



ESDP newsletter

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

Issue 2 | June 2006

DR Congo: supporting transition

Interview

Aceh: innovative mission bolsters the peace process

Focus

Promoting a common security culture:
the European Security and Defence College





La politique européenne de sécurité et de défense (PESD) en un coup d'œil

Dans le cadre de la PESC, l'Union élabore une politique de sécurité commune, qui couvre l'ensemble des questions relatives à sa sécurité, y compris la définition progressive d'une politique de défense commune, qui pourrait conduire à une défense commune, si le Conseil européen en décide ainsi, sous réserve que les États membres adoptent une décision dans ce sens conformément à leurs exigences constitutionnelles respectives.

Parallèlement à la nomination de Javier Solana en tant que premier "Haut Représentant pour la PESC", le Conseil européen réuni à Cologne en juin 1999 a placé au cœur du renforcement de la PESC les missions de gestion des crises. Celles-ci incluent des missions humanitaires et d'évacuation, des missions de maintien de la paix et des missions de forces de combat pour la gestion des crises, y compris les missions de rétablissement de la paix.

Ce même Conseil européen a décidé que "l'Union doit disposer d'une capacité d'action autonome soutenue par des forces

militaires crédibles, avoir les moyens de décider d'y recourir et être prête à le faire afin de réagir face aux crises internationales, sans préjudice des actions entreprises par l'OTAN".

C'est sur cette base que des efforts soutenus ont abouti à la mise en place de structures politiques et militaires permanentes et à l'établissement de capacités civiles et militaires, y compris la formulation par l'UE d'un ensemble de concepts et de procédures en matière de gestion des crises. L'Union a également conclu des arrangements relatifs à la consultation et à la participation de pays tiers à la gestion des crises. L'Union a également défini avec l'OTAN le cadre des relations entre les deux organisations, qui comprend des arrangements permettant à l'Union de recourir aux moyens et capacités de l'OTAN.

L'Union européenne mène des opérations au titre de la Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense depuis 2003.

As we finalise this second issue of the *ESDP newsletter*, the European Union is about to launch its fourth military operation under the European Security and Defence Policy. This latest mission will support the UN force, MONUC, during the crucial electoral period in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

The DRC is a key country for the stability and development of the Great Lakes region and of Africa as a whole. Accordingly, it has been a major priority for the EU in recent years. The new operation will help to consolidate peace. The *newsletter* places the new mission in the context of the EU's strong, long-standing and multifaceted commitment to the DRC and its transition process.

In a similar spirit – supporting a peace process and helping a post-conflict transition – the EU is engaged alongside Asian and other partners in an innovative mission, the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), in Indonesia. Aceh has been ravaged by years of conflict and by the December 2004 tsunami. We talk to Pieter Feith, the Head of AMM, about how this mission is successfully supporting the peace process while also breaking new ground for future missions.



ESDP is about women and men who are or will be called upon to implement the policy. A new scheme, built as a network, is aimed at promoting a shared security culture: the European Security and Defence College. The *newsletter* looks at the College as it completes its 2005-06 academic year and shares in the experience of course participants, including those from non-EU countries

In this issue we also meet EU counter-terrorism coordinator Gijs de Vries, take stock of the EU-Russia partnership on security, and highlight significant new assets that will enhance the EU's operational capabilities: the EU Military Staff's Civil-Military Cell and EU battlegroups.


Your comments on the first issue of the *newsletter* tended to confirm that it was filling a gap. We will try to continue to follow developments in the rapidly expanding policy that is ESDP in as comprehensive and lively a way as possible. Please do not hesitate to continue to share your comments with us.



Civil-Military Cell 8



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Names and News

EU prepares for Kosovo mission

The EU is preparing for an enhanced role in Kosovo. In this context, the Council decided on 10 April to establish an EU planning team regarding a possible future EU crisis management operation in the field of rule of law and possible other areas in Kosovo.

The planning team – code-named EUPT Kosovo – has initiated planning to ensure a smooth transition between selected tasks of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and a possible EU crisis management operation in the field of rule of law and other areas that might be

identified by the Council in the context of the future Kosovo status process. It is also due to provide technical advice as necessary as an EU contribution in the context of UNMIK's plans for downsizing and transfer of competencies to the local institutions. The planning team's mandate runs until the end of this year.

Pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1244, a process to determine the future status of Kosovo was launched at the beginning of November 2005 with the appointment of the UN Status Envoy, Martti Ahtisaari.

The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Kosovo, Soren Jessen-Petersen, welcomed the EU's engagement in the discussions on the future international engagement in Kosovo. Kosovo's provisional institutions of self government also indicated that they welcomed the team to conduct contingency planning for a possible ESDP mission in the field of rule of law.

Since last year, the Council has been working on an enhanced EU role in Kosovo, on the basis of reports by the High Representative and the Commission. The rule of law and police have been identified as priority areas.

Getting assistance quickly where it is needed

The EU is making concrete progress on the use of military assets for emergency and crisis response. On 15 May, EU foreign ministers, welcoming HR Solana's proposals to improve the EU's ability to respond to disasters and the coordination of transport for relief efforts, agreed on practical steps for the use of Member States' military or military-chartered transportation assets and ESDP coordination tools in support of EU disaster response.

Helping citizens in an emergency, crisis or disaster, whether natural or man-made, requires effective delivery of assistance where and when it is needed. In certain cases, Member States are able to offer assistance (notably through EU mechanisms) to respond to an emergency or natural disaster, but have no transport to bring it where it is needed. To this end, the Council decided to put in place effective procedures at EU level for identifying potentially available military or military chartered transport capacities, and for coordinating their use as supplementary means when circumstances so warrant.

In order to complement civilian means of transport already available through existing mechanisms, Member States may decide to make available, on a



Floods in Cambodia

voluntary basis, military-owned strategic air- and sea-lift capabilities when such capabilities are available, as well as military-chartered civilian strategic lift capabilities, in particular under the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS), as already decided by one Member State.

Detailed procedures to identify potential military-owned or military-chartered assets will ensure a more rapid match between transport needs with available military transportation capabilities. These procedures will include direct links with duty desks in Ministries of Defence manned 24/7, as well as with the main European air- and sea-lift coordination centres in Eindhoven and Athens. This will ensure better coordination of the use of available assets. Procedures will also be put in place between the Council Secretariat and the Commission to exchange information rapidly on needs and available transportation means which will ensure effective mobilisation. (see article on the civ-mil cell, page 7).

Names and News

La Force de gendarmerie européenne prend son essor

Le Quartier général de la Force de gendarmerie européenne a été inauguré le 23 janvier 2006 à Vicence (Vicenza), Italie.

Initiative de cinq pays, l'Espagne, la France, l'Italie, les Pays-Bas et le Portugal, dotés de forces de gendarmerie, la Force européenne de gendarmerie (FGE) vise à renforcer les capacités internationales de gestion des crises. Evoquée pour la première fois par la France à l'occasion d'une réunion des ministres de la défense de l'Union européenne à Rome à l'automne 2003, l'initiative a débouché le 17 septembre 2004 sur la signature entre les cinq pays fondateurs d'une déclaration d'intention.

Le général de gendarmerie Gérard Deanaz a été nommé premier commandant de la FGE en janvier 2005. Des premiers exercices se sont déroulés à Vicence en avril puis à Saint-Astier (France) en juin 2005 et à Valdemoro (Espagne) en avril 2006.

La FGE possède une capacité initiale de réponse rapide d'environ 800 personnes sous un délai de 30 jours. Les forces participantes sont la *Guardia Civil* espagnole, la Gendarmerie nationale française, l'*Arma dei Carabinieri* italienne, la *Maréchaussée royale* des Pays-Bas et la *Guarda Nacional Republicana* portugaise. L'Etat-major de la force, situé à Vicence, est composé d'un noyau permanent de 30 personnes.



Dans les opérations de gestion de crises, la FGE viendra assurer une présence effective aux côtés d'autres acteurs y compris de composantes militaires et aux côtés de la police locale. Tout ceci pour faciliter la réactivation des moyens de sécurité, en particulier lors de la transition entre les volets militaire et civil.

Les unités de la FGE pourront être placées soit dans une chaîne de commandement militaire soit aux ordres d'une autorité civile, afin de garantir les missions de sécurité publique, d'ordre public et de police judiciaire. La FGE doit pouvoir couvrir tous les aspects d'une opération de réponse à la crise, dans les phases initiale, de transition et de désengagement militaire, ainsi qu'être employée en prévention d'une crise. La FGE sera mise à disposition, en priorité, au profit de l'Union européenne.

A l'occasion de l'inauguration du QG de la FGE, le Haut Représentant Javier Solana a salué les efforts des pays fondateurs et souligné que cette force s'inscrivait dans la perspective d'une Europe mieux à même de faire face aux crises et qu'elle était donc un atout pour la Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense. Il a souhaité beaucoup de succès à la Force de gendarmerie européenne et à son Quartier général.

www.eurogendfor.org

Nominations à venir

Les chefs d'état-major des Etats membres de l'UE, lors de leur réunion du 11 mai dernier, ont décidé de recommander au Conseil de nommer le Général Henri Bentégeat, chef d'état-major des armées françaises, comme prochain président du Comité militaire de l'UE, pour succéder à l'actuel président, le Général Rolando Mosca-Moschini, en novembre 2006. Les ministres, lors de la session du Conseil "Affaires générales et relations extérieures" du 15 mai, se sont félicités de ce choix et ont noté que la décision formelle sera prise lors d'une prochaine session du Conseil.

Ils se sont également félicités de l'avis favorable donné par les chefs d'état-major au Haut représentant Solana concernant la nomination du Général David Leakey comme prochain Directeur-Général de l'Etat-Major de l'UE à partir du 1er mars 2007, à l'issue du mandat du Général Jean-Paul Perruche. Le Général Leakey a dirigé la force de l'UE en Bosnie-Herzégovine en 2004-2005.



A gauche, le Général Rolando Mosca-Moschini, à droite, le Général Jean-Paul Perruche



Général Henri Bentégeat



Général David Leakey



EU Border Assistance Mission in Rafah

Working for anticipation and coherence: The Civil-Military Cell of the EU Military Staff (EUMS)

The establishment of the Civil-Military Cell within the EU Military Staff is a further step in the EU's effort to enhance its capacity for crisis management planning and achieve greater coherence of the civilian and military instruments and structures at its disposal in responding to crises. The Cell is aimed at enhancing the EUMS' capacity to conduct early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning and at ensuring coordination between civilian and military means. It has already been active in the planning of and support to a number of civilian ESDP operations. It can also be tasked to generate the capacity to plan and run an autonomous EU operation.

