Belarus (although the latter's regime was deemed less authoritarian than Cuba's). It was also argued that sanctions had the effect of making Belarus more and more dependent on Russia, hence weakening its links with the West.

Achievements and shortcomings of EU policy towards the neighbours

The effectiveness of ENP is undermined by two main factors: (1) the unclear endgame of the policy – ENP countries are expected to undertake painful reforms, but in the absence of an EU membership perspective it is unclear what their ultimate

reward will be. This is also the case in the South where, while ruling out membership, the EU has not sketched out what the future shape of its relations might be; (2) High energy prices and the EU's dependency on external sources of supply means that there are considerable transfers of funds to the neighbours, regardless of the ENP.

There is the issue of consistency and coherence in the ENP. The EU does not promote democracy to the same extent in the South as it does in the East. For example, Belarus is excluded from the ENP because of its authoritarian regime, whilst Tunisia is an ENP member despite the fact that it is not democratic. In addition, the EU's credibility as a democracy-promoter has been undermined by its policy *vis-à-vis* Hamas, which despite being democratically elected, was boycotted by the EU.

In the East: the presence and effectiveness of the EU are also weakened by competition in the region with Russia. This means that the ENP is in fact more political/geopolitical than enlargement was, at least this is the way it is viewed from Russia. Three recommendations were put forward regarding relations with the Eastern neighbours:

1)   The EU should strengthen its role in solving the so-called 'unresolved conflicts' in its neighbourhood – for now the EU is active is promoting confidence-building measures but otherwise its role is limited.

2)   The idea of a so-called 'ENP-Light' for those neighbours that do not meet ENP-proper criteria – such as Belarus – may be worth considering.

3)   Eastern Partnership and especially its visa-facilitation provisions are indeed very important for the ENP states in the East.

*In the South***:** ENP has brought confusion to the EU's relations with the Southern neighbours, since the EU already had the Barcelona Process (BP) in place since the mid-1990s. The BP, as deficient as it may have been, was more inclusive and less diverse. For example Syria and Algeria are not in the ENP but they are in the BP. In 2008, the EU decided to advance its bilateral ENP relations with Morocco and Israel.

ENP is a bilateral policy that does not cover all the relevant issues, because it depends on the will of the partners with the EU driving the process. The implementation of Action Plans has often been lax. The following recommendations were proposed:

1)   The emerging Mediterranean Union should focus on visa-facilitation programmes as one of its primary objectives;
2)   Civil societies in the partner states should be involved to a greater extent;

3) It is important to maintain the geopolitical equilibrium between the East and the South. This should also concern the financial aid directed to these regions.

The EU Neighbourhood

The EU's strategy *vis-à-vis* its neighbours depends on its ability to define common policies in areas of mutual importance. These include supporting democratic reforms, defining the EU's immigration policy in a way that builds bridges with the neighbours, addressing regional conflict and building on existing interpendencies in order to devise a cooperative approach to energy.

Energy

The EU's energy dependence will increase substantially over the coming years, with most gas and oil imports coming from geopolitically sensitive regions, notably the Middle East, Russia and Central Asia, as well as Western Africa. At the same time, the energy demands of new economic giants such as China and India are skyrocketing, which will lead to a discrepancy between demand and supply. The may well be aggravated by inadequate investment in exploration, extraction, refining and transportation – a problem that is compounded by the growing share of reserves controlled by national oil companies.

In the face of this critical cycle, participants felt that external energy policy and energy security should feature prominently in the review of the ESS implementation. Energy production was described as a source of economic and political power; it was argued that energy can be a basis for cooperation or a source of friction at the international level. The tension between the market approach, favouring competition and seeking low prices, and the strategic approach, where the state plays a prominent role in energy choices which are guided by political considerations, was stressed. This tension affects both relations between the EU and its partners, such as Russia, and the internal EU debate between partisans of market liberalisation and those favouring national champions.

Some noted that the formulation of a truly common energy policy at the EU level was complicated by the different energy mixes and outlooks of the Member States. Divergent perceptions on nuclear energy as a partial alternative to fossil fuels posed a particular problem. Differences on the nuclear dossier also affected EU energy policies towards the Mediterranean and Middle East neighbourhoods, with some ambivalence within the EU on the risks that the civilian use of nuclear power could pose for vertical and horizontal proliferation.

The question of the diversification of energy sources and transport routes was also addressed, it was also stated that the pipeline network was inadequate to guarantee the seamless supply of energy both into the Union and within the Union between EU Member States. The apparent lack of legal clarity on the management of existing transport frameworks posed another serious problem.

Policy implications and recommendations
- The achievement of an internal energy market is a key condition for Europe to perform a credible external energy policy and enhance its energy security.
- New pipelines are required to achieve diversification of supplies but also to ensure that there is enough transport capacity. The more pipelines, the better.
- Within the EU, connectors should be established to ensure that all countries are plugged into the distribution network, thereby enhancing internal cohesion.
- A viable and transparent legal framework should be set up to regulate transit pipelines and establish clear mutual commitments for the EU and its neighbours.
- The EU and its Member States need to boost their investment in energy-related R&D and technology with a view to enhancing energy efficiency and developing sustainable alternatives to fossil fuels.
- Improving energy efficiency offers much scope for cooperation with its neighbours. Options for cooperation in the civilian nuclear sector can also be explored, while ensuring a proliferation-proof regime.

Unresolved conflicts

The term 'frozen conflict' is misleading in the case of the conflicts on the territories of Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan, on which discussion focused. In June 2008, these conflicts were live and in three out of four cases were in danger of escalation. It was pointed out that the conflicts have a very detrimental impact on the states concerned as well as regionally. They fuel separatism and undermine sustainable development and democratic consolidation, and they also foster re-militarisation across borders.

Throughout the discussion it became evident that it is important to differentiate between the conflicts. Russia is currently trying to negotiate a political settlement in Transnistria. It was pointed out that there is no strong ethno-political component to the conflict in Transnistria; one participant called the Transnistrian attitude 'economic separatism'. The strongest driver of Russian policy seems to be the creation of a positive precedent of conflict resolution in Europe as opposed to less successful Western efforts in Kosovo. Nagorno-Karabakh is the most internationalised conflict in the region. Here stronger EU engagement is limited by, among other factors, the role individual Member States

play in the Minsk Process. Therefore, a 'Europeanisation' of the attitudes of these Member States might be a way to increase the EU's role in Nagorno-Karabakh. It was clear that the situation in Georgia was volatile. Both South Ossetia and Abkhazia had been teetering on the brink of escalation since Kosovo's independence. It was pointed out that while political structures in South Ossetia were very weak, *de facto* authorities in Abkhazia were much stronger and better organised and had a clear vision of independence.

It was also pointed out that these unresolved conflicts had different dimensions: the internal dimension; the regional dimension, involving Russia, and a strategic dimension, i.e. the involvement (to different degrees) of external actors like the EU, NATO and other international organisations. The EU is engaged on all three levels: it cooperates with Georgia in the framework of the ENP action plan, which entails measures in the area of conflict resolution. It cooperates with other external actors and coordinates its policies with them. EU policies are probably weakest in the second dimension (Georgian-Russian relations and Russian policy regarding the conflict) because EU Member States disagree over relations with Russia and consequently over what kind of engagement in the unresolved conflicts is possible. It was emphasised that the unresolved conflicts (and their being linked to EU-Russia relations) have the potential to keep pulling the EU apart unless they are addressed proactively.

In the case of Abkhazia some participants saw a window of opportunity for the EU after Kosovo's independence. It was pointed out that the steps taken by Russia (legalisation of relations with Abkhazia, lifting of economic sanctions, deployment of more Russian troops in Abkhazia), together with the commotion they caused in the region as well as in the international community had made the situation more fluid than it had been for years. A multitude of statements by different EU actors as well as HR Javier Solana's visit to Abkhazia on 6 June was evidence of the strong awareness within the EU of the security threat and the need to pursue a more active policy.

Policy implications and recommendations
- It was emphasised that the EU is already engaged in conflict resolution on various levels. It works on increasing the attractiveness for separatist regions through cooperation in the framework of the ENP Action Plans. It nominated a Special Representative for the South Caucasus, who is actively engaged in conflict resolution measures in both regions. However, in this particular and dangerous situation, the EU should use the momentum and become more proactive.
- Regarding the parties to the conflict as well as Russia, it was recommended that the EU should give clear signals at this time. In particular, it was recommended that it should:
  i.   back Georgia and at the same time deter the Georgian leadership from taking military action;

ii. reassure the Abkhaz side that their concerns (regarding Georgia as well as Russia) were being taken seriously by the EU, and empower them so as to become relevant interlocutors for Georgia;

iii. engage with Russia, because there cannot be a solution to the conflict without Russian participation, and at the same time call upon Russia to play a constructive role in conflict resolution.

