



# ESDP newsletter

#5

European Security and Defence Policy

December 2007

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Civilian and Military Missions
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Security and Protection in a Key Area



# La politique européenne de sécurité et de défense

## en un coup d'œil



Dans le cadre de la PESC, l'Union élabore une politique de sécurité commune, qui couvre l'ensemble des questions relatives à sa sécurité, y compris la définition progressive d'une politique de défense commune, qui pourrait conduire à une défense commune, si le Conseil européen en décide ainsi, sous réserve que les États membres adoptent une décision dans ce sens conformément à leurs exigences constitutionnelles respectives.

Parallèlement à la nomination de Javier Solana en tant que premier "Haut Représentant pour la PESC", le Conseil européen réuni à Cologne en juin 1999 a placé au cœur du renforcement de la PESC les missions de gestion des crises.

Celles-ci incluent des missions humanitaires et d'évacuation, des missions de maintien de la paix et des missions de forces de combat pour la gestion des crises, y compris les missions de rétablissement de la paix.

Ce même Conseil européen a décidé que "l'Union doit disposer d'une capacité d'action autonome soutenue par des forces militaires crédibles, avoir les moyens de décider d'y recourir et être prête à le faire afin de réagir face aux crises internationales, sans préjudice des actions entreprises par l'OTAN".

C'est sur cette base que des efforts soutenus ont abouti à la mise en place de structures politiques et militaires permanentes et à l'établissement de capacités civiles et militaires, y compris la formulation par l'UE d'un ensemble de concepts et de procédures en matière de gestion des crises. L'Union a également conclu des arrangements relatifs à la consultation et à la participation de pays tiers à la gestion des crises. Elle a en outre défini avec l'OTAN le cadre des relations entre les deux organisations, qui comprend des arrangements permettant à l'Union de recourir aux moyens et capacités de l'OTAN.

Depuis janvier 2007, l'Union dispose d'un Centre d'opérations (OpsCentre) lui fournissant une nouvelle option pour la planification et la conduite d'opérations. Elle dispose également de forces de réaction rapide, les groupements tactiques ("EU Battlegroups").

L'Union européenne mène des opérations au titre de la Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense depuis 2003. À ce jour, elle a mené, mène ou s'apprête à mener une vingtaine d'opérations, dans les Balkans occidentaux, en Afrique, au Moyen-Orient et en Asie.

Pour un aperçu des missions et opérations de l'UE, voir page 26. Pour en savoir plus sur ces missions et opérations, consulter le site Internet du Conseil de l'UE: [www.consilium.europa.eu/esdp](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/esdp)



# Editorial

The EU-Africa summit in Lisbon on 8-9 December 2007 is due to usher in a new stage in the long-standing relations between the two continents with the adoption of a far-reaching joint strategy and a concrete action plan for its implementation. These relations, deeply rooted in history, have developed into a strong partnership, that recognises the interdependence between Africa and Europe and seeks to address regional and global challenges jointly.

The EU is already the world's largest donor in Africa and is the continent's most important economic and trade partner. It has a particular role to play and a particular responsibility towards the African continent.

Especially as it can avail itself of a wide array of instruments to contribute to long-term development and poverty eradication, to prevent and manage violent conflict and to build peace in developing countries.

On 19 November, EU defence and development ministers underlined that the nexus between development and security should inform the EU's policies in order to contribute to the coherence of its external action. There cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace.

Promoting peace and stability in Africa has been a long-standing objective of the European Union and of its foreign and security policy. The EU-Africa summit will further highlight this by making peace and security a key dimension of the new joint strategy. It provides the *newsletter* with a good opportunity to examine the EU's objectives, initiatives and instruments in this field.

One objective will be to support the African peace and security architecture that is taking shape under the leadership of the African Union.

EU support is provided in various forms including through crisis-management instruments. In certain cases, the EU will act in Africa in direct support to African Union, sub-regional or UN efforts to promote peace and stability through military and civilian crisis-management missions. Several of the EU's operations under the European security and defence policy have taken place in Africa, in close cooperation with African partners, notably to support the UN and often at the UN's request.

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) saw the first deployment of an EU military operation outside Europe, in 2003, ARTEMIS in Bunia in the East. In 2006 operation EUFOR RD Congo made a significant contribution to the transition in the DRC by helping to maintain a stable environment during the crucial election period.

In the context of the Darfur crisis, the EU has been providing the African Union with financial and logistical support and with expertise for its mission in Sudan/Darfur (AMIS). It is now planning an EU operation in Darfur's neighbouring regions of Chad and the Central African Republic, to support a UN presence there in order to improve security.

Security sector reform (SSR) in African states is another priority. EU missions to support reform of the police and armed forces in the DRC are testimony to the EU's long-term engagement in the country and in the region. And work is at hand concerning a possible mission to support SSR in Guinea Bissau.

EU efforts also aim to help develop African capabilities, such as the AU's African Standby Force, and to build on activities by member states to provide training and advisory, technical, planning and logistical support. African peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building mechanisms are being strengthened at the continental, regional and national levels. A programme like EURO RECAP is a significant example in this regard. Ensuring sustainable, predictable and flexible funding for African-led peace support operations is another challenge. A key instrument in this context is the EU's African Peace Facility.

The *newsletter* looks at the range of these missions and instruments. They are vivid examples of the EU's long-term engagement in favour of peace and security in Africa and of the partnership that is developing with the African Union and with African countries.



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## Imprint

**Publisher:** General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union

**Editorial coordination:** General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union (DG Press, Communication, Protocol), EU Institute for Security Studies

**Photo credits:** cover 1: European Commission, DG ECHO/François Goemans; p. 2: European Community; p. 3: EUFOR RD Congo; p. 4: EC DG ECHO, Ricardo Oliveira/GPM; pp. 5-6: Council of the EU; p. 7: MFA Portugal (eu2007.pt); p. 8: AFP, Ricardo Oliveira/GPM; p. 10: EU Institute for Security Studies (EU-ISS); p. 11: EC, DG ECHO; p. 12: Council of the EU; p. 13: EC DG ECHO; p. 14: Council of the EU, AFP, EC DG ECHO; p. 15: UN-DPKO cartographic section; p. 16: EC DG ECHO; p. 17: Council of the EU; p. 18: EUPOL Kinshasa; p. 19: EUSEC RD Congo; p. 20: RECAMP; p. 21: Council of the EU; p. 22-23: European Defence Agency, Council of the EU; cover 4: EUSEC RD Congo

**Editorial deadline:** 26 November 2007

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**Covers:** cover 1: Bunia, DRC, refugee camp  
cover 4: Bunia, mission EUSEC RD Congo

### > Security and Defence College 2007-2008 courses have started

The European Security and Defence College (ESDC)'s 2007-2008 academic year has started. The College's High Level Course is running in five week-long modules held between September 2007 and June 2008 in Brussels as well as in Lisbon, Prague, Tartu (Estonia) and in Slovenia. The course is open to senior civilian and military personnel from EU institutions and member states and candidate countries.

The College organised its first Orientation Course on the European security and defence policy in Brussels from 24 to 28 September. The course was "hosted" by the Romanian National Defence College. In addition to participants from the EU and candidate countries, the course was also open to third states and international organisations. It was run under the motto "The European Union – a Global Actor". A second Orientation Course was held in Brussels from 5 to 8 November.

Further ESDC activities have included a course for spokespersons and public information officers from ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Interior and Justice, throughout the member states, the EU institutions and ESDP missions organised in Brussels on 20 and 21 November. The course provided participants with a good opportunity to receive a comprehensive update on ESDP and its developments.

The ESDC, established in 2005, is organised as a network between national institutes, colleges, academies and institutions within the EU dealing with security and defence policy issues and the EU Institute for Security Studies. It provides training in the field of the European security and defence policy at the strategic level in order to develop and promote a common understanding of the policy among civilian and military personnel, and to identify and disseminate best practice in this field.



### > Parliamentary dimension further develops

Links with the European Parliament and activities to inform this institution on developments in the European security and defence policy have continued to develop in recent weeks.

On 11 September 2007, the President of the European Parliament, Hans-Gert Pöttering, visited the EU Operations Centre in Brussels. The OpsCentre, part of the EU Military Staff, became available on 1 January 2007. It provides an option for commanding, missions and operations, from Brussels.

High Representative Solana, in addition to his appearances in the Parliament's plenary or committee meetings, regularly briefs MEPs on ESDP developments, including operations. This is done through the special committee on sensitive information in the field of ESDP established by an interinstitutional agreement in 2002.

Relations with national parliaments are also coming to fruition. Solana addressed the Conference of Chairpersons of the foreign affairs committees of the 27 EU member states' national parliaments in Lisbon on 8 October and exchanged views with them on current priorities of the common foreign and security policy and the European security and defence policy.

### > Appointments

■ **Alexander Weis** took up his post as Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency on 1 October. He served previously as Germany's deputy National Armaments Director. He replaces Nick Witney who led the Agency from its establishment in July 2004.

The Agency's steering board also decided that, from 1 January 2008, there will be two deputy Chief Executives. Carlo Magrassi, currently Armaments Director of the Agency, will be in charge of strategy and Adam Sowa, the deputy National Armaments Director in the Polish Ministry of Defence, will handle Agency operations. They will succeed Germany's Hilmar Linnenkamp, who has served as sole deputy since the creation of the EDA.

"Nick Witney has done an outstanding job as the first head of the Agency," said Javier Solana. "He led the team that laid the foundations for the EDA in 2004 and, since becoming its first Chief Executive, has created a vibrant institution, delivering substantial results and making a real difference to European defence co-operation."

Both Witney and Weis present their views on Agency achievements and challenges in this issue of the ESDP Newsletter (pp 22-23).

■ On 19 September, HR Solana appointed **Gilles de Kerchove** as the new EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator. In this new function, de Kerchove will coordinate the work of the EU Council in the field of counter-terrorism, maintaining an overview of all the instruments at the Union's disposal, closely monitoring the implementation of the EU counter-terrorism strategy, and ensuring that the Union plays an active role in the fight against terrorism. Prior to his new appointment, de Kerchove was a director at the Council Secretariat in charge of police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters, where he worked closely with Gijs de Vries, the former EU counter-terrorism coordinator.

