

ISSUE

CHAILLOT PAPER N° 135 – July 2015

EU home affairs diplomacy: why, what, where – and how

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Chaillot Papers



EU Institute for Security Studies

100, avenue de Suffren

75015 Paris

<http://www.iss.europa.eu>

Director: Antonio Missiroli

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ISBN: 978-92-9198-366-7

ISSN: 1683-4917

QN-AA-15-002-EN-N

DOI: 10.2815/612309

Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in Condé-sur-Noireau (France) by Corlet Imprimeur.

Graphic design by Metropolis, Lisbon.

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Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Beatrice Berton for her invaluable research assistance, in particular in compiling data for the various maps and diagrams featured in this publication.

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135

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Foreword

Thirty years after the signature of the Schengen Agreement and twenty five after the Dublin Convention, a policy blueprint that was originally intended to be quintessentially ‘internal’ has now become part and parcel of a wider web of ‘external’ relations and actions.

Whether the issue is granting asylum to refugees from conflict-torn regions or liberalising visas for citizens from neighbouring countries, both foreign and domestic policy considerations have to be brought into the EU picture, weighed against one another and made mutually compatible – hopefully even mutually reinforcing. While migration, in particular, has become the main junction at which all these policy tracks converge, there is also a broader set of EU ‘internal’ provisions with ‘external’ implications (and vice versa) that deserve to feature on the radar screen. The growing threat posed by terrorist networks – both global and home-grown – is the most relevant case in point.

This *Chaillot Paper* by Hugo Brady and Roderick Parkes explores the genesis of ‘home affairs diplomacy’ and how it has taken shape; it analyses where the hotspots lie and how they could be dealt with; and it highlights the challenges as well as the opportunities that bringing together different policy communities (at both national and EU level) generates for a more coherent and more ‘strategic’ European approach to an outside world that has become more connected and more complex than ever before.

This is still very much a work in progress, a continuous learning process in which experts, academics and commentators also have a key role to play. There are no simple solutions to complex problems, either locally or globally. And, regionally, the EU also has to manage populist pressures that make it more difficult to devise and implement sustainable common policies that factor in the long-term interests of the Union as a whole. Yet again, migration-related issues may well become a growth area for EU diplomacy, especially as the crises of the past couple of years have proved to be unmanageable without external cooperation. This essay, therefore, represents just the beginning of an ongoing monitoring effort that the EUISS intends to develop over the next few months with a view to framing ‘home affairs diplomacy’ in the wider context of the Union’s foreign and security policy.

Antonio Missiroli

Paris, July 2015

Introduction

Home affairs cooperation is a growth area in international relations today.¹ Border management, migration, asylum, crime-fighting and counter-terrorism are all increasingly subject to European and international rule-setting. But at the fringes of the EU, such rules are often poorly applied. To its south, the EU faces huge, disorderly population movements, as well as a new terrorist threat, Da'esh, whose ranks have been joined by over 5,000 EU passport holders. Refugee camps are dotted across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), their inhabitants uncertain of seeing a conflict resolution in their lifetimes. And to the EU's east, weak states are ever more vulnerable to powerful and tech-savvy crime networks, a thriving black market and the challenge posed to the rule of law by regional instability. This leaves the EU's neighbours vulnerable to disorder emanating from their own neighbours.

The EU is responding by deepening coordination between its home affairs specialists and its diplomats. The European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU's diplomatic corps, has home affairs specialists in its global affairs unit (three terrorism specialists, and one for migration) and home affairs coordinators in its regional units. The heads of the EU's delegations abroad, when they meet together in Brussels, receive briefings from the Commission's Home Affairs Directorate (DG HOME). In April 2015, EU officials represented the Union in international negotiations on global legislative norms for tackling foreign fighters, their first such intervention in the sensitive field of counter-terrorism. And Frontex, the EU agency for border cooperation, has a new executive director with a strong diplomatic record alongside his interior ministry experience.

Policy coordination can only work, however, if it has the right geographical focus, toolkit and strategy. Over the past few years the EU has combined its foreign policy and home affairs expertise more than hitherto. But it has focused on two theatres: the local and the global. The Union has encouraged capacity building on border management and internal security in Eastern Europe and North Africa, leveraging the attraction of these regions towards the world's largest market. It has helped set home affairs norms at a global level in the UN, G7 and through organisations such as the International Civil Aviation Authority, often working in tandem with the US.

Migration and internal security concerns already influence the EU's trade and aid deals, as well as its overseas humanitarian and security missions. The EU has designed and deployed security missions to bolster the rule of law, well beyond its

1. The views expressed in this paper reflect strictly and solely the authors' personal views. The authors would like to thank the relevant home affairs, foreign policy officials and experts for interviews they granted them in the course of their research for this paper. Any errors are the sole responsibility of the authors.

neighbourhood, in West and East Africa. Its development department (DG DEVCO) cites migration as one of the main thematic focuses of EU development aid. Trade partnerships with African and Caribbean countries have clauses on the repatriation (readmission) of illegal immigrants. The next step is to combine such clout with a real strategic framework and a means to act in order to tackle problems upstream in the relevant country or regions.

New areas of freedom, security and justice

The preservation of international order (diplomacy) by shoring up the internal rule of law (home affairs) in neighbouring states is not new. But, at least for now, it is a more pressing priority for EU foreign policy than shaping a new global order. This actually plays to traditional European strengths. The Union is more at ease offering itself as a model based on incentives and the power of attraction than engaging in classic global power struggles. Its internal freedoms still provide an aspirational benchmark for those suffering the forceful redrawing of national boundaries, as is occurring in Eastern Europe, or a descent into lawlessness, as in the Southern Mediterranean and wider parts of Africa.

According to one EU official, the Union could focus on creating ‘a world-wide patchwork of Areas of Freedom, Security and Justice [AFSJ]’, a reference to the Union’s own system of free movement, passport-free travel, common asylum rules and web of cross-border criminal justice arrangements. Instability beyond Europe’s borders is not driven solely by environmental, economic or demographic forces, but also by a governance crisis in neighbouring states. Brutal cross-border regimes, such as Da’esh or Boko Haram, tap into local communities and provide a crude version of order. If the European Union wants to contain such threats and address the root causes of challenges such as migration, it needs to help foreign governments provide economic opportunities, effective security and a reliable rule of law. But such efforts must have buy-in from the Union’s neighbours and global partners. Blatant European ‘burden-shifting’ to weaker states would undermine new attempts to forge a home affairs diplomacy for the Union.

This *Chaillot Paper* first underlines the potential contribution of EU home affairs diplomacy to international order. It suggests that the EU has generally been ahead of the curve when it comes to international home affairs trends: the EU’s free movement regime, conceived during the Cold War, required cross-border rules on migration and crime. This helped create a borderless space shared by sovereign states,

which is one of Europe's greatest achievements. Nonetheless, the EU's borderless spaces are also vulnerable to external shocks, and the 26-member Schengen Area can be abused by networks of criminals and human smugglers.

The paper then maps out those external challenges. It suggests that, although global flows in trade and tourism are continuing to expand, states' readiness to agree upon, and implement, common home affairs rules is decreasing. This leaves global economic networks exposed to disorderly migration, criminals and terrorists.² That is a particular problem for the EU, as the ring of neighbouring states around it are in the main growing weaker, not stronger. Many are host to smuggling networks or Islamist terrorist cells, for example. For the past two years at least, this situation has created new vulnerabilities and areas where the EU's influence can no longer reach as things stand.

Third, the essay shows how the existing pillars of the EU's home affairs diplomacy are increasingly under strain: the EU has upped efforts in global standard-setting bodies like the UN and it continues to dangle the 'carrot' of freer access to visas to neighbours like Turkey, Ukraine or Morocco. The Union has also begun to link up existing rule-of-law operations and development projects along various criminal trafficking routes across Africa and Asia, and has announced its intention to begin leveraging trade and aid policies to apply significant political pressure to states which do not properly guard their own borders.

Fourth, the paper suggests that the long-term solution may lie in taking a joined-up approach to whole regions: when commentators talk about tackling the 'root causes' of the Mediterranean refugee crisis, they no longer mean using the carrot of EU market access to address the governance factors preventing Mediterranean countries' integration into the global economy. The task is rather to unpick regional conflicts and unlock regional labour markets.

2. United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Assessment* (Vienna: UNODC, 2010), p. 29.

CHAPTER 1

Why European home affairs diplomacy matters now

The internationalisation of home affairs

Fifteen years ago, an academic paper was published on the ‘internationalisation of EU home affairs’. Appearing just weeks after the September 11 attacks on the US, it highlighted the imperative of coordinating the EU’s internal and foreign policies. Thanks to the Amsterdam Treaty, the paper pointed out, the EU was now a true home affairs actor, building on European citizenship, the free movement of labour and passport-free travel; and it was creating a more credible common foreign and security policy. This obliged European member states to acknowledge that they now shared internal and foreign policy interests, but also that these two dimensions were increasingly aligned: if governments were to maintain the EU’s border-free internal spaces, they now needed to be more active in the international sphere.³

Today, it is widely acknowledged that the EU’s foreign policy is linked to its internal security. In June 2014, European leaders announced that the answer to many of the continent’s security and immigration challenges ‘lies in relations with third countries, which calls for improving the link between the EU’s internal and external policies.’⁴ The emergence of lawless states and regional conflicts is a setback for, or even partly points to a failure of, EU external action especially when they are located so close to the Union’s borders. Such developments go on to impact European internal spaces: the Schengen zone and free movement areas.

The EU is striving to manage irregular migration and refugee flows from Africa and the Middle East, which in 2015 reached the highest numbers since standardised European records began. Member states like Belgium, the UK, France, Sweden and Denmark fear the new phenomenon of ‘foreign fighters’ – European passport-holders and citizens of their own states who are indoctrinated by radical Islamist groups in Pakistan, Yemen or Somalia and who return daily to the EU from Iraq and Syria. And the law enforcement authorities of all EU members are locked in a struggle with international organised crime – often in the form of cybercrime – that siphons off billions annually from the economy, spreads corruption and blights local communities.

3. Ferruccio Pastore, ‘Reconciling the prince’s “two arms”: internal-external security policy coordination in the European Union’, *Occasional Paper* no.30, Institute for Security Studies-WEU, Paris, October 2001.

4. European Council, Conclusions, 26-27 June 2014, EUCO 79/14, p.1. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/143478.pdf.

But the Schengen Area has also been one of the greatest sources of influence available to the EU. The offer of freer access to the bloc's 26-country passport-free travel zone continues to drive security sector reform in the Balkans and is potentially pivotal in relations with Turkey. The same 'carrot' encourages countries in Eastern Europe and the Southern Mediterranean to sign mobility partnerships or visa-facilitation agreements, conditioned against 'readmission' accords obliging authorities abroad to take back irregular migrants. Mobility is becoming an important factor in the EU's relations with almost all African and Asian states, as well as with China, India and Russia.

EU member states and their coordination problems

At a national level, in EU member states, the internationalisation of home affairs has exacerbated traditional tensions between interior and foreign officials. When Wolfgang Schäuble first served as Germany's interior minister in the 1990s, he reportedly estimated that the external affairs aspects of his job took up around 10% of his attention; during his second stint (2005-2009), it had gone up to 50%. Thus it has become important for home affairs officials to cooperate more closely with colleagues in different ministries.

European ambassadors would like to be able to offer work and travel visas so as to better influence their host country's behaviour. But they will rarely have close contact with that country's interior ministry to discuss common security issues or the return of illegal migrants. Rather, it is the job of European interior ministries to worry about domestic criminal trends that have their origin abroad, insufficient cooperation from third countries on trafficking, or abuses of the international asylum system. Put crudely, in the words of one interior official, 'the foreign ministries say "come!" and we say "stay away!"'. It has always been like that.'

The Union is developing new foreign and external security policy structures as well as a more robust approach to internal security cooperation and border management simultaneously. But there is a danger that the mutual suspicion between the worlds of home affairs and foreign policy at the national level will be replicated at EU level. Both processes are driven by demand from member states, and both exist in quite distinct legal worlds. The Union's common foreign and security policy is an inter-governmental exercise whereas the justice and home affairs (JHA) sphere is predominantly legislative, a rather *sui generis* form of liberal inter-governmentalism.