- Some participants were of the opinion that the EU should first and foremost rely on its symbolic strength and focus on confidence building and post-conflict economic reconstruction. It was pointed out that the EU had the potential to open a window to the world for the Abkhaz population. In this context, the deployment of EU information offices in Abkhazia was discussed as a possible measure. It was argued that the EU should in general increase its presence on the ground. A bigger number of police liaison officers in Abkhazia could improve the security situation and complement – not replace – Russian peacekeeping troops. Some participants called for a greater role for the EU in peace negotiations. It was emphasised that there was no quick fix to the conflicts in the region. Negotiating solutions will take a long time, not the least because a positive outcome implies changes of attitudes on all sides involved.

Borders

To create a 'ring of friendly states' and ensure security in its neighbourhood the EU has to decide what type of borders it wants to have with its neighbours. Though this subject is traditionally the domain of Justice and Home Affairs, it is the case that the theme of 'borders', and the range of issues it raises, bring into focus the inescapable and increasing linkages that exist between the internal and external aspects of EU security.

With these thoughts in mind, the working group discussed a bundle of inter-related issues: migration, free movement of goods, border controls and visa facilitation and considered how far they should be incorporated into EU thinking about security and the European Security Strategy. The central problem that the debate revolved around was: if we open up our borders will we be less secure? A straightforward question but one which defied a straightforward answer.

Discussion began with a consideration of how, through successive enlargements, the EU's borders have been drawn across ever more challenging regions, with neighbouring states that are 'less like' the EU. In response, the EU has sought to install good governance in the neighbourhood, drawing the neighbours closer to the EU by exporting aspects of its model of integration. At the same time, there has been a firming-up of the EU's external borders both in the East and the South.

Panel speakers reminded the group that borders are not just about challenges and security threats, but that they also present opportunities to create security. Certainly, in regions where border security management is lacking, illegal cross border activities and trafficking festers. But at the same time the same borders can represent opportunities to create complex, transnational zones of administrative and cultural activity and exchange, with the EU playing a central role.

When confronting the question of borders and cognate issues, the EU seems to be caught between a drive for greater regulation, securitisation and thus harder borders on the one hand, and calls for more liberalisation and softer, more porous borders, on the other. For example, the EU and its Member States have become better adept at regulating and managing borders, not least via the coordinating functions of FRONTEX. But the EU also puts an emphasis on the merits of cross-border activities and regional integration and encourages people-to-people contacts with and among the neighbours. Crucially, such activities will only prosper with less restrictive borders and enhanced free movement principles. Reflecting on this, participants commented that there appears to be a contradiction, even a tension, in the EU's policies. The challenge the EU and its Member States face is how to strike a balance between these two momentums, in a way that ensures a keen sense of security and at the same time does not diminish the EU's own values.

The subsequent discussion focused on the following issues.
- The EU's current approach to its borders: the group debated as to whether Schengen remained the best regime for the EU 27 and whether the southern and eastern borders can still be managed in the same way? The group cast doubt on the long-term future of Schengen, with some participants suggesting a more flexible regime where the EU could soften, but also harden, borders in varying ways according to specific contexts.
- Visa facilitation: the EU needs to demonstrate more flexibility when it comes to visa facilitation, not least because it is a key theme in the recent Eastern Partnership and Mediterranean Union initiatives. As participants noted, progress is being made with the eastern neighbours in this area, but overall the lack of user-friendly visa regimes that allow citizens of neighbouring states to work/study/visit the EU stymies the development of EU-neighbourhood relations.
- Migration as a security issue and the ESS: over recent years migration has become a securitised issue and has subsequently entered into the EU's threat perception. Participants called for a 'de-securitisation' of migration and consequently the overall feeling of the group was that migration should not feature in the European Security Strategy. At the same time, participants were keenly aware of the problems associated with the continued separation of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and CFSP/ESDP agendas and the resulting weak coordination across these areas on migration/border issues. The goal seems to be to enhance Europe's security, and reduce the loss of life and suffering that goes with illegal immigration and trafficking.

Democracy and the Rule of Law

The speakers noted that the European Security Strategy refers to well-governed countries, but not specifically to democracy, human rights or the rule of law. The discussion focused primarily, but not exclusively on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and why, despite the promotion of democracy and rule of law having been a major goal shaping the ENP from its inception, democratisation in the neighbourhood has been slow, suffering substantial setbacks. The group explored the incentives, objectives, priorities and geographical scope of the ENP and other policies towards the neighbourhood.

Incentives
The resources made available through the ENP as incentives for reform in partner countries were deemed insufficient, and as making success in the area of democracy and rule of law promotion improbable. In addition to this resource challenge, further impediments to the EU successfully influencing reform in partner countries were raised. These included the fact that positive conditionality has not been applied consistently, the lack of a framework in which to measure performance, and widespread corruption in many of the target countries. There was little support for isolation, with logical tailor-made engagement advocated as a much better tool for dealing with various actors, including Hamas. There was broad support for more engagement with civil society, encouraging European non-state actors to engage in dialogue with their counterparts in partner countries.

There was broad agreement that the EU needs to improve its attractiveness to both the governments and populations of the partner countries. The provision of more information to partner countries about the EU and its policies, the development of distinct tools for addressing governments and populations, and the tailoring of relevant and comprehensible information about democracy and rule of law for each country were raised as potential means. Visa-waiver schemes were identified as particularly important in engaging with young people in the partner countries. Visa-waiver schemes were also cited as evidence that it was not necessarily the size/cost of incentives that mattered, but the effective application of conditionality *vis-à-vis* these incentives.

Objectives and priorities
There was broad agreement that both stability and reform are in the interests of the EU. There was however disagreement on the extent to which the EU faced a dilemma between the two objectives. One participant suggested that that a dilemma between reform and stability would not be faced if the EU was more proactive in its interaction with both state and society actors in target countries, and stopped looking at the regimes as monolithic actors, but as comprising an array of individuals and institutions with varying interests. In relation to the Southern neighbourhood, some participants argued that a fear of political Islam had negatively affected European policy, while others countered that it was unclear whether

moderate Islamists were really independent of anti-democratic extremists.

There was disagreement over whether the EU should pursue human rights, democracy and rule of law simultaneously, or prioritise rule of law for tactical reasons. Against calls for rule of law to be prioritised by some participants, other participants argued that it was not possible to have rule of law without accountability, and that even a tactical prioritisation of rule of law could weaken prospects for democracy. In any case, it was suggested that the EU should focus on specific areas of reform, clarify its understanding of democracy, and be clearer and consistent in addressing failure to reach objectives agreed in country action plans.

Geographical scope
The speakers and participants differed on the question of whether there should be further differentiation between Southern and Eastern partners, and between individual countries, in the context of the ENP and other policies. One argument, in favour of further differentiation between countries, was based on a categorisation of countries according to their relative dependency on the EU and the degree to which they pursue reform policies supportive of ENP norms and values. Citing the danger of external pro-reform influence being useless, even counter-productive, advocates of this position argued that the EU should not financially support those countries unwilling to pursue reform and over whom the EU has little influence such as Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Jordan, Libya and Syria. Other speakers and participants opposed any further differentiation within the ENP framework, challenging the desirability and feasibility of withdrawing funding from such countries. The fact that the ENP framework was already in place, the exemplary function such funding constitutes, the fact that the stances taken by certain regimes could not be equated with that of each country's public, and the fact that such arguments might be seen as legitimising disengagement with these countries on reform questions overall were all cited as reasons. One participant argued that a better way forward would be to put into practice the positive conditionality already existing on paper. It was also argued that there was already a clear differentiation between Southern and Eastern partner countries, with an element of imposition on the Eastern partner countries and less flexibility when compared with the Southern partner countries.

The group evaluated recent moves to enhance existing, and develop new, multilateral frameworks to govern relations with the neighbourhood, including the Black Sea Synergy, Union for the Mediterranean, and the Eastern partnership. It was argued that these initiatives should be understood in the context of internal manoeuvring between Member States to ensure relatively balanced division of a limited budget. It was argued that the resulting array of mechanisms might be an opportunity for using historical ties to develop special relationships with various countries, as long as this was done with more European coherence, and that such proposals were discussed between Member States before being publicised. The Barcelona Process was challenged as too inflexible a multilateral format – with the table too large for some issues, and too small for others, suggesting the need for a more flexible format.

Policy implications and recommendations

▪ More proactive and tailor-made incentives and communication strategies should be developed *vis-à-vis* target countries, including the provision of more information about the EU and its policies, the development of distinct tools for addressing governments and populations, and the tailoring of relevant and comprehensible information about democracy and rule of law for each country.

▪ European non-state actors should be encouraged to engage in dialogue with their counterparts in the neighbourhood, while other forms of dialogue beyond formal mechanisms should be explored by the EU.

▪ Progress reports should be clear and consistent regarding partner countries' failure to reach agreed objectives.

▪ Positive conditionality should be applied in a transparent and consistent manner.

