ESDP: from Cologne to Berlin and beyond
OPERATIONS – INSTITUTIONS – CAPABILITIES

Berlin, 29/30 January 2007

Discussion Paper

The following is a set of indicative questions aimed at triggering debate during the three workshops dedicated to, respectively, ESDP operations, institutions and capabilities. This list of questions has been drafted under the sole responsibility of the Institute for Security Studies of the European Union.

It is understood that not all the questions need to be specifically addressed. They should be regarded as pointers to some of the issues that are most relevant for appraising ESDP and outlining its development. Due to their wide-ranging implications, some questions are repeated under different headings.

Working Group 1: Operations

1. With ALTHEA forces being scaled back and the termination of the EUFOR RD Congo mission, the bulk of envisaged ESDP operations in the course of 2007 will be civilian, aimed at nation-building and stabilisation. Is there a trend towards the prevalence of the civilian dimension of ESDP over the military one? If so, is this a central feature of contemporary crisis management (based on the assumption that there is no military solution to political crises, as shown by Iraq, Lebanon etc)? What kind of robust military capacities are still relevant?

2. With a view to the 15 crisis management operations carried out so far, what key lessons have been identified, actually learned, and implemented?

3. Does the deployment of ESDP operations enable the Union to pursue a more effective and coherent foreign policy? In other words, are there CFSP 'returns' on the ESDP 'investments'? Consider, among others, the cases of Sudan, Iraq and Bosnia.

4. What progress has been made towards integrated crisis management? The EU has not launched an integrated civil-military crisis management mission to date, but is supposed to have the capacity to do so. What are the main gaps to be filled in this perspective, from the planning stage to the conduct of the operation in the field? What are the best practices to draw from?

5. Does ESDP need standing operational and planning capabilities? Is the debate dominated by 'ideological' positions or by lessons learned from operations, such as EUFOR RD Congo?

6. How can we enhance the role of EUSRs in a context where ESDP operations are deployed? Issues of mandate, coordination, political oversight from headquarters, appropriate reporting and clear guidelines from Brussels.

7. What are the strengths and weaknesses of EU-UN cooperation in the field of crisis management? Is an expectations gap widening, due both to the limited amount of available resources and to the different cultures of peacekeeping and peace-building?

8. What are the lessons to be drawn from the cooperation of the EU with NATO and other regional organisations? In so far as NATO is concerned, has the Berlin+ agreement proved effective? Turning to cooperation with the African Union, in particular through the ESDP supporting action to AMIS II, what are the real prospects for the implementation of the EU Concept on strengthening African capabilities?

9. What lessons can be learnt from the participation of third states in ESDP operations? What perspectives for further expanding the range of countries involved and the scope of cooperation?

10. The EU has a Security Strategy but lacks a military doctrine. Does it need one?

11. In the recent debate, the application of ESDP instruments to a number of new domains has been suggested. These include, notably, energy security, infrastructure protection, disaster relief, protection against terrorist attacks on EU territory, the implementation of the mutual assistance clause envisaged in the Constitutional Treaty, border control and the management of illegal migration, and space security. In this context, what is the likelihood of the EU taking on these missions?

12.   Should there be a geographic scope for ESDP? Should priority areas, notably including the EU neighbourhood, be identified, or should the EU aim to pursue a global ESDP, wherever intervention is required?

13.   The EU has developed an ESDP checklist on gender mainstreaming and on children affected by armed conflict. How can it be ensured that these aspects will become part and parcel of the preparation, planning, conduct and lessons learned of ESDP missions?

14.   What specific challenges arise from the envisaged ESDP missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan? How are these challenges being addressed, and what innovations are being introduced to support the planning process and ensure the readiness of the EU to undertake these missions?

Working Group 2: Institutions

1. Has the failure to ratify the Constitutional Treaty affected ESDP? Innovations have been envisaged and pursued to enhance inter-institutional cooperation and to foster coherence and better policy planning *à traité constant* under CFSP and ESDP. In this perspective, what are the next steps? What more can be achieved, without reforming the institutional framework?

2. What is the state of play in the implementation of the post-Hampton Court process directed to enhance the institutional capacity of the EU to conduct crisis management tasks under ESDP?

3. Under ESDP, decision-making is carried out at 27 but Member States differ greatly in terms of means, resources, and readiness to use them. Is there a tension between inclusive decision-making and implementation at variable geometries? Should more room for flexibility be built into ESDP and, if so, how?

4. What progress has been made towards integrated crisis management? The EU has not launched integrated civil-military crisis management missions as such, but is supposed to have the capacity to do so. What are the main gaps to be filled in this perspective, from the planning stage to the conduct of the operation in the field? What are the best practices to draw from?