On 10 and 11 February this year, rare torrential rains in the deserts around Tindouf in Algeria caused severe flooding in three of five Sahrawi refugee camps, destroying nearly 50 percent of the refugees' shelters and leaving, according to initial estimates, some 50,000 refugees homeless. Subsequently, OCHA (the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) sent a request to the MIC (Monitoring and Information Centre of the European Commission) for fixed-wing strategic airlift to move 2,000 tents from Amman, Jordan, to Tindouf.

This is the normal route for messages related to disaster response management to be transmitted to the European Union. The MIC passed further requests through the EU's Joint Sitcen (Situation Centre) to the EU Military Staff, whose Civil-Military Cell set about assisting in the coordination of a response from the EU.

As the response developed, several Member States were involved in the process of checking the availability of additional aircraft. As a result, flights by C-130 aircraft were provided on short notice, which met the transport requirements, and the EU proved to be able to react rapidly and add real value, through military means, to the efforts of the international community and responsible civilian agencies to assist in disaster relief.

This incident highlights just one of the roles played by what is a relatively new establishment: **the Civil-Military Cell within the EU Military Staff**. Set up in 2005, the "Civ/Mil Cell" has been designed to boost Europe's crisis management capabilities through the provision of joint civil-military planning and operation capacities.



General Jean-Paul Perruche, Director-General of the EU Military Staff



General Heinrich Brauss, Head of Civ/Mil Cell, meeting EUPOL Kinshasa Head of mission Superintendent Aldo Custódio



Civ/Mil staff in a UN helicopter making an aerial recce over Kinshasa

Whenever the EU conducts autonomous military operations (as distinct from those, such as Operation ALTHEA, whereby collective NATO assets and capabilities are made available of under the so-called "Berlin plus" arrangements), the recourse until now has been to utilise a Member State's national headquarters, which will then be multi-nationalised for the purpose of conducting an EU-led military operation. This is what happened during the EU's deployment to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2003, in Operation "ARTEMIS", where the EU, with France in the lead, together with help from some other Member States, provided a military force of some 1,500 soldiers as well as the Operation and Force Headquarters. And this is also what is happening currently as the EU is preparing an autonomous military operation in support of the UN's MONUC in the DRC during the electoral period in summer this year. Nevertheless, in certain cases, in particular where a joint civil/military response to a crisis is required, the Civ/Mil Cell could generate the capacity to plan and run the operation. This would entail the setting up of an Operations Centre, after a decision by the EU Council.

But this is only one of the roles of this new entity which has evolved as a natural result of what has been articulated in the European Security Strategy (ESS), which advocates greater coherence and recognises the need for a more active approach in pursuit of the EU's strategic objectives. The implication from the ESS is that the EU should:

- make optimal use of all the civilian and military instruments at its disposal;
- incline towards anticipatory, rather than reactive, action and should not only aim to respond to crises but rather better to identify potential instability before it deteriorates, and thus manage potential crisis situations;
- be able to respond timely and rapidly to a crisis in order to settle it before it can escalate;
- provide consistency, across the various levels of command, in terms of both planning and implementation of suitable means that should complement each other in a coherent way throughout the entire crisis management process, from conflict prevention and crisis resolution to cessation of conflicts and post-conflict stabilisation.

In order to implement such a proactive approach, of identifying opportunities and acting in anticipation of crises, the time factor is crucial. The key to unlocking this necessary time is prudent advance planning.

The more of this planning that can be undertaken before there is a formal decision by the EU to take action, the greater flexibility there will be to reduce the length of time to action – which is something of particular importance for rapid response.

The better the EU's civilian and military means are coordinated both during the planning and implementation phase and tailored to the complexity of a particular crisis, the more effective the response will be.

In order to contribute to achieving these objectives that the Civ/Mil Cell is made up of two entities: the Strategic Planning Branch and the EU Ops Centre Permanent Staff.

- The Strategic Planning Branch, made up of eight military and seven civilian planners, including two colleagues from the Commission, undertakes strategic contingency planning. Such prudent advance planning will be developed for possible missions/operations, taking account of the EU's strategic objectives, including strategic options for the various instruments and outline resource requirements. It is undertaken at the initiative of SG/HR Solana or the Political and Security Committee. The aim of this planning is to enhance the EU's capacity for rapid action although it will not prejudice the ultimate political decision, to be taken by the Council of the European Union, to proceed with an option.
- Once the EU has decided to respond to a specific crisis and to launch a mission, the Cell provides assistance to crisis response strategic planning for single-strand operations, civilian or military, carried out under the responsibility of the appropriate Secretariat service, in particular in the context of previously undertaken strategic contingency planning.
- The Operations Centre Permanent Staff, as shown earlier, is responsible for generating and maintaining the inherent capacity to plan and run an autonomous EU operation — in particular where a joint civilian/military response is required and where no national HQ is identified. The permanent staff forms the key nucleus of the EU Ops Centre that will be activated upon a Council decision. An initial operating capability, that is the ability to plan, has to be achieved within five days by using the key nucleus reinforced by essentially 'double-hatted' staff from the Military Staff. Full operational capability, that is the ability to plan and operate, will be reached within 20 days of activation with further reinforcement of pre-identified personnel from our civilian counterparts within the Secretariat and from Member States.

In addition, the Civ/Mil Cell fulfils another invaluable task which is the provision of assistance in civilian operations, carried out under civilian authority, ranging from planning and support to the conduct of operations. The most recent and direct examples are the planning and mission support provided to the EU-led Aceh Monitoring Mission and to the EU Border Assistance Mission in Rafah in the Palestinian Territories.

To sum up, the Civ/Mil Cell is a unique combination of expertise, drawing experienced planners from both military and civilian sources, including the European Commission. It is proving itself to be an effective new apparatus in the toolbox of instruments available to the EU. Its role is very much a 'system integrator', a facilitating entity to link the inputs from across the EU and, whilst avoiding unnecessary duplication, to pull the individual expert strands of work together in order to produce a more coherent and comprehensive product. It is here, in facilitating comprehensive contingency planning in focused anticipation of potential crisis situations and identified opportunities to pursue EU strategic objectives, that the Civ/Mil Cell can bring the most added value to comprehensive crisis management.

It is anticipated that its work will lead to a greater coherence between the civilian and military structures — within the General Secretariat of the Council and between it and the European Commission. With such a coherent approach, the identification of the most appropriate assets to generate the necessary effect should enable a more systematic use of assets and so reduce duplications, overheads and, in the medium term, contribute to increased capability. Ergo, a more capable EU will be enabled by more coherence. The Civ/Mil Cell is a key player in this regard.

La Cellule civilo-militaire de l'Etat-major de l'UE

En 2005, afin d'améliorer ses capacités en matière de gestion des crises, l'Union européenne crée la Cellule civilo-militaire. Intégrée à l'Etat-major de l'UE (EMUE), cet outil effectue une série de tâches de planification et de soutien aux opérations. Il est également chargé d'être en mesure de générer, le cas échéant, les capacités pour la planification et la conduite d'opérations autonomes de l'UE (Centre d'opérations).

Au sein de cet organe permanent, un élément de planification stratégique anticipe de manière régulière les événements, contribue à renforcer les capacités de l'Etat-major en matière d'alerte précoce et mène des travaux de planification en cas d'imprévu. De son côté, le personnel permanent du Centre d'opérations est chargé de maintenir la capacité de générer les moyens de planifier et de conduire des opérations autonomes au cas où le Conseil de l'UE le déciderait.

La cellule fournit également une assistance dans le cadre d'opérations civiles menées par l'Union dans le cadre de la PESD, comme les missions à Aceh ou à Rafah.

Conçue comme un «intégrateur système», la Cellule civilo-militaire vise à garantir, face aux crises, une meilleure coordination entre les outils et les structures civils et militaires de l'UE. Cet organe concrétise la volonté, affirmée par la Stratégie européenne de sécurité, d'adopter une approche plus proactive et plus cohérente pour les actions extérieures d'une Union européenne qui a pour objectif d'être un acteur mondial.

ESDP Training: The European Security and Defence College

COLLEGE FINALISES 2005/2006 ACADEMIC YEAR



Sharing and promoting a common culture among the personnel concerned in the EU is an important objective for ESDP. An innovative scheme is addressing this aim: the European Security and Defence College. As the College completes its 2005-06 academic year, we look at its functioning and at how it also includes participants from third countries.

In mid-July 2005, the EU Council established the European Security and Defence College (ESDC). The ESDC consists of a network of national institutes, colleges, academies and institutions within the EU that deal with security and defence policy issues. The mission of the college is to provide training in the field of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) at all strategic levels. Among its principal objectives are to “further enhance the European security culture within ESDP” and to “provide Member States’ administrations and staff with knowledgeable personnel familiar with EU policies, institutions and procedures”.

The ESDC organises its training activities into two types of courses: ESDP high-level courses (HLC) and ESDP orientation courses (OC). In addition, an internet-based advanced distance-learning system is being developed to support the College’s training activities. Participants in the ESDC training activities are usually military or civilian personnel working for EU Member States, acceding States or the EU institutions on ESDP issues. Specific orientation courses may also be open to participants from third states and international organisations.

During the 2005/06 high-level course, five residential modules were organised between September 2005 and March 2006. Approximately 60 students from EU Member States, acceding States, the European Parliament, the General Secretariat of the Council, and the European Commission took part in the course. During each of the sequential modules – held in Brussels, Berlin, Shrivenham (UK), Vienna/Budapest and Stockholm – participants were exposed to specific components of the HLC curriculum:

- *Module 1* - History and context of ESDP
- *Module 2* - ESDP civilian and military capabilities
- *Module 3* - ESDP crisis-management operations
- *Module 4* - ESDP in a regional context
- *Module 5* - Future perspectives of ESDP

The modules relied on a combination of lectures, syndicate/group work, exercises, and site visits to meet curriculum objectives. For example, during module 3, held in

Shrivenham, participants visited the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) in Northwood where they received briefings on how the PJHQ is prepared to support a non-UK led battlegroup in the field. During module 5, held in Stockholm, two exercises were incorporated to give participants an opportunity to apply their knowledge in small group settings. In one of the exercises, participants were asked to analyse potential EU action in an evolving international crisis situation focusing on political-military level issues. Concluding the exercise, a simulated Political and Security Committee (PSC) meeting was held to review options and decisions. The 2005/06 high-level course ended on 17 March 2006. The Secretary-General of the Council of the EU/High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, attended the graduation ceremony and handed out course certificates.