■ On 1 November, Brigadier-General **Jürgen Scholz** became the new Head of the EUPOL Afghanistan mission. He succeeds Brigadier-General Friedrich Eichele. High Representative Solana noted that, "as former Head of two EU Police missions in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Brigadier-General Scholz is ideally placed to build on the excellent work carried out by his predecessor".

■ On 4 December, Major General **Ignacio Martin Villalain** replaces Rear-Admiral Hans-Jochen Witthauer as Commander of EUFOR (COM EUFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

## Presidency's word

# The EU-Africa Partnership

> *Nuno Severiano Teixeira*  
Portuguese Minister of Defence



In terms of global security, Africa has been experiencing a 'geo-strategic rebirth' since the start of the twenty-first century. It has become a new theatre of international competition and a priority for international partnerships.

The African continent is rich in natural, energy and human resources, but is also a permanent arena of war, poverty, hunger and pandemics, of fragile and even failed states, and of terrorism and illegal trafficking. These are risks and threats that affect not just the African continent; their reach is international – they are obviously a problem for European security. Only international co-operation can work to address them.

It is in this context that we must examine the Europe-Africa partnership. There are common goals – sustainable development, good governance, stability and security – and there are also shared risks and threats – terrorism, transnational organised crime, pandemics, and trafficking in women and children. But we also hold shared concepts and views. For instance, there is the idea of partnership itself: a partnership between sovereign states based on the principles of solidarity, accountability, trust and mutual respect.

Arising from these principles is the second concept we share in common, that of African ownership. This refers to the capability of African actors to share responsibility for stability and peace on their continent, and it underpins the partnership between the European Union and Africa. For its part, the international community is responsible for supporting and promoting the progressive development of African capacities, through a constructive relationship with local actors.

Security is another concept we share in common. The multiplication of conflicts, civil war, the failure of states, these are recurring phenomena that, directly and indirectly, pose threats to regional and international stability. Complex phenomena call for wide-ranging response mechanisms that are part of a new and broader view of security. At the core of this concept lay the rule of law, good governance, and the principles of human rights. Only in this way can we promote sustainable development, improve the living conditions of populations, and promote global stability.

It is now a major priority to contribute to the consolidation of constitutional regimes as well as to the densification of multilateral co-operation structures to promote regional stability. These structures act on security and defence issues in a broader and more concerted fashion, forging autonomous and credible multilateral means to respond to regional crises.

We know this is no short-term task. It depends on medium- and long-term implementation of joint strategies. It calls for the adaptation of existing instruments and mechanisms, starting with those of the European Union itself. This is the only way to implement a broad, holistic and long-term policy, based on the triangulation of security, good governance and development.

A partnership between Europe and Africa, based on shared values and interests, is absolutely essential. That partnership is now embodied in the co-operation between the EU and the African Union. The inclusion of security and defence issues makes it possible to exchange experiences and get to know each other's strategic cultures and operational principles.

The Europe-Africa dialogue has been a priority for the Portuguese Presidency of the EU, held during the second half of 2007. But it is also a European Union priority. It is time to initiate a new cycle in European-African relations. To mark this new cycle, we want to demonstrate our determination to stand next to our African partners in promoting regional security, a mutual interest of the utmost importance. The best way to promote our strategic priorities on reshaping European-African relations is to have strong African allies who share the same broad vision. Security in Africa means security for Europe, and this must be the starting point in the construction of our strategic partnership.



> *The EU's High Representative, Javier Solana and the African Union's Commissioner for Peace and Security, Said Djinnit, 22 October 2007*

# The New Strategic Partnership

## A changing environment

**The European Union-Africa Summit on 8 and 9 December in Lisbon will make it visible: today Europe has a different perspective on the neighbouring continent than just a decade ago. It sees Africa's diversity, problems and challenges better but also, increasingly, the opportunities for Africans and Europeans.**

This is appropriate. Africa's place in the world is changing dramatically as a result of new geo-political constellations, new political and economic interests combined with, and triggered by, the effects of globalisation. Both individual African countries as well as sub-regional and continental organisations face new opportunities and challenges. Over recent years, the continent has taken important steps towards responding to this radically changing environment. African societies and governments have opened up and become more democratic and competitive. New regional structures have emerged or been strengthened with new agendas and resources.

One particularly significant development is that today there is a much greater choice, not only for African countries and organisations but also for the private sector and civil society, to engage with international partners. Europe and many other countries and regions are providing assistance and becoming engaged on the economic, political and security front. The United States is setting up an African military command, most likely to be located on the African continent. China is rapidly becoming a major trading partner and investor. India, Brazil, Malaysia and others are following suit.

### Closer to African partners

Europe and Africa have long-standing political, developmental and cultural links which qualify their relationship as privileged. But Europeans are increasingly discovering and defining common EU interests in Africa in terms of democratic governance, security, energy, combating terrorism, climate change, migration, etc., while maintaining their support for African efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals by 2015 and to address crises and conflicts, poor governance and situations of fragility where they occur. Important policies are being developed at EU level to address most of these challenges. The EU has further widened its common understanding of development policy. Nowadays, assistance programmes also address problems such as conflicts and instability, and integrate trade, environment and humanitarian dimensions. The EU is starting to use its aid instruments differently, more effectively and more flexibly, as shown by the creation of the African Peace Facility (see presentation on page 21), the Stability Instrument, the trade policy and the Governance Initiative, and also by the growing use of political dialogue, diplomacy and, last but not least, the ESDP civilian and military crisis-management instruments.

However, results do not yet match expectations in Europe and the actual needs in Africa, in spite of the many efforts and investments. One explanation is the multitude of actors and instruments. Above all,

the EU needs to be closer to its partners in Africa, to be better able not only to listen and understand but also to engage in dialogue and communicate European interests and preferences.

### On the basis of mutual interests

In this context, the EU and Africa agreed at the fifth EU-Africa Ministerial Meeting in December 2005 in Bamako (Mali) to take the partnership to a new, strategic level and to develop a Joint EU-Africa Strategy. Concrete work on the Joint Strategy started in early 2007. Negotiations took place in troika format on both sides with systematic involvement of EU member states through relevant Council working groups. The institutional process has been backed up by a large-scale consultation exercise to collect input for the draft from a broad range of non-institutional stakeholders in Europe, Africa and beyond. Regular discussions have also taken place with representatives from the European Parliament, the Pan-African Parliament and stakeholders in African and European civil society.



> *EU Council President Luis Amado with South African President Thabo Mbeki, 10 October 2007, EU/South Africa Troika*

### > Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

The eight MDGs – which range from halving extreme poverty to halting the spread of HIV/AIDS and providing universal primary education, all by the target date of 2015 – form a blueprint agreed to by all the world's countries and all the world's leading development institutions. They have galvanised unprecedented efforts to meet the needs of the world's poorest.

[www.un.org/millenniumgoals](http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals)



> Africa-EU Summit, Cairo, April 2000

The main principles of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy are that the two sides want to move beyond donor/recipient patterns and to work together on the basis of jointly identified mutual and complementary interests and benefits. More than in the past, EU support will work towards Africa-led and Africa-owned approaches and strengthen the primary responsibility of African partners for peace and security, democratic governance, respect for human rights, and economic and social development. In this context, the EU will also promote 'whole of Africa' approaches in support of Africa's aspirations to find regional and continental responses to some of the most important challenges.

In addition to the continued efforts in support of peace and security, governance and human rights, trade and regional and continental integration in Africa, and other key development issues, the Joint Strategy defines the objectives of reinforcing and elevating the EU-Africa partnership, of jointly addressing global challenges and of facilitating and promoting a broad-based, wide-ranging, people-centred partnership for all people in Africa and Europe.

## Strategic priorities

The Joint Strategy develops the strategic priorities of the partnership in four areas:

In the area of peace and security, there will be a strengthened dialogue on issues of common and global concern, as well as on crises and conflicts in Africa, Europe and beyond. But there will also be continued and strengthened co-operation towards building up African capacities to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. Here, the civilian and military crisis-management instruments, combined with the European Community's financing instruments, as well as member states' financial contributions and 'Europeanised' member states' programmes, make the EU an effective partner for the African Union (AU) and the sub-regional organisations. Finally, both sides want to find better solutions for the financing of African-led peace-support operations with mechanisms that involve African, European and non-European contributions on a visible, sustainable and flexible basis.



> José Socrates, Portuguese Prime Minister and President-in-office of the European Council, with the President of the African Union, H.E. John Kufuor, at the African Union Summit, July 2007

Activities in the area of governance and human rights will be two-fold. The promotion of democratic governance and human rights constitutes a central feature. The two continents will join efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the multilateral system and to promote the values of democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Secondly, the EU will support the new pan-African governance architecture where Africa is developing its public and private institutional capacity at all levels – national, regional and continental.

In the area of trade and regional integration, the priority of the partnership will be to help Africa improve its productive capacities, move up the value-added scale and become less dependent on raw materials and simple processed products. The key goals will be:

- private sector development, supported by foreign investments, to strengthen the supply side of African economies;
- the development and strengthening of physical infrastructure networks and related services, which are needed for the movement of persons, goods and information;
- trade integration, which is essential to increase both South-South and North-South trade flows.

In the area of key development issues, efforts will focus on making a key contribution to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, particularly in the health and education sectors. But co-operation will also be strengthened on science technology and scientific research, gender equality, environmental sustainability and climate change, migration and development, agriculture and food security, infrastructure, water and sanitation, energy and the development of knowledge-based societies, as well as culture.



## Institutional architecture

To translate these principles, objectives and strategic priorities into reality, the Joint Strategy develops an institutional architecture permitting a more ambitious and substantive intercontinental dialogue. This includes dialogue at the highest political level with regular summits of Heads of State and Government, the possibility of joint sectoral ministerial meetings, plus closer links and exchanges between key institutional actors such as the European Parliament and the Pan-African Parliament, as well as the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and its equivalent on the African side (ECOSOCC).