The EU's home affairs diplomacy gap

In late 2014 Europol, the EU's police agency, revealed the existence of Operation *Archimedes*. Over the course of one week in September, police, border guards and prosecutors from 34 countries had cracked down on international crime groups involved in drug smuggling, human trafficking and grand theft. In November of the same year, a coalition of willing EU countries deployed Operation *Triton*, a maritime surveillance mission, to patrol the territorial waters of Italy as well as parts of the Italian and Maltese search and rescue (SAR) zones. The operation partly replaced *Mare Nostrum*, an Italian maritime mission deployed near the coast of Libya. *Mare Nostrum* had attempted to mitigate the humanitarian and security problems of migration from North Africa. Both operations have been ground-breaking in their way, but they suggest a lack of joined-up thinking between the EU's home affairs and foreign policy spheres.

Operation *Archimedes* scored quite spectacular successes. Over 1,000 suspects were arrested and large quantities of drugs, contraband and stolen property seized from some 300 cities, ports and airports. Dozens of women and children were released from the clutches of human traffickers. The operation, which involved over 20,000 police officers working in unison across borders, was not only the continent's largest ever joint police operation with police and border guards from all 28 EU members. It also involved contributions from Australia, Columbia, Norway, the US, Serbia and Switzerland.

In 2014, Operation *Triton* consisted only of six naval vessels and three aircraft, and was originally dwarfed by Italy's own 'military humanitarian' operation which was able to save around 130,000 lives. The mission would later be tripled in size in April 2015 and subsequently hailed as a success, even by erstwhile critics such as Amnesty International.

Nevertheless, one thing *Archimedes* and *Triton* have both lacked thus far is a diplomatic dimension linking them to the machinery of foreign policy negotiations in Brussels. *Archimedes* was in fact just a part of the European Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats (EMPACT), an intelligence-led EU police exercise intended to frustrate organised crime networks operating in Europe. EMPACT is an EU 'policy cycle' intended to give member state police a way to share intelligence, identify common priorities and tackle criminal targets efficiently and according to a set strategy. It is managed by the little-known Standing Committee on Internal Security (COSI), made up of police, security and interior officials from national governments as well as the heads of relevant EU agencies, Council bodies and Commission Directorates General.

Officials from the European External Action Service may attend COSI meetings only by invitation. Furthermore, none of the EMPACT projects envision the systematic sharing of intelligence between police operations and the EU's missions or deployments abroad, or vice versa. Such intelligence could be useful, for example, in the case of drugs smuggled into Europe through the Balkans. Neither does the EU's

diplomatic machinery take full advantage of valuable successes like *Archimedes*. For instance, the EU's delegations in the Balkans could have capitalised on the publicity surrounding the operation to urge their host country's politicians to bolster security reform or law enforcement cooperation with the EU, in the guise of Europol, Eurojust and Frontex, against drugs and human trafficking.

Triton is also hampered by a lack of cooperation with third countries – to a degree this is unavoidable since Libya, for example, lacks a functioning central authority. And only national capitals can, in effect, use the 'carrot' of visas to boost their influence over foreign governments in migration matters. The EU has signed 'mobility partnerships' (wide-ranging framework agreements) with Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and others, which offer conditional access to participating member states' labour markets. But their goal is to encourage capacity building and internal security reform rather than operational cooperation. Moreover, Frontex is only just beginning to use its powers to post immigration liaison officers in various countries to build links with the authorities there: the first such appointment has been to Ankara. So can the EU ever aspire to a much more elaborate and results-orientated diplomacy on home affairs issues? To some extent, it is already happening. What follows tries to explain the trends and to show where the Union might go from here.

The area of freedom, security and justice as a governance regime

Unlike its member states with their natural distinction between domestic and foreign affairs, the EU is itself wholly a product of foreign affairs – an international governance project. Its 'interior' regime is no exception. The idea of a border-free Europe was dreamt up in the 1950s by foreign ministers as a means to rebuild relations between mistrustful West European societies, diminish the geopolitical salience of borders and create a common labour pool, in response to the claustrophobic pressures of the Cold War.⁵ The by-product of their idea was a set of European home affairs rules which, by the 1990s, covered the processing of asylum claims, the 'hot pursuit' of suspects across borders and legal assistance between national judiciaries, among other things.

After the collapse of the Communist bloc, the EU's borderless spaces left member states vulnerable to international networks of criminals and terrorists as well as waves of irregular migrants, but the Union countered this with a basic framework of 'flanking measures' designed to confront such threats. Work towards passport-free travel began back in the mid-1980s and this now provided a centre of gravity, and a clear rulebook, for the EU to influence its neighbours. The EU enlarged the Schengen Area to the East in 2007 in return for reforms, with only Romania, Bulgaria and Cyprus remaining in the waiting room. Then it used visa and labour market access to exert

5. Willem Maas, *Creating European Citizens* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).

influence on a further ring of countries to the EU's east and south in order to achieve home affairs reforms there. And at a global level, EU members were also able to promote the standards on which they had built inward mobility on everything from data-sharing to border management.

During this period, the EU benefited significantly from the idea of global convergence. Other countries, as they became more prosperous, often aspired to European-style governance, including the predictability of a society and economy governed by the rule of law. Democratised access to information via the internet and the rise of low-cost travel have meant that this admiration finds its expression more and more through flows of migrants. Irregular migrants debriefed after crossing into Europe are clear about their motives: they are no longer prepared to endure protracted conflicts, such as in Syria and Iraq, on the assumption that things will improve. Moreover, according to Frontex staff, these newcomers perceive the combination of representative democracy, a well-regulated labour market and welfare support to be quite particular to the EU. Lacking faith in their home countries' capacity to meet their aspirations, migrants are ready to make the often perilous journey to the European Union.

This suggests that migrants could be integrated into reasonably open economies closer to home. That will require action by the EU across Eastern Europe, the Gulf, Africa and Latin America to help establish rule-based frameworks which, like the Schengen Area, are tailored to regional particularities. For an EU accustomed to setting uniform home affairs standards, and countries used to accepting them, this emphasis on local needs and responsibilities is new.

The Khartoum Process

In November 2014, the EU launched the Khartoum Process on human trafficking and smuggling, a political dialogue with countries of the Horn of Africa, Egypt and Tunisia, in order to begin building up precisely this kind of regional order. The EU already has a number of thematic dialogues, notably the Prague, Budapest and Rabat processes dealing with migration across Eastern Europe, the so-called 'Silk Route' and North Africa. The Khartoum Process, however, is the first dialogue where the EEAS has been involved from the outset, with positive results. The good personal relations between the head of the EU's delegation in Cairo and the Egyptian chair, and a coordinated *démarche* of the African participants by EU diplomats, ensured a smooth kick-off meeting. But the EEAS's main contribution has been to push African governments to undertake responsible reforms to tackle networks of traffickers and smugglers.

In Ethiopia, for instance, would-be emigrants have to journey to Addis Ababa to receive not just the necessary documentation but permission to leave the country; given the expense and the uncertainty, many Ethiopians find it easier simply to place themselves in the hands of people smugglers. South Sudan, meanwhile, needs to come to terms with its new status as a country of immigration: the Kenyans and

other Africans filling the high-skilled jobs created by an influx of development aid and foreign investment face discrimination. As for Kenya itself, it now views its refugee population as a source of insecurity, with camps reportedly infiltrated by terrorists. The Khartoum Process is identifying fields where the EU might work with these countries to improve their governance.

The Khartoum Process is also attuned to the regional context in Africa. The EU is pressing the Horn's Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to overcome local rivalries (Ethiopia has held the chair of this body since 2008) and to create a regional free movement regime rather like its West African counterpart the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Meetings have also been held between the African Union Commissioners and European Commissioners, as the EU entreats powerhouses like South Africa to open their labour market to the countries of the Horn and combat discrimination. And the EU has made sure to give precedence to another, potentially far more significant inter-regional migration dialogue, between the Horn and the major labour markets of the Gulf States.

Finally, the EEAS has tried to improve the EU's responsiveness as a partner. To this end it was important for the EEAS to realise that DG HOME is often quicker at unlocking EU funding for foreign projects than is the DG for Development Cooperation (DEVCO), and that DEVCO currently pursues just three strategic goals in each partner country (with 'migration management' forced to compete with traditional priorities such as 'education' or 'health' – furthermore, it is the partner country that chooses the priorities.) But above all, the EEAS has pushed for the Khartoum dialogue to focus on the sole areas of common interest between the EU-28 and the participating African states (people trafficking and smuggling) while subtly broaching the question of legal migration to the EU (the Africans' main priority) and improving human rights standards in the Horn (the EU's priority).

The new challenge of policy coordination

Development policy could be considered an absent but indispensable friend in the EU's efforts to construct a home affairs diplomacy with real leverage. But this is arguably unfair. The Commission's development wing, DG DEVCO, already funds a number of projects related to border control and security reform in the Horn of Africa (see Box 1, pp.18-19). EU diplomats see the potential benefit of using DEVCO's budget as a lever to cajole African governments into reforming the rule of law. Interior officials see DEVCO's spending power as a means to better control refugee flows. Needless to say, DEVCO officials see the world very differently.

DG DEVCO has unusually equitable relations with foreign governments (its 'clients'). Its administrators are understandably protective of their relations with a state like Eritrea, which has only just resumed development talks with the EU after a four-year hiatus. Rather than hard bargaining, they advocate at most light-touch

diplomatic pressure such as sequencing the EU's political dialogues to place migration and human rights discussions back-to-back. DEVCO officials also couch their policy approach in terms of 'mutual interests' between Africa and the EU and 'co-development'. Indeed, some DEVCO officials would prefer to avoid governmental talks, and channel cooperation to the local level (chronically ignored in most international home affairs activities, despite this level bearing the brunt of refugee flows and disorder).

While DEVCO officials recognise that development aid can potentially be useful in reducing disorderly migration to the EU, they also warn that in the short term it may actually increase its incidence: there is a so-called 'migration hump' whereby recipients of aid become wealthier and more mobile, and gravitate to higher-wage economies. If there are no opportunities to migrate, disorder and radicalism can ensue. And if aid is in turn redirected to these newly affluent individuals, this can aggravate a major source of instability in emerging economies – the huge income disparities between rich and poor. DEVCO officials would prefer to see EU funds go towards promoting good governance in Africa so that Africans can work and travel regionally, rather than prioritising border teams and police hardware.

Furthermore, the development community has its own norms, customs and traditional beneficiaries, often supported by former colonial powers within the Union itself. These can create considerable inertia when it comes to responding to new but pressing priorities. And it is not just third countries but international organisations which can emerge as indispensable, but also self-interested, partners in the coordination process. Whereas DG HOME manages most of its external migration programmes through the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), DEVCO works through a range of partners. These partners – such as the International Labour Organization (ILO), and the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) – freely admit that they see this coordination effort as the starting shot for a race to greater policy influence and funding.

Box 1: EU development support along the East African migration route

The Khartoum Process on trafficking and irregular migration focuses on nine countries of origin and transit in East and North Africa. A mapping exercise in April 2015 showed that, in almost all of these countries, the EU's development-support wing already runs a number of migration-related projects. These are principally funded from the EU's development and neighbourhood policy budgets. A small number of projects are also jointly funded by the EU's internal security and migration funds.

In Ethiopia, the EU has a €10 million programme to integrate returnee migrants (implemented jointly by Addis Ababa and the International Labour Organisation) and a €1.2 million programme, currently in limbo, to socially reintegrate former fighters from a militant regional movement, founded to destroy infrastructure and development activities, and who have been subject to political persecution (implemented by IOM).

Djibouti is a participant in a number of the EU's multinational projects – a €1.2 million project together with Ethiopia and Yemen on children trafficked through the Gulf of Aden (implemented by the International Organisation for Migration), a €0.8 million project with Ethiopia to crack people-smuggling networks (UNODC), and a €1.8 million project strengthening refugee protection across Yemen and the Horn (Danish Refugee Council).

Kenya is the subject of a €1.3 million cross-border initiative with Somalia to boost the protection of vulnerable migrants (UK International Rescue Committee), while Sudan is party to a €2 million project to help NGOs and governments in Egypt and Ethiopia to protect the human rights of migrants along the East Africa Route (IOM) and a €2 million project to protect the rights of Ethiopians and Somalians working in households in the Gulf (International Labour Organisation).

In Tunisia, there is a new €3 million project to improve standards and facilities for refugees (run in cooperation with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Centre for Migration Policy Development). There is also a pilot project of €1 million designed to create networks of cooperation between Tunisia and Morocco on the one hand and Frontex and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). (The project also includes Jordan in the work of EASO.) There is also a €10 million project with Egypt to boost resilience to migration pressures which is administered by the IOM.