With respect to orientation courses, the first regular ESDP orientation course was held in Brussels under the Luxembourg Presidency in February 2005. Since then, four additional orientation courses have been organised – three in Brussels and one in Vilnius. Roughly 330 students have participated in the regular orientation courses held to date. These courses have hosted a variety of participants. For example, the orientation course arranged by the Austrian Presidency on 20-24 February 2006 was the first course open to participants from candidate countries, third states and international organisations. The orientation course held in Vilnius on 20-24 March 2006 placed the emphasis on participants from the EU’s eastern neighbourhood.

In spite of varying audiences, the orientation courses follow a standard format that focus on lectures and panel discussions. The main areas covered during these courses are: the EU institutional framework and EU treaties; civilian aspects and instruments of ESDP; the military structures of the EU; capability development; EU external relations; concepts and operations; and future perspectives of ESDP. Examples of specific components discussed include the European Security Strategy and EU-NATO relations. The last orientation course for the academic year 2005/06 was held in Brussels on 29 May-2 June 2006.

These orientation courses are presented in greater detail in this issue of the newsletter in an article by the Austrian presidency.

PROMOTING A SHARED SECURITY CULTURE: ESDP COURSES OPENED UP FOR NON-EU COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

by Jochen Rehr and Irene Terpetschnig

Jochen Rehr is political adviser at the Austrian Military Representation in Brussels



Irene Terpetschnig is also working at the Austrian Military Representation



A common identity is of major importance for a strong Europe. Within the EU, this idea has been implemented symbolically by the European flag, the European anthem, Europe Day on 9 May and the motto "Unity in diversity".

In the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and in particular the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), it is important to strengthen a common security culture. In this regard, the development of common training plays a major role. It goes back to a Greek initiative in 2002: the aim was to establish training on a European level in order to prepare civilian and military personnel from EU Member States and EU institutions for their tasks in the field of ESDP.

In 2003, the first ESDP orientation course was organised in Brussels. The results were convincing and such orientation courses were regularly organised thereafter and very often supported by the successive EU presidencies. The fundamental aim was to provide participants with a basic knowledge of ESDP and to enhance professional contacts in order to contribute to the development of a common security culture.

Finally, in 2005, EU training policy in the area of ESDP achieved a qualitative leap with the establishment of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC), a network between national institutes, colleges, academies and institutions within the EU dealing with security and defence policy issues. This virtual college is primarily responsible for the conduct of ESDP orientation courses, which target the audience of "ESDP newcomers", and ESDP high-level courses, which focus on the

target group of "strategic leaders". Other ESDP courses can be put under the ESDC umbrella, if so wished and agreed by Member States.

Thanks to the establishment of discussion fora within the ESDC such as the steering committee – which is composed of one representative per Member State and is responsible for the overall coordination and direction of ESDC training activities – the idea was brought up to open ESDP orientation courses to candidate countries and third states. The idea was warmly welcomed by the countries represented in the committee, however, a host nation still had to be found.

As it was Austria's intention to place special emphasis on the Western Balkan states during its presidency, it was decided in November 2005 to organise the first orientation course open to candidate countries, third states and international organisations in February 2006, as well as an orientation course in May/June 2006 open specifically to participants from Western Balkan states.

The idea behind the opening of the course was to promote a better understanding of ESDP as an essential part of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy and to enhance transparency, thus contributing to the development of a common security culture. Moreover, the open course was meant to allow participants from different countries and organisations to visit relevant EU institutions and to meet and network with representatives from other countries or organisations in order to enhance mutual understanding and to foster an interesting exchange of views.

First impressions from course participants



Wael Al-Assad
League of Arab States

"I think this course is very important for diplomats from outside the EU membership to introduce them to the processes and mechanisms of the EU in the area of ESDP, and to make them understand the principles and visions of the strategy as well as the policies associated with this strategy, particularly when it comes to policies directed towards other regions, and to provide transparency."



Maria Metcalf
USA

"It is clear that ESDP is evolving quite quickly. I am glad that the Austrian presidency took the initiative and time to ensure that candidate and third countries better understand the role of ESDP in CFSP and the direction that the EU envisions for ESDP. I found the course useful – I learned a lot about the various areas of ESDP, the institutions and the decision-making processes."

Promouvoir une culture commune en matière de sécurité

D'abord imaginé à l'initiative de la Grèce en 2002 et ensuite soutenu par les présidences successives de l'Union européenne, le Collège européen de sécurité et de défense (CESD) a été officiellement établi en 2005 dans le but de promouvoir et de consolider une culture commune au sein de l'UE en matière de Politique étrangère et de sécurité commune (PESC) et, plus particulièrement, de Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense (PESD).

Ce collège virtuel, qui regroupe des instituts nationaux, des académies et des institutions européennes travaillant sur les questions de sécurité et de défense, organise également des cours de sensibilisation à la PESD pour les nouveaux Etats membres et des cours de haut niveau à destination des décideurs stratégiques.

Afin de promouvoir une meilleure compréhension de la PESD hors de l'UE, trois sessions ouvertes à des participants des pays candidats à l'adhésion à l'Union, des Etats tiers ainsi que des organisations internationales ont été organisées en février, mars et mai 2006.

The first orientation course, which took place from 20 to 24 February 2006 in Brussels, was attended by 57 participants from around 50 different countries. They were welcomed in an opening ceremony in the EU Council's Justus Lipsius building by the Austrian representative in the EU Political and Security Committee, Ambassador Franz-Josef Kuglitsch, the Austrian military representative to the EU and NATO, Major General Wolfgang Jilke, and course director Dr. Jochen Rehr. The Austrian Federal Minister of Defence, Günther Platter, underlined in his welcoming video address the important added value of the participation of third states and international organisations.

The course programme started with a basic introduction to the EU institutional framework and gave an insight into the European Security Strategy. The lectures and panel discussions which followed focused on civilian and military crisis management structures, capability development and decision-making processes. Other important issues addressed during the course were the EU's external relations as well as civilian and military operations, including gender issues. The opportunity for participants to assist in an EU Military Committee meeting and the fact that High Representative Javier Solana himself addressed the course certainly constituted highlights.

All the lectures and panel discussions were held by highly experienced speakers, to a considerable extent from the Council General Secretariat and the Austrian Presidency, but also from the European Commission, the European Parliament or the Belgian Royal Institute for International Relations. The course ended with a solemn closing ceremony where participants received a certificate signed by the High Representative for the CFSP.

Asked for their opinion on the course, participants stressed the excellent opportunity the course provided for diplomats from inside and outside the EU to gain a thorough knowledge and understanding of ESDP. They also underlined the importance of the platform it provided for people from various countries and structures to get together and establish close contacts.

Two more courses were open for participation of third states during the Austrian presidency. The second, hosted by Lithuania and supported by France, took place in Vilnius at the end of March and put the emphasis on Eastern Europe. The third course was also hosted by the Austrian presidency and was held in Brussels at the end of May. It aimed specifically at giving representatives from the Western Balkan states the opportunity to participate in the course.

First impressions from course participants



Victor Borisenko

Russian Federation

"The ESDP orientation course has certainly been extremely useful to me because it allowed me to get a clear picture of what ESDP is and who the main actors are. But what is most valuable about the course is that it provides an excellent opportunity from various countries and structures to get together and establish close contacts."



Agneza Rusi

former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia

"My country used to be a recipient of ESDP, having hosted the first military EU mission on its territory (Concordia) as well as an advisory police mission. In December 2005, it was granted the status of a candidate country for EU membership and as such has pledged its commitment to contribute to the development of the European Security and Defence Policy. The ESDP orientation course will be very useful for further preparing the Macedonian administration and relevant national structures for future participation in the ESDP."

Coordonner la lutte contre le terrorisme

La lutte contre le terrorisme est devenue, surtout depuis le 11 septembre 2001, une des priorités majeures de l'Union européenne, sur le plan intérieur comme sur le plan des relations extérieures. Elle constitue également un élément clé de la Stratégie européenne de sécurité. Depuis mars 2004, Gijs de Vries est le coordinateur de la politique antiterroriste de l'Union européenne. Nommé par Javier Solana au lendemain des attentats de Madrid, il insiste sur le fait que la lutte contre le terrorisme ne doit jamais se faire au détriment des droits de l'homme: "Les droits de l'homme sont un élément essentiel pour gagner la bataille contre le terrorisme".

Gijs de Vries est chargé de coordonner le travail des différentes formations du Conseil dans la lutte contre le terrorisme. Il veille aussi à avoir une vue d'ensemble de tous les instruments dont dispose l'Union, à suivre la mise en œuvre du plan d'action de l'UE pour la lutte contre le terrorisme et à assurer la visibilité des politiques de l'Union dans ce domaine.

Gijs de Vries souligne que la lutte contre le terrorisme relève en premier lieu de la responsabilité des gouvernements nationaux. Leurs forces de police, leurs services de renseignement et leurs autorités judiciaires en sont les instruments opérationnels. Le rôle de l'UE consiste à soutenir les Etats en facilitant l'échange d'information et la coopération opérationnelle transfrontalière et en mettant en place un cadre législatif commun ainsi qu'un ensemble commun de relations avec les partenaires externes de l'UE.

Depuis les attentats aux Etats-Unis en septembre 2001 et à Madrid en mars 2004, le rôle de l'UE dans la lutte contre le terrorisme s'est accru. Par exemple, beaucoup d'extraditions de criminels présumés y compris de terroristes ont été effectuées sur la base du mandat d'arrêt européen (729 extraditions en 2004). Un centre conjoint d'analyse de la menace (Sitcen) rassemblant des experts des services de sécurité et de renseignement a été établi à Bruxelles. Suite à l'adoption de normes européennes, la sécurité de nos ports et aéroports a été améliorée et la sécurité de nos passeports sera renforcée. Pour ce qui est des relations extérieures, l'UE a conclu quatre accords de coopération avec les Etats-Unis et elle coordonne l'assistance technique à des Etats comme l'Algérie, le Maroc, l'Indonésie et d'autres partenaires.