One of the most important changes in Africa has been the emergence of the African Union which is a natural interlocutor for the EU on continental issues and the most important institutional partner for the EU to promote common agendas. Therefore, the future institutional architecture will centre on the AU. This approach requires leading institutions that invest particularly in their capacity to interact with each other. The EU should therefore allocate the necessary resources and adapt its organisational structures. The opening of an EU delegation to the AU in Addis Ababa will be an important step in that direction. Beyond that, the EU should assist the AU in its institutional reform and also – if so requested – support the strengthening of the AU's institutional ability to interact with the EU.

## Civil society involvement

Beyond the level of states and institutions, the EU and Africa will facilitate and promote a broad-based and wide-ranging people-centred partnership for all people in Africa and Europe. The aim is to put in place a broad network of people-to-people contacts between the EU and

Africa at all levels and in all areas – between trade unions, universities, youth organisations, private sector organisations, cultural and educational institutions, etc.

In this context, an appropriate and prominent place needs to be defined in the institutional partnership for civil society and other non-governmental stakeholders. The Joint Strategy should remain a permanent platform for continued dialogue with stakeholders in the EU and Africa in the years ahead. Civil society organisations and Members of Parliament can then play a key role in monitoring the implementation of African and European policies and commitments.

## Action plans

The Joint Strategy will be implemented by successive Action Plans, the first of which will be adopted in Lisbon in December at the EU/Africa summit. These Action Plans will cover a three-year period, and will identify the main political priorities, as well as the policy commitments, programmes and actions that will be needed to achieve them. The Action Plans should become political instruments for Heads of State and Government by which success and failure can be easily assessed, and which will give, if necessary, new political impetus to joint efforts in key areas, or redirect them.

For further information:

[www.eu2007.pt](http://www.eu2007.pt)

[www.africa-union.org](http://www.africa-union.org)

[www.ec.europa.eu/development/eu-africa-summit-2007](http://www.ec.europa.eu/development/eu-africa-summit-2007)



## Le nouveau partenariat stratégique UE-Afrique en bref

Désormais, les pays et les organisations, ainsi que le secteur privé et la société civile, tendent à s'ouvrir vers l'extérieur et à établir des contacts avec des partenaires internationaux. De plus en plus, les Européens découvrent et définissent des intérêts communs de l'UE en Afrique dans les domaines de la gouvernance démocratique, de la sécurité, de l'énergie, de la lutte antiterroriste, du changement climatique, de la gestion des migrations, etc. D'importantes politiques sont élaborées au niveau de l'UE afin de relever les défis posés par les crises et les conflits, la mauvaise gouvernance et les situations de fragilité.

La stratégie conjointe Afrique/UE s'affranchit des schémas du type bailleurs de fonds-bénéficiaires. Le futur partenariat est axé sur des intérêts et des avantages mutuels et complémentaires définis conjointement. La stratégie conjointe comprend quatre grands ensembles de priorités: la paix et la sécurité; la gouvernance démocratique et les droits de l'homme; le commerce et l'intégration régionale; et les autres questions clés en matière de développement. La stratégie conjointe sera mise en œuvre par des plans d'action successifs, dont le premier sera adopté lors du sommet UE-Afrique des 8 et 9 décembre 2007 à Lisbonne.

# Security for Africans

> by *Alvaro de Vasconcelos*  
Director of the EU Institute for Security Studies



**The African continent is gradually becoming a priority area for the European Union. During the Portuguese EU Presidency, the extensive work put into the EU-Africa strategy has made this particularly clear. The EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon in December will therefore endorse, it is hoped, a common EU-Africa strategy for peace and development. After many years in which the emphasis was on development aid and, to some extent, good governance, the over-riding message today is clearly that without security human development is not sustainable.**

Involvement in conflict resolution in Africa is nothing new for the European Union. EU member states, especially those with traditional links with Africa, have long had a significant military presence on the continent. At the same time, the EU has made Africa one of its top priorities in the realm of the European security and defence policy, as the ESDP missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the support mission in Darfur attest, as well as the decision by the EU to conduct a bridging military operation in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic (see page 12). The current debate on how to deal with security issues in the African continent, as illustrated by the recent seminar organised by the EU Institute for Security Studies with the Portuguese Presidency (see next page), revolves mainly around the question of ownership and the role of external powers.

In my view, a number of specific key issues need to be addressed in order for the EU's Africa policy to be successful in achieving its aims:

**Discarding 'Afro-pessimism':** Africa is often perceived, mainly if not solely, as a continent beset by severe security problems, ranging from catastrophic humanitarian crises (e.g. Darfur) to failing states (e.g. Somalia). It is important to bear in mind, however, that there are successful states in Africa which today play a central role in ensuring continental development and democracy. This is certainly true of democratic South Africa and some of its neighbours like Mozambique or Botswana. The decision to hold an EU-South Africa Summit during the French Presidency (second half of 2008), following the bi-continental summit, is an important indication of the EU's recognition of this fact.

**Reconciling ownership and responsibility:** Ensuring real ownership for those directly involved – i.e. African civil societies and their legitimate governments – means primarily not only increasing support for the structures of the African Union but also lending support to sub-regional organisations and individual African states. This is not to say that Europe should avoid responsibility for crisis resolution in Africa, resorting if necessary to leading or contributing to UN-backed military operations. When it comes to dealing with the humanitarian tragedy of Darfur, the international community and the European Union within it cannot waive their responsibility to prevent genocide. Ensuring that this objective is attained will require working closely with willing and able partners, not only in Africa but also beyond.

**Engaging with new global players:** The emergence of new global players, such as China, India and Brazil, has a significant impact on Africa. It is difficult to imagine a solution to the various problems that exist in Africa without taking emerging multipolarity into consideration. Indeed, the continent can be seen as the primary arena in which

emerging multipolarity is being played out, hence the risk that it may become central to the competition for raw materials between different powers as was the case in the past. The EU's strategic thinking on Africa needs to integrate the efforts of the new players in solving its most pressing problems. As regards the situation in Darfur, international pressure has already contributed to China taking a more active role in helping solve the humanitarian issues in the Sudan. China, and especially India and Brazil, should be taken into account when it comes to formulating EU security policy and they should be seen as important partners, alongside the United States, for conflict resolution in Africa, including where peacekeeping operations are concerned.

**Citizens' security should come first:** As the EU gets increasingly involved in contributing to the development of African military capabilities, it needs to make sure that the primary objective of ensuring security for the Africans is fully met. In doing so, it must remain mindful of the fact that in Africa, as in many other places in the world, armed forces are not always necessarily part of the solution. Defence is sometimes understood as lending direct or indirect support to authoritarian regimes that are responsible for crimes committed against their own citizens. Therefore, security sector reform (SSR) must remain a top priority and every effort must be made to ensure that the military play their role in strengthening the rule of law and protecting human rights.

**A shared European vision of Africa:** The success of the EU's African policy critically depends on the definition of a truly common European perspective. This must transcend the narrowly defined interests of some member states in relation to specific countries or regions in Africa, but at the same time make the most of the web of special relationships linking the EU and Africa, including those distinctive relationships forged by their common history. In this respect, it is important to note the timely statements of the Portuguese EU Presidency on the need to overcome the notion of 'spheres of influence' and rather think of Africa as a whole and engage in a bi-continental dialogue. Recent developments, such as the launch of the African Union, may help set this renewed partnership in place. A truly European vision, on the other hand, requires a full level of commitment on the part of all EU members.

It is not hard to foresee that the ESDP's operational development will be closely connected to the African continent in the near future. The level of troop commitments and fair 'burden-sharing' among its members might therefore serve as a litmus test for the EU's seriousness about successfully implementing the common EU-Africa Strategy – a strategy which, crucially, puts human development concerns on a par with security concerns.

## Résumé

Le sommet UE-Afrique des 8-9 décembre à Lisbonne adoptera une stratégie conjointe pour la paix et le développement. Le message prépondérant est que sans sécurité, le développement ne peut être durable. La présidence portugaise de l'UE a souligné la nécessité de voir au-delà des "sphères d'influence", de considérer l'Afrique dans son ensemble et de s'engager dans un dialogue entre les deux continents.

La stratégie conjointe comprend une série d'axes majeurs:

**La sécurité avant tout:** L'UE contribue de plus en plus au développement des capacités militaires de l'Afrique et doit veiller à ce que la sécurité pour les Africains demeure l'objectif premier.

**Rejeter l'"afro-pessimisme":** L'Afrique est souvent considérée comme croulant sous les problèmes, mais certains États africains ont réussi à relever les défis et jouent un rôle essentiel dans le développement et la démocratie en Afrique.

**L'appropriation et la responsabilité:** Il convient de veiller à ce que les sociétés et les gouvernements d'Afrique s'approprient réellement la stratégie. Pour ce faire, il faut soutenir l'UA, les organisations sous-régionales et les différents États.

**Les acteurs internationaux:** L'émergence de la Chine, de l'Inde et du Brésil a des répercussions sur l'Afrique. Les solutions envisagées pour répondre à ses problèmes doivent tenir compte de cette nouvelle multipolarité.

**Une vision partagée:** La politique de l'UE en Afrique dépend de la définition d'une position européenne commune dépassant les intérêts des différents États membres.



> Violence in Eastern DRC, 2007

## Seminar on crisis prevention and conflict resolution in Africa

On 23 October 2007, the EU Institute for Security Studies co-hosted a high-level seminar in Lisbon with the Portuguese Ministry of Defence on 'ESDP, crisis prevention and conflict resolution in Africa'. The purpose of this conference was to bring together representatives from EU governments and institutions, the African Union, ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) and selected European and African academics to debate the role of the EU in African security. The topics discussed included the convergence of European and African security interests, the rule of law and political control of the African security sector, and the concepts of ownership and responsibility in EU-African co-operation.

Speakers at the conference included the Portuguese Defence Minister Nuno Severiano Teixeira; the Commissioner for peace and security of the African Union (AU), Said Djinnit; the Director for defence issues from the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, Claude-France Arnould; the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Ibn Chambas; the Director General of the EU Military Staff, General David Leakey; and Béatrice Pouligny from Sciences-Po University amongst others.

