



# ESDP Newsletter

#3

European Security and Defence Policy

January 2007



> ESDP in action  
**EUFOR RD Congo –  
effective support for  
the DRC**

> Kosovo  
EU prepares for  
enhanced role

# La politique européenne de sécurité et de défense

## en un coup d'œil



Dans le cadre de la PESD, l'Union élabore une politique de sécurité commune, qui couvre l'ensemble des questions relatives à sa sécurité, y compris la définition progressive d'une politique de défense commune, qui pourrait conduire à une défense commune, si le Conseil européen en décide ainsi, sous réserve que les États membres adoptent une décision dans ce sens conformément à leurs exigences constitutionnelles respectives.

Parallèlement à la nomination de Javier Solana en tant que premier "Haut Représentant pour la PESD", le Conseil européen réuni à Cologne en juin 1999 a placé au cœur du renforcement de la PESD les missions de gestion des crises. Celles-ci incluent des missions humanitaires et d'évacuation, des missions de maintien de la paix et des missions de forces de combat pour la gestion des crises, y compris les missions de rétablissement de la paix.

Ce même Conseil européen a décidé que "l'Union doit disposer d'une capacité d'action autonome soutenue par des forces militaires crédibles, avoir les moyens de décider d'y recourir et être prête à le faire afin de réagir face aux crises internationales, sans préjudice des actions entreprises par l'OTAN".

C'est sur cette base que des efforts soutenus ont abouti à la mise en place de structures politiques et militaires permanentes et à l'établissement de capacités civiles et militaires, y compris la formulation par l'UE d'un ensemble de concepts et de procédures en matière de gestion des crises. L'Union a également conclu des arrangements relatifs à la consultation et à la participation de pays tiers à la gestion des crises. Elle a en outre défini avec l'OTAN le cadre des relations entre les deux organisations, qui comprend des arrangements permettant à l'Union de recourir aux moyens et capacités de l'OTAN.

L'Union européenne mène des opérations au titre de la Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense depuis 2003.



# Editorial

The EU military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo has come to an end, on schedule, as the presidential election process came to its own successful conclusion. For the first time in decades, this major African country, as large as the entire EU-25, and so crucial for the stability of the Great Lakes region and of Africa as a whole, has elected its president democratically.

The EU operation, outlined in the June issue of the *ESDP Newsletter*, turned out to be decisive. It provided deterrence and, in the tense days of mid-August in Kinshasa, its intervention was instrumental in bringing back calm and ensuring that the election process stayed right on track. It made a difference on the ground.

The EUFOR troops are leaving the DRC, but the EU remains as determined as ever to stand by the DRC authorities in the huge task of reconstruction and consolidation that awaits them.

The EU's action during the election process in the DRC also offers us an opportunity to look at the role an important ESDP agency, the EU Satellite Centre, plays in support of operations.

While the task of supporting Congo continues for the EU after EUFOR, attention is also increasingly turning to another area in search of durable stability and consolidation of its institutions - Kosovo. Here the EU is likely to be called upon to play a growing role in the coming months and beyond. With preparations under way for a future civilian ESDP mission in Kosovo after a status settlement the *ESDP Newsletter* talks to the EU's representative for the Kosovo talks, Stefan Lehne, on prospects for next year.

The ESDP does not develop in a vacuum. This issue looks at some important relationships, inside the EU system with the European Parliament, and outside with the UN - just as Congo and Lebanon have provided two striking new examples of EU-UN co-operation - and tries to grasp the shape of things to come as we strive to develop a long term vision and to decipher the new 'global puzzle' of the world the EU will have to deal with in 2025.

The more the EU does - in the Western Balkans, in Africa, in the Middle East or in South-East Asia -, the more it is doing and will be asked to do. This is good news for an emerging global actor that wants to do its share alongside its international partners. But it is also a daunting challenge, not least in terms of capabilities. In January 2007, the EU reaches full operational capability with its Battlegroups and has at its disposal a new Operation Centre. These developments are part of the crucial effort to enhance the EU's capacity to undertake ESDP operations.



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## > L'Union s'engage pour le Liban

En août dernier, les ministres des Affaires étrangères des États membres de l'UE réunis pour un Conseil extraordinaire à Bruxelles sur le conflit libanais ont exprimé leur intention de contribuer rapidement au renforcement de la FINUL (Force intérimaire des Nations unies au Liban) en mettant à disposition un nombre substantiel de soldats ainsi que d'importants moyens maritimes, aériens et un soutien en matière de commandement, de communications et dans le domaine logistique. Le Conseil a noté que ces contributions donnaient un rôle crucial à l'Union au sein de la FINUL renforcée. L'Union européenne a réitéré à plusieurs reprises sa disposition à contribuer à la reconstruction d'un État libanais capable d'exercer sa pleine souveraineté sur son territoire.

Lors de leur réunion du 13 novembre, les ministres européens des Affaires étrangères ont accueilli avec satisfaction le déploiement des troupes de la FINUL et de l'armée libanaise, qui progresse bien. Le Conseil a également réaffirmé qu'il était déterminé à appuyer la mise en oeuvre intégrale de la résolution 1701 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies.

## > EU extends support for Darfur mission

EU ministers decided in October to extend until 31 December 2006 the EU civilian-military supporting action to the African Union (AU) mission in the Darfur region of Sudan (AMIS II). This decision follows a previous one taken by the AU Peace and Security Council to extend the mandate of AMIS until the end of this year.

The EU will continue its supporting action pending transition of the AU mission to a United Nations' operation in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 1706. The EU supporting action, first agreed in July 2005, aims to ensure effective and timely EU assistance to support the AMIS II enhancement. Respecting the principle of African ownership, it supports the AU and its political, military and police efforts to address the crisis in Darfur. It includes support to the AMIS civilian police component, planning and technical assistance at all AMIS levels of command, the provision of military observers, training of African troops and observers, as well as strategic and tactical transportation.

On 30 November, the AU Peace and Security Council decided to extend the mandate of AMIS for a period of 6 months from 1 January 2007.

## > Le Conseil prolonge la mission de l'UE à Rafah

Le 13 novembre dernier, le Conseil a décidé de proroger de six mois la mission de l'Union européenne d'assistance à la frontière au point de passage de Rafah dans la bande de Gaza (mission "EUBAM Rafah"). Cette mission a été lancée le 25 novembre 2005 suite à l'accord intervenu entre Israéliens et Palestiniens sur les déplacements et l'accès aux points de passage.

La partie palestinienne et la partie israélienne ont approuvé cette prorogation, qui était prévue depuis le début de la mission dans le cas où aucune des parties ne formulerait d'objections.

Un total de près de 340 000 personnes ont franchi le point de passage de Rafah depuis le 25 novembre 2005. Le rythme s'est considérablement ralenti depuis juin 2006. La mission EUBAM Rafah a fait tout son possible depuis lors pour que le point de passage soit ouvert le plus souvent possible, des efforts particuliers étant faits pour les cas humanitaires et les pèlerins.

Le Conseil a souligné à l'occasion de sa décision l'aide que l'UE a apportée et continue d'apporter, dans les circonstances actuelles, au renforcement des institutions palestiniennes et il s'est déclaré prêt à accroître son soutien à un gouvernement palestinien avec lequel l'UE puisse nouer un dialogue. L'action sera poursuivie en tenant compte de l'expérience précieuse acquise dans le cadre des missions de l'UE dans ce domaine, à savoir la mission de l'UE d'assistance à la frontière au point de passage de Rafah et de la mission de police de l'UE pour les territoires palestiniens, ainsi que des résultats de l'aide technique fournie aux institutions palestiniennes.

Les ministres des Affaires étrangères de l'UE ont souligné combien il était important que l'accord de novembre 2005 sur les déplacements et l'accès aux points de passage aux frontières soit mis en oeuvre. Il a insisté sur l'importance particulière d'un fonctionnement normal des points de passage aux frontières de Gaza, notamment à Rafah, et a demandé à Israël de tout mettre en oeuvre pour que ces points de passage soient ouverts et le restent.

> **Names and News**



> **Aceh mission concludes its mandate**

The EU-led Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), extended by the EU Council in September for a final three months, ended on 15 December 2006, after local elections held on 11 December. As a result of the remarkable progress achieved by the parties, AMM was able to reduce its numbers but remained engaged in the peace process and provided international presence in the run-up to the local elections. A separate EU election observation mission observed the voting process.

> **Afghanistan: EU examining potential role in policing, rule of law**

The EU is considering an increased engagement in the rule of law sector in Afghanistan. Progress in this sector, including police and justice both at the central and provincial level, is essential to the security and long-term stability of the country. A fact-finding mission has visited Afghanistan recently to examine the opportunities and conditions for a potential civilian ESDP mission in the field of policing with linkages to the wider rule of law. EU Foreign Ministers will consider options for the future of the overall EU engagement, taking into account the mission's findings.

In 2002-2006, the EU collectively contributed 3.7 billion euros in aid to Afghanistan, amounting to one-third of the aid provided by the international community. Member States have played leading coordinating roles in particular sectors and have made large contributions to security, including through the current provision of around half the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), or 16,000 troops.



*Le Comité militaire de l'UE le 6 novembre 2006. Les généraux Bentégeat et Mosca-Moschini sont à l'avant-plan, respectivement quatrième et cinquième à partir de la gauche.*

> **Changements de personnel**

Le 6 novembre, le général Henri Bentégeat a remplacé le général Rolando Mosca-Moschini à la présidence du Comité militaire de l'Union européenne.

Le 21 novembre, le Deputy Chief Constable Colin Smith a été désigné à la tête de la mission de police EUPOL COPPS dans les Territoires

palestiniens où il remplacera le Superintendent Jonathan McIvor le 1<sup>er</sup> janvier 2007.

Le 6 décembre, le contre-amiral Hans-Jochen Witthauer remplace le général Chiarini à Sarajevo comme commandant de force de l'opération EUFOR Althéa en Bosnie-et-Herzégovine.

## > EDA launches innovative new projects

At the 13 November Steering Board of the European Defence Agency, EU Defence Ministers agreed to launch a new joint research programme into technologies for protecting their armed forces against threats such as snipers, booby traps and improvised bombs, establishing a ground-breaking mechanism for collaborative action to help boost Europe's efforts in defence research and technology.

They approved a three-year Joint Investment Programme (JIP) worth more than 54 million euros and involving 19 European governments. "Today's decision represents a major step in that direction and demonstrates the creativity and the political will of EU governments. As I reported to the Council of Ministers, the Agency has now begun to deliver substantial results – and this is prominent among them," said Javier Solana, the Head of the Agency, who chaired the meeting.

Unlike previous collaborations on defence R&T, which involved governments negotiating financial and industrial shares for each individual project, the JIP sets up a common budget to fund the whole programme with a management committee representing the contributors to oversee the selection and financing of individual projects. The programme will focus on a limited number of specific R&T priorities driven by agreed capability requirements for future operations: collective survivability, individual protection, data analysis, wireless communication, and mission planning and training.