Views from the Neighbours

The debate was concentrated on views from Belarus, Tunisia and Ukraine.

Belarus

The country's economic dependence on Russia has grown dramatically in recent years. In two to three years Belarus could no longer be economically viable as a sovereign state. Russia opposes the development of closer links between the EU and Belarus and it is in its interest that Belarus stays outside the ENP. The US can afford to pursue a policy of uncompromising sanctions *vis-à-vis* Belarus because the latter is not its neighbour, but, of course, this is not the case for the EU. By maintaining its policy of economic sanctions against Minsk, the EU was pushing Belarus into Russia's arms. It was considered necessary to rethink this policy.

Recommendation: The EU should offer ENP membership to Belarus under several political conditions. These should include: the release of all political prisoners, allowing the freedom of the media and holding free elections.

Tunisia

Tunisia is one of several Southern Mediterranean states that are not democratic, just like Belarus; nonetheless, they are ENP members and the EU pursues no sanctions against them. The reason is a fear of an Islamist party coming to power, hence, a preference for the maintenance of the existing secular regime. This, however, is misplaced. Moderate political Islam can embrace democracy, as the example of Turkey clearly shows. The inclusion of an Islamist party in Morocco's

governing coalition has stabilised the emergence of Islamist tendencies in the population. Reforms are badly needed in Tunisia, which urgently needs to address good governance and implement political reforms.

RECOMMENDATION: The EU should use the range of its political (ENP) and economic (investment) instruments to promote reforms. A stronger message from the EU is required.

Ukraine

Ukraine has rapidly progressed in applying the *acquis* and approximating its legislation in response to the Action Plan and other requirements of the Commission. We can now speak about the 'Europeanisation' of the Ukrainian domestic polity – the process that was typical of the accession countries in the 1990s. Ukraine's interest in the ENP depends on the content of the new enhanced agreement, but Kiev is overall dissatisfied with the ENP and it expects a clear enlargement perspective. This clear focus of Kiev and the enduring popularity of the EU in Ukrainian society means that the EU could have more influence on the country than it does.

RECOMMENDATION: Ukrainian civil society often argues that the EU is limiting itself in the assessment of political and economic reforms in the country. The EU can and should have a more modernising impact on Ukraine by strengthening its conditionality.

Conclusions

It was stressed during this panel that the ESS is not in the process of being rewritten. The December 2007 mandate of the Council concerned exclusively the revision of the **implementation** of the ESS and this is exactly what this and other seminars in the series were concerned with. The ESS is not an operational guideline but it provides the EU with a set of principles, such as effective multilateralism and the building of a secure neighbourhood, that need to be applied by concrete actions. Since the adoption of the ESS in 2003 the EU has deployed ESDP missions in the neighbourhood and the Member States have contributed to UNIFIL in Lebanon. The EU appointed a number of Special Representatives both in the South and the East and has been active in promoting confidence-building measures in the areas of unresolved conflicts, especially in the Caucasus.

It was also argued that the EU must retain a common policy towards the neighbourhood and resist the temptation to differentiate between the East and the South, as has been the case with regard to democracy promotion. As regards the implementation of the principles laid down in the ESS, the most effective tool for securing the

neighbourhood is the process of enlargement. This option is still there and it is essential that negotiations with Turkey lead to a successful conclusion. However, the enlargement option is not available to other areas of the neighbourhood and especially not to the Northern African states. This affects the effectiveness of the ENP as a transformational policy and it is important therefore that a clear alternative is offered to these states. The new agreements negotiated by Ukraine, Morocco and Israel are steps in this direction but they fall short of the neighbours' expectations. It also does not add to the coherence of the ENP that these new agreements have different names, respectively, 'enhanced agreement', 'advanced status' and 'special status'. It was argued in this context that the idea of 'everything but Institutions' formulated by Romano Prodi, is certainly worth exploring as a possible route, to give a sense of greater inclusion to EU neighbours.

3.   STRENGTHENING ESDP:

THE EU'S APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Many speakers criticised the European Security Strategy, describing it as an inadequate document that badly needed updating. Some participants said it was only 'half a security strategy' since it focused mainly on trans-national issues rather than classical power politics. Others called it more of a description than a strategy, while some even described it as 'smug' and 'wishy washy'. It was apparent that the EU must distinguish more clearly between foreign, security and defence policy challenges. For example, should energy security be included in the European Security Strategy? If so, in what way?

But some speakers defended the existing European Security Strategy, arguing that it could only be 'half a strategy' because it was a response to the Iraq war (even if the document did not mention Iraq). Moreover, many of the current economic and energy challenges are a direct result of the Iraq war. The values and broad approach contained in the European Security Strategy are still valid, even if the world has become more uncertain since 2003. Some argued that the general approach to international politics contained in the 2003 security strategy ('effective multilateralism') has become more valid in the meantime.

More generally, some participants said that EU Member States need to be more realistic about which responses to security challenges can be shared and which cannot. The EU has no clear adversary, but most national White Papers on foreign and security policy mention the important role of the EU in helping to 'absorb shocks'. The European Security Strategy says nothing about multipolarity, bipolarity, or even non-polarity, and how to work with rising powers such as China and India. On paper the EU is strong and attractive, with access to many resources. But the EU should not be satisfied with simply being a role model.

EU governments have not clearly defined their strategic or security interests. For example, everyone agrees in principle that energy security is in their interest, but in practice that would require EU governments to form a single energy policy, both internally and externally. Any EU discussion on interests must include re-thinking territorial security, crisis management, and the links between internal and external security, plus how to mix civil and military resources for effective policy responses. And the EU should have a continuous debate about strategy as priorities will change over time.

In the short term Europe should focus its energy on three things: (i) Afghanistan, since it is not in Europe's interest that NATO fails there; (ii) developing a Turkey policy since that country is crucial for both Afghanistan and the Caucasus;

and (iii) the Eastern neighbourhood (including Central Asia). In the longer-term energy security and climate change are the main challenges. And the EU must be clear on its priorities for cooperation with a new US administration, focusing on effective multilateralism, the broader Middle East and Russia.

Russia, Georgia and the return of power politics

The recent crisis in Georgia shows the weakness of the West, in particular the failure of EU policies for conflict prevention. In that sense the Caucasus is the new Balkans, and the EU needs a proper Eastern policy which includes Central Asia. The current EU neighbourhood policy is inadequate as it does not offer enough to the neighbours. Russia has re-introduced power politics to European security, even if this is not a new Cold War. The Kremlin thinks in a completely different way to the EU, and approaches international politics with a power-based (especially military) mindset. Russia's actions in Georgia should not have come as a surprise; they fit in with a long pattern of threatening behaviour towards European governments (both EU and non-EU), such as cutting off gas supplies and carrying out cyber-attacks.

In other words, the main lesson from the Georgia crisis is that the EU must learn how to play 'hard' politics. The US and the EU have had little leverage over Russia because they lack coercive instruments, like military capabilities, and existing military resources are already over-deployed. Not all participants agreed with this approach, in part because 'sticks' are not exclusively military and can be used in a variety of ways, and should be thought through carefully. The Iraq experience has shown that military force alone is not the answer, and there is little public support in Europe for such policies since citizens are more worried about the financial crisis, unemployment, health care, poverty and climate change than, say, Russia. And the EU should not under-estimate itself. Compared with Russia, the EU is 15 times richer, has 3½ times the population and spends 4 times more on defence.

Even so, if the EU does not develop a coherent and effective policy towards Russia, there may be at least three problems: there could be genuine misunderstandings and crises; the EU will remain split between those who care about Russia and those who do not; and Russia will exploit EU weaknesses. And a lack of EU policy will mean that NATO will become the only viable alternative with the US taking the lead, rather than Europeans.

The changing international system

A few participants suggested that recent crises, such as those in Georgia or global finance, mean that the EU needs to change the way it assesses the international

system – in other words, the real challenge is systemic. These crises are a wake-up call for an EU that has been much too inward-looking. There are a number of systemic challenges. First, the rise of a more multipolar world – Russia and China believe primarily in national power, placing interests above values, which is bound to undermine both the UN and the EU. Second, energy security is an absolutely key objective for all major global players. Third, there is a huge zone of instability stretching from West Africa through the Middle East into Central and East Asia. Fourth, climate change, which could cause major challenges for Europe (for example, if the North Pole melts). Fifth, there are a number of unforeseen drivers, such as technology developments or shortages in natural resources like minerals.

The world is entering an era of strategic surprises and the key challenge facing the EU is the changing international system. This is not only because of shifts in power towards new poles, it is also because US power in particular has weakened, even if it remains the world's most powerful country. Plus in the future the US may have different priorities to Europe, and therefore may become less useful for Europe. Multilateral governance is crucial in a more multipolar world, but Europe has not been so effective in multilateral institutions. For example, in the G8 Europe is present, but not as Europe.