**Security sector reform:** Delegates agreed that the EU has already played an important role in conflict-prevention, management and resolution missions in Africa, for instance through the five ESDP operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (two peace-keeping operations, two police missions and one security sector reform mission). One of the main lessons from those experiences has been that in post-conflict scenarios, security sector reform (SSR) – developing local armed forces, police and intelligence services, and the judiciary system – is the first step towards effective state-building. Disarmament, demobilisation and the re-integration of ex-combatants, are also fundamental in this context.

**Shared responsibilities:** The EU approach to African security is to favour the development of African capacities to help African governments ensure their own security in the long run. The EU has made it clear that its partnership with African governments and institutions

(such as the AU) should be based on African ownership, mutual accountability, and tailored approaches and responses to each specific context. Given the nature and size of the challenge, and its possible consequences, solutions must stem from common strategies and shared responsibilities between Europeans and Africans.

**Three things to do:** To enhance African ownership in the EU-African partnerships, governments and institutions should agree to do three things: outline a set of EU-AU co-operation principles and concrete measures as to how they should be implemented; create co-operation mechanisms between local and international stakeholders (EU, AU, UN); and set up a monitoring system to assess success criteria and benchmarks before, during and after an operation.

Delegates at the conference generally agreed that there is a growing convergence of European and African security interests, and a better understanding of each other's views. This can be seen from the preparation of the joint EU-Africa strategy, which is due to be adopted in December at the EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon, and from growing co-operation between the EU and the AU. But the EU-AU partnership does not mean that bilateral cooperation is outdated: the EU should take benefit of historically-rooted relationships between Member States and African governments. Plus the EU should bolster its relationship with sub-regional organizations (such as ECOWAS) and key African governments (such as South Africa and Nigeria).

**Strategic partnership:** The strengthening of the EU-Africa relationship and meeting the Millennium Development Goals will depend on many factors. These include poverty reduction; eradication of pandemics; and gender equality. More broadly, promoting respect for human rights, good governance and the rule of law will be fundamental. However, to fulfil those objectives, the EU and African governments and institutions have to establish and develop a strategic partnership for coping with common security challenges.

> By Daniel Keohane, Research Fellow  
at the EU Institute for Security Studies


# La PESD en action, au Tchad et en République centrafricaine

Après CONCORDIA, ARTEMIS, ALTHEA et EUFOR RD Congo, l'UE planifie sa cinquième opération militaire, sa dix-septième opération de gestion de crise dans le cadre de la Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense (PESD)<sup>(1)</sup>.

> Par Claude-France Arnould, directeur des questions de défense au Secrétariat général du Conseil de l'UE



> Le HR Javier Solana avec le président de la République centrafricaine, François Bozize (photo de gauche) et avec le président tchadien Idriss Déby (photo de droite).



Disposant d'une forte légitimité, à la suite de l'adoption unanime par le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies de la résolution 1778 (2007), EUFOR Tchad/RCA se déploiera dans l'est du Tchad et le nord-est de la République centrafricaine, pour une durée d'un an.

Cette opération complète l'action que l'UE mène de longue date pour soutenir les efforts de paix dans l'ensemble de la région, y compris au Darfour où, depuis 2005, elle a appuyé l'Union africaine.

Une fois déployée, la force aura pour tâches principales de protéger les civils en danger, de faciliter l'acheminement de l'aide humanitaire et la libre circulation du personnel humanitaire et de contribuer à protéger le personnel et les installations des Nations Unies, ainsi qu'à faciliter le retour des personnes déplacées.

## Un environnement exigeant

Au-delà des aspects techniques, cette opération européenne est particulière à plus d'un titre, par l'ampleur de la tâche à accomplir, le degré de coordination avec les autres acteurs internationaux, en particulier les Nations Unies, et une mise en œuvre cohérente des différents instruments de l'UE.

Il s'agit de projeter la force à plus de 4 000 kilomètres de Bruxelles, dans des conditions logistiques extrêmes. Sur le plan humanitaire, l'ONU estime qu'environ 236 000 réfugiés du Darfour se trouvent au Tchad et 173 000 Tchadiens ont été déplacés par le conflit qui ravage cette partie de l'ouest du Soudan. Le sud tchadien accueille en outre environ 45 000 réfugiés centrafricains. Par son action, la force devra permettre aux acteurs humanitaires de travailler dans des conditions de sécurité satisfaisantes et de pouvoir circuler librement. Elle devra également permettre à l'ONU de déployer dans les camps de réfugiés une force de police de quelque 300 personnes, chargée de sélectionner,

entraîner, conseiller et superviser la Police tchadienne pour la protection humanitaire (PTPH), forte d'environ 850 policiers. Tout ceci devra fonctionner dans un environnement général difficile, avec des distances à couvrir considérables, des infrastructures quasiment inexistantes et des conditions météorologiques extrêmes. Ces conditions sont toutefois bien identifiées et les États membres qui fourniront des troupes ont pleinement conscience et ont entraîné leurs forces armées pour faire face à ce type d'environnement. La composition de la force n'est pas encore totalement arrêtée, mais il est certain que la plupart des États membres sera représentée.

Cette opération est particulière car pour la première fois, une force européenne militaire va se déployer pour créer les conditions permettant le déploiement d'une mission des Nations Unies, la MINURCAT. Il a donc été nécessaire de mener la planification des deux opérations en très étroite coordination, à un degré qui n'avait d'ailleurs jamais été atteint entre les deux organisations pour la planification d'une



> Iriba, Tchad

(1) Opérations CONCORDIA dans l'ancienne République yougoslave de Macédoine (2003), ARTEMIS en RD Congo (2003), ALTHEA en Bosnie-Herzégovine (2004-) et EUFOR RD Congo (2006).



> Camp de réfugiés d'Oure Cassoni, Tchad

opération. C'est toutefois la troisième opération militaire de l'UE en soutien d'une mission de l'ONU: après ARTEMIS, qui, en 2003, a fait cesser des massacres en Ituri, à l'est de la RDC, et a permis à la MONUC de se renforcer; après l'opération de soutien à la même MONUC, l'an passé, lors des élections en RDC.

La coopération entre l'UE et les Nations Unies, illustrée par les déclarations signées en septembre 2003 et juin 2007, correspond ainsi à la fois à une volonté politique de soutenir le "multilatéralisme efficace", volonté affirmée dans la stratégie de sécurité, et à une réalité très concrète: l'appui aux Nations Unies dans leurs opérations de maintien de la paix.

## Une coordination efficace

La coordination a bien fonctionné entre le Secrétariat général du Conseil à Bruxelles et le département des opérations de maintien de la paix à New York, de même qu'avec le Quartier général d'opération localisé près de Paris, au Mont Valérien, et placé sous la direction du général irlandais Patrick Nash, pour la planification; elle devra se poursuivre dans la conduite de l'opération. Il appartiendra aussi au commandant de la force, le général français Jean-Philippe Ganascia, de s'assurer que les mécanismes adéquats de coordination seront mis en place sur le terrain avec les différents acteurs de la crise, au Tchad comme en Centrafrique. Depuis le Quartier général de la force à Abéché, en étroite collaboration avec le Représentant Spécial de l'UE, Torben Brylle, il s'efforcera de coordonner son action plus particulièrement avec la force de police des Nations Unies, qui supervise la police tchadienne pour la protection humanitaire chargée du respect de l'ordre dans les camps de réfugiés et déplacés, mais aussi avec les forces de sécurité locales et les acteurs humanitaires qui agissent dans la région. Il sera ainsi en relation étroite avec le représentant spécial des Nations Unies, les autorités des gouvernements du Tchad et de la RCA, et les représentants des organisations internationales (notamment le Comité international de la

Croix-Rouge) ou non gouvernementales. Enfin, son action devra prendre en compte les effets produits par le déploiement de la force hybride des Nations Unies déployée au Darfour (MINUAD).

## Une approche globale

Par-dessus tout, la force de l'action européenne dans cette sous-région repose sur l'utilisation cohérente des différents instruments de l'UE, politiques, de sécurité et de développement. Elle devrait également permettre d'assurer une continuité de l'action européenne, combinant les effets de court/moyen terme de l'opération militaire avec les effets de moyen/long terme des actions de développement menées dans le cadre communautaire. Les personnes déplacées ne pourront retourner vers leurs villages d'origine que si des actions politiques ont été engagées vis-à-vis des gouvernements concernés, si les conditions de sécurité sont redevenues satisfaisantes, et si des efforts significatifs de reconstruction ont été entrepris en parallèle, permettant la reprise d'une vie normale. Ce simple exemple illustre, s'il en était besoin, la pertinence d'une bonne coordination dans l'utilisation des instruments européens. Cette approche globale est définie dans le concept de gestion de crise, approuvé par le Conseil, et qui fixe en particulier les objectifs de l'action européenne. Sur la base de ce concept, développé par le secrétariat général du Conseil (DG E VIII, en charge des questions de défense) en très étroite coordination avec les différentes directions du secrétariat, en particulier l'État-major de l'UE (EMUE), et avec la Commission, les différentes composantes sont déclinées: plan d'action politique pour la sous région, concept d'opération (CONOPS), puis plan d'opération (OPLAN) pour la partie sécurité mais aussi définition des actions à court, moyen et long terme que la Commission peut mettre en œuvre au titre du FED (Fonds européen de développement) ou des nouveaux instruments financiers qu'elle peut mobiliser (voir par ailleurs page 21). À l'occasion de cette planification, une coopération très étroite s'est ainsi instaurée entre le Secrétariat et les services de la Commission, pour faire converger les actions.



[www.consilium.europa.eu/eufor-tchad-rca](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eufor-tchad-rca)

> *Sudanese refugees in Chad*

## Summary

Following CONCORDIA, ARTEMIS, ALTHEA and EUFOR RD Congo, the EU is planning its fifth military operation and its 17<sup>th</sup> crisis-management operation in the framework of the ESDP. After unanimous adoption by the UN Security Council of Resolution 1778 (2007), EUFOR will deploy in Eastern Chad and the North-eastern Central African Republic for a duration of one year.

The operation supplements long-term action in support of peace efforts in the area, including in Darfur. Once deployed, the force will protect civilians, including United Nations personnel, ensure freedom of movement and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid.