In a further boost to collaborative action, the Steering Board also welcomed new initiatives for joint work on Software Defined Radio (SDR), a technology for secure communications with important potential applications for civilian and military use. Five countries – Finland, France, Italy, Spain and Sweden – announced an ad-hoc joint research project (ESSOR) under the EDA umbrella worth an estimated 100 million euros aimed at enhancing interoperability (in Europe and with the US and NATO) of medium-term national SDR projects, and at promoting a European technological and industrial capacity of strategic importance.

> See page 22 article by EDA Chief Executive N. Witney on the "Long-Term Vision".

## > Operation Centre ready for activation

With effect from 1 January 2007, the EU will have a third option for commanding, from Brussels, missions and operations of limited size (that is, like that of a battlegroup: some 2,000 troops). On that date, the new EU Operation Centre within the EU Military Staff will be ready for action. Using some EUMS core staff, as well as some extra "double-hatted" EUMS officers and so-called "augmentees" from the Member States, the EU will have an increased capacity to respond to crisis management situations. So far, the EU has had two options as to how to run a military operation at the Operation Headquarters (OHQ) level.

One option is, in a so-called "autonomous" operation, to make use of facilities provided by any of the five Operation Headquarters (OHQs) currently available in European Member States. These are: the French



## > EU battlegroups in training

**Member States are conducting activities to train and prepare EU battlegroups and their components.**

Some 830 German, Dutch and Finnish troops were involved in exercise 'European Endeavour 2006' (EE06) from 11 to 24 November in Ulm, Germany, to test an EU battlegroup. Under EE06, which constituted the German Bundeswehr's main exercise for this year, the Response Forces Operations Command in Ulm trained to set up a 'force headquarters' in a fictitious country of deployment and to command the German-Dutch-Finnish EU battlegroup which will be on standby in the first half of 2007.

Against this backdrop, the exercise was intended in particular to test the operational readiness of the HQ and to certify full operational capability of the EU battlegroup by the end of 2006. For the first time, Germany, Finland and the Netherlands are thus providing the EU with a fully operational rapid reaction battle group as of 1 January 2007, for a duration of six months.

The German, Dutch and Finnish Chiefs of Defence visited the exercise at Leipheim airbase on 21 November.

From 18 to 28 September 2006, the Belgian defence forces organised the 'Quick Response' exercise, involving Belgian as well as French, Dutch, Austrian, German and Luxembourg troops. Quick Response aimed to train forces for international missions, and included an EU battlegroup.

> See special pull-out section on EU battlegroups pages I-IV.

OHQ in Mont Valérien, Paris; the UK OHQ in Northwood; the German OHQ in Potsdam, Berlin; the Italian OHQ in Rome; and the Greek OHQ in Larissa. In 2003, Operation 'ARTEMIS' in the DR Congo used the French OHQ, while the current EUFOR DR Congo military operation employs the German OHQ.

A second option is, through recourse to NATO capabilities and common assets (under the so-called "Berlin plus" arrangements), to make use of command and control options such as Operation Headquarters located at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium and D-SACEUR as the Operation Commander. This is the option used in the conduct of Operation ALTHEA, where EUFOR BiH operates in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

# L'Union européenne, acteur global

**Lors de la conférence annuelle de l'Institut d'études de sécurité de l'Union européenne qui s'est déroulée à Paris le 6 octobre dernier, Javier Solana a rappelé le nouveau statut, les responsabilités mais aussi les contraintes de l'Union européenne comme acteur global. En voici les principaux éléments.**

**A**lbert Camus lorsqu'il reçut le Prix Nobel à Stockholm déclara: "chaque génération se croit vouée à refaire le monde. La mienne sait pourtant qu'elle ne le fera pas. Mais sa tâche est peut-être plus grande. Elle consiste à empêcher que le monde se défasse." Comme l'écrivain français, j'appartiens à une génération qui sait que refaire le monde n'est pas aussi facile qu'on le souhaiterait, qui sait que l'on ne transforme le monde ni par les armes, ni par décret. Une idée ou un concept ne suffit pas non plus. Très simplement parce que les réalités politiques sont toujours plus complexes et plus résistantes que les modèles théoriques. De même qu'une œuvre d'art ou une caricature ne résume pas une civilisation, des élections ne font pas une culture démocratique.

Dès lors, plutôt que de vouloir transformer le monde, je crois qu'il est plus important, plus urgent aussi, d'essayer d'empêcher notre monde de se défaire. Et croyez-moi, l'Europe s'y emploie. Avec force et conviction. En considérant qu'il faut d'abord trouver une solution entre Palestiniens et Israéliens. Et ainsi d'éradiquer les discours les plus radicaux et leur traduction terroriste. En reconnaissant ses droits à l'Iran, mais en trouvant aussi les voies appropriées pour lui rappeler ses obligations les plus élémentaires. Et ainsi de contribuer à la paix et à la sécurité prescrites par la Charte des Nations unies. En établissant un dialogue franc avec les pays non alignés. Et ainsi de mettre un frein à la rupture entre le Nord et le Sud. En réussissant à convaincre la Chine de s'engager, au Liban par exemple. Et ainsi de préparer le continent asiatique à mieux assumer ses responsabilités au moment où l'un de ses représentants s'apprête à reprendre le flambeau de Kofi Annan. En acceptant d'écouter le nouvel acteur qu'est devenue l'opinion mondiale. Et ainsi de ne pas rester sourd à ce que d'autres, mieux que moi, ont décrit comme la "respiration du monde". En empêchant le monde de se défaire davantage.

## Dialogue et action

Par le dialogue je suis le premier à croire à la force de la diplomatie des mots. Mais aussi par l'action – je suis aussi le premier à défendre l'engagement civil et militaire de l'Union européenne. Pour agir de cette manière sur l'évolution du système international, comment évolue l'Union européenne?

Certains continuent de juger l'Union en crise. D'autres déclarent que l'Union a déjà traversé bien des crises. Permettez-moi de faire deux constats.

Premier constat: l'Europe est de plus en plus sollicitée. Il n'y a plus une crise, plus un problème, pour lesquels on ne se tourne pas vers l'Union européenne. Formidable succès! Surtout si l'on tient compte des imperfections institutionnelles du système actuel. Mais cette situation nouvelle n'est pas sans poser un problème: celui des ressources, qui ne sont naturellement pas inépuisables. En clair, il est maintenant demandé à l'Europe de faire mieux et toujours plus.

Deuxième constat: malgré la contrainte des ressources, l'Europe répond présente. Des Grands Lacs aux Balkans. Du Caucase à l'Asie du Sud-Est. Comment? En agissant seule et avec les autres: aujourd'hui, avec les Nations unies au Liban ou au Congo, avec l'OTAN dans les Balkans, avec l'Union africaine au Darfour; demain, par exemple, avec la Ligue arabe au Proche-Orient.

C'est cela le multilatéralisme efficace. Il est évident qu'il est plus compliqué de décider et d'agir à 25: on ne peut pas attendre de 25 États, avec leur histoire et leur géographie respectives, de réagir comme un seul homme lorsque survient une nouvelle crise internationale. Faut-il dans ce cas décider d'agir à quelques-uns?

Depuis l'origine, notre Union procède de la volonté de créer les mécanismes d'intégration les plus utiles possible pour les États et les citoyens. Mais ces mécanismes d'intégration ne sont efficaces que si trois conditions sont remplies: que ces mécanismes soient basés sur de véritables solidarités; qu'ils permettent à ceux qui le souhaitent de développer ces mêmes solidarités; et enfin qu'ils permettent aux autres de rejoindre, lorsqu'ils le souhaitent, l'entreprise des premiers.

Pour l'avenir, lorsqu'il y aura une nécessité ou une utilité d'agir à quelques-uns quelque part dans le monde, il faudra l'assumer: que ceux qui le peuvent, agissent, en laissant aux autres, lorsqu'ils le souhaitent, la possibilité de joindre leurs propres efforts. Ainsi l'Union des 25 États sera-t-elle en mesure de peser comme il se doit sur l'évolution du monde.

Faut-il pousser plus loin l'intégration? Oui bien sûr! Pour justement la rendre plus efficace. Pour justement permettre aux États, dans le cadre européen commun de mieux agir. Quand ils le peuvent. Là où il le faut dans le monde.





## Identity and foreign policy

Some say foreign policy is essentially about the defence of your material and security interests around the world. Others say that, to explain how countries behave, you just need to look at their place within the structure of the international system. There is truth in both points. First, we do have European interests to defend. Other countries defend theirs as well, so there is no need to be apologetic about this. And second, given the distribution of power in the world today, Europeans can only make an impact if they work together.

But this is not the whole story. These 'realist' and 'structuralist' accounts miss out one crucial factor. And that is the impact of identity on foreign policy. For what you do on the international stage is surely also a function of your identity – of how you define yourself and the values you seek to promote abroad.

True, discussions on European identity sometimes degenerate into platitudes. But don't forget that in 2003 we adopted the very first European Security Strategy. I believe there is a core set of values, convictions and experiences that together form a composite European identity. And there are, by now, enough elements of a European model on how we organise our societies and interact with the wider world.

We all feel it when we travel around the world. What are these elements? I would say compassion with those who suffer; peace and reconciliation through integration; a strong attachment to human rights, democracy and the rule of law; a spirit of compromise, plus a commitment to promote, in a pragmatic way, an international system based on rules.

But there is also a sense that history and culture are central to how the world works, and therefore how we should engage with it.

When Americans say "that is history", they often mean it is no longer relevant. When Europeans say "that is history", they usually mean the opposite. Once again, these elements are not unique to Europe. And I don't want us to define ourselves negatively, against 'the other'. But we probably do feel more strongly about these values than others. And certainly about the need to defend them as a legacy for future generations: Europe as a responsible power.

I believe the relationship between identity and foreign policy works in both directions. Foreign policy is a way to express your identity. But acting together on the world stage is also a way to progressively shape



and enhance a common identity. Identities are not static. They change with different experiences. So the more we act together; the more we have shared successes and the occasional failure; the more our reflexes will converge; the more this idea of a European identity will firm up and become less elusive.

It is well-known that, whenever asked, people across Europe insist on a stronger European role in the world. I am convinced that they do so not just to promote our material interests or because we risk being squashed by big powers of today or of tomorrow. It is also to defend 'a certain idea of Europe' in a more fragmented world. It's clear that when I said earlier Europe should halt a world tearing itself apart, that I was not advocating a sentimental or conservative attachment to the status quo. We all know that the world is changing in many profound and multifaceted ways. The rise of China, India, Brazil and others; the role of 24-hour media; the return of identity politics; and the new salience of energy questions and migration. We have to understand these changes. Not to deny them but to manage them. Not to resist economic and political globalisation but to negotiate its terms. Through its actions, the Union has to be able to respond to and channel these changes in a direction that serves our ideals and interests. That is Europe's calling.