Some participants warned of confusing a more multipolar world with 19th century power politics. The world is much more interdependent today, and while Russia is 'back', it is also suffering economically for its actions. The international system will be a mix of big nation-states and regional groupings, plus the major powers do not have an interest in fighting each other. Europeans should also learn to differentiate between the major powers, e.g. identify more clearly the differences between Russia and China. And the changing international system requires the EU to become much more assertive about its vision of international relations and how they should be conducted. Growing multipolarity means the EU must push for more effective multilateralism ('better governance for a better world'); not least because the EU will have to work with others to tackle most major challenges such as energy and climate change.

Capabilities, strategy and ambition

It is a cliché to say that the EU lacks the military capabilities it needs to fulfil all its foreign policy ambitions. Defence ministries have a difficult job, as current operations require their armed forces to go anywhere in the world, work with other nationalities and carry out a wide range of military and non-military tasks. Plus, the EU does not decide on deployments, Member States do, and they do so in different ways for different reasons. The good news is that in recent years EU Member States have increased the number of soldiers they can deploy, plus investments in equipment will soon start to pay off.

However, given the well-documented equipment gaps, European defence ministries need to re-think their procurement and deployment practices. Small groups of countries should work more closely together on specific projects and share more capabilities, and a higher proportion of defence budgets should be spent on equipment. The concept of 'permanent structured cooperation' contained in the Lisbon Treaty (if ratified by all Member States) may help closer cooperation between national defence ministries. The difficulty is that the criteria for joining such a defence group need to be binding to be meaningful, but not so stringent as to exclude most Member States. The criteria should be output-based, focusing on the future. For instance, Member States could join permanent structured cooperation if they met a number of commitments, such as deployability targets, minimum investment per soldier, and acquiring specific capabilities by a certain date. The European Defence Agency should play a crucial role, both in coordinating existing procurement plans, and encouraging more multinational procurement and sharing of key assets such as logistics.

Some speakers pointed out that ESDP has had no impact on improving capabilities, nor has it contributed much to international security, mainly because of politics, and that this could not go on. There is not a lack of ideas on how to improve the EU's military prowess, there is a lack of political will, especially from the major military countries in Europe. The EU needs to think about 'grand strategy' ('the calculated relationship between means and large ends'). The EU should set up a permanent body to develop ideas for a common strategy, while defence ministers need their own council and should discuss a European White Paper on defence. To ensure unity of effect, effort and command the EU also needs a proper operational headquarters in Brussels. The EU should discuss its 'grand strategy' with the US, both in an EU-US forum, and as an EU caucus in NATO. This should also encourage closer EU-NATO cooperation on capabilities.

The vital role of the UK with regard to the success of ESDP in the future received some attention. While the French *livre blanc* (White Paper) on defence and national security describes ESDP as fundamental for French security, the 2008 UK National Security Strategy does not mention ESDP at all. One participant suggested that if the UK did not re-commit to ESDP, then other EU Member States may need to consider developing ESDP without the UK, although such a scenario would be extremely undesirable. To avoid this, and to re-affirm their political commitment to ESDP, the three largest countries – France, Germany and the UK – should convene a trilateral summit to draw up a trilateral security strategy, using that as a basis for developing a more substantial EU security strategy and a more meaningful EU defence policy.

Coherence of EU policies

Crisis management is a messy business, and difficult to implement. It is the opposite of strategy as it requires tactical responses. And crises, by their nature, imply failure; few notice the success of prevention policies. On paper the EU can offer a lot, but it is currently more like a 'tri-athlete' than the 'decathlete' it needs to be. And too much attention is paid to internal EU processes rather than joint policies. Different parts of the EU institutions sometimes manage different civilian operations in the same country, mixed with an ESDP military operation, which also requires working with the EU presidency and the Member States. Plus, aside from internal coherence between the Council and the Commission, among others, the EU needs to work effectively with other organisations and countries. For example, in Afghanistan it must work with NATO and the US (among others). One major problem is that EU structures are not designed to have a single chain-of-command. As a start, the EU should carry out many more crisis management exercises to develop its internal coordination.

Given the range of security challenges the EU is attempting to tackle, the Union's institutions must include the private sector and NGOs in their coherence discussion. For example, some NGOs have extensive knowledge of the Caucasus and could help the EU in those countries. Rapid and effective emergency response is crucial for the security of the single market area, but the role of the military for EU emergency response is unclear. Even so, most crises will not require military responses, and the focus of EU policies should remain civilian, as it has been up to now. Some speakers argued that institutional coherence between the Council and the Commission had improved greatly in recent years, for instance in Georgia. But some processes are very slow – the Commission, for instance, cannot easily re-direct aid spending to a country where there is an ESDP operation (i.e. Chad). Plus the Commission, in particular ECHO (its humanitarian aid agency), must remain neutral in conflicts and avoid becoming politicised.

Participants listed a number of proposals for improving EU coherence and effectiveness. Conflict prevention is an area where the EU could do much more, by linking early-warning and early action. The EU must also be clear about which crises it wishes to respond to and which it cannot – for instance Georgia should take precedence over Zimbabwe or Burma. The EU also needs to work much more with regional groupings, such as the African Union. And EU governments need to think through the practical implications of the 'solidarity clause', and the links between internal and external security.

Cooperation with other international organisations

The focus of the discussion on cooperation with other organisations was on EU cooperation with NATO, the OSCE and the UN. The context of EU-NATO cooperation has changed in the last year. The US accepts ESDP; France intends to re-join NATO's military command; the Georgia crisis has revived the case for the 'West'; and Cypriot re-unification talks have re-started. However, there are still some problems in the relationship, such as a lack of military capabilities, the lack of an EU-US forum for strategic dialogue and a resurgent Russia. In general EU-NATO cooperation is too *ad hoc* and requires a more systemic approach to work out shared strategic interests and contingency planning. The EU and NATO must also work on finding a new anti-terrorism strategy since the 'war on terror' has failed. And the EU should develop a common position on the future evolution of NATO, and the impact of potential NATO enlargement on the EU's security and defence policy.

The EU-OSCE relationship is entirely focused on 'other Europe' (non-EU Europe), in the Eastern neighbourhood. In this 'other Europe', not all governments share EU values, or listen to EU rhetoric about values, and they are still willing to use force to settle disputes. This is in part because many of these states are not yet fully established or functioning and are still in the process of being built. The OSCE matters for the EU's policies towards 'other Europe', as often it is the only place to discuss values and political commitments, for instance with Russia. Plus the OSCE is on the ground in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The EU could form a very effective bloc in the OSCE, since it includes 27 out of 56 members, pays 75% of the OSCE budget and EU governments regularly hold the chair. But the EU has much less influence in the OSCE than the US or Russia. If the EU really believes in 'effective multilateralism', it should learn to use its power in the OSCE.

Strong cooperation with the United Nations is crucial for the success of ESDP missions. All ESDP missions, except Bosnia, have operated alongside UN operations, and the UN is the main organiser of international peacekeeping. Over 100,000 personnel currently serve on UN peacekeeping operations around the world, costing $7 billion a year (40% of which is paid by the EU), and these operations are each mandated by two EU members, France and the UK, as permanent members of the UN Security Council. But the UNSC has become a very uncomfortable place for the EU, as its positions on Burma, Zimbabwe and Georgia have been vetoed by other permanent members. The EU is poor at working with the UN both strategically and operationally, and it is getting worse at it – EU-UN cooperation on the ground in Chad has been worse than in Congo. Some in the UN have been critical of ESDP operations, as they have had little impact on the ground and seem to be politically motivated. Thus, the EU should not assume that it will always have UN support on the ground in future.

If cooperation between the EU and NATO, the OSCE or the UN is to work better on the ground in future, then each organisation has to understand the other's specific nature and *raison d'être*, because trust requires knowledge of each other. That means international organisations have to work out their shared interests, comparative advantages, resources and legal and political frameworks. Clear divisions of labour between organisations are not realistic operationally, as each organisation develops its response on an *ad hoc* basis. Flexibility, therefore, is absolutely necessary for operations managed by different organisations in the same country, and chains-of-command must communicate with each other. And there cannot be subordination of one international organisation to another.

Conclusions

When assessing its security policies, the EU must reconsider two competing and interdependent trends: globalisation and the return of power politics. The European Security Strategy should be a prescription, not just a description. Even in an increasingly multipolar world there is no doubt the US will remain powerful and a crucial partner for Europe. Russia is not an existential threat, and it is too early to learn long-term strategic lessons from the Georgia crisis. Multilateralism will remain very complex, reforming multilateral institutions is very difficult and the EU must learn to use its power in those institutions. Even if power has not changed that much since the European Security Strategy was drafted in 2003, perceptions of power have changed. As a result, it is more urgent that EU governments develop a sense of their vital common interests. This in turn would help EU governments push for more effective global governance in multilateral institutions, and they would work more effectively with partners around the world to resolve conflicts and manage crises.