Egypt itself hosts three initiatives – a €0.3 million project to improve legal advocacy for refugees (Egyptian Foundation for Refugee Rights), a €0.1 million project targeted at those vulnerable to trafficking (DCI; Association of Egyptian Female Lawyers), and a €0.5 million project to improve the judicial response to

trafficking through Egypt (IOM). There is also a broader, €1.8 million project to promote the rights of migrants from Egypt and its neighbours working in the Gulf (IOM).

On a region-wide level, there are €13.3 million worth of projects running, including a city-to-city project to improve municipal planning on migration, a law enforcement programme against smuggling (jointly funded by the EU's Annual Work Programme and its Internal Security Fund), a programme on mixed flows (Expertise France) and a Euromed project to encourage cooperation among all countries of the Mediterranean on migration issues.

As for the future: besides the new Regional Development and Protection Programme for refugees in the Horn (jointly funded by the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund), most projects in the pipeline will be funded by the 11th European Development Fund, and involve third parties – IGAD (fostering free movement), the Common Market for Eastern and South Africa (visa and free movement) and the East African Community (refugee protection).

CHAPTER 2

What focus for EU home affairs cooperation?

The EU's home affairs regime faces four international challenges. The first arises from the cluster of weak states to its south and east. In these fragile and corrupt states, illicit activities such as smuggling and irregular migration are part of everyday life and have been for at least 20 years. In the wake of the EU's economic downturn, these states are experiencing serious demographic and economic pressures, and have fallen prey to regressive cultural and religious influences triggering regional disorder and turning the EU's southern and eastern neighbours into an arc of instability.

This in turn increases the EU's exposure to an outer ring of countries which supply its illicit economy. Europe's demand for black-market labour, drugs, and illegal firearms is met by providers in a range of countries across Africa, Eastern Europe, Asia and the Americas. These providers are not only realising regional economies of scale at home, they are also exploiting the weak governance across the EU's southern and eastern neighbourhoods to build land and sea routes through it, thus beating a path for other disorderly elements to infiltrate the EU, including religious radicals and terrorists.

A third set of problems involves the wider arteries that link the EU to the global legitimate economy – the world-wide trade and freight routes, the financial and telecommunications networks. These channels have acquired a 'dark side' in recent years as they are exploited for material gain by non-state actors. In whole regions of the world, these networks are now more or less unprotected. They need to be kept open and safeguarded from the illicit activities of multinational firms, terrorists, organised crime groups and other non-state actors.

The fourth set of problems pertains to the way rival powers take advantage of the corrosion of global norms to rewrite international rules. Regional political players, such as Da'esh or Boko Haram, are trying to establish themselves across the EU's neighbourhood and Africa on the basis of illicit, non-state activity. And regional (Saudi Arabia, Russia) as well as global (China) powers may be tempted opportunistically to exploit the fragility of the global economic order by rewriting its rules in order to gain easier access to everything from natural resources to intellectual property.

Arc of instability: weak states in the EU's neighbourhood

The EU's southern and eastern neighbours have among the most fragile home affairs regimes in the world, and are facing some of the most intractable problems. Prime among these is the MENA region's demographic 'youth bulge', typical of emerging economies which use Western technology to reduce infant mortality but not fertility. Elsewhere in the world, especially in Asia, the bulge has been a boon, a means to draw in foreign investment and reduce the dependency ratio between old and young. But under conditions of poor governance, it triggers disorder. In some MENA states populations have tripled since 1970, with 60% aged 25 or less. These countries have, moreover, often failed to make the transition from a rural economy to the kind of urbanised economy that accommodates a fast-growing population.

The situation is different, but still challenging, in the autocratic oil-rich states of the Gulf. The youth bulge is continuing to grow there even as it comes to a head across North Africa, Syria and Iraq with explosive effect. Thanks to their resource wealth, the Gulf countries still provide something of a regional labour market, and immigrants from the MENA region and the Horn of Africa make up a significant proportion of the workforce. But therein lies the problem. The youthful native population of these countries is struggling to enter the labour market, and demands more responsive government. Research on radicalisation also suggests that affluence will not help: the focus of youthful frustrations tends simply to shift from national to international targets as soon as a certain level of *per capita* wealth is reached.


This combination of demographic, economic and environmental factors is now rekindling cross-border ethno-religious loyalties and has led to an upsurge in Islamic radicalism. The young unemployed populations of the MENA region fall easy prey to religious and political extremism: the weakening of Libya's southern border has permitted an overspill of terrorists and arms from Mali, as well as fuelling secessionism in resource-rich southern Algeria. In this context sub-Saharan migrants are subject to severe discrimination, and refugees from across the Gulf and Africa have increasingly become associated with insecurity in the perception of local host communities, and are seen as possible tools of foreign security services. Weak but autocratic elites in the Gulf States and Iran seem ready to exploit the situation for geopolitical gain.⁶

Eastern Europe's political demography is no less prone to disorder although it offers virtually the reverse picture: a declining population, economic stagnation and growing nationalism. In Serbia, one fifth of the population is aged over 65, compared with just 8% globally. The region may have taken steps to rid itself of organised crime,⁷ but levels of unemployment are quite high as the economy remains dominated by rent-seeking and corruption. In recent years Serbia has spent

6. Barah Mikail, 'Refugees in the MENA region: what geopolitical consequences?', FRIDE Policy Brief no.162, 2013.

7. UNODC, *Crime and its impact on the Balkans and affected countries* (Vienna: UNODC, 2008).

FIGURE 1: FRAGILITY AND INSTABILITY IN THE SOUTHERN NEIGHBOURHOOD AND GREATER MIDDLE EAST



Sources for data: World Bank 2013; ILO Global Employment Trends 2014; Fragile States Index - MEMA countries 2014; UNHCR/Governments, compiled by UNHCR, FICSS, 2014.

almost as great a proportion of its GDP on health and welfare as EU member states, leaving elderly Serbs dependent on young taxpayers to fund their care. All this is driving young workers to leave their families and seek work abroad. In Serbia, as across the region, this wave of emigration has disrupted family structures, further denting birth rates and raising concerns about the health of the national community.

The situation in the region is complicated by Russia and its historical predicament. Following the collapse of the USSR, a diaspora population of around 15 million Russians was stranded across Central Asia and Eastern Europe, often in poor but strategically important urban conglomerations. The native population in Russia then went into precipitous decline.⁸ Facing economic and demographic pressures, Moscow is now reaching out to its diaspora populations and fomenting territorial conflict, as for example in 2008, when it encouraged the secession of South Ossetia from Georgia by a policy of ‘passportisation’ – the mass distribution of Russian passports to breakaway populations. It appears to have revisited these tactics in Crimea, Eastern Ukraine and more recently in Moldova.


Hub and spokes: illicit links to regions of origin and transit

The neighbourhood is also becoming a transit zone of increasing significance (see Box 2): thanks to the demand for illicit goods and services in European countries, the EU finds itself joined to a distant ring of source countries by land and sea routes which pass through the EU-28’s volatile neighbours, further destabilising them. These countries supplying the EU hub are easy to map out – Peru, Columbia and Bolivia are the source of cocaine, transited via Brazil, Ecuador and Venezuela, through West Africa, and into Spain or Portugal; Afghanistan is the source of heroin and, cannabis resin transported through Iran and Pakistan and then through East Africa and Greece; China is the source of counterfeit goods shipped West; the Western Balkans and Russia are hubs for flows of weaponry and of sex slaves; India supplies the raw materials for psychoactive drugs.

The EU’s major entry junctions are also identifiable. Europol identifies five gateways for criminals into the EU: the Netherlands/Belgium; the Baltics/Kaliningrad; Bulgaria/Romania/Greece; Southern Italy; and Spain/Portugal. Frontex and EASO have mapped out similar entry points: Spain is the entry point for a West African migration route that cuts through Ghana, Mali and Algeria; Greece and Italy link to an East African route passing through Somalia, Eritrea and Egypt; eastern member states are the entry point for an Asian route cutting across Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Syria, as well as a channel heading in from Russia. Pressure points can be deflected but seldom sealed. A fence at the

8. Timothy Heleniak, ‘Migration dilemmas haunt post-Soviet Russia’, Migration Policy Institute (MPI), October 2002.

FIGURE 2: ETHNIC RUSSIAN DIASPORAS AND GEOPOLITICAL FAULTLINES IN THE EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD



Source for data: CIA World Factbook

Box 2: Human-smuggling networks in the Mediterranean

Human-trafficking networks based in Libya have been operating with relative impunity since the collapse of the country's central administration after the 2011 uprising. These networks, comprised mainly of local militias and Tunisian gangs, grew hugely between 2012 and 2014. They offer a 'travel agency' service, purporting to offer migrants full passage from, say, Palestine to Sweden via a tortuous refugee trail.

The gangs advertise openly on Facebook; operate collection points in Istanbul, Izmir or Beirut; organise connection flights to Algiers; and then transport migrants to the Libyan border, before escorting them to a port, perhaps Tobruk or Zuwarah in the north-west or even a former naval academy on the outskirts of Tripoli. Migrants are then transferred from smaller vessels to larger boats permanently stationed at maritime staging points and pushed into Italian territorial waters.

In 2014, smuggling networks were charging from between €2,500 to €5,000 for places on the deck of a boat crossing from the Libyan coast to Italian territorial waters. (Smugglers can still charge €3,500 just for a crossing from a Turkish port to a Greek port.) For those who survive the perilous crossing, there is then another stage: they will be smuggled through the EU to their stated destination, often via unwitting haulage companies contacted by the smugglers through online 'ride-sharing' websites.

Migrants are well-briefed about the law governing the reception of asylum-seekers in Germany, Holland, Sweden, Denmark and Norway. But the smugglers are also frequently brutal and contemptuous of human life. In one incident off the coast of Malta, they deliberately sank a vessel after migrants refused transfer to an unseaworthy ship offered for the crossing, with the loss of 500 lives.

The top five categories of migrants smuggled in the Central Mediterranean in 2014 were Eritreans, Syrians, Sub-Saharan of unknown nationality, Malians and Nigerians. Sub-Saharan Africans are treated especially badly by smugglers on account of their ethnicity. They may be forcibly recruited in a refugee camp in Khartoum, made to work for their passage to Libya (around €600 in hard labour) and then forced below decks on over-crowded vessels with little chance of survival if something goes wrong.

The smuggling networks are highly adaptive. Over the last decade, smugglers have established a 'squeezed balloon' dynamic along Schengen's southern frontier. Illegal entries may shrink as the authorities heighten surveillance in one area, but the smugglers quickly move on to exploit weaknesses in other areas that then bulge. In previous years, the traffickers have aimed at small islands like the Canaries, Lampedusa or Greece's land border with Turkey.

Libya is thus only one, if hugely significant, gateway or open 'back door' into Europe. Concurrently, illegal border crossings have also doubled in Greece and Spain (especially through fence crossings in the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla). The smugglers' clients are from Syria, Libya, Iraq and Palestine (as well as Nigeria, from where flows are increasing fast), victims of humanitarian crises in conflict regions, or refugees fleeing the rise of violent Islamism and extremist militancy.


Turkish-Bulgarian border, for instance, diverts migrants towards the Aegean, and a planned fence along the Hungarian-Serbian border is likely to have an equivalent effect.

Various criminal and trafficking routes originate within the EU-28 countries themselves. Some of these routes are virtual (e.g. the stolen personal data transferred for processing to India and areas of South Asia with new access to the internet). But the EU also produces toxic and mechanical waste, cheaper to dispose of abroad than under the bloc's strict environmental standards. And local housebreaks in the EU increasingly turn out to have been carried out by criminal networks originating from as far afield as the Caucasus. There are also the money-laundering, VAT fraud and child-exploitation activities which link the EU to Dubai and the United Arab Emirates, and the hire cars which feed the Russian market for stolen vehicles, removed from the borderless Schengen Area and offered for sale before the hire time is even over. The stolen hire car may also be the transport of choice for the self-funded foreign fighter.