Europe should have the strength to accept the things which cannot be changed; the courage to change things which must be changed; but also the wisdom to distinguish one from the other.

# EUFOR RD Congo – l'Union européenne aux côtés des Congolais

**L'opération militaire EUFOR RD Congo a conclu sa mission avec succès le 30 novembre 2006, date de la fin de son mandat. À cette date, ses troupes ont entamé leur redéploiement. L'opération a pu fournir un soutien rapide et robuste aux efforts de la MONUC – la mission des Nations unies en RDC – pour la sécurisation du processus électoral.**

En coopération étroite avec la MONUC et les autorités congolaises, EUFOR RD Congo a apporté une contribution déterminante en matière de dissuasion et de maintien de la paix et de l'ordre public, notamment à Kinshasa, au cours de la période électorale. Ceci fut notamment le cas lors des incidents du mois d'août dans la capitale lors desquels la force européenne a pu faire la preuve de son utilité et de son efficacité, faisant en outre à cette occasion la preuve de sa totale impartialité. L'opération a donc permis de faire la différence sur le terrain et de maintenir le processus électoral sur les rails. En ce sens, c'est un succès militaire et un succès politique.

La mission de police EUPOL Kinshasa, renforcée pour la période des élections, a elle aussi joué un rôle important, en coopération avec EUFOR, en contribuant à la protection des institutions de la transition et en aidant la police congolaise à maintenir l'ordre dans la capitale.

Les élections sont d'abord le succès des Congolais. Ils ont démontré leur attachement au processus démocratique en participant nombreux au scrutin, dans le calme et la dignité. L'importance des efforts de la Commission électorale indépendante pour assurer la crédibilité et la transparence du processus électoral est également à souligner.

La RDC, qui sortait d'un conflit majeur, était dans une phase capitale de son histoire. La tenue avec succès des premières élections multipartites depuis des décennies dans ce pays est un événement historique qui pose les fondations d'une restauration durable de la paix, de la stabilité, de la réconciliation nationale et de l'État de droit.

L'écho de cet événement dépasse d'ailleurs les frontières de ce grand pays. Le succès du processus électoral congolais est en effet important pour la stabilité et le développement de l'ensemble de la région des Grands Lacs et de l'Afrique centrale.

Si l'opération militaire de l'Union européenne a conclu son mandat, l'Union demeure aussi déterminée que jamais à soutenir la RDC et à contribuer à la consolidation de la paix et de la stabilité dans la période de l'après-transition. En effet, le travail n'est pas fini. L'UE se tiendra aux côtés des Congolais pour la consolidation des forces de sécurité et plus largement pour la reconstruction et le développement du pays.

L'aide de la Communauté européenne à la RDC s'est élevée à quelque 800 millions d'euros depuis sa reprise en 2002. Des aides significatives sont prévues au titre du 10<sup>e</sup> Fonds européen de développement (2008-2013).

La réforme du secteur de la sécurité demeure un objectif-clé. L'Union est prête à coordonner les efforts internationaux dans ce domaine, en coordination avec l'ONU et en soutien aux autorités congolaises. La mission européenne de réforme du secteur de la sécurité – EUSEC RD Congo – poursuivra et amplifiera ses efforts. La mission EUPOL Kinshasa a quant à elle été prolongée jusqu'à juin 2007 pour poursuivre son travail aux côtés de la police congolaise.

Comme l'a dit Javier Solana au lendemain de l'annonce des résultats définitifs du deuxième tour de l'élection présidentielle, "le moment est historique pour la RDC et pour le peuple congolais mais aussi pour l'Afrique toute entière. Les Congolais espèrent la paix, la stabilité et la prospérité. Il est de l'obligation de tous les responsables politiques congolais d'aider à répondre à cet espoir. Fidèle à son engagement, l'Union européenne continuera de se tenir aux côtés de la RDC dans la voie nouvelle qui s'ouvre aujourd'hui."





*Angela Merkel, chancelière fédérale allemande, visite le QG de l'opération installé à Postdam.*



*EUFOR RD Congo a rassemblé des troupes venues notamment d'Allemagne (ci-contre), de France (ci-dessous), d'Espagne (en haut à gauche) et de Pologne (photo de couverture).*



*Un appareil de transport d'EUFOR*



## The EU Satellite Centre in support of EU operations in the DRC

**As part of its mission to support EU foreign and security policy, the EU Satellite Centre has been providing valuable assistance from space to the Union's operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.**

*By Frank Asbeck, EUSC Director*

In order to support EU decision-making in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – in particular the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – the EU Satellite Centre provides customised analysis of satellite imagery. It has been busy preparing a wide range of Digital Geographic Information (DGI) products for the EU operation in DR Congo. The EUSC has produced, for example, DGIs for Kinshasa, Lumumbashi, Mbuji-Mayi, Kananga, Mbandaka and Kamina in DR Congo, as well as Brazzaville in the neighbouring Republic of the Congo and Port Gentil and Libreville in Gabon. EU troops deployed in this complex and often, dangerous area needed all the support possible. In this context, satellite imagery can make an important contribution to the success of their mission and their safety.

The EUSC's priority areas reflect the key security concerns defined by the European Security Strategy. They include the monitoring of regional conflicts, cases of state failure, and threats posed by organised crime, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It typically provides full support to EU operations, such as in DR Congo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Centre is also an important early warning tool, facilitating information for the early detection and possible prevention of armed conflicts and humanitarian crises.

The operational activities of the Centre at the EU level mainly take place in the form of direct co-operation with the Council's Directorate for the Defence Aspects of External Relations (DG E VIII), EU Military Staff and the Joint Situation Centre. The EUSC can also be, and is, tasked directly by Member States which, for example, require specific information for troop deployments. As a rule, the EUSC regularly produces imagery analysis for international organisations, especially the United Nations. This is especially valid for the UN's mission in DR Congo, but is on the increase in other areas, too.

For DR Congo, the EUSC was asked by the Council to produce image maps using satellite imagery of the nine requested cities in DR Congo, Congo and Gabon. High-definition imagery was used for this, from satellites like QuickBird and Ikonos, to produce maps and other digital products that users in the field can adapt to their needs. The Centre's experienced image analysts produced Digital Geographic Information products showing not only key features of the requested cities, such as the status of airport infrastructure, the analysis of the road network or the identification of possible helicopter landing spots, but also a detailed overview of regional facilities, including governmental offices, hospitals, TV/radio stations, water installations, power installations, prisons and military barracks, with embedded hyperlinks to collateral data on key features in the area of interest.



*The image shows the city centre of Kinshasa, including the visual markers that represent the lines of communication, embassies, government buildings, etc.*

These products were also made available to the United Nations and MONUC, its mission in DR Congo. These geographical information systems were highly appreciated on the ground, as testified by letters of appreciation from Jean-Marie Guénemo, UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. Or, as the EU's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana put it: "[The co-operation between the EU and the UN] confirms my understanding that the EUSC is an important asset for supporting the decision-making [process] and is essential for strengthening early-warning and crisis monitoring functions."

The EUSC recently received an e-mail from the EU Operational Headquarters in Potsdam stating: "The products on (DR Congo's city) Kamina produced by the EUSC for EU OHQ Potsdam are really very good. Your analysts have done a very good job."

In addition, the EUSC has developed tools for customised map production, so that EU troops in the field can use digital geographical information products from which they can print a hard-copy map with features that are relevant to their daily mission. It goes without saying that such support, using recent high-definition satellite imagery, is highly valued by the commanders and troops on the ground, as testified to by the feedback on the quality of the products and by the orders for new, constantly updated issues.

In the future, the prospects for EU analytical products based on high-resolution satellite imagery are very bright. It is highly probable that, as the ESDP grows, the EU Satellite Centre will grow with it. To achieve this goal, interaction with end-users and permanent feedback is vital. Responding to the requirements of end-users with utmost precision and making sure that Satellite Centre products are tailored to their needs will be one of the key factors in defining the EUSC's future development. The Centre has to learn lessons from the support it has already provided to EU operations and, together with other actors within the framework of the ESDP, make its service better, faster and more responsive.

> [www.eusc.europa.eu](http://www.eusc.europa.eu)

## > EU prepares for resolution to Kosovo's political status



**The EU is preparing for a future crisis management mission in Kosovo under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) after a status settlement.**

Following a Council Decision in April, an EU Planning Team for Kosovo (EUPT Kosovo) has been successfully deployed and is making progress with its planning tasks for this mission, which should focus on the rule of law and the police.

This is part of an overall effort on preparations for an enhanced EU role in Kosovo after a status settlement.

As early as February 2005, EU Foreign Ministers mandated High Representative Solana and Commissioner Rehn to begin exploring the EU's possible contribution to the international community's efforts to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1244, including the process towards a settlement of the future status of Kosovo, as well as the EU's role in Kosovo beyond a status settlement.

Javier Solana and Olli Rehn submitted joint reports to the Council in June and December 2005 as well as in July 2006. They noted in particular that, following a settlement, the primary objective of the future international engagement in Kosovo should be to support and monitor the Kosovo government's efforts to promote local and regional security, political and social stability, economic sustainability and reconciliation.

An international presence will need to be established in Kosovo to monitor the implementation of the status settlement, the rule of law, and certain economic and fiscal matters. In addition, the international community will continue providing institution building assistance.

In this context, the EU intends to become the driving force within the future international presence, with a contribution based on two main components:

- The head of the international civilian presence will also be EU Special Representative ("double hatting"). In this respect, an EU team established by the EU Council in September is already contributing to the preparation of the future international civilian presence in Kosovo in close co-operation with other international actors.
- The EU will play an important role in the rule of law area most importantly through an ESDP operation. An EU Planning Team is already working in Pristina to prepare this future ESDP operation, which will focus on the justice sector and on the police. In parallel, assistance under the future Pre-Accession Instrument (IPA) will focus on capacity building within the local authorities.



> *UN Special Representative for Kosovo Joachim Rucker meeting EU High Representative Javier Solana.*



*Stefan Lehne, the EU's Representative*

**The international community has carried out a delicate balancing act for the past two years to get Serbia and Kosovo to see eye-to-eye on the latter's desire for independence. Yet relations between the two remain tense. Those involved in Kosovo's status talks – the EU, the six-nation Contact Group of nations and UN authorities – are working on how to secure the territory's future and offer its people control over their political destiny. With the UN Status Envoy due to present his proposals after the January elections in Serbia, Stefan Lehne, the EU's representative to the talks, describes what is at stake.**

"As long as Kosovo's status remains in limbo, then temptation lingers for those who would like to re-draw borders in the Balkans. Kosovo is the last remaining bit of Yugoslavia's break-up and it needs to be dealt with. We see resolution of its political status as a way to bring this kind of speculation to an end and thus stabilise the region as a whole," said Lehne.