4. WHICH STRATEGY FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION'S SECURITY INTERESTS? [9]

Instead of providing language for a new document, speakers and participants reflected on the relevance of the 2003 document for the next few years and lessons learned from its implementation. Despite reservations expressed regarding the level of the EU's ambitions and its priorities, a broad consensus was reached on the general relevance of the 2003 document: it is still seen as a valid expression of what the European vision of the world is – as a doctrine based on the empirical and historical experience of the EU as a soft power; as a diplomatic method based on multilateralism; and as reflecting the EU's identity as, in the words of one speaker, a 'multilateral actor.' The conjunction of financial and environmental crises with the re-emergence of territorial competition, however, reflect the new global context that the EU will have to take into account to fine-tune 2003 ESS general statements about the world's stability and Europe's position. It was argued by a minority of participants that the very text of the ESS should be changed not only due to the fact that the Union is now composed of 27 members (and not 25 as mentioned in the 2003 document) but also because 'things have changed in the political psychology of Europe during the last few months.'

Tensions between expectations of the EU's role on the one hand, and difficulties in meeting them on the other, were highlighted by the debate. It was underlined (despite the lack of a European-wide debate on the future of Europe and the difficulties encountered by the Lisbon Treaty) that the relatively narrow review mandate provided by the European Council would not meet high expectations to replace the 2003 ESS document.

Interests and priorities

'Common threat perception' is going to remain a key challenge in the future for CFSP/ESDP policymakers. However, participants agreed that the range of threats has expanded since 2003: cyberspace security, climate change and energy security have emerged on the agenda. Debates on the ESS had been strongly influenced by the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war: perceptions of threats had changed and concerns about Russia's growing assertiveness were expressed by several participants; constructive engagement with this country was viewed as the most suitable policy; transnational or horizontal threats such as state failure, terrorism, regional conflicts, mentioned and developed in the 2003 documents, have been almost absent from discussions in Paris. While a list of threats emerged during

9. This seminar, which took place in October, was the last in the series and sought to arrive at a synthesis of the conclusions reached in the previous seminars.

the seminar, clear prioritisation proved to be a challenge. It was also noted that we are still far from a common European strategic culture, but that we have already come some way in this respect in the last decade. The general message that recurred throughout the seminar in various guises is that while the Union may be able to develop a global vision of the world order, it should limit itself to a core of priority areas and topical policies, based on its capability to act and to react to current emerging challenges. Hopes *vis-à-vis* a revived and closer direct EU-US relationship were expressed by most of the speakers, some of whom were keen to see the EU clarifying its agenda on specific areas such as Afghanistan in particular.

Multilateralism and global governance

Although the EU can appear as an attractive model of peaceful regional integration, it is still liable to be perceived more as a fortress than as a lighthouse. New territorial claims and the emergence of unprecedented global uncertainties bring us back to geopolitics. The success of and future prospects for the EU's efforts to promote effective multilateralism were questioned by several participants in the light of the growing assertiveness of global actors like China and Russia and given the nature of US foreign policy. Some stated that 'multilateralism is not a holy thing in itself,' that 'it is an instrument in pursuing policy' and that the European Union should define its interests and then decide what its instruments are; others even stressed that 'security approaches have to change in order to realise that multilateralism is not necessarily cheaper. It means pooling resources if Europe wants to be more effective.' The question is therefore less about the multipolar nature of the future world order than if it is going to be 'based on multilateral rules or confrontations about power.' Hence a number of priorities emerged from the debate: the urgent need for the EU to act as one in multilateral frameworks such as the UN, NATO or the OSCE and to persuade other players to act in closer coordination; the need to build a European position regarding NATO's future and NATO's enlargement; the need to support structural changes in the global governance system; and the necessity to have Member States take the lead in promoting the EU's multilateral role.

As for priorities for effective multilateral action, it seemed clear that the importance of energy security and climate change must be reemphasised by the EU.

Neighbourhood

'There is a soft war going on over the future in the East of Europe,' one speaker said, justifying further engagement towards Eastern European countries. Enlargement was commonly analysed by participants as the most efficient foreign policy tool to promote stability and democracy although it was noted that it is only marginally mentioned in the text of the ESS. Based on strong incentives, enlargement gives strong leverage to the EU to impose demanding conditionality. Without enlargement

perspectives, neighbourhood policies are much less successful. As for the European Neighbourhood Policy, a critical appraisal of the Union's democratisation policies was given by experts. A strong focus was put on differentiation as a way of combining the EU's simultaneous interests in stability and democracy. It was once stated that 'consistency is a very much over-valued good in European discourse, particularly if people think that it means that one should treat all states equally. Coherence is very important.' Some pointed to double standards, while others directly addressed the rationale of the European Neighbourhood Policy and argued for a clear distinction between Eastward and Southward policies. Challenging the presumed 'stability versus democracy' dichotomy, some called for more efforts in conflict prevention and resolution in the neighbourhood, as a *sine qua non* condition for progress on both fronts of stability and democratisation.

Security and defence policy

While in 2003 the ESDP was still largely structured to meet challenges and objectives specific to the Balkans, it then had had to grow and to adapt to new overseas environments. The seminar showed that in 2008, however, ESDP is still constrained by major political obstacles and remains the hostage of an undecided European foreign policy. It was generally felt that European defence is lacking leadership, commitment and priorities. To address this issue, the option of having a core/pioneer group of countries willing and able to move forward to develop joint defence initiatives was favoured by most of the participants. More optimism was voiced by a smaller number of participants convinced that the pooling of defence and technological resources will be an unavoidable option in the future.

A strong pledge for Operations Headquarters in Brussels was made by several participants and this proposal was not explicitly challenged during the seminar. More common funding and pooling, more consolidated European defence industries (well-known options already discussed in Helsinki): these points were raised again. Likewise, the need to develop civilian crisis management capabilities was greeted by consensus. Closer coordination between ESDP, border and internal security and domestic public opinion was also presented as an important factor in the successful implementation of the ESS.

Conclusions

Tomorrow's world will be less Western. By supporting effective multilateralism, the EU has confirmed its identity as an international actor. It has tried to create stakes for other global players. It will not be able to solve global problems by itself. The EU will have to work more closely with other global players such as China, Russia, India, Brazil and regional powers like Turkey or Iran to ensure its own security and to contribute to a better world. Achieving coherence, unity, and a proactive approach to the many challenges it faces will be possible if Europeans continue to dialogue widely on their common interests and strategic options. To become a lighthouse rather than a fortress, the EU will need to equip itself to fully implement its 2003 European Security Strategy.

The ESS, as it was drafted in 2003, is still a valid document. It is a key instrument in identifying strategic challenges and threats. Its review process has been a key step in updating and completing it. Climate change and its impact, energy security and cyberspace security have emerged as new challenges to be considered in the future. To be more active, more capable and more coherent, 'better implementation' sub-strategies and action plans will have to be developed. These will have to be substantiated by clear commitments from the highest level in Member States. The development of civilian crisis management capabilities, for example, is commonly seen as a key priority and will hopefully lead to concrete actions such as national action plans and training.

As one participant put it, 'the ESS weakness is actually our own powerlessness' and it is up to Europeans to decide how they want to appropriate their own power.

ANNEX I: List of EUISS regional seminars

1. Rome, 5-6 June 2008

‘European Interests and Strategic Options
The EU and global governance: rules – power – priorities’

Seminar organised in cooperation with the Istituto Affari Internazionali

2. Warsaw/Natolin, 27-28 June 2008

‘A Common Approach to the Neighbourhood’

Seminar organised in cooperation with the Centrum Europejskie Natolin

3. Helsinki, 18-19 September 2008

‘Strengthening ESDP: the EU’s Approach to International Security’

Seminar organised in cooperation with the Finnish Institute of International Affairs and the Swedish Institute of International Affairs

4. Paris Forum, Paris, 2-3 October 2008

‘Which Strategy for the European Union’s Security Interests?’