The UN estimates approximately 236 000 Darfur refugees are now living in Chad and 173 000 Chadians have been displaced by the conflict devastating Western Sudan. The same area of Chad is already accommodating approximately 45 000 Central African Republic refugees.



> *Situation briefing in Iriba, Chad*



> *Treguine camp in Chad*



## Fiche d'information

# La future opération militaire de l'UE au Tchad et en République centrafricaine (EUFOR Tchad/RCA)

Le 15 octobre 2007, le Conseil de l'UE a adopté une action commune portant sur l'opération EUFOR TCHAD/RCA. L'Union européenne se prépare en effet à conduire une opération militaire de transition dans l'est du Tchad et dans le nord-est de la République centrafricaine. Cette opération s'inscrit dans le cadre de la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense (PESD).

En menant une telle opération, l'UE renforcera l'action qu'elle mène de longue date visant à faire face à la crise du Darfour, dans le cadre d'une approche régionale de cette crise. Cette opération sera conduite avec l'accord des gouvernements tchadiens et centrafricains.

Dans sa résolution 1778 (2007) du 25 septembre 2007, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies a approuvé la mise en place d'une mission des Nations Unies en République centrafricaine et au Tchad (MINURCAT) et a autorisé l'Union européenne à déployer ses forces, pour une durée d'un an à partir du moment où celle-ci aura déclaré sa capacité opérationnelle initiale.

EUFOR TCHAD/RCA sera une opération militaire intérimaire destinée à soutenir la présence multidimensionnelle des Nations Unies dans l'est du Tchad et dans le nord-est de la République centrafricaine afin d'améliorer la sécurité dans ces régions. La mission de l'UE aura plus particulièrement les objectifs suivants:

- contribuer à la protection des civils en danger, en particulier les réfugiés et les personnes déplacées,
- faciliter l'acheminement de l'aide humanitaire et la libre circulation du personnel humanitaire en contribuant à améliorer la sécurité dans la zone d'opérations,
- contribuer à la protection du personnel, des locaux, des installations et du matériel des Nations Unies et assurer la sécurité et la liberté de circulation de son propre personnel, du personnel des Nations Unies et du personnel associé.

L'opération aura une durée d'un an. Son quartier général opérationnel est situé au Mont Valérien (France), un des cinq QG opérationnels déclarés par les États membres pour des opérations autonomes de l'UE.

Le Général de Corps d'armée Patrick NASH (irlandais) a été nommé commandant de l'opération de l'UE. Le Général de Brigade Jean-Philippe GANASCIA (français) a été nommé commandant de la force de l'UE.

EUFOR TCHAD/RCA dispose d'un mandat approprié permettant l'usage de la force armée si nécessaire. Elle sera indépendante, impartiale et neutre.

Le montant financier de référence pour les coûts communs de l'opération militaire est de EUR 99,2 millions.

La mise en place d'EUFOR TCHAD/RCA s'inscrit dans le cadre d'un ensemble de mesures visant à renforcer l'engagement de l'UE en soutien d'une solution à la crise au Darfour. Tous les instruments de l'Union européenne – diplomatiques, politiques et financiers – seront mobilisés pour soutenir ces efforts. Les principaux éléments, tous liés, comprennent:

- un soutien accru aux efforts de l'Union africaine (UA) et de l'ONU pour relancer le processus politique en vue d'une solution durable;
- l'accélération de la mise en place de l'opération hybride UA/ONU au Darfour. D'ici-là, le soutien à la mission de l'UA au Soudan et au Darfour (AMIS) ;
- une mobilisation accrue afin d'assurer le financement de l'aide humanitaire ainsi que l'accès humanitaire.

> *Projet d'assistance médicale en République centrafricaine*



## > Une action humanitaire et des instruments d'assistance

Les régions concernées par l'opération EUFOR Tchad/RCA sont marquées par une instabilité et une insécurité généralisée qui affectent des centaines de milliers de personnes civiles, obligées de vivre dans des conditions d'extrême vulnérabilité.

La stabilité durable de ces régions du Tchad et de la République centrafricaine (RCA) ne pourra être assurée que si l'action internationale, et en particulier celle de l'Union européenne, ne se résume pas au seul volet "sécurité" mais couvre également les volets "assistance" et "politique".

Un élément important à prendre en compte avec le déploiement de cette force européenne est la préservation de l'espace humanitaire. C'est pourquoi les services d'ECHO (Office humanitaire de la Commission européenne) ont travaillé étroitement avec les planificateurs militaires du Conseil de l'Union européenne afin d'assurer un respect des mandats respectifs et une très bonne coordination entre militaires et civils/humanitaires. Des officiers de liaison de la Force de l'UE seront présents sur le terrain afin d'assurer un lien et un échange d'informations permanent avec les humanitaires.

Les mesures d'assistance prévues couvrent trois aspects:

- Un volet sécuritaire de soutien à l'opération de police tchadienne sous l'égide des Nations Unies. Il s'agira essentiellement de financer la formation des 850 policiers tchadiens chargés d'assurer l'ordre dans les camps de réfugiés et de déplacés. Il est crucial que cette action de police soit exemplaire et bien accueillie par les populations. Des fonds

financés par l'Instrument de stabilité à hauteur d'environ EUR 10 millions seront engagés avant la fin de l'année 2007 à cet effet.

- Un volet humanitaire: en 2007, EUR 30,5 millions ont été affectés par la Commission à l'aide humanitaire d'urgence et à des programmes d'assistance multisectorielle en faveur tant des populations déplacées et réfugiées que des communautés hôtes au Tchad. Huit millions d'euros ont été engagés en faveur de la République centrafricaine. Des montants au moins similaires seront prévus pour 2008.

- Un volet réintégration/réhabilitation: des fonds supplémentaires du 9<sup>e</sup> FED (Fonds européen de développement) d'environ EUR 13,1 millions seront mobilisés à court terme au Tchad et en RCA. Le programme a pour vocation de poursuivre les actions ECHO, dans le cadre d'une stratégie de réhabilitation et de transition vers le développement.

Ces mesures d'assistance sont nécessaires mais doivent être couplées avec des mesures concernant le processus politique. Pour assurer une stabilité durable, l'action internationale et européenne au Tchad et en RCA devra être complétée par diverses activités: l'appui à la gouvernance économique et au système de justice et de sécurité ainsi que l'appui à l'accord politique entre gouvernement et partis d'opposition devant mener à des élections en 2009.

La Commission européenne continuera à promouvoir cette approche globale au Tchad et en RCA, en étroite collaboration avec ces deux pays.



# EU support for the African Union Mission in Sudan/Darfur

The European Union and its member states have been providing a wide range of support to the African Union's (AU) efforts to help stabilise the situation in Darfur since January 2004. This assistance has included financial, personnel and political support to the Abuja talks process and the Ceasefire Commission.

It also includes support to the AU mission in the Darfur region of Sudan (AMIS) through the provision of equipment and assets, planning and technical assistance, military observers, training of African troops and civilian police officers, and strategic transportation (EU civilian-military supporting action).

■ In this context, the EU deployed personnel to AMIS II, including police officers, military experts, and military observers. In addition, some military staff, police officers and political advisors have been deployed to Addis Ababa to support the EU Special Representative for Sudan (EUSR) in his contacts and cooperation with the AU.

■ In the same period, EU member states have provided coordinated strategic airlift for well over 2,000 African Union personnel.

■ The EU has committed a total of over EUR 300 million from the African Peace Facility in support of AMIS since June 2004. This has provided the funds necessary to pay personnel costs including salaries, allowances, insurance, travel, rations and medical costs.

■ Additionally, EU member states have made substantial bilateral contributions - financial as well as the provision of expertise, equipment, food rations, airlift, etc., taking the overall EU contribution to AMIS to close to EUR 500 million for the period 2004-2007.

Since July 2005, the EU has had a Special Representative for Sudan. The EUSR, currently Mr Torben Brylle, appointed in May 2007, ensures the coordination and coherence of the EU's contributions to AMIS. He is assisted by a team of EU military and police advisers in Addis Ababa.



➤ Visit of the director general of the EU Military Staff General David Leakey (2<sup>nd</sup> from left) to AMIS HQ, June 2007

## Réforme du secteur de la sécurité:

# l'engagement de l'UE aux côtés de la RDC

En décembre 2006, la République démocratique du Congo (RDC) a connu ses premières élections démocratiques depuis son accession à l'indépendance en 1960, mettant fin à plus de dix ans d'un conflit sanglant et à quatre années d'une transition politique parfois turbulente: une ère nouvelle qui est notamment placée sous le signe de la reconstruction par les autorités congolaises nouvellement élues.



> EUPOL Kinshasa

Une des premières tâches, identifiée comme prioritaire, vise à la restauration de l'État de droit sur l'ensemble du territoire de la RDC et nécessite pour cela de procéder à la réforme du secteur de sécurité (RSS/SSR) dans ses trois domaines: armée, police, justice. Tâche énorme dans un pays vaste, grand comme l'Europe de l'Ouest, une démocratie naissante, toujours marquée par des affrontements violents dans les régions de l'Est.

À leur demande, le Conseil de l'Union européenne a décidé de soutenir, dans le cadre de la PESD, les efforts des autorités congolaises dans cette action par la mission EUSEC RD Congo, en place depuis 2005 et dirigée par le général Pierre-Michel Joana (France) pour soutenir la réforme de l'armée, et par la mission EUPOL RD Congo, en place depuis le 1<sup>er</sup> juillet 2007, dirigée par le Superintendant Adilio Custodio (Portugal) et qui appuie la réforme de la police.

Outre les actions de coopération au développement menées au nom de l'Union par la Commission européenne, l'UE a démontré son engagement à soutenir le processus de transition en RDC, par le biais de l'action politique, de l'aide ainsi que de missions militaires et de police - les missions ARTEMIS (2003), EUFOR RD Congo (2006) et EUPOL KINSHASA (2005-2007) - ces dernières années.