Once that is done, he added, "then the EU and the international community can focus more intently on helping Kosovo solve its economic, social and administrative problems, which are considerable".

It would also bring benefits to Belgrade, he argued. "Serbia is a highly important partner for us. It's one of the biggest countries in the region and it has large intellectual and administrative capabilities. The country could catch up quickly [with mainstream Europe] if only it put its mind to doing so."

The UN had tasked its special envoy for Kosovo, former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, to come up with a final proposal in November in the hope of wrapping up Kosovo's status by the end of this year. However, Status Envoy Ahtisaari announced on 10 November that he would not present his proposal until after Serbia's parliamentary elections on 21 January 2007.

According to Lehne, Ahtisaari's proposal will rest on two basic tenets: decentralisation of administrative responsibilities, and safeguards so that central institutions – i.e. police, judiciary and parliamentary bodies – remain multi-ethnic. These will ensure religious rights and autonomy for Kosovo's Serb minority community, which is only 10% of the 2-million strong population. "We're also thinking about a 'vital interest' mechanism to give an enhanced role to minorities when their legislative interests are at play," he said.

The safeguards will also cover the fair treatment of property claims. This will be important for any returning Serbs who left the territory when it broke from Belgrade in 1999. Lehne was not optimistic, however, that large numbers of expatriated Serbs would cross back into Kosovo.

"Most who left were urban, educated Serbs holding government and white-collar jobs, which they lost. Few observers expect a large number of them to come back. On the other hand, Kosovo's rural Serbs stayed put and are likely to do so."

As for Kosovo's security, Lehne said "there is a general consensus that a continued international military and civilian presence will be needed in Kosovo", although he quickly added that "there is no interest in setting up a protectorate state either".

Once the final piece in the Balkan sovereignty 'puzzle' falls into place, it will then point to the wider strategic issue hovering over the region: its future in Europe. Indeed, with the EU's recent nod toward Romania and Bulgaria as future members, Serbia and Kosovo will be surrounded by the Union's territory. So, how can their eligibility be defined?

"Nobody believes that membership for Kosovo or Serbia is right around the corner. There is going to be a pretty long process [of accession]," Lehne observed. "That said, the Western Balkans will be an enclave and it goes against all historical logic that it would remain outside the EU forever."

In the interim period, he said, relations with Brussels via the EU's Stabilisation and Association Agreement approach will be key to establishing their European perspective. "In terms of helping these countries achieve the reforms they need, the [SAA] process will be more important than the end goal for the time being. Let's remember the Berlin Wall fell nearly 15 years before the EU had its first big wave of enlargement. It took those countries that long to ready their economies and political systems to become members," he concluded.

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**With a resolution of the political status, the EU and the international community can focus more intently on helping Kosovo solve its economic, social and administrative problems, which are considerable.**

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# *THE EUROPEAN UNION* **BATTLEGROUPS**



## **Full Operational Capability 2007**

The European Union is a global actor, ready to undertake its share of responsibility for global security. With the introduction of the Battlegroup Concept the Union has another military instrument at its disposal for early and rapid responses when necessary. Since January 2005, the EU Battlegroup Concept has reached its Initial Operational Capability. This means that the EU has at least one Battle Group on standby on a permanent basis. On 1 January 2007 the EU Battlegroup Concept reaches Full Operational Capability. From that date the EU will be able to fulfil its ambition of having the capacity to undertake two concurrent single battlegroup-sized rapid response operations, including the ability to launch both such operations nearly simultaneously.

Council of the European Union

# Full Operational Capability 2007



At the 1999 Helsinki European Council, Rapid Response was identified as an important aspect of EU crisis management. As a result, the Helsinki Headline Goal 2003 assigned to Member States the objective of being able to provide rapid response elements available and deployable at very high levels of readiness. Subsequently an EU Military Rapid Response Concept was developed.

In June 2003, the first EU autonomous military crisis management operation, Operation Artemis, was launched. It showed very successfully the EU's ability to operate with a rather small force at a distance of more than 6 000 km from Brussels. Moreover, it demonstrated the need for further development of rapid response capabilities. Subsequently, Operation 'Artemis' became a reference model for the development of a battlegroup-sized rapid response capability.

In 2004, the Headline Goal 2010 aimed for the completion of the development of rapidly deployable battlegroups, including the identification of appropriate strategic lift, sustainability and debarkation assets by 2007.


Within this context and based on a French/British/German initiative, the EU Military Staff (EUMS) developed the Battlegroup Concept. In June 2004, the EU Military Committee (EUMC) agreed the Battlegroup Concept, and since then the work has been taken forward, based on an agreed roadmap. The work was concluded in October 2006 with the delivery of one single Battlegroup Concept document.

The battlegroup is the minimum militarily effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations, or of being used for the initial phase of larger operations. It is based on a combined arms, battalion-sized force and reinforced with combat support and combat service support elements. In its generic composition, but depending on the mission, the battlegroups are about 1 500 personnel strong.


The battlegroups are based on the principle of multinationality and may be formed by a framework nation or by a multinational coalition of Member States for an autonomous EU operation. In all cases, interoperability and military effectiveness will be key criteria.

A battlegroup is associated with a deployable force headquarters and pre-identified operational and strategic enablers, such as strategic lift and logistics. Member States may also contribute niche capabilities, providing specific elements with added value to the battlegroups. The battlegroups are sustainable for 30 days in initial operations, extendable to 120 days, if re-supplied appropriately.

## Basic features



## Reaction time



The Headline Goal 2010 laid down that, on decision-making, the EU's ambition is to be able to take the decision to launch an operation within five days of the approval of the crisis management concept (CMC) by the Council. Concerning the deployment of forces, the ambition is that the forces start implementing their mission on the ground no later than ten days after the EU decision to launch the operation. For this reason the battlegroup package will be held at a readiness of five to ten days.





### EU Treaty and ESS tasks

- Humanitarian & rescue tasks
- Peacekeeping
- Tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking
- Joint disarmament operations
- Support for third countries in combating terrorism
- Security Sector Reform (SSR), which would be part of broader institution building

## Tasks

Battlegroups will be employable across the full range of tasks listed in Article 17.2 of the Treaty on European Union and those identified in the European Security Strategy, in particular in tasks of combat forces in crisis management, bearing in mind their size.

Based on the Headline Goal 2010, which places the emphasis on rapid response and deployability, the EU has progressed well in further developing its military capability. As a basis for the capability development process, the following five illustrative scenarios have been used: conflict prevention, separation of parties by force, stabilisation, reconstruction and military advice to third countries, evacuation operations and assistance to humanitarian operations. Although the battlegroup capability could be used in all scenarios, the latter two scenarios in particular have specific requirements for rapid response. A possible option is for an EU battlegroup to be used in an EU autonomous initial operation in order to enable other organisations (e.g. the UN) to generate the necessary forces for a subsequent larger crisis management operation. The operation would as a rule be conducted under a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR), although operations could be envisaged where a UNSCR would not be necessary (e.g. evacuation of EU citizens).

## Standards, training and certification

To qualify as an EU battlegroup, the battlegroup packages have to meet commonly defined and agreed military capability standards. Standards and criteria, set by Member States, form the basis for developing specific instructions to ensure coherence between the constituent parts of the battlegroup package, taking into account the demands for multinationality. A basic principle is that the battlegroup training is the responsibility of the Member States concerned. The EU facilitates the coordination among Member States. The certification of battlegroups also remains a national responsibility of the contributing Member States. The EU Military Committee, assisted by the EU Military Staff, monitors the battlegroup certification process.

Training is a key requirement for battlegroups. Member States are conducting a series of exercises in this context. For instance, exercise European Endeavour 06 was carried out in Germany in November 2006 to certify the German/Dutch/Finnish Battlegroup Force Headquarters. Exercise Quick Response conducted in Belgium in September 2006 also featured an EU battlegroup. Other examples include the Swedish-led exercise 'Illuminated Summer' in July 2007 in the context of the Nordic Battlegroup, and the Greek-led exercise EVROP II-07 in May 2007 for the 'HELBROC' Battlegroup.

The certification of the battlegroup package by the Member States will provide the EU with the necessary assurance that it is ready for a possible mission. The Operation Commander, who will be appointed by the Council on a case-by-case basis, has the authority to tailor the command and control structure and the battlegroup package to the specific requirements of the operation.

## Battlegroup commitments

The Member States conduct the generation of a battlegroup package and are responsible for offering a complete package. The battlegroup package has no fixed structure and thus provides Member States with the necessary flexibility to form their own battlegroup package. This could lead, for instance, to battlegroups with a mountain or amphibious capability. This flexibility facilitates a smoother force generation and a broader spectrum of capability.

The Member States offer their battlegroup packages at the six-monthly EUMS-chaired Battlegroup Coordination Conferences (BGCC). The planning horizon of the BGCC is five years. It is up to the Member States how they constitute a battlegroup package, for what time frame it will be offered, and how often.

The last BGCC before Full Operational Capability was held on 27 October 2006. It confirmed that 2007 and 2008 are completely subscribed. MS have committed several other battlegroup packages for the period after these years. Operation headquarters are pre-identified for most of the battlegroup packages.

At the beginning of 2007, the EU will welcome potential contributions from 25 Member States, one candidate state and one non-EU NATO country, filling over 20 time slots with battlegroup packages.

## Role of the Battlegroup Concept

The Battlegroup Concept provides the EU with a specific tool in the range of rapid response capabilities, which contributes to making the EU more coherent, more active and more capable. The Battlegroup Concept enables the EU to respond rapidly to emerging crises with military means, taking into account the size and capabilities of the battlegroups on standby.

The Battlegroup Concept also has the potential to be a driver for capability development and for making the armed forces of Member States more capable of undertaking rapid long-range deployments. Significantly, the need for additional strategic lift capabilities is underlined by the Battlegroup Concept.

Furthermore, the Battlegroup Concept emphasises the need for accelerated decision-making. Not only do the EU bodies need to be ready but the national decision-making processes need to be synchronised to meet the demanding timelines.

Setting up a battlegroup package is an opportunity for enhanced military co-operation between Member States. This improves mutual knowledge of each other's capabilities with regard to military means and political decision-making.

Finally, the Battlegroup Concept reinforces the EU's military identity in a concrete manner.



Since the Battlegroup Concept was agreed in June 2004, much has been achieved. With the full commitment of the Member States, the Battlegroup Concept has already shown its potential value in securing increased co-operation and capability development among Member States. It has contributed to enhancing the EU's capability to deal with rapid response and will continue to do so.