An illicit route across the neighbourhood, once created, will often attract new forms of contraband activity, with drug-smuggling typically a common denominator. Europol estimates that 30% of organised crime groups in the EU are involved in the drugs trade, and the high payoffs make this the basis for other activities – for smuggling commodities or laundering the proceeds. For example, the recent discovery of cannabis plantations in Albania, just off the heel of Italy, signalled the existence not just of a significant local drugs economy but also the likelihood of illicit networks to facilitate seasonal migration. Yet it is cocaine, not cannabis (or heroin), that is the real moneyspinner: the EU remains a stable market for this high-end drug, and as drug smugglers increasingly use the land routes across the Sahara and North Africa, the purveyors of other illicit commodities follow in their wake.

The land route through the turbulent neighbourhood will not suit all forms of trafficking, of course, and air routes are increasingly preferred for sex-trafficking: Nigeria, China, Vietnam, Namibia and Latin America are all known to be source zones. Terrorist organisations generally – although not always – remain somewhat apart as well: organised crime groups (OCGs) peddle specialised services such as

FIGURE 3: INFLOWS AND HOTSPOTS



Sources for data: Eurostat; International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR); Europol.

procuring documents or providing safe passage across borders (this is the so-called 'crime as service' model); but OCGs tend to refrain from selling these services to terrorist groups, for fear of attracting the attention of the authorities. Terrorists have thus developed their own expertise in these fields. Whether they now exploit these for material gain – whether, say, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is funding its activities through drug-trafficking – is currently the subject of investigation and research by Europol.

Global flows: the corrosion of the EU's economic networks

Europol's risk analysis report, its biannual Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA), describes the corrosive effect of the prolonged economic downturn on Europe's globalised economy. The financial crisis has not substantially increased the levels of organised crime in the EU, according to Europol, but it has certainly altered its workings. It has eaten away at the sinews of Europe's global networks: European consumers are now more prepared to purchase cheap counterfeit goods than before; some white-collar professionals in the EU are helping to give a legitimate face to OCGs; and diaspora communities are providing a base in the EU for cross-national crime and terror groups. Moreover, the values that once underpinned the legitimate economy – adaptability, expertise, opportunity – are now being turned to illicit purposes.

This is the dark side of globalisation. Organised crime groups use the legitimate channels of the global economy to shift stolen intellectual property, rare natural resources, antiquities and human organs across borders. OCGs also borrow the methods and structures of legitimate businesses: producers of narcotics and counterfeit pharmaceuticals maintain large R&D operations of their own; traders in stolen arms and document fraudsters offer online shopping services. Even terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda operate along the lines of a multinational business and follow a national franchising model. In whole regions of the world, the task facing the EU is thus to safeguard and control global flows – of information, finance, freight – and to weigh any security-related restrictions against the rationale for keeping flows as open as possible.

This latter calculation applies particularly to the internet: the lesson from the US is that heavy internet surveillance only fuels demand for encryption services. The challenge is rather to safeguard the flow of reliable public information. Disreputable websites misrepresent the Syrian conflict and promote extremist interpretations of the Koran; they warn Syrian refugees to avoid being fingerprinted in the EU; and they give Ukrainians information about fake multi-entry Schengen visas useful for seasonal migration. Such illicit channels and websites provide Russians, Belarussians and South Africans with crucial tips about how best to attain a Schengen visa; more problematically, Iranians and Algerians seemingly

lack this insider information, leading to high rejection rates and backlogs. Further afield, migrants from the Horn are often ignorant about their rights in Gulf labour markets, leading to abuses in what should be a healthy regional economy.

Networks are the lifeblood of the global economy. Take remittance channels. Major emerging economies, from Egypt to Mexico, feature among the top ten recipients of global remittances. And the EU-28 find themselves bound to third countries by remittance corridors – from Italy to the Philippines; from Germany to Turkey; from Spain to Bolivia; from France to Morocco; from Greece to Albania. Collectively, foreign workers in the EU remit huge sums to Nigeria, Morocco, China, India and Lebanon, and new technologies are facilitating much-needed transfers to fragile war zones, refugee camps or otherwise closed economies. These transfers have, moreover, proven quite resilient to the economic downturn, charting a rise in 2011 of 7% (to USD 351 billion), a period when overseas development aid dipped (to USD 134 billion).⁹


But remittances can also spell regional disorder, and not just because they lead to unhealthy situations of dependence between sending and receiving states (global transfers to Nigeria grew unsustainably by 70% in 2007 alone). If remittances are proving resilient to economic crisis it is often for negative reasons. Migrants overstay their allotted residency period illegally in a country or dip into its unregulated labour market so as to support their families back home. They are sucked into stable but low-end jobs in areas like construction, with the result that their professional qualifications quickly become obsolete and they find themselves trapped. Moreover, a number of terrorist organisations outside the EU fund themselves from remittances garnered by the sale in the EU of goods or illicit services offered to diaspora communities. The proceeds are sent by wire transfer, charitable donation, pre-loaded value card or courier.

Boxing gloves: the power politics of counter-globalisation

A recent trend, also noted by Europol's SOCTA, is the way organised crime groups are capitalising on the reintroduction of borders in the global economy. Stronger immigration controls at the EU's southern border are fuelling demand for people-smuggling networks. Inter-state tensions across the neighbourhood are leading OCGs to diversify their membership – with some now comprising up to 60 nationalities – and to cooperate along ethnic-kinship lines such as Russian-Latvian or Maghreb-Iberian. But most tellingly, OCGs are no longer emulating the workings of the global economy. There has, for instance, been an upswing in bartering between OCGs, with groups exchanging services in kind, so as to avoid financial transactions. This highlights the way non-state activity can

9. OECD, 'Development aid to developing countries falls because of global recession', Paris, 4 April 2012.

FIGURE 4: GLOBAL FLOWS AND NETWORKS



Sources for data: Bilateral Migration Matrix 2013, World Bank; Eurostat.

fuel ‘deglobalisation’,¹⁰ the fragmentation and renationalisation of the global economy.

This corrosion of the global rule-based economy has led some terrorist groups to raise the level of their political ambition. Organisations like al-Qaeda which formerly adopted the fluid, networked structure of the global economy are now engaging in full-blown state-building efforts. Their primary goal is no longer to fight the West’s global power but to exploit the West’s shrinking influence in order to establish their own autonomous power bases. This is symbolised in Syria and Iraq where al-Qaeda has been eclipsed by the local state-building efforts of its former ‘franchise’ member, Da’esh. State-like justice and governance structures are also emerging in African and Middle Eastern refugee camps where inmates have sometimes spent decades in limbo. There too, non-state actors are thus assuming state-like functions.

Some Eastern European and Central Asian governments give a warm welcome to illicit, non-state actors. When a government fails to master globalisation – to ensure access to markets for its citizens, say, or to attain Western standards of healthcare – reliance on smuggling or counterfeiting services can seem a more attractive option. The whole eastern neighbourhood is affected: the elite group of organised crime bosses, the 500 ‘thieves in law’, stretches out across the Caucasus and performs services for the political class. Governments of the region are using their relations with non-state actors not only to contract out basic services – such as the construction work on the Sochi Winter Olympics venue – but to challenge the rules of the global economy. Russia seems to be using its alliances with such non-state actors, from motorcycle gangs to criminals in its diaspora, to undermine the existing rule-based order.

Of course, most emerging economies have benefited from globalisation. For them, however, the erosion of the rules of the global economy presents an opportunity to secure an even more favourable international regime. Illicit cross-border activities such as counterfeiting begin where legitimate trade, capital and migration flows end. States like China may find the distinction arbitrary. They resent the restrictions placed on the exchange of manufacturing know-how under intellectual property law. And they may view counterfeiting and cyberattacks as a means of closing the technological gap with Western firms. Thus illicit non-state activities enter the realm of high politics because they offer governments a chance to present existing global rules as arbitrary and as an example of unfair Western influence. This in turn exposes the global rule-based economy to ideological attack.

Most obviously, the global standards underpinning humanitarianism and refugee law are vulnerable to ideological revision, because they are associated with Western ‘double standards’ – the old criticism that Western states intervene in other countries on humanitarian grounds while they protect their own national

10. Jayshree Bajoria, ‘The dangers of “deglobalization”’, Council on Foreign Relations, Analysis Brief, March 2009.

borders.¹¹ Labour migration too is subject to new ideologies. For twenty years, migration was seen as a positive vector of Western economic liberalism, promising mutual ‘wins’ to both sending and receiving countries. But China has adopted a mercantilist approach to migration, treating the emigration of its citizens as a means to access resources in the global south. In Russia, by contrast, migration is commonly perceived as a threat to demography and traditional social structures, and a more conservative ideology of national community is being promoted to discredit it.

11. B.S. Chimni, ‘Globalisation, humanitarianism and the erosion of refugee protection’, Refugee Studies Centre, RSC Working Paper no.3, 2000.

CHAPTER 3

Where is the EU focusing home affairs efforts abroad?

Early priorities 1999–2013

The search for a workable framework for dealing with the external sources of the EU's crime, migration and terrorism problems stretches back nearly 20 years to a time of accelerating globalisation and US hegemony in international affairs. It was in 1998, against a background of bloody internal conflicts in Serbia, Afghanistan and Sudan, that the Dutch interior ministry came up with a modest proposal for the establishment of a High Level Working Group on Migration and Asylum (HLWG) in a bid to inject foreign policy expertise into the EU's home affairs policy. The HLWG, which still functions under the auspices of the European Council, brought together diplomats and interior ministry officials to develop action plans on migration challenges emanating from specific third countries such as Albania and Morocco.

But the HLWG was quickly flanked by new initiatives. In the wake of the 2001 attacks on the US, matters such as international terrorism and its financing came to the attention of European diplomats. In 2003, they drafted the first European Security Strategy (ESS) which prescribed a global multilateral approach to addressing foreign policy challenges. The strategy's consideration of these challenges was immediately striking for its preoccupation with non-state threats of the kind that normally bother home affairs officials – specifically terrorism, the proliferation of weapons, state failure and organised crime. Thus it was no surprise when the interior officials drafting the Union's Internal Security Strategy (ISS) delivered a quite similar threat perception, focusing on criminal networks, cyberspace and border governance and on the EU's general resilience to external shocks.

In 2005, moreover, EU interior ministers announced a strategy for the 'external dimension of JHA'. Spreading 'freedom, security and justice' (FSJ) abroad was now recognised as a means of securing the same at home. Their document consisted of a minimalistic mission statement that neatly combined the internal security- and migration-related strands of its subject matter. Consequently, it was able to set out clear diplomatic priorities, particularly for the EU's neighbourhood. The strategy set the objective of achieving better cooperation with the Balkan states, East European neighbours and Russia on almost every home affairs issue; cooperation with North

Africa would focus on counter-terrorism. Beyond the neighbourhood, the focus was drug trafficking from Afghanistan and Latin America, and illegal immigration from and through Africa, although work with these latter regions proved difficult.

Development policy: supporting regional approaches to migration

2005 was also the year that EU governments launched the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). This marked a recognition that third countries would be readier to open talks with the EU on home affairs matters if the EU took account of their interests and funding needs in fields such as administrative reform, labour migration, refugee management and human trafficking. Although regularly criticised for its vagueness, the GAMM has proved a success in two fields. Firstly, it further strengthened the EU's global diplomacy on home affairs matters in the absence of a robust multilateral regime. This was because the GAMM was elaborated in preparation for the UN global dialogue on migration and development, which ran throughout 2006, and European diplomats were keen for the EU to speak there with one voice.

Secondly, it spurred the development of mobility arrangements with close neighbours like Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Jordan and Moldova. Mobility Partnerships are voluntary frameworks of hundreds of joint projects on border and immigration control brokered between the EU and sending countries. In most cases, they involve a basic *quid pro quo*. The EU's offer of access to participating member states' labour markets is conditioned against domestic reforms. As such, EU diplomats employ a kind of 'enlargement-lite' approach, in which partial access is offered to the EU's internal markets in return for regulatory approximation. These partnerships, especially when complemented with visa liberalisation processes like those innovated with the Western Balkans, also lay the bedrock for social and employment links between the EU and its neighbours.

Still, as regards one key aim of the GAMM – to boost cooperation between the EU's home affairs and development spheres – results were lacking. The Commission's DG DEVCO funds numerous border-security and migration projects worldwide, and DG HOME has been behind Regional Protection Programmes to assist in the relief of refugees in East Africa. DG HOME also took advantage of the various regional fora created by the UN process to engage in the Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development with Western and Central African countries. But while EU development officials primarily took the UN process as a cue to identify how human mobility could contribute to 'co-development' between the EU and other world regions, the EU's home affairs specialists focused on the question of leveraging mobility to achieve regulatory approximation in the neighbourhood.