Forum organised in cooperation with the French Presidency of the EU

OTHER

Vilnius, 29-30 May — Debate on the European security culture

Organised in cooperation with the Slovenian Presidency of the EU and the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, University of Vilnius

Paris, 7 July — Seminar on EU-NATO relations

Organised by the French Presidency of the EU with the cooperation of the EUISS

ANNEX II: List of speakers in the regional seminars

- Giuliano AMATO, former Prime Minister of Italy, Rome

- Philip ANDREWS-SPEED, Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy at the University of Dundee, Dundee

- Claude-France ARNOULD, Council of the EU, Brussels

- Alyson BAILES, University of Iceland, Reykjavik

- Annegrete BENDIEK, SWP, Berlin

- Erik BERGLUND, Frontex, Warsaw

- Christoph BERTRAM, formerly SWP, Berlin

- Carl BILDT, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Stockholm

- Pinar BILGIN, Bilkent University, Ankara

- Sven BISCOP, EGMONT (RIIR), Brussels

- Emma BONINO, Italian Senate, Rome

- Esra BULUT, EUISS, Paris

- Nejib CHEBBI, Democratic Progressive Party, Tunis

- Marek CICHOCKI, Natolin European Centre, Warsaw

- Laurent COHEN-TANUGI, Mission 'L'Europe dans la mondialisation', Paris

- Lazar COMANESCU, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, Bucharest

- Robert COOPER, Council of the European Union, Brussels

- Marta DASSU, Aspen Institute, Rome

- Renata DWAN, DPKO, New York

- Michael EMERSON, CEPS, Brussels

- Fernanda FARIA, ECDPM, Maastricht

- Sabine FISCHER, EUISS, Paris

- Annalisa GIANELLA, Council of the European Union, Brussels

- Bastian GIEGERICH, IISS, London

- Nicole GNESOTTO, CNAM, Paris

- João GOMES CRAVINHO, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, Lisbon

- Richard GOWAN, New York University, New York

- Charles GRANT, CER, London

- Giovanni GREVI, EUISS, Paris
- Ulrike GUEROT, ECFR, Berlin
- Damien HELLY, EUISS, Paris
- Jolyon HOWORTH, Yale University, New Haven
- Vaclav HUBINGER, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague
- Pierre-Michel JOANA, EU Council, Brussels
- Daniel KEOHANE, EUISS, Paris
- Bernard KOUCHNER, French Minister of Foreign and European Affairs and Presidency of the EU, Paris
- Karel KOVANDA, DG Relex, EU Commission, Brussels
- Petr KRATOCHVIL, IIR, Prague
- Eneko LANDABURU, European Commission, Brussels
- Erwan LANNON, EUISS, Brussels/College of Europe, Natolin
- Pierre LÉVY, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris
- Kerry LONGHURST, IFRI, Paris
- Dov LYNCH, OSCE, Vienna
- Carlo MAGRASSI, EDA, Brussels
- Giampiero MASSOLO, Secretary-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome
- Oliver MEIER, IFSH, Hamburg and Berlin
- Aleksander MILINKEVICH, Former Presidential Candidate, Minsk
- Hugues MINGARELLI, DG Relex, EU Commission, Brussels
- Antonio MISSIROLI, EPC, Brussels
- António MONTEIRO, former Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon
- Maria do Rosário de MORAES VAZ, IEEI, Lisbon
- Hanna OJANEN, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki
- Sean O'REGAN, EU Council, Brussels
- Olaf OSICA, Natolin European Centre, Warsaw
- Luis PERAL, EUISS, Paris
- Jean-Paul PERRUCHE, former head of EU Military Staff, Paris
- Volker PERTHES, SWP, Berlin
- Alain RICHARD, formerly Ministry of Defence, Paris

- Tomas RIES, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm

- Maria João RODRIGUES, IEEI, Lisbon

- Véronique ROGER-LACAN, French Ministry of Defence, Paris

- Natalino RONZITTI, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome

- John ROPER, former Director of the EUISS, House of Lords, London

- Jacek SARYUSZ-WOLSKI, President of the Natolin European Centre, Chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee, European Parliament, Brussels

- Helga SCHMID, Policy Unit, EU Council Secretariat, Brussels

- Peter SEMNEBY, EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus, Brussels

- Radoslaw SIKORSKI, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, Warsaw

- Alda SILVEIRA-REIS, EU Council, Brussels

- Stefano SILVESTRI, President, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome

- Eugeniusz SMOLAR, Centre for International Relations, Warsaw

- Alexander STUBB, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland, Helsinki

- Bengt SUNDELIUS, Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm

- Paweł SWIEBODA, Demos Europa, Warsaw

- Fred TANNER, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Geneva

- Rafal TRZASKOWSKI, Natolin European Centre, Warsaw

- Zygimantas VAICIUNAS, Centre for Strategic Studies, Vilnius

- Álvaro de VASCONCELOS, EUISS, Paris

- Raimo VÄYRYNEN, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki

- Rob de WIJK, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, The Hague

- Nick WITNEY, ECFR, Paris

- Kataryna WOLCZUK, University of Birmingham, Birmingham

- Richard WRIGHT, European Commission, Brussels

- Kostiantyn YELISEYEV, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Kiev

- Richard YOUNGS, FRIDE, Madrid

- Marcin ZABOROWSKI, EUISS, Paris

- Jan ZIELONKA, Oxford University, Oxford

ANNEX III: General secretariat of the Council of the EU — Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy

REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY – PROVIDING SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD –

Executive Summary

Five years on from adoption of the European Security Strategy, the European Union carries greater responsibilities than at any time in its history.

The EU remains an anchor of stability. Enlargement has spread democracy and prosperity across our continent. The Balkans are changing for the better. Our neighbourhood policy has created a strong framework for relations with partners to the south and east, now with a new dimension in the Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership. Since 2003, the EU has increasingly made a difference in addressing crisis and conflict, in places such as Afghanistan or Georgia.

Yet, twenty years after the Cold War, Europe faces increasingly complex threats and challenges.

Conflicts in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world remain unsolved, others have flared up even in our neighbourhood. State failure affects our security through crime, illegal immigration and, most recently, piracy. Terrorism and organised crime have evolved with new menace, including within our own societies. The Iranian nuclear programme has significantly advanced, representing a danger for stability in the region and for the whole nonproliferation system.

Globalisation has brought new opportunities. High growth in the developing world, led by China, has lifted millions out of poverty. But globalisation has also made threats more complex and interconnected. The arteries of our society – such as information systems and energy supplies – are more vulnerable. Global warming and environmental degradation is altering the face of our planet. Moreover, globalisation is accelerating shifts in power and is exposing differences in values. Recent financial turmoil has shaken developed and developing economies alike.

Europe will rise to these new challenges, as we have done in the past.

Drawing on a unique range of instruments, the EU already contributes to a more secure world. We have worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity. The EU remains the biggest donor to countries in need. Long-term engagement is required for lasting stabilisation.

Over the last decade, the European Security and Defence Policy, as an integral part of our Common Foreign and Security Policy, has grown in experience and capability, with over 20 missions deployed in response to crises, ranging from post-tsunami peace building in Aceh to protecting refugees in Chad.

These achievements are the results of a distinctive European approach to foreign and security policy. But there is no room for complacency. To ensure our security and meet the expectations of our citizens, we must be ready to shape events. That means becoming more strategic in our thinking, and more effective and visible around the world. We are most successful when we operate in a timely and coherent manner, backed by the right capabilities and sustained public support.

Lasting solutions to conflict must bind together all regional players with a common stake in peace. Sovereign governments must take responsibility for the consequences of their actions and hold a shared responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

It is important that countries abide by the fundamental principles of the UN Charter and OSCE principles and commitments. We must be clear that respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states and the peaceful settlement of disputes are not negotiable. Threat or use of military force cannot be allowed to solve territorial issues anywhere.

At a global level, Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral order. The UN stands at the apex of the international system. Everything the EU has done in the field of security has been linked to UN objectives. We have a unique moment to renew multilateralism, working with the United States and with our partners around the world. For Europe, the transatlantic partnership remains an irreplaceable foundation, based on shared history and responsibilities. The EU and NATO must deepen their strategic partnership for better cooperation in crisis management.

The EU has made substantial progress over the last five years. We are recognised as an important contributor to a better world. But, despite all that has been achieved, implementation of the ESS remains work in progress. For our full potential to be realised we need to be still *more capable, more coherent and more active.*

INTRODUCTION

The European Council adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003. For the first time, it established principles and set clear objectives for advancing the EU's security interests based on our core values. It is comprehensive in its approach and remains fully relevant.

This report does not replace the ESS, but reinforces it. It gives an opportunity to examine how we have fared in practice, and what can be done to improve implementation.

I. GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND KEY THREATS

The ESS identified a range of threats and challenges to our security interests. Five years on, these have not gone away: some have become more significant, and all more complex.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Proliferation by both states and terrorists was identified in the ESS as 'potentially the greatest threat to EU security'. That risk has increased in the last five years, bringing the multilateral framework under pressure. While Libya has dismantled its WMD programme, Iran, and also North Korea, have yet to gain the trust of the international community. A likely revival of civil nuclear power in coming decades also poses challenges to the non-proliferation system, if not accompanied by the right safeguards.

The EU has been very active in multilateral fora, on the basis of the WMD Strategy, adopted in 2003, and at the forefront of international efforts to address Iran's nuclear programme. The Strategy emphasises prevention, by working through the UN and multilateral agreements, by acting as a key donor and by working with third countries and regional organisations to enhance their capabilities to prevent proliferation.

We should continue this approach, with political and financial action. A successful outcome to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2010, with a view in particular to strengthening the non-proliferation regime, is critical. We will endeavour to ensure that, in a balanced, effective, and concrete manner, this conference examines means to step up international efforts against proliferation, pursue disarmament and ensure the responsible development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy by countries wishing to do so.