Pour Gijs de Vries, il est crucial de veiller à ce que la lutte contre le terrorisme ne mène pas à stigmatiser une quelconque communauté. Il rejette en effet fortement la thèse du "choc des civilisations". Il souligne l'importance de promouvoir le

respect basé sur les valeurs universelles, la tolérance, le dialogue entre les religions et entre les cultures et la pleine participation de tous à la société. Il note également que la lutte contre le terrorisme doit se faire sur la base de nos valeurs communes: "Les mesures que nous prenons pour lutter contre le terrorisme doivent être conformes aux droits et aux valeurs que nous nous sommes engagés à défendre, y compris les droits des détenus."

Gijs de Vries sait que nous restons vulnérables et que la sécurité absolue n'existe pas. Néanmoins, il demeure optimiste: "La liberté et la démocratie sont plus fortes que la peur et la tyrannie."



L'un des enseignements des attentats de Madrid et de Londres n'est-il pas que chaque victime d'actes terroristes – peu importe le lieu où l'acte a été commis – est désormais une victime européenne? A chaque fois qu'un Etat Membre de l'Union est victime d'un acte terroriste, c'est aussi l'Union en tant que telle qui est frappée.

Coordinating the fight against terrorism

In March 2004, a few days after the Madrid attacks, Javier Solana designated Gijs de Vries coordinator of the EU's anti-terrorist policy. De Vries says that while fighting terrorism is, first and foremost, the responsibility of national governments with their police forces, intelligence services and legal authorities, the EU supports them by facilitating the exchange of information as well as co-operation among Member States and with external partners, and by putting in place a common legal framework. In any case, he asserts, "Every time a Member State becomes a victim of terrorism, it is also the Union itself that is attacked."

Significant progress has been achieved in recent years. De Vries cites examples such as the European arrest warrant and safer ports and airports. Crucially, de Vries rejects the 'clash of civilisations' scenario, stressing respect, tolerance and dialogue between religions and cultures. "Measures taken in the fight against terrorism", he says, "must be in conformity with the rights and values that we defend, including the rights of detainees."

Absolute safety does not exist, de Vries admits, but he adds, "Freedom and democracy are stronger than fear and tyranny."

ESDP in the Democratic Republic of Congo: supporting transition

The peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo provides a chance for a better future. It is, above all, the responsibility of the Congolese people, with the support of their neighbours and African partners, to seize this chance. But the European Union has a longstanding commitment to supporting this process and is enhancing its support on the occasion of the elections.

The new EU military operation in support of MONUC during the election period will build on this trend and will be part of the EU's comprehensive approach to the DRC.



Visit of High Representative Javier Solana to Bunia (DR Congo)

Following a request by the United Nations, the Council of the European Union has decided in April 2006 to launch an autonomous EU military operation – codenamed EUFOR DRC – in order to support the UN peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) during the electoral period. This will be the fourth ESDP operation in the DRC. In June-August 2003, Artemis was deployed in Ituri (in the North-East of DRC) and was the first autonomous military operation of the European Union; in 2005, two operations were launched in order to reform the Congolese police in Kinshasa (EUPOL) and the Congolese army (EUSEC).

These operations have been launched in support of the peace process in the DRC, which started in 2003. The transitional period (2003-2006) aimed at stabilising the DRC while alleviating the suffering of the civilian population. Thirty years of the Mobutu regime and two regional and civil wars (1996-97 and 1998-2002) led to massive human rights abuses by armed elements from both regular and rebel forces. The state apparatus was virtually dismantled.

Although on a relatively small scale, the ESDP operations have been well targeted and have successfully implemented their mandate, either by protecting civilians and improving regional stabilisation (Artemis) or by contributing to security sector reform (EUPOL and EUSEC). Beyond their impact on the Congolese situation, they also underline synergies with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Hence, these operations are a good example of the “effective multilateralism” approach as outlined in the European Security Strategy.

Short and sharp: Artemis

Artemis constitutes a good example of fruitful co-operation between the European Union and the United Nations that could be replicated with the forthcoming EUFOR DR Congo operation. When Artemis was deployed in June 2003 in the Ituri region, MONUC was at pains to ensure stability. Major human rights abuses and ethnic cleansing were occurring in Ituri, and MONUC did not have the military capabilities and mandate to put to an end this violence. As a bridging operation, Artemis provided a respite for MONUC. Artemis brought violence in Bunia, the main town of Ituri, to an end. Moreover, Artemis contributed significantly to containing violence outside of Bunia: air monitoring hindered supplies of weapons, while limited but effectively targeted operations on the outskirts of Bunia reduced the brutal activities of the Ituri armed groups. In the meantime, MONUC had its mandate adapted and benefited from an additional brigade to handle the Ituri situation.



High Representative Javier Solana and EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Aldo Ajello

Small but efficient: the impact of EUPOL and EUSEC

EUPOL Kinshasa was launched in April 2005 in order to “monitor, mentor, and advise the Integrated Police Unit (IPU)”. Thirty staff from the European Union have been deployed in Kinshasa with a budget of 4.37 million euros. The IPU was created in order to secure the transitional institutions and assure the protection of the leaders of the former warring parties in Kinshasa. The IPU includes 1,008 staff, who were selected by the parties. As distrust prevailed among these, the IPU has played a major role in the confidence-building process in Kinshasa. An efficient training programme was completed before the first two years of the Congolese transition process ended in June 2005. As various political parties contested a one-year extension of the transition, major demonstrations were triggered off in Kinshasa in June and July 2005. Numerous observers then commended the role of IPU in managing these demonstrations without resorting to violence.

Only nine-staff strong, with a budget of 1.6 million euros, EUSEC RD Congo is promoting security sector reform in the Congolese army. The mission provides advice and assistance with the aim of contributing to a successful integration of the Congolese army. In the framework of the mission, experts are assigned to key posts within the Congolese administration. One key project addresses the chain of payments. In the past, the pay of “ghost soldiers” had been embezzled. By eventually being able to impose a proper chain-of-payment programme, EUSEC has been able to ensure that Congolese soldiers actually receive their wages. Hence, EUSEC provides a template for a targeted approach to this issue in future missions.

La PESD en République démocratique du Congo: soutien à la transition

Le Conseil de l'UE a décidé en avril 2006, dans le cadre de la PESD, de mener une opération militaire d'appui à la MONUC pendant la période électorale.

L'opération militaire, dénommée « EUFOR RD Congo », comportera des éléments avancés à Kinshasa ainsi qu'une force en attente stationnée hors du pays mais rapidement déployable si nécessaire.

EUFOR RD Congo s'inscrit dans un engagement européen constant en faveur de la transition en RDC. L'opération Artemis, les missions EUPOL Kinshasa et EUSEC R.D. Congo sont des exemples concrets de l'action de l'UE en vue de soutenir la stabilité et la transition dans le pays ainsi que d'une coopération étroite et active entre l'UE et l'ONU en matière de gestion des crises.



Opération militaire de l'UE d'appui à la MONUC pendant la période électorale en RD Congo

Le Conseil de l'UE a adopté le 27 avril une Action commune (base juridique et cadre de l'opération pour l'UE) sur une opération de l'Union européenne d'appui à la Mission des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo (MONUC) pendant la période électorale.

L'opération militaire sera conduite en plein accord avec les autorités de République démocratique du Congo (RDC) et en étroite coopération avec elles et avec la MONUC. Cette opération autonome sous la direction de l'UE sera menée dans le cadre de la Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense (PESD). "L'Union est déterminée à soutenir le processus électoral et le peuple congolais en ce moment historique pour la transition", a déclaré le Haut Représentant Javier Solana. "Le soutien que nous apportons maintenant contribuera à asseoir la paix en RDC et dans la région après des années de conflit."

Le Conseil a nommé le Général de corps d'armée Karlheinz Viereck (Allemagne) commandant de l'opération de l'UE et le Général de division Christian Damay (France) commandant de la force de l'UE.

L'opération envisagée:

L'opération militaire, dénommée "EUFOR RD Congo", sera déployée conformément au mandat figurant dans la résolution 1671 (2006) du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies adoptée unanimement le 25 avril. Elle comportera:

- le déploiement d'un élément avancé à Kinshasa de plusieurs centaines de militaires;
- la disponibilité d'une force en attente, de la dimension d'un bataillon, située "au-delà de l'horizon" hors du pays, mais rapidement déployable si nécessaire. Cette force sera prête à être déployée sur décision de l'UE.

Selon les termes du mandat du Conseil de sécurité, EUFOR RD Congo assurera les tâches suivantes:

- apporter son soutien à la MONUC pour stabiliser une situation, au cas où la MONUC rencontrerait de graves difficultés pour s'acquitter de son mandat dans la limite de ses capacités existantes;
- contribuer à la protection des civils exposés à la menace imminente de violences physiques dans les zones où elle sera déployée, et sans préjudice de la responsabilité du Gouvernement de la République démocratique du Congo;
- contribuer à la protection de l'aéroport à Kinshasa;
- assurer la sécurité et la liberté de mouvement du personnel ainsi que la protection des installations d'EUFOR RD Congo;
- effectuer des opérations de caractère limité, afin d'extraire des individus en danger.

EUFOR RD Congo sera déployée en RDC pour une période s'achevant quatre mois après la date du premier tour des élections présidentielles et législatives, fixée au 30 juillet.

Le Conseil avait approuvé le concept d'une telle opération le 23 mars, suite à une demande de l'ONU. La planification d'un soutien renforcé en matière de police par le biais d'EUROPOL Kinshasa sera également poursuivie.

La mission sera réellement européenne et multinationale, de nombreux Etats Membres ayant exprimé leur disposition à participer, plusieurs d'entre eux en fournissant des troupes.

Le Comité Politique et de sécurité (COPS) assurera l'orientation politique et la direction stratégique de l'opération.

Le processus électoral

Le 27 février 2006, les ministres des Affaires étrangères de l'UE ont rappelé l'importance d'achever le processus de transition en RDC, qui est également essentiel pour favoriser la paix et la stabilité à travers la région des Grands Lacs. Ils ont noté que le succès du référendum des 18-19 décembre 2005 avait démontré l'importance que les Congolais attachent au processus démocratique et que le processus électoral à venir marquera un pas décisif à cet égard.