Administrative cooperation: uniform practices across the neighbourhood

In this bid to achieve international regulatory convergence, EU home affairs officials and diplomats have recognised the importance of administrative cooperation. In the mid-2000s, EU agencies (besides CEPOL, the European Police Training College) were thus given a key role in training personnel in the EU and abroad, as well as in fostering a shared intelligence-led approach and in ensuring timely access to international data and information. During this period, new units and agencies proliferated. The 2004/2005 terror attacks on London and Madrid spurred the appointment of an EU counter-terrorism co-ordinator, for instance, tasked with bringing together the foreign and interior aspects of the Council's work. And the mandate of the EU's fledgling intelligence cell, SITCEN (later called INTCEN) was reinforced.

Box 3: EU border management across the neighbourhood

Frontex is probably best known for operations such as *Triton* close to European shores in the Aegean and the Mediterranean. But the agency's direct external influence is in fact even greater in the Balkans and countries belonging to the EU's Eastern Partnership: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. There it has played a transformative role, operating as the Union's vanguard in migration management by promoting uniform border standards.

The agency has helped Moldova, for instance, effectively shadow the EU's entire border *acquis* in order to secure visa-free access to the Schengen Area. The country has a working arrangement with Frontex, a mobility partnership, and co-hosts a 200-strong border assistance mission alongside Ukraine (EUBAM). It has also signed up to the idea of Integrated Border Management (IBM).

IBM represents the EU's own theory of border control, inspired by the Schengen code which governs cooperation within the EU's passport-free travel zone. The IBM concept stresses cooperation between the many services which typically operate at frontiers: border guards, coastguards, customs and asylum officers. It also stresses the need for international organisations to be able to plug into domestic capabilities. The aim is to permit the flow of legal goods, services and workers.

The EU has spread IBM between Schengen states and their eastern neighbours, and even helped the neighbours to cooperate bilaterally. This was precisely the idea behind the EU's most high-profile border assistance mission to Moldova and Ukraine. This EUBAM, organised by the European Commission at the invitation of the presidents of Moldova and Ukraine, is a hands-on means of applying EU border standards in a volatile region.

In its southern neighbourhood too of course, the EU has been involved in border missions – notably at the Rafah crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. Conditions in the South, however, are often more treacherous, as witnessed by the recent winding down of an EUBAM in Libya and its decamping to Tunisia. There is also the old problem that governments of the region are often more worried about the security of their regime than about that of their citizenry.

Many of these countries have nevertheless sought European expertise in managing their own southern borders – albeit remaining reticent about discussing such activities publicly, for fear of being seen to restrict Muslim migration from sub-Saharan Africa at the EU's behest. Cooperation between EU agencies and southern Mediterranean authorities thus tends to be framed in an equitable way: to increase these countries' participation in the work of Frontex and EASO, as one recent mandate put it.

In the East, too, the political waters are becoming choppy. The breakaway region of Transnistria has been a major focus of the Moldovan-Ukrainian EUBAM, and the EU has been praised for finding innovative solutions to cross-border crime despite the huge political sensitivities surrounding border management in the region. Mobile operations prevent smuggling without recognising any formal border. But EU border management is regarded with increasing mistrust by Moscow, while Ukraine itself has begun restricting the movement of Russian troops to and from the region.

Since its creation in 2004, Frontex has led the field in this kind of administrative harmonisation (see Box 3). The agency has provided practical assistance to other EU bodies such as Commission DG DEVCO across Africa and Eastern Europe as well as the Union's border assistance missions (EUBAMs). But the prime focus has again been the EU's nearest neighbours, as witnessed by a number of multilateral programmes such as the risk-analysis networks it has built between Western Balkan capitals. Under its revised mandate of 2011, it can readily dispatch and receive liaison officers to build international cooperation. It has also chosen to pursue 17 working agreements with critically important states including Turkey, and it has mandates to add Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco and Libya as well as countries further afield such as Senegal, Mauritania, and Brazil.

The great advantage of this service-provision model lies in the way Frontex has spread technical know-how in the neighbourhood even when political relations were difficult. Belarus had until recently only limited high-level political interaction with the EU but, through a working arrangement with Frontex, adopted European standards on customs control and border management. Similarly, one of Frontex's earliest working arrangements was with the Russian Border Guard Service, due partly to the need to manage border and customs arrangements for the Kaliningrad exclave. Frontex also has arrangements in place which should allow foreign

authorities to transfer their know-how back to the EU: Frontex's Common Core Curriculum for border guards can be adopted by other states and, once they are familiar with it, they can participate in its further development.

Security and defence: boots, and shoes, on the ground

Operational activities under the CSDP have increasingly come to the fore (see Box 4). In 2011, for instance, interior ministries pressed for more concrete results from the EU's external JHA agenda. The winding down of an EU security sector reform (SSR) mission to Guinea-Bissau was the spur. Police and border authorities in Europe had hoped the mission, which was intended to loosen the military's control over the political system, would continue, as they were worried that Guinea-Bissau might become a narco-state. Military strongmen in the fragile West African country were in hock to Latin American cocaine cartels, meaning the country could be used as a hub for international drug trafficking. In future, buy-in from the Union's foreign policy structures, particularly its crisis-management planning department, was deemed a necessary prerequisite for strategic action in the JHA realm.

Box 4: CSDP missions and home affairs

As of March 2015, the EU was running 11 civilian missions under its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). These covered international home affairs issues such as the rule of law (Kosovo), civilian security sector reform (Ukraine, Mali and Niger), border management (the Palestinian Territories, Libya/Tunisia), police training (Afghanistan, the Palestinian territories), anti-piracy (Horn of Africa) and civilian monitoring of a post-conflict situation (Georgia).

These missions suffer from a notable lack of coordination with EU home affairs agencies such as Frontex and Europol. This is clear when it comes to information-sharing. The 'status of forces agreements' (SOFAs) that give EU personnel permission to operate on foreign territory restrict information-sharing. The result is that it is usually easier for the EU's missions to share information with Interpol, the international policing agency, than with the EU's own home affairs agencies.

Staff exchanges between JHA agencies and EU missions have also been rare. Frontex officers served in an advisory capacity with the EU's 2013 Libyan border mission, and Europol shares criminal intelligence with the long-standing rule-of-law mission in Kosovo. But these are exceptions. The EU's interior ministries have viewed secondment of valuable staff to such missions more as a burdensome duty than an opportunity, especially during a time of budgetary

constraint. Yet the prosecution of a Balkan drug lord or helping local authorities to break up a people smuggling network in Niger is arguably far more cost effective, in both human and financial terms, than dealing with the consequences of such instability downstream.

The desire to harness the potential of this insight was behind the 2004 decision of five member states to create their own joint Gendarmerie Force. Known as EU-ROGENDFOR, the force consists of rapidly deployable police with paramilitary capabilities from France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania and Spain, with Poland becoming a member in 2013. It has assisted and substituted local police and other civilian forces in Afghanistan, the Balkans and Haiti.

Still, EUROGENDFOR remains largely outside EU structures, and EU missions themselves usually focus on ‘capacity building’. They do not substitute for local authorities but act in support of them, helping to train and equip personnel and advising on day-to-day actions. This has been true for EU operations in the Horn of Africa or Afghanistan. This ‘leading from behind’ role limits the ability of such missions to collect information as regards suspects of human trafficking or terrorism. Rather, it has been NATO which often performs the executive tasks and indeed which has provided the security guarantee for EU personnel.

Here too, cooperation has proved complicated. Due to political differences, the EU and NATO have been unable to fully avail of the so-called ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements that are meant to provide for integrated operational structures. As a result, in Kosovo, cooperation was more likely to be achieved informally over a barbecue than through formal technical agreements. In the highly-fragmented context of Afghanistan, where greater numbers of international and local actors were involved, the process was more complex still.

But such problems are, for the most part, hangovers: legacies of the previous neglect of CSDP missions by EU home affairs agencies; of post-Cold War competition between the EU and NATO; and of the EU’s heavy emphasis on setting data-protection rules. The 2013 Libya EUBAM is a sign of things to come. Established at a regional hotspot, it required the buy-in of MENA and Sahel countries. And it wanted backup from a dedicated EU security mission, since NATO had restricted its own activities.

There are questions now about how far coordination between home affairs and CSDP should go. Home affairs tools are proving useful for military ends, e.g. by offering witness protection schemes for defectors from Boko Haram or forensic analysis of border incursions in Eastern Europe. But the real question for the EU is how to coordinate these two fields with broader trade, aid and diplomatic tools.

A 2011 joint working paper produced by the High Representative and DG HOME pointed to the importance of the rule of law for CSDP missions: 'CSDP missions rely on personnel seconded by member states, in particular police officers, judges, prosecutors, customs officers etc. National FSJ actors are thus the chief providers of personnel for civilian CSDP missions.'¹² It also isolated the main challenges to bringing the EU's civilian-military and home affairs realms together in ways that respected the legal concerns of each and prevented them duplicating each other's activities. The solutions it identified included: producing a shared CSDP/home affairs analysis of the same issues by drawing on intelligence from both foreign policy and JHA players; exchanging information systematically between such players; and involving JHA actors in the planning of EU missions in third countries.

The key question was how to better prepare JHA personnel for service abroad – a challenge echoed on the CSDP side, where personnel in EU missions were felt to be lacking in migration and law enforcement training. But defining a specific list of common actions has since proved difficult. The relevant EU working group (JAI-EX) tasked with co-ordinating CSDP and JHA issues has long struggled to field concrete initiatives. This was (and is) due partly to the challenges of marrying the different disciplines and mindsets of personnel who also tend to go into 'monitoring mode' when difficult issues arise. Hence a revival of technical and political discussions, with the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) and COSI meeting bi-annually from 2011 and the emphasis placed by the High Representative on 'jumbo' Council meetings between ministers responsible for home and CSDP matters.

The EU's current approach


With the recent weakening of the states in its near abroad, the EU is trying to extract far more leverage than usual from its mobility deals and administrative cooperation formats. With Turkey, visa liberalisation is now being used to prevent a drastic split from the EU in geo-strategic priorities. As one EU home affairs official put it: 'the cause of the split is clear: Europeans prioritise the fight against Da'esh, then the creation of a post-Assad regime and then managing the Kurdistan Workers Party [the PKK]; for Ankara, those priorities have the exact reverse order'. Significantly, the EU is also coming to recognise the importance of high-level political pressure to complement administrative cooperation. Without this, another observer informs us: 'security-sector reform becomes as risky as arming rebel fighters: we simply don't know into whose hands these institutions will fall.'

As for the Western Balkans, five years after lifting visa restrictions to Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, FYROM, Montenegro and Serbia, the EU finds itself exposed to increasing rates of irregular migration from the region. Asylum claims reached a sizeable

12. European Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Affairs, 'Strengthening ties between CSDP and FSJ actors: proposals for a way ahead', Joint staff working paper, SEC(2011) 560 final, 5 May 2011.

53,700 in 2013, the vast majority dismissed as unfounded (Serbs, the most numerous claimants, had a 96% refusal rate). Some of the most recent flows emanate from Kosovo, which is still looking to secure visa freedom with the EU. In other Balkan states, the spectre of a reintroduction of visa controls is used to shore up reforms. But with the region increasingly polarised by events to its east and south, the EU must keep its borders open in order to offset the negative Russification of Balkan populations, even though this openness potentially exposes it to penetration by the region’s Islamist radicals.

FIGURE 5: MOBILITY PARTNERSHIPS, VISA FACILITATION AND READMISSION AGREEMENTS



Mobility cooperation has intensified with key members of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) area. The mobility partnership format has recently been extended to Tunisia and Morocco, and there are discussions about offering a mobility deal to Ukrainians four years after the last attempt faltered due to Kiev’s fears of a brain drain. Three further forms of mobility cooperation with Ukraine have been mooted: an extension of the geographic scope of the local border-traffic agreement between Ukraine and Poland so as to facilitate small goods trading; a liberalisation of the local cross-border services market for Ukrainian artisans and traders; and greater scope for Ukrainian firms to send staff to the EU to establish small subsidiaries.¹³ There are, however, concerns that the EU is exposing itself to an influx of disorderly migration should the conflict in eastern Ukraine worsen.

13. Sergio Carrera, Elspeth Guild and Joanna Parkin, ‘What role for migration policy in the Ukraine crisis?’, CEPS Commentary, March 2014.