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# > EU-UN co-operation on crisis management

**Relations between the UN and the EU have undergone fundamental changes in recent years. This is due both to changes in the international environment and to internal developments within the EU. This new co-operation is already beginning to yield good results and offers promising perspectives for the institutional and operational future of both institutions.**

*by Jim Cloos, Director at the Council General Secretariat\**

The end of the Cold War made it possible for the UN to play a greater role. Between 1946 and 1990, there were 683 Security Council resolutions. In the decade and a half since, this number has more than doubled. The multiplication of local crises and wars has increased the relevance of UN interventions, in particular in Africa. As a result, the UN now has nearly 80,000 uniformed and civilian personnel deployed in 18 peacekeeping and related field operations. This has, however, stretched the UN peacekeeping capacities to its limits. More than troops, the UN needs rapid reaction capacity and 'enabling assets', such as strategic airlifts, intelligence, medical units and logistics.

At the same time, the gradual political transformation of the EU has given it an increased role in foreign policy. The emergence of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is of particular relevance. The ESDP is, in many ways, geared towards providing the UN with services in order to help it fulfil its increasing burden.

This article mainly concentrates on crisis management, one of the most important and promising areas of EU-UN co-operation. It is important to underline that crisis management should be seen as part of a broader approach, including conflict prevention, to its multifaceted involvement in the peacebuilding phase.

## The EU philosophy

The European Security Strategy, adopted in December 2003, sets out the EU vision of a stronger international society, well-functioning international institutions and a rules-based international order. It strongly emphasises the role of the UN and states that: "The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively is a European priority."

The EU is in itself a structure for peace and security in its region. It was created to overcome the legacy of two world wars and to prevent new conflicts in Europe. The founding idea of the EU is to create a zone of peace built on the voluntary pooling of sovereignty, common institutions and the rule of law. The EU wants to extend this zone of peace and prosperity to its neighbouring countries. One of the most important recent successes of the EU is the enlargement process. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, eight of the countries from the former Soviet bloc have been integrated peacefully into the Union. The EU's positive transformative power in its immediate neighbourhood has undoubtedly been a decisive factor for the peaceful transition in Eastern Europe.

The EU emphasises the same values in wider international relations. Strengthening the international order is a fundamental objective for the EU and its Member States. Building on its own experience, the EU is an active proponent of effective multilateralism. The European Security Strategy states that: "The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order."

The EU, however, does not confine itself to the peace and stability of today's Europe. The European Security Strategy acknowledges that there can be a need for intervention in other parts of the world where states are faced with the threat of collapse or chaos. State failure is one of the main concerns addressed in the Strategy. State failure undermines global governance and adds to regional instability. If multilateralism is to be effective, there is a need for crisis management tools and mechanisms to enforce global governance. The European Security Strategy emphasises the need to "develop a culture that fosters early, rapid and, when necessary, robust intervention". The EU is already putting this into practice. Since the beginning of 2003, the EU has successfully engaged in more than a dozen military or civil ESDP operations in three continents. An important aspect of the EU crisis management capabilities is the close co-operation with the UN.

It should finally be underlined that the EU is completely in line with the comprehensive approach underlying the report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and supported by Kofi Annan in his report "In Larger Freedom" as well as by the world's heads of state and government in the outcome document adopted at the World Summit on 14-16 September 2005. Kofi Annan eloquently states that "we will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights. Unless all these causes are advanced, none will succeed." The EU has warmly welcomed this approach, including at the level of heads of state and government. The EU-UN co-operation should be seen in this broader perspective. In this context, it is worth mentioning that the EU – the European Community and EU Member States taken together – provide more than half of the Official Development Assistance in the world. In the framework of the 2005 World Summit, the EU has undertaken very substantial commitments to delivering even more and better aid.

\* This article is adapted from a chapter published in J Wouters et al., eds., *The United Nations and the European Union, 2006*, TMC Asser Press, The Hague, the Netherlands. The author writes here in a personal capacity.

## The EU-UN co-operation in crisis management

The relations between the EU and the UN in the field of crisis management began to develop at a time when the UN was looking at the reform of its peace operations in the framework of the Brahimi report process, which coincided with the laying of the foundations of the ESDP. The UN, confronted with the changing nature of peacekeeping, sought increased support from regional actors. At the same time, the EU started creating crisis management capacities.

The first two ESDP operations in 2003 were successful tests for the EU-UN relationship:

- The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina took over the UN International Police Task Force in a seamless transition, thanks to close co-operation in the planning phase.
- Operation Artemis was a rapid EU military deployment in support of the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), at the UN's request and under a UN mandate. EU and UN activities were intimately linked throughout the planning and the deployment of the operation. The EU intervention in Ituri, strictly limited in time, allowed the UN to strengthen MONUC and to expand its mandate.

These examples of co-operation on the ground were a major breakthrough in the relations between the two institutions. It forced them to work together on the ground and to acquire a better knowledge of each other's working methods. A framework for regular consultation between the two organisations was set up by the September 2003 'Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management' which identified four areas for further co-operation: planning, training, communication, and best practices. A consultative mechanism, the Steering Committee, was established to enhance coordination in these areas between the UN (in particular DPKO and DPA) and EU staff (Council Secretariat and Commission). The Steering Committee meets twice a year. This is a quite novel approach, lending a new quality to the relationship between the UN and the EU.

The new relationship with the UN has without a doubt stimulated and energised the EU efforts to improve its crisis management capacity. Two further developments will further enhance this capacity. The first relates to the setting up in Brussels of a civil-military cell with the aim of improving the overall planning capacity in an integrated fashion. The second concerns the creation of some 18 'battlegroups', i.e. battalion-sized forces of 1,500 troops, fully equipped, rapidly deployable, with force headquarters, pre-identified logistics and transport elements.

## The way forward

After a very promising start, the time has now come to consolidate the work done and to move to a higher level. There are seven concrete lines of action that I would like to advocate.



*Visit of UN Secretary-General Annan to the EU OHQ in Potsdam, Germany. Left: General Viereck, EUFOR RD Congo Operation Commander; right: German federal defence minister Jung.*

First, we should develop the Steering Committee approach and continue to work on all four priorities identified in the 2003 declaration. The recently concluded arrangement on exchange of classified information and the deployment of an EU military liaison officer to the Council's New York Liaison Office will further facilitate co-operation.

Second, lessons identified from operations and modalities underlying the possible scenarios will have to be looked at. Issues such as the information-sharing mechanisms in pre-deployment phases, the compatibility of standards and rules of engagement, the re-hatting of EU forces into a UN operation by individual nations, the possible double hatting of the head of the mission, the financing of operations, the recourse to joint participation and evaluation missions all need to be examined in detail. These issues are necessary conditions for smooth transitions between EU and UN deployments.

Third, it will be important to examine in a very pragmatic way how the EU battle groups or other rapid reaction forces can be used to respond to UN demands. The latter refer to concepts such as 'reserve force', 'over-the-horizon standby force', and 'enhanced rapid deployable forces'. The EU is ready to look into these demands, but with two very clear conditions: the EU will always insist on its political autonomy and on an EU chain of command, with the political and the strategic control being exercised by the Political and Security Committee. The EU cannot guarantee a decision that ultimately depends on national decisions to provide troops. The recent debate in Germany about assuming a lead role for the setting up of a mission to support the election in the DRC underscores this point. This operation – EUFOR RD Congo – has provided an interesting illustration of an innovative EU contribution following a UN request.

Fourth, the 'EU Strategy for Africa' adopted at the meeting of the European Council on 15-16 December 2005 will be an important framework for much of the work involving the African continent. It is a comprehensive strategy, based on shared values and agreed UN principles, which includes development, security and human rights. Covering all African countries, it entails a prioritised approach aiming at the promotion of peace and security and sustainable economic and social development in Africa. The Strategy sets out a medium- and long-term perspective, including measures to be taken during the next ten years. It also foresees the continuation of the highly successful Africa Peace Facility mechanism.



> *UN mission in Congo.*

Fifth, one of the promising areas for EU-UN co-operation is assistance to regional organisations such as the African Union in order to strengthen their crisis management capacity. As current examples show in Congo or Sudan, there is scope for an intensified UN/EU/AU co-operation. In Darfur, the EU, working in close co-operation with the UN and other partners such as Canada and the US, has consistently supported the AU AMIS mission in terms of financing (via the Africa Peace Facility), planning and command structures. Work is presently ongoing to prepare smooth transition from AMIS to an UN operation. The case of the DRC shows how a variety of EU missions have helped the UN (MONUC) to stabilise the situation and to support the transition process to a political settlement: ARTEMIS as a quick-response and a bridging operation, EUPOL Kinshasa for police training, EUSEC Congo for security sector reform, and a chain of payment projects to ensure effective payment of the reformed armed forces. The military operation EUFOR RD Congo in support of MONUC during the election process was another important contribution in that respect.

Sixth, our organisations should develop their efforts to look together at crisis management as a continuum involving conflict prevention, military and civil peacekeeping and peacebuilding. It is important to develop a comprehensive and coherent approach involving both civil and military aspects. In this regard, the concept of integrated missions is very promising: EU operations are planned in an integrated way both from a military and civilian perspective, so that post-conflict reconstruction is taken into account from the start. This integrated approach is in line with UN thinking, in particular the Brahimi report and the setting up of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). As mentioned above, the EU has already established a civil-military cell in order to strengthen the coherence between military and civilian components in operations.

Finally, the setting up of a PBC will further strengthen the efforts to ensure a comprehensive approach. The PBC will fill the present gap between the end of peacekeeping operations and the return to the path of development. The EU is presently looking into ways of improving its contributions to Security Sector Reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) in order to assist the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, areas that fall within the PBC's future area of responsibility. The establishment of the PBC has consistently been an EU priority, and the EU intends to participate constructively and actively through an integrated approach, taking into account both crisis management tools and longer-term development aid. The EC has every intention to provide support to the Peacebuilding Fund that will be set up.

## Conclusion

Crisis management, both military and civilian, has become a major new element in UN-EU relations. We have gone a long way since the first contacts of the year 2000, moving from an ad hoc dialogue to a structured co-operation. This co-operation begins to yield good results in terms of knowledge of our respective functioning and activities as well as in terms of an institutionalised but unbureaucratic framework for practical co-operation. None of the relations between the UN and other regional organisations has gone as far as the UN-EU relationship, although – or because – the EU is not a traditional regional organisation in the sense of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. This co-operation offers promising perspectives. We need to think both operationally and strategically about our relations. The EU is willing to be proactive and take a front-runner approach in both regards.

## Résumé

La fin de la guerre froide et l'émergence d'une politique européenne de sécurité et de défense (PESD) sont deux facteurs qui ont radicalement fait évoluer les relations entre les Nations unies et l'Union européenne. L'Union européenne soutient la responsabilité et le rôle des Nations unies dans le maintien de la paix et la sécurité au niveau international. Par ailleurs, sur le vieux continent, l'UE représente une zone de paix et de stabilité. L'UE s'est dotée de capacités de gestion de crise à un moment où l'ONU, confrontée aux changements dans la nature du maintien de la paix, cherchait un soutien accru de la part des organisations régionales. Sur le terrain, les premières opérations de la PESD (Artemis au Congo et Mission de police de l'UE en Bosnie-et-Herzégovine) ont été coordonnées avec les missions des Nations unies. À l'avenir, cette coordination devrait se structurer et se renforcer, notamment via le soutien à d'autres organisations régionales, le recours aux Groupements tactiques de l'UE (*Battlegroups*) ainsi que le développement d'une réflexion commune sur la gestion intégrée des crises, allant de la prévention des conflits à la reconstruction et à des opérations militaires et civiles.