5. How to improve coherence and synergy between ESDP civilian and military instruments on the one hand, and Community instruments on the other? What progress has been achieved, what shortcomings have been identified, and how can they be addressed?

6. How to enhance the role of EU Special Representatives in a context where ESDP operations are deployed? Issues of mandate, coordination, political supervision from headquarters, appropriate reporting and clear guidelines from Brussels.

7. Does ESDP need standing operational and planning capabilities? Is the debate dominated by 'ideological' positions or by lessons learnt from operations?

8. Perspectives on the ESDP/NATO relationship vary, with some warning against duplication and others stressing complementarity and comparative advantages, with a view to an effects-based cooperation. To what extent does this debate affect the perspectives for the development of ESDP? How far can the EU-NATO relationship be managed at a time when NATO is evolving in numerous and different directions? How far is the US factor (i.e. US military participation) essential for relations between the two institutions?

9. What are the strengths and weaknesses of EU-UN cooperation in the field of crisis management? Is an expectations gap widening, due both to the limited amount of available resources and to the different cultures of peacekeeping and peace-building?

10. Does the deployment of ESDP operations enable the Union to pursue a more effective and coherent foreign policy? In other words, are there CFSP 'returns' on the ESDP 'investments'? Consider, among others, the cases of Sudan, Iraq and Bosnia.

11. How can we better communicate ESDP, both to local interlocutors, where ESDP operations are deployed, and to global partners? How can the visibility of the EU commitment across the world be enhanced through ESDP means?

12. The EU has a Security Strategy but lacks a military doctrine. Does it need one?

Working Group 3: Capabilities

1. Global demand for EU crisis management is on the rise, but supply is subject to serious limitations. What crisis management resources are most solicited? Does the EU need more troops on the ground to perform the tasks of stabilisation that are in high demand? Does the EU need a reserve on stand-by to back up forces in the field?

2. Progress towards fulfilling the Headline Goal 2010 is patchy. What more can be done at European level to encourage Member States to invest more, together, in order to fill the long-established capability shortfalls?

3. What are the most effective methods to raise capabilities? Assessing the pros and cons of different options, such as pooling and role specialisation.

4. What could be done to enhance coherence in developing military (HG 2010) and civilian (CHG 2008) capabilities? Could a single, comprehensive civil-military headline goal be envisaged in the long term?

5. To what extent has the Civilian Headline Goal (CHG) process helped better to plan and conduct actual civilian missions? Would it be useful to consider reviewing these scenarios in light of current experiences with a view to planning future missions?

6. Two Battlegroups are fully operational as of January 2007 but, in the light of recent experience of European military deployments, it is unclear under what circumstances they could be used. What is the current thinking across Member States and what scenarios are envisaged? How can we address potential challenges stemming from the rigid rotation system, insufficient strategic reserves, and the limited means for rapid deployment?

7. Groups of EU Member States have set up a number of distinctive multinational formations for cooperation in the military field (i.e. EUROCORP, EUROMARFOR), as well as a European Gendarmerie Force, outside the ESDP framework. How can we enhance the contribution of these multinational formations to the development of ESDP?

8. Perspectives on the ESDP/NATO relationship vary, with some warning against duplication and others stressing complementarity and the comparative advantages of sharing capabilities. How does this debate affect the development of ESDP capabilities?

9. What are the implications of the EDA Long Term Vision exercise for the process of military and civilian capabilities generation under ESDP?

10. What is the assessment of the progress made by the EDA towards establishing a European Defence Equipment Market, and towards enhancing joint investment in R&T? What follow-up is envisaged to build on these achievements? What more needs to be done to take further steps towards a strong European Defence Technological and Industrial Base?

11. Will the maritime dimension of ESDP acquire more prominence, notably to enhance the strategic sealift capacities of the Union and to support rapid deployment? What capabilities, concepts and formats are required to move in this direction? How might this affect the development of joint forces?

12.   In the recent debate, the application of ESDP instruments to a number of new domains has been suggested. These include, notably, energy security, infrastructure protection, disaster relief, protection against terrorist attacks on EU territory, the implementation of the mutual assistance clause envisaged in the Constitutional Treaty, border control and the management of illegal migration, and space security. In this context, what capabilities need to be developed to carry out these distinctive tasks, e.g. dual-use technologies?

13.   What specific challenges are posed by the envisaged ESDP missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan? How are these challenges being addressed, and what capabilities are needed to ensure the readiness of the EU to undertake these missions?