Connecting the dots

More attention is now being devoted to the potential links between the EU's existing development projects, CSDP missions and home affairs relationships in Africa, Latin America and Eurasia. The EU is now trying to link up these projects and organise them along supply and transit routes. It lately set out its work priorities regarding countries of migrant origin and transit in North and West Africa, and will do the same as regards engaging other countries to help combat human trafficking. But the EU faces a stumbling block to its efforts to pull together its somewhat piecemeal projects: it has no comprehensive overall picture of its various JHA-related activities. This is a legacy of the bloc's gradual accretion of competencies, not to mention poor communication in Brussels between the Union's home affairs, development and CSDP arms.

The scattergun nature of the EU's previous JHA-related activities is also hampering the effort to exert political pressure on individual countries of origin and transit. The EU must apply targeted political pressure if it wants to push – say – Egypt to act on the copious information it holds about Sinai smuggling networks or, in the East, to prevent the release from prison of well-connected Central Asian criminals by Tbilisi. Take the task of addressing migration routes from Africa across the Mediterranean. A rudimentary mapping reveals the EU's relevant activities (see Box 5 overleaf) to be rather diffuse: mobility partnerships with Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan; migration and security dialogues with Lebanon (incipient), Egypt (frozen), Algeria (in preparation) and Libya (in limbo); and 'common agendas' (i.e. preludes to mobility partnerships) in the pipeline with Nigeria and Ethiopia.

A recent pilot project by the EU to boost its efforts to return irregular migrants to Pakistan and Bangladesh, both major sending countries, probably shows the way ahead. The European Commission is combining a range of common European levers, including potentially from its development and trade toolbox, to press these two states to readmit illegal immigrants from the EU. If successful, the format may in turn be rolled out to Nigeria, Ghana and other states across Africa and Asia. The same kind of targeted approach, combining a comprehensive range of resources to achieve a small set of goals, might be applied to the more stable of the countries of the neighbourhood too, aimed for instance at the creation of an anti-smuggling centre based in Egypt, say, with Moroccan and Tunisian participation.

Box 5: EU actions on Mediterranean migration

In late 2013, following a mass drowning of migrants off Lampedusa, the EU established a taskforce to deal with Mediterranean migration. Five broad categories of project were foreseen: (i) actions with third countries; (ii) regional protection of refugees, and the creation of channels for them to reach the EU; (iii) the fight against trafficking; (iv) maritime surveillance; and (v) help for hard-hit member states. Just over a year later, this had produced a mixed bag of 63 clusters of both new and ongoing initiatives.

Measures to expel migrants were quite advanced – the pilot projects with Pakistan and Bangladesh; the expulsion, with Frontex’s help, of 1,800 migrants (at a cost of €9.5 million); financial support to reintegrate returnees in their home countries; a readmission agreement with Turkey (albeit initially applying only to Turkish nationals, and notoriously hard to enforce); and a project to map the EU-28’s programmes for illegal migrants returning home voluntarily.

Humanitarian tools remained in their infancy – there are the two incipient Regional Development and Protection Programmes (RDPP) in North Africa and the Horn, and a six-month old RDPP in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. At the time the situation was reviewed in late 2014 there was ongoing discussion of the use of EU humanitarian visas (a matter left largely to member state discretion); a €6-10,000 per head refugee resettlement programme; and €0.3 million allocated to help transfer (‘relocate’) refugees from one EU member state to another.

Besides Frontex’s *Triton* operation, border-control measures included the Joint Operational Team (JOT) Mare – a Europol-run intelligence centre on smuggling; the EU’s burgeoning Patrol Network, comprising Frontex and member states’ combined maritime surveillance operations; EASO’s training programme to help authorities screen for refugees in mixed migration flows; and a 2014 EU Regulation setting out rules for the surveillance of European waters by Frontex.

Much cooperation has focused on improving the international information base – Turkish-European moves towards joint migration risk assessments; links between EU member state immigration liaison officers based in Turkey; the AFIC intelligence-sharing network between African authorities and Frontex. There is also a public portal in five languages (including Arabic) detailing legal paths to the EU, and an information campaign in Niger for prospective migrants.

Moves are afoot for greater data exchange between Europol and Frontex, albeit years after Frontex gained the right to process personal data in 2011. These efforts were complemented by a Europol-EASO pilot project collecting data

on people smuggling; an endeavour by EU delegations to incorporate national immigration liaison officers into their work; and Frontex and the EEAS are looking to formalise their cooperation on information-sharing, as well as with CSDP missions and EU delegations.

The EU has given its international dialogues a more practical flavour. This is clear at the level of political leaders (Euro-African summits will focus on spending the €17.5 million dedicated to migration) and at ministerial level (the Euro-African conferences on migration and development are now supposed to move from words to actions), besides the technical (the EuroMed conferences between police and justice personnel) and expert levels (ACP-EU anti-trafficking conference).

In a few fields, there was little progress to report – specifically regarding the EU’s goal of cooperating with AFRIPOL, Africa’s incipient police cooperation body, or on reviving the old Frontex format of joint patrols in third country waters. And, of course, actions in Libya are on hold: the border assistance mission there was downsized to just 17 personnel in November 2014, and moves to incorporate Libya into the EU’s Seahorse maritime surveillance network and Search and Rescue activities are currently frozen.

Deepening home affairs multilateralism

With its global economic networks increasingly at risk of corrosion by non-state actors, the EU has further boosted its multilateral home affairs diplomacy. This has not always been easy. The GAMM was the basis for the EU to speak with one voice on migration in the UN, but already in 2006 the EU had to fight to gain anything more than observer status in the dialogue process. Even when the EU does project a coordinated message, moreover, this is refracted through the UN’s own complex political structures. The UN Department for Political Affairs cooperates more readily with the pragmatic UN Development Programme than with the more legal-minded UNHCR in Geneva, which in turn is often far removed from its politically-minded practitioners in conflict zones. The EU is having to target its technical home affairs knowledge at certain UN interlocutors, and its foreign policy expertise at others.

The EU has also begun harnessing member states’ special rights of representation in multilateral fora like the Group of Seven major world economies. The G7 is a central arena for world-wide discussions on issues such as money laundering, and it comprises global powers capable of swinging the debate in the UN. Accordingly,

the EU has helped Berlin use its G7 presidency to align positions ahead of 2016's UN General Assembly Special Session on Drugs, where some Latin American states are pushing for international conventions to be relaxed. In other fields, the EU has been exploring the scope for a subset of its member states to coordinate their international connections. This might take the form of an 'EU-5' of southern member states cooperating on people-smuggling and a partial revival of the old 5+5 format with North-West African partners.

The EU's strategic partnerships, its bilateral partnerships with ten major powers, are also crucial to its multilateral home affairs diplomacy.¹⁴ Alliances with Canada and Japan have been identified as key to reasserting multilateral home affairs rules. And cooperation with a non-traditional partner like Mexico could usefully go beyond bilateral talks to include joint actions in zones of shared concern across Latin America. The EU is also taking care to involve strategic partners in its more intrusive external actions. Its border missions and training exercises across the neighbourhood have featured the participation of Canada and Japan. And when dealing with strategic partners with whom bilateral relations are generally difficult – Russia – cooperation has been built around issues where both parties have a shared interest, such as fighting domestic drug consumption.

Leveraging special relationships

Diplomacy in international organisations is proving a necessary but not sufficient means of defending international home affairs rules. In some cases, multilateralism may even be part of the problem. Russia has been able to bog down discussion in the UN on the establishment of an implementation mechanism for the anti-crime convention. Moscow is also impeding the Council of Europe's efforts to police the internet and root out cybercrime, while Russia pushes to enshrine the right of states to censor the internet in negotiations on a new International Telecommunications Treaty. Meanwhile new inter-state formats are emerging in possible competition to the Council of Europe, OECD or UN, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO comprises China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and is creating its own standards on organised crime.

The EU has responded by bolstering its relationship with its most important global partner – the US – for home affairs ends. The EU is working towards a European Passenger Name Record (PNR) regime partly to safeguard relations with the US; and the EU's participation in the 'safe harbour' data protection system operated by the US Department of Commerce is now weighed up in similar terms; the EU's new Western Balkan Counterterrorism Initiative was in part a response to US fears about Muslim foreign fighters; and some of the EU's counter-terrorist actions fol-

14. Thomas Renard, 'Partners in crime? The EU, its strategic partners and international organised crime', Fride-Egmont Working Paper no.5, 2014.

low US pressure in the UN Security Council. Thus the EU's long-standing constitutional concerns about transatlantic home affairs cooperation are now tempered by geostrategic awareness. And the EU is already reaping the rewards of this strategy: it is using the transatlantic alliance to push Latin American states to tackle their local euro-counterfeiting and drugs trades.

But the EU is also facing another, subtler challenge: the informal 'soft' regionalisation of the global home affairs regime by the UN. A number of global dialogues of differing degrees of formality are now getting underway in the areas of development cooperation, refugee law and peacekeeping. All have obvious implications for home affairs cooperation, and the UN is regionalising these discussions, with the Secretary General known to be keen on the Chapter VIII regional peacekeeping arrangements and giving weight in development talks to the UN's five regional economic commissions. The EU, which is treated as a regional organisation under its terms of representation in the UN, has always underlined the fact that it is more than this – a body of global reach. But it seems that other European bodies, including the Council of Europe and OSCE, are ready to engage in the UN's policy of regionalisation.

CHAPTER 4

How to deal with volatile home affairs hotspots?

Four layers of problems on the EU's doorstep

The weakening of the states surrounding the EU is increasing the sense of instability on its borders. Turkey, for instance, has been unable to restrict the flow of fighters across its border for fear of being seen to take sides in the Syrian conflict and leaving itself open to terrorist attack. Meanwhile the flow of Iraqi and Syrian refugees northwards is causing both territorial (in Turkey's Hatay province which Syria still claims, and in the Iraqi borderlands) and social (with Alevi and Kurdish minorities, and poorer Turks taking the burden of refugee integration) tensions. This could have a knock-on effect in the neighbouring Western Balkans, where there are already concerns about the radicalisation of a Muslim population with visa-free access to the EU.

The EU has also seen illicit smuggling routes – the 'hub and spokes' – deepen across the neighbourhood. A steady stream of Eritreans are, for example, working their way up to Libya and Turkey so as to cross into the EU. They are fleeing the prospect of military service at home which, despite a 2011 law circumscribing its length, can still apparently last up to 20 years, and entails little short of indentured labour; given the lack of economic opportunities in Eritrea's otherwise moribund economy, moreover, those citizens who avoid conscription or are released in response to international pressure also face a tough fight for survival. There is speculation that these emigrants are placing themselves in the hands of militant Islamist groups that stand to make lucrative profits from people-smuggling. Thus the Central Mediterranean in particular is becoming a channel for truly mixed migration flows – for economic migrants and refugees, for the brutalised and the radicalised.

It comes as no surprise then that the EU's global commercial networks are being eaten away close to home. Maritime channels across the Eastern Mediterranean are now being used to transport looted antiquities and human cargoes to the EU. These routes may also be serviced by European ships sent abroad for cheap scrapping and bought up by well-funded Turkish gangs. Meanwhile commercial shipping crossing the Central Mediterranean has been in the frontline of efforts to rescue stricken migrants. Shipping companies are now deviating from well-worn routes, and smaller vessels are refusing to give their coordinates to the European authorities. The EU's heavy focus on people-smuggling is also diverting the attention of the European

Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) away from its core mandate to address classic maritime risks such as shipping accidents, spills and pollution.

With the EU focused on its south, Russia is stealthily rolling out its bid to counter globalisation: the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Seemingly based on the notion that ‘good neighbours make good fences’, this trading bloc effectively acts as a buffer for Russia against Western interference. The five-state union is held together by a rather shaky free movement component, which imitates the kind of arrangement pioneered inside the European Union. For Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and acceding state Kyrgyzstan, EEU membership thus secures the flow of labour remittances out of Russia. For Russia, hard hit by economic sanctions, this free movement component can be sustained only by closing off its labour market to non-members like Moldova. Chisinau is now under pressure to sign up to the EEU to ensure continued flows of labour remittances.