Se réjouissant de la promulgation de la nouvelle Constitution et de l'adoption de la loi électorale, les ministres ont encouragé le Gouvernement National de Transition, les partis politiques, leurs dirigeants et la société civile à travailler ensemble afin de garantir des élections pacifiques, équitables et transparentes conformément aux normes internationales, ce qui devrait contribuer de façon significative à assurer l'avenir de la RDC en tant que pays démocratique et stable.

Le succès des élections n'est pas seulement important pour la population congolaise. Il aura un impact majeur pour la paix et le développement dans la région des Grands Lacs et l'Afrique dans son ensemble. Bien que l'existence d'un environnement stable et sûr soit en tout premier lieu la responsabilité du Gouvernement National de Transition de la RDC, soutenu par la MONUC, l'UE est prête à y contribuer.

L'engagement de l'UE en faveur du processus de transition en RDC

L'UE a un engagement de longue date en faveur du processus de transition en RDC, notamment par son soutien continu envers la transition, y compris le processus électoral, soutien qui est apporté via le FED (Fonds européen de développement) et des programmes de la Communauté européenne, des missions dans les domaines militaire, de sécurité et de police ainsi que par le biais d'un appui bilatéral par les Etats Membres.

- La coopération de la Communauté européenne avec la RDC a été reprise en 2002. La stratégie de coopération et le programme indicatif 2003-2007 visent à combattre la pauvreté et à fournir un soutien au renforcement des institutions ainsi qu'une aide macro-économique. Depuis 2002, ces priorités ont été financées à hauteur d'environ 750 millions d'euros. La CE a fourni plus de la moitié du financement du processus électoral en RDC, avec une contribution de 149 millions d'euros.
- L'UE est engagée politiquement dans les efforts de recherche de la paix et de la stabilité dans la région des Grands Lacs africains, notamment à travers les activités du Représentant Spécial de l'UE (RSUE) Aldo Ajello, qui a été en contact régulier avec tous les acteurs clés sur le terrain depuis 1996. En de nombreuses occasions, le Haut Représentant Solana et le Commissaire Michel ont joué un rôle important à cet égard. L'UE est également membre du Comité international d'accompagnement de la transition (CIAT).
- L'UE a régulièrement fait état de l'importance qu'elle attache au respect de la souveraineté, de l'intégrité territoriale et de l'indépendance politique de la RDC et de tous les Etats dans la région ainsi que de son soutien pour l'Accord global et inclusif sur la Transition en RDC signé à Prétoiria le 17 décembre 2002.
- Les missions conduites par l'UE en RDC au titre de la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense – l'opération ARTEMIS, les missions EUPOL Kinshasa et EUSEC R.D. Congo – sont des exemples concrets de l'action de l'UE en vue de soutenir la stabilité et la transition dans le pays ainsi que d'une coopération étroite et active entre l'UE et l'ONU en matière de gestion de crise. (Voir article ci-joint.)



Visite du Haut Représentant Javier Solana à EUPOL Kinshasa (RD Congo)



Mission de Police de l'UE (EUPOL Kinshasa)

Strengthening peace after the disaster the Aceh Monitoring Mission

INTERVIEW WITH AMM HEAD OF MISSION, PIETER FEITH



AMM HoM, Pieter Feith and Aceh Military Commander, Major General Supriadin.

The Aceh Monitoring Mission, launched last September, is the first EU mission in Asia and the first co-operation with ASEAN member states of this kind. The establishment of AMM demonstrates the European Union's commitment to the peace process in Aceh, in a region emerging from a 30-year conflict and devastated by the consequences of the 2004 tsunami, as well as to peace and stability in the region as a whole. Beyond the expected term of the mission, the EU seeks ways to accompany the Indonesian government and the Acehnese people on the path of security, stability, economic development and social justice.

What are the main tasks of the AMM?

The objective of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) is to assist the government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in their implementation of the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed on 15 August 2005. These are to monitor the process of legislation change, to rule on disputed amnesty cases, to monitor the reintegration of active GAM members, to monitor the human rights situation and provide assistance in this field, and to deal with complaints and alleged violations of the MoU.

As part of the AMM's tasks, the decommissioning of GAM armaments and the relocation of non-organic military and police forces was fully completed on 5 January 2006. In accordance with the MoU, the GAM handed over all of its 840 weapons to AMM and on 27 December 2005 it officially disbanded its military wing (TNA). Equally, the government of Indonesia has fulfilled its commitments by relocating its non-organic military and police. The number of police and military (TNI) forces remaining in Aceh are within the maximum strength of 14,700 for the TNI and 9,100 for the police, in accordance with the MoU.

What are the main obstacles that the AMM had to confront on the ground?

There were a couple of shooting incidents early on that could have derailed the process but they were swiftly investigated and handled by AMM. The commission on security arrangements that I established at HQ and district level has facilitated positive dialogue between the parties and AMM to the extent that incidents were defused before they became major obstacles.

Are you satisfied with the level of co-operation achieved with ASEAN countries?

Yes, very much so. We have monitors from Thailand, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore in AMM. For the first time in an international peacekeeping mission we have fully integrated EU and ASEAN teams at every level. The professional co-operation and respect has been enormous. Approximately half of our Asian monitors are Muslim and many of them speak the Indonesian language. This allows for an excellent understanding of local culture and customs and the ASEAN participation enables a regional legitimacy of the mission. I look forward to taking forward this co-operation in future missions, if applicable, and have agreed with my ASEAN colleagues to construct a template for such co-operation.

What is the focus of the second phase of the mission, up to September 2006?

We are continuing our job here very much in the same way as we have successfully done so far. But the crisis is over and our focus is no longer on decommissioning and relocation but fixed on the more complex issues.

We are carefully monitoring the reintegration process. A lot has been done. Most combatants and prisoners have safely returned home and payments have been executed. There are significant financial resources available both from the government of Indonesia and from the international community. The support will include; economic facilitation, land allocation, vocational training or assistance for those unable to work. The government of Indonesia has already allocated funds and is finding suitable land. It is also establishing an agency – BRA (Aceh peace reintegration body) – on which GAM is also represented in order to speed up implementation. This body, together with its supportive structures (Forum Bersama) will also benefit from input and support from the international community. It is true that the process will go well beyond AMM's end of mission,

but it is important for the Acehnese people to see that things move forward. Our aim is to make the process self-sustainable before we leave Aceh.

The process of legislation change, especially the draft Law on the Governing of Aceh, is being monitored by AMM. This law is a key element in achieving a peaceful, comprehensive and sustainable solution of the conflict in Aceh. According to the MoU, the AMM has been given the mandate to monitor the process of legislation change. We are doing this but the AMM will respect and not interfere in the work of the national parliament. Though as part of its remit, the AMM will report on the parliamentary proceedings to the European Union and participating ASEAN capitals. In addition, AMM will confidentially inform the government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement of its assessments, in particular with regard to compatibility of the text with the Helsinki MoU.

What is your assessment of the co-operation among EU actors in Aceh, and with other international players?

The European Commission delegation in Jakarta has established an office in Banda Aceh, called Europe House. The presence of the EU in Aceh has very much benefited from this decision. We are working very closely with the Commission delegation, in particular on reintegration, socialisation and human rights issues.

Furthermore, the European Commission and the European Parliament have been invited to give support to the organisation of local elections and to launch an Election Observer Mission. An idea that I have suggested and which is currently being discussed is the possibility for this observer mission to make use of AMM infrastructure, contacts and experiences.

As regards co-operation with other international players, AMM has established good contacts with most major organisations and donors on the ground, in particular with the UN, the World Bank and USAID. For example, the AMM is working closely with both World Bank and UNDP, under the umbrella of Tim Sosialisasi, as regards socialisation of the MoU. We have further arranged peace concerts together with USAID where Rafly, one of Aceh's most appreciated artists, has toured the province and staged music events including speeches, hand shakes and the release of peace doves by the government of Indonesia, GAM and AMM on stage.

What needs to be done for the peace process to stay on track, after the AMM leaves Aceh?

Looking beyond AMM's mandate — peace should be self-sustainable. We are working on creating structures that will last longer than our presence; we are and have been promoting more direct contact between the parties. It is important for the parties as well as other groups to interact without an intermediary. AMM also promotes the further involvement of the international community, in particular the European Commission, as concerns more long-term plans such as reintegration and human rights. It is important to underline that AMM will leave but the EU will stay. The EU is supporting the peace process with programmes for up to 25 million euros.

What lessons do you draw from the AMM for future ESDP operations?

It has been said that no other mission has ever been deployed more quickly. During negotiations in Helsinki both the government of Indonesia and the GAM agreed that they would like to see a monitoring presence in Aceh immediately after the



Indonesian National Day, 17 August 2005

signing of the MoU. It is crucial to be able to deploy quickly. We were able to get our first monitors on the ground by 15 August. This could be the standard for future EU missions. But in order to do it rapidly, regularly and effectively we need to shorten our procedures and have access to start-up funding.

AMM is breaking new ground for future ESDP missions and we like to think it will change the way the EU conducts crisis-management operations. The AMM has a unique mix of competencies, drawing on both civilian and military experience. This mix is quite interesting and well adapted to the operation. What this mission is doing is using its diverse knowledge to successfully perform its tasks. The future of crisis management may lie more in effective demobilisation, decommissioning, reintegration and human rights monitoring than in traditional peacekeeping. This implies a need for a broad range of instruments and expertise, something that the EU is increasingly showing that it is capable of providing.

In this context, I believe the AMM represents an invaluable opportunity for the EU to demonstrate its capacity to rapidly launch a complex mission within its security and defence policy and to combine a decommissioning, demobilisation and reintegration process with post-catastrophe reconstruction, thereby implementing a coherent action across the spectrum of its instruments and their respective institutional frameworks. In other words, it is a good example of how practical collaboration between the various EU institutions, in particular the European Commission and the Council, can strengthen the impact.

Pieter Cornelis Feith: born on 9 February 1945 in Rotterdam, The Netherlands. Studied Political Science at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland and is a graduate of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Medford, Mass., US.

9 September 2005: appointed as Head of the EU-led Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), seconded by the EU Council General Secretariat.

Since 2001: EU Council General Secretariat. Deputy Director General for Politico-Military Affairs, and one of the closest advisors to High Representative Javier Solana.

1995-1997 and 1998-2001: NATO (1995-97: Political Advisor to Commander IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1998-2001: NATO International Staff, Director of the Crisis Management and Operations Directorate and Head of the NATO Balkans Task Force).

1970: joined the Netherlands diplomatic service. Posts at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague and assignments in Damascus, Bonn, New York (Mission to the UN), Khartoum and at the Netherlands Mission to NATO and WEU, Brussels.

EU-led Aceh Monitoring Mission



In September 2005, the European Union, together with five contributing countries from ASEAN, as well as with Norway and Switzerland, deployed a monitoring mission in Aceh (Indonesia) – the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). This mission is designed to monitor the implementation of various aspects of the peace agreement set out in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) on 15 August 2005. The AMM became operational on 15 September 2005, the date on which the decommissioning of GAM armaments and the relocation of non-organic military and police forces began. On 11 May 2006 in Brussels, favourable consideration was given by the EU to the Government of Indonesia's request for AMM to continue its mandate until the date of the local elections (Pilkada) in Aceh, but no later than 15 September, 2006.

The peace process

The peace negotiations were initiated in Helsinki between the GoI and the GAM under the auspices of the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), a non-governmental organisation chaired by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari. Upon conclusion of the fifth round of talks, the Parties agreed on a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed on 15 August 2005. The EU has supported the peace process negotiations by providing direct support to CMI through the EC Rapid Reaction Mechanism.



Front row from left to right: acting Governor of Aceh Mustafa Abubakar, EU High Representative Javier Solana and Senior GAM representative Malik Mahmud (Banda Aceh 22 April 2006)



The third decommissioning phase (15 November 2005)



Visit by Swedish Minister for Development Co-operation Carin Jämtin



Signature of the MoU, Helsinki (15 August 2005)



Decommissioned weapons



Withdrawal of Indonesian troops



Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)

The GoI and the GAM committed themselves in the MoU to achieve a peaceful, comprehensive and sustainable solution to the conflict in Aceh. The MoU details the agreement and the principles that will guide the political process in Aceh, covering the following topics *inter alia*:

- political reforms in Aceh (including a law on the governing of Aceh, political participation, economy, and rule of law),
- human rights,
- amnesty and reintegration of GAM members into society,
- appropriate security arrangements for the implementation of the MoU provisions,
- establishment of the Aceh Monitoring Mission, and
- agreement on a dispute settlement mechanism.

Initial phase

An initial monitoring presence (IMP) was deployed on 15 August 2005. The IMP, which comprised 80 monitors from EU and ASEAN countries, covered the period between the signing of the MoU (15 August 2005) and the full deployment of the AMM (15 September 2005).

End of decommissioning and relocation phase

As part of the AMM's tasks, the decommissioning of GAM armaments and the relocation of non-organic military and police forces was fully completed on 5 January 2006. In accordance with the MoU, the GAM handed over all of its 840 weapons to AMM and on 27 December 2005 it officially disbanded its military wing (TNA). Similarly, the GoI has fulfilled its commitments by relocating its non-organic military and police. This was done in four phases in parallel with the decommissioning, and in total 25,890 soldiers and 5,791 police officers were relocated out of Aceh. The numbers of police and military (TNI) forces, as verified by AMM, remaining in Aceh are within the maximum strength of 14,700 for the TNI and 9,100 for the police, in accordance with the MoU.

The Aceh monitoring mission

The EU, together with five ASEAN contributing countries (Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) and Norway and Switzerland, deployed a monitoring mission in Aceh (Indonesia). The mission is of a civilian nature and is EU-led. It was launched on 15 September 2005.

Aims and scope

The objective of the AMM is to support the GoI and the GAM in their implementation of the peace agreement. This includes the following tasks:

- monitor the demobilisation of GAM and monitor and assist with the decommissioning and destruction of its weapons, ammunition and explosives (completed);
- monitor the relocation of non-organic military forces and non-organic police troops (completed);
- monitor the reintegration of active GAM members;
- monitor the human rights situation and provide assistance in this field in the context of the tasks set out in the above points;

- monitor the process of legislation change;
- rule on disputed amnesty cases;
- deal with complaints and alleged violations of the MoU;
- establish and maintain liaison and good co-operation with the parties.

The AMM does not take on a negotiation role. Should this be needed during the implementation process, it will be the responsibility of the two parties and the original facilitator/negotiator, i.e. the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI).

Size and structure

The AMM is a civilian mission within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) exercises the political control and the strategic guidance of the AMM under the responsibility of the Council of the EU. The costs of the mission are financed from the EU budget (the reference amount for the mission is EUR 9 million) and by contributions of EU Member States and participating countries (EUR 6 million).

The AMM currently numbers approximately 80 international unarmed personnel (it had about 200 in the first phase), of which almost two-thirds come from EU Member States as well as Norway and Switzerland, and slightly more than one-third from the five participating ASEAN countries. Monitors wear recognisable civilian mission attire with clear mission identification markings.

The mission, whose headquarters is in Banda Aceh, established a monitoring capability which currently comprises 11 district offices geographically distributed to demonstrate EU-ASEAN contributing countries' support and engagement throughout Aceh. Monitors conduct their monitoring tasks by patrolling and communicating with both parties, and by carrying out inspections and investigations as required.

The head of the mission (HoM), Pieter Feith, seconded from the EU Council Secretariat, is supported by three deputies, two EU and one from ASEAN. The HoM reports to Javier Solana, Secretary-General/High Representative of the Council of the EU on matters related to the AMM, and will inform the parties, the CMI, the PSC and the contributing countries from ASEAN and Europe on possible violations of the MoU.

The EU and Indonesia

The EU has supported the rehabilitation and reconstruction needs in the countries affected by the tsunami. EUR 200 million were committed for the rehabilitation and reconstruction needs of Indonesia alone for 2005-6. Planned EU Member State contributions amount to an additional EUR 391 million. The European Commission Humanitarian Coordination Office (ECHO) has channelled EUR 40 million worth of relief assistance to tsunami victims.

Excluding tsunami assistance, total EU aid (EC+25) amounts to EUR 200 million per annum. In addition, the European Commission's "Country Strategy Paper" for Indonesia (2002-2006 period) foresees commitments for over EUR 215 million covering different development sectors during that period. The disbursements foreseen in 2005 for Indonesia are in the order of EUR 75 million.

The European Community will further support the Aceh peace process through flanking measures including support to reintegration of former GAM combatants into civil society and democratic political life; support to persons displaced by the conflict and to returnees from third countries; EU observation of local elections in 2006; technical assistance and capacity-building to support local police and civil judicial system; and access to justice in particular with regard to the protection of human rights, enhancement of local public administration, and support to the organisation of local elections.

On 27 February 2006, the EU Council welcomed the European Community's measures in Aceh, worth EUR 25 million, to support and consolidate the results of the peace process, and underlined its support for the forthcoming local elections in Aceh, including the possible deployment of an EU election observation mission.

The EU has confirmed its attachment to a united, democratic, stable and prosperous Indonesia. It has reiterated its respect for the territorial integrity of the Republic of Indonesia and recognition of its importance as a major partner.

www.aceh-mm.org

www.consilium.europa.eu/aceh

ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/indonesia/intro/index.htm

Mission de Surveillance de l'Union européenne à Aceh, Indonésie

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Le 15 août 2005, le gouvernement indonésien et le GAM (Free Aceh Movement – Mouvement pour l'Aceh libre) signaient un mémorandum d'entente sous les auspices d'une organisation non gouvernementale dirigée par l'ancien président finlandais Martti Ahtisaari, avec le soutien de l'UE. Afin de contrôler la mise en application de cet accord, une Mission de surveillance à Aceh a été mise en place par l'UE, cinq pays contributeurs de l'ANASE, ainsi que la Norvège et la Suisse.

Entre autres objectifs, la Mission de Surveillance à Aceh accompagne la démobilisation et la réintégration des membres du GAM, le déclassement de leur armement ainsi que la re-localisation des forces armées et des forces de police gouvernementales non-organiques.

A l'instar de l'aide à la reconstruction du pays après le tsunami, la Mission illustre le rôle joué par l'UE en Indonésie en matière d'assistance et de consolidation du processus de paix.

Dans son interview, Pieter Feith, chef de la Mission de surveillance à Aceh, commente les acquis de la première phase de la mission, les obstacles rencontrés, les objectifs de la deuxième phase ainsi que la coopération entre les différents acteurs européens à Aceh. Il évoque la pérennité de la paix après le départ des observateurs et tire les leçons pour de futures opérations dans le cadre de la PESD.

The EU battlegroups: approaching full operational capability



Artemis operation

Battlegroups are a specific form among the EU's rapid response elements and are a possible answer to the timely provision of the necessary capabilities for an EU rapid response operation. A battlegroup is the minimum militarily effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations, or for the initial phase of larger operations

Full operational capability is scheduled for next January

In June 2003, the EU launched Artemis, its first-ever fully autonomous¹ military operation. Its objective was to stabilise security conditions in parts of the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Approximately 1,800 troops participated in the nearly three-month-long mission. As a rapid response operation, Artemis provided EU policy-makers and planners with an operational template for future rapid reaction deployments – effectively planting some of the seeds for the EU battlegroups.

About a year later, the Council approved the "Headline Goal 2010", a new objective for the development of ESDP and its capabilities, which places significant emphasis on rapid response. Consistent with the experiences gained through Artemis, it calls for EU force packages that can respond to a crisis either as a stand-alone force or as part of a larger operation at high rates of readiness. As a follow-up, EU Member States outlined their initial EU battlegroup commitments at the November 2004 Military capability commitment conference. Overall, 13 EU battlegroups were pledged at that time.

The committed battlegroups have a generic composition of approximately 1,500 troops with combat support and combat service support. They are formed either by a framework nation or by a multinational coalition of Member States. Participation in the battlegroups is also open to EU accession candidate countries and non-EU

European NATO countries. For example, the 'Nordic' battlegroup scheduled to be on standby for six months starting in January 2008, includes contributions from Sweden, Finland, Estonia, and Norway (a non-EU European NATO country).

As a special type of rapid response element, each battlegroup must be able to start implementing mission objectives on the ground no later than ten days after the EU decision to launch the operation. Member States have committed themselves to be able to respond with rapid and decisive action towards the whole spectrum of tasks listed in Article 17(2) of the Treaty on European Union and those identified in the European Security Strategy. While battlegroups have utility across the full range of these tasks, their full potential would be best realised in tasks of combat forces in crisis management, bearing in mind their limited size. Such EU-led-crisis management operations could be conducted in response to requests by the UN and under a UN mandate.

The funding for ESDP operations involving a battlegroup would follow currently established practices that are applicable to military ESDP operations. The ATHENA mechanism would administer the common costs of the operation while individual operational costs would be covered by the participating states according to the principle of "costs lie where they fall".

¹ i.e. without having recourse to NATO assets and capabilities

With respect to sustainability, the forces should be available for 30 days of initial operations – extendable to 120 days. Each identified battlegroup is associated with a Force Headquarters and pre-identified operational and strategic enablers such as strategic lift.

An initial operational capability was reached in January 2005, giving the EU the ability to conduct at least one battlegroup-sized rapid response operation. During the period of initial operational capability, one or two battlegroups are on standby for a period of six months before there is a rotation. For the first half of 2005, the United Kingdom and France each contributed a battlegroup. Italy made its battlegroup available for the second half of 2005. Currently, a multinational battlegroup made up of contributions by Spain (framework nation), Italy, Portugal, and Greece is on standby, as is a German-led battlegroup with contributions from France.

Full operational capability is scheduled for January 2007. At that time, the EU will have the capacity to engage in two concurrent single battlegroup-sized rapid response operations that can be launched nearly simultaneously. Thus, for each rotational period lasting six months, two battlegroups will be on call and available for short-notice deployments. On 15 May 2006, EU ministers noted that from January 2007 on the EU will have the required number of battlegroups available.

During the first half of 2007, Germany, the Netherlands, and Finland will contribute one battlegroup while France, Belgium and Luxembourg will provide the second. During the second half of 2007, Italy, Hungary, and Slovenia will be responsible for one battlegroup while Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, and Cyprus head up the second.

Besides the important contribution made by the EU battlegroups towards the Headline Goal 2010, they should also be seen as an important vehicle for stimulating the transformation of European forces into more rapidly deployable units.



Signature of the technical agreement between the ministries of defence of the Italian Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Hellenic Republic and the Republic of Portugal concerning the SIAF/SILF-based battlegroup with the participation of Greece and Portugal

Les Groupements tactiques de l'UE: Vers une pleine capacité opérationnelle

En juin 2003, l'Union européenne lançait sa première opération militaire autonome de réaction rapide: l'opération Artemis en République démocratique du Congo. L'année suivante, suite à cette expérience et dans le but de rendre leurs forces militaires plus flexibles, plus mobiles et mieux adaptées aux nouveaux défis internationaux, les Etats membres de l'UE se proposaient de créer, au plus tard en janvier 2007, treize groupements tactiques en mesure d'être projetés rapidement, y compris pour des missions de forces de combat.

Composés d'environ 1 500 soldats hautement équipés, les groupements tactiques sont formés d'éléments d'un ou de plusieurs Etats membres. Les groupements tactiques sont également ouverts à des pays candidats à l'UE ainsi qu'à des pays non-européens membres de l'OTAN. Ces forces doivent pouvoir être déployées sur le terrain en dix jours, pour une période d'un à quatre mois.

En janvier 2005, un premier niveau de capacité a été atteint, permettant alors à l'Union de mettre rapidement sur pied au moins une opération impliquant un groupement tactique. L'objectif pour janvier 2007 est de pouvoir disposer de la capacité de mener simultanément deux opérations de réponse rapide basées sur des groupements tactiques. En mai 2006, les ministres de l'UE ont confirmé que cet objectif serait tenu.

Building a Common Security Space between the EU and Russia

by *Dov Lynch*

Dov Lynch is Senior Research Fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies. He directs research on EU-Russian relations, security developments in Russia and the former Soviet Union, as well as EU policies towards the region.

The 15th European Union-Russia summit took place in Moscow in May 2005 and agreed roadmaps for building four 'Common Spaces'. The third space on external security developed principles for co-operation in the political and security spheres. The roadmap was a mixed surprise. On the one hand, the agreement showed how relatively little co-operation had actually occurred. At the same time, the roadmap set the foundations for genuine co-operation between the EU and Russia.



From left to right: President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, UK Prime Minister and the then President of the European Council Tony Blair and EU High Representative Javier Solana (EU-Russia Summit in London, 4 October 2005)

The Strategic Partnership until 2005

After the declaration of a strategic partnership in 1999, Russia and the EU succeeded in clearing some of the ground for developing a security dialogue. In some areas of foreign policy, such as on the Balkans and the Middle East, significant advances occurred in Russian-EU security co-operation. Russia participated in the EU's first operation under the European Security and Defence Policy, EUPM, in Bosnia and Herzegovina by sending three police officers. Discussions were held on military-technical co-operation, in particular on the question of the EU making use of Russian strategic aircraft capabilities. While never participating in EU crisis-management exercises, Russia has been invited to relevant information briefings. Russia also signed an agreement in 2003 on co-operation with Europol, and a dialogue on counter-terrorism was launched after 2001. The EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator holds regular meetings with his Russian counterpart, the Special Envoy for Counter-Terrorism. Intensive co-operation has developed in the area of non-proliferation, where the EU and Russia share similar views on the importance of international regimes. Finally, monthly meetings between Russian officials and the troika of the Political and Security Committee kept the two parties in regular contact on a wide range of foreign policy and security questions.

And yet the security dialogue also displayed worrying features. While heavy on institutional mechanisms of interaction, the substance of the 'strategic partnership' did not develop far. Relations were often higher on rhetoric than on substance. Overall, the EU-Russia dialogue on security struck many observers as being wide but thin.

EU enlargement in 2004 called on Brussels and Moscow to review security relations. Enlargement altered Europe's political geography, bringing the EU and Russia much closer to each other. A new geography raised a host of questions of proximity between Russia and the EU and Member States, ranging from issues of border co-operation to that of visa facilitation. Enlargement also created a new shared region in Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, and the South Caucasus, between the enlarged EU and the Russian Federation. As a result, crafting a genuine security dialogue acquired new urgency.

The Common Space on External Security

On May 10, 2005, Moscow and Brussels reached agreement on a roadmap for the creation of a common space of external security. The roadmap highlights clear progress in thinking about security co-operation, especially in the shared neighbourhood – or, as the document puts it, “the regions adjacent to the EU and Russian borders”. The document contains a number of important first principles, which, if respected, constitute the basis for deeper co-operation.

- First, Russia and the EU pledge to forge greater co-operation in the new region between them;
- Co-operation is set to become more 'result-orientated';
- The roadmap declares the possibility of joint initiatives in support of 'efforts in agreed formats'. The formula opens opportunity for flexibility in approaching conflict settlement in the former Soviet Union, even allowing for a greater EU role;
- Russia and the EU agree to consult before undertaking new initiatives, in order to avoid the tensions that may arise from unilateral measures;
- The parties agree to deepen expert contacts as well as the dialogue on military questions, including crisis management experience;
- The roadmap provides for enhanced co-operation between the two parties on crisis management, with a particular focus on civilian crisis management and disaster relief.

The Moscow agreement does raise the question, however, of what is a 'common space'? This concept has not been defined officially. In theory, one could imagine that a common space would be built on several foundation stones:

a) Common agenda

Agreement between the parties on the items that should be included in the common space and those items to be excluded.

b) Shared values

A genuine common space should have a foundation of values that are held in common by the two parties.

c) Similar interpretations

The parties should agree on the nature of major trends in the space, and especially what constitutes a 'crisis'.

d) Working mechanisms

The parties should share working mechanisms that allow for joint or coordinated measures.

Viewed against these criteria, it is clear that most of the hard work lies ahead to develop a genuine strategic partnership between Russia and the EU. However, the roadmap is an excellent start.

Since the agreement, the prospects for a deeper security dialogue are already clearer. Meetings have been held between the Chief of the Russian General Staff and the Chairman of the EU Military Committee. In February and March 2006, four Russian officers participated in two ESDP training orientation courses. The possibility of informal Russian contacts with the European Defence Agency has been accepted. Finally, negotiations on an information protection agreement, vital for co-operation in Europol and on counter-terrorism, are advancing.

The EU ISS project

In addition, the European Union Institute for Security Studies was given a role in the roadmap to deepen co-operation with the Russian academic community in the field of crisis management. As a result, the EU ISS launched a joint research project in 2006 with a Russian partner, the Centre for Political and International Studies within the prestigious Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO, under the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Within this framework, the director of the Centre, Professor Alexander Nikitin, will spend time at the EU Institute to draft a jointly authored report entitled 'Sharing Experience in Crisis Management'. The joint report will examine Russian and EU experience and approaches to crisis-management operations with the aim of exploring modalities for greater co-operation in this area. At the expert level, this joint project represents another important step towards building a genuine common security space.



From left to right: Austrian Chancellor and President of the European Council Wolfgang Schäussel, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, President of the European Commission José Manuel Durão Barroso and EU High Representative Javier Solana (Sochi, 25 May 2006)

Bâtir un espace commun de sécurité entre l'UE et la Russie

Depuis leur déclaration de partenariat stratégique en 1999, l'UE et la Russie ont développé un dialogue et entamé une coopération dans le domaine de la sécurité, notamment en matière de contre-terrorisme et de non-prolifération, mais aussi de gestion des crises (participation de policiers russes à la Mission de police de l'UE en Bosnie-Herzégovine).

L'élargissement de l'UE en 2004 l'a rapprochée géographiquement de la Russie mais il a aussi renforcé l'urgence du dialogue en matière de sécurité.

En mai 2005, lors du 15^e sommet UE-Russie, les deux parties ont élaboré une feuille de route en vue de créer un espace commun de sécurité extérieure, en particulier dans les régions adjacentes aux frontières des deux parties. Dans le même sens, l'Institut d'études de sécurité de l'Union européenne a été chargé d'approfondir sa coopération avec la communauté académique russe dans le domaine de la gestion des crises.

Entre la Russie et l'UE, beaucoup reste à faire pour parvenir à un espace commun de sécurité extérieure impliquant un agenda, des valeurs des interprétations et des mécanismes de travail partagés. La feuille de route constitue à cet égard un excellent point de départ.

Clippings



Friday, May 19, 2006

Stabilizing Darfur

Javier Solana

BRUSSELS The long-suffering people of Darfur need help — not next week, or next month, but today. The violence that has long terrorized the civilian population is persisting. Extreme human rights violations are continuing and aid deliveries are facing huge difficulties and risk being cut back. Consequently, the humanitarian situation is the worst on the planet.

What is more, the war in Darfur risks spreading to the whole of the region. Chad has already been engulfed by it. This humanitarian and political crisis is unacceptable, an affront to our conscience. Standing by is not an option.

That is why the European Union is engaged, on all fronts, in helping to find a solution to the crisis in Darfur. Darfur is a priority for Europe and will remain so as long as the violence continues and until the displaced people and refugees can return home.

But we also know that African countries must be in the lead. Europeans acting on their own are unable to achieve much. What we can do and are doing is supporting African efforts with political, financial, logistical and other forms of assistance.

From the beginning of the conflict, the European Union has supported the African Union's efforts to stabilize the situation. It has funded the African Union force to the tune of €212 million. It has trained, equipped and transported the African troops and it has dispatched European military experts and police officers to the field. Without the European Union, there would probably not have been any AU force to offer a degree of protection to the people of Darfur.

EU institutions and member states have deployed more than €800 million for humanitarian aid. Europe has also played a leading role, in support of the African Union and in concert with the United States, during the peace negotiations in Abuja. In particular, the British envoy, Hillary Benn, and the EU special envoy, Pekka Haavisto, have been involved throughout the crucial preparatory phases of the Abuja agreement, under the leadership of President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria.

The peace agreement reached in Abuja is good news for the women and children of Darfur, the only piece of good news they have had in three years. These hopes must not be dashed. Europe will be at the forefront in ensuring that the peace agreement is implemented in full and in good faith by all the parties. Time is short. The rainy season begins soon and security and humanitarian supplies must be restored before then. .../...



Monday, May 8, 2006

Las tropas españolas estarán en primera línea de la operación de la UE en Congo

Miguel González

Una compañía de reacción rápida, con unos 150 soldados, irá al aeropuerto de Kinshasa

Las tropas españolas estarán en primera línea de la operación de la Unión Europea en apoyo a las primeras elecciones democráticas de la historia de la República Democrática de Congo (RDC), previstas para el 30 de julio. Los planes de la UE prevén que la compañía de reacción rápida española se despliegue en el aeropuerto de N'Dolo, en Kinshasa, donde estará el cuartel general avanzado de la denominada Eufor RD Congo. El Gobierno español aún no ha aprobado oficialmente su participación, pero el ministro de Defensa, José Antonio Alonso, ha expresado su "disposición favorable".

El pleno del Congreso votará el próximo jueves, en aplicación de la Ley Orgánica de Defensa Nacional, el refuerzo del contingente militar español en Afganistán con 150 efectivos, pero no pasará mucho tiempo antes de que deba aprobar también el envío de hasta 200 militares a Congo.

El enésimo retraso de la cita electoral, prevista para el 18 de junio y pospuesta hasta el 30 de julio, ha ralentizado los preparativos de la operación, pero en las próximas semanas viajará a Kinshasa un equipo de reconocimiento del Estado Mayor de la Defensa y a su vuelta debería empezar la vacunación de las tropas.

El Consejo Europeo aprobó el pasado día 27 una "acción común" en respuesta al llamamiento de la ONU. Según la misma, Eufor RD Congo contará con unos 1.450 efectivos, aportados por Alemania, Francia, España, Bélgica, Portugal y Suecia.

El mando supremo corresponderá al teniente general alemán Karlheinz Viereck, que dirigirá la operación desde el cuartel general de Postdam (Alemania), cerca de Berlín; mientras que el jefe sobre el terreno será el general de división francés Christian Damay.

La fuerza europea tendrá un "elemento avanzado" con 400 a 450 efectivos en Kinshasa y una "fuerza de espera" en Livreville (Gabón), del tamaño de un batallón, para acudir en auxilio del primero y garantizar su evacuación en caso de necesidad. .../...

Clippings

Süddeutsche Zeitung

Wednesday, May 17 2006

Brüssels Werkzeuge; Sichere Wahlen, loyale Armee: Wie die EU im Kongo helfen kann

Martin Winter

Brüssel – Es kommt eben immer auf den Blickwinkel an. Wenn man ausschließlich die Lage im Kongo betrachtet, dann könnte man sagen, „was für ein Desaster“. Doch wer es mit dem vergleicht, was war, der sehe „Fortschritte“. Aldo Ajello ist keiner, der die Dinge schönredet. Dafür hat der 70-jährige italienische Diplomat zu viel von der Welt im Allgemeinen und von Afrika im Besonderen gesehen. Aber deswegen hütet er sich auch vor Schwarzmalerei. Der Beauftragte der Europäischen Union für den Kongo hat schon Mosambik auf dem Weg vom Bürgerkrieg zu einem funktionierenden Staat weitergeholfen. Damals, Anfang der neunziger Jahre, war er noch Emissär der Vereinten Nationen.

Zwischenzeitlich ist viel passiert und nicht alles zum Besten. Auf einen Erfolg des Westens kommen mehrere Misserfolge. Somalia, Ruanda und auch die Demokratische Republik Kongo stehen bislang nicht auf der Habenseite der europäischen Politik. Vor nicht langem ließ sich ein hoher europäischer Politiker sogar zu der vertraulichen Bemerkung hinreißen, er habe Afrika abgeschrieben.

Nun will die EU Truppen unter deutscher und französischer Führung zur Sicherung der Wahlen in den Kongo schicken, am Mittwoch wird der Bundestag den Einsatz debattieren. Vorbei die Zeit wie in 2001, als Belgiens Außenminister Louis Michel wegen seines hartnäckigen Insistierens belächelt wurde, Europa müsse seinen Blick nach Schwarzafrika richten. Heute tut das niemand mehr als Ausfluss des schlechten Gewissens der Belgier ab, die den Kongo im 19. Jahrhundert ausgeplündert hatten.

Nach einem der schlimmsten Bürgerkriege der Geschichte, der rund vier Millionen Menschenleben gekostet hat und an dessen Weiterschwellen täglich immer noch mehr als Tausend sterben, hat die EU begriffen, dass sie mehr als nur Verbandsmaterial schicken muss. „Wenn wir nichts tun, dann werden die Kosten für uns sehr hoch“, prophezeit Ajello. Dem Kongo zu helfen ist nicht nur eine Frage der Moral, sondern auch des europäischen Eigennutzes. Solange das Land nicht zur Ruhe kommt und in der Lage ist, seine Nachbarn Ruanda und Uganda von blutigen Raubzügen in seine rohstoffreichen Grenzregionen abzuhalten, so lange wird es Flüchtlingsströme aus dem Herzen Afrikas nach Europa geben. So lange wird der große Kontinent im Süden der EU instabil bleiben.

.../...

Die Presse

Friday, December 25, 2005

Aceh: Todeswelle brachte kalten Frieden

Franziska Annerl

Indonesien. In der vom Tsunami schwer betroffenen Provinz Aceh haben die ehemaligen Unabhängigkeitskämpfer der GAM ihre letzten Waffen niedergelegt.

Banda Aceh. Dreißig Jahre tobte der Bürgerkrieg in Aceh, dominierte den Alltag auf diesem Flecken Erde an der Nordspitze Sumatras. Doch langsam erholt sich die geschundene indonesische Provinz von dem blutigen Konflikt. In der Provinzhauptstadt Banda Aceh erinnert heute nichts mehr an das jahrelange Kampfgeschehen. Die Märkte und Restaurants sind voller Menschen, Tag und Nacht sieht man Frauen und Männer auf Mopeds durch die Straßen brausen.

Die Acehnesen brauchen endlich keine Angst mehr zu haben, unversehens in wilde Schießereien zwischen indonesischen Soldaten und Rebellen der Separatistenbewegung GAM zu geraten. Der am 16. August in Helsinki vereinbarte Waffenstillstand hält bisher – zum Erstaunen vieler Beobachter in Banda Aceh. Die GAM-Rebellen haben ihren Teil am Friedensabkommen von Helsinki diese Woche erfüllt: Sie haben, wie vereinbart, 840 Waffen an unabhängige Beobachter der Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) übergeben. Gestern, Mittwoch, wurden während einer großen Zeremonie die letzten Waffen zerstört. „Die Demobilisierung ist damit beendet“, erklärte AMM-Leiter Pieter Feith. Bis Ende Dezember sollen die letzten der über 29.000 indonesischen Soldaten und Polizisten die Region verlassen.

Der Frieden ist auch ein Erfolg für die Europäische Union: 220 Beobachter aus Europa und der südostasiatischen Gemeinschaft Asean sind in der AMM bis Frühjahr 2006 im Einsatz. Es ist dies der erste Friedenseinsatz der EU in Asien überhaupt.

Die Übergabe der Waffen wurde stets wie ein Volksfest inszeniert: Tausende Schaulustige versammelten sich auf den Hauptplätzen der Dörfer oder in Stadien. Die Ex-Guerilla-Kämpfer traten in Reih und Glied an und übergaben Gewehre, Handgranaten und Pistolen den AMM-Beobachtern.

Dass es aber überhaupt zum Niederlegen der Waffen kam, dafür war der Tsunami verantwortlich, der die Region am 26. Dezember 2004 mit unglaublicher Wucht getroffen hatte: Mindestens 160.000 Menschen starben in Aceh, 600.000 verloren ihr Zuhause. „Ohne Frieden“, erklärte der indonesische General Bambang Dharmono gegenüber europäischen Journalisten in Banda Aceh, „kann es keinen Wiederaufbau der zerstörten Regionen geben.“

.../...



EU ISS Publications

Books and reports

Transatlantic Book 2006 – Friends again? EU-US relations after the crisis

Nicole Gnesotto, James Dobbins, Federico Romero, David Frum, William Wallace, Ronald D. Asmus, István Gyarmati, Walter B. Slocombe, Gilles Andréani, Philip H. Gordon, Werner Weidenfeld, Felix Neugart, Geoffrey Kemp, Dov Lynch, Fiona Hill, Baudoin Ballaert, Joseph Quinlan, Marcin Zaborowski; edited by Marcin Zaborowski, 2006.

Defence procurement in the European Union – the current debate. Report of EUISS Task Force
Chairman and rapporteur: Burkard Schmitt, 2005.


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