Visant à soutenir et assister les autorités congolaises dans la réforme du secteur de la sécurité dans le domaine de la police et de son interaction avec la justice, une activité clé de la mission EUPOL RD Congo

consiste en l'appui au Comité de suivi pour la réforme de la police (CSRP), dont la mise en place a été prévue dans le contrat de gouvernance du nouveau gouvernement congolais. Sous l'autorité du ministère de l'intérieur, de la décentralisation et de la sécurité, ce comité doit être l'instrument de la réforme de la police congolaise. Cette action a pour objectif de développer, d'organiser et d'assurer le suivi de la réforme de la police nationale congolaise sur la base de la nouvelle loi organique de la police tout en favorisant la coordination internationale dans ce domaine.

Le projet de la mission EUPOL est de faciliter, d'aider et de participer à la mise en place de cet instrument congolais de réforme. À ce titre, plusieurs experts européens travaillent avec des experts congolais et internationaux, notamment dans le domaine des ressources humaines et de la gestion du personnel, de la formation, et de l'organisation de la future police congolaise. Pour assurer la cohérence de l'appui dans le cadre de la réforme du secteur de la sécurité, EUPOL RD Congo dispose d'une interface "justice". Quatre magistrats ont pour tâche de travailler en coordination avec les partenaires nationaux et internationaux sur les aspects de la justice pénale. Leur action se concentre, d'une part, sur les problématiques liées à l'interaction entre la police et la justice et, d'autre part, sur la séparation entre la justice civile et la justice militaire

Poursuivant l'expérience d'EUPOL KINSHASA dans la coordination des moyens de maintien de l'ordre dans la capitale durant la période de sécurisation des élections, les autorités congolaises ont souhaité déve-



> Adilio Custodio, chef de la mission EUPOL, dans son état-major à Kinshasa

## > Guinée-Bissau: une mission de RSS à l'étude

Le 15 octobre dernier, le Conseil de l'UE a estimé qu'une action dans le domaine de la réforme du secteur de la sécurité (RSS) en Guinée-Bissau serait appropriée. Il s'est félicité des progrès effectués dans la planification de cette mission de conseil et d'assistance, qui serait composée notamment d'experts civils et militaires pour soutenir le processus national de réforme du secteur de la sécurité. Une telle mission PESD s'inscrirait dans une démarche complémentaire des activités communautaires ainsi que de celles menées au titre du Fonds européen de développement.



> Mission EUSEC à Komanda, octobre 2007

opper le principe de centre opérationnel destiné à améliorer la coordination et l'action des moyens policiers dans les interventions. EUPOL RD Congo assiste donc à la mise en place de centres opérationnels au sein de la police nationale congolaise. Les policiers européens assurent les actions de suivi, de conseil et d'encadrement des policiers congolais dans la mise en place de ces instruments de coordination.

La mission européenne de conseil et d'assistance en matière de réforme du secteur de la sécurité (EUSEC RD Congo), lancée le 8 juin 2005, a vu son mandat renouvelé pour la deuxième fois en 2007, ce qui témoigne de l'engagement continu de l'UE en faveur de la stabilisation et du redressement de la RDC: en étroite coopération et coordination avec les autres acteurs de la communauté internationale, EUSEC RD Congo vise à apporter un soutien concret aux autorités congolaises compétentes en matière de sécurité, afin de garantir la sécurité du peuple congolais et de permettre la réconciliation nationale et la stabilité dans la région.

Afin de mettre en place une structure d'administration moderne et efficace des effectifs des forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC), la mission EUSEC s'est consacrée au projet "Chaîne de paiement", portant sur la séparation de la chaîne de commandement de celle des finances. Cette séparation constitue un des fondements de la réforme de l'armée congolaise dans la mesure où elle conditionne pour une partie importante les besoins financiers de la Défense et, d'autre part, la mise en place des procédures de paiement sécurisées.



> Mission EUSEC à Nizi-Bambu, octobre 2007

Des chefs de bureau comptable ont été nommés au sein de chaque brigade intégrée de l'armée congolaise depuis février 2006 et des agents payeurs au niveau des bataillons ont débuté en octobre 2006. Néanmoins, les conseillers "brigades" de la mission EUSEC présents sur le terrain continuent à suivre les opérations de paiement.

En outre, l'appui technique et logistique au recensement biométrique des effectifs de l'ensemble des FARDC représente actuellement une priorité de la mission: financé par l'UE par le biais de la délégation de la Commission européenne en RDC à hauteur de EUR 2 million, le recensement biométrique a été lancé officiellement par l'état-major des forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo au début de l'année 2007 et vise à l'identification complète et fiable de tous les militaires des FARDC: à l'issue de cette opération, chaque militaire congolais disposera d'une carte d'identité individuelle infalsifiable qui lui permettra de s'identifier, notamment, grâce à ses empreintes digitales.

Le recensement a été clôturé pour la garnison de Kinshasa au mois d'octobre 2007, la prochaine étape étant la région militaire du Bas-Congo. Constituant une étape indispensable de la restructuration et de la reconstruction des FARDC, ce processus permettra de mettre en œuvre une gestion moderne des ressources humaines. Par un meilleur contrôle des effectifs, il doit également aboutir à l'amélioration du niveau de rémunération et des conditions de vie des soldats.

## Summary

In December 2006, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) saw its first democratic elections since independence in 1960, putting an end to more than ten years of conflict and four years of political transition.

One of the first identified priorities involves the restoration of the rule of law across the entire territory of the DRC, and this, in turn, requires significant reform in three areas of the security sector: army, police force, and judiciary.

The Council of the European Union is supporting these efforts in the framework of the ESDP. The EUSEC RD Congo mission, operating since 2005 and directed by General Pierre-Michel Joana, supports reform of the army, while the EUPOL RD Congo mission, launched in July 2007 following the 2005-2007 EUPOL Kinshasa mission, and directed by Superintendent Adilio Custodio, supports reform of the police force.

# Au cœur du partenariat stratégique:

## EURO RECAMP

**EURO RECAMP est une initiative européenne qui vise à renforcer les capacités africaines de prévention, de gestion et de résolution des conflits. Le plan EURO RECAMP vient d'être identifié par l'Union africaine comme l'un des principaux opérateurs du plan d'entraînement de la Force africaine en attente et il renforcera donc le partenariat "Paix et sécurité" entre l'Union européenne et l'Afrique.**

Le plan d'entraînement prévoit d'être en mesure de déployer d'ici 2010 une brigade d'environ 5000 hommes comprenant des éléments civils et militaires dans le cadre du chapitre VI de la Charte des Nations Unies. À cette fin, EURO RECAMP aidera le Département des opérations de soutien à la paix (PSOD) de l'Union africaine (UA) à réaliser un Command Post Exercise (CPX) au niveau du continent en 2010.



Stage de formation au Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre à Accra (Ghana)

### Un instrument de la PESD au service de l'Afrique...

EURO RECAMP est une initiative européenne d'origine française qui s'appuie sur les dix années d'expérience des anciens cycles RECAMP regroupant environ quarante partenaires africains, européens et non européens. Instrument de la Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense (PESD) au service de l'Afrique, cette initiative est placée sous le contrôle du Comité politique et de sécurité de l'UE (COPS) qui a désigné récemment la France comme nation cadre pour la mise en œuvre du premier cycle. Elle évolue également dans le cadre de l'Africa Clearing House (G8++), instance de coordination générale des activités des partenaires sur l'Afrique.

Au cours d'un cycle de deux années, EURO RECAMP dispensera des activités civilo-militaires ayant pour objectif d'entraîner les responsables africains à réaliser une planification décisionnelle de gestion de crises au niveau du continent. Concrètement, il s'agira de renforcer les capacités politico-stratégiques du PSOD de l'Union africaine, c'est-à-dire de développer les procédures menant de la prise de décision politique à l'engagement de la force, de mettre en place une chaîne de commandement entre l'UA et les sous-régions et de participer à la formation du personnel de ces organisations.

### ... qui vise à la formation des responsables africains

La formation de responsables militaires et civils africains constituera un volet majeur du cycle EURO RECAMP. Ce volet s'appuiera sur un réseau continental de centres d'excellence africains. Le Centre de maintien de la paix de Bamako, le Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre à Accra, l'International Peace Support Training Centre de Karen (Kenya) et certaines Écoles nationales à vocation régionale (ENVR) devraient jouer un rôle important.

Les États membres de l'Union européenne pourront également dispenser, au sein de leurs centres nationaux, des formations au maintien

de la paix dans les domaines civil et militaire. Ce pourrait être le cas, par exemple, du Centre d'excellence pour la police (COESPU) à Vicence (Italie), du Centre d'entraînement pour la paix (HDF PSTC) à Szolnok (Hongrie), de l'Institut des hautes études pour la défense nationale (IHEDN) à Paris, et du Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC) à Shrivenham (Royaume-Uni).


### Une dynamique ouverte à tous

Sous l'autorité du COPS et avec l'appui du Secrétariat général du Conseil, la mise en œuvre du cycle sera réalisée par une équipe internationale s'appuyant sur l'état-major interarmées de force et d'entraînement de Creil, en France. Des représentants du Royaume-Uni, de la Belgique et de la France composent cette équipe. Un représentant de l'Union africaine et un expert européen de la gestion civile des crises devraient prochainement y être intégrés. La participation active de l'UA, qui assurera le contrôle politique du cycle pour la partie africaine, est ainsi attendue à tous les niveaux.

Les contributions volontaires des États membres et la Facilité de Paix gérée par la Commission (voir page suivante), qui a signé un premier accord de EUR 20 millions avec les partenaires africains en vue de renforcer les capacités africaines de maintien de la paix, constitueront les sources majeures de financement du cycle EURO RECAMP.

Les partenaires non européens devraient également tenir une place considérable dans le prochain cycle. Les Nations Unies, cadre légitime international, sont un partenaire privilégié. Les États-Unis participeront également à EURO RECAMP, en plus de leur programme ACOTA qui vise essentiellement, et de façon complémentaire, les aspects logistiques et tactiques de la Force africaine en attente. Le Canada, notamment au travers du Centre Pearson d'Ottawa, devrait dispenser des formations au maintien de la paix. L'ensemble de ces participations sera finalisé au cours d'une conférence des contributeurs prévue au cours du premier trimestre 2008 à Bruxelles.