When home affairs becomes high politics

In past years the EU had been handling these four kinds of challenges through relatively discreet processes of internal coordination and external action. Its state-building measures throughout the ‘arc of instability’ involved DGs HOME and NEAR and the close cooperation of southern or eastern EU members. The efforts to tackle illicit routes at source involved the EEAS and EU delegations, DG DEVCO and the CSDP apparatus as well as member states with close historical relations to source countries such as Eritrea. The effort to safeguard cross-border commercial channels such as those leading out from the Northern Mediterranean and to prevent counter-globalisation tended to involve the Commission president and large member states, and played out in norm-setting fora like the G7, OECD and UN.

But the scale and proximity of current challenges mean the EU has to coordinate and combine policies in ever more strenuous ways. The EU must bridge a gulf between its local and central administrative levels. Thus an EU visa liberalisation deal with Georgia has to be a vehicle for painstaking governance-building if towns in the EU are to escape the attentions of Caucasian housebreaking gangs and criminal networks; but now a speedy visa deal has high geostrategic importance as a means to anchor Georgia to the West. The EU also has to bridge a gulf between its home and foreign affairs officials. Thus EU interior officials might see Moscow or Damascus as potential allies in a fight against non-state threats like terrorism; but foreign policy officials would treat the duo as a threat to global rules and see some of their own goals reflected instead by non-state actors – militias in eastern Ukraine and Syria.

As a result, decision-makers in Brussels find themselves having to pull together ever more of the EU’s various policy communities at short notice. A jumbo Council meeting between interior and foreign ministers held in April 2015 was typical of the new drive for ‘horizontal’ coordination between the home affairs branch and the EU’s diplomatic, CSDP and development branches. The meeting gave ministers

a chance to discuss the migration situation in the Mediterranean. But despite its scale and format, it quickly became apparent that the meeting could also have done with the presence of the Frontex and EMSA directors when questions of maritime law came up. The discussion about the EU's border control budget really required coordination with finance ministers too. And, of course, there was the problem that the jumbo format is designed to facilitate discussion, not binding decisions.

As the political discussion becomes more centralised in Brussels, moreover, much of the real action is devolving downwards in practice. It is the EU's cities and regions that bear much of the burden for crime, asylum and immigration, and they who pragmatically cooperate where national governments fear to tread (often due to resistance from the local level). Lobbies like the European Conference of Peripheral and Maritime Regions are the ones drawing up best practice models for migration; Belgian and British cities stand ready to work with counterparts in Russia on foreign fighters; and Polish towns like Lublin are cooperating on local governance with counterparts from Kaliningrad to Tunisia. And yet, these cities and regions have no real notion of Europe's overall foreign policy agenda. So the EU's 'vertical' coordination is also at stake.

Despite a seemingly anarchic international environment, the EU in fact disposes of opportunities if it wishes to rebuild order in its near abroad. Take Ankara: Turkey's problematic porous southern border is a legacy of its decision to pivot away from the EU and towards its Muslim neighbours following Ankara's frustration with the slow pace of its EU accession talks. This creates a dual opportunity for the EU. For one thing, it suggests that a rekindling of relations could give the EU leverage to secure Turkey's southern border, as well as to put in place the conditions for information exchange and creating firewalls across the Middle East. For another, Ankara's past policy of Arab *rapprochement* has created a set of economic channels from Turkey to its southern neighbours which could now prove useful in restoring peace and prosperity to the region.¹⁵

In Eritrea, meanwhile, there is growing evidence that the authorities are playing a collusive role in the exodus of their own citizens. Eritrea's border personnel reportedly accept bribes to place their citizens in the hands of people-smugglers, and Eritrean embassies levy a tax of 2% on remittances from those who reach the EU. Some EU officials see this as a coercive 'state-run people-smuggling racket'. However, an apparent increase in home visits by Eritrean migrants suggests that Asmara may be reaching out to its European diaspora as a lifeline for its moribund economy. This reveals Eritrea's dependence on the EU, and some EU member states are already trying to exploit this to break up the smuggling route. They are putting political pressure on Asmara to improve its governance standards, but also providing vocational training for young Eritrean workers and opening up the labour markets of the Gulf for them.

As regards the protection of its maritime commercial networks, the EU set a blueprint in 2008 when it launched an anti-piracy CSDP mission, Operation *Atalanta*, off the Horn of Africa. This mission combined humanitarian, judicial and economic

15. Hugh Pope, 'Pax Ottomana?', *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2010.

goals: it cleared a channel for food aid to Somalia; it brought pirates to justice in the Horn and the Seychelles; and it pressed insurance firms to reward commercial ships that adhered to best practice in repelling pirates. The EU's use of force was also carefully circumscribed. Piracy was to be combated first by non-military means; success in addressing the economic root causes of piracy would draw out the ringleaders in defence of their 'business model', allowing the EU to target them more effectively. This approach, which led to the establishment of the international Contact Group on Piracy, might be replicated for people-smuggling with some careful international diplomacy.

What leverage for the EU?

The EU has already begun exploiting these openings, for instance with a naval mission in the Mediterranean. But the underlying question remains: how can the EU best marshal its power to spread home affairs rules in such difficult circumstances? One option is for the EU to establish clear internal lines of political authority, so as to better coordinate and project power. In Europe parliaments have traditionally been marginal to both internal security and foreign policy, fields seen as innate expressions of the national will which do not require democratic debate. But over the past 20 years, the European Parliament (EP) has come to play a role in both fields, as these were subject to international standardisation. The challenge now is for the EP to articulate a common European will.¹⁶ One idea doing the rounds is for the Commission to propose a 'home affairs pact' to be adopted by the EP and European Council, empowering the EU to act in a crisis.

Such an initiative, however, would face resistance from the EU's constituent parts which defy this kind of tight hierarchy. The EU is also dealing with highly-fragmented third states. Turkey recently purged its security services for political reasons, and has devolved discretion for border matters to regional governors. Its trade links to Syria may be back up to 2010 levels, and its ties to Iraq set to grow further, but its authorities lack the incentive to monitor criminal networks using Turkey merely as a transit country to Europe. Turkish Airlines has bent to Ankara's trade policy and opened new routes to Turkey from Mogadishu and Algiers, but the authorities have no real means of preventing these flights being used for irregular migration. And, of course, there is Turkey's web of visa-free relations with fractious Arab states. In short, although its home affairs challenges may make Ankara susceptible to coordinated pressure from Brussels, it may also leave Turkey incapable of responding to the EU's requests for closer cooperation on migration and internal security.

With this in mind, the EU's traditional policy of fostering transformation in its neighbouring states through focusing on visa and mobility issues in an enlargement or 'enlargement-lite' approach seems more fruitful. After all, the EU wants to

16. Ben Tonra, 'Democratic foundations of EU foreign policy: narratives and the myth of EU exceptionalism', *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 18, no. 1, 2011, pp.1190-1207.

encourage the emergence of orderly home affairs regimes in these countries – in a process that brings together a wide range of players in their increasingly fragmented political systems. The EU could best mobilise the necessarily broad array of stakeholders in Turkey or Ukraine with an enlargement-lite process that re-energises bilateral talks on visa-free access and mobility, possibly with more emphasis on the functional rather than the procedural and institutional factors. Yet European governments must (and indeed do) worry about their own absorption capacity for migration.

The missing dimension here is probably the inter-regional approach – the possibility of building regional cooperation between the EU's neighbours to the south and east, and between these regions and their own neighbours, so as to lighten the burden on the EU's existing cooperation formats. Joined up, region-wide action by the EU in West Africa, for instance, would alleviate migration pressures on the MENA region. It would address the cross-border structures of organised crime – whereby criminal kingpins feed off poor regional societies and economic powerhouses exploit the weaknesses of their less stable neighbours.¹⁷ And it would provide a useful layer of international norms between the national and the global, at a time when China and others are seeking easy access to the region's raw resources. In this regard, the EU's own AFSJ and free movement regime might serve as a point of reference.

West Africa as fertile ground for a regional response

In recent times, the EU has established four home affairs-related interventions in West Africa. These are: (i) its security and governance intervention (the 2011 Sahel Strategy aimed at terrorism); (ii) a law-enforcement network aimed at organised crime gangs (the Cocaine Route project which addresses an illicit supply and transit chain across the region); (iii) an incipient naval approach to maritime crime (the Gulf of Guinea strategy aimed in part at the challenge posed to global rules by illegal overfishing by Chinese fleets); and (iv) a trade and aid package to boost economic regulation (Economic Partnership Agreements between the EU and West African states have been initialled, and DG DEVCO has begun a project to support regional free movement). Together these measures constitute a more or less comprehensive response to regional home affairs.

They are also heavily interlinked. The EU's trade and aid package, for example, aims to help West African countries build up their own range of goods, services and jobs, so that they diversify away from the export of raw commodities such as fish or food crops. At present, however, West Africa's reliance on commodities is acute. This means littoral states are signing up to fishing deals with Chinese and South Korean fleets, although they know full well that these are overfishing their waters as well as undermining EU-sponsored efforts to monitor stocks. The competition from in-

17. Tim Midgley, Ivan Briscoe and Daniel Bertoli, 'Identifying approaches and measuring impacts of programmes focused on Transnational Organised Crime', Saferworld Report, May 2014.

dustrial fleets drives local fishermen to turn to a range of illicit maritime activities, including narcotics smuggling. And the cocaine which these fishing boats bring to land in turn passes up along the old Tuareg salt path to North Africa, potentially providing a lucrative source of funding for al-Qaeda in the Sahel.

To each of these four sets of problems West Africa's fifteen-state cooperation body, ECOWAS, has an approach of its own. But – crucially – each of the EU's four interventions addresses its own specific choice of international partners and countries. The Sahel Strategy is concerned with the way environmental factors erode governance, and so it focuses mainly on a cluster of desert states – Mauritania, Mali and Niger; the Cocaine Route project traces an illicit supply route and involves law enforcement personnel not just in West Africa but across Latin America; and the Gulf of Guinea strategy is focused on littoral operations. The EU's trade approach does acknowledge ECOWAS as its prime partner. But it does not necessarily help to build ECOWAS as a player. Trade talks are about bargaining and comparative advantage and, in dealing with the ECOWAS countries as a bloc, the EU inevitably sets some of them (Ghana, Ivory Coast and Cape Verde) off against the rest.

Perhaps the only project which aims to build up ECOWAS as a partner, therefore, is that specific development-aid component designed to promote free movement in the region (see Box 6). The EU has a keen interest in building up orderly free movement across West Africa: West African states are a major source of irregular migration to the EU but many migrants might remain if conditions for mobility within their home regions were improved. Thus the EU simply cannot afford a situation where a greater proportion of migrants head northwards out of West Africa. Yet DEVCO's project has a deeper rationale: to develop relations with this regional partner *per se*, even if this does not quite fit the geography or economics of every home affairs problem in West Africa. The idea is that choosing a primary partner for cooperation is the best way to coordinate the EU's various policy arms, to secure local buy-in and to build regional order.

Box 6: EU support for West African free movement

The EU-funded project Free Movement and Migration (FMM) in West Africa aims to fully realise the free movement provisions contained within the ECOWAS 1979 protocols. DG DEVCO has put aside a budget of €26 million for FMM for a five-year period from mid-2013, with co-funding coming from ECOWAS itself. Managed by the EU delegation in Abuja, the project has been driven from the earliest conceptual stages by DEVCO's Africa Unit rather than its Migration Unit. Nevertheless, the project may well serve as a blueprint for the EU to develop other regional free movement regimes.

FMM addresses three sets of partners. It offers technical support to the ECOWAS Commission, and specifically its units dealing with free movement and human trafficking. It provides ECOWAS member states with expertise on demand so as to ensure implementation of ECOWAS rules, such as on the contentious rights of establishment and residence. Joint requests from governments are expedited. Lastly, it supports local NGOs working to clarify migrants' rights in the region. There are also political dialogues between the EU and ECOWAS members.

The FMM project is being run by a consortium of large international partners – ILO and IOM as well as ICMPD. Despite initial tensions between them during the budgeting phase, the 'jumbo format' has paid off. These three organisations manage numerous EU projects, meaning they can link up their activities and knock on the right doors in Brussels if need be. The trio have also built up cooperation with non-EU states active in the region, notably Switzerland. These three competitors have thus been turned into collaborators, ensuring that the project has been spared divisive lobbying.

Greater diplomatic pressure by the EU is required above all to defuse tensions between different regional bodies in West Africa, with ECOWAS seen as dominated by Anglophone Nigeria. The EU might press ECOWAS to meet its commitment to recruit dedicated specialists and to provide consortium partners with proper access to ECOWAS staff. Public diplomacy is also lacking: although this project is something of an experiment to measure the practicality of extending free-movement cooperation with COMESA in southern Africa and MERCOSUR in Latin America, the EU has been reticent about publicising FMM.