More work is also needed on specific issues, including: EU support for a multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle; countering the financing of proliferation; measures on biosafety and bio-security; and containing proliferation of delivery systems, notably ballistic missiles. Negotiations should begin on a multilateral treaty banning production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

Terrorism and organised crime

Terrorism, within Europe and worldwide, remains a major threat to our livelihoods. Attacks have taken place in Madrid and London, while others have been foiled, and home-grown groups play an increasing role within our own continent. Organised crime continues to menace our societies, with trafficking in drugs, human beings, and weapons, alongside international fraud and money-laundering.

Since 2003, the EU has made progress in addressing both, with additional measures inside the Union, under the 2004 Hague Programme, and a new Strategy for the External Dimension of Justice and Home Affairs, adopted in 2005. These have made it easier to pursue investigations across borders, and co-ordinate prosecution. The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, also from 2005, is based on respect for human rights and international law. It follows a four-pronged approach: preventing radicalisation and recruitment and the factors behind them; protecting potential targets; pursuing terrorists; and responding to the aftermath of an attack. While national action is central, appointment of a Counter-Terrorism Coordinator has been an important step forward at the European level.

Within the EU, we have done much to protect our societies against terrorism. We should tighten co-ordination arrangements for handling a major terrorist incident, in particular using chemical, radiological, nuclear and bioterrorism materials, on the basis of such existing provisions as the Crisis Coordination Arrangements and the Civil Protection Mechanism. Further work on terrorist financing is required, along with an effective and comprehensive EU policy on information sharing, taking due account of protection of personal data.

We must also do more to counter radicalisation and recruitment, by addressing extremist ideology and tackling discrimination. Intercultural dialogue, through such fora as the Alliance of Civilisations, has an important role to play.

On organised crime, existing partnerships within our neighbourhood and key partners, and within the UN, should be deepened, in addressing movement of people, police and judicial cooperation. Implementation of existing UN instruments on crime is essential. We should further strengthen our counterterrorism partnership with the United States, including in the area of data sharing and protection. Also, we should strengthen the capacity of our partners in South Asia, Africa, and our southern neighbourhood. The EU should support multilateral efforts, principally in the UN.

We need to improve the way in which we bring together internal and external dimensions. Better co-ordination, transparency and flexibility are needed across different agencies, at national and European level. This was already identified in the ESS, five years ago. Progress has been slow and incomplete.

Cyber security

Modern economies are heavily reliant on critical infrastructure including transport, communication and power supplies, but also the internet. The EU Strategy for a Secure Information Society, adopted in 2006 addresses internet-based crime. However, attacks against private or government IT systems in EU Member States have given this a new dimension, as a potential new economic, political and military weapon.

More work is required in this area, to explore a comprehensive EU approach, raise awareness and enhance international cooperation.

Energy security

Concerns about energy dependence have increased over the last five years. Declining production inside Europe means that by 2030 up to 75% of our oil and gas will have to be imported. This will come from a limited number of countries, many of which face threats to stability. We are faced therefore with an array of security challenges, which involve the responsibility and solidarity of all Member States.

Our response must be an EU energy policy which combines external and internal dimensions. The joint report from the High Representative and Commission in June 2006 set out the main elements. Inside Europe, we need a more unified energy market, with greater inter-connection, particular attention to the most isolated countries and crisis mechanisms to deal with temporary disruption to supply.

Greater diversification, of fuels, sources of supply, and transit routes, is essential, as are good governance, respect for rule of law and investment in source countries. EU policy supports these objectives through engagement with Central Asia, the Caucasus and Africa, as well as through the Eastern Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean. Energy is a major factor in EU-Russia relations. Our policy should address transit routes, including through Turkey and Ukraine. With our partners, including China, India, Japan and the US, we should promote renewable energy, low-carbon technologies and energy efficiency, alongside transparent and well-regulated global markets.

Climate change

In 2003, the ESS already identified the security implications of climate change. Five years on, this has taken on a new urgency. In March 2008, the High Representative and Commission presented a report to the European Council which described climate change is a 'threat multiplier'. Natural disasters, environmental degradation and competition for resources exacerbate conflict, especially in situations of poverty and population growth, with humanitarian, health, political and security consequences, including greater migration. Climate change can also lead to disputes over trade routes, maritime zones and resources previously inaccessible.

We have enhanced our conflict prevention and crisis management, but need to improve analysis and early warning capabilities. The EU cannot do this alone. We must step up our work with countries most at risk by strengthening their capacity to cope. International cooperation, with the UN and regional organisations, will be essential.

II. BUILDING STABILITY IN EUROPE AND BEYOND

Within our continent, enlargement continues to be a powerful driver for stability, peace and reform.

With Turkey, negotiations started in 2005, and a number of chapters have been opened since. Progress in the Western Balkans has been continuous, if slow. Accession negotiations with Croatia are well advanced. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has obtained candidate status. Stabilisation and Association agreements have been signed with the other Western Balkan countries. Serbia is close to fulfilling all conditions for moving towards deeper relations with the EU. The EU continues to play a leading role in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but, despite progress, more is required from local political leaders to overcome blockage of reforms.

We are deploying EULEX, our largest civilian ESDP mission to date, in Kosovo and will continue substantial economic support. Throughout the region, co-operation and good neighbourly relations are indispensable.

It is in our interest that the countries on our borders are well-governed. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), launched in 2004, supports this process. In the east, all eligible countries participate except Belarus, with whom we are now taking steps in this direction.

With Ukraine, we have gone further, with a far-reaching association agreement which is close to being finalised. We will soon start negotiations with the Republic of Moldova on a similar agreement. The Black Sea Synergy has been launched to complement EU bilateral policies in this region of particular importance for Europe.

New concerns have arisen over the so-called 'frozen conflicts' in our eastern neighbourhood. The situation in Georgia, concerning Abkhazia and South Ossetia, has escalated, leading to an armed conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008. The EU led the international response, through mediation between the parties, humanitarian assistance, a civilian monitoring mission, and substantial financial support. Our engagement will continue, with the EU leading the Geneva Process. A possible settlement to the Transnistrian conflict has gained impetus, through active EU participation in the 5+2 negotiation format, and the EU Border Assistance Mission.

The Mediterranean, an area of major importance and opportunity for Europe, still poses complex challenges, such as insufficient political reform and illegal migration. The EU and several Mediterranean partners, notably Israel and Morocco, are working towards deepening their bilateral relations. The ENP has reinforced reforms originally started under the Barcelona Process in 1995, but regional conflict, combined with rising radicalism, continues to sow instability.

The EU has been central to efforts towards a settlement in the Middle East, through its role in the Quartet, cooperation with Israel and the Palestinian Authority, with the Arab League and other regional partners. The EU is fully engaged in the Annapolis Process towards a two-state solution, and is contributing sustained financial and budgetary support to the Palestinian Authority, and capacity-building, including through the deployment of judicial, police and border management experts on the ground. In Lebanon, Member States provide the backbone of the UNIFIL peacekeeping mission. On Iraq, the EU has supported the political process, reconstruction, and rule of law, including through the EUJUST LEX mission.

Since 2003, Iran has been a growing source of concern. The Iranian nuclear programme has been subject to successive resolutions in the UNSC and IAEA. Development of a nuclear military capability would be a threat to EU security that cannot be accepted. The EU has led a dual-track approach, combining dialogue and increasing pressure, together with the US, China, and Russia. The High Representative has delivered a far-reaching offer for Iran to rebuild confidence and engagement with the international community. If, instead, the nuclear programme advances, the need for additional measures in support of the UN process grows. At the same time, we need to work with regional countries including the Gulf States to build regional security.

The ESS acknowledged that Europe has security interests beyond its immediate neighbourhood. In this respect, Afghanistan is a particular concern. Europe has a

long-term commitment to bring stability to this country. EU Member States make a major contribution to the NATO mission, and the EU is engaged on governance and development at all levels. The EU Police Mission is being expanded. These efforts will not succeed without full Afghan ownership, and support from neighbouring countries: in particular Pakistan, but also India, Central Asia and Iran. Indeed, improved prospects for good relations between India and Pakistan in recent years have been a positive element in the strategic balance sheet.

Security and development nexus

As the ESS and the 2005 Consensus on Development have acknowledged, there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace. Threats to public health, particularly pandemics, further undermine development. Human rights are a fundamental part of the equation. In many conflict or post-conflict zones, we have to address the appalling use of sexual violence as a weapon of intimidation and terror. Effective implementation of UNSCR 1820 on sexual violence in situations of armed conflict is essential.

Conflict is often linked to state fragility. Countries like Somalia are caught in a vicious cycle of weak governance and recurring conflict. We have sought to break this, both through development assistance and measures to ensure better security. Security Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration are a key part of post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction, and have been a focus of our missions in Guinea-Bissau or DR Congo. This is most successful when done in partnership with the international community and local stakeholders.