# ESDP and the European Parliament: enhancing forces

*By Karl von Wogau, Chairman of the European Parliament's Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE)*

**Most Europeans are in favour of a common security and defence policy for the EU. In order to ensure continued support for this policy. In this comment for the newsletter, MEP Karl von Wogau pleads for the parliamentary dimension of the ESDP, including increased parliamentary monitoring by the European parliament and national parliaments, in order to ensure continued support for this policy.**

According to Eurobarometer, the EU's public opinion gauge, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is supported by 69% of EU citizens. This is because they are aware that they all face the same threats, such as terrorism, organised crime or regional conflicts, and they feel that the answer can only be a European one.

The world today has become more dangerous than was the case ten years ago, and European countries, collectively and through the European Union, must be ready to take their share of responsibility to protect their values and interests and to secure peace and stability, foremost in their geographical neighbourhood, as well as in other parts of the world following the principles of the UN Charter.

The European Parliament, using the instruments it has at its disposal, as they are laid down in the Treaty establishing the European Union, is seeking to get involved in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and in the ESDP. The main legal tools used by the Parliament to oversee the building up of the ESDP, which is an integral part of the CFSP, are the following:

- In conformity with the Treaty, the European Parliament shall be consulted on the main aspects and the basic choices of the CFSP and its views shall be duly taken into consideration. The European Parliament shall be kept regularly informed by the Presidency of the developments of the Union's foreign and security policy (Article 21 TEU)
- The Parliament must hold an annual debate on the implementation of the CFSP: this includes debating progress in the ESDP
- Questions can be addressed to the Council and to the Commission
- Finally, recommendations can be addressed to the Council.

Further to this, the European Parliament has the possibility of using the instruments foreseen in its own internal rules of procedure. These are:

- Resolutions on topical issues (in the past on the ALTHEA operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina or more recently on EUFOR in DR Congo)
- Own-initiative reports, where it can express its views on what is desirable for putting more flesh on this policy.

To take concrete examples, the last reports which have recently been, or are on their way to being, adopted in the field of the ESDP include a

report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy in the context of the ESDP, on which I have been appointed rapporteur. Another is on the implementation of the Code of Conduct on arms exports by Mr Romeva i Rueda, and one on the fight against international terrorism by Mr Yañez-Barnuevo. For 2007, we intend to prepare reports on the contribution of space policy to the ESDP and on security sector reform. We are seeking to prepare a resolution on addressing existing capabilities shortfalls which may hamper the success of EU crisis management operations.

The power of the European Parliament in foreign and security policy derives essentially from its right of being kept informed on the latest developments in these two fields, either during its plenary sittings or during meetings of its relevant committees and subcommittees. While the President-in-office of the Council, including the defence minister of the rotating presidency, the High Representative and the External Relations Commissioner come regularly before the Committee on Foreign Affairs to debate foreign policy issues. ESDP-related matters are scrutinised and debated in the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) – which I currently chair – and whose task also involves paving the way for the decisions to be taken by the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

SEDE has regular contacts with the Ambassador to the PSC of the country holding the presidency, the Director-General of the EU Military Staff, the Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency, the commanders of EU operations and the directors of other EU bodies (such as the Institute for Security Studies and the Satellite Centre). I should also mention the contacts we have developed with the Council's General Secretariat.

The Subcommittee organises hearings with experts on specific subjects (the previous one being on 'Lessons to be drawn from ESDP operations', held in October 2006) and sends ad hoc delegations to acquire first-hand information on the spot: in Bosnia and Herzegovina to see how the EUFOR Althea mission is working, in Kosovo, where an EU-led police force should operate next to KFOR as from 2007, or in DR Congo to see EUFOR's work in the field.

We urge the Member States to support the broader parliamentary dimension of the ESDP and recall that responsibility for parliamentary monitoring of the ESDP is shared between the parliaments of the EU



> *Karl von Wogau, Chairman of the European Parliament's Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE).*

Member States and the European Parliament on the basis of their respective rights and duties under relevant treaties and constitutions. We would like a closer relationship with national parliaments in order to provide adequate scrutiny of the ESDP.

At present, meetings between the chairs of the committees on foreign affairs and defence of the national parliaments and the European Parliament are organised twice a year by the respective parliaments of the current holder of the EU presidency. The European Parliament also invites the chairs of these committees.

The European Parliament has also developed closer working ties with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. This was justified by the fact that the EU and NATO are co-operating more and more (e.g. the monthly meetings between the EU-PSC and the North Atlantic Council and the developing co-operation in the Balkans). The NATO Parliamentary Assembly is a good place to discuss security issues, both with MPs from the EU Member States or with MPs from allied countries. In this Assembly, the EP permanent delegation, which consists of ten members, has a special status: our members can participate not only in the plenary sessions but also in the work of the committees, even as rapporteurs.

A classical way for a parliament to control the executive is through the budget. Unfortunately, the CFSP budget (which also covers the ESDP) is very small (around €160 million in commitments) and the Treaty (Article 28 TEU) excludes military operations from being financed by the EU budget. This situation is not satisfactory as one should bear in mind that it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish between civilian and military expenditures when the EU carries out crisis management operations which make use of both civilian and military instruments (one good example is Bosnia, where the EU is involved in a police mission, a military mission and reconstruction actions). Furthermore, the principle of "costs lie where they fall" is not fair, because the EU countries are not put on an equal footing as far as military operations are concerned: some countries are willing to

## Résumé

Karl von Wogau, le président de la Sous-Commission Sécurité et Défense (SEDE) du Parlement européen, plaide pour une dimension parlementaire de la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense, y compris un suivi accru de cette politique par le PE et les parlements nationaux. Cette nouvelle politique jouit d'un large soutien dans l'opinion publique et le Parlement européen entend donc utiliser ses pouvoirs pour y être impliqué autant que possible, notamment en organisant des rencontres et des débats, en adressant des questions ou des recommandations au Conseil, en préparant d'initiative des résolutions ou des rapports, mais surtout en agissant comme autorité budgétaire. Dans ce domaine, Karl von Wogau constate qu'il est de plus en plus difficile de distinguer les opérations civiles et militaires, et il propose d'adapter les procédures pour pouvoir financer les coûts communs des opérations militaires par le budget de l'Union.

participate but cannot really deliver, while others are not willing at all. Before all EU operations can be financed from the EU budget, a first step would be to bring the ATHENA mechanism, which covers the common costs of a military operation, under the EU budget, as recommended by the European Parliament. Within the EU budget, the European Parliament is advocating, as budgetary authority, a further increase of the appropriations for Galileo, GMES and security research programmes.

As I said at the beginning, our citizens are in favour of a common European defence policy, but most of them are not aware of the progress achieved by the ESDP. This makes it necessary, if we wish them to continue to support the idea of European defence, to increase the democratic control of the European Parliament and the national parliaments over the ESDP and the CFSP, because we can be certain that, one day, soldiers from our countries will, unfortunately, die in action during an ESDP operation, while defending the values and interests of the European Union and simultaneously of our nations.

# Giving the EU a long-term vision

To “prepare the future”, the EU needs to avail itself of a vision of how the future will look. Such a vision, especially of the future nature and context of ESDP operations, is essential to inform those near-term decisions that will determine Europe's long-term defence capabilities and capacities. In November 2005, the Ministerial Steering Board of the European Defence Agency (EDA) tasked the Agency to lead a wide-ranging exercise to develop an initial long-term vision of European defence capability and capacity needs, looking some two decades ahead. The EDA invited the EU Institute for Security Studies to participate in the project by contributing a report on the global context in which the ESDP will operate in 2025. The Institute's Giovanni Grevi introduces us to the “new global puzzle” facing the EU, later from the title of the book he recently directed with EU-ISS Director Nicole Gnesotto as a follow-up to this work, while EDA Chief Executive Nick Witney offers us an outline of the “long-term vision”.

## The new global puzzle

The ongoing debate on the reform of EU policies and institutions, including the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), should be more closely linked with a strategic assessment of the global context of European integration itself, and of its evolution. Seven years on (and 15 civilian and military operations) from the launch of ESDP in 1999, and three years on from the adoption of the landmark European Security Strategy, the Union is in a position to play a more proactive and effective role in international affairs. Building on the considerable progress achieved so far, a comprehensive overview of the long-term trends, factors and actors shaping the international system and the security landscape can help the Union define the challenges and priorities ahead, and devise the policies and capabilities required to confront them.

By way of an initial contribution to this exercise, the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) has produced a wide-ranging report setting out the key drivers of change, their impact on pivotal global regions, and their implications for the EU – *The New Global Puzzle. What World for the EU in 2025?* This project started off as the EUISS input to the European Defence Agency's initiative to produce ‘An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs’. Having paved the way for more in-depth work on the development of military capabilities under ESDP, the EUISS report lends itself to a broader debate on the place of the Union in a changing world, and on the defining questions that EU leaders will need to address in the not-so-distant future.

The report offers a contrasted picture of the world in 2025, with two countervailing tendencies at work: the world will certainly become more interdependent, but it will, at the same time, be more fragmented and heterogeneous. Economic globalisation will gain in speed and depth and will contribute to the expected, impressive economic growth of countries such as China and India. At the same time, however, inequality is likely to grow between developed and emerging countries on the one hand, and regions left at the margins of globalisation on the other, notably including the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and Sub-Saharan Africa. Cultural globalisation, vectored by new information and communication technologies, will also have a mixed impact. The global flow of ideas, information and images will boost interconnectedness, but will also fuel different and potentially divergent perceptions of international affairs, and entail value clashes. Cultural fragmentation in

traditional as well as societies in the developed world might result in alienation and in political and religious fundamentalism.

The international political system will also be heterogeneous and mixed, with the rise of new global and regional powers paralleled by the efforts to build new frameworks for global multilateral governance, and by the potential proliferation of weak states and disorder in some regions. Twenty years down the line the world is likely to be multipolar, with no country in a position to assert hegemony either in the economic or in the political sphere. The key question is what type of multipolar system that will be, whether a relatively benign concert of powers or a confrontational setting where major powers compete for scarce resources, markets and spheres of influence. The answer will directly affect the scope for co-operation in shaping new structures of global governance.