When it comes to law enforcement, free movement in West Africa cannot be seen to encourage criminality and drug-running if the EU does indeed want to pursue similar regimes in Latin America and Southern Africa. Yet it has fallen to the Swiss government to undertake a basic study of regulatory standards across the region – with the discovery that just a handful of states actually have a migration policy. EU home affairs experts have, by contrast, tended to focus on high-end ideas such as the introduction of the ECOWAS biometric passport.

As for the CSDP dimension, West African states are historically mistrustful of each other, not least of Nigeria which mixes both economic and military power, and might use free movement to project the state's power abroad. There is also concern that the greater regulation of regional migration will actually reduce resilience to refugee flows and serve to formalise discriminatory practices, in turn inviting disorder. And, of course, there is the underlying instability across the whole of West Africa, notably in the sub-region of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire.

Conclusion:

three priorities for the EU

In this challenging international environment, the EU faces three major tasks in organising its home affairs, each of which will require a different combination of policy tools.

• **Boosting the EU's resilience to external shocks**

In April 2015, a small group of officials and diplomats convened in Brussels for an exercise simulating an influx of refugees and migrants to the EU through Turkey and the Balkans (a scenario which, incidentally, has come to pass). The informal exercise revealed that, although the EU's various arms possess a great deal of know-how useful in such an eventuality, together this did not amount to an early-warning system. To establish such a system would require deeper coordination – for EU overseas missions and delegations to routinely transfer information to Frontex about countries of origin; for Frontex to send to INTCEN and to Europol migrants' insights into smuggling networks; and for EASO officials to tally Frontex's data about how migrants are entering the EU against their own information on where asylum applications are being lodged.

But the exercise also revealed the limits of what an early-warning system might achieve. Few systems, for instance, would have foreseen Eritrea's emergence as a major migrant-sending country: even today there is no real explanation as to why this small country produces so many migrants to the EU while other arbitrary African regimes do not. This lack of predictability shows the need to build the EU's resilience to unexpected pressures, and it puts the spotlight on three emergency solidarity mechanisms: the EU's mutual defence clause (Art. 42(7)) for cases of classic territorial aggression by a third state; the solidarity clause (Art. 222), to assist members facing a non-state territorial crisis such as a terrorist attack; and Arts. 78(3) & 80 for non-territorial crises such as refugee flows, which can be resolved by redistributing asylum-seekers between member states.

The practical distinctions between these clauses can be subtle. EU members' inability to return failed asylum seekers to uncooperative sending countries, and the potential link between migration and terrorism, could in theory turn irregular migration into a territorial crisis under Art. 222. Meanwhile, the use by Russia of 'non-state' (or 'hybrid') methods of territorial aggression, and the accretion of state-like attributes by terrorist groups like Da'esh, mean that Art. 222 now has defence implications akin to Art. 42(7). This conflation demands delicate cooperation across different policy fields – between the crisis-management systems housed in DG ECHO,

DG HOME and the EEAS; the emergency teams operated by EASO and Frontex; the civil protection structures across the EU and a ring of neighbours including Turkey, Serbia and Norway; EUROGENDFOR and EU vehicles of civil-military cooperation.

• **Internationalising home affairs policy**

In May 2015, the European Commission adopted the second of two new ‘policy agendas’ – strategies for migration and for internal security which will serve to coordinate the Commission’s home affairs work for the next five years. This followed up on the creation of thematic ‘project teams’ within the College of Commissioners, designed to acquaint Commissioners holding foreign-policy related portfolios with home affairs priorities. And it has in turn been bolstered by new mechanisms to improve inter-service coordination between DGs such as ECHO and DEVCO around the agendas’ core goals. But the two documents also revealed a coordination problem at the very heart of EU home affairs itself: migration and internal security have not been internationalised to the same degree. This mismatch hampers the development of European home affairs diplomacy as a uniform field.

While EU migration policy is today the subject of extensive cooperation with the EU’s eastern and southern neighbours and features prominently in relations to African states, European policy on crime and terrorism is more focused on the situation inside the EU, and is only partially internationalised. This disparity between the two components of European home affairs policy has become evident as the EU tries to work with the arc of eight nearby countries from Morocco to Turkey which have emerged as home affairs priority states. These countries are seeking cooperation in various fields: development, national security reform, information exchange with Europol and mutual legal assistance.

One task for the EU is therefore to put together a policy package for third countries in the sphere of internal security which matches that for labour migration (the mobility partnership format). The EU can take various short-cuts here such as to make European best practice in the field of counter-radicalisation more readily available to other countries. But, just as Frontex has led the field in internationalising the EU’s migration and borders policy, it will probably fall to Europol and other EU agencies when it comes to the hard grind of internationalising internal security cooperation. The EU’s crime and justice agencies thus need to be integrated into the analytical work of their foreign counterparts and of EU overseas missions. They also need to be linked to each other (see Box 7, pp 59-60), so that the EU’s home affairs regime functions as a coherent system.

Box 7: Cooperation between the EU's JHA agencies

Besides Europol, Frontex, EASO, CEPOL and Eurojust, the EU's network of JHA agencies includes the Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), the Agency for the Operational Management of large-scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA) and the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA). Cooperation between them focuses on encouraging evidence-led and rule-based action by the EU.

The agencies are bound by a web of agreements. The most important of these are the operational agreements which permit the exchange of personal data, such as that agreed between Eurojust and Europol in 2009. A second important category, strategic arrangements, allows for the exchange of technical information as well as cooperation in training. Europol enjoys these relationships with Frontex and CEPOL, as well as a further set of the EU's non-JHA agencies relevant to its specific field.

Recent additions to the web of JHA agreements include: Memorandums of Understanding between Eurojust and Frontex (December 2013), between EMCDDA and Eurojust (July 2014), and between Eurojust and FRA (November 2014), as well as a working arrangement between eu-LISA and Frontex (January 2014). But the really vital operational working arrangement between Europol and Frontex has been held up for some time due to legal concerns on Frontex's part.

In 2006 the nine agencies formed a network to pursue 'synergies'. A scorecard system to map their cooperation is run for the benefit of the European institutions, with the results published annually by the European Parliament, along with an annual listing of priorities for cooperation. There are regular network meetings – taking place three times in the course of 2015 – followed by a heads of agency meeting planned for November.

Training by the agencies has been identified as the best means to ensure practical cooperation across the EU and the neighbourhood. A joint 'training matrix' was duly initiated in 2014, and the Law Enforcement Training Scheme is becoming the main tool for common training efforts. There are also various accreditation and benchmarking exercises, including a certification process run by EASO and Frontex, and moves towards a Sectoral Qualification Framework.

At the level of risk analysis, information is regularly exchanged but methodological cooperation is underdeveloped, and practitioners struggle to combine the risk analysis reports of Europol, Frontex and EASO. Experts from Frontex, Europol and other JHA agencies have, however, made tentative efforts to coordinate their methodologies. The agencies have also made a joint,

evidence-based contribution to the EU's high-level process of creating a new multi-annual strategic programme.

Practical cooperation remains rather limited. In 2014 such initiatives featured the cooperation between Frontex and EASO on relations with Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco; a temporary secondment of a representative from Eurojust to Europol's cybercrime centre; the cooperation between Europol and Eurojust on the running of Joint Investigation Teams; and implementation of the EMPACT operational actions plans on organised crime with CEPOL, Eurojust, Europol, EMCDDA and Frontex.

• Integrating thematic and geographic priorities

In June 2015, the European Council gave the go-ahead to talks on a Global Strategy for foreign and security policy. This was another step towards the EU's long-standing goal of creating a joined-up foreign policy approach to other world regions, binding together its trade and aid, its law enforcement and migration, and its military and humanitarian tools. Clearly, the internationalisation of home affairs is a prerequisite for this joined-up approach, and the goal of creating areas of freedom, security and justice in West Africa and other world regions could provide an organising principle for it. But the coordination process also raises difficult questions, such as the degree to which EU development and trade policies should be used for home affairs purposes, and whether they should be leveraged to help expel irregular migrants or used as a means to address the root causes of disorderly migration.

EU members have developed their own ways of joining up interior and foreign policies. These range from creating a pool of high-level officials across the civil service who can be posted to any ministry, to ensuring that one ambassador per world region is in charge of coordinating home affairs goals there. One idea for the EU would be to establish a programme for Security and Legal Attachés (SLAs) with a curriculum that includes training in development aid: European SLAs posted to EU delegations to boost security and justice cooperation really need an affinity with the development terminology in order to work with NGOs on the ground. This programme could be trialled somewhere where the EU's home affairs stakes are relatively low, such as Latin America where countries are looking for European help to build national security capacities.

In regions closer to home, the EU could also usefully try out new combinations of policy tools. In the Western Balkans the EU has until now used access to the Schengen Area to leverage governance reform – a mixture of home affairs and enlargement

methodologies. But as unemployment levels rise in a region which is also a magnet for human smugglers trafficking migrants into the EU, the flanking measures currently in place with Western Balkan countries need to be reviewed. Trade and economic tools could now be useful in boosting employment across the Balkans. EU economic advisors are indeed engaging there, not least to improve statistical reporting and long-term economic planning by governments. But the shift could be deeper. The EU could use its visa policy to provide impetus to West Balkan economies, for instance by making sure international investors from Asia or the Americas who hold a Schengen visa gain easy access also to Balkan countries sharing a visa-free regime with the passport-free zone.

Annex

Abbreviations

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| 5+5 | Discussion forum for ten West Mediterranean states of Europe and North Africa |
| ACP | African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States |
| AFIC | Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community Joint Report |
| AFRIPOL | African Police Cooperation Mechanism |
| AFSJ | Area of Freedom, Security and Justice |
| AQIM | Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb |
| AU | African Union |
| AWP | Annual Work Programme |
| CEPOL | European Police Training College |
| CFSP | Common Foreign and Security Policy |
| CIVCOM | Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management |
| CMPD | Crisis Management and Planning Directorate |
| COMESA | Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa |
| COSI | Standing Committee on Internal Security |
| CSDP | Common Security and Defence Policy |
| CTC | Counter-Terrorism Coordinator |
| DCI | Development Cooperation Instrument |
| DG DEVCO | Directorate General for Development |

| | |
|-------------|--|
| DG HOME | Directorate General for Home Affairs |
| DG NEAR | Directorate General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations |
| EASO | European Asylum Support Office |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |
| EEAS | European External Action Service |
| EEU | Eurasian Economic Union |
| EMCDDA | European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction |
| EMPACT | European Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats |
| EMSA | European Maritime Security Agency |
| ENI | European Neighbourhood Instrument |
| ENPI | European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument |
| EP | European Parliament |
| ESS | European Security Strategy |
| EUBAM | EU Border Assistance Mission |
| EUROGENDFOR | European Gendarmerie Force |
| FMM | Free Movement and Migration |
| FRA | Fundamental Rights Agency |
| FSJ | Freedom, Security and Justice |
| FYROM | Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia |
| GAMM | Global Approach to Migration and Mobility |
| G7 | Group of seven major world economies |
| HLWG | High Level Working Group on Migration and Asylum |
| IBM | Integrated Border Management |

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| ICMPD | International Centre for Migration Policy Development |
| IGAD | Intergovernmental Authority on Development |
| ILO | International Labour Organisation |
| INTCEN | EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (<i>successor of SITCEN</i>) |
| IOM | International Organisation for Migration |
| ISS | Internal Security Strategy |
| JAI-EX | Committee for the External Dimension of Justice and Home Affairs |
| JHA | Justice and Home Affairs |
| MENA | Middle East and North Africa |
| MoU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| OCG | Organised Crime Group |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development |
| OSCE | Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe |
| PNR | Passenger Name Record |
| PSC | Political and Security Committee |
| R&D | Research and Development |
| RDPP | Refugee Development and Protection Programme |
| SAR | Search and Rescue |
| SCO | Shanghai Cooperation Organisation |
| SITCEN | Situation Centre |
| SLA | Security and Legal Attaché |
| SOCTA | Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment |

| | |
|-------|---|
| SOFA | Status of forces agreement |
| SSR | Security Sector Reform |
| TFEU | Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNHCR | UN High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNODC | United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime |
| USD | United States Dollars |
| USSR | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| VAT | Value Added Tax |



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