## EU support to conflict prevention, peace-support operations, peace-building policies and related capacity-building in Africa



> AMIS operation in Sudan

The European Union and its member states have been providing such support at both regional, sub-regional and national levels, and through various instruments, in particular the African Peace Facility, as well as through Regional Indicative Programmes, the National Indicative Programmes and the EU Rapid Reaction Mechanism (which, from 2007, is called the Stability Instrument).

### The African Peace Facility

The African Peace Facility (APF), one of the EU's newest and most innovative instruments for external action, remains by far the most important source of funding for this support. It is built on the three core principles of African ownership, solidarity and partnership between Africa and Europe, and was created in response to a request to the EU from the July 2003 African Union (AU) summit in Maputo (Mozambique) to set up an instrument in support of African leadership in the area of peace and security. The APF, established in mid-2004 with EUR 250 million, was designed to support the emerging new structures known collectively as the African 'continental peace and security architecture' and to allow African regional and sub-regional organisations to take responsibility for, and effectively carry out, peace-support operations (PSOs).

The APF has rapidly become the financial foundation of Africa's peace and security architecture. The initial APF allocation of EUR 250 million was topped up in 2007 by additional allocations, including

voluntary contributions from several EU member states, and reached a total of EUR 384 million.

The bulk of the funds used for PSOs has been mostly absorbed by the AU Mission in Sudan/Darfur (AMIS), with a total amount of over EUR 300 million. The EU support has not only contributed to the improvement of the overall security situation in Sudan's Darfur region, but has also served to strengthen the AU's leadership role on the continent. So far, the APF has also provided funding to the following PSOs: the African Union Mission in Somalia, (AMISOM – EUR 15 million) and the Multinational Force in the Central African Republic (FOMUC – EUR 23 million). The APF has also backed the African Union Mission in the Comoros (AMISEC – EUR 5 million).

As regards capacity-building, the following activities have been supported: strengthening the capacities of the African Union Commission (AUC, EUR 6 million), African Standby Force workshops (EUR 1 million), support to sub-regional organisations' liaison officers to the AU, planning capacities for the African Standby Force, and support to early-warning systems and financial management at both sub-regional and continental levels (EUR 27,7 million).

For the future, the EU will continue funding the APF with EUR 300 million from the Tenth European Development Fund (EDF) for an initial three-year period (2008-2010).

# The end of the first shift: satisfaction, frustration and confidence

The following reflections on the European Defence Agency (EDA) were written by Nick Witney shortly before leaving on 1 October, after serving as its first Chief Executive

It is now almost four years since I began to prepare to lead the Agency Establishment Team – a prelude, as it turned out, for taking the first shift as EDA Chief Executive. These years have been quite the most rewarding experience of my professional life.

I look back with a real sense of privilege. First, because it is always good to build something new; and in this case, where the mandate was no more precise than the European Council's call for "an Agency in the field of defence capabilities, armaments acquisition and research", the opportunity was a strikingly wide one. To have been able to play a central role in designing the EDA, creating it and setting it to work, staffing it and determining its strategies, priorities, approaches and culture has been hugely rewarding. And it has been a privilege to undertake these efforts for such a manifestly worthwhile cause. There was, and remains, a real need for this Agency, to support a European security and defence policy which is increasingly manifesting itself in action. I have always had the comforting sense of working with the tide – with a developing understanding in Europe both of how little European member states can achieve individually in a rapidly globalising world, and yet also of what a distinctive and influential force for good Europeans can be when they act together.

A sense of privilege has been accompanied by a sense of frustration. I have catalogued elsewhere – and will certainly do so again! – the early successes that the EDA has achieved. The consensus seems to be that this represents unexpectedly rapid progress. If this is right, then it is because our collective expectations are too low. In seeking to encourage defence co-operation in Europe, we are in a double bind. First, the endeavour is afflicted by the inevitable friction of any multinational enterprise – a friction manifested less in the explicit clash of interests than in a collective predisposition to take refuge from difficult issues and hard decisions in elaborate processes and endless drafting. The Brussels culture is focused too little on achieving results, and change, in the real world outside. And it is not much consolation to reflect that this is probably even more true in EDC than it is around the Rond-Point Schuman. To this general friction, defence adds its own massive inertia. It is a hugely complicated business, operating to some necessarily long lead times. But there is a cultural dimension here as well: the deep-seated aversion to risk which seems to go with the whole notion of defence, and too often a failure of the leadership required to insist that changing things requires things to change and that policy agreements are not much use unless reflected in how defence budgets are actually spent. Clausewitz remarked that, to overcome the friction of warfare, the General requires an iron will. Changing the orientation and management of defence in Europe requires no less from the top leadership in each of the participating member states who own the Agency enterprise.



So I wish we could have done more and moved faster. Yet, I am wholly confident that the enterprise will succeed. Though we are, as I noted above, borne along by what will amount to a steady geo-strategic current. We have demonstrated in the early phases what can be achieved through the Agency if we focus on results and maintain a sense of urgency, and there are now enough talented and committed people engaged in the enterprise to ensure its continuing success. The biggest privilege of all over the last three and a half years has been to work with such a wonderful selection of colleagues, from 26 different nations and an even wider variety of backgrounds – working together with a sense of shared purpose and willingness to co-operate which has often astonished me. I feel a strong personal sense of gratitude to scores of people, whether on the Agency Establishment Team, on the staff of the Agency (especially Hilmar Linnenkamp, my deputy), within national ministries of defence and many other communities beyond. I am conscious that I have not always been an easy boss and have asked a great deal of my colleagues' tolerance and forbearance. In exchange, they have kept me cheerful and sane. I know that my successor, Alexander Weis, will find the same.

*Nick Witney will shortly be joining the newly established European Council on Foreign Relations ([www.ecfr.eu](http://www.ecfr.eu)) as a senior policy fellow. With trans European membership and representation, the ECFR aims to promote a more integrated European foreign policy, with open society values at its core.*

# Delivering the goods: the next phase for the European Defence Agency

Alexander Weis, EDA Chief Executive



Taking over the leadership of an organisation is never easy, but it is a lot less daunting when the institution has solid foundations, talented and motivated staff, and an excellent track record. That has certainly been my experience since 1 October as Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency and for this, my predecessor, Nick Witney, and his team deserve the highest praise. The EDA has achieved a very great deal in an exceedingly short space of time and has become a significant actor on the European defence stage.

Thanks to their efforts, and to the support of our 26 participating member states, we have introduced measures to bring more transparency and competition to the European defence equipment market: a Code of Conduct covering government-to-industry contract opportunities, and a Code of Best Practice in the supply chain covering industry-to-industry subcontracting, which aims to ensure that smaller suppliers can find business opportunities in the European market. For the first time, all information about contracting opportunities can be accessed via a single online portal, in this case our European Bulletin Board at [www.eda.europa.eu/ebbweb](http://www.eda.europa.eu/ebbweb).

From a broader perspective, a year ago we published a long-term vision report, which describes the possible framework within which ESDP crisis-management operations could take place in the future and the sort of military capabilities which would be needed. That analysis is more concrete and more practical in the comprehensive Capabilities Development Plan, in which governments are sharing their thinking about what Europe is going to need in the medium term and how we can deliver it most efficiently. In defence Research and Technology (R&T), the Agency has encouraged more collaborative projects linked to the key capabilities we require. The innovative Joint Investment Programme (JIP) on force protection, with its progressive management arrangements, has attracted government commitments of more than EUR 50 million. A key objective of the JIP is to bring new actors from businesses and university research centres – and from smaller member states – into the world of joint R&T. Most recently, we have secured an agreement on a strategy to strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). We have established clear roadmaps for identifying the key technologies and capabilities we must preserve and strengthen in Europe, along with other measures to give governments confidence that they can truly look at the DTIB on a European level rather than as a series of national activities.

With such a strong base to build on, we can now look forward to the next phase of the Agency's life, where our focus must increasingly be on 'delivering the goods'. I mean this quite literally: my objective for the

Agency is that it should increasingly take the leading role in coordinating multinational armaments projects in Europe and should become the natural home for all joint development and procurement initiatives of that kind. The resources that European governments are prepared to commit to defence are such that there can be no room for duplication of effort or wasted energy. Two specific projects on which we could make a start are the initiative for a future transport helicopter launched this year by France and Germany, and the area of space-based reconnaissance satellites, where there is an opportunity to build on the agreement of last December between France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Spain and Greece for a Multinational Space-based Intelligence System (MUSIS). Such projects are critical for us to demonstrate to member states how we can add value to their efforts to transform Europe's military capabilities to meet the needs of the 21st century.

Of course, much remains to be done on our agenda. We are launching a communication campaign to have more contracts advertised on the European Bulletin Board, more cross-border bids made and more business awarded to suppliers from other countries. The JIP is an excellent template for joint R&T activities but we need to extend it to new projects. There are demanding roadmaps to follow for the Capabilities Development Plan and work on the European DTIB if they are to deliver concrete results.

I am also very fortunate that national governments continue to show a very high degree of commitment to the work of the Agency. I speak from experience here, having sat on the other side of the table as Germany's Deputy National Armaments Director. I have seen just how many officials at all levels in defence ministries across Europe are deeply involved in the various strands of the EDA's agenda. With this background, I believe I will be well placed to intensify communication and promote understanding between the Agency and national capitals – essential prerequisites for our common success.

The European Defence Agency has already delivered more perhaps than many expected when it was first conceived. I intend to continue to confound such expectations.

# Clippings

the guardian

## > Defence is our priority

*Dr Nuno Severiano Teixeira,  
Portugal's Defence Minister*

Security has always been a central aspect of European integration. Its goal - to end fratricidal wars and build a stable Europe founded on a democratic peace - has been reached; today it is unthinkable that EU member states should go to war, or even threaten to use force, against each other. But a sustained peace among Europe's democracies depends on the survival of the EU. And in a context of multiplying post-cold-war threats, the EU is central to the development of common defence. [...]

The Balkan wars forced Europeans to think long and hard about our inability to intervene to solve conflicts within our own continent. This wake-up call bore fruit with the establishment of the European security and defence policy in 2000. At the same time, efforts to work with Nato enabled the EU to undertake its first military missions, first in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and then in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the intervention depended on EU means alone.