The demand for global governance will steeply increase over the next 20 years. First, the further globalisation of all sorts of exchanges will become more exposed to turbulences and disruption, and will require a solid governance framework. Second, states and societies will be confronted with common challenges and threats on an unprecedented scale, including environmental degradation, growing energy demand and consumption, and sustained demographic expansion. Short of radical, prompt policy intervention, the world in 2025 will be more populated, more exploited, more arid and more polluted than it is today. World population will increase by 23.4% to around 8 billion, and only one out of ten people will live in the developed world. Global energy demand will grow by 50%, with developing countries accounting for more than two-thirds of the increase: demand will grow faster than supply. As a consequence of envisaged energy production patterns, CO<sub>2</sub> emissions will continue to grow at the global level, with an inevitable impact on global warming. Water scarcity will increasingly affect MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa, the two regions where population is expected to grow fastest by, respectively, 38% and 45%. The widely expanding workforce of these and other poor regions is unlikely to find employment in the absence of far-reaching economic governance reforms in respective countries.

Although the objective requirement for global governance will grow, adequate supply may not follow. Political, economic and other structural developments point to considerable changes in the distribution of power and influence, which could make agenda-setting at the inter-



## The New Global Puzzle *What World for the EU in 2025?*

Directed by Nicole Gnesotto and Giovanni Grevi



### > Giovanni Grevi

is a Research Fellow with the EU Institute for Security Studies. The text of *The New Global Puzzle. What World for the EU in 2025?* (directed by Nicole Gnesotto and Giovanni Grevi) is available on the EUISS website at <http://www.iss.europa.eu/>

national level more complicated. In its many forms, power will shift in relative terms from the West to the rest. In particular, a glance at some key indicators puts the place of the EU in the world in perspective. The Union will host only 6% of the world population (and also a rapidly ageing one), and will depend on energy imports for 90% of the oil (mainly from MENA) and 80% of the gas (mainly from Russia) that it will require. Envisaged economic growth rates are feeble if compared not only to emerging countries but also to the US, and investments in education, S&T and R&D are growing at a relatively slower pace than those of Europe's competitors.

From a geopolitical perspective, the point needs to be stressed that the EU will probably be surrounded by some of the most unstable regions in the world, where a range of negative structural trends and political conflicts seem to converge. This is notably the case of MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa. The EU will also have to meet the challenge of developing a strategic partnership with Russia, in a context where transition towards a liberal democracy and a real market economy remains in question. Energy is likely to remain a strategic asset for Russia's foreign policy. The potential for conflict or simply state failure along the Southern border of the post-Soviet space, notably in Central Asia, should not be underestimated either.

Against this picture, Europe needs to make the choice whether actively to shape or passively to endure change. The realistic appraisal of some prospective trends and of the evolution of key global regions should become the basis for proactive, joint action within and outside the EU. For the Union to succeed in an international landscape such as the one sketched out here, three points are essential. First, shared European interests and priorities will need to be defined and consistently pursued. This is not a commonplace but a clear precondition for Europe to enter a real strategic dialogue and partnership with other major global players, short of which the Union will simply not be considered a credible political interlocutor. Second, in both strategic partnerships and international forums, the Union should continue to champion effective multilateralism. This approach will provide the EU with a comparative advantage. In a more diverse and interdependent world, legitimacy will be a hard currency of international relations. A wide range of interests and values will need to be taken into account when defining compromise at the international level. Seeking agreement may become more complicated, but also more important not only to confront the major structural challenges pointed out above, but also to deal effectively with security threats.

Third, as made clear in the European Security Strategy, the Union needs to be "ready to act when the rules are broken". In this perspective, ESDP will be a key tool to enable the EU to back up its distinctive multilateral approach with the means to support and enforce rules, when needs be, in close synergy with the other policies and instruments available to the Union. The future global context entails, therefore, a number of implications for ESDP as well. These have been captured very effectively by the EDA in a passage that is quoted here, and should provide the basis for further reflection on the development of European capabilities: "ESDP operations will be expeditionary, multinational and multi-instrument, directed at achieving security and stability more than 'victory'. Information will be critical, whether informing the 'war of ideas' in cyberspace, or facilitating effective command decisions. 'Asymmetry' will apply not merely to an opponent's tactics but also to his aims and values. In such circumstances, the military will be only one of a range of instruments applied to achieve the campaign goals."

### Résumé


Deux documents récents viennent nourrir la réflexion à long terme sur le développement de la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune et de la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense dans le cadre d'un projet dirigé par l'Agence européenne de défense. D'une part, l'Institut d'études de sécurité présente dans son "new global puzzle" les perspectives politiques et économiques du monde d'ici à 2025: globalisation économique et culturelle, multi-polarité dans la sphère politique, contraintes démographiques et écologiques, instabilité autour de l'Europe. Autant de défis face auxquels l'Europe devra pouvoir réagir de multiples manières: politiques, économiques et militaires. D'autre part, dans son "Initial Long Term Vision for European Defense Capability and Capacity Needs", l'Agence européenne de défense (EDA) rappelle les principaux enjeux pour une politique de défense à venir: importance du renseignement et des médias, prolifération des technologies et des armes, interventions dans des circonstances confuses. Sur cette base, elle propose quatre maîtres mots pour guider le développement des forces militaires européennes: synergie, agilité, sélectivité et durabilité.

## A long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs

What sort of defence capabilities will Europe need in 20 years' time? And what sort of industrial and technological capacities will be required to supply those needs? A first step was taken towards trying to answer those questions when the EDA Steering Board, meeting in Defence Ministers' formation on 3 October, authorised the publication of the Agency's initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs.

The origins of the exercise lay in the recognition that, every day, decisions are being taken all over Europe which will in practice determine whether or not the right capabilities and capacities are available to us in the second and third decades of this century. No one can predict the future; there can be no guarantees that decisions taken today and tomorrow will be vindicated by events. But, one year ago, the EDA's Steering Board agreed that a comprehensive exercise was needed to produce guidance on trends and priorities which could assist those whose daily task it is to "prepare the future".

The product of these endeavours is a deliberately slim volume of some 25 pages to be found on the EDA's website at [www.eda.europa.eu/ltv/ltv.htm](http://www.eda.europa.eu/ltv/ltv.htm). It surveys the global context as it may develop in and around Europe over the next two decades, examining social, demographic, economic, legal and other trends. It then considers the changing environment for ESDP operations, and what this may mean for their nature and needs. From this is derived a profile of the future defence capabilities that may be needed, as well as identification of certain key issues (ranging from industrial policy to expanding the cost of manpower in armed forces) with which defence planners will have to contend.



Although orchestrated by the EDA, the exercise to compile the vision was widely inclusive. Most of the work on the global context was done by the Institute of Security Studies (see separate article), whilst the EU Military Committee led the work on future defence capabilities. Amongst many other authorities consulted, ten leading scientists and technologists across Europe consented to advise on what impacts we may expect from the advance of science. Inevitably, much of what we learned is not directly reflected in the LTV document itself. But the document is intended to be only a launch pad, – or perhaps a foundation – on which the Agency's main forward agendas, particularly in the area of defence capability development, can be based. Generating an EU Capability Development Plan will assist Member States in developing their national plans and should help bring them together so that they can identify opportunities for joint investment and collaborative projects. That can only happen if there is a shared perception of the most likely environment in which European forces would have to operate. The Long Term Vision has now given us this common view.



### > Nick Witney

is the Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency

[www.eda.europa.eu](http://www.eda.europa.eu)

# > Nouveau président du Comité militaire

**Le 6 novembre 2006, le général d'armée Henri Bentégeat (France) a pris les fonctions de président du Comité militaire de l'Union européenne (CMUE), succédant au général d'armée Rolando Mosca Moschini (Italie).**



*Général d'armée  
Henri Bentégeat*

Le Comité militaire de l'Union européenne (*European Union Military Committee – EUMC*) est l'organe militaire le plus élevé au sein du Conseil de l'Union européenne. Il est composé des chefs des forces armées, chefs d'états-majors des armées ou chefs des forces de défense (selon les appellations nationales) de chacun des États membres. Ces derniers s'expriment à Bruxelles par la voix de leurs représentants militaires permanents. Le CMUE est chargé de fournir au Comité politique et de sécurité (COPS) des recommandations et des avis militaires sur les questions militaires intéressant l'Union européenne.

Le président du Comité militaire de l'Union européenne est désigné par le Conseil pour un mandat de principe de trois ans. Il est généralement choisi parmi les anciens chefs des forces armées des États membres. Comme président, il est le porte-parole du CMUE, le conseiller militaire du Secrétaire général du Conseil/Haut représentant de l'UE et assiste aux sessions du Conseil traitant de questions militaires.

Avant qu'il ne rejoigne Bruxelles, le général Bentégeat a partagé sa carrière entre des responsabilités opérationnelles, diplomatiques et stratégiques. Dans les années 70 et 80, il a commandé plusieurs formations au sein des troupes de Marine dont le Régiment d'infanterie et de chars de marine (RICM) et il a effectué des missions opérationnelles au Tchad et en République Centrafricaine. En 1990, durant la guerre du Golfe, il était attaché de défense adjoint à l'ambassade de France à Washington. En 1996, il était commandant supérieur des forces armées aux Antilles. En 1999, il est nommé chef de l'état major particulier du président de la République française, Jacques Chirac, puis chef d'état major des armées françaises en octobre 2002.

Le général Bentégeat prend ses fonctions alors que plusieurs dossiers de première importance sont inscrits à l'agenda du Comité militaire. Outre le suivi des opérations actuelles de l'Union, mettant en jeu l'instrument militaire, il devra se pencher avec attention sur les perspectives ouvertes par les décisions prises par le Conseil européen à Hampton Court. Dans le même temps, la pleine capacité opérationnelle des groupements tactiques et l'achèvement des infrastructures requises par le Centre d'opérations, à partir du 1er janvier 2007, donnent à l'Union des capacités supplémentaires d'action. Les réflexions sur la dimension maritime militaire et la réponse rapide aérienne devraient, dans les mois qui viennent, consolider encore l'outil militaire que les chefs d'états-majors des armées des États membres mettent à disposition de l'Union. Autant de défis que le général Bentégeat relève avec confiance et détermination.

“ Les réflexions sur la dimension maritime militaire et la réponse rapide aérienne devraient, dans les mois qui viennent, consolider encore l'outil militaire que les chefs d'états-majors des armées des États membres mettent à disposition de l'Union. ”

## Résumé

General Henri Bentégeat, from the French Army, took over as Chairman of the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) from General Rolando Mosca Moschini of the Italian Army, on 6 November 2006. The EUMC, made up of the chiefs of the defence staffs of each Member State, provides advice and recommendations to the Political and Security Committee (PSC). During his three-year term, the General will also act as military advisor to the Secretary General of the Council/EU High representative and participate in relevant Council meetings.

During his career, he commanded various units in the Marines, including on operations in Chad and the Central African Republic. He was deputy defence attaché in the French Embassy in Washington DC during the 1991 Gulf War, then in 1996 became commander of French forces in the Antilles. After heading President Jacques Chirac's private military staff, he became chief of the French defence staff in October 2002.