Ruthless exploitation of natural resources is often an underlying cause of conflict. There are increasing tensions over water and raw materials which require multilateral solutions. The Kimberley Process and Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative offer an innovative model to address this problem.

Piracy

The ESS highlighted piracy as a new dimension of organised crime. It is also a result of state failure. The world economy relies on sea routes for 90% of trade. Piracy in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden has made this issue more pressing in recent months, and affected delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia. The EU has responded, including with ATALANTA, our first maritime ESDP mission, to deter piracy off the Somali coast, alongside countries affected and other international actors, including NATO.

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), Cluster Munitions and Landmines

In 2005, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition. In the context of its implementation, the EU supports the UN Programme of Action in this field. The EU will continue to develop activities to combat threats posed by illicit SALW.

The EU has given strong support to the concept of an international Arms Trade Treaty and has decided to support the process leading towards its adoption. The EU is also a major donor to anti-mine action. It has actively supported and promoted the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines worldwide. The Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions, agreed at Dublin in May 2008, represents an important step forward in responding to the humanitarian problems caused by this type of munitions, which constitute a major concern for all EU Member States. The adoption of a protocol on this type of munitions in the UN framework involving all major military powers would be an important further step.

III.   EUROPE IN A CHANGING WORLD

To respond to the changing security environment we need to be more effective – among ourselves, within our neighbourhood and around the world.

A. A more effective and capable Europe

Our capacity to address the challenges has evolved over the past five years, and must continue to do so. We must strengthen our own coherence, through better institutional co-ordination and more strategic decision-making. The provisions of the Lisbon Treaty provide a framework to achieve this.

Preventing threats from becoming sources of conflict early on must be at the heart of our approach. Peace-building and long-term poverty reduction are essential to this. Each situation requires coherent use of our instruments, including political, diplomatic, development, humanitarian, crisis response, economic and trade co-operation, and civilian and military crisis management. We should also expand our dialogue and mediation capacities. EU Special Representatives bring EU influence to bear in various conflict regions. Civil society and NGOs have a vital role to play as actors and partners. Our election monitoring missions, led by members of the European Parliament, also make an important contribution.

The success of ESDP as an integral part of our Common Foreign and Security Policy is reflected by the fact that our assistance is increasingly in demand. Our Georgia mission has demonstrated what can be achieved when we act collectively with the necessary political will. But the more complex the challenges we face, the more flexible we must be. We need to prioritise our commitments, in line with resources. Battlegroups and Civilian Response Teams have enhanced our capacity to react rapidly.

Appropriate and effective command structures and headquarters capability are key. Our ability to combine civilian and military expertise from the conception of a mission, through the planning phase and into implementation must be reinforced. We are developing this aspect of ESDP by putting the appropriate administrative structures, financial mechanisms, and systems in place. There is also scope to improve training, building on the European Security and Defence College and the new European young officers exchange scheme, modelled on Erasmus.

We need to continue mainstreaming human rights issues in all activities in this field, including ESDP missions, through a people-based approach coherent with the concept of human security. The EU has recognised the role of women in building peace. Effective implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security and UNSCR 1612 on Children and Armed Conflict is essential in this context.

For civilian missions, we must be able to assemble trained personnel with a variety of skills and expertise, deploy them at short notice and sustain them in theatre over the long term. We need full interoperability between national contingents. In support of this, Member States have committed to draw up national strategies to make experts available, complemented by more deployable staff for mission support, including budgeting and procurement. The ways in which equipment is made available and procured should be made more effective to enable timely deployment of missions.

For military missions, we must continue to strengthen our efforts on capabilities, as well as mutual collaboration and burden-sharing arrangements. Experience has shown the need to do more, particularly over key capabilities such as strategic airlift, helicopters, space assets, and maritime surveillance (as set out in more detail in the Declaration on the Reinforcement of Capabilities). These efforts must be supported by a competitive and robust defence industry across Europe, with greater investment in research and development. Since 2004, the European Defence Agency has successfully led this process, and should continue to do so.

B. Greater engagement with our neighbourhood

The ENP has strengthened individual bilateral relationships with the EU. This process now needs to build regional integration.

The Union for the Mediterranean, launched in July 2008, provides a renewed political moment to pursue this with our southern partners, through a wide-ranging agenda, including on maritime safety, energy, water and migration. Addressing security threats like terrorism will be an important part of this.

The Eastern Partnership foresees a real step change in relations with our Eastern neighbours, with a significant upgrading of political, economic and trade relations. The goal is to strengthen the prosperity and stability of these countries, and thus the security of the EU. The proposals cover a wide range of bilateral and multilateral areas of cooperation including energy security and mobility of people.

Lasting stability in our neighbourhood will require continued effort by the EU, together with the UN, the OSCE, the US and Russia. Our relations with Russia have deteriorated over the conflict with Georgia. The EU expects Russia to honour its commitments in a way that will restore the necessary confidence. Our partnership should be based on respect for common values, notably human rights, democracy, and rule of law, and market economic principles as well as on common interests and objectives.

We need a sustained effort to address conflicts in the Southern Caucasus, the Republic of Moldova and between Israel and the Arab states. Here, as elsewhere, full engagement with the US will be key. In each case, a durable settlement must bring together all the regional players. Countries like Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have played an increasingly important role in the region, whereas this has not been the case with Iran. There is a particular opportunity to work with Turkey, including through the Alliance of Civilisations.

C. Partnerships for effective multilateralism

The ESS called for Europe to contribute to a more effective multilateral order around the world. Since 2003, we have strengthened our partnerships in pursuit of that objective. The key partner for Europe in this and other areas is the US. Where we have worked together, the EU and US have been a formidable force for good in the world.

The UN stands at the apex of the international system. Everything the EU has done in the field of security has been linked to UN objectives. The EU works closely in key theatres, including Kosovo, Afghanistan, DRC, Sudan/Darfur, Chad and Somalia, and has improved institutional links, in line with our joint 2007 EU-UN Declaration. We support all sixteen current UN peacekeeping operations.

The EU and NATO have worked well together on the ground in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, even if formal relations have not advanced. We need to strengthen this strategic partnership in service of our shared security interests, with better operational cooperation, in full respect of the decision-making autonomy of each organisation, and continued work on military capabilities. Since 2003, we have deepened our relationship with the OSCE, especially in Georgia and Kosovo.

We have substantially expanded our relationship with China. Ties to Canada and Japan are close and longstanding. Russia remains an important partner on global issues. There is still room to do more in our relationship with India. Relations with other partners, including Brazil, South Africa and, within Europe, Norway and Switzerland, have grown in significance since 2003.

The EU is working more closely with regional organisations, and in particular the African Union. Through the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, we are supporting enhanced African capacities in crisis management, including regional stand-by forces and early warning. We have deepened links with our Central Asia partners through the Strategy adopted in 2007, with strengthened political dialogue, and work on issues such as water, energy, rule of law and security. Elsewhere, the EU has developed engagement with ASEAN, over regional issues such as Burma, with SAARC, and Latin America. Our experience gives the EU a particular role in fostering regional integration. Where others seek to emulate us, in line with their particular circumstances, we should support them.

The international system, created at the end of the Second World War, faces pressures on several fronts. Representation in the international institutions has come under question. Legitimacy and effectiveness need to be improved, and decision-making in multilateral fora made more efficient. This means sharing decisions more, and creating a greater stake for others. Faced with common problems, there is no substitute for common solutions.

Key priorities are climate change and completion of the Doha Round in the WTO. The EU is leading negotiations for a new international agreement on the former, and must use all its levers to achieve an ambitious outcome at Copenhagen in

2009. We should continue reform of the UN system, begun in 2005, and maintain the crucial role of the Security Council and its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The International Criminal Court should grow further in effectiveness, alongside broader EU efforts to strengthen international justice and human rights. We need to mould the IMF and other financial institutions to reflect modern realities. The G8 should be transformed. And we must continue our collective efforts to meet the Millennium Development Goals.

These issues cross boundaries, touching as much on domestic as foreign policy. Indeed, they demonstrate how in the twenty-first century, more than ever, sovereignty entails responsibility. With respect to core human rights, the EU should continue to advance the agreement reached at the UN World Summit in 2005, that we hold a shared responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

. . .

Maintaining public support for our global engagement is fundamental. In modern democracies, where media and public opinion are crucial to shaping policy, popular commitment is essential to sustaining our commitments abroad. We deploy police, judicial experts and soldiers in unstable zones around the world. There is an onus on governments, parliaments and EU institutions to communicate how this contributes to security at home.

Five years ago, the ESS set out a vision of how the EU would be a force for a fairer, safer and more united world. We have come a long way towards that. But the world around us is changing fast, with evolving threats and shifting powers. To build a secure Europe in a better world, we must do more to shape events. And we must do it now.

ABBREVIATIONS

AU	African Union
BP	Barcelona Process
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organisation

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