In 2003 the EU approved the European Security Strategy, which identifies the main threats to our common security. This document, which outlined a European view and strategic doctrine for the first time, needs to be updated.

But having a European defence system also means developing military capabilities. We need to strengthen the rapid response capacity to deal with crisis situations. This includes setting up battle groups covering land, air and sea; reinforcing planning and operations management capacities; and establishing a European industrial base, with a central role for the European Defence Agency. All this should complement Nato.

Making European defence a priority is urgent in order to consolidate the Euro-Atlantic security community; to reinforce EU cohesion and its autonomous defence capability; and to respond to external threats and contribute to regional and international stability in the Middle East and Africa.

Portugal is an integral part of European defence. It has been a player from the start, participating in the Common European Security Policy and in all EU military missions, and contributing to the development of European military capabilities. Portugal's commitment is being put to the test as it presides over the EU Council in the second half of 2007. We want to reinforce Europe's capacity to intervene in international crises, and the EU-Nato partnership. We are committed to strengthening relations between the EU and the UN, not least to address the task of rebuilding war-torn states. We want to broaden strategic and military cooperation between the EU and the African Union to help prevent conflict and ensure the consolidation of Africa's states. We want to reinforce dialogue with the countries of the southern Mediterranean, which is essential to address shared threats.

.../...

26.09.2007

Público

## > Cooperação com África e o Magrebe continuam a ser prioridade europeia

*Teresa de Sousa*

**Ministros europeus debateram com o presidente da União Africana o alargamento à área da Defesa da estratégia comum a aprovar na cimeira UE-África, em Dezembro**

O compromisso de que África e o Magrebe vão continuar a ser prioridades europeias também no domínio da segurança e o reconhecimento de que a Defesa deve subir na lista de prioridades políticas da União chegaram para que Nuno Severiano Teixeira se declarasse satisfeito com o Conselho informal que ontem terminou em Évora.

Os ministros europeus da Defesa receberam ontem os seus congéneres dos cinco países do Magrebe (Argélia, Marrocos, Tunísia, Líbia e Mauritânia) para debater o reforço da cooperação em matéria de defesa perante ameaças transnacionais que vão do terrorismo às catástrofes ambientais, passando pela imigração clandestina e pelo narcotráfico.

O objectivo da presidência portuguesa era fazer evoluir esta cooperação do actual modelo dos "5+5" (os cinco países do Sul da UE mais os cinco do Norte de África) para uma relação assumida pela Europa no seu conjunto. Severiano Teixeira ficou satisfeito com o facto de a Eslovénia e a França se terem comprometido a seguir na mesma linha.

Os dois países vão presidir à UE nos dois próximos semestres. Hervé Morin, o ministro francês, lembrou que a União do Mediterrâneo, uma proposta lançada pelo Presidente Sarkozy mas ainda não totalmente clarificada, é precisamente uma das prioridades do seu Governo onde a iniciativa portuguesa se pode encaixar.

Os responsáveis da Defesa europeus debateram também com o seu homólogo do Gana o futuro das relações de cooperação com África. O Gana preside actualmente à União Africana. O propósito europeu é inscrever na "estratégia comum" que deve ser aprovada na cimeira UE-África em Dezembro também a cooperação no domínio da Defesa. Com dois vectores centrais: ajudar os africanos a melhorar as suas capacidades militares de gestão de crises no seu próprio continente; e apoiar a formação das forças armadas e de segurança em países africanos recém-saídos de conflitos internos e em processo de consolidação da paz e da democratização.

O Congo é sempre dado como exemplo. Uma força militar europeia ajudou a pôr fim ao conflito, a realizar eleições e agora continua a ajudar à consolidação do processo de estabilização e de construção de um Estado de Direito. Generalizar o modelo parece ser o objectivo. A operação da PESD no Congo foi feita sob a égide das Nações Unidas. Resta saber se os africanos vão aceitar este tipo de intervenção europeia por sua livre iniciativa ou por pressão regional.

.../...

30.09.2007



**Le Phare**  
Quotidien indépendant paraissant à Kinshasa

## > Réforme de la sécurité, l'Eupol suggère une synergie police-justice

*J-Alain Kabongo*

Dans le cadre de sa politique de sécurité et de défense, l'Union Européenne a lancé depuis le dimanche 1<sup>er</sup> juillet une nouvelle mission Eupol en RDC pour une durée d'une année. Elle pense ainsi répondre aux préoccupations du gouvernement congolais en matière sécuritaire.

Cette mission vise à soutenir la réforme du secteur de la sécurité dans le domaine de la police, dans l'optique de son interaction avec la justice. En clair, l'Eupol veut apporter sa contribution à la réforme et à la restructuration de la police nationale congolaise (PNC), en appuyant la mise en place d'une force de police viable, professionnelle et multi-ethnique/intégrée.

Elle va aussi améliorer l'interaction entre la PNC et le système judiciaire, notamment dans son volet pénal et assurer la cohérence de l'ensemble des efforts déployés en matière de réforme du secteur de la sécurité.

Cette mission comprend 36 agents internationaux dont des policiers, des experts des questions pénales, etc. Ils sont tous supervisés par un chef de mission, le portugais Adilio Custodio. L'Eupol/RDC agit en synergie étroite avec la mission Eusec /RDC.

Cette nouvelle mission va bénéficier de l'expérience de sa devancière Eupol/Kinshasa qui s'est achevée le 30 juin 2007. Depuis son lancement en avril 2005, Eupol/Kinshasa a assuré l'encadrement de l'Unité de police intégrée (UPI) et participé à la coordination des unités de maintien de l'ordre à Kinshasa pendant les turbulences électorales.

C'est ce matin à Bruxelles (Belgique) que Roland van de Geer, Représentant spécial de l'Union européenne pour la région des Grands Lacs, va faire le point sur les développements enregistrés par la RDC dans la réforme de son secteur de sécurité. Ce sera au cours d'un point de presse prévu au Centre de presse du Conseil, au bâtiment « Justus Lipsius » de Bruxelles.

4.07.2007

**Europe's World**  
THE ONLY EUROPE-WIDE POLICY JOURNAL

## > A blueprint for buttressing Africa's precarious security

*Michèle Alliot-Marie*

*Interior Minister and former Defence Minister of France*

European troops have been playing an increasingly vital role in some parts of Africa, where civil-military missions as part of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) are helping to underpin stability. Michèle Alliot-Marie assesses progress and identifies the pitfalls

The EU's military mission to ensure free and fair elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) showed just what it can achieve through the European Security and Defence policy (ESDP). A contingent of some 2,500 troops from 22 countries went there in mid-2006 to support United Nations troops, and provided a rapid reaction force able to snuff out politically motivated disorder before it could erupt into full-blown mayhem in the DRC's capital Kinshasa. Three years earlier, Operation ARTEMIS, a comparable EU mission in the eastern province of Ituri, had again demonstrated Europe's resolve to use its military capability to underpin a long-term peace process.

For some people, raw military might is the only true measure of power. But the various EU missions that have now been carried out in support of ESDP have much more to commend them than may meet the sceptical eye. Large parts of Africa are in need of support, and Europe can and must lend a hand. To say that "Europe is back" is not to say "here we go again"; the EU's new style of political-military engagement in Africa in no way recalls colonial times.

There have been 16 different European military missions of one sort or another so far, and tailoring ESDP support to so many very different situations, while keeping these operations affordable, has resulted in a wide range of commitments.


France's military forces – long accustomed to crisis management operations in Africa – are also experiencing a paradigm shift. From now on, most of our activities in support of peace and stability in Africa will be European-led.

I am in no doubt that Africa really does have a future. It has a youthful population that will soon top one billion people, abundant mineral reserves and an inherent dynamism. I also believe that developing the continent's future must be shared between Africa and Europe, and that our policies in the EU should be geared to that. It is true that many African countries currently suffer from instability, state failure, regional strife, violent internal political competition and other assorted ills, including, massacres and large-scale brutality, civil war, massive movements of refugees, economic disruption and much attendant environmental damage. Yet the big picture in Africa is not uniformly bleak. Some African countries are comparatively stable and prosperous, even though those that are not that tend to obscure the success stories.

.../...

Summer 2007

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# Aperçu des missions et opérations de l'Union européenne

Novembre 2007

- Missions civiles
- Opérations militaires
- Missions/opérations achevées
- Missions/opérations en cours de planification

**Autres missions :**

EUMM (EU Monitoring Mission, Balkans occidentaux)  
 EUSR border teams Moldavie/Ukraine  
 et Géorgie/Caucase du Sud

## Afrique

- **Soutien à AMIS II**  
Soudan/Darfour  
Effectif: 31 civils et 20 militaires
- **EUSEC RD Congo**  
Effectif: 40
- **EUPOL Kinshasa**  
RD Congo  
2005-2007
- **ARTEMIS**  
RD Congo 2003  
Effectif: 1800
- **EUFOR Congo**  
RD Congo 2006  
Effectif: 2300
- **EUPOL RD Congo**  
Effectif: 39
- **EUFOR Tchad/RCA**

## Balkans occidentaux/ Caucase du Sud

- **EUJUST THEMIS**  
Géorgie 2004-2005
- **EUPM**  
Bosnie - Herzégovine  
Effectif: 182
- **EUFOR ALTHEA**  
Bosnie - Herzégovine  
Effectif: 2500 (après transition)
- **EUPOL PROXIMA**  
Ancienne République yougoslave  
de Macédoine (ARYM) 2004-2005
- **EUPAT**  
Ancienne République yougoslave  
de Macédoine (ARYM) 2006
- **CONCORDIA**  
Ancienne République yougoslave  
de Macédoine (ARYM) 2003
- **KOSOVO – EUPT**  
Équipe de planification (Effectif: 100)  
pour la future mission PESD "État de droit"

## Asie

- **EUPOL AFGHANISTAN**  
Mission de police, Effectif: 160
- **AMM Monitoring Mission**  
Aceh/Indonésie  
2005-2006

## Moyen-Orient

- **EUJUST LEX**  
Irak/Bruxelles  
Effectif: 25
- **EUPOL COPPS**  
Territoires palestiniens  
Effectif: 31
- **EUBAM Rafah**  
Territoires palestiniens  
Effectif: 65

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