He takes up his duties with a particularly full agenda for the EUMC. Besides ongoing operations, it will focus on the new perspectives in security policy and capabilities. And on 1 January 2007, the EU Battlegroups reach full operational strength and the infrastructures needed for the Operations Centre will have been completed, giving the EU additional capabilities. Discussions on a maritime dimension and rapid air response should make further military assets available to the EU in the coming months.

# > Clippings

FINANCIAL TIMES

## > Europe urged to cut armed forces

By George PARKER

Europe needs to start cutting its 2m-strong armed forces to take account of competition to recruit young people as the continent's population ages, according to a report expected to be endorsed by EU defence ministers tomorrow.

The report warns that personnel costs are likely to rise sharply by 2025, when the average European will be 45 years old and private sector employers will vie with the military to recruit from a dwindling pool of young people. It calls on European armed forces to outsource to the private sector, increase automation and eliminate excess capacity. "Do Europeans between them really need nearly 10,000 main battle tanks and nearly 3,000 combat aircraft?" asks the European Defence Agency, in a paper that examines the defence challenges in 20 years' time.

Javier Solana, the EU foreign policy chief, will describe the paper - drawn up with the help of Europe's military planners and foreign policy experts - as "a compass bearing to help us advance into the fog of the future".

The paper will be discussed by defence ministers at an informal meeting starting today in Levi, Finland, at which Europe's role in Darfur, Bosnia and the Democratic Republic of Congo will also be on the agenda.

The European Defence Agency was set up with the task of co-ordinating procurement among the EU's 25 separate armed forces and to try to tackle the duplication that makes the union such a weak military presence on the world stage.

The paper, seen by the FT, says Europeans should abandon the traditional concept of "victory" in their future military planning, and should build flexible forces able to deploy to trouble spots around the world. Joint European operations should in future be "expeditionary, multinational and multi-instrument", directed at achieving security and stability more than "victory".

It argues for heavy investment in IT and smartweapons to let European forces fight wars in which opponents shelter among civilian populations under the scrutiny of the world's media.

It says a proportionate and targeted military response with the backing of the United Nations will be crucial, and highlights "the increasing tendency to hold individuals responsible for their actions, not just at head of state or military commander level but down the command chain".

While Europe gets older, the paper warns that rapid population growth in Africa and the Middle East will pose the risk of instability on the continent's doorstep, especially if young people are without hope of a job.

Referring to Africa, the paper says: "The implications for despair, humanitarian disaster and migratory pressures are obvious."

"It will be more expensive to recruit and equip our armed forces in the future," said Nick Whitney, European Defence Agency chief executive. "They will have to be flexible enough to handle complex and sensitive operations."

BELGIQUE  
La Libre

## > Eufor, de Potsdam à N'Dolo

Par Dominique SIMONET

.../... Le principe de l'Eufor RD Congo est relativement simple. Le commandement opérationnel allemand est installé à Potsdam, près de Berlin, alors que le commandant tactique est français et basé à Kin (N'Dolo). Dans la capitale congolaise sont implantés les éléments avancés: la Légion étrangère espagnole, force de réaction rapide, est à N'Dolo, tandis qu'un bataillon aéroporté allemand, appuyé par des forces spéciales néerlandaises, est à N'Djili, tout comme les deux hélicoptères Gazelle des forces spéciales françaises, équipés notamment de missiles antichar TOW. En réserve "au-delà de l'horizon" à Libreville, au Gabon, se trouvent le bataillon aéroporté français ainsi que les avions de transport. Enfin, trois avions de combat français Mirage F-1 CR qu'on peut appeler à la rescousse sont basés à N'Djamena.

La mise en place de l'incroyable puzzle, (...) n'a pas été simple. Le général de corps aérien Karlheinz Viereck a dû prendre son bâton de pèlerin pour générer cette force. Le plus simple ne fut pas de rassembler des moyens aériens suffisants: des Hercules C-130 et des Transall C-160 viennent de sept nations différentes. Et si les Grecs amenaient un C-130, les Turcs, pourtant pas dans l'UE, voulaient en fournir un aussi... Il a fallu tenir compte des impératifs nationaux, notamment de la restriction allemande selon laquelle le personnel militaire, au Congo, ne peut travailler que dans Kinshasa et sa région. Ses deux Transall médicalisés ne peuvent circuler qu'entre Libreville et la capitale congolaise. Cette décision politique a été motivée notamment par une rumeur selon laquelle les militaires allemands risquaient de se trouver confrontés à des enfants soldats, ce qui, compte tenu du rayon d'action de l'Eufor, qui évite les provinces de l'est, n'était pas juste. Mais cela eut pour conséquence la mise à disposition du C-130 belge "Casevac" (Casualty evacuation), susceptible d'aller chercher des blessés partout dans le pays. Ceci n'est qu'un exemple; ce fut comme cela pour presque tout, sans empêcher l'Eufor RD Congo d'être pleinement opérationnelle la veille du premier tour des élections, le 29 juillet dernier.

À 35 km de Berlin, Potsdam a toujours attiré les rois, les princes, les célébrités et les militaires. La caserne Henning von Treskow, du nom d'un officier opposé au nazisme, a d'abord été une école de la Luftwaffe, avant d'abriter des éléments de l'Armée rouge soviétique, notamment les services de renseignement militaire russes. Récupéré par l'Armée populaire de la RDA, le site, depuis la réunification allemande, accueille le commandement territorial de la Bundeswehr, l'armée fédérale. Un destin.

.../...

DIE WELT.de

AP Associated Press

## > "Einer der erfolgreichsten Einsätze der Bundeswehr"

Das Verteidigungsministerium zieht eine positive Bilanz der Mission im Kongo. Die ersten Soldaten sind auf dem Flughafen Köln/Bonn eingetroffen.

Von Jens WIEGMANN

Die ersten Bundeswehrsoldaten sind nach vier Monaten von ihrem Kongo-Einsatz zurückgekehrt. Auf dem Flughafen Köln/Bonn trafen in der Nacht zum Sonntag etwa 100 Mann ein. Heute will Verteidigungsminister Franz Josef Jung weitere heimkehrende Soldaten bei ihrer Ankunft begrüßen und einige für besondere Verdienste auszeichnen. "Wir haben Wort gehalten: Unsere Soldaten werden Weihnachten wieder zu Hause bei ihren Familien sein", sagte Jung (CDU) WELT.de. Die Bundeswehr hatte 780 der 2000 Soldaten der EU-Truppe im Kongo (Eufor) gestellt.

Die Bundeswehr wertet die Mission als vollen Erfolg. Der Einsatz sei erfolgreich abgeschlossen worden und hervorragend gelaufen, heißt es aus dem Verteidigungsministerium. Eine umfassende Auswertung soll im Januar erfolgen. Die Zufriedenheit und Erleichterung bei der Truppe ist verständlich, denkt man an die Diskussionen vor der Bundstagsentscheidung für die Teilnahme an der Eufor-Mission Anfang Juni. Vor dem ersten Kampfeinsatz deutscher Soldaten in Afrika wurde befürchtet, sie könnten in einen Strudel der Gewalt geraten, möglicherweise auch im instabilen Osten des Landes. Niemand wollte sich ausmalen was passiert, wenn die europäischen Einheiten Kindersoldaten gegenüberstünden.

Zu einer Eskalation der Gewalt im Kongo ist es nicht gekommen. Die meisten Beobachter sehen dies als Verdienst der Eufor-Soldaten in der Hauptstadt Kinshasa und ihrer abschreckenden Präsenz. Für den Bundestagsabgeordneten Hartwig Fischer (CDU), Mitglied im Ausschuss für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung sowie im Menschenrechtsausschuss, ist das Kongo-Engagement der Deutschen "einer der erfolgreichsten Einsätze der Bundeswehr überhaupt". Er habe wesentlich zu einer neuen Chance für den Kongo beigetragen, Demokratie aufzubauen, sagte Fischer der WELT. Allerdings sei die Beteiligung an Eufor bereits der dritte Schritt Deutschlands an der Seite des Landes gewesen, nach Lufttransporten und medizinischer Betreuung im Rahmen der EU-Operation "Artemis" 2003 im Ostkongo und der Begleitung des Verfassungsprozesses. "Damit wurden erst die Voraussetzungen für die Wahlen in diesem Jahr geschaffen", sagte Fischer. Die Eufor sei dann bei ihrem Einsatz in den entscheidenden Momenten zur Stelle gewesen, die Koordination mit der UN-Truppe Monuc sei optimal gelaufen.

.../...

## > Head of EU-led Aceh peace mission predicts smooth transition when mission ends

By Foster KLUG

The head of the European Union-led peace monitoring mission in Indonesia's devastated Aceh province predicted on Thursday a smooth transition when the Europeans leave next month as former rebels rejoin society, participate in elections and negotiate directly with their former enemies in government.

Pieter Feith said both sides still could contact top EU officials to arbitrate any emergencies after the mission ends Dec. 15, but for the most part the success of enforcing last year's peace agreement would be up to the government in Jakarta and to the rebels, who fought a 29-year war that claimed 15,000 lives.

"The parties need to assume responsibility and ownership" of the peace process, Feith told an audience gathered at Johns Hopkins University's school of international studies. "It's important that a large, proud country like Indonesia" not be seen as having to rely on foreigners to solve its problems, he said.

The Europeans leave just after the Acehnese stage a Dec. 11 vote for governor and other local positions. The government is allowing former fighters to field candidates in the elections, which has been illegal in the past. Indonesia's ambassador to the United States, Sudjandnan Parnohadiningrat, told reporters Thursday that the elections are a source of pride for his country, after so many years of death and war. He said they will be a "showcase of how the Aceh peace settlement has borne fruit."

An EU mission, separate from the peace mission, will observe the elections, which Feith predicted would be calm. Still, more police will be brought in to prevent violence, he said.

Feith praised Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a former army general and the country's first directly elected leader, for his willingness to seek a peace agreement with the rebels, where other leaders had pushed for crushing the guerrillas militarily.

It appeared, the Dutch head of the EU mission said, that Jakarta had learned from its disastrous handling of the crisis in East Timor. That former Portuguese colony descended into violence in 1999, when East Timor broke from 24 years of brutal Indonesian rule, and revenge-seeking militia rampages left nearly 1,500 people dead.

"A refreshing new openness has emerged" in Indonesia, Feith said, which bodes well for Indonesia to improve its international reputation. Under terms of a peace agreement signed on Aug. 15, 2005, the army pulled more than 20,000 troops from Aceh, and the province was given control over 70 percent of its natural resources.

Feith said rebels were encouraged to publicly hand over their weapons, which were destroyed immediately. Simultaneously, thousands of Indonesian troops left Aceh in stages, giving both sides important psychological reassurances that peace was becoming a reality, Feith said, and encouraging rebels to rejoin society.

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
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