

ESDP newsletter

Special issue - October 2009

European Security and Defence Policy 1999-2009...

ESDP @ 10

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1999-2009... Politique européenne de Sécurité et de Défense



La politique européenne de sécurité et de défense

en un coup d'œil



Dans le cadre de la Politique étrangère et de sécurité commune (PESC), l'Union européenne élabore une politique de sécurité commune, qui couvre l'ensemble des questions relatives à sa sécurité, y compris la définition progressive d'une politique de défense commune, qui pourrait conduire à une défense commune, si le Conseil européen en décide ainsi, sous réserve que les États membres adoptent une décision dans ce sens conformément à leurs exigences constitutionnelles respectives.

Parallèlement à la nomination de Javier Solana en tant que premier "Haut Représentant pour la PESC", le Conseil européen réuni à Cologne en juin 1999 a placé au cœur du renforcement de la PESC les missions de gestion des crises.

Celles-ci incluent des missions humanitaires et d'évacuation, des missions de maintien de la paix et des missions de forces de combat pour la gestion des crises, y compris les missions de rétablissement de la paix.

Ce même Conseil européen a décidé que "l'Union doit disposer d'une capacité d'action autonome soutenue par des forces militaires crédibles, avoir les moyens de décider d'y recourir et être prête à le faire afin de réagir face aux crises internationales, sans préjudice des actions entreprises par l'OTAN".

C'est sur cette base que des efforts soutenus ont abouti à la mise en place de structures politiques et militaires permanentes et à l'établissement de capacités civiles et militaires,

y compris la formulation par l'UE d'un ensemble de concepts et de procédures en matière de gestion des crises. L'Union a également conclu des arrangements relatifs à la consultation et à la participation de pays tiers à la gestion des crises. Elle a en outre défini avec l'OTAN le cadre des relations entre les deux organisations, qui comprend des arrangements permettant à l'Union de recourir aux moyens et capacités de l'OTAN.

Depuis janvier 2007, l'Union dispose d'un Centre d'opérations (OpsCentre) lui fournissant une nouvelle option pour la planification et la conduite d'opérations. Elle dispose également de forces de réaction rapide, les groupements tactiques ("EU Battlegroups").

L'Union européenne mène des opérations au titre de la Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense (PESD) depuis 2003. Six ans plus tard, vingt-deux opérations ont eu lieu ou sont en cours, dans les Balkans, au Proche-Orient, en Afrique et en Asie du Sud-Est. À ce jour, l'UE conduit 12 opérations simultanément : deux opérations militaires et dix missions civiles.

Pour un aperçu des opérations et des missions de l'UE, voir carte, page 64.

Pour en savoir plus sur le détail des opérations, consulter le site Internet du Conseil de l'Union européenne : www.consilium.europa.eu/pesd – www.consilium.europa.eu/esdp

YouTube : www.youtube.com/EUSecurityandDefence



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Editorial

The European Security and Defence Policy is turning 10 this year. It is in 1999 that EU leaders, having welcomed the Franco-British declaration made on 4 December 1998 in Saint-Malo and following the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty on 1 May 1999, formally launched the project in the European Council meetings in Cologne in June and in Helsinki in December.

In Cologne, the European Council, resolved that the European Union play its full role on the international stage, expressed its intention to give it the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence to strengthen the EU's Common foreign and security policy.

EU leaders in Cologne also appointed a High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy – a new post under the Amsterdam Treaty – with substantial credentials in foreign policy and defence, Javier Solana. Institutional and policy development ensued rapidly. In Helsinki in December 1999, the European Council set key objectives in the field of military capabilities (the "Helsinki Headline Goal"), in Feira (Portugal) in June 2000 it did the same for civilian crisis management, and in Nice in December 2000 it finalised a major package of implementing measures in particular as regards the structures and procedures of ESDP.

But of course the policy remained largely virtual for observers and the public until its most tangible output – the conduct of crisis management operations – materialised in 2003, with the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina the first mission launched, in January of that year.

In March 2003, the EU launched its first military operation (Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), a milestone largely overshadowed by the start of the war in Iraq. The Iraq crisis had another more positive consequence for the EU and ESDP: it was in May 2003, after the EU had experienced profound internal divisions over the conflict, that EU ministers decided to launch work on a common security concept. The European Security Strategy, drawn up by EU High Representative Solana, was endorsed by the European Council in December 2003. The EU now had for the first time a common analysis of threats and challenges and of the way ahead for the EU in the field of security, an analysis that remains to this day – its implementation was reviewed in 2008 – a key document for European security and an updated conceptual basis for European foreign policy as EU Policy Unit Director Helga Schmid explains in this newsletter.

Few policies have developed faster than ESDP, powered by the engine born from the "hard school of failure" of the conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s (Carl Hallergård points out that the Amsterdam Treaty was negotiated between 1995 and 1997 when European leaders were still grappling with the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which ended in November 1995). Since 2003 twenty more missions have been launched on four continents, of which twelve are active today. From Sarajevo to Pristina, from Ramallah to the Gulf of Aden, the EU is contributing to a secure environment, monitoring borders, overseeing peace agreements, training police forces, building up criminal justice systems and protecting shipping from pirate attacks.

Thus in ten years under this policy the EU established structures, defined a security strategy, launched 22 missions, developed partnerships, notably with the UN, NATO and the African Union, created a European Defence Agency and started a process to address capability shortfalls and to encourage Member States to provide ESDP with the adequate assets. It has gone from declarations to operations. In Javier Solana's words, "ten years ago, ESDP was an aspiration; now it is a reality on the ground, with crisis-management operations making a real difference to people's lives across the world."

Since its own beginning four years ago, the ESDP newsletter has tried to provide an insight into this collective endeavour. Today it looks back at this process.



> European Council, Helsinki, Finland, 10 and 11 December 1999

> EUNAVFOR-Atalanta

This year's anniversary is still an early one. The development of ESDP occurred in a relatively short period by institutional standards, especially for a policy that implied introducing radically new elements – e.g. military – in the EU's framework. Structures, including a Political and Security Committee, an EU Military Committee, an EU Military Staff, a Situation Centre, as well as other resources such as a Satellite Centre and an Institute for Security Studies were put in place.

As those who took part in the early days of ESDP remember, the EU has gone a long way since then. Graham Messervy-Whiting gives us a few personal snapshots of his first days as head of the interim Military Staff, – the EU's first permanent military structure – in March 2000 in his temporary office in the "Fisheries" corridor of the Council building in Brussels, and of how "the ball started to roll".

A more recent newcomer, General Henri Bentégeat who came to Brussels in 2006 to chair the EU Military Committee, recalls his beginnings as well: "I was not necessarily a Euro-enthusiast, but I was interested in the task, because somehow I felt that there was something to do and that behind words, concepts and political debates, there could be a concrete project".

Indeed, the debate about ESDP has often – especially in the early days – taken an, if not ideological, at least rather abstract character. In doing so, it has largely missed the actual developments which have turned the EU into a player in international crisis management.

One striking feature is that for those who have been involved in ESDP in one way or the other, in Brussels, in capitals or in the field, its added value becomes self-evident. If the EU as a new player in international crisis management has encountered growing demand, it is probably because, as Javier Solana writes, "we were ahead of our time in 1999. The comprehensive, multi-faceted nature of our approach was novel."

A new addition to the EU's wide spectrum of activities and policies that range from the economic to the political, ESDP is not happening in isolation nor is it an end in itself. It is an integral part of the EU's efforts to "play its full role on the international stage" – in the words of leaders in Cologne – and to avail itself of the tools necessary to that end.

This is where the EU's added value lies. It combines humanitarian aid, support for institution-building and good governance, as well as technical and financial assistance – areas in which it has experience dating back to long before the 1992 Maastricht Treaty – with crisis-management capabilities, political dialogue and mediation. The joint civilian-military approach makes the EU flexible and able to offer tailor-made solutions to complex problems.

Calling the initial decade of ESDP a success story does not mean being complacent and ignoring the various challenges the European Union faces in what Professor Jolyon Howorth calls "the very different world order emerging in the twenty-first century". A number of contributors to this anniversary issue take a hard look at these challenges, in terms of strategic vision, of collective ambition, of coherence and of resources to respond to the growing calls to help tackle crises and prevent the widening of a gap between expectations and means. Some of these contributors are guests from academia or think tanks who do not hesitate to address these challenges in their own thought-provoking manner.

But as Robert Cooper points out, "the EU itself has been 50 years in the making, and it was designed to promote the economic welfare of its members rather than for foreign policy. So we should not be surprised if turning the EU into something like a power is not done overnight. Anything worthwhile takes time." At the threshold of the second decade, with the perspective of new arrangements under a new Treaty, "the mission continues" and it will require all the commitment of its stakeholders.

> Timeline



> *Ceremony of signature of the Treaty of Amsterdam, 2 October 1997*



> *European Council of Cologne, 3 and 4 June 1999*

- 1 November 1993:** Entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, which defined the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and referred to a common defence policy
- 4 December 1998:** Real starting point of Defence Europe at the Franco-British Summit in Saint-Malo. The European Union was henceforth to equip itself with a "capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces (...) in order to respond to international crises"
- 1 May 1999:** Entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty incorporating the Petersberg Tasks (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking) into the CFSP and creating the position of Secretary-General/High Representative
- 4-5 June 1999:** At the Cologne European Council, launch of a common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and transfer of Western European Union functions to the European Union. Appointment of Javier Solana to the post of Secretary General/High Representative for the CFSP
- 10-11 December 1999:** At the Helsinki European Council, decision to develop an autonomous defence capability by 2003, with the aim of deploying, within 60 days, up to 60,000 men on missions of at least one year, in order to implement the full range of Petersberg tasks
- 19-20 June 2000:** At the Feira European Council, key decisions on civilian crisis management
- 7-9 December 2000:** At the Nice European Council, adoption of the texts defining the EU political and military bodies and structures (Political and Security Committee, Military Committee and Military Staff), and of the capability catalogue identifying the capabilities needed to carry out the EU tasks. Transfer of WEU's operational role to the European Union
- 15-16 June 2001:** At the Göteborg European Council, agreement on the EU's civilian objectives
- 15 December 2001:** At the Laeken European Council, declaration on the operational capability of the ESDP
- 1 January 2002:** Western European Union subsidiary bodies (Satellite Centre and Institute for Security Studies) transferred to the EU
- 21-22 June 2002:** Seville European Council: joint declaration on the commitment of capabilities in the area of rule of law – scope of ESDP broadened in order to include the fight against terrorism
- 16 December 2002:** Adoption of the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO ensuring EU access to NATO assets and capabilities, in particular assured access to NATO planning, presumption of availability of NATO capabilities and common assets, principles and procedures for release, monitoring, return and recall of assets and command options. This 'Berlin +' arrangements were effected by an exchange of letters between SG/HR and NATO SG on 17 March 2003
- 1 January 2003:** Start of the first ESDP mission, the EU Police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM)
- 31 March 2003:** Start of the first EU military operation in the former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia (Concordia), where the EU took over from the NATO mission (Allied Harmony)
- 12 June 2003:** Launch of the EU military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Artemis), in the Ituri region; first military operation outside Europe, and the first undertaken without recourse to NATO collective assets and capabilities
- 24 September 2003:** Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management
- 12-13 December 2003:** At the European Council, adoption of the European Security Strategy and agreement to establish an EU cell with civil/military components and an Operations Centre
- 15 December 2003:** Start of the Police mission in the former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia (EUPOL Proxima), following on from the military operation (Concordia)
- 17 May 2004:** Approval by the EU Council of the 2010 Headline Goal, which reflects the objectives of the European Security Strategy and, in particular, emphasises the qualitative aspects of the development of the capabilities and rapid reaction
- 12 July 2004:** Council agreement to the Joint Action establishing the European Defence Agency (EDA)



- 17 July 2004:** Launch of the first rule of law mission: EUJUST Themis in Georgia
- 22 November 2004:** Military Capability Commitment Conference – Creation of EU Battlegroups
- 2 December 2004:** Start of the EU military operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea), following on from SFOR
- 16-17 December 2004:** Brussels European Council endorsed the Civilian Headline Goal with a 2008 horizon (CHG 2008)
- 21 February 2005:** Launch of the Integrated Rule-of-Law mission for Iraq (EUJUST Lex)
- 2 May 2005:** Establishment of the mission to provide support for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC RD Congo)
- 27 June 2005:** Council agreement to the Joint Action establishing the European Security and Defence College
- 18 July 2005:** Launch of the civilian-military supporting action to AMIS II in Sudan
- 15 September 2005:** Launch of the EU Monitoring mission in Aceh (AMM), Indonesia
- 21 November 2005:** Launch of the European Union Border Assistance Mission in Rafah (EU BAM Rafah)
- April 2005:** Launch of the police mission EUPOL KINSHASA. The first civilian ESDP mission to be deployed in Africa. EUPOL KINSHASA was followed on 1 July 2007 by EUPOL RD CONGO, deployed to assist the DRC authorities with police reform
- January 2006:** Launch of the European Union Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police support (EUPOL COPPS)
- 27 April 2006:** Launch of the EUFOR RD Congo military operation in support of MONUC during the election period in the Democratic Republic of Congo
- 3 October 2006:** Approval by the EDA Steering Board of the Long-Term Vision developed by the Agency and the European Union Military Committee, as a reference for the future development of European military capabilities
- 15 June 2007:** Launch of the EUPOL Afghanistan mission to support police reform in Afghanistan
- July 2007:** Launch of EUPOL RD Congo, taking over from EUPOL Kinshasa
- November 2007:** Decision of the ministerial Civilian Crisis Management Capability conference to put an end to the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 and adopt a new capability goal for 2010 (Civilian Headline Goal 2010)
- 28 January 2008:** Launch of military Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA in Eastern Chad and the North-East of the Central African Republic
- 16 February 2008:** Launch of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo)
- June 2008:** Launch of the European Union mission in support of Security sector reform in Guinea-Bissau
- 15 September 2008:** Launch of the European Union military coordination action (EU NAVCO) to support surveillance and protection operations led by certain Member States in Somalia and off the Somali coast
- 1 October 2008:** Launch of the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia
- 10 November 2008:** Adoption of a statement on the European young officers exchange scheme modelled on Erasmus
- 10 November 2008:** Adoption of a "Ministerial Commitment to the Development of Civilian Capabilities" and adoption of a "Ministerial Commitment to the Development of Military Capabilities"
- 8 December 2008:** Launch of EUNAVFOR – Atalanta – European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast
- 12 December 2008:** Declaration on the strengthening of capabilities (submitted to the European Council of December 2008, Brussels)
- 11-12 December 2008:** Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a changing world
- 15 March 2009:** Transition from EUFOR TCHAD/RCA to the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)
- From July 2009:** Start of events (seminars, conferences, etc.) on ESDP@10

Ten years of European Security and Defence Policy



by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy

2009 is a landmark year for the European Security and Defence Policy and it marks the threshold of a new era once the Lisbon Treaty enters into force and provides a new momentum for our external action. As we celebrate the first decade of EU crisis management under the ESDP, this is a good moment to take stock of our achievements and to assess our aims and ambitions for the coming decade.



> High Representative Javier Solana

We can be justly proud of our success. Who could have foreseen, in 1999, that in the course of the next ten years we would deploy 22 civilian and military operations, spanning three continents? Since the Franco-British Summit at St Malo and the Cologne and Helsinki European Councils, when the ESDP was born, the development of our crisis-management capacity has made the EU a global provider of security.

Through the ESDP, the European Union is making an effective contribution to international peace and security

Ten years ago, ESDP was an aspiration; now it is a reality on the ground, with crisis-management operations making a real difference to people's lives across the world. We have demonstrated repeatedly that we can respond rapidly to a crisis and operate in the most inhospitable of terrains. Through the ESDP, the European Union is making an effective contribution to international peace and security. Until a decade ago, EU foreign policy consisted of making declarations. Since then, we have been steadily building up our capacity to take action in crisis zones in order to help people. This year, we have 12 operations running concurrently – more than ever before. All over the world, from Kabul to Pristina, from Ramallah to Kinshasa, we have men and women from EU Member States, wearing the familiar EU badge of stars, working together to monitor borders, oversee a peace agreement, train police forces, build up criminal justice systems and protect shipping from pirate attacks.

The EU is still the only organization that can call on a whole range of stabilization instruments

We were ahead of our time in 1999. The comprehensive, multi-faceted nature of our approach was novel. And the EU is still the only organization that can call on a whole range of

stabilization instruments, both to pre-empt or prevent a crisis and to restore peace and rebuild institutions after a conflict. This is where our added value lies – in our unique ability to bring to bear the whole panoply of instruments and resources that are available to us and that complement the traditional foreign policy tools of Member States. We can combine humanitarian aid and support for institution-building and good governance in developing countries with crisis-management capacities and technical and financial assistance, as well as the more specifically diplomatic tools, such as political dialogue and mediation.

We learned from the hard school of failure during the Balkans crisis in the 1990s

We first cut our teeth in the Balkans. We learned from the hard school of failure during the Balkans crisis in the 1990s. We saw, when the Balkans descended into violence, that we did not have the instruments to react. We realised that we had to have the means to respond to such crises. The handling of our periphery is essential for our credibility in international politics. We have to be able to stabilise our own neighbourhood. In 2003 we intervened with a military operation (Operation Concordia) to prevent war in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Since 2003, 22 civilian and military operations spanning three continents

Today, we are still heavily engaged in the Balkans. EULEX Kosovo, launched in early 2008, is the largest civilian ESDP mission to date. It is a rule-of-law mission, with the central aim of supporting the Kosovo authorities develop their capacities and it has staff working in the police and judicial system and in mobile customs teams. From 2005 to 2006, in Aceh, Indonesia, we worked closely with the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in monitoring the peace agreement between

Résumé

Dix ans de Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense

Il y a dix ans, la politique étrangère européenne se limitait à des déclarations. Depuis lors, nous n'avons cessé d'améliorer nos capacités d'action dans les zones de crises afin d'aider les personnes qui en avaient besoin. L'UE apporte aujourd'hui une contribution efficace au maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales.

L'UE est la seule organisation à même de faire appel à des instruments de stabilisations variés, que ce soit dans le but d'anticiper ou d'empêcher une crise, de restaurer la paix ou de reconstruire des institutions après un conflit. C'est précisément avec cette panoplie d'instruments à disposition, qui complètent les outils traditionnels de la politique étrangère, que se trouvent la valeur ajoutée de l'Union européenne.

Afin de pouvoir répondre à la "demande d'UE" et de pouvoir atteindre nos ambitions politiques, il est nécessaire que nous améliorions davantage l'efficacité et la cohérence de l'action extérieure de l'UE. L'entrée en vigueur du traité de Lisbonne devrait nous y aider afin de faire un usage plus rationnel des instruments dont nous disposons.

Il est enfin indispensable de renforcer la solidarité entre les Etats membres, de façon à ce que l'entité politique et économique à laquelle ils appartiennent puisse répondre aux attentes européennes et internationales pour que l'UE joue un rôle encore plus important sur la scène mondiale dans les 10 prochaines années.

the rebels and the government reached after the 2004 tsunami. Not only was this operation a great success in helping to restore peace after decades of civil war but it drew us closer to the countries of South East Asia and provided an excellent model for future cooperation with other regional organisations.

Of the 22 crisis-management operations conducted since 2003, six have been military operations. The other 16 have been civilian, deploying police, judges, border guards, customs officials and other experts from the EU Member States and also from third countries that take part in operations under the EU flag, such as Norway, Switzerland, Ukraine, Croatia, Turkey and even the United States.

Our purpose is to promote peace and security world wide

Our purpose is to promote peace and security world wide; the raison d'être of our operations is crisis management; our hallmark is our holistic approach and our key attribute is our flexibility. We seek to offer tailor-made solutions to complex problems. Today's conflicts demonstrate more clearly than ever that a military solution is neither the sole option, nor the best option, particularly during the stabilization of a crisis – a truth which President Obama and his administration have also emphasised.

We offer a combination of military and civilian resources, used separately or jointly, as appropriate

We offer a combination of military and civilian resources, used separately or jointly, as appropriate. We act autonomously, or in partnership with others. And our action is not restricted to our backyard. Whilst it is clearly in our own security interests to promote stability in our neighbourhood, the EU is a global player with responsibilities to match. We are a political community based on democracy, freedom and the rule of law and these are the values that underpin our action abroad. Our missions are motivated by concern for the common good, whether we are trying to improve the situation for victims of sexual violence in Congo, helping the Palestinians build the structures of their future state or training police in Afghanistan.

With our military operation EUFOR RD Congo, we supported the UN in helping provide a secure environment for elections in Congo in 2006. The following year, we sent EUFOR Tchad/RCA to protect refugees, displaced persons and humanitarian aid workers from the fall-out of the Darfur crisis and the resulting regional instability, again in support of the UN.



> *EU HR Javier Solana at the informal meeting of EU Defence Ministers, 28 September 2009*

Who would have guessed ten years ago that the EU would one day be responsible for thirteen frigates in the Indian Ocean?

In 2008, we showed how quickly we could mobilise when we dispatched over 200 unarmed monitors to Georgia within two weeks, after the war between Russia and Georgia. And at the end of 2008, we launched our first-ever naval operation, EUNAVFOR-Atalanta, to tackle piracy. Who would have guessed ten years ago that the EU would one day be responsible for thirteen frigates in the Indian Ocean? Here, we have reduced the success rate of pirates by half. And we have protected almost every ship that has followed our directions.

We are now looking at further ESDP actions on land to help Somalia develop into a stable, functioning state that can offer a future for its people. Somalia is a good example of the EU's holistic approach. We are now considering possible security-sector reform measures to complement EUNAVFOR and the humanitarian and political support that we are already giving Somalia. We are working in close partnership with the UN, the African Union and the US to help consolidate the legitimate security institutions of the country.

We have to be bold and we have to be ready to respond to the growing demands that will be made of us to play our part in the global security environment

The situation in Somalia and off its shores is a prime example of the complex challenges in today's security environment that we are tackling through the ESDP. Rising to these challenges means taking increasing risks. We have to be bold and we have to be ready to respond to the growing demands that will be made of us to play our part in the global security environment. Though we have come a long way in ten years we cannot be complacent.

The world in the coming decade will be in a constant state of flux. More than ever, we will have to be adaptable and we will have to develop a more sophisticated understanding of complex situations with sharper political analysis, a clearer set of priorities and more sensible budgeting decisions. The European Union can only be effective if it combines all its instruments intelligently. The key to the future success of ESDP missions is to continue to develop a culture of planning and conducting combined civilian and military operations together. All this is entirely within our reach. All we need is the political will.

The key to the future success of ESDP missions is to continue to develop a culture of planning and conducting combined civilian and military operations together

Our ESDP actions must always remain firmly anchored in political strategies. The solution to any crisis, any emergency, any conflict, must always be political. It is this conviction that underpins our philosophy. And our strength resides in the consensual basis of ESDP. ESDP missions are not based on a single state's interests but on a collective and consensual ethos motivated by concern for the common good. This is where ESDP derives its moral and legal legitimacy.

At the moment, there is a gap between our ambitions and our capabilities which we have to address. We cannot achieve anything without the resources to do the job. We must have the personnel and the capabilities – both civilian and military – to back up our political decisions and we must be able to mobilize them as soon as they are required. The demand for our engagement continues to outstrip supply. All this remains work in progress. That is why we need the continued investment from our Member States: with people, ideas, capabilities and financial resources. Striving for greater European defence integration and cooperation is part of this. Member States should continue to support the European Defence Agency in its efforts to lead this process.

We must improve the efficiency and coherence of our external action still further

To meet the demands made of the EU and to realize our political ambitions, we must improve the efficiency and coherence of our external action still further. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty will help by enabling us to make more rational use of the EU's instruments in the field of external relations. We also have to strengthen our civilian and military capabilities and increase their funding and we need to work on enhancing our flexibility, both in deploying rapid reaction forces and in developing a more sophisticated interaction with our partners.

To achieve this, we need above all to strengthen the solidarity between Member States so that the political and economic entity to which they belong can live up to both the European and the international expectations for Europe to be an even greater player on the world stage in the next ten years of ESDP.



> Trip of EU HR Javier Solana to Chad, 7 May 2008

Enhance the EU as a global actor – Set up a European Institute for Peace



By Carl Bildt

The president of the Council of the EU for this second half of 2009, Carl Bildt, looks at the areas in which the EU should develop its capacity in order to enhance its role on the international stage.

Carl Bildt is Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs and former Prime Minister of Sweden. He was the UN Special Envoy for the Balkans between 1999 and 2000; the High Representative of the International Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina for reconstruction and the peace implementation process from 1996 to 1997 and the EU's Special Envoy for Former Yugoslavia 1995, Co-Chair of the Dayton Peace Talks on Former Yugoslavia between the years 1995-1997.



> Carl Bildt

The demand for EU engagement across the world is increasing. Whether we go to the ASEAN nations in Phuket, to Kabul or to the South Caucasus, the message is clear: "We want more Europe!"

The EU is regarded as a global actor with a real and demonstrated potential to build security, peace and democracy. However, there is a supply-demand mismatch. The EU lacks some of the resources necessary to respond to this increasing demand.

Looking back 10 years, the Common Foreign and Security Policy came as a response to the tragic events in the Balkans in the 1990's, where Europe's split and indecisiveness was painfully revealed. This led to a number of groundbreaking decisions to avail the EU the capacity to carry out complex diplomatic tasks and military and civilian operations in support of international peace and security.

The Swedish Presidency coincides with the 10th anniversary of the European Security and Defence Policy. And, it certainly has been an impressive development that we have witnessed since the end of the 1990's.

Over 20 civilian and military operations have been carried out in different parts of the world, often in close cooperation with the UN and other international and regional organizations.

However, the challenges and threats of today are evolving more rapidly and are becoming increasingly complex. If we look at the world today, we can say that the world is more difficult, more demanding, and, to a certain extent, more dangerous than it was just a couple of years ago. There is a closer connection between internal and external security – between our engagement in remote countries and our own, national security. An

important part of our work still consists in building stability and prosperity in the EU's neighbourhood.

The EU must have the ability to adapt and respond to these new challenges. This goes for the 'software' of our policies as well as the instruments we employ. There is some room for improvement here and in particular I believe the Union should develop its capacity in the following areas:

- Bringing forward the strategic debate: Experience shows that once we have broad agreement on what our common policy should be in a particular area, mustering the necessary resources is less of a problem. The European Security Strategy and its Implementation document from last year are good starting points. But, more is needed in order to translate this into clear strategic policies and priorities.
- To support this debate we need to develop the EU's intelligence and policy-planning capabilities in Brussels as well as in the world.
- Making better use of the interaction with NGO's, think-tanks and academic institutions: A wider network of networks would give us valuable input to our policy-making process – in turn making the EU a more effective global actor.
- As to our crisis-management instruments, we should continue developing useful and flexible military instruments, including for smaller-scale, rapid-response operations. In this context, we intend to take a fresh look at how the EU Battlegroups could best be used. On the civilian side, Rule-of-law missions have proven critical to success in complex processes of state-building and governance. Progress has been made in this area on which we want to build further.



> *Inauguration of EUPM, January 2003*

- The financial crisis is also likely to have effects on regional and global security, highlighting the need for the EU to better use its economic and trade policies to complement the diplomatic, crisis management and other external instruments.

We need to work closely with partners on the global scene. Effective multilateralism is a prerequisite for success in complex state-building and stability operations. Also in this area, we have seen important progress over recent years – including through a closer cooperation with the UN – but there is still scope for improvement.

My conviction is that we need to set up something like a European Institute for Peace to be able to structure these wider contacts, assist us in conducting informal diplomacy and possibly also to help us draw the right lessons for the future with regard to the conduct of our missions and operations.

A joint and sustained effort is needed to sharpen the instruments in order to enhance the EU's role as a global actor. I hope the Swedish Presidency of the EU will be able to assist in setting the path in the right direction.



> *EU Battlegroups in training*



> *Logo of the Swedish Presidency of the Council of the EU*

“The EU represents the aspiration for a world governed by law”

> By Robert Cooper, Director-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs at the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU

Robert Cooper is Director-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs at the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union since 2002. He is responsible to Javier Solana, High Representative of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, and has assisted with the implementation of European strategic, security and defence policy. He previously worked in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and as an adviser to Tony Blair in 10 Downing street. He is the author of "The breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the 21st century".



> Robert Cooper

The European Union is not a state; and if you judge it against the standards of states it will often fail. It cannot make decisions as quickly as a state, nor can it back them up with resources as states can. In the EU a lot of time and energy is spent on forging a consensus, which leaves less for promoting Europe's interests externally. When the EU acts abroad in the mode of a classical power it needs to borrow the authority and the assets of its Member States. The ambition of the EU cannot often be much greater than the sum of the ambitions of its Member States, and they are not always ambitious. Nevertheless the Europeans can sometimes achieve much more by acting together than on their own.

Those who talk glibly about Europe as a coming super-power would do well to note them. But without denying the criticisms it is also possible to look at the last ten years in a different light.

We are still young compared with NATO or the UN. We are still work in progress

I have chosen that time frame deliberately: it is ten years since the appointment of Javier Solana as High Representative, and ten years since the EU first started organising itself to undertake military or civilian operations abroad. That means that we are still

young compared with NATO or the UN. We are still work in progress; but I do not think that we should be ashamed of what we have done in this period, though as ever in life this falls short of all that we could have done.

We should remember what came before. I was not directly involved myself but my memory of Europe in the 1990s is of us scrambling collectively to deal with the break up of Yugoslavia, trying without any organised machinery to reach a shared analysis, not succeeding at that, and then failing in our attempts to do anything serious as violence unfolded in Bosnia. At the end of the decade we gave ourselves some of the means to do better next time. The machinery created then, and developed over the ten years, has managed 22 operations overseas with a reasonable degree of success.

None of these missions has saved the world but they have saved lives; and they have made some parts of the world a better place

None of these missions has saved the world but they have saved lives; and they have made some parts of the world a better place. There is always more that could be done and resources are short; but I do not think we should be ashamed of what we have been able to do.

The second thing to say about the last ten years is this. When the international history of this period is written I guess that people will identify two world-changing developments. The first is the emergence of China as a major power. The second is the stabilisation of Central Europe. Many people played a part in this: Mikhail Gorbachev for a start, and national leaders such as Vaclav Havel and Bronislaw Geremek as well. The United States had a key role and so did NATO. Nevertheless I doubt if I am alone in believing that the enlargement of the EU played the central role in ensuring that, contrary to all historical experience, the revolutions ended in decently governed democracies.



> Discussion between EU High Representative Javier Solana and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon before the working lunch of the UN-EU-AU Conference on Somalia, 23 April 2009



> *Enlargement of the EU, Day of welcomes – Dublin, 1 May 2004*

That 27 countries do not always agree is not a surprise; what is remarkable is that they frequently find a sufficient basis of agreement to act together, even in areas such as Kosovo where there are also fundamental policy differences. Pluralism has its problems but also its merits. If the EU is slow to decide it may also be slow to make mistakes – which is not always the case with major powers. Looking back over the past ten years the EU's record as a foreign policy actor seems at least as constructive as those of the US, China, India and Russia. Others may not shake in their shoes at the mention of the EU. Should we be ashamed of that? Perhaps we might even take perverse pride in the fact that after centuries of bloodshed and imperial conquest Europe has moved on.

The world does not need another great power in the 19th century mode. The EU represents the aspiration for a world governed by law. This reflects the nature of the EU, itself a community of law. And one way or another it is the direction in which almost all our external policies point. In the 20th century such ideas were dangerously idealistic; in the 21st they may be the only way to organise a complex and interdependent planet. In amongst this lies the question of whether we can be a power without being a state. This remains to be answered. But it seems worth a try.

In different ways almost all ESDP operations contribute to the strengthening of states or to the spread of the rule of law; often there are two sides of the same coin. This is most obvious with Missions such as EULEX in Kosovo, EUPM in Bosnia or EUPOL COPPS in Palestine. But it is also true for Atalanta which is defending international law off the coasts of the Horn of Africa or EUMM in Georgia which is there to create an environment in which law rather than force or fear can govern peoples lives.

Of course there are many failings and failures – the latter is a normal characteristic of foreign policy. But we have made progress in the last ten years and there is potential for more.

The EU itself has been 50 years in the making, and it was designed to promote the economic welfare of its members rather than for foreign policy. So we should not be surprised if turning the EU into something like a power is not done overnight. Anything worthwhile takes time.

This is an extract of an article reprinted with the kind permission of Charles Grant.

To consult the article in its integrity, please consult "Is Europe doomed to fail as a power?" Essay by Charles Grant, with a response by Robert Cooper, Centre for European Reform, July 2009: <http://www.cer.org.uk/>

Résumé

L'UE représente une vision du monde gouvernée par le droit

L'UE n'est pas un Etat, et ne peut être jugée comme tel selon les mêmes critères. Beaucoup d'énergie et de temps sont en effet consacrés à atteindre un consensus. Souvent, l'ambition de l'UE ne peut guère être beaucoup plus importante que celles de ses Etats membres, et ces derniers ne sont pas toujours ambitieux. Néanmoins, ce que nous pouvons faire ensemble est bien plus important que ce que chacun pourrait faire individuellement.

La Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense a dix ans. Elle est relativement jeune comparée à l'OTAN ou aux Nations Unies. Beaucoup reste encore à faire mais je crois que nous n'avons pas à avoir honte de ce que nous avons réalisé jusqu'à maintenant. Si aucune des 22 missions que l'UE a lancé depuis 2003 n'a sauvé le monde, elles ont en tous les cas contribué à faire en sorte que certains endroits soient plus vivables.

Un monde gouverné par le droit, c'est au 21^e siècle, la seule façon d'organiser le monde tel qu'il est aujourd'hui : complexe et interdépendant.

Quelles ambitions pour la Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense en 2020?



Par Claude-France Arnould, Directeur des questions de défense au Secrétariat général du Conseil de l'UE

Ministre plénipotentiaire, Claude-France Arnould est Directeur pour les questions de défense au Secrétariat général du Conseil de l'Union européenne depuis 2001. Elle a été directrice des Affaires internationales et stratégiques au Secrétariat général de la défense nationale de 1998 à 2001 puis Premier conseiller à l'Ambassade de France en Allemagne de 1994 à 1998.

Secrétaire général de l'École nationale d'administration de 1987 à 1989, Claude-France Arnould a également été conseillère technique auprès du ministre délégué chargé des Affaires européennes en 1986.



> Claude-France Arnould

Parler d'ambitions de la Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense est toujours ambivalent, et peut évoquer soit une recherche un peu vaine de se faire valoir soit, à l'opposé, cette ambition bénéfique évoquée par Montesquieu, pour qui: "Une noble ambition est un sentiment utile à la société, lorsqu'il se dirige bien". L'ambition de la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense peut certainement être "utile à la société", européenne et internationale.

Les paramètres essentiels d'une prospective à dix ans vont au-delà de la question posée sur la PESD, mais détermineront la réponse. Que sera l'UE dans une décennie?

Quel sera son fonctionnement institutionnel? Le traité de Lisbonne aura-t-il été ratifié? Si non, mais même peut-être si oui, un autre traité sera-t-il intervenu entre temps? Entre 1990 et 2000, trois traités se sont en effet succédés. Des dispositions auront-elles été mises en œuvre sans nécessiter de traité, comme cela a été le cas de l'Agence de défense européenne? Où que l'on en soit dans la ratification des textes, beaucoup dépendra de la volonté du Conseil et du Conseil européen et des personnalités qui seront en place, à Bruxelles comme dans les capitales.

Quels seront ses Etats membres? Combien y aura-t-il d'élargissements et seront-ils accompagnés de réformes institutionnelles, avec ou sans des coopérations plus étroites dans le cadre ou hors des traités?

Enfin, quel sera le contexte mondial, en termes stratégiques, économiques, d'accès aux ressources naturelles et de climat, avec les tensions que cela peut induire?

Cette cascade de questions illustre les incertitudes. Or, la PESD est éminemment sensible à l'état des institutions et au périmètre de l'Union européenne. La politique de défense et de sécurité ne peut se développer que dans un contexte d'institutions qui fonctionnent, avec des niveaux de responsabilité et de décision clairement définis, une cohérence des politiques, une solidarité des Etats membres, sauf à recourir à des coopérations plus étroites.

Je me concentrerai sur quelques défis qui me paraissent devoir être surmontés pour donner à la PESD, peut-être devenue demain "Politique de sécurité et de défense", la chance de répondre aux attentes qu'elle a fait naître et aux besoins qu'elle est la mieux à même de satisfaire.

Les défis à surmonter...

La PESD a derrière elle une décennie de succès aussi indéniables que méconnus. L'UE a su passer à l'action, en privilégiant la conduite des

opérations à la fois militaires et civiles à l'architecture conceptuelle et institutionnelle. Née du consensus sur la nécessité pour l'Union d'assumer ses responsabilités dans les Balkans, y compris par le déploiement de la force, elle s'est adaptée à l'évolution des besoins, qu'il s'agisse des opérations militaires en Afrique ou des missions civiles sur des théâtres très exigeants. Concernant les capacités, les derniers projets confiés à l'Agence européenne de défense illustrent, là aussi, le caractère pragmatique des travaux de la PESD.

... sont pourtant de taille

Le plus important, ou du moins le plus immédiat, est certainement d'éviter un décalage entre ce qui est attendu de la PESD et les moyens qui sont mis à sa disposition. Car cet écart risque de se creuser, sous le double effet des difficultés financières actuelles et de l'engagement accru des Européens, au sein de l'Alliance Atlantique, en Afghanistan.

La demande pour que l'Union européenne intervienne face aux crises est exponentielle, particulièrement dans le domaine civil. L'Union européenne a vocation, grâce à la panoplie d'instruments qu'elle peut déployer, à répondre à ce besoin et ce sont des capacités massives d'intervention qui sont attendues d'elle, qu'il s'agisse de policiers, de juges, d'observateurs... Mais dans le domaine militaire aussi, la contraction des budgets de défense, les besoins opérationnels en Afghanistan, qui pèseront en tous cas pendant les premières années de la prochaine décennie, vont réduire de plus en plus les capacités de contribuer à des opérations de l'UE.

D'opération en opération, on constate un paradoxe: l'implication de plus en plus faible des plus gros Etats membres et de plus en plus forte des autres Etats, notamment parmi ceux qui ont rejoint l'UE lors des derniers élargissements. Ces derniers ont la volonté d'être des acteurs exemplaires en tant que membres de l'Union européenne, et de concrétiser leur soutien aux Nations Unies, ce qui a pu l'emporter sur les réticences naturelles à s'engager sur un théâtre parfois étranger à tous égards.

Une question hante beaucoup d'esprits à Bruxelles, malgré la confirmation explicite de l'engagement français en faveur de la PESD: la France va-t-elle continuer, dans les prochaines années, d'être le principal contributeur des opérations de l'UE, dans sa nouvelle position au sein de l'OTAN et du fait des mesures de réorganisation de son système de défense? Malgré l'atout majeur que donnent à l'Union la mobilisation des petits et moyens Etats et la participation d'Etats tiers, la PESD ne peut se développer ou même se poursuivre sans l'engagement des Etats membres ayant les plus fortes capacités de défense.

Cette tendance à une raréfaction des ressources de la PESD ne peut être contrebalancée que par une perception accrue de sa nécessité. Or, pour le moment, la PESD s'assimile essentiellement à un effort de l'Union face à des situations humanitaires douloureuses et à une incarnation de l'engagement politique de l'UE. Ici ou là, la PESD reste même soupçonnée de "s'inventer des opérations ou des missions" pour exister... Curieusement, ce soupçon lui reste réservé.

Les Etats membres ont des intérêts vitaux de défense, qu'ils préservent aujourd'hui, pour la plupart d'entre eux, dans le cadre de l'OTAN, mais aussi des intérêts de sécurité plus larges de sécurité intérieure. La PESD en même temps qu'elle doit répondre à ses objectifs humanitaires et diplomatiques, doit contribuer à répondre à ces exigences plus larges de sécurité et le faire visiblement.

En outre, la PESD ne sera pleinement légitime que si elle s'accompagne d'une réelle solidarité, à la fois financière et politique.

Les Etats membres de l'UE doivent également pouvoir répartir rationnellement leurs efforts entre les différents cadres multilatéraux et le niveau national: pour déterminer le cadre le plus approprié, il importe de répondre à la question: avec qui voulons-nous agir et pouvons nous agir au mieux? Ce sont les circonstances propres à la crise qui doivent déterminer la préférence, et l'UE doit pouvoir en discuter en toute clarté avec ses partenaires, et en particulier avec les Etats-Unis. Il faut aussi que les Etats membres fassent un choix clair entre action nationale et action de l'UE. Les deux niveaux peuvent se renforcer utilement, mais uniquement s'ils sont efficacement coordonnés.

Les atouts

Abordée de manière conceptuelle, la question du développement de la PESD est aussi sensible et potentiellement conflictuelle que l'a été celle de la monnaie ou de la politique étrangère. Elle est même plus explosive encore, car elle touche au plus vif de la souveraineté nationale et à la relation de défense avec les Etats-Unis. Mais l'approche pragmatique a donné à la PESD toutes ses chances et elle devrait s'imposer à l'avenir avec de plus en plus de force. Aucun Etat membre n'a les moyens d'être un acteur isolé face aux crises, a fortiori du fait de l'évolution démographique. De surcroît, politiquement, la légitimité à agir seul est de plus en plus douteuse.

La PESD, indissociable de la PESC, a profondément transformé celle-ci, la faisant progressivement échapper aux travers de la coopération politique. La politique de sécurité et de défense doit cependant converger avec l'ensemble des politiques de l'Union. Quelle que soit la crise ou la menace, la solution ne peut reposer que sur la mise en œuvre, au service d'une politique à définir, des instruments appropriés: aide économique, mesures commerciales, visas, développement, assistance humanitaire, opérations de gestion de crise, civile et militaire, mesures concernant les trafics illégaux, la coopération policière... Le traité de Lisbonne permettrait une radicale amélioration.

Comment surmonter les défis et tirer parti des atouts de la PESD? La première condition est d'inscrire réellement dans la réalité la cohérence des instruments de l'Union.

Cette possibilité sera accrue si le traité de Lisbonne entre en vigueur. Toutefois, même avec le traité, elle ne sera pas complètement donnée; sans le traité, elle ne serait pas non plus impossible. Nous devons nous assurer que toutes nos actions dans le cadre de l'Union européenne sont inscrites dans une stratégie et

authentiquement coordonnées. Concrètement, comment y parvenir? Les structures et procédures du traité de Lisbonne, si elles sont mises en œuvre dans un souci d'efficacité et dans une volonté de coopération réelle, feront franchir un pas décisif. Mais ces améliorations ne feront que faciliter une mise en œuvre cohérente des moyens d'action. Trois éléments détermineront la réussite. Le premier est que le Conseil – et le Conseil européen – joue pleinement son rôle de mise en cohérence.

Il faudrait, deuxièmement, que la Commission ait la possibilité de mieux assurer l'impact opérationnel de ses programmes et de ses instruments financiers. Or, à la différence des acteurs de la PESD, elle n'opère pas directement. Il est difficilement imaginable que d'ici à dix ans, les politiques communautaires d'action extérieure ne soient pas guidées par une plus forte exigence d'efficacité, mesurable et visible, et ne soient pas davantage liées à la PESC/PESD et aux capacités des Etats membres, y compris grâce à la symbiose que facilitera le service d'action extérieure. Dernier élément, il faut faire converger non seulement premier, deuxième et troisième pilier, mais aussi, améliorer la synergie avec l'action bilatérale des Etats membres.

La deuxième condition pour réussir est de savoir et de pouvoir opérer ensemble, ce qui comporte plusieurs exigences: l'interopérabilité des matériels, mais aussi des hommes. Les diverses perspectives de coopération renforcées, y compris la coopération permanente structurée, pourraient, en cas de blocage persistant, permettre des avancées significatives de la part de ceux des Etats membres qui seraient prêts à aller plus avant sur tous ces points. Enfin, l'UE devra disposer des moyens de planification et de conduite les mieux à même de lui permettre de faire converger en une approche globale sa stratégie politique, ses capacités militaires et civiles, et l'ensemble des moyens, y compris communautaires, mais aussi d'offrir la meilleure garantie de professionnalisme et d'efficacité.

La réussite dépendra de cette cohérence de l'action. Mais elle dépendra également de la capacité de l'UE à mieux gérer l'information concernant la PESD: celle qu'il faut recueillir et celle qu'il faut diffuser afin de "connaître et faire connaître". C'est peut-être le domaine où l'UE a le plus de progrès à accomplir dans la décennie à venir. L'Union doit aussi être capable de faire connaître ce qu'elle fait à ses citoyens et à leurs élus ainsi qu'à ses partenaires. Mais Bruxelles ne pourra faire entendre ce que fait l'Union dans le domaine de la sécurité et de la défense que si les Etats membres relaient le même message.

Le pari que l'on peut faire est que, d'ici dix ans, sauf événement majeur venant bouleverser la donne, événement extérieur à la construction européenne ou interne, une politique de défense commune mise en œuvre dans le cadre de l'Union restera peut-être encore une perspective malgré la clause de défense mutuelle, mais qu'une politique commune de sécurité sera en place, fondée sur la cohérence des instruments de l'Union. C'est peut-être un pari trop audacieux, peut-être au contraire trop timoré; mais il correspond à un développement naturel après dix premières années de succès et à une ambition réaliste à laquelle il est possible de s'atteler.

Vous pourrez lire l'intégralité de cet article, en anglais, dans l'ouvrage publié par l'Institut d'études de sécurité: What ambitions for European defence in 2020? La version française de cet ouvrage est attendue pour début 2010.

Nous avons développé un sentiment de confiance dans l'efficacité de la PESD

À l'approche de la fin de son mandat, le Général Bentegeat dresse le bilan de ses trois années d'expérience à la tête du Comité militaire de l'Union européenne.

Le Général Bentegeat a été désigné Président du Comité militaire de l'Union européenne par le Conseil de l'UE à compter du 6 novembre 2006. Auparavant, sa carrière s'est partagée entre responsabilités opérationnelles en métropole et outre-mer, responsabilités dans les domaines de l'international (Washington) et des affaires stratégiques, et enfin, responsabilités dans le domaine politico-militaire (état-major particulier du Président de la République). Le général Bentegeat sera remplacé à son poste le 6 novembre prochain par le Général suédois Hakan Syren.



> Henri Bentegeat

Le 6 novembre 2009, mon mandat de Président du Comité militaire de l'Union européenne, c'est-à-dire de représentant des chefs d'état-major des 27 armées nationales de l'Union, prendra fin.

Je n'ai pas oublié mes débuts, il y a trois ans. Je n'étais pas un incondicional de l'Europe, mais la tâche m'intéressait parce que je sentais confusément qu'il y avait quelque chose à faire et que, derrière les mots, les concepts et les débats politiques, il pouvait y avoir un projet concret.

Aujourd'hui, en passant le relais à mon successeur, je peux dire que j'ai eu la chance de vivre en direct les progrès tangibles de l'Union dans le domaine de la défense et de la sécurité. J'ai pu surtout mesurer la contribution de l'Union européenne aux efforts de paix et de stabilisation de la communauté internationale mais aussi ce que l'Europe de la défense apporte à chacun de nos pays.

C'est un fait, la Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense (PESD) existe et elle fonctionne plutôt bien. Dans le seul domaine militaire, au cours des trois dernières années, l'Union a permis le déroulement des premières élections libres au Congo depuis quarante ans et a lancé deux nouvelles opérations, au Tchad et en République Centrafricaine d'une part, et au large des côtes somaliennes, contre la piraterie, d'autre part.

EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, EUNAVFOR: ces deux dernières entreprises méritent qu'on s'y attarde

Au Tchad et en Centrafrique, plus de 400.000 réfugiés et les organisations humanitaires qui les aidaient à survivre étaient victimes d'agressions continuelles de bandes armées. Les Nations unies et l'Union africaine, engagées au Darfour voisin, ne pouvaient assurer leur sécurité. Le déploiement de la force européenne, répondant à une exigence morale sans lien avec la sécurité des ressortissants européens, a permis non seulement de protéger les populations déplacées, d'assurer le soutien humanitaire, mais a aussi contribué à la stabilité régionale.

Cette opération, à laquelle 18 pays européens ont contribué avec des déploiements d'unités, a démontré la capacité de l'Union à

planifier et conduire une opération d'envergure dans un environnement difficile, un tour de force logistique dont peu la croyaient capable. Ce fut aussi l'occasion d'une première planification fructueuse conjointe avec la Commission européenne qui a préparé et organisé le retour des déplacés tchadiens dans leurs villages d'origine.

L'opération maritime EUNAVFOR-Atalanta, quant à elle, souscrit à deux objectifs ambitieux, soulager la Somalie ravagée par plusieurs décennies de guerre civile et défendre les intérêts commerciaux européens. Nul n'ignore en effet que les trois-quarts des approvisionnements maritimes de l'Europe passent par le Golfe d'Aden. L'action des pirates était donc susceptible d'augmenter sensiblement le coût des denrées importées par l'Union. Parallèlement, la situation en Somalie exigeait que l'acheminement maritime de l'aide humanitaire soit protégé et que la force africaine AMISOM de soutien au gouvernement somalien puisse ravitailler sans crainte des pillards.

Les succès rapidement obtenus par EUNAVFOR sont le résultat d'un partenariat efficace avec les autres participants à la lutte contre la piraterie. Ils sont aussi le résultat d'une exceptionnelle coopération civilo-militaire, à Bruxelles, à Northwood et dans l'Océan Indien. Aujourd'hui, l'Union veut aller plus loin dans son effort pour éliminer les racines de la piraterie en aidant la Somalie à rétablir l'Etat de droit.

Collectivement, nous avons développé un sentiment de confiance dans l'efficacité de la PESD

Ces deux opérations incarnent les progrès réalisés par l'Europe dans sa capacité à défendre ses intérêts et ses valeurs. Dans cette période, j'ai vu évoluer les institutions et les procédures, mais aussi et surtout les mentalités. Le Comité militaire a davantage pris conscience de l'utilité de son rôle et de l'efficacité potentielle de ses moyens. Collectivement, nous avons développé un sentiment de confiance dans l'efficacité de la PESD.

Cette confiance, fondée sur des résultats concrets, a été aussi alimentée par le développement constant et régulier de nos capacités


 > EUFOR TCHAD/RCA

militaires collectives, chaîne de commandement, concepts et procédures opérationnelles, réaction rapide, identification et élimination de nos lacunes... L'Etat-major de l'Union européenne et l'Agence européenne de Défense ont joué un rôle-clé dans ce domaine. Citons, pour l'exemple, quelques réalisations significatives: le Plan de développement capacitaire géré par l'Agence en collaboration étroite avec le Comité militaire, le Centre d'opérations de l'Etat-major, les cinq Quartiers généraux mis à disposition de l'UE, l'interarmement de groupements tactiques de réaction rapide. Autant d'activités peu visibles de l'extérieur mais qui constituent le socle de notre capacité d'action.

Il y a désormais, dans le monde, une attente d'Europe

Restons lucide. Il serait vain de nier les difficultés, les attermoissements, les compromis. Comme dans toute société humaine, les égoïsmes, les arrière-pensées et les prudences excessives compliquent et freinent l'action collective. Mais l'Union européenne a pour elle d'être la seule organisation au monde à pouvoir mobiliser simultanément, pour prévenir ou gérer des crises, des moyens financiers, juridiques, policiers et militaires conséquents. Il y a désormais, dans le monde, une attente d'Europe. Nous ne pouvons la satisfaire que partiellement et nous connaissons nos limites. Mais ce que nous pouvons apporter à la Communauté internationale, personne d'autre ne peut le faire aujourd'hui avec les mêmes atouts.

Pour progresser, il reste à relever trois défis

Le premier, le plus important, est d'accélérer l'intégration de notre capacité d'action globale à l'extérieur. Beaucoup de progrès ont été faits mais le chemin de la coopération civilo-militaire reste long et plein d'embûches. Nous devons pouvoir mieux exploiter le formidable potentiel de l'Union européenne au service de la paix et de la stabilité. Les institutions, les procédures et les esprits peuvent encore évoluer. A terme la planification et la gestion des crises doivent être totalement intégrées à Bruxelles, comme sur le terrain.

Le deuxième défi est celui de la crise économique. Elle pèse déjà sur les budgets de défense de tous les pays européens. Certes, l'Agence européenne de Défense nous offre la possibilité de mieux dépenser nos ressources limitées de manière plus efficace. Mais cela ne suffira pas si nous voulons conserver notre autonomie et notre

capacité d'action. Comment pourrions-nous assumer l'abstention et l'impuissance face au déferlement de violences et de désordres que la crise ne manquera pas d'engendrer dans les régions les plus défavorisées?

Le dernier défi, crucial pour nous comme pour la Communauté internationale, est celui du renforcement de nos partenariats avec l'ONU, avec l'OTAN, avec l'Union africaine et d'autres encore. La prévention des conflits et l'éradication du terrorisme exigent une totale coopération entre les acteurs. L'Union européenne ne peut contribuer à la paix en s'isolant. Les partenariats avec les Nations unies et l'Union africaine sont essentiels pour l'encadrement et la continuité de nos actions. Le partenariat avec l'OTAN est crucial dans le domaine militaire.

L'Europe de la défense est un projet récent, à peine six ans depuis la première opération. C'est un succès fragile et encore limité mais nous sommes convaincus que ce que nous faisons est utile et efficace.

Résumé

General Henri Bentegeat, who is approaching the end of his 3-years terms as chairman of the EU Military Committee, tells us about his first impression when he arrived in Brussels, and what he thinks has been achieved since:

When I arrived in 2006, I was not necessarily a Euro-enthusiast. Nevertheless, now that I have to hand over the reins to my successor, I can say that I was fortunate in having the privilege to directly experience the tangible progress of the Union in the field of security and defence.

It is a fact that the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) exists and works which can be noticed in the military domain. Indeed, our trust is based on concrete achievements and has grown in parallel with the steady development of our collective military capacities, of our chain of command, operational procedures and concepts, our prompt reactions and the identification and elimination of our gaps.

In order to improve our capacity to meet them, three challenges still have to be faced. The first one and the most important, is to accelerate the integration of our overall external action. The second challenge is the economic crisis and its potential impact on defence expenditure, and the last one is to reinforce our partnerships with the UN, NATO, the African Union and others.

The European Security Strategy: Today and tomorrow



by Helga Schmid, Director of the Policy Unit of the HR Solana

Other contributors have outlined in these pages what the EU has achieved during this period, in deploying ESDP operations around the world and strengthening its capabilities. Helga Schmid looks at how these achievements fit into the wider strategic outlook, and where the EU goes next.



> Helga Schmid

Helga Maria Schmid, Director of the Policy and Early Warning Unit, joined the Council General Secretariat in January 2006. Before that Helga Schmid, a German diplomat, worked in the cabinets of Foreign Ministers Klaus Kinkel and Joschka Fischer. She headed Foreign Minister Fischer's Political Staff from 2003 until the end of 2005. Ms Schmid joined the German Foreign Service in 1990. At the beginning of the 90's she worked as advisor to the Minister of State for European Affairs and as press attachée for the German Embassy in Washington.

The European Security Strategy (ESS) was adopted in 2003. For the first time, the EU agreed on a joint threat assessment and set clear objectives for advancing its security interests, based on our core values. Entitled 'A Secure Europe in a Better World', the text identified global challenges and key threats – terrorism, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime – that we face, and sets out the principles which guide our response. Today, the ESS is a familiar reference point. It is easy to forget the stir that it caused at the time. Only a few months after divisions between Member States over the US-led invasion of Iraq, the European Union was able to describe, in a simple, readable form, our distinct strategic culture.

The ESS remains fully valid. But the world has changed since 2003, and we recognise that our outlook must evolve as well. Five years later, in December 2008, Javier Solana presented an Report on the Implementation of the ESS to the European Council, in line with a mandate agreed by Heads of State and Government in 2007. Called 'Providing Security in a Changing World', this report, elaborated in association with the European Commission, examines how the strategy has worked in practice, and what should be done to improve its implementation. The European Council endorsed its analysis. Together, these set out an updated conceptual basis for European foreign policy

An updated conceptual basis

As the Report on Implementation emphasised, our security environment is changing with bewildering speed. We face complex problems, often interlinked, which defy traditional distinctions between domestic and foreign policy. As in 2003, the main threats are WMD, terrorism, organised crime and regional conflict. But other issues have

become more pressing in the meantime, such as the security implications of climate change, energy supply, cyber-security and piracy. Often, these problems come bundled together. In Afghanistan and Pakistan today, for example, we face enormous challenges, which include radicalisation and terrorism, regional tensions, economic pressures, migration, the trade in drugs, and nuclear proliferation.

A comprehensive approach

Our response must take a comprehensive approach. Military means alone are not enough. We need a mix of policies, covering economic development, stronger political institutions, improved rule of law, and counter-terrorism measures, among others. At its best, the European Union is uniquely placed to deliver this approach. We aspire not just to stop conflict, but to address the underlying causes. Our ESDP missions, whether patrolling sea lanes, protecting refugees, policing post-conflict societies or monitoring ceasefires, bring together classic peacekeeping with state-building and stabilisation. And, often, they can open doors in places like Georgia where others cannot.

It is encouraging that, increasingly, others are talking the same language. The Obama Administration came to office with a similar view of the world. Hillary Clinton talks about "smart power", bringing together hard and soft instruments. Ann-Marie Slaughter, my counterpart at the State Department, sees a "networked world", framed by our interconnection. The recent Russian National Security Strategy described a wide range of threats, including failed states, climate change and disease. In the process sparked by President Medvedev's proposals on European Security, we have been able to frame the terms of debate around just such a comprehensive definition of security.



> European Council, December 2003



> Meeting of the European Council, Brussels, 11 and 12 December 2008

Matching ambition with action

But much remains to be done, if we are to match our ambitions. Within Europe, we need more coherence and better capabilities. The Lisbon Treaty will provide a framework towards achieving the former. But we also need to improve our capabilities over ESDP, in generating contributions from Member States for new operations, financing them, and improving the way that our instruments interact on the ground, especially in stabilising war-torn societies. Too much of Europe's armed forces are still configured for territorial defence within our continent. We lack civilian experts – judges, police and administrators – in sufficient numbers to build lasting stability in places that are recovering from conflict. We need better headquarters and command structures, greater ability to combine civilian and military planning at all stages of the operational cycle, and more flexible financial systems. Strategic airlift, helicopters, space assets and maritime surveillance are all in short supply. So, sometimes, is public support. Too often, policy makers have failed to explain why deployment in distant places is necessary to safeguard our security within Europe. Yet it is an essential component for success.

In our neighbourhood, we need to be more ambitious. The ESS talked about creating a ring of stable, well-governed states around the EU. The Union for the Mediterranean, and the Eastern Partnership, have provided a new institutional basis. The challenge is to muster political engagement and resources to match. This is not about spheres of influence, or geopolitics. Prosperity and stability benefit all alike.

At an international level, we need to reshape the system. Globalisation is changing our world. Power is shifting, from west to east, and beyond governments, to other actors. No player, no matter how powerful, can address current global problems alone. Cooperation is indispensable, but it can only happen through a system which reflects modern realities. To ensure that multilateralism remains effective, we need to modernise the membership and working of international institutions. As Europeans, this involves a

Résumé

La Stratégie européenne de sécurité : aujourd'hui et demain

La Stratégie européenne de sécurité (SES) a été adoptée en 2003. Pour la première fois, l'UE s'est mis d'accord sur une évaluation commune des menaces et a déterminé des objectifs clairs pour faire avancer ses intérêts de sécurité, basés sur des valeurs communes. Cinq ans plus tard, lors du Conseil européen de décembre 2008, Javier Solana a présenté un rapport sur la mise en œuvre de la SES : "Assurer la sécurité dans un monde en mutation". Ce dernier analyse les changements à accomplir afin d'améliorer sa mise en œuvre. Ensemble, ces deux documents exposent un cadre conceptuel actualisé pour la politique étrangère européenne.

La réponse de l'UE doit être globale. Les moyens militaires ne sont pas suffisants et nous avons besoin de différents instruments qui assurent, notamment, le développement économique, des institutions politiques plus fortes, un Etat de droit qui fonctionne ainsi que des mesures de lutte contre le terrorisme. Seule l'UE est à même de fournir une telle approche. L'objectif n'est pas seulement de mettre fin aux conflits, mais également de pouvoir aborder ses causes sous-jacentes. En effet, les missions PESD lient le traditionnel maintien de la paix avec la stabilisation ou la reconstruction d'Etats.

Néanmoins, il reste encore énormément de choses à faire si nous voulons atteindre nos objectifs. Le traité de Lisbonne nous y aidera. Au niveau international, il est nécessaire que nous redéfinissions le système. Ceci implique un changement de mentalité pour les Européens, qui seront obligés de se rassembler et devront également être prêts à partager leurs décisions et leur fardeau avec d'autres.

change in mindset too. Our relative weight is reducing. That puts an onus on us to pull together, but also to be more open in sharing decisions and burdens with others.

Over the next ten years, these changes are likely to accelerate. If we are to respond, we need to rise to the challenges which I have described. Above all, it requires us to think rather differently than in the past. Historically, states have sought to secure or expand their interests at the expense of others. In a globalised world, this approach cannot bring security – if ever it could. Rather, we need to strengthen the connections between us. We need a foreign policy which seeks to build security through multilateralism and international law; which works for consensus, but is prepared to act when we must, and which combines the full range of our instruments. It is on this collaborative diplomacy that Europe was built. And it is only through this kind of foreign policy that we can hope to achieve security in our modern world. But, as always, we have to match words with deeds.

Promoting a European security culture

The European Security and Defence College (ESDC) was established in 2005, with the aim of providing strategic-level education in European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). It followed thorough need analysis and experimentation phases. The creation of the ESDC was to give the European Security and Defence Policy a training and education instrument which actively promotes a European security culture.



EU Member States participate in the effort on a voluntary basis. The training audience includes civil servants, diplomats, police officers, and military personnel from the EU Member States and EU institutions involved in ESDP. Partner countries and other international organisations are also invited to participate in some of the ESDC courses. In its first 4 years, the ESDC has developed into a key strategic ESDP training provider.

The ESDC is a virtual network college. Several national universities, academies, colleges and institutes contribute to the success of the ESDC. The network members are well known civilian and military educational and research institutions in Europe.

The objective of the ESDC is to provide Member States and EU Institutions with knowledgeable personnel able to work efficiently on ESDP matters. In pursuing this objective, the College makes a major contribution to a better understanding of ESDP in the overall context of CFSP and to promoting a common European security culture.

Helping to build professional relations and contacts at European level, the College activities promote a co-operative spirit and co-operative methods at all levels, from Alumni to inter-institutional projects.

The ESDC is the key provider of ESDP-related training. The flagship training is provided as the High Level Course (HLC). The HLC consists of five modules offered in five EU Member States, focusing on aspects such as history, capabilities, decision making process, ESDP missions/operations and future developments. Orientation courses (OC) for ESDP newcomers are

provided 4-5 times a year and last one week. Other courses focused on regional (e.g. Africa, Western Balkans) or on more specialised audiences (e.g. public information staff, strategic ESDP mission planners, security sector reform experts) also feature in the programme.

Currently, Member States are offering several new courses as pilot activities. These courses cover topics like Civil-Military Cooperation (CMCO), Gender aspects in ESDP missions, International Humanitarian Law, Peace-building and the development of capabilities.

The success of the ESDC courses lies in a mixture of making the best use of the academic expertise, contacts and experience of our network members and bringing to the courses the practical knowledge of the specialists from the European Institutions working on a day-to day basis on the important dossiers in the field of ESDP. During all ESDC courses, the Chatham House Rules are applied, thus creating an environment where the officials can give an open and frank view.

From the very beginning, the ESDC had to deal with its very limited resources: only a small permanent secretariat (currently three full time employees), no own budget and no own college rooms. To face these challenges, a high emphasis was placed on safeguarding the quality of our training activities. That is why each course is thoroughly evaluated and constant improvements are being made. Good relations with the European Institutions and with the network members make sure that the training activities are taking place in the best possible conditions, with the Secretariat playing the link between the two.




Hans-Bernhard Weisserth, Acting Head of the ESDC Secretariat within the General Secretariat of the Council, DG E, Defence Issues Directorate

The College is looking to fully develop its unique position as training actor and European network hub

From 2005 to 2009, the ESDC has trained some 1800 individuals from within and from outside the EU. Open Orientation Courses attracted course participants from third countries (e.g. USA, Russia, Japan, China, Australia) and international organisations (e.g. UN, OSCE, NATO).

From its unique position within the General Secretariat of the Council, the ESDC Secretariat plays a significant role in the yearly training cycle relevant to ESDP. Not only does the College



Résumé

Promouvoir une culture européenne de sécurité

Le Collège européen de sécurité et de défense (CESD), établi en 2005, est la principale source de formation en matière de PESD et a pour but de promouvoir une meilleure compréhension de la politique étrangère de l'UE et de renforcer la culture européenne de la sécurité. Il s'agit d'un réseau auquel contribuent des universités, des académies, des collèges et des instituts nationaux.

Le cours de haut niveau couvre des matières telles que l'histoire, la prise de décision, les missions PESD et les perspectives d'avenir. Le Collège propose également un cours d'orientation pour les nouveaux venus, ainsi que des

formations plus thématiques et spécialisées. Il opère avec des ressources très restreintes et un petit secrétariat permanent, mais sans budget propre ni salles de cours. Cela n'a pas empêché le CESD de former quelque 1.800 participants européens ou venant de pays tiers depuis 2005. Il compte actuellement étendre les formations proposées afin de couvrir les nouvelles questions de sécurité.

Le CESD occupe un rôle central dans une nouvelle initiative adoptée sous la présidence française en 2008, visant l'échange de jeunes officiers au sein de l'UE (idée inspirée du programme communautaire Erasmus).

contribute significantly to the execution of the training programme through the delivery of its courses, its small Secretariat plays a key role in the analysis of the training requirements, the development of the EU training programme relevant to ESDP and the evaluation of this training programme through the Comprehensive Annual Report on Training (CART).

On the solid foundations already established, the European Security and Defence College is looking to fully develop its unique position as training actor and European network hub. This goes in line with an ever-increasing demand for ESDP training, which the future evolution of the Union will only strengthen. The greater complexity of ESDP in present and future operations will also require more specialised staff to be trained in ESDP matters.

To meet these challenges already on the horizon, the ESDC is looking to increase and broaden its course provision and to adapt it rapidly to specialist audiences and specific domains. The tools to this end are the modular course planning and delivery method, the full implementation of the Internet-based Distance Learning (IDL) system, and of course, an augmentation of the currently small, but active and responsive Secretariat team.

As directed by the new Joint Action of 2008, the ESDC Secretariat presented a study on the future perspectives of the College in autumn 2008. The recommendations were adopted by the Council in December 2008, and the implementation is ongoing.

The European Initiative for the Exchange of Military Young Officers (inspired by Erasmus)

Under the French Presidency in the second half on 2008, the Council approved an initiative aiming to increase the number of international exchanges during the initial academic and professional training of young officers. An initial stocktaking undertaken by the ESDC Secretariat in the summer of 2008 had shown clearly that the number of exchanges for military students was far lower than for their civilian counterparts. On the other hand, the ever increasing engagement of our young officers in peace-support operations makes it necessary for them to be able to work together closely with colleagues from other countries. Already having a first chance to meet with their counterparts from other Member States should significantly increase their 'interoperability'.

Based on the initial stocktaking, a number of recommendations were formulated and approved at the General Affairs and External Relations Council of 10 and 11 November 2008. The ESDC was given a crucial role in the implementation of these

measures and can count on the support of all 27 Member States to bring this task to a good end.

To elaborate the identified recommendations an Implementation Group (IG) was created in February 2009. This IG meets as a task-oriented format of the ESDC's Executive Academic Board, thus building on the existing ESDC network. Work immediately started on five different aspects that were identified as possible quick-wins. Three of these quick-wins already carry their first fruits:

- A common module on ESDP, based on the curriculum developed by ESDC, was organised in September 2009 by Portugal, with the participation of cadets from several Member States. In preparation, course material for this module has been developed by specialist from different network members and a train-the-trainer seminar has been successfully organised in Brussels in June, hosted by the Belgian Military Academy;
- A detailed stocktaking has been started and the replies from the Member States have been made available to the complete network. This will allow the interested educational institutes to easily identify partners to organise exchanges between them;
- Thanks to the Bulgarian Military University, a dedicated forum for the exchange of information, both between cadets and between the members of the Implementation Group has been set up. You can visit this forum on: <http://www.emilyo.eu>. Emilyo is an acronym that stands for the Exchange of Military Young Officers.

With the work on two other quick-wins still underway, the Implementation Group continues activity on several other lines of development, each covering one of the recommendations accepted by the Council. By the time this article appears, the second, more detailed stocktaking will be finished. This stocktaking was conducted with the cooperation of the Faculty of Law and Political Science of the University of Liège. It will form a keystone document for the further development of the Initiative.

Separate initiatives for the Air forces, Navies and Armies of some of the Member States predate this new European Initiative. So as not to duplicate or even hinder the activities of these forums for cooperation, the ESDC endeavours to keep in close contact with these groups.

Nevertheless, it will still take some time before the handicap military students are facing in the field of international exchanges is worked away. Only with the dedicated support of specialists from the 27 Member States can the ESDC hope to complete this challenging task.

ESDP's first steps



By Graham Messervy-Whiting

Major General Messervy-Whiting was recruited in March 2000 by Javier Solana to design the EU's military staff; head the implementation team to recruit, house, equip, train and deliver a fully capable team; then become its first Chief of Staff. He is now an academic at the University of Birmingham and a member of the judiciary for England and Wales.



Graham Messervy-Whiting

The European Union's politico-military structure started to take on flesh in late 1999. Javier Solana arrived as the first Secretary-General/High Representative, with Pierre de Boissieu as his Deputy, and the Policy Unit (PU) started to form up. In early 2000, an interim Political and Security Committee (iPSC) and interim Military Body (iMB) held their first meetings and the author was selected, as the first serving military officer in the Council General Secretariat, to head a team to design and deliver a new military Directorate-General, the EU Military Staff (EUMS). The design was completed, "sold" to all the stakeholders and approved by the end of that year.

By spring 2001, the EUMS was forming up and moving from the Justus Lipsius to the purpose-adapted Kortenberg building some 700 metres away. It did so not alone but along with all its key colleagues in the EU's politico-military structure, such as the bulk of the Directorate-General for External Affairs, the PU and the Joint Situation Centre. By the end of 2001, the Political and Security and Military Committees (PSC and EUMC) had taken their place as official Council bodies and a 130-strong EUMS had attained "full staff capability".

2002 saw: all elements of the politico-military structure beginning to work together productively

2002 saw: all elements of the politico-military structure beginning to work together productively; the development of the necessary concepts, policies and procedures; the EU's first crisis-management exercise; the launch of the first ESDP mission, the police mission in BiH; and the watershed of the long-awaited agreement between NATO and the EU. By spring 2003, the EU had launched its first military operation, CONCORDIA in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – an operation with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities; by that summer, the EU had launched its second military operation, ARTEMIS in the DRC – an operation without recourse to NATO.

A few personal snapshots of the first two weeks of what was to become the interim Military Staff. After Javier Solana's telephone call to me in England, on 8 March 2000, confirming my appointment to head the interim Military Staff (iMS) and asking me to start work as soon as possible, I quickly sorted out some temporary cover in my existing job, made the necessary family arrangements, then flew to Brussels to start things moving on 13 March. I walked into

the Justus Lipsius in civilian clothes on Day One, not wanting to cause too much consternation, but Solana quickly made it clear that he positively wanted ESDP's first steps to be militarily visible. I was made most welcome, not just by Solana and his Cabinet team, but also by Pierre de Boissieu and his senior leadership team, without whom nothing touching on people, budget, office-space, equipment or communications could have been achieved.

Having settled in to my temporary office, in the Fisheries corridor, the face-to-face briefing I presented for Solana's approval that first week was my outline work plan covering suggested main responsibilities, initial operating concept and draft timelines. The second such briefing, on 21 March, was for the selection of the first tranche of seven candidates to be called forward soonest from the Member States to start forming up the iMS, to be followed by a second tranche of five before the summer; several of these pioneers would bring with them their invaluable Western European Union experience of policy, plans and operations in the European arena. The third briefing, this time to de Boissieu and his team, covered: what the iMS needed logistically and pretty much immediately to start its design work, collocated in an empty conference room with the interim Situation Centre; and also an urgent draft input to the following year's Council Secretariat budget lines for a future EU Military Staff. On 24 March, I was invited by the Presidency to brief the iMB on how I saw the development of the iMS and its evolution into the EUMS.

I welcomed the first member of my team, Jean-Luc Lagadec, on 29 March. By the end of week two I had already given, at Solana's suggestion and in my Fisheries office, the first power-point presentation on the iMS to a curious but not unfriendly US Assistant Secretary of Defense. And so the ball started to roll!

Résumé

Les premiers pas de l'Etat major de l'UE

Le général Messervy-Whiting nous présente ses débuts dans ce qui allait devenir l'Etat-major de l'UE, lorsque, il y a presque dix ans, il fut recruté par le Haut Représentant Javier Solana afin de devenir le chef de l'Etat major intérimaire. Dans cet article, il raconte les premiers recrutements, dont certains arrivaient avec l'expérience de l'UEO, la logistique à mettre en place, le budget... bref, tout ce qui était nécessaire pour établir l'institution et mettre en place une équipe performante.

What ambition for European defence?



By Álvaro de Vasconcelos, Director of the EU Institute for Security Studies

Álvaro de Vasconcelos has been Director of the EU Institute for Security Studies since May 2007. Prior to this, he headed the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (IEEI) in Lisbon. As well as being a regular columnist in the Portuguese and international press, he is author and co-editor of many books, articles and reports, notably in the areas of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy and on the world order.



Álvaro de Vasconcelos, Director of the EU Institute for Security Studies

The EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) has marked the 10th anniversary of ESDP with a variety of initiatives, notably twin publications that focus on the first and the coming ten years of ESDP, and a seminar organised in Brussels together with the Swedish Presidency and the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (SIIA). Opened by Javier Solana and Carl Bildt, this seminar was also the occasion for the launch of the book *What Ambitions for European Defence in 2020?* This publication, in addition to the forthcoming volume that seeks to make sense of the scope and diversity of ESDP missions conducted so far, looks at the evolving strategic outlook. It makes a number of policy recommendations bearing in mind the rapidly changing international landscape which is witnessing the emergence of diverse global actors and a new multipolar configuration of power.



An “EU Peace Corps” by 2020

Practitioners, analysts and politicians who contributed to the book all agree that there is a clear need for the European Union to have the military capacity to act in order to ensure that multilateralism can really be effective. Europe must be able to intervene militarily to prevent large-scale crimes against humanity: this is essential if there are to be no more horrors like Bosnia, Rwanda or Darfur. But, as is strongly suggested too, this does not mean that ESDP is going to turn into a military alliance, a European version of NATO. Such a scenario simply does not make sense and will not be on the cards as long as the American commitment to European security exists. The reality is that the EU is building ESDP into a security tool indispensable to the conduct of foreign policy: an instrument designed to promote EU international standards that adds a vital element to its ability to promote peace, democracy and also, it must be added, development. In the years to come, it is likely that ESDP missions will be expanded to include disarmament and post-conflict stabilisation, both crucial for sustainable development to take root in troubled areas.

This in no way changes the EU’s essential civilian-power nature or makes it suddenly prone to legitimising power politics and using military force to impose its own interests. Protecting civilians will continue to be the main purpose of the EU’s defence policy – this is why human security is the guiding principle that underpins EU security culture. To do so effectively at a minimum cost to life and limb, the EU must be prepared to undertake the full range of military operations including peace enforcement. The military power that the EU builds up over the next ten years should be shaped for the energetic pursuit of its quest for peace and justice.

Overcoming the three deficits of ESDP

Far from evolving as a sort of new NATO, the ambition for ESDP is thus to create an “international peace force”, that constitutes a robust, readily-deployable civil-military tool serving the aims of EU foreign policy. The main conclusion that emerges from the EUISS’s new book is that EU states must swiftly agree, in 2010 at the latest, on definite steps to overcome the main shortcomings identified as follows:

(1) The foreign policy deficit. ESDP is an integral part of CFSP and in fact of all external action of the Union, born of the European conviction that the solution of international or regional crises is first and foremost political but that military force may need to be deployed at the service of that political solution. The fact is, paradoxically, that it has proven easier for the EU to deploy troops and field policemen than to define common positions and act on them. But when this happens, as it did in the immediate aftermath of the Georgia war in August 2008, the EU can act decisively to prevent the escalation of a dangerous conflict.

(2) The coherence deficit. If the EU’s strongest point is the ability to combine a wide variety of instruments, there is a recognised deficit on the implementation side between different EU institutions, and also at times between EU-defined and



> *EU High Representative Javier Solana, Director of the EU Institute for Security Studies Álvaro de Vasconcelos and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden Carl Bildt during the opening speech at the ESDP@10 seminary held in Brussels on 28 July 2009*

Member States' policies. Overcoming this deficiency is a major objective of the reforms agreed by EU Member States with the (as yet unratified) Lisbon Treaty.

(3) The joint capabilities deficit. There is no major lack of capabilities in Europe to deal with most of the contingencies where the EU's military involvement might be required, but there is a severe lack of joint capabilities; commitments made since the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999 have failed to fully materialise. There are 1,700 helicopters in military inventories, for instance, but when they are needed for crisis-management operations they are not available owing to training gaps or because mission requirements are not adequately met. The Member States do not need to spend more on defence, but rather to spend better and in a more coordinated manner.

Legitimacy will remain the key

To give the Union the ability to act in a more decisive way, the EUISS proposes 10 points for the next ten years. In this road map, it is stressed that the imperative need is not to jeopardise legitimacy for the sake of what may be mistakenly regarded as effectiveness. Today, ESDP enjoys high levels of public support, averaging some 76%, and is strongly backed by all national parliaments; moreover, it is based on sound multilateral legitimacy. This owes much to the fact that it is open to all Member States, and the EUISS strongly recommends this should not change. The Chad operation under Irish command provided a good example of the critical importance of combining national strengths when it comes to matching EU soft power with hard power – what Joseph Nye has called “smart power”.

The book opens with a quotation from Thucydides: “For those who make wise decisions are more formidable to their enemies than those who rush madly into strong action.” Under all circumstances, this must be the motto underlying EU external action, as Carl Bildt stressed at the Brussels seminar. As Javier Solana put it on

the same occasion, this means remaining “consistent in terms of the pursuit and application of our principles: liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.”

Résumé

Álvaro de Vasconcelos dirige l'Institut d'études de sécurité de l'UE depuis mai 2007, et, avant cela, l'Institut d'études stratégiques et internationales (IEEI) à Lisbonne.

L'Institut d'études de sécurité de l'UE (IES) a célébré le dixième anniversaire de la PESD par diverses initiatives, y compris un séminaire à Bruxelles, organisé avec la présidence suédoise et l'Institut suédois des affaires internationales.

Le 28 juillet 2009, l'IES a lancé un nouveau livre, “What Ambitions for European Defence in 2020?”, expliquant pourquoi l'UE doit avoir une capacité militaire qui lui permette d'intervenir pour promouvoir la paix, la démocratie, le développement, et de prévenir les crimes contre l'humanité.

L'IES affirme que les États membres de l'UE doivent prendre des mesures – d'ici à 2010 au plus tard – pour surmonter trois déficits essentiels. Il met l'accent sur les difficultés à atteindre des positions communes en matière de politique étrangère; un manque de cohérence dans la mise en œuvre par les différentes institutions et les États membres des instruments disponibles; et une carence en termes de mise en commun des capacités.

Afin de fournir à l'Union la capacité d'agir avec plus de détermination, l'IES présente une feuille de route comportant dix points pour les dix années à venir.

Building a more capable Europe



By Alexander Weis, Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency

In June 2003, the European Union's Heads of State and Government, meeting in Thessaloniki, decided that there be an Agency for improving Europe's military capabilities in support of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This decision, at the EU's highest decision-making level, underlined the political importance of European Defence Agency (EDA): without adequate military capabilities ESDP cannot fulfil its aim – to restore peace and to establish the conditions for creating stability in crisis areas. The European Security Strategy, approved by the end of the same year, confirmed this need: a "More Capable Europe" was identified as one of its policy implications, with explicit reference to the Agency as the tool to transform the militaries into more flexible, mobile forces and to increase capabilities.



Alexander Weis

Strategic Framework

Capability improvement without direction would be like a rudderless ship sailing on the ocean: the winds would take it anywhere and the destination would never be reached. For steering its activities and setting capability priorities the Agency and its Member States have established a strategic framework. It consists of four longer-term strategies, reflecting EDA's four functional areas, all of which are crucial to improve Europe's military capabilities:

- the Capability Development Plan (CDP), defining the future capability needs, from the short to the longer-term and taking into account lessons learned from real-life operations; the CDP is the overarching "strategic tool" as it drives R&T, armaments cooperation and defence industries;
- the European Defence Research & Technology (EDRT) strategy, defining in which key technologies to invest and how to do this most productively;
- the European Armaments Cooperation (EAC) strategy, describing how to come most quickly and most effectively from harmonised military requirements to armaments cooperation programmes;
- the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) strategy, describing the future European defence industrial landscape, based on the three Cs: Capability-driven, Competent and Competitive.

The linkage between the strategies is crucial, not only in theory but also in practice. For example, CDP priorities have to be connected to key technologies, identified in the context of the EDRT strategy. In November 2008 Ministers of Defence selected four such areas: CBRN defence, Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices, Counter-Man portable Air Defence Systems and Maritime Mine Counter Measure. Experts have discussed how and where R&T can support the development of these capabilities. Results will influence the generation of R&T investment under the EDA umbrella.

Solving capability shortfalls

The Agency is making good progress in several capability shortfall areas. Work on filling the gaps for helicopters' availability is most promising, with the launch of the Helicopter Training Programme (HTP) in 2010 quickly approaching. Through this programme, helicopter crews not trained to fly "hot and high" will be able to learn these specific skills. The HTP will deliver additional operational capability in the near term. For the medium term the focus is on technical upgrading of existing helicopters, with an initial focus on the MI-17. Business cases have been developed, allowing various Member States operating the same helicopter to approach industries together for negotiating the upgrade packages. Finally, there is the long-term aspect (2020+), namely the Future Transport Helicopter. In May 2009 Ministers welcomed that this Franco-German initiative had become an EDA project, open to other Member States. As tasked by the Head of the Agency, EDA has also started to explore the potential for transatlantic cooperation, as future heavy lift helicopters are equally needed by the United States Army.

Another project, progressing well, is the insertion of Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) into normal airspace. Numbers and sizes of UAS are growing. Having them flying in normal airspace – next to manned civil aircraft – is becoming an important enabler for crisis management operations. There is equally an interest on the civil users' side. Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV) are likely to monitor Europe's external borders for illegal crossings or to fly over its adjacent waters to spot environmental spoils, drugs traffickers and illegal immigrants. So, there is a combined civil-military interest in solving the problem of having UAS/UAVs flying in normal airspace. For that reason the EDA is closely working together with the Commission and the European air traffic and air safety authorities. EDA's focus is on developing more quickly the "Sense & Avoid" technology, needed on board of UAS/UAVs to "see" other aircraft flying around then and, if needed, to change the flight path for avoiding collisions. Five Member States, under Swedish leadership, have invested € 50m in the MIDair Collision Avoidance System or

MIDCAS project. The contract was signed by the five partners and EDA at the Paris Airshow in June 2009. The aim is to have a demonstrator equipped with the S&A technologies flying by 2012-2013.

Another European capability gap is information. Intelligence will be even more crucial for crisis management operations in the future as it is already today. Space-based assets are an essential component, in particular for information on areas where operators have limited or no access. Currently only three European countries have a dedicated military capability: France, Germany and Italy. Together with Belgium, Greece and Spain they have brought the Multinational Space-based Imaging System or MUSIS project to EDA in March 2009. This project aims at continuity of space-based earth surveillance services from 2015 onwards. EDA's specific role is to seek additional participants and to liaise with the European Commission to seek synergies with civilian users' driven technology investment, more particularly with the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) programme.

In May 2009, EDA Ministers of Defence launched the European Framework Cooperation for Security and Defence Research. It will serve as the overarching structure – the details of which yet remain to be determined – for maximising complementarity and synergy between defence and civilian security-related technology research. The Commission and EDA are the two partners in this endeavour, ensuring that technology investment under the Commission's Framework Programme and the EDA umbrella is coordinated consistently to avoid duplication and to spend the scarce research euro to the optimum. A potential first candidate for substance is "situational awareness", from sensing to command and control – for which there is tremendous overlap between civilian and military users.

Defence: Market & Industry

In the meantime EDA's work in the Industry and Market area is also moving forward. The Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement, opening up the European Defence Equipment Market for cross-border competition, is now up and running for more than three years. More than 400 government defence contract opportunities, with a total estimated value of over € 16 billion, have been placed on the Electronic Bulletin Board at EDA's website. There has been an increase of cross-border awards up to 30% in 2008.

On 1 July 2009, the Agency's youngest Code of Conduct was activated, namely on Offsets. In an ideal world offsets would not exist, but as long as a true European Defence Technological and Industrial Base has not been realised this is unlikely to be the case. Therefore, the Code of Conduct on Offsets does not stop the practice, but it does make it transparent and it sets a cap of 100% offset as of 1 October 2010. All subscribers to the Defence Procurement Code (including non-EU Member state Norway) have joined the Offsets Code of Conduct. Through its reporting and monitoring role the Agency will get a detailed overview of offsets practices. This baseline information, never collected before, will assist in addressing further steps in the future.

Financial pressure

The global financial-economic crisis has already had a dramatic impact on the defence budgets of some European countries. The real effect will become even more visible in the next few years, when savings will have to be made. As personnel costs cannot be reduced quickly, the two other major sections of the defence budgets – operations & maintenance and investment – are likely to be affected: reduced contributions to crisis management operations, delays or even scrapping of planned investment. All of this comes on top of a structural problem, namely that the costs of equipment are rising more quickly than the inflation rate, namely with an estimated five to ten percent annually. Thus, the room for investment for the Ministries of Defence will become smaller and smaller over time.

There is no other solution than to break with national chains of planning and investment and to collaborate with European partners in order to save money and realise real interoperability. At the same time the separated worlds of civilian security and defence should be transformed into combining efforts: in terms of bringing civil and military requirements together in capability areas of common use, such as command and control and information; in terms of making maximum use of coordinated investment in dual-use technology; and in terms of closely coordinating concepts and doctrines where civil and military actors operate side by side.

The European Defence Agency is ideally placed in the EU family of organisations to play the key role in improving military ESDP capabilities, in synchronisation with those needed by civilian crisis management actors as well as by civilian users for securing Europe internally.

More info on: www.eda.europa.eu

Résumé

En juin 2003, les chefs d'Etats et de gouvernements ont mis en place l'Agence européenne de défense (AED) afin d'améliorer les capacités militaires de l'UE en appui de la PESD.

Quatre stratégies à long terme reflètent les secteurs opérationnels de l'AED: le Plan de développement des capacités, la stratégie européenne dans le domaine de la recherche et de la technologie, la stratégie en matière de coopération dans le domaine de l'armement et la stratégie en matière de base industrielle et technologique de défense.

L'AED travaille également dans divers domaines où existent des déficits capacitaires. Le travail accompli dans les domaines de l'Industrie et des Marchés progresse aussi avec par exemple le code de conduite sur les acquisitions de défense ou encore l'adoption du code de conduite sur les compensations.

La crise financière et économique a d'ores et déjà eu un impact important sur les budgets de défense de différents Etats membres. Dans ce contexte, l'AED est idéalement placée pour aider à renforcer la collaboration entre partenaires européens, afin d'économiser et de créer une véritable interopérabilité, ceci en synergie avec les capacités indispensables à la gestion civile des crises.

EU Military Staff – one key factor in ESDP success



By Lieutenant General David Leakey (UK) CMG, CBE
Director General EU Military Staff (DGEUMS)

In this article, Lieutenant General Leakey outlines the role of the EUMS, its evolving contribution to the success of ESDP and future challenges and opportunities.

Lieutenant General David Leakey was appointed Director General EU Military Staff (DGEUMS) in February 2007. Previously he was the first Commander of EUFOR ALTHEA (Bosnia and Herzegovina) between 2004-2005. Established in January 2001, the mission of the EU Military Staff (EUMS) "is to perform early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning, also encompassing identification of forces for missions and tasks referred to in the TEU, including those identified in the European Security Strategy"



> David Leakey

The EU Military Staff (EUMS) is the military engine room of ESDP. It delivers the military advice and expertise within ESDP which enables the EU to respond to crises and instability, through the planning, launch and conduct of military operations. However, the response to crises is becoming more complex, requiring a more comprehensive mix of civilian and military capability to give real effect to the International Community's interventions. Against this background I am often asked: "What does the EUMS do and how big is it? Where is it going?"

What does the EUMS do?

The short answer is that the EUMS is like a mini Ministry of Defence. We are part of the Council General Secretariat and work in close collaboration with our civilian counterparts. We do much the same as the military elements of a Ministry of Defence in a Member state.

The Intelligence staff contributes to the assessments, analysis and early warning on current and emerging areas of instability. The Strategic Planners work up strategic options. The Operations Directorate acts as the military interface between the operational commands and the Brussels political machinery, oiling it with military expertise and advice. The Concepts and Capabilities Directorate works continuously with the Member States to produce military concepts and policy frameworks which guide the generation and conduct of deployed forces on EU-led operations. It also collaborates with the Member States and the European Defence Agency in developing and cataloguing the military capabilities which Member States make available for EU-led operations.

Then there are the specialist Directorates dealing with the critical functions which enable operations, namely Communications and Information Systems and Logistics. These focus on the strategic communications and strategic transport and infrastructure which are indispensable to deployment, command and control and the conduct of operations.

How big is the EUMS?

Including the secretaries, administrators, communications and computer housekeepers, the EUMS numbers only 210. These 210 are the sum total of all permanent EU military personnel, hardly the mythical "Euro Army"! This small staff consists of military officers and NCOs seconded on three year tours of duty from the 27 Member States. It is the EU's military nucleus which generates from the Member States the forces and operational headquarters for use on operations, just as NATO or the UN does.

How effective is the EUMS?

I recall the old tale of the US President who arrived by helicopter at NATO's big headquarters at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Brussels. He commented on the enormous size of the headquarters as seen from the air and asked how many people worked there. The SACEUR of the day replied: "about half of them!". How is it in the EUMS?

Member States generally send excellent officers to the EUMS. In such a small staff there are few hiding places. Everyone has to pull their weight even though some find that it takes some months to adjust to working in English and French. However, there is always a rich mix of operational experience and specialist expertise. As we have witnessed over the last years, the EUMS has successfully handled a variety of EU military operations, on land and sea, in Africa and the Balkans. To have conducted six diverse expeditionary operations in the space of just six years with a permanent staff structure of just over 200 is certainly economical compared with the permanent structures of some other military organisations.

How has the EUMS evolved throughout ESDP?

At its inception, the EUMS was designed to focus on its military function. However, there has been growing recognition that the confrontations and conflicts within unstable and insecure regions of the



> EUFOR TCHAD/RCA

world cannot be solved by military means alone. Only through the coherent, even collaborative, action between all instruments, civilian and military, can enduring stability be delivered. These include police, rule of law, customs, civilian administrators, funding for humanitarian aid, development, regeneration, institution building in addition to the diplomatic and political instruments. Consequently, in 2005, the EUMS was expanded to include a Civ/Mil cell to facilitate more comprehensive planning between civilian and military actors.

This role became even more relevant when the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) or, in plain English, the Civilian Operation Headquarters was established in Brussels in August 2007. The EUMS has worked closely with and in support of the CPCC, most notably during the EU's rapid deployment of a large force of civilian monitors in response to the Georgia crisis of Autumn 2008 when the EUMS had up to 34 military staff working in support of the CPCC. Additionally, on a day to day basis the EUMS is in support of the CPCC, especially in certain specialist areas such as medical and communications, as it exercises its responsibility for some 10 current civilian operations throughout Africa, Asia, Europe and the Middle East.

It would conceal the truth to say that the military and civilians are invariably good bedfellows. Generally they work well enough together but there can be animosities and jealousies, differences of ethos and culture, tradition and motivation. If the EU's comprehensive approach to civilian and military complementarity on ESDP operations is to prosper, there is much work still to be done. However, as ESDP reaches its 10th birthday, the next development in this direction is about to take place. Parts of the civilian Secretariat are to merge and, together with some embedded military staff and even a general officer, will give a new focus and much stronger impetus to civilian and military planning at the strategic level.

Such new structures and new working practices will challenge the orthodox constitution in most Member States (as well as in the EU structures) of separation of the military and civilian arenas.

Who does the EUMS work for?

In the modern era of non-hierarchical flat structures it is not surprising to find that the EUMS does not have just one boss. Given its military focus, its work is primarily to serve the EU Military Committee (EUMC) which, although it has one Chairman, consists of 27 senior military officers who represent the Chiefs of Defence of their respective Member States; the work of the EUMC is prepared,

Résumé

Le lieutenant-général David Leakey, directeur général de l'État major de l'UE (EMUE), souligne la contribution de ce dernier à la réussite de la PESD.

L'État-major de l'UE (EMUE) ressemble à un mini ministère de la défense: il fournit l'expertise militaire qui permet à l'Union de réagir aux crises et à l'instabilité via des opérations militaires.

Il fonctionne avec un personnel permanent de seulement 210 personnes, composé d'officiers et de sous-officiers militaires détachés des 27 États membres pour des postes d'une durée de trois ans. La prise de conscience croissante que les crises ne peuvent être résolues par la force militaire seule signifie que l'EMUE travaille toujours plus étroitement avec la capacité civile de planification et de conduite (CPCC selon l'acronyme anglais).

Au cours des six dernières années, l'EMUE a coordonné six opérations européennes, sur terre et sur mer, de l'Afrique aux Balkans, et toutes ont efficacement rempli leur mission. Les opérations en Bosnie-et-Herzégovine et au large de la Somalie sont toujours en cours. Il est incontestable que l'EMUE a joué un rôle décisif dans le succès de la PESD et dans la poursuite du développement des capacités militaires de l'Europe.

presented and/or supported by the EUMS. Conversely one of the EUMC's roles is to direct and supervise the work of the EUMS. Additionally, the EUMS is part of the wider Council General Secretariat and, therefore, works under the authority of the EU Secretary General and also under the political direction of the rotating EU Presidency which chairs the Political and Security Committee (PSC) – 27 ambassadors from the Member States: many bosses!

As to the future, the lines of responsibility will become more blurred as the comprehensive approach gains traction. Increasingly such issues as capability development and even operations themselves may have a rich mix of both civilian and military elements. Thus the existing structures and processes which deal separately with military and civilian lines of responsibility will have to be adapted, just as the military and civilian staffs within the Secretariat become more integrated in the way they work. Such changes may pose a challenge, in certain circumstances, to the sound principle of separate civilian and military chains of command for operations.

Conclusion

It has been quite an achievement by the EU to conduct six different military ESDP operations in six years. Three of these operations have been truly expeditionary and conducted in some of the most inaccessible and inhospitable African geography. Two have been Balkan operations (the operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina still continues) essential to the stability and development of Europe's so-called "own back yard". Finally, the nature of the current counter-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia has presented a quite different set of operating challenges, not least in its maritime setting.

So far all these military ESDP operations have successfully delivered exactly what was demanded of them even if the EU's military may not yet have been tested in demanding combat. However, without question the EUMS has played a key role in ESDP operational success and in the continuing development of Europe's military capability to match the demands of the modern operating environment.

Together, making a positive difference



By Kees Klompenhouwer, Civilian Operations Commander

The Civilian Operations Commander is overall commander of all civilian Heads of Missions and reports directly to the SG/HR and through him to the Council of EU. Under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee and the overall authority of the High Representative, the Civilian Operations Commander ensures the effective planning and conduct of civilian ESDP crisis management operations, as well as the proper implementation of all mission-related tasks. In this, the Civilian Operations Commander is supported by the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) within the General Secretariat of the Council, to which Member States also contribute with seconded national experts drawn mainly from National Law Enforcement and Justice Sector.

Not very many people know what the acronym ESDP means, or what the role of European institutions is in the area of crisis intervention. The media tends to focus on big political events, while our action in civilian crisis management is often not in the limelight. Our missions tend to be small in numbers, and geared towards long-term effect, with results showing often only a long time after the public attention has moved on.

ESDP started 10 years ago, and the first civilian ESDP mission (the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina) was not launched until 2003, just 6 years ago. Since that time, we have launched a total of 15 civilian missions, and are currently running nine missions in parallel, with a total of more than 3,000 civilian personnel deployed. In the last 6 years, our missions have become increasingly varied and complex. We quickly evolved from police missions to operations covering the areas of security sector reform, police reform, justice and penitentiary. This stems from the realization that all of the rule of law areas, from the security to the justice sector and even customs, are intertwined and have to be reformed together in order to yield a functioning system. Our missions range from classical monitoring, mentoring and advising missions, to the monitoring of a cease-fire agreement, to taking on executive functions in areas where the country is not able to manage this on its own.

In 2007, the crucial decision was taken to provide civilian operations with a clear command structure vested in Brussels. My responsibility as Civilian Operations Commander is to plan, launch and direct at the operational level the civilian crisis management operations of the EU worldwide. In this, I am supported by the CPCC, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, a directorate of now more than 60 very motivated staff, including active duty police officers, judges, diplomats and political advisors.

ESDP matters

Civilian crisis management is not an easy task, and it is becoming increasingly risky, as we operate more and more in regions of continuing strife and conflict. Nevertheless, we should persevere.



> *Kees Klompenhouwer visiting EUPOL Afghanistan, 7 June 2009*

Why? First of all, because I fundamentally believe that what we do in these countries makes a positive difference. Reforming the security and/or justice sector in countries that have seen conflict is fundamental to regaining the trust of the population in the functioning State, and thereby ensure a lasting peace. We have a responsibility to help these countries get back to normality.

Equally important, our engagement abroad is also in the interest of our own security. By addressing instability and organized crime in failing States beyond our borders, we contribute to the internal security of the European Union. Furthermore, we help to set up a framework for strategic and eventually operational cooperation between those countries and our domestic law enforcement agencies. Increasing domestic security and an effective justice sector will lead to more incentives for the population to see their future in their own country. For all these reasons, European civilian crisis management has become an important and popular tool in the European approach to conflict-ridden States.

The international community is starting to take note of the fact that we are becoming an actor on the international security scene, and our missions are increasingly drawing attention. Our missions provide the indispensable bridge between security and development. Our goal is to provide sustainable solutions that are compatible with the EU's fundamental values. This is not spectacular, and usually will not provide much TV coverage. But it is essential. Every day we are asked to do more than the day before.

Our comparative advantage

What make civilian crisis management operations such an attractive option? Member States initiate and own the action. This guarantees Member state buy-in and solidarity, but also strengthens our voice towards the host nation. Together we have a potential leverage that no single Member state can muster in the field of civil security.

Our strength is that we can make use of the human and professional resources of the 27 Member States, their active police officers, their prosecutors and judges, their custom officials and security specialists. In fact, we have a capability in civil security that, though relatively small in size, is unique in the world.

Civilian operations are a flexible tool. They are not guided by a legalistic approach, nor are they hampered by the strong conflicting dogmata sometimes surrounding European defence. Member States are often more willing to commit to civilian action to



> EUPOL RD Congo

address the security situation in a failing state, possibly also because it reinforces the image of Europe as a civilian power.

Because the civilian missions are politically driven, their mandates can be easily adapted to the needs of the situation at hand. At the same time, crisis management can be functional, even very successful, despite a lack of political unity. Thus even in difficult cases such as Kosovo, which not all EU Member States have recognized, consensus was found on a workable Operational Plan to provide for public order and Rule of Law in Kosovo.

I will not claim that our operations are cheap, though still much less costly than military operations. However, I would submit that they are not only affordable, but bring long-term advantages, both to the countries themselves, and to the interior security of the EU and they still represent a modest budget when compared with overall EU expenditure in external action.

Challenges ahead

Although I am pleased with what we have achieved so far, there is no room for complacency. Over the last 10 years we have proven that the European Union can be an actor on the international security scene. I am proud to say that we have contributed to providing stability in the host countries, and we have helped them in upgrading their police and reforming their security sector. However, the job is not finished: we must prove that we can do it better each time we take action.

We have still important hurdles to overcome if the EU is to play its role commensurate to its stated values and ambitions. The growing number and size of missions provides a challenge to Member States that have to provide more quality personnel. In the last 6 years, the number of personnel deployed in civilian missions has multiplied by a factor of 10. Since good quality police officers, judges, prosecutors and customs officers, as well as procurement, finance, human resource and logistics experts are a rare asset also needed at home, Member States have struggled to keep up with the growing demand. It is essential that all Member States develop explicit national arrangements to support the increasing demand for personnel.

The pace of the planning process has increased as well. We learned last year during the Georgia crisis that we must be able to react fast, often almost as fast as the military. To do so professionally, we will need dedicated planners experienced in setting up



> EUPOL Afghanistan

civilian crisis management operations. Our current procedures, notably for the procurement of materials, are cumbersome and ill-adapted to the fast pace of crisis management. We are addressing all these challenges, but we will need the support of other actors to change the situation effectively.

We should furthermore ensure that our missions are properly supported with a strategic vision in mind. This vision needs to be shared by all the EU actors involved, constituting a European strategy for the regions concerned.

Finally, the greatest strategic challenge is the development of local political and institutional ownership of the new standards and the new institutions that we help to shape in the host countries. In the end, we need to remind ourselves that much continues to depend on the political will, maturity and capability of the leaders in the countries where we operate. Our task is to convince them at every step we take. Our power to attract, convince and bind our partners into new and lasting domestic law and order arrangements will in the end be the decisive factor. As operational people we cannot achieve that on our own. We continue to need the political support of the Member States and the EU Institutions to achieve that goal.

But Member States should also be realistic about what can be achieved with limited resources in a given time frame. In my country, they say "a handful of patience is worth more than a bushel of brains". In civilian ESDP we actually need both: patience is needed in order to achieve meaningful results, as monitoring, mentoring and advising will not yield results overnight. The professional brains, experience and communication skills of our personnel are also crucial to ensure that those results will be meaningful and lasting.

Résumé

En mai 2008, Kees Klompenhouwer a été nommé Directeur de la nouvelle capacité civile de planification et de conduite (CPCC selon l'acronyme anglais), chargée des missions civiles de la PESD en matière de gestion des crises. Il évalue les progrès accomplis jusqu'ici.

Le rôle des institutions européennes dans la gestion des crises civiles reste méconnu. L'UE a lancé 15 missions depuis 2003, et elle dirige actuellement 9 missions en parallèle, qui ont exigé le déploiement d'un effectif de plus de 3.000 hommes. En 2007, elle a mis en place une nouvelle structure destinée aux missions civiles, qui est basée à Bruxelles: la CPCC, composée de plus de 60 personnes.

Nos missions sont de plus en plus complexes et risquées. Mais nous devons poursuivre nos efforts, parce que nous contribuons réellement à l'établissement d'une paix durable dans des régions auparavant déchirées par des conflits, ainsi qu'à l'accroissement de la propre sécurité intérieure de l'UE.

Nous disposons d'une seule capacité civile de sécurité, qui fait appel aux ressources humaines et professionnelles des 27 États membres: policiers, procureurs et juges, fonctionnaires des douanes et spécialistes de la sécurité. Ceci nous permet de proposer une gestion efficace des crises comme par exemple au Kosovo, à propos duquel il n'existe pas de consensus politique au sein de l'UE.

Je suis satisfait de ce que nous avons réalisé jusqu'à présent, mais nous nous trouvons confrontés à de nombreux défis dont le plus important sera de développer une appropriation locale forte des nouvelles normes et institutions que nous contribuons à façonner dans les pays d'accueil.

La PESD en 2020: Quelle ambition pour l'Europe de la défense ?



Par Nicole Gnesotto, Professeur de Relations Internationales

Nicole Gnesotto est professeur titulaire de la chaire sur l'Union européenne au Conservatoire national des arts et métiers (CNAM) à Paris. Ancien chef adjoint du Centre d'Analyse et de Préviation du ministère français des Affaires étrangères (1986 à 1990), elle a notamment dirigé l'Institut d'Etudes de Sécurité de l'UEO de 1999 à 2001, avant d'être nommée en 2002 premier directeur de l'Institut d'études de sécurité de l'Union européenne jusqu'en 2007. Elle est l'auteur de nombreuses publications.



> Nicole Gnesotto

Dix ans après sa création, la Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense offre un bilan très contrasté. Le succès de cette nouvelle politique de l'Union est indiscutable, mais les lacunes voire les échecs de la PESD sont tout aussi manifestes. Depuis 2003, 22 interventions extérieures, militaires et/ou civiles, ont été conduites par l'Union sur quatre des cinq continents. Simultanément, l'Union reste perçue comme un acteur de sécurité marginal, le plus souvent absent dans le règlement des grands enjeux stratégiques de la planète. La satisfaction face aux progrès accomplis est indéniable, mais la frustration à l'égard des performances réalisées n'en est pas moins aiguë. Sur quel bilan et pour quelles ambitions peut-on raisonnablement construire l'avenir de l'Union comme acteur majeur de la sécurité internationale ?

Rapide anatomie d'un bilan

Aucune ambition pour l'avenir de la PESD ne peut faire l'impasse sur l'inventaire des atouts et des faiblesses enregistrés depuis dix ans. La valeur ajoutée de la PESD est d'abord celle de la légitimité politique des interventions européennes. Lorsque l'Union agit dans le monde, c'est par consensus. Ce sont donc près d'un demi-milliard d'individus qui cautionnent indirectement son action. Aucun Etat membre ne peut afficher, à lui seul, une telle légitimité. Parce qu'elle agit toujours sous l'égide des Nations Unies, l'acceptabilité d'une intervention de l'Union, par les populations d'une zone de crise, est également plus forte que celle des autres cadres d'intervention. Quant aux opinions publiques européennes: une moyenne de 70 % des citoyens est favorable à un rôle plus important de l'Union sur la scène internationale.

Le second avantage tient à la globalité des compétences de l'Union, laquelle est nettement plus qu'une simple alliance de moyens militaires. Une intervention dans le cadre de l'Union constitue en effet l'assurance que l'ensemble des moyens non militaires de gestion des crises – l'aide à la reconstruction, l'aide humanitaire, l'aide au développement, le conseil juridique pour la réforme des gouvernances locales etc – peut être mobilisé parallèlement à la séquence purement militaire de l'intervention. L'Union est d'ailleurs le premier donneur mondial en matière d'aide au développement. Aucune autre organisation, à commencer par l'OTAN, n'est capable d'offrir une telle palette de moyens complémentaires. Quant aux Etats membres, aucun n'a les moyens de mobiliser autant de ressources financières dans un cadre purement national.

A l'inverse, le sentiment de frustration à l'égard de l'Europe de la défense se nourrit de plusieurs handicaps tout aussi évidents. Il existe d'une part un décalage de plus en plus intenable entre l'augmentation de la demande extérieure et la stagnation, voire la régression des moyens mis par les Etats membres à disposition de l'Union.

Le décalage flagrant entre les progrès de la PESD et le statu quo en matière de politique étrangère commune constitue un second handicap.

Pourquoi une nouvelle ambition ?

Paralysie confortable certes, et nul doute que la relance de l'Europe de la défense ne paraîtra pas forcément nécessaire à l'ensemble des Etats membres. Au-delà des convictions personnelles, sur quoi donc fonder la nécessité d'une nouvelle étape dans l'affirmation stratégique de l'Union? Existe-t-il dans le contexte international, ou au sein de l'Union elle-même, une dynamique favorable à cette nouvelle ambition ?

A première vue, la réponse est plutôt négative. Parmi les arguments plaçant en faveur du statu quo, voire même du délitement progressif de la PESD, l'honnêteté oblige à relever deux évolutions. La première est majeure, puisqu'elle concerne le virage insufflé par la nouvelle présidence Obama à l'ensemble de la politique étrangère et de défense des Etats-Unis. Sur fond de réconciliation transatlantique, le tout consacré par la réintégration de la France au sein de l'OTAN, le bon sens ne serait-il pas désormais de privilégier l'efficacité et la vitalité de ce cadre atlantique ? Pourquoi vouloir continuer à donner à l'Union les moyens de son autonomie stratégique ? Sur le plan de la défense et de l'intervention militaire proprement dites, la tentation du "tout Otan" risque d'être majoritaire. L'Europe de la défense pourra certes progresser, mais dans un cadre atlantique, comme pilier européen de l'OTAN, pas forcément comme outil nécessaire au renforcement politique de l'Union elle-même.

Le deuxième argument en faveur du statu quo réside dans la violence de la crise économique et de la récession. L'ambition d'une nouvelle étape ne s'impose pas – parce que la sortie de crise à l'intérieur doit l'emporter sur la gestion des crises à l'extérieur et qu'un sain principe d'économie devrait amener l'Union à déléguer encore plus à l'OTAN la gestion de la sécurité internationale.

Toutefois, la morosité ambiante n'annule pas pour autant quelques dynamiques favorables, à l'inverse, à l'émergence d'une nouvelle ambition stratégique de l'Union. La première tient aux évolutions qui affectent la sécurité à l'heure de la mondialisation: les dimensions non-militaires des crises ont pris une importance considérable depuis deux décennies. Renforcées par l'apparition de menaces globales, l'insuffisance et la relativité de l'outil militaire dans la gestion de crises sont devenues un élément majeur face auquel la modernité stratégique du cadre européen saute aux yeux.

La deuxième dynamique propice au renouvellement des ambitions stratégiques de l'Union réside en Amérique. Pour de multiples raisons, les Etats-Unis ne seront plus en mesure de prendre en charge l'ensemble des crises régionales, pas plus qu'ils ne seront capables d'insuffler seuls, au système international, une dynamique consensuelle. Cette relativité de la puissance américaine mettra de plus en plus les Européens au pied du mur.

Trois conditions pour un renforcement de l'action stratégique de l'Union

Théoriquement, ces dynamiques différentes peuvent conduire à deux types de scénarios pour l'avenir de la PESD. Dans l'hypothèse basse, la PESD perd progressivement sa composante militaire au profit de l'OTAN qui devient la seule instance d'intervention militaire, avec la possibilité d'y insérer le développement d'un pilier européen de défense. Au sein de l'Union, la PESD continue de se développer uniquement sur le volet civil. Dans l'hypothèse haute, l'Union continue de développer ses moyens militaires et civils de gestion de crises, en fonction de ses objectifs propres de politique étrangère. Des coopérations techniques peuvent se développer avec l'OTAN selon les besoins de telle ou telle crise, mais c'est entre les Etats-Unis et l'Union que se noue un partenariat politique et stratégique global.

C'est évidemment la seconde hypothèse qui est ici privilégiée. Elle est sans doute la plus exigeante, la plus improbable donc, mais certainement pas hors d'atteinte si les Européens maintiennent un minimum d'ambition pour l'entreprise européenne commencée il y a 60 ans.

Trois conditions président au renforcement de l'Europe comme acteur de sécurité:

- Remettre la PESD à sa juste place, celle d'un outil au service du rôle international de l'Union. La PESD n'est pas un quatrième pilier séparé. C'est donc ce rôle politique de l'Union sur la scène internationale qui doit demeurer l'objectif et la priorité. L'évolution de la sécurité internationale confère d'ailleurs aux moyens non militaires de gestion des crises une importance croissante: or l'Union est la seule organisation à posséder toute la gamme des moyens nécessaires. Sa modernité stratégique, et donc sa valeur ajoutée comme institution de sécurité globale, n'en sont que plus évidentes.

- Définir le rôle et l'ambition de l'Union dans le système international issu de la mondialisation.

- Définir les termes d'un partenariat nouveau entre les Etats-Unis et l'Union européenne constitue la troisième priorité. Ni la PESD ni l'OTAN ne sont en effet des acteurs politiques autonomes.

Vraies pistes et faux débats

Sur la base de ces préalables politiques, il est donc possible de concevoir et de promouvoir les évolutions suivantes:

Jouer complètement la carte de la cohérence de l'action extérieure de l'Union; passer du virtuel au permanent, de la coopération à l'intégration; acquérir les moyens d'une certaine autonomie stratégique; légitimer l'Europe qui protège: dans les cas de terrorisme ou de catastrophes naturelles, les moyens militaires et civils de la PESD doivent pouvoir être utilisés sur le territoire de l'Union. Avec le Traité de Lisbonne, la clause de solidarité en cas de terrorisme ou de catastrophe naturelle devra être mise en oeuvre.

La deuxième fausse route concerne la flexibilité en matière de PESD. La force de l'Union c'est la collectivité de ses décisions et la solidarité de tous en cas d'engagement. Casser ce principe au nom d'une mini défense européenne, par définition non consensuelle, serait se condamner à une impuissance réelle.

Conclusion

Au regard de l'accélération continue du temps historique depuis un siècle, 2020 constitue une échéance largement inimaginable. La première décennie du XXI^e a pour sa part largement contribué à changer le monde (attentat du 11 septembre, folie unilatéraliste américaine, folie du capitalisme financier, extraordinaire montée en puissance des pays asiatiques, élargissement massif mais crise rampante des institutions européennes, retour du nationalisme russe etc. etc.). La décennie qui s'annonce n'a aucune raison d'être moins productive en révolutions et surprises stratégiques diverses. Rester aux aguets de l'évolution internationale est sans doute une nécessité pour tout acteur politique. Décider de jouer un rôle actif et vouloir façonner plutôt que subir les évolutions de la mondialisation relève d'une autre ambition. Si l'Union européenne refuse d'affronter ce défi, si elle renonce à toute volonté d'influence collective sur le cours du monde, avec entre autres outils une PESD efficace, la question de son utilité ne manquera pas de se poser.

Vous pourrez lire l'intégralité de cet article, en anglais, dans l'ouvrage publié par l'Institut d'études de sécurité: What ambitions for European defence in 2020? La version française de cet ouvrage est attendue pour début 2010.

ESDP in 2020: The need for a strategic European approach



By Jolyon Howorth

Jolyon Howorth is Jean Monnet Professor ad personam of European Politics at the University of Bath (UK) and, since 2002, has been permanent Visiting Professor of Political Science at Yale University. He has published extensively in the field of European Security and Defence Policy and transatlantic relations.



> Jolyon Howorth

ESDP has come a long way in ten short years. Had anybody predicted, in 1999, that, a decade later, the EU would have carried out twenty-five overseas crisis management missions on four continents, most commentators would have accused the forecaster of dreaming. It is true that much can still be done better: there is serious need for greater institutional and political integration, greater military and civilian capacity, more focused and rationalised resources, autonomous and reliable intelligence, better working relations with other key partners.

But above all the EU needs to begin to approach the world and engage with it in an overtly strategic fashion. During the first decade of ESDP, such an approach was virtually impossible. Most EU missions have been reactive: the response of a somewhat bewildered Union to the urgent demands placed upon it by history. So much energy was required on the organizational side – institutional engineering, capacity generation, political consultation – that the luxury of strategic thinking was beyond the EU's reach. Moreover history had moved into fast-forward mode. Events were driving international relations faster than the capacity of politicians and statesmen to respond.

The world is being redefined in terms of relative power assets

The last twelve months alone have witnessed massive aftershocks from the recent movements of history's tectonic plates: the election of a transformational President in Washington; the humiliation of the "Western" model of market-driven capitalism; the rise to serious prominence of China; the increasing centrality of India as a power broker in South Asia; the Indian Ocean emerging as the principle theatre of future great power jostling; France's return to NATO after forty-three years' absence; the extension of the Afghan crisis to Pakistan; the drive towards the global elimination of nuclear weapons; the return to the strategic scene of Russia; new global players vying with one another for strategic resources in Africa. The world is being redefined in terms of relative power assets. This dizzying pace of change is likely to continue over the coming decades. In this context, the EU can no longer afford to be simply a reactive or passive player.

Given that there is now a real likelihood that the Lisbon Treaty will be ratified by all EU Member States, the need is increasingly felt for a more strategic approach, in which the Union's interests and values, objectives and capabilities are proactively weighed. The European Council's December 2008 "Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy" recognizes that, over the last five years, the threats facing the EU have become "increasingly complex", that "we must be ready to shape events" by "becoming more strategic in our thinking", and that this will involve being

"more effective and visible around the world". American international relations experts have long referred to such an approach as a "grand strategy", most succinctly defined by Yale historians John Gaddis and Paul Kennedy as "the calculated relationship between means and large ends".

There are four main reasons why the EU should progressively adopt a more calculated strategic approach and begin at last to think in terms of "large ends".

The first is that the EU's relative assets in the global pecking order are weak and getting weaker. Demographic decline makes the Union increasingly dependent on immigration for sustained economic balance. Lack of key natural resources results in many dependencies – particularly energy dependency. In terms of territory, the EU occupies 2.8% of the earth's surface, compared with 6% to 7% for China, the USA, Canada, Brazil and Australia and 11.5% for Russia. Moreover, the very fact that the EU, politically and institutionally, does not enjoy the attributes of a unitary state should motivate its leaders to find ways of overcoming this strategic disadvantage.

The second reason derives directly from this last point: the world's other major players, which are unitary states, all act in a clear strategic way. The US has long relied on a quadrennial National Security Strategy. China, Russia, India and Brazil are pursuing clear-cut and long-term strategic goals. Even some of the second-tier rising powers such as Indonesia, South Africa and Australia are increasingly behaving like strategic players. The big players may make strategic mistakes – even tragic ones – but at least they are lucid about their aims and objectives.

The third reason has to do with alliances and partnerships. Strategists throughout history have sought to compensate for relative disadvantage by combining with other powers to achieve common objectives. Traditionally these combinations have taken the form of military alliances, often against rising or potentially dangerous powers. That was the original purpose behind NATO. But today, such military alliances – like military instruments themselves – are increasingly perceived as less useful than other forms of cooperation – on trade, energy, development, environment, regional stabilisation and nation-building. The EU, in both declaratory and real terms, is well placed to engage in such multiple partnerships. But unless these are coordinated via a strategic plan, they will be sub-optimal in impact.

The fourth reason is that the US umbilical cord has now been severed. The most significant consequence of the end of the Cold War – the relative military disengagement of the US from the European strategic space – dictates that Europeans, whether they like it or not, can no longer rely on Uncle Sam to bail them out. Both in Europe and in the rest of the world, Europeans increasingly need

Résumé

Jolyon Howorth est professeur titulaire d'une chaire Jean Monnet ad personam en politique européenne à l'université de Bath (Royaume-Uni) et, depuis 2002, professeur en sciences politiques invité permanent à l'université de Yale.

Au cours de la première décennie de la Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense (PESD), la plupart des missions de l'Union européenne ont été réactives. À présent, l'UE doit se rapprocher du monde en adoptant à son égard une attitude ouvertement stratégique.

Il y a à cela quatre raisons principales. La première est que les atouts de l'UE en termes généraux (population, ressources, etc.) se réduisent. Deuxièmement, les autres acteurs majeurs du monde sont des États unitaires, et ils se comportent en fonction de critères stratégiques évidents.

Troisièmement, les partenariats et les alliances de l'UE doivent être coordonnés par un programme stratégique. Et, quatrièmement, les Européens ne peuvent plus dépendre d'une intervention des États-Unis.

Une telle vision stratégique exigerait :

- une compréhension politique partagée de ce que signifie une politique étrangère et de sécurité commune;
- un "grand document stratégique" comportant une évaluation commune des menaces à moyen et long terme;
- en plus des nouvelles institutions prévues par Lisbonne, l'UE aura besoin d'une sorte de Conseil de sécurité européen;
- de nouvelles procédures pour la production de capacités civiles et militaires.

to know what it is they are attempting to achieve. They cannot achieve that lucidity if they remain at sixes and sevens, each trying to outdo the others in quasi-slavish – or semi-hostile – attitudes towards the USA. Most likely, and most often, European objectives will mesh with American ones. The strategic partnership with the US will be the most important of all the EU's partnerships. But the formulation of European strategic objectives should follow European logic and European logic alone. NATO's current problems derive from a confused attempt, on both sides of the Atlantic, to pursue a "transatlantic strategic logic" which may simply not exist as such. Unless the EU is able to coordinate its input into NATO's current Strategic Concept exercise, it will remain a passenger in an alliance still dominated by the US.

The founding fathers of the EU did not wait until everybody came on board

Forging a strategic vision will be difficult unless the EU Member States openly recognise that they currently project two very different visions of the Union itself. The one sees the EU as a project, explicitly political, with clear strategic objectives, requiring the application of serious political will, the designation of definitive borders and a discernible finalité. The other sees it as essentially a process, primarily commercial and financial, explicitly a-political, focused on regulatory frameworks and indefinite enlargement, with no borders and no sense of finalité. These two visions suggest very different readings of what an EU grand strategy might involve. They are in desperate need of reconciliation. And time is not on the EU's side. The international environment becomes more ominous by the day. The founding fathers of the EU did not wait until everybody came on board. They steamed ahead (with strategic lucidity) and the others, eventually, jumped onto the moving train. The same will probably have to happen again with the shift to a genuine grand strategy.

So what might an EU grand strategy require? There are four key enablers:

The first is political/procedural. It requires a minimal alignment of the principal EU actors around a single vision of what the Common foreign and security policy (CFSP) actually amounts to. Those countries which perceive CFSP merely as a tactical facility to be resorted to if national strategies prove inadequate should be invited to enjoy an "opt-out/opt-in" status with regard to CFSP. This will mean that those countries which wish to help the EU genuinely to speak and act with one voice can pursue CFSP unhindered.

The second is strategic in the strict sense. In 2008, the UK, France and Germany all published national "Security Strategy" documents. It would therefore seem logical, in the first instance, for these three countries (which together spend over 61% of the total defence

budget of the EU-27) to convene a high level tripartite conference to examine the extent to which they could agree on the basic contours of an EU Strategic White Book. Those contours would thereafter be discussed more widely within the EU-27 framework to generate a clearly articulated EU strategic long term vision – in other words a "grand strategy paper". This would state with considerable clarity a common appraisal of the medium to long-term term threats, together with appropriate measures and instruments with which to respond, and their interconnectedness. This will require bold vision concerning the EU's direct partnership with (but also strategic autonomy from) the United States, lucid inputs to NATO's strategic concept process, and clear thinking on other strategic partnerships. Some Member States may wish to "opt out" of that process. They should be encouraged to do so.

The third requirement is institutional. In the first place, the institutional acquis of the Lisbon Treaty should be fully, rapidly and optimally activated. Appointments to the key new institutional positions should be based on three criteria and three only: leadership qualities, political competence and strategic vision. In addition to the new institutions called for in Lisbon, the EU will need some form of European Security Council, backed by an autonomous high level intelligence and strategic analysis service, a formal Council of Defence Ministers, a permanent high level EU Defence College and a seriously upgraded European Defence Agency.

The fourth requirement is organisational and material. Beyond the institutional innovations referred to above, new procedures for the generation of both military and civilian capacity, based on rationalisation, pooling, sharing, specialisation and best practice will be essential. The laborious bottom-up processes adopted so far must be replaced by top-down strategic guidance. Strategic implementation of permanent structured cooperation, geared to maximum inclusiveness, can help generate every last drop of EU capacity, even from countries with comparatively little to offer. Budgetary rationalisation (rather than increases) will be a necessary corollary. The refinement of fully equipped operational headquarters for both military and civilian operations and above all for their synergisation and effective integration (the "comprehensive approach") will be unavoidable.

Critics of such an approach miss the fact that the world is changing at dizzying speed. We are witnessing an intense reorientation and repositioning of strategic resources around the globe. The stakes are very high. The EU cannot afford to fiddle while Brussels burns. Europe has been living for over a century on historical capital. European integration was a visionary attempt to adapt to the post-1945 world order. Adaptation to the very different world order emerging in the twenty-first century demands serious strategic vision. Without it, the EU itself, as a historical experiment, could well begin to unravel.

Will the Lisbon Treaty make a difference?



By Krzysztof Bobinski

New challenges will face Europe's Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) if the Lisbon Treaty is finally ratified and its new solidarity clauses come into force. The clauses will surely raise expectations about the future role of the European Union in the defence and security fields but will they change anything?

Krzysztof Bobinski is the head of Unia & Polska, a pro EU organisation in Warsaw.



> Krzysztof Bobinski

The ESDP, currently celebrating its tenth birthday has made impressive progress, despite the EU's internal contradictions in this area. These include the tension between the Member States, jealous of their sovereignty, and the need to work together at the European level on issues such as climate change, terrorist threats and energy security. Some Member States see no imminent military threat and thus no need for a common army. Others fear a "militarization" of the EU as a weakening of NATO. The EU's own "no more war" ideology has legitimised the project till now. But it clashes directly with the need some Member States feel for a joint armed force of some kind to back the Union's global ambition. Experts worried about the EU taking the military route quote Jean Monnet's assistant and biographer, Francois Duchene's description of the EU as a "civilian power". But, in truth, Duchene was writing in 1972 when the Cold War was in full swing and NATO in place and ready act against external threats. Now the Cold War is over and external threats in the neighbourhood have sunk out of view. NATO is still in place but is less sure of itself. The Atlantic alliance is certainly focused more on prevailing in Afghanistan than on its traditional defence role in the Central European plain. A security void is beginning to appear in Europe. How long, then, can the EU remain no more than a "civilian power"?

The EU is already showing that it "conducts international relations differently"

Till now the ESDP has moved forward with a measure of caution. It has conducted civilian and military missions beyond the EU's frontiers and taken care that these should arouse little controversy, carried the United Nations with it and had the support of the Member States. All have sought to show that the EU is "an international good" as Celso Lafer says. Alvaro de Vasconcelos adds that the EU is already showing that it "conducts international relations differently". But the process is also bedeviled by a lack of fundamental consensus among the Member States on the need to pool sovereignty in the field of security and defence. To make things worse, the EU's foreign policy lacks the coherence and clout to make the other global powers sit up and take notice when Brussels speaks.

Can a few clauses in the Lisbon Treaty, whose gestation period has been long and whose future is still uncertain, change this? The clauses cover three fields: the threat of terrorism, natural and man-made disasters, and mutual defence. Cooperation on terrorism is no

doubt proceeding at a pace determined by the political will of politicians and their perception of the urgency of the threat at any given time. By its very nature the process is difficult to observe and evaluate by outsiders. It is also confined to public service elites. In any event, one must trust they are working together. Here the Lisbon Treaty clause can be expected to do little to change the intensity of ongoing efforts to combat the terrorist threat.

Clauses of the Lisbon Treaty

The greatest boost for the ESDP should come in the field of disaster relief. The clause in the Treaty sanctions the use of the military on EU territory and should lead to break down in the national barriers still in place in this field. Raging forest fires and flooding appear to be on the rise as weather conditions in Europe change and "freak" conditions become more and more common. This is the area where public opinion will applaud national disaster relief organizations coming together for operations abroad as well as for coordinating reconstruction efforts and securing stricken areas from looters and for the evacuation of victims. This is about human security and it is the simplest way of breaking down national barriers. It helps to whittle away at long standing national enmities as Turks and Greeks getting involved in mutual relief operations have shown. If one of the problems which civilian ESDP operations currently face is joint recruitment of staff for civilian operations isn't the ever present threat of natural disasters reason enough to establish an EU wide, permanent Agency of Crisis Management with the expertise and the equipment to go wherever needed at short notice. Such an agency would naturally be able to go beyond the EU's borders on foreign ESDP disaster relief missions where needed and it should do so. The cost, of course, should be shared by all 27 Member States. Its structure and permanent staff – an EU "peace corps" – would become a reservoir of expertise which could also be used in post conflict situations abroad, thus enhancing the EU's "soft power" capabilities.

The most controversial Treaty clause is the mutual defence provision which says "if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power". This is where the political trip wires and minefields begin.

Many Member States prefer to stay with the status quo where NATO remains Europe's external security provider and sheer away from openly defining which neighbouring states might, possibly, at

Résumé

Le traité de Lisbonne apportera-t-il quelque chose de différent ?

Krzysztof Bobinski est le président d'Unia & Polska, une organisation pro-européenne de Varsovie.

La politique européenne de sécurité et de défense sera confrontée à de nouveaux défis au moment où, le cas échéant, le traité de Lisbonne sera enfin ratifié et où ses nouvelles clauses de solidarité entreront en vigueur.

Le PESD a accompli des progrès impressionnants. Elle a dirigé des missions civiles et militaires au-delà des frontières de l'UE et pris soin d'éviter les controverses. Mais elle pâtit d'un manque de consensus fondamental sur la

nécessité d'une souveraineté partagée, et d'un manque de cohérence sur la politique étrangère de l'Union.

Le traité de Lisbonne pourra-t-il changer cela ? Les clauses de solidarité concernent trois domaines : la menace terroriste, les catastrophes naturelles et d'origine humaine, et la défense mutuelle. Il est peu probable que le Traité fasse beaucoup pour apporter un plus aux efforts soutenus dans la lutte contre le terrorisme, mais il devrait avoir plus de réussite dans le domaine des secours en cas de catastrophes. La clause la plus controversée concerne la disposition relative à la défense mutuelle. La mise en œuvre de ces clauses constituera un test majeur pour l'UE et la PESD.

some time in the future, be a potential aggressor. The new Member States, who are also recent NATO members, have gone further. Like the United Kingdom, they have jealously guarded against any development of a separate EU defence capacity as they worry that this would weaken NATO's (and America's) commitment to Europe's security.

But at the same time, the central Europeans see themselves as the victims of America's understanding with the Russians in the late 1990s about a de facto moratorium on modernising or expanding military capabilities in central Europe in the wake of NATO expansion. This is why the Poles eagerly grabbed at the US proposal for a missile defence installation on their territory. They saw it as a way of demonstrating they are no longer subject to a great power understanding reached over their heads as to the military capabilities they are "allowed" to deploy, even as a sovereign state. This is why guarantees of mutual defence under NATO's article 5 are regarded with concern. They worry about minimal progress on contingency planning within NATO in the event of an external threat to the Baltic countries or the central Europeans. These concerns have been heightened with the onset of President Barack Obama and his "reset" policy towards Russia. They surfaced earlier this year with the letter of 21 former central European leaders who wondered aloud "whether NATO would be willing and able come to our defence in some future crises". The signatories may be veterans but they reflect thinking in their government administrations.

The Lisbon Treaty will provide the hope of a new guarantee

Now the Lisbon Treaty will provide the hope of a new guarantee. Alexander Stubb, Finland's foreign minister, says his country views the solidarity clause as "binding on all Member States" in the event of armed aggression". A recent Finnish Government report says that the "EU is Finland's fundamental security policy choice". Finland is not a NATO member and is not covered by Article 5. Thus it can be expected to talk up the Lisbon solidarity clause. But how soon will it be before the central Europeans, currently pushing for a "renaissance" of NATO, begin look over their shoulders at the ESDP and seriously consider how the guarantees in the NATO Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty might be "complimentarised" in practice.

The Lisbon Treaty has yet to be ratified. It may fail. But the text has been accepted by the governments of the 27 Member States who agreed the solidarity clauses. These clauses were written into the text of the Treaty for a purpose and that purpose remains in place whatever the fate of the Treaty. Faced with the prospect of natural disasters or external threats some Member States can be expected to reach for them and argue that plans, structures and people be put into place to fulfil the promise of these clauses. The ensuing debate will be a major test as much for the EU as for the ESDP.



> The Treaty of Lisbon



> Ceremony of signature of the Treaty of Lisbon – Lisbon, 13 December 2007

La “marque de fabrique” européenne



Par Nicolas Gros-Verheyde

Il y a 10 ans, la Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense (PESD) était embryonnaire. Aujourd’hui, elle est devenue réalité même si elle n’est pas encore exempte de balbutiements et de tâtonnements. Petit à petit, dans une totale discrétion, l’Europe a bâti plusieurs instruments, qui lui ont permis d’agir et lui ont donné une originalité particulière. C’est cette “marque de fabrique” qu’il importe de définir.

Dans les crises passées des années 1990 – en ex-Yougoslavie, au Rwanda, ... –, l’Europe était restée, plus ou moins, l’arme au pied. Laissant faire, laissant se commettre les atrocités. Le “plus jamais ça”, issu de la seconde guerre mondiale, qui avait été le moteur profond de la construction européenne, depuis les années 50, était refoulé. L’Europe n’était pas seulement divisée politiquement, elle était paralysée, incapable d’agir; n’ayant pas les instruments pour favoriser l’unité, ni les outils opérationnels pour intervenir. Pour ceux qui ont connu ces moments, et ils sont nombreux à exercer aujourd’hui des responsabilités politiques de premier niveau, au plan européen comme national, le souvenir peut être amer. Mais ces “crises” ont eu un mérite: refaire de la création d’une Europe de la Défense, une priorité. Car il s’agissait de “ne plus jamais rester comme ça”, passifs.

Une “syntaxe” différente

Encore fallait-il s’entendre sur cette Europe de la Défense. Car historiquement et militairement, c’est l’Organisation du Traité Atlantique Nord (OTAN) qui a eu la charge de bâtir et consolider la défense européenne. L’UE se devait donc, à côté de l’Alliance, de définir sa stratégie, ses propres objectifs, de se doter de premiers propres outils opérationnels propres. Une autonomie qui est la condition nécessaire à la réalisation de sa politique. C’est à cela que l’UE a consacré les premières années. Même si les deux organisations paraissent se “marcher sur les pieds”, on peut tracer des différences nettes qui, loin de la confusion, imposent la complémentarité.

A la première, organisation militaire, la fonction de garantir la sécurité collective de ses membres, au besoin en allant au-delà des frontières (Kosovo, Afghanistan ...), en cas de risque pour la sécurité de ses membres. A la seconde, organisation civile, le soin de développer d’une politique étrangère commune, dont la politique de défense et de sécurité (PESD) fait partie des outils et instruments, pour stabiliser, s’interposer dans des conflits aux bordures de ses frontières comme loin de celles-ci.

Derrière ces deux organisations se profilent, aussi, deux conceptions de la sécurité. Dans l’une, elle est un objectif, en soi, sous contrôle politique évidemment. Dans l’autre, c’est un instrument – parmi d’autres – au service d’une politique étrangère qui vient en complément d’autres politiques (aide humanitaire, développement, sécurité civile...).

L’une est largement impulsée par les Etats-Unis – il est difficile de le nier –, mais garde une essence intergouvernementale. L’autre ressort d’une volonté plus propre aux Européens, avec une impulsion



> Nicolas Gros-Verheyde

Nicolas Gros-Verheyde est correspondant “Affaires européennes” de Ouest-France, après avoir occupé le même poste à France-Soir. Spécialiste des questions de défense à Europolitique, il contribue également à La Lettre de l’Expansion. Il a commencé sa carrière de journaliste en 1989 par des reportages en Europe de l’Est avant la réunification, après avoir travaillé dans des ONG de secours d’urgence ou de développement. Il a également travaillé pour La Tribune, Le Quotidien de Paris, Impact Médecin, Radio France Urgences, Arte et LCI.

Depuis 2007, il a créé un blog, “Bruxelles2” spécialement dédié à l’Europe de la défense. Mis à jour quotidiennement, ce blog décrit ce qui se passe derrière les murs du Justus Lipsius (le Conseil de l’UE), du Cortenberg (l’Etat major) ou du Berlaymont (la Commission européenne), en matière de stratégie, de politique de défense et de marchés industriels.

-> www.bruxelles2.eu

historique franco-allemande, devenue plus large et plus diversifiée aujourd’hui, avec les élargissements vers le Sud, le Nord, et l’Est de l’Europe. Elle a une vocation franchement intégratrice des États qui la composent, fédérative des énergies nationales (à distinguer du modèle fédéral).

Une capacité d’action nouvelle

La “marque de fabrique” de l’UE, son principal atout, c’est incontestablement sa capacité à intervenir dans presque toutes les régions du monde, même dans les situations politiques les plus complexes (Afrique, Asie, Moyen-Orient...). Sa multiplicité d’opinion à l’intérieur même des États membres n’est pas un inconvénient. Au contraire... Elle lui procure une sorte de “neutralité” et lui donne la légitimité nécessaire pour être accepté. Une opération ARTEMIS au Congo menée par la seule Belgique, une opération EUFOR au Tchad menée par la seule France ou une opération de réforme du secteur de la sécurité menée en Guinée-Bissau menée par le seul Portugal aurait immanquablement été taxée d’intervention de l’ancienne puissance coloniale. Avec l’UE, le pays concerné a une certaine garantie qu’il n’en sera pas ainsi.

Ses différences historiques, ses divergences géographiques lui offrent, en outre, une palette de connaissance et d’approche de presque toutes les régions du monde qu’aucune autre puissance ne peut actuellement réunir. Indéniablement, les derniers élargissements n’ont pas érodé son pouvoir d’action. La réunification du continent européen pourrait, au contraire, signifier un renforcement en matière d’Europe de la défense. La mise en avant de la PESD comme priorité n°1 de la présidence polonaise de l’UE en 2011 en est un exemple frappant.

Enfin, son caractère “friendly”, “moins agressif” que d’autres forces d’intervention (Etats-Unis, Otan, Russie) lui permet d’être appréciée par la plupart de partis en conflit. Le fait pour l’Europe de ne pas pouvoir déclencher la guerre peut parfois être une faiblesse. C’est aussi une force. Quand l’Europe négocie, elle n’est pas perçue de manière systématiquement hostile, comme une volonté d’accaparement, d’invasion. Les exemples récents du Kosovo (dans sa phase indépendante), de la Géorgie (dans son conflit avec la Russie) sont là pour le rappeler. Le fait que l’UE existe sans avoir détruit ses États membres est aussi un gage pour nombre d’États dans le monde d’une marque de respect.

De ce fait, la PESD trouve sa meilleure expression dans les missions de stabilisation de la paix, d’autant plus quand des éléments militaires et civils se chevauchent dans le temps ou dans l’espace,

Résumé

Nicolas Gros-Verheyde has worked as a European affairs correspondent for various French newspapers. In 2007, he set up a blog, www.bruxelles2.eu, dedicated to European defence.

10 years ago, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was embryonic. Today, it has become a reality. It contributes to stabilising peace and intervenes in conflicts both at the European borders and in distant locations.

Kosovo, Chad, Georgia, the Gulf of Aden... the operations launched in the last two years are the manifestation of the taking of a decisive step. The EU is

now able to carry out autonomous operations of major importance, both military and civil, on land as well as at sea, essentially simultaneously.

The multiplicity of opinions among EU Member States is not a drawback. On the contrary, it results both in a form of "neutrality" and in the legitimacy necessary for acceptance. Moreover, the image of the EU as being more friendly and less aggressive than other intervention forces means that it is appreciated by most parties in conflict.

comme au Proche-Orient, dans la région africaine des Grands lacs, voire dans la corne de l'Afrique...

Des opérations de "2e génération"

Depuis deux ans, les opérations entamées témoignent du franchissement d'un pas décisif. On pourrait même parler "d'opérations de seconde génération" tant la réalité de 2009 diffère celle des années précédentes. La chronologie en témoigne. L'UE est aujourd'hui en capacité de mener des opérations, autonomes, d'une importance certaine, d'ordre militaire ou civil, sur terre comme sur mer, le tout de manière quasi-simultanée.

En février 2008, les 27 décident, à l'unanimité, de conduire une mission "État de droit" (EULEX) forte de 3.000 personnes au Kosovo alors qu'ils sont profondément divisés sur la reconnaissance, ou non, de l'indépendance de cette province autonome de l'ex-Yougoslavie. Une évolution politique très nette. Plusieurs années auparavant, l'Europe était divisée sur des questions semblables mais n'avait pu s'entendre sur une action.

En mars 2008, l'UE commence à déployer à l'est du Tchad et en République centrafricaine, une opération militaire (EUFOR) de près de 4.000 hommes (et femmes), loin de ses frontières naturelles. Ce qui représente un pari logistique certain. Avec une originalité supplémentaire. Aucun des "grands" États membres – mis à part la France – n'était présent en nombre. Cette opération n'est rendue possible dans une configuration que n'avaient pas prévus les fondateurs de la PESD, grâce aux nouveaux États membres (Pologne en tête), aux États à la neutralité affichée (Irlande, Autriche) ou non membres de l'OTAN (Suède, Finlande). Le soutien de la France, qui a des implantations sur place, est un gage de ce succès logistique. Mais il constitue un risque politique pour l'UE: celui d'être pris en flagrant délit de neutralité. Plusieurs spécialistes parient d'ailleurs sur l'échec de l'opération. Il n'en est rien. Au terme du mandat prévu, d'un an, l'Union européenne cède la place à l'ONU.

En septembre 2008, l'UE déploie en Géorgie, une force de plus de 200 observateurs "civils" afin de veiller au retrait des troupes russes et au cessez-le-feu, conformément à l'accord signé entre le président russe Dimitri Medvedev et le président en exercice de l'UE, Nicolas Sarkozy, sur les lignes de l'Ossétie du Sud et de l'Abkhazie, les deux régions sécessionnistes de Géorgie. Alors que la tension est au maximum sur le terrain européen, l'UE est arrivée à s'imposer entre les deux Grands – Russie et États-Unis – qui s'échangent des invectives orales et arment les belligérants. Le tout en quelques semaines. Ce qui est une prouesse quand on connaît le peu de moyens de l'UE. Quinze ans auparavant, l'Europe n'avait pas pu empêcher ces deux régions de s'embraser et de faire des milliers de morts.

En décembre 2008, enfin, l'UE déploie au large de la Somalie une force d'une dizaine de navires et d'avions, afin de lutter contre la piraterie maritime qui menace les bateaux du Programme alimentaire mondial et l'approvisionnement humanitaire de la Somalie, les pêcheurs européens ainsi que les navires marchands de toutes nationalités. En plein Golfe d'Aden, à quelques encablures du canal de Suez, et non loin, ce déploiement a également une vertu stratégique non négligeable.

Pendant ce temps, elle continue de se déployer de plus petites missions dans des endroits à risque: en Afghanistan (police), en Irak (police et justice), en Palestine (police et prisons), en Guinée-Bissau (réforme de la sécurité)...

L'intégration civile et militaire

Dans la plupart de ces opérations, l'UE joue groupée. Utilisant de façon alternative, ou cumulée, les moyens militaires et civils, selon les besoins et également les contingences politiques. La "force de frappe" financière et diplomatique de la Commission européenne est souvent une aide précieuse. Au Tchad, il permet de financer le retour des réfugiés et déplacés; en Géorgie de stabiliser le pays; dans le Golfe de mettre au point un programme visant à renforcer les capacités locales de lutte contre la piraterie. Il s'agit de cumuler développement économique à long terme et gestion de crise à court terme. Les moyens disponibles sont mis à disposition de l'un ou l'autre. Les militaires ont donné un "coup de main" décisif pour la mise en place rapide de l'opération en Géorgie. Tandis que les "civils" apportaient leur touche essentielle diplomatique à l'opération militaire au Tchad ou en Somalie.

C'est cela la marque de fabrique de la politique de défense l'UE: être une organisation politique, intégrant un ensemble d'instruments, civils et militaires, sans agressivité, avec une vocation à agir dans toutes les régions du monde, où les décisions représentent la volonté commune. Dans le passé, cela a pu donner l'impression du plus dénominateur commun mais cela donne parfois aussi... le maximum multiple.

Le contrôle politique permanent

Indéniablement, le Comité politique et de sécurité (COPS), bien que très discret, est le cœur du dispositif européen, la marque du contrôle politique sur toute la chaîne de gestion de crise. Cette rencontre, plusieurs fois par semaine, des diplomates des 27 États membres, spécialisés sur les questions de défense et de sécurité, leur permet d'avoir en même temps, la même information sur une situation de crise. Et de préparer, éventuellement, une réponse commune qu'elle ressorte de la PESD, des instruments diplomatiques classiques ou des politiques communautaires. En recevant de multiples intervenants (envoyés spéciaux de l'UE, chefs de mission, responsables de l'ONU, de l'OTAN, des ONG...), elle évite le repli sur soi. Sa discrétion, parfois décriée, lui évite aussi d'être confronté à une pression médiatique ou politique trop importante. Cette instance est d'autant plus utile que nombre de pays, sur les nouveaux États membres, n'ont pas automatiquement la palette diplomatique internationale qu'ont certains pays "historiques". Mais, in fine, ce sont toujours les États membres, qui donnent le feu vert à une opération, par Ministres interposés, souvent avec l'autorisation de leur Parlement national.

The United Nations and the European Security and Defence Policy – Future EU cooperation with UN peacekeeping

The tenth anniversary of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) provides an opportunity for reflection over its development and impact – as a key element of the European Union’s (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy as well as an important contribution to multilateral peace and security efforts with the UN at its core.



By Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General of the UN for Peacekeeping Operations



> Alain Le Roy

Alain Le Roy was appointed UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations in June 2008. Since September 2007, he was Ambassador in charge of the Union for the Mediterranean Initiative.

After serving in the private sector as a petroleum engineer, he joined the public service as Sous-préfet, then as Counsellor at the Cour des comptes (French Audit office). Mr. Le Roy was appointed as Deputy to the United Nations Special Coordinator for Sarajevo and Director of Operations for the restoration of essential public services. He went on missions for the United Nations Development Programme in Mauritania and was appointed United Nations Regional Administrator in Kosovo (West Region).

After having been National Coordinator for the Stability Pact for South-East Europe in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he was appointed European Union Special Representative in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. He was subsequently appointed Assistant Secretary for Economic and Financial Affairs in the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, before serving as the French Ambassador to Madagascar.

Contributing to that reflection, I would like to point to areas within the field of peacekeeping where the cooperation between the UN and the EU could be strengthened even further.

United Nations peacekeeping is facing immense challenges today. The vast scale of our operations is daunting, with 17 peacekeeping missions around the globe currently deploying more than 115,000 military, police and civilian staff. The mandates guiding these UN peacekeeping missions are more complex and multidimensional than ever – many calling for more robust action.

Meanwhile, we are facing difficulties in generating the necessary capabilities and providing necessary logistical support to these missions, located across some of the world’s most difficult terrain. Indeed, we have seen a tremendous surge of peacekeeping while supply is constrained globally.

However, these challenges also provide new opportunities for UN peacekeeping – opportunities for greater cooperation with those who share the same goals.

The “New Horizon” process

In order to better explore these opportunities, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the UN Department of Field Support have embarked on a comprehensive peacekeeping review. It is called the “New Horizon” process. It seeks a renewed consensus on when and how UN peacekeeping should be applied and aims to translate it into more effective action on the ground. It also seeks a dialogue with Member States, regional organisations and other partners both within and outside the UN system to achieve this goal. Obviously, the European Union (EU) is an important partner in this dialogue.

The measures we are proposing in the New Horizon process can be divided into three broad areas where the EU and the UN are cooperating and should continue to do so.

Three broad areas where the EU and the UN are cooperating and should continue to do so

The first area is hand-over, or transition, of missions or mission tasks from one organisation to the other. Under this scenario, we have undertaken two important exercises over the past year. In December 2008, the EU deployed its rule of law mission, EULEX, under Security Council resolution 1244 and assumed all residual operational responsibilities in this area in Kosovo as UNMIK’s Police and Department of Justice ceased operations.

The second handover, this time from the EU to the UN, took place on 15 March 2009 when the EU bridging force in eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic, deployed in 2008, was transitioned to a UN force. Overall, this was a success both for the EU and for the UN. The deployment of EUFOR was an important signal of the re-engagement by Europe in peacekeeping and Africa. It also showed that, during a time of high demand for peacekeeping, the UN and regional organisations are able to bring their comparative advantages to bear and to share the burden of international peace and security.

Undeniably there were some bumps along the road in handovers in both Kosovo and in Chad. However, considering that handovers between the UN and the EU have never been undertaken before on this scale. Their successful conclusion must be seen as a significant joint achievement. Nevertheless, interoperability between our

Résumé

En juin 2008, Alain Le Roy a été nommé au poste de secrétaire général adjoint des Nations unies en charge des opérations de maintien de la paix. Après avoir travaillé dans le secteur privé en qualité d'ingénieur pétrolier, il est entré dans la fonction publique française. Il a été notamment coordonnateur national du pacte de stabilité pour l'Europe du sud-est au sein du ministère français des affaires étrangères, puis Représentant spécial de l'UE dans l'ancienne République yougoslave de Macédoine.

Il existe des domaines où la coopération entre les Nations unies et l'Union européenne pourrait être renforcée, notamment en ce qui concerne le maintien de la paix, qui présente aujourd'hui des défis considérables. L'étendue des opérations de l'ONU a de quoi impressionner, avec 17 missions dans le monde entier nécessitant le déploiement de plus de 115.000 hommes, militaires, policiers et civils. Cependant, nous éprouvons des difficultés à produire les capacités et le support logistique

requis. Ainsi l'ONU a-t-elle entrepris une révision complète de sa politique de maintien de la paix, appelée "nouvel horizon", initiative au sein de laquelle l'UE est un partenaire important.

Nous proposons donc trois grands secteurs dans lesquels l'UE et l'ONU peuvent, et même devraient, coopérer plus étroitement en matière de maintien de la paix et de gestion des crises. Le premier concerne le transfert des missions d'une organisation à l'autre; le deuxième les situations où l'UE pourrait appuyer l'action de l'ONU par des opérations rapides, à court terme (comme en République démocratique du Congo); le troisième scénario consiste en un déploiement parallèle des opérations de l'ONU et de l'UE, dont l'Afghanistan constitue l'exemple le plus évident. Nous avons un intérêt commun à garantir que les Nations unies et l'Union européenne agissent de concert pour pouvoir faire du bon travail.

respective organisations is a real challenge and we all have to engage with our common Member States to achieve the goal of increased institutional interoperability.

The second scenario is that of situations where the EU could support the UN with rapid, short-term bridging operations or with strategic capabilities. The example that stands out is that of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

The UN and the EU have worked in close cooperation in the DRC in various crisis situations. Between June and September 2003, the EU successfully deployed Operation ARTEMIS to Bunia – to secure its airport and protect civilians – within three weeks from the authorization by the Security Council. The force stabilized the situation in Bunia and provided MONUC, the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC, with the time and space to reinforce its presence and subsequently expand the zone of stability beyond Bunia. In 2006, following a request by the UN and in agreement with DRC authorities, the EU launched a second military operation, known as EUFOR, in support of MONUC during national elections. It sent a strong signal of resolve to all potential spoilers and thereby greatly complemented MONUC's efforts and contributed to the successful outcome of the elections, the first in 40 years in the DRC.

In this area of rapid, short-term bridging operations there is a need for enhanced strategic planning and dialogue amongst all providers of peacekeeping capabilities to ensure that adequate, rapidly deployable capabilities – including strategic enablers such as lift capabilities, logistics and information support – and strategic reserves are identified to address these emerging conflict challenges. Member States have repeatedly recognized the need for UN peacekeeping operations to have the required capacity to deploy to difficult environments. This is a challenge we all face, but we have yet to find feasible and predictable solutions. Future discussions need to address these issues.

The third scenario is when we deploy UN and EU operations side by side – a vital area given the lack of resources and one that feeds into the issue of pooling resources. We cannot be competitors. We

must work together to manage the limited resources that are available.

To enhance our cooperation in several other thematic areas

Afghanistan is an obvious example where the UN and the EU cooperate to stabilize the situation and support the transition from conflict to development. The rule of law remains weak in Afghanistan, and in particular poor policing contributes to the Afghan population's dissatisfaction with the current situation – which impacts negatively on both the Afghan government and the international community. The EU can and does contribute a great deal in this field and we hope that the current EUPOL mission will be further strengthened. In the DRC, the UN and the EU also cooperate closely in the area of security sector reform. MONUC works closely with the European Union Police Mission and the European Union Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo in this regard, and we look forward to enhancing and deepening this partnership with a view to making tangible progress on this critical issue, which is one of the key benchmarks for sustainable peace in the DRC.

We should also continue to enhance our cooperation in several other thematic areas, such as gender and human rights mainstreaming, as well as training and guidance development. The EU is a critical partner to the UN in helping countries transition to longer-term peacebuilding processes. In all fields where we cooperate the co-ordination efforts should be strengthened. A continued EU commitment to UN peacekeeping and alignment of our approaches to crisis management can only enhance our interoperability.

We have a common interest to ensure that both the UN and the EU do a good job where we already work together, as well as in potential future scenarios where either organisation may be called upon to go into a conflict situation alone. Therefore we should continue to work together to further enhance our partnership and ensure that it is mutually supportive and successful.

Ten Years of the ESDP: A NATO perspective

It would be dishonest to hide the fact that some NATO traditionalists were nervous ten years ago when the EU's Security and Defence Policy finally moved from the drawing board into operational reality with the launch of the first EU military mission. Would Europeans now shift their focus away from the Alliance towards EU solutions to crisis management and meeting the new security challenges? Would we be "robbing Peter to pay Paul" in competing for the limited pool of military capabilities, and in determining the respective priorities of NATO/EU operations?



Jamie Shea, Director Policy Planning, Private Office of the Secretary-General, NATO



Jamie Shea

With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the 23 EU operations launched over the past decade have not only strengthened the EU's role and importance on the world stage, but also contributed greatly to Alliance security. In part this is because EU capabilities have become the necessary complement to NATO's military forces in nearly all of the Alliance's current operations. For instance, in Afghanistan, EUFOR works alongside ISAF in developing the key area of police training. The European Commission provides significant funding of non-military activities, such as judges, aid workers and administrators, within NATO's provincial reconstruction teams. EU aid is increasingly a vital factor in the stability of Pakistan without whose cooperation NATO would find it difficult to provide security for Afghanistan. In Sarajevo, EUFOR and NATO HQ have developed a seamless cooperation and the North Atlantic Council and the EU's Political and Security Committees consult frequently on developments in Bosnia under the "Berlin+" arrangements. These arrangements, whereby NATO gives the EU assured access to its planning capabilities and presumed access to NATO's assets have been shown to work well on the two occasions when they have been used: in Bosnia and in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In Kosovo, NATO and the EU have worked hand in hand since 1999 to uphold security and develop viable institutions; and in Addis Ababa or in Northwood in the UK, EU and NATO military personnel works together whether to coordinate airlift support to the African Union or anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia. In short, it is difficult to envisage a major NATO operation these days in which the EU would not also be present in a significant complementary role.

The EU's Security and Defence Policy has helped to shape the overall environment of security

At the same time, and looking back over the past ten years, it is striking that the EU's European Security and Defence Policy has helped to shape the overall environment of security in ways that help NATO's own policies and programmes to be more effective. This is manifest in many ways. First, the EU's operations in places where it would be politically difficult for the Alliance to deploy – such as Georgia in the wake of the Russian-Georgian conflict of August 2008, or the Middle East, or the Ukrainian-Moldovan border,

help to stabilise regions which are also of strategic interest to the Alliance. The deployment of EUMM monitors in Georgia, in particular, was instrumental in consolidating a ceasefire and promoting transparency in a country that is an important partner of NATO and to which it has offered the firm perspective of ultimate membership. Moreover, EU conditionality on the transfer of indicted war criminals in Serbia and Bosnia, as well as its Stabilisation and Association agreements with countries in the Balkans also further the political objectives that NATO is seeking in its own programmes such as the Membership Action Plan or the Individual Dialogue. As we look back on a decade of NATO enlargement since the end of the Cold War, and fifteen years of NATO's partnerships with countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, it is beyond doubt that NATO's new members and partners have been all the more valuable to the Alliance because of their simultaneous integration into EU structures and dialogues.

Nevertheless, it remains true that these strategic benefits to Europe's security have resulted more from a happy convergence of the independent actions of both NATO and the EU than from a deliberate concerted policy of these two institutions. Certainly the day to day cooperation between NATO and the EU has greatly improved and has become more relaxed and substantial, especially between the respective international staffs. The NATO Secretary General is also more involved, and more regularly, in meetings of EU Foreign and Defence Ministers, in the same way that Commission President Barroso and High Representative Solana attended NATO's Bucharest Summit in 2008. Transatlantic dinners of NATO and EU Foreign Ministers are also a regular occurrence, the latest being held in New York just a few days ago. Notwithstanding the well-known political obstacles standing in the way of a true strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, the pull of events, such as Afghanistan, piracy or France's recent return to NATO's integrated military structures, seems to be bringing NATO and the EU inexorably closer together.

Certain improvements are not only feasible but highly desirable

This said, the impact of the global financial crisis on already overstrained defence budgets as well as the urgent need to put all our military and civil instruments together to make progress in places



> EUFOR Althea



> EU HR J. Solana and NATO SG J. de Hoop Scheffer during the press briefing held at the end of the meeting between the EU Political and Security Committee with the North Atlantic Council, 24 November 2008

such as Afghanistan, Somalia or the Balkans, argue for a less ad hoc and more long term, coherent approach to the NATO-EU relationship over the next ten years. Naturally, both institutions will remain fully independent with overlapping but not identical functions. The EU will not need NATO's help in everything it undertakes in the CFSP domain, nor vice-versa. Yet certain improvements are not only feasible but highly desirable. For instance, more consultation in establishing those priorities most linked to our immediate security interests and where both institutions have to pull their weight equally, as in the Balkans, if we are to make progress. In the 21st century our diminished resources and capabilities will not allow us to engage everywhere, and all the time. Another improvement would be in planning and developing our capabilities to take full advantage of synergies, such as in the pooling of research or the joint training and certification of EU Battle Groups and the NATO Response Forces. Both institutions would also benefit from more interaction on the new security challenges, such as energy supplies, cyber defence, proliferation and the security implications of climate change. As the response to such challenges has perforce to be complex and multi-faceted, a joined-up approach between NATO and the EU will become even more important if the values and policies of North America and Europe are to prevail in a multi-polar world where power is moving towards Asia.

Two imperatives stand out

Strong relationships, however, are not built only on ambitious political visions but also on common sense. In this respect, two imperatives stand out. First, NATO and the EU must be able to conclude rapidly agreements that provide for the mutual support and protection of EU and NATO personnel deployed in the same theatre without institutional politics standing in the way. The safety of our soldiers, police and civilian personnel must always come first. Second, NATO and the EU should not compete with each other for precious assets in order to launch similar missions in the same areas. Where one institution is already effectively engaged, it makes more sense for the other institution to support rather than attempt to duplicate – avoiding what diplomats refer to as “double dipping”. Our roles should be complementary rather than competitive. There will be plenty of security tasks to keep both institutions fully engaged for many years to come without the need to compete.

The EU's ESDP has come a very long way in a short time, and NATO-EU relations have thankfully moved ahead as well. Yet given the magnitude of the challenges we face, both old and new, both these processes will need to continue to develop more rapidly still over the next decade.

Résumé

Dix années de PESD, vues par l'OTAN

Jamie Shea est directeur de l'unité de la planification politique au Cabinet du Secrétaire général de l'OTAN.

Il est vrai que certains partisans de l'OTAN ont appréhendé le moment où l'UE a décidé de lancer sa première opération militaire au titre de la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense. Les Européens se détourneraient-ils de l'Alliance pour trouver, dans un cadre communautaire, des solutions à la gestion des crises?

Toutefois, avec le recul, les opérations de l'UE au cours de la dernière décennie n'ont pas seulement consolidé la position de l'Europe sur la scène internationale, mais elles ont également contribué à la sécurité de l'Alliance. Il est en effet difficile à l'heure actuelle d'envisager une opé-

ration d'envergure de l'OTAN aux côtés de laquelle l'UE ne jouerait pas un rôle important.

Il est établi que la coopération au jour le jour entre l'OTAN et l'UE s'est beaucoup améliorée. Cependant, l'impact de la crise financière internationale sur des budgets de défense déjà fortement réduits montre la nécessité de relations cohérentes à plus long terme entre l'OTAN et l'UE pour la prochaine décennie. Deux impératifs ressortent. En premier lieu, l'OTAN et l'UE doivent être en mesure de fournir une assistance et une protection mutuelles aux troupes déployées sur le même théâtre d'opérations. En second lieu, l'OTAN et l'UE ne devraient pas se disputer le lancement de missions identiques dans les mêmes zones: nos rôles devraient être complémentaires.

“Peace and security are in the centre of the relations between the EU and Africa”

More than ever, peace and security are in the centre of the relations between the EU and Africa. In this context, Koen Vervaeke highlights how the development of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and its early applications in Africa has added a very important new instrument in the EU’s toolbox to support African efforts and has proven to be an essential element to make the EU’s contribution to peace and stability on the African continent more credible and effective.

Koen Vervaeke is Head of the EU Delegation to the AU. This appointment reflects the common will of the Council of the EU and of the European Commission to combine all the instruments of the EU and thereby ensure a coherent approach towards Africa at all levels. His role is in particular to contribute to the implementation of the common agenda with Africa as reflected in the Joint Strategy Africa – EU. To this end, Koen Vervaeke and his team closely cooperate not only with the African Union but also with diplomatic missions of the European Union Member States and with all other interested international governmental and non-governmental actors in Addis Ababa.

The African Union is a strategic continental actor and a key international partner of the European Union. In the few years since its creation in 2002 the AU has become a key player in crisis management and the promotion of peace, stability, democracy and development.

More than in the past, European Union support will work towards Africa-led and Africa-owned approaches and strengthen the primary responsibility of African partners for peace and security, democratic governance, respect for human rights, and economic and social development.



> Koen Vervaeke

ESDP is not an aim in itself. It has to be used to serve political goals of the EU, but also of the country or region, where such an EU support is given. It needs to fit into the respective context to be effectively deployed. It was therefore crucial that ESDP’s development coincided with more resolve on the African side to tackle conflicts by African lead nations such as South Africa in the DRC, Nigeria in West Africa, by sub-regional organisations, and, above all, by the transformation of the OAU into the African Union in 2003, refusing indifference with regard to (internal) conflicts – thus allowing ESDP missions to provide sensible support to these genuinely African efforts.

In parallel, the development of ESDP also responded somehow to a critical situation the UN – the traditional supplier of crisis management – had to face, going through a credibility crisis in Africa after its debacles in Somalia and Rwanda. While it was then reluctant to engage more robustly on the continent, the aftermath of the end of the cold war and the break-down of old alliances did even increase the call for strong international engagement.

The EU, itself put into question for not being able to prevent the war in the Balkans, took decisive steps in the 1990s to strengthen its external action through different new instruments, notably ESDP. In its efforts to bring peace and prosperity beyond its own borders, it seemed then only logical and opportune to project these instruments also into Africa.

The EU’s role in Africa changed to the benefit of a more political approach

The self-perception of the EU’s role in Africa, traditionally very much focussed on development cooperation, thus changed to the benefit of a more political approach – again in line with the overall development of the EU away from being only an economic giant but political dwarf towards a more global player. The foundation was the further development of the Common Foreign and Security

Policy, of which ESDP is an integral part. For the first time ever, the EU adopted a Security Strategy in 2003, acknowledging security as pre-condition to development as well as the need for the EU to mobilise all its instruments in a comprehensive approach if it were to be successful. The role of High Representative Javier Solana to translate this new policy into operations would be determining.

The first ever appointment in 1996 of an EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes region (followed by others in the following years, in particular for Sudan and the AU), the EU-Africa Summit in Cairo in 2000, the revision of the contractual relationship with Africa (and Caribbean and Pacific States) with the signing of the Cotonou Agreement containing more political elements – in particular with regard to human rights –, the adoption of a new Africa strategy or the creation of an innovative instrument to fund AU-led peace operations – the Africa Peace Facility – have been visible steps along the road to such an increased political engagement with Africa. They are also based on the recognition that stability and prosperity on the African continent are of strategic interest for the EU.

Africa: strong ESDP engagement

However, no one could have predicted that Africa, starting with the Democratic Republic of Congo, would become the scene of strong ESDP engagement. The military operation ARTEMIS in 2003 was the EU’s first military operation outside Europe. At a moment when the peace process was bound to collapse, ARTEMIS stabilised the security conditions and improved the humanitarian situation in the North-eastern town of Bunia, allowing the UN peace keeping mission MONUC to be strengthened again to take over the responsibility after a bridging period. Three years later, again at a critical juncture of Congo’s transition, EUFOR RD Congo was deployed in Kinshasa in support of MONUC during the electoral process. EUFOR Tchad/RCA in 2008/09 contributed to protecting civilians in danger in eastern Chad and the north of the Central African Republic. Its presence prevented further spill over in the region of the Darfur conflict.

Résumé

Koen Vervaeke est le Chef de la Délégation de l'Union européenne auprès de l'Union Africaine basée à Addis-Abeba, en Ethiopie. L'UA est un partenaire international essentiel de l'Union européenne. Le rôle principal de Koen Vervaeke est d'aider à la mise en oeuvre du Plan d'action dans le cadre de la stratégie commune Afrique-UE.

Le développement de la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense en Afrique est un instrument important de soutien aux efforts poursuivis par les Africains pour obtenir la paix et la stabilité sur leur continent.

La PESD doit servir les objectifs politiques non seulement de l'UE, mais aussi des pays ou des régions concernées. Pour régler les conflits qui surviennent en Afrique, elle doit donc faire preuve d'une détermination renforcée, qui passe avant tout par la coopération avec l'Union africaine. Cette politique traduit également une réorientation du rôle de l'UE en

Afrique, traditionnellement axé sur la coopération au développement, vers une approche plus politique.

Mais qui aurait pu prédire que l'Afrique serait le théâtre d'un aussi fort engagement de la PESD? ARTÉMIS, en République démocratique du Congo, a été en 2003 la première opération militaire menée par l'UE à l'extérieur de l'Europe. Plusieurs autres missions ont suivies.

Ces actions doivent être les plus efficaces possibles, parce que la capacité à obtenir des résultats est essentielle pour que nos partenaires africains prennent leurs responsabilités. Par conséquent, le renforcement des capacités, le soutien direct aux opérations africaines en matière de paix (financement et conseils) et les contributions à la réforme du secteur de la sécurité doivent continuer à être associées, si besoin est, à des opérations autonomes de la PESD.

Besides these autonomous military operations in close cooperation with the UN, the EU used its ESDP capabilities also in a more diversified way. In Darfur, European military and police, in an advisory function, were working side by side with African counterparts in the AU led peace keeping mission AMIS. Currently, the EU has deployed three independent ESDP missions on the continent in the field of security sector reform (SSR): EUSEC RD Congo's key task is to provide advice and assistance for the reform of the Congolese army. EUPOL RD Congo supports and assists the Congolese authorities with security sector reform in the crucial area of police and its interaction with the justice sector. In Guinea-Bissau, a dedicated SSR mission provides advice and assistance on reform of the security sector in order to contribute to creating the conditions for implementation of the National Security Sector Reform Strategy.

Finally, EUNAVFOR-Atalanta is the first ever ESDP maritime operation with the aim to help deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia.

Peace and security challenges will remain for the time to come. The new Joint Africa-EU Strategy adopted in Lisbon at the second EU-Africa Summit in December 2007, based on the principles of ownership and shared responsibility, offers for the future the overarching political vision of Heads of State and Government on both sides on what should guide our mutual partnership. It is significant that the first of the eight partnerships identified in the first action plan is about peace and security. ESDP has and will undoubtedly make a major contribution to this end.

Together with our African partners, we have to ensure the best possible effectiveness of our actions

The EU's contribution in resolving conflicts should continue to be based on the widest possible security definition. As the African Union, the regional organisations and its Member States increase their efforts to bring peace and stability to the continent, possible areas of EU support, including through ESDP, will rather increase than diminish in the coming years. Together with our African partners, we have to ensure the best possible effectiveness of our actions. Key to the principle of African ownership is the ability to deliver. Therefore, capacity building for African organisations will continue to be a priority. In this context, we need to make sure that the AU and the regional organisations are well interlinked and establish mutually reinforcing relations to ensure that the vision of the "African Peace and Security Architecture" will be fully implemented as soon as possible.

The EU has no intention to become the "gendarme" of Africa. Capabilities are stretched and we do not think this would be the right approach. Nevertheless, short-term substitution of African

efforts with the deployment of ESDP missions on the continent might also be needed in the future. Therefore, capacity building, direct support to African peace support operations (financially and by giving advice), contributions to security sector reform, will continue to have to be paired – at times – with the readiness to deploy autonomous ESDP operations, as already undertaken in the past few years. We might also reflect what contribution ESDP can bring to the new security challenges Africa is facing: terrorism, the impact of climate change, organised crime and drugs trafficking.

Within the European Union, we will continue to look for the best possible coordination and coherence of the different instruments at the EU's disposal, both financial and political, both from the Community and the Council. Each potential ESDP contribution will be judged upon its merits and contribution to the overall policy. However, we know that we need to interlink better our different policy tools to live up to the expectation expressed in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy that both continents be able to respond timely and appropriately to peace and security threats. In all this, ESDP will continue to have a key role to play.



A special advisor for African capabilities

General Pierre-Michel Joana was appointed Special Advisor for African peacekeeping capabilities by EU HR Solana on 29 February 2008. Pierre-Michel Joana plays a key role in coordinating all related activities within the Council Secretariat, in close cooperation with the European Commission and also with African partners, in particular the African Union, and international stakeholders.

In carrying out his mission General Joana also liaises closely with the EU Special Representative to the African Union. Since July 2009, as Personal Representative of Javier Solana for Somalia, General Joana has been coordinating the exploration of solutions aimed at bringing stability to Somalia and the region, both at sea and on land. As well as building on the success of the EU's naval taskforce, EUNAVFOR-Atalanta, the EU is looking at the following new areas of activity: reinforced support to the African Union in Somalia; capacity-building in the Somali Security Sector; long-term assistance strategy for Somalia; reinforced legal framework to tackle piracy.

“The Commission helps to build a comprehensive EU approach to crisis management”

3 questions to Richard Wright, Director, Directorate General for External Relations of the European Commission

Richard Wright is the European Commission representative to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) at the Directorate General for External Relations and was formerly Director for relations with North America, East Asia, Australia, New Zealand, EEA, EFTA, San Marino, Andorra and Monaco. He is also Head of Crisis Platform and Policy Coordination in CFSP. He is the former Ambassador, Head of Delegation of the European Commission to the Russian Federation, Moscow, and has had considerable experience of a variety of posts within the European Commission.



> Richard Wright

How would you define the European Commission's role in Common Foreign and Security Policy / European Security and Defence Policy?

Under the current Treaty, the Commission is fully associated with the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Like the Presidency and Member States, it has a (shared) right of initiative on any question relating to CFSP.

The Commission participates in the decision-making process in all relevant Council bodies and in political dialogue meetings with third countries. This means in practice that the Commission President is present at European Councils and Summits, the Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy and/or those Commissioners responsible for Development or Enlargement are present at the monthly General Affairs and External Relations Councils (GAERC) and Gymnichs (informal Foreign Ministers' meetings held once each Presidency), Commission representatives participate in EU Troikas at all levels from Ministerial to official both in Brussels and in third countries, and the Commission is represented in the Political and Security Committee (PSC/COPS), and geographical or thematic working groups of the Council.

The EU is the largest provider of development aid and humanitarian assistance in the world. As such, the Commission has a long tradition of work on development and humanitarian assistance. Activities in these areas, as well as other actions under the first pillar, play a crucial role in achieving the Union's overall objectives as well as the political objectives of CFSP and ESDP. The Instrument for Stability, launched in 2007, has enabled the Commission to respond more effectively to crises. The Commission is also responsible for the management and implementation of the CFSP budget.

The Council and the Commission are jointly responsible for the consistency of the Union's external activities as a whole. Moreover, as guardian of the EC Treaty, the Commission has a particular responsibility in ensuring coherence both in all EU external activities and between these external activities and the other areas of EU (internal) action.

Where the Council takes initiatives in political crisis management, the Commission has committed to ensure that any action which it

undertakes under its own competence is consistent with political objectives set under the CFSP, and to ensure close operational collaboration between Commission-managed external assistance and ESDP missions.

The Commission participates systematically in the preparation of certain CFSP legal instruments and contributes to the preparation of all EU instruments, declarations and Council (or European Council) Conclusions.

In what ways does the European Commission contribute to developing EU comprehensive approaches to crisis management?

The broad range of external assistance instruments managed by the European Commission has been providing a vital contribution to the EU's overall capacity to respond to crises in third countries, often alongside EU Joint Actions under CFSP/ESDP. The launch of the Instrument for Stability (IFS) in 2007 enhanced considerably the Commission's crisis response capacity.

While crisis response measures are frequently required in order to mitigate the most urgent effects of a man-made crisis, it is widely acknowledged that these alone cannot provide durable solutions to the root causes of crises. The contribution of the European Community is indispensable to achieving a genuine EU comprehensive approach which can provide the required diplomatic and development tools in parallel with ESDP tools.

The following examples demonstrate specific actions undertaken by the Commission to help build a comprehensive EU approach to crisis management:

- Alongside the EUFOR military operation in Chad and the Central African Republic, the EC "Instrument for Stability" (IFS) was mobilised with EUR 15m for two programmes supporting (i) the UN's MINURCAT police programme protecting refugee camps / IDP sites and (ii) the election census in Chad, as well as EUR 6.5m for security system reform in the Central African Republic. Meanwhile, the 9th European Development Fund (EDF) has been enabling essential capacity building for the administrations in both Chad and the Central African Republic as well as supporting vital economic devel-



> Emergency help during the Bunia riots, DRC 2003



> Worker opening bags to prepare rations for distribution, 2008

opment, while there was also a targeted EUR 10 million EDF programme in the area of EUFOR's deployment in eastern Chad.

- In Afghanistan, the Commission mobilised the IFS for an action to help the government with reform of the justice sector. This action has been undertaken in parallel with the work of the EUPOL mission, representing yet another good example of how the 1st and 2nd pillars can be effectively mobilised towards supporting a comprehensive state-building approach. In parallel to work in the justice sector, the Commission is also a major supporter of the Afghan National Police, having provided some EUR 280 million since 2002 to the Law and Order Trust Fund. Such support has been important in terms of helping to leverage the necessary reforms in the police and Ministry of Interior.
- Alongside the EULEX mission in Kosovo, the IFS provides support (total of EUR 34m to date) for both the International Civilian Office and the vetting of new judges and prosecutors, having previously supported the orderly phasing out of part of the UN administration. This dovetails well with the very substantial EC assistance of over EUR 300 million which the Commission is implementing in support of Kosovo's socio-economic development and capacity building of institutions and the introduction of European standards in line with the EU policy for the rest of the Western Balkans.
- Most recently, in May 2009, the Commission agreed a rapid response programme for EUR 1.75m to support the Kenyan judicial system in treating cases of piracy suspects detained off the coast of Somalia, in particular by the EUNAVFOR-Atalanta naval ESDP operation.

How does the European Commission contribute to strengthening civilian ESDP missions?

At a time of growing security challenges and demands upon the Union, the EU has to strengthen its capabilities of prevention, rapid reaction, planning and implementation of civilian ESDP missions. Without this, the projection of the EU as a credible partner for undertaking civilian missions will be impaired, an outcome which would undermine one of the unique assets of EU crisis management.

The Commission plays an important role in strengthening civilian ESDP missions and, concretely, we manage the CFSP budget, which

has increased steeply from EUR 30 million in 2002 to EUR 243 million this year, and is due to reach over EUR 400 million by the end of the current financial framework in 2013. The bulk of this year's budget, almost 90%, will be used for the 9 civilian ESDP missions. The lion's share is dedicated to the rule of law mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo), to the Police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) and the Monitoring mission in Georgia (EUMM). Commission services give daily support, training and advice to missions in relation to procurement, financial management and control.

Budgetary resources have not acted as a brake on ESDP ambitions so far. If specific needs arise, there are procedures to increase the budget during a given budget year. As elsewhere in the Community budget, there is a need to prioritize and concentrate on core CFSP tasks. In particular ESDP missions should not expand to areas that are best handled by Community programmes, e.g. in the area of civil justice.

In addition, the Commission has developed concrete measures to support ESDP operations and to enhance civilian capabilities. We have, in close cooperation with the General Secretariat of the Council, engaged in a number of activities such as the expansion of the number of "pre-approved" suppliers (for example in the field of armoured vehicles, 4WD vehicles, telecommunications and IT equipment, high risk insurance) to speed up equipment supplies, i.e. the so-called framework contracts.

We are further developing the concept of "preparatory measures", which allow a mission start up before political decisions are finalized. It should be noted that for the Monitoring mission in Georgia these measures contributed to a timely deployment of the full ESDP mission.

Finally, the Commission finances, through the Instrument for Stability, training in two important areas related to ESDP. Training has been completed for 100 Member States staff belonging to the Civilian Response Teams. The Commission is also continuing to finance the training of 600 police experts a year on civilian crisis management so that the robustness, flexibility and interoperability of EU police elements is improved when deployed by the EU or by the UN. This training was undertaken in 2008 by the French Gendarmerie, and in 2009 will be managed by the Italian Carabinieri and in 2010 by the German Federal Police.

“L’implication du PE est un gage de légitimité, d’efficacité et de visibilité”



> Arnaud Danjean



Arnaud Danjean, Président de la sous-commission Sécurité et Défense du Parlement européen

Arnaud Danjean (F, PPE) est le nouveau Président de la sous-commission "Sécurité et Défense" du Parlement européen pour la nouvelle législature 2009-2014. La sous-commission "Sécurité et Défense" est une sous-commission de la commission des Affaires étrangères, compétente pour les questions ayant trait à la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense (PESD).

En tant que nouveau Président de la sous-commission "Sécurité et défense" du Parlement européen, quelles sont vos priorités pour la nouvelle législature ?

La légitimité de la PESD s'établit et se renforce à travers les opérations. En tant que parlementaires, nous devons assurer un suivi étroit des différentes opérations, le plus en amont possible et tout au long de leur déroulement. Le Parlement peut aussi conduire un processus de retour d'expérience. L'implication parlementaire dans le suivi des opérations PESD est un gage de légitimité, d'efficacité et de visibilité dans l'opinion publique. La pérennité de la PESD en dépend.

Le Parlement peut également avoir un rôle utile dans l'amélioration des interactions entre les différentes institutions en charge de la PESD, élément qui sera d'autant plus important si le traité de Lisbonne est ratifié.

Je souhaite également développer la force de proposition du Parlement sur les dossiers clés en matière de sécurité et de défense (opérations, non-prolifération, développement des capacités et donc de l'industrie de défense).

Enfin, le Parlement doit contribuer à renforcer le dialogue avec les partenaires stratégiques, particulièrement les Etats-Unis.

10 ans d'existence, 6 ans d'opérations ; quel bilan faites-vous de la PESD ?

J'ai commencé ma carrière dans les années 90 au cœur des crises balkaniques, qui ont constitué un traumatisme majeur pour l'Europe. Quinze ans plus tard, on prend toute la mesure du changement entre l'absence d'Europe dans les crises ex-yougoslaves et la réaction rapide et efficace face à la crise en Géorgie. Cela constitue un succès en soi et suffit à justifier l'intérêt de la PESD.

On ne peut certes pas s'en tenir à ce satisfecit général, mais il faut sans cesse rappeler que la paix reste la valeur cardinale sur laquelle s'est bâtie l'Europe. Ceux qui critiquent la PESD en ironisant sur l'absence de définition ambitieuse d'intérêts stratégiques européens en matière de défense ne devraient jamais perdre de vue ce fondement majeur, qui nous oblige vis-à-vis de notre environnement proche

National Parliaments and CFSP/ESDP

The role of national Parliaments in external relations differs from one Member state to another. In other words, the most notable feature of oversight of the ESDP by Parliaments is the lack of uniformity in the existing mechanisms of parliamentary oversight in the different Member States.

In the field of CFSP, the Conference of Chairpersons of the Foreign Affairs Committees of national parliaments (COFACC) meets during each presidency. Similarly, the Chairs of the Committees of Defence meet during each presidency.

The EU High Representative participates in the meetings of COFACC. As regards the meetings of Defence Committee Chairs, key actors in ESDP, including EU Special Representatives and senior officials from the Council Secretariat, participate as speakers. The HR and his representatives also meet regularly with MPs from individual Member States' Parliaments in Brussels and in EU capitals.

comme dans les zones les plus lointaines dont les crises affectent directement notre stabilité.

En 10 ans, la PESD a rempli un de ses objectifs majeurs : permettre aux Européens d'intervenir efficacement face à une crise aux portes de l'Union européenne. Ces progrès ont pu être accomplis grâce à la volonté des Etats membres de construire une capacité autonome de gestion des crises pour l'Union.

La valeur ajoutée de la PESD semble acquise : l'UE est un acteur crédible, consensuel et demandé sur la scène internationale. Il faut donc à présent se doter de capacités civiles et militaires adaptées à ce rôle.

Comment envisagez-vous les relations entre le Parlement et le Conseil ainsi que votre relation avec les parlements nationaux sur la PESD ?

Beaucoup dépendra de la future architecture de l'Union, si le traité de Lisbonne est ratifié. Je ne suis pas de ceux qui pensent que le Parlement se grandira en ayant une approche concurrentielle avec le Conseil en matière de défense. Il faut simplement que le Conseil respecte le Parlement en tant qu'acteur majeur permettant de doter ce secteur sensible et en maturation d'une légitimité démocratique.

Ce souci de légitimité doit également se retrouver dans des contacts approfondis avec les parlements nationaux.

“The EU has a role of its own to play in the Middle East”



Marc Otte, EU Special Representative for the Middle East peace process



> Marc Otte

Marc Otte was appointed EU Special Representative for the Middle East peace process on 14 July 2003. His current mandate runs until 28 February 2010 and is based on the EU's policy objectives for the Middle East peace process. These objectives include a two-state solution with a democratic, viable, peaceful and sovereign Palestinian state living side-by-side with Israel within secure and recognised borders enjoying normal relations with their neighbours. This aim should be reached in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, 1397 and 1402 and the principles of the Madrid conference.

As EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the Middle East peace process, what is your role in the implementation of the EU's policy objectives in the Middle-East?

The EUSR's role is to promote the principles of the EU Middle East policy laid down in the mandate, namely a two-state solution with Israel and a democratic, viable, peaceful and sovereign Palestinian State living side by side in peace and security as well as a solution to the Israeli/Syrian and Israeli/Lebanese tracks. My main task is to closely monitor developments on the ground, further the EU policy goals throughout the region and in the EU as well as to coordinate international efforts on behalf of the EU in close contact with other international partners. Since the EU is part of the Middle East Quartet, my responsibility includes ensuring an active role for the EU within this format. Supporting the work of the EU High Representative in the field assigned by the mandate, the EUSR helps to shape a coherent, visible and more focused foreign policy, in close contact with the European Commission, the EU Presidency and Member States. This implies a constant presence in and travelling through the region and participation in relevant bilateral and multilateral meetings, conferences etc. on the Middle East. Internally, my role is to keep the Council updated on the latest developments and to provide them with comprehensive evaluation on a regular basis, both personally and through reporting. This includes for example a permanent monitoring of the progress made toward peace by both conflicting sides. Finally, the EUSR gives input to the discussion process among Member States and thus helps shaping the Common Security and Foreign Policy of the EU.

The EU has two ESDP civilians missions in the Palestinian Territories, EUBAM Rafah and EUPOL COPPS. What are their roles?

EUPOL COPPS is designed to assist the Palestinian Authority in enhancing security and the rule of law in the Palestinian territories. It offers advice and provides concrete material support to improve and reform the civil security and judiciary sectors while making sure that the ownership of the reforms remains with the Palestinian Authority. Operating since 1 January 2006, EUPOL COPPS has played an active role in training the Civil Police officers, advising the Palestinian Authority on structural changes and helping to channel financial and material assistance from EU Member States and other international donors. This has led to a more professional performance of the Palestinian police which is felt by the local population and

acknowledged also by Israeli officials. Lately, EUPOL COPPS focuses on the judicial sector, especially criminal justice reform (see page 54).

EUBAM Rafah was initiated in late 2005 in order to monitor the functioning of the crossing point Rafah at the border between Gaza and Egypt. Based on the Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) between Israel and the Palestinian Authority in 2005, the EU showed its engagement by taking over the role of a neutral third party to monitor the implementation of the AMA at Rafah. Thanks to the mission's presence more than 400,000 passengers crossed through Rafah before the take-over of Gaza by Hamas in June 2007. At present the mission is temporarily suspended, but is kept on stand-by to demonstrate the EU's commitment and to resume its work as soon as possible.

Do you think that the EU's role in the Middle East will be strengthened with the arrival of a new US administration since Obama's election?

Of course, the US is the key player in the Middle East and the approach of the new US Administration, which is more open to cooperation and multilateralism, is very helpful in order to join forces aiming at reaching our common goal – a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict. But the US cannot be successful without strong allies and given our close transatlantic relationship, the EU is the natural partner here and has a lot to offer which is much appreciated by the new Administration.

If only one looks at the presence on the ground of the EU in total, i.e. its institutions, ESDP missions and Member States with their respective networks, the EU has a role of its own to play in the Middle East. It provides a reference framework for regional cooperation and can serve as a model for the countries in the region to aspire to. With its neighbourhood policy the EU aims at promoting its values and cooperation mechanisms to the Middle East, not to forget about the Barcelona process, and its successor, the Union for the Mediterranean. Apart from that, the EU is, for example, the largest donor to the Palestinian Authority and has played a key role in channelling aid through its financing mechanism Pegase, which is also open to and used by other international donors. The EU's role here is crucial to strengthen the Palestinian Authority and irreplaceable since not all donors provide direct budget aid.

Nevertheless, I believe that the EU has still potential and by acting even more coherently we could increase its role in the Middle East and as partner for the US.

“Palestinians will not enjoy security and stability with an effective police force alone”



By Chief Constable Paul Robert Kernaghan, Head of EUPOL COPPS

On 14 November 2005, the Council established an EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS). The operational phase began on 1 January 2006 with an initial duration of 3 years, extended since.

EUPOL COPPS has a long term reform focus and provides enhanced support to the Palestinian Authority in establishing sustainable and effective policing arrangements.

Chief Constable Paul Robert Kernaghan is the Head of the EUPOL COPPS mission since 1 January 2009. He has extensive police background acquired in Northern Ireland and England and international experience.

Transforming the Palestinian Civil Police – No walk in the park

Nobody said it was going to be a walk in the park. In our field – institution building, security sector reform – it takes time to make progress under normal circumstances. The difficulty increases exponentially when it comes to the Middle East.

Political instability – almost inherent to the region – has had a major impact on the work of EUPOL COPPS in the past. One of the most painful examples came in early 2006. Almost simultaneously, as EUPOL COPPS became formally an ESDP mission, Hamas won the Palestinian legislative elections, and the mission was put on standby since it could not engage with a Hamas-controlled government.

In this context, the relative calm during the last two years – despite major events such as the Israeli offensive against the Gaza Strip as 2008 turned into 2009 – and the progress that the Palestinian Civil Police (PCP) has been able to make, is remarkable. It has been a team effort, one of almost blind faith, and made up of small steps, one after the other, day after day.

Bringing in equipment for the Palestinian Police is in itself a small odyssey. Not only does it often get stuck in customs for months, but it also requires specific item by item approval from the Israeli Ministry of Defence.

Despite this in most cases, it eventually ends up making its way to the Palestinians. Since the beginning of the year there has been a real increase in equipment that has made its way through the hurdles. More than 150 vehicles have been delivered. The network of Smart Net sites is nearly complete and now the PCP have radio coverage in most of the West Bank. This on top of complete kits for all 700 mem-

bers of the Public Order unit and the whole Criminal Investigation Department.

The Palestinian Police was very badly in need of just about everything after the destruction suffered during the Intifada that started at the end of 2000 – in which, by the way, the Palestinian security forces played no small part.

However, it is not just about distributing equipment. The real transformation of the police comes through training. To put it another way, a police force is not such by virtue of their uniform or the car they drive, but by their skills. This is in many ways the most difficult part, and where cooperation and motivation by the Palestinians themselves is essential.

Two current projects stand out in this regard, one on Community Policing and the other focused on developing the Command and Control skills of the police, through their Operational Control Rooms.

The Community Policing project is being tested in Azun village, Qalqiliya district. Community Policing is one of the basic pillars of EUPOL COPPS' Civil Policing model. The focus is on community involvement in problem solving and local policing issues in general.

The Operational Control Plan is an essential component of EUPOL COPPS' efforts to transform the PCP into a more professional and efficient institution by leading to greater control of its middle management on patrols on the ground and improved data collection and manipulation.

The success of all these projects depends on one single notion: Credibility. The Palestinians must feel that all our efforts are to their benefit. For this reason EUPOL COPPS has made sure since it started, that the whole transformation process, from beginning to end, is Palestinian owned. Examples of this are the fact that most of the training carried out by EUPOL COPPS contains a train-the-trainers component and that the syllabuses are almost always designed in cooperation with the Palestinians.

Credibility – like a reputation – is a quality that takes years to build up but only moments to destroy. In other words, things could go wrong at any moment, and particularly so due to the delicate nature of security sector reform. Typically for a police force some of the most delicate situations are those involving public disturbances. Not only is tension high due to actual violence or potential for violence, but additionally the police are often under intense media scrutiny. For this reason one of the most important training functions delivered by EUPOL COPPS has been in riot control. The entire Public Order unit has been through specialised training in this field.



> EUPOL COPPS

Other potential scandals are those involving allegations of torture whilst under detention. In terms of human rights abuses, the Palestinian Civil Police is recognised by local and international human rights organisations as the least culpable of all Palestinian security forces. EUPOL COPPS has a very strong interest in maintaining it this way and assisting the PCP in continuously improving its performance.

Justice, Rule of Law for Palestinians

Six months is a long time and one year can appear to be an age in the context of our operational environment. Maybe a slight exaggeration, but for anyone involved or following events it has the ring of truth. It is almost exactly a year since the Rule of Law section was established in the mission and though I would not dare to say my colleagues look aged, they certainly appear to me weather-beaten.

Since its origins EUPOL COPPS has developed and transformed itself significantly. From a United Kingdom government Department For International Development project to becoming an European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission, from EU COPPS to EUPOL COPPS, from a dozen members of staff to more than sixty today. One of the most important changes, however, came about with the creation of the Rule of Law Section in October 2008, which turned the whole enterprise into, de facto, a Police and Justice mission. Changes have taken place so quickly that in some places bureaucracy hasn't caught up! The most obvious example of this is the very name of the mission, European Union Police Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support which does not reflect the Criminal Justice element. There is a strong case for a re-designation of the mission as a European Rule of Law mission [EULEX Palestine].

The two operational sections of the mission are the Field Adviser section and the Rule of Law section. The former still larger than the latter only by a small margin. Out of the 63 mission members, 15 belong to the Rule of Law section and 17 to the Field Adviser section. The mission, however, is still growing, in a race against time to achieve as much as possible while the volatile political climate still permits it.

After a decade of ESDP missions throughout the world – the majority supporting police and Rule of Law – the EU was quick to realise that Palestinians would not enjoy security and stability with an effective police force alone. To put it bluntly, that would only contribute to the creation of a Police State.

Without improvements to the whole Criminal Justice System the efforts of the Palestinian police to put a criminal in jail would go to waste. To use American terminology, that might lead to order but certainly not to law and order.

Of course, EUPOL COPPS has not been the first to notice this. For years the international community has provided support to the Palestinian Justice sector, and the Palestinians themselves have done their utmost to provide justice to their compatriots. Interested in not replicating the efforts of others and aware of the bilateral support to all and each of the Justice institutions, the EU understood that there was a need to look for the choke points in the way each link of the Criminal Justice System joined to the next. Thus, the unique contribution of EUPOL COPPS is its comprehensive and at the same time focused approach. The mission is solely devoted to the Criminal Justice System, dealing with it as a whole and with experts for every link of the chain.

They are senior police officers, prosecutors, judges, prison directors, as well as defence lawyers and legal and human rights experts from seventeen different nations capable of working both at the macro and the micro levels.

The skills of our penitentiary experts, for example, allow them to advise on the organisational structure of the Prison Service as a whole, the syllabus of the training course for prison staff, as well as provide input in the design of the future Jericho prison and the specific furnishings of an individual cell.

Logically, the first task we set ourselves in October 2008 was to audit the whole Criminal Justice System, just as we had done one year before for the Civil Police after the mission was reactivated in July 2007. Our audit, based on first hand information – interviews, visits and obviously the original texts has become a basic reference document for all actors in the Justice sector.

Numerous gaps were identified, however, one in particular became the basic barometer by which we gauge the state of the Justice System, and that is the percentage of prison inmates that have not received their final sentence. It is by using that same index that we can now, one year on, measure significant improvements already palpable thanks to Palestinian and international efforts.

From ninety percent, give or take, when we started our work it is now down to little more than seventy percent. Progress indeed.

“RDC, Darfour, Somalie : l’UE s’engage sur les terrains les plus exposés”



Jean-Christophe Belliard, Ambassadeur de France en Éthiopie

Jean-Christophe Belliard est entré au ministère des Affaires étrangères français en 1985, après avoir passé le concours d'Orient (swahili, somali). Il a été en poste au Kenya, au Soudan, en Tanzanie, aux Etats-Unis à Washington et en Afrique du Sud. Il a également été plusieurs fois à la direction Afrique du Quai d'Orsay (rédacteur Grands lacs, Sous-directeur Afrique centrale et orientale) avant d'être nommé Conseiller spécial pour l'Afrique auprès de Javier Solana à Bruxelles (août 2005-janvier 2009). Il est depuis le 8 janvier 2009, Ambassadeur de France à Addis-Abeba en Ethiopie.



> Jean-Christophe Belliard

Jean-Christophe Belliard, vous avez été envoyé personnel de Javier Solana pour l'Afrique. Vous êtes maintenant ambassadeur de France en Ethiopie. Quels bilans/enseignements tirez-vous de ces expériences ?

Il est bien entendu trop tôt pour tirer un bilan ou un enseignement de ce que je fais en ce moment en Ethiopie. Je n'y suis que depuis quelques mois. Mais je crois que je ne serais pas aujourd'hui en Ethiopie si je n'avais pas été auparavant à Bruxelles, dans l'équipe de Javier Solana.

Javier Solana, en effet, a eu la gentillesse de me confier un certain nombre de missions, notamment – déjà ! – et ce dès 2006/2007, sur la Somalie. Javier Solana avait eu l'intuition, dès ce moment, que le dossier allait prendre de l'ampleur. Il avait, en effet, été invité à un sommet de la Ligue arabe qui avait eu lieu en Arabie Séoudite. Il y avait eu une réunion particulière sur la Somalie, en présence du roi d'Arabie Séoudite. Javier Solana m'avait alors demandé d'aller dans la région pour faire entendre la voix de l'Union européenne. Je m'étais alors rendu au Caire, en Arabie Séoudite, en Ethiopie, à Djibouti et au Kenya. J'avais, partout, été reçu, au plus haut niveau, notamment, déjà, en Ethiopie, par le premier ministre, M. Méléès Zenawi.



> EUSEC RD Congo

Plus tard, Javier Solana m'a confié une autre mission, celle d'émissaire européen sur le Zimbabwe, lorsque la situation s'est, au Zimbabwe, dégradée en termes politiques. Là aussi, je me suis rendu dans la région : en Afrique du Sud, au Botswana. Partout, je me suis rendu compte de l'extraordinaire popularité de Javier Solana, d'une part parce qu'il symbolisait la dimension extérieure de l'Union

européenne, mais également, et surtout, parce qu'il était Javier Solana. Aucun de mes entretiens n'a commencé sans que mon interlocuteur ne me dise quelque chose de gentil et d'élogieux sur Javier Solana. De toute évidence, sa visibilité politique – surtout en raison de son travail au Proche et au Moyen-orient, ainsi que dans les Balkans – est très grande en Afrique. Ses multiples voyages et prises de positions font que Javier Solana est connu et reconnu, et ce, partout, même dans les capitales les plus reculées de l'Afrique. Grâce à lui, l'Union européenne a une image forte. Nous existons, nous sommes pris au sérieux. Grâce à cette image, les portes s'ouvriraient facilement. Ma nationalité n'existait pas. Je ne rencontrais pas les chefs d'Etat africains parce que j'étais français (la question ne se posait pas), mais parce que j'étais dépêché par Javier Solana. C'est cela qui comptait, et la confiance était, toujours, au rendez-vous, ce qui facilite bien les choses.

Dès lors, grâce à cette expérience bruxelloise, j'ai pu développer un réseau de contacts très dense dans l'ensemble de l'Afrique, qui m'est aujourd'hui particulièrement utile puisque, à Addis Abeba, je suis accrédité non seulement auprès de l'Ethiopie, mais également auprès de l'Union africaine. Cela est très utile, notamment lors des sommets de l'Union africaine, où tout le monde se retrouve soit à Addis Abeba (en général en janvier) soit dans la capitale de la présidence du moment de l'Union Africaine (en général en juillet).

Quel a été, selon vous, l'apport de la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense (PESD) en Afrique ?

Concernant l'Afrique, je suis convaincu que l'Union européenne a contribué à faire la différence. C'est cela qui compte. Et rien d'autre que cela ne compte.

L'exemple le plus achevé, je crois, est la République Démocratique du Congo (RDC). L'Union européenne s'y est engagée, de manière obstinée : deux opérations militaires, une dans l'Ituri (Bunia), l'autre à Kinshasa ont permis, à chaque fois, à la demande des Nations Unies, de remettre le processus de paix sur les rails. Ce travail a été complété par le lancement de deux missions (EUSEC, EUPOL), dont l'objectif est de contribuer à la refondation des forces de sécurité (armée, police). Ce travail n'a pas été vain. Avec des moyens limités : les opérations militaires ont été limitées dans le temps et dans leurs effectifs (rien à voir avec ce que l'Union européenne a fait dans les



> Zoom de patrouille d'EUNAVFOR-Atalanta au large de Mogadiscio

Balkans), les deux missions EUSEC et EUPOL ne coûtent pas grand chose, l'Union européenne a contribué à stabiliser un pays immense, meurtri par les conflits.

Je crois que l'Union européenne n'a pas à rougir de ce qu'elle a fait en RDC depuis quelques années, en complément de l'action des Nations Unies. Et il est bon de rappeler que nulle part ailleurs dans le monde on a affaire à des souffrances aussi immenses (quatre millions de morts depuis 1994, des viols par dizaine de milliers). Je crois aussi que ce résultat a été possible parce que l'Union européenne s'est engagée de manière collective. Aucun pays européen, seul, n'aurait pu le faire, à la fois en termes militaires et politiques. Et cela faisait chaud au cœur de voir, dans les rues de Kinshasa, des policiers hongrois, ou des militaires polonais. Toute l'Europe s'était donnée rendez-vous à Kinshasa.

L'opération au Tchad est, également, un véritable succès. En se déployant comme elle l'a fait, dans un des endroits les plus isolés de l'Afrique (à el Geneina, on est à mi-chemin entre la Mer rouge et l'Atlantique), l'Union européenne a réussi à calmer les choses dans ce jeu à plusieurs bandes qu'est le conflit du Darfour. Les mouvements de rebelles, aussi bien tchadiens que darfouriens, ont dû limiter leurs opérations, les relations entre le Soudan et le Tchad se sont apaisées, ce qui permet de donner du temps au processus de paix actuellement en cours dans cette région, et a permis aux Nations Unies de prendre le relais dans des conditions idéales. L'opération a associé un nombre de pays européens encore plus important qu'en RDC, et même la Russie a apporté des hélicoptères, ce qui montre l'importance que ces pays accordent à l'Afrique, contrairement à ce qu'on entend ici et là. L'Union européenne, en outre, a eu l'intelligence de comprendre que ce qui se passait en République centrafricaine avait un lien avec ce qui se passait au Tchad et au Soudan. Le déploiement en RCA a, également, permis de faire la différence.

En Somalie, très tôt, l'Union européenne a compris la pertinence de déployer une opération navale pour contrer les actions des pirates. Je crois que c'était bien de le faire. C'était surtout bien de le faire aussi vite. L'Union européenne, aujourd'hui, travaille d'arrache-pied sur une politique globale pour la Somalie. Les Etats membres sont engagés. Javier Solana est engagé. Nous devons faire plus et mieux, notamment à terre, parce que c'est là que les choses se passent: soutenir le gouvernement de transition, notamment pour qu'il se

dote de forces de sécurité appropriées, soutenir le travail politique remarquable du Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général des Nations Unies, soutenir l'action non moins remarquable de l'Union africaine qui est déployée sur ce terrain particulièrement dangereux.

RDC, Darfour, Somalie: l'Union européenne s'engage sur les terrains les plus exposés en Afrique, les seuls où, au fond, on se bat encore en Afrique. Elle ne le fait jamais à la légère, et, à l'arrivée, elle fait la différence. L'Union européenne – il faut le dire – fait la différence en Afrique. Le bilan de l'Union européenne en Afrique est positif, et c'est pour cela que nous devons continuer à nous mobiliser sur ce continent, qui est si proche de nous.

Comment voyez-vous le développement des relations entre les deux continents?

Je vois d'abord, et je m'en réjouis, une prise de conscience générale, en Europe, que le destin de l'Afrique et de l'Europe sont liés. Ce qui se passe en Afrique ne peut qu'avoir des conséquences pour l'Europe. D'où l'engagement européen (de tous les européens) sur les théâtres les plus difficiles de l'Afrique. Je mentionne ici la PESD, mais il conviendrait, bien entendu, d'élargir à tous les sujets: développement économique, réchauffement climatique. L'Afrique est aujourd'hui de tous les combats, de tous les débats. Il est juste qu'elle soit pleinement associée à tous les grands forums. La réforme de la gouvernance mondiale concerne, en premier lieu, l'Afrique.

De manière plus pratique, je crois que nous n'avons pas d'autre choix que de continuer à travailler, au quotidien, comme nous le faisons aujourd'hui, avec l'Union africaine. La stratégie pour l'Afrique, entreprise commune, doit être mise en oeuvre, intégralement, même si cela peut parfois sembler un peu technocratique. C'est une discipline commune qui mènera à quelque chose.

Pour ma part, j'attache la plus haute importance à au moins deux domaines (qui sont liés): le développement des capacités de l'Union africaine, et le développement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix. Ce sont des sujets prioritaires pour l'Europe. Ce sont des sujets prioritaires pour l'Afrique. Il est bon, à cet égard, que l'Union européenne ait créé une représentation auprès de l'Union africaine, dirigée par Koen Vervaeke, avec lequel – la boucle est bouclée – j'ai travaillé à Bruxelles sous l'autorité de Javier Solana.

“The ESDP has developed in response to challenges in the Balkans”



Carl Hallergård, Counsellor in the Private Office of EU HR Javier Solana

Carl Hallergård is counsellor in the Private Office of EU High Representative Javier Solana, dealing with the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe. He has worked with the EU since 1995, and most of this time with – and briefly in – the Balkans. He notably participated in the planning and launch of the first military ESDP operation, EUFOR Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.



Carl Hallergård

Which role did the Balkans play in the emergence of ESDP?

It is often said that the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy was born in the Balkans. It is not difficult to make the case. The function of EU High Representative was created by the Amsterdam Treaty, which was negotiated between 1995 and 1997 when European leaders were grappling with the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which ended in November 1995.

The appointment of Javier Solana as the first EU High Representative in 1999 was the real breakthrough for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as for the first time the European Union obtained a personality of its own on the world stage. The early assignments for Javier Solana typically focused on the Balkans, be it the mediation leading to the Ohrid Agreement in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia or the peaceful separation of Serbia and Montenegro through the Belgrade Agreement.

In the same way, the EU's Security and Defence Policy has developed in response to challenges in the Balkans. The 77-day long NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia was still underway as European leaders in Cologne on 4 June 1999 agreed to incorporate the WEU into EU structures and outlined the main elements of ESDP.

When ESDP was fleshed out in Helsinki in December the same year, it was the military requirements of SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina and KFOR in Kosovo which served as the model for the military headline goals.

Six months later, the difficulty of recruiting nearly 5,000 international police officers for the UN police mission in Kosovo led to the adoption of a “concrete target” for the EU's ability to deploy up to 5,000 police officers.

So the Balkans provided both an important trigger and many of the prototypes for ESDP. It was therefore only logical that it was in the Balkans that the first civilian and military operations were launched.

By the time ESDP was up and running, however, international involvement in the Balkans was already at its peak. Large NATO missions were deployed to Kosovo (KFOR), Bosnia and Herzegovina

(SFOR) and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Allied Harmony), while UN police missions were operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina (IPTF) and Kosovo (UNMIK), and OSCE ran large scale police training programmes in Kosovo and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

How have the ESDP missions and operations in BiH, Kosovo, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia helped to stabilise the region?

The EU's operational involvement consisted mainly of the European Commission's sizeable assistance programmes and the often overlooked EU Monitoring Mission. EUMM was launched already in 1992 (as ECMM) and was closed only in 2007. It covered the entire region, including Albania. It provided EU capitals with essential field reporting and often played an important confidence building role, in particular during conflict situations. Its reports still provide valuable evidence for proceedings before the ICTY.

It was therefore logical that the first ESDP missions followed on from existing operations. The first ESDP mission was the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was launched on 1 January 2003 and took over from UN IPTF. EUPM, which consists of around 200 European and international police officers, continues to successfully support the reform of the police forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and will step up its efforts in support of the local police forces' fight against organised crime.

The EU's first military operation, Concordia, was launched only a few months later, on 31 March 2003, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Consisting of around 300 troops, and with a mandate to protect EU and OSCE monitors, it took over from the NATO operation Allied Harmony, underlining the EU's commitment to the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement signed in 2001.

The improvement in the security situation during 2003 allowed Concordia to complete its mandate already on 15 December 2003, thereby ending the military presence in the country. The EU's focus shifted to police as it launched, on the same day, the police mission EUPOL Proxima, which, taking over from the OSCE, consisted of 200



> *EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina*

police officers. Two years later, on 15 December 2005, further progress on the ground, allowed the EU to replace EUPOL Proxima with a team of 30 police advisers (EUPAT).

The leading involvement of the EU – and of Javier Solana in particular – in the negotiation and implementation of the Ohrid Agreement of 2001 make the stabilisation and normalisation of the situation in the former Yugoslav Republic a particular success story for the EU's CFSP and ESDP. The country is today a candidate country awaiting a date for the start of membership negotiations.

Following the successful launch of EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2003, the EU on 2 December 2004 took over from NATO's SFOR operation and launched the so-far largest ESDP operation EUFOR ALTHEA. The initial strength of 7,000 troops has since been reduced to around 2,000, reflecting the significant improvement in the security situation and the near completion of the military tasks set out in the Dayton/Paris Agreement of 1995. Planning is currently underway for further evolution of the mission from the current executive mandate to a more advisory mission in support of military reforms. This planning proceeds in parallel with that for the closure of the international Office of the High Representative and the transition towards an reinforced EU Special Representative as leading the international engagement in the country.

Although significant constitutional and structural reforms remain before Bosnia and Herzegovina is ready for EU membership, this transition will allow Bosnia and Herzegovina to regain its full sovereignty and apply for membership in the European Union.

The EU's currently largest ESDP mission, EULEX Kosovo, was launched on 16 February 2008. With a broad rule of law mandate covering police, customs and justice, it took over a significant part of the responsibility of UNMIK, the UN mission which since 1999 had executive administrative responsibility in Kosovo under UN Security Council resolution 1244. EULEX Kosovo, while equipped with certain executive powers, is essentially a monitoring, mentoring and advisory mission. It consists of more than 1,700 European and international staff and close to 1,000 local staff and is deployed throughout Kosovo.

In a legally and politically complex environment, EULEX has from its launch successfully managed to support the development and

consolidation of essential rule of law institutions in Kosovo, building further on the achievements of UNMIK since 1999. Since its deployment, EULEX has become an essential provider of professional advice to local police, customs and judicial structures, and confidence to the different communities. The mission has also managed to develop effective cooperation with capitals in the region, thereby facilitating the regional integration of Kosovo. Its work is also essential to prepare Kosovo for its European future by promoting European standards and best practices in the rule of law area.

How does ESDP fit into the broader EU policy in the region and in the perspective of membership?

As can be seen from these situations, the ESDP missions launched by the EU in the Balkans have been at the heart of the EU's stabilisation and normalisation efforts. As the region continues to stabilise and the countries move closer towards EU membership, the ESDP missions are gradually transformed from executive missions to mentoring and advisory missions. As the reforms take effect, the non-executive ESDP missions in turn give way to technical assistance aimed at preparing countries in the region for EU membership. The Balkans have therefore been – and remain – a good example of the EU's comprehensive approach, able to accompany countries out of crisis situations and along the path of institution building.

No doubt the lure of EU membership is making these efforts easier, but also without this element, the experience gained by the EU in the Balkans will bring benefits to its ESDP engagements in other parts of Europe and beyond.



> *EULEX Kosovo European Union Rule of Law Mission*

Clippings

EL PAÍS

EL PERIÓDICO GLOBAL EN ESPAÑOL

> La UE preparará fuerzas de seguridad para que Somalia luche contra la piratería en tierra

*Ricardo M. De Rituerto, Gotemburgo
29 septiembre 2009*

La UE quiere formar un embrión de fuerzas de seguridad que dé credibilidad política y militar al endeble Gobierno de transición del jeque Sharif Ahmed, asediado por enemigos políticos y tribales.

La Unión Europea se plantea una implicación más activa en la lucha contra la piratería en las aguas vecinas a Somalia y prepara planes para dotar al precario Gobierno de transición de Mogadiscio de los medios necesarios para combatir en tierra a esos delincuentes. "El problema nace en tierra", ha señalado hoy el ministro de Defensa sueco, Sten Tolgfors, anfitrión de una reunión de ministros de Defensa de los Veintisiete.

Los ministros se reunieron de forma informal el lunes y hoy en Gotemburgo (Suecia) para analizar diversos aspectos de su competencia, entre ellos la operación Atalanta de lucha contra la piratería en el Índico. Todos celebraron los resultados de este despliegue aeronaval, que debía concluir el próximo diciembre, tras un año de campaña, y fue prorrogado el pasado mes de junio hasta diciembre de 2010, en vista de que sigue siendo necesaria la operación a la luz de una actividad pirata que sería aún más dañina de no ser por la presencia disuasoria de militares de Alemania, Bélgica, Francia, Grecia, Noruega, Países Bajos y Suecia, además de España. Noruega no pertenece a la UE, como tampoco Croacia de la que se espera aportaciones de personal. Atalanta coordina también buques de Estados Unidos, Rusia y China que operan en aquellas aguas.

El objetivo inmediato es ahora tanto civil como militar. La Unión negocia acuerdos con Kenia, Seychelles y Tanzania para juzgar a los piratas que han sido capturados y entregados a las autoridades kenianas e isleñas, proceso negociador que podría ver el próximo juicio de un primer salteador en Kenia. Pero la piratería es una derivada del Estado fallido que es Somalia y hacia esa raíz apunta también la Unión.

"El problema nace en tierra y diversos Estados han pedido que se vea si se puede hacer más en tierra", ha señalado el ministro Tolgfors, que ha encabezado la reunión por la presidencia de la UE que ocupa Suecia. "Francia ya ha formado soldados en Yibuti", agregó el ministro, en referencia al centenar y medio de militares que reciben instrucción en ese país vecino a Somalia.

La UE quiere formar un embrión de fuerzas de seguridad que dé credibilidad política y militar al endeble Gobierno de transición del jeque Sharif Ahmed, asediado por enemigos políticos y tribales y sostenido por la Unión Africana. "La situación no es fácil, pero vamos a hacer todo lo que esté en nuestras manos", abundó Javier Solana, coordinador de la política exterior europea. "Vamos a tratar con Yibuti y Uganda para que permitan la formación de fuerzas de seguridad del Gobierno de transición".

[...]

LE FIGARO

> Europe de la défense : les nouveaux défis

*Javier Solana
13 octobre 2009*

Le haut représentant de l'UE pour la Politique étrangère et de sécurité commune dresse le bilan de dix ans de politique européenne de sécurité et de défense.

La Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense a dix ans. Quels doivent être les axes d'efforts des prochaines années ? À l'évidence, certaines des crises qui secouent le monde d'aujourd'hui vont continuer de nous mobiliser pour longtemps encore. Sans compter que de nouveaux conflits peuvent toujours surgir. L'enjeu est clair : pour les crises existantes ou celles qui menacent, disposer des instruments adéquats pour créer, sur le terrain, les conditions d'une solution.

Pour relever ce défi, deux nouveaux éléments viennent aider l'Union : les avancées promises par le traité de Lisbonne en matière d'action extérieure d'une part ; la nouvelle donne transatlantique d'autre part, depuis le retour de la France dans les structures militaires intégrées de l'Otan jusqu'à la confirmation par l'Administration Obama de la nécessité d'une Europe de la défense.

Dans ce nouveau cadre, je vois trois axes d'effort. Premièrement, parachever la mise en ordre des instruments existants. Rassembler les outils diplomatiques traditionnels de l'Union européenne et les placer sous l'autorité d'un seul et unique haut représentant qui contrôlera aussi les outils de gestion de crise de l'UE, sera le gage d'une plus grande efficacité. C'est tout l'enjeu de la mise en oeuvre du traité de Lisbonne, lorsque celui-ci sera définitivement ratifié. L'opérationnalité du nouveau dispositif ne sera pas assurée en une nuit. Nous parlons de mettre sur pied ce qui doit devenir le premier réseau diplomatique mondial, épaulé par les ressources civiles et militaires de 27 États membres et fort d'un budget communautaire de près de 50 milliards d'euros d'ici à 2013.

Deuxième axe : renforcer la capacité de l'Union européenne à déployer des opérations de paix. C'est grâce aux progrès accomplis depuis dix ans que celle-ci, sous la présidence de la France, a déployé en 2008, en moins de trois semaines, l'opération qui a permis d'enrayer, dans le Caucase, la crise entre la Russie et la Géorgie. C'est également grâce au succès de ses opérations en Indonésie, après le tsunami, ou dans la région des Grands Lacs africains que l'Europe a acquis l'expérience et l'autorité nécessaires pour conduire des opérations plus ambitieuses encore. En clair, les Européens ont fait la démonstration de leur capacité à déployer des opérations civiles, de la lutte contre le crime organisé dans les Balkans à la formation de la police afghane, et des opérations militaires, pour prévenir de nouvelles catastrophes humanitaires au Tchad ou sécuriser des élections au Congo. Ce sont, au final, pas moins de 23 opérations sur quatre continents, soit près de soixante-dix mille hommes et femmes, que l'Europe a déployés depuis 2003. Avec à chaque fois le souci de porter secours à des populations en détresse ou à des citoyens européens dont la sécurité et les intérêts sont directement menacés.

[...]

FINANCIAL TIMES



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> Pan-European procurement : The trauma and necessity of closer collaboration

By Jermemy Lemer
8 September 2009

Thirty years on, the goal of a comprehensive and collaborative approach to defence procurement remains unfulfilled. According to the European Defence Agency, in 2007 Member States spent just €6.8bn (\$9.7bn) on joint programmes against total investment of €41bn. And while the European aerospace industry has largely consolidated into EADS, the continent retains some dozen shipyards and armoured vehicle producers. The US, which accounts for roughly half of global defence spending, has two of each.

Despite this, European procurement is again on the agenda. Just last month Malcolm Rifkind, a Conservative MP and a former British defence and foreign secretary, wrote that "more substantial co-operation" with EU allies was the best way of "maintaining our military capability".

At the same time, a report by the Institute for Public Policy Research, a leading think tank, advocated bold government action to knock European industry together. European countries "should agree a single line with the defence industry and... if [they] do not engage in merger and consolidation... then governments will perform the task for them," the authors said.

The short-term triggers for this renewed interest in collaboration are clear. The global financial crisis has left a deep hole in public finances that will have to be filled by higher taxation and lower spending. And with health and education a priority, defence cuts seem likely.

[...]

Nick Witney, a former chief executive of the European Defence Agency, argues that the "intellectual case" for greater collaboration is well accepted. In 2007, he points out, 26 defence ministers signed up to a strategy document that noted "a fully adequate [defence industrial base] is no longer sustainable on a strictly national basis".

"What you have on the one hand is the theory, which is pretty incontestable, that this has to be the way for Europeans to go forward," Mr Witney says. "But you contrast that with the practice and usually it is a cock-up of some kind."

[...]

But, Mr Witney remains hopeful. Successful examples of EU procurement such as Storm Shadow, a Franco-British cruise missile, suggest that smaller teams of countries might provide an incremental solution he says. And in 2006 the UK and France set up a government and industry working group to look at defence co-operation.

Fewer partner nations however, mean that the benefits of scale are also much reduced.

Legislation offers some hope too. So far this year the EU has adopted a code of conduct committing nations gradually to reduce offsets and open defence procurement to European competition. It has also passed a number of directives to simplify the movement of military goods. Those could make a difference Mr Valasek says.

[...]

> Comment l'Agence européenne de Défense devient de plus en plus opérationnelle

Entretien exclusif avec Alexander Weis
22 septembre 2009

Au cours des derniers mois, l'agence européenne de défense (AED) s'est vu progressivement confier une vaste gamme de projets qui vont de la formation de pilotes et de la modernisation d'hélicoptères au développement du futur hélicoptère de transport et de la prochaine génération de satellites d'observation. Elle prépare actuellement un programme de travail triennal qui devrait servir de base pour une planification budgétaire de même durée. La négociation d'un accord avec l'OCCAR, qui sera chargée de la gestion des projets d'armement conçus à l'AED, et la base juridique consolidée apportée par le Traité de Lisbonne devraient achever de fournir à l'agence une responsabilité plus opérationnelle, pour autant que la volonté politique soit au rendez-vous. Dans ce moment crucial pour le développement de l'AED, son directeur exécutif a accepté de répondre aux questions de l'Agence Europe. (O.J.)

Agence Europe : Vous avez dit à plusieurs reprises que vous souhaitez que l'AED cesse d'être un moulin à papier pour participer à l'élaboration de projets concrets. Comment progressent ces projets ?

Alexander Weis : Je vais essayer, même si c'est très difficile. Je sais que les journalistes aiment les faits et les chiffres. Et je ne suis pas le responsable des projets, mais je vais faire de mon mieux. Essayons de structurer cette présentation, en rappelant que nous nous dirigeons vers le prochain conseil d'administration et le prochain Conseil des ministres. Ces deux événements auront lieu le 16 novembre, et nous sommes en train d'en préparer les ordres du jour. Les hélicoptères y figurent bien sûr. MUSIS (la prochaine génération de satellites d'observation : NDLR) n'est pas sur la liste, parce que ce n'est pas encore prêt pour une présentation aux ministres. La surveillance maritime sera sur la liste. Et ce sera aussi le cas pour d'autres sujets comme l'acquisition en commun et le partage d'équipements de défense. Vous savez que nous sommes actuellement en train de travailler à la création d'une flotte européenne de transport aérien, sur la base de l'airbus A400M, ainsi que d'avions déjà disponible, comme le C-130 ou le Casa produit par l'Espagne. L'idée est de mettre ces moyens ensemble dans une structure commune afin de mettre ces avions à disposition non seulement des pays qui en disposent, mais aussi de ceux qui n'ont pas ce type de capacités. (...) Douze États membres ont signé une déclaration d'intention l'an dernier en novembre, et nous avons approfondi le travail depuis. Nous sommes proches d'un accord sur le prochain document opérationnel, qui est une lettre d'intention. Et en plus des douze États signataires, il y en a déjà quatre autres qui sont très intéressés. Aussi, le nombre de ministres qui pourraient signer cette lettre d'intention est susceptible d'augmenter. Cela concerne surtout des aspects organisationnels et juridiques, moins les aspects techniques et technologiques.

[...]

Javier Solana, EU High Representative

'This book makes a significant contribution to the debate on the future of ESDP and the implications of what the Lisbon Treaty could and should bring to it, identifying the obstacles to progress and solutions for addressing them. I am grateful to the EUISS for this important initiative and to the contributors for their valuable input.'

Simon Serfaty, Brzezinski Chair, Center for Strategic & International Studies

'...many of the questions raised in this timely volume, and many of its conclusions, will shape the debate within Europe and across the Atlantic for years to come. No one concerned with Europe's future as a world power, whether policymaker or scholar, can afford to miss it.'



Contributors:

Claude-France Arnould
Juha Auvinen
Henri Bentégeat
Nicole Gnesotto

Jolyon Howorth
F. Stephen Larrabee
Tomas Ries
Jacek Saryusz-Wolski
Stefano Silvestri

Alexander Stubb
Nuno Severiano Teixeira
Álvaro de Vasconcelos
Alexander Weis
Richard Wright

Publications

**European Security and Defence Policy
The first 10 years (1999 - 2009)**

Book, October 2009

**edited by Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly
and Daniel Keohane**

This EUISS book examines the evolution of ESDP. Benefiting from the analysis of 19 contributors, the book breaks new ground by providing the first comprehensive review of every ESDP operation to date, some 23 missions in total, assessing their achievements and shortcomings. It explains

how the EU institutions responsible for international crisis management have developed and function, and analyses the key relationships between the EU and the United Nations, NATO, the OSCE and the African Union – partnerships which are fundamental in today's changing world. It also contains data on Member State contributions (both civil and military) to EU operations, and compares the combined military resources of the 27 EU governments in 1999 with 2009.

**10 Papers for Barcelona 2010
Is a new series of ten papers...**

...published in cooperation with the Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) which aim to address ten critical topics for Euro-Mediterranean relations. The papers have been commissioned with a view to formulating policy options on a set of issues which are central to achieving the objectives set out in the 1995 Barcelona Declaration and the Paris Declaration of 2008, as well as defining new targets for 2020 in the political, economic and social spheres.

EU Security and Defence: Core Documents 2008, Volume IX

Chaillot Paper N°117, July 2009

compiled by Catherine Glière

Available in English and in French, this volume presents official documents on European security and defence, including statements, decisions and other material from the relevant EU structures.

**The inter-polar world: a new scenario
Occasional Paper N°79, June 2009**
Giovanni Grevi

Giovanni Grevi sketches out a new scenario for the changing international system: the inter-polar world. He suggests that the shifts in global power will be shaped by the necessities of increasing interdependence – not least in confronting shared challenges, from the economic crisis to climate change, and their political and security implications. Inter-polarity is multipolarity in the age of interdependence. The EU, the US and emerging powers need to match the increasing demand for cooperation with renewed leadership and creative solutions to reform the multilateral architecture.

**War crimes, conditionality and EU integration in the Western Balkans
Chaillot Paper N°116, June 2009**

Vojin Dimitrijevic, Florence Hartmann, Dejan Jovic, Tija Memisevic, edited by Judy Batt and Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik

The political conditions for opening the path towards EU integration for the countries of the Western Balkans include both full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and regional reconciliation. This paper examines the extent to which this strategy has worked, looking at questions of leadership and political will, as well as the importance of EU integration on national agendas.

Activities

ESDP @ 10

Brussels, 28 July 2009

This event, marking 10 years of the European Security and Defence Policy, was held in conjunction with the Swedish presidency of the EU. It was also the occasion for the launch of the Institute's publication *What ambitions for European defence in 2020?*



Javier Solana, Álvaro de Vasconcelos, Carl Bildt.

**Summer school: European security culture and national traditions
Cambridge, 14-17 July 2009**

The Institute held its first ever summer school in Cambridge on 14-17 July 2009, bringing together young researchers to discuss European security culture. The school was attended by participants from 25 EU Member States, and one participant each from the EU's Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods.



Participants at the summer school.

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
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
YouTube:

www.youtube.com/EUSecurityandDefence

www.esdp10years.eu



Aperçu des missions et opérations de l'Union européenne – octobre 2009

**EUFOR ALTHEA**

Bosnie-Herzégovine, depuis 2004
Effectif: 2.014

EUPM

Bosnie-Herzégovine, depuis 2003
Effectif: 363

EULEX KOSOVO

Depuis 2008
Effectif: 2.598

CONCORDIA

Ancienne République yougoslave
de Macédoine (ARYM), 2003

EUPOL COPPS

Territoires palestiniens, depuis 2006
Effectif: 60

EU SSR Guinée-Bissau

Depuis 2008
Effectif: 35

EUBAM Rafah

Territoires palestiniens, depuis 2005
Effectif: 31

EUFOR Tchad/RCA

2008-2009
Effectif: 3.700

EUSEC RD Congo

Depuis 2005
Effectif: 44

EUPOL Kinshasa
RD Congo, 2005-2007

EUPOL RD Congo

Depuis 2007
Effectif: 74

Missions civiles: **missions en cours** / missions achevées

Opérations militaires: **opérations en cours** / opérations achevées

Les effectifs tiennent compte du personnel international et local

EUPAT

Ancienne République yougoslave de Macédoine (ARYM), 2006

EUPOL PROXIMA

Ancienne République yougoslave de Macédoine (ARYM), 2004-2005

EJUST THEMIS

Géorgie, 2004-2005

EUMM GEORGIA

Depuis 2008
Effectif: 366

EUPOL AFGHANISTAN

Mission de police, depuis 2007
Effectif: 426

EJUST LEX

Irak/Bruxelles, depuis 2005
Effectif: 45

Soutien à AMIS II

Soudan/Darfour, 2005-2006

ARTEMIS

RD Congo, 2003
Effectif: 1.800

EU NAVFOR - Atalanta


Depuis 2008
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EUFOR RD Congo

2006
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Aceh/Indonésie, 2005-2006



CONTACTS

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presse.pesd@consilium.europa.eu
tél: + 32 (0)2 281 91 20 • + 32(0)2 281 61 07
InfEuropa schuman 14 – Rue Archimède 1, Bruxelles

> Rédaction – Editorial staff

e-mail: presse.pesd@consilium.europa.eu

> Accès en ligne – On